The War with Mexico, Volume II

		PAGE
Maps and Plans in Volume II		vii
Conspectus of Events		xi
Pronunciation of Spanish		xiii
CHAPTER
XXI.	Behind the Scenes at Mexico	1
XXII.	Vera Cruz	17
XXIII.	Cerro Gordo	37
XXIV.	Puebla	60
XXV.	On to the Capital	79
XXVI.	Contreras and Churubusco	99
XXVII.	Negotiations	120
XXVIII.	Molino del Rey, Chapultepec and Mexico	140
XXIX.	Final Military Operations	165
XXX.	The Naval Operations	189
XXXI.	The Americans as Conquerors	210
XXXII.	Peace	233
XXXIII.	The Finances of the War	253
XXXIV.	The War in American Politics	268
XXXV.	The Foreign Relations of the War	294
XXXVI.	Conclusion	310
Notes on Volume II		327
Appendix (Lists of Sources)		517
Index		563

As equally good sources disagree sometimes, a few inconsistencies are unavoidable. Numerous errors have been corrected. An asterisk indicates an unpublished source. Statements, cited in the notes, have also been used.

1.	The Fortress of San Juan de Ulúa in 1854	21
	From a *plan in the War Dept., Washington.
2.	Siege of Vera Cruz: General Plan	24
	From a map drawn by McClellan from surveys done by six American officers (N. Y. City Public Library); *a map drawn by order of Lieut. Col. Henry Wilson (War Dept., Washington).
3.	Siege of Vera Cruz: The American Works	28
	From a map drawn by Lieut. Foster, based on surveys of four American officers (War Dept., Washington).
4.	From Vera Cruz to Perote	39
	Based on a map issued by Manouvrier and Snell, New Orleans, 1847 (Papers of N. P. Trist).
5.	Contour Lines near Cerro Gordo	40
	From a *drawing in the War College, Washington.
6.	Battle of Cerro Gordo: General Map	43
	Based on a map drawn by Lieut. Coppée from the surveys of Maj. Turnbull and Capt. McClellan (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.); a map drawn by McClellan (Mass. Hist. Society); a *sketch of a reconnaissance by Lieut. Tower (War Dept., Washington); *Croquis de la Posición del campo de Cerro Gordo, 1847 (War Dept., Washington); a plan by I. A. de Soiecki (Vera Cruz City archives); and a *sketch by Lieut. Thos. Williams (among his letters).
7.	Battle of Cerro Gordo: Central Portion	51
	Based on the same sources as No. 6 supra.
8.	From Jalapa to Puebla	61
	Based on a Fomento Dept. map.
9.	Profile of the Route from Vera Cruz to Mexico	62
	From a map published by Manouvrier and Snell, New Orleans, 1847 (Papers of N. P. Trist).
10.	A Part of the Valley of Mexico	80
	From a map surveyed and drawn by Lieut. M. L. Smith and Bvt. Capt. Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 11; 31 Cong., 1 sess.); and a map by Balbontín (Invasión Americana).
11.	Battles of August 19 and 20, 1847: General Map	100
	Based on a map drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of Maj. Turnbull, Capt. McClellan and Lieut. Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.); the Smith and Hardcastle map (No. 10 supra); a *map drawn by Capt. Barnard from the surveys of Capt. Mason and Lieuts. Beauregard, McClellan, and Foster (War Dept., Washington); a map drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of Mason and Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.); a map in Apuntes; and a map drawn by McClellan (Mass. Hist. Society).
12.	Battle of Contreras	108
	Based on the Turnbull map (No. 11 supra); a *plan of Capt. Gardner (Pierce Papers); *notes by Capt. Henshaw on a map by Hardcastle (Mass. Hist. Society); a *sketch by Lieut. Collins, 4th Artillery (Collins Papers); New Orleans Picayune, Sept. 12, 1847; a plan by Balbontín (Invasión Americana); and a map in Apuntes.
13.	Battle of Churubusco	111
	Based on the Turnbull map (No. 11 supra); a map drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of Mason and Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.); and a sketch by Balbontín (“Invasión Americana”).
14.	The Tête de Pont, Churubusco	112
	*Drawn by Lieuts. Beauregard and Tower from Beauregard’s survey (War Dept., Washington).
15.	Profile of East Curtain, Tête de Pont, Churubusco	113
	*Drawn by Beauregard from the surveys of Lieuts. McClellan, Beauregard, and Foster (War Dept., Washington).
16.	The Fortifications of Churubusco Convent	114
	*Drawn by Beauregard and Tower from Beauregard’s survey (War Dept., Washington).
17.	Battles of Mexico: General Map	141
	Based on a map drawn by Hardcastle from the surveys of Turnbull, McClellan, and Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.); and a map drawn by McClellan and Hardcastle (published by the government).
18.	Battle of Molino del Rey	143
	Based on the maps specified under No. 17 supra;a sketch by Hardcastle (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.); and a sketch in New Orleans Picayune, Oct. 17, 1847.
19.	Battle of Chapultepec	150
	Based upon the maps specified under No. 17 supra; a *sketch drawn by Tower from surveys of Beauregard and Tower (War Dept., Washington); a plan accompanying Gen. Quitman report (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 1 sess.); *recollections of Señor D. Ignacio Molina, Chief Cartographer of the Fomento Dept., Mexico.
20.	Blindage at Chapultepec	151
21.	The Citadel, Mexico, in 1840 (War Dept. *plan, Washington)	159
22.	Alvarado, Mexico	198
	A *plan by J. L. Mason (War Dept., Washington).
23.	A Part of Tabasco River	205
	Based on a map in Ho. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 2 sess.
24.	Guaymas, Mexico	206
	From a plan in Ho. Ex. Doc. 1; 30 Cong., 2 sess.
25.	Mazatlan, Mexico	207
	From a *drawing by Commander Wouldridge of Brigantine Spy (Admiralty Papers, Public Record Office, London).
26.	The Tip of Lower California	207
	Based on a map in Sen. Ex. Doc. 18; 31 Cong., 1 sess.
27.	Territory acquired from Mexico	241

1845
March.		The United States determines to annex Texas; W. S. Parrott sent to conciliate Mexico.
July.		Texas consents; Taylor proceeds to Corpus Christi.
Oct.	17.	Larkin appointed a confidential agent in California.
Nov.	10.	Slidell ordered to Mexico.
Dec.	20.	Slidell rejected by Herrera.
1846
Jan.	13.	Taylor ordered to the Rio Grande.
Mar.	8.	Taylor marches from Corpus Christi.
21.		Slidell finally rejected by Paredes.
28.		Taylor reaches the Rio Grande.
Apr.	25.	Thornton attacked.
May	8.	Battle of Palo Alto.
9.		Battle of Resaca de la Palma.
13.		The war bill becomes a law.
June	5.	Kearny’s march to Santa Fe begins.
July	7.	Monterey, California, occupied.
14.		Camargo occupied.
Aug.	4.	Paredes overthrown.
7.		First attack on Alvarado.
13.		Los Angeles, California, occupied.
16.		Santa Anna lands at Vera Cruz.
18.		Kearny takes Santa Fe.
19.		Taylor advances from Camargo.
Sept.	14.	Santa Anna enters Mexico City.
20–24.		Operations at Monterey, Mex.
22–23.		Insurrection in California precipitated.
23.		Wool’s advance from San Antonio begins.
25.		Kearny leaves Santa Fe for California.
Oct.	8.	Santa Anna arrives at San Luis Potosí.
Oct.	15.	Second attack on Alvarado.
24.		San Juan Bautista captured by Perry.
28.		Tampico evacuated by Parrodi.
29.		Wool occupies Monclova.
Nov.	15.	Tampico captured by Conner.
16.		Saltillo occupied by Taylor.
18.		Scott appointed to command the Vera Cruz expedition.
Dec.	5.	Wool occupies Parras.
6.		Kearny’s fight at San Pascual.
25.		Doniphan’s skirmish at El Brazito.
27.		Scott reaches Brazos Id.
29.		Victoria occupied.
1847
Jan.	3.	Scott orders troops from Taylor.
8.		Fight at the San Gabriel, Calif.
9.		Fight near Los Angeles, Calif.
11.		Mexican law regarding Church property.
28.		Santa Anna’s march against Taylor begins.
Feb.	5.	Taylor places himself at Agua Nueva.
19.		Scott reaches Tampico.
22–23.		Battle of Buena Vista.
27.		Insurrection at Mexico begins.
28.		Battle of Sacramento.
Mar.	9.	Scott lands near Vera Cruz.
29.		Vera Cruz occupied.
30.		Operations in Lower California opened.
Apr.	8.	Scott’s advance from Vera Cruz begins.
18.		Battle of Cerro Gordo; Tuxpán captured by Perry.
19.		Jalapa occupied.
May	15.	Worth enters Puebla.
June	6.	Trist opens negotiations through the British legation.
16.		San Juan Bautista again taken.
Aug.	7.	The advance from Puebla begins.
20.		Battles of Contreras and Churubusco.
Aug. 24–Sept. 7.         Armistice.
Sept.	8.	Battle of Molino del Rey.
13.		Battle of Chapultepec; the “siege” of Puebla begins.
14.		Mexico City occupied.
22.		Peña y Peña assumes the Presidency.
Oct.	9.	Fight at Huamantla.
20.		Trist reopens negotiations.
Nov.	11.	Mazatlán occupied by Shubrick.
1848
Feb.	2.	Treaty of peace signed.
Mar.	4–5.	Armistice ratified.
10.		Treaty accepted by U. S. Senate.
May	19, 24.	Treaty accepted by Mexican Congress.
30.		Ratifications of the treaty exchanged.
June	12.	Mexico City evacuated.
July	4.	Treaty proclaimed by President Polk.

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The niceties of the matter would be out of place here, but a few general rules may prove helpful.

A as in English “ah”; e, at the end of a syllable, like a in “fame,” otherwise like e in “let”; i like i in “machine”; o, at the end of a syllable, like o in “go,” otherwise somewhat like o in “lot”; u like u in “rude” (but, unless marked with two dots, silent between g or q and e or i); y like ee in “feet.”

C like k (but, before e and i, like [A]th in “thin”); ch as in “child”; g as in “go” (but, before e and i, like a harsh h); h silent; j like a harsh h; ll like [B]lli in “million”; ñ like ni in “onion”; qu like k; r is sounded with a vibration (trill) of the tip of the tongue (rr a longer and more forcible sound of the same kind); s as in “sun”; x like x in “box” (but, in “México” and a few other names, like Spanish j); z like [A] “thin.”

Words bearing no mark of accentuation are stressed on the last syllable if they end in any consonant except n or s, but on the syllable next to the last if they end in n, s or a vowel.

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THE WAR WITH MEXICO

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The revolution of August 4, as already has been suggested, was a complex and inconsistent affair, combining most heterogeneous elements: the popular institutions of 1824 and the autocratic power of the soldier upheld with bayonets; the army and the people, whose relations had always been, and in Mexico always had to be, those of wolf and lamb; the regular troops and the National Guards, who loved each other as fire loves water; General Salas reluctantly taking orders from Citizen Farías, and both of them doing obeisance to Liberator Santa Anna, whom both distrusted; and all coöperating to revive a federal constitution, which had been found in practice unworkable, and needed, in the opinion of everybody, to be redrawn.[3]

Such a state of things argued insincerity; and in fact many had taken up the cry of Federalism at this time simply because the failure of reactionary designs had made the word a popular appeal, and because—nearly all the former leaders of that school having been crushed by the Centralists—there seemed to be room for new aspirants; while the state of things indicated also that more troubles were soon to arrive, since evidently no final solution of the political problem had been achieved, and such a welter of principles, traditions and methods was a loud invitation to the demagogue and the schemer. Don Simplicio predicted that new stars were to flash out soon in the political heavens, and then disappear before the astronomers would have time to name them; and it added significantly, “The comets will be found to be all tails.”[3]

In particular the field was open for radical democracy. Calm judgment is never listened to in a period of excitement, and the Mexicans, like the French of 1792, instead of resorting to the practical Anglo-Saxon rule of compromising differences, believed in carrying principles to their logical end. Centralism and monarchical ideas had failed to render the nation happy; democracy was therefore the panacea, and the more of it the better. The demoralized condition of the people promoted this dangerous policy. Referring to all those concerned with public affairs, a thoughtful writer of the day characterized them as ignorant, destitute of honor, patriotism, morality, good faith or principles of any kind, and influenced exclusively by self-interest and ambition; and naturally men of the opposite kind held aloof in disgust and despair. For these reasons the conservative wing of the Federalists, led by Pedraza and known as the Moderados (Moderates), found itself distanced in the race for support; and the Puros—that is to say, pure Federalists and democrats—gained the ascendency at once.[3]

Their acknowledged leader, as we have seen, was the patriotic though indiscreet Farías, but he was more honest than brilliant, and a man stepped forward now who reversed that description. This man was Rejón. A keen, subtle mind, a bold, unfaltering will, a ready, plausible tongue and a tireless ambition quite indifferent about means, characterized him chiefly, and for the present crisis these were redoubtable qualifications. The Spanish minister once remarked, after conversing with him, that it was impossible to trust a person who possessed no principles except the transient interests of his ambition. And Rejón had another qualification that was no less important. Though unworthy of confidence and everywhere distrusted, Santa Anna counted as an essential factor in all plans, a power that each party felt it must have; and Rejón was believed at this time to represent Santa Anna.[3]

POLITICS AT MEXICO

The aims and to some extent the methods of the radical faction were borrowed from the United States, but without regard to differences of race, experience and present circumstances. Government, they maintained, should be completely democratic and completely secular; and they dreamed of this consummation almost voluptuously, as a Mussulman dreams of paradise. They held public meetings, where everybody was free to speak; and in these disorderly gatherings they discussed religious freedom, the seizure of Church property, the reformation of the clergy, the secularization of marriage and education, the necessity of destroying military domination in politics, and the capital punishment of all suspected monarchists. In short, from the conservative point of view, they passed sentence of death on society. Santa Anna did not sympathize with their programme. He wished society to live—for him, and he was conducting now an equivocal correspondence with men hostile to the Puros. But it probably suited his purpose to have them succeed for a time, and to have the substantial citizens add to their litany, “From Rejón deliver us, good Lord!” He himself had played the part of the Lord before now, and was willing to do so again, though he preferred the more terrestrial name of dictator.[3]

Of course property felt the menace, and it had reason to do so. During the latter part of September, 1846, an editorial in the official journal, commonly attributed to Rejón, intimated that if the rich did not contribute for the war, the people would know where to find their wealth; and even foreign houses were threatened. The British minister forced a prompt retraction of this language so far, at least, as his fellow-countrymen were concerned; but within two weeks a number of capitalists were invited to loan $200,000 with an intimation that, unless they did so, the money would be taken. Every one understood that the leopard, though now comparatively silent, had not changed his spots and would not, and hence four élite militia corps, familiarly known as the Polkos, were formed at Mexico to protect life and property. One of these, called the Victoria battalion, was composed of merchants, professional men and scions from wealthy families. Another, which bore the name of Hidalgo, consisted of clerks; and the Bravos and Independencia battalions, made up largely of artisans, represented the industrial interests of the city. The ministry, who desired to exclude such persons from the National Guard, opposed the recognition of these corps; but, supported by Salas, the substantial citizens carried the day.[3]

An equally natural reaction caused by radical violence was political. In the hope of welding the Federalists into a harmonious party, the council of government had been revived, and members of both wings had been appointed to it. Santa Anna, in order to establish his particular friend Haro at the head of the treasury, next proposed to transfer Farías from that office to the presidency of the council. This was understood—correctly, no doubt--as a move to eliminate him virtually from the government, and was fiercely denounced; but Santa Anna then remarked that should Salas for any reason drop out, the president of the council would take his place at the head of the government, and Pedraza could have the post in case Farías preferred to remain as he was.[1] This put a new look on the matter, and the programme was carried out; but the Puro attacks upon their rivals continued to excite bitter resentment. When it was arranged that Farías and Pedraza should publicly shake hands, and crowds gathered to witness the amazing ceremony, it failed to occur. The Moderados belonging to the council resigned; the body ceased to enjoy prestige and influence; and Farías lost all official power. Naturally some of the blame for this result was laid to the charge of the Pedrazists. Partisan rancor grew still more savage. The fury of the French revolution was rivalled. “We must finish with our enemies or die ourselves,” cried one factional organ; “the scaffold must be raised; we must drink their hearts’ blood.” Bankhead described the situation as one of “universal terror and distrust.”[3]

About the middle of October there came an explosion. Apparently Rejón demanded that Salas initiate the Puro reforms, and the acting Executive, who was not only weak and incompetent but obstinate, resented the pressure, and turned his face toward the Moderados. To the Puros this looked reactionary, and he was charged with a design to prevent Congress from assembling. Next it was required of Salas that he should give way to Farías as the representative of the new régime, and probably there were threats at least of bringing this change about, if necessary, through an insurrection of the populace.[2] Then Salas, with the Hidalgo battalion of which he was the commander, took possession of the citadel. The people, alarmed by rumors that a sack was contemplated, flew to arms; and Rejón found it necessary to moderate his tone.[3]

AN EXPLOSION

When the Executive, as was inevitable, dismissed him from office, he submitted; and Santa Anna himself, though his orders to Rejón had been to hold the post whatever Salas might do, found public sentiment at the capital too strong for him, and concluded to accept the change. Rejón’s conduct had excited so much dissension and alarm, that his removal gratified all sensible persons at Mexico. The rumors and the disturbance were now attributed officially to agents of the United States, and comparative quiet returned.[3]

The aims of Santa Anna and those of the Puros may have been exactly contrary in these events; but both overshot the mark, and they suffered a common loss of prestige. As one method of restoring it, they induced the governors of San Luis Potosí and Querétaro to declare that within their jurisdictions the Liberator would be recognized as head of the nation until the assembling of Congress; but their principal scheme was to carry the Presidential election. Congress, chosen on the first day of November, was to elect, and it consisted chiefly of men termed by well-to-do citizens “the dregs of society”—that is to say, poorly educated radicals taken from the masses.[3]

This appeared to ensure a Puro triumph, yet there were serious difficulties. Rejón had been discredited, and the former administration of Farías had left painful memories. Besides, it was feared that his election would offend Santa Anna, who of course was not on very cordial terms now with the tribune of the people, and preferred to have a weak man like Salas, with whom satisfactory relations had grown out of the Rejón episode, continue in power. At one time Almonte seemed to be the Puro favorite; but finally it was decided to cast the Presidential vote for Santa Anna, who could not legally hold the chief political and the chief military offices at the same time and would no doubt remain with the army, and to elect Farías to the Vice Presidency as the actual executive.[3]

Even this combination, however, met with strong and unexpected opposition. The conservatives and moderates were naturally against it; certain states—for the voting was done by these quasi sovereignties as units—could not forgive Santa Anna for past misdeeds, and the powerful Church party looked upon Farías as Antichrist. Finally Escudero of Chihuahua, whose delegation held the balance of power, opened negotiations with Farías, and that gentleman declared in writing his willingness to “join loyally” with any one who desired “in good faith the welfare of the country.” Holding this instrument—a weapon, should there be need of it—in their hands, a number of the Moderados, who realized his honesty, vigor and good intentions, and believed now that he would give them a share in the administration, accepted the Puro candidates, and on December 22 by a narrow majority these were elected. The news produced a commotion; but without encountering serious opposition Farías took up the reins of government at once.[3]

His primary aim was to support the war. This he intended to do because he felt an ardent patriotism, but other reasons also lay in his mind. Abominating the military class, he desired to have as many as possible of the corrupt officers left on the field, and he designed to keep the army so busy, that it would not be able to prevent the states, which were generally Federalist and democratic in sentiment, from organizing their strength, and making sure that no tyrannical central power would ever raise its front again. But the first requirement for military operations was money. Farías had, therefore, to take up immediately the financial problem, and he found it most difficult.[3]

Of all the fields of Mexican misgovernment the worst had been the treasury, for it not only required a care and a good judgment that were peculiarly foreign to the national temperament, but provided opportunities for illegitimate gains that were most congenial. During Spanish rule the needs of the country had been fully met, and about nine millions a year, almost half of the revenues, left as a surplus. Under Itúrbide a financial system which three centuries of able administration had built up was despised, and with mines abandoned, agriculture discouraged, commerce paralyzed, honesty relaxed, taxes diminished for the sake of popularity, and expenses increased for the sake of glory, the foundations of ruin were promptly laid. The logical superstructure soon mounted high in the shape of two British loans, which bound Mexico to pay about twenty-six million dollars in return for about fifteen, a large part of which was practically thrown away by her agents.[5]

FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES

The expulsion of the rich and thrifty Spaniards, the costs of civil wars, in which the nation paid for both sides, unwise and unstable fiscal systems, borrowing at such rates as four per cent a month, incredibly bad management,[4] and methods of accounting that made it impossible for the minister of the treasury to know the actual state of things, were enough to complete the edifice; but they were supplemented with peculation, embezzlement, multiplication of offices, collusion between importers and customhouses, and systematic smuggling winked at by half-starved officials. Revenue after revenue was mortgaged, and by 1845 the government found itself entitled to only about thirteen per cent of what entered the treasury.[5]

Since the beginning of hostilities our blockade, assisted by new methods of wholesale smuggling, had greatly reduced the income from duties, which had always been the principal reliance; the adoption of the federal system had given the best part of the internal revenue to the states; and the residue was almost wholly eaten up by the officials. The foreign debt amounted now to more than fifty millions and the domestic debt was nearly twice as great. Every known source of income had been anticipated. Freewill offerings had proved illusory. By ceasing to make payments on account of the debt in May, 1846, the government had largely increased its income, of course, but it had forfeited all title to financial sympathy; and the high officials, who robbed the treasury still in this time of supreme distress, had stripped it of all title to respect.[5]

The government, therefore, had no real credit. Men who made this kind of gambling their business would now and then furnish a little money for a brief term at an exorbitant rate. In February, 1846, for example, a loan was placed at a total sacrifice of about thirty-seven per cent. But when the treasury was authorized to borrow fifteen millions in a regular way, nobody cared to furnish any part of the sum. New taxes were equally vain. In October, 1846, the government imposed a special war “contribution” in order to save the Mexicans, it explained, from becoming foreigners in their own country, like the Spaniards of Florida; and the chief result was to enrage a handful of persons, who found they had been silly enough to pay while almost everybody else had laughed. In November a forced loan was demanded of the clergy, but the project aroused such opposition that substantially it had to be given up. The whole gamut of methods, even violence, has been tried in vain, said the ministry in December. Business was dead, confidence gone, capital in hiding or sojourning abroad; and if by good luck a bag of silver dropped into the treasury, it seemed to evaporate instantly. Financially, reported the Spanish minister, the situation of the country was “truly frightful.”[5]

To make it more, not less, frightful, there did exist one vast accumulation of riches. This was the property belonging to the Church. No one could seriously deny that the nation had authority to use, in a time of dire need, funds that had been given to the organization in days of plenty, for this was a principle of Spanish law, and the Crown had exercised the right without so good an excuse. There was also a particular reason in the present instance, for the wealth of the Church, aside from articles used in worship, consisted mainly of land, and, as virtually no land tax existed in Mexico, it was escaping the common burden—a burden, too, that was peculiarly for its advantage, since in the case of American conquest it was bound to lose its exclusive privileges. Besides, there was the saying of its Founder, “Freely ye have received, freely give.”[5]

THE POLICY OF FARÍAS

Very naturally, then, people had been casting their eyes for some time at the riches of the Church. In June, 1844, El Siglo XIX, the most thoughtful newspaper of Mexico, had suggested raising funds for the Texas war by mortgaging some of its property; and a few months later Duff Green, then on the ground, had expressed the opinion that Mexico would have to choose between that resource and forced loans. In July, 1845, the correspondent of the London Times dropped a similar hint in that journal, and in the course of the year it became a popular idea, that the Church could perform a great public service, and at the same time vastly strengthen its own position, by providing means for the anticipated war against the United States. In October, 1846, the Monitor Republicano suggested once more a mortgage of ecclesiastical property; and at one time the government actually decided upon the measure. Bankhead admitted that he could see no other resource. These hints were not, however, acted upon by the clergy; and after many long discussions they would only agree to advance $10,000 or $20,000 a month for a limited period. This was to insult the nation, exclaimed the Monitor Republicano.[5]

Charged now with full responsibility, Farías met the issue squarely. Not only was he determined to carry on the war, but the letters of Santa Anna had been, and were, most urgent. November 7 the General demanded that “no step” should be neglected, if it could “help to prevent the name of Mexican from soon becoming the object of ridicule and contempt for the whole world.” “Do not reply that the government cannot obtain funds,” he wrote later; “This would be saying that the nation has ceased to exist ... so rich a nation cannot lack money enough to support its independence, nor can the government say that it has no authority to look for the money.” These letters evidently referred to ecclesiastical property, and they were followed up at New Year’s with almost daily communications of the same tenor. Such fearful urgency had a good excuse, for the government was now sending him no funds.[6]

It had none. Although Farías kept faith with Escudero, the Moderados as a party showed the radical chief no mercy; the Centralists loathed the apostle of federalism; all conservatives detested the typical democrat, and the clericals abominated the extinguisher of titles. All the old ladies thought him worse than Luther, and many of every kind and condition rebelled at his brusque and tactless ways. No person of substance would lift a finger to support his measures. A cloud of distrust, passion, hostility and mortal hatred—mostly an emanation from the whole wretched past of the country—grew thicker about him each day. Raise money he could not. Moreover he probably felt little desire to do so by any of the ordinary methods. One of his cardinal principles was the necessity of destroying the fuero, the political strength and the intellectual domination of the Church by reducing its wealth; and now the demand of Santa Anna, the army and the nation that funds be provided for the war, appeared to make this policy opportune and even irresistible.[6]

A committee of Congress reported against the plan of borrowing on the security of Church property; but that signified little, for no practical substitute was offered. There were fears that the army would break up. There were fears that for self-protection it would proclaim a dictatorship or march upon the capital. Santa Anna’s warning and threatening communications were shown to Congress. The legislators tried to evade the issue, but they were told that all the responsibility rested upon their shoulders; that it was for them to choose between the salvation and the ruin of the fatherland; and on January 7 they grappled with the problem. Behind them—tireless, uncompromising, inexorable—the Executive insisted upon action; and behind him stood Santa Anna, demanding the same thing and promising to support it.[9]

The session lasted virtually until January 11. The debates were hot, and they were bitter. To make use of the Church lands, it was argued, would invade the rights of property, lay upon one class of society the general burden, and, should the lands be sold, involve a tremendous loss of values, since there was little ready money in the country, and few would have the means and inclination to purchase. The country must be saved, answered Rejón, Juárez and their allies; is there any other resource?—point it out. “If the Yankee triumphs,” cried one speaker, “what ecclesiastical property or what religion will be left us?” And upon these principal themes were played an infinite number of variations in all the possible tones of Mexican eloquence and fury.[9]

Just before midnight on the ninth, however, the turmoil ceased; the handsome chamber of the Deputies became still. High above the throne in front glimmered pallidly the sword of Itúrbide; in letters of gold, on the semi-circular wall at the rear, all the names of the Beneméritos of Mexico reflected the subdued light; shadows filled the galleries; exhausted members half-slumbered in their chairs, and others talked wearily here and there in groups; but the stillness was momentous, for the first article of a new law had been passed, authorizing the Executive to raise fifteen millions, for the purposes of the war, by pledging—if necessary, even selling—property vested in the Church.[7] Minor discussions followed. The religious, charitable and educational work of the clergy was guarded completely; many provisions designed to hamper the realization of the main purpose were accepted in order to conciliate opposition; and at length, on January 11, the plan became law.[9]

A CRISIS AT MEXICO

“The crisis is terrible,” wrote the minister of relations two days later, and well he might. All the fierceness and intrigues of partisan politics, all the cunning of high and low finance, all the subtleties of priestcraft and all the terrors of a haughty Church came into play.[8] Freely we have received, but we will not give, and anathema to him who takes, was in effect the dictum of the prelates. For a time it looked as if no official would venture, at the peril of excommunication, to promulgate the law; but Farías and Juárez found a man, and he was appointed governor of the Federal District, in which lay the capital, for that purpose. Then came protests from the “venerable” clergy, complaints from state governments, mutinies of troops, and civilian insurrections organized by priests. Cries of “Viva la religión! Death to the government!” resounded in the streets of the capital. Ministers of state were hard to find, and they soon went out of office. Minor officials resigned so rapidly they could hardly be counted. Santa Anna, after hailing the law as the salvation of the country, turned against it. Moderados in Congress, encouraged by the outcry, hurled epithets harder than stones at the Puros.[9]

On the other hand some of the Deputies, the regular troops at the capital, who expected to profit by the law, the comandante general of Mexico, the National Guards and the democratic masses rallied to the support of the government; and Farías, his long head erect, and his face, always thoughtful and sad, now anxious but set, appealed to the patriotism of the nation, made the most of his authority as chief of the state, and held to his course with inflexible energy and courage. Not only was he determined to have the law respected, but he demanded that it should be made effective. Chaos was the result. “When we look for a ray of hope,” said El Republicano, “we discover nothing but alarms, anxieties and every probability of social dissolution.” Furious anarchy,” was Haro’s description of the scene. There must soon be a crash, he added; “the Devil is running away with us.”[9]

Peaceful interests were not, however, entirely forgotten amid this turbulence. During the second week of January Moses Y. Beach, proprietor and editor of the New York Sun, arrived at Vera Cruz from Havana. He carried a British passport. Besides his wife Mrs. Storms, a remarkably clever newspaper woman, accompanied him. Presumably she was to play the part of secretary, for Beach had large financial enterprises in mind, and confidential clerical assistance would certainly be necessary. For some reason letters were written from Cuba to Santa Anna and the authorities at Vera Cruz denouncing him as an American agent; and the party had to go through with a tedious examination of three days, for the comandante general had been expressly ordered to watch all suspicious foreigners hailing from the United States. But the ordeal was passed satisfactorily, and on the twenty-third or twenty-fourth of January Beach arrived at the capital. Letters from Roman Catholic prelates of the United States and Cuba gave him a confidential standing at once in the highest Church circles; his project of a canal across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec excited the lively interest of Santa Anna’s particular friends; and his plan for a national bank brought him into friendly relations with Farías and the other Puro leaders.[10]

Still, the presence of this agent of civilization did not restore tranquillity. On February 4 the government contrived by shrewd management to put a law through Congress, which in effect gave it autocratic power to raise five millions, and thus cut through the complications and restrictions that had rendered the action of January 11 substantially inoperative. The wrath of the Church blazed afresh. At all hazards Antichrist must be put down. Already they had concluded to supply Santa Anna with money, in return of course for his aid against Farías, and now they opened negotiations with the Moderados. This party, however, thought it would be good tactics to divide the Puros by supporting Farías, provided he would let them control his policy, and they so proposed; but the impracticable fellow, who was battling for principles and not place, declined the offer. Finally the Puros themselves, realizing that all the other factions were against their chief, decided that under his leadership they could not succeed, and resolved to throw him overboard.[11]

INSURRECTION AT MEXICO

While they were casting about for a method, a certain Person advised the clericals to offer an organized resistance against the laws of January 11 and February 4, and circumstances made that course easy. General Peña y Barragán, suspected of conspiring against the government, was placed under temporary arrest, and this made him eager to head a revolution. Farías, understanding that the Independencia battalion could not be trusted, ordered it to Vera Cruz, imagining that it would not refuse to march against the enemy. But on various more or less valid pretexts it did so; the other three élite battalions joined with it; and on February 27 they declared that Farías and Congress, having lost the confidence of the nation, had forfeited their authority, demanding at the same time the annulment of the “anti-religious” laws.[12] Amidst the ringing of bells and burning of gunpowder, the city echoed with the cries, “Death to Gómez Farías! Death to the Puros!” Cannon were soon at the street corners, and the usual scenes of a Mexican insurrection, fatal chiefly to peaceful residents, were presently on exhibition. The clergy, there is ample reason to believe, paid the costs, and priests left the confessionals to herald this new crusade in the streets.[13]

After about nine days of indecisive skirmishing, however, the clericals felt discouraged. The nation had not rallied to their cause as they had expected. The sum of $40,000 was required for the next week of fighting, and they hesitated. But again a certain Person urged them on. The awkwardly drawn Plan was reduced to one article—Farías must be deposed. On that almost all could agree. Monarchists, Centralists, Santannistas, Clericals, Moderados, Puros were for once in happy unison. Salas reappeared with some troops to take revenge on his old enemy. And yet with epic heroism Farías, never faltering and never compromising either his official dignity or his personal character, held firmly on with his few soldiers and such of the populace as he could arm. Again the battle raged, and again the innocent fell. But who was it that directed this tempest? Who was the mysterious Person, overwhelming the government of Mexico with darkness and confusion at this critical hour? He was Moses Y. Beach, agent of the American state department and adviser to the Mexican hierarchy. Permission had been given him to bring about peace, if he could; and, unable to do this, he seized the opportunity to help Scott.[13]

The time had now arrived for the Saviour of Society to appear, since all rational persons were desperately tired of the vain struggle; and Peña y Barragán wrote to Santa Anna, begging him to take possession of the Presidential chair. Congress did nothing, for many Deputies—fearing that it might act in a manner contrary to their sentiments—remained away from the chamber, and a quorum could not be assembled; but when Pedraza was arrested by the government, a large group of Moderado members, feeling that Santa Anna’s “victory” at Buena Vista had confirmed his power, addressed him to the same effect as Peña; and the Liberator, giving his best corps barely four days of repose, and explaining his departure from the north as one more sacrifice on the altar of his country, set out with a substantial body of troops for Mexico.[14] Along his route women made wreaths and threw them before his feet. Men of every faction acclaimed him; and from Querétaro to the capital the road was filled with carriages, in which all sorts of persons desiring to reach his ear strove to outdo one another in despatch.[20]

On the first news of the insurrection Santa Anna’s impression had been that its ulterior aim was hostile to him,[15] for his partisans at the capital supported the government; and, as a Puro envoy confirmed this impression, he promised Farías military aid; but then appeared Moderado agents with strong assurances and probably with stronger financial arguments, and he went over, though not openly, to their side of the controversy. Both parties were ordered by him to discontinue hostilities, and both did so at once; for, as the clergy had now shut their strong boxes, the insurgent officers were anxious to reëstablish a connection with the national treasury, while the regulars of Farías would not disobey Santa Anna. After the President’s arrival at Guadalupe Hidalgo a Te Deum was celebrated there in honor of his triumph over the Americans; and the next day, March 23, amidst real demonstrations of joy, he formally superseded Farías, while a certain Person[16]—diligently but vainly sought after by the police—was hastily making his way through the mountains in the direction of Tampico.[20]

SANTA ANNA TRIUMPHANT

Apparently Santa Anna had experienced the luckiest of turns. Precisely when the Americans had shattered his plans, and he found himself buried in the northern deserts with a broken, starving army,[17] this insurrection gave him a splendid occasion for making a triumphal march to the capital amid plaudits of gratitude and admiration, and he now found himself at the summit of prestige and power.[18] In reality, however, his situation was by no means entirely satisfactory. Understanding that the Puros—who in reality had served him with substantial good faith and therefore stood highest in his present sympathy—had lost their dominant position, he allied himself with their opponents; but the Moderados disliked and distrusted him still, and he received at least one distinct notice that by taking their side he was placing himself gratuitously in the hands of his enemies. The Puros did not feel extremely grateful to him for merely avoiding an open break with them; and, although it seemed wise to join in the acclamations lest some worse thing befall them, they were already sharpening their arrows against him. Indeed, they were believed to be sharpening their daggers, and he took full precautions. The clergy had trembled and recoiled on hearing that his arms had triumphed against the Americans, and the Saviour of Society now appeared to lean toward them—or toward their strong boxes; but they knew him well enough to foresee, as they soon realized, that he intended to extort ample compensation for all the favor shown them.[20]

Such was the inner state of things, and the external course of events proved not less interesting. The effect of the insurrection upon the progress of the war, as we shall presently see, was notable, and in substance it produced a counter-revolution in domestic politics. As Farías was no more willing to resign than to compromise, some disposition of him seemed necessary, for Santa Anna would evidently have to take the field again shortly, and it would not have been expedient, whatever the rights of the case, to let the executive power fall back into his control. It was therefore decided to abolish the Vice Presidency; and in this way fell on April Fool’s Day the noblest but most unpopular man in the country.[19] At the positive dictation of Santa Anna General P. M. Anaya, a Moderado, was then elected substitute president, while the raging Puros raged in vain. The clergy succeeded, by offering two millions of real money, in persuading Santa Anna to annul the laws of January 11 and February 4; but the day before he did this, Church property worth twenty millions was placed by Congress—theoretically, at least—within the reach of the government.[20]

Not many weeks before this, Don Simplicio had announced, “There will be presented an original tragi-comedy entitled ‘All is a farce in our beloved Mexico,’” and now J. F. Ramírez, who had been minister of relations when the hated law passed, exclaimed in bitterness of heart: All of us, without an exception, have been acting in a way to deserve the contempt and chastisement of cultivated nations; “we are nothing, absolutely nothing, with the aggravating circumstance that our insensate vanity makes us believe that we are everything.”[20]

---

On the twenty-first of February, General Scott, who had sailed from Tampico in a storm the day before, observed in the distance what seemed to be greenish bubbles floating on the sea. These were the Lobos Islands, and presently he found there on transports the First and Second Pennsylvania, the South Carolina, and parts of the Louisiana, Mississippi and New York regiments of new volunteers. Within a week many more troops, including nearly all the regulars of the expedition, arrived from Tampico or the Brazos, and the natural break-water that protected the anchorage—a sandy coral island of about one hundred acres, fringed with surf, covered with bushes and small trees woven together with vines, and scented by the blossoms of wild oranges, lemons and limes—veiled itself behind the spars and cordage of nearly a hundred vessels.[3]

Judicious measures prevented the smallpox from spreading. Drilling began; and the drum, fife and bugle aroused a fighting spirit, while visiting, social jollity and military discussion tended to create an army solidarity. In the evening bands played martial airs, and the watch fires on the coast gave an additional sharpness to the ardor of the soldiers. Meanwhile the General, who still expected vigorous opposition to his landing, waited impatiently for more surf-boats and heavy ordnance, looked anxiously for the ten large transports[1] in ballast requisitioned by him in November, elaborated his plans for disembarking, and issued the corresponding orders.[3]

The next rendezvous was to be off Antón Lizardo, about a dozen miles beyond Vera Cruz and some two hundred more from the Lobos anchorage, where islands, reefs and the shore of the mainland combined to form a deep and capacious harbor; and about noon on the second of March the steamer Massachusetts plowed through the fleet, dashing the spray from her bows, and set off in that direction. A blue flag with a red centre waving at her main-truck indicated that Scott was aboard, and when the noble figure of the commander-in-chief, standing with uncovered head on the deck, was observed, peal after peal of cheers resounded from ship to ship. The clanking of anchor chains followed them; the sailors broke into their hearty songs; the sails filled gracefully; and the fleet stood away.[3]

For two days its progress was not fast, but then a norther set in. Like a panorama, peak after peak on the lofty sky line passed rapidly astern; and finally Orizaba, the “mountain of the star,” upreared its head superbly more than three miles above sea level not far inland. Then came Green Island, where the Albany and Potomac were on hand to give any needful assistance,[2] and the John Adams showed her black teeth to lurking blockade-runners; while in the distance the frowning bastions of Ulúa “castle” could be made out, and the sixteen domes of Vera Cruz appeared to be promenading along her white wall. Pitching and rolling on the huge billows of inky water, with foam leaping high over their bows, the transports threaded their way swiftly between the tumbling and roaring piles of surf that marked the reefs, and finally, on March 5, the swallow-tail pennant of Commodore Conner and the flags of the American squadron were seen off Antón Lizardo. Cheers followed cheers as the transports dropped anchor one after another; and when the sun went down in a blaze of glory behind Orizaba, the spirits of the men, stimulated by so many novel, beautiful and thrilling scenes, by the approach of combat and the expectation of triumph, reached the very culmination of military enthusiasm. It was a good beginning—except that Scott arrived a month late, and the yellow fever usually came on time.[3]

VERA CRUZ

“Heroic” Vera Cruz, the city of the “True Cross,” was in form an irregular hexagon, with a perimeter some two miles in length, closely packed with rather high buildings of soft, white-washed masonry. Although famous as the charnel house of Europeans, it was a rather pleasant place for those who could endure the climate. The little alameda, across which many a dandy strutted every day in tight linen trousers, a close blue jacket, gilt buttons and a red sash, and many a pretty woman tottered coquettishly in pink slippers, was charming. The curtained balconies gave one a hint now and then of ladies making their toilets and smoking their cigarettes just within; and the flat roofs, equipped with observatories commanding the sea, were delightful resorts in the cool of the day. Along the water front extended a massive wall, supplemented at the northern end with Fort Concepción, at the southern end with Fort Santiago—both of them solidly built—and, between the two, with a mole of granite some two hundred yards in length. Landward the defences were feeble, for it had long been assumed that any serious attack would be made by water; but there were nine well-constructed, though in most cases not large, bastions, and between them dilapidated curtains of stone, brick and cement about fifteen feet high and two and a half or three feet thick.[9]

Behind the town extended a plain rather more than half a mile wide; and beyond that rose hills of light sand—enlarged editions of the dunes that ran along the shore north and south of Vera Cruz—which gradually increased in height until some of them, two or three miles inland, reached an elevation of perhaps three hundred feet. Then came dense forests, cut here and there by a road and occasionally diversified with oases of cultivated land, richly scented by tropical fruits and flowers. To the southwest of the city lay a series of ponds and marshes, drained by a small stream that passed near the wall; and this creek, supplemented by cisterns and an underground aqueduct, provided the town with water. In the opposite direction, on a reef named the Gallega—distant nearly three quarters of a mile from Fort Concepción—rose the fortress of Ulúa, built of soft coral stone, faced with granite, in the most scientific manner, and large enough to accommodate 2500 men.[4] Water batteries lay wherever it seemed possible to effect a landing, and tremendous walls, enfeebled by no casemates, towered to a height of about sixty feet.[9]

At the beginning of March, 1846, Mora y Villamil, the highest engineer officer in the Mexican army and at this time comandante general of Vera Cruz, feared that on account of Slidell’s departure the Americans might suddenly attack him. Aided by Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Robles, a skilful and active subordinate, he drew up detailed plans for repairing the crumbling fortifications of the city and castle, and these were approved by the government; but the lack of money prevented the full execution of them. In October the captain of a British frigate warned the new comandante general that an American attack was imminent; and at about the same time Santa Anna, while bitterly reproaching the government for its neglect of the town and pointing out what needed to be done, charged him to make the “strong buildings” a second and a third line of defence in case of attack, and then perish, if necessary, under the ruins of the city; but again the want of funds vetoed adequate preparations. On the other hand, unpaid soldiers paid themselves by stealing powder and selling it.[9]

About the middle of November it was learned at Mexico from a New Orleans newspaper that an expedition against Vera Cruz had been projected, and within two months the news was confirmed. Santa Anna heard of it, and wrote that 6000 militia should be assembled there. He was told in reply that his demand would be met early in February; and assurances were given to Congress that everything requisite had been done.[5] By the fourth of March the comandante general, to whom the information had been transmitted, was inditing urgent appeals for help, and soon the appearance of Scott showed that a crisis had arrived. In reliance on the promises of the general government, hopeful and incessant work on the fortifications now began; but within four days letters from the war department, conferring unlimited powers upon the commander, admitted that on account of the Polko insurrection at the capital no assistance could be given, and many of the people not only left the city, but endeavored to draw their friends and relatives from the National Guards.[9]

In point of fact military men had long known that Vera Cruz, as a fortified town standing by itself, was indefensible. General Mora admitted that it needed stronger exterior works than could be constructed; and there was no squadron to keep Ulúa supplied with provisions. The proper course for the comandante general was either to strip the city of whatever Scott could use, and merely endeavor to prevent him from advancing farther, as was privately argued by leading members of Congress, or—for the moral effect of such an example—to send all non-combatants away, and struggle until crushed; but neither public sentiment nor the government would have permitted the first of these plans, and, while the comandante had the second in mind on the fifth of March, it was too heroic for execution.[9]

A FIGHTING CHANCE

Besides, there seemed to be a fighting chance. Ulúa was much stronger than when the French, aided by fortune, had captured it, and the anchorage occupied by them could now be shelled. Some of the guns had been improperly mounted; some of the carriages were old; at some of the embrasures balls of different calibres were mixed; pieces without projectiles could be found, and projectiles without pieces; rust had impaired the fit of many balls; but the city and the fortress together had probably three hundred serviceable cannon and mortars,[6] more muskets than men, and plenty of ammunition. As an assault was expected, the streets were defended with cannon and barricades, sand-bags protected the doors and windows, loopholes without number were made in the wall, the rather shallow but wet ditch was cleared, and although barbed cactus made the approach of an enemy to the bastions almost impossible, thousands of pitfalls—each with a sword, bayonet or short pike set erect at the bottom—were dug beyond the wall, so arranged that no one marching straight forward could well avoid them.[9]

Juan Soto, the governor of the state, was indefatigable, and as the state militia numbered about 20,000, it seemed reasonable to count upon succor. Giffard, the British consul, expected that substantial help would come from that source. Other states were likely to furnish aid; and the people, taught by the long inaction of the Americans off the shore to despise them and encouraged by fictitious reports that assistance would be rendered by the national government, felt united and enthusiastic.[7] The city council offered all its resources, and the well-to-do raised funds for a hospital by giving a theatrical performance. The garrison, led by the brave, active and popular though not very able Morales, now comandante general, may be estimated as at least 1200 in Ulúa and 3800 in the city.[8] About half of them were merely National Guards; but these, decorated with tricolored cockades and red pompons, looked and felt extremely dangerous. “As God lives,” cried one of their leaders, “either we will triumph, or all of us, without a solitary exception, will be interred in the ruins.” The civilians remaining in town may have numbered 3000.[9]

Bearing in mind the necessity, not merely of taking Vera Cruz and Ulúa, but of getting his army away from the coast before the advent of yellow fever, and satisfied that Polk would show him no mercy in case of ill-success, General Scott examined his problem with all possible care, and consulted freely the officers he particularly trusted.[10] He could not very prudently have left, say, 5000 men to mask or possibly reduce Vera Cruz, as some critics insisted he should have done, and advanced with the rest, for the essential purpose of his expedition was to capture that place, and such a course might have been viewed by the government as insubordinate. Besides, that policy would probably have been regarded by the Mexicans as a sign of weakness; the possession of the harbor and shipping facilities would evidently aid all further operations; by holding them it would be possible to deprive the enemy of war supplies and other necessaries; the arms, ammunition and cannon of the Mexicans were highly valuable, especially to them; and the American army would not have been an adequate aggressive force after thus detaching nearly half its numbers. The obstacle before Scott had, therefore, to be faced and overcome.[13]

The best method, evidently, was to reduce the town before seriously attacking Ulúa, because that success would greatly diminish the enemy’s fire, make it possible to contract and so strengthen the American line, and somewhat facilitate the transportation of supplies. Such had been the General’s plan from the first. Officers eager for distinction recommended an assault, and Scott well knew that a quick, brilliant stroke would best win him fame and popularity.[11] But he understood equally well that an assault, necessarily made at night, would entail a heavy loss of his best men—enough, perhaps, to prevent his advancing farther and escaping the pestilence—besides involving a great slaughter of both combatants and non-combatants in the town. On the other hand, as the British consul and the British naval commander agreed, there was not enough time before the yellow fever season to warrant relying upon starvation alone.[12] Siege and bombardment were therefore indicated, and Scott promptly decided upon that plan as combining, better than any other, humanity with effectiveness.[13]

THE DEBARKATION

The initial step was to select a point for debarking; and Conner, whom Scott had requested in December to study this problem, had already fixed upon the beach of Mocambo Bay, two and a half or three miles southeast of Vera Cruz, which was somewhat sheltered from northers and could be swept by the guns of the fleet. Sacrificios Island, a strip of sand representing a large reef, was just off shore, too, forming an anchorage here. Accordingly Scott, with Conner, the principal generals, Robert E. Lee, P. G. T. Beauregard and other officers, went up in the little steamer Petrita, reconnoitred the spot, and then—probably to deceive the Mexicans regarding his intentions—ran within a mile and a half of Ulúa, where he was almost sunk by the gunners.[14] His judgment agreed with the Commodore’s, and orders were given to land on the eighth. But when that morning came, signs of a norther showed themselves. The glass fell. The heat became stifling. A southerly wind loaded with moisture blew, and the summit of Orizaba, clad in the azure hue of the poet, stood sharply forth; hence the orders were countermanded.[17]

The signs failed, however, and the extra day was available for the last preparations. A detailed plan of debarkation had been drawn up and announced while the army was at Lobos Islands, but certain difficulties had not been anticipated. The ten large transports in ballast had not come, and to land from a great number of small vessels at Sacrificios, where there was little room and foreign warships occupied all the safe anchorage, appeared imprudent. Conner, therefore, offered to transport the army on larger, better and more ably handled vessels belonging to the squadron, and Scott’s wise acceptance of the proposal involved extensive readjustments.[17]

These, however, were skilfully arranged, and when the dawn of March 9 announced a perfect day, a scene of the greatest activity began. Signals fluttered to mastheads. In clarion tones officers issued their orders. Despatch boats dashed here and there. Sailors and soldiers roared their favorite airs. Fully half of the 10,000 and more troops were placed on the frigates Raritan and Potomac, and most of the others on smaller vessels of the squadron. At about eleven o’clock the order to sail was given. Amid thunderous cheers the Massachusetts plunged through the fleet, and took its place in the lead with Conner’s flagship. A gentle breeze from the southeast filled the sails; and the war vessels and transports were off. After a smooth voyage they began to arrive near Sacrificios at about one o’clock, and in close quarters, but without mishaps or even the least confusion, each dropped anchor in its allotted space.[15] The yards and rigging of the foreign war vessels were black with men, and ladies, armed with glasses and parasols, gazed impatiently from the deck of the British packet.[17]

Without the loss of a moment three signal flags rose to the main-truck of the Massachusetts, and the work of landing Worth’s brigade of regulars began. The double-shotted cannon of the squadron were brought to bear on the shore. Seven gunboats drawing eight feet or less formed a line within good grape range of the beach, and cleared for action. About sixty-five surf-boats, which had been towed from Antón Lizardo by steamers, were rowed by naval crews to the vessels carrying troops—each having a definite assignment—and after receiving from fifty to eighty soldiers apiece, making up the whole of the brigade, attached themselves in two long lines to the quarters of the steamer Princeton, which had now anchored about 450 yards from the shore. This process consumed several hours, and it was hardly ended when a shell whizzed over them. “Now we shall catch it,” thought the soldiers, for rumors of opposition had been heard, two or three hundred cavalry could be seen, and artillery was supposed to be lurking behind the dunes.[17]

The flash of a signal gun shot now from the Massachusetts; the surf-boats cut loose, faced the shore abreast in the order of battle, and struck out for land; and a cheer burst from every American throat. Great Orizaba cast aside its veil of haze, and stood out against the setting sun. Not a cloud flecked the sky; not a ripple marred the burnished water. Ulúa and Vera Cruz thundered loudly, though in vain. National airs rolled from our squadron. Shells from the gunboats broke up the Mexican cavalry and searched the dunes. The oars of the straining sailors flashed. Muskets—not loaded but with fixed bayonets—glittered. Regimental colors floated at the stern of each boat. Suddenly one of the boats darted ahead and grounded on a bar about a hundred yards from the shore. Out leaped Worth; his officers followed him; and the whole brigade were instantly in the breaking ground-swell, holding aloft their muskets and cartridge-boxes.[17]

Here was the chance of the enemy, for our vessels could not fire without endangering Americans; but no enemy was to be seen.[16] Led by their color-bearers the regulars quickly splashed ashore, formed in a moment, charged to the crest of the first dune, planted their standards and burst into cheers; the men on the ships, tongue-tied for some time by an excitement and anxiety that made their brains reel, answered with huzza after huzza till they made the bay “seem peopled with victorious armies,” wrote one of the soldiers, and the strains of “Star-Spangled Banner” broke from the bands. Less formally, but rapidly and in order, the boats went back for the troops of Patterson and Twiggs; and by midnight, without having met with a single accident, more than 10,000 men, duly guarded by sentries, were eating their biscuit and pork on the sand or preparing to bivouac.[17]

VERA CRUZ INVESTED

During the night Mexicans in the rear did some shooting but without effect, and the process of investment began. Diverting attention from this by having a gunboat, sheltered about a mile from the city behind Point Hornos, throw shot and shell into Vera Cruz for a couple of hours the next forenoon, Scott had Pillow’s brigade capture the hill of Malibrán behind Worth’s camp, and push on toward the rear of the city. Quitman then passed it; Shields passed Quitman, and Twiggs passed him. Wallowing up and down the slopes of deep sand in a sultry heat without water to drink proved to be extremely hard work; and breaking through the valleys, where a matted growth of chaparral—armed with thorns as keen as needles and stiff as bayonets—resisted everything but sharp steel, was harder yet. Day and night Mexican irregulars, both infantry and horse, and cannon salutes from the city and the castle embarrassed operations, and there were many brisk skirmishes. Moreover the landing had scarcely been made when a norther set in, covering the men with sand, blowing away old hilltops and building up new ones. But not long after noon on March 13 Twiggs reached the Gulf north of the city. The next morning a well-supported detachment from each brigade advanced as far as it could find cover, driving the Mexican outposts before it; and by night these detachments were only about seven hundred yards from the town.[21]

The American position as a whole, known as Camp Washington, was now a semi-circular line about seven miles long. There were gaps, but these were rapidly closed with strong pickets. The railway and the roads were all occupied; the visible water supply of the city was cut off; and on March 16 Scott announced that nothing less than a small army could break through. Meantime, whenever the weather permitted, artillery, stores, horses and provisions were landed in the most systematic manner. Safeguards were issued to the representatives of foreign powers at Vera Cruz, and in a letter of March 13 to the Spanish consul[18] Scott indicated plainly that “bombardment or cannonade, or assault, or all” of these might be expected by the citizens.[21]

The time to plant artillery had now arrived, and the ideal spot was found on the sixteenth; but after a battery had been laid out there, access to it proved to be dangerously exposed. Two days later, however, a fairly good point was discovered, near the cemetery and Worth’s position, about half a mile south of the town, which screened it somewhat from the castle; and preparations to establish two mortar batteries there, about one hundred yards apart, began the following night. At the same time a deep road, wide enough to admit a six-mule team, was under construction.[21]

Most of this labor had to be done at night, and the utmost possible silence observed. As the transports lay a mile off shore, while the only wharf was an open beach, and a norther blew violently from the twelfth to the sixteenth, the work of landing ordnance and ordnance stores proceeded slowly. Fortunately the work on the batteries was not discovered; but the fire of Paixhan guns and heavy mortars from the city and castle, though irregular and singularly unfruitful despite the undeniable skill of the gunners,[19] compelled the Americans to adopt extreme precautions. Nor were these embarrassments the only ones. Notwithstanding seasonable orders, only fifteen carts and about a hundred draught horses had arrived. Not more than one fifth of the ordnance requisitioned by Scott about the middle of November and due at the Brazos—he now reminded Marcy—by January 15, had yet appeared. A great many artillery and cavalry horses had been drowned, injured or delayed; and there was a shortage of almost every requisite for siege operations.[20] But the army and the navy coöperated zealously; soldiers took the places of draught animals; and in spite of every difficulty three batteries, mounting seven 10-inch mortars, were in readiness by two o’clock on the afternoon of the twenty-second, and the soldiers felt eager to hear what they called the “sweet music” of these “faithful bull-dogs.”[21]

THE BOMBARDMENT

At this hour, therefore, Scott formally summoned the town, intimating that both assault and bombardment were to be apprehended. The reply was a refusal to surrender; and at a quarter past four, accompanied by a deafening chorus of joyous, frantic shouts and yells, the American batteries opened, while the “mosquito fleet” of two small steamers and five gunboats,[22] each armed with a single heavy cannon, stationed themselves behind Point Hornos, and fired briskly.[24]

Like “hungry lions in search of prey,” a soldier thought, the shells from the mortars flew “howling” to their mark. With heavier metal and vastly more of it, Vera Cruz and the castle replied. The city wall blazed like a sheet of fire. Shot, shell and rockets came forth in a deluge, it seemed to the men; and the two columns of smoke, rolling and whirling, mounted high and collided as if striving to outflank and conquer each other. Still more terrible was the scene at night. A spurt of red fire; a fierce roar; a shell with an ignited fuse mounting high, pausing, turning, and then—more and more swiftly—dropping; the crash of a roof; a terrific explosion that shook the earth; screams, wailing and yells—all this could be distinctly seen or heard from the American lines. During the twenty-third and the following night the fire still raged, but on the American side more slowly, for although ten mortars were now at work, a norther interrupted the supply of ammunition.[24]

But while the bombardment made an interesting spectacle, as a military operation it was proving unsatisfactory. The ordnance thus far received by Scott was inadequate for the reduction of the city—to say nothing of Ulúa. With mortars, especially as the distances could not be ascertained precisely, it was impossible to be sure of hitting the bastions and forts. Shells could be thrown into the town, but while the houses suffered much, the fortifications and garrison escaped vital damage, and there was no sign of yielding. Not a few in the American army, who had supposed that a fortified city could be taken at sight like a mint julep, grew impatient; the officers eager for assault fumed; Worth, proud of his quick work at Monterey, sneered; Twiggs grunted. As an army man Scott naturally desired that branch of the service to reap all the glory of its campaign, but he now found himself compelled to ask for naval guns heavy enough to breach the wall, and make an assault practicable; and when Perry, who had taken Conner’s place on the twenty-first, insisted that men from the squadron should work them, he consented.[24]

