A growing number of people are devoting their attention
to a closer study of foreign affairs. Many of them may
not have the opportunity to read the larger volumes of
histories; and, indeed, even if they had, they would find
their choice of books very much restricted when they
came to the more recent period of European and world
history, although in the last year or so the gap has to some
extent been filled up by several interesting studies of international
politics in the nineteenth century. Some knowledge
of this period is essential if we are to understand
the full significance of the events of to-day, and if we are
to form any helpful opinion of the course to be pursued
in future.
Historians often take for granted that their readers
already have some general knowledge of the groundwork
of events and they build up their structure of criticism,
their delineation of policy and tendencies, and their survey
of international problems on the assumption that the
scaffolding has been erected. But often it has not, and
then history, more especially the complex tangle of international
history, becomes difficult to grasp. It may
therefore serve some useful purpose if a few poles of scaffolding
representing the dates and outline of conflicts
and agreements between nations can be supplied in a very
brief and easily intelligible form, a presentment of the
bare record of facts which may be useful for reference.
During the last hundred years war has been a more
common occurrence in international intercourse than most
people realize. The forty-two records of wars tabled in
these pages do not cover the whole ground. They are
the chief conflicts, or the conflicts fraught with the most
serious consequences, but they are by no means the
only occasions on which there was fighting in the world.
Revolutions, unless they led to international war, are
not mentioned, neither are expeditions such as the advance
on Llassa, the Chitral expedition, the Indian frontier wars,
the Kaffir wars, the Somaliland expeditions, the revolt of
the Herreroes in German West Africa or the French
expeditions in Morocco: the wars between the states
of South America, with two exceptions, have also been
omitted. But the list as it stands, is striking enough and
may suffice to make the student inquire further into the
circumstances which produced this almost unceasing strife.
The causes are epitomized in the fewest possible words
and the occasion is separated from the cause. Causes
of wars are very seldom remembered and are not very
easily discovered in the perusal of histories. The occasion
is sometimes mistaken for the cause, whereas it may often
be merely a pretext. The occasion of a war has not infrequently
been a comparatively trivial incident, whereas
the cause can be traced to the gradual development of
friction for which divergence of policies or conflict of ambitions
may have been responsible. The trivial incident,
or even an incident of a more serious nature, may pass off
without fatal consequences if no friction exists between
the nations and there is a general atmosphere of amicable
understanding. Where, on the contrary, relations are
strained it requires but a very small spark to light up a
conflagration. It is important therefore to detach the
occasion from the cause.
Causes of war in the nineteenth century differ to some
extent from those of previous centuries. The elemental
combative passion of man expressing itself in fierce racial
animosities is far less noticeable. Religious differences
do not figure so positively as a reason for conflict.
Dynastic ambitions linger on and still play a formidable
part, even after 1815, but not with the same unashamed
and aggressive arrogance as in bygone centuries. Nationalist
aspirations begin to assert themselves, and the waves
of revolutionary exasperation with outworn systems of
despotic government have made those very governments
combat that spirit by force of arms. As the century proceeds,
and the wonderful inventions for rapid transit and
communication develop, the most noticeable element in
war-making is the commercial or colonial ambition of
governments fostered largely by the pressure of financial
interests and declaring itself under the name of Empire.
This policy of competitive imperial expansion in the newly
accessible regions of the globe will be found to constitute
the most frequent cause of dispute, of jealousy, and of
suspicion between nations. The pretext will vary, the
excuse will be presented under plausible guises for popular
consumption, but the ultimate cause, the fundamental
origin will be the same. Imperialism economic in its
origin is fostered largely by an exaggerated spirit of nationalism.
The remarkable extent of Empire expansion in the
latter part of the nineteenth century is best illustrated
by the following figures:—
Acquisitions of Territory
To the British Empire 1870–1900: 4,754,000 square
miles; 88,000,000 population.
To France 1884–1900: 3,583,580 square miles;
36,553,000 population.
To Germany 1884–1900: 1,026,220 square miles;
16,687,100 population.
But perhaps the chief and most frequent cause of war
is war itself. In the Balkan Peninsula—where, whenever
the fighting has ceased, nothing approaching a satisfactory
settlement has ever been concluded—this is specially true.
Eight or nine of the wars recorded concern the Balkans.
Or take the Crimean War. Sir Spencer Walpole says:
“From 1856 to 1878 the Continent of Europe was afflicted
with five great wars—the Franco-Austrian War of 1859;
the Danish of 1864; the Austro-Prussian of 1860; the
Franco-German of 1870 and the Russo-Turkish of 1878:
all of which can be lineally traced to the war of 1854,”
and one at least of those wars, as we know, sowed the
seeds of future war. The war that is concluded by a dictated
peace, the war that leaves a sense of grievance and
unsatisfied though legitimate claims, the war that inspires
a lasting desire for revenge inevitably leads to future war.
Wars are never aggressive but always defensive on the
part of those who are responsible for waging them. Wars
are never defensive but always aggressive on the part
of those against whom they are waged. The Ministers
and monarchs do the quarrelling, the people believe the
version they are told and obey. The people do the fighting
and make the sacrifice, the Ministers and monarchs do
the treaty-making without consulting them. The people’s
part is one of valiance, endurance, and suffering; the part
of the Ministers and monarchs is one too often marred by
failure and frequently disfigured by intrigue and deception.
Cast your eye through these forty-two very brief records
of wars. Think of the valour, the determination, and
the heroism of the people, be they soldiers or civilians.
