Having characterised in detail the different aims to which war may be directed,
we shall go through the organisation of war as a whole for each of the three
separate gradations corresponding to these aims.
In conformity with all that has been said on the subject up to the present, two
fundamental principles reign throughout the whole plan of the war, and serve as
a guide for everything else.
The first is: to reduce the weight of the enemy’s power into as few
centres of gravity as possible, into one if it can be done; again, to confine
the attack against these centres of force to as few principal undertakings as
possible, to one if possible; lastly, to keep all secondary undertakings as
subordinate as possible. In a word, the first principle is, to act
concentrated as much as possible.
The second principle runs thus to act as swiftly as possible; therefore,
to allow of no delay or detour without sufficient reason.
The reducing the enemy’s power to one central point depends
1. On the nature of its political connection. If it consists of armies of one
Power, there is generally no difficulty; if of allied armies, of which one is
acting simply as an ally without any interest of its own, then the difficulty
is not much greater; if of a coalition for a common object, then it depends on
the cordiality of the alliance; we have already treated of this subject.
2. On the situation of the theatre of war upon which the different hostile
armies make their appearance.
If the enemy’s forces are collected in one army upon one theatre of war,
they constitute in reality a unity, and we need not inquire further; if they
are upon one theatre of war, but in separate armies, which belong to different
Powers, there is no longer absolute unity; there is, however, a sufficient
interdependence of parts for a decisive blow upon one part to throw down the
other in the concussion. If the armies are posted in theatres of war adjoining
each other, and not separated by any great natural obstacles, then there is in
such case also a decided influence of the one upon the other; but if the
theatres of war are wide apart, if there is neutral territory, great mountains,
etc., intervening between them, then the influence is very doubtful and
improbable as well; if they are on quite opposite sides of the State against
which the war is made, so that operations directed against them must diverge on
eccentric lines, then almost every trace of connection is at an end.
If Prussia was attacked by France and Russia at the same time, it would be as
respects the conduct of the war much the same as if there were two separate
wars; at the same time the unity would appear in the negotiations.
Saxony and Austria, on the contrary, as military powers in the Seven
Years’ War, were to be regarded as one; what the one suffered the other
felt also, partly because the theatres of war lay in the same direction for
Frederick the Great, partly because Saxony had no political independence.
Numerous as were the enemies of Buonaparte in Germany in 1813, still they all
stood very much in one direction in respect to him, and the theatres of war for
their armies were in close connection, and reciprocally influenced each other
very powerfully. If by a concentration of all his forces he had been able to
overpower the main army, such a defeat would have had a decisive effect on all
the parts. If he had beaten the Bohemain grand army, and marched upon Vienna by
Prague, Blücher, however willing, could not have remained in Saxony, because he
would have been called upon to co-operate in Bohemia, and the Crown Prince of
Sweden as well would have been unwilling to remain in the Mark.
On the other hand, Austria, if carrying on war against the French on the Rhine
and Italy at the same time, will always find it difficult to give a decision
upon one of those theatres by means of a successful stroke on the other. Partly
because Switzerland, with its mountains, forms too strong a barrier between the
two theatres, and partly because the direction of the roads on each side is
divergent. France, again, can much sooner decide in the one by a successful
result in the other, because the direction of its forces in both converges upon
Vienna, the centre of the power of the whole Austrian empire; we may add
further, that a decisive blow in Italy will have more effect on the Rhine
theatre than a success on the Rhine would have in Italy, because the blow from
Italy strikes nearer to the centre, and that from the Rhine more upon the
flank, of the Austrian dominions.
It proceeds from what we have said that the conception of separated or
connected hostile power extends through all degrees of relationship, and that
therefore, in each case, the first thing is to discover the influence which
events in one theatre may have upon the other, according to which we may then
afterwards settle how far the different forces of the enemy may be reduced into
one centre of force.
There is only one exception to the principle of directing all our strength
against the centre of gravity of the enemy’s power, that is, if ancillary
expeditions promise extraordinary advantages, and still, in this case,
it is a condition assumed, that we have such a decisive superiority as enables
us to undertake such enterprises without incurring too great risk at the point
which forms our great object.
When General Bulow marched into Holland in 1814, it was to be foreseen that the
thirty thousand men composing his corps would not only neutralise the same
number of Frenchmen, but would, besides, give the English and the Dutch an
opportunity of entering the field with forces which otherwise would never have
been brought into activity.
Thus, therefore, the first consideration in the combination of a plan for a
war, is to determine the centres of gravity of the enemy’s power, and, if
possible, to reduce them to one. The second is to unite the forces which are to
be employed against the centre of force into one great action.
Here now the following grounds for dividing our forces may present themselves:
1. The original position of the military forces, therefore also the situation
of the States engaged in the offensive.
If the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss of time, and
the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too great, then the same may
be justifiable on those grounds; for to effect an unnecessary concentration of
forces, with great loss of time, by which the freshness and rapidity of the
first blow is diminished, would be contrary to the second leading principle we
have laid down. In all cases in which there is a hope of surprising the enemy
in some measure, this deserves particular attention.
But the case becomes still more important if the attack is undertaken by allied
States which are not situated on a line directed towards the State attacked not
one behind the other but situated side by side. If Prussia and Austria
undertook a war against France, it would be a very erroneous measure, a
squandering of time and force if the armies of the two powers were obliged to
set out from the same point, as the natural line for an army operating from
Prussia against the heart of France is from the Lower Rhine, and that of the
Austrians is from the Upper Rhine. Concentration, therefore, in this case,
could only be effected by a sacrifice; consequently in any particular instance,
the question to be decided would be, Is the necessity for concentration so
great that this sacrifice must be made?
2. The attack by separate lines may offer greater results.
As we are now speaking of advancing by separate lines against one centre of
force, we are, therefore, supposing an advance by converging lines. A
separate advance on parallel or eccentric lines belongs to the rubric of
accessory undertakings, of which we have already spoken.
Now, every convergent attack in strategy, as well as in tactics, holds out the
prospect of great results; for if it succeeds, the consequence is not simply a
defeat, but more or less the cutting off of the enemy. The concentric attack
is, therefore, always that which may lead to the greatest results; but on
account of the separation of the parts of the force, and the enlargement of the
theatre of war, it involves also the most risk; it is the same here as with
attack and defence, the weaker form holds out the greater results in prospect.
The question, therefore, is, whether the assailant feels strong enough to try
for this great result.