The new battery, constructed by Robert E. Lee and mounting three long 32’s for solid shot and three 68’s for shells, was planted just behind the bushy crest of a slight eminence, only some 800 yards from the city wall, where the enemy did not suppose that such an enterprise would be ventured; and until the guns were about ready to be unmasked on the morning of the twenty-fourth, its existence was not suspected.[23] Here were instruments of power and precision, and they told. The Mexicans concentrated upon them a terrific fire, but with no serious effect; and when on the next morning a battery consisting of four 24-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers joined the infernal chorus, the fire, though hindered occasionally by the tardiness of ammunition, was “awful,” said Scott and Lee, while the city appeared like one dense thunder-cloud, red with flashes and quivering with incessant roars.[24]

That night the batteries played still more fiercely. Sometimes four or five shells were sizzling through the air at once. The fire, said an officer, was now “perfectly terrific”; and to heighten the wildness of the scene, many vessels could be observed by the light of the moon going ashore in the norther. About thirty were wrecked by this one gale, and others had to cut away their masts. In the meantime preparations for assaulting both by land and by water, should an assault prove to be necessary, were actively pressed.[24]

THE SITUATION IN VERA CRUZ

In town, during the early period of these operations, the enthusiasm continued to run high, for the cautious and faint-hearted had gone away, and the reports of the irregulars, constantly skirmishing against the Americans, were colored to suit the popular taste. Work on the fortifications proceeded, and fresh cartridges for the artillery were made with feverish haste. Bands played; the gunners amused themselves by firing at small and far distant groups among the sand-hills; and at night fireballs and rockets lighted up the plain in anticipation of the hoped-for assault. When the investment was completed, when the American outposts drew near the town, and especially when it became known that preparations for a bombardment were under way, the people grew more serious; but it was expected that forces from without would break the line, or at least prevent the construction of batteries.[26]

A painful disappointment followed, however. Soto made great efforts to collect the tax levied by the state; but the citizens, impoverished by the long blockade, had no money, and without cash troops could not be fed. In spite of many hopes the fluctuating bands under Colonel Senobio, the chief leader of the irregulars in the vicinity, do not seem to have risen at any time far above 1000, and perhaps never reached that number. In vain Soto appealed for an able general and a nucleus of regulars. They were not within reach, and the few pieces of artillery could not be moved. The states of Puebla and Oaxaca tried to help, but were tardy and inefficient.[26]

Men from the upper country dreaded the yellow fever; and those of the coast, volatile by nature, ignorant of real warfare, without organization, training or discipline, were astonished and confounded when they struck the solid American line. They pecked at it continually, but Morales himself could see that no skill, concert or strength marked their efforts. Discouragement and wholesale desertion followed. The city, therefore, could not obtain provisions by land; and as most of the seamen alongshore fled to the mountains, and boat communication became more and more difficult, it was realized that supplies from the interior were out of the question. After March 20 the troops could be given little or no meat; but soldiers were detailed to fish the prolific waters under the guns of Ulúa, and no doubt beans and tortillas, the staple food of the common people, continued to be fairly plentiful.[26]

The opening of the bombardment, however, precipitated a crisis, and as our fire grew more and more intense, the consternation and suffering increased. Crashing roofs; burning houses; flying pavements; doors, windows and furniture blocking the streets; a pandemonium of confused and frightful sounds; bells ringing without hands; awful explosions; domes and steeples threatening to fall; the earth quaking; crowds of screaming women, who rushed hither and thither; terrible wounds and sudden deaths—all these were new and overwhelming scenes.[25] Only one bakery escaped destruction, as it happened, and the children cried in vain for bread; the priests would not leave their shelter to comfort and absolve; and finally the very instinct of self-preservation was lost in a stupid despair more dreadful to witness than death itself.[26]

The troops in the southwestern section, under our heaviest fire, became terror-stricken. In other quarters men left the ranks to look after families and friends; and when a murky dawn ended the terrible night of the twenty-fifth, demoralization was rife. People wandered about the streets crying for surrender. Always passionate, they now hated their own government for deserting them. The consuls went out under a flag of truce, but Scott refused to see them, sending them word—it was reported—that any persons leaving the city would be fired upon, and that unless it should surrender in the meantime, new as well as the old batteries would open the next morning. This fact overwhelmed the people; and the prospect of being exterminated at leisure by an enemy who could not be injured, beat down their last thought of resistance.[26]

Consul Giffard had predicted that any plausible excuse for surrender would be turned to good account. Supplies were now said to be failing, and in the course of this dreadful night an informal meeting of officers agreed upon capitulation. Naturally the idea gave offence to many, and there was talk of opening a way through the American line with the sword. But a council of war soon decided to negotiate; commissioners were appointed; and Scott, who was invited to take similar action, did so. The six men came together on the afternoon of the twenty-sixth, but could not agree; and the Mexicans returned to the city, leaving behind them a proposition.[29]

THE SURRENDER OF VERA CRUZ

Worth, who was our chief representative, believed the negotiations were simply a waste of time, and favored an immediate assault; but Scott saw that the Mexicans, while trying to save appearances, really meant surrender, and the next morning granted with certain vital modifications their terms.[27] His demands were accepted, and it was thus agreed in substance that Landero, to whom the command had been turned over, should march his army out with all the honors of war, the troops be paroled, and the armament—so far as not destroyed in the course of the war—be disposed of by the treaty of peace. It was further agreed that all the Mexican sick should remain in town under Mexican care, private property be respected, and religious rights be held sacred.[29]

It was a “shameful surrender,” declared Santa Anna, and from a military point of view this could hardly be denied. Ulúa had practically not been touched; it had a considerable supply of provisions, and there was a chance of obtaining more from blockade-runners. Vera Cruz was in a harder yet not in a desperate plight. Men of importance there, knowing the city would be denounced for surrendering, naturally endeavored to prove that it had suffered terribly and exhausted its resources before yielding; and the principal neutrals—friendly toward them, engaged mostly in trade, and more willing to have life sacrificed than property—raised an outcry against the proceedings of Scott that became a fierce indictment in Europe and the United States. But the British naval commander, though not inclined to favor the General, reported that the casualties in the city were only eighty soldiers killed or wounded, about one hundred old men, women and children killed, and an unknown number injured, and that its food supply, while no doubt less delicate and varied than could have been desired, would have lasted beyond the middle of April; and there is considerable evidence that his figures were approximately correct.[28] Ammunition did not fail, nor did water.[29]

The surrender was really due therefore to the moral effect of Scott’s artillery. Even Giffard, who termed his operations cruel and unnecessary, admitted this; and, bearing in mind the General’s obligations to obey his government and save the lives of his men, the inevitable horrors of an assault by night, and the serious danger that a reliance upon starvation as the sole means of reducing the city would have given time for Santa Anna’s regulars and the yellow fever to arrive, one concludes again and finally that Scott’s method was humane and wise.[29]

Owing to inequalities of the ground, the character of the soil, great skill on the part of our engineers, incessant care and remarkable good fortune, the total losses caused by 6267 Mexican shot, 8486 shells and all the bullets of the irregulars were only about nineteen killed and sixty-three wounded. The siege was not exactly a fête champêtre, however. It was tiresome to be awakened at night so often by Mexican skirmishers, disagreeable to be routed out by the diabolical screech of a heavy shell, and quite annoying to have one of the “big dinner-pots,” as the soldiers called them, explode close by. Saturating dews, abominable drinking water, scanty and bad rations, howling wolves, lizards in one’s boot, “jiggers” that made the feet itch incessantly, fleas that even a sleeping-bag could not discourage, and sand-flies nearly as voracious, were minor but real afflictions. When a norther began, the whole aspect of nature seemed to change. The sky became a pall, the atmosphere a winding-sheet, the wind a scourge; and the roaring, chilling blast filled one’s ears, eyes, mouth and even pores with biting grit, cut the tents into ribbons, and sometimes buried their sleeping inmates.[30] To escape from the Mexican shot sentries often had to burrow in the sand, and under the tropical sun they learned to appreciate the power of the old brick oven. When carrying provisions or dragging cannon, amidst hills that blazed like the mirrors of Archimedes at Syracuse, men often dropped.[31]

On the other hand, besides the initial high spirits, which helped immensely, and the excitement and comradeship that knocked off the edge of hardships, there were special sources of cheer—particularly the “blue-shirts,” as the seamen were called. When turning out in the face of an icy sand-blast sharp enough to cut granite, it was something to hear a salty voice give the order, “Form line of battle on the starboard tack!” But sailors on shore leave, who burst from their long confinement like birds let loose, and “cruised” in the environs with perfect abandon, were better yet. Their sport with the wild monkeys was truly edifying, and their delight over the burro would have set Diogenes laughing. Sometimes they rode him, and sometimes they carried him. Planted in the Mexican style just forward of the creature’s tail, they felt that at last they were riding the quarter-deck, and commanding a snug vessel of their own. Above all they enjoyed “mooring ship.” This congenial manoeuvre was achieved by taking aboard for “anchor” a heavy block of wood, previously attached to the donkey’s neck with a long rope, then racing at full speed, heaving the “anchor,” paying out the cable, and bringing up in a heap on the sand—the donkey on top, very likely.[31]

Not less cheering and a little more military was the news, which arrived by the fifteenth of March, that “Old Wooden-leg’s” army had been “licked up like salt” at Buena Vista. And still another comfort was to gaze from a safely remote hill at Vera Cruz, which looked—the soldiers agreed—so oriental, with airy palm trees visible over the white wall, hundreds of buzzards floating in wide circles far above, the dark bulwarks of Ulúa set in waves of purple and gold on the left, a forest of American spars and masts on the right, piercing the misty splendor of the yellow beach, the bright sails of fishing boats in the middle distance, and the vast, blue, cool Gulf beyond it all. How the panting soldiers gloated on the prospect of taking possession![31]

VERA CRUZ OCCUPIED

And on March 29 they did so. The day was enchantingly summerlike; a delightful southeast breeze came over the water; and the domes of Vera Cruz were gilded with splendid sunshine. In a green meadow, shaded with cocoanut palms, a little way south of the town, Worth’s brigade was drawn up in a dingy line, and a dingy line of volunteers, about seventy yards distant, faced it. At one end of the intervening space, near the city wall, stood sailors and marines. The American dragoons and a battery were opposite them, and a white flag waved at the centre. A little before noon the Mexican troops, in their best uniforms of blue, white and red, marched out of the gate, formed by company front with a band at the head of each regiment, advanced to the flag, and stacked arms. A few slammed or even broke their muskets; many kissed their hands to the city; and a standard bearer, who had removed his flag from the staff and secreted it in his bosom, wept for joy when permitted to keep it. But most of the men seemed in fairly good spirits, and as a rule the much-decorated officers, who retained their swords, produced a fine impression.[32]

As the rear of the column left the gate, the Mexican banner on Fort Santiago, after receiving a last salute from the guns of the city and castle, was lowered; and then issued forth a crowd of men, women and children, loaded with fiddles, guitars, parrots, monkeys, dogs, game-cocks, toys and household utensils, that was enough to destroy any funereal sentiments which otherwise might have been felt. Even by the Mexican accounts, not a word or look of triumph, not even a note of authority, was chargeable to the victors; and Worth, who received the column, proffered a thousand courtesies. General Scott, the so-called “vain-glorious,” remained in the background; but he sent a note excusing from their parole about forty officers, whom he expected to aid him at the capital as in effect advocates of peace.[32]

Amid cheers and the waving of caps, American flags then rose on the forts, greeted by hundreds of salutes from sea and shore. It seemed, wrote a soldier, as if there were nothing in the world but cannon, and all the cannon thundering; and the glory of the Stars and Stripes, gleaming amidst the smoke, gave a new significance to the emblem of patriotism. With his bands playing favorite American airs, Worth’s brigade now marched into the town; and later Scott, with his staff and a brilliant escort, followed it. Perry took formal possession of Ulúa; and the disbanded Mexican troops that resided elsewhere scattered to their homes, preparing the people for submission wherever they went by tales of American invincibility, and teaching them by every sort of outrage to welcome American rule.[32]

---

I believe it would be many months after the capture of Vera Cruz and the fortress of Ulúa, said Minister Pakenham in substance at the end of January, 1847, before an army strong enough to advance any distance into the interior could be collected there, and meantime the climate would be “frightfully destructive.” Heat, fatigue, differences in food, and the yellow fever will cause heavy losses, wrote Bermúdez de Castro, the Spanish minister at Mexico in March, and the road to the capital passes so many centres of population and so many fine military positions, that without great labor and preparations an invading force can be destroyed. Two men better qualified to express opinions on the matter could scarcely have been found; but without hesitation the “scientific and visionary” Scott addressed himself to the task. Had the requisitions duly made by him in November been complied with, he might by this time, at a trifling cost in lives, have been standing on the great plateau, and quite possibly within the capital; but now, with only two thirds of the desired troops[1] and an insufficient supply of many other essentials, he fearlessly girded up his loins.[5]

Stores were expeditiously landed. The First Infantry and two independent volunteer companies received orders to garrison the town and the fortress. It was arranged to minimize the danger of yellow fever by keeping the Americans at the water-front as much as possible and cleaning the city. The military department of Vera Cruz, extending fifty miles inland, was created. Foreign merchants, under the threat of a six per cent duty on exported gold and silver, supplied funds by cashing official drafts on the United States at par. “One more appeal ... to the ninety-seven honorable men, against, perhaps, the three miscreants in every hundred,” urging them to coöperate actively in preventing even trivial outrages, was issued; and the people of the region were addressed[2] in a proclamation.[5]

“Mexicans,” said Scott, I am advancing at the head of a powerful army, which is soon to be doubled, and another army of ours is advancing in the north. “Americans are not your enemies,” however, but only the enemies of those who misgoverned you, and brought about this unnatural war. To the peaceable inhabitants and to your church, which is respected by the government, laws and people in all parts of our country, we are friends. Everything possible will be done to prevent or punish outrages against you; and on the other hand any citizen, not belonging to the regular forces, who undertakes to injure us will be severely chastised. “Let, then, all good Mexicans remain at home, or at their peaceful occupations.” Let them also furnish supplies, for all who do so will be paid in cash and protected. If such a course be followed, the war may soon end honorably for both sides; and the Americans, “having converted enemies into friends,” will return home.[5]

The problem of transportation, however, caused the General a great deal of trouble. As early as the beginning of February notice of his probable needs had been given by him to the quartermaster’s department, and presumably steps had been taken to meet them; but the loss of animals on board the ships during storms or by the wrecking of transports had upset all calculations.[3] For wagons especially he was dependent upon the United States. At least eight hundred were needed, and up to April 5 only one hundred and eighty had arrived, though three hundred more were known to be on the way. Four or five thousand mules were required for wagons, two or three thousand for pack-saddles, and about four hundred mules or horses for the siege train; and by the same date less than 1100 had been obtained. An expedition to the village of La Antigua[4] on the north shore met with little success in this regard, and a more important one, to the rich country on the upper Alvarado River,[4] which was supposed to abound in horses and mules, produced but very disappointing results.[5]

In the opinion of Scott, however, the district near Jalapa, a beautiful city about seventy-four miles inland, was likely to prove more satisfactory. From Beach’s friend, Mrs. Storms, who had presented herself to him on March 20, he seems to have learned that friendly sentiments were entertained there. No serious opposition below that point and even for some distance beyond it seemed to him probable; and hence on April 8, although his means for equipping a road train were but a quarter of what he desired, and only an inadequate siege train could be moved, the second division of regulars, commanded by Brigadier General Twiggs, marched for Jalapa, which was also the first point where large quantities of subsistence and forage could be obtained.[5]

MEXICAN DEFENSIVE PLANS

Measures to defend the route had been set on foot by Mexico in good season.[6] From the lofty plateau of the interior the national highway—which it was evident that an American army would have to follow on account of its artillery—wound through mountains to sea level, presenting, according to the minister of war, “almost insuperable obstacles against any audacious invader.” Not far above Jalapa the village of Las Vigas marked a spot of military value, and the narrow, rugged pass at La Hoya, though it could be turned without much difficulty, afforded an excellent opportunity to stop a weak force or delay a strong one, while below that city Corral Falso, Cerro Gordo, Plan del Río and the national bridge (puente nacional) were fine points. As early as October 11, 1846, an order to fortify several of these positions was issued. Some gangs of laborers assembled, a little preparatory clearing of the ground was done, a few cannon were moved about; but energy, money, supplies, appliances and engineering skill fell indefinitely short of the requirements, and up to the twentieth of March, 1847, nothing substantial was accomplished.[9]

That day Santa Anna arrived near the capital on his return from the north, and, although he expected Vera Cruz to delay the Americans much longer than it did, he seems to have taken the southern danger into consideration at once. Disputes between the generals had sprung up. As a result La Vega was given the district from Vera Cruz to Corral Falso, General Gregorio Gómez that extending from Corral Falso to Las Vigas, and General Gaona a jurisdiction above this; and each was ordered to fortify his best points and raise as many troops as he could. Over all of these officers was then placed General Canalizo, a little man with a big tongue, as commander-in-chief of the eastern division. The forces under Senobio and other chiefs were to be gathered, “regularized” and trained. The troops—a cavalry brigade, two brigades of infantry and a force of artillery—that had followed the President from La Angostura were ordered to march toward Vera Cruz by the shortest route, a brigade under Rangel to proceed from the capital in the same direction, and 2000 National Guards, from Puebla to join those corps; and General Mora, who now commanded the Army of the North, was instructed to send his bronze 16-pounders to Jalapa with all possible speed.[7] Every effective engineer then at the capital received similar marching orders, and attention was given to the need of ammunition, wagons, mules and other necessaries. At the same time instructions were issued to block the route via Orizaba at Chiquihuite, a naturally strong position below that city.[9]

Late on March 30 news that Vera Cruz had fallen reached the capital. At once the government expelled Black, the American consul residing at Mexico, and issued a circular calling upon all citizens to forget rancor and dissension, offer their lives and fortunes, and stand unitedly behind the President. “Mexicans,” exclaimed Santa Anna, “do not hesitate between death and slavery.... Awake! A sepulchre opens at your feet; let it at least be covered with laurels!” and he adjured Canalizo in the name of the country to fortify Corral Falso and Cerro Gordo, and above all to defend the national bridge “in all possible ways and at all costs” in order to give time for troops to concentrate above it. With Senobio’s forces and the militia—amounting, said this letter, to more than 2000 men—and aided by the topography of the ground, itself “equal in value to an army,” the enemy could be detained, the President assured him; and he was authorized to shoot every deserter and every coward. At the same time Governor Soto was directed to proclaim martial law, call out all the fit men between the ages of fifteen and fifty years, and aid Canalizo in every possible way. Then, after transferring the executive power to General Anaya, the substitute President, Santa Anna left the capital on April 2. As he went down the steps of the palace to his waiting carriage, he and the onlookers felt sad presentiments they could not hide. Even his enemies had tears in their eyes, and it seemed to every one like a final good-by.[9]

SANTA ANNA AT THE FRONT

On the way gloomy reports met him. Soto wrote that while all in his power had been done, the fate of Vera Cruz had smitten the people with terror, and the resources of the state were far from adequate. Canalizo wrote no more hopefully. Efforts had been made to rouse the spirit of the public.[8] Under penalty of death all intercourse with the Americans had been prohibited, and under the same threat all citizens had been ordered to place beyond the invader’s reach whatever could be of service to him. But the outlook was dark. Although a good engineer had been at the national bridge for a week, work on the fortifications had scarcely begun; eight hundred out of a thousand men had fled panic-stricken on learning of Scott’s triumph at Vera Cruz, there was little ammunition or money, and the bridge could not be held. In view of Santa Anna’s adjuration Canalizo promised to make another effort, but he soon ordered La Vega to abandon the position. The light fortifications recently built were demolished, and as wagons to carry the guns away could not be obtained, they were spiked and pitched into a ravine.[9]

Observing at La Hoya that virtually nothing had been done, Santa Anna ordered Engineer Cano to fortify the pass, and then went on to his great hacienda of El Encero, eight miles below Jalapa, where he arrived on the fifth. Two days later, in company with Lieutenant Colonel Robles, he passed Corral Falso, five miles farther down the highway, and the hamlet of Cerro Gordo, nearly five miles beyond that, and finally, making a steep and circuitous descent, he came to Plan del Río, about five miles from the hamlet. Near the first of these three positions the highway passed through a narrow, craggy defile, that could not be turned; but Santa Anna decided to make a stand at the second, because according to the country people and the traditions of both the Spanish régime and the revolutionary war, it was equally unassailable on the flanks, and holding it would force the Americans to remain within reach of the yellow fever, which ceased to be terrible just above Plan del Río.[14]

CERRO GORDO

Very little work had been done at Cerro Gordo, but the position seemed admirable. About half a mile below the hamlet the descending highway entered a ravine, which rapidly deepened. On the left of this rose a hill named El Telégrafo, which, though low and easily ascended from the direction of the hamlet, was five or six hundred feet high on the opposite side and extremely steep. To the right of the ravine the grade of the hamlet continued for more than a mile, ending finally in three tongues, just south of which the plateau was cut, approximately east and west, by a precipitous canyon of rock more than five hundred feet deep, the channel of a small stream called the Río del Plan. The tongues, which may be designated from south to north as A, B and C, were parallel to the highway and more or less fully commanded it.[10] Near the head of the ravine, at a spot that may be called D, a road branched off from the highway toward the tongues, and there was a low eminence, E, in this vicinity.[14]

Believing that Scott could advance with artillery only by the highway, Santa Anna gave his chief attention to this part of the terrain, and recalling Cano and his men from La Hoya, he sent them to assist Robles here. At the ends of the tongues parapets were laid out, which, though not completed, served to indicate the correct positions; and in front of each the bushes and trees were cut down and left on the ground, so that an assailant should be impeded and should have no screen. On A General Pinzón, a mulatto of considerable ability, was placed with about six guns and some five hundred men. At B, where the highway had formerly run, there were not less than eight guns and about a thousand troops under General Jarero. C was held by Colonel Badillo with about five pieces and nearly three hundred men.[11] E was entrusted to General La Vega with a reserve of some five hundred grenadiers; and that officer had charge also of a six or seven gun battery at D and of a neighboring breastwork, parallel to the highway—which was cut at that point—and completely dominating it, where the Sixth Regiment, counting nine hundred bayonets, was placed. In all some 3500 men, including the artillery, occupied this wing.[14]

April 17 Santa Anna transferred Robles, Cano and their laborers to the other side of the highway. On the summit of El Telégrafo, which commanded the entire position, there was a level space of about an acre, and in it stood a square stone tower. Here a breastwork, some distance back from the crest and partly enclosing the tower, was imperfectly constructed; four 4-pounders were planted; all the bushes, cactus and small trees within musket range on the slope were cut down and left on the ground; and the Third Infantry, consisting of about one hundred men, took possession of the summit. To the left and rear of this point ran a spur, which rose to a minor crest—a broken ledge eighteen or twenty feet high—some thirty feet lower than the summit and about a hundred yards from it. In the rear of all these points, close to the hamlet, lay the main camp and strong reserves of troops and guns. To Santa Anna the position seemed impregnable. He reported to the government that it was completely fortified, well armed with artillery and garrisoned with 12,000 men.[12] News from the capital that revolutionary movements were on foot and that something must be accomplished to prevent the idea of peace from gaining currency, no longer troubled him. Confiding in his army and his position he gave free rein to his vanity, his lordliness and his exultation. Here should the proud invaders be rolled back or here under the saffron wing of the plague should they rot. And then let domestic foes tremble![14]

But a number of circumstances undermined him. The narrow camp, too much crowded with cottages, tents, huts and market booths, became confused even while there were no hostilities. Insects kept the troops restive. The supply of water, brought in barrels from the Río del Plan, was insufficient,[13] and many drank the crude sap of the maguey, which made them ill. A sort of cholera set in, and exposure produced lung troubles. Far worse, however, were the moral distempers. Some of the troops had turned their backs to the Americans at Palo Alto, the Resaca, Monterey and Buena Vista, while others had recently, to their utter amazement, seen heroic Vera Cruz and mighty Ulúa, the pride of Mexico, haul down their flags; and men of both classes represented the enemy as invincible. Every deserter was ordered shot, and this interference with a popular diversion gave offence.[14]

Looking at the shaggy hills and ravines on his left, Santa Anna declared that a rabbit could not get through there. Perhaps not, thought many a soldier, but the Americans are not rabbits. About seven hundred yards in front of El Telégrafo stood a similar though somewhat lower hill called La Atalaya, which commanded a wide expanse of the rough country, and the engineers felt it should be fortified and strongly held; but the President would merely station twenty-five men there. Robles himself believed that Scott could turn the main position, and wanted fortifications erected at the extreme left; but Santa Anna would listen to no advice, and his cocksureness itself excited alarm. In private, officers talked of a disaster, and even Canalizo foreboded it. The tinder of a panic was ready.[14]

TWIGGS’S ADVANCE

Meanwhile Twiggs with two field batteries,[15] six 24-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, four 10-inch mortars, and a squadron of dragoons—in all some 2600 men—set out in the footsteps of Cortez.[16] Most fortunately the troops had a stock of enthusiasm, for the beginning of the march was terrible. After going three miles along the beach they struck off at a right angle for six or eight on a deep, sandy road, sometimes three or four feet below the level of the ground, with a blazing sun overhead, not a breath of moving air, and Twiggs’s horse for a pace-maker. Many threw away everything detachable, and the greater part of the division—at least four fifths, it was said—fell by the way. Some died, and many others did not rejoin the command for days. Unbroken mules and drivers ignorant of their business added to the difficulties. The meagre facilities for transportation did not permit even officers to have tents, and some of the scanty supplies were lost through the breaking down of wagons.[19]

The next day, happily, a change took place. The column set out before sunrise, marched more slowly, and halted occasionally; and the national highway, no longer buried in sand, proved to be a spacious, comfortably graded cement avenue, carried over the streams by handsome bridges of cut stone, and flanked on both sides by the estates of Santa Anna.[17] Now it penetrated a dark forest of palms, cactus, limes and countless other trees festooned with vines, and now it crossed rolling prairies. Here it was cut through solid rock; here it skirted a beautiful hill, with a charming vista of leafy glades; and presently it was clinging as if in terror to the face of a cliff. Bowers carpeted with many soft hues and perfumed with heliotrope recalled ideas of Eden, while marshes full of strange bloated growths, bluish-green pools rimmed with flowers of a suspicious brilliancy, and thick clumps of dagger plants tipped with crimson offered suggestions of a different sort.[19]

Matted tangles of leafage spattered with gold, big tulipans gleaming in the shadows like a red rose in the hair of a Spanish dancer, blossoms like scarlet hornets that almost flew at one’s eyes, and blooms like red-hot hair-brushes, the sight of which made the scalp tingle, were balanced with big, close masses of white throats and purple mouths, and with banks of the greenish-white cuatismilla, discharging invisible clouds of a fragrance that seemed to be locust blended with lily of the valley. Trees with tops like balloons, like corkscrews and like tables, trees drained almost dry by starry parasites that swung from their branches, trees covered with strawberry blossoms—or what appeared to be strawberry blossoms—that were to graduate into coffee beans, trees bare of everything except great yellow suns, the Flower of God, that fascinated one’s gaze—these and countless other surprises followed one another; and then would come a whole grove netted over with morning glories in full bloom. Amid scenes like these our exhausted troops quickly regained their spirits.[19]

Toward the end of the march on the eleventh, when about thirty-seven miles from Vera Cruz, the troops crossed a branch of the Antigua, and soon came to the river itself. In the triangular space thus bounded rose a hill crowned with an old fort.[18] Here stood the national bridge, a magnificent structure more than fifty feet high and nearly a quarter of a mile in length, commanding romantic views of the rapid stream winding through towering vistas of luxuriant vegetation. On leaving the bridge the road made a sharp turn to the left at the foot of a high and very steep bluff; and it seemed as if a battery planted at the top of the bluff, as La Vega’s had been, might stop an army until overpowered with siege guns. But Canalizo had been wiser than his chief, for there were fords above and below and cross-roads in the rear, that made it possible to turn the position. So amidst a wondrous illumination from glow-worms and fireflies, the troops made their third camp here in peace.[19]

Beyond this point the influence of Canalizo could be seen. The bamboo huts thatched with palm-leaves were all vacant and empty. Scarcely one living creature could be seen except flitting birds. These, however, still abounded: parrots, macaws, hawks, eagles, orioles, humming-birds, mocking-birds, cardinals brighter than cardinals, cranes larger than cranes, talkative chachalacas, toucans as vociferous as their bills were huge—every color from indigo to scarlet, and every note from the scream to the warble; and the same ocean of green still rolled its vast billows, warmed and brightened by the same golden sun.[19]

At the end of this march, about thirteen miles from the national bridge, the highway narrowed and pitched down a long, steep, winding descent, with overhanging trees and rocks on one side and a precipice on the other, as if making for the centre of the globe. Then it crossed Río del Plan, and came to a small, irregular opening, where a few scattered huts could be seen. This was Plan del Río. Views of superb heights delighted the eye, but the hot breath of the coast could be felt in the valley. Even the hollows between the sand-hills of Vera Cruz were thought less pestilential. But the men lay down, and, as a soldier wrote, covered themselves with the sky.[19]

In the midst of scenery like this, “Old Davy” Twiggs appeared like a perfectly natural feature. His robust and capacious body, powerful shoulders, bull-neck, heavy, cherry-red face, and nearly six feet of erect stature represented physical energy at its maximum. With bristling white hair and, when the regulations did not interfere, a thick white beard, he seemed like a kind of snow-clad volcano, a human Ætna, pouring forth a red-hot flood of orders and objurgations from his crater of a mouth; and he was vastly enjoyed by the rough soldiers even when, as they said, he “cursed them right out of their boots.” In a more strictly human aspect he made an excellent disciplinarian, and he could get more work out of the men than anybody else in the army; but as a warrior, while he always looked thirsty for a fight, he was thought over-anxious to fight another day—to be, in short, a hero of the future instead of the past; and as a general, Scott had already said that he was not qualified “to command an army—either in the presence, or in the absence of an enemy.” His brains were, in fact, merely what happened to be left over from the making of his spinal cord, and the soldiers’ names for him—the “Horse” and the “Bengal Tiger”—classed him fairly as regarded intellect.[20]

Twiggs had been warned by Scott that a substantial army, commanded by Santa Anna, lay in his front; lancers were encountered on April 11; and a reconnaissance of that afternoon, made because the enemy were said to be in force just ahead, proved that guns commanded the pass of Cerro Gordo; yet the next morning he advanced in the usual marching order. Nothing saved his division but the eagerness of the Mexicans. They opened fire before he was entirely within the jaws of death, and he managed to retreat—extricating his train with difficulty, however. The enemy have given up and withdrawn, boasted Santa Anna, while the Americans felt ashamed. Further reconnoitring on that day gave a still more impressive idea of the problem ahead; but the General, as if intoxicated by holding an independent command, ordered an assault made at daybreak the next morning. The Volunteer Division, consisting at present of two brigades, a field battery and a squadron of cavalry, then arrived. Patterson, who led it, seemed, however, by no means eager to accept the responsibility of command, and, as no confidence whatever was felt in Pillow, the second in rank, he placed the entire force under Twiggs on the ground of illness. Pillow and Shields, who were thought no less willing than Twiggs to make a bid for glory at the expense of their men, then demanded a day for rest and preparation; and accordingly, about sunset on the thirteenth, orders for the attack were issued.[20]

DISCOURAGEMENT

But the officers and soldiers, distrusting alike the information and the ability of their commander, now felt extremely depressed. The situation appeared hopeless, thought even Lieutenant U. S. Grant; and Captain Robert E. Lee described the Mexican position as an “unscalable” precipice on one side and “impassable” ravines on the other. It seemed, wrote a third man, like a Gibraltar; and the idea of assailing it with Twiggs for leader inspired the deepest alarm. Everybody not selfishly ambitious desired to wait for the commander-in-chief; and yet Polk, in order to justify his depreciation of Scott, said with reference to this very situation, that our forces would be victorious “if there was not an officer among them.” Suddenly, however, the faces of the men brooding round their bivouac fires lighted up, for news came that Patterson, in order to veto the project of Twiggs, had assumed the command, and ordered offensive operations to be suspended.[20]

Scott, whose ideas of an army differed radically from those prevalent in Mexico, hardly believed that Santa Anna could place himself below Jalapa at this time with as many as 4000 men, even though reports of a larger number reached him; but he arranged to drop his work at Vera Cruz on the first news of serious opposition, and letters from Twiggs and Pillow, received late on April 11 led him to set out the next day. Early on Wednesday afternoon, the 14th, he was at Plan del Río, doffing his old straw hat as the soldiers, who doubtless realized that in taking Vera Cruz by siege instead of assault he had spared their lives, cheered tumultuously. Instantly chaos became order, confidence reigned, and the jealous clashes of the commanders ended. Now something will be done, thought the officers; the soldiers began to laugh and whistle; and what an officer called a “hum of satisfaction” pervaded the camp. Already the battle was half gained.[23]

Engineers Beauregard and Tower had by this time done some reconnoitring, and, as indeed would have been fairly obvious to any intelligent person, had concluded that a turning movement against the Mexican left—toward which a trail had been found to lead—offered the best hope. But an idea was not a plan. The reconnaissances were far from complete, and reports upon the Mexican position and numbers differed materially. Hence the commander-in-chief, who accepted everything valuable done by his subordinates but never surrendered his own judgment, decided to begin anew, and, in the hope of gaining the highway in Santa Anna’s rear and cutting off his entire army, sent Captain Lee at once to the ravines.[21] Friday that indefatigable engineer found himself in contact with the Mexican lines far to the rear of El Telégrafo. Reconnoitring could go no farther, and the highway toward Jalapa was not actually seen; but there were good reasons for believing it near, and the construction of a “road” for troops and artillery on the route discovered by Lee was pressed with great energy. At about 9 o’clock on Friday evening all the facts and conclusions were brought together in a plan by Major John L. Smith, senior engineer on the ground, and in substance his plan was adopted. Its essential point was, in accordance with Scott’s announced aim, to gain the highway in the Mexican rear first of all, and then—not until then—attack in the rear and perhaps also on the front.[22] After the adjournment of this conference the army was further cheered by the arrival of Worth, 1600 picked men and a number of heavy guns. The Mexican forces were estimated as 12–18,000, and Scott had only 8500; but the bright stars of that night looked down on an army sleeping soundly in full courage and confidence.[23]

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

At seven or eight o’clock the next morning Twiggs advanced. His instructions were to avoid a collision, occupy La Atalaya, reach the Mexican left, and rest on his arms near the highway until the remainder of the army should be in position, and the time for acting decisively should arrive. Accordingly, after marching about three miles along the highway he turned off to the right by the road already cut, ordering the men to trail arms and preserve absolute silence. At one point the road lay for twenty-five or thirty feet in view of the enemy, and Lee proposed to screen it with brush. But this appeared to Twiggs quite unnecessary, and hence the Mexicans could observe not only the troops but four mountain howitzers, four 6-pounders, and two 12-pounders gleaming in the sun. Pinzón and also the outpost on La Atalaya notified Santa Anna of the American movement, and strong reinforcements were therefore despatched to that hill.[26]

Twiggs advanced but slowly, for the road—hewed in the roughest way through oaks, mesquite, chaparral, cactus and the like and over almost impassable ground—could barely answer its purpose, but about noonday the command found itself in the vicinity of La Atalaya. Lieutenant Gardner of the Seventh Infantry was then directed to ascend a neighboring hill with Company E, and take an observation of the enemy. He was attacked; upon which Colonel Harney, now commanding Twiggs’s first brigade in place of Persifor F. Smith, who was ill, sent forces to relieve him, pursued the Mexicans to La Atalaya with the Mounted Rifles, First Artillery and other troops, and after a stiff combat occupied that point.[26]

One of the captains—for on such ground independence of action was unavoidable—inquired of Twiggs how far to charge the enemy. “Charge ’em to hell!” roared the Bengal Tiger; and naturally enough a small American force rushed down the farther slope of La Atalaya and began to ascend El Telégrafo. It was then in a desperate situation, exposed to the cannon of the Mexicans and to overwhelming numbers. A party of Americans under Major Sumner, which bravely hastened to its relief, succeeded only in sharing its plight. But happily cover was found; a howitzer discouraged the enemy; and later this group was able to retire. La Atalaya remained in American hands despite attempts to recover it; but the Mexicans had been fully warned, and our troops were not lying on their arms near the Jalapa route. Meantime or soon Shields’s brigade came to the support of Twiggs, who now had control of nearly 5000 men. The casualties amounted to about ninety on our side and more than two hundred on the other; but the Mexicans, whose operations had been directed by Santa Anna himself, believed the Americans had seriously attacked El Telégrafo, and exulted loudly with shouts and music over what seemed to them a triumph.[26]

Santa Anna did not yet believe, or would not admit, that Scott’s main drive would be aimed against his left, but he recognized the wisdom of strengthening that wing. He therefore ordered a breastwork, which was made of short palisades reinforced behind with stones and brush, to be thrown up near the base of El Telégrafo, placed a couple of 12-pounders, the Second Ligero and the Fourth Line regiments on the summit, selected brave Ciriaco Vázquez to command there, planted five guns on a slight eminence near headquarters to guard the mouth of a wooded ravine on the left, had the ground in front of this battery partly cleared, and ordered the Eleventh regiment and Canalizo’s cavalry to support the guns. The Americans were not less active. By dint of extraordinary exertions General Shields’s brigade, assisted by other troops, dragged a 24-pounder and two 24-pound howitzers with ropes through the woods and rocky gorges, pulled them up the steep and bristling side of La Atalaya, mounted them, and constructed a parapet for them and the rocket battery; and with perhaps even greater difficulty four New York companies placed an 8-inch howitzer on the farther side of Río del Plan over against the tongues, A, B and C. Darkness and rain did not facilitate these operations.[26]

THE BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO

Sunday morning the sky was clear, a gentle breeze from the Gulf just fluttered the red, white and green flag on the stone tower, and the Mexican trumpets blared in all directions. Soon the guns of La Atalaya solemnly announced the battle, producing consternation at first on the summit of El Telégrafo; but the pieces were badly aimed, and accomplished little beyond encouraging the Americans and calling forth a vigorous reply.[24] The Second Infantry and Fourth Artillery under Brevet Colonel Riley of Twiggs’s division now moved on toward Santa Anna’s rear and the Jalapa route, supported by the brigade of Shields, which included the New York regiment and the Third and Fourth Illinois. Learning of this activity in the valley, General Vázquez ordered Colonel Uraga with the Fourth Infantry and a 4-pounder to the minor crest of El Telégrafo, and as Riley crossed the continuation of the spur he was much annoyed by their fire. Four companies of the Second Infantry were therefore detached as skirmishers, and before long, in spite of Scott’s orders and the protest of Lee, who was conducting Riley’s command, Twiggs, pawing the ground somewhere out of range, ordered Riley’s whole brigade up the hill. Shields, however, proceeded along the route discovered by Lee. The ground was rough and precipitous, and the growth of trees and thorny chaparral dense; but the General—a stout, soldier-like man with a heavy mustache, black hair and brilliant dark eyes—had a great deal of energy, and in three straggling files his men pushed on.[26]

During the artillery duel Harney’s command lay under cover on the summit of La Atalaya, listening to the harsh, bitter shriek of the Mexican grape, which tore the bushes into shreds; but at about 7 o’clock a charge upon El Telégrafo was ordered.[25] As the troops measured the height, crowned with guns and fortifications and topped off with a scornful banner, the attempt seemed almost impudent; but that was the day’s work, and it had to be done. First the “cursed Riflemen,” as the Mexicans named them, were diverted to the left, where the Mexican Sixth Infantry could be seen approaching; the bugles sounded; and then the Third and the Seventh Infantry, supported by the First Artillery, dashed down the slope of La Atalaya. Here and in the valley they were swept by a deadly shower of bullets, canister and grape, and the front melted like snowflakes; but, as fearless Captain Roberts of the Rifles put it, “When dangers thickened and death talked more familiarly face to face, the men seemed to rise above every terror.” The contest at the palisade breastwork was hard, and the Mexicans dared even to cross bayonets with Americans; but they finally gave way. Here a little time was taken for rest, and then forward pressed the troops, helping themselves up the slope, over craggy rocks and loose stones, and through the chaparral by catching at bushes and trees. The screen of woods and the steepness of the incline protected them now.[26]

Very different proved the cleared part of the hill, where small trees, bushes and thorny cactus lay spread with tops pointing down. Here progress was slow and concealment impossible. But with deliberate fearlessness the men plodded firmly on, firing at will, strong in that mutual confidence which gives a charge its force. They “seem to despise death,” cried the Mexicans in astonishment. Here and there one was struck down; here and there, breathless and exhausted, one dropped; but no flinching could be seen. Like the wave of fire in a burning prairie, the line moved steadily up. “Charge, charge!” shouted the officers; and the men yelled and cheered, yelled and cheered, yelled and cheered till sometimes it seemed as if even the trees were cheering, till sometimes the roar of the guns could not be heard; and Harney—red-headed, tempestuous Harney of the steel-blue eyes—at last in his element, led them as they deserved to be led. Superbly tall, his athletic figure needed no plume; the sword in his long arm waved them on; like the keen edge of a billow rushing upon the shore his calm, shrill voice rode the tumult.[26]

Just below the crest a pause for breath; and then the blue stripe was up and over. At the breastwork the fighting was sharp, for Santa Anna had sent up two more regiments; but soon Vázquez fell; with pistols, bayonets and clubbed muskets the Mexicans were driven from the summit; and in a moment big Sergeant Henry of the Seventh had the Stars and Stripes flying from the tower. Riley’s men, pushing up through dense thickets under a hot fire, had now taken possession of the spur; and while some of them hurried on to join Harney, others shot down the gunners of the battery on the summit. In a twinkling Captain Magruder turned the pieces, and poured a storm of iron on the flying Mexicans. General Baneneli, commanding the reserve just below, tried hard to charge, but his men would not face the yelling Americans. The Grenadiers and the Eleventh Infantry, hurried by Santa Anna in that direction, were overwhelmed by the fugitives; Riley’s advance plunged down the hill toward the Mexican camp; and an indescribable confusion ensued.[26]

Just at this time, after a fearful march of perhaps two miles, Shields with his foremost companies emerged from the chaparral on the Mexican left, and hastily prepared to charge. Three guns of the headquarters battery, one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards distant in their front, had been turned upon Riley, but the other two let fly at them. Shields fell and his men recoiled. It was no wonder. About three hundred raw volunteers, without regulars and without artillery, stood before cannon and an army! Some two thousand fresh horse under Canalizo, guarding that very ravine, faced them just at the left of the battery, and the cannon kept at work. But their mere emerging from the close chaparral at this point, in a strength which the enemy could not measure, was of itself a triumph.[26]

“The Yankees! They have come out to the road!” cried the Mexicans; “Every one for himself!” Some of Riley’s men shot down or frightened away the gunners of the battery, and in another moment seized three of the pieces. At the same instant a section of Shields’s brigade, which had now come up in more force, captured the other two, while a second section, followed by the Seventh Infantry, struck for the highway. Canalizo, afraid of being cut off, took flight, as many had already done; and all the rest of the Mexicans who could, either followed him or, like Santa Anna himself, rushed headlong down one or the other of two paths, narrow and steep, that descended into the canyon of the Río del Plan. Scott, who had watched the charge “under a canopy of balls,” as Major Patten said, was now on the scene. Harney, his old foe, he greeted in the warmest and friendliest of terms; and, as he moved among the victorious troops with tears rolling down his cheeks, he spoke to them noble and touching words, as not merely their commander but their elder brother in arms, fully sharing their pains, their pride and their joy.[26]

While these brave scenes were enacted, the other flank witnessed a burlesque of war. Naturally Scott planned to attack the Mexican right in order to deceive Santa Anna regarding his intentions, prevent the troops of that wing from going to the assistance of the other, and perhaps accomplish something positive in that quarter.[27] This piece of work was assigned to Pillow’s brigade, and although he objected to it as dangerous, a hint about discipline brought him into line. As early as April 13, in view of Twiggs’s plan, he and Lieutenant Tower of the engineers had reconnoitred the ground, and this examination had been continued on the fifteenth and sixteenth; but the General did not understand or did not remember what he saw. It was clear, however, that a force attacking between A and the canyon would have the enemy on but one side, and would be as far as possible from the guns occupying B and C. With Scott’s approval this plan was adopted, and the 8-inch howitzer was placed so as to command the flank and rear of the battery at A.[29]

Pillow’s orders were to set out on his march of about four miles at 6 o’clock on Sunday morning, yet he did not reach his position until almost 9. One reason for the delay probably was, that in consequence of a manoeuvre, executed by his order, the rear of the column missed the proper route. Another reason also may be surmised. Aside from wanting confidence in their general’s military capacity, his troops had long disliked him; and his display of unfeeling harshness on the march from Vera Cruz had given further offence. Under such circumstances things never can go well.[29]

During the march he announced that he had changed his mind, and would have the First Pennsylvania (Wynkoop) supported by the First Tennessee (Campbell) attack on the northern face of tongue A, and the Second Tennessee (Haskell) supported by the Second Pennsylvania (Roberts) attack on the southern face of B, which was obviously sure—since it guarded the old road—to be held more strongly than either of the other tongues.[28] This ingenious plan, moreover, divided the American while tending to concentrate the Mexican strength. By mismanagement he reversed both of his attacking regiments—a mistake that caused embarrassment and loss of time; and then on leaving the highway, about three miles from Plan del Río, and entering the narrow path leading to the point of attack, he adopted this order: Wynkoop, Haskell, Campbell, Roberts, which—since it was necessary to advance mostly in single file—placed Campbell and Roberts a long distance from the troops that each was to support, so that neither of them reached his position before the fighting on this wing ended.[29]

On arriving at the appointed spot, where the orders of Mexican officers at B could be heard very distinctly, Haskell began to form his badly scattered regiment. “Why the Hell don’t Colonel Wynkoop file to the right?” shouted Pillow at the top of his voice. A bugle in the front sounded instantly, and within three minutes the Mexicans opened a heavy fire of grape and canister. Some of Haskell’s men, brave but not in hand, bolted; others took shelter; and the rest, at Pillow’s order, charged pell-mell. Emerging into the cleared space they received a murderous fire from all of the tongues. In less than three minutes about eighty, including every field officer except the colonel, were either killed or wounded, and all able to move were in flight. Pillow meanwhile, squatting in the bushes with his back to the enemy at a distance of about 450 yards, was “shot all to pieces,” as he said, by a canister bullet that slightly wounded his upper arm; and he retired at a run, leaving Wynkoop without the promised instructions.[29]

A state of general confusion ensued. Campbell and his men were anxious to charge; Wynkoop felt no less eager when it was too late; the Second Pennsylvania was demoralized; all were more or less under fire. Campbell, however, to whom Pillow resigned the command, got the men almost ready to charge upon tongue A; but then Pillow, venturing back from the rear, withdrew his brigade so far into the woods that, until notified by Scott, he did not know the Mexicans in his front, who found their rear was occupied by the Americans, had surrendered. As for the 8-inch howitzer, it fired seven ineffective shells; and then, at the critical time, as Pillow had neglected to arrange a code of signals, Ripley, who controlled it, suspended work. Evidently, as Polk said, gallant Americans—and such Pillow’s men really were—did not require a commander![29]

A little before 10 o’clock the fighting was over and pursuit began. Having little cavalry and no adequate subsistence train Scott’s powers in this respect were limited; but every man had been expected to set out in the morning with rations for two days, and substantially all the troops except Pillow’s, accompanied by two incomplete batteries, moved actively forward. Patterson once more became well enough to act, and took charge of the advanced forces. Frequently bands of fugitives were seen at a distance, looking in their cotton or linen jackets like flocks of sheep. The artillery had some fair long shots, and occasionally other troops also came within reach of the enemy. But the Mexicans fled—even the cavalry—without stopping for ceremony, too much cowed to face even a small party of Americans; and the results were of little significance.[31]

Heat and exhaustion checked the most advanced pursuers about four miles from Jalapa, but nothing could stop the Mexicans. Like stampeded cattle, the fugitives thought only of flying until worn out. No stand was made at Jalapa. At La Hoya, the second line of defence, General Gómez, hearing of the disaster, sent word to the rear, “All is lost at Cerro Gordo, all, all!” and fled. In complete disorder, panting, starving, falling by the way—the horses of the cavalry in a like state—the men streamed on toward Puebla, plundering when they could. Thousands also of those who surrendered managed to escape at one place or another in the rough, wooded country, and, as Scott could with difficulty feed his own army and thought future opposition could be weakened by proving the friendly sentiments of his proclamation, the remaining 3000 were released on parole.[30] More than 4000 stand of arms, old and not worth using, were destroyed; and about forty cannon, which Scott had no means of transporting, were rendered unserviceable and left at Cerro Gordo. The Mexican casualties were estimated at 1000 or 1200, while the American loss during the two days amounted to only thirty officers and 387 men, of whom sixty-four were killed.[31]

JALAPA OCCUPIED

Next morning the Americans advanced again. For the two last miles below Jalapa the highway ran between continuous hedges loaded with blossoms and vocal with the songs of birds, while bougainvillea flamed here and there on a cabin or tree-top in a conflagration of purple, and the air was laden with delicious perfumes; and when the town was descried from an eminence, it seemed like a delicate mosaic set in a massive frame of rich emerald. Friends had been left behind forever, but grief was offset by the joy of surviving; and after dressing ranks the troops began to enter Jalapa at about 9 o’clock with bayonets fixed, colors flying and bands playing. Some of the girls could not help laughing at the unkempt appearance and nondescript costumes of the terrible and victorious Yankees; but the people, who lined the streets, appeared neither hostile nor afraid, and the bells rang out a welcome.[32] The soldiers for their part soon felt they had reached Eden, and they were none the less content on hearing of the dull saffron haze which now hung over Vera Cruz—a visible token that “King Death in his Yellow Robe” had once more set up his throne there; while Scott himself, wishing to tranquillize the army and favorably impress the public, proceeded to hide the errors of his subordinates with reports that misled the public.[33] As for the future he cheerfully announced, “Mexico has no longer an army.” Apparently the United States had a very substantial one; but surprises were soon to occur.[34]

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THE ADVANCE FROM JALAPA

Wishing to take advantage of the Mexican panic, Scott hurried Worth’s division after the fugitives. Down the steep hill on which Jalapa lies poured the men in blue, passing the little plaza and the quaint cathedral; and then without halt, leaving the city of flowers and its groves of liquidambar, they set out on a long, gradual ascent. What a march they now had! “The most beautiful country there is,” commented an officer; and his remark was truer than he knew. Dominated by the splendid snowy peak of Orizaba, there spread a vast expanse of hills and gorges, mountains and valleys, here studded with white villages, there gemmed with a silver cascade, yonder brightened with fresh fields of corn and grain, always variegated with the shadows of lazy clouds, and everywhere softly receding into a deeper and still deeper blue; and as the column wound in and out through the clear, cool and fragrant atmosphere, every turn revealed new beauties or displayed once more the beauties already seen—only a little nearer each time, or a little more remote.[1]

Gradually the ascent grew sharper and the air cooler, and about a dozen miles from Jalapa Worth came to the Black Pass—the “terrible pass,” wrote Scott—of La Hoya, where for more than a mile the troops were squeezed between two steep mountains, cleared to afford artillery a fair sweep, and partly fortified; but the seven or eight guns lay on the ground spiked, and not an enemy could be seen. Then after making a sharp twist they kept on winding and ascending for about six miles till they reached the log houses of Las Vigas, much like those of Russia and Sweden. Vegetation was luxuriant still; but the trees on the steep hills at the left were evergreens, and the flowers that brightened the overtowering walls, buttresses and spurting arches of black lava were mostly dandelions and yellow jarilla, for the Americans now stood a mile and a half above the sea and almost three quarters of a mile above Jalapa. Here the winds bit; and now and then masses of thick vapor, whirling up from an immense gorge and burying the column for a time in wintry twilight, would sweep on ahead of it in rolling, shining volumes of heaven-high clouds.[1]

This was the final pass; and after marching some twelve miles farther, one saw at the left edge of a sandy, gravelly plain, set with occasional tufts of coarse grass, the dust-brown castle of Perote and, seemingly just above it though in reality several miles distant, the pine-clad mountain of that name. The castle was a superb specimen of military architecture, capable of accommodating more than 2000 men; but it had long served chiefly as a state prison, a refuge for troops, an arsenal, and a dépôt for the rich convoys that went this way. The American troops could have passed by on the other side of the plain, had that been necessary; but it was not. With only twenty-three gunners and scarcely any powder, General Gaona could not have defended the place. Canalizo therefore ordered him to evacuate it on the nineteenth; and at noon on the twenty-second Worth took possession of its elaborate bastions, more than fifty cannon, more than 25,000 balls and shells and even 500 muskets, which the terror-stricken Mexicans had not cared to remove. Throwing Garland’s brigade and Duncan’s battery about fifteen miles in advance to facilitate the gathering of subsistence, Worth now halted in accordance with his orders.[1]

SCOTT’S DIFFICULTIES

Scott meantime remained at Jalapa to study his problems and make his preparations. The capital of Mexico, he believed, lay at his mercy, and this opinion seems to have been correct; but unlike his critics, who merely had to deal with legions of ink on areas of paper, he found that much needed to be done before seizing it. The position of the Americans depended vitally on military prestige, and it was therefore of the utmost importance to suffer no reverse. His first care was to make sure of getting up in advance of the especially fatal rainy season, which was expected to begin at the latest by the first week of June, the needful clothing, equipments, ammunition, salt, medicines and many other imported articles; and since the lack of cavalry and a due regard for the health of the troops forbade trying to keep the road below Cerro Gordo clear of Mexicans, this tedious work involved the use of heavily escorted convoys,[2] and the exercise of unceasing vigilance, energy and skill.[6]

His next care was to gather provisions, determine whether supplies of breadstuffs, meats, rice, beans, coffee, sugar and forage existed near the proposed line of march, and arrange for obtaining them despite the hatred of the people, which quite equalled their fear.[3] A third care was to divine what Santa Anna intended and was able to do, for news came that he was now on our flank and rear, preparing to conduct guerilla war against the American detachments and convoys. Contrary to his expectation Scott found subsistence and forage scarce at Jalapa, and as Quitman’s brigade came up without the extra rations it had been ordered to bring, the situation proved embarrassing. A scarcity of funds aggravated it alarmingly. An immediate advance upon the capital was therefore out of the question; but on April 30 Scott issued preliminary instructions, enjoining kind treatment of the people in the strongest possible terms, as absolutely necessary if the troops did not wish to starve; and the volunteers were ordered to set out on the fourth and fifth of May.[6]

But now a difficulty that had been feared by Scott rose directly in his path. Seven regiments and two companies of volunteers were to be free at various near dates, averaging about the middle of June. Polk, believing that many would reënlist, had recommended that a bounty should be offered as an inducement, and Congress had acted upon the suggestion. April 26 General Scott received the law and promptly circulated it; but he soon found that Polk’s expectations were to be disappointed.[6]

It would have been quite agreeable to linger at Jalapa, strolling about this paradise of birds, gazing at the many-hued blossoms of a perpetual springtime, feasting on the delicacies of semi-tropical gardens, winning occasional glimpses of exotic luxury through doors ajar, listening to ever-graceful señoritas—a few dazzling blondes as well as many sparkling brunettes—who played the guitar hour after hour in their grated windows, and catching glances now and then from eyes of fire; but the soldiers had learned what campaigning really meant. They had been allowed to go unpaid and unprovided for. They had met with hardships and privations not counted upon at the time of enlistment. Disease, battle, death, fearful toil and frightful marches had been found realities. Besides, they had now “seen the elephant,” as they said; they felt they had won glory enough; and, as even Colonel Campbell admitted, they “sighed heavily” for home, family and friends. In spite of their strong desire to see the Halls of the Montezumas, out of about 3700 men only enough to make one company would reëngage, and special inducements, offered by the General, to remain as teamsters proved wholly ineffective.[6]

One course now open to Scott was to march on, trusting that new forces would arrive seasonably to replace the soldiers discharged; but of this he had no assurance. Another was to assume that even when legally free the volunteers would not abandon him in the enemy’s capital; but the evidence was all to the contrary. More than once American troops had insisted upon their rights without considering the needs of the country; and now five colonels declared in writing that “only a very small proportion” of their men would “under any supposable circumstances” remain in the service “for any time whatever” beyond their term. Such was the sentiment of all these volunteers.[6]

Moreover, to advance, capture Mexico and so force the men to sail from Vera Cruz in the midst of the pestilential season would have been insubordinate as well as inhumane, for the government had ordered most emphatically, with particular reference to the yellow fever, that regard for their health must outweigh all military considerations.[4] The returning volunteers would also have been exposed, under inexperienced commanders and without a proper complement of artillery, to Santa Anna and the guerillas, and those remaining behind at the capital would have been regarded by the Mexicans as destined prey. On the other hand, should the entire army retreat after capturing Mexico, the exultant people would have risen almost en masse to starve, harass and slaughter them; while even Worth doubted whether Scott’s whole force, could it by any possibility be persuaded to remain intact, would be strong enough to hold the capital. Finally, as the sequel was to show and as any well-informed person could have foreseen, merely capturing and retaining Mexico City was not sure by any means to end the war. The seat of government could easily move, and Scott was correctly informed that it proposed to do so. Santa Anna was in the field with a growing army; his moral and physical resources had not been exhausted; and more fighting needed to be done.[6]

