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On War

On War

by Carl von Clausewitz

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About this eBook

Author
Clausewitz, Carl von, 1780-1831
Credits
Produced by Charles Keller and David Widger
Language
English
LoC Class
U: Military science
Subject
War
Category
Text
eBook-No.
1946
Project Gutenberg
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1946
Release Date
February 26, 2006
Copyright
Public domain in the USA.

Contents

  1. 1.On War — by General Carl von Clausewitz — TRANSLATED BY COLONEL J.J. GRAHAM — 1874 was 1st edition of this translation. 1909 was the London reprinting. — NEW AND REVISED EDITION WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY COLONEL F.N. MAUDE C.B. (LATE R.E.) — EIGHTH IMPRESSION IN THREE VOLUMES — Contents
  2. 2.INTRODUCTION
  3. 3.PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
  4. 4.NOTICE
  5. 5.THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHOR
  6. 6.BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAUSEWITZ (BY TRANSLATOR)
  7. 7.BOOK I. ON THE NATURE OF WAR
  8. 8.CHAPTER I. What is War? — 1. INTRODUCTION. — 2. DEFINITION. — 3. UTMOST USE OF FORCE. — 4. THE AIM IS TO DISARM THE ENEMY. — 5. UTMOST EXERTION OF POWERS. — 6. MODIFICATION IN THE REALITY. — 7. WAR IS NEVER AN ISOLATED ACT. — 8. WAR DOES NOT CONSIST OF A SINGLE INSTANTANEOUS BLOW. — 9. THE RESULT IN WAR IS NEVER ABSOLUTE. — 10. THE PROBABILITIES OF REAL LIFE TAKE THE PLACE OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE EXTREME AND THE ABSOLUTE. — 11. THE POLITICAL OBJECT NOW REAPPEARS. — 12. A SUSPENSION IN THE ACTION OF WAR UNEXPLAINED BY ANYTHING SAID AS YET. — 13. THERE IS ONLY ONE CAUSE WHICH CAN SUSPEND THE ACTION, AND THIS SEEMS TO BE ONLY POSSIBLE ON ONE SIDE IN ANY CASE. — 14. THUS A CONTINUANCE OF ACTION WILL ENSUE WHICH WILL ADVANCE TOWARDS A CLIMAX. — 15. HERE, THEREFORE, THE PRINCIPLE OF POLARITY IS BROUGHT INTO REQUISITION. — 16. ATTACK AND DEFENCE ARE THINGS DIFFERING IN KIND AND OF UNEQUAL FORCE. POLARITY IS, THEREFORE, NOT APPLICABLE TO THEM. — 17. THE EFFECT OF POLARITY IS OFTEN DESTROYED BY THE SUPERIORITY OF THE DEFENCE OVER THE ATTACK, AND THUS THE SUSPENSION OF ACTION IN WAR IS EXPLAINED. — 18 A SECOND GROUND CONSISTS IN THE IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. — 19. FREQUENT PERIODS OF INACTION IN WAR REMOVE IT FURTHER FROM THE ABSOLUTE, AND MAKE IT STILL MORE A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES. — 20. THEREFORE, THE ELEMENT OF CHANCE ONLY IS WANTING TO MAKE OF WAR A GAME, AND IN THAT ELEMENT IT IS LEAST OF ALL DEFICIENT. — 21. WAR IS A GAME BOTH OBJECTIVELY AND SUBJECTIVELY. — 22. HOW THIS ACCORDS BEST WITH THE HUMAN MIND IN GENERAL. — 23. WAR IS ALWAYS A SERIOUS MEANS FOR A SERIOUS OBJECT. ITS MORE PARTICULAR DEFINITION. — 24. WAR IS A MERE CONTINUATION OF POLICY BY OTHER MEANS. — 25. DIVERSITY IN THE NATURE OF WARS. — 26. THEY MAY ALL BE REGARDED AS POLITICAL ACTS. — 27. INFLUENCE OF THIS VIEW ON THE RIGHT UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY HISTORY, AND ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORY. — 28. RESULT FOR THEORY.
  9. 9.CHAPTER II. Ends and Means in War
  10. 10.CHAPTER III. The Genius for War
  11. 11.CHAPTER IV. Of Danger in War
  12. 12.CHAPTER V. Of Bodily Exertion in War
  13. 13.CHAPTER VI. Information in War
  14. 14.CHAPTER VII. Friction in War