When Frederick the Great advanced upon Bohemia, in the year 1757, he set out
from Saxony and Silesia with his forces divided. The two principal reasons for
his doing so were, first, that his forces were so cantoned in the winter that a
concentration of them at one point would have divested the attack of all the
advantages of a surprise; and next, that by this concentric advance, each of
the two Austrian theatres of war was threatened in the flanks and the rear. The
danger to which Frederick the Great exposed himself on that occasion was that
one of his two armies might have been completely defeated by superior forces;
should the Austrians not see this, then they would have to give battle
with their centre only, or run the risk of being thrown off their line of
communication, either on one side or the other, and meeting with a catastrophe;
this was the great result which the king hoped for by this advance. The
Austrians preferred the battle in the centre, but Prague, where they took up
their position, was in a situation too much under the influence of the
convergent attack, which, as they remained perfectly passive in their position,
had time to develop its efficacy to the utmost. The consequence of this was
that when they lost the battle, it was a complete catastrophe; as is manifest
from the fact that two-thirds of the army with the commander-in-chief were
obliged to shut themselves up in Prague.
This brilliant success at the opening of the campaign was attained by the bold
stroke with a concentric attack. If Frederick considered the precision of his
own movements, the energy of his generals, the moral superiority of his troops,
on the one side, and the sluggishness of the Austrians on the other, as
sufficient to ensure the success of his plan, who can blame him? But as we
cannot leave these moral advantages out of consideration, neither can we
ascribe the success solely to the mere geometrical form of the attack. Let us
only think of the not less brilliant campaign of Buonaparte’s, in the
year 1796, when the Austrians were so severely punished for their concentric
march into Italy. The means which the French general had at command on that
occasion, the Austrian general had also at his disposal in 1757 (with the
exception of the moral), indeed, he had rather more, for he was not, like
Buonaparte, weaker than his adversary. Therefore, when it is to be apprehended
that the advance on separate converging lines may afford the enemy the means of
counteracting the inequality of numerical forces by using interior lines, such
a form of attack is not advisable; and if on account of the situation of the
belligerents, it must be resorted to, it can only be regarded as a necessary
evil.
If, from this point of view, we cast our eyes on the plan which was adopted for
the invasion of France in 1814, it is impossible to give it approval. The
Russian, Austrian, and Prussian armies were concentrated at a point near
Frankfort on the Maine, on the most natural and most direct line to the centre
of the force of the French monarchy. These armies were then separated, that one
might penetrate into France from Mayence, the other from Switzerland. As the
enemy’s force was so reduced that a defence of the frontier was out of
the question, the whole advantage to be expected from this concentric advance,
if it succeeded, was that while Lorraine and Alsace were conquered by one army,
Franche-Comte would be taken by the other. Was this trifling advantage worth
the trouble of marching into Switzerland? We know very well that there were
other (but just as insufficient) grounds which caused this march; but we
confine ourselves here to the point which we are considering.
On the other side, Buonaparte was a man who thoroughly understood the defensive
to oppose to a concentric attack, as he had already shown in his masterly
campaign of 1796; and although the Allies were very considerably superior in
numbers, yet the preponderance due to his superiority as a general was on all
occasions acknowledged. He joined his army too late near Chalons, and looked
down rather too much, generally, on his opponents, still he was very near
hitting the two armies separately; and what was the state he found them in at
Brienne? Blücher had only 27,000 of his 65,000 men with him, and the great
army, out of 200,000, had only 100,000 present. It was impossible to make a
better game for the adversary. And from the moment that active work began, no
greater want was felt than that of re-union.
After all these reflections, we think that although the concentric attack is in
itself a means of obtaining greater results, still it should generally only
proceed from a previous separation of the parts composing the whole force, and
that there are few cases in which we should do right in giving up the shortest
and most direct line of operation for the sake of adopting that form.
3. The breadth of a theatre of war can be a motive for attacking on separate
lines.
If an army on the offensive in its advance from any point, penetrates with
success to some distance into the interior of the enemy’s country, then,
certainly, the space which it commands is not restricted exactly to the line of
road by which it marches, it will command a margin on each side; still that
will depend very much, if we may use the figure, on the solidity and cohesion
of the opposing State. If the State only hangs loosely together, if its people
are an effeminate race unaccustomed to war, then, without our taking much
trouble, a considerable extent of country will open behind our victorious army;
but if we have to deal with a brave and loyal population, the space behind our
army will form a triangle, more or less acute.
In order to obviate this evil, the attacking force requires to regulate its
advance on a certain width of front. If the enemy’s force is concentrated
at a particular point, this breadth of front can only be preserved so long as
we are not in contact with the enemy, and must be contracted as we approach his
position: that is easy to understand.
But if the enemy himself has taken up a position with a certain extent of
front, then there is nothing absurd in a corresponding extension on our part.
We speak here of one theatre of war, or of several, if they are quite close to
each other. Obviously this is, therefore, the case when, according to our view,
the chief operation is, at the same time, to be decisive on subordinate points
But now can we always run the chance of this? And may we expose
ourselves to the danger which must arise if the influence of the chief
operation is not sufficient to decide at the minor points? Does not the want of
a certain breadth for a theatre of war deserve special consideration?
Here as well as everywhere else it is impossible to exhaust the number of
combinations which may take place; but we maintain that, with few
exceptions, the decision on the capital point will carry with it the decision
on all minor points. Therefore, the action should be regulated in conformity
with this principle, in all cases in which the contrary is not evident.
When Buonaparte invaded Russia, he had good reason to believe that by
conquering the main body of the Russian army he would compel their forces on
the Upper Dwina to succumb. He left at first only the corps of Oudinot to
oppose them, but Wittgenstein assumed the offensive, and Buonaparte was then
obliged to send also the sixth corps to that quarter.
On the other hand, at the beginning of the campaign, he directed a part of his
forces against Bagration; but that general was carried along by the influence
of the backward movement in the centre, and Buonaparte was enabled then to
recall that part of his forces. If Wittgenstein had not had to cover the second
capital, he would also have followed the retreat of the great army under
Barclay.
In the years 1805 and 1809, Buonaparte’s victories at Ulm and Ratisbon
decided matters in Italy and also in the Tyrol, although the first was rather a
distant theatre, and an independent one in itself. In the year 1806, his
victories at Jena and Auerstadt were decisive in respect to everything that
might have been attempted against him in Westphalia and Hesse, or on the
Frankfort road.
Amongst the number of circumstances which may have an influence on the
resistance at secondary points, there are two which are the most prominent.
The first is: that in a country of vast extent, and also relatively of great
power, like Russia, we can put off the decisive blow at the chief point for
some time, and are not obliged to do all in a hurry.
