"Mr. Wright understood the friends of this
bill to put its merits upon the single and distinct
ground that the government of the United States
had released France from the payment of the
claims for a consideration, passing directly to
the benefit of our government, and fully equal
in value to the claims themselves. Mr. W. said
he should argue the several questions presented,
upon the supposition that this was the extent
to which the friends of the bill had gone, or
were disposed to go, in claiming a liability on
the part of the United States to pay the claimants;
and, thus understood, he was ready to
proceed to an examination of the strength of this
position.
"His first duty, then, was to examine the relations
existing between France and the United
States prior to the commencement of the disturbances
out of which these claims have arisen;
and the discharge of this duty would compel a
dry and uninteresting reference to the several
treaties which, at that period, governed those
relations.
"The seventeenth article of the treaty of amity
and commerce of the 6th February, 1778,
was the first of these references, and that article
was in the following words:
"'Art. 17. It shall be lawful for the ships of
war of either party, and privateers, freely to
carry whithersoever they please the ships and
goods taken from their enemies, without being
obliged to pay any duty to the officers of the
admiralty or any other judges; nor shall such
prizes be arrested or seized when they come to
or enter the ports of either party; nor shall the
searchers or other officers of those places search
the same, or make examination concerning the
lawfulness of such prizes; but they may hoist
sail at any time and depart and carry their
prizes to the places expressed in their commissions,
which the commanders of such ships of
war shall be obliged to show; on the contrary,
no shelter or refuge shall be given in their ports
to such as shall have made prize of the subjects,
people, or property of either of the parties; but
if such shall come in, being forced by stress of
weather, or the danger of the sea, all proper
means shall be vigorously used, that they go
out and retire from thence as soon as possible.'
"This article, Mr. W. said, would be found to
be one of the most material of all the stipulations
between the two nations, in an examination
of the diplomatic correspondence during
the whole period of the disturbances, from the
breaking out of the war between France and
England, in 1793, until the treaty of the 30th
September, 1800. The privileges claimed by
France, and the exclusions she insisted on as
applicable to the other belligerent Powers, were
fruitful sources of complaint on both sides, and
constituted many material points of disagreement
between the two nations through this entire
interval. What these claims were on the
part of France, and how far they were admitted
by the United States, and how far controverted,
will, Mr. W. said, be more properly considered
in another part of the argument. As connected,
however, with this branch of the relations, he
thought it necessary to refer to the twenty-second
article of the same treaty, which was in
the following words:
"'Art. 22. It shall not be lawful for any foreign
privateers, not belonging to subjects of the
Most Christian King, nor citizens of the said
United States, who have commissions from any
other prince or State in enmity with either nation,
to fit their ships in the ports of either the
one or the other of the aforesaid parties, to sell
what they have taken, or in any other manner
whatsoever to exchange their ships, merchandises,
or any other lading; neither shall they be
allowed even to purchase victuals, except such
as shall be necessary for their going to the next
port of that prince or State from which they
have commissions.'
"Mr. W. said he now passed to a different
branch of the relations between the two countries,
as established by this treaty of amity and
commerce, which was the reciprocal right of
either to carry on a free trade with the enemies
of the other, restricted only by the stipulations
of the same treaty in relation to articles to be
considered contraband of war. This reciprocal
right is defined in the twenty-third article of the
treaty, which is in the words following:
"'Art. 23. It shall be lawful for all and singular
the subjects of the Most Christian King, and
the citizens, people, and inhabitants of the said
United States, to sail with their ships with all
manner of liberty and security, no distinction
being made who are the proprietors of the merchandises
laden thereon, from any port to the
places of those who now are or hereafter shall
be at enmity with the Most Christian King, or
the United States. It shall likewise be lawful
for the subjects and inhabitants aforesaid to sail
with the ships and merchandises aforementioned,
and to trade with the same liberty and security
from the places, ports, and havens of those who
are enemies of both or either party, without any
opposition or disturbance whatsoever, not only
directly from the places of the enemy aforementioned
to neutral places, but also from one place
belonging to an enemy to another place belonging
to an enemy, whether they be under the
jurisdiction of the same prince, or under several.
And it is hereby stipulated that free ships shall
also give a freedom to goods, and that every
thing shall be deemed to be free and exempt
which shall be found on board the ships belonging
to the subjects of either of the confederates, although
the whole lading, or any part thereof,
should appertain to the enemies of either, contraband
goods being always excepted. It is also
agreed, in like manner, that the same liberty be
extended to persons who are on board a free
ship, with this effect, that although they be enemies
to both or either party, they are not to be
taken out of that free ship, unless they are soldiers
and in actual service of the enemies.'
"The restrictions as to articles to be held between
the two nations as contraband of war,
Mr. W. said, were to be found in the twenty-fourth
article of this same treaty of amity and
commerce, and were as follows:
"'Art. 24. This liberty of navigation and
commerce shall extend to all kinds of merchandises,
excepting those only which are distinguished
by the name of contraband, and under this
name of contraband, or prohibited goods, shall
be comprehended arms, great guns, bombs, with
fuses and other things belonging to them, cannon
ball, gunpowder, match, pikes, swords, lances,
spears, halberds, mortars, petards, grenades,
saltpetre, muskets, musket ball, helmets, breastplates,
coats of mail, and the like kinds of arms
proper for arming soldiers, musket rests, belts,
horses with their furniture, and all other warlike
instruments whatever. These merchandises
which follow shall not be reckoned among
contraband or prohibited goods; that is to say,
all sorts of cloths, and all other manufactures
woven of any wool, flax, silk, cotton, or any other
material whatever; all kinds of wearing apparel,
together with the species whereof they are used
to be made; gold and silver, as well coined as
uncoined: tin, iron, latten, copper, brass, coals;
as also wheat and barley, and any other kind of
corn and pulse: tobacco, and likewise all manner
of spices; salted and smoked flesh, salted
fish, cheese, and butter, beer, oils, wines, sugars,
and all sorts of salts; and, in general, all provisions
which serve for the nourishment of mankind,
and the sustenance of life; furthermore,
all kinds of cotton, hemp, flax, tar, pitch, ropes,
cables, sails, sail cloths, anchors, and any part
of anchors, also ships' masts, planks, boards, and
beams, of what trees soever; and all other things
proper either for building or repairing ships, and
all other goods whatever which have not been
worked into the form of any instrument or thing
prepared for war by land or by sea, shall not be
reputed contraband, much less such as have been
already wrought and made up for any other use;
all which shall be wholly reckoned among free
goods; as likewise all other merchandises and
things which are not comprehended and particularly
mentioned in the foregoing enumeration of
contraband goods, so that they may be transported
and carried in the freest manner by the
subjects of both confederates, even to the places
belonging to an enemy, such towns or places being
only excepted as are at that time besieged,
blocked up, or invested.'
"Mr. W. said this closed his references to this
treaty, with the remark, which he wished carefully
borne in mind, that the accepted public law
was greatly departed from in this last article.
Provisions, in their broadest sense, materials for
ships, rigging for ships, and indeed almost all the
articles of trade mentioned in the long exception
in the article of the treaty, were articles contraband
of war by the law of nations. This article,
therefore, placed our commerce with France upon
a footing widely different, in case of a war between
France and any third power, from the rules which
would regulate that commerce with the other
belligerent, with whom we might not have a
similar commercial treaty. Such was its effect as
compared with our relations with England, with
which power we had no commercial treaty whatever,
but depended upon the law of nations as
our commercial rule and standard of intercourse.
"Mr. W. said he now passed to the treaty of
alliance between France and the United States,
of the same date with the treaty of amity and
commerce before referred to, and his first reference
was to the 11th article of this latter
treaty. It was in the following words:
"'Art. 11. The two parties guarantee mutually
from the present time, and for ever, against
all other powers, to wit: The United States to
His Most Christian Majesty the present possessions
of the Crown of France in America, as well
as those which it may acquire by the future treaty
of peace: And His Most Christian Majesty
guarantees on his part to the United States, their
liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute
and unlimited, as well in matters of government
as commerce, and also their possessions, and the
additions or conquests that their confederation
may obtain during the war, from any of the dominions
now or heretofore possessed by Great
Britain in North America, conformable to the
fifth and sixth articles above written, the whole
as their possessions shall be fixed and assured to
the said States at the moment of the cessation
of their present war with England.'
"This article, Mr. W. said, was the most important
reference he had made, or could make,
so far as the claims provided for by this bill
were concerned, because he understood the
friends of the bill to derive the principal consideration
to the United States, which created their
liability to pay the claims, from the guaranty
on the part of the United States contained in it.
