IN this matter, most decidedly, we need expert
advice. Let us start with Beauty. The one
who best understands Beauty is undoubtedly
the Artist. Let us call in the Artist.... Will
you question him, or shall I? You prefer to do
it yourself, I see. Very well, then—but please
try to get to the point as soon as possible!
The Questioner. What we want to know is
this: is it possible to teach the child to become an
artist?
The Artist. He is an artist already.
The Questioner. What do you mean!
The Artist. Just what I say. The child is
an artist; and the artist is always a child. The
greatest periods of art have always been those in
which artists had the direct, naïve, unspoiled
vision of the child. The aim of our best artists
today is to recover that vision. They are trying
to see the world as children see it, and to record
their vision of it as a child would do. Have you
ever looked at children’s drawings—not the sort
of things they are taught to do by mistaken and
mischievous adults, but the pictures that are the
natural expressions of their creative impulses?
And haven’t you observed that modern paintings
are coming to be more and more like such pictures?
The Questioner. Well—er, yes, I had noticed
something of the kind! But is that sort of
thing necessarily art? I mean—well, I don’t
want to attempt to argue with you on a subject
in which you are an expert, but—
The Artist. Oh, that’s all right! The modern
artist is ready to discuss art with anybody—the
more ignorant of the subject, the better!
You see, we want art to cease to be the possession
of a caste—we want it to belong to everybody.
As a member of the human race, your opinions are
important to us.
The Questioner. That is very kind of you.
I fear it is rather in the nature of a digression,
but, since I may ask without fear of seeming presumptuous,—are
those horrid misshapen green
nudes of Matisse, and those cubical blocks of paint
by I-forget-his-name, and all that sort of thing—are
they your notion of what art should be?
The Artist. Mine? Oh, not at all! They
are merely two out of a thousand contemporary attempts
to recover the naïve childlike vision of
which I spoke. If you will compare them with a
child’s drawing, or with a picture by a Navajo Indian,
or with the sketch of an aurochs traced on
the wall of his cave by one of our remote ancestors,
you will note an essential difference. Those
artists were not trying to be naïve and childlike;
they were naïve and childlike. The chief merit
of our modern efforts, in my personal opinion, is
in their quality as a challenge to traditional and
mistaken notions of what art should be—an advertisement,
startling enough, and sometimes maliciously
startling, of the artist’s belief that he has
the right to be first of all an artist.
The Questioner. Now we are coming to
the point. What is an artist?
The Artist. I told you, a child. And by
that, I mean one who plays with his materials—not
one who performs a set and perhaps useful
task with them. A creator—
The Questioner. But a creator of what?
Not of Beauty, by any chance?
The Artist. Incidentally of Beauty.
The Questioner. There we seem to disagree.
If those horrid pictures—
The Artist. Suppose you tell me what
Beauty is.
The Questioner. It seems to me quite simple.
Beauty is—well—a thing is either beautiful,
or it isn’t. And—
The Artist. Just so; the only trouble is that
so few of us are able to agree whether it is or
isn’t. You yourself have doubtless changed your
opinions about what is beautiful many times in the
course of your career as an art-lover; and the
time may come when you will cherish some horrid
nude of Matisse’s as your dearest possession.
Let us admit, like the wise old poet, that Beauty is
not a thing which can be argued about. It can
only be produced.
The Questioner. But if we don’t know what
Beauty is, how can we produce it?
The Artist. I have already told you—as
the incidental result of creative effort.
The Questioner. Effort to create what?
The Artist. Oh, anything.
The Questioner. Are you joking?
The Artist. I never was more serious in my
life. And I should really inform you that I am
merely repeating the familiar commonplaces of
modern esthetics. Beauty is the incidental result
of the effort to create a house, a sword,—
The Questioner. Or a shoe?
The Artist. Yes. I have some peasant
shoes from Russia which are very beautiful. You
can see shoes which are works of art in any good
museum.
The Questioner. But hardly in any boot-shop
window!
The Artist. Those shoes were not created—they
were done as a set task. They were not
made by peasants or craftsmen for pleasure—they
were made by wage-slaves who did them only
because they must. Do not for a moment imagine
that it is the difference in materials or shape
that matters—it is the difference in the spirit with
which they are made. I have seen modern shoes
which are works of art—because they were made
by a bootmaker who is an artist and does what
pleases himself.
The Questioner. Do they please anybody
else?
The Artist. Eh?
The Questioner. Would you be seen wearing
them?