The second is: when a minor point (like Silesia in the year 1806), through a
great number of fortresses, possesses an extraordinary degree of independent
strength. And yet Buonaparte treated that point with great contempt, inasmuch
as, when he had to leave such a point completely in his rear on the march to
Warsaw, he only detached 20,000 men under his brother Jerome to that quarter.
If it happens that the blow at the capital point, in all probability, will not
shake such a secondary point, or has not done so, and if the enemy has still
forces at that point, then to these, as a necessary evil, an adequate force
must be opposed, because no one can absolutely lay open his line of
communication from the very commencement.
But prudence may go a step further; it may require that the advance upon the
chief point shall keep pace with that on the secondary points, and consequently
the principal undertaking must be delayed whenever the secondary points will
not succumb.
This principle does not directly contradict ours as to uniting all action as
far as possible in one great undertaking, but the spirit from which it springs
is diametrically opposed to the spirit in which ours is conceived. By following
such a principle there would be such a measured pace in the movements, such a
paralysation of the impulsive force, such room for the freak of chance, and
such a loss of time, as would be practically perfectly inconsistent with an
offensive directed to the complete overthrow of the enemy.
The difficulty becomes still greater if the forces stationed at these minor
points can retire on divergent lines. What would then become of the unity of
our attack?
We must, therefore, declare ourselves completely opposed in principle to the
dependence of the chief attack on minor attacks, and we maintain that an attack
directed to the destruction of the enemy which has not the boldness to shoot,
like the point of an arrow, direct at the heart of the enemy’s power, can
never hit the mark.
4. Lastly, there is still a fourth ground for a separate advance in the
facility which it may afford for subsistence.
It is certainly much pleasanter to march with a small army through an opulent
country, than with a large army through a poor one; but by suitable measures,
and with an army accustomed to privations, the latter is not impossible, and,
therefore, the first should never have such an influence on our plans as to
lead us into a great danger.
We have now done justice to the grounds for a separation of forces which
divides the chief operation into several, and if the separation takes place on
any of these grounds, with a distinct conception of the object, and after due
consideration of the advantages and disadvantages, we shall not venture to find
fault.
But if, as usually happens, a plan is drawn out by a learned general staff,
merely according to routine; if different theatres of war, like the squares on
a chess board, must each have its piece first placed on it before the moves
begin, if these moves approach the aim in complicated lines and relations by
dint of an imaginary profundity in the art of combination, if the armies are to
separate to-day in order to apply all their skill in reuniting at the greatest
risk in fourteen days then we have a perfect horror of this abandonment of the
direct simple common-sense road to rush intentionally into absolute confusion.
This folly happens more easily the less the general-in-chief directs the war,
and conducts it in the sense which we have pointed out in the first chapter as
an act of his individuality invested with extraordinary powers; the more,
therefore, the whole plan is manufactured by an inexperienced staff, and from
the ideas of a dozen smatterers.
We have still now to consider the third part of our first principle; that is,
to keep the subordinate parts as much as possible in subordination.
Whilst we endeavour to refer the whole of the operations of a war to one single
aim, and try to attain this as far as possible by one great effort, we
deprive the other points of contact of the States at war with each other of a
part of their independence; they become subordinate actions. If we could
concentrate everything absolutely into one action, then those points of contact
would be completely neutralised; but this is seldom possible, and, therefore,
what we have to do is to keep them so far within bounds, that they shall not
cause the abstraction of too many forces from the main action.
Next, we maintain that the plan of the war itself should have this tendency,
even if it is not possible to reduce the whole of the enemy’s resistance
to one point; consequently, in case we are placed in the position already
mentioned, of carrying on two almost quite separate wars at the same time, the
one must always be looked upon as the principal affair to which our
forces and activity are to be chiefly devoted.
In this view, it is advisable only to proceed offensively against that
one principal point, and to preserve the defensive upon all the others. The
attack there being only justifiable when invited by very exceptional
circumstances.
Further we are to carry on this defensive, which takes place at minor points,
with as few troops as possible, and to seek to avail ourselves of every
advantage which the defensive form can give.
This view applies with still more force to all theatres of war on which armies
come forward belonging to different powers really, but still such as will be
struck when the general centre of force is struck.
But against the enemy at whom the great blow is aimed, there must be,
according to this, no defensive on minor theatres of war. The chief attack
itself, and the secondary attacks, which for other reasons are combined with
it, make up this blow, and make every defensive, on points not directly covered
by it, superfluous. All depends on this principal attack; by it every loss will
be compensated. If the forces are sufficient to make it reasonable to seek for
that great decision, then the possibility of failure can be no ground
for guarding oneself against injury at other points in any event; for just by
such a course this failure will become more probable, and it therefore
constitutes here a contradiction in our action.
This same predominance of the principal action over the minor, must be the
principle observed in each of the separate branches of the attack. But as there
are generally ulterior motives which determine what forces shall advance from
one theatre of war, and what from another against the common centre of the
enemy’s power, we only mean here that there must be an effort to make
the chief action over-ruling, for everything will become simpler and less
subject to the influence of chance events the nearer this state of
preponderance can be attained.
The second principle concerns the rapid use of the forces.
Every unnecessary expenditure of time, every unnecessary detour, is a waste of
power, and therefore contrary to the principles of strategy.
It is most important to bear always in mind that almost the only advantage
which the offensive possesses, is the effect of surprise at the opening of the
scene. Suddenness and irresistible impetuosity are its strongest pinions; and
when the object is the complete overthrow of the enemy, it can rarely dispense
with them.
By this, therefore, theory demands the shortest way to the object, and
completely excludes from consideration endless discussions about right and left
here and there.
If we call to mind what was said in the chapter on the subject of the strategic
attack respecting the pit of the stomach in a state, and further, what appears
in the fourth chapter of this book, on the influence of time, we believe no
further argument is required to prove that the influence which we claim for
that principle really belongs to it.
Buonaparte never acted otherwise. The shortest high road from army to army,
from one capital to another, was always the way he loved best.
And in what will now consist the principal action to which we have referred
everything, and for which we have demanded a swift and straightforward
execution?
In the fourth chapter we have explained as far as it is possible in a general
way what the total overthrow of the enemy means, and it is unnecessary to
repeat it. Whatever that may depend on at last in particular cases, still the
first step is always the same in all cases, namely: The destruction of the
enemy’s combatant force, that is, a great victory over the same
and its dispersion. The sooner, which means the nearer our own frontiers,
this victory is sought for, the easier it is; the later, that is, the
further in the heart of the enemy’s country it is gained, the more
decisive it is. Here, as well as everywhere, the facility of success and
its magnitude balance each other.