The Senate would see that the article was a
mutual and reciprocal guaranty, 1st. On the part
of the United States to France, of her possessions
in America; and 2d. On the part of France
to the United States, of their 'liberty, sovereignity,
and independence, absolute and unlimited,
as well in matters of government as commerce,
and also their possessions,' &c.; and that
the respective guarantees were 'for ever.' It
would by-and-by appear in what manner this
guaranty on the part of our government was
claimed to be the foundation for this pecuniary
responsibility for millions, but at present he
must complete his references to the treaties
which formed the law between the two nations,
and the rule of their relations to and with each
other. He had but one more article to read, and
that was important only as it went to define the
one last cited. This was the 12th article of the
treaty of alliance, and was as follows:
"'Art. 12. In order to fix more precisely the
sense and application of the preceding article,
the contracting parties declare that, in case of a
rupture between France and England, the reciprocal
guaranty declared in the said article
shall have its full force and effect the moment
such war shall break out; and if such rupture
shall not take place, the mutual obligations of the
said guaranty shall not commence until the moment
of the cessation of the present war between
the United States and England shall have ascertained
their possessions.'
"These, said Mr. W., are the treaty stipulations
between France and the United States, existing
at the time of the commencement of the
disturbances between the two countries, which
gave rise to the claims now the subject of consideration,
and which seem to bear most materially
upon the points in issue. There were other
provisions in the treaties between the two governments
more or less applicable to the present
discussion, but, in the course he had marked out
for himself, a reference to them was not indispensable,
and he was not disposed to occupy the
time or weary the patience of the Senate with
more of these dry documentary quotations than
he found absolutely essential to a full and clear
understanding of the points he proposed to examine.
"Mr. W. said he was now ready to present
the origin of the claims which formed the subject
of the bill. The war between France and
England broke out, according to his recollection,
late in the year 1792, or early in the year 1793,
and the United States resolved upon preserving
the same neutral position between those belligerents,
which they had assumed at the commencement
of the war between France and certain
other European powers. This neutrality
on the part of the United States seemed to be
acceptable to the then French Republic, and her
minister in the United States and her diplomatic
agents at home were free and distinct in their
expressions to this effect.
"Still that Republic made broad claims under
the 17th article of the treaty of amity and commerce
before quoted, and her minister here assumed
the right to purchase ships, arm them as
privateers in our ports, commission officers for
them, enlist our own citizens to man them
and, thus prepared, to send them from our ports
to cruise against English vessels upon our coast.
Many prizes were made, which were brought
into our ports, submitted to the admiralty jurisdiction
conferred by the French Republic upon
her consuls in the United States, condemned,
and the captured vessels and cargoes exposed for
sale in our markets. These practices were immediately
and earnestly complained of by the
British government as violations of the neutrality
which our government had declared, and
which we assumed to maintain in regard to all
the belligerents, as favors granted to one of the
belligerents, not demandable of right under our
treaties with France, and as wholly inconsistent,
according to the rules of international law, with
our continuance as a neutral power. Our government
so far yielded to these complaints as to
prohibit the French from fitting out, arming,
equipping, or commissioning privateers in our
ports, and from enlisting our citizens to bear
arms under the French flag.
"This decision of the rights of France, under
the treaty of amity and commerce, produced
warm remonstrances from her minister in the United
States, but was finally ostensibly acquiesced
in by the Republic, although constant complaints
of evasions and violations of the rule continued
to harass our government, and to occupy the attention
of the respective diplomatists.
"The exclusive privilege of our ports for
her armed vessels, privateers, and their prizes,
granted to France by the treaty of amity and
commerce, as has before been seen, excited the
jealousy of England, and she was not slow in
sending a portion of her vast navy to line our
coast and block up our ports and harbors. The
insolence of power induced some of her armed
vessels to enter our ports, and to remain, in
violation of our treaty with France, though not
by the consent of our government, or when we
had the power to enforce the treaty by their
ejection. These incidents, however, did not fail
to form the subject of new charges from the
French ministers, of bad faith on our part, of
partiality to England to the prejudice of our
old and faithful ally, of permitted violations of
the treaties, and of an inefficiency and want of
zeal in the performance of our duties as neutrals.
To give point to these complaints, some few instances
occurred in which British vessels brought
their prizes into our ports, whether in all cases
under those casualties of stress of weather, or
the dangers of the sea, which rendered the act
in conformity with the treaties and the law of
nations or not, is not perhaps very certain or
very material, inasmuch as the spirit of complaint
seems to have taken possession of the French
negotiators, and these acts gave colorable ground
to their remonstrances.
"Contemporaneously with these grounds of
misunderstanding and these collisions of interest
between the belligerents, and between the
interests of either of them and the preservation
of our neutrality, the French began to discover
the disadvantages to them, and the great advantages
to the British, of the different rules which
governed the commerce between the two nations
and the United States. The rule between us
and France was the commercial treaty of
which the articles above quoted form a part, and
the rule between us and Great Britain, was that
laid down by the law of nations. Mr. W. said
he would detain the Senate to point out but two
of the differences between these rules of commerce
and intercourse, because upon these two
principally depended the difficulties which followed.
The first was, that, by the treaty between
us and France, 'free ships shall also give a freedom
to the goods; and every thing shall be
deemed to be free and exempt which shall be found
on board the ships belonging to the subjects of
either of the confederates, although the whole
lading, or any part thereof, should appertain
to the enemy of either, contraband goods being
always excepted;' while the law of nations, which
was the rule between us and England, made the
goods of an enemy a lawful prize, though found in
the vessel of a friend. Hence it followed that
French property on board of an American vessel
was subject to capture by British cruisers without
indignity to our flag, or a violation to international
law, while British property on board of
an American vessel could not be captured by a
French vessel without an insult to the flag of
the United States, and a direct violation of the
twenty-third article of the treaty of amity and
commerce between us and France, before referred
to.
"Mr. W. said the second instance of disadvantage
to France which he proposed to mention,
was the great difference between the articles
made contraband of war by the twenty-fourth
article of the treaty of amity and commerce, before
read to the Senate, and by the law of nations.
By the treaty, provisions of all kinds,
ship timber, ship tackle (guns only excepted),
and a large list of other articles of trade and commerce,
were declared not to be contraband of
war, while the same articles are expressly made
contraband by the law of nations. Hence an
American vessel, clearing for a French port with
a cargo of provisions or ship stores, was lawful
prize to a British cruiser, as, by the law of nations,
carrying articles contraband of war to an
enemy, while the same vessel, clearing for a
British port, with the same cargo, could not be
captured by a French vessel, because the treaty
declared that the articles composing the cargo
should not be contraband as between the United
States and France. Mr. W. said the Senate
would see, at a single glance, how eminently
these two advantages on the part of Great Britain
were calculated to turn our commerce to her
ports, where, if the treaty between us and
France was observed, our vessels could go in
perfect safety, while, laden with provisions, our
only considerable export, and destined for a
French port, they were liable to capture, as
carrying to an enemy contraband articles. Upon
their return, too, they were equally out of
danger from French cruisers, as, by the treaty,
free ships made free the goods on board; while,
if they cleared from a port in France with a
French cargo, they were lawful prize to the
British, upon the principle of the law of nations,
that the goods of an enemy are lawful prize,
even when found in the vessel of a friend.
"Both nations were in constant and urgent
want of provisions from the United States; and
this double advantage to England of having her
ports open and free to our vessels, and of possessing
the right to capture those bound to
French ports, exasperated the French Republic
beyond endurance. Her ministers remonstrated
with our government, controverted our construction
of British rights, again renewed the accusations
of partiality, and finally threw off the
obligations of the treaty; and, by a solemn decree
of their authorities at home, established the
rule which governed the practice of the British
cruisers. France, assuming to believe that the
United States permitted the neutrality of her
flag to be violated by the British, without resistance,
declared that she would treat the flag
of all neutral vessels as that flag should permit
itself to be treated by the other belligerents.
This opened our commerce to the almost indiscriminate
plunder and depredation of all the
powers at war, and but for the want of the provisions
of the United States, which was too
strongly felt both in England and France not to
govern, in a great degree, the policy of the two
nations, it would seem probable, from the documentary
history of the period, that it must have
been swept from the ocean. Impelled by this
want, however, the British adopted the rule, at
an early day, that the provisions captured, although
in a strict legal sense forfeited, as being
by the law of nations contraband, should not
be confiscated, but carried into English ports,
and paid for, at the market price of the same
provisions, at the port of their destination. The
same want compelled the French, when they
came to the conclusion to lay aside the obligations
of the treaty, and to govern themselves,
not by solemn compacts with friendly powers,
but by the standards of wrong adopted by their
enemies, to adopt also the same rule, and instead
of confiscating the cargo as contraband of war, if
provisions, to decree a compensation graduated
by the market value at the port of destination.