  15. 15.CHAPTER VIII. Concluding Remarks, Book I
  16. 16.BOOK II. ON THE THEORY OF WAR
  17. 17.CHAPTER I. Branches of the Art of War
  18. 18.CHAPTER II. On the Theory of War — 1. THE FIRST CONCEPTION OF THE “ART OF WAR” WAS MERELY THE PREPARATION OF THE ARMED FORCES. — 2. TRUE WAR FIRST APPEARS IN THE ART OF SIEGES. — 3. THEN TACTICS TRIED TO FIND ITS WAY IN THE SAME DIRECTION. — 4. THE REAL CONDUCT OF WAR ONLY MADE ITS APPEARANCE INCIDENTALLY AND INCOGNITO. — 5. REFLECTIONS ON MILITARY EVENTS BROUGHT ABOUT THE WANT OF A THEORY. — 6. ENDEAVOURS TO ESTABLISH A POSITIVE THEORY. — 7. LIMITATION TO MATERIAL OBJECTS. — 8. SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS. — 9. VICTUALLING OF TROOPS. — 10. BASE. — 11. INTERIOR LINES. — 12. ALL THESE ATTEMPTS ARE OPEN TO OBJECTION. — 13. AS A RULE THEY EXCLUDE GENIUS. — 14. THE DIFFICULTY OF THEORY AS SOON AS MORAL QUANTITIES COME INTO CONSIDERATION. — 15. THE MORAL QUANTITIES MUST NOT BE EXCLUDED IN WAR. — 16. PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY OF A THEORY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR. — 17. FIRST SPECIALITY.—MORAL FORCES AND THEIR EFFECTS. (HOSTILE FEELING.) — 18. THE IMPRESSIONS OF DANGER. (COURAGE.) — 19. EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF DANGER. — 20. OTHER POWERS OF FEELING. — 21. PECULIARITY OF MIND. — 22. FROM THE DIVERSITY IN MENTAL INDIVIDUALITIES ARISES THE DIVERSITY OF WAYS LEADING TO THE END. — 23. SECOND PECULIARITY.—LIVING REACTION. — 24. THIRD PECULIARITY.—UNCERTAINTY OF ALL DATA. — 25. POSITIVE THEORY IS IMPOSSIBLE. — 26. MEANS LEFT BY WHICH A THEORY IS POSSIBLE (THE DIFFICULTIES ARE NOT EVERYWHERE EQUALLY GREAT). — 27. THEORY MUST BE OF THE NATURE OF OBSERVATIONS NOT OF DOCTRINE. — 28. BY THIS POINT OF VIEW THEORY BECOMES POSSIBLE, AND CEASES TO BE IN CONTRADICTION TO PRACTICE. — 29. THEORY THEREFORE CONSIDERS THE NATURE OF ENDS AND MEANS—ENDS AND MEANS IN TACTICS. — 30. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALWAYS ATTEND THE APPLICATION OF THE MEANS. — 31. LOCALITY. — 32. TIME OF DAY. — 33. WEATHER. — 34. END AND MEANS IN STRATEGY. — 35. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ATTEND THE APPLICATION OF THE MEANS OF STRATEGY. — 36. THESE FORM NEW MEANS. — 37. STRATEGY DEDUCES ONLY FROM EXPERIENCE THE ENDS AND MEANS TO BE EXAMINED. — 38. HOW FAR THE ANALYSIS OF THE MEANS SHOULD BE CARRIED. — 39. GREAT SIMPLIFICATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED. — 40. THIS EXPLAINS THE RAPID GROWTH OF GREAT GENERALS, AND WHY A GENERAL IS NOT A MAN OF LEARNING. — 41. FORMER CONTRADICTIONS. — 42. ON THIS ACCOUNT ALL USE OF KNOWLEDGE WAS DENIED, AND EVERYTHING ASCRIBED TO NATURAL TALENTS. — 43. THE KNOWLEDGE MUST BE MADE SUITABLE TO THE POSITION. — 44. THE KNOWLEDGE IN WAR IS VERY SIMPLE, BUT NOT, AT THE SAME TIME, VERY EASY. — 45. OF THE NATURE OF THIS KNOWLEDGE. — 46. SCIENCE MUST BECOME ART.
  19. 19.CHAPTER III. Art or Science of War — 1.—USAGE STILL UNSETTLED (POWER AND KNOWLEDGE. SCIENCE WHEN MERE KNOWING; ART, WHEN DOING, IS THE OBJECT.) — 2. DIFFICULTY OF SEPARATING PERCEPTION FROM JUDGMENT. (ART OF WAR.) — 3. WAR IS PART OF THE INTERCOURSE OF THE HUMAN RACE. — 4. DIFFERENCE.
  20. 20.CHAPTER IV. Methodicism
  21. 21.CHAPTER V. Criticism
  22. 22.CHAPTER VI. On Examples
  23. 23.BOOK III. OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL
  24. 24.CHAPTER I. Strategy — OBSERVATION. — 1. POSSIBLE COMBATS ARE ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS TO BE LOOKED UPON AS REAL ONES. — 2. TWOFOLD OBJECT OF THE COMBAT. — 3. EXAMPLE. — 4. WHEN THIS VIEW IS NOT TAKEN, THEN A FALSE VALUE IS GIVEN TO OTHER THINGS.
  25. 25.CHAPTER II. Elements of Strategy
  26. 26.CHAPTER III. Moral Forces
  27. 27.CHAPTER IV. The Chief Moral Powers
  28. 28.CHAPTER V. Military Virtue of an Army
  29. 29.CHAPTER VI. Boldness
  30. 30.CHAPTER VII. Perseverance
  31. 31.CHAPTER VIII. Superiority of Numbers
  32. 32.CHAPTER IX. The Surprise
  33. 33.CHAPTER X. Stratagem
  34. 34.CHAPTER XI. Assembly of Forces in Space
  35. 35.CHAPTER XII. Assembly of Forces in Time
  36. 36.CHAPTER XIII. Strategic Reserve
  37. 37.CHAPTER XIV. Economy of Forces
  38. 38.CHAPTER XV. Geometrical Element
  39. 39.CHAPTER XVI. On the Suspension of the Act in War
  40. 40.CHAPTER XVII. On the Character of Modern War
  41. 41.CHAPTER XVIII. Tension and Rest — The Dynamic Law of War
  42. 42.BOOK IV THE COMBAT
  43. 43.CHAPTER I. Introductory
  44. 44.CHAPTER II. Character of a Modern Battle
  45. 45.CHAPTER III. The Combat in General
  46. 46.CHAPTER IV. The Combat in General ( continuation )
  47. 47.CHAPTER V. On the Signification of the Combat
  48. 48.CHAPTER VI. Duration of Combat
  49. 49.CHAPTER VII. Decision of the Combat
  50. 50.CHAPTER VIII. Mutual Understanding as to a Battle
  51. 51.CHAPTER IX. The Battle(*) — ITS DECISION
  52. 52.CHAPTER X. Effects of Victory
  53. 53.CHAPTER XI. The Use of the Battle
  54. 54.CHAPTER XII. Strategic Means of Utilising Victory
  55. 55.CHAPTER XIII. Retreat After a Lost Battle
  56. 56.CHAPTER XIV. Night Fighting
  57. 57.BOOK V MILITARY FORCES
  58. 58.CHAPTER I. General Scheme
  59. 59.CHAPTER II. Theatre of War, Army, Campaign — 1.—Theatre of War. — 2.—Army. — 3.—Campaign.
  60. 60.CHAPTER III. Relation of Power
  61. 61.CHAPTER IV. Relation of the Three Arms
  62. 62.CHAPTER V. Order of Battle of an Army — 1.—Division. — 2.—Combination of Arms. — 3.—The Disposition.
  63. 63.CHAPTER VI. General Disposition of an Army
  64. 64.CHAPTER VII. Advanced Guard and Out-Posts
  65. 65.CHAPTER VIII. Mode of Action of Advanced Corps
  66. 66.CHAPTER IX. Camps
  67. 67.CHAPTER X. Marches
  68. 68.CHAPTER XI. Marches ( Continued )
  69. 69.CHAPTER XII. Marches ( continued )
  70. 70.CHAPTER XIII. Cantonments
  71. 71.CHAPTER XIV. Subsistence — 1.—Living on the inhabitants, or on the community, which is the same thing. — 2.—Subsistence through exactions enforced by the troops themselves. — 3.—By regular requisitions. — 4.—Subsistence from Magazines.
  72. 72.CHAPTER XV. Base of Operations
  73. 73.CHAPTER XVI. Lines of Communication
  74. 74.CHAPTER XVII. On Country and Ground
  75. 75.CHAPTER XVIII. Command of Ground
  76. 76.BOOK VI DEFENCE
  77. 77.CHAPTER I. Offence and Defence — 1.—Conception of Defence. — 2.—Advantages of the Defensive.
  78. 78.CHAPTER II. The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Tactics
  79. 79.CHAPTER III. The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Strategy
  80. 80.CHAPTER IV. Convergence of Attack and Divergence of Defence
  81. 81.CHAPTER V. Character of the Strategic Defensive
  82. 82.CHAPTER VI. Extent of the Means of Defence — 1.—Landwehr (Militia). — 2.—Fortresses. — 3.—The People. — 4.—The National Armament, — 5.—Allies.
  83. 83.CHAPTER VII. Mutual Action and Reaction of Attack and Defence
  84. 84.CHAPTER VIII. Methods of Resistance