If we are not so superior to the enemy that the victory is beyond doubt, then
we should, when possible, seek him out, that is his principal force. We say
when possible, for if this endeavour to find him led to great detours,
false directions, and a loss of time, it might very likely turn out a mistake.
If the enemy’s principal force is not on our road, and our interests
otherwise prevent our going in quest of him, we may be sure we shall meet with
him hereafter, for he will not fail to place himself in our way. We shall then,
as we have just said, fight under less advantageous circumstances an evil to
which we must submit. However, if we gain the battle, it will be so much the
more decisive.
From this it follows that, in the case now assumed, it would be an error to
pass by the enemy’s principal force designedly, if it places itself in
our way, at least if we expect thereby to facilitate a victory.
On the other hand, it follows from what precedes, that if we have a decided
superiority over the enemy’s principal force, we may designedly pass it
by in order at a future time to deliver a more decisive battle.
We have been speaking of a complete victory, therefore of a thorough defeat of
the enemy, and not of a mere battle gained. But such a victory requires an
enveloping attack, or a battle with an oblique front, for these two forms
always give the result a decisive character. It is therefore an essential part
of a plan of a war to make arrangements for this movement, both as regards the
mass of forces required and the direction to be given them, of which more will
be said in the chapter on the plan of campaign.
It is certainly not impossible, that even Battles fought with parallel fronts
may lead to complete defeats, and cases in point are not wanting in military
history; but such an event is uncommon, and will be still more so the more
armies become on a par as regards discipline and handiness in the field. We no
longer take twenty-one battalions in a village, as they did at Blenheim.
Once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about rest, not
about taking breath, not about considering, not about reorganising, etc., etc.,
but only of pursuit of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the
enemy’s capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or of
whatever else appears to be a rallying point for the enemy.
If the tide of victory carries us near the enemy’s fortresses, the laying
siege to them or not will depend on our means. If we have a great superiority
of force, it would be a loss of time not to take them as soon as possible; but
if we are not certain of the further events before us, we must keep the
fortresses in check with as few troops as possible, which precludes any regular
formal sieges. The moment that the siege of a fortress compels us to suspend
our strategic advance, that advance, as a rule, has reached its
culminating point. We demand, therefore, that the main body should press
forward rapidly in pursuit without any rest; we have already condemned the idea
of allowing the advance towards the principal point being made dependent on
success at secondary points; the consequence of this is, that in all ordinary
cases, our chief army only keeps behind it a narrow strip of territory which it
can call its own, and which therefore constitutes its theatre of war. How this
weakens the momentum at the head, and the dangers for the offensive arising
therefrom, we have shown already. Will not this difficulty, will not this
intrinsic counterpoise come to a point which impedes further advance? Certainly
that may occur; but just as we have already insisted that it would be a mistake
to try to avoid this contracted theatre of war at the commencement, and for the
sake of that object to rob the advance of its elasticity, so we also now
maintain, that as long as the commander has not yet overthrown his opponent, as
long as he considers himself strong enough to effect that object, so long must
he also pursue it. He does so perhaps at an increased risk, but also with the
prospect of a greater success. If he reaches a point which he cannot venture to
go beyond, where, in order to protect his rear, he must extend himself right
and left well, then, this is most probably his culminating point. The power of
flight is spent, and if the enemy is not subdued, most probably he will not be
now.
All that the assailant now does to intensify his attack by conquest of
fortresses, defiles, provinces, is no doubt still a slow advance, but it is
only of a relative kind, it is no longer absolute. The enemy is no longer in
flight, he is perhaps preparing a renewed resistance, and it is therefore
already possible that, although the assailant still advances intensively, the
position of the defence is every day improving. In short, we come back to this,
that, as a rule, there is no second spring after a halt has once been
necessary.
Theory, therefore, only requires that, as long as there is an intention of
destroying the enemy, there must be no cessation in the advance of the attack;
if the commander gives up this object because it is attended with too great a
risk, he does right to stop and extend his force. Theory only objects to this
when he does it with a view to more readily defeating the enemy.
We are not so foolish as to maintain that no instance can be found of States
having been gradually reduced to the utmost extremity. In the first
place, the principle we now maintain is no absolute truth, to which an
exception is impossible, but one founded only on the ordinary and probable
result; next, we must make a distinction between cases in which the downfall of
a State has been effected by a slow gradual process, and those in which the
event was the result of a first campaign. We are here only treating of the
latter case, for it is only in such that there is that tension of forces which
either overcomes the centre of gravity of the weight, or is in danger of being
overcome by it. If in the first year we gain a moderate advantage, to which in
the following we add another, and thus gradually advance towards our object,
there is nowhere very imminent danger, but it is distributed over many points.
Each pause between one result and another gives the enemy fresh chances: the
effects of the first results have very little influence on those which follow,
often none, often a negative only, because the enemy recovers himself, or is
perhaps excited to increased resistance, or obtains foreign aid; whereas, when
all is done in one march, the success of yesterday brings on with itself that
of to-day, one brand lights itself from another. If there are cases in which
States have been overcome by successive blows in which, consequently,
Time, generally the patron of the defensive, has proved adverse how
infinitely more numerous are the instances in which the designs of the
aggressor have by that means utterly failed. Let us only think of the result of
the Seven Years’ War, in which the Austrians sought to attain their
object so comfortably, cautiously, and prudently, that they completely missed
it.
In this view, therefore, we cannot at all join in the opinion that the care
which belongs to the preparation of a theatre of war, and the impulse which
urges us onwards, are on a level in importance, and that the former must, to a
certain extent, be a counterpoise to the latter; but we look upon any evil
which springs out of the forward movement, as an unavoidable evil which only
deserves attention when there is no longer hope for us a-head by the forward
movement.
Buonaparte’s case in 1812, very far from shaking our opinion, has rather
confirmed us in it.
His campaign did not miscarry because he advanced too swiftly, or too far, as
is commonly believed, but because the only means of success failed. The Russian
Empire is no country which can be regularly conquered, that is to say, which
can be held in possession, at least not by the forces of the present States of
Europe, nor by the 500,000 men with which Buonaparte invaded the country. Such
a country can only be subdued by its own weakness, and by the effects of
internal dissension. In order to strike these vulnerable points in its
political existence, the country must be agitated to its very centre. It was
only by reaching Moscow with the force of his blow that Buonaparte could hope
to shake the courage of the Government, the loyalty and steadfastness of the
people. In Moscow he expected to find peace, and this was the only rational
object which he could set before himself in undertaking such a war.
He therefore led his main body against that of the Russians, which fell back
before him, trudged past the camp at Drissa, and did not stop until it reached
Smolensk. He carried Bagration along in his movement, beat the principal Russia
army, and took Moscow.