"Such, said Mr. W., is a succinct view of the
disturbances between France and the United
States, and between France and Great Britain,
out of which grew what are now called the
French claims for spoliations upon our commerce,
prior to the 30th of September, 1800.
Other subjects of difference might have had a
remote influence; but, Mr. W. said, he believed
it would be admitted by all, that those he had
named were the principal, and might be assumed
as having given rise to the commercial
irregularities in which the claims commenced.
This state of things, without material change,
continued until the year 1798, when our government
adopted a course of measures intended to
suspend our intercourse with France, until she
should be brought to respect our rights. These
measures were persevered in by the United
States, up to September, 1800, and were terminated
by the treaty between the two nations of
the 30th of that month. Here, too, terminated
claims which now occupy the attention of the
Senate.
"As it was the object of the claimants to
show a liability, on the part of our government,
to pay their claims, and the bill under discussion
assumed that liability, and provided, in part at
least, for the payment, Mr. W. said it became
his duty to inquire what the government had
done to obtain indemnity for these claimants
from France, and to see whether negligence on
its part had furnished equitable or legal ground
for the institution of this large claim upon the
national treasury. The period of time covered
by the claims, as he understood the subject, was
from the breaking out of the war between
France and England, in 1793, to the signing of
the treaty between France and the United States,
in September, 1800; and he would consider the
efforts the government had made to obtain indemnity:
"1st. From 1793 to 1798.
"2d. From 1798 to the treaty of the 30th
September, 1800.
"During the first period, Mr. W. said, these
efforts were confined to negotiation, and he felt
safe in the assertion that, during no equal period
in the history of our government, could there
be found such untiring and unremitted exertions
to obtain justice for citizens who had been injured
in their properties by the unlawful acts
of a foreign power. Any one who would read
the mass of diplomatic correspondence between
this government and France, from 1793 to 1798,
and who would mark the frequent and extraordinary
missions, bearing constantly in mind that
the recovery of these claims was the only ground
upon our part for the whole negotiation, would
find it difficult to say where negligence towards
the rights and interests of its citizens is imputable
to the government of the United States,
during this period. He was not aware that
such an imputation had been or would be made;
but sure he was that it could not be made with
justice, or sustained by the facts upon the record.
No liability, therefore, equitable or legal,
had been incurred, up to the year 1798.
"And if, said Mr. W., negligence is not imputable,
prior to 1798, and no liability had then
been incurred, how is it for the second period,
from 1798 to 1800? The efforts of the former
period were negotiation—constant, earnest, extraordinary
negotiation. What were they for
the latter period? His answer was, war; actual,
open war; and he believed the statute book of
the United States would justify him in the position.
He was well aware that this point would
be strenuously controverted, because the friends
of the bill would admit that, if a state of war
between the two countries did exist, it put an
end to claims existing prior to the war, and not
provided for in the treaty of peace, as well as to
all pretence for claims to indemnity for injuries
to our commerce, committed by our enemy in
time of war. Mr. W. said he had found the evidences
so numerous, to establish his position that
a state of actual war did exist, that he had been
quite at a loss from what portion of the testimony
of record to make his selections, so as to
establish the fact beyond reasonable dispute, and
at the same time not to weary the Senate by tedious
references to laws and documents. He
had finally concluded to confine himself exclusively
to the statute book, as the highest possible
evidence, as in his judgment entirely conclusive,
and as being susceptible of an arrangement
and condensation which would convey to
the Senate the whole material evidence, in a
satisfactory manner, and in less compass than
the proofs to be drawn from any other source.
He had, therefore, made a very brief abstract of
a few statutes, which he would read in his
place:
"By an act of the 28th May, 1798, Congress
authorized the capture of all armed vessels of
France which had committed depredations upon
our commerce, or which should be found hovering
upon our coast for the purpose of committing
such depredations.
"By an act of the 13th June, 1798, only sixteen
days after the passage of the former act,
Congress prohibited all vessels of the United
States from visiting any of the ports of France
or her dependencies, under the penalty of forfeiture
of vessel and cargo; required every vessel
clearing for a foreign port to give bonds (the
owner, or factor and master) in the amount of
the vessel and cargo, and good sureties in half
that amount, conditioned that the vessel to which
the clearance was to be granted, would not, voluntarily,
visit any port of France or her dependencies;
and prohibited all vessels of France,
armed or unarmed, or owned, fitted, hired, or
employed, by any person resident within the
territory of the French Republic, or its dependencies,
or sailing or coming therefrom, from entering
or remaining in any port of the United
States, unless permitted by the President, by
special passport, to be granted by him in each
case.
"By an act of the 25th June, 1798, only
twelve days after the passage of the last-mentioned
act, Congress authorized the merchant
vessels of the United States to arm, and to defend
themselves against any search, restraint, or
seizure, by vessels sailing under French colors,
to repel force by force to capture any French
vessel attempting a search, restraint, or seizure,
and to recapture any American merchant vessel
which had been captured by the French.
"Here, Mr. W. said, he felt constrained to
make a remark upon the character of these several
acts of Congress, and to call the attention of
the Senate to their peculiar adaptation to the
measures which speedily followed in future acts
of the national legislature. The first, authorizing
the capture of French armed vessels, was
peculiarly calculated to put in martial preparation
all the navy which the United States then
possessed, and to spread it upon our coast. The
second, establishing a perfect non-intercourse
with France, was sure to call home our merchant
vessels from that country and her dependencies,
to confine within our own ports those
vessels intended for commerce with France, and
thus to withdraw from the reach of the French
cruisers a large portion of the ships and property
of our citizens. The third, authorizing our
merchantmen to arm, was the greatest inducement
the government could give to its citizens
to arm our whole commercial marine, and was
sure to put in warlike preparation as great a
portion of our merchant vessels as a desire of
self-defence, patriotism, or cupidity, would arm.
Could measures more eminently calculated to
prepare the country for a state of war have been
devised or adopted? Was this the intention of
those measures, on the part of the government,
and was that intention carried out into action?
Mr. W. said he would let the subsequent acts of
the Congress of the United States answer; and
for that purpose, he would proceed to read from
his abstract of those acts:
"By an act of the 28th June, 1798, three days
after the passage of the act last referred to,
Congress authorized the forfeiture and condemnation
of all French vessels captured in pursuance
of the acts before mentioned, and provided
for the distribution of the prize money, and for
the confinement and support, at the expense of
the United States, of prisoners taken in the captured
vessels.
"By an act of the 7th July, 1798, nine days
after the passage of the last-recited act, Congress
declared 'that the United States are of right
freed and exonerated from the stipulations of
the treaties and of the consular convention
heretofore concluded between the United States
and France; and that the same shall not henceforth
be regarded as legally obligatory on the
government or citizens of the United States.'
"By an act of the 9th July, 1798, two days
after the passage of the act declaring void the
treaties, Congress authorized the capture, by
the public armed vessels of the United States,
of all armed French vessels, whether within the
jurisdictional limits of the United States or upon
the high seas, their condemnation as prizes, their
sale, and the distribution of the prize money;
empowered the President to grant commissions
to private armed vessels to make the same captures,
and with the same rights and powers, as
public armed vessels; and provided for the safe
keeping and support of the prisoners taken, at
the expense of the United States.
"By an act of the 9th February, 1799, Congress
continued the non-intercourse between the
United States and France for one year, from the
3d of March, 1799.
"By an act of the 28th February, 1799, Congress
provided for an exchange of prisoners with
France, or authorized the President, at his discretion,
to send to the dominions of France,
without an exchange, such prisoners as might
remain in the power of the United States.
"By an act of the 3d March, 1799, Congress
directed the President, in case any citizens of
the United States, taken on board vessels belonging
to any of the powers at war with France,
by French vessels, should be put to death, corporally
punished, or unreasonably imprisoned,
to retaliate promptly and fully upon any French
prisoners in the power of the United States.
"By an act of the 27th February, 1800, Congress
again continued the non-intercourse between
us and France, for one year, from the 3d
of March, 1800.
"Mr. W. said he had now closed the references
he proposed to make to the laws of Congress,
to prove that war—actual war—existed
between the United States and France, from
July, 1798, until that war was terminated by
the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800. He
had, he hoped, before shown that the measures
of Congress, up to the passage of the act of Congress
of the 25th of June, 1798, and including
that act, were appropriate measures preparatory
to a state of war; and he had now shown a total
suspension of the peaceable relations between
the two governments, by the declaration of Congress
that the treaties should no longer be considered
binding and obligatory upon our government
or its citizens. What, then, but war could
be inferred from an indiscriminate direction to
our public armed vessels, put in a state of preparation,
by preparatory acts, to capture all
armed French vessels upon the high seas, and
from granting commissions to our whole commercial
marine, also armed by the operation of
previous acts of Congress, authorizing them to
make the same captures, with regulations applicable
to both, for the condemnation of the prizes,
the distribution of the prize money, and the detention,
support, and exchange of the prisoners
taken in the captured vessels? Will any man,
said Mr. W., call this a state of peace?