  85. 85.CHAPTER IX. Defensive Battle
  86. 86.CHAPTER X. Fortresses
  87. 87.CHAPTER XI. Fortresses ( Continued )
  88. 88.CHAPTER XII. Defensive Position
  89. 89.CHAPTER XIII. Strong Positions and Entrenched Camps
  90. 90.CHAPTER XIV. Flank Positions
  91. 91.CHAPTER XV. Defence of Mountains
  92. 92.CHAPTER XVI. Defence of Mountains ( Continued ) — 1. A mountain system as a battle-field. — 2. The influence of mountains on other parts of the country. — 3. Mountains considered in their aspect of a strategic barrier. — 4. Mountains in their relation to the provisioning of an army.
  93. 93.CHAPTER XVII. Defence of Mountains ( continued )
  94. 94.CHAPTER XVIII. Defence of Streams and Rivers
  95. 95.CHAPTER XIX. Defence of Streams and Rivers ( continued )
  96. 96.CHAPTER XX. A. Defence of Swamps
  97. 97.B. Inundations
  98. 98.CHAPTER XXI. Defence of Forests
  99. 99.CHAPTER XX. The Cordon
  100. 100.CHAPTER XXIII. Key to the Country
  101. 101.CHAPTER XXIV. Operating Against a Flank
  102. 102.CHAPTER XXV. Retreat into the Interior of the Country
  103. 103.CHAPTER XXVI. Arming the Nation
  104. 104.CHAPTER XXVII. Defence of a Theatre of War
  105. 105.CHAPTER XXVIII. Defence of a Theatre of War—( continued )
  106. 106.CHAPTER XXIX. Defence of a Theatre of War ( continued ) Successive Resistance.
  107. 107.CHAPTER XXX. Defence of a Theatre of War ( continued ) When no Decision is Sought for.
  108. 108.SKETCHES FOR BOOK VII THE ATTACK
  109. 109.CHAPTER I. The Attack in Relation to the Defence
  110. 110.CHAPTER II. Nature of the Strategical Attack
  111. 111.CHAPTER III. Of the Objects of Strategical Attack
  112. 112.CHAPTER IV. Decreasing Force of the Attack
  113. 113.CHAPTER V. Culminating Point of the Attack
  114. 114.CHAPTER VI. Destruction of the Enemy’s Armies
  115. 115.CHAPTER VII. The Offensive Battle
  116. 116.CHAPTER VIII. Passage of Rivers
  117. 117.CHAPTER IX. Attack on Defensive Positions
  118. 118.CHAPTER X. Attack on an Entrenched Camp
  119. 119.CHAPTER XI. Attack on a Mountain
  120. 120.CHAPTER XII. Attack on Cordon Lines
  121. 121.CHAPTER XIII. Manœuvring
  122. 122.CHAPTER XIV. Attack on Morasses, Inundations, Woods
  123. 123.CHAPTER XV. Attack on a Theatre of War with the View to a Decision
  124. 124.CHAPTER XVI. Attack on a Theatre of War without the View to a Great Decision
  125. 125.CHAPTER XVII. Attack on Fortresses
  126. 126.CHAPTER XVIII. Attack on Convoys
  127. 127.CHAPTER XIX. Attack on the Enemy’s Army in its Cantonments
  128. 128.CHAPTER XX. Diversion
  129. 129.CHAPTER XXI. Invasion
  130. 130.CHAPTER XXII. On the Culminating Point of Victory(*)
  131. 131.SKETCHES FOR BOOK VIII PLAN OF WAR
  132. 132.CHAPTER I. Introduction
  133. 133.CHAPTER II. Absolute and Real War
  134. 134.CHAPTER III. A. Interdependence of the Parts in War
  135. 135.B. On the Magnitude of the Object of the War, and the Efforts to be Made.
  136. 136.CHAPTER IV. Ends in War More Precisely Defined Overthrow of the Enemy
  137. 137.CHAPTER V. Ends in War More Precisely Defined ( continued ) Limited Object
  138. 138.CHAPTER VI. A. Influence of the Political Object on the Military Object
  139. 139.B. War as an Instrument of Policy
  140. 140.CHAPTER VII. Limited Object—Offensive War
  141. 141.CHAPTER VIII. Limited Object—Defence
  142. 142.CHAPTER IX. Plan of War when the Destruction of the Enemy is the Object

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