He acted on this occasion as he had always done: it was only in that way that
he made himself the arbiter of Europe, and only in that way was it possible for
him to do so.
He, therefore, who admires Buonaparte in all his earlier campaigns as the
greatest of generals, ought not to censure him in this instance.
It is quite allowable to judge an event according to the result, as that is the
best criticism upon it (see fifth chapter, 2nd book), but this judgment derived
merely from the result, must not then be passed off as evidence of superior
understanding. To seek out the causes of the failure of a campaign, is not
going the length of making a criticism upon it; it is only if we show that
these causes should neither have been overlooked nor disregarded that we make a
criticism and place ourselves above the General.
Now we maintain that any one who pronounces the campaign of 1812 an absurdity
merely on account of the tremendous reaction in it, and who, if it had been
successful, would look upon it as a most splendid combination, shows an utter
incapacity of judgment.
If Buonaparte had remained in Lithuania, as most of his critics think he
should, in order first to get possession of the fortresses, of which, moreover,
except Riga, situated quite at one side, there is hardly one, because Bobruisk
is a small insignificant place of arms, he would have involved himself for the
winter in a miserable defensive system: then the same people would have been
the first to exclaim, This is not the old Buonaparte! How is it, he has not got
even as far as a first great battle? he who used to put the final seal to his
conquests on the last ramparts of the enemy’s states, by victories such
as Austerlitz and Friedland. Has his heart failed him that he has not taken the
enemy’s capital, the defenceless Moscow, ready to open its gates, and
thus left a nucleus round which new elements of resistance may gather
themselves? He had the singular luck to take this far-off and enormous colossus
by surprise, as easily as one would surprise a neighbouring town, or as
Frederick the Great entered the little state of Silesia, lying at his door, and
he makes no use of his good fortune, halts in the middle of his victorious
career, as if some evil spirit laid at his heels! This is the way in which he
would have been judged of after the result, for this is the fashion of
critics’ judgments in general.
In opposition to this, we say, the campaign of 1812 did not succeed because the
government remained firm, the people loyal and steadfast, because it therefore
could not succeed. Buonaparte may have made a mistake in undertaking such an
expedition; at all events, the result has shown that he deceived himself in his
calculations, but we maintain that, supposing it necessary to seek the
attainment of this object, it could not have been done in any other way upon
the whole.
Instead of burthening himself with an interminable costly defensive war in the
east, such as he had on his hands in the west, Buonaparte attempted the only
means to gain his object: by one bold stroke to extort a peace from his
astonished adversary. The destruction of his army was the danger to which he
exposed himself in the venture; it was the stake in the game, the price of
great expectations. If this destruction of his army was more complete than it
need have been through his own fault, this fault was not in his having
penetrated too far into the heart of the country, for that was his object, and
unavoidable; but in the late period at which the campaign opened, the sacrifice
of life occasioned by his tactics, the want of due care for the supply of his
army, and for his line of retreat, and lastly, in his having too long delayed
his march from Moscow.
That the Russians were able to reach the Beresina before him, intending
regularly to cut off his retreat, is no strong argument against us. For in the
first place, the failure of that attempt just shows how difficult it is really
to cut off an army, as the army which was intercepted in this case under the
most unfavourable circumstances that can be conceived, still managed at last to
cut its way through; and although this act upon the whole contributed certainly
to increase its catastrophe, still it was not essentially the cause of it.
Secondly, it was only the very peculiar nature of the country which afforded
the means to carry things as far as the Russians did; for if it had not been
for the marshes of the Beresina, with its wooded impassable borders lying
across the great road, the cutting off would have been still less possible.
Thirdly, there is generally no means of guarding against such an eventuality
except by making the forward movement with the front of the army of such a
width as we have already disapproved; for if we proceed on the plan of pushing
on in advance with the centre and covering the wings by armies detached right
and left, then if either of these detached armies meets with a check, we must
fall back with the centre, and then very little can be gained by the attack.
Moreover, it cannot be said that Buonaparte neglected his wings. A superior
force remained fronting Wittgenstein, a proportionate siege-corps stood before
Riga which at the same time was not needed there, and in the south
Schwarzenberg had 50,000 men with which he was superior to Tormasoff and almost
equal to Tschitschagow: in addition, there were 30,000 men under Victor,
covering the rear of the centre. Even in the month of November, therefore, at
the decisive moment when the Russian armies had been reinforced, and the French
were very much reduced, the superiority of the Russians in rear of the Moscow
army was not so very extraordinary. Wittgenstein, Tschitschagow, and Sacken,
made up together a force of 100,000. Schwartzenberg, Regmer, Victor, Oudinot,
and St. Cyr, had still 80,000 effective. The most cautious general in advancing
would hardly devote a greater proportion of his force to the protection of his
flanks.
If out of the 600,000 men who crossed the Niemen in 1812, Buonaparte had
brought back 250,000 instead of the 50,000 who repassed it under
Schwartzenberg, Regmer, and Macdonald, which was possible, by avoiding the
mistakes with which he has been reproached, the campaign would still have been
an unfortunate one, but theory would have had nothing to object to it, for the
loss of half an army in such a case is not at all unusual, and only appears so
to us in this instance on account of the enormous scale of the whole
enterprize.
So much for the principal operation, its necessary tendency, and the
unavoidable risks. As regards the subordinate operations, there must be, above
all things, a common aim for all; but this aim must be so situated as not to
paralyse the action of any of the individual parts. If we invade France from
the upper and middle Rhine and Holland, with the intention of uniting at Paris,
neither of the armies employed to risk anything on the advance, but to keep
itself intact until the concentration is effected, that is what we call a
ruinous plan. There must be necessarily a constant comparison of the state of
this threefold movement causing delay, indecision, and timidity in the forward
movement of each of the armies. It is better to assign to each part its
mission, and only to place the point of union wherever these several activities
become unity of themselves.
Therefore, when a military force advances to the attack on separate theatres of
war, to each army should be assigned an object against which the force of its
shock is to be directed. Here the point is that these shocks
should be given from all sides simultaneously, but not that proportional
advantages should result from all of them.
If the task assigned to one army is found too difficult because the enemy has
made a disposition of his force different to that which was expected, if it
sustains a defeat, this neither should, nor must have, any influence on the
action of the others, or we should turn the probability of the general success
against ourselves at the very outset. It is only the unsuccessful issue of the
majority of enterprises or of the principal one, which can and must have an
influence upon the others: for then it comes under the head of a plan which has
miscarried.