Scott was called slow by some of his critics, but when the case permitted he could make a quick decision; and on the sixth and seventh of May the volunteers referred to—“with a joyous and pleasant countenance upon every man,” as one of them wrote—set out for home under Patterson.[5] Their departure left the General with an army of 7113. As for early reinforcements, he had recommended on November 29 the addition of twelve regiments to the regular establishment, and had said that about the first of May they would be indispensable; but at present he only knew that 960 recruits were on the way. None the less he sent Quitman forward with three regiments of November volunteers, and on the sixth of May instructed Worth to advance with his division and two of those regiments, led by Quitman, against Puebla, leaving the third regiment with a sufficient number of artillerists at Perote.[6]

MEXICAN ASSISTANCE

For the confidence with which less than 4000 men were thus advanced beyond the reach of prompt assistance, to cope with a strong city and the Mexican troops, there was a special reason. The heads of the Roman Catholic Church in Mexico, who did not feel all the religious intolerance which they deemed it proper to exhibit in public, cherished no love toward Santa Anna. For many years his rapacity had given them offence; and one of his first acts on landing at Vera Cruz in August, 1846, had been to strike at their power. They had therefore felt disposed to favor the continuance of hostilities, hoping that he and his myrmidons would be destroyed. But when Moses Y. Beach made it plain to them on the one hand that resistance to the United States would be dangerous, and on the other guaranteed the freedom and the property of Church and citizens, they decided to support our efforts in behalf of peace, work against Santa Anna as the chief obstacle, and arrange secretly to have Jalapa, Perote, Puebla and Mexico City refrain from opposing Scott.[8]

At “unconquered Puebla,” which was more fully under the domination of the Church than any other Mexican town, circumstances favored the clerical design. Terrible stories had been circulated there about the Americans. They were barbarians, vandals, tigers; they had branded and sent across the Gulf into slavery shiploads of Tampico people, and stuck little children on their bayonets at Vera Cruz. But these tales had now lost all credibility. Santa Anna had been found out. Buena Vista no longer seemed a Mexican victory. The military caste was not only hated but despised. News had come that wherever the Americans took possession, odious taxes were abolished and trade became brisk. Scott’s treatment of the people shone in comparison with Santa Anna’s, and his soldiers looked angelic beside the guerillas. The defeat at Cerro Gordo caused not only deep discouragement but even deeper disgust, for the men and money of the state had been sacrificed to the incompetence of the commanders. Besides, marvels were told of the Americans. They could hew a man asunder at one stroke; their horses were gigantic and incredibly swift; their artillery was unspeakably terrible; and every one of their bullets might split into fifty pieces, each of the pieces fatal. Worth’s division included 5000 of these warriors, an American deserter stated.[8]

With such popular support the clericals had Isunza, who was closely connected with them, put in place of the vigorous Ibarra as governor, and he not only took a stand for non-resistance, but answered the appeals of the national government with sharp complaints. Instead of preaching against the Americans, the churchmen led pious processions about the streets, to show that prayer and not the arm of flesh was to be relied upon. The arms and ammunition were sent away—for safe-keeping. The governor would supply no funds for military purposes. “Reason prohibits vain sacrifices,” he remarked. The comandante general decided that the city could not be defended. The prefect ordered that after the arrival of the Americans, not more than three citizens were to meet in public, and that none should carry arms; while the ayuntamiento announced that no unsigned placards would be tolerated. “Men are not all called to play the rôle of heroes,” observed the Monitor del Pueblo. We can only “await with resignation the terrible blow with which Providence chooses to afflict us,” decided the city authorities. All the arrangements are complete, Worth was notified by headquarters on the tenth of May. The people are waiting for you, reported foreigners from Puebla.[8]

Scott, for his part, agreed to protect the citizens and especially the Church, and he put forth on the eleventh of May a proclamation called by him “the crowning act of conciliation,” which was drawn up under his direction by a representative of the bishop of Puebla, and embodied the ideas and sentiments deemed by the leaders of the clerical party most likely to be effective.[7] The oppression under which the people of Mexico lay crushed received in this proclamation brief but vivid treatment, distrust regarding Santa Anna’s abilities, honor and aims was excited, and the Americans were represented as true brethren of the Mexicans. Paredes, an unpatriotic usurper, had forced us to take up arms in behalf of republican institutions and the welfare of the whole continent, as well as for the maintenance of our proper dignity; but we were anxious now as ever, to live in peace and friendship with Mexico, even though determined, if the war must continue, to do the work of the sword thoroughly.[8]

SANTA ANNA’S MEASURES

On the other hand Santa Anna was not idle. His first thought on quitting the terrible field of Cerro Gordo was that Canalizo’s horse would stop at El Encero, and that he might rally the flying infantry upon it; but on moving in that direction by the southern bank of Río del Plan he found himself cut off by the American pursuit, and turned abruptly to the left. Always profoundly depressed after a reverse, he rode along grim and speechless, as if stunned; but the next day an enthusiastic reception at a small town, aided perhaps by the marvellous beauty of the district, lifted his head. In the early evening of April 21 he reached Orizaba, and here the applause of the readily excited townsfolk made him feel himself once more a general and a President.[12]

His low intellectual plane did not permit him to understand his mental inferiority or to perceive the real strength of the unpretentious and apparently careless Americans.[9] It was impossible for him, looking abroad upon a vast and potentially rich country with all the vanity of his people, to believe that a handful of poorly dressed Yankees, imperfectly trained and seemingly not very martial, could overpower its millions. He felt that sooner or later his groping finger would touch the right spring, as it had done so many times before, and the nation would rise up about him. Pride, self-will and blind passion, raging in his heart, inflamed his courage; and his sense of a proprietary claim to the country inspired him with a sort of patriotism. What has been lost after all, he said, except a position and some cannon? The nation is still mighty. Let it but join me, and I shall yet be victorious.[12]

Within his reach lay the brigade of Antonio de León—a little more than 1000 poorly armed men with two 6-pounders—just from Oaxaca, the presence of which in this quarter had brought him to Orizaba, and also the National Guards ordered before the battle to Chiquihuite. Larger and smaller bodies of fugitives and irregulars, learning where he was, came in. All the armed men of the vicinity, whatever their proper function, he caught in his unsparing net, and he summoned to the colors every citizen from sixteen to forty years of age. Beyond the sweep of his arm far less animation reigned. One disappointment more, one hope less now, was the mildest frame of mind among the public. Canalizo, a faithful dog that for the present had been kicked one time too many, sharply resented Santa Anna’s complaints. The scattering soldiers and officers, denouncing him bitterly as well as exaggerating the power of the Americans, discouraged the people. A popular newspaper demanded savagely that he should be court-martialled. The charge of collusion with the invaders came back to life. Many of the Indians, feeling that an American triumph would help them, became restive.[12]

But the government stood resolutely behind him, and he was invested with plenary powers. Soto tried again to rouse the people of the state. From a wider and wider circle fugitives and laboring men were gathered. Small cannon and some artillerists came within his reach. The stocks of horses and mules that Scott had tried in vain to get from the region of the upper Alvarado River were turned to account. Considerable money and supplies arrived from the government, and other funds and necessaries were taken without formalities wherever they could be discovered.[10] By the first of May he pretended there were 4000 men under his flag, and no doubt he did have 2500.[12]

By good fortune more than by design, too, he found himself in an excellent position, within striking distance of Scott’s communications, rear and base; and even though not richly imbued with the spirit of Napoleonic warfare, he laid his plans accordingly. But—fortunately for Scott, who might have been seriously embarrassed[11]—Santa Anna was more politician than general. On May 15 the election of a President was to occur, and the votes had to be counted at the seat of government. His enemies and rivals were incessantly busy there. A revolution had begun to brew, he understood. A suspicion had got abroad that he intended to give up the fight and move into Guatemala; and news reached him that Mexico City was to be surrendered. For these reasons and to obtain additional supplies, all his forces were directed upon Puebla; and at the head of a motley and miserable army numbering—he boasted—4500 men he arrived there on May 11.[12]

His reception was not flattering. Aside from the fact that everybody of much account felt ready to see Scott, the town had suffered previously through Santa Anna’s visiting it, accounts of his exactions had come from Orizaba, his presence was thought likely to result in hostilities, and the people feared that he would compel them to take up arms. Many fled at his approach, and many more wished they were elsewhere. Not without excuse under the circumstances, his conduct was arbitrary, insulting and extortionate. He cashiered all the officers of the Vera Cruz garrison, raved at the indifference of the authorities and people at Puebla, seized the horses, made liberal demands for cash, and—it was asserted—even took ornaments of gold from the churches. Some funds, a quantity of ammunition and some cannon were finally obtained here; but Isunza furnished him less than two hundred men, and perhaps the indignation of the people quite offset his gains.[13]

THE AMERICANS MARCH ON

Close behind him, too, came the Americans. Already a day’s march apart, Worth’s two brigades maintained that interval for some time, followed by Quitman with the New York and South Carolina regiments at an equal distance. For six or eight miles from Perote the country was highly cultivated and already brown with ripening wheat and barley; but then came a sandy, arid region where steep, conical hills of bare limestone, calcined like those of the Rhone valley, shot up from a wide, smooth plain in extravagant confusion, and appeared to bar the way. Hacienda buildings that were crenellated fortresses could be seen here and there; but the only cheering sights were glimpses of silvery Orizaba, a number of smaller mountains with Italian profiles, forked lightnings at play sometimes in the black clouds, and mirages of gardens, lakes and sylvan shores that deceived even the most experienced.[14]

At Ojo de Agua, about thirty-five miles from Perote, a spring of water almost as large as the fountain of Vaucluse gave rise to a creek, which watered palmettoes and extensive meadows. Eight or nine miles farther on, the troops came to dark Nopalucan, which lay reclining on a comfortable eminence and viewing complacently its fertile valley. Then some twenty-five miles of romantic scenery brought them to Amozoc, a manufacturing town of 2000 souls ten or eleven miles from Puebla, and here Worth, who had made easy marches for two days in order to lessen the interval between him and Quitman, halted his now united brigades at noon on the fourteenth to await that officer, and to give his own dusty division time to “brush up.”[14]

Santa Anna, after sending his infantry and artillery toward Mexico early that morning, had moved off with some 2000 cavalry to surprise Quitman, supposing that he would be at his usual distance behind Worth, and that Worth had continued his march. The consequence was that his troops, finding themselves at about eight o’clock within half a mile or so of Duncan’s battery and under fire, scattered promptly up the hills and into the woods. Divining correctly that he would reassemble them to strike at Quitman, Worth despatched forces at once to the rear; but Quitman, who had set out in the night, was now only two miles distant, and, warned by the artillery fire, had prepared to meet the enemy. Santa Anna therefore accomplished nothing more than to fatigue his men, and give them a superfluous lesson in running away; and after returning with them to Puebla for the night, he evacuated that city before daybreak the next morning with one more failure to his account.[14]

While at Nopalucan, May 12, Worth had addressed the governor and the municipality at Puebla, saying that in three days he should take possession of the city, and that he desired to confer with the civil authorities before doing so, in order to arrange for the maintenance of order and worship. Owing to what was regarded as a lack of formality in this proceeding and to Santa Anna’s insistence that Worth should have addressed him, no reply was made. But when a second letter arrived in the evening of the fourteenth, the ayuntamiento appointed a commission to meet the American general, and the next morning a conference took place at Chachapa, where our troops arrived at an early hour. Generous pledges of civil and religious protection were then offered and accepted; and the Pueblans, who adopted the usual jockeying tactics, drew from Worth an agreement that Mexican law, to be administered by Mexican authorities, should remain in force, although Scott’s General Orders 20 had thrown the protection of military law round the American troops.[15] In short, said Hitchcock, the inspector general of the army, Worth—not Puebla—surrendered; and Scott found it necessary to rectify the error.[17]

WORTH TAKES POSSESSION OF PUEBLA

At a little before ten o’clock that day the American troops—who had suffered badly from dust on the arid, stony hills, consoled only by views of the great snow-clad volcanoes glittering behind Puebla—approached the city. It was a proud moment for them when, as their brilliant commander said, “with all the flush and glow of victory in their hearts” they entered the second city of Mexico in importance and the first in military fame. Almost the entire population of the town looked on. Streets, sidewalks, windows and balconies were thronged with holiday-makers. As usual, the appearance of the victorious Americans fell sadly below expectation—perhaps only demigods in luminous mail could have reached it; but the people showed an intense curiosity to scrutinize them. Sometimes the troops had to work their way through the crowd; but no ill temper was displayed on either side, and finally, reaching the main plaza, our men stacked their arms and lay down to sleep as if at home.[17]

Puebla, a fine city laid out in the rectangular style and inhabited by some 80,000 persons, was chiefly noted for piety, cotton mills, dolls and sweetmeats. The principal feature was the cathedral with its two dark towers—each of them capped with a yellowish, incrusted dome bearing aloft a globe and cross, and each filled with numberless bells of all sizes, which singly performed special offices, and three times a day rang together in a celestial chorus. Eight or ten altars, refulgent with sacred vessels of gold, silver and precious stones in amazing profusion, lighted up the interior; and there was also a candelabra so big—or was it so grimy?—that $4000 had been paid a few months earlier for cleaning it. Near by, in the arcades of the plaza, could be found the dolls and sweetmeats; and of course Poblana market girls, too, were there: black eyes, black hair combed over the ears, huge silver ear-rings, snowy chemisette partly hidden with a gray rebosa (scarf), short red petticoat fastened round the waist with a silk band and fringed with yellow, small shoes and large silver buckles.[17]

For almost a fortnight Worth now had an opportunity to show the real breadth of his admired talents. With the ecclesiastical authorities, for obvious reasons, no difficulties occurred. He and the bishop exchanged calls promptly. Bells rang, churches opened, and in some of them public rejoicings were celebrated. But between him and the civil functionaries, mainly in consequence of his excessive complaisance, there sprang up not a little friction. His troops felt very much dissatisfied, for his nervous and restless temperament was in continual excitement about Mexican attacks, and once he kept them standing under arms needlessly all day. Such alarms came to be known as “Worth’s scarecrows”; and as the natural consequence, had a real danger presented itself, the men would have responded tardily and half-heartedly.[17]

Worse yet, on evidence for which he himself could not say much, he warned his division a little later (June 16) by means of a circular, that attempts to poison them were to be feared, adding gratuitously, “Doubtless there are among those with whom we are situated many who will not hesitate, as is the habit of cowards, to poison those from whom they habitually fly in battle—a resource familiar in Spanish history, legitimately inherited and willingly practised by Mexicans.” Of course the circular was not likely to elude publicity, and its indiscretion blazed. It gave the Pueblans a dangerous hint, insulted all Mexicans, and reflected grossly upon Spain, whose continued neutrality was highly desirable.[16] Evidently, though quite able to criticise, Worth did not possess all the qualifications of a commander-in-chief.[17]

THE AMERICAN SITUATION AT PUEBLA

Happily a wiser mind and steadier hand now took charge. Until May 20 General Scott had felt compelled to wait at Jalapa for a heavy train, from which he expected much more than he received. Two days later Twiggs set out, and on the twenty-eighth Scott—after leaving a garrison at Jalapa and a smaller one at Perote—reached Puebla with four troops of horse one day in advance of the division.[18] As at Plan del Río his arrival brought confidence and tranquillity. Needless alarms ended. Rumors of hostile forces were investigated promptly by his Mexican Spy Company[19] or other trustworthy persons, and the General fixed his mind on greater work than trying to hunt down every party of irregulars that raised a dust in the vicinity. The troops were drilled each morning and, if the weather permitted, later each day, and after about six weeks of this made a brilliant showing, when reviewed by divisions. The engineer soldiers received special training for the work supposed to lie before them; careful maps of the district between Puebla and the capital were prepared; and Scott frequently gathered the engineers and the heads of the army at his quarters of an evening, discussing military affairs or monologuing inimitably on the many interesting persons and events familiar to him.[22]

The Mexican government ordered that nothing marketable should be taken into the city, but the Pueblans replied unanswerably: There is no power to enforce that policy; and if there were, the result would be to starve us, not the Americans, for they could supply their needs by the sword and we could not. The markets offered, therefore, all sorts of articles and at moderate prices. Indeed they were too abundant, for the soldiers gormandized on fruits and sugar-cane brandy, and these indulgences, added to the want of salt meat, the change of climate and water, the rare atmosphere, the chilling winds and the lack of suitable clothing, caused a great amount of sickness—principally dysentery and ague. On the fourth of June more than 1000 Americans were on the invalid list, and that number largely increased.[22]

Sickness of mind prevailed no less. It depressed one to hear the dead march almost every evening. Rumors of wholesale plots to assassinate the officers and poison the men tried their nerves. Renewed efforts to cause desertion excited alarm. Whig speeches condemning the war and suggesting that bloody hands and hospitable graves ought rightfully to be the welcome of our soldiers in Mexico undermined confidence and courage. Poverty chilled their marrow. Men had served eight months and been paid for two. At the time when shoes and other indispensable clothing had to be obtained at an exorbitant cost, the army was already in debt and credit was flickering.[20] Through an intercepted letter the Mexicans knew of Scott’s financial difficulties, and the Americans knew that they knew. The expected revolution against Santa Anna did not break out, and a pacific President was not elected on June 15, as General Scott had almost expected.[22]

To crown all other discouragements, we had a ridiculously small army, while news came repeatedly that Santa Anna’s forces were growing rapidly. With less than 5800 privates—not over 4000 of them available for an advance—the General had to face, not only the Mexican army, but a nation of seven million inflammable persons, who might at any time be roused to fury by some untoward event. Even the 960 recruits that had been counted upon did not arrive. June 3, therefore, deciding to throw away the scabbard and meet all odds with the naked sword, he reluctantly ordered up to Puebla the garrison of Jalapa[21] and a part of the men left at Perote, cutting himself off in the heart of the enemy’s country.[22]

Pillow, the great captain, wrote censures on this course to Polk, and Polk, the consummate strategist, agreed with his agent; but Scott understood that necessity is a supreme law and courage the soldier’s first axiom. A farther advance was, however, impossible. To leave Puebla without a garrison, allowing that strong city, reoccupied by the enemy, to menace the rear and stand like a wall of stone across the path of reinforcements and supplies, was out of the question; and troops were also needed to protect helpers and overawe enemies among the civil population. If reduced by these deductions the army would not have constituted a striking force. Nothing could be done but stand at guard, and await new troops.[22]

THE PROBLEM OF REINFORCEMENTS

These, for a number of reasons, were delayed. Marcy’s report of December 5, 1846, presented to Congress at the opening of the session, admitted that the regular army stood nearly 7000 below full strength, and it also recommended the addition of ten regiments; but the administration, feeling at sea about its war policy, and not realizing how far the men on the firing-line came short of their estimated numbers or how much time would be required to place new troops there, took no decided stand in the matter. On the twenty-ninth, however, a bill authorizing the new regiments was presented in the House by the military committee, and the President followed this up some days later with a Message. A law offering a bounty of twelve dollars to encourage enlisting, upon which the war department acted promptly, was the next move; and on January 11, 1847, the House, excited by news that Worth stood in great peril at Saltillo, voted the new regiments. The Senate, on the other hand, procrastinated until Marcy was in despair, and Polk twice decided to address the country. Without much doubt partisan scheming and personal aims were chiefly responsible for the delay; but differences of opinion, more or less honest, regarding the comparative utility of regulars and volunteers, the expediency and proper terms of a land bounty, and the rights of the Senate in regard to the choice of officers caused much discussion, in which every issue touching the inception and conduct of the war had to run the gantlet of passionate vociferation.[25]

Progress was also hindered in another way. Although Polk had found it necessary to appoint Scott and had given that officer to understand that bygones were to be bygones, he liked him no better than before, did not wish the Whigs and their possible candidate for the Presidency to win more glory in the war, and realized the political wisdom—particularly in view of Calhoun’s unfriendliness—of pleasing the Van Buren Democrats. There were also objections to the existing arrangement that could be stated publicly. The number of troops to be employed in Mexico was said to require a chief of higher grade than a major general, and Polk took the ground that the commander—especially since he might be desired to handle the question of a treaty—should be in full agreement and sympathy with the Executive.[25]

For these combined reasons he offered to Benton the post of lieutenant general, provided it could be established, before Scott left Washington, and about the first of January requested Congress to authorize the appointment of such an officer.[23] This precipitated a commotion. The Senator’s harsh, domineering ways had made him unpopular, and grave doubts regarding his technical and temperamental fitness for the place existed not only in Congress but in the Cabinet. Calhoun and his friends detested the idea of letting Benton gain so much prestige and with it very likely the Presidency; the partisans of Taylor and Scott resented such treatment of their favorites; all the Whigs, besides suspecting Polk of scheming to evade responsibility and make Benton his grateful successor, rallied to the support of their two most prominent men; and, after serving for some time as an embarrassment, the plan was rejected.[25]

Finally, then, after a conference committee had adjusted the differences between the two Houses, the Ten Regiment Bill, though defeated once in the Senate, passed that body on February the tenth, and received Polk’s approval the next day; and as a loan bill had been worried through Congress at the end of January, something was apparently to be done.[24] Since, however, the officers were liable to be discharged on the conclusion of peace, it was not believed that many already in the service could be induced by a slight advance in rank to enter the new establishment, and for this and probably other reasons few of the more than five hundred places were offered to the army. The field was therefore clear for civilian warriors, and their campaign opened at once. Not limiting their operations to Capitol Hill, applicants for commissions besieged and assaulted the White House. “I have pushed them off and fought them with both hands like a man fighting fire,” wrote Polk in his diary, but “it has all been in vain.” “Loafers without merit” came, and equally meritorious Congressmen supported them. Not one in ten of the appointees was known to the President, and their degree of unfitness was precisely what might have been expected. A considerable number of them had actually been run out of the service—in some cases for bad conduct before the enemy—and many were found less teachable than privates.[25]

During February this beautiful exhibition continued, and such were the only immediate fruits of the much debated law, for it empowered no one to organize the new troops into brigades and divisions or to appoint general officers, and the military appropriations had not yet been made. Further Congressional exertions, therefore, had to be put forth; but at last on the second and third of March, after a loss of almost three months at this crisis of the war, the deficiencies were supplied, and enlistment shortly began. Vigorous efforts were made by the administration to set the new regulars in motion, company by company, and even squad by squad; and finally on the nineteenth of April, since little more could be expected from the November calls, requisitions for six and a half new regiments of volunteer infantry and twelve companies of horse—all to serve until the conclusion of peace—were issued.[25]

On the fourth of June, then, about six hundred new troops, commanded by Brevet Colonel McIntosh, left Vera Cruz for the interior, escorting a long train of loaded mules and wagons and two or three hundred thousand dollars in specie. Mexican irregulars, who knew the value of the convoy, soon attacked and stopped it. Cadwalader, then waiting for a part of his brigade, reinforced McIntosh on the eleventh with about five hundred men and took command. Fighting his way along he incorporated the garrison of Jalapa commanded by Colonel Childs, and on the twenty-first reached Perote.[27]

Meanwhile Pillow, now a major general by the grace of his former law partner, arriving at Vera Cruz and finding there some 2000 of his men, had advanced with most of them on June 18; and although Scott was in the most urgent need of money, Pillow ordered Cadwalader to await his arrival at Perote. Eventually, on July 3, the combined forces were in motion, and five days later all of them—including the recruits long since expected—passed the brown gate of Puebla. Of the rank and file Scott now had 8061 effectives and 2215 sick. Next Brigadier General Pierce with some 2500 men got away from the coast about the fifteenth of July,[26] and after similar fighting appeared at headquarters on the sixth of August with a heavy siege battery, a long train of wagons and $85,000 in unsalable drafts, but with none of the specie that had been expected and regarded as indispensable.[27]

THE AMERICAN ARMY

Scott now had about 14,000 men, some 2500 of whom lay, however, in the hospitals, while about six hundred were convalescents too feeble for an ordinary day’s march. The cavalry, led by Colonel Harney, included portions of the three dragoon regiments under Captain Kearny, Major Sumner and Major McReynolds. For artillery, besides the siege train, there were the field batteries of Duncan, Taylor, Steptoe and others,[28] and the howitzer and rocket battery of Talcott. Brevet Major General Worth’s division of infantry, known as the First, consisted of Brevet Colonel Garland’s brigade (Second and Third Artillery, Fourth Infantry and a light battalion) and the brigade of Colonel Clarke, which included the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Infantry. The Second Division, commanded by Brigadier General Twiggs, was composed of the regiments under Brevet Brigadier General Persifor F. Smith (Mounted Riflemen, First Artillery and Third Infantry) and Brevet Colonel Riley (Fourth Artillery, Second and Seventh Infantry). Major General Pillow, higher in rank than the brave, able and experienced Worth, a professional soldier, had the Eleventh and Fourteenth Infantry and the Voltigeur regiment under Brigadier General Cadwalader, a polished veteran of Chestnut Street parades, Philadelphia, and the Ninth, Twelfth and Fifteenth Infantry under the gentlemanly Franklin Pierce, a social and political hero of Concord, New Hampshire; while General Shields’s brigade (New York and South Carolina volunteers) and Lieutenant Colonel Watson’s, consisting of three hundred marines and a detachment of the Second Pennsylvania, made up the division of Quitman, an excellent person and politician, who had now reached the highest military grade.[29]

The troops that had been waiting at Puebla were by this time in fine training; and the new men, besides receiving the soldier’s baptism on the way up, had learned at least the value of discipline and skill. The former had become to a large extent acclimated, and they felt an entire confidence in their commander, which, fully accredited by his victories, extended promptly to the reinforcements. The essential clothing had been purchased or manufactured. Thanks to indefatigable exertions a large stock of provisions had been accumulated, and at a cost of 15 per cent funds for the march to the capital had been raised. Although time had permitted the friendly sentiments and reasonable arguments of Scott’s proclamation to leaven the people, and association with the Americans had refuted the calumnies previously effective against them, our officers and men expected hard fighting. Thoughts of distant homes and of near perils were silvering many a fine head. There were no good laughers in the army now. But in an equal degree hearts were nerved. Mentally the cost of success, figured without discount, was already paid. All felt eager to advance. And when, anticipating Pierce’s arrival by one day, Scott gave the order, a soldier’s joy lighted up their bronzed features.[30]

---

Almost immediately after Santa Anna left the seat of government for the Cerro Gordo campaign, more than twenty generals and several members of Congress were called together at the palace by Anaya to consider the defence of the capital.[1] Apparently the problem could be solved without much difficulty. Mexico lies in a rather shallow basin—said to be the crater of an ancient volcano—about thirty-two by forty-six miles in diameter. In the time of Cortez the site had consisted of islands barely rising above the water, but the spaces between these had gradually been filled, and the water had subsided. Six lakes could still be counted, however; almost everywhere else in the environs there were marshes traversed by elevated roads or causeways; and the rim of the basin, as well as the routes beyond it, seemed to offer advantageous points for defence.[2]

The sentiment of this council and of the city, though concealed under a cloak of bellicose ardor, opposed resisting the Americans in earnest, or at all events opposed inviting bombardment; and it was therefore decided merely to take precautions against a raid, fortify certain points on the roads, and bring out a host of irregulars to hang upon the rear and flanks of the enemy. All men capable of bearing arms were summoned to the colors. The states were called upon for aid. Hopes of borrowing twenty millions imparted a sunny look to the situation; and ecclesiastics, naturally passive in view of the agreement with Beach to let Scott have the city, were deliberately forced into the streets by the civil authorities to preach fanaticism and rouse the public from their apathy. Except perhaps by this last method, however, little was accomplished. “Let us unite, let us unite, and do you go and fight against the French,” some of the Spanish priests had said when their country was invaded by Napoleon. So things went now in Mexico, and every one assigned to himself the duty of exhorting. Fine ideas beamed forth, but everything of practical utility was conspicuously wanting. Still, as the American volunteers were considered “banditti, without the slightest knowledge of military tactics, without any sort of training, without confidence, and in general easily terrified,” no keen sense of alarm was felt.[2]

POLITICAL CHAOS AT MEXICO

The disaster of Cerro Gordo cast new and fearful shadows upon the scene. That defeat, said Anaya, “simply means complete ruin for the whole republic,” and even his gratification that Santa Anna’s “interesting person” had not gone down in the wreck seemed rather of an iridescent kind. Military confidence, which had revived after earlier shocks, gave way entirely. The prestige derived by Santa Anna from his alleged success at Buena Vista was now torn to shreds by panting fugitives from the south. About a thousand pamphlets, for which no language was too savage or too true, poured light upon his character and achievements, and the military men as a class met with similar treatment.[3] To be sure, the government promised boldly to continue the war. April 20 Congress invested the Executive with autocratic powers, and prohibited all steps toward peace.[4] The Federal District, in which lay the capital, was placed under martial law. Urgent demands for troops were sent wherever soldiers could be supposed to lurk. Once more the authorities called upon every citizen of the proper age to take up arms. Quotas aggregating 32,000 men were formally assigned to the states. Light fortifications, intended to delay and perhaps block the Americans, were ordered to be thrown up along the route; and the heads of the Church issued an appeal for concord and morality.[5]

But all of these proceedings displayed more alarm than courage, more desperation than intelligence. Many of the defensive points were found valueless. Tools, funds, engineers and laborers fell short. The meagre donations for continuing hostilities evinced a total want of enthusiasm. The problem of obtaining enough troops, provisions and artillery to defend the town seemed more and more insoluble, and the danger not only of bombardment but of sack more and more terrible. Grandees got out their old travelling coaches, and even plain citizens began to emigrate. The government itself decided that against an army represented by American deserters as more than 16,000 strong, fully equipped, shortly to be reinforced, and soon to advance, the city could not possibly be held; and the favorite plan of the administration, the most promising that could be devised, was to buy up Scott’s Irish soldiers through the priest McNamara, recently conspicuous in California, and facilitate their desertion by having Santa Anna attack Puebla. Should this fail, submission and peace appear to have been deemed inevitable.[5]

With some exceptions rulers and people alike, wearied by decades of dissensions, oppression, scheming, robbery and illusory promises, discouraged by the passive opposition of the clergy and the wealthy classes, overwhelmed by a series of military disasters, convinced that incompetent and perhaps traitorous generals led the armies, and powerless to discern any happy omens for the country, felt neither hope nor spirit; and the kindness of the Americans, added to their invincibility, had now overcome even the instinct of race.[5]

To heighten the confusion, a state of governmental chaos reigned. Anaya had at most but little prestige or influence, and friends of Santa Anna, angry because excluded from office, created a friction between the two that weakened both. The ministers could not coöperate harmoniously. General Bravo was given command of all the troops in the Federal District and the state of México, and Santa Anna did not want him in that important position. Congress devoted itself, when not harassing the administration, to wrangling over a new constitution, substantially that of 1824, which finally was voted on the eighteenth of May. In conscious impotence the Puros writhed and snarled; and their enemies, the Moderados, after having triumphed and brought Santa Anna to their side, now boldly paraded their dislike of him, and, by showing no concern except about retaining their power, excited hostility and contempt. Common sense was no less wanting than patriotism; and when these two parties finally agreed to save the country, their plan was—to supplement the constitution with two more articles.[5]

Of all the discontent, resentments and ambitions the now despised Santa Anna became naturally the target. Almonte still plotted to be President. Arista and Ampudia, joined now in disgrace as formerly in misfortune, felt thoroughly dissatisfied. Gómez Farías could not forget his betrayal, and Olaguíbel, governor of the most important state, México, loyally supported him. Bravo reciprocated Santa Anna’s dislike. Valencia aspired to the chief military command. All in favor of ending the war—who now had an organ, El Razonador—considered Santa Anna a bar to peace and even to the faithful observance of a preliminary armistice; and some of them, arguing that his extraordinary powers were cancelled automatically by the adoption of a new organic law, advocated placing him in the interior somewhere, ostensibly to wait for new troops, and negotiating a treaty without his knowledge. The Puros were expected to explode a revolution against him about the twentieth of May, and for all sorts of personal or patriotic reasons a host of minor individuals made ready to coöperate with it.[5]

SANTA ANNA AT THE CAPITAL

But all these busy folks were only mice, reckoning without the cat. On leaving Puebla Santa Anna proceeded to San Martín, which lay on the direct road to Mexico where it began to ascend the rim of the Valley. Works had been erected near, but it was found they could easily be turned and not easily be provisioned; and a council of war decided to occupy the capital, since only there could large resources be counted upon. May 18, therefore, the wretched army of 3000 or 3500 men arrived at Ayotla, fifteen miles from their destination. Learning of this unexpected and undesired event, the hostile elements undertook to “pronounce” at once, but could not set the movement off. Three leading statesmen of the dominant party then hurried to meet the General, and after arguing all day persuaded him to write that Anaya might remain in office and even decide whether Mexico City should be defended, while he himself would retain his military command, or, if dissatisfied with Anaya’s decision, would resign.[6]

But presently cunning Tornel and one or two others convinced Santa Anna that a mere handful of enemies had spread this net in order to drag him from power, and eliminate his influence on the vital question of peace. Jealousy and fears inspired by the favor that Valencia and Bravo were apparently enjoying, added to the urgency of his officers, did the rest; and on the nineteenth, in spite of the understanding just agreed upon—indeed, only about an hour after his letter reached the palace—his troops entered the city. Anaya’s rather sour and curdled face flushed hot and bitter. He did not care to retain the Presidency, for he believed a revolution would soon break out; but forcible ejection, in disregard of a written promise, was another affair. He found himself powerless, however; and the next day, after inducing a council of generals to decide upon holding Mexico, Santa Anna announced that he would sacrifice his wishes, and resume the executive power.[6]

The state of things that ensued was indescribable. Nothing equal to it has been known perhaps, and nothing imagined save the witches’ caldron. One public man estimated the number of bubbling intrigues as twenty millions. Nothing is left us except vanity and dissension, but those we possess in the superlative degree, wrote Ramírez. Congress had no prestige, no power, no capacity; and its factions could see nothing except opportunities to stab one another. Santa Anna’s breach of faith intensified the distrust and hatred of the Moderados without gratifying the Puros. Hoping to win some popularity, he restored the freedom of the press, which had recently been curtailed; but his enemies merely took advantage of it. “The man of La Angostura, of Cerro Gordo, of Amozoc, weary of destroying Mexicans on the field of battle, comes home tranquilly to find repose in the Presidential chair,” exclaimed Almonte’s organ.[6]

A plausible and eloquent manifesto put out over Santa Anna’s name dropped cold on the pavement. No basis of popular or political strength for even a temporary footing could be discovered by his counsellors. Santa Anna himself felt staggered by the opposition. His only chance was to place the nation between the devil and the deep sea—between bayonets and chaos—hoping it would again call upon him to save it; and so on the twenty-eighth, declaring that schemers and revolutionists, who found him in their way, paralyzed his efforts to serve the country, he made another sacrifice, and resigned the Presidency.[6]

Unhappily for him it soon appeared likely that Congress would accept the sacrifice, while on the other hand certain aspects of his outlook brightened. Busy Tornel induced a fraction of the Puros, who realized their helplessness, to adopt his cause. Valencia, though much to Santa Anna’s repugnance, had been given for his present portion the chief command at San Luis Potosí, and so disappeared from the capital. Almonte found himself in prison under a charge of conspiracy. Arista and Ampudia were banished from the vicinity. Bravo retired from his command. At the same time promotions fell copiously on devotees; and the happy recipients knew these might well cease to be valid, should their patron fall. Almonte was said to have received a majority of the votes for President, while Santa Anna had been supported by only Chihuahua; but so much territory lay in American hands that a question about the legality of the election arose, and Congress deferred the matter. On the second of June, therefore, the arch-prestidigitator laid himself once more upon the altar, and in order to save the country from Scott and anarchy withdrew his resignation.[6]

“Mexicans, I shall be with you always—to the consummation of your ruin,” so the Monitor Republicano paraphrased his announcement; and then it added: “What a life of sacrifice is the General’s; a sacrifice to take the power, to resign, to resume; ultimate sacrifice; ultimate final; ultimate more final; ultimate most final; ultimate the very finalest. But let him cheer up. He is not alone in making sacrifices. For twenty-five years the Mexican people have been sacrificing themselves, all of them, in the hope that certain persons would do good to the country.” But in spite of sarcasm and ridicule Santa Anna had triumphed. Hated by many, disliked by most, distrusted by nearly all, yet forging ahead because he was on the ground with troops, because his combination of good luck, audacity and cunning could not be matched, because the Moderado government had proved incompetent, because a régime of dissension and anarchy could organize no solid opposition against him, and because a group of selfish interests found in him a sharp, tough bit of steel to fix at the head of their spear, he triumphed once more.[6]

SANTA ANNA STILL SUPREME

The victory threatened, however, to be fatal. In every direction lurked pitfalls charged with gunpowder. In all the history of Mexico dissensions had never been more bitter, nor political and social chaos nearer. Congress annoyed him until at length, by failing week after week to form a quorum lest one faction or another should score an advantage, it fell into abeyance and left him virtually a dictator.[7] In the hope of obtaining funds from the Church, he gave deeper offence than ever to the most prominent of the Moderados; but the prelates, in alliance with leading monarchists, continued to plot against him. Newspapers waged a bitter campaign until choked with an iron hand. His persecution of the generals excited fierce resentment. A Puro chief, entering the Cabinet and getting a glimpse of his ulterior aims, resigned in six days.[8]

In short the administration had no political creed, and could find no political support; and the assistance of that indispensable villain, Tornel, who could be seen stealing to the palace at the hour when the night-hawk begins to fly, covered it with discredit. Executive authorities waged almost civil war upon one another. Rumors, not without some basis, that a formal dictatorship was in view, could not be stilled; and the general want of confidence in the President’s character and aims rendered the most skilful appeals to patriotism vain. Only by the utmost exertions could the fragile edifice of government be kept balanced on the point of the bayonet.[8]

Nor was the opposition against Santa Anna confined to his immediate vicinity. The people of Mexico City had always despised the outlying states; and not only was this disdain repaid, but the capital, source of so many political and financial ills experienced by the rest of the country, was looked upon by a great number of thoughtful men as hopelessly corrupt—as a diseased part that required amputation. When restoring the old federal system in August, 1846, in order to satisfy his democratic allies and win popularity, Santa Anna apparently did not foresee, as Consul Black did, that after realizing their power and getting into touch with one another, the states would take a firm position upon their prerogatives. In addition to such difficulties, it was commonly felt that military men and the army stood mortally opposed to democracy and federal institutions, that success in the field might enable Santa Anna to overthrow this principle and these institutions, and that a loud cry for patriotism and war, combined with a systematic withholding of men and supplies, would compel him to fight and ensure his ruin.[8]

By evasions, therefore, or in some cases positive refusals to obey the commands of the general government, substantially all the states withheld support, frequently alleging that under the régime of the new constitution its extraordinary powers, conferred by the law of April 20, did not exist, and that all National Guards, as well as all revenues assigned to the states in September, 1846, were independent of the national authorities. In this opposition Zacatecas naturally played a leading part, but perhaps Olaguíbel, an impressive, honest and able man, who had travelled in the United States and Europe and had filled his library with busts of the leading American statesmen, was its foremost representative; and the firm support of his constituents, who felt intensely jealous of Santa Anna, as well as the coöperation of Gómez Farías, rendered him a formidable person. Balked thus by constitutional theories that not only flattered local interests and pride but were noticeably economical, Santa Anna could obtain—aside from the troops brought by General Juan Alvarez and a few others—very little assistance outside of the Federal District.[8]

That was hard enough, but still greater difficulties lay behind it. In the far northwest Sonora, Sinaloa and Durango entertained the idea of uniting as a new republic, and six of the central states were banded together in a Coalition. This extra-legal, if not illegal, organization had been called into existence in January, 1847, by the pronunciamiento of the Mazatlán garrison, which aimed at making Santa Anna dictator. By the end of May it was in good shape, and had a plan for troops of its own. Two weeks later the delegates, who made Lagos their place of meeting, called themselves an Assembly, and were buying arms; and by the fourth of July they felt bold enough to declare null a decree of Santa Anna. Of course the ostensible purpose was to protect independence, nationality and federal institutions; but, as the correspondence of the state governors reveals, the real aims included the establishment of a “new pact of alliance,” a new confederation, in which Santa Anna and that Babylon, the city of Mexico, should have no part. With this Coalition a large number of the Puros naturally sympathized.[8]

SANTA ANNA PREPARES FOR BATTLE

In the face of it all, however, the futile strategist of Cerro Gordo, with a truly superb wilfulness and a more truly pitiful self-confidence, snatched up once more the bloody dice. Cannon were brought from distant points, cast by the government from bells and old ordnance at Chapultepec and elsewhere, or manufactured by contractors. New muskets, of which foreigners offered to deliver great stocks at Mexican ports or by way of Guatemala, were purchased; old ones, appropriated by deserters or stolen during revolutions, were hunted up; and all citizens were ordered, though perhaps without great results, to let the government have what arms they owned. Immense quantities of powder were produced at Morelia, at Guanajuato, at Santa Fe near Mexico, and at the capital; a great deal was imported overland from British Honduras, and additional supplies came from New Orleans by the way of Campeche. At various points mortars, bayonets, projectiles and numberless other articles were turned out by government establishments or private contractors. Forges clanged on all sides; and wherever the President’s restless and unscrupulous mind could have its way, there reigned a feverish activity, cooled only by a want of funds.[11]

At Mexico City, before his arrival, some 2000 regulars and 8000 National Guards, besides the officers, were in garrison; and these with his army, five hundred from Querétaro, some two hundred Irish deserters, an unknown number of able-bodied loafers impressed at the capital, and larger or smaller accessions from other sources, made up the Army of the East. The Army of the South under Juan Alvarez, who commanded the line to Acapulco with headquarters near Mexico, had on its roll at the end of June 2748 officers and men; and Canalizo, comandante general of Puebla, who became reconciled to his chief in June, was supposed to have a few thousands of National Guards and irregulars. But as most of these forces were poorly paid and a large part of them served unwillingly, desertion—in spite of the severest rules—was common, and the numbers fluctuated incessantly.[11]

At San Luis Potosí, meantime, lay the Army of the North, which contained the largest percentage of veterans. In May Valencia, so long a rival of the President, had talked in a very lofty style, as if already the military head of the nation, about marching south and cutting Worth to pieces, and Santa Anna, though anxious to get his troops, now wished him to remain at a distance; but in July, on account of Scott’s approaching reinforcements, it seemed necessary to bring down that army, and it arrived at Guadalupe Hidalgo, a few miles north of Mexico, on the twenty-seventh, numbering more than 4000 men with twenty-two guns. Just how many soldiers the President then had cannot be stated, and in all probability no one could have stated at the time; but, such as they were, there seem to have been fully 25,000 men and probably, as reports and intercepted letters convinced many of the Americans, 30,000, if not more.[9] Some were well dressed, well equipped and well trained; but from that pinnacle the army descended to mere off-scourings, whose rags were as the President said, “a disgrace to the nation,” and whose military efficiency doubtless corresponded.[11]

Of equally varied quality were the officers. The generals best known to the country were nearly all out of the service now, being under charges or at odds with the head of the government. Valencia was a conspirator, a drunkard, a dolt and a volcano. Alvarez, an ignorant mulatto from the wilds, understood only half-savage, partisan fighting. Lombardini, a strutting lackey, who commanded the Army of the East except when Santa Anna took personal charge of it, strove to conceal behind a swarthy face, a heavy mustache and goatee, and a ceaseless volubility the poverty of his intellect; and the great mass of the officers were—well, they had already shown their value. They were now ordered to be intelligent and brave, to be zealous whether paid or not paid, to do their full duty and something more, to cast behind them every thought of accepting parole, and to say nothing against their superiors; but it lay beyond the power of orders to make them what they could not be, and the small number of excellent men were lost in the crowd.[11]

THE MEXICAN PLANS

Regarding the plan of operations a radical difference of opinion existed. To not a few the idea that Scott was lying comfortably at Puebla seemed almost unendurable. They longed to have him attacked unceasingly; and they insisted that, should the arrogant invader dare to march for the capital, every step of the route should be contested. Santa Anna on the other hand still believed in concentration, and though some regard was paid to the apprehensions of the ayuntamiento, his views naturally prevailed. The plan adopted, then, after considerable vacillation in regard to details, was to protect the entire perimeter of the city with fortifications, inundate more or less the surrounding meadows, and prevent Scott from seriously injuring the town with his artillery by erecting a series of works at the most advantageous points of the environs. These protected lines were to be held by the less reliable corps—National Guards, for example—and the troops belonging to the regular army were to be a mobile force ready to defend the city at any threatened point.[11]

The plan was thus essentially defensive, and it has been said with much force that a system of this kind promises merely negative results in the case of success, and positive ruin in the case of defeat. But the present situation was peculiar. Supplied with provisions for no long period, and without hopes of early and strong reinforcements, the Americans were bound to fail unless promptly and signally victorious, and their entering the Valley would then have meant destruction. “Scott is lost,” exclaimed the Duke of Wellington after the Americans crossed the rim; “He cannot capture the city and he cannot fall back upon his base.” Santa Anna’s plan, therefore, did not merit the criticism bestowed upon it.[11]

Besides, Alvarez with nearly all the Mexican horse was to swing in behind the advancing Americans, cut off their communication with Puebla, follow, annoy and injure them in every possible way, conceal his real strength so as to bring out and overwhelm their cavalry, attack vigorously whenever Scott should become seriously engaged before Mexican fortifications, and be ready to prevent his retreat. Canalizo with his thousands was to support Alvarez; and Valencia also, advancing from Guadalupe Hidalgo to the, village of Texcoco, east of Mexico, was to coöperate with him, and especially to throw himself with all his energy into the attack on the American rear or flank, whenever Scott should assail the outer works. At the same time the people of the neighboring towns and villages were to swarm about the invader like hornets, and sting him day and night incessantly. In short the plan was excellent—only Santa Anna overlooked, as usual, several possibilities.[11]

As soon as he took up the reins of government the construction of defences had begun, and now, under the technical direction of General Mora, Manuel Robles and Juan Cano, it was pushed with all the energy of an intense military despot who stuck at nothing. Villages were depopulated, haciendas robbed of their laborers, jails emptied, and the streets cleared of vagabonds. Enforce obedience, the governor of the District was curtly told when he reported that his orders had no effect. Sunset no longer promised repose, and the church bells no longer meant worship. Informed on July 18 that Scott would leave Puebla on the twenty-first, Santa Anna rose above his exemplar, Napoleon, and took for model the Creator. Within eight days let all the works be completed, he decreed. But engineers, laborers, tools, instruments, timber, provisions, time and cash—much of which was embezzled by high officers and officials even at this juncture—all fell short, and Santa Anna’s serviceable cannon were not enough to equip even the works constructed.[11]

Certain points, however, became quite formidable, and especially Old Peñón, a lofty, precipitous hill of rock standing by itself, close to the Puebla route, seven miles from the city.[10] Stockades, breastworks, parapets and guns bristled on summit and brow; works at the base and in advance commanded all dangerous approaches; a trench full of water crossed the road; the meadows in front—cut with ditches—were inundated; and the swampy edge of Lake Texcoco guarded the opposite side of the road. To the Mexicans, who always measured the strength of a chain by its heaviest link, this position seemed a wonderful protection; and in general the people, if not the city, were strongly fortified by the President’s labors.[11]

THE PEOPLE ENTHUSIASTIC

For other reasons also the morale of the inhabitants improved. Characteristic light-heartedness made them turn from past defeats to future triumphs. They were told that at Cerro Gordo Scott had made his troops fight by opening a battery upon them from the rear; that his men, while they presumed to think they could make “vile slaves” of the generous and valiant Mexicans, were few, sickly, poverty-stricken, dissatisfied; and that Polk, embarrassed by the expense of the war, could send him but scanty reinforcements. Greed, brutality and sanguinary ambition were charged against us at this crisis by the London Times in its usual contemptuous manner, and the Diario eagerly quoted it. The successes of the guerillas against American convoys roused a lively enthusiasm. “Only a little, a very little” effort is necessary to beat the hateful Anglo-Saxon, proclaimed the government; and a review of the brilliant Eleventh Infantry, headed by its band of twenty-five pieces, made that little seem easy and agreeable.[11]

People who bore the names of saints as a matter of course easily exploded Scott’s Address of May 11. How absurd, they cried, for the American general to pretend he is a Christian: there is no St. Winfield in the calendar! The only hope of the Americans lies in Mexican dissension, therefore let us disappoint them, it was urged; and to promote harmony all the newspapers except the official organ were suspended on plausible grounds. Santa Anna’s activity and warlike spirit had to be recognized by all. We must confide in him and gather round him like a band of brothers, preached the Diario; and when all political trials were ordered to end, and the President banqueted at Valencia’s house, the fraternal era so long hoped for seemed at hand.[11]

Finally, on the ninth of August, at two o’clock in the afternoon, a 16-pounder boomed portentously from the citadel. The long roll was beaten. Bands of music patrolled the city. Hands clapped. Vivas echoed through the streets. Rockets flashed rosettes in the sky. “Blinded by pride the enemy have set out for the capital,” proclaimed Santa Anna; “For this, Mexicans, I congratulate myself and you.” The government, while savagely and contemptuously scoring the Americans, announced a series of reforms to be effected by Santa Anna, not as a constitutional magistrate, but as a Divine Providence; and the Diario echoed back, “Half a dozen of these measures would change the face of the Republic.” The President assumed command of the army, and every citizen from sixteen to fifty years of age took his place in the ranks. Amidst the most fervid enthusiasm of crowds that filled the streets, balconies and housetops, troops followed troops gaily toward Old Peñón, and two days later the forces were reviewed there.[12]

Tents gleamed under a splendid sun. Bands played as if inspired. The soldiers marched with a quick, impatient step. Anaya—recently the chief magistrate, Gorostiza—the primate of Mexico’s literary men, white-haired Herrera—the most honored of her political chiefs, and countless other dignitaries did honor to the occasion. The rich vestments of the clergy gave exquisite lustre and color, and their pompous benedictions added a sense of more than human grandeur. All were happy, radiant, brotherly. Every thought of peace, every thought of opposing or even doubting Santa Anna appeared to be forgotten. In all his previous career so refulgent a day had never been his. “Ecce Homo!” cried the Diario; “Behold the illustrious champion of 1821, the hero of 1829, the genius of 1838!” For him the hill became a Mount of Transfiguration. Or rather, perhaps, it was Mt. Sinai, where Deity appeared in thunders and lightnings. You MUST, was the command to the governor of Zacatecas this day. Let the state of Mexico send me her troops, rang the message to Olaguíbel. And Olaguíbel replied meekly, They shall go to-morrow.[12]

SCOTT’S MARCH TO MEXICO

Scott was in fact advancing. On the morning of Saturday, the seventh, his camp was astir early. The base of Popocatepetl seemed black, and the slopes a pale, silvery blue; but its top, almost 18,000 feet above the sea, was a “Blazing Star,” as some of the Indians named the mountain, and appeared like an omen of victory. The Second Division was soon ready. Twiggs faced it, waved his hat round his white head, and cried in the voice of Ajax, “Now, my lads, give them a Cerro Gordo shout!” A simultaneous hurrah from twenty-five hundred iron throats was the response; and at six o’clock, preceded by the cavalry and the engineer company and followed by the siege train—while his band, mounted on splendid white horses, played our national airs—he began the eventful march. One day apart, Quitman, Worth and Pillow followed him. Though it was announced that no man unable to do three marches could be permitted to go, hundreds of convalescents unequal to the effort insisted upon trying, and, gradually falling out, rejoined the garrison of Puebla. Feeble in numbers[13] for such an enterprise, but confiding in their quality, their leader and their prestige, the 10,738 men and their officers pressed boldly forward.[15]

For a time the dust proved extremely annoying and the sun scorched; but soon mountain air began to be felt, and the troops entered a wide, blooming and scented valley, full of rich fields, grazing herds, noble hacienda houses that were almost palaces, and trim white churches that seemed like stragglers from the great host at Puebla. In the rear shone Orizaba and the nearer pyramid of Malinchi. On the left Popocatepetl and his consort, the Sleeping Woman (Iztaccihuatl), deeply blanketed in fleecy white, looked hardly a stone’s throw distant; and after the sun had set, the air grown cold, and the valley—now less open—filled with shadows, their purple tops glowed like interplanetary lighthouses.[15]

Soon after passing the ugly little town of San Martín, twenty miles from Puebla, the troops began to ascend more rapidly. Eleven miles more brought them to a mountain river, Tesmelucan, where the elegant aërial bridge that spanned the abyss made them almost feel they were flying. The scenery now became Alpine. Deep chasms, answered to peaks, and lovely glens to precipices; and the cedar, the oak and the ash, as well as pines of extraordinary height and straightness, reared themselves on the slopes. At Río Frio, about thirty-six miles from both Puebla and Mexico, where an icy stream dashed foaming down the rocks, the mountains closed in on the left, and their crest, lined with deserted parapets, almost overhung the road.[14] Then a stiffer climb of about five miles placed the troops on a narrow plateau which formed the summit; and they were now 10,500 feet above the sea.[15]

A few miles down the steep descent on the other side their prospect opened, and below, girt round with singularly bold mountains—rough, dark and purplish, but softened here and there with a wisp of shining vapor—lay the Valley of Mexico, which the pellucid atmosphere, transmitting colors and outlines undimmed, brought wondrously nigh. Ten small volcanoes, that had been crumbling for ages untold, stood clothed in luxuriant verdure nearly to the summit. Six broad lakes now laughed under the brilliant sun and now brooded in the shadows of passing clouds. Velvet champaigns—cut with ash-colored roads, gleaming canals and straight lines of poplars, and studded with walled haciendas, rambling towns and cozy-looking villages—were further variegated with highly cultivated fields of many crops, with groves and orchards from which peered steeples and bell-towers, with villa roofs of tiles, red and cheery, and with whitewashed cottages that shone like silver. Every possible hue of green and every possible tone of light and shade blended into one harmonious effect. And in the midst of this wonderful scene, as the climax of the stillness and beauty, the focus of all eyes, the aim of all desires, untarnished by smoke, seemingly without stain, bright with sunshine, begemmed with many a palace, park and lofty church, slumbered the capital of Mexico, Venice-of-the-Mountains. Not one of the fascinated soldiers but held his breath; and not one, testified the commander-in-chief, but said to himself or his neighbor, “That splendid city shall soon be ours!”[15]

Along this part of the route almost 13,000 trees had been cut down for barricades, and some of them had been placed in the road; but the Americans were not materially hindered, and in crossing the lower slopes they found little to do except admire the wondrous variety and profusion of the wild-flowers. On the eleventh, seeing Mexicans ahead for the second time, Twiggs waited for Quitman; but a few hours later, after passing a cross-road, he went on about four miles, and occupied the adobe village of Ayotla, half-buried in olive trees, while Harney’s cavalry took post at San Isidro, a mile and a half in advance, and Quitman camped in the rear. The next day Worth’s division turned to the left by the cross-road, marched three miles and a half to the squalid little town of Chalco, simmering at the margin of the shallow, marshy lake bearing that name, and finally halted a little distance beyond; and Pillow camped at Chimalpa, not far beyond Worth.[15]

But what had the enemy been doing? The people along the route, who were to have stung the Americans day and night, recognized the difference between them and the Mexican irregulars, welcomed them cordially, and gave them all possible assistance. Canalizo—who seems to have been cowed by the disaster of Cerro Gordo, and some time before this had fled from San Martín, with six hundred men at his back, on seeing an American officer, detailed to arrange an exchange of prisoners, approach with a small escort—felt no desire to fight, besides which most of his troops revolted or deserted; and Governor Isunza not only failed to assist him with men and means, but flatly refused him a particular corps, expressly demanded by the Executive at Mexico.[16]

Alvarez, well-nigh a brigand, had always fought for his own advantage, knew that all the other chief leaders were doing this now, and, in addition to cherishing resentments against Santa Anna, probably felt no craving to play a strictly inferior part. Though he did not have all the men for whom he seems to have been drawing rations, his force was important, and in three particulars he obeyed his orders. He stationed himself at the designated point on the flank of San Martín, kept beyond the reach of Scott’s artillery, and scrupulously refrained from attacking the Americans on unfavorable terms; but while he made excuses bravely, and proposed valiant operations that Santa Anna forbade as inconsistent with his general plan, he retired some ten miles from the route on the plea that his exhausted horses required pasturage. For probably similar reasons Valencia quibbled and shirked; his train of heavy guns—which, though needed in the fortifications, he would not give up—impeded his movements; and so the only hostilities were a trifling skirmish with irregulars, in which one American trooper fell a victim to his own rashness. Thus ended, to his deep disgust, the first chapter of Santa Anna’s hopes.[16]