"[Here Mr. Webster, chairman of the select
committee which reported the bill, answered,
'Certainly.']
"Mr. W. proceeded. He said he was not
deeply read in the treatises upon national law, and
he should never dispute with that learned gentleman
upon the technical definitions of peace
and war, as given in the books; but his appeal
was to the plain sense of every senator and
every citizen of the country. Would either call
that state of things which he had described,
and which he had shown to exist from the
highest of all evidence, the laws of Congress
alone, peace? It was a state of open and undisguised
hostility, of force opposed to force, of
war upon the ocean, as far as our government
were in command of the means to carry on a
maritime war. If it was peace, he should like
to be informed, by the friends of the bill, what
would be war. This was violence and bloodshed,
the power of the one nation against the
power of the other, reciprocally exhibited by
physical force.
"Couple with this the withdrawal by France
of her minister from this government, and her
refusal to receive the American commission, consisting
of Messrs. Marshall, Pinckney, and Gerry,
and the consequent suspension of negotiations
between the two governments, during the period
referred to; and Mr. W. said, if the facts and
the national records did not show a state of war,
he was at a loss to know what state of things
between nations should be called war.
"If, however, the Senate should think him
wrong in this conclusion, and that the claims
were not utterly barred by war, he trusted the
facts disclosed in this part of his argument would
be considered sufficient at least to protect the
faith of the government in the discharge of its
whole duty to its citizens; and that after it had
carried on these two years of war, or, if not war,
of actual force and actual fighting, in which the
blood of its citizens had been shed, and their lives
sacrificed to an unknown extent, for the single and
sole purpose of enforcing these claims of individuals,
the imputation of negligence, and hence
of liability to pay the claims, would not be urged
as growing out of this portion of the conduct of
the government.
"Mr. W. said he now came to consider the
treaty of the 30th September, 1800, and the reasons
which appeared plainly to his mind to have
induced the American negotiators to place that
negotiation upon the basis, not of an existing
war, but of a continued peace. That such was
assumed to be the basis of the negotiation, he
believed to be true, and this fact, and this fact
only, so far as he had heard the arguments of
the friends of the bill, was depended upon to
prove that there had been no war. He had attempted
to show that war in fact had existed,
and been carried on for two years; and if he
could now show that the inducement, on the
part of the American ministers, to place the negotiation
which was to put an end to the existing
hostilities upon a peace basis, arose from no
considerations of a national or political character,
and from no ideas of consistency with the
existing state of facts, but solely from a desire
still to save, as far as might be in their power,
the interests of these claimants, he should submit
with great confidence that it did not lay in
the mouths of the same claimants to turn round
and claim this implied admission of an absence
of war, thus made by the agents of the government
out of kindness to them, and an excess of
regard for their interests, as the basis of a liability
to pay the damages which they had
sustained, and which this diplomatic untruth,
like all the previous steps of the government,
failed to recover for them. What, then, Mr.
President, said Mr. W., was the subject on our
part, of the constant and laborious negotiations
carried on between the two governments from
1793 to 1798? The claims. What, on our part,
was the object of the disturbances from 1798 to
1800—of the non-intercourse—of the sending
into service our navy, and arming our merchant
vessels—of our raising troops and providing
armies on the land—of the expenditure of the
millions taken from the treasury and added to
our public debt, to equip and sustain these fleets
and armies? The claims. Why were our citizens
sent to capture the French, to spill their
blood, and lay down their lives upon the high
seas? To recover the claims. These were the
whole matter. We had no other demand upon
France, and, upon our part, no other cause of
difference with her.
"What public, or national, or political object
had we in the negotiation of 1800, which led to
the treaty of the 30th September of that year?
None, but to put an end to the existing hostilities,
and to restore relations of peace and friendship.
These could have been as well secured by
negotiating upon a war as a peace basis. Indeed,
as there were in our former treaties stipulations
which we did not want to revive, a negotiation
upon the basis of existing war was preferable,
so far as the interests of the government were
concerned, because that would put all questions,
growing out of former treaties between the parties,
for ever at rest. Still our negotiators consented
to put the negotiation upon the basis of
continued peace, and why? Because the adoption
of a basis of existing war would have barred
effectually and for ever all classes of the claims.
This, Mr. W. said, was the only possible assignable
reason for the course pursued by the
American negotiators; it was the only reason
growing out of the existing facts, or out of the
interests, public or private, involved in the difficulties
between the two nations. He therefore
felt himself fully warranted in the conclusion, that
the American ministers preferred and adopted a
peace basis for the negotiation which resulted in
the treaty of the 30th of September, 1800, solely
from a wish, as far as they might be able, to save
the interests of our citizens holding claims against
France.
"Did they, Mr. President, said Mr. W., succeed
by this artifice in benefiting the citizens
who had sustained injuries? He would let the
treaty speak for itself. The following are extracts
from the 4th and 5th articles:
"'Art. 4. Property captured, and not yet definitively
condemned, or which may be captured
before the exchange of ratifications (contraband
goods destined to an enemy's port excepted),
shall be mutually restored on the following
proof of ownership.'
"[Here follows the form of proof, when the
article proceeds:]
"'This article shall take effect from the date
of the signature of the present convention. And
if, from the date of the said signature, any property
shall be condemned contrary to the intent
of the said convention, before the knowledge of
this stipulation shall be obtained, the property
so condemned shall, without delay, be restored
or paid for.'
"'Art. 5. The debts contracted for by one of
the two nations with individuals of the other, or
by individuals of the one with individuals of the
other, shall be paid, or the payment may be
prosecuted in the same manner as if there had
been no misunderstanding between the two
States. But this clause shall not extend to
indemnities claimed on account of captures or
confiscations.'
"Here, Mr. W. said, was evidence from the
treaty itself, that, by assuming a peace basis for
the negotiation, the property of our merchants
captured and not condemned was saved to them,
and that certain classes of claimants against the
French government were provided for, and their
rights expressly reserved. So much, therefore,
was gained by our negotiators by a departure
from the facts, and negotiating to put an end to
existing hostilities upon the basis of a continued
peace. Was it, then, generous or just to permit
these merchants, because our ministers did not
succeed in saving all they claimed, to set up this
implied admission of continued peace as the
foundation of a liability against their own government
to pay what was not recovered from
France? He could not so consider it, and he
felt sure the country never would consent to so
responsible an implication from an act of excessive
kindness. Mr. W. said he must not be understood
as admitting that all was not, by the
effect of this treaty, recovered from France,
which she ever recognized to be due, or ever intended
to pay. On the contrary, his best impression
was, from what he had been able to
learn of the claims, that the treaty of Louisiana
provided for the payment of all the claims which
France ever admitted, ever intended to pay, or
which there was the most remote hope of recovering
in any way whatever. He should, in
a subsequent part of his remarks, have occasion
to examine that treaty, the claims which were
paid under it, and to compare the claims paid
with those urged before the treaty of September,
1800.
"Mr. W. said he now came to the consideration
of the liability of the United States to these
claimants, in case it shall be determined by the
Senate that a war between France and the United
States had not existed to bar all ground of claim
either against France or the United States. He
understood the claimants to put this liability
upon the assertion that the government of the
United States had released their claims against
France by the treaty of the 30th of September,
1800, and that the release was made for a full
and valuable consideration passing to the United
States, which in law and equity made it their
duty to pay the claims. The consideration passing
to the United States is alleged to be their
release from the onerous obligations imposed
upon them by the treaties of amity and commerce
and alliance of 1778, and the consular convention
of 1778, and especially and principally by the
seventeenth article of the treaty of amity and
commerce, in relation to armed vessels, privateers,
and prizes, and by the eleventh article
of the treaty of alliance containing the mutual
guarantees.
"The release, Mr. W. said, was claimed to
have been made in the striking out, by the Senate
of the United States, of the second article
of the treaty of 30th September, 1800, as that
article was originally inserted and agreed upon
by the respective negotiators of the two powers,
as it stood at the time the treaty was signed.
To cause this point to be clearly understood, it
would be necessary for him to trouble the Senate
with a history of the ratification of this treaty.
The second article, as inserted by the negotiators,
and as standing at the time of the signing
of the treaty, was in the following words:
"'Art. 2. The ministers plenipotentiary of
the two powers not being able to agree, at present,
respecting the treaty of alliance of 6th
February, 1778, the treaty of amity and commerce
of the same date, and the convention of
14th of November, 1788, nor upon the indemnities
mutually due or claimed, the parties will
negotiate further upon these subjects at a
convenient time; and, until they may have
agreed upon these points, the said treaties and
convention shall have no operation, and the relations
of the two countries shall be regulated
as follows:'
"The residue of the treaty, Mr. W. said, was
a substantial copy of the former treaties of amity
and commerce, and alliance between the two
nations, with such modifications as were desirable
to both, and as experience under the former
treaties had shown to be for the mutual interests
of both.