This same rule applies to those armies and portions of them which have
originally acted on the defensive, and, owing to the successes gained, have
assumed the offensive, unless we prefer to attach such spare forces to the
principal offensive, a point which will chiefly depend on the geographical
situation of the theatre of war.
But under these circumstances, what becomes of the geometrical form and unity
of the whole attack, what of the flanks and rear of corps when those corps next
to them are beaten.
That is precisely what we wish chiefly to combat. This glueing down of a great
offensive plan of attack on a geometrical square, is losing one’s way in
the regions of fallacy.
In the fifteenth chapter of the Third Book we have shown that the geometrical
element has less influence in strategy than in tactics; and we shall only here
repeat the deduction there obtained, that in the attack especially, the actual
results at the various points throughout deserve more attention than the
geometrical figure, which may gradually be formed through the diversity of
results.
But in any case, it is quite certain, that looking to the vast spaces with
which strategy has to deal, the views and resolutions which the geometrical
situation of the parts may create, should be left to the general-in-chief;
that, therefore, no subordinate general has a right to ask what his neighbour
is doing or leaving undone, but each is to be directed peremptorily to follow
out his object. If any serious incongruity really arises from this, a remedy
can always be applied in time by the supreme authority. Thus, then, may be
obviated the chief evil of this separate mode of action, which is, that in the
place of realities, a cloud of apprehensions and suppositions mix themselves up
in the progress of an operation, that every accident affects not only the part
it comes immediately in contact with, but also the whole, by the communication
of impressions, and that a wide field of action is opened for the personal
failings and personal animosities of subordinate commanders.
We think that these views will only appear paradoxical to those who have not
studied military history long enough or with sufficient attention, who do not
distinguish the important from the unimportant, nor make proper allowance for
the influence of human weaknesses in general.
If even in tactics there is a difficulty, which all experienced soldiers admit
there is, in succeeding in an attack in separate columns where it depends on
the perfect connection of the several columns, how much more difficult, or
rather how impossible, must this be in strategy, where the separation is so
much wider. Therefore, if a constant connection of all parts was a necessary
condition of success, a strategic plan of attack of that nature must be at once
given up. But on the one hand, it is not left to our option to discard it
completely, because circumstances, which we cannot control, may determine in
favour of it; on the other hand, even in tactics, this constant close
conjunction of all parts at every moment of the execution, is not at all
necessary, and it is still less so in strategy. Therefore in strategy we should
pay the less attention to this point, and insist the more upon a distinct piece
of work being assigned to each part.
We have still to add one important observation: it relates to the proper
allotment of parts.
In the year 1793 and 1794 the principal Austrian army was in the Netherlands,
that of the Prussians, on the upper Rhine. The Austrians marched from Vienna to
Condé and Valenciennes, crossing the line of march of the Prussians from Berlin
to Landau. The Austrians had certainly to defend their Belgian provinces in
that quarter, and any conquests made in French Flanders would have been
acquisitions conveniently situated for them, but that interest was not strong
enough. After the death of Prince Kaunitz, the Minister Thugut carried a
measure for giving up the Netherlands entirely, for the better concentration of
the Austrian forces. In fact, Austria is about twice as far from Flanders as
from Alsace; and at a time when military resources were very limited, and
everything had to be paid for in ready money, that was no trifling
consideration. Still, the Minister Thugut had plainly something else in view;
his object was, through the urgency of the danger to compel Holland, England,
and Prussia, the powers interested in the defence of the Netherlands and Lower
Rhine, to make greater efforts. He certainly deceived himself in his
calculations, because nothing could be done with the Prussian cabinet at that
time, but this occurrence always shows the influence of political interests on
the course of a war.
Prussia had neither anything to conquer nor to defend in Alsace. In the year
1792 it had undertaken the march through Lorraine into Champagne in a sort of
chivalrous spirit. But as that enterprise ended in nothing, through the
unfavourable course of circumstances, it continued the war with a feeling of
very little interest. If the Prussian troops had been in the Netherlands, they
would have been in direct communication with Holland, which they might look
upon almost as their own country, having conquered it in the year 1787; they
would then have covered the Lower Rhine, and consequently that part of the
Prussian monarchy which lay next to the theatre of war. Prussia on account of
subsidies would also have had a closer alliance with England, which, under
these circumstances, would not so easily have degenerated into the crooked
policy of which the Prussian cabinet was guilty at that time.
A much better result, therefore, might have been expected if the Austrians had
appeared with their principal force on the Upper Rhine, the Prussians with
their whole force in the Netherlands, and the Austrians had left there only a
corps of proportionate strength.
If, instead of the enterprising Blücher, General Barclay had been placed at the
head of the Silesian army in 1814, and Blücher and Schwartzenberg had been kept
with the grand army, the campaign would perhaps have turned out a complete
failure.
If the enterprising Laudon, instead of having his theatre of war at the
strongest point of the Prussian dominions, namely, in Silesia, had been in the
position of the German States’ army, perhaps the whole Seven Years’
War would have had quite a different turn. In order to examine this subject
more narrowly, we must look at the cases according to their chief distinctions.
The first is, if we carry on war in conjunction with other powers, who not only
take part as our allies, but also have an independent interest as well.
The second is, if the army of the ally has come to our assistance.
The third is, when it is only a question with regard to the personal
characteristics of the General.
In the two first cases, the point may be raised, whether it is better to mix up
the troops of the different powers completely, so that each separate army is
composed of corps of different powers, as was done in the wars 1813 and 1814,
or to keep them separate as much as possible, so that the army of each power
may continue distinct and act independently.
Plainly, the first is the most salutary plan; but it supposes a degree of
friendly feeling and community of interests which is seldom found. When there
is this close good fellowship between the troops, it is much more difficult for
the cabinets to separate their interests; and as regards the prejudicial
influence of the egotistical views of commanders, it can only show itself under
these circumstances amongst the subordinate Generals, therefore, only in the
province of tactics, and even there not so freely or with such impunity as when
there is a complete separation. In the latter case, it affects the strategy,
and therefore, makes decided marks. But, as already observed, for the first
case there must be a rare spirit of conciliation on the part of the
Governments. In the year 1813, the exigencies of the time impelled all
Governments in that direction; and yet we cannot sufficiently praise this in
the Emperor of Russia, that although he entered the field with the strongest
army, and the change of fortune was chiefly brought about by him, yet he set
aside all pride about appearing at the head of a separate and an independent
Russian army, and placed his troops under the Prussian and Austrian Commanders.