THE APPROACH TO MEXICO

Four lines of advance now offered themselves to Scott. By taking the cross-road to the right he could have skirted Lake Texcoco, passing the village of that name, and approached the north or the northwest quarter of Mexico. But the route would have been long, deficient in water and fuel, and circuitous; it was defended by Valencia with an ample supply of artillery; a movement in that direction would have made surprise or even sudden attack impossible for him; at a pass near Guadalupe Hidalgo stood fortifications; and a march round these would have involved another long circuit on exposed and unknown ground. This route, therefore, was not seriously considered. On the other hand, after the most thorough investigation, Scott had planned before leaving Puebla to take the cross-road to the left, march along the southern shores of Lakes Chalco and Xochimilco, and reach San Agustín, some ten miles to the south of Mexico; and it was for this reason that he placed Worth, who was to lead the movement while Twiggs was to menace Old Peñón, near Chalco.[17]

On reaching the ground, however, unfavorable reports about this road were given by Mexican spies; and the General, partly for that reason and partly to mystify the enemy, reconnoitred the Peñón and also a fourth route, which led to the village of Mexicaltzingo, about five miles from the city. In regard to the Peñón his engineers—who pushed their investigations with the utmost intrepidity, studied every foot of the red ledges dripping with crimson gravel, and even penetrated behind the hill—decided that it could be carried, but only at a severe loss; while the evidence concerning the fourth possibility led to a substantially similar conclusion, supported by the additional objection, that apparently success would place the Americans on difficult and unknown ground. At about the same time Scott obtained further information regarding the Chalco route, which seemed to justify the opinion formed at Puebla. Consequently the orders to attack Mexicaltzingo—issued either because at the time Scott thought he should march that way or because he desired to mislead the cunning Mexican spies, who even gained the confidence of high American officers—were suddenly rescinded in the night of the fourteenth, and the next day, though Twiggs continued to threaten the Peñón until the morning of the sixteenth, all the rest of the army, headed by the cavalry and Worth’s division, set out for San Agustín, distant from Chalco some twenty-five miles.[17]

For about half this distance the road was little more than a narrow lane, with a lake—or more properly a watery marsh—on the right and bold foothills close on the left. Spaces of firm ground there were. At one time venerable olive trees formed an arch over the road; once the troops camped in a fine grove, and some ledgy, rocky spurs had to be crossed. But for much of the way, although the weather had been remarkably dry for the midst of the rainy season, the story, as Scott had anticipated, was “mud, mud, mud.” Now and then a man would slip and sink to his waist in a bog-hole; in places the track was quite overflowed; the chilly, torrential rains of almost every afternoon increased the difficulties; and the labor of getting several miles of wagons and heavy guns along such a route was almost incredible. Besides, the troops had to be ready at all hours for attack—frontal, rear or flank. But early in the afternoon of the seventeenth Harney and Worth’s advance reached San Agustín, a delightful place full of handsome gardens and orchards; and the next day the rest of the troops joined them—“ready,” as a soldier put it, “for anything except a thrashing.”[18]

TO SAN AGUSTÍN

But again, where were the Mexicans? With so many works to construct, Santa Anna could hardly be censured for leaving unfortified—especially as both an inner and an outer line were made ready against any forces using it—a route that seemed to be quite impracticable for an army train; but he might have placed upon it a few light guns and a body of skirmishers, who could have embarrassed the Americans greatly. This, however, with his usual over-confidence and faulty judgment, he neglected to do. Yet he was not idle. On the fourteenth he knew the Americans were talking of a march to San Agustín; and though he suspected this language might be a blind, he not only sent additional forces to that quarter, but ordered Alvarez to follow Scott, should such a movement occur, and be ready to fall upon him bravely should he attack a fortified position; and when the movement actually began on the following day, though Santa Anna misinterpreted its aim, he promptly took further defensive steps on that line.[18]

One result was a slight brush between Alvarez and Twiggs after the latter moved from Chalco on the sixteenth; but Alvarez soon found so many difficulties in the road pursued by the Americans and so little food or pasturage left in their rear, that he once more abandoned his appointed field of operations. Santa Anna would not break up his general plan by sending strong detachments from the southern line; and consequently Scott’s march was merely annoyed by a few hundred irregulars, who fired at intervals, rolled great stones down the slopes, and cut ditches in the road, but broke from cover and fled like scared rabbits when C. F. Smith’s corps of light infantry ran leaping and shouting across the hillsides. Thus ended the second chapter of Santa Anna’s hopes.[18]

Meantime a precipitate rearrangement of the Mexican forces took place. The President, after reconnoitring the American advance, hastened to place himself between San Agustín and Mexico. Troops were despatched from the Peñón to various points on the southern front, and Valencia was ordered to proceed by the way of Guadalupe Hidalgo to the same quarter. But the former status could no more be restored than one could put back the smoke of an exploded shell. The strongest fortifications had been turned and rendered useless; and any one could see that on the side now threatened, where a number of causeways approached the city, the defence of it would almost necessarily be weakened by a division of the garrison. After such enthusiasm and such impatience to meet the enemy, retirement unadorned with laurels or with even the stains of combat produced a humiliating reaction in all hearts.[19]

At Mexico the returning soldiers found empty streets, untenanted balconies and bolted windows; and the silent, sombre, fearsome aspect of a besieged city enveloped and oppressed them. Doubts as to Santa Anna’s competence or loyalty, which had slept but not died amidst the recent glorification and his confident promises of “a splendid triumph,” awoke. People recalled that precisely when the enemy were moving against Vera Cruz, the Mexican army had been led off into the northern deserts; and they hotly demanded why the engineers, the laborers, the troops and the cannon had been massed at Old Peñón, where Scott could nullify them all by a turn of the wrist. As if in answer, it was publicly stated that an outpost had found a treasonable communication addressed by the President of Mexico to the American commander; and so ended Chapter III of Santa Anna’s hopes.[19]

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While grievously disappointed by the collapse of his efforts at Old Peñón, Santa Anna felt by no means despondent regarding his new line. Toward the south ran the great highway of Acapulco—along which numberless cargoes of silks, teas and spices had approached—guarded at about a mile from the city by the gateway or garita of San Antonio Abad. Three miles and a half beyond that garita the highway crossed a bridge over Churubusco River, here practically a drainage canal running between high embankments planted with maguey, with Mexicaltzingo about a mile and a half distant at the left. On the farther side of the river, a fifth of a mile southwest of the bridge, stood a massive convent and church, skirted by the rambling hamlet of Churubusco. Passing the church at a distance of three hundred and fifty yards the highway veered slightly toward the east, and some two and a quarter miles from the river came to a great feudal hacienda named San Antonio, adorned with trim silver poplars and Peruvian pepper trees along the front of its buildings. A scant mile then brought one to the similar but far less pretentious establishment of Cuapa; and two scant miles more to San Agustín.[1] At the Churubusco bridgehead and convent and at San Antonio, where the erection of defences had begun some time before, laborers could now be seen working—particularly at San Antonio—like bees; and with all possible haste guns, as well as troops, were brought over from the Peñón. Here, said the President, he “desired to have the battle fought.”[4]

To increase his confidence, troops not only occupied Mexicaltzingo on the left, but in even stronger force guarded the opposite flank. About three miles toward the south from San Cosme, the western garita of Mexico, the traveller, passing the fortified hill of Chapultepec on the right, found himself at the genial suburb of Tacubaya. Keeping on in the same general direction for nearly six miles and traversing Mixcoac at about half-way, one came to San Angel, a pretty but narrow town of some importance on the skirt of the foothills. Two miles from here toward the east at Coyoacán, a garden spot loved by Cortez and Alvarado, the fine brigade of Pérez, which consisted of about 3500 infantry, was now placed; and at San Angel itself a high military officer, followed by some 5500 troops[2] from Guadalupe, drove up in a coach about noon on Tuesday, the seventeenth of August. The man was of average height but unusually broad, with a bull-neck deep in his shoulders, as if some person had tried to force a good idea into his head with a pile-driver, a hard, cruel, domineering look about his blue eyes, small side-whiskers, and a heavy mustache. It was Valencia, whose imputed schemes and intrigues had of late been keeping every tongue busy.[4]

VALENCIA’S MOVEMENTS

Valencia’s instructions were to block the way from Coyoacán to Tacubaya with men and works; but he mounted at once, rode on south by the turnpike, passed Ansaldo—a farmhouse buried in its orchard, two miles and a half or so from San Angel—and a strong half-mile beyond it paused. On his right, open ground sloped gradually back into a rounded hill, some three or four hundred yards from the road; and below him on the left flowed a small but lively stream at the bottom of a deep, wide ravine, near the opposite side of which stood the adobe buildings of Padierna farm.[4]

From this point a mule-path, barely practicable for horses, wriggled off in the direction of San Agustín, here about four miles distant in a straight line; and—covering the whole intermediate plain from San Antonio and San Agustín on the one side to Padierna and San Angel on the other, from Coyoacán on the north to the mountains on the south—extended a pedregal or lava bed, which looked as if a raging sea of molten rock had instantly congealed, had then been filled by the storms of centuries with fissures, caves, jagged points and lurking pitfalls, and finally had been decorated with occasional stunted trees and clumps of bushes. After pursuing the mule-path for some distance, ordering a camp and batteries established on the slope of the rounded hill, and instructing experts to reconnoitre the ground thoroughly, Valencia returned to his post; and in the evening, on learning from the experts that four other paths—one of them available for artillery—led from San Agustín to San Angel, he summarized the reconnaissances in a letter to Santa Anna, complaining that he had neither room to manoeuvre nor time to fortify where he was, asking leave to change his position, and calling for 2000 more men.[4]

The next day, Wednesday, the eighteenth, Santa Anna, writing back that Scott intended to attack San Antonio, ordered Valencia to place his troops at Coyoacán, and send his artillery to Churubusco, a mile farther east. Valencia, who by this time had placed a strong outpost on the mule-path and sappers on the rounded hill, replied that Scott, striking both at San Antonio and at San Angel, would push his thrust in whichever direction he should find the easier, and that he could not conscientiously leave the second point unguarded by obeying those orders. Notes worthy of the most finished and effusive pirates were then exchanged; and in the end Santa Anna, who longed to remove his insubordinate general but dared not, authorized him to do as he pleased and assume, of course, the attendant responsibility.[3] Accordingly on Thursday morning Valencia advanced with trumpets, drums and flags to the rounded hill, and proceeded to array his forces. A long, low, earthen parapet with an angle at the southern end already faced Padierna, and five guns were in battery; but the summit of the hill was neglected.[4]

SCOTT FEELS HIS WAY

During this time the Americans were not inactive. Early on Wednesday Scott directed Worth and Engineers Mason and Tower, supported by Garland’s brigade of infantry and a body of dragoons, to reconnoitre San Antonio.[5] The task was accomplished boldly and thoroughly; and they found the place heavily defended, not only in the vicinity of the white castle which formed the headquarters of the hacienda, but for a long distance eastward—where, moreover, the water-soaked ground almost forbade approach—and saw countless laborers toiling hard upon the works. The presence of at least one 24-pounder was demonstrated, and other heavy cannon were believed to be there. In Worth’s opinion, the cost of making a successful assault by the narrow, gun-swept causeway with fascines and ladders would cripple the army.[6]

Questioning peons through an interpreter, the officers learned of a path which began at the highway near Cuapa, made a circuit on the left through the pedregal, and apparently returned to the highway some distance inside the works, and this received careful attention; but the conclusion was, that while infantry could filter through it, artillery could not pass; and to advance by such a route in the presence of a strong, unshaken enemy, whose front and other flank could not be attacked or seriously threatened, appeared worse than hazardous. Even Scott felt rather depressed on hearing the reports, especially as fortifications were said to exist north of the hacienda. The men, wagons and guns, all covered with mud, that lay scattered about on the wet ground, seemed little indeed like a conquering army. Except for some cattle, the army had only four days’ provisions; the hard bread was already musty, and the horses lacked forage.[6]

Later, however, Lee and Beauregard brought somewhat more promising information. To the hacienda of Peña Pobre, a mile and a quarter from San Agustín toward the west, they had found a good road; and then, after proceeding about an equal distance by a mule-path to the top of a sharp ridge, they had seen the path continue to Padierna and the turnpike, which lay in full view nearly a mile and a half away, and they believed it possible to make a road by that line. Their escort had routed a hostile corps of observation, and some men had been seen at work on a rounded hill beyond the turnpike, but no other Mexican forces appeared to be near. Indeed, it seemed probable that much less adequate defences had been provided here than on the great southern highway, and in this direction Scott resolved to strike. “An enemy that halts, vacillates, declines the battle offered him, makes a circuit, hunts for a position and finds none to suit him is an enemy lost,” exulted the Diario.[6]

THE BATTLE OF CONTRERAS

The next morning, August 19, therefore—while Quitman unwillingly remained at San Agustín to guard the base,[7] and Worth, with his engineers and troops, continued to reconnoitre and threaten on the San Antonio side—Scott ordered a force of engineers to build a road in the other direction. Pillow’s division was to furnish working-parties, and Twiggs’s to clear away whatever Mexican detachments might undertake to hinder the operations; and the implied instructions were to gain and hold the San Angel turnpike, so that San Antonio could be turned. Scott did not expect or desire a general engagement at this time; but he directed Pillow to take command and employ both divisions, if a battle should be opened, promising that in such an event he would soon appear on the field. Under these instructions the troops advanced cautiously but rapidly the first mile and a quarter, constructed a road to the summit of the ridge, pulled up the guns with drag-ropes, and looked over. As the returning tide makes a sea in the Bay of Fundy, where only bare ground had been visible a few hours earlier, Valencia’s army had taken possession. It was now one o’clock, and evidently road-building was over for a while.[11]

Pillow, however, knew all about winning victories. From a central hill, Zacatepec, where he stood, he could measure Valencia’s forces to a nicety, and he decided to brush them away. By his order the Mounted Rifles, particularly the advanced companies of Roberts and Porter, deployed quickly, drove the Mexican skirmishers in a handsome style from rocks and fissures, and finally occupied Padierna. At the same time and under his instructions Magruder—tall, blonde and intrepid—advanced his field battery nearly a mile without cover over that almost impassable ground, which the enemy had now barred with stone walls, planted it under the slight protection of a transverse ledge, and not long after two o’clock opened a duel with Mexican siege guns, 68-pound howitzers and many lighter pieces, more than twenty in all, at a range of about 900 yards, while brave Callender fought the howitzer battery beside him, dashing little Reno set off rockets, and Smith’s and Pierce’s brigades, which were presently to attack Valencia’s camp, furnished support. And Pillow knew also how to “bag” a defeated enemy. So he ordered Riley’s brigade to the extreme right to coöperate with the frontal attack by checking reinforcements and cutting off Valencia’s retreat. Then he countermanded this order, but not in season.[11]

Zigzagging, scrambling, leaping, and sliding as best they could over about a mile of pedregal, Riley’s brigade crossed the stream and the turnpike, formed in the orchard of Ansaldo, routed small bodies of lancers, passed through San Gerónimo—an Indian village lying amid trees and ravines a quarter of a mile west of Ansaldo and about three times as far from Valencia—had a stiff but victorious brush with Torrejón and three regiments of cavalry, defied Valencia’s cannon, some of which now faced this way, found cover at length in broken ground between the village and his camp, and waited for the Mexicans to be routed. But the major general commanding failed in the prime essential of his plan, for he did not induce Valencia to retreat. Badly crippled, the American batteries became silent after an hour or so, the brigades that had expected to charge saw clearly they could accomplish nothing, and Riley found himself isolated. So ended wretchedly the first phase of the battle of Contreras,[8] Pillow’s phase.[11]

But by this time a second phase was taking shape. Pillow himself perceived that Riley had been thrown into imminent peril, and sent Cadwalader’s brigade, which was followed by the Fifteenth Infantry, to his support. Smith, useless where he was and probably feeling little confidence in Pillow or Twiggs, decided to regard himself as the senior officer present, gathered his men, except those employed in skirmishing, and, with a yell of endorsement from them, proceeded in the direction that Riley had taken—not, however, primarily to intercept Valencia’s retreat or reinforcements, but with a direct view to attacking his left flank. At about the same time—probably by half-past three o’clock—Scott himself joined Pillow and other officers on Zacatepec, viewed with his usual battlefield equanimity the desperate state of things, now spread before him like a map on a table, studied Valencia’s batteries, the heavy ranks of supporting infantry and the long lines of cavalry in the rear, and soon fixed upon woody San Gerónimo—marked at a line distance of about a mile and three quarters by its white steeple—as the key to the situation, since it both flanked and isolated Valencia, and ordered Shields’s brigade also, which had followed him from San Agustín, to that point.[11]

Smith, arriving at San Gerónimo about an hour before sunset, found all of the commands, except Shields’s, that had been ordered to go there; and he also found that Santa Anna, after hurrying from San Antonio through Coyoacán and San Angel, had placed himself with Pérez’s brigade and seven or eight hundred cavalry and artillery on low hills about one half or three quarters of a mile behind San Gerónimo, and—though checked by Cadwalader’s brigade—was making ready to attack. Smith at once began preparing to dispose of him, while the Mexicans on the hills, after four or five guns arrived, indulged in vivas, music and a little harmless cannonading; but both commanders finally concluded that the hour was now too late for a battle. Santa Anna also decided that an impassable ravine separated him from the Americans, and that he could not prudently expose his men and arms to the rain then imminent; and therefore, leaving his cavalry and artillery behind, he put the rest of his forces under cover at San Angel.[11]

Night and a storm now set in, but behind the curtain of darkness four striking scenes were presented. Scott, the general who seemed to have lost half his army all at once without a battle, sat at headquarters anxious and helpless. Seven times he despatched an officer to his isolated right with orders, and seven times the officer failed to get through. But still he waited—patient, considerate for those about him, hopeful and alert, reflecting no doubt that brave men, skilful officers and the natural strength of San Gerónimo would count. Valencia, on the other hand, feeling that at last he had proved Santa Anna a blunderer, and had forced him into the position of a mere assistant, was jubilant, boastful and literally intoxicated. He reported grandly on his “brilliant day,” and scattered promotions as if already head of the state.[11]

Santa Anna, devoured by passions and perplexities, now sent José Ramiro to Valencia by a circuitous route with orders to retreat at once. Not long afterwards two of Valencia’s aides reached San Angel, bringing news that, instead of being exterminated, thousands of Americans were established in the San Gerónimo woods. Don’t talk to me, Santa Anna cried to the aides, who endeavored to excuse the situation; Valencia is an ambitious, insubordinate sot; he deserves to have his brains blown out, and I will not expose my men to the storm for him; let him spike his guns, make the ammunition useless, and retreat. When Ramiro arrived at the camp, Valencia would not listen to his message, and fiercely demanded ammunition and men; but when his aides reported, he saw his doom.[9] “Traitor, he has sold us!” he cried, storming like a madman in the midst of his troops. Soldiers heard and echoed the cry. Women shrieked. Frightened horses broke loose and galloped into the night. Americans with lights are creeping in behind us, reported Torrejón. The army understood. Scouts were feeling the way. The price had been paid to Santa Anna. Their blood would soon be claimed.[11]

In ignorance of all these outside events the Americans at San Gerónimo, too exhausted to eat, bore the torrents of chilling, beating rain without fires and in darkness as best they could. Some found huts, but most of them lay in the mud or stood up under trees. Smith’s and Riley’s men occupied the lanes, and Shields’s brigade, which stumbled in at about midnight, put up in the road and an orchard. Officers fared like privates. In such a plight, the troops listened for hours to the music and vivas of the enemy, and for their own part could only reflect on the painful and fruitless exertions of the day and on the prospects of the morrow. Without cavalry, without cannon, without reserves of provisions or ammunition, without hope of quarter, they felt that with some 4200 men they might have to face 25,000 exultant Mexicans and any amount of artillery at daybreak. But everybody believed in General Smith.[10] “Here he is!” “Now we’ll have them!” Riley’s soldiers had cried on seeing Smith arrive; and the confidence was not misplaced.[11]

During the afternoon a ravine leading toward Valencia’s rear had been found. Smith seized upon the hint at once, and proposed to attack by that route before daybreak with bayonets only; a conference of officers agreed to his plan; it was decided to notify Scott, and suggest that a diversion be made on Valencia’s front at the proper time; Lee undertook the almost impossible feat of carrying this message across the pedregal; and Officers Tower and Brooks, whose lights—probably occasional matches—Torrejón had reported, were sent off to study the ravine, and prepare to be the guides. As Santa Anna was expected to attack early, Shields accepted the charge of building fires in the morning as if no Americans had left the ground, and holding San Gerónimo.[11]

Two hours after midnight the troops were roused, and at three o’clock Riley began to move. But it was tedious work to marshal the scattered corps in the darkness and rain by touch and whisper, and morning broke before the last were out of the village. The ravine branched deceptively; it was full of rocks, too; and the watery clay, a soldier said, slipped like “soft soap.” Finally, however, the units closed up at about a mile from San Gerónimo, and, partially hidden in a fog, scrambled up to firm ground behind a low hill. As it was now light, the firearms were put in order; and with quick adaptation to the topography, the present arrangement of the Mexicans and their probable movements, General Smith marshalled and instructed the troops.[11]

Riley’s brigade, about 1300 strong, was to be the storming party. Cadwalader’s in halves formed a wing on each side to keep off cavalry. A part of Smith’s, together with the engineer company, was directed to slip along behind elevated ground, and fall upon the flank or rear of a Mexican force posted in advance; and the rest of it, marching by the left, was ordered to strike the camp and a large body of lancers on the flank. Even the possibility of a rear attack from Santa Anna, supposed to be still where he had been seen the evening before, was provided against. Meanwhile the troops that had remained in the pedregal, assembled as well as possible by Twiggs and Lee during the latter part of the night, in accordance with orders from Scott, watched and waited near Padierna under Colonel Ransom of the Ninth Infantry.[11]

Finally a slightly round-shouldered man, with blue eyes, a sandy mustache and sandy hair, walked slowly to the front and looked at his watch. It was about six o’clock. “Are you ready?” he asked in a cheery voice. “Ready!” the troops answered with a meaning smile. He gave them a keen glance. “Men, forward!” he then ordered, for it was General Smith. “Forward, forward!” flew the command through the ranks, and ahead they went.[11]

Struck on front and rear General Mendoza’s advanced corps fired without aiming, turned and bolted; but Ransom’s men, darting across the ravine, gave Valencia something else—something he fancied more serious than Smith’s approach—to think about. Only a pair of 6-pounders bore on Riley, and they fired high. Soon the Mexicans at the breastwork, exchanging shots wildly with Ransom, found that bullets were coming from behind, leaped over the parapet and fled. Attacked by Smith’s men, the lancers gave way and upset the rest of the infantry; and Riley’s column, deployed as well as time and the ground would allow, bore down like a flood. All was now confusion in the camp: infantry, horse, artillery, mules, women, laborers in a mob. Some of the gunners remained at their pieces—chained to them, it was said—but, like the infantry, they aimed little; and almost in a moment, like a bag turned upside down, the camp was empty of all the Mexicans who could get away. Again General Smith drew out his watch. “It has taken just seventeen minutes,” he remarked.[11]

Riley’s brigade halted to secure the prisoners and the spoils, among which—to the frantic delight of the soldiers—were the two cannon lost so nobly at Buena Vista; but the rest of the victorious troops pursued the enemy to San Angel; and the Mexicans fleeing by the turnpike toward Ansaldo, cannonaded from their own camp and running the gantlet of Smith, Ransom and even Shields, who had moved down toward the road, fared badly. Others, including Torrejón and a large part of the cavalry, managed by taking rough paths to reach San Gerónimo and the hills. Valencia also escaped; but Salas, who tried to check the flight, was captured. Seven hundred Mexicans fell, it was estimated; over eight hundred were made prisoners; the captured cannon, including the best that Santa Anna had, and the captured ammunition proved invaluable; and the cost, as reported by Scott, was not over sixty Americans killed and wounded.[11]

AFTER THE BATTLE OF CONTRERAS

Nor were such the only consequences of this lightning-stroke. Santa Anna, having at length decided to rescue Valencia and raised his forces to at least 7000 by drawing Rangel’s reserve brigade from the city, had set out at daybreak for his position of the night before; but when in sight of Valencia’s camp he learned from flying soldiers that all was over, and that his outer line of defences had failed. Angrily striking at fugitives with his whip he turned back, and waited near San Angel for a while, unable to decide anything. Then he sent Rangel to guard the southwest section of Mexico, despatched orders to evacuate San Antonio and Mexicaltzingo, and marched with the rest of his forces to Churubusco. Here priceless time was spent in raving against Valencia—whom he ordered shot at sight—in a passion that almost crazed him. His dominant idea now, so far as he could think at all, was to make the capital a second Troy; and, probably with that in view, he set Pérez’s brigade in motion toward the city.[12]

After a time, however, reason gained the better of desperation, and seeing the necessity of protecting the retreat of the San Antonio garrison, he ordered General Rincón, who was ably seconded by Anaya, to hold the Churubusco convent as long as possible, garrisoned the bridgehead with one of Pérez’s regiments, extended two others far down behind the embankment of the river eastwardly, used a part of the remaining two as a line from the bridgehead to the convent, and stationed the rest on the highway behind.[12]

The convent position included, besides the building proper, a strong church with a parapeted roof, a high stone enclosure provided on the inside with scaffolds for troops, a broad, wet ditch, two outside bastions facing Coyoacán, unfinished but strong breastworks on the west and south, two detached adobe huts pierced with embrasures on their southwest sides, four 8-pounders, three smaller guns, and for garrison some 1500 or 1800 men, consisting of the Mexico battalions named Independencia and Bravos, the San Patricio contingent of American deserters or most of it, and some detachments of other corps; while the bridgehead, a powerful, scientifically constructed work, with four feet of water in the ditch and three heavy cannon, appeared to defy attack. Surveying this excellent position Santa Anna recovered some of his courage, and began work actively to complete the fortifications near the bridge. The untried militia at the convent were almost in despair when they found themselves in the forefront, but he promised to aid them at the critical time.[12]

Scott, for his part, left San Agustín before he knew how Smith’s plan had worked out, met the news on the pedregal, kept on to San Angel, and near that place, amid tumultuous cheering, took command of Pillow’s and Twiggs’s divisions.[13] The road to Mexico by way of Tacubaya lay open, but he could not move now in that direction and leave Worth, Quitman, the artillery, the baggage, the stores and the sick to join him as best they could, exposed—as it was believed—to some 25,000 Mexicans. The first needful step was to capture San Antonio and reunite his army. Worth had already been directed, after the rout of Valencia became known, to attack and also turn that position whenever he should learn that Pillow and Twiggs had gained its rear; and as a cross-road led from San Antonio to Coyoacán, Coyoacán was the proper point of concentration. Scott therefore went there with his troops, and sent Lee, strongly escorted by dragoons and Mounted Rifles, to reconnoitre the enemy and give the preconcerted signal for Worth’s advance. Further to assist that general, Pillow with Cadwalader’s brigade was now ordered down the cross-road.[14]

THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO

Worth did not, however, wait for assistance. At about eleven o’clock he sent Colonel Clarke’s brigade—the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Infantry—and Brevet Colonel C. F. Smith’s battalion from Cuapa to turn San Antonio by the path on the left hand and cut off retreat, and placed Garland, accompanied by Duncan’s battery, in a somewhat sheltered spot, as near as possible to the fortifications, with orders to advance on hearing the other brigade at work. Clarke’s tortuous path seemed to be three miles long, and as it lay for two thirds of the distance in the pedregal, where the troops had to slide and scramble in single file, two hours were occupied in the march. The Mexicans, therefore, warned by seeing this movement—which they vainly attempted to check—as well as ordered by Santa Anna to retire, made the utmost efforts, after spiking some of their guns, to escape with the rest of them. But the garrison of San Antonio and the neighboring fortifications, which consisted of the Hidalgo and Victoria battalions of Mexico and some other militia, were wholly unfitted to execute a difficult retreat in the face of the enemy. Not far from its middle Clarke struck their column; and while the first part, led by General Bravo, kept on toward Churubusco bridge, the second broke up and scattered.[15]

By this time Garland, having found by pushing a company forward that San Antonio had been evacuated, hastened on to unite with Clarke. The enemy were quickly driven from fortifications of a minor importance at Sotepingo, and the division then rushed forward after Bravo, while the Mexicans—a mass of cavalry, infantry and artillery, wagons, mules, women, servants, carriages and camp-followers—made all possible speed. Owing to the effects of the rains, two Mexican guns and a number of wagons were mired on the way; and near the Churubusco bridge Pérez’s brigade, hard pressed by the Americans from San Angel, crowded in upon the stream of fugitives.[15]

So it happened that when Engineer Stevens climbed the church tower of Coyoacán at about noon to reconnoitre, he observed a large body of Mexican troops pouring along the highway from San Antonio. Apparently Santa Anna was drawing all his forces to the city. Dense fields of corn six feet high or more almost hid the works at the convent. Perceiving, however, the nose of a bastion, Stevens concluded there might be one gun at that point, which he thought could be rushed; and a prisoner mentioned only two guns. The entire American army, reacting from the gloom of the previous evening, exultant over Smith’s victory, and almost intoxicated by the change from storm to splendid sunshine, was now feeling invincible, eager and over-confident. Stevens merely shared the contagion; his report—precipitate and misleading, as he fully admitted later—signified that without loss of a moment the San Antonio garrison ought by all means to be intercepted; and so Scott did what we know it had not been his intention to do: ordered Twiggs immediately to the convent and highway by the direct road. “Make haste, my sons,” he called to the troops, “or they will be gone before you reach them!”[16]

At his instance and by way of precaution, engineers were sent on to make investigations; but, as the case appeared simple and urgent, the investigating and the fighting began hastily together. In a haphazard way the Mounted Rifles, or at least a part of them, became engaged; then the First Artillery advanced; and soon the rest of Smith’s brigade—the Third Infantry—besides the engineer company and Taylor’s battery were thrown in. Rincón, a gray-haired Spanish veteran, deceived our generals, for he desired to save ammunition, and therefore did not open his artillery fire till the Americans had come within musket range. To pause after the conflict began would have chilled the ardor of the troops and encouraged the enemy. Victory or defeat were the only alternatives, and a defeat could not be thought of.[16]

Victory did not arrive, however; so now the Second and the Seventh Infantry, led by Riley, attacked the Mexican right. Amidst the corn the American infantry became scattered, yet in the same haphazard way fought on; and Taylor, placed in a very exposed position before the state of things was understood, fired at short musket range with beautiful precision and rapidity. But the Mexicans, inspired by good leaders and by the example of the American deserters, who aimed the cannon, stood their ground. From parapets and bastions poured sheets of unceasing flame, sally followed sally, and guns at the bridgehead coöperated. In an hour and a half Taylor drove the enemy from the walls and from the roof of the church, but he lost twenty-four men and fourteen horses killed and wounded. The battery had to be withdrawn, and victory seemed almost beyond reach.[16]

Worth had now been attacking the bridgehead for half an hour or more. Hurrying the troops along, without giving them definite instructions, at a speed limited only by their wind and the obstacles in their way, he had left the Sixth Infantry on the highway, placed the Fifth and the Eighth at the right of it, and sent the rest of his infantry obliquely against the Mexican left; and then, without a reconnaissance of the bridgehead, the Sixth was ordered to charge whatever lay in its front.[15]

Probably the army contained no better corps, but it recoiled twice in confusion under a terrific storm of iron and lead. Valor was not lacking, but the men were dumfounded to come “butt-end first,” as a soldier put it, upon such a fort so strongly held, when they had supposed they were chasing a parcel of rabbits; and their numbers were unequal to the task. Officers as well as men showed every sign of panic. The regiment could not be kept on the highway; and the troops in the tall corn on the right accomplished no more. The ground was soft there; and it was cut up with dikes and with deep, wide ditches containing about three feet of water. The men fought, but they fought in general disorder. C. F. Smith found himself with not more than twenty of his battalion at hand. Even the artillery, the backbone of the army, failed now, for Duncan’s light pieces could not challenge the bridgehead squarely on the highway, and the ground beside it was unsuitable for them; while occasional fire from the convent and the explosion of an ammunition wagon abandoned by the Mexicans added to the difficulties.[15]

At the same time, besides these two combats which Scott had not expected, one planned by him was taking place. A few minutes after sending Twiggs toward Churubusco he ordered Pierce—and presently Shields also—to follow a road leading north from Coyoacán, cross Churubusco River, and move toward Santa Anna’s rear, so as to protect the American flank and rear, favor the attack on the convent, and cut off the retreat of the Mexicans. The route adopted by the troops after leaving the road took them for a mile and a half through cornfields and marshes, and placed them near the highway, about three quarters of a mile north of the bridgehead, not far from the hacienda of Los Portales. To parry the blow Santa Anna at once moved in that direction with the Fourth Ligero, the Tulancingo regiment and most of the Eleventh Line, his finest corps, extending his men—perhaps 2200 in all—until they almost overlapped the Americans; while some 1500 or 2000 cavalry, probably consisting of the horse that had followed him to San Angel reinforced by that which had escaped from Contreras, menaced—though afraid to attack—Shields’s left.[17]

Precisely what occurred now cannot be stated, for apparently most of the reporting officers were more anxious to conceal than to disclose facts; but it seems clear that Shields handled the men clumsily, that his own regiments fell into disorder when charging and shrank from the devouring Mexican fire, and that Pierce’s brigade, composed of excellent material but officered to a large extent with political favorites, actually skulked. The Mexicans, on the other hand, finding two ditches along the highway to protect them from the dreaded bayonet and an embankment to screen them somewhat from bullets, fought stiffly. Shields was therefore unable, with his six hundred good men and two small howitzers, to make any impression, and after a time his troops huddled wherever they could in the shelter of some buildings.[17]

But finally, between three and four o’clock, the spell broke. Worth’s men, though astonished and for a time dismayed, had no thought of giving up. “Victory or death” was not a phrase to them, but a conviction. Though dikes, ditches, bad ground, corn higher than their heads, and the Mexican artillery fire broke up their organization, personal courage and personal leadership survived. In smaller or larger groups they fought on. Santa Anna, by taking the Fourth Ligero from Pérez to defend the rear, deducted half the strength of his left wing, and no doubt Shields’s operations, very suggestive of the American methods used in previous battles, tended to make the troops at the bridgehead nervous. Gradually a part of the unlucky Sixth and men of C. F. Smith’s and Garland’s commands, working toward the extreme American right, out-reached the enemy, crossed the river, turned the Mexican line, and moved on toward the highway. This created great alarm. The fate of Valencia was recalled. Many of the officers wilted. Ammunition seems partially to have failed; and at length, under a still galling fire, some of the Eighth Infantry, followed by more of the Fifth, waded the ditch of the bridgehead—twenty feet broad it was—climbed over the parapet or pushed through the embrasures, and settled the question hand to hand.[15]

At once Duncan planted two of his guns on the highway near the convent, and for ten or fifteen minutes, aided by a piece or two at the bridgehead, he fired with a judgment, rapidity and accuracy that delighted the on-lookers. By this time two of Rincón’s guns at the right of the convent and one of the other pieces had become unserviceable; the ammunition, so lavishly expended, had failed the infantry; and the loss of the bridgehead, which stood on higher and commanding ground, was recognized as a most serious blow. The artillery commandant began to move a cannon from the front side to the right. Only two guns were in play on the front; and our Third Infantry, noting the slackened fire, dashed over the parapet at the left of the convent. Still the American deserters would not permit a white flag to be shown, and the garrison retired sullenly to the interior of the building. But Captain J. M. Smith, seeing that active resistance was over, now put up a white handkerchief himself to prevent further bloodshed. The signal of surrender stopped Duncan’s work, too; and the Mexicans, astonished by the consideration shown them, laid down their arms.[18]

Pérez and Bravo with a large part of the troops were now on the way to Mexico via Mexicaltzingo and Old Peñón, and others were taking flight along the highway, pursued by Worth’s division. Shields perceived what was occurring, and harangued his brigade. “The South Carolinians will follow you to the death,” answered the “Tigers,” as they were called by Scott. Many, if not all, of the New Yorkers joined them; Pierce’s officers mustered pluck enough to guard the left; and once more a charge was made. It proved no easy work, though, even now. First and last more than a third of Shields’s brigade were killed or wounded. Brave, handsome Butler, commanding the Tigers, and his lieutenant colonel went down, and Colonel Burnett of the New Yorkers fell. But at last Shields carried the day, captured nearly four hundred Mexicans, and met Worth’s cheering van on the highway.[17]

All joined then in the pursuit, supported with a captured 6-pounder and a howitzer, and took liberal toll as they went, until, after charging nearly two miles, they were halted by Worth. Orders from the commander-in-chief to the same effect soon arrived. Four companies of dragoons under Harney were permitted, however, to keep on, and when the sight of a battery led him to pull up, Captain Kearny of the First resolved to charge the guns, and galloped ahead.[19]

“Oh, what a glorious sight it was to see Phil Kearny riding into them!” wrote a soldier. His own troop were picked men; they rode picked horses—all iron-gray—that now seemed endowed with supernatural strength; and his other troop were fit comrades. Standing quite upright in the stirrups they looked like centaurs. Little by little the rear fours, hearing the trumpet sound the recall, dropped off; but the leader and about a dozen others kept on like a swift vessel, dashing the billows of humanity right and left. The battery, which stood at the garita, fired upon friend and foe alike. Still the little group arrived there, leaped from their horses to carry it, and found—that they were alone. The panic of the enemy, however, saved them. Tearing loose and springing into the saddle, they got away. But a grape-shot was faster than Kearny; and so, losing an arm but winning a brevet, he finished valiantly the battle of Churubusco.[19]

AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO

Santa Anna’s total loss for the day—the killed, the wounded and especially the missing—may be roughly estimated as 10,000. He admitted that he lost more than a third of his men. After he was able to find where he stood (August 30) the Army of the East contained 11,381 privates. Alvarez had 2447 privates (August 26); and, besides remnants of Valencia’s troops, there were doubtless many small bodies of militia. Scott estimated the Mexicans killed and wounded as 4297, and 2637 prisoners, including eight generals, were reported; while the American ordnance was more than trebled, and the scanty stock of ammunition enormously increased. Out of 8497 engaged in the two battles, we lost fourteen officers and 119 privates killed, sixty and 805 respectively wounded, and some forty of the rank and file missing, who probably lost their lives.[20]

The high moral qualities displayed by our troops made the day glorious, as Hitchcock said, “in the highest degree”; and the army, naturally overestimating the numbers of the enemy, felt exceedingly proud. Scott, riding about the field, gray and massive, was hailed by the troops as the very genius of power and command.

they felt; and when he addressed them with the eloquence of a soldier’s heart, it seemed as if the cheers that followed must have shaken the “Halls.” Nature, however, appeared to view the situation differently. The mountains above Padierna wrinkled their foreheads with still deeper furrows, or knit them with still darker scowls. Dense black clouds, preceded by gleaming heralds, rushed suddenly across the sky. Lightning flashed in sheets. Thunders rolled until the earth seemed to tremble. Torrents of rain deluged the ground; and in a little while, almost like something heavy and solid, night swiftly and prematurely descended.[21]

---

After fighting ceased, the Americans found temporary quarters wherever they could. Most of Shields’s command occupied Los Portales “in a most deplorable condition,” and Worth’s division remained at the same point or in Churubusco. Some of Pillow’s men retired to San Antonio, and there passed the night without rations, blankets, fires or lights, while others moved across to Mixcoac. A part of Twiggs’s lay in a muddy field without shelter, while the rest made their way to Coyoacán or San Angel. Some of the troops, covered with sticky mud, slept in a barn on straw, and acquired an extremely curious appearance. For all it was a hard night, and perhaps hardest for the officer on guard. The hours crawled. Thoughts of the battle, the morrow and the distant home barely stirred his leaden brain. Every instant, drowsiness threatened to become stupor. Now and then a sentry’s challenge, the snort of a horse, the blast of a bugle roused him with a start. At last came a streak in the east. He called the drummer, and ordered him to “beat off.” Instantly the sharp roll was taken up by others. The bustle of men awoke; and the troops were alive again. Joy and pride welled up in their hearts, but the sadness of bereavement also and a sense of disappointment. They seemed to have won the race but lost the prize. Why had they not slept in the city?[1]

There were adequate military reasons for this. It was believed that Santa Anna still had some 20,000 men, and what fortifications defended the interior of Mexico no one pretended to say. Three surprises had met the Americans during the past forty-eight hours. They had sick and wounded, prisoners, wagons and captured material to look after. They were scattered, unmunitioned, spent. Not a few had become ill. In spite of Scott’s precise orders to carry rations a large number had gone hungry for about a day, and many had fasted longer. The stock of provisions had practically been exhausted. If repulsed, the troops would have faced starvation; if successful, they would have been a disorganized mass of ravenous, infuriated soldiers in a hostile city. Almost all, even officers, were eager for a revel in the “Halls”; they would largely have scattered for something to eat and something to drink; many would soon have been intoxicated; and fearful scenes, costly alike to them and the inhabitants, would have disgraced the victory and imperilled the army.[1]

AMERICAN EFFORTS TO MAKE PEACE

Besides, the aim of the United States was peace; it appeared certain that in view of the battle just won the Mexicans would be disposed to offer acceptable terms; and resident Americans as well as neutrals had assured Scott that by taking the city, breaking up the government, dispersing the sensible and substantial men who desired a settlement, and perhaps rousing the people to desperation, he would be defeating his own government. On the other hand, as the General had reckoned before leaving Puebla, the presence of a victorious American army waiting at the gate seemed likely to excite intense fears of slaughter and sack, and prove a most effective argument for negotiation. Consequently, though sure he could break his way in, Scott deliberately sacrificed military glory, and halted. The wish to end hostilities was the dominant consideration; and, fully to understand this, we must now place ourselves at Washington, and then return to our present point by a singularly winding route.[1]

Both in his war Message of May 11, 1846, and later, Polk announced that he would be ready to negotiate whenever Mexico would make or even hear propositions; and he sought a listening ear with a persistence due to several causes: a real desire to end the war, a naïve ignorance of Mexican psychology, the exigencies of home politics and foreign relations, a natural predilection on his own part and on Buchanan’s for schemes and tactics, and behind all a sincere wish, in accordance with our long-standing sentiment and policy, for the prosperity and friendship of the sister republic. Taylor was therefore instructed to place himself on confidential terms, if possible, at the Mexican headquarters with a view to bringing about negotiations; and in line with this policy Worth, while at Saltillo, offered pleasant sentiments to Santa Anna on the subject of peace.[2]

The battles on the Rio Grande and the unwelcome effects of the blockade tended to sober Mexico, as did the aloofness of Great Britain; and Marcy counted not a little on the settlement of the Oregon question. Intimations were received from Consul Black in June and July, 1846, that not only all thoughtful citizens but Paredes himself desired to reach an agreement. Bravo and his Cabinet, who temporarily assumed the reins of government, felt more strongly in the same way, and were more free to act; other signs also pointed in that direction; and it was hoped that Santa Anna, should he regain power, would favor peace. The American administration, on the other hand, felt much embarrassed by the unexpected seriousness of the problems involved in the conflict. So on the twenty-seventh of July Buchanan addressed the Mexican minister of relations, waiving as undesirable all discussion upon the causes of the war, and inviting negotiations in the most conciliatory manner.[4]

But the government of Salas, which received this overture, had attacked Paredes for slackness in prosecuting the hostilities; and he now counted upon this issue for maintaining the power it had given him. Besides, wrote Bankhead, the Mexicans were still confident they could hold their own against the United States; and the war spirit ran so strongly that Santa Anna, returning from exile to treat, remained to fight.[3] Rejón, therefore, answering Buchanan in a lofty and cutting strain, refused to ignore the causes of the war, and only promised that Congress, on meeting in December, would take the matter up. In other words, as an American newspaper observed, he said in effect: We are sorry that you feel so tired of the campaign; as for ourselves, we are quite comfortable. The reply was not one to fire the popular heart of the United States; and without committing Mexico to anything, it required our Executive to prepare for a long and arduous contest. Nor was Salas reassuring when he laid the subject before Congress. “If Mexico fights with constancy and courage, hers will be the triumph,” he proclaimed, and therefore the government has not desired to hear proposals of peace. Polk answered Rejón by ordering the hostilities to be conducted more harshly, and by announcing in his Message at the beginning of December that an indemnity covering the costs of the war, as well as our claims, would be required; but the Mexican Congress did nothing.[4]

About a week after Buchanan addressed the minister of relations in July, Polk recommended to Congress a naïve measure admirably fitted to embarrass peace negotiations as much as it was intended to facilitate them. This was an appropriation of $2,000,000 to be used in that business for “extraordinary expenses.” Probably the measure, vigorously though confidentially pressed by the Executive, would have passed; but Senator Davis killed it by speaking against time. In the following session a similar proposition granting three millions came up about the middle of January, 1847, and on March 3, after every Congressman with a voice had talked himself out, it was carried. The natural result followed. Even at our Capitol there were open though false charges that bribery was contemplated, and to the Mexican that design seemed of course transparently plain. No public man who cares for his reputation can vote for peace now, said the Diario.[5]

The sentiment in favor of offering to treat with our weak and unfortunate neighbor—as illustrated by formal action in Rhode Island and New York, for example—was in fact strong. Even the British minister at Washington recognized that the feeling in the Senate was “entirely in favor of generous and pacific measures towards Mexico.” Such Whigs as Webster and Winthrop demanded that a commission be sent; Benton favored that idea; and about the middle of January, 1847, it was powerfully supported by Atocha, who presented himself at the capital. This cunning and perfectly unscrupulous intriguer, who had been expelled by Santa Anna’s enemies in 1845 because he represented the dictator’s corrupt financial methods and then by Santa Anna himself in September, 1846, because he knew too much about the Liberator’s dealings with Mackenzie, readily proved his intimacy with leading Mexicans, created the belief that he was the government’s peace agent, induced our administration to propose on January 18 a meeting of American and Mexican commissioners at Jalapa or Havana, and was made the bearer of Buchanan’s despatch to the minister of relations.[6]

Undoubtedly, though invested with no diplomatic functions, Atocha was expected to do much personally; but in this he totally failed. At Vera Cruz the people attempted to murder him. At Mexico he was ordered to leave almost immediately, and was prevented from talking with any person of influence; and such use as he contrived to make of the pen, in suggesting terms of peace to Rejón, proved utterly fruitless. In short, the American messenger was handled with tongs, and he was back at Washington about the twentieth of March with an offensively worded note, refusing to treat until all Mexican lands and waters should be evacuated by our forces. Clearly this was a most unhappy overture.[6]

WHY MEXICO WOULD NOT TREAT

Many circumstances combined to inspire such boldness on the part of our antagonist. Aside from the personal interest of many public men in continuing the war, and the belief, prompted by vanity and encouraged by specious arguments, both domestic and European, that natural defences, latent resources and the military ardor of brave citizens fighting for their homes would enable her to beat untrained money-grubbers and “cowardly adventurers,” operating far from their base—aside from all this, hatred of “the rapacious invader,” a fear that peace would only lead to fresh demands and fresh encroachments, and the fine theory that no people struggling for their independence could be vanquished exerted a strong influence.[7]

The fact that an actual occupation of California would have to be reckoned with could hardly be faced. To make peace without first gaining a victory seemed humiliating, sure to be disadvantageous, and likely to make dispirited Mexico the sport and prey of the whole world; and Santa Anna in particular felt strongly on this point, because his personal future as well as the cause of the nation required some show of success. No peace is possible now except the peace of the grave—national and racial extinction—it was insisted. Many reasoned that Polk, to satisfy the United States, would have to demand, as matters stood, a huge indemnity. Why regret a war that is bringing so much gold into the country; a war that will overthrow Santa Anna, the corruptionists, the intriguers, the military men and the sham patriots; a war that will put an end to extortion and finally unite all the good elements of the nation, demanded not a few; and why make sacrifices to stop it, when peace will bring civil wars, which are worse?[7]

Better subjugation than surrender, cried some in desperation; while others believed that an American conquest and annexation would extinguish privilege and monopoly, set up a pure democracy, ensure stability and order, bring in a flood of enterprising northerners, and make the country prosper. The clergy in particular, anxious to preserve their property and their ease, felt rather more than willing to accept such a dénouement. On the other hand, many believed that our people neither would nor could bear for any length of time the expense of the contest. This was the key to Rejón’s policy, as he told the Spanish minister. It was, therefore, only necessary to protract the war a little—meanwhile allowing the wrath of Heaven time to pass away—in order to reach the very pinnacle of glory.[7]

European journals offered much encouragement. Mexico need only be obstinate, advised the London Times, and it seemed a most agreeable prescription. The United States cannot long maintain the necessary troops, predicted the Globe. The Americans are tired of the war, need peace more than Mexico, have no disciplined soldiers, cannot follow up their successes, and with good reason dread British interference, remarked some of the French papers. Even more significant were expressions coming from the United States. Hold fast, and you can make “a brilliant treaty,” said a letter. All are disgusted with the hostilities, and in four years this country will kneel and pray for peace, declared others. Persistent American denunciations of the war as dishonorable made the idea of submission look shameful to our enemies. No nation as brave and numerous as the Mexicans have ever been conquered, announced the New York Express. The American treasury will soon be empty, predicted the National Intelligencer; and that influential paper endorsed the view that our antagonist could wear us out. Calhoun used all his powers to show that it would be “folly” to push the war, and ruin to push it successfully. Still more encouraging were the Whig orators. In the voice of doom Webster threatened the President with impeachment; and Corwin exclaimed, “Call home your army; I will feed and clothe it no longer.” Reports of a Whig revolution circulated at Mexico; and the belief, accepted by many in Europe also, that at any rate the Whigs would soon come into power and reverse the policy of the American government, was confidently entertained by our foes.[7]

But nothing proved so comforting, so cheering, as the conduct of our government. The call for 12-months volunteers appeared to indicate the limit of our endurance, and invited procrastination. Polk’s assurances, following so many earlier assurances from American Presidents, that for our own sake we desired Mexico to be strong, prosperous and friendly, implied that we did not intend to crowd her far. Our conciliatory language and repeated efforts to negotiate were noted as clear signs of weakness. The employment of an agent like Atocha seemed a confession of impotence; and the appropriation of three millions for secret expenses in order to obtain peace, as El Republicano put it, looked like throwing up the sponge. Polk wishes to exchange a bad war for a good bargain, sneered Le Constitutionnel of Paris. An extension of our boundary was believed to be one aim of the negotiations we urged; and the Mexicans felt, said Pakenham, that we should not think of buying territory, if able to take it by force. The idea of selling it under such circumstances was viewed as doubly degrading.[7]

Happily saved by his ignorance of Mexican character and sentiment from the mortification of knowing all this, fully conscious that the war was unpopular even with his own party, and hopeful that Buena Vista and the capture of Vera Cruz had affected Mexico, Polk favored the idea of a commission. Benton, however, would not have Slidell on the board; the President could not well ignore Slidell unless a higher official—the secretary of state himself—should be made sole representative; and no first-class man could go to Mexico and dance attendance on the whims, delays and insults of a government that scornfully held off. Indeed, the nation could not afford to place the head of our state department or a commission of leading public figures in such a predicament.[8]

TRIST APPOINTED PEACE COMMISSIONER

At length, however, Buchanan’s resourceful mind thought of sending Nicholas P. Trist, a protégé of his own and now chief clerk of the state department. Trist’s dignity, it was doubtless thought, would not be too delicate; his action, it seemed evident, could be controlled; and the glory of success, if a treaty should be made, would belong to the administration—particularly the secretary of state—and not exalt the agent in any dangerous political sense. Besides, the chief clerk was a man of agreeable and impressive appearance, admitted talents, unusual industry and the highest character; he had studied at West Point; he knew diplomatic business; as consul at Havana for a term of years, he had become acquainted with Spanish-American traits; and he spoke the language of Mexico fluently. He was therefore immediately appointed as Polk’s agent—though officially styled “Commissioner Plenipotentiary”—to be paid, not as a diplomatic representative, but from the appropriation for the contingent expenses of foreign intercourse.[8]

The appointment was not, however, entirely felicitous. Trist, associated with Jefferson as law-student and as grandson by marriage and associated with Jackson as private secretary, had sojourned on Olympus and tasted the ambrosia of the gods; but he did not possess their divine constitution, and ambrosia disagreed with him. It gave him queer feelings in the head that were not exactly growing pains, and produced a state of mind that was neither of heaven nor of earth. The Declaration of Independence was always resounding in his thoughts, and mentally he was always walking up the stairs of the White House arm in arm with a hero, sage and prophet; but he overlooked the foundation of downright common sense on which great men build, and lacked the humor that might at least have kept him near the ground.[8]

Aspiring, as he said, to influence the course of the world by drawing supernal truths from the region of abstract speculation, he resembled the gazing astronomer who walked into the ditch; and a deep, sticky ditch lay just before him. Cordial coöperation with Scott was almost indispensable for the proper execution of his work; but he thought he disliked the man, he knew that Polk and the Cabinet disliked him, and his chiefs—probably afraid that he might be overpowered by the Whig general—took superabundant pains to brace him. Polk urged him to consort with Pillow, whom he represented as a Cincinnatus compounded with a Scipio Africanus; and Buchanan, uprearing his big person impressively, expanding in his courtly, diplomatic style, and beaming upon the artless, ethereal chief clerk with his uncommunicative blue eyes, intimated that by faithfully carrying out the wishes of the government he might become the next Democratic nominee for the Presidency![8]

NEGOTIATIONS OPENED

Trist was equipped with a commission, credentials, letters from the secretaries of the war and the navy departments to Scott and Perry, a draft or projet of a treaty, instructions directing him to inform our military and naval commanders, if Mexico should make and ratify the treaty, and a sealed despatch to the minister of relations, in which Buchanan pointed out that an evacuation of Mexican territory would be a surrender of all our costly gains, but announced that a commissioner, ranking second in our state department, would attend the army, and be ready at all times to negotiate. Ostensibly a mere bearer of despatches, the chief clerk hastened incognito to New Orleans, reached Vera Cruz on May 6, fell very sick there, and forwarded to Scott both Marcy’s letter and Buchanan’s despatch, which was to be placed at once in the hands of the Mexican commander. He was authorized—not ordered, as he should have been—to let the General see his own instructions and his copy of the sealed despatch, which would have explained the plans of the government; but instead of doing this he merely wrote a letter of his own.[9]

What that letter said was never disclosed; but we know that it proceeded from a truly amiable but high-strung, “top-lofty” man, who felt expressly Called by Destiny to perform a Great National Act and incidentally to put Winfield Scott where he belonged.