"This second article was submitted to the
Senate by the President as a part of the treaty,
as by the constitution of the United States the
President was bound to do, to the end that the
treaty might be properly ratified on the part of
the United States, the French government having
previously adopted and ratified it as it was signed
by the respective negotiators, the second article
being then in the form given above. The Senate
refused to advise and consent to this article, and
expunged it from the treaty, inserting in its
place the following:
"'It is agreed that the present convention
shall be in force for the term of eight years
from the time of the exchange of the ratifications.'
"In this shape, and with this modification
the treaty was duly ratified by the President of
the United States, and returned to the French
government for its dissent or concurrence. Bonaparte,
then First Consul, concurred in the
modification made by the Senate, in the following
language, and upon the condition therein
expressed:
"'The government of the United States having
added to its ratification that the convention
should be in force for the space of eight years,
and having omitted the second article, the government
of the French Republic consents to
accept, ratify, and confirm the above convention,
with the addition, purporting that the convention
shall be in force for the space of eight years,
and with the retrenchment of the second article:
Provided, That, by this retrenchment, the two
States renounce the respective pretensions which
are the object of the said article.'
"This ratification by the French Republic,
thus qualified, was returned to the United States,
and the treaty, with the respective conditional
ratifications, was again submitted by the President
of the United States to the Senate. That
body 'resolved that they considered the said
convention as fully ratified, and returned the
same to the President for the usual promulgation;'
whereupon he completed the ratification
in the usual forms and by the usual publication.
"This, Mr. W. said, was the documentary
history of this treaty and of its ratification, and
here was the release of their claims relied upon
by the claimants under the bill before the Senate.
They contend that this second article of the
treaty, as originally inserted by the negotiators,
reserved their claims for future negotiation, and
also reserved the subjects of disagreement under
the treaties of amity and commerce, and of alliance,
of 1778, and the consular convention of
1788; that the seventeenth article of the treaty
of amity and commerce, and the eleventh article
of the treaty of alliance, were particularly onerous
upon the United States; that, to discharge
the government from the onerous obligations
imposed upon it in these two articles of the respective
treaties, the Senate was induced to expunge
the second article of the treaty of the 30th September
above referred to, and, by consequence,
to expunge the reservation of their claims as
subjects of future negotiation between the two
nations; that, in thus obtaining a discharge from
the onerous obligations of these treaties, and
especially of the two articles above designated,
the United States was benefited to an amount
beyond the whole value of the claims discharged,
and that this benefit was the inducement to the
expunging of the second article of the treaty,
with a full knowledge that the act did discharge
the claims, and create a legal and equitable obligation
on the part of the government to pay
them.
"These, Mr. W. said, he understood to be the
assumptions of the claimants, and this their
course of reasoning to arrive at the conclusion
that the United States were liable to them for
the amount of their claims. He must here raise
a preliminary question, which he had satisfied
himself would show which assumptions of the
claimants to be wholly without foundation, so
far as the idea of benefit to the United States
was supposed to be derived from expunging this
second article of the treaty of 1800. What, he
must be permitted to ask, would have been the
liability of the United States under the 'onerous
obligations' referred to, in case the Senate had
ratified the treaty, retaining this second article?
The binding force of the treaties of amity and
commerce, and of alliance, and of the consular
convention, was released, and the treaties and
convention were themselves suspended by the
very article in question; and the subjects of
disagreement growing out of them were merely
made matters of future negotiation 'at a convenient
time.' What was the value or the
burden of such an obligation upon the United
States? for this was the only obligation from
which our government was released by striking
out the article. The value, Mr. W. said, was
the value of the privilege, being at perfect liberty,
in the premises, of assenting to or dissenting
from a bad bargain, in a matter of negotiation
between ourselves and a foreign power. This
was the consideration passing to the United
States, and, so far as he was able to view the
subject, this was all the consideration the government
had received, if it be granted (which
he must by no means be understood to admit),
that the striking out of the article was a release
of the claims, and that such release was intended
as a consideration for the benefits to accrue to
the government from the act.
"Mr. W. said he felt bound to dwell, for a moment,
upon this point. What was the value of
an obligation to negotiate 'at a convenient time?'
Was it any thing to be valued? The 'convenient
time' might never arrive, or if it did arrive,
and negotiations were opened, were not the
government as much at liberty as in any other
case of negotiation, to refuse propositions which
were deemed disadvantageous to itself? The
treaties were suspended, and could not be revived
without the consent of the United States;
and, of consequence, the 'onerous obligations'
comprised in certain articles of these treaties
were also suspended until the same consent
should revive them. Could he, then, be mistaken
in the conclusion that, if the treaty of 1800 had
been ratified with the second article forming a
part of it, as originally agreed by the negotiators,
the United States would have been as effectually
released from the onerous obligations of the
former treaties, until those obligations should
again be put in force by their consent, as they
were released when that article was stricken
out, and the treaty ratified without it? In
short, could he be mistaken in the position that
all the inducement, of a national character, to
expunge that article from the treaty, was to get
rid of an obligation to negotiate 'at a convenient
time?' And could it be possible that
such an inducement would have led the Senate
of the United States, understanding this consequence,
to impose upon the government a
liability to the amount of $5,000,000? He could
not adopt so absurd a supposition; and he felt
himself compelled to say that this view of the
action of the government in the ratification of
the treaty of 1800, in his mind, put an end to
the pretence that the striking out of this article
relieved the United States from obligations so
onerous as to form a valuable consideration for
the payments provided for in this bill. He
could not view the obligation released—a mere
obligation to negotiate—as onerous at all, or as
forming any consideration whatever for a pecuniary
liability, much less for a liability for millions.
"Mr. W. said he now proposed to consider
whether the effect of expunging the second article
of the treaty of 1800 was to release any
claim of value—any claim which France had
ever acknowledged, or ever intended to pay.
He had before shown, by extracts from the
fourth and fifth articles of the treaty of 1800,
that certain classes of claims were saved by that
treaty, as it was ratified. The claims so reserved
and provided for were paid in pursuance
of provisions contained in the treaty between
France and the United States, of the 30th of
April, 1803; and to determine what claims were
thus paid, a reference to some of the articles of
that treaty was necessary. The purchase of
Louisiana was made by the United States for
the sum of 80,000,000 of francs, 60,000,000 of
which were to be paid into the French treasury,
and the remaining 20,000,000 were to be applied
to the payment of these claims. Three separate
treaties were made between the parties, bearing
all the same date, the first providing for the
cession of the territory, the second for the payment
of the 60,000,000 of francs to the French
treasury, and the third for the adjustment and
payment of the claims.
"Mr. W. said the references proposed were to
the last-named treaty, and were the following:
"'Art. 1. The debts due by France to citizens
of the United States, contracted before the 8th
of Vendemiaire, ninth year of the French Republic
(30th September, 1800), shall be paid
according to the following regulations, with interest
at six per cent., to commence from the
period when the accounts and vouchers were
presented to the French government.'
"'Art. 2. The debts provided for by the preceding
article are those whose result is comprised
in the conjectural note annexed to the present
convention, and which, with the interest, cannot
exceed the sum of twenty millions of francs.
The claims comprised in the said note, which
fall within the exceptions of the following articles,
shall not be admitted to the benefit of this
provision.'
"'Art. 4. It is expressly agreed that the preceding
articles shall comprehend no debts but
such as are due to citizens of the United States,
who have been and are yet creditors of France,
for supplies, for embargoes, and prizes made at
sea, in which the appeal has been properly lodged
within the time mentioned in the said convention
of the 8th Vendemiaire, ninth year (30th
September, 1800).'
"'Art. 5. The preceding articles shall apply
only, 1st, to captures of which the council of
prizes shall have ordered restitution, it being
well understood that the claimant cannot have
recourse to the United States otherwise than
he might have had to the government of the
French Republic, and only in case of the insufficiency
of the captors; 2d, the debts mentioned
in the said fifth article of the convention, contracted
before the 8th Vendemiaire, and 9 (30th
September, 1800), the payment of which has
been heretofore claimed of the actual government
of France, and for which the creditors
have a right to the protection of the United
States; the said fifth article does not comprehend
prizes whose condemnation has been or
shall be confirmed; it is the express intention
of the contracting parties not to extend the
benefit of the present convention to reclamations
of American citizens, who shall have established
houses of commerce in France, England,
or other countries than the United States,
in partnership with foreigners, and who by that
reason and the nature of their commerce, ought
to be regarded as domiciliated in the places
where such houses exist. All agreements and
bargains concerning merchandise, which shall
not be the property of American citizens, are
equally excepted from the benefit of the said
convention, saving, however, to such persons
their claims in like manner as if this treaty had
not been made.