The Artist. Would I be seen drinking
my coffee from a cup that had been turned on a
wheel by a man who loved the feel of the clay
under his fingers and who knew just the right
touch to give the brim? Was Richard Coeur du
Lion’s sword less a sword because it had been
made by an artist who dreamed over the steel
instead of by a tired man in a hurry? I cannot afford
to wear shoes made by my bootmaker-artist
friend—but I wish I could, for they fit!
The Questioner. Will you give me his address?—I
beg your pardon—Please go on.
The Artist. I was about to say, you wrong
the artist if you think that he is not interested in
utility. It is only because utility has become
bound up with slavery that artists and people with
artistic impulses revolt against it and in defiance
produce utterly and fantastically useless things.
This will be so, as long as being useful means being
a slave. But art is not an end in itself; it
had its origin, and will find its destiny, in the
production of useful things. For example—
The Questioner. Yes, do let us get down to
the concrete!
The Artist. Suppose you are out walking in
a hilly country, and decide to whittle yourself a
stick. Your wish is to make something useful.
But you can’t help making it more than useful.
You can’t help it, because, if you are not in a
hurry, and nobody else is bossing the job, you
find other impulses besides the utilitarian one coming
in to elaborate your task. Shall I name those
impulses?
The Questioner. If you will.
The Artist. I am not a psychologist, but I
would call them the impulse to command and the
impulse to obey.
The Questioner. To command and obey
what?
The Artist. Your material, whatever it is—paint
and canvas, words, sounds, clay, marble, iron.
In this case, the stick of wood.
The Questioner. I’m afraid I do not
quite—
The Artist. The impulse to command comes
first—the impulse to just show that stick who is
master! the desire to impose your imperial will
upon it. I suppose you might call it Vanity.
And that impulse alone would result in your making
something fantastic and grotesque or strikingly
absurd—and yet beautiful in its way. But it
is met and checked by the other impulse—the impulse
to obey. No man that ever whittled wood
but has felt that impulse. He feels that he must
not do simply what he wants to do, but also what
the wood wants done to it. The real artist does
not care to treat marble as if it were soft, nor
paint and canvas as though they were three-dimensional.
He could if he wanted to—but he
respects his medium. There is an instinctive
pleasure in letting it have its way. I suppose you
might call it Reverence. And this Vanity and
this Reverence, the desire to command and the
desire to obey, when they are set free in the
dream and effort of creation, produce something
which is more than useful. That something more
is what we call Beauty.—Do you care to have me
go further into the mechanics of beauty?
The Questioner. Well—er—I suppose
now that we have got this far into the subject, we
might as well get to the end of it. Go on!
The Artist. What I am about to tell you is
the only really important thing about art. Unfortunately,
the facts at issue have never been
studied by first-class scientific minds, and so they
lack a proper terminology to make them clear.
In default of such a scientific terminology, we are
forced to use the word “rhythm” in the special
sense in which artists understand it. You speak
of the movements of a dance as being rhythmic.
The artist understands the word to refer to the
relation of these movements to each other and
above all to the emotion which they express.
And to him the whole world is a dance, full of
rhythmic gestures. The gesture of standing still,
or of being asleep, is also rhythmic; the body is
itself a gesture—he will speak of the rhythm
of the line of a lifted arm or a bent knee. Trees
that lift their branches to the sky, and rocks that
sleep on the ground have their rhythms—every
tree and every rock its own special rhythm. The
rhythm of a pine tree is different from that of a
palm—the rhythm of granitic rocks different
from that of limestone. So far the matter is
simple enough. But the relations of these rhythms
to each other are also rhythmic. These relations
are in fact so manifold that they constitute a
chaos. But in this chaos each person feels a different
rhythm; and, according as he has the power,
transmits his sense of it to us through a rhythmic
treatment of his medium. In the presence of his
work, we feel what he has felt about the world;
but we feel something more than that—we feel
also the rhythm of the struggle in the artist
between his impulse to command and his impulse
to obey. Our own impulses of vanity and of
reverence go out to welcome his power and his
faithfulness. And just as there are gay rhythms
and sad rhythms in the gesture of movement, so
there are magnificent rhythms and trivial rhythms
in the gesture of a soul facing the chaos of the
world. What has he found worth while to play
with, and how has he played with it? What kind
of creator is he? Ability to feel and express
significant rhythm—that is nine-tenths of art.
The Questioner. But my dear fellow, how
are we to teach all this to children?
The Artist. Very simply: by giving them a
knife and a piece of wood.
The Questioner. Well, really!