If such a fusion of armies cannot be effected, a complete separation of them is
certainly better than a half-and-half state of things; the worst of all is when
two independent Commanders of armies of different powers find themselves on the
same theatre of war, as frequently happened in the Seven Years’ War with
the armies of Russia, Austria, and the German States. When there is a complete
separation of forces, the burdens which must be borne are also better divided,
and each suffers only from what is his own, consequently is more impelled to
activity by the force of circumstances; but if they find themselves in close
connection, or quite on the same theatre of war, this is not the case, and
besides that the ill will of one paralyses also the powers of the other as
well.
In the first of the three supposed cases, there will be no difficulty in the
complete separation, as the natural interest of each State generally indicates
to it a separate mode of employing its force; this may not be so in the second
case, and then, as a rule, there is nothing to be done but to place oneself
completely under the auxiliary army, if its strength is in any way
proportionate to that measure, as the Austrians did in the latter part of the
campaign of 1815, and the Prussians in the campaign of 1807.
With regard to the personal qualifications of the General, everything in this
passes into what is particular and individual; but we must not omit to make one
general remark, which is, that we should not, as is generally done, place at
the head of subordinate armies the most prudent and cautious Commanders, but
the most enterprising; for we repeat that in strategic operations
conducted separately, there is nothing more important than that every part
should develop its powers to the full, in that way faults committed at one part
may be compensated for by successes at others. This complete activity at all
points, however, is only to be expected when the Commanders are spirited,
enterprising men, who are urged forwards by natural impulsiveness by their own
hearts, because a mere objective, coolly reasoned out, conviction of the
necessity of action seldom suffices.
Lastly, we have to remark that, if circumstances in other respects permit, the
troops and their commanders, as regards their destination, should be employed
in accordance with their qualities and the nature of the country that is
regular armies; good troops; numerous cavalry; old, prudent, intelligent
generals in an open country; Militia; national levies; young enterprising
commanders in wooded country, mountains and defiles; auxiliary armies in rich
provinces where they can make themselves comfortable.
What we have now said upon a plan of a war in general, and in this chapter upon
those in particular which are directed to the destruction of the enemy, is
intended to give special prominence to the object of the same, and next to
indicate principles which may serve as guides in the preparation of ways and
means. Our desire has been in this way to give a clear perception of what is to
be, and should be, done in such a war. We have tried to emphasise the necessary
and general, and to leave a margin for the play of the particular and
accidental; but to exclude all that is arbitrary, unfounded, trifling,
fantastical; or sophistical. If we have succeeded in this object, we look
upon our problem as solved.
Now, if any one wonders at finding nothing here about turning rivers, about
commanding mountains from their highest points, about avoiding strong
positions, and finding the keys of a country, he has not understood us, neither
does he as yet understand war in its general relations according to our views.
In preceding books we have characterised these subjects in general, and we
there arrived at the conclusion, they are much more insignificant in their
nature than we should think from their high repute. Therefore, so much the less
can or ought they to play a great part, that is, so far as to influence the
whole plan of a war, when it is a war which has for its object the destruction
of the enemy.
At the end of the book we shall devote a chapter specially to the consideration
of the chief command; the present chapter we shall close with an example.
If Austria, Prussia, the German Con-federation, the Netherlands and England,
determine on a war with France, but Russia remains neutral a case which has
frequently happened during the last one hundred and fifty years they are able
to carry on an offensive war, having for its object the overthrow of the enemy.
For powerful and great as France is, it is still possible for it to see more
than half its territory overrun by the enemy, its capital occupied, and itself
reduced in its means to a state of complete inefficiency, without there being
any power, except Russia, which can give it effectual support. Spain is too
distant and too disadvantageously situated; the Italian States are at present
too brittle and powerless.
The countries we have named have, exclusive of their possessions out of Europe,
above 75,000,000 inhabitants,(*) whilst France has only 30,000,000; and the army
which they could call out for a war against France really meant in earnest,
would be as follows, without exaggeration:—
Austria .............250,000
Prussia .............200,000
The rest of Germany. 150,000
Netherlands ..........75,000
England ..............50,000
—————
Total: ......725,000
Should this force be placed on a warfooting it would, in all probability, very
much exceed that which France could oppose; for under Buonaparte the country
never had an army of the like strength. Now, if we take into account the
deductions required as garrisons for fortresses and depôts, to watch the
coasts, etc., there can be no doubt the allies would have a great superiority
in the principal theatre of war, and upon that the object or plan of
overthrowing the enemy is chiefly founded.
The centre of gravity of the French power lies in its military force and in
Paris. To defeat the former in one or more battles, to take Paris and drive the
wreck of the French across the Loire, must be the object of the allies. The pit
of the stomach of the French monarchy is between Paris and Brussels, on that
side the frontier is only thirty miles from the capital. Part of the allies;
the English, Netherlanders, Prussian, and North German States have their
natural point of assembly in that direction, as these States lie partly in the
immediate vicinity, partly in a direct line behind it. Austria and South
Germany can only carry on their war conveniently from the upper Rhine. Their
natural direction is upon Troyes and Paris, or it may be Orleans. Both shocks,
therefore, that from the Netherlands and the other from the upper Rhine, are
quite direct and natural, short and powerful; and both fall upon the centre of
gravity of the enemy’s power. Between these two points, therefore, the
whole invading army should be divided.
But there are two considerations which interfere with the simplicity of this
plan.
The Austrians would not lay bare their Italian dominions, they would wish to
retain the mastery over events there, in any case, and therefore would not
incur the risk of making an attack on the heart of France, by which they would
leave Italy only indirectly covered. Looking to the political state of the
country, this collateral consideration is not to be treated with contempt; but
it would be a decided mistake if the old and oft-tried plan of an attack from
Italy, directed against the South of France, was bound up with it, and if on
that account the force in Italy was increased to a size not required for mere
security against contingencies in the first campaign. Only the number needed
for that security should remain in Italy, only that number should be withdrawn
from the great undertaking, if we would not be unfaithful to that first maxim,
Unity of plan, concentration of force. To think of conquering France by
the Rhone, would be like trying to lift a musket by the point of its bayonet;
but also as an auxiliary enterprise, an attack on the South of France is to be
condemned, for it only raises new forces against us. Whenever an attack is made
on distant provinces, interests and activities are roused, which would
otherwise have lain dormant. It would only be in case that the forces left for
the security of Italy were in excess of the number required, and, therefore, to
avoid leaving them unemployed, that there would be any justification for an
attack on the South of France from that quarter.
We therefore repeat that the force left in Italy must be kept down as low as
circumstances will permit; and it will be quite large enough if it will suffice
to prevent the Austrians from losing the whole country in one campaign. Let us
suppose that number to be 50,000 men for the purpose of our illustration.