"From these provisions of the treaty, Mr. W.
said, it would appear that the claims to be paid
were of three descriptions, to wit:
"1. Claims for supplies.
"2. Claims for embargoes.
"3. Claims for captures made at sea, of a description
defined in the last clause of the 4th
and the first clause of the 5th article.
"How far these claims embraced all which
France ever acknowledged, or ever intended to
pay, Mr. W. said he was unable to say, as the
time allowed him to examine the case had not
permitted him to look sufficiently into the documents
to make up his mind with precision upon
this point. He had found, in a report made to
the Senate on the 14th of January, 1831, in favor
of this bill, by the honorable Mr. Livingston,
then a Senator from the State of Louisiana, the
following Classification of the French claims, as
insisted on at a period before the making of the
treaty of 1800, to wit:
"'1. From the capture and detention of about
fifty vessels.
"'2. The detention, for a year, of eighty other
vessels, under the Bordeaux embargo.
"'3. The non-payment of supplies to the West
India islands, and to continental France.
"'4. For depredations committed on our commerce
in the West Indies.
"Mr. W. said the comparison of the two
classifications of claims would show, at a single
view, that Nos. 2 and 3 in Mr. Livingston's list
were provided for by the treaty of 1803, from
which he had read. Whether any, and if any,
what portions of Nos. 1 and 4 in Mr. Livingston's
list were embraced in No 3 of the provisions
of the treaty, as he had numbered them
he was unable to say; but this much he could
say, that he had found nothing to satisfy his
mind that parts of both those classes of claims
were not so included, and therefore provided for
and paid under the treaty; nor had he been able
to find any thing to show that this treaty of
1803 did not provide for and pay all the claims
which France ever acknowledged or ever intended
to pay. He was, therefore, unprepared
to admit, and did not admit, that any thing of
value to any class of individual claimants was
released by expunging the second original article
from the treaty of the 30th September,
1800. On the contrary, he was strongly impressed
with the belief that the adjustment of
claims provided for in the treaty of 1803 had
gone to the whole extent to which the French
government had, at any period of the negotiations,
intended to go.
"Mr. W. said this impression was greatly
strengthened by the circumstance that the claims
under the Bordeaux embargo were expressly
provided for in this treaty, while he could see
nothing in the treaty of 1800 which seemed to
him to authorize the supposition that this class
of claims was more clearly embraced within the
reservations in that treaty than any class which
had been admitted by the French government.
"Another fact, Mr. W. said, was material to
this subject, and should be borne carefully in
mind by every senator. It was, that not a cent
was paid by France, even upon the claims reserved
and admitted by the treaty of 1800, until
the sale of Louisiana to the United States,
for a sum greater by thirty millions of francs
than that for which the French minister was
instructed to sell it. Yes, Mr. President, said
Mr. W., the only payment yet made upon any
portion of these claims has been virtually made
by the United States; for it has been made out
of the consideration money paid for Louisiana,
after paying into the French treasury ten millions
of francs beyond the price France herself
placed upon the territory. It is a singular fact
that the French negotiator was instructed to
make the sale for fifty millions, if he could get
no more; and when he found that, by yielding
twenty millions to pay the claims, he could get
eighty millions for the territory, and thus put
ten millions more into the treasury of his nation
than she had instructed him to ask for the
whole, he yielded to the claims and closed the
treaty. It was safe to say that, but for this speculation
in the sale of Louisiana, not one dollar
would have been paid upon the claims to this
day. All our subsequent negotiations with
France of a similar character, and our present
relations with that country, growing out of private
claims, justify this position. What, then,
would have been the value of claims, if such
fairly existed, which were not acknowledged
and provided for by the treaty of 1800, but were
left for future negotiation 'at a convenient
time?' Would they have been worth the five
millions of dollars you propose to appropriate
by this bill? Would they have been worth
further negotiation? He thought they would
not.
"Mr. W. said he would avail himself of this
occasion, when speaking of the treaty of Louisiana
and of its connection with these claims, to
explain a mistake into which he had fallen, and
which he found from conversation with several
gentlemen, who had been for some years members
of Congress, had been common to them
and to himself. The mistake to which he alluded
was, the supposition that the claimants
under this bill put their case upon the assumption
that their claims had constituted part of
the consideration for which Louisiana had been
ceded to the United States; and that the consideration
they contended the government had
received, and upon which its liability rested,
was the cession of that territory for a less sum,
in money, than was considered to be its value,
on account of the release of the French government
from those private claims. He had rested
under this misapprehension until the opening
of the present debate, and until he commenced
an examination of the case. He then found that
it was an entire misapprehension; that the United
States had paid, in money, for Louisiana,
thirty millions of francs beyond the price which
France had set upon it; that the claimants under
this bill did not rest their claims at all upon
this basis, and that the friends of the bill in
the Senate did not pretend to derive the liability
of the government from this source. Mr. W.
said he was induced to make this explanation
in justice to himself, and because there might
be some person within the hearing of his voice
who might still be under the same misapprehension.
"He had now, Mr. W. said, attempted to
establish the following propositions, viz.:
"1. That a state of actual war, by which he
meant a state of actual hostilities and of force,
and an interruption of all diplomatic or friendly
intercourse between the United States and
France, had existed from the time of the passage
of the acts of the 7th and 9th of July,
1798, before referred to, until the sending of the
negotiators, Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, in
1800, to make a treaty which put an end to the
hostilities existing, upon the best terms that
could be obtained; and that the treaty of the
30th of September, 1800, concluded by these
negotiators, was, in fact, and so far as private
claims were concerned, to be considered as a
treaty of peace, and to conclude all such claims,
not reserved by it, as finally ratified by the two
powers.
"2. That the treaty of amity and commerce,
and the treaty of alliance of 1778, as well as
the consular convention of 1788, were suspended
by the 2d article of the treaty of 1800, and
from that time became mere matters for negotiation
between the parties at a convenient time;
that, therefore, the desire to get rid of these
treaties, and of any 'onerous obligations' contained
in them, was only the desire to get rid
of an obligation to negotiate 'at a convenient
time;' and that such a consideration could not
have induced the Senate of the United States to
expunge that article from the treaty, if thereby
that body had supposed it was imposing upon
the country a liability to pay to its citizens the
sum of five millions of dollars—a sum much
larger than France had asked, in money, for a
full discharge from the 'onerous obligations'
relied upon.
"3. That the treaty of 1800 reserved and
provided for certain portions of the claims; that
payment, according to such reservations, was
made under the treaty of 1803; and that it is
at least doubtful whether the payment thus
made did not cover all the claims ever admitted,
or ever intended to be paid by France; for
which reason the expunging of the second article
of the treaty of 1800, by the Senate of the
United States, in all probability, released nothing
which ever had, or which was ever likely
to have value.
"Mr. W. said, if he had been successful in
establishing either of these positions, there was
an end of the claims, and, by consequence, a
defeat of the bill.
"The advocates of the bill conceded that two
positions must be established, on their part, to
sustain it, to wit:
"1. That the claims were valid claims against
France, and had never been paid. And
"2. That they were released by the government
of the United States for a full and valuable
consideration passing to its benefit by means
of the release.
"If, then, a state of war had existed, it would
not be contended that any claims of this character,
not reserved or provided for in the
treaty of peace, were valid claims after the ratification
of such a treaty. His first proposition,
therefore, if sustained, would defeat the
bill, by establishing the fact that the claims, if
not reserved in the treaty of 1800, were not
valid claims.
"The second proposition, if sustained, would
establish the fact that, inasmuch as the valuable
consideration passing to the United States
was alleged to grow out of the 'onerous obligations'
in the treaty of amity and commerce,
the treaty of alliance, and the consular convention;
and inasmuch as these treaties, and all
obligations, past, present, or future, 'onerous'
or otherwise, growing out of them, were suspended
and made inoperative by the second
article of the treaty of the 30th of September,
1800, until further negotiation, by the common
consent of both powers, should revive them, the
Senate of the United States could not have expected,
when they expunged this article from
the treaty, that, by thus discharging the government
from an obligation to negotiate 'at a convenient
time,' they were incurring against it a
liability of millions; in other words, the discharge
of the government from an obligation to
negotiate upon any subject 'at a convenient
time,' could not have been considered by the
Senate of the United States as a good and valuable
consideration for the payment of private
claims to the amount of five millions of dollars.