The Artist. And crayons and clay and singing-games
and so forth.—But perhaps you prefer
to show them pictures of alleged masterpieces,
and tell them, “This is great art!” They will
believe you, of course; and they will hate great
art ever afterwards—just as they hate great
poetry, and for the same excellent reason: because,
presented to them in that way, it is nothing
but a damned nuisance. Yet the child who enjoys
hearing and telling a story has in him the
capacity to appreciate and perhaps to create the
greatest of stories; and the child who enjoys whittling
a block of wood has in him the capacity to
appreciate and perhaps to create the greatest art!
The Questioner. Then you do not think
children can be taught to appreciate art by looking
at photographic reproductions of it?
The Artist. I would hardly expect a Fiji
Islander to become an appreciator of civilized
music by letting him look at my phonograph records.
The dingy-brownish photograph of a gloriously
colored painting has even less educational
value—for it lies about the original. Do you
know that there are thousands and thousands of
American school children who think that the great
masterpieces of the world’s painting are the color
of axle-grease? They are never told that their
own free efforts with colored crayons are more like
Botticelli in every sense than any photograph
could possibly be; but it is true.
The Questioner. But don’t you want them
to respect Botticelli?
The Artist. No. I want them to look at
Botticelli’s pictures as they look at those of another
child—free to criticize, free to dislike, free
to scorn. For only when you are free to despise,
are you free to admire. After all, who was
Botticelli? Another child. Perhaps they may
prefer Goya—
The Questioner. Or the Sunday comic supplement!
The Artist. A healthy taste. And if they
know what drawing is, though having used a pencil
themselves, they will prefer the better comic
pictures to the worse, and be ready to appreciate
Goya and Daumier—who were the
super-Sunday-supplement comic artists of their
day.
The Questioner. Left to themselves they
may come to like Goya, as you say; but will they
ever come to appreciate such a masterpiece as
Leonardo’s Last Supper without some more formal
teaching?
The Artist. Do you call it “teaching” to
talk solemnly to children in language they cannot
understand? If they are making pictures
themselves, and being assisted in their enthusiastic
experiments by a real artist instead of a
teacher, they will naturally wonder why their
friend should have the photograph of the Last
Supper in the portfolio from which he is always
taking out some picture in order to illustrate his
answers to their questions. And having wondered,
they will ask why, and their friend will
tell them; and perhaps they will get some of their
friends enthusiasm, and perhaps not. But they
will know that the real human being who is like
themselves does like that picture.
The Questioner. But it makes no difference
whether they like it or not?
The Artist. You can’t compel them to like
it, can you? You can only compel them to pretend
that they do.
The Questioner. Can’t you teach them
what is called “good taste”?
The Artist. Only too easily. And their
“good taste” will lead them infallibly to prefer
the imitations of what they have been taught to
praise, and quite as infallibly to reject the great
new art of their generation. They will think
some new Whistler a pot of paint flung in the public’s
face, and the next Cezanne a dauber.
The Questioner. Then you don’t approve
of good taste!
The Artist. Every artist despises it, and
the people who have it. We know quite well
that the people who pretend to like Titian and
Turner, because they have been carefully taught
that it is the thing to do, would have turned up
their noses at Titian and Turner in their own
day—because they were not on the list of dead
artists whom it was the fashion to call great;
they know moreover that these same people of
good taste are generally incapable of distinguishing
between a beautiful and an ugly wall-paper,
between a beautiful and an ugly plate, or even between
a beautiful and an ugly necktie! Outside
the bounds of their memorized list, they have no
taste whatever.
The Questioner. Cannot good taste be
taught so as to include the whole of life?
The Artist. It would take too much time.
And thank God for that! For good taste is
simply a polite pretense by which we cover up our
lack of that real sense of beauty which comes
only from intimate acquaintance with creative processes.
The most cultivated people in the world
cannot produce beauty by merely having notions
about it. But the most uncultivated people in the
world cannot help producing beauty if only they
have time to dream as they work—if only they
have freedom to let their work become something
besides utilitarian.
The Questioner. You think, then, that education
should not concern itself with good taste,
but rather with creative effort?
The Artist. Exactly.
The Questioner. You say that children are
artists already?
The Artist. And that artists are children.
The Questioner. Then the task of education
in respect to them would seem to be easy!
The Artist. No—on the contrary, infinitely
hard!
The Questioner. What do you mean?
The Artist. I have said that children are
artists and that artists are children. The task
of education is to help them to grow up.
The Questioner. New difficulties!
The Artist. And tremendous ones! But if
I am to discuss them, you must keep still for a
while and let me talk in my own fashion.
—Very well, ladies and gentlemen. Shall we
adjourn for lunch, and when we reassemble here
give the Artist the platform for half an hour?
What is the sentiment of the meeting? The Ayes
have it.