The General’s reply, on the other hand, is extant, and can readily be understood. He was already in a state of mind regarding the administration. Friends had warned him against it since his departure from the United States, and the warnings had seemed to be coming true. After Polk had promised him confidence and coöperation, and after he as a grateful return had assisted Polk with the Whigs, the President had immediately branded him before the world as unfit, and outraged his natural pride as a military man, by trying to have a civilian placed over him. Polk had infringed upon his rightful power to discipline unruly subordinates; his requisitions for vessels, troops and supplies had not been met; and now, though general-in-chief, he was required to transmit a despatch, doubtless bearing seriously upon the war, without knowing its contents or using a proper discretion as to its opportuneness—a requirement that Marcy did not undertake to defend; and he read in the Secretary’s letter these words: “Mr. Trist is clothed with such diplomatic powers as will authorize him to enter into arrangements with the government of Mexico for the suspension of hostilities.” This looked mysterious and, in view of Polk’s course toward him, alarming. He believed that in a highly important respect the management of the campaign had been taken from him, and he felt that he was to be degraded before his army, the Mexicans and the public at large by a clerk from the state department, of whom he had known at Washington just enough to believe he disliked him.[9]

It seemed unjust and insulting; and being an irascible, overworked, over-worried soldier and master of language, seven of whose regiments had just gone home unexpectedly, he answered as might have been foreseen. Trist, angry, ill, conscious to his pen’s point of every convolution, involution, evolution, ramification and complication of his mental processes, and unaware of Marcy’s blundering phraseology, replied at a length and in a tone that were enough to drive Scott wild; and when he finally reached headquarters on May 14, though Scott provided amply for his dignity and comfort, the two were not on speaking terms, and further epistolary exchanges only widened the breach. I fear Scott and Trist have got to writing, groaned Marcy, who knew them both; if so, all is over. As for the sealed despatch, on the grounds that it was doubtful whether the present circumstances warranted its presentation, and that anyhow a proper escort for protection against guerillas could not then be afforded, it was returned to the commissioner.[9]

On the sixth of June, therefore, Trist wrote a letter to Bankhead, explaining the character of Buchanan’s despatch, asking him to make known the existence of the despatch and Trist’s presence with the army, and inquiring whether at a proper time that minister would transmit the paper to the Mexican government. Bankhead, as we know, strongly desired peace. The interests of the British merchants at Puebla and the capital and of consul-general Mackintosh, who not only was in business but had made large advances to Santa Anna, lay in the same direction; and hence Edward Thornton, a member of the British legation, called on Trist at Puebla five days later.[10] Trist’s verbal explanations of his government’s aims proved satisfactory, and soon the despatch arrived at its destination.[12]

The law of April 20 had forbidden, however, all negotiations with the United States. Ibarra, the minister of relations, therefore, replied to Buchanan that his communication would be laid before Congress, and Santa Anna promised Bankhead that he would use his best efforts to have it considered promptly and favorably. Meantime the public disputed fiercely whether an American proposition should be heard. Many of course denounced the idea, but others said it would place Mexico in a better position to listen, than to reject a proffer of peace without knowing its terms. The Diario—that is to say, the President—advocated this opinion, and the peace feeling, represented by the most sober and intelligent citizens, especially of the mercantile class, and supported by the sensible arguments of El Razonador, showed no little strength.[12]

June 24 Thornton visited Puebla again, delivered Ibarra’s reply to Buchanan, stated that Santa Anna had openly declared in favor of negotiations, and added that Santa Anna felt—as did Bankhead—that an immediate attack upon the capital would be most unfortunate for the cause of peace. Trist, therefore, perhaps having had pains in the head for some time that were growing pains, addressed Scott on the subject, and sent him the official documents that explained his mission. The General replied in a friendly and high-minded style. The two met. Each discovered that his impression of the other had been radically incorrect. When Trist became very ill again, as he soon did, Scott anxiously went through his personal stores for guava marmalade; and they became intimate and mutually admiring friends. The commander-in-chief cordially proposed to disregard for the sake of his country every thought of personal glory, and he was ready to assume all needful responsibility.[12]

SANTA ANNA’S EMBARRASSMENTS

In Mexico, however, a lubricant almost always had to be applied in government affairs, and that lubricant was gold. Knowing that the United States eagerly desired peace and had already appropriated millions to gain it, not a few Mexicans would have felt they sinned against nature and custom had they been willing to oblige us for nothing. Santa Anna’s greed overtopped the mountains. Rejón was well understood to be corrupt. Valencia, one of the loudest declaimers against peace, had a large family, was old and was poor; and in Santa Anna’s opinion he desired to be a little more comfortable. Numerous minor figures, more or less prominent in Congress, also appreciated comfort. The British merchants, with whom “arrangements” were a regular feature of dealings with the government, believed the Americans would have to apply the lubricant. Such was Bankhead’s opinion, and on his second visit Thornton intimated as much. Scott, though he would not have attempted to corrupt an honest person, considered it no worse to employ a “statesman” than a spy, if the statesman desired to serve him; and he believed that without the use of money a year of bloodshed would not force Mexico to sign an acceptable treaty. He offered, therefore, to provide the requisite funds for carrying out Thornton’s idea, and Trist welcomed his assistance.[12]

Santa Anna doubtless felt eager to obtain peace provided he could remain in authority, and that proviso was natural, for otherwise he would have lost a position he loved, and exile or death would have been his early portion; but it was not easy to calculate the chances. Buchanan’s despatch seemed to many a fresh sign of weakness. Scott had less than half the numbers that Marcy had promised, and many inferred that no more good troops could be sent. For a nation to succumb before less than 10,000 isolated men, poorly trained and poorly supplied, seemed ridiculous and even irrational. Trist’s lack of prestige was another offence to Mexican pride. The charge of collusion, supported by the known fact that an American officer had visited Santa Anna in Cuba, manacled him; his countless enemies were awake and implacable; and he found it necessary to deny that he thought of treating.[12]

The Coalition opposed all thoughts of peace. Fearful of responsibility and paralyzed by personal and factional intrigues, Congress would not assemble. Nobody of influence had the courage to advocate what all knew to be necessary. Each party held back, hoping the other would make a tactical blunder of that sort. The law of April 20 towered squarely in the way. A caricature represented Polk amputating Santa Anna’s remaining leg, and the ether sponges were labelled “3,000,000 pesos.” As the President and his friends could see no way out of the predicament, he decided—so the Spanish minister reported—to smash his army against Scott’s, hoping that a treaty would then be acceptable to the nation. But the loss of his troops would have left him powerless; and he confined himself now to advising, as did the British, that Scott should alarm the capital by advancing toward it.[12]

At length, however, an arrangement for a meeting of Congress was made by the factions, and on July 13 that august body convened; but it referred Buchanan’s letter back to the administration as executive business, declaring at the same time against an “ignominious” treaty, and leaving untouched the law of April 20; and then practically, though not in form, it broke up. Santa Anna was now inclined to hold that Congress had abandoned him, negotiate a treaty of peace as a military act, and carry it through by means of the American lubricant. Three days later, therefore, after discussing the matter with Pillow and the commander-in-chief, Trist formally asked the coöperation of Scott in providing $10,000 at once and promising to hand over a million whenever a treaty should be ratified by Mexico; and Scott not only assented,[11] but paid the smaller sum that day, as bread upon the waters, out of his fund for secret expenses.[12]

The outlook seemed favorable. Pedraza and Baranda, both of them in favor of a settlement, were virtually decided upon as the Mexican commissioners, and July 27 Santa Anna called his generals together—presumably to bring them round. But Valencia arrived that day from San Luis Potosí with his army, loudly declaiming for war and closely watching for a slip on Santa Anna’s part; Scott’s delay about advancing weakened the plan; and so the council of generals did nothing. Santa Anna now hesitated more and more. Both he and his officers became encouraged by the accumulation of troops and war material. Finally they concluded that a triumph lay within their reach, and the idea of making peace lost its attractiveness. Scott for his part allowed the negotiations to have no influence on his military plans. He doubtless hoped that a white flag and an offer to treat would meet him on the way to Mexico; but as they did not come, those plans were unflinchingly executed, and our arms triumphed.[12]

Soon after the battle of Churubusco ended, he returned to San Agustín, and as the initial step toward peace negotiations wrote a note summoning Mexico City to surrender. But Santa Anna did not wait for it. The town was in a dreadful state of confusion and panic. Wounded or demoralized soldiers could be seen everywhere. Many roamed about the streets, crying out at the slightest alarm, “Here come the Yankees!” Astounded by the American victories and utterly disheartened by the incompetence, cowardice and quarrels of their leaders, many felt that God had pronounced the doom of Belshazzar against “this accursed Babylon.” Hence, though Santa Anna rallied troops as well as possible, he felt that an assault could not be repulsed, and at about midnight had Pacheco, then minister of relations, address a despatch to Buchanan proposing the negotiations requested so many times by the American government.[13] The purpose of the despatch, which Bankhead transmitted open to Trist with an appeal from himself to heed it, was to prevent the Americans from entering the city; and the Spanish minister, who was consulted with reference to it, agreed that in view of Polk’s repeated assurances it could not fail to have that effect.[14]

AN ARMISTICE

Thornton and Mackintosh also brought their influence to bear; and the next morning, while Scott was preparing to take up battering or assaulting positions to warrant the summons, General Mora met him at Coyoacán with a proposal for a truce. The terms of this proposal were not satisfactory; but Scott sent back by him an overture for a short armistice. This was accepted by Santa Anna as a gift from heaven. Commissioners to arrange the terms were appointed the next day, and on the twenty-fourth ratifications of their agreement settled the matter. The army, though its entire confidence in Scott prevented all trouble, felt profoundly dissatisfied; but with a total disregard of personal considerations the General took what reasonably seemed to him the wise course.[14]

Scott, who was now at Tacubaya with Trist, held his troops at command—Worth and the dragoons at Tacubaya, Pillow at Mixcoac, Twiggs about four miles farther out, and Quitman at San Agustín—in such a manner as to be fairly safe himself, and to threaten the western and southern approaches of the city. The well men cleaned their clothes and arms, and the sick and wounded soon found themselves comfortable and cheerful. Several Mexican Congressmen among the prisoners were set free. About half a million of needed specie was obtained from the city—principally and perhaps entirely by cashing drafts on the United States government. A large quantity of provisions, contracted for while the Americans lay at Puebla, was brought out, and a train of wagons proceeded for the same purpose to the valley of Toluca, where Olaguíbel, ostensibly the implacable enemy of the Americans, helped them to obtain supplies. Apples, pears and peaches of an indifferent quality were now ripe, and the soldiers lived fairly well.[15]

Santa Anna was even busier than Scott. Measures were taken to collect all missing soldiers, reorganize and rearrange the corps, maintain a state of defence, and revive morale by removing disaffected officers as well as by punishing conspicuous delinquents. All American prisoners in the city were freely given up. Gamboa, a politician of México state, caused some trouble by critically reviewing Santa Anna’s course during the war, and formally charging him with treason. Far more serious was the combination of Valencia—who was still regarded by many as a martyr, had gathered a small army, and had pronounced against Santa Anna—with Olaguíbel, who stood on confidential terms with Alvarez; and to make this combination still more threatening, it seemed to be supported by Paredes, now at the head of a small force, by Almonte and by Canalizo. All possible care was taken to guard against the movement. Every officer known to have been associated with Valencia was imprisoned or at least cashiered; every hint of intrigue excited attention; and the government heard with deep concern that somebody on a sorrel horse had carried letters from Toluca to Querétaro. Naturally Santa Anna did not fail to assemble the generals, and offer his place to any one who would take it; and of course none of them had the bad taste—not to say imprudence—to come forward. Moreover behind all the military disaffection, rejoicing over it as a threat against Santa Anna, though unwilling to join forces with the army in any cause, towered the Coalition, justly regarded as even more dangerous.[15]

NEGOTIATIONS

But obviously the chief business of the government was the negotiation with Trist. Here Santa Anna acted sincerely—as sincerely as the drowning man who clutches at a plank, no matter how great a rascal he has been. On this point we have a superabundant amount of evidence, and in particular the full reports of Lozano, chargé d’affaires of Spain, with whom Santa Anna talked explicitly and at great length. Texas and upper California could be given up, the General thought, as territory already lost. The region between the Rio Grande and the Nueces, it was hastily inferred from a vague remark dropped by Trist at Puebla, could be made neutral, perhaps under a European guaranty; and with that barrier established against smuggling and the dreaded encroachments of the United States, and with millions of shining American dollars pouring into the treasury for the benefit of those supporting him and the treaty, Santa Anna felt he could meet all opponents. In his own mind, though he intended to get still better terms if possible, the bargain was as good as made. He therefore placed on the commission superior men, disposed to effect an amicable settlement, and not mere partisans of his own: ex-President Herrera, J. B. Couto, a man of the highest integrity and leader of the Mexican bar, General Ignacio Mora, chief of the military engineers, and Miguel Atristain, a lawyer supposed to represent British commercial interests; and he put forth a manifesto entirely satisfactory from the American point of view, in which he declared openly for peace, and, holding that Congress on being duly consulted had referred the subject back to the Executive, brushed aside the law of April 20.[17]

Trist, for his part, stated promptly the full demands of the United States, which required that Mexico should not only accept the Rio Grande line but cede New Mexico and upper California; and three or four days later, in the hope of removing difficulties, he decided to inform Santa Anna confidentially that he would pay the highest sum authorized by his instructions. This course was proper for the representative of a country that had always loved frank diplomacy, and felt no need of jockeying in the present negotiations; and it was also prudent, for in tedious haggling and crafty special pleading no Anglo-Saxon could rival the Mexicans. September 1 and 2 the terms were fully discussed.[16] Regarding certain minor points that might have entered into an agreement a mutual disposition to be conciliatory showed itself, but on the essentials Trist held firmly. Much to his surprise, the pecuniary consideration appeared to count for little in comparison with the alienating of territory and its population, and the Mexicans proved obdurate. At last, therefore, to save the only hope of peace, Trist proposed that the armistice be extended forty or forty-five days, and the decision of Washington be obtained as to excluding nationality and population from the Nueces-Rio Grande district.[17]

The proposed extension of time Santa Anna, angry at what he thought had been a deception on Trist’s part with reference to this district, rejected at once as a scheme to get provisions and reinforcements, and so he found himself confronted squarely by unexpected and unpalatable terms. Nor were these his only difficulties. With light-hearted vanity the people still ignored their long series of defeats. An intense fear prevailed that Santa Anna, with what military forces remained and the money coming from Washington, would sweep away republican institutions, establish himself as autocrat for life, and wreak vengeance on his enemies. All the standard objections against ending the war marshalled themselves anew. Arguments, protests and threats, official as well as unofficial, poured in.[17]

Any sale of territory, wrote the governor of Querétaro, would authorize a general secession. Negotiations not shared in by Congress are treasonable, proclaimed Farías, Otero, Rosa and other statesmen in concert. Rejón, who probably wished the Americans to capture Mexico, install the Puros in authority and make a treaty with them, added his loud voice to the chorus. The Coalition and the Valencia-Olaguíbel conspiracy loomed up darker than before. States and citizens who refused to support the war denounced Santa Anna for proposing to end it. Many who longed for a treaty would not think of a treaty signed by him. The friends of peace lacked organization and the courage necessary to dominate the situation. The members of Congress would not gather, and it seemed evident that no popular assembly would ever ratify the “sale” of loyal fellow-citizens, which the New Mexicans were believed to be.[17]

FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

Apparently Santa Anna’s one chance was to declare himself dictator immediately, and, if he cared to make so distasteful a bargain, ratify it himself; but there were signs that his army—with Valencia and Paredes, long favorites of the military caste, bidding against him—would not support his authority against such opposition in such a cause. Rascally but keen Tornel, who called himself the Rainbow because he shone in stormy times, but was likened by others to the bat, poured self-interested counsels against peace into his ear; and from similar motives Pacheco assisted Tornel. Santa Anna’s nerve weakened. Besides, an alternative offered itself. Had not Scott lost a good part of his little army in the recent fighting, and made the armistice in the desperate hope of receiving fresh troops? Might not fickle fortune change in the next battle? Whatever its result, could the Americans venture to demand more than was now demanded? Why not have another throw of the dice, and then make the treaty, if it could not be avoided?[17]

As soon as Trist’s persistence in our demands was made known to him, therefore, although he still felt some hope they would be modified, Santa Anna began to prepare a line of retreat. Warlike instead of pacific reasons for agreeing to the armistice made their appearance in public. Every thought of negotiating a treaty was denied, and papers were drawn up representing him as a bold and indignant champion of Mexican rights. At first his orders had been to keep the agreement with Scott inviolably; but on finding that no acceptable modification of Trist’s demands was in sight, he proceeded to break it—especially by preventing money and supplies from leaving the city, and by having work done on the fortifications of Chapultepec—and appeals for troops, funds and materials were issued. Scott, on the other hand, there is good reason to believe, adhered to his pledges; but he was alert, and his paid agents in the city watched Santa Anna’s proceedings. On September 2 he relinquished all real expectation of peace, yet he still clung to hope.[19]

The Mexican leader also shrank from drawing the sword. But on the afternoon of the 6th his commissioners, arriving late and agitated at the rendezvous, presented Trist with a counter-projet, which they knew he would reject, and an argumentative note intended for the Mexican public. No discussion took place. Evidently the time for words had passed. Scott then sent a letter charging that Santa Anna had violated the armistice, and announcing that unless complete satisfaction should be made before noon the following day, hostilities would be resumed. Santa Anna’s ingenious reply was mainly a counter-blast of accusations designed to rouse what he called “the first city of the American continent”; and again it was war.[18] Yet something had been accomplished. The word “peace” had been uttered and seriously considered; it was Trist’s firm belief that not only the commissioners but most of the Cabinet were for accepting the American terms; in a measure this attitude on the part of leading Moderados committed their party; and the Mexican plenipotentiaries retired from the meetings filled with cordiality and even admiration for Trist.[19]

In the United States great disappointment was felt over the issue of these negotiations. The general view of the armistice was the easy, superficial one that all Mexicans were rascals, and that Santa Anna had shamelessly tricked our good faith. Marcy, not seeing that the counter-projet was a political ruse, gravely pronounced it “extravagant and inadmissible.” Polk, whose knowledge of the Mexicans was revealed by his quaint idea that an extension of the American ægis over New Mexico might be welcomed by them, condemned the armistice as if peace had not been his avowed aim; and the administration organ, besides representing Scott and Trist as dupes, described it as contrary to the intentions of the government, when in fact a commissioner had attended the army for the express purpose of negotiating at the earliest possible moment. Mexico rejects peace, proclaimed the Union; let us give her war. “Burn the olive branch and whet the sword,” was the popular cry; let her be humbled in dust and ashes![20]

THE AMERICAN VIEW

To the army the respite of a fortnight proved a physical, mental and moral blessing. San Agustín, buried in orchards, umbrageous Coyoacán, cozy San Angel and lively Mixcoac had each its charms; and Tacubaya, where the palace, embowered in blossoms and fragrance, crowned a hill gently—even pensively—shaded by silvery old olives, was lovelier yet, and afforded the noblest views. Here the brilliant sunrise, first lighting up the distant white volcanoes that propped the sky, and then stooping to brighten the near-by villas of the city merchants, ushered in gorgeously the perfect day. After noon black, jagged clouds could be seen gathering quickly in the soft and luminous blue; the edge of one would melt into a slender gray shadow, dripping to the earth; and in a few moments the grandest artillery of the heavens would be at work. Then sometimes a rainbow followed; the sunset was fair; the moon rose clear and full; and the white houses, massive towers and brilliant porcelain domes of the city appeared to be afloat in a magical radiance toned with slumber and with dreams. “Heaven help those at home,” wrote a soldier, “who think they know what moonlight is!”[21]

Amid experiences like these it seemed hard, almost impossible, to contemplate war and bloodshed. But the troops felt thoroughly angered by what they looked upon as Mexican treachery—first in pretending to negotiate, and then in violating the armistice; and they quickly nerved themselves, not without satisfaction, for the coming struggle. All realized that only triumph could save them now from destruction.[21]

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Rather more than half a mile west of Chapultepec and still farther north of Tacubaya stood a complicated range of low stone buildings known as El Molino del Rey (The King’s Mill). They extended in a rambling fashion approximately north and south more than 300 yards, and consisted essentially of a flour mill and a foundry for bronze cannon. The heavy walls and the parapets of the flat roofs, reinforced with sand-bags, made these buildings almost a fort. Nearly half a mile from them toward the northwest lay a very solid stone edifice, at one time a powder magazine, called the Casa Mata, protected now with a small, dry fosse and light, incomplete breastworks. Along the west front of El Molino extended a somewhat irregular drainage ditch, or series of ditches, at this critical time free from water, which then made a bend, passed some twenty-five yards from the south face of Casa Mata, continued in the same direction nearly one fourth of a mile, and finally joined a deep, wide ravine, that ran for a long way northeast and southwest, and could not easily be crossed except (at X) near this junction. For military uses the ditch gained strength from dirt thrown up in front of it and a line of maguey growing some thirty yards back. From it an easy slope, clear of trees but somewhat obstructed with cornfields near the bend, rose toward the southwest for about 600 yards and culminated in a ridge, which overlooked Tacubaya; while west of the ravine and a mile or so from Casa Mata stood the hacienda buildings of Los Morales.[1]

SCOTT’S PREPARATIONS

Inferring from supposed signs of American activity, and also from Scott’s peremptory letter, that on the afternoon of September 7 a determined effort would be made to seize Chapultepec and attack the defences of the city, which had not become very strong in this quarter, Santa Anna made special efforts during the sixth to place his most serviceable troops on the terrain just described; and the next day, taking command there in person, he posted and instructed them with particular care. León’s and Rangel’s brigades were stationed in El Molino; the best of Pérez’s brigade garrisoned the Casa Mata; Ramírez’s occupied the intermediate space; four guns were placed a little in front of the bend; 3000 or 4000 horse under Alvarez—the first division commanded by him and the second by Manuel Andrade—proceeded to Los Morales; reserves of infantry and artillery lay in the rear, and the cannon of Chapultepec were made ready to sweep the ridge and slope.[2]

At the same time pains were taken to rouse Mexico City. Suspicion of Santa Anna persisted, but his credit had been improved not a little by Valencia’s conduct, and the public felt inclined to believe in him once more. The image of the Virgin of Guadalupe, the Patroness of Mexico, now passed through the streets. Under orders from Tornel the clergy preached a crusade against the heretical invaders. Tales of alleged American atrocities supplemented their exhortations. People were ordered to sharpen their daggers, and make ready to throw paving-stones from the azoteas. That Scott’s handful—only some 8000 available men and supposed to number even less—could beat 18,000 or 20,000 valiant Mexicans, protected by strong defences, and capture a city still occupied by perhaps 200,000 persons, appeared incredible. Citizens as well as troops grew confident. When the bells began to ring at about half-past nine on the morning of the seventh, all welcomed the alarm; and when Santa Anna visited the chosen terrain during the afternoon to issue his orders for battle, he was received with applause.[3]

BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY

Scott also prepared. September 7 the engineer company and Cadwalader’s brigade advanced from Mixcoac to Tacubaya, the rest of Pillow’s division and one of Twiggs’s brigades moved toward the city as a feint, and Twiggs’s other brigade and Quitman’s division were ordered to concentrate at Mixcoac. Captain Mason and Lieutenant Foster of the engineers daringly reconnoitred the Mexican position, and, although Casa Mata—standing on low ground and partially masked by its earthworks and the maguey—was not adequately made out, they analyzed the situation correctly otherwise. Then, to prevent errors, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Duncan and two engineers did the work a second time; and Scott and Worth also made observations. Information that he deemed thoroughly safe led the commander-in-chief to believe that guns needed for the defence of the city were now under construction at El Molino, and he desired Worth to have a party destroy the works and material during the coming night—in his opinion an easy task—and immediately retire. At Worth’s request, however, a daybreak attack and, as the natural consequence, a broader plan were decided upon.[4]

Accordingly, the first gray light of September 8 found the Americans waiting to assault the position. One cannon guarded the road from Mexico to Tacubaya. Brevet Colonel Garland’s brigade and Captain Drum of the Fourth Artillery with his two Buena Vista 6-pounders were directly south of El Molino, at a distance of about 400 yards from it, to ward off a flank attack from Chapultepec, threaten the mill, and be ready to assist as might be necessary. On the ridge, not far to their left, stood Captain Huger with two 24-pound siege guns, Brevet Major Wright’s party of stormers—twelve officers with five companies of 100 men each, drawn during the night from the six regiments of Worth’s division—and a supporting body composed of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel C. F. Smith’s light battalion. Some 500 yards farther to the left and higher up the ridge the guns of Duncan, who had charge of all the artillery, bore upon the Mexicans near Casa Mata, about 700 yards distant, with Colonel Clarke’s brigade—now commanded, on account of Clarke’s illness, by Brevet Colonel McIntosh—on the left of the pieces and General Cadwalader’s brigade, acting as a reserve, at their right and rear. And finally, near the ravine, Major Sumner of the Second Dragoons with some 270 mounted men occupied our extreme left under orders to hold the Mexican cavalry in check and coöperate wherever he could. In all there were 3447 officers and men.[5]

Apparently Worth’s dispositions had been wisely planned, and a scrutiny of the Mexican position, could it have been made, would have confirmed the expectations of a quick victory. Deceived by Scott’s feint against the southern front of the capital, Santa Anna had broken up his army during the night, and now, with a considerable part of it and some of the guns, he was fully two hours distant. No one officer commanded the troops before Worth. Only a sharp, strong thrust was required.[5]

As soon as Huger could make out the low, white walls of El Molino, about a third of a mile distant, he opened fire; and at the same time Engineers Mason and Foster advanced some 350 yards. All was perfectly still in front. Both of them believed the position had been abandoned, and Mason sent Foster back to have Wright’s party—now deployed in line—advance. Consequently, instead of waiting, as had been the plan, until the 24-pounders had perceptibly shaken the mill, the stormers advanced and masked those guns when some ten rounds had been fired. The Mexican pieces, which had been moved nearer the mill during the night, at once opened furiously with canister from an unexpected quarter, and soon a terrific fusillade burst from the parapeted azoteas of El Molino. In spite of it all, three of the pieces were taken, however.[5]

But the American spearhead—Wright’s party—was merely glued fragments of steel, not a forged blade. A large part of the men were separated from the comrades and officers whom they knew and relied upon, and all from the colors they adored. Mason, Foster, Wright and eight other officers out of fourteen went down. The column broke. Nearly a third of the men, whose comrades fought later in the engagement, under their proper colors and officers, like heroes, absolutely bolted. The enemy saw that only a handful were persisting, and promptly rallied. Without orders brave Lieutenant Colonel Echeagaray brought from Chapultepec the Third Ligero. “At them!” he cried; and instantly a counter-attack was launched. The guns were recaptured. The Americans had to retreat. And the pursuing Mexicans butchered and robbed our wounded.[5]

Smith’s battalion rapidly advanced, however, though possibly not quite soon enough. Drum directed a quick, accurate fire upon the Mexican battery. Garland moved up by a road that sheltered his command until it came within some 200 yards of the mill. Drum followed him, stopping at intervals to deliver canister. Cadwalader sent aid. Tall, swarthy León crumpled suddenly with a bullet in his side; valiant Balderas fell over into the arms of his son; and for these ardent leaders the Mexicans had no substitutes. Ramírez took flight. The Mexican reserves would not budge. The Americans captured the enemy’s guns, penetrated into the buildings, and forced their way to the azoteas. Close fighting then settled the issue; and before very long, under the fire of their own pieces, as well as Drum’s and one from Huger, the Mexican left wing and the troops coming to its aid from Chapultepec were in precipitate retreat.[5]

Casa Mata, still held by the excellent men under Pérez but wholly destitute of artillery and feebly protected by its earthen enclosure, might have been cleared of defenders by a vigorous application of artillery. Duncan began work. But Worth believed in brilliant operations, and ordered McIntosh to assault the position. With a smile that beautified his rugged face, the old warrior set out; and soon, bleeding from two wounds, he was lying on the slope. The second and the third in command fell. Officer after officer was struck down. The men toppled over by the wholesale. Wild with enthusiasm some of the Mexicans leaped over the defences and came to meet their assailants.[5]

In spite of their well-aimed and murderous volleys, however, they were soon punished and driven back. But what more could be done? The walls of Casa Mata had not been breached, and there were no ladders. So the Americans lay down behind the embankment of the ditch, and coolly picked off Mexicans at Casa Mata and behind the maguey. After a time their muskets became foul. Their ammunition began to give out. Somehow an order to retire got started; and finally the shattered remnants of the brigade fell back to the rear, followed by miscreants who glutted their fury on our wounded. But Duncan, whose guns had been masked by McIntosh’s advance, now resumed his work upon Casa Mata, and in a short while the Mexicans were in flight, pursued by the unerring missiles of the battery.[5]

Yet there were still 3000 or 4000 horse at Los Morales. These troops had been expected by Santa Anna to sweep the field, and he had personally given their commander his instructions. But a mere partisan fighter like Alvarez did not know what to do with two divisions of cavalry, an arm that it requires distinctive qualifications and much experience to handle well. Besides, his division included no artillery, and he probably felt no more anxious than before to help the President at his own expense. He followed but carelessly Santa Anna’s instructions. His orders to Andrade were more or less confused and impracticable; and that officer, who was at odds with his commander and felt that Santa Anna had overlooked his achievements at Buena Vista, concluded to keep himself and his men out of danger.[5]

At length, however, while McIntosh was charging, Alvarez advanced in brilliant array with his own division. Sumner at once dashed hotly across the ravine and at them, passing the Mexican infantry within pistol range and losing forty-four men and 104 horses in perhaps ten seconds. Duncan turned his now unemployed guns in the same direction. One of Alvarez’s brigades, made up of untrained guerillas, broke immediately under the cannon fire; and the whole division soon retreated in disorder upon Andrade’s men, fiercely pursued by the riderless horses of Sumner’s command, as if to get revenge for the loss of their masters. Later some of the cavalry undertook, or so pretended, to cross the ravine at another point. But Sumner dashed at them again, a part of Cadwalader’s brigade was now in that quarter, and both Duncan and Huger—the latter being at present near the American centre with one gun— sent their compliments; the Mexicans retreated; and at about seven o’clock the battle ended.[5]

“A sad mistake,” said Hitchcock, and he was right. A few cannon moulds were found. The partial destruction of El Molino and Casa Mata cancelled the military value of the position, and facilitated later American operations; but such operations were not contemplated at this time. A few small cannon and a quantity of more or less valuable ammunition fell into our hands, and a heavy gun at Chapultepec became disabled. Probably 2000 Mexicans were killed or wounded, and perhaps an equal number deserted. Nearly 700 prisoners were taken. The loss of two excellent officers meant still more, perhaps. Intrenching implements needed at Chapultepec were lost. The want of coöperation among the Mexican generals and especially the total failure of the cavalry to meet expectations disheartened the capital. But the casualties in the little American army amounted to 124 killed and 582 wounded. The confidence of the officers, if not the men, in their leaders faltered at the evident mistakes of Scott and Worth. Each of those generals blamed the other, and the discord between them, which reached down to the private soldier, became worse than ever. No American could find satisfaction in a barren victory gained with such difficulty and at such a cost; and the Mexicans, believing we had aimed to accomplish far more, exulted over their imaginary triumph. Scott faced the situation with unshaken fortitude, but those who knew him intimately saw that he felt anxious.[6]

THE GREAT PROBLEM

However, the great problem before them soon occupied the minds of all. Mexico, lying on a very slight elevation or swell, could be entered on its western side by the garita of San Cosme and at the southwest by the garita of Belén, to each of which led a causeway from the fortified hill of Chapultepec, about a mile and a half southwest of Belén. From this garita a second causeway ran south about an equal distance to the picturesque chapel of La Piedad, where it was crossed by one extending eastwardly from Tacubaya to the San Antonio or Acapulco highway, which—it will be recalled—led south to Churubusco and San Agustín. Not far north of the latter junction and about a mile from the city proper stood the garita of San Antonio; while, intermediate between the San Antonio and the Piedad routes, the Niño Perdido causeway, coming from San Angel, connected with Niño Perdido garita, which stood at the edge of the city. Finally, a road leading nearly east from San Antonio gateway conducted one to La Viga garita and La Viga canal, a deep and broad waterway, which, since it could not well be bridged in the face of the enemy, practically bounded Scott’s field of operations. There were thus four garitas—Belén, Niño Perdido, San Antonio and La Viga in this order from west to east—each guarding an approach to the capital from the south.[7]

Scott’s expectation was to break the south front, and after the armistice ended, his engineers, assisted to some extent by himself and a Mexican officer in his pay, reconnoitred it actively and boldly except on the forenoon of the eighth. Had it been feasible to strike immediately on the resumption of hostilities, the enemy’s lines would have been found poorly fortified and armed. But this could not well be done with Santa Anna’s principal forces menacing our flank; the American army was not yet in position; and Scott desired first of all to destroy El Molino. After the battle of the eighth half of his troops imperatively required a breathing space. The wounded had to be given attention. The army still needed to be placed. It was necessary to protect hospitals, baggage and stores—especially since Governor Olaguíbel and about 700 militia, supposed by Americans to be Alvarez with his two divisions, were approaching the rear, and according to reports Valencia had 8000 men in that vicinity. Moreover Scott’s information was not complete. The eighth of September, following the twentieth of August, had proved the danger of rashness; and the fresh losses made extreme caution absolutely necessary. Finally, Scott felt a suspicion that the Mexicans expected and wished him to attack their apparently unfinished works covering the south front.[8]

On the morning of the eleventh he inspected these once more, and then had a conference of generals and engineers at La Piedad. It was a solemn gathering. Before them lay the fortified capital of Mexico, a hopeful army of perhaps 15,000, a good equipment of artillery, nearly 700 trained gunners, and a large population, somewhat disillusioned, but excited and vengeful; and in view of the American situation it was essential, as the commander-in-chief clearly indicated, to strike a vital blow at once.[9]

But where? Point by point Scott fully and fairly stated the case: at the southwest the mighty porphyritic hill of Chapultepec to carry, but a clear problem, hard ground, excellent places for batteries, Huger’s opinion that in one day the fortified college on the top of the hill could be demolished, in the event of success a position from which to operate freely, and at least a possibility that, after losing what was commonly deemed its key, Mexico would listen to terms; on the southern front marshes, inundations, large ditches full of water everywhere, causeways already cut by the enemy, bridges destroyed, a topography that made rear and flank attacks impossible, an extensive series of well-planned and well-armed fortifications crossing their fires and commanding one another, and an enemy apparently eager to have the attack made here. Scott, while disclaiming any wish to influence the judgment of others, pronounced frankly for Chapultepec.[9]

Then one of the engineers—a tall, handsome young man, with a positive chin, a strong nose, a dark, closely trimmed mustache, dark hair clustering above his ears, and a fresh, clear color in his face—stood up and reported crisply on the work of reconnoitring. His name was Robert E. Lee, and he recommended approaching by the southern front. Three other engineers concurred with him. Four generals, doubtless influenced by these experts, took the same view. Twiggs and Riley inclined the other way. The fifth engineer present was then called upon, and he—Beauregard—in a long, technical statement argued for the Chapultepec route. Pierce changed his opinion. A silence followed; and then Scott, drawing up his magnificent figure to its full height, announced in his grand way: “Gentlemen, we will attack by the western gates. The general officers present here will remain for further orders—the meeting is dissolved.” And so the die was cast.[10]

CHAPULTEPEC

The preparation of Chapultepec for defence had begun in May, and Santa Anna had insisted upon it as of the “highest importance”; but want of money hindered and at times checked operations. During the armistice a little progress was made, and September 9, under the direction of a competent engineer and of the President himself, the work began in earnest. But alterations in plan, a lack of implements, a shortage of materials, the general confusion and the want of time naturally made thoroughness impossible. Chapultepec was therefore a fort but not really a fortress. It stood alone, too, without the supporting positions that a fortress must have; and shot and shell could penetrate the defences of the college on the summit of the hill almost everywhere. Even the parapets were not ready; and instead of the 2000 men required for an adequate garrison of the buildings and works, only a few hundreds occupied them. Their elevation merely hindered approach—not assault—and artillery could largely offset that advantage. To hold the grove was essential, for without it the garrison above could not obtain supplies or even water; and here the want of adequate defences had a still worse effect, since large forces could not be protected against artillery.[11]

Yet for 7180 available Americans including those required to make a feint against the southern front—an “army” that had to contemplate still harder work beyond, and could not afford severe losses here—Chapultepec meant a great deal. In general the position formed an approximate rectangle about three fourths of a mile in length by one fourth of a mile in width, bounded at its western end by El Molino and on the other sides with high stone walls. In the south wall, at about its middle point, there was an opening covered on the outside by a sand-bag redan (B), unarmed. From the main gateway in the eastern end the causeway of Belén struck off toward the city, another road—guarded here by a cut and by two batteries—ran toward Tacubaya, and a third, after running westwardly into the rectangle and a little way up the slope until it arrived at a 4-pounder in a circular redoubt (C), flanked with an infantry entrenchment (D), turned sharply toward the northeast, and finally climbed to the summit.[12]

Here on a rectangular level space or terre-plein, supported at the eastern end by an almost vertical precipice and on the other sides by high, parapeted walls, rose the masonry buildings of the military college, skilfully though incompletely reinforced with sand-bags and screens of timber (blindage), supplemented with parapeted azoteas, and surrounded with ten effective guns, heavy and light. A deep, broad fosse at the base of the western wall, mines below that, and finally, half-way down the slope, a redan (E) strengthened this end, where the incline was gentlest. In swamps at the western foot of the hill stood a large grove of huge cypresses—extending also toward the main gateway—through which ran an east and west road commanded by this redan (E) and also by the wall of the fort. Beyond the grove came a north-and-south ditch, intended for drainage, with a redan-breastwork (A)—looking westward—at its northern end; and finally, after traversing level and open fields for about a quarter of a mile toward the west, one arrived at El Molino. Placed so conspicuously in view, 150 or 200 feet in height, Chapultepec seemed to deserve its popular reputation of impregnability, and the American soldiers gazed at the white walls on the summit, transfigured in the sunlight, with dread if not with consternation.[12]

Late in the afternoon, September 11, Quitman’s division ostentatiously presented itself at La Piedad, but after dark both his and Pillow’s moved to Tacubaya, leaving Twiggs with Brevet Colonel Riley’s brigade and Steptoe’s and Taylor’s field pieces behind. During the night two 16’s and an eight-inch howitzer under Drum were placed behind bushes on the road from Tacubaya to Mexico, about 1000 yards from Chapultepec, and a similar howitzer with a 24-pounder, masked in the same way, south of El Molino under Hagner; and these batteries (Nos. 1 and 2) opened fire the next morning (September 12). Later in the day a 16-pound siege gun and an eight-inch howitzer (Battery No. 3) and a ten-inch mortar (No. 4), planted nearer the mill, joined in the work. Chapultepec replied; and, as usual, the Mexican artillerymen—of whom there was a full complement—did well, occasionally knocking sand-bags from the American parapets, while our own gunners, warned by the burst of smoke, took shelter at each discharge. Meantime Steptoe, in the hope of deceiving the Mexicans as to Scott’s purpose, made as much noise as possible opposite the San Antonio garita.[13]

During these preparations the Mexicans passed their days in a state of fever. Reports that our army had only half-rations cheered them, and Scott’s deceptive manoeuvres were attributed by many to indecision or timidity. On the eleventh a review and a valiant proclamation from the President recalled his “victory” of 1829 over the Spaniards. But a sense of weakness and confusion, the loss of friends, the continual alarms, the marchings and countermarchings, and the ominous clang of the bells kept them sad and anxious. Santa Anna, for his part, displayed as usual a remarkable activity and a remarkable want of judgment and method. During the night of September 9 he set perhaps 2000 men at work—one hour each—on the southern fortifications, and the parapets rose as if by enchantment. Not knowing where Scott would strike, he broke his army into a number of detachments, and shifted troops and guns frequently according to his notion of the probabilities, while always maintaining a reserve. But he lost himself in a maze of details; and on the eleventh, deceived by the rather weak American feint, he unwisely drew men and cannon from Chapultepec and Belén.[14]

SEPTEMBER 12

Early the next morning, however, the reports of spies and the roar of Scott’s heavy guns enlightened him. Troops were hurried to the real point of danger. With all speed he went there himself, ordered his best engineers to work on the fortifications near the main gateway of the Chapultepec enclosure, and posted troops close by. But there was little he could do. More and more accurately the American batteries fired and kept on firing. Two of the best cannon in the fort were disabled. The buildings of the college suffered, the garrison suffered more, and their morale suffered most of all, for except the engineers and gunners the men felt utterly helpless. When Santa Anna entered the rectangle unattended to reconnoitre, a shell burst near him and covered his red pony with dirt. Toward evening General Bravo, the commander of the position, came down, reported to him that the garrison were cowed, and demanded fresh troops; but Santa Anna could see no use of sending them forward to be destroyed on the way or else demoralized after arriving. They should be provided, he said, at the critical moment.[15]

Scott saw, however, as the day waned, that Huger’s expectations would not be realized—that an assault would be necessary. For this last resort preparations had in fact been made. The troops and the ladders were now ready. Fearing the Mexicans would repair the damages under cover of night he thought at first of delivering the blow at once; but he concluded that it was now too late in the day, that his guns could soon dispose of repairs and reinforcements, and that a morning attack would give many hours for pursuing the advantages gained. Engineers proceeded to mend and improve our own batteries, and the generals met for a conference. Here the plans were finally decided upon. Quitman’s division and a forlorn hope of about 265 selected officers and men from Twiggs’s division, under Captain Casey of the Second Infantry, were to advance by the Tacubaya road; and Pillow’s, preceded by a similar party from Worth’s division, led by Captain McKenzie of the Second Artillery, was to attack by way of El Molino and the grove. Then every one betook himself to his post. But Pillow felt discontented. “We shall be defeated,” said Worth privately; and even Scott admitted to Hitchcock, “I have my misgivings.”[16]

BATTLE OF CHAPULTEPEC

At daybreak—about half-past five—the next morning a signal gun broke the stillness, and then our batteries opened. For two hours or so they hurled shot and shells at the fort, and then for some thirty minutes grape, canister and shells were poured into the grove. At about eight o’clock, as if by common consent, they stopped—but only to burst forth again with new fury.[17]

That one momentary pause was the command to attack. Colonel Trousdale, with the Eleventh and Fourteenth Infantry and a section of Magruder’s field battery under the “Stonewall” Jackson of our civil war, moved some distance eastward from near El Molino by the Anzures causeway along the northern side of the rectangle, to prevent reinforcement and embarrass escape in that quarter. Lieutenant Colonel Johnston with four companies of the gray Voltigeurs advanced outside the south wall, drove the Mexicans from the redan (B) and from the wall, behind which they had been standing on platforms, passed through the opening, captured the circular redoubt (C) and the breastwork near it (D), and opened fire on the southern parapet of the fort. Reno’s howitzers, taken from El Molino eastward into the fields, poured shells upon the grove and the Mexican entrenchments (A and E). Four other Voltigeur companies under Colonel Andrews, after crossing those open fields, rushed with loud cheers into the swamp; and the Ninth and the Fifteenth Infantry, deploying into line, followed them closely. Decorated with long, hanging moss, the venerable cypresses, dear alike to Cortez and to Montezuma, seemed like the fit guardians of some mystical and melancholy religion; but now hurrahs and sharp flashes and the terrible crash of cannon-balls amidst the branches broke their shadowy silence, and the Americans, wallowing through the mire, drove the Mexican skirmishers from tree to tree, from the grove, and at last from the battle.[17]

Clearly it was time for Santa Anna to support the garrison. Attempts had been made to repair the fort during the night, but no adequate materials could be found there. A cannon had burst. The dead and wounded lay about. There were no surgeons, no medical supplies. The expected reinforcements did not appear. Most of the students, gallant lads in gray uniforms and gaily tasselled blue caps, withdrew by command. Bravo—thickset and erect, with deep eyes and a powerful chin—though he was cold and unenterprising, had flawless courage, and he stood with folded arms or marched calmly from post to post. But the infantry of the garrison—hungry, exhausted, stunned, hopeless—cowered behind the parapets. Many had to be driven to their places, and some had to be fired on. Even the engineers and gunners felt despondent.[17]

But Santa Anna could not see what to do. No doubt the hill was to be attacked from the grove, but the enemy seemed likely to assault by the Tacubaya causeway also, and Trousdale, he fancied, might come round by a road that skirted the eastern end of the rectangle to strike his rear. Besides, the officers and men showed no desire to challenge the American artillery by marching up the hill, and he understood well enough himself how few of them could probably reach the fort. At length, however, he strengthened the forces on the Tacubaya road, and sent most of the San Blas Activo battalion to Bravo. At the circular redoubt this corps met the Americans, and not many of them lived to go farther.[17]

East of the grove, Andrews with his Voltigeurs and Reno with his howitzers turned a little to the right and united with Johnston. This left the Ninth a clear front. Colonel Ransom had promised, the day before, that he and his men would go into the fort or die. Proudly erect, sword in hand, the beau-ideal of a soldier, he strode in front up the steepest part of the slope, while the Fifteenth marched on his left. The breastwork (E) was captured; and then, coming in view of the fort—its buildings almost hidden in smoke, its parapets a sheet of flame, the air filled with the hiss and shriek and roar of missiles—he waved his sword, shouted, “Forward, the Ninth!” and fell dead with a bullet in his forehead. A terrible cry rose from his men: “Ransom has fallen—the Colonel is shot!” Wild for revenge they all charged on, and a part of them reached the fosse.[17]

But there had been some mistake. The ladders had been entrusted to raw men, it was said; perhaps they had not been started off in time; apparently some of the bearers had left their places and hurried on; some had been killed and others frightened. Anyhow the ladders did not arrive. Like the Voltigeurs on their right, the Ninth and the Fifteenth sought shelter behind rocks and stumps and fired at the parapet; and the tardy storming party, which was to have passed through them, feeling no desire to get between the two lines of fire and really unable to do anything without ladders, halted.[17]

The men were fairly safe. Their muskets taught most of the enemy to keep down behind the parapet. The rest of the Mexicans fired very badly, and the Americans near the wall could not be reached by the cannon. But the attack was making no progress. Time passed—five, ten, fifteen dreadful minutes, and still no ladders could even be seen. The American batteries, which had been firing over the heads of our troops, could no longer do it safely. The ardor of battle was cooling. Low mounds that looked like graves, but in reality were the mines, lay under our men, and a Mexican lieutenant of engineers had orders to fire them at the right moment. Santa Anna with perhaps 4000 or even 5000 reserves so near—might he not come round the hill? Scott’s whole gazing army, back even to Lieutenant Mayne Reid at Battery No. 2, was seized with a horrible fear. Pillow, lying at the foot of the hill painfully hurt in the ankle, sent for the whole of Worth’s division, which was supporting him as a reserve, and begged Worth to make “great haste” or it would be “too late.”[17]

There was, however, a nearer source of help. When the signal for attack was given, Quitman’s division—preceded by forty pioneers under Captain Reynolds of the Marines, Casey’s forlorn hope, and 120 stormers from the volunteer division led by Major Twiggs of the Marines—advanced on the Tacubaya causeway until about 200 yards from the gateway batteries. To support it, repel a body of Mexicans on its right, ward off any force that might approach from the city, perhaps turn those batteries, and if possible gain the Mexican rear, General Smith struck off into the meadows and pushed on despite the ditches; and Captain Drum and Lieutenant Benjamin, each with a single gun, and Lieutenant Hunt with two of Duncan’s pieces advanced by the road, firing on those batteries or at the hill and fort as opportunities offered.[17]

On each side of the causeway ran a ditch that was almost a canal and cramped the troops not a little; and a terrible fire of artillery and musketry from the meadows, the front, the wall of the rectangle and the fort on the hill-top greeted them. Quitman had reconnoitred here the day before, and thought he understood the problem; but the Mexicans had made further preparations afterwards, and when he ordered a charge, it was checked, and Twiggs and Casey fell. Ahead of him, partly enfilading the road, blazed at least five guns, and some of the best soldiers in the Mexican army—commanded by General Rangel—occupied the stone buildings near them, while others fired from behind the wall near the gateway. Under this concentrated and awful storm the Americans recoiled, and sheltered themselves near a bend in the road by lying down, getting into the ditches or occupying some houses. Here, too, the offensive was blocked; the attack failed.[17]

But “the issue of battle lies in the hearts of men,” and the will of every American heart was Victory. Lieutenant Reid, hurrying over from the battery with two companies, dropped on the slope, but his men went forward. By Quitman’s order the New York and the Second Pennsylvania regiments left the Tacubaya causeway, under a heavy fire waded the ditches on the left and rear to the redan (B), and charged through the opening, while the Palmettoes, finding a break in the same wall, made a little farther east by an American cannon, enlarged it with their bayonets and squeezed through. Shields and the commanders of the New York and Pennsylvania regiments were wounded, but the troops kept on. Clarke’s brigade, sent forward by Worth, hastened up the western slope, and when Lieutenant Longstreet of the Eighth fell, Lieutenant Pickett seized the colors. For some reason the mines failed to explode; and at last the ladders came up.[17]

Shouting and yelling, the Voltigeurs, the Ninth and Fifteenth, some of McKenzie’s and the foremost of Quitman’s men, all closely intermingled, and brilliant with flags and the sparkle of arms, crowded to the fosse. The first ladders, with all the bold fellows upon them, were thrown down, but in a moment so many more were placed, side by side, that fifty could go up abreast. The blue Voltigeur flag, now full of holes, was planted on the parapet. A tide of brave Americans overflowed the fort. Resistance was vain. A little before half-past nine Bravo gave up his diamond-hilted sword, and the tricolor, that had been waving placidly amidst the uproar, came down with a jerk.[17]

Fire was opened then upon the Mexicans at the gateway below, and fearless Captain Roberts of Casey’s storming party, at the head of all the troops on the causeway and supported by General Smith’s brigade, carried the gateway batteries. Many from Quitman’s and Smith’s commands rushed to the summit, dealing with flying enemies as they went. Scott himself came up—the hero of Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane. The men pressed round him. He told them how glad he was, and how proud of them; and how proud their country, their wives, their sisters and their sweethearts would be; and it seemed as if such cheering had never been heard, anywhere in the world, before.[17]

Exultant but weary, the soldiers now looked about them as they took breath. From this eyrie the whole wonderful Valley of Mexico could be surveyed. All round the west the great wall of rugged mountains closed it in, and two vast, snowy peaks guarded its portal on the east. As if reluctantly the mountains gradually subsided into verdant hills and a wide plain, enamelled in a thousand soft hues. The broad, smooth lakes gleamed like molten silver. The gold of ripening grain, penciled lines of pale-green maguey, cottages radiant in the sun like the sails of distant ships, country-houses and villas half hiding in foliage, and many straight, converging avenues, lined with trees, delighted the eye. In the midst, clear-cut as a medallion, lay the city of Mexico, the capital, its roofs and towers black with people; and there, just yonder, stood the Halls of the Montezumas, the Jerusalem of these ardent young crusaders. Unfortunately breastworks, redoubts, cannon and a Mexican army were still to be reckoned with. Santa Anna had probably lost not more than 1800 killed, wounded and missing this day, and apparently Scott’s loss had been about one fourth as great.[18]

QUITMAN’S OPERATIONS

But the Americans quickly prepared to advance—first of all, Quitman. Naturally a certain discretion had been given to the commanding generals, and he intended to make the most of it. Looking from the hill along the Belén causeway, he saw a wide avenue divided through the middle by a stone aqueduct some eight feet wide and fifteen feet high, resting on heavy arches and pillars of masonry. Owing to fine weather the road was unusually firm. A small number of troops, fleeing in the utmost confusion, could be seen upon it, but at only one point fortifications. Borrowing all of Pillow’s troops except the Fifteenth Infantry, which remained to hold Chapultepec and guard the prisoners, he quietly gave orders that his men should assemble near the main gateway. At once the inspiring words began to circulate, “Quitman’s division to the city!” and as soon as possible the Rifles, in their crimson sashes, were leading the march forward. About a mile on, a two-gun battery, with a field redan at its right on the marsh, blocked the way. For an hour or so Drum used a small gun upon it. Then the Rifles, after creeping along the aqueduct from arch to arch, took it by assault, and the march continued toward the fortifications at the garita.[19]

As at the other garitas, no gates existed here, but a ditch and a parapet blocked one half of the causeway and a zigzag redoubt the other. Just at the north was the stone house intended for guards and customs officials, beyond which lay the wide Paseo (Promenade). South, on the Piedad road, were artillery and infantry that could fire through the arches. Inside the garita, buildings extending toward the east offered shelter, and in open ground a little more toward the north and about 300 yards distant, the extensive edifice called the citadel, protected with a wall and a wet ditch, constituted a serious obstacle.[19]

Santa Anna, after acting like a madman when Chapultepec fell, came to this garita. General Terrés, a brave old Spaniard, commanded here with about 180 infantry and some artillerymen. Santa Anna gave him three guns of medium power, and stationed General Ramírez in the Paseo, Brevet General Argüelles on the opposite side, and General Perdigón Garay and Colonel Barrios in the rear with substantial reserves.[19]

On approaching this formidable position, Quitman encountered a withering storm of bullets, grape and solid shot from both sides and the front, and suffered rather severely. But Drum and Benjamin, iron men, bringing up as soon as possible a long 18-pounder and a 24-pound howitzer on the opposite sides of the aqueduct, dampened the ardor of the Mexicans not a little, and splinters from the masonry did havoc among the sheltered artillerymen at the garita. Some troops already beaten at Chapultepec and at the intermediate battery soon became demoralized. At about one o’clock rumors crept in that Americans from the southern front were turning the position. Ramírez, Garay, Argüelles and Barrios retired without the formality of saying good-by; and Terrés, whose cannon ammunition had failed, withdrew prudently to the citadel with two of the guns and about seventy panicky men, the remnant of his garrison. The Rifles now dashed over the parapet; and at exactly twenty minutes past one a tall, slender man with short, bristling, grayish hair stood on it, smoking a cigar and waving a red handkerchief tied to a rifle. It was Quitman, self-possessed but exultant; and in a few moments the Palmetto colors and the green banner of the Rifles, with its blazing gold eagle, were flying at the portal of the city.[19]

The advance then continued for some little distance, and, as the ammunition of our two heavy guns had been exhausted, the captured Mexican 8-pounder was made to do good service. But Santa Anna, who had thought the position safe and gone on to San Cosme, soon arrived with ordnance and troops. The citadel was reinforced, and infantry and cannon were placed at other points. Quitman’s last artillery cartridges were used, and under the enemy’s fire no more could be brought up. Solid shot cut down both Drum and Benjamin. Our infantry had to retire to the vicinity of the garita. Attempts were then made to strengthen the position; but they did not accomplish very much. Ammunition gave out entirely, and firing ceased. The enemy grew bolder. Again and again they charged, and though repulsed they did not appear to be discouraged. By this time every member of Quitman’s staff, Beauregard, his engineer officer, and all his artillery officers had been killed or wounded, and he longed anxiously for night.[19]

Meanwhile, events had occurred on Scott’s other wing. Trousdale’s command, supplemented with Jackson’s guns, pushed along the road and aqueduct on the north side of the rectangle, and the latter distinguished himself by fearlessly attacking a one-gun redoubt, which, supported by infantry and by fire from the summit of the hill, barred the way. To check Mexican reinforcements and threaten the enemy—particularly the troops in Quitman’s front—Scott now had Worth, Garland’s brigade, C. F. Smith’s battalion, Duncan’s battery, the rest of Magruder’s battery and Sumner’s dragoons pursue the same route. The one-gun redoubt was flanked and occupied; and Worth’s forces arrived at the northeast corner of the rectangle in time to annoy the retreat of Rangel and other departing Mexicans.[20]

THE SAN COSME APPROACH

Here began the broad, straight Verónica causeway—closely similar to that of Belén—which extended almost north for nearly two miles (3530 yards) to the English cemetery, and there joined the San Cosme highway at approximately a right angle. Understanding the difficulties of the Belén approach, Scott intended to make only a feint in that quarter, and let his left wing break into the city. He therefore sent the brigades of Clarke and Cadwalader and also Huger with siege guns to Worth. To organize the attacking column, replenish the ammunition, make other needed preparations, and sweep away the resistance encountered at several minor fortifications, especially near the cemetery, required time; but at about four o’clock Worth found himself on the straight highway about half a mile from the San Cosme garita.[20]

This entrance to the city had been included in the general scheme of defence, but on account of its remoteness from pressing danger few workmen had been employed here; and when Chapultepec fell, it lay entirely open except for a small parapet without a ditch extending partly across the highway some 250 yards to the west. General Peña, however, coming this way from Chapultepec, stopped at the parapet, and Rangel placed at the garita such troops as he could assemble. Santa Anna, who displayed on this occasion reckless valor and an almost fiendish activity, sent three available cannon and brought additional troops. The roofs of buildings in the vicinity were occupied. A redoubt with embrasures was hastily erected at the garita, the near arches of the aqueduct were stopped up with sand-bags, and some guns in the Paseo were prepared to coöperate.[20]

On attempting to advance, therefore, Worth found the highway swept with bullets, canister, grape and shells. Garland, however, was ordered to creep forward under the protection of the arches, and endeavor to reach the south flank of the garita, and Clarke to burrow through the continuous line of buildings on the other side, and strike the northern flank. Lieutenant U. S. Grant, who was reported as acquitting himself at this time “most nobly,” waded some ditches with a party of men and a mountain howitzer, and planted the gun on the roof of a church at the right; and Lieutenant Raphael Semmes of the navy performed a similar exploit on the left. Artillery fire compelled Peña, who—reinforced by Santa Anna with two companies of the Eleventh Infantry—was fighting gallantly, to leave the parapet; and Hunt, of Duncan’s battery, though he lost more than half his men in dashing 150 yards at full speed, landed a gun at that point, where he could load in safety and then fire from the one embrasure.[20]

By five o’clock these preparations were complete. On the other hand Rangel had been severely wounded, and his principal gun, a 24-pound howitzer, had become unserviceable. Suddenly, to his utter astonishment, Americans appeared on the top of a three-story house that commanded the interior of his redoubt, and with a single volley disposed of almost every gunner and artillery mule. Then some of them hurried down to the front door of the house, burst it open, and rushed into the redoubt, where they met Americans just arrived by a flanking movement from the other side of the highway. In a panic the Mexicans fled, literally sweeping away Santa Anna and a body of troops, who had come at all speed from Belén to support the position. Many of them scattered, but with no little difficulty others were conducted to the citadel. By six o’clock Worth entered Mexico. Near the garita his forces were safely housed, and by way of “good-night” and good advice, Huger dropped a few shells in the vicinity of the palace.[20]

The end, however, was not yet in view. Santa Anna had some 5000 infantry and fifteen cannon at the citadel, with probably about 7000 more troops not far away, and the Americans, besides having lost many in the day’s fighting, were now fearfully divided. Not only Worth but Quitman, who planted three heavy guns in battery during the night, intended to advance in the morning, and apparently a day of carnage was to ensue.[20]

But Santa Anna probably began to feel the reaction that always followed his great efforts. Funds and provisions were scanty. The army was demoralized, and the mass of the people felt disheartened. Within the town there were no fortifications, and it looked as if another battle under these conditions might scatter the troops, and involve the loss of nearly all the war material. Besides, leading persons in the city had always been strenuously anxious to prevent bombardment and assault; and the President was urged now, as four months previously, to spare it. Early in the evening, therefore, he briefly discussed the situation with Olaguíbel, the minister of war and three generals. The Governor was for acting deliberately; but Santa Anna, declaring that honor had been satisfied and the city could not be defended successfully, ordered immediate evacuation; and by one o’clock the troops retired in a somewhat orderly fashion to Guadalupe Hidalgo. About three hours later a commission of the city council (ayuntamiento) offered terms of capitulation at the American headquarters in Tacubaya. These were of course rejected, for the town lay at our mercy; but Scott gave informally the usual assurances of good treatment.[21]

THE AMERICANS CAPTURE MEXICO

So when the first thin streak of dawn glimmered forth behind the gray volcanoes, and our cannon at Belén garita were on the point of opening fire, a white flag and an invitation to enter the capital reached Quitman. First making sure there was no deception, he advanced; and after stopping about half an hour at the citadel he moved forward under a splendid sun to the grand plaza, which fronted the palace and the cathedral, with Smith’s brigade, the Marines, the New York volunteers and Steptoe’s battery. As a triumphal procession the command looked rather strange. Quitman and Smith marched at its head on foot—the former with only one shoe; and behind them came troops decorated with mud, the red stains of battle and rough bandages, carrying arms at quite haphazard angles. Not less astonishing looked the city, for sidewalks, windows, balconies and housetops were crowded with people. Except for the silence, the countless white handkerchiefs and the foreign flags, it might have been thought a holiday. Before the palace, which filled the east side of the plaza, the troops formed in line of battle. Officers took their places at the front, and when Captain Roberts hoisted a battle-scarred American flag on the staff of the palace at seven o’clock, arms were presented and the officers saluted.[22]

Soon loud cheering was heard. A few squares away the commander-in-chief, escorted by cavalry with drawn swords, had reached Worth’s command, which had stopped at six o’clock by orders opposite the high ash trees of the Alameda. A clatter of galloping hoofs followed; and in another moment, amidst the involuntary applause of the Mexicans, General Scott, dressed in full uniform and mounted on a tall, heavy bay charger, dashed with his staff and Harney’s dragoons into the grand plaza—his noble figure, gold epaulets and snowy plumes, resplendent under the brilliant sun, fitly typifying the invisible glory of his unkempt and limping army. Uncovering, he rode slowly along the line of battle to the music of our national airs; the troops, presenting arms again, cheered and hurrahed till it seemed as if the earthquake-proof cathedral must be shaking, and the cavalry escort waved high their flashing blades.[22]

In stentorian tones the commander-in-chief appointed Quitman governor of the city; and then, dismounting in the courtyard, he clanked up the broad stairway of the palace, to indite congratulations on the “many glorious victories” of his army. Presently cross-belted American Marines were calmly patrolling the Halls of the Montezumas as if they owned them, while the rest of the troops gazed with profound exultation at the long pinkish façade and the endless balconies of the upper story, and the people gazed silently at the troops. “They are all and each of them heroes,” commented a foreigner present, and others in the world thought the same.