"The third proposition, if sustained, would
prove that all the claims ever acknowledged, or ever
intended to be paid by France, were paid under
the treaty of 1803, and that, therefore, as claims
never admitted or recognized by France would
scarcely be urged as valid claims against her,
no valid claims remained; and, consequently,
the expunging of the second article of the treaty
of the 30th of September, 1800, released nothing
which was valid, and nothing remained to be
paid by the United States as a liability incurred
by that modification of that treaty. Here Mr.
W. said he would rest his reasoning as to these
three propositions.
"But if the Senate should determine that he
had been wrong in them all, and had failed to
sustain either, he had still another proposition,
which he considered conclusive and unanswerable,
as to any valuable consideration for the release
of these claims having passed to the United
States in consequence of their discharge from
the 'onerous obligations' said to have been
contained in the former treaties. These 'onerous
obligations,' and the only ones of which
he had heard any thing in the course of the debate,
or of which he had found any thing in the
documents, arose under the 17th article of the
treaty of amity and commerce, and the 11th
article of the treaty of alliance; and, in relation
to both, he laid down this broad proposition,
which would be fully sustained by the treaties
themselves, and by every act and every expression
on the part of the American negotiators,
and the government of the United States, viz.:
"'The obligations, liabilities, and responsibilities,
imposed upon the government of the
United States and upon France by the 17th
article of the treaty of amity and commerce of
1778, and by the 11th article of the treaty of
alliance of 1778, where mutual, reciprocal, and
equal: each formed the consideration, and the
only consideration, for the other; and, therefore,
any release which discharged both powers
from those liabilities, responsibilities, and obligations,
must have been mutual, reciprocal, and
equal; and the release of either must have
formed a full and valuable consideration for the
release of the other.'
"Mr. W. said he would not trouble the Senate
by again reading the articles from the respective
treaties. They would be recollected, and no one
would controvert the fact that, when the treaties
were made, these articles were intended to
contain mutual, reciprocal, and equal obligations.
By the first we gave to France the liberty of
our ports for her armed vessels, privateers, and
prizes, and prohibited all other powers from the
enjoyment of the same privilege; and France
gave to us the liberty of her ports for our armed
vessels, privateers, and prizes, and guarded the
privilege by the same prohibition to other
powers; and by the second we guaranteed to
France, for ever, her possessions in America,
and France guaranteed to us, for ever, 'our liberty,
sovereignty, and independence, absolute
and unlimited, as well in matters of government
as commerce.' Such were the obligations in
their original inception. Will it be contended
that they were not mutual, reciprocal, and equal,
and that, in each instance, the one did not form
the consideration for the other? Surely no one
will take this ground.
"If, then, said Mr. W., the obligations imposed
upon each government by these articles
of the respective treaties were mutual, reciprocal,
and equal, when undertaken, they must
have remained equal until abrogated by war, or
changed by treaty stipulation. No treaty, subsequent
to those which contain the obligations,
had affected them in any manner whatever. If,
as he had attempted to show, war had existed
from July, 1778, to 1800, that would not have
rendered the obligations unequal, but would
have abrogated them altogether. If, as the
friends of the bill contend, there had been no
war, and the treaties were in full force up to
the signing of the convention of the 30th of September,
1800, what was the effect of that treaty,
as originally signed by the negotiators, upon
these mutual, reciprocal, and equal obligations?
The second original article of that treaty will
answer. It did not attempt to disturb their
mutuality, reciprocity, or equality, but suspended
them as they were, past, present, or future,
and made all the subject of future negotiation
'at a convenient time.'
"But, Mr. W. said, the Senate of the United
States expunged this article of the treaty of
1800, and refused to advise and consent to ratify
it as a part of the treaty; and hence it was
contended the United States had discharged
themselves from the 'onerous obligations' of
these articles in the respective treaties, and had,
by that act, incurred, to the claimants under
this bill, the heavy liability which it recognizes.
If the expunging of that article discharged the
United States from obligations thus onerous,
did it not discharge France from the fellow obligations?
Was not the discharge, made in that
manner, as mutual, reciprocal, and equal, as the
obligations in their inception, and in all their
subsequent stages up to that act? How, then,
could it be contended that the discharge of the
one was not a full and adequate consideration
for the discharge of the other? Nothing upon
the face of the treaties authorized the introduction
of this inequality at this step in the official
proceedings. Nothing in the record of the proceedings
of the Senate, when acting upon the
article, indicates that they intended to pay five
millions of dollars to render this mutual release
equal between the two powers. The obligations
and responsibilities were reserved as subjects of
future negotiation, upon terms of equality, and
the striking out of that reservation was but a
mutual and reciprocal and equal release from
the obligation further to negotiate. This much
for the reciprocity of these obligations as derived
from the action of the sovereign powers themselves.
"What was to be learned from the action of
their respective negotiators? He did not doubt
but that attempts had been made on the part
of France to exhibit an inequality in the obligations
under the treaty, and to set up that inequality
against the claims of our citizens; but
had our negotiators ever admitted the inequality
to exist, or ever attempted to compromise the
rights of the claimants under this bill for such a
consideration? He could not find that they
had. He did not hear it contended that they
had: and, from the evidence of their acts, remaining
upon record, as a part of the diplomatic
correspondence of the period, he could not suppose
they had ever entertained the idea. He
had said that the American negotiators had always
treated these obligations as mutual, reciprocal,
and equal; and he now proposed to read
to the Senate a part of a letter from Messrs.
Ellsworth, Davie, and Murray, addressed to the
French negotiators, and containing the project
of a treaty, to justify his assertion. The letter
was dated 20th August, 1800, and it would be
recollected that its authors were the negotiators,
on the part of the United States, of the
treaty of the 30th of September, 1800. The extract
is as follows:
"'1. Let it be declared that the former treaties
are renewed and confirmed, and shall have
the same effect as if no misunderstanding between
the two powers had intervened, except so
far as they are derogated from by the present
treaty.
"'2. It shall be optional with either party
to pay to the other, within seven years, three
millions of francs, in money or securities which
may be issued for indemnities, and thereby to
reduce the rights of the other as to privateers
and prizes, to those of the most favored nation,
And during the said term allowed for option,
the right of both parties shall be limited by the
line of the most favored nation.
"'3. The mutual guaranty in the treaty of
alliance shall be so specified and limited, that its
future obligation shall be, on the part of France,
when the United States shall be attacked, to
furnish and deliver at her own ports military
stores to the amount of one million of francs;
and, on the part of the United States, when the
French possessions in America, in any future
war, shall be attacked, to furnish and deliver at
their own ports a like amount in provisions.
It shall, moreover, be optional for either party
to exonerate itself wholly of its obligation, by
paying to the other, within seven years, a gross
sum of five millions of francs, in money or such
securities as may be issued for indemnities.'
"Mr. W. asked if he needed further proofs
that not only the American government, but the
American negotiators, treated these obligations
under the treaty as, in all respects, mutual, reciprocal,
and equal; and if the fallacy of the argument
that the United States had obtained to
itself a valuable consideration for the release of
these private claims in the release of itself from
these obligations, was not utterly and entirely
disproved by these facts? Was not the release
of the obligations on the one side the release of
them on the other? And was not the one release
the necessary consideration for the other?
How, then, could it be said, with any justice,
that we sought our release at the expense of the
claimants? There was no reasonable ground
for such an allegation, either from the acts of
our government or of our negotiators. When
the latter fixed a value upon our obligations as
to the privateers and prizes, and as to the guaranty,
in the same article they fixed the same
price, to a franc, upon the reciprocal obligations
of France; and when the former discharged our
liability, by expunging the second article of the
treaty of 1800, the same act discharged the corresponding
liability of the French government.
"Here, then, Mr. W. said, must end all pretence
of a valuable consideration for these claims
passing to the United States from this source.
The onerous obligations were mutual, reciprocal,
and equal, and the respective releases were mutual,
reciprocal, and equal, and simultaneous,
and nothing could be fairly drawn from the act
which operated these mutual releases to benefit
these claimants.
"Mr. W. said he was, then, necessarily brought
back to the proposition with which he started
in the commencement of his argument, that, if
the United States were liable to pay these
claimants, that liability must rest upon the
broad ground of a failure by the government,
after ordinary, and, in this instance, extraordinary
efforts to collect the money. The idea of
a release of the claims for a valuable consideration
passing to the government had been exploded,
and, if a liability was to be claimed on
account of a failure to collect the money, upon
what ground did it rest? What had the government
done to protect the rights of these
claimants? It had negotiated from 1793 to
1798, with a vigilance and zeal and talent almost
unprecedented in the history of diplomacy.
It had sent to France minister after minister,
and, upon several occasions, extraordinary missions
composed of several individuals. Between
1798 and 1800, it had equipped fleets
and armies, expended millions in warlike preparation,
and finally sent forth its citizens to
battle and death, to force the payment of the
claims. Were we now to be told, that our
failure in these efforts had created a liability
against us to pay the money? That the same
citizens who had been taxed to pay the expenses
of these long negotiations, and of this
war for the claims, were to be further taxed to
pay such of the claims as we had failed to collect?