Another consideration deserving attention, is the relation of France in respect
to its sea-coast. As England has the upper hand at sea, it follows that France
must, on that account, be very susceptible with regard to the whole of her
Atlantic coast; and, consequently, must protect it with garrisons of greater or
less strength. Now, however weak this coast-defence may be, still the French
frontiers are tripled by it; and large drafts, on that account, cannot fail to
be withdrawn from the French army on the theatre of war. Twenty or thirty
thousand troops disposable to effect a landing, with which the English threaten
France, would probably absorb twice or three times the number of French troops;
and, further, we must think not only of troops, but also of money, artillery,
etc., etc., required for ships and coast batteries. Let us suppose that the
English devote 25,000 to this object.
Our plan of war would then consist simply in this:
1. That in the Netherlands:—
200,000 Prussians,
75,000 Netherlanders,
25,000 English,
50,000 North German Confederation,
—————
Total: 350,000 be assembled,
of whom about 50,000 should be set aside to garrison frontier fortresses, and
the remaining 300,000 should advance against Paris, and engage the French Army
in a decisive battle.
2. That 200,000 Austrians and 100,000 South German troops should assemble on
the Upper Rhine to advance at the same time as the army of the Netherlands,
their direction being towards the Upper Seine, and from thence towards the
Loire, with a view, likewise, to a great battle. These two attacks would,
perhaps, unite in one on the Loire.
By this the chief point is determined. What we have to add is chiefly intended
to root out false conceptions, and is as follows:—
1. To seek for the great battle, as prescribed, and deliver it with such a
relation, in point of numerical strength and under such circumstances, as
promise a decisive victory, is the course for the chief commanders to follow;
to this object everything must be sacrificed; and as few men as possible should
be employed in sieges, blockades, garrisons, etc. If, like Schwartzenberg in
1814, as soon as they enter the enemy’s provinces they spread out in
eccentric rays all is lost. That this did not take place in 1814 the Allies may
thank the powerless state of France alone. The attack should be like a wedge
well driven home, not like a soap bubble, which distends itself till it bursts.
2. Switzerland must be left to its own forces. If it remains neutral it forms a
good point d’appui on the Upper Rhine; if it is attacked by
France, let her stand up for herself, which in more than one respect she is
very well able to do. Nothing is more absurd than to attribute to Switzerland a
predominant geographical influence upon events in war because it is the highest
land in Europe. Such an influence only exists under certain very restricted
conditions, which are not to be found here. When the French are attacked in the
heart of their country they can undertake no offensive from Switzerland, either
against Italy or Swabia, and, least of all, can the elevated situation of the
country come into consideration as a decisive circumstance. The advantage of a
country which is dominating in a strategic sense, is, in the first place,
chiefly important in the defensive, and any importance which it has in the
offensive may manifest itself in a single encounter. Whoever does not know this
has not thought over the thing and arrived at a clear perception of it, and in
case that at any future council of potentates and generals, some learned
officer of the general staff should be found, who, with an anxious brow,
displays such wisdom, we now declare it beforehand to be mere folly, and wish
that in the same council some true Blade, some child of sound common-sense may
be present who will stop his mouth.
3. The space between two attacks we think of very little consequence. When
600,000 assemble thirty or forty miles from Paris to march against the heart of
France, would any one think of covering the middle Rhine as well as Berlin,
Dresden, Vienna, and Munich? There would be no sense in such a thing. Are we to
cover the communications? That would not be unimportant; but then we might soon
be led into giving this covering the importance of an attack, and then, instead
of advancing on two lines, as the situation of the States positively requires,
we should be led to advance upon three, which is not required. These three
would then, perhaps, become five, or perhaps seven, and in that way the old
rigmarole would once more become the order of the day.
Our two attacks have each their object; the forces employed on them are
probably very superior to the enemy in numbers. If each pursues his march with
vigour, they cannot fail to react advantageously upon each other. If one of the
two attacks is unfortunate because the enemy has not divided his force equally,
we may fairly expect that the result of the other will of itself repair this
disaster, and this is the true interdependence between the two. An
interdependence extending to (so as to be affected by) the events of each day
is impossible on account of the distance; neither is it necessary, and
therefore the immediate, or, rather the direct connection, is of no such great
value.
Besides, the enemy attacked in the very centre of his dominions will have no
forces worth speaking of to employ in interrupting this connection; all that is
to be apprehended is that this interruption may be attempted by a co-operation
of the inhabitants with the partisans, so that this object does not actually
cost the enemy any troops. To prevent that, it is sufficient to send a corps of
10,000 or 15,000 men, particularly strong in cavalry, in the direction from
Trèves to Rheims. It will be able to drive every partisan before it, and keep
in line with the grand army. This corps should neither invest nor watch
fortresses, but march between them, depend on no fixed basis, but give way
before superior forces in any direction, no great misfortune could happen to
it, and if such did happen, it would again be no serious misfortune for the
whole. Under these circumstances, such a corps might probably serve as an
intermediate link between the two attacks.
4. The two subordinate undertakings, that is, the Austrian army in Italy, and
the English army for landing on the coast, might follow their object as
appeared best. If they do not remain idle, their mission is fulfilled as
regards the chief point, and on no account should either of the two great
attacks be made dependent in any way on these minor ones.
We are quite convinced that in this way France may be overthrown and chastised
whenever it thinks fit to put on that insolent air with which it has oppressed
Europe for a hundred and fifty years. It is only on the other side of Paris, on
the Loire, that those conditions can be obtained from it which are necessary
for the peace of Europe. In this way alone the natural relation between 30
millions of men and 75 millions will quickly make itself known, but not if the
country from Dunkirk to Genoa is to be surrounded in the way it has been for
150 years by a girdle of armies, whilst fifty different small objects are aimed
at, not one of which is powerful enough to overcome the inertia, friction, and
extraneous influences which spring up and reproduce themselves everywhere, but
more especially in allied armies.
How little the provisional organisation of the German federal armies is adapted
to such a disposition, will strike the reader. By that organisation the
federative part of Germany forms the nucleus of the German power, and Prussia
and Austria thus weakened, lose their natural influence. But a federative state
is a very brittle nucleus in war. There is in it no unity, no energy, no
rational choice of a commander, no authority, no responsibility.
Austria and Prussia are the two natural centres of force of the German empire;
they form the pivot (or fulcrum), the forte of the sword; they are monarchical
states, used to war; they have well-defined interests, independence of power;
they are predominant over the others. The organisation should follow these
natural lineaments, and not a false notion about unity, which is an
impossibility in such a case; and he who neglects the possible in quest of the
impossible is a fool.