---

At the north, after the Buena Vista campaign and the embarrassments growing out of it came to an end, Taylor probably wished, in what an officer calledto advance as far as San Luis Potosí, and retained troops urgently needed by Scott; but by the middle of June, 1847, he doubtless realized that effective operations on so long a line, especially through hostile and much of the way through barren territory, were impracticable, and advised that Scott’s column alone should act on the offensive. A month later orders of a corresponding tenor were issued at Washington, and then some 3000 surplus troops of the northern army proceeded toward the capital, though too late, of course, to assist in the decisive struggle.[1]

Valencia, during his brief stay at San Luis Potosí in the early summer of 1847, not only requested permission to move against Saltillo, but planned that General Filisola, aided by a brigade under Avalos, then lying at Matehuala, by Reyes, the comandante general of Zacatecas, and by Urrea—who still commanded theand could easily pass across the Sierra Madre from Tula—should threaten, if not attack, Saltillo and Monterey, and at least keep the Americans on the defensive. Some disquieting movements of these troops resulted; but Valencia was soon called to Mexico, and various difficulties, chiefly a lack of means resulting from the American occupation, proved fatal to this ambitious enterprise, besides hindering the Mexican preparations to receive Taylor at San Luis Potosí.[1]

During the winter of 1846–47 and to some extent later, the garrison of Tampico was menaced by plans for an uprising, to be assisted by outside forces, and sometimes it was feared that a move to capture the city would be launched from Tula in the hope of embarrassing Scott’s communications; but the Americans, though not strong in numbers there, were vigilant and well protected by fortifications. Besides, the authorities of Tamaulipas, now living on fairly good terms with the invaders, had little wish to take part in active hostilities. They quarrelled bitterly with Urrea, who naturally attempted to draw supplies and money from the region, and in November, 1847, with a view to bringing about harmony, that officer was removed. Scott’s victories and especially the fall of Mexico had no little effect in this quarter; the prospect of serious operations entirely disappeared; and early in November, 1847, General Taylor, who had reached the conclusion some time before that his country wanted him for President, and had laid aside his old brown coat in favor of checked shirt sleeves, set out for home on a leave of absence, which actually continued until the close of the war. Wool took his place; but nothing occurred in this region except guerilla affairs, of which a due account will be given presently.[1]

In the northwest, meantime, Price, who commanded in New Mexico and was disturbed by rumors of danger from the south, decided on his own responsibility, ignoring instructions to do otherwise, that he must assume the aggressive. Early in March, 1848, the city of Chihuahua was therefore reoccupied; and on the sixteenth of that month, after a little brisk fighting, the town of Rosales, about sixty miles to the southeast, which Angel Trias held with some 800 men, chiefly National Guards, was captured by assault with a trifling loss. But this campaign had no general effect on the war—indeed, the treaty of peace had already been signed—and Price was ordered by Marcy to retire.[1]

FIGHTING IN THE CAPITAL

In Scott’s department the final military operations began very promptly. Immediately after the Americans took possession of the grand plaza at Mexico on the morning of September 14, a multitude of blanketed léperos crowded closely upon them. Already these miscreants had tasted the disorder they loved, for the palace had been left unguarded, and they had sacked it; and now they showed signs of turbulence. The plaza was cleared, however, and no further trouble seemed likely. But when our troops began to march away to their quarters, a shot was heard. A bullet probably intended for Worth struck Garland, and almost instantly firing from street corners, windows and the tops of houses became general, though not systematic. Thousands of convicts from the jail supported the populace, and in one way or another not a few of the better class coöperated. By Tornel’s order paving stones had been taken to many of the azoteas with a view to resisting the invader step by step, and these, like every other sort of weapon, were now used.[2]

Though surprised, the Americans promptly accepted the challenge. Skirmishers drove back the mobs. Grape and canister swept the streets. As a rule, every house from which a shot flew became a target for our heavy cannon, which seemed to shake the very foundations of the city, and when breached was immediately sacked; and sharpshooters worked effectively on towers and roofs. Scott threatened even sterner measures; and the city authorities not only put up notices, embodying his threats and imploring the people to desist from a vain and imprudent contest, but interceded personally with them in the streets. By about noon the Americans held all the points of vantage, and as evening approached, the firing died away. A fearful night ensued. It was dark and cold. No lights relieved the gloom. Wild mobs ran shouting through the streets, and the hoof-beats of American patrols resounded from square to square.[2]

Santa Anna, finding it impossible on the morning of the fourteenth to subsist his army at Guadalupe, had ordered the infantry and heavy guns to Querétaro under General Herrera, and proceeded with four small pieces and the cavalry to San Cristóbal, a point about fourteen miles northeast of the capital. After seeing the people of Mexico view with indifference his efforts of the previous day, he expected nothing of them; but on learning of the outbreak he marched back to Guadalupe, and at a late hour sent into Mexico a small force of cavalry and infantry to investigate and assist. This met Duncan’s battery and retreated; but Santa Anna, assured that on the next day there would be a rising en masse, erected a breastwork at the Peralvillo garita on the north side of the town, and waited.[2]

As soon as day broke, gloomy and wet, the shooting was in fact resumed, at least in the northern quarters. But he soon perceived that no general movement was taking place, and again marched away. This disheartened the people still more; the efforts of the authorities influenced them greatly; and by the end of the afternoon, realizing that much was to be suffered and nothing gained, they generally abandoned hope. During the next day or two scattering shots could be heard, but real fighting was over. Extravagant hopes of destroying the small American army were still entertained by lightheaded men.wrote one of these, and attempts were made by military officers to organize a real conspiracy; but lack of courage, means, confidence and mutual trust—as well as the watchfulness of the Americans—made success impossible. Scott repeatedly warned his troops to be vigilant and orderly, to keep together, and to refrain from drinking. As the danger grew less menacing, however, they became less careful, and for probably a month assassinations were frequent. From first to last several hundred Americans perished in the hostilities, and no doubt far more of the enemy. But by the middle of October the city was tranquil.[2]

The concluding field operations in Scott’s department resembled for the most part the fighting just described, for they had to do chiefly with guerillas. That style of warfare suited the national character. It had figured prominently in the Spanish struggle against Napoleon and in the Mexican war of independence; and when the public began to see clearly that battles could not stop the Americans, it was invoked—even though by universal military practice in Europe those who robbed and fought at will, while pretending to be inoffensive, were considered brigands and assassins—as the one hope.[3]

Thoughtful persons like J. F. Ramírez and General Mora pointed out serious dangers: the impossibility of discipline, the relaxation of morale, the destruction of all standards, and the certainty that a spirit of violence and rapine would grow by what it fed upon; and they recognized the improbability that such methods could prevail against the strength, equipment, compactness and skill of the Americans. But the obvious advantages of the guerilla system, which it required far less intelligence to perceive and appreciate, counted powerfully on the other side. How much the Spanish themselves had suffered from their irregulars during the hostilities against Napoleon was not understood, and patriotic pride in the war of independence had tended to draw a veil over its horrors.[3]

The dagger, said the official newspaper, was the favorite weapon of the people. Unarmed men could burn wagons and intercept communications, it was pointed out. Even women and children could help. A thorough knowledge of the country, its mountains and its by-paths, would evidently constitute an enormous advantage. Light corps of the abstemious rancheros, embarrassed with no baggage, could travel quickly day and night, concentrate in large numbers against an American detachment, strike, vanish, and then, when least expected, reappear, making the most of all neglects, all mistakes, nullifying superior strength by avoiding it, and nullifying discipline by fighting in a style that had no need of discipline. Situated even more favorably than Spain for such warfare, the Mexicans were to outdo her example.[3]

This is what will save us, proclaimed in effect the legislature of México state.exclaimed the congress of Vera Cruz. Santa Anna endorsed the plan. Salas organized thewhich were to make” “in every manner imaginable”; and in April, 1847, the government, pinning its faith to the system, set it on foot in earnest. Scott, thewas to be routed after all.[3]

THE GUERILLAS OF THE NORTHEAST

In the north February, 1847, was the golden month of the irregulars, for the approach of the Mexican army under Santa Anna encouraged the rancheros to lay aside the habits of peace. Canales boasted of 161 Americans killed that month, and Urrea with his combined force of regulars and guerillas, besides engaging in other operations, captured a train of wagons at Agua Negra, and horribly slaughtered a large number of guards and teamsters. To avenge this butchery a party of Rangers, teamsters and other civilians murdered twenty-four men in a village not far distant. Upon this Canales declared what he called martial law, announcing that every American, armed and unarmed, and every Mexican living peaceably would be shot; and many were led by fear or a lust for plunder to take up arms.[4]

The American trains in particular seemed likely to be easy prey. As they commonly stretched out for some two miles and were guarded only—for so the character of the road usually dictated—at the ends, the Mexicans, trained to charge at full speed through an ordinary thicket, could readily attack them from ambush at about the middle point, create a stampede, and do a great deal of mischief. Infantry could not pursue the guerillas with success, and the number of our mounted men was always comparatively small, for every Mexican ranchero had at least one smart pony. In September, 1847, a band even attacked Mier. Governor Aguirre of Coahuila exerted himself particularly to organize forces of this character, and not only alcaldes but priests aided the cause.[4]

The American leaders, however, pursuing a course that was now conciliatory, now severe, and in many instances technically unjust, succeeded in coping with a system that was itself unjust. Taylor levied on the people of Nuevo Léon a tax of $96,000, the estimated value of the goods destroyed at Agua Negra, but suspended it indefinitely, when representative authorities proved the substantial innocence of the population and begged for mercy. Cavalry patrols and detachments pursuing culprits fairly wore out their horses. Villages, if even suspected of harboring thewere burned. Contributions were imposed wherever connivance appeared probable. By April, 1847, Canales was in despair.[5]

Then Wool determined to stamp out the evil, and announced in July that any guerillas caught by him would be executed. In December, 1847, he issued his famous Order 11, which not only made the Mexican authorities and their towns responsible for all damages done, but required them to hunt down theAguirre attempted to retaliate, but in vain. The Americans had power enough to carry out threats, whereas he had not; and he admitted his failure. Besides, the mass of the population were indolent in mind as well as body, and looked upon submission as preferable to danger. In February, 1848, finding the guilty rancheros were anxious to give up the business, Wool enabled them to resume peaceful occupations by declaring an amnesty, and in the following May he stated that the country had never before been so free from highway robbery.[5]

GUERILLAS IN VERA CRUZ STATE

In the south, Vera Cruz, a state of mountains, gorges, thickets and forests threaded with blind paths, was the chief home of the guerilla, and it looked as if Scott’s line of communication might be virtually destroyed. Not only many hardy, hot-blooded and unscrupulous natives, but a great many desperadoes hailing from Cuba were ready to enlist. After the fall of Vera Cruz, and still more after the battle of Cerro Gordo, a large number of regular officers, to say nothing of privates, could scarcely find bread, and some men, like the ex-divinity student, ex-Carlist, Jarauta—whose small, close beard, fierce black eyes, braided jacket, graceful cloak and gold-laced sombrero gave him a romantic air—had acquired in Spain a taste for this adventurous, reckless life; but a vastly greater number were prosaic felons, liberated from prison under a pledge to rob and murder. Nominally J. C. Rebolledo, a fine looking man of rather humane instincts, was the chief in this district, but the 800 or so persons belonging to many small bands, while occasionally acting more or less in concert, were mainly independent. The decree under which all goods coming from points occupied by the Americans were lawful booty opened possibilities of large gains, and Rebolledo’s capture of ten loaded wagons in April, 1847, set the people aflame with cupidity.[6]

Brevet Colonel McIntosh and his inexperienced officers, who left Vera Cruz for the interior—it will be recalled—about the first of June, 1847, with a well-advertised convoy including a large amount of specie, dependent on wild mustangs under raw, half-mutinous drivers largely ignorant of English, received the full benefit of this ambitious feeling. Near Tolomé and at Paso de Ovejas he lost men, wagons and pack-mules; and at the national bridge there was a genuine skirmish, in which a number of Americans were killed or wounded. Out of about 130 wagons twenty-four had to be abandoned in the low country; and a little way above Jalapa, though strongly reinforced, the troops had to fight again. General Pierce, who left Vera Cruz about six weeks later than McIntosh, had similar experiences. Early in August Major Lally set out from the coast with a few more than 1000 soldiers, two 6-pounders and sixty-four wagons. He lost no merchandise, but his four fights cost him nearly 100 men killed, wounded and missing; and Captain Wells, who followed Lally with some 200 recruits and additional ammunition, lost forty and had to retreat. These and other affairs proved that irregulars, favored by the geography of the region, were capable of doing substantial harm.[7]

But in Vera Cruz, as in every other quarter where they operated, though perhaps nowhere else in so marked a degree, the lack of morale, which enabled the guerilla system to exist, proved the cause of its failure. Poor arms, poor ammunition, poor marksmanship, and the want of artillery might have been remedied, or at least might have been offset by the counter-balancing advantages; but this defect was fatal. The Mexican guerillas were very different from what the guerillas of Spain had been. They fought like savages without the excuse of savages, for they knew better. Infuriated by their treacheries and cruelties, the Americans were persistent and unsparing in severity. Patrols who seemed never to sleep hunted out their nests in the mountains. On the march, flanking parties would force their way through the woods five miles or more from the road to catch them between two fires. The torch was applied with much liberality on suspicion, and sometimes on general principles, to huts and villages; and in the end a black swath of devastation, leagues in width, marked the route.[8]

Scott ordered that in every case of outrage the nearest alcalde, if he failed to deliver up the guilty, should be fined at least $300 for a murder or the value of the stolen property for a robbery, and that any robber or murderer and any person belonging to a known party of such miscreants might, when caught, be summarily tried by three officers, and either flogged or executed. This plan, however, did not quite satisfy those on the ground—especially the Texas troops. Captain Walker, on his cream-colored horse, and Colonel Hays, in his blue roundabout, black trousers and black leather cap, impressed themselves on the Mexican imagination as the agents of diabolical wrath; and in general it was a tale of merciless atrocities followed by merciless reprisals.[8]

At the same time this lack of morale deprived the guerillas of Mexican support. By taking bribes for letting merchandise pass up to the interior and sometimes even guarding it, they violated the laws on which their existence rested. Mostly they were brave only where they felt safe. When laden with booty they would scatter to their homes, no matter how important the business in hand. Rivalries and even hostilities between parties operating in the same district arose. Cooperation could seldom be reckoned upon, and hardly any would face the climate far above Jalapa. Soon learning that it was more wholesome to waylay Mexicans than Americans, they plundered their fellow-countrymen without ceremony; and they would rob even old women or young children of their needful clothing. Sheafs of complaints against them piled up in the state and national archives. People organized to fight them, and sometimes appealed to the Americans against the very men who were to have been their champions.said an American officer.[9]

GUERILLAS OF THE CENTRE

In the states of Puebla, México and Oaxaca also guerillas were organized, and in Puebla all these parties could find an opportunity. General Rea, a pupil of Morelos and the Mexican revolution, had the discredit of the chief command, though Bravo, who stood at the summit of the social scale, was mainly responsible for their iniquities, since during his brief term as comandante general of Puebla he issued a great number of patents to unfit leaders. What Rea did particularly in this regard was to combine individuals and small groups, and place them under some kind of supervision. He loved to answer critics by saying that his guerillas were in the field because honorable men were not; and that, had not the government condoned their crimes, they would have served the Americans as counter-guerillas. After a time his officers adopted a set of rules which aimed to regulate operations, but even this measure seems to have accomplished little. The guerillas robbed the people, seized funds belonging to the state, and pillaged even churches. Some gangs were large enough to attack haciendas. One party called themselves the “Lancers of the Poisoned Spear.”[10]

Soon after Scott left Puebla for Mexico early in August, 1847, these banditti and every individual ruffian of that vicinity hurried to the city. Mexicans and even foreign residents were robbed and outraged, and about the first of September, in the hope of more booty, the Americans also were attacked. Two thousand soldiers were needed for a garrison, and Colonel Childs, the civil and military governor, actually had 2193; but 1800 of these were in hospitals. His effectives consisted of about fifty cavalry, 100 artillery, 250 of the First Pennsylvania volunteers, and a small spy company of Mexicans.[11]

Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Black of Pennsylvania and the main body of troops occupied thea large rectangular building on the eastern side of the town, which had a plaza of its own opening toward a public promenade called the Tivoli. To this position five howitzers were allotted, and within a hundred and fifty yards of it all the sick were placed. Half a mile or so from the town on a hill stood Loreto fort, a stone affair equipped with two 12-pound field guns and a 10-inch mortar, where Major Gwynn of the Sixth Infantry commanded; and not far distant, on a higher point of the same hill, was Guadalupe church, now protected with mountain howitzers, a ditch and an earthen wall, under Captain Morehead of the Pennsylvania regiment. But the chief element of the defence was the large, robust, finely-featured Childs, a skilful and veteran officer, cold in manner, clear in judgment, and inflexible in courage. September 13 thebegan in earnest, and from that day on there was a continual small-arm attack, particularly at night, upon San José, which replied with a musket and howitzer fire that kept the assailants at a respectful distance. What was more serious than guerilla shooting, all supplies were now cut off. Such was the state of things at the second city of Mexico when Santa Anna retired from the first.[11]

THEOF PUEBLA

Santa Anna’s real intention was probably to seek an asylum in Guatemala. But many of his friends urged that he could make himself dictator as the sole hope of the country, and it was clear that, if he should recover Puebla and cut off Scott, he would still be able to boast of a triumph. His cavalry, though greatly reduced by desertion, included some 2000 men backed with four light guns. Alvarez, who was ordered to Puebla, still had about 600 foot and horse. Rea, Santa Anna understood, commanded 600 irregulars; 2500 National Guards lay near him with two field pieces, it was reported; and the Pueblans were described as eager to fight. Six thousand men and six guns appeared quite enough to dispose ofas Mexicans described the garrison; and he therefore presented himself at Puebla on September 21. Two days later Alvarez arrived there. But between these two events Childs appeared at a second-story balcony, as a soldier expressed it, and announced that Scott had taken the capital. Evidently, therefore, the Mexican President was not greatly to be feared.[11]

After looking about, Santa Anna concluded that it would not be easy to capture the American positions by assault, and appealed to the minister of war—wherever that official might be—for 1000 infantry, a 16-pounder, a 12-pounder, ammunition and supplies. He now had ten cannon, but all of them were light; owing to desertion his force included only some 4000 men; and the citizens had no arms, he reported. Probably, too, the annoyances and outrages inflicted upon them by him and his troops, and his appointing the guerilla chief military commandant of the city dampened whatever ardor they had possessed.[12]

On September 23 and 24 unsuccessful attempts were made at Guadalupe, and the next day Santa Anna summoned Childs, describing his army as 8000 strong, and graciously announcing thatthe Americans might retirewith the honors of war. Childs replied as was proper, and then, riding to the posts, gave notice amid cheers that no surrender need be expected. To add the touch of humor that soldiers love, an American flag was manufactured out of an old Mexican uniform, and raised aloft; and the garrison settled down to severe duty, stern discipline, short rations and incessant watchfulness at all hours. The Mexicans tried to approach San José by throwing up successive breastworks at night in the streets leading that way, but shot, shell and rockets from Loreto kept them back. September 30 Santa Anna learned that no ammunition could be provided for the heavy cannon demanded of the minister, and resolved apparently to make a bold effort. With two 6-pounders he fired all day on the weak, plaza face of San José. But Childs, anticipating such a manoeuvre, had brought a 12-pounder from Loreto the night before; and this, protected with bags of tobacco, made an assault impracticable.[12]

A new factor now entered the military situation. About the middle of September GeneralLane, one of Taylor’s chief officers at Buena Vista, arrived at Vera Cruz from the Rio Grande, and on the nineteenth his brigade set out for the interior. Aware of the situation at Puebla but not aware what was to be encountered on the route, the General had not made adequate preparations, and on meeting guerillas at the national bridge he was obliged to send back for ammunition and supplies. By October 1, however, he managed to leave Jalapa.[13]

It was a hard march that ensued. Torrents of rain deluged the troops. Sometimes the road lay deep under water. For dinner they had a thin slice of beef, a couple ofand some coffee; for supper, after darkness fell upon them with tropical abruptness, the same without the beef; and perhaps mud for a couch. But Lane, a hearty westerner with a stout frame and unbounded vigor, led on unshrinkingly in his black hat and old blue overcoat, and the rest followed him eagerly. October 5, after incorporating additional troops at Perote, he left that place with a force of about 3300 and seven guns, and marched on across hot plains, where water sold for five dollars a drink, and men died of sheer fatigue.[13]

Santa Anna, informed by spies that 1000 Americans were approaching, and anxious, not only to prevent them from joining Childs, but still more to win the glory of routing them, had set out from Puebla four days earlier with perhaps 3500 men, leaving Rea to continue the fighting. Desertion played havoc with his command, especially when the strength of Lane’s force was ascertained; but, after sending back a large part of the faithful in order to keep control of them, he took possession of El Pinal, where the national highway passed between a precipitous mountain and a ravine, with about 1000 cavalry and six guns, and made preparations to ambush Lane’s rear. This done, he moved to Huamantla, a sizable town eight miles distant, and waited.[13]

THE FIGHT AT HUAMANTLA

Early on October 9 the drums and bugles awoke Lane’s troops at the hacienda of San Antonio Tamaris, approximately ten miles from Huamantla and twelve from El Pinal; and the men, leaping from the damp grass and buckling their muddy belts, found the white walls of the hacienda, the church towers of neighboring villages, the dark woods on the hillsides, and the distant, snowy peaks all aglow under a splendid sun. Never, perhaps, did soldiers feel more like having an adventure. Santa Anna had just marched from Huamantla to conceal his force at El Pinal, leaving behind him with no scouts or outposts his six guns, a very small guard for them and a party of irregulars; but a spy reported to the Americans that he was at Huamantla, and Lane moved off to attack him. First rode four mounted companies, and at their head a rather short, slender, spare, slouchy man, with reddish hair, a small reddish beard, mild blue eyes and a quiet, kindly manner, whom nobody would have picked out as a fearless, indomitable fighter, the scourge of the guerillas, but in fact he was Captain Walker; and then marched Lane with five guns and some 1800 men.[14]

When about three miles from their destination, Walker and his 200 cavalry, seeing a party of Mexican horse approach the town, dashed ahead. Entering Huamantla they formed in fours, and then with a yell, a flash of sabres and a thunder of hoofs they swept through to the plaza. The Mexicans had time to get four of the guns away, but the others were captured, and most of the American troopers, concluding their work had been finished, scattered to drink, loot or hunt for cannon and ammunition. But now Santa Anna, who had observed Lane’s movement from a church tower near El Pinal, appeared with his full command. They were a beautiful sight—galloping horses, red and green uniforms, brilliant pennons and a billowy sea of flashing lance points; but they were enemies, and the Americans accepted their challenge.[14]

“Take it cool, my boys, but run like the devil!” cried Lane. Every nerve was taxed. Blood gushed from nostrils. The Mexicans, lashing their steeds into foam, reached the goal first, however, and the American troopers found themselves attacked on all sides. Walker was shot from a house, and soon expired; but he lived long enough to give a final order: “Don't surrender boys; the infantry will soon be here.” And so they were—“with a shout and a bound,” said one of them. The tide was quickly turned, and giving up the town, as the soldiers loved to call Santa Anna, passed the night some distance away. So ended the Tale of Huamantla or The Biter Bitten, which received no little applause at the time.[14]

While these events were taking place, the garrison of Puebla continued to be hemmed in, starved and harassed. Their casualties numbered in all only fifty-two, but they felt severely the effect of so long a strain. Though a number of sorties were made, and their persecutors had to retire from several annoying positions, the Americans were not strong enough to do more. Their day of deliverance was approaching, however. October 10 Lane moved forward, dogged and somewhat annoyed by Santa Anna. Two days later his men saw the spires of Puebla, dominated by the sombre towers of the cathedral, and set off by white volcanoes veiled with clouds. And now and again the numberless bells of the city, great and small, pealed forth harmonious tones of many colors, that seemed to blend and interweave in rich and varied tapestries of sound, hung out in the mediaeval style to honor their triumphal approach.[15]

At about one o’clock, announced by the bells of Guadalupe, they entered the suburbs—not a few of them at a run. One column then advanced by the main street, while another flanked the town by the left. For two hours there was considerable firing from houses, though Rea’s guerillas had begun to leave their posts the night before; but at length Lane extended histo Childs, with a sunny smile on his rather hard features, and the garrison joyously welcomed their deliverers. In the main plaza a bugler playedand all sang the chorus:

Now followed the punishment of Rea. Some twenty-five miles from Puebla toward the southwest lay beautiful Atlixco, a defensible point that not only reconciled the climates of the temperate and the cold zones of Mexico, and controlled a region fertile in grains, flocks and herds, but, while fairly remote from the Americans, gave convenient access to important roads. Here, in the midst of flowers, fruits and snowy mountains, the government of Puebla had found a refuge, when the Americans under Worth approached the state capital; and to this asylum Rea now withdrew. De facto, at least, the guerilla chief was the most important person on the ground. The authorities did not relish his prominence; they detested his men and his methods; and on October 18, tired of spending money fruitlessly on the National Guards for Rea to command, they dissolved the corps. But many of the irregulars proposed to make the best of what appeared to be a good situation, in which they could live on plunder, if not paid.[16]

October 18 Lane, who apparently never slept nor expected his followers to sleep, ordered them to be ready in the morning for an expedition. Many of the soldiers were barefoot, but they borrowed shoes; and at about nine o’clock, cheered by the fife and the drum, some 1500 men set out round the base of Popocatepetl under a hot sun. At about four in the afternoon, after making twenty miles or so, they came in sight of the enemy, and a running fight began. Blistered feet and parching tongues were now forgotten. The Mexicans, holding some good position and protected by chaparral, could make a stand against cavalry, but when the infantry came up they always fled. Shortly after sunset Lane reached Atlixco, which stood on the slope of a lofty hill. As it was unsafe to risk a street fight in an unknown town at night, he ordered the artillery to open. The moon was full. Marks were easily selected. By their burning fuses the shells could be traced until they fell amidst the shadows; and then a burst of red fire, the crash of roofs and walls, and the cries of the people told the rest.[17]

After about an hour of cannonading, the troops advanced into the town—which surrendered at once—and there slept as best they could. Rea, with two guns and the disordered remnants of his force, retreated to Izucar de Matamoros, about thirty miles farther down the valley; but from that point he was routed a month later. These and other exploits of Lane’s discouraged as well as dispersed the chief guerilla forces of the plateau, and in February, 1848, Rea asked permission of the Mexican authorities to leave the country.[17]

POLITICAL CHAOS IN MEXICO

Neither in these affairs nor in any other military operations did Santa Anna figure at this time, and there was a good reason for his inactivity. Officially he no longer existed. As General Scott had feared, our entering the capital had resulted in the destruction of the Mexican government. September 16 Santa Anna resigned, explaining that it was advisable to preserve the chief magistracy from the hazards of war, and fix it near the centre of wealth and population, whereas he proposed to continue the hostilities wherever that should be possible. The same proclamation or decree assigned the executive power to a triumvirate: the president of the supreme court, General Herrera and General Alcorta, and Santa Anna then ceased actually to exercise any civil authority.[18]

But as Congress was not in session to accept his resignation, some doubted whether it became effective; the presidency of the supreme court was vacant on account of the incumbent’s death; the appointment of Herrera and Alcorta needed to be made, or at least confirmed, by the council of government, a body no longer acting; and it was denied broadly that Santa Anna had the power to issue such a decree. Peña y Peña, to be sure, was regarded as a member of the court, and, if he was, he could claim by right of seniority to act as the chief justice; but the legality of his membership was questioned, and the presidency of that body was really an elective office. Peña was old, feeble and even timid; his ill-success as Herrera’s minister of relations doubtless weighed heavily upon him; and he was now living, almost as a recluse, in the country. Indeed there was really no organic law even, for the amended constitution of 1824, though formally adopted, had not come into effect. In short, chaos reigned, and the states were officially “resuming” their individual sovereignty.[18]

But a number of good and able men, particularly Cuevas and Couto, determined to ward off ruin, and awakened others. Peña, drawn from his retirement, consented for patriotic reasons to override all the technical difficulties; and on September 22 he announced formally that, in order to give the nation a head, he would act as the Executive until an interim President could somehow be chosen. At the small city of Toluca, capital of the state of México, just outside the Valley, this fiction of a government pitched its tent; and perhaps it gained some feeling of security from the vast bastioned, battlemented ridge between it and the Americans, from snowy Mt. Miguel towering above the city, and from the peacefully shining lagoons of the intervening meadows. What was more important, Herrera, Olaguíbel and many others of the best men rallied to the support of Peña, the representatives of neutral governments recognized him, and the states began to concur. Early in October, however, he removed to Querétaro, a safer yet central place, and with Luis de la Rosa as sole minister addressed himself to his task.[19]

SANTA ANNA ELIMINATED

The programme that he announced was honorable and straightforward. My tenure of office will be extremely brief, he said in effect, for Congress will be assembled as soon as possible; I will usurp no powers, but will not be turned from the path of duty by insurrections; the closest economy will be practised, the necessary taxes laid fairly, and all interests respected; union and harmony will be the watchwords, and the national rights will be maintained. His most urgent problem, of course, was to deal with Santa Anna, who not only held the chief military command, but insisted that he could resume the Presidential authority by simply withdrawing his resignation; and in this matter the government showed a decision that earned it no little prestige. All Santa Anna’s protests against political effacement were disregarded, and on October 7 he was instructed both to give up his troops and to submit, as did other unsuccessful commanders, to a military trial.[20]

At about the time this order overtook him, the Huamantla affair occurred. From a military point of view he was now prostrate. He saw it himself, and knew that the country would see it. Evidently his countless political enemies would make the most of his complete failure, and he was doubtless aware that his military reports had offended many officers. His chief executive merits—decision and activity—had led only to a useless expenditure of life and money, it was now pointed out, and his ostensible patriotism was attributed to passion and obstinacy. Even his confidence in himself broke down. Unable to understand why failure had attended all his efforts, he fell into a sombre depression, and without a struggle he placed his troops at the orders of General Reyes, who joined him on October 11 with about 1000 men. His part in the war was over; and in the following January, realizing that nothing could be gained through intrigue or conspiracy and fearing the Americans would make him a prisoner, he asked for permission to leave the country. Both his own government and our authorities consented. And after giving a dinner at El Encero to the American officers of that vicinity, who had treated him with distinguished consideration, he sailed once more, about the first of April, from what he regarded as an ungrateful country.[21]

Santa Anna being now eliminated, the government had to face its military difficulties without his assistance. In general the problem was to make bricks with neither straw nor clay. Almost every good cannon had been taken by the Americans, and the muskets had nearly all been captured, thrown away or sold. Ammunition was almost wholly wanting. The engineering material had been lost or destroyed. Vast sums of money were needed to provide fortifications as well as replace all this equipment, and the government could hardly obtain enough, day by day, to cover its minimum expenses. Even officers had to sell their shoes for bread.[22]

As for an army, Santa Anna and Alvarez together had some 2000 troops the first week of October, Reyes had about 1000, about 3000 from Mexico City concentrated at Querétaro under Herrera, about 1000 from Jalisco were on their way to the same point, and small detachments existed at various other places. But nearly all of these men were utterly demoralized. “Almost useless,” they were officially termed; and the army as a whole felt the crushing weight of general contempt. Herrera, the commander-in-chief, became so disgusted over the uncontrolled excesses of the troops that he resigned. Rincón declined on the ground of ill-health to serve. Arista, when summoned to Querétaro, declared he would not command a soldier until exonerated for his conduct on the Rio Grande. No officers of high distinction, indeed, were available except the aged, torpid and infirm Bustamante and “the old woman,” Filisola, as Bancroft described him.[22]

Attempts were made to lay plans of campaign, but an expert summed up one of them by saying it appeared excellent—only it was based upon things as they should have been, not as they were; and all the others had the same defect. Schemes were devised to reform, reorganize and build up the forces, and quotas amounting to 16,000 were assigned to the states; but México, which had been expected to furnish nearly a quarter of these men, promptly answered that she could not, and other states did not even reply. In fact, the regular forces decreased instead of multiplying, for sometimes a general could not feed his troops, and frequently, when soldiers were let out of the barracks on service, they vanished; and the people, instead of helping to support the Mexican troops, even dreaded to see them approach, for their coming was liable to draw an American attack, and more than liable to mean extortion, outrage and robbery. Nowhere on the military horizon could a glimmer of light be seen.[22]

THE AMERICAN POLICY

Over against this pitiful government stood the United States—wealth against poverty, strength against weakness; and the antithesis was complete, for while the Mexicans could only plan, that was the hardest thing for us to do. The idea of retiring to a defensive line still persisted. Taylor himself adhered to it. But in addition to the other overwhelming objections to this project, it seemed improbable that a majority in Congress could agree where to draw the line. Even Calhoun, though qualified to make a better argument for an untenable proposition than any other man in the country, was unable to present this policy in such a manner as to satisfy either the friends or the opponents of the war. Some advised holding, in addition to the territory thus to be cut off, the chief ports of Mexico; and some advocated retaining the capital also, and the line to Vera Cruz. Others favored the occupation of still more cities; and many were for subjugating and holding the entire country.[23]

To this last plan, however, even had it been practicable to levy all the costs upon Mexico, there were tremendous objections. It would have involved keeping under arms 80,000 or possibly 100,000 young men, seriously needed at home for the most part, in order to be sure of having effectives enough at the front. The troops in Mexico would have become corrupted both physically and morally; and the commanders would have acquired the ideas and vices of proconsuls. It seemed to be almost an insoluble problem. No final decision was made. But the government determined to occupy the capital, hold the line to Vera Cruz, retain the chief ports, and extend our holdings according to circumstances.[23]

To Scott, however, the lack of a definitive plan signified little. Not one reinforcement entered the capital until after the first of November, and even at the end of that month he was barely able to garrison Mexico and Chapultepec. December 4 his army included only about 8000 privates, of whom a quarter were sick. During the next three weeks Generals Patterson, Butler and Cushing, Colonel Hays, Lieutenant Colonel Johnston and Major Lally, each with troops, arrived; and the forces then numbered about 11,000 effectives and 3000 sick.[24]

Scott therefore announced, with no doubt a strategic purpose as well as a rhetorical flourish, that our army was “about to spread itself over and to occupy the Republic of Mexico.” What he really intended was to take possession successively of the principal mining regions—those of Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí—and the capitals of such important states as lay within easy reach. Even for the former purpose, however, two columns of some 5000 effectives each were needed, and the men as well as clothing for them could not be provided. The only immediate operations, therefore, aside from the establishment of new posts on the road to Vera Cruz, were the peaceful occupation of Pachuca, a mining town about fifty miles northeast of Mexico, Toluca, about thirty-eight miles distant in the opposite direction, and Cuernavaca, the key to the Acapulco region, a little farther away toward the southwest.[24]

February 6, 1848, an expedition of more consequence marched, by Scott’s orders, from Vera Cruz. Most of the guerillas who infested the road to the interior lived and found a market at or near Córdoba, a city about sixty-five miles to the southwest, and Orizaba, sixteen or eighteen miles beyond it in the same direction; and Bankhead was instructed to occupy those towns. Very different from Lane’s rough trips on the plateau was this march. Near Córdoba flourished such genuine tropical wonders as the bread tree, the butter tree, the milk tree, and a kind of palm called “the traveller’s friend,” which covered the wayfarer’s head with a tent, and quenched his thirst with abundant sap. Going on, one found enormous masses of vegetation—thick, matted, boundlessly prolific—moulded into astonishing yet harmonious forms by the bays and promontories of the rapidly mounting foothills; terraces of luxuriant foliage piled on sheer cliffs, castles on the terraces, and cathedrals on the castles; verdure, verdure everywhere, dripping, flowing, spurting, tumbling in every hue and shade of green, with a dark, velvety mist in the gorges that became clear sapphire when the sun touched it, and here and there a cascade letting fall its crystal thread from a mossy crag.[25]

Then came the rich Orizaba valley, hemmed in with jungles, and winding off between sombre, precipitous mountains until lost in the dreamy distance; and above it the sparkling snows of the vast peak sent down a torrent of gray glacier water, that leaped into mid-air, and then, gathering itself below, wound on through splendid, odorous trees full of parrots, canaries and mocking-birds, hurried past fragrant orange groves and still more fragrant blossoms, poured through the arches of a noble old bridge, and buried itself in the woods. But the Americans did not forget their orders. Both cities were occupied without resistance, and both were garrisoned; and the guerillas now found their proceedings considerably hampered.[25]

THE REMOVAL OF SCOTT

The final military operations of Scott seemed thus rather tame, as was natural; but Polk executed one that could be termed startling, if not exactly brilliant. His principal assistants were Pillow, Worth and Duncan; and in different ways each had excellent qualifications for the work. Pillow was not “The Lie Incarnate,” as Trist believed, nor even “a perfect ass,” as many thought; but vanity, ambition, lack of probity, and a gift for dark and cunning methods characterized him. His instincts and talents, indeed, were those of the criminal lawyer who minds nothing about his case except the verdict. When the President’s brother shot a man down in the street at Nashville, Pillow got him off. With reference to his work in helping bring about Polk’s nomination at Baltimore he wrote, “The fatal blow was given, but it was not seen nor known what produced such a result—nor where the blow came from.” “I feel as boyant as the air,” he said in December, 1846, when great dissatisfaction with Taylor prevailed at Washington, because I know “that I have done the work.... I have paid him in full” for his treatment of me. And one could seldom get a finger on Pillow’s back, when he was not wriggling actively toward some object of selfish desire.[26]

Without a particle of real military ability or success to his credit, he now stood second in our army, and hence logically enough saw no reason why he might not, by some devious path, arrive at the first position and even at the Presidency. “Modesty,” said Burke, “does not long survive innocence.” To plant such a person, with urgent recommendations, at open, big-hearted Scott’s right hand, to win his confidence, to spy upon, criticise and undermine him, and inevitably to scheme for his place, was indecent; but Polk did it.[26]

Very unlike Pillow was the courtly and fascinating Worth; but his mind was intense, narrow and self-centred. After the battle of Monterey he exclaimed, “I am satisfied with myself. The most vindictive foes crouch at my feet, and my friends choke with joy and delight.” And there is one sin of which even angels are capable, we have been told. All his military recognition he owed to Scott, but probably the debt weighed heavily on his proud and restive nature; and, while apparently reciprocating the genuine affection of his chief, he had inwardly rejected Scott’s principles and methods nearly thirty years before the Mexican war. Regarding his friend, fellow New Yorker and brother Democrat, Marcy, an adroit politician, he felt very differently. “I would not give an ounce” of his wisdom, he wrote in June, 1846, for all Scott’s glory; Scott “is determined to sink and draw his friends down with him.”[27]

At Vera Cruz the commander-in-chief, relying on their long intimacy, told Worth frankly that he believed the administration intended to ruin him, and the subordinate officer evidently determined not to be drawn down. At the same place a brother officer suggested to Worth a higher position than was even the highest in the army. The suggestion appears to have struck root. All military men believed the next President would be one of them, and what commander had acquired a more brilliant reputation? The New York Sun recommended him for the place; and the idea of his candidacy was favorably received by many. This prospect naturally turned him still more against his old friend, for either Scott or Taylor seemed almost certain to be the Whig nominee. Through a series of clashes, for which little—if any—justification can be seen, and in spite of Scott’s efforts to conciliate him, Worth proceeded then to gain emancipation from his burden of gratitude, and place himself in open antagonism to his former patron.[28]

THE REMOVAL OF SCOTT

Duncan’s motives were different again. He was intimate with Worth; and Pillow, who offered to marry the Colonel to a rich and handsome widow, doubtless promised him the post of inspector general. At any rate he urged Polk to make the appointment, hinting at other reasons than mere qualifications, and it was made; and we know that Duncan gave himself much trouble to assist Pillow as a partisan supporter. The power of such a combination, headed by the President himself, to gather adherents from the many ambitious officers hardly needs to be pointed out; and finally there were, of course, jealous and envious men. “Since we cannot attain to greatness, let us revenge ourselves by railing at it,” said Montaigne for the benefit of such persons; and many of the officers knew that greatness was beyond their powers. None of them could monologue as Scott did; none could look in a cocked hat as he looked; none had won the Mexican war; and, moreover, he was the sole general-in-chief.[29]

The result was a powerful movement against the prestige and authority properly belonging to Scott. Pillow’s reports on the battles of Contreras and Chapultepec tended to represent the General as a nonentity; and Worth not only did somewhat the same, but referred to the Commander in terms of ridicule and contempt. A letter, doubtless written directly or indirectly by Pillow over the signature of “Leonidas,” extolling Pillow shamelessly and belittling Scott, was trickily worked into the New Orleans Delta of September 10, 1847; and another letter, containing a passage intended to show that Worth and Duncan had saved Scott from choosing the wrong approach to the capital, appeared in the United States, then in a Tampico newspaper and finally at Mexico City. Both letters were grossly improper, especially since the army lay in the enemy’s country; and Scott found it necessary to act. As he well said, “The general-in-chief who once submits to an outrage from a junior, must lay his account to suffer the like from all the vicious under him,” and “even the great mass of the spirited, intelligent, and well affected, among his brothers in arms, would soon reduce such commander to utter imbecility, by holding him in just scorn and contempt” for his recreancy to himself and the country.[30]

On November 12, therefore, he issued his General Orders 349, which aimed to stigmatize these offences in such a way as to prevent a recurrence of them. Duncan then assumed in a plainly defiant manner the paternity of the Tampico letter, although in fact the offensive passage had not been written by him. His primary object in doing this was evidently to give Worth a handle, and the handle was promptly seized. One thing led to another; and in the end formal charges were brought by the commander-in-chief against Pillow, Worth and Duncan, and by the two generals against him; appeals—insulting to Scott—were made by Pillow and Worth to the government; and the technical “arrest” of the three officers followed.[31]

The government then stepped in. Scott had no doubt given it offence during the campaign, for his letters had plainly enough revealed a conviction that Polk had broken faith with him, and purposely thrown difficulties and annoyances across his path; but the circumstances had appeared to warrant his complaints, and Marcy had at least “got even” by administering liberal censures in reply. The balance in fact—aside, perhaps, from a mere acerbity of language—was against the administration. Besides, having served the country well and saved the government from disaster, Scott was entitled to some indulgence for irritation caused by the peculiarly trying circumstances that surrounded him. He was a large man, had done a large work and merited large treatment. But there was nothing large about the administration. The confines of mediocrity hemmed it in. Pillow and Duncan were therefore by its orders relieved of arrest; Worth was not only released, but assigned to duty according to his highest brevet rank; and “in view of the present state of things in the army,” chiefly or entirely caused by Polk’s agent and Marcy’s friend, Scott was deposed. He had performed his task, said Robert E. Lee, and now was “turned out as an old horse to die.” April 22, 1848, amidst the lamentations, cheers and blessings of the army as a whole—trembling himself with emotion—he took his leave, and Major General Butler, who was a Democrat and looked well on a horse, bore sway at headquarters.[32]

---

In January, 1846, the United States had available for naval hostilities one ship-of-the-line, seven frigates and razees, fifteen sloops-of-war, six brigs, one schooner and three steamers—that is to say, thirty-three war craft. As ships-of-the-line carried more than seventy guns, frigates about forty-four to fifty, sloops twenty, brigs ten and other vessels in proportion, this fleet had 1155 cannon. Two of the vessels, under Commodore James Biddle, were on the coast of Asia; several occupied the Brazil station; and five cruised in African waters to check the trade in slaves. The Pacific squadron, commanded by Commodore John D. Sloat, comprised on July 1, 1846, the frigate Savannah, the sloops Portsmouth, Levant, Warren and Cyane, the schooner Shark and the storeship Erie, to which the frigate Congress, the razee Independence and the sloops Dale, Saratoga and Preble were added later in the year, while the Levant went home; and substantially all the rest of the fleet, known as the Home Squadron, attended to the West Indies and Gulf service, under Commodore David Conner.[1]

The appropriation for the year ending with June, 1846, was a little less than ten millions, but only about six and a half millions were expended. The war bill of May 13 permitted the completion of all vessels then building and the purchase of others; and by November, 1847, after suffering a number of losses, the navy had in commission five ships-of-the-line, one razee, four frigates, thirteen sloops, six brigs, eleven schooners, four bomb-vessels, twelve steamers and six storeships.[1]

The peace establishment created by Congress in 1844 provided for 7500 petty officers, seamen, landsmen and boys, and in August, 1846, this number was raised to 10,000 for the period of the war; but owing to the remarkable activity of the merchant marine and the consequently high wages, men could not easily be obtained. During the most important year—November, 1846, to November, 1847—not over 8000 were in the fleet at any one time. The whole number of seamen employed in the course of the war did not exceed 7000; and hence plans to strengthen our forces in the Gulf and the Pacific had to be curtailed. The service, too, did not enjoy unqualified popularity. In the sailor’s decalogue appeared this commandment:

and the cannon had to be rubbed with fragrant “sea pitch” from the bottom of the ocean until they shone like Japanese lacquer. Discipline, therefore, not reinforced by the enthusiasm and the necessities of war, fell considerably below its reputation, and the crews were eager to be free when their time expired. The officers, even, had become lax after thirty years of peace, and in too many instances their standards of conduct had given way.[2]

In the administration of the navy, also, the effects of a long peace could be seen. The control of matters had fallen, though not by accident, into the hands of shrewd officers deeply interested in themselves and their friends. Supernumeraries abounded. Those who drew the most pay often rendered the least service. The pet ambition was for a safe, quiet and easy position. Shore billets were too numerous. No field officer of the Marines had cruised since his promotion, and one of them had been in the service more than a generation without going to sea. Secretary Bancroft, eager for distinction, undertook to eliminate the abuses, but only succeeded in eliminating himself. He had taught Greek, and was ridiculed by the naval men as undertaking to play the pedagogue over them. Having no dominating force of character nor even a commanding presence, he could not stand against the governing clique. The requirements of the war, which might have assisted an abler administrator to win the day, only increased his difficulties. The Senate refused to confirm some of his appointees; and early in September, 1846, he became our minister to England.[3]

J. Y. Mason, who succeeded him, was a fat, easy, agreeable man, quite innocent of the desire to achieve reforms. Nobody disliked him, but nobody felt obliged to obey him; and as late as the twentieth of February, 1847, suddenly discovering that Scott had mentioned certain designs of the army against Vera Cruz, he awoke to the fact that his department had failed to give the anticipated assistance. Just what could be expected of the navy under all these prejudicial conditions was, therefore, in some minds, a little uncertain.[3]

PRIVATEERING

One of the most serious duties imposed upon it was to guard against privateering, for not only our commerce but the supplies required by our troops depended upon free lanes. About the middle of 1845 the government issued orders that any activity of such a kind on the part of Mexico should be considered the signal for war; and as a deterrent it was announced by the newspapers, though incorrectly, that privateersmen were to be regarded as pirates. Crews not predominantly composed of Mexicans, it was often asserted, could legally be “strung up to the yard-arm,” since we were understood to have treaties that sanctioned this principle with most countries.[4]

After the war actually began, a great deal of danger was apprehended. Desperate characters were believed to be waiting at New Orleans, and “piratical gangs” in the ports of Cuba, where Almonte seemed to be at work. News arrived early in August, 1846, that privateering regulations had been issued by Mexico, and suspicious craft soon appeared off Key West. In December the Mexican minister of war openly avowed that great hopes of injuring the United States in this manner were entertained. Blank certificates and commissions reached Washington; information regarding efforts to set vessels at work in various quarters arrived there; and finally the Carmelita of Bangor, Maine, was captured near Gibraltar by a felucca named El Unico, fitted out at Oran, Algeria, and run by Spanish desperadoes.[4]

Mexico had not in reality, after studying the subject with deep interest, much expectation of accomplishing any large results by issuing letters of marque, and the regulations of July, 1846, were intended principally or wholly to annoy this country; but in September and October she took the matter up rather seriously. A new law provided that any foreigner entering her naval service might become a Mexican at once, and blank naturalization papers as well as thousands of privateering commissions, duly signed but not filled out, were carried by agents to the West Indies, Great Britain, France and Spain. Almonte did his best at Havana. J. N. Pareda, appointed Mexican chargé d’affaires at Madrid, appears to have circulated the documents actively in the Peninsular ports; and another privateer, a Spanish steamer named La Rosita, put out from Oran.[5]

On the other hand, the representatives of the United States insisted upon our treaties and the obligations of neutrality. Polk’s annual Message of December, 1846, denounced the Mexican plan as inviting “all the freebooters upon earth,” who felt like paying for the privilege, to cruise against American commerce, announced that our own courts would say whether such papers could protect them from the pirate’s doom, recommended that Congress provide at once for the trial of Spanish subjects caught in such business, and suggested American privateers—intended mainly to recapture vessels taken under Mexican letters. An American force hastened to the Mediterranean, and our squadrons were expected to seize all the rovers putting out, as well as intercept all prizes on their way to the enemy’s ports. These precautions looked rather discouraging to enterprising desperadoes.[6]

In England there was a feeling, as will appear later, that Mexico should be allowed the utmost license against us, and the Mexican minister at London received many applications for letters; but Great Britain did not really wish her supplies of cotton to be endangered, and all the seas to be filled with corsairs preying upon the trade of the world; and in October, 1845, her minister to Mexico was instructed to prevent that country, if he could, from issuing letters of marque indiscriminately. Bankhead protested also, as did the Spanish minister, against important features of the regulations. Palmerston himself, though he acted in a languid fashion, and gave notice at Washington that British subjects, found on Mexican privateers, could not be treated as pirates, announced that his government would faithfully do its duty.[7]

France was prompt and active in responding to our demands. Spain, placed under stringent obligations by the treaty of October, 1795, promised full compliance with its requirements, captured El Unico, punished its crew, pursued La Rosita, and ordered O’Donnell, the captain general of Cuba, to act as her obligations required; but she accepted Pareda, the colporteur of what was piracy under her agreement, as consul of Mexico; and the captain general, while he convinced the American representative of his good-will and in fact would not permit an open violation of the treaty, suggested to the Mexicans ways—fortunately impracticable—of evading his own rules. But the risks of privateering under so many embarrassments and the virtual impossibility of converting a prize into cash, prevented all attempts except the feeble ones already mentioned. In this field, consequently, our navy, though incessantly watchful, could acquire no laurels.[7]

THE BLOCKADE

Another aspect of the situation concerned it more seriously. On the day Congress passed the war bill (May 13, 1846) orders were issued to blockade the ports of Mexico. Several definite aims prompted this action. Primarily, of course, it was desired to prevent supplies of all kinds from reaching the enemy, and to deprive them of the almost indispensable revenues obtained in peace by taxing imports; but there were also hopes that loss of business would induce Great Britain and France, which had a profitable trade in that quarter, to urge upon Mexico the acceptance of our terms. The blockade was therefore to be enforced vigorously. At the same time neutrals were to be treated with all reasonable indulgence. Theoretically only their war vessels had the right of entering closed ports, but practically the intention was to broaden that narrow door considerably. Toward itself, however, the United States determined to be strictly faithful in observing its declared principles. Merely those ports where the order could become effective were in view. The announcement of blockade was to be made as public as it could be; and in particular the government required that a full warning should be given to neutral ships.[8]

For the work thus imposed upon him Conner had ample time to prepare. As early as August, 1845, he was directed to blockade the Gulf ports in case of war; early in 1846 he knew of Mexico’s attitude regarding Slidell; before the end of March his vessels occupied convenient positions; and promptly on the outbreak of hostilities a blockade was announced at the chief harbors. By July, with some assistance from the revenue service, it extended from the Rio Grande to the Goatzacoalcos.[9]

But the difficulty of making it continuously effective proved to be extraordinary. There were not vessels enough of the proper kind; occasionally a more or less complete concentration became necessary; and accidents of many sorts occurred. Uncharted shoals and rocks, currents of unknown direction and force, the frequent haze, and the darkening of the lighthouses made extreme caution imperative. The suddenness and violence of the storms almost surpassed belief. At Vera Cruz the Somers was blown over and sunk before Semmes, her able commander, could take steps to avert the disaster. Even at the anchorages one would suddenly hear on a calm afternoon the clarion orders of the speaking trumpet; the ship would quiver and reverberate as the cable of the heaviest anchor ran swiftly out; in a moment the storm would burst; and for days it might be a question almost hourly of going ashore. At such times all sailing vessels on patrol duty had to make instantly for the open sea, and before they could return to their stations a lurking blockade runner could perhaps enter the port. Owing to such difficulties Alvarado and Frontera, for instance, could not be watched continuously.[9]

Embarrassments also of a minor yet serious character had to be encountered. Our vessels, unlike those of England, were designed exclusively for war, and long confinement impaired the efficiency of the men. The government supplies of eatables needed to be eked out from New Orleans huckster boats and European merchant ships. Water could not be obtained readily from a hostile shore. At the Antigua River, in July, 1846, the boats going up with casks were fired upon, and such affairs had to be expected. Vessels were despatched long distances occasionally to obtain fresh provisions, but even then scurvy of a most serious nature broke out in the summer of 1846, disabling some of the largest and most efficient ships for several months. The Raritan had more than 200 cases. Nearly all on the Potomac suffered. The Falmouth had to go as far north as Boston to throw it off. Swampy shores and kelp rotting under the torrid sun produced myriads of poisonous as well as otherwise annoying insects. During a brief stay in the river off Tampico nearly all the officers and men contracted ague, and the yellow fever scourged a number of the vessels. More than two thirds of those on the Saratoga had the latter disease. In August, 1847, the Mississippi left her station with some 200 men suffering from it.[10]

Being strangers and enemies, the Americans labored under peculiar disadvantages. The people gladly assisted blockade runners in every possible way. Spanish captains in particular, having friends on shore and pilots thoroughly familiar with the coast, could not be prevented from reaching harbor at night or in thick weather by way of the shoals. Sometimes it looked, for one or another of these many reasons, as if our officers were careless or incompetent. Army observers, not well informed regarding the conditions, felt disposed now and then to pronounce the blockade a humbug, and naturally some foreigners did so. This opinion had neither truth nor probability in its favor. But naturally, in view of all the circumstances, it proved more satisfactory to occupy the ports, and open them to commerce on the basis of a reasonable contributory tariff.[11]

OFFENSIVE NAVAL OPERATIONS

Besides cruising to watch for privateers and hovering off the chief harbors to maintain a blockade, our fleet was expected to share in the general offensive. For one thing Bancroft ordered Conner to seize all the Mexican war vessels that he could reach. But here a singular difficulty arose: none of that sort existed. The navy of Mexico, aside from small craft in the Pacific, included nine vessels amounting to about 3200 tons. The most important were the steamers Guadalupe and Moctezuma, built in England, which made up nearly two thirds of this meagre total; but as these had never been paid for, they were easily transferred to a British firm, and in consequence of a calm succeeded in escaping to Havana. The rest of the vessels—a small brig, which changed its name too often to have one, and six even smaller craft—took refuge early in the Alvarado River. The commander sank three of them to obstruct the channel, and when Hunter took Alvarado in April, 1847, the rest were burned.[12]

Conner’s only chance for offensive work, therefore, aside from capturing a merchant vessel occasionally, was to engage in shore operations; and while the officers and men felt eager to get a nearer view of the scenery, as they said, and rival the glories of the army, they found themselves embarrassed by the same difficulties that attended blockading and by others also. The want of tenders and storeships proved especially serious when hostilities were in view. Each vessel had to obtain supplies at the Pensacola navy yard; the round trip cost a month or so; and that base lacked the needed equipment. Once it spent about four weeks in supplying the Potomac with bread for a three-months cruise, and in July, 1846, the yellow fever broke out there. A point of capital importance was to reach the small harbors and cut off all trade; but until the last of September, 1846, Conner had not a vessel that could cross the bars, tow boats over, and operate in the rivers; and the first load of coal reached him two weeks later. A shortage of officers and men hampered operations; and Mason, besides failing to anticipate such a case, failed to be awake when it occurred. By December, 1846, the Home Squadron included a substantial flotilla of small craft, mounting from one to four guns each; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies and making repairs on a hostile coast in a season of storms almost paralyzed it.[13]