Consider the noble part played by those who without
question obeyed what they were led to believe was their
country’s call. And then look on the other side at the
results—the ineptitude of the statesmen, the patched-up
treaties, the worthless agreements, the wars that led to
further wars, the failure to secure a settlement after the
soldier had done his part, and the unnecessary prolongation
of conflicts when agreement might have been reached
by the exercise of a little wisdom and foresight. The
contrast is remarkable between the actions on the battlefield
and the intrigue in the council chamber. Blood
has been spilt, lives lost, and victories won often without
any positive advantage being gained in the final result.
The wars are arranged according to date. Some were
long-drawn-out struggles, others sharp conflicts of a few
months. The number of men engaged in any battle and
the casualties if they could be tabulated would no doubt
seem comparatively small to our modern eyes. The total
loss of life in the Crimean War amounted to about 600,000
men.1 An estimate of the loss in killed and wounded in
some of the other great battles may be given as follows:
Solferino (1859), 31,500; Chickamauga (1863), 35,100;
Gettysburg (1863), 37,000; Königrätz (1866), 26,894;
Vionville (1870), 32,800; Gravelotte (1870), 30,000; Plevna
(1877), 19,000;2 The Boer War (1899–1902): British
losses, 28,603; Boers killed, 4,000, prisoners 40,000;3
Mukden (1905), 131,000.
Wars to the generation that experiences them are unmixed
evils engendering hatred and evil passions and
bringing in their train loss, suffering, destruction, and
impoverishment, all of which are acutely felt. The succeeding
generation inherit their consequences in the shape
of high taxation and the attempts to mend and reconstruct
the dislocated national life. The horror has gone but
the memory remains. To the succeeding generation they
become episodes read of in the cold pages of history, and
then at last they fade into mere names—a battle with a
vaguely remembered date.
Each war is terminated by a treaty. The main provisions
of a few additional treaties which were not
concluded after wars are also given. In but few
instances have war treaties been observed, and in several
cases they were not worth the paper they were written
on. Treaties are signed and ratified by statesmen without
the sanction or approval, and sometimes without the
knowledge, of their people. The statesmen enter the
council chamber as individuals bent on securing advantages
at other people’s expense, and ready by bargain
and intrigue to attain their ends. These instruments
therefore are expressions of temporary expediency sometimes
exacted after defeat, sometimes the result of
compromise and generally inconclusive. If treaties are
to become sacred obligations founded on international
justice and respected not merely by changing governments
but by whole nations, the spirit in which they
are drawn up and the method by which they are
concluded must be radically altered. The existence of
secret treaties and engagements has proved to be one
of the gravest dangers to European peace.
There are a large number of conventions which have
been concluded between nations, by which social intercourse
with regard to such matters as post and telegraph
is facilitated, and of late years arbitration treaties between
one Power and another have multiplied very rapidly. This
is the one advance in which the efforts of diplomacy have
borne fruit. The important treaty of Arbitration between
Great Britain and the United States is the only one of these
treaties mentioned in the list. Agreements with regard
to the conduct of war have been made, such as the Geneva
Convention of 1864 and 1906, and the Hague Declarations
of 1899 and 1907, but they have proved to a large extent
futile.
Treaties are generally concluded for an undefined period,
and lapse owing to deliberate breach or altered circumstances.
But no people, and it may safely be said no
government, was precisely aware which of the innumerable
treaties were still in force, and what actually in given
circumstances its obligations were.
There may be many instances in which a nation may
look back with pride at the victory of its arms and the
achievements of its generals. There are but few instances
in which a nation can look back with pride at the advantages
gained by treaties of peace and at the achievements
of its diplomatists. From the Treaty of Vienna, 1815, to
the Treaty of Bukarest, 1913, the record of so-called settlements
is not one to inspire confidence in the efficacy of
warfare or in the methods of diplomacy.
After the termination of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815
there were great hopes of an era of peace. But two antagonistic
elements existed in Europe which were bound
sooner or later to come into open conflict. On the one
hand the French Revolution had engendered in the peoples
a spirit of unrest, of discontent, of impatience with the
unfettered monarchical system, and at the same time confidence
in their power and hope of success in the destruction
of tyranny and arbitrary government. It was in fact the
rise of democracy. On the other side the despotic governments
were ready to co-operate, and, under the guidance
of Metternich, endeavour to repress and exterminate the
movement for the establishment of constitutional government,
and for the expression of nationalist and democratic
aspirations. Two waves of revolution passed over Europe
in 1830 and 1848, and by the middle of the century the
reactionaries could no longer hold their own, and many
states had been freed from despotism and oppression.
In the latter part of the century, however, as has already
been pointed out, fresh causes for war arose in the competitive
ambition of governments for imperial expansion.
Wars became more frequent and extended into remote
regions of the world which had become accessible. There
are forty-seven wars mentioned in these records; of these
thirteen took place before the Crimean War, which is
about the middle of the period, and thirty-three after. In
twenty-one out of the forty-five wars Great Britain was
either directly or indirectly concerned as a belligerent.
There were only two wars in which Christian nations were
not primarily involved.
It must be remembered that in no country had the
peoples any voice in the determination of policy so far
as international affairs were concerned. While for brevity’s
sake the usual phraseology is adopted, and such expressions
used as “France decided,” “Russia refused,” “Italy
intended,” etc., etc., in no case does the name of the country
mean the people or indeed anything more than a monarch
and a few statesmen. Although constitutional monarchy
became established during the period in many countries,
and with it, parliamentary government, the idea of diplomacy,
foreign policy, international engagements, and
treaties being under parliamentary supervision and control,
had not yet been suggested.
The solution of the vast problem of the avoidance of
war in the future, if it rests alone on the wisdom of sovereigns
and statesmen, is not likely, judging by the experience
of the past, to be reached very rapidly. In the
meanwhile a careful examination of the events of recent
history is a necessary preparation for all who want to
dispel the strange but prevalent delusion that force of
arms settles international disputes, and this record may
be useful as a manual for reference.