He could never consent to such a deduction
from such premises.
"But, Mr. President, said Mr. W., there is
another view of this subject, placed upon this
basis, which renders this bill of trifling importance
in the comparison. If the failure to
collect these claims has created the liability to
pay them, that liability goes to the extent of
the claims proved, and the interest upon them,
not to a partial, and perhaps trifling, dividend.
Who, then, would undertake to say what
amount of claims might not be proved during
the state of things he had described, from the
breaking out of the war between France and
England, in 1793, to the execution of the treaty,
in 1800? For a great portion of the period,
the municipal regulations of France required
the captured cargoes to be not confiscated, but
paid for at the market value at the port to
which the vessel was destined. Still the capture
would be proved, the value of the cargo
ascertained, before the commission which the
bill proposes to establish; and who would
adduce the proof that the same cargo was paid
for by the French government?
"This principle, however, Mr. W. said, went
much further than the whole subject of the old
French claims. It extended to all claims for
spoliations upon our commerce, since the existence
of the government, which we had failed to
collect. Who could say where the liability
would end? In how many cases had claims of
this character been settled by treaty, what had
been collected in each case, and what amount
remained unpaid, after the release of the foreign
government? He had made an unsuccessful
effort to answer these inquiries, so far as the
files of the state department would furnish the
information, as he had found that it could only
be collected by an examination of each individual
claim; and this would impose a labor upon
the department of an unreasonable character,
and would occupy more time than remained to
furnish the information for his use upon the present
occasion. He had, however, been favored
by the Secretary of State with the amounts allowed
by the commissioners, the amounts paid,
and the rate of pay upon the principal, in two
recent cases, the Florida treaty, and the treaty
with Denmark. In the former instance, the
payment was ninety-one and two thirds per
centum upon the principal, while in the latter it
was but thirty-one and one eighth per centum.
Assume that these two cases are the maximum
and minimum of all the cases where releases
have been given for partial payments; and
he begged the Senate to reflect upon the
amounts unpaid which might be called from the
national treasury, if the principle were once admitted
that a failure to collect creates a liability
to pay.
"That in his assumption that a liability of
this sort must go to the whole amount of the
claims, he only took the ground contended for
by the friends of this bill, he would trouble the
Senate with another extract from the report of
Mr. Livingston, from which he had before read.
In speaking of the amount which should be appropriated,
Mr. Livingston says:
"'The only remaining inquiry is the amount;
and on this point the committee have had some
difficulty. Two modes of measuring the compensation
suggested themselves:
"'1. The actual loss sustained by the petitioners.
"'2. The value of the advantages received, as
the consideration, by the United States.
"'The first is the one demanded by strict
justice; and is the only one that satisfies the
word used by the constitution, which requires
just compensation, which cannot be said to have
been made when any thing less than the full
value is given. But there were difficulties which
appeared insurmountable, to the adoption of
this rule at the present day, arising from the
multiplicity of the claims, the nature of the depredations
which occasioned them, the loss of
documents, either by the lapse of time, or the
wilful destruction of them by the depredators.
The committee, therefore, could not undertake
to provide a specific relief for each of the petitioners.
But they have recommended the institution
of a board, to enter into the investigation,
and apportion a sum which the committee have
recommended to be appropriated, pro rata,
among the several claimants.'
"'The committee could not believe that the
amount of compensation to the sufferers should
be calculated by the advantages secured to the
United States, because it was not, according to
their ideas, the true measure. If the property
of an individual be taken for public use, and the
government miscalculate, and find that the object
to which they have applied it has been
injurious rather than beneficial, the value of the
property is still due to the owner, who ought
not to suffer for the false speculations which
have been made. A turnpike or canal may be
very unproductive; but the owner of the land
which has been taken for its construction is not
the less entitled to its value. On the other
hand, he can have no manner of right to more
than the value of his property, be the object to
which it has been applied ever so beneficial.'
"Here, Mr. W. said, were two proposed
grounds of estimating the extent of the liability
of the government to the claimants; and that
which graduated it by the value received by the
government was distinctly rejected, while that
making the amount of the claims the measure
of liability, was as distinctly asserted to be the
true and just standard. He hoped he had shown,
to the satisfaction of the Senate, that the former
rule of value received by the government would
allow the claimants nothing at all, while he was
compelled to say that, upon the broad principle
that a failure to collect creates a liability to pay,
he could not controvert the correctness of the
conclusion that the liability must be commensurate
with the claim. He could controvert, he
thought, successfully, the principle, but he could
not the measure of damages when the principle
was conceded. He would here conclude his remarks
upon the points he had noticed, by the
earnest declaration that he believed the passage
of this bill would open more widely the doors
of the public treasury than any legislation of
which he had any knowledge, or to which Congress
had ever yielded its assent.
"Mr. W. said he had a few observations to
offer relative to the mode of legislation proposed,
and to the details of the bill, and he would trouble
the Senate no further.
"His first objection, under this head, was to
the mode of legislation. If the government be
liable to pay these claims, the claimants are
citizens of the country, and Congress is as accessible
to them as to other claimants who have
demands against the treasury. Why were they
not permitted, individually, to apply to Congress
to establish their respective claims, as other
claimants were bound to do, and to receive such
relief, in each case, as Congress, in its wisdom,
should see fit to grant? Why were these claims,
more than others, grouped together, and attempted
to be made a matter of national importance?
Why was a commission to be established
to ascertain their validity, a duty in ordinary
cases discharged by Congress itself? Were the
Senate sure that much of the importance given
to those claims had not proceeded from this association,
and from the formidable amount thus
presented at one view? Would any gentleman
be able to convince himself that, acting upon a
single claim in this immense mass, he should
have given it his favorable consideration? For
his part, he considered the mode of legislation
unusual and objectionable. His principal objections
to the details were, that the second
section of the bill prescribed the rules which
should govern the commission in deciding upon
the claims, among which 'the former treaties
between the United States and France' were
enumerated; and that the bill contained no declaration
that the payments made under it were
in full of the claims, or that the respective claimants
should execute a release, as a condition of
receiving their dividends.
"The first objection was predicated upon the
fact that the bill covered the whole period from
the making of the treaties of 1778, to that of
the 30th September, 1800, and made the former
treaties the rule of adjudication, when Congress
on the 7th July, 1798, by a deliberate legislative
act, declared those treaties void, and no longer
binding upon the United States or their citizens.
It is a fact abundantly proved by the documents,
that a large portion of the claims now to be paid,
arose within the period last alluded to; and that
treaties declared to be void should be made the
law in determining what were and what were
not illegal captures, during the time that they
were held to have no force, and when our citizens
were authorized by law to go upon the high seas,
regardless of their provisions, Mr. W. said, would
seem to him to be an absurdity which the Senate
would not legalize. He was fully aware that
the first section of the bill purported to provide
for 'valid claims to indemnity upon the French
government, arising out of illegal captures, detentions,
forcible seizures, illegal condemnations,
and confiscations;' but it could not be overlooked
that illegal captures, condemnations, and
confiscations, must relate entirely to the law
which was to govern the adjudication; and if
that law was a void treaty which the claimants
were not bound to observe, and did not observe,
was it not more than possible that a capture,
condemnation, or confiscation, might, by compulsion,
be adjudged illegal under the rule fixed
by the bill, while that same capture, condemnation,
or confiscation, was strictly legal under the
laws which governed the commerce of the claimant
when the capture was made? He must say that
it appeared clear to his mind that the rule
of adjudication upon the validity of claims of this
description, should, in all cases, be the same rule
which governed the commerce out of which the
claims have arisen.
"His second objection, Mr. W. said, was made
more as a wish that a record of the intentions
of the present Congress should be preserved
upon the face of the bill, than from any idea that
the provision suggested would afford the least
protection to the public treasury. Every day's
legislation showed the futility of the insertion
in an act of Congress of a declaration that the
appropriation made should be in full of a claim;
and in this, as in other like cases, should this
bill pass, he did not expect that it would be,
in practice, any thing more than an instalment
upon the claims which would be sustained before
the commission. The files of the state department
would contain the record evidence of the
balance, with the admission of the government,
in the passage of this bill, that an equal liability
remained to pay that balance, whatever it might
be. Even a release from the respective claimants
he should consider as likely to have no other
effect than to change their future applications
from a demand of legal right, which they now
assume to have, to one of equity and favor; and
he was yet to see that the latter would not be
as successful as the former. He must give his
vote against the bill, whether modified in that
particular or not, and he should do so under the
most full and clear conviction, that it was a proposition
fraught with greater dangers to the
public treasury, than any law which had ever
yet received the assent of Congress."