Another embarrassment existed. Conner was a brave, able, accomplished, excellent man, but for a generation his business had been that of a navigator. His duty had been to go his rounds in safety, and he did it well. Nobody could handle a frigate better in a storm. He looked carefully after the health of his men, too. In thoughtfulness, prudence, judgment and fidelity he left nothing to be desired. But his constitution had never been robust, and the effects of an old wound, thirty years of service in a southern climate and the torture of neuralgia had now made him a confirmed invalid, worn and wasted, and subject at intervals to almost maddening pain. His powers both of thought and of execution were impaired. Naturally such a man did not wish to risk either men or ships; and, lacking the vigor for quick decisions and powerful action, he could not wisely involve himself in dangerous complications. On the outbreak of war he should have retired; but he knew that he stood high in favor at Washington, Bancroft had assured him that he could retain the command indefinitely, and no doubt he failed to realize the situation. More or less well, however, shore operations were carried on, and our next business will be to trace them from the beginning.[14]

THE HOME SQUADRON

Owing to the state of our relations with Mexico the Home Squadron concentrated at Vera Cruz in February, 1846, and later, in accordance with instructions to coöperate with Taylor, Conner presented himself at Point Isabel in time to safeguard that position during the battles on the Rio Grande, and assist in occupying Burrita. When the war bill passed, his forces consisted of the steamer Mississippi, which could tow a number of small craft at full speed, the steamer Princeton, a swift vessel designed by the celebrated Ericsson, the handsome frigate Raritan, which flew the broad blue pennant of the Commodore at the main, the frigates Cumberland and Potomac, the sloops Falmouth, John Adams and St. Mary’s, the brigs Porpoise and Somers and the schooner Flirt, with probably some 2700 men. Leaving the Brazos about the twentieth of May Conner sailed with a part of the squadron for Pensacola, while other vessels did blockade work or scouted along the coast as far as Yucatan. In June Captain Saunders of the St. Mary’s, lying off Tampico bar, opened fire twice on the Mexicans, who seemed to be erecting works, and made a bold, well-planned effort against three gunboats anchored inside the mouth of the Pánuco, which only circumstances defeated. By August the composition of the squadron and its distribution changed somewhat; three small schooner-gunboats had arrived; but there was no material difference in strength.[15]

Meanwhile Conner had in mind the small, handy Mexican vessels then lying in Alvarado River, which did nobody any good there, and were capable of assisting in his work materially. It seemed very proper to seize or at least destroy them. From residents of Alvarado, who traded with the Americans, useful information was doubtless obtained; and the master of a captured launch, well fed and well frightened, gave correct details regarding the bar, channel and shipping. A redoubt stood near the beach, but it contained no large guns; and, although warned by the questioning of the launch’s master, the Mexicans gathered no forces except some 200 militia in the town and about as many more several hours distant up the river. The situation invited a bold stroke.[16]

Accordingly the Mississippi and Princeton, two frigates and the schooner-gunboats—each of these mounting one piece—dropped anchor in line opposite the fort at eleven o’clock in the morning, August 7, 1846, and the steamers opened a fire, to which the lightness of the Mexican ordnance permitted no reply. The bombardment continued more or less actively for about six hours, but without effect. Owing to the swift current of the river, swollen by heavy rains, it seemed hardly possible to row up to the town, and finally the gunboats were placed within musket range of the shore some distance north of the fort. Apparently the intention was to land under the protection of our artillery. The Mexicans therefore opened a small-arms fire from the sand-hills, to which our cannon and the muskets on the gunboats replied; but in about half an hour darkness put an end to the operations. Bad weather came on immediately; the open roadstead was unsafe; and after nightfall, although it had been proposed to resume the attack the next day, Conner withdrew with his disgusted men to Antón Lizardo.[16]

The following month one of the bureau chiefs gave him to understand that the administration wished something done for the newspapers to make a “noise” about, and another attempt upon the same position was planned. By this time the enemy had improved the defences, and mounted a heavy pivot gun on a high knoll; and a letter from one of our sailors, picked up on the beach, gave them ample notice of the attack. These facts did not signify materially, however, for the Americans realized they must positively win a victory this time, and braced themselves for whatever might occur. A little after sunrise, October 15, the Mississippi, the Vixen (a small steamer carrying three guns which had recently joined the squadron), the McLane (a steamer loaned by the revenue service), the three gunboats, the Nonata (a prize schooner mounting four guns), and a revenue schooner named the Forward arrived off the bar. The plan was to have the Mississippi cannonade with shells, and the other steamers, towing the gunboats, ascend the river.[17]

Everything went wrong, however. The Mississippi produced no effect. Owing to the strength of the current it seemed necessary to have wind, and Conner waited in vain until about 2 o’clock for the usual sea breeze. The bar stood higher than it ordinarily did; and although he, aboard the Vixen, crossed with two gunboats, the McLane grounded, and her section—the larger section—of the force was thrown into the utmost disorder amidst the breakers. Not only did the Mexican fire prove serious, for a shot struck near the wheelhouse of the Vixen, but up the river could be seen another fort, and also Mexican vessels carrying more metal than Conner now had available. He therefore retired across the bar, touching twice; and when at length his other section found itself ready to try once more, he deemed the hour too late. Besides, he now believed the McLane would be unable to go up the river with even one gunboat in tow. Again bad weather came on, and again the expedition withdrew. Officers and men were angry this time as well as disgusted; and although the Mexicans on the ground realized that accidents had saved them, a shout of triumph and encouragement rang through their country.[17]

OPERATIONS AT THE SOUTHEAST

The Mississippi now bore the red pennant of Matthew C. Perry, who was to have command of the squadron on Conner’s retirement, and meantime, feeling anxious to serve, contented himself with the dignity of a vice commodore and acted as a captain; and since not only the Vixen but coal to make her effective were at last on hand, Conner despatched his energetic lieutenant southeastward, on the next day after the second Alvarado fiasco, with all the vessels employed in that affair except one of the gunboats. After seizing on the way an American barque, found in communication with Mexicans, Perry entered Tabasco River on the twenty-third, took possession of the town (Frontera), and the next day—transferring men from his flagship, which drew too much water for the bar, to the captured Petrita, a small but swift American-built steamer—he proceeded about seventy-five miles up the rapid and winding stream through heavy and splendid forests, disabling the guns of a small, deserted fort on the way, and reached San Juan Bautista, capital of the state of Tabasco, and seat of an active commerce in munitions and other goods, that reached as far as Mexico City. Here five merchant vessels fell into his possession. But now, unfamiliar with Mexican tactics, Perry blundered into peremptorily summoning the town, which J. B. Traconis, the comandante general, refused to give up.[18]

San Juan Bautista was a small, dull city of broad streets and one-story brick houses, lying in a wide plain. In spite of scandalous desertion Traconis probably had about 400 men supported by two small guns. These forces he broke into a number of parties and placed in the outskirts. Perry opened fire on the town with cannon, and after a time sent a party ashore. A skirmish followed, but nothing decisive could be accomplished, and after sunset, fearing the sailors would be shot down in the streets during the night, he recalled them.[18]

On the following day the foreigners protested against the bombardment. Negotiations were then tried; but the Comandante General, who cared much for his dignity and nothing for the people, insisted on playing out his rôle of the fearless patriot. Since it was impracticable to garrison the town, Perry decided to retire. But as one of the prizes grounded near the shore and a party of the Mexicans—although a white flag could be seen on the Vixen and other vessels—fired on the Americans who were aboard, causing the death of one and injuring two more, he resumed the cannonade. Of course the enemy gracefully withdrew; and then Perry did the same, leaving Traconis to magnify his triumph. The McLane and Forward were left at Frontera to blockade the river and protect neutrals; and after burning four vessels and capturing one more on the way, Perry rejoined Conner on the last day of the month with nine prizes. In its real aim the expedition had succeeded; but the affair at San Juan Bautista had been so indecisive and murderous that even American soldiers, eager to claim credit and inured to the chances of war, felt humiliated.[18]

The fortnight of activity and excitement cheered the men of the squadron a great deal, however, and then followed the capture of Tampico, which delighted Secretary Mason beyond measure, and gave the newspapers genuine material for a “noise.” When this affair, including the trip up the Pánuco, ended, Conner despatched his lieutenant southeastward in the Vixen, accompanied by two gunboats. December 21, at the town of Laguna on El Carmen Island, Yucatan, Perry seized a couple of small forts, garrisoned by a few timid soldiers, and disabled the guns; and after reinforcing the blockade of Tabasco River, looking into the coastal waters, and making two prizes on his return voyage, he joined the squadron two days after Christmas. A visit of Conner’s to the same point the following month ended important operations in this quarter for some time. The occupation of Laguna checked a thriving illicit commerce by the river that entered the Gulf here.[19]

All this while the haughty, outstanding challenge—the scalp-lock, so to speak—of Mexico, the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa in Vera Cruz harbor, remained secure. The capture of it, many of our citizens felt, would wrap the Gulf in a blaze of American glory; and young Porter, young Farragut and other possible Decaturs had plans of attack ready. But older men thought the enterprise impracticable for the navy alone. At the beginning of the war Bancroft expressly notified Conner that his forces were not deemed adequate for such an undertaking. Not only had the fortress been strongly and shrewdly constructed, but the channel that led to it was narrow and winding, so that a mishap would have endangered all of the attacking vessels. The French had taken it in 1838, but only by good luck and a sort of treachery, and since that year it had been greatly strengthened. Conner and Scott agreed that it could not be captured by the fleet. But in March, 1847, misfortune overtook Ulúa, for Scott, supported brilliantly by the naval forces, laid siege to Vera Cruz.[20]

PERRY SUCCEEDS CONNER

To the Home Squadron and its commander as well as to the “castle” this event signified a great deal. In fact it brought Conner both to the climax and to the tragedy of his professional career. It enabled him to display in the debarkation his real abilities; and then precipitated him on the eve of a triumph into oblivion. His regular term as commander had expired in November, 1846, and Perry notified him that a successor was ready. But Conner held Bancroft’s promise of an indefinite continuance in his position; he doubtless felt that after long withholding needed means, the department owed him a chance to do something worth while; and when he found that Scott was to move against Vera Cruz, he saw his opportunity. Unfortunately for him the change of secretaries, the complaints and bold proposals of young officers, and the clamor of the public, ignorant both of what had been possible and of what had been accomplished, had undermined his position.[21]

In January, 1847, Slidell informed the government that Conner had lost not only his physical and mental vigor but the confidence of his men. The following month Perry, whose ship had gone to Norfolk for repairs, visited Washington frequently; and how that ambitious, coarse-grained, wilful man talked, one can readily imagine. Besides, while Perry’s outfit of Christian graces was noticeably defective, it could not be denied that he possessed energy and a fighting temper. The government therefore decided that Conner had not “shown himself equal to the crisis.” March 3 a change of commanders was ordered; and when the dénouement of the operations at Vera Cruz approached, instead of gracefully permitting Conner to finish what he had begun, “Old Bruin,” as the sailors called Perry, insisted upon his rights. March 21, therefore, his broad blue pennant went up on the Mississippi, and in a few days his name shone forth in the capitulation of Vera Cruz and Ulúa. “Poor Commodore Conner,” said Marcy.[21]

Only one important fortified place on the Gulf, Tuxpán, now flew the tricolor, and it was a point of pride to capture the town, for guns from the Truxtun—our finest brig, wrecked on the bar—had been mounted there, and the strength of the position challenged our squadron. The city stood on the left bank of a river bearing the same name and about six miles from its mouth. On the lower edge of it rose a steep eminence, Hospital Hill, with a 9-pounder not far from its base and a 32-pound carronade pivoted at its top, both of them bearing upon the river. Nearly a mile and a half below, at the junction of a tributary, stood a water battery of two 18’s called Palmasola; and some distance farther down, on a bluff about sixty feet high jutting into the stream, two 32-pound carronades and a long nine in La Peña redoubt commanded the stream for perhaps two miles. In and near these forts were stationed some three or four hundred Mexicans under General Cos.[22]

TUXPÁN CAPTURED

Early on April 17 a large American force, including the “Two Pollies,” as forecastle wit or experience had christened the Spitfire and Vixen, concentrated off the mouth of the river. Perry had the channel of the bar sounded and marked with buoys, and the small steamers lightened. The next morning at high tide—near ten o’clock—in spite of serious misgivings the flotilla got through the surf into the placid river. The Spitfire, commanded by Tattnall and carrying Perry, the Vixen and another small steamer named the Scourge, then took in tow three armed schooners and some thirty rowboats, which contained four light guns and almost 1600 men; and this fine procession, adorned with brilliant pennants and ensigns, wound upward in admirable order between the low and verdant banks.[22]

Perhaps two miles below La Peña the river, here two or three hundred yards in width, straightened, the current became swifter, and the banks rose into thickly wooded hills. When the flotilla reached this point, a curl of smoke burst from the redoubt. “Go ahead fast!” signalled the Commodore. The steamers dropped their tows. The sails of the schooners filled, and hundreds of oars flashed in the now declining sun.[22]

It was a race, but more than a race. The shore artillery spoke loudly and well. The Spitfire suffered repeatedly. Tattnall was wounded. With boom after boom steamers and gunboats replied. As the Americans approached it, La Peña’s fire died out. “Land and storm!” ordered Perry. “Ay, ay, Sir,” was the response. Amidst the thunder of cheers it was done, but the Mexicans did not wait for their visitors. Dropping rammers and sponges they ran, and the Stars and Stripes flew up. A fire from the woods was quickly silenced. No less promptly yielded the other forts; and “at a gallop” the town was captured. In all, the casualties numbered only fourteen. A few prizes fell into Perry’s net above Tuxpán; the forts were demolished; the Truxtun’s guns were shipped off, and leaving two vessels to blockade the river, he sailed away.[22]

After this Perry and his officers cruised for prizes, and invited a number of small ports to raise our flag—an invitation always accepted with alacrity if not enthusiasm—but his attention was chiefly fixed on the southeast. Yucatan and to a certain extent her neighbor, Tabasco, endeavored to carry water on both shoulders. The former province, which was more industrious and prosperous than any other part of Mexico, had always demanded and usually been accorded under both Spanish and Mexican rule a position of semi-independence. In recent years difficulties had arisen between her and the government, but her sympathies were entirely against the United States. Both from policy and from a sense of humanity, our desire was to see her remain neutral and to spare her the rigors of war; but Yucatan, without appreciating either our wish or our conduct, aimed simply to preserve her export commerce, her no less valued business of importing American flour, and her trade—especially in foodstuffs and munitions—with Mexico, escape all the burdens and losses of the conflict, and run no risk of later Mexican vengeance.[23]

To accomplish so difficult a task her cunning and unscrupulous politicians veered and turned, put out statements, and organized revolutions according to the exigencies of the moment. Her two chief cities, Mérida and Campeche, now joined hands and now seemed or were antagonistic. Local rivalries complicated the situation further; and on our side, owing to the distance between Washington and the Home Squadron, there could not be perfect cöoperation. The blockade was therefore imposed and lifted, imposed and lifted by turns. At length, in May, 1847, Perry took possession of Laguna and El Carmen Island, appointed a naval officer as governor, and authorized commerce under the contributory tariff; but at the same time our efforts to prevent all contraband trade, both there and by Tabasco River, continued.[23]

In June Perry decided to attack San Juan Bautista again. On the thirteenth he reached the bar at Frontera in the Mississippi, and the next day he proceeded up the river, with a flotilla of one brig, one schooner, four small steamers, three bomb-vessels and a fleet of rowboats. After easily silencing the fire of two breastworks on the way, he found obstructions in the river opposite a third, and fearing the steamers might not be able to pass them without delay, landed quickly with ten guns and more than 1100 men, and under an almost insupportable heat routed a hostile party. The steamers, however, passed on, driving the enemy from the breastwork, and by the sixteenth San Juan Bautista once more became ours. The fortifications were destroyed, and the guns put aboard.[24]

OPERATIONS ON THE PACIFIC COAST

Perry decided to hold the place, and on retiring left there nearly two hundred men besides four small vessels and their complements. But this proved another mistake. The Mexicans were driven from the vicinity, but when our force went back to the town, they immediately returned to blockade it; and on July 22, after the climate had laid low more than a third of the Americans, our garrison abandoned the place. From this time on, Perry found occupation enough in watching Tuxpán River, protecting against Mexican irregulars the ports where American customhouses existed, and patrolling the coast.[24]

During these operations of the Home Squadron significant events had been taking place also on the other coast of Mexico. Its enormous length made a strict blockade practically impossible; but on the nineteenth of August, 1846, the magnificent Stockton covered it completely—with a proclamation. It was not that he intended to declare a paper blockade, but only that he did not, like finite creatures, realize the necessity of adequate means. About three days later Du Pont in the Cyane and Hull in the Warren left California for the south. During their cruise fourteen or fifteen prizes were taken—including the Malek Adel, an armed brig—and so all probability that our commerce and whalers in the Pacific would be molested happily vanished. Guaymas was cannonaded a little (October 6), and Mazatlán suffered a rather nominal blockade of about four weeks. That period ended on the eighth of November, and for almost three months no American vessel appeared there.[25]

In February and March, 1847, the Portsmouth watched the port for about five weeks, but then it was left wide open again. England refused to recognize such a blockade. The United States admitted its illegality; and on the sixth of March, 1847, Commodore Biddle, now commanding the squadron, cancelled Stockton’s proclamation. During the spring of 1847 Mazatlán, which had almost a monopoly of the commerce, was again blockaded for a time, and after May the summer hurricanes interdicted commerce. Since Mexico had no armed vessel of any importance in the Pacific, naval operations then became unnecessary.[25]

In July, 1847, Shubrick succeeded Biddle. As the blockade of Mazatlán had been raised, he issued on August 6 a fresh notice, covering that port, Guaymas and San Blas, and about the middle of October sailed from Monterey, California, in the Independence, accompanied by the Cyane. The rest of his active squadron—which had preceded him southward or was to join him in that quarter—consisted of the Congress, Portsmouth, Preble, Dale and two storeships. On the twenty-ninth near Cape San Lucas he met Lavallette in the Congress, and learned that after an hour’s cannonading—caused by the disobliging refusal of General Campusano to surrender—Guaymas had been occupied nine days before. November 10 mountains lighted by a declining sun and canopied by a turquoise sky rose from the Gulf of California before him on the east; and soon, approaching a long, curving line of white beach, he dropped anchor near the lioness-hill of Crestón Island, which crouched, grandly recumbent, with her fore paws extended, watching over two islet cubs that slept in front of her. Here, on the mainland, was Mazatlán.[26]

OPERATIONS ON THE PACIFIC COAST

For nearly eighteen months the port, second only to Vera Cruz in the value of its commerce, had been controlled by Colonel Rafael Téllez, a happy-go-lucky insurgent of convivial tastes, oriental convictions on the subject of seraglios, and aboriginal ideas touching honor. In finance he succeeded, for it was only necessary to put his fist, whenever it felt empty, into the till at the customhouse; but as a warrior he proved hardly equal to the crisis. In short, he retired promptly and contented himself with partially blocking the port, which our forces occupied on the eleventh. November 20 an attempt of the Americans to cut off an annoying Mexican party some ten miles from the city failed; but the town was presently fortified in such a way that it stood in no danger. Early in January, 1848, San Blas was blockaded. Manzanillo’s turn came on the seventeenth of that month; and numerous expeditions, which scoured the coast and went short distances inland, seized light craft, destroyed fortifications, and captured ordnance.[27]

In tracing all these operations in the Pacific one receives a certain impression of tardiness and inefficiency. Acapulco, a point of slight commercial importance but one distinctly in the view of our naval commanders, escaped entirely; and other ports, especially San Blas, were apparently neglected. But the American vessels had no base near at hand. Few safe harbors could be found. Long voyages were necessary to obtain provisions and to send or pick up despatches. The sailors often found themselves compelled to do the work of soldiers ashore; and in particular vexatious duties had to be performed by the navy in Lower California.[28]

January 11, 1847, J. Y. Mason informed Stockton that both Californias were to be retained; and in the course of fifteen days, beginning with March 30, La Paz, San Lucas and San José, the chief towns of the peninsula, were occupied by our squadron. The authorities readily submitted, and the people seemed to concur. An intensely hostile spirit showed itself before long, however, and, with the aid of leaders and resources drawn from the mainland, bitter attacks—heroically resisted—were made upon our feeble posts at San José and La Paz during the fall and winter. Some American troops from upper California rendered great assistance; but Shubrick’s watchful coöperation was constantly requisite, and the spirit of resistance could not be exorcised until the end of March, 1848.[28]

REVIEW OF THE NAVAL OPERATIONS

The naval operations on both coasts failed to win loud applause, but there were obvious reasons. The high expectations of the public, based upon the war of 1812, could not possibly be satisfied, for our navy met with no enemy on its proper element. Its work had to be plodding and monotonous. Due preparations for that had not been made, and even the best informed landsmen understood but very imperfectly the difficulties that were encountered. Under such circumstances to conduct the blockade with as much efficiency as was actually shown, depriving Mexico of revenues and to a large extent of munitions, giving general satisfaction meanwhile to foreign interests more than willing to complain, was no slight achievement; and to play at the same time so effective a part on land, especially in the conquest of California, merited far higher encomiums than were bestowed.[29]

The conduct of naval men in occupied territory crowned their services. At Mazatlán, for example, Shubrick announced that he would exert himself to benefit, not injure, the people. Religious freedom, the protection of person and property, firm support of the city authorities, a low tariff and unrestricted commerce—except in munitions and with Mexican ports—were granted. Vexatious taxes that burdened the poor disappeared, and a wise, economical fiscal system took their place. The sale of ardent spirits to men in our service was prohibited. The Americans mingled freely with the people and, as the local historian admitted, “behaved like gentlemen.” After six weeks of this régime Shubrick was formally requested by the merchants to stay there. At Guaymas a similar policy produced similar results, and the people felt anxious to have Campusano’s forces leave the vicinity. Laguna became under our authority more prosperous than ever before. The naval balls and parties were extremely popular; and even after peace came, the Commodore was “most earnestly” requested by the people to let our forces remain for a while.[30]

---

For a considerable time large parts of Mexico were occupied by our troops, and it is quite worth while to know something of their life and behavior there. Conquering soldiers in a foreign land, especially when the enemy is deemed cowardly, treacherous and cruel, are not likely to be angels; and we may count upon meeting here with disagreeable as well as complimentary facts. But we must face these as brave and honest men who love the truth, believe in our country, and are not foolish enough to expect perfection of human nature. It will be some consolation to recall Napoleon’s maxim, “The conduct of a general in a conquered country is beset with difficulties,” and to remember that no nation, if well acquainted with its history, will think of pointing the finger at us.

The purpose of the United States was to treat non-combatants as friends, and protect them in all their rights of person, property and religion.[1] Civilization prescribed this course, and policy emphasized it. Both for immediate military success and for the restoration, after the war, of mutually profitable relations, it seemed highly desirable to strike only at the government and the army of Mexico, and to avoid angering the great body of the citizens.[2]

Accordingly Taylor was promptly supplied with a proclamation, to be distributed in both English and Spanish, which threw upon Paredes the odium of the conflict, assured the Mexican people that a government of “usurpers and tyrants” had involved them in its losses and miseries, and promised that no one behaving as a neutral would be molested; the General was instructed that his “utmost endeavors” must be put forth to make good the pledge; and an active policy of conciliation was urged upon him. As will be seen later, the course of the war and the attitude of Mexico eventually suggested a programme considerably sterner in certain respects; but such was the real desire of our government, and it went so far that in order to prove we had no intention of attacking the religion of the Mexicans, Roman Catholic priests were engaged to accompany our army.[2]

Taylor, besides resting under a strict obligation to obey his orders, doubtless concurred fully in this view of the matter, and for a time good conduct on the part of our troops prevailed. The authorities of Matamoros were respected; the people felt contented, and viewed the war with indifference; persons of the upper classes began to show themselves; and the town seemed on the way to being a smart little New Orleans. But the arrival of the volunteers in force gave the situation a new aspect.[3] Even men of unblemished reputations appeared to feel that becoming soldiers exempted them from every law, both civil and moral.[6]

DISORDERS AT MATAMOROS

When in camp below New Orleans the troops were guilty of some “sky-larking”—that is to say, plundering; and when they entered the enemy’s country they became, said a regular officer, “the living embodiment of a moral pestilence. Crime followed in their footsteps, and wherever they trod, they left indelible traces of infamy.” To meet their wishes, disorderly establishments of every kind sprang up,[4] and the streets were constantly filled with drunken, brawling, insolent officers and men carrying arms. One of them drew a pistol on the British consul because his cane was black; many depredations were committed; and before the tenth of July at least five or six harmless persons were shot down for amusement.[6]

Although it would seem as if Taylor, with some 2500 regulars at his back, might have enforced order, he declared that he could not, and soon gave up the effort. Unwilling to bring offenders before a military court, he endeavored to have the Mexican judges act in some cases, but of course they dared not; and he shipped a few of the malefactors to New Orleans, where they could not be held a moment for crimes perpetrated abroad. The result was practical impunity—“perfect impunity,” wrote the British consul—for the worst of crimes. At the beginning of August, however, the General prohibited the importation of liquor by the Rio Grande; and as the army was then moving on, Matamoros became comparatively quiet.[6]

Later commanders undertook with considerable success to keep it so; but even in January, 1847, robbery and violence were not unknown there, and the non-commissioned officers as well as the soldiers were forbidden to leave their quarters with arms unless on duty. Discharged volunteers on their way down the river did great harm,[5] and Taylor wrote in June, 1847, “There is scarcely a form of crime that has not been reported to me as committed by them.” Above Matamoros determined efforts were made with partial success to keep liquor from the troops, and the conditions were better. Here and there Americans would “muster in” some fruit or fowls. “Soldiers who have to fight their enemy in the enemy’s country will never go hungry as long as there are any chickens about,” wrote one of them; and in fact, said an officer, it was a patriotic duty for Uncle Sam’s men to keep their souls and their bodies together. But the rule in such cases was to compensate the owners, and probably no serious resentment lingered.[6]

During the battles of Monterey there was enough shooting to satisfy any reasonable person, and the quiet beauty of the scene should soon have banished thoughts of carnage. The tranquil mountains that stood about the town on three sides, receding as the clouds enveloped them in shadow or approaching as the splendor of the sun brightened every point, the statuesque aguacates clothed in foliage like dark green velvet, the fan-like palmettoes, the feathery date palms, the delicious oranges and pomegranates, the murmuring streams, and the lilies that brightened many a pool invited to repose; yet no sooner was battle over than murder began.[10]

The chief criminals were the Texans,[C] who felt that barbarities committed by the Mexican on their soil during the revolution warranted the crudest retaliation. At Matamoros they had been the fiercest of the volunteers, and now—stationed for a while at the town—they found a still better opportunity.[7] Other volunteers aided them. To say nothing of robberies and minor outrages perpetrated “in the broad light of day,” it was thought, noted a regular officer in his diary, that not less than one hundred Mexicans were slain in cold blood, and out of about 7000 still in town, 5000, more or less, fled. A citizen cannot take his hat off, wrote a Mexican, without some American’s saying, “That is mine”; and if the owner denies it, he gets a bullet. Strict regulations[8] were soon framed, however, and under Worth’s command the volunteer learned what they meant.[10]

To a large extent, if we leave the Texans out of the account, the Mexicans themselves were responsible for the worst outrages of Monterey and the vicinity. They sold liquor to the troops persistently, and retaliated indiscriminately for the excesses that resulted. The Americans then took vengeance, and in the end some ghastly deeds on rather a large scale occurred. Singularly enough, too, the punctiliousness of our officers contributed to the same end. They would not convict a Mexican without legal proof of his guilt, and when soldiers saw a man, who was almost certainly the murderer of their comrade, let off because a drove of Mexicans testified to an alibi, they were likely to steal out after him or make some one else pay his forfeit.[9] Still, the many injunctions to be fair and kindly toward the people were not without effect. One soldier used to sit cross-legged in the square of Monterey, and play his rickety accordion for the benefit of the populace.[10]

AFFAIRS AT SALTILLO

At Saltillo strict police regulations were made. As had now become the general rule, to provide soldiers with intoxicating beverages, except by special permission, was forbidden, and fifty lashes were made the penalty for disobedience. The troops had to seek their quarters at retreat, and the Mexicans go home when the ten o’clock bell rang. But in spite of every precaution the “lawless volunteers,” as Worth called them, were guilty of many offences, and—with the perhaps excessive emphasis of a high-minded regular officer—he wrote to his daughter, “The innocent blood that has been basely, cowardly and barbarously shed in cold blood, aside from other and deeper crimes, will appeal to Heaven for, and, I trust, receive, just retribution.”[12]

Here, as at Monterey, Worth made an admirable governor, sitting four hours a day to hear complaints, and administering substantial justice without reference to legal technicalities; and his successors were much like him.[11] A sergeant was discharged for treating a Mexican unjustly. An American “doctor” was expelled for disorderly conduct. Soldiers were not allowed to endanger the people by riding fast in the streets. Property stolen or destroyed was paid for by the army, and this rule was made to work the other way also. The town prospered; and although some of the soldiers would now and then help themselves to fruit or snatch a piece of candy from a stand, and cases of outrage on the one hand or assassination on the other occurred at intervals, the people—notably hostile at first—became friendly, the windows were always full of laughing girls, and the women in their rebosas, red petticoats and blue cloth slippers went every evening to the fountain in the plaza with their tall earthen jars, unmolested and unafraid.[12]

Tampico, to say nothing of the drills and parades, offered enough interesting sights and amusements to keep the soldiers out of mischief, one might have thought. The many strange and beautiful trees; the mullard and sea-trout, schools of yellow jackfish, huge, pearly tarpon, and many other denizens of the rivers and lagoons; the buzzards coasting on air, the grunting ravens, and forty other kinds of birds; the long, slender pirogues of red cedar constantly bringing luscious fruits to the market; the many vessels coming and going: these were only a few of the attractions. But in reality the town was a hard problem, for its nearness to the United States and its commercial relations made the exclusion of all undesirable visitors impossible. So-called restaurants bearing popular American names flourished, and, in spite of the prohibition against importing liquor, strong drink was about all they offered except hard beef; while the existence of gambling houses was proved by the severe and repeated orders against them. Almost every volunteer, said a regular officer, celebrated his arrival with a “frolic,”[13] and according to the Mexican accounts, threats, insults and small depredations were not infrequent.[14]

AFFAIRS AT TAMPICO

But in Tampico as elsewhere, the people had much less to suffer, in all probability, than from the Mexican troops who formerly had garrisoned the town, and the big United States flag set up in the plaza near the Pánuco represented substantial benefits. Many new kinds of manufactured articles made their appearance, and all such things were sold at low prices. Business became active. According to tradition the paving of the city dates from this time. A theatre was built. Preparations were made and presumably carried out for the extension of the mole. An American newspaper appeared. Mexican visitors had to give an account of themselves, and there were no riots and no dirks. Patrols marched up and down the broad streets; sentries with fixed bayonets were on hand at every gathering, even balls; and the very happiest of frolics were pretty sure to end before morning with a nap on the guard house floor.[14]

Some of the Mexicans thought our volunteer officers were afraid of their men, but Gates, Shields and the other commanders do not seem to have been. The assistance of the leading Mexicans in maintaining order was invited; many of the citizens fraternized with our men; and in general a high rate of mortality was probably the only serious consequence of reckless tendencies. The residents thought the American volunteers careless, badly dressed and poorly drilled; but some of them admitted they had never felt so safe before.[14]

Clearly our troops improved in conduct as time went on, but none the less their early excesses had serious consequences. For a long while there had been a tendency in the northeastern parts of Mexico to secede. The primary scheme had been to join Texas; and after our absorption of Texas ended it, the idea of an independent republic, with American protection or annexation to this country in view, gained much support. Early in 1846 the authors of this project were in communication with Taylor and the American government. Whether such a plan could have been executed or not, there were reasons for our wishing to have the people cherish it. In such a mood they were bound to be our friends instead of enemies, and the paralyzing influence of their temper would have extended into other provinces.[15]

Accordingly Taylor was instructed to favor the idea. But reports of the outrages committed by our volunteers penetrated to all quarters; the Mexican authorities, who understood the popular tendencies, were doubtless active in spreading the reports; and the disposition to view us with cordiality received a shock from which it never recovered. “People near Matamoros, previously inclined to favor the Americans,” declared the comandante general of Nuevo León in a broadside, “have written these weighty words: ‘The domination of the Grand Turk is kinder than that of the Americans. Their motto is deceit. Their love is like the robber’s. Their goodness is usurpation; and their boasted liberty is the grossest despotism, iniquity and insolence, disguised under the most consummate hypocrisy.’” As an offset, the bad conduct of Mexican officers and troops did not signify. That was a family affair.[15]

The blackest shadow in the picture, however, was New Mexico. Armijo had compensated the people for his tyranny and robbery by permitting them every sort of license in their social relations. Virtue was little known and less valued. Even women fought duels with dirks or butcher-knives. Dances, at which all classes mingled in the revelry, were the chief amusements; the church bells announced them; and at mass one heard the same music, played by the same musicians. Gambling and cock-fighting stood next in esteem, perhaps; and then came other vices that seemed more precisely necessities than ornaments of existence.[18]

To throw into a small and isolated community of that sort, without books or society or proper diversions, a large number of young and reckless frontiersmen greatly above the average in physical vigor, was to make it a seething caldron of gross passions. The soldiers were not willing to do what little work there was, and they scorned regulations. “The dirtiest, rowdiest crew I have ever seen collected together,” was a responsible British traveller’s description of the American forces; and a soldier wrote in his diary, “A more drunken and depraved set, I am sure, can never be found.” To be liked, an officer had to be lax, and to be unpopular was liable to mean—as good officers learned—a pistol or a sabre in one’s face. Half the captains, a letter said, could be found every night in bad places. The disorder of the governor’s Christmas dinner party disturbed the whole town. There was probably no deliberate oppression. Gross outrages appear to have been few. But the drunken, brawling, overbearing volunteers despised the men about them and showed it; and the latter, flouted at every turn, and in particular robbed of their women, scowled and brooded with all the ferocity of an indolent but passionate, jealous race, and plied the knife when they dared.[18]

Kearny might perhaps have ridden the tempest, but a local politician like Price could only be swept away. A few of the better Americans got up a prayer-meeting, but that was just a dewdrop in Tartarus. One began to be ashamed of one’s nation, wrote a good officer. To enhance dissatisfaction, the Indians continued their depredations as if no treaties had been made. A well-meant code of laws was drawn up, but it contained certain troublesome provisions about land titles; and some taxation had to be imposed. The people took fright. “We have come for your good; yes, for all your goods,” began to be their interpretation of Kearny’s assurances.[18]

Naturally an insurrection occurred. Price now showed energy, and the troops courage. In a brief campaign, January and February, 1847, the malcontents were put down. But the people, though cowed, loved the victors none the better, and the victors trusted and respected the people none the more. The conditions became perhaps worse than ever.[16] Supplies were uncertain. Discipline became lax again, and the Indians were now more rapacious than for twenty years. Dissipation resulted in much sickness and many deaths. Moreover the people felt wronged because political privileges bestowed by Kearny in excess of his authority had to be withdrawn. For most, if not all, of the time it was impossible to obtain the money required for the administration of civil affairs, and the civil authorities clashed with the military.[17] Undoubtedly serious difficulties were inherent in the situation, but nothing could excuse our government for permitting such a state of things to continue for so long a time.[18]

AMERICAN RULE IN CALIFORNIA

Very different was the scene in California. Soon after the treaty of Cahuenga was made Stockton returned to his naval duties, and Frémont, appointed by him under the law of nations, assumed the governorship.[19] In February, 1847, however, orders that had been issued at Washington early in November, directing that the chief military officer should take command, reached San Francisco, and about the first of March Kearny became the executive. In general he was inclined to be less indulgent than Frémont or Sloat, but he intended to be fair and kind. “The Americans and Californians,” he proclaimed with the same exaggeration of his authority as at Santa Fe, “are now but one people; let us cherish one wish, one hope, and let that be for the peace and quiet of our country. Let us as a band of brothers unite and emulate each other in our efforts to benefit and improve this our beautiful, and which soon must be our happy and prosperous home.”[21]

At the end of May, 1847, he returned to the east, and Colonel R. B. Mason of the First Dragoons, whom the government had sent out for the purpose, became governor and commander-in-chief. Mason was an excellent executive, able, experienced, sensible, strong and faithful. Some thought his character hard, but probably all clear-headed persons realized that it was just. He believed in firm though kind methods, avoided entanglements, and bore sway successfully till the close of the war.[21]

The restless faction of the Los Angeles district, free from the restraint of a large American element, still existed, and at intervals caused considerable anxiety. Indeed it is clear from Mexican sources that a hope of troops from the south was fondly cherished there for a long time. The approach of the Mormon battalion, which—after suffering many hardships on the route from Santa Fe—arrived at San Diego under Captain Cooke in January, 1847, excited the people, for that sect was loathed in California. A great deal of trouble about land titles arose, for the surveying had been poorly done, the boundaries overlapped in many instances, and few had the proper documents. Frémont’s volunteers, expecting large pay, refused to be mustered into the service under the law of May 13, 1846, and were discharged in a very angry frame of mind, April, 1847, with no pay at all; and very little was done toward compensating the people for the spoliations committed by the volunteers.[21]

The government, though tempered by the maintenance of the alcalde system, was necessarily a military one; the old alcaldes, familiar with the customs of the land, would not serve; the new ones, though generally good men, could not always give satisfaction; and the growing American element, disgusted with so unsystematic a system, demanded self-government and written laws. No funds could legally be had for the expenses of war and civil administration except those derived from the customhouses, and the Americans were so deeply committed by their promise of low duties that Mason felt compelled to reduce the tariff explicitly ordered by the government. There were jealous differences of opinion on many points between the Californians and the Americans, between the various nationalities of the foreigners, and between the old and the new immigrants; and finally the people were disturbed by serious quarrels between the Stockton-Frémont party and the Kearny-Mason party, and by the old fear that eventually the Americans would sail away, leaving them to settle with Mexico as best they could.[21]

For troops, besides Company C of the First Dragoons, Kearny’s escort from Santa Fe, there were Company F of the Third Artillery, which arrived in February, 1847, the Mormon battalion, and a regiment of New York volunteers under Colonel J. D. Stevenson, who came in March, 1847, and were expected to remain in California as settlers after the close of the war.[20] Apparently the Mormons were to be a source of weakness rather than strength, and the antecedents of the New York regiment inspired little confidence. Stevenson’s men did in fact begin promptly to “sow wild oats.” They were not disposed to work on the fortifications, and they were insubordinate. But under Mason’s control they soon learned to do well, and he reported that at the close of the war “one common cry of regret arose [from the Californians] at the order for their disbandment; [and] the little petty causes of complaint were forgotten in the remembrance of the more substantial advantages they had enjoyed under the protection of the military.” The conduct of the Mormons was always exemplary and they won the esteem of the people.[21]

Imported articles became cheap. Real estate and all the products of the soil, particularly at the north, increased in value. Commerce trebled in a year. All damages caused by men recognized as in the service of the United States were repaired, and the offenders punished. The return of José Castro without means or hopes at the beginning of 1848 produced an excellent effect. Gold-digging became more attractive than conspiracies. And although a certain number of irreconcilables cherished regrets and grievances, the official news of peace and absorption in the United States—which came on the evening of August 6, 1848—greeted a busy and hopeful community.[21]

So much for the north, and we pass now to the régime of Scott. After learning of the atrocities perpetrated on the Rio Grande, that “scientific and visionary” officer drafted and laid before the secretary of war a martial-law order, to be enforced in Mexico until action should be taken by Congress. But the idea of putting constraint on the free American voter probably struck Marcy with terror. He started at the title, said nothing, and after a while returned the paper without comment. Scott then sent it on to Taylor, and was informed that the General threw it aside almost instantly, calling it “another of Scott’s lessons.” The crying need of some adequate method for punishing American soldiers in foreign parts compelled Marcy in December to recommend that Congress authorize a military tribunal; but that body also doubtless had an eye to votes, and took no action.[25]

SCOTT’S POLICY

Scott, however, though an aspirant for the Presidency, did not shrink from his duty, and on arriving in Tampico he issued General Orders 20, which threw the pale of martial law round all United States forces operating in Mexico, and provided for the punishment, through “military commissions,” of offences committed by, in or upon them.[22] Orders 20, republished at Vera Cruz, Puebla and the capital and widely circulated in Spanish, were supplemented by issuing safeguards, under which one or more soldiers, bearing a proper document signed by a corps or division commander, could be quartered at any place which it was especially for the interest of the army to protect.[23] In occupying towns the rule was to billet no officer or man, without consent, upon any inhabitant, and to quarter the troops in barracks and other public buildings already used for the purpose by the Mexican government.[24] These arrangements, the practice of paying for everything used by the army, the principle of treating non-combatant Mexicans as fellow-citizens, and a strenuous endeavor to enlist the coöperation of all the decent men of the army in the suppression of outrages constituted the system of Scott.[25]

At Vera Cruz misdeeds were perpetrated, of course, but the culprits who could be detected paid a price for their sport that put the fear of the Lord—or at least of Scott—into the hearts of others. One tipsy fellow, who nearly killed a Mexican woman with kicks and blows, was strapped over a wagon, given twelve good lashes, and then placed at labor in a fort with a ball-and-chain for the rest of the war. A second ruffian, for a worse offence against a woman, was promptly and publicly hanged.[26] On the other hand preventive regulations[27] concerning liquor, gambling, roaming about the city and the like soon went into force.[30]

But the American measures were not simply negative. Worth, who became governor as soon as the town surrendered, distributed free rations among the people, and prevented extortion by establishing a fair scale of prices for eatables. A large force of laborers was employed at liberal wages to clean the streets and the Augean castle of Ulúa. Assured of protection the shops reopened promptly. In ten days the general effects of the bombardment appeared hardly noticeable. Freed from the exactions of their officials and military chiefs and rapidly gaining confidence in our intentions, the people seemed like new men. Commerce, favored by the low American duties, took on fresh life. Although anti-Catholic sentiment was raging in the United States, Scott and some of his principal officers attended mass and even marched in the processions; and the soldiers were bidden to salute not only the tasselled cane of the magistrate but the cassock of the priest.[30]

Worth soon moved on with Scott’s army; but his successor was described by the British consul as deserving “all praise.” Those who followed him did perhaps equally well;[28] all branches of the public service were maintained; the good-will of the citizens was acquired and held; and Lerdo de Tejada, one of the best statesmen and historians of Mexico, has declared that Vera Cruz had to suffer scarcely anything from the American occupation except the humiliation of foreign rule, while profiting substantially in several respects.[30]

These results were achieved, too, under serious and almost crippling embarrassments. In some regards the city was highly agreeable. Fish more resplendent than gems lay always in the market. A long list of delicious fruits and vegetables graced each its proper season. Often a duet of the military band and the mocking-birds enchanted the ear. To sip a sherbet at noonday—all the curtains drooping over the balconies, the blue sky gray with excess of light, the blackbirds panting with beaks wide open and wings partly spread, the lépero drunk with sleep in the shadow of a wall, a hush over the docks, a stillness in the market—had an exotic fascination; and an evening stroll round the plaza or along the beach at Vergara, where the principal camp lay, with the soft, languid, lingering breeze of the Gulf on one’s face and every star asking to be counted, was a delight one could not soon forget.[30]

This region, however, was a favorite hunting-ground, not only of the yellow fever, but of diseases even more fatal.[29] A few slices of the fragrant Córdoba pineapple, washed down with a glass of the almost irresistible brandy, left one hardly time to make a will. Through the long day a huge ball of fire called the sun poured down an intense heat, and at night the mosquitos were numberless. The story of the invalids was long and sad; and sadder yet the tale of many a gallant soldier-boy, full of thoughts of the loved ones, who breathed his last sigh in the crowded wards of a hospital—alone.[30]

At Córdoba, where the lanes blazed with small red roses, the sentiment was intensely Mexican, and the authorities ordered that on the approach of the American forces as many of the inhabitants as possible should leave town with everything belonging to the state that could be of service. But the people were mostly satisfied with shutting themselves up during the brief stay of General Bankhead, and the merchants did not go so far as that. The legitimate rights of the conqueror were asserted, but the American commander perhaps made full compensation for this by requiring the city council to reduce the expenses of administration. Care was taken to provide for the punishment of all disorders, and in particular for all interference with religious observances. After Bankhead left, hearing that some of the garrison were plundering, he threatened to send an entire battalion, if necessary, to apprehend the culprits.[31]

On higher ground farther west lay Orizaba, sombre yet beautiful amidst its orchards, gardens, palm groves, orange trees and rich fields of tobacco and sugar-cane, like a proud Spanish dowager surrounded by her grandchildren. Here the troops helped themselves occasionally to fruit and cane, injured trees and committed some graver offences. The consequence was that soldiers were forbidden to leave the town except on service and the officers commanding guards in the outskirts had to arrest every man guilty of such acts or pay for the damages, and in either case were held responsible for disobedience and neglect of duty.[32]

THE STATE OF THINGS AT JALAPA

Of all the places occupied by American troops in Mexico the most delightful was Jalapa. In fact, probably a more delightful place is nowhere to be found. For natural attractiveness it surpasses even Taormina, Kandy and Nikko, the beauty-spots of Sicily, Ceylon, Japan. The abundant water was excellent, which could rarely be said of Mexican towns, and ice from Orizaba Mountain could be had to cool the abundant refreshments. The mercury never stood high and never low. Spring was almost the only season. The foliage always looked new and exuberant, and blossoms were constantly opening as if with ever fresh surprise.[34]

From the plaza one gazed into a broad valley tapestried with many-hued verdure. Here palms, live-oaks, magnolias, tamarinds and aguacates—often enmeshed with beautiful and sometimes with aromatic vines—gracefully sheltered the azalea, the verbena, the poppy, the jasmine and countless varieties of geraniums and roses. Here such exquisite plants as the vanilla, heliotrope and tree-lily exhaled with unceasing generosity their delightful odors. Here, amid ancient forests, gorges curtained with exotic ferns and orchids extended to mysterious depths teeming with all manner of strange, fascinating growths. And when, after long surveying this Eden, or descending to wander far in its mazy paths, one’s eye rose to a broad belt of pines and firs clothing jagged sierras, and at last, above their rich green, beheld a slender but enormous pyramid of snow, the peak of Orizaba, heaven-high and resplendent against the deep, tropical blue, it seemed as if nature had lavished on this chosen spot the whole diapason of her beauty. Music hath charms to soothe; and such loveliness, grace, perfume and grandeur, combined, were splendidly suited to still the passions of war.[34]

Scott and the first American troops proved worthy of this paradise. Nobody was molested. The officers lodged only in vacated houses. The soldiers tried to make friends among the townsfolk. Our generals attended the funeral of a worthy Mexican officer killed at Cerro Gordo. Gold and silver flowed in streams—brighter than “Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus”—that reached the humblest cottage. Many of the people wept when Scott marched away.[34]

But some later commands, untamed volunteers who stopped there for a brief time, left a different impression. Lally’s men seem to have been a scourge, and Wynkoop’s proved so lawless that even Lally’s were glad to see the last of them. During their stay the shops were closed, and all business came to an end. Seven officers left their accounts unpaid at the hotels, and some of them carried away towels or the shirts of brother officers. In a word they were natural thieves. Other misdeeds could be traced to the lack, for some time, of pay. But the main cause of trouble was liquor. Against this evil, as against gambling and the rest, adequate regulations were issued; but sometimes commissioned officers, anxious to be popular, would force hotel keepers to let their men have drink. At the bottom of everything lay the selling of liquor by wholly unauthorized persons. “Let the municipal authorities unite with me to put a stop to that infamous traffic,” wrote one American governor of the city to the first alcalde, “and I will answer for it that there will be no disturbances or outrages committed by the soldiers.”[34]

Another feature also of the American occupation came out with especial clearness at Jalapa. Not only were offences, extending to robbery and murder, committed against our troops, but it was found on scrupulous investigation that often definite stories of misdeeds charged to our men were plausible only till the other side came out, and that many claims for damages were deliberately invented or grossly exaggerated.[34]

Against all real offenders the successive governors—particularly Colonel George W. Hughes, who remained in office a considerable time—were as a rule severe. Stern orders, biting rebukes, earnest appeals to represent our country worthily, precautions like patrols and frequent roll-calls, and at need exemplary punishments were not lacking. One day four soldiers received thirty lashes each, had their heads shaved, and were drummed out of camp, with the word “Robber” pasted on their backs, for breaking into a house.[33] But at the same time careful measures had to be taken for the protection of our men and our government. Happily the people in general seem to have understood that some pilfering and occasionally other misdemeanors were unavoidable, and to have appreciated our efforts to defend, conciliate and please them, to maintain—in coöperation with the town officials—the municipal service, to provide for the charities of the city, and to ensure respect for woman, religion and civil authority. Vigne, a French traveller, says the Americans were much liked at Jalapa, and probably they were nowhere treated more pleasantly.[34]

THE AMERICANS AT PUEBLA

At Puebla, August 1, 1847, the Robert Anderson of Fort Sumter wrote: “We have been now in this large City since May 15th, with a soldiery gathered from many Nations, many of them undisciplined, and yet, I will venture the assertion, without fear of contradiction, that, in no City of the same size, either in our own blessed Country or in any other, is private property, or are private rights, more secure and better guarded than here.... Not an instance, I am certain, has been elicited, or brought to light, of one of our soldiers killing a Mexican.... ’Tis truly Wonderful, I cannot understand it.”[35] The people are all contented, said a letter to El Republicano, for business is good and taxes are low; and, he might have added, an American band plays for us in the park. It is “almost incredible,” admitted a writer in El Nacional, a newspaper of the state, how well the American soldiers treat our priests and women. How are they able to wear the mask so long? The common people, not seeing through the trick, accept their conduct in good faith.[37]

After the siege ended, some of our men were arrested for plundering houses from which they had been fired upon, and there was a little pilfering at the fruit stands; but Fúrlong, the Mexican prefect, urged the people to give the war no further thought, and friendly relations very soon returned. Street lanterns were still punctured occasionally by tipsy and facetious Americans with their bayonets, but they were paid for. When Lane’s brigade of volunteers arrived, complaints began in earnest, and a committee laid the situation before Scott; but there was no case of such importance that amends or even investigation was demanded.[36] The city council stated to the prefect that Childs had saved its authority, improved the condition of the town, aided the Mexican officials, and given them willing audience in order to concert measures for the public good. One measure in particular was the re-establishment of the chamber of commerce, destroyed by the state government; and, as the bishop admitted, Childs did all in his power to prevent and remedy abuses.[37]

AMERICAN RULE AT THE CAPITAL

At Mexico City there were “some outrages naturally,” reported Doyle, chargé d’affaires of England; and emphasis can fairly be placed on his last word, for the troops, entering the town excited by desperate fighting and crowned with victory, were fired upon by the populace, and found themselves hunted at every turn by robbers, assassins and their confederates.[38] Doyle added that “even from the beginning a great deal of forbearance” was displayed by the Americans; and the correspondent of the London Daily News wrote, “On the whole I must confess that General Scott and his troops have acted with unexpected moderation.” Indeed, they “have shown an exemplary clemency,” admitted a Mexican letter printed by a Mexican paper.[43]

The restaurant-keeper who furnished a meal and got rather less than he expected or the janitor who tried to keep soldiers out of their assigned quarters and got rather more, had little reason to complain. Indeed, both had reason to be content, for in a city full of léperos and escaped felons property and life depended upon our protection. “We must endure the presence of the Americans or suffer worse things,” said a Mexican. No allowances were made by Scott, however.[39] “Revelling in the halls of Montezuma” means now, a soldier wrote home, that if the patrol finds you in the street after eight o’clock in the evening you are taken to the guardhouse, and if noisy, you are handcuffed; and for more serious offences the punishments were extremely severe. Quitman, the first governor of the city,[40] and P. F. Smith, who succeeded him, ably seconded the commander-in-chief.[43]

Under such auspices the shops began to open within a week after the capital surrendered, and business was soon brisker than ever. The clergy were somewhat refractory, and on September 19 all the churches were found closed; but Quitman immediately sent word that should they remain closed, the United States flags would be removed from their towers as a sign that our army had withdrawn its protection. No further hint was needed, for millions in gold, silver and gems lay within their dark walls; and soon the relations between army and church became entirely satisfactory.[43]

The troops then felt at liberty to make themselves at home. The American Star, “a neat and saucy little sheet,” whose proprietors and editors had followed the troops from Vera Cruz, and set up their press wherever Scott made a stay, appeared on September 20, and later was followed by the North American.[41] The cafés and eating places took on strange names: New York Restaurant Eagle Hotel, Old Kentucky House and the like. “American Dry Goods,” read one sign; “Mince Pies for sale Here,” another; “Mush and Milk at All Hours,” a third. Officers formed an association called the Aztec Club. An agitation for an American railroad to Vera Cruz began. An American sermon was preached at the palace in the splendid Ambassadors’ Hall, on the text: “Only fear the Lord, and serve Him in truth with all your heart; for consider how great things he hath done for you”; and other sermons followed. American citizens, temporarily soldiers, made all the shows prosperous, and a complimentary benefit was given to Señora Canete at the National Theatre by “The Chiefs and Officers of the American Army.” As cold weather came on, stoves, chimneys and smoke made their appearance to the intense astonishment of the natives, total strangers to such abominations; and finally that proud Spanish institution, the bull-fight, succumbed in this manner:[43]

Unfortunately, under such names as “Contreras,” “Churubusco” and “Old Chapultepec,” American drinks of established fame arrived. Music halls and dance houses, familiarly known as the Hells of Montezuma, were crowded. Relieved now from the anxiety and tension of the campaign, the gallant volunteers could not be still a moment. Generally they were rather brusque and rowdyish, and to the polite Mexicans they appeared even more so than they really were. They loved to present themselves at a show with trousers tucked into their boots, drape their legs over the backs of the seats, and yell for American patriotic airs; and they seemed to be always eating except when busy with a glass.[43]

Gambling became a rage, and in its temples were other priestesses besides those of Chance. Of La Bella Unión, the chief resort, it was said, What is unknown “is as well as what is known.” Eager for popularity and advancement many officers would not interfere, and in fact some of them sank almost as low as their men. One consequence of such dissipation was illness,[42] and another was robberies, quarrels and fights. The arrival of reinforcements—fresh volunteers and recruits—quickened all riotous tendencies. So far as personal morals went the conditions of Santa Fe were approached by not a few, and to crown all two volunteer officers, involved in what seems to have been a gambling-house fracas, were convicted of murder. Conqueror as well as conquered must pay his penalty.[43]

Most, however, shrank from such a life, and many tried to render the American stay a fine experience for themselves and for others. It was not in vain. Their nobler tastes found congenial soil. The turquoise sky, the pictured façades of the houses, the handsome gray old palaces curiously and lavishly sculptured, and embellished with precious tiles in blue and white, the Alameda with its grand trees and its fountain, the amazing richness of the churches and their wondrous gilded carvings, the embroidered gold vestments of the priests, the perfume here and there of an ancient garden stealing out through a broken wall, the red conflagration of sunrise behind snowy mountains, the distant, mellow clang of a convent bell as evening shadows gathered, the brilliant round moon turning the peaks into gigantic veiled watchmen and setting massive domes and spires a-quiver with a mystical sort of life—these things helped introduce our finer spirits to the heart of the land, and fill them with sympathy and good-will. Mexico has never been without strangers to love her, and she found such among her conquerors.[43]

Here our survey of the ground ends, but a few vertical sections will be instructive. While always having it understood that our authority was paramount, the American local governors desired to let the alcaldes and ayuntamientos (city councils) look after municipal affairs, and were disposed to coöperate in a liberal fashion with them for the good order, the efficient and economical administration and even the improvement of the towns.[46]

AMERICAN METHODS

Naturally enough those officials, exposed to the criticism of both sides, found their positions irksome. Usually, though not always, they were permitted to resign if they chose to do so, and new officials were then elected by the people or appointed by the governor. Shields extinguished the ayuntamiento of Tampico for incompetence and malfeasance in office, and selected their successors. At Mexico a refractory council was dissolved by Scott, and a Puro body, friendly to the Americans and anxious to make the city government democratic through our aid, was chosen in a somewhat irregular way. When provisions, mules and other such things were needed, it was usual to call upon the town authorities to furnish them at liberal prices. A threat that otherwise the needed supplies would be taken by force and nothing paid, often accompanied the request; but this was in most cases only designed to justify the authorities, in the view of the people, for complying.[46]

Attention was paid by the governors to the care and lighting of the streets, proper sanitation, the maintenance of schools, hospitals, prisons and public works, and especially to the police. At Córdoba the city guards were allowed to carry only clubs, but such a restriction was not usual. Worth had regulars for policemen at one time. At Puebla after the siege a guard of 100 volunteers patrolled the streets all night. General Smith enlisted at Mexico a picked body of four hundred American soldiers. Shields, while governor of Tampico, placed an officer of the regulars at the head of this department. The police were firmly supported by the governor, if they proved reliable; if not, a change occurred. The Americans held that peaceable citizens lost none of their political rights during our occupation, and on election days our troops were kept in their quarters or marched out of town.[44] So, too, Mexican tribunals were entirely free in dealing with Mexican affairs, though no one connected with our army could be tried by them; and their decisions were enforced by our commanders.[45] When Mexicans were placed before an American military commission they were permitted to bring counsel, but occasionally somewhat unusual methods had to be employed, because men ready to make any sort of an oath in defence of a fellow-countryman could always be found. Our protection extended, of course, to the subjects of foreign powers.[46]

Social relations between the Mexicans and our armies were hindered by the old impression that Americans were haughty, taciturn and insolent, by the fear of receiving actual insults and injuries from our soldiery, and, when this fear wore off, by a dread that any association with Americans would later be punished by fellow-citizens—as proved to be the result at Victoria, for example. The relations of Scott and his officers with churchmen were generally good, but as a rule the educated and wealthy moved away on our approach or shut themselves up. In the case of Tampico,[47] however, officers were able to secure the presence of Mexican ladies at a steamboat excursion and a ball.[50]

As a rule, Parras was hospitable throughout the war. At Jalapa the two nationalities mixed somewhat freely. Governor Hughes became intimate with the leading clergymen, and he stated that on account of the general cordiality shown by the Franciscans the head of that order was banished from the capital. A handsome ball was given there to Childs when he left the city. It was at Mexico, however, that social relations were best established.[48] Society decided rather promptly to appear in public as usual. Even common soldiers were often able to make friends of respectable persons, and officers became intimate in many families. What was more surprising, a figure in public affairs like Alamán opened his door.[50]

The women, usually so ardent in their patriotism, were noticeably cordial. The Mexican men were as a rule essentially feminine, and the downright virility of the northern breed made itself deeply and quickly felt. Less than three weeks after the capture of Monterey Private Kingsbury naïvely wrote, “The women are very kind.... I enjoy myself much in company with the fair Señoras.” Conversation was probably somewhat limited; but a great many soldiers made a dash at Spanish, and while some concluded the people did not understand their own language, others achieved results that were at least interesting.[49] Our officers, it hardly need be said, never lagged behind their men.[50]

A fandango on hard ground beside a winding river with mandolins and guitars softly singing and moonlight sifting down through gently waving palms, was not despised, and to go from leaky canvas to a gilded ball-room for a whirl with a black-eyed beauty who could waltz with a full glass of water on her head, was a strong argument for treating Mexicans kindly. The dark señoritas of Jalapa in particular, and still more their celestial cousins of the golden hair and blue eyes, loved to dance, chat and intrigue, and now their wit and their fans had the opportunity of a lifetime; at Puebla, the full name of which meant The City of Angels, “bewitching glances” often made our officers feel “aguish,” said one of them; and the capital stood first in this as in all other respects. Romance never had a more brilliant or a deadlier course. Many a brave heart was thrilled by a mysterious invitation that meant perhaps a kiss and perhaps a stab, and many a fearless gallant made a wild ride into the night. That woman’s subtle power, added to the influence of our gentlemanly and highly educated officers in social intercourse, had important effects on public sentiment cannot be doubted. Still, fear of their own countrymen prevented people from associating openly with Americans to any great extent.[50]

In short, as this phase of the subject is reviewed, one finds, much that was deplorable and in the case of a foreign war should always be guarded against. But that is not strange. War is ugly business; and since all of us begin conscious existence as savages, and many rise little above that stage, we should not be surprised if some of our soldiers, deprived to such an extent of uplifting influences, reverted more or less toward it. Besides, a grain or two of lawlessness is after all a normal and useful ingredient in human nature.[52]

AMERICAN RULE BENEFICENT

On the whole there was a vast deal to admire and praise. Scott, a man well versed in the history of campaigns, asserted that his troops displayed “the highest moral deportment and discipline ever known in an invading army.” Doyle, after making careful inquiries all the way from Vera Cruz to the capital and viewing the case as a practical man, reported with reference to our troops that “Even from the account of the Mexicans themselves they seem to have behaved very well.” Gutiérrez de Estrada, a Mexican of high standing, said to his people that the Americans occupying their country ensured them security of person and possessions and all proper satisfactions better than their own governments had ever done.[52]

And when one considers also the relative fewness of serious outrages and the comparatively small number of individuals affected, the great sums of money paid for supplies and labor,[51] the reduced prices of almost all manufactured articles, the prevention of brigandage, insurrections, and civil as well as military extortions, tyranny and excesses in the territory that we held, the promotion of commerce and trade, the good ideas of municipal administration frequently exhibited by the governors of towns, and the fine examples of subordination to authority, both military and civil, exhibited by all grades of our troops from the private up to General Scott himself—when these things are considered, one may well feel that our occupation was a blessing to the people. Yet—they would rather have had Mexican abuse than American benefits.[52]

---

In the end peace came, for sooner or later it had to come; but nobody could have imagined the extraordinary course of events that was to bring it about, and for a long while it seemed impossible.

All the men of sense in Mexico recognized that she had neither physical nor moral strength enough to continue the struggle, but the majority of the nation were not sensible. The old influences operated still. Some could not forgive the outrages perpetrated by our volunteers; some wished so lucrative a war to continue; some dreaded the demoralizing effect of the millions coming from the United States, of which every politician and every military chief were sure to want as much as possible. Incorrigible vanity still ignored failures and offered iridescent hopes. Pride revolted against making terms while the invader’s foot pressed the sacred earth of the fatherland, and against the inevitable surrender of territory. At least, said not a few, we must wait until we make ourselves look formidable, so as to command respect; and this meant indefinite postponement.[1]

Our army still appeared insignificant; many of our troops were deserting, and some of the generals hated one another. Most of the people saw an American soldier or heard a word of English seldom, if at all. Almost everything went on as before. The people confessed their sins to the same priests, answered for their misdemeanors in the same courts, bribed the same officials, paid taxes to the same embezzlers, and were bullied by the same policemen in the same uniform. Evidently the Americans dared not use their advantage. On the other hand they were eager for peace. Doubtless they knew the war had few apologists in the United States, thought many, and realized that soon a change of administration would end it.[1]

A large section of the Puro party—a section which may be called for the present purpose Eventualists—felt, even though Santa Anna’s fall had removed one great objection to peace, that it was highly desirable to have the war continue until the old army should be virtually exterminated, or desired that at least we should hold the country until the military, clerical, political and social reforms desired by the Puros could be effected and public tranquillity be ensured. A larger number than ever craved annexation to the United States as the only guaranty of order and prosperity; and still others dared not advocate peace, lest they should be charged with lacking patriotism or touching “foreign gold.” Besides, had not the government, since the fall of the capital, announced that all damages resulting from hostilities would have to be made good by the United States? That did not seem like throwing up the sponge.[1]

In addition to these embarrassments many facts appeared to show that sensible, concerted action, even if generally desired, would be impossible. Political organization seemed to be dissolving. News of riots and insurrections came on every wind. Even the governor of México state was made a prisoner by malcontents. Many believed with reason that, like the Texas war, the present conflict had been used as a pretext for official extortion, and refused to pay taxes. The central government was regarded not infrequently as a common enemy. Unruly, vicious, greedy men—especially the unpaid army officers—plotted incessantly. Signs pointed to Indian uprisings, which the presence of the Americans encouraged. State decrees against an ignominious peace, and state governments that had not experienced the ills of invasion, barred the way of negotiation.[2]

Secessions looked highly probable. The Coalition of Lagos agitated constantly. The legally obliterated state of Aguas Calientes threatened to take up arms. Zacatecas made trouble about internal affairs. The Eventualists, or a large part of them, felt ready to smash the federal union into bits. The monarchists labored, not without success, to prove that a European king and European troops could save the nation. The Santannistas hoped to make the Prince of Spoilers dictator. Many of the Puros felt ready to join them in order to regain a share of the power, and a dull, subterranean rumbling satisfied not a few that Santa Anna would soon be supreme. Almonte, the implacable foe of peace, though now regarded by nearly every one as a cunning, selfish adventurer, seemed to many a useful tool; and his Presidential hopes found strong support.[2]

Among the Americans officers pessimism reigned. In point of time, wrote the commanding general, we may not be half through the war. Bankhead could observe no sign of peace. “Mexico is an ugly enemy. She will not fight—and will not treat,” said Webster. The venerable Albert Gallatin, scanning the horizon from his watchtower, discovered “hardly any hope” that peace would be concluded by Polk’s administration. With the capture of Mexico City the real difficulties of the Americans begin, thought Le Correspondant of Paris; and the London Times declared that we should have to drop the war or annex a country that would cost us more than its value.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS REOPENED

The conditions threatened a long, expensive, demoralizing occupation of Mexico, leading almost inevitably to either our absorbing millions of undesirable aliens or our becoming involved in a general state of irritation and hostility liable to end in a national outburst of hatred and fury against us. To avoid these deplorable alternatives Polk thought of practically setting up a government with which to make peace. But such an organization—even if really feasible, which Polk himself doubted—would have required protection for a length of time that no one could forecast, would very likely have ended in the same dilemma as undisguised occupation, and, if at all successful, might have given the world a pretext for saddling Mexico’s future upon us. How to escape from the predicament Polk and his advisers discussed anxiously but without success.[3]

President Peña y Peña, however, supported by his Cabinet, by a group of true, honest patriots and by the Moderado party in general, determined to end the war; and Trist, who understood their sentiments, reopened the subject on the twentieth of October. Within a fortnight he was informed that Mexico desired peace, and would appoint commissioners in a few days. November 2 Congress met. Letters in favor of concluding the hostilities poured in upon the members and had their effect. The Puro-Santannista league attacked the government promptly on the ground of remissness in conducting the war, but a resolution calling upon the ministry to state what military steps it had taken failed by more than two to one. Senator Otero offered a motion, forbidding the authorities to consider the cession of any territory held without question by Mexico before the war; but this was rejected, to the surprise of all, by a vote of 46 to 29. Señor del Rio then summoned the administration to state whether negotiations with Trist had been resumed, and he also went down.[4]

On the eleventh came the election of an interim President, and again the peace party triumphed. The opposition—which had found Almonte too unpopular, especially among the Santannistas—gave their votes to Cumplido, on the basis of an understanding that Santa Anna should neither be reinstated nor be put on trial, but Anaya was chosen by 42 against 31. About a week later the representatives of seven states met at Querétaro by invitation of the government, and after a desultory but illuminating discussion of nearly ten days agreed, with the exception of San Luis Potosí, to support a movement for peace. Even the war party felt the strength of the current.[5]

Some action in that sense looked almost sure; and, as a new Congress was expected to assemble at the beginning of the year, the present members, partly in consequence of intrigues and partly from a fear of responsibility, slipped away in such numbers as to conclude the session, leaving the government a free field. The opposition then came to a head in an insurrection at Querétaro. But Anaya brought out artillery and some reliable troops, particularly 200 American deserters, and announced that he would not only fight in deadly earnest but make examples of the chief rebels. To the insurgents these ideas were novel and shocking, and they declined to play the game out. The road to peace then seemed to be open.[5]

TRIST RECALLED

But the marplot had been at work. Finding he could not control Scott’s policy with reference to the armistice and probably wishing to undermine the general-in-chief, Pillow had written to the President. Exactly what he said cannot be stated, but probably he described the armistice as a gross blunder, and accused our peace commissioner of acting as a tool of Scott for the injury of Polk’s friends—especially Pillow; and on October 4 Polk ordered the recall of Trist. In his despatch Buchanan intimated that our envoy’s presence might encourage the Mexicans to insist upon insulting terms, like those tendered by them on September 6, and—probably with a view to hardening our conditions—announced that Mexico must sue for peace at Washington. By the twenty-first came news that Scott had entered the capital, and that Trist had fallen short of obedience by intimating that possibly we might not insist upon the Rio Grande line. Polk’s feelings grew hot as he reflected, and on the twenty-fifth a special messenger set out with a reprimand and a repetition of the order to leave Mexico. Both despatches reached their destination on the same day, November 16.[6]

On receiving them Trist decided to inform the Mexican authorities of his recall and go home at the first opportunity. Indeed it seemed to him the best policy to return and lay before his government some of the information it lacked. But a special escort could not be spared, and, as no train was to go down until December 4, he could be deliberate. By Thornton, therefore, who was temporarily in charge of the British legation and set out for Querétaro the next day, he sent merely an informal notice of what had occurred, with a request that some proposal be sent on to Polk. By the day Thornton arrived (November 21) Mexican peace commissioners had been appointed; and Peña, minister of relations under the interim government, listened to his news with signs of emotion painful to witness. No Mexican felt ready to sue for peace at Washington, and Polk’s demand signified the failure and political ruin of the peace men.[7]

Peña took the ground that Trist’s proposal to reopen the negotiations bound his government, and implored the chargé to urge upon him the sincerity and the difficulties of the Mexican authorities. He also begged Thornton for an intimation, to be used against the war party, that England could not be counted upon for assistance; and the chargé complied promptly with both requests. Fortified also by the action of Congress and the sentiment of the governors, and believing that in view of Mexico’s present attitude the United States would shortly cancel its orders of recall, Peña then officially notified Trist that negotiators had been appointed.[7]

Our commissioner now found himself in a most extraordinary position. Buchanan’s letters of recall proved that peace was desired and the situation misunderstood by our Executive, but these facts could not obliterate certain others. Trist was not merely a private citizen but a discharged official under the frown of his government. Dealings with Peña could be described as traitorous. A warning against confidence in Mexican pretences and a notice that harder terms would now be exacted by the United States had been served upon him; and what those terms would be he could only imagine. Yet he fully believed in the sincerity of Peña and his associates. Thornton confirmed this opinion, and adjured him to improve the opportunity. No one on the ground could see any other way to peace. General Scott favored negotiating and probably expressed the opinion to Trist, as to Mexicans, that, should he make a treaty, it would be accepted by the United States. But on him, Nicholas P. Trist alone, it depended to say whether two nations were to be miserable or happy, to keep on cutting at each other’s throats or enjoy the blessings of peace; and on him it rested to assume, should he take humanity and patriotism for guides, a most arduous task at the gravest personal risk and with no substantial profit in view. At noon on December 4 he decided aright, and it was a truly noble act.[8]

Trist now had it intimated to the Mexican commissioners, that if they were disposed to accept a boundary line traced up the Rio Grande to thirty-two degrees of latitude and thence west, he would meet them privately to make further arrangements. The outcome was a strong recommendation from the Mexican commissioners, presented and urged by Thornton, that Peña consent. Peña did so; but he pointed out that it would be necessary to defer action until the new Senate should confirm the nomination of the commissioners. Encouraged, however, by advices from Thornton, Trist revoked his official notice that Polk had recalled him, and waited, with feelings that can be imagined, for the waters to move.[9]

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The negotiations stood in fact at a graver crisis than he thought. News that leading Whigs talked of settling with Mexico on terms far easier than Trist proposed caused hesitation at Querétaro, and fresh hopes of English assistance had a still greater effect. But fortunately Doyle arrived at this juncture to take charge of the British legation, and promptly directed Thornton to state that nothing more than good offices could be expected of his government. The support of these British diplomats, one at the capital and the other at Querétaro, proved most helpful; but then came Polk’s Message, which encouraged the Eventualists by saying that, should Mexico continue the war, our protection might be given to any party able and willing to set up a republican government and make peace. Trist grew more and more anxious, and on the day after Christmas expressed his desire to proceed. In consequence of Doyle’s attitude all Mexican scruples about the confirmation of the commissioners vanished. On January 1 their full “powers” reached the capital; and, beginning on the second, Couto, Cuevas and Atristain met there secretly with Trist almost every day. Rincón, the other member of the board, did not serve.[9]

Trist was prepared to stimulate his colleagues with news that a sentiment in favor of pushing the war through without delay had now become pronounced in the United States. At the same time his letter of September 7 provided them with a most convenient position, for it maintained that all the districts now held by American troops were ours by right of conquest, and that by accepting our terms Mexico, instead of selling lands and population, would recover a large amount of both. He gave them, too, an agreeable surprise by proposing substantially the same terms as during the armistice.[10]

They for their part knew California and all of Texas were lost; but their instructions were exacting, and they struggled for all conceivable advantages. Foreign arbitration and a European guaranty of the boundary were promptly demanded, and were as promptly refused. It was proposed that on the signing of the treaty all American forces in the country should retire to within fifty leagues of the coast; but this and other unreasonable conditions met the same fate. Anticipating sharp and captious criticism from opposing lawyers in Congress, the Mexicans devoted the most wearisome care to phraseology. Cordiality prevailed, however. Trist’s good-will, self-sacrifice and courtesy received full recognition, and he seems to have been rather intimate with Couto, the ablest of his colleagues. Doyle and Thornton, though always respecting the line of strict neutrality, assisted materially in removing difficulties.[10]

Trist felt intensely anxious to save time, and for good reasons. Orders might arrive any day—and eventually did arrive—making it absolutely impossible for him to act as an American representative. Scott was placed by his orders under a military obligation to drive the government from Querétaro, and though he granted a de facto truce, thinly disguised by occupying a few places and intimating a desire for new instructions, a positive despatch might at any hour end that state of things.[11]

Yet day after day passed. The Mexican government and commissioners felt obliged to stick at everything and to confer often by letter. January 8 Anaya’s term expired by limitation; and, as Congress had not assembled, his predecessor became once more the provisional executive. Four days later an abortive insurrection at San Luis Potosí frightened the timid Peña nearly out of his wits, for it seemed like the prologue of a revolution, and he demanded that before signing a treaty he should have sufficient American funds to provide adequate support against malcontents; but at length his commissioners, insisting that such a proposal would be indecorous, eliminated this difficulty. Finally the government stopped short at the financial consideration. It asked for thirty millions, and our commissioner, in view of the expenses already caused by the protraction of the war, would give but fifteen. On the twenty-ninth of January, therefore, Trist, in very considerate but very positive language, officially declared the negotiation ended.[11]

A TREATY SIGNED

By arrangement, however, Doyle informed the Mexican commissioners that enough time to communicate once more with Querétaro would be given. Through the same channel they received a hint from Scott, that he would protect the authorities against the dreaded revolution, should a treaty be signed, but would otherwise have to dislodge the government, and thenceforth hunt it like a deer on the mountain. Doyle talked with British directness and good sense. The commissioners brought all this pressure to bear on their government. It yielded; and, on the second of February, at the suburb of Guadalupe Hidalgo, seat of the most venerated shrine in Mexico, in the profound secrecy that had shrouded all these negotiations, the treaty was at last signed.[12]

By its terms Mexico appeared to sacrifice, independently of Texas, an immense area; but she really suffered little, for she had no grip—and deserved to have none—upon California and New Mexico. Indeed she had found those distant regions merely embarrassing. Nor did she really cede any territory. As Trist contended and our Supreme Court has in effect decided, the only cession was that made by the United States in surrendering districts then in our hands. Our real title was conquest—conquest from those who had taken the country by conquest from its conquerors. What Mexico granted us was peace and an acknowledgement of our title. In return we gave her not only peace, which meant vastly more to Mexico than to us, but extensive lands, the renunciation of all American claims antedating the treaty, and fifteen million dollars in money—a wealth of gold that her treasury had never seen before. On both sides the treaty conferred benefits; on our part it was magnanimous; and to settle the matter in this way gave the United States a feeling of satisfaction worth all it cost.[13]

The wish of the Mexican government had been to open the peace negotiations by making an armistice. To the Americans this could offer little advantage, for the only enemies they now had to fear were guerillas, and these recognized no laws. To Peña, on the other hand, it meant security from hostile expeditions, larger revenues, diminished expenses, Congressional elections in the territory under American control, and hence the political support of those who felt the burdens of war. But Scott, while ready to grant a virtual immunity from attack during the negotiations, was neither authorized nor willing to sign an armistice at that stage; and to have done so, indicating that peace was contemplated, would have endangered the plans of the Mexican government itself. In order, however, to bring about the execution of the treaty our commissioner had to demand of Scott a pledge that he would send out no more expeditions until new instructions, issued after the arrival of the treaty at Washington, should reach him. In short, he requested the General to disregard the orders of a government eager to put him in the wrong; and Scott, placing the public weal above all personal considerations, promptly consented.[14]

The second article of the treaty provided expressly for a suspension of hostilities, and in view of its previous anxiety to obtain that concession, the Mexican government was expected to act in the matter at once; but it procrastinated so much as to excite suspicions of bad faith at the American headquarters. This conduct, however, was merely owing to its constitutional apathy; and on the twenty-second of February, 1848, Generals Mora and Quijano opened negotiations with Worth and Smith at the capital. True to the Mexican practice, followed on almost every occasion since the first of our dealings with Mexico, they began with what Doyle fairly characterized as “exorbitant” demands. For example, they asked for the evacuation of the capital, Puebla, Jalapa and Vera Cruz, and for concessions incompatible with the treaty of peace itself.[14]

But Worth and Smith, assuming promptly a just and firm attitude, as our civil officials ought to have done from the beginning, refused to consider such demands, and the Mexicans then withdrew them. Everything within reason, however, was granted. Doyle called the armistice, indeed, “very favourable” to the weaker side, and the ratification of it on March 4 and 5 by the Mexican and American commanders-in-chief supplemented happily the treaty of peace. Not only that, but it stopped for the time being every attempt at revolt, for under one of the articles insurgents were to be opposed by the armies of both nations. Paredes and Almonte found it wise to be quiet, and—as we have observed—Santa Anna sailed away.[14]

AMERICAN IDEAS ABOUT MEXICO

The treaty, conveyed with extraordinary speed, reached the White House on February the nineteenth, but whether it did well to arrive so soon—or even to arrive at all—appeared extremely doubtful. As we have learned, a strong appetite for territory had existed in the United States before the war, and Mexico had looked inviting. In January, 1846, Baker of Illinois suggested in Congress the absorption of that country. By the following July a somewhat organized annexation party existed at New York, and later Senator Dickinson became its champion. The wish to acquire soon became strong. Perhaps Moses Y. Beach visited Mexico in this cause. Certainly Mrs. Storms, who accompanied him, worked actively for it, and his paper ardently recommended annexation as not only advantageous for the United States but sure to benefit Mexico.[15]

Other papers warmly took up this idea, arguing that Providence called upon us to regenerate her decadent population. “The Spanish have ceased to rule in Mexico,” announced the Democratic Review as its watchword in February, 1847. Secessionists like Simms of South Carolina thought the proposed confederacy would need that country to give it bulk; and by a different route Senator Hannegan of Indiana, representing the strong expansionist sentiment of the West, arrived at the same point of view in regard to annexing Mexico.[15]

The recall of Trist, which seemed to give the United States a free hand, and also the plan to extend our occupation of her territory, which logically pointed that way, strongly promoted the idea, for besides the obvious tendency of these measures they were supposed to mean that Polk had that end in view. The attitude of men high in the administration circle produced a similar effect. Bancroft held that we should “rescue a large part of Mexico from anarchy.” Cass used language that suggested rescuing the whole, and followers of his talked that way explicitly. Apparently he thought he could win the next Presidential election on this issue; and the war party at his back offered Mexico as a reward for supporting its views. Buchanan, at first opposed to the acquisition of any territory, trimmed his sails to the rising breeze, and wrote that if Mexico did not conclude the war, it would be necessary for us to “fulfill the destiny” assigned to us by Providence. Walker, who knew more about the far southwest than any other man at Washington, favored annexation strongly, and even tried to drag the subject into his annual report. Indeed, the financial editor of the New York Herald saw in him the regenerator of Mexico; and very likely he himself, as head of the treasury, dreamed of winning immense economic triumphs in that field.[16]

Soon after 1848 came in, the annexation cause began to put on a bold front. Naturally the younger element in the party and the country felt inclined to take it up. Crocodile tears were shed over the “poor foundling”—though a future heiress—placed by Divine Providence at our threshold. The danger that England or France might ravish it away from us came to the fore. Conquest was pronounced in the Senate a legitimate method of expansion. Orators in both Houses pointed more plainly toward an extension at the cost of Mexico. Declarations in the contrary sense indicated the force of the current. Senator Niles believed that substantially all of the Democrats among his colleagues would fall in with the plan. Enthusiastic citizens acclaimed it. Speculators fancied it would help their schemes in various ways. Capitalists believed that by stimulating enterprise it would enlarge and continue the demand for money. Manufacturers and high tariff men argued that it would increase the national expenses and therefore the duties. Army officers could see a wide field for them; and the opponents of slavery, led by the National Era, felt that Mexican plantations would draw away the negroes—now understood to be unprofitable—of Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia. Public meetings became excited on the subject. The country is going mad for Mexico, inferred Buchanan; and Walker believed that only a systematic newspaper agitation was needed to ensure success.[17]

THE QUESTION BEFORE POLK

Polk moved in the same direction. In September, 1847, he concluded that, should the war continue, he might demand Tamaulipas and the line of thirty-one degrees, and reduce the compensation to fifteen millions; and before the end of January, 1848, he felt inclined to throw aside entirely the terms offered through Trist. Besides, he loathed the treaty on account of the man who made it and the man who gave assistance. After his recall, considering himself a private citizen, Trist reported with a free hand, criticising the President’s recent Message as encouraging the Eventualists, and expressing his opinions on the business without much reserve. Naturally Polk the Mediocre, guided by Pillow the Cunning, totally misconceived the spirit of Trist and Scott. In his eyes they had contrived a wicked political “conspiracy” against Him, His administration, His party and His Pillow. Both had proved “utterly unworthy,” and on January 25 the “arrogant, impudent” and “very base” Trist was ordered to leave headquarters. To accept, approve, endorse, recommend and support the work of such a scoundrel seemed impossible.[18]

But Polk had professed to be considerate and forbearing toward our erring sister, and to seek only redress, indemnity, security and peace. His terms had been officially stated; and while his Message of December, 1847, had suggested that a continuance of the war might be expected to modify them, no real fighting had occurred since then, and—although Polk had known for about six weeks that negotiations on virtually the old basis were afoot—no modification of them had been announced. That Message had expressly disclaimed all thought of making “a permanent conquest” of Mexico; and on the fourth of this very February Sevier, chairman of the committee on foreign relations, had stated in the Senate that Polk was anxious for peace, desired only indemnity, and wanted to preserve Mexican nationality.[19]

Trist had substantially embodied Polk’s terms in the treaty, and had even anticipated his thought of reducing the compensation. Congress had voted men and money on the basis of Polk’s professions and terms; and, should he now raise his demands, all his enemies would say their charges of greed, falsehood, injustice, o’ervaulting ambition and bloodthirsty wickedness had been proved. Hostilities might continue, the Whigs might carry the election, the war might end in disaster and ignominy, and all the gains now embodied in the treaty might be lost. Even should these perils be avoided, it seemed extremely doubtful whether Mexico would ever accept by treaty a more encroaching boundary, and quite possible that an endeavor to obtain it would open a long vista of expenses, guerilla warfare, foreign complications and Heaven only knew what. Extension toward the south was liable to kindle the fires of an anti-slavery agitation and perhaps disrupt the Union. The treaty and the victories that it consummated meant enough glory for any President. Finally, Polk, now moving about with dragging steps, dry, brown face, gray hair and sunken eyes, perhaps felt weary of battling both abroad and at home; and at the very least, should he endorse this paper and lay it before the Senate, his responsibility would cease.[19]

Buchanan and Walker opposed the treaty; but the former, as well as Polk himself, recognized that any personal misconduct of Trist, a mere agent of the Executive, had no proper bearing on the question. The rest of the Secretaries favored placing the document before the Senate. On February 22, after full debates in the Cabinet, Polk did this, recommending by implication the acceptance of it; and so a paper which had been simply a memorandum drawn up by a private American citizen and several Mexicans holding official positions, became a real treaty, merely awaiting confirmation.[20]

Among the Senators the treaty met with jeers and scowls. “Great Jehovah!” exclaimed Lieutenant W. T. Sherman on learning its terms; it is “just such a one as Mexico would have imposed on us had she been the conqueror”; and so thought a number of the Senators. It is a mere piece of waste paper, cried many; the impudent, perhaps traitorous, work of a discredited agent, whom the President had ordered out of Mexico; and it would be undignified, ridiculous, degrading, to accept such a thing. The war party opposed it. The annexationists opposed it. The no-territory men opposed it. The Little Unionists, who thought the country too big already, opposed it. Not a few hated to think of letting Polk elude them so easily.[21]

But suddenly the head of John Quincy Adams, as he sat in the House, dropped. He was borne to the Speaker’s room. “This is the last of earth; I am content,” murmured the venerable statesman. For two days he lingered, unconscious; and then he passed away. This tragic event had a deep effect. There fell a hush, as when snow descends upon the city pavement. The sessions of Congress were suspended. Senators were prevented from announcing their positions hastily. And when discussion began once more, it was resumed with a new feeling of seriousness, a new sense of responsibility.[21]

THE TREATY BEFORE THE SENATE

If the President could put up with Trist and his work, surely the Senate could, one began to think; and in every way Polk’s virtual endorsement gave the paper enough respectability. Politics played a leading rôle in almost every mind, but after a little it seemed like bad strategy to vote against the glory and the territory ensured by its terms. The committee on foreign relations, which decided to throw the treaty aside and send an “imposing” commission to do the work over, dropped the scheme when Polk told them bluntly this would be “worse than an idle ceremony.” Benton, thoroughly angry at the administration because Frémont, his son-in-law, had been condemned for insubordination in California; Berrien, wedded to his “no-territory” idea; Corwin, anxious perhaps to have more Americans find hospitable graves in Mexico; Webster, who asserted that California and New Mexico were “not worth a dollar”; and certain other Senators, committed for this or that reason, were beyond argument; but all their hopes failed.[22]

The deep current set against them. “What better can we do?” became an unanswerable argument for the treaty. The people wanted peace. They desired no more bloodshed, no more costs. One could not be sure of obtaining another treaty from chaotic Mexico, or sure that any treaty differing from the present one could have as good a chance in the American Senate. To reject the work of Trist was understood more and more clearly to involve, perhaps, not only interminable fighting, but a train of moral, political, industrial, commercial and financial ills of which no one could see the end. Already enough generals had built up reputations, thought many of the politicians. It would be of priceless advantage, urged some of the finer men, to supplement our military triumphs with a great act of magnanimity. By March 7 ratification, which had been for a time extremely doubtful, appeared probable. Houston of Texas, a leading opponent, concluded to visit New Hampshire. And on the tenth by 38 against 14—a narrow margin, since a majority of two-thirds was requisite—the treaty won. A transfer of four votes from the affirmative to the negative would have defeated it.[22]

There were a few amendments. Article X, which might have revived extinct Mexican claims to lands in Texas now occupied by bona fide settlers, went overboard at once. The provision of security for the Roman Catholic church in the acquired territory (Art. IX) fell out as unnecessary, as reflecting on the good faith of the United States, as suggesting government interference with religious affairs in this country, and as tending to confirm the Mexican pretence that we entertained hostile feelings toward that communion. The Senate refused to agree that California and New Mexico should be made into states “as soon as possible” (Art. IX), regarding that as a step to be taken with deliberation, and only when, in the judgment of Congress, all the prerequisites of statehood should exist. Instead of allowing Mexico to choose between payment by instalments and payment in securities convertible at once into cash (Art. XII) it was decided to offer only the former method, as a veiled hint that an infraction of the treaty would cause a suspension of the instalments. Another amendment permitted the Indians to have firearms, which, as they lived by the chase, had to be done. A further modification, intended to hasten the conclusion of peace, authorized the exchange of ratifications at Querétaro whenever Mexico should accept the amended treaty; and it was also provided by the Senate that evacuation could then begin. Finally a secret article, which permitted Mexico to consummate the ratification of the agreement at any time within eight months, instead of the four months of Article XXIII, was cancelled, because it seemed to encourage procrastination, and allow her time to escape from the treaty, while compelling us to bear great expenses. But none of these changes touched the essentials.[23]

THE TREATY IN MEXICO

It now became necessary to have some one explain the amended treaty to Mexico, bring about her acceptance of it, and, should it be confirmed, exchange the ratifications. This gave Polk a chance to prove himself a large man. Scott, though not without serious grounds of offence against Hitchcock, Harney and Quitman, had forgiven and honored them, because they deserved well of the country. Trist, the bringer of peace, the negotiator of its terms, high in the favor of the Mexican government, and able to exert much influence on the Mexican Congress, deserved the appointment. If the treaty represented a great national service and had merit enough to be accepted, its maker had merit enough to be recognized. But the President was only Polk the Mediocre after all. His plumage had been ruffled; and instead of giving Trist this high and lucrative post, he relegated the peacemaker to a dishonorable oblivion, and would not even pay him for the time actually spent in the negotiations. To think that a President of the United States could be so small![24]

Aside from this petty meanness and spite, however, Polk selected a man worthy, both personally and officially, of the position. This was Sevier, chairman of the Senate committee of foreign relations and leading champion of the treaty in that body. Then, as Sevier became suddenly though temporarily ill and no delay could be risked, Clifford, the attorney general, was appointed associate commissioner with equal powers; and eventually the two—both arriving at Mexico by the fifteenth of April—acted in concert.[24]

Mexico now became the scene of action again. February 6 the government announced what had been done about peace. Knowing how loud an outcry had been raised against even considering a treaty, one can imagine what occurred, now that a treaty had been made. The old objections were reiterated. Trist’s lack of authority was dwelt upon. Secret, despotic, illegal, treasonable, shameful, ruinous, were a few of the everyday epithets that bombarded the government. It had no power to alienate Mexican territory. It should have waited for the American friends of peace to act. Even “the sepulchral comfort” of temporary subjugation was described as preferable to such a peace. “Approval of the treaty,” exclaimed Rejón, “is the political death of the Republic.” Another insurrection broke out at San Luis Potosí, and all the comandantes general were notified to expect revolts.[25]

The peace men, however, stood firm. Honor has been saved, they insisted. The United States has recognized Mexico as an independent nation. There has been no suing for terms at Washington. Territory has been regained, not sold. To speak properly, indeed, this is a “treaty of restitution”; fifteen millions are to be paid for injuries done us; the territory acquired by the United States costs her more dearly than Louisiana; and full rights have been secured for all Mexicans adopted by another government. Whatever harshness can be found in the conditions is due to the circumstances, not the government. War has no respect for justice. Besides, in case of need a nation, like an individual, may find amputation expedient, and be the stronger for it. Above all, the administration has merely done its duty in treating according to its best judgment. It has determined nothing, settled nothing. The facts of the case will be laid before Congress, and the representatives of the people shall decide.[25]

Here, then, came the real crisis: would Congress ratify the treaty? At Washington, in spite of some encouraging reports, the impression gained ground that it would not. The amendments appeared to cause little excitement, but they were not the real issues. Opponents of peace had the speeches of American statesmen printed, and hawked them about the streets. Prudent Mexicans demanded an end of the uncertainty, disorder and chaos that was paralyzing the country; but so had they always demanded it. The government exhibited little activity, while the Puros and the friends of Santa Anna did not sleep. The especially important elections in the occupied territory did not end until April 23, and by that date one could see that something else was to be feared even more than opposition. As on every other occasion demanding a patriotic stand, most of the decent men felt afraid to assume responsibility. Another difficulty was that money for their travelling expenses had customarily been advanced to the members by the government, and now it had no money for the purpose. Finally, however, said an American who did not precisely understand the affair, merchants at the capital subscribed a large sum to hunt up the Congress and feed it long enough to ratify the treaty; severer measures also were taken to ensure attendance; and early in May a quorum of shaking legislators convened.[26]

In opening Congress Peña stated the grand question ably. Honor, union, independence and the hope of national prosperity and felicity have been saved, he pointed out; the United States made the proposals, and Mexico has obtained all the advantages possible under the circumstances; we have given up some territory, but the foremost nations of the world have done the same at one time or another; every one sees that we should have adjusted our difficulties in 1845, but it is now possible once more to settle them, and the opportunity to do so should not again be lost. The ministers of war and finance presented statements proving the impossibility of continuing the war successfully, and the peace commissioners justified the terms of the treaty. The prospect of recovering the Mexican customhouses and receiving the American millions looked highly attractive. No less telling, doubtless, were the preparations of the United States to resume hostilities with fresh energy, and to tax Mexico rigorously. The most efficient American army that had yet been seen in the country awaited Butler’s orders, and large reinforcements had been voted by Congress. No responsible men in their senses could resist such arguments. The treaty, as amended by the American Senate, was promptly ratified, and by June 9 Washington had the news. With all speed it ran from city to city, from town to town, from vale to vale; and everywhere it was greeted with quiet but heartfelt rejoicings.[27]

By an arrangement already made, Sevier and Clifford, after learning what had been done by the Mexican Congress, proceeded to the seat of government. It was a tiresome journey of about 145 miles; but at last, from the summit of a high ridge, they saw domes and spires two miles or so distant, glittering on a low eminence in a fine valley, which was enclosed by parallel ranges of mountains. The town was Querétaro; and on May the twenty-sixth, in the President’s rather plain reception room, dignified with crimson curtains and with chairs of state, Clifford presented their credentials.[28]

THE TREATY RATIFIED BY MEXICO

Peña, tall and benign though sadly worn, Rosa, the minister of relations, rather short and swarthy but with large, thoughtful eyes lighting up his countenance, and Anaya, the minister of war, tall and gaunt, with high cheek bones and a face of Indian stolidity, received them with all due courtesy. “Sister republics, may the two countries ever maintain the most friendly relations,” was the American greeting; and Peña replied, “As the head of this nation, I desire nothing more ardently than that our treaty may prove the immutable basis of that constant harmony and good understanding which should prevail sincerely between the two republics.” Conversations and formalities ensued, and on May 30 an exchange of the ratifications concluded this momentous business.[28]

In the execution of the treaty a few misunderstandings arose, but none of serious importance; and the minister of relations attested the good faith of the United States.[29] Orders for the evacuation of Mexican territory were promptly given to our commanders in the various fields of operation, and were promptly obeyed.[30] Even before the last formalities occurred, in fact, Butler called in his outposts, and as the sun rose on the twelfth of June it shone upon the arms of his rejoicing troops, drawn up—facing the palace—in the grand plaza of the capital. Housetops, balconies and the near streets were full, but perfect order and stillness prevailed except for the sharp commands of our officers. Thirty guns saluted the American banner on the palace, and then it was lowered. The Mexican flag took its place on the staff and received the same honors. An American band struck up gaily. The unconquered ranks wheeled, marched and left the city. Herrera, the new President, returned to the chair from which Paredes had ejected him, and the proud capital rejoiced to be free once more. But it rejoiced soberly. “I question,” said U. S. Grant, “whether the great majority of the Mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming.”[31]

The plan of evacuation was to let the troops wait near Jalapa until transports could be provided and their baggage go aboard, and then march to the unhealthy coast and sail away as quickly as possible. For some time General Smith had now been making preparations at Vera Cruz with his characteristic efficiency; and soon the army, the sick, the wounded and the many who attended to their needs, took ship rapidly for New Orleans. By the twelfth of July more than 25,000 embarked, and on the last day of the month all the fortifications of Vera Cruz and frowning Ulúa, the symbol of Mexican pride, were given up. Stirred by feelings deep and strong, the departing soldiers looked round them with a farewell gaze—at the low white walls, at the exotic vegetation that had now come to be familiar, and at the gleaming, snowy peak of Orizaba, towering above its belt of dark evergreens. They had trodden the soil of that wonderful country with the stern, proud foot of the conqueror, but they now left it full of sympathy and good wishes; and one of the number put his feelings into terse and soldierlike rhymes:

---

Mexico, as we have learned, entered upon the contest with neither money nor revenues nor credit. From nothing, nothing comes; and many supposed she was too poor to fight. But she did fight—or at least men fought in her name—and one cannot help asking how they contrived to do so. In full the question cannot be answered, but some of the facts lie within our view, and these are not only valuable in themselves but highly suggestive.[1]

Aside from loans, the income of the government in 1844 was figured roughly as follows: import duties, seven million dollars; duties on commerce in the interior, four and a quarter millions; profits from the monopolies of the mints, tobacco, stamped paper, playing cards, national lottery, post-office, etc., two and a quarter millions; miscellaneous taxes and revenues, three millions; total, sixteen and a half millions net. But the American blockade cut off nearly fifty per cent of this income at one stroke; and not only our progressive occupation of territory, but the dislike of the people for national taxes, their growing dissatisfaction with Santa Anna’s régime, and their increasing destitution caused a rapid shrinkage of the residue.[2]

It was proposed to contrive a general plan of taxation for the emergency; but probably the interests principally threatened put a stop to it, and at all events it mysteriously disappeared. The government was given ample authority, but could do nothing. A war tax was laid on house-rents, for example; but it could not be collected everywhere, and probably its net proceeds amounted to little. In November, 1846, it was decided to issue drafts for two millions, to be accepted by the clergy and then purchased by designated citizens; but the scheme, though actually decreed, proved a failure, and the famous laws of January 11 and February 4, 1847, were no more successful. June 17, 1847, a special tax of one million was assessed upon the entire population; but only a small fraction of this appears to have been paid. In November, 1847, the government offered to deduct one half of the pending national taxes levied before May 1, 1846, if citizens would pay them by February 1, 1848; and this indicates clearly how the people had been acting. A few of the states, besides maintaining National Guards, erecting fortifications and manufacturing cannon, remitted some cash to the central government; but when we find the richest of them all, Mexico, boasting that she had sent the insignificant sum of about $160,000, we have reason to place a rather slight value upon this kind of assistance. Moreover, accepted drafts on that state, payable in one, two and three months, could not be sold—even at a discount.[3]

The clergy gave nominally a million and a half, but they appear to have taken up indirectly, at a discount of forty per cent, the drafts of which this donation consisted. Citizens provided a large part of the new ordnance, but aside from this we hear of few substantial gifts. Just after the battle of Molino del Rey, in order to obtain bread for the army, the government requested the bakers of the capital to meet, but only a part of them came. A “positive supreme order” then brought them together, and they promised contributions; yet the promises were not kept.[4]

Every possible effort was made to borrow. Once the treasury offered a national loan of two and a half millions, but it fell flat in the states that might have paid the most. Just before the battle of Cerro Gordo there was a door-to-door canvass at Mexico; but only small sums can have been picked up. About three months later the government imposed a forced loan, of which more than $280,000 were assigned to the capital; but the Mexicans had learned to evade such extortions, and it proved hard to collect the allotted amounts. In July, 1847, the British consul general, Mackintosh, loaned $600,000 in exchange for the ratification of an arrangement negotiated with the British bondholders. In four loans the clergy furnished some three millions, all told. The President raised money, it was reported, on public and private securities, sold bonds freely at very low rates, and borrowed in effect by giving contracts on terms favorable enough to make the transactions worth while as gambling propositions. The principal mint, for example, was turned over to the British consul general for a period of ten years in February, 1847, in exchange for some $200,000 in cash and a promise to pay one per cent on the amount coined; and on similar principles arms and other necessaries were sometimes obtained.[4]

All of these financial operations were at least ostensibly lawful, but Santa Anna did not pause here. Wherever money could be found, he seems to have taken it, holding that the exigency outweighed all rights and all pledges. Funds belonging to the tobacco revenue were illegally seized, for instance; and a large sum due the Academy of Fine Arts fell into this voracious maw. Not only cash but everything needed for the army went the same way. At Jalapa early in April, 1847, for example, all the owners of horses received orders to bring them in. Grain, forage, lead, lumber, arms, ammunition, tools, cattle, mules and laborers were taken by force; and sometimes military officers exhibited the burglar’s predilection for a midnight hour. Here was a kind of finance that saved the expenses of accounting, and without it even the low cost of the Mexican soldier would not explain Santa Anna’s holding out so long.[5]

THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL OUTLOOK

The United States, happily, stood far above this level, but not so far that probably mere good luck did not save us from grave trouble; and it was easy to foresee many dangers—all the worse because they naturally made capital timid—when the hostilities began. The total receipts of the treasury for the fiscal year ending with June 30, 1845, were nearly thirty millions and the ordinary expenditures $22,935,828. It was estimated that during the next year the receipts would fall about three millions, and Walker—allowing the munificent amounts of something more than two and a half millions for the army and something less than five for the navy—expected to reduce the total disbursements a little, anticipating for the period ending with June, 1847, a further saving of more than four millions. The receipts for July-September, 1845, proved to be more than two millions below those of the corresponding months of 1844, and the customs income for the fiscal year 1845–46 was $815,445 less than for the preceding twelve-month. In a word, shrinking revenues and curtailed outlays were the prospect.[6]

In this condition of things, not only had the unpredictable costs and embarrassments of war to be faced, but those of war in a distant land. Money was to be sent out of the country, never to return, and the bills for supplies to be increased by the burdens of marine transportation, insurance and losses; while risks from privateers and European complication could be seen. Before such an outlook business men shrank from large enterprises. People with money felt disposed to keep it.[7]

Where, then, were funds to come from? The currency had been inflated by the paper issues of many banks. Stocks were selling far below the prices of twelve months before. Even the business men who did not endorse the tariff of 1842 had adjusted their affairs to it, and now everybody understood that a new scale of duties, based upon free-trade ideas, lay on the treasury anvil. Calls for the government funds held and used by state depositories and for the specie of all the banks were feared. The banks cannot support a loan, and even in peace our capitalists have never done so, remarked the financial editor of the New York Herald, probably the best newspaper authority.[7]

The government must look abroad, concluded the editor, and in Europe no light could be seen. By 1842 our state debts, mostly held there, had amounted to nearly $200,000,000. Mississippi, Michigan, Arkansas and Florida sank in the mire of repudiation. Pennsylvania, Maryland, Indiana, Illinois and Louisiana became delinquent. The bonds of South Carolina fell below par. Missouri passed a stay law. Sidney Smith, when he met a Pennsylvanian at dinner, felt like dividing the man’s raiment among the British guests, most of whom, if not all, had probably suffered by the “dishonor” of the state. Indeed, the bondholders were disposed to throw off half of the interest rate, if our national treasury would assume the debts; but a proposition to do this failed in Congress.[8]

As early as 1841 even our six per cent national bonds would not sell in Europe, though money commanded less than half as large a return there. “Who will lend on American securities?” asked the London Spectator the very month we began war upon Mexico. Our credit then grew worse instead of better. The war bill precipitated a panic in Wall Street, and soon business in the west and south was described as prostrate. Bad as such a financial outlook was in itself, too, it involved a consequent ill. Evidently the administration would have to pinch; and, as Madame de Sévigné once remarked, “There is nothing so expensive as want of money.”[8]

The Democrats, however, were committed against the protective tariff of 1842, now in force, and Polk as a party man felt that something must be done about it. Walker no doubt shared this opinion; and, having gained immense prestige in the south by his brilliant advocacy of the annexation of Texas, he very likely hoped that by now carrying into effect the fiscal ideas prevalent in that section, he might supplant Calhoun. Probably, too, he sincerely believed in these ideas. To him the existing scale of duties appeared to be the cause of the shrinking revenues; and he stated boldly that war, which had been recognized for some time as a possibility, “would create an increased necessity for reducing our present high duties in order to obtain sufficient revenue to meet increased expenditures.”[9]

NEW FISCAL LAWS

Soon after hostilities began, therefore, a tariff bill came before Congress. It was bitterly and stubbornly fought. In the Senate its defeat appeared sure; but Crittenden and Clayton, believing it could only prove a discreditable failure, had a Whig support it in order to gain party advantage at the expense of the nation, and by this unworthy trick and the casting vote of the presiding officer it passed. In company with it went a warehouse bill and the restoration of the sub-treasury system, which divorced the government from the banks, and required the treasury to accept and pay out only specie. About the first of August, 1846, this entire system became law. “Our administration seems enamoured of ruin, and woos calamity for itself,” exclaimed the Whig North American; our credit is threatened by the sub-treasury plan; our industries are deprived of protection; “while an expensive war is eating out our vitals, our revenue is to be diminished”; and a direct tax will have to be laid.[9]

The new tariff became effective on the first of December, 1846. As of course importers waited for it, a lean period preceded that event, and the heavy receipts that followed it, providing Walker with an apt retort, did not prevent the total for the year ending with June, 1847, from coming short of his estimate by more than four millions. Without waiting to acquire this unwelcome fact, however, the government found itself compelled in June, 1846, to revise at a sharp angle upward its predictions of the expenditures. Over and above their calculations of the previous December the war and navy departments now called for $23,952,904, which Polk informed Congress was “the largest amount which any state of the service” would require up to July 1, 1847. The secretary of the treasury had expected to find on July 1, 1847, a surplus (virtually that estimated for the previous year minus half a million) of at least $4,332,441, and had confidently hoped for a substantial gain in revenue; but he admitted that it was now requisite, since a working capital of four millions for the treasury and the mints had to be kept on hand, to provide $12,586,406 of additional income.[10]

The proper method of handling our war finances was, in the first place, to increase the existing taxes—not only to obtain funds promptly, but as a firm support for the nation’s credit and a basis for those temporary loans which are a wise expedient at the beginning of a war; and Walker expected the proposed tariff to answer this purpose. But the question how to raise these twelve and a half millions remained. Excise and direct taxes, the administration believed, would not be prompt enough, and would not seem to the public warranted by the circumstances. It was therefore recommended to Congress that both treasury notes and a loan should be resorted to; and on July 22, 1846, without much debate, the issue of ten millions in such obligations, to be sold at not less than par, was authorized.[11]

Treasury notes could not really serve the government’s purpose well, for they were soon to be paid, the expense of handling them fell upon the treasury, and, as they were receivable for duties, they were sure to pour into the customhouses instead of real money whenever they should be cheaper than specie. The treasury, bound by law to pay out only the latter, would then have to buy coin at the market price—presumably, as Gallatin said, with depreciated notes. These would then fall still more, and so the process appeared certain to continue.

BONDS ISSUED

But notes were the most convenient and readiest, if not the only way of quickly anticipating revenue; they were particularly suited to the nature of the government’s expenditures; they provided an easy method of transmitting the large sums that would be needed in the south on the war account; and financial critics at New York approved of them. Not all were of that opinion, however. About the middle of September the appearance of notes for half a million was announced by one journal under the heading, “Extensive Paper Money Manufactory”; but the government persisted, and by the ninth of December, 1846, nearly four millions of them were out. This with the balance—more than nine millions—handed over by the previous fiscal year, made up for the lean customs receipts of this period.[12]

Meanwhile attention was given to the more substantial resource of a loan. At the end of September the secretary of the treasury disappeared mysteriously from his accustomed haunts, and to Polk’s acute distress of mind wandered for more than two weeks in the perilous jungle of Wall Street. His experiences there were in fact rather hard. The capitalists looked with favor on the project of a loan and had plenty of money, but—believing the government would require a large amount, and therefore that a loan made now would be likely to depreciate, as well as actuated by their characteristic spirit of thrift—they stood out for six per cent. The New York and Boston banks, it was thought at the White House, were in league against the administration. Besides, the public had little information about the way money was being spent, and felt apprehensive of extravagance and a huge debt. Many believed the war had cost half a million each day. Not a few distrusted Walker. He had engineered Mississippi into bankruptcy, and had become insolvent personally. In the Senate his reputation had been that of a needy adventurer, intensely ambitious, clever in debate and intrigue, but not of solid ability, and especially not a financier. At present nobody denied his real talents or his extreme devotion to work, but he was charged with inaccuracy and with sophistical reasoning.[13]

Apparently five and two fifths per cent was all he felt ready to offer, and special reasons could be given for halting there, since it was feared that issuing a six per cent loan at par would injure the United States sixes, now held at 106, and also the credit of the government. But finally, with the approval of the President and the Cabinet, he advertised, October 30, for bids on a five million loan for ten years at six per cent. November 12 the tenders were opened. For a small fraction of the amount a slight premium was offered, and for the rest par. No doubt the rate, in comparison with European standards, had to be regarded as high, but on the other hand this was our first specie loan, and was said to be the only war loan ever taken without a discount.[13]

Plainly, however, more needed to be done. It was already extraordinarily difficult to pay the comparatively small expenses of the war, wrote the British minister at this time. Congress had not fully provided for even the minimum needs recognized by the sanguine, if not sophistical, Walker; and early in December, 1846, his annual report intimated that on July 1, 1848, with a due allowance for the working capital of the treasury, there would be a deficit of twenty-three millions. Apparently a loan was requisite, and he advised making the term twenty years. Then, with no little anxiety, the administration waited. At the end of December Bancroft wrote privately, “If we can raise the ways and means,” we can surmount the other difficulties. On the eleventh of January, 1847, a bill virtually embodying Walker’s recommendations was thrown into the House, and a long, acrimonious debate ensued. The treasury “languishes,” announced the organ of the government; needed volunteers could not be called out; but the legislators had irrepressible things to say. At length, however, on January 28 the bill providing $23,000,000 became a law. Though it primarily contemplated treasury notes, it permitted the Executive liberty of action; and a large amount of six per cent bonds were sold.[14]

But Polk was by no means out of trouble now. Walker’s estimate made no mention of great outstanding purchases, for which the contractors had not yet sent in their accounts. Not only the customs duties but the sales of public lands were coming far short of his expectations. No allowance appeared to be made for the effect of bounty land scrip that was likely to reduce them still more. The Vera Cruz expedition and a possible march to the enemy’s capital were in view. Indeed, the real war had only begun. Besides, the temper of Congress had already threatened trouble and made it. Not only to ensure additional revenue in general, but in particular—it would seem—to strengthen the credit of the government by showing how the interest on its obligations would be taken care of, the Secretary brought up again the suggestion of his annual report, that a duty of twenty-five per cent should be placed on tea and coffee, which—although the free list had been restricted in the tariff of 1846—had been left untaxed. In fact it had been intimated by him at New York, even if not actually promised, that such a step would be taken; and a few days before Christmas, 1846, he notified the committee on ways and means that probably without this assistance a satisfactory loan could not be made. Yet Congress rejected the proposition by a great majority.[15]

A plan of Benton’s also—to grade the public lands on the basis of their attractiveness, and reduce prices accordingly—which would have increased the income of the government, failed to pass, though endorsed by Polk, Walker and the general land commissioner. Pessimists were happy. With Polk, the war, the weather, the sub-treasuries “and perhaps the Devil” to struggle against, wrote a correspondent of Martin Van Buren, soon not an ingot would be “left standing,” and there was “no calculating, no prophesying” what would become of the nation.[15]

A TARIFF FOR MEXICAN PORTS

Apparently to offset the failure of the tea and coffee tax, Walker’s active brain produced another scheme, designed not only to bring in revenue and reassure the capitalists, but also to please the shipping men of the United States and neutral countries. This was to open the Mexican ports controlled by us, and permit merchandise to enter there under a moderate scale of duties. During March, 1847, assisted by Senator Benton and the attorney general, Polk satisfied himself that under his powers as commander-in-chief he could impose and collect the duties as military contributions, for by the right of conquest he could either exclude commerce or admit it on his own terms, and contributions were legitimate under the laws of war. Said Vattel, “A nation [at war] on every opportunity lays its hands on the enemy’s goods, appropriates them to itself, and thereby, besides weakening the adversary, strengthens itself, and at least in part, procures an indemnification, an equivalent, either for the very cause of the war, or for the expences and losses resulting from it”; and a low scale of duties was an extremely mild application of this principle.[16]

Moreover, it was quite as legitimate under our Constitution also, though not expressly mentioned, as to blockade or bombard Vera Cruz, respecting which the organic law was equally silent. Indeed, to have left the ports wide open or allowed the high Mexican tariff to remain in force would, in addition to being harmful to us, have required as great an exercise of authority. Finally, Scott and some of our naval commanders, moved by the evident proprieties of the situation, fixed duties and used the proceeds at their discretion, and it was manifestly better to arrange the business in a uniform, well-considered manner.[16]

It might have been expected that substantially either our own or the Mexican tariff would be applied, but neither would have answered. Mexican imports were very different from ours; specific, not ad valorem, duties had been customary there; and competent appraisers could not be found. On the other hand the unreasonable Mexican duties, besides preventing commerce to a large extent, encouraged fraud and smuggling. In March, 1847, therefore, a special tariff was prepared by Walker, lowering the Mexican duties on imports more than one half, and substituting for all port dues and charges a uniform tax of one dollar per ton; and on March 31 Polk ordered the system to be put in force. Mexico retorted that goods paying the American duties—especially goods prohibited by her laws—would be confiscated, and this attitude caused some uneasiness in France; but it seemed fairly evident that the United States would protect neutrals accepting our policy, and not only the foreign merchants in Mexico but the neutral governments felt highly pleased with our course.[17]

The authorities at Washington, however, did not rejoice as much. The real difficulty lay, not in landing merchandise at the ports, but in placing it before Mexican customers, and comparatively few of the latter could be reached. Persevering efforts were made to solve the problem on both coasts. Sometimes, for reasons not fully understood, the Mexican government issued licenses for the passage of goods to the interior, and for a consideration local authorities in the northeast did the same; but even these documents were not always valid against officials and military men whose “patriotism” had not been “sweetened.” European merchants could see this difficulty. Up to October 20, 1847, only one small cargo from that direction entered the harbor of Vera Cruz, and Walker admitted privately that a very small part of the few imports was disposed of for consumption beyond the coast. In a word, this vaunted plan gave no substantial help on the problem of supporting the war.[18]

GOOD FORTUNE HELPS US

But by this time the good luck which has been supposed to keep an eye on the United States of America had intervened. In 1846 came the great Irish famine. British provision laws were suspended. Faced with starvation people cared little what they paid, if they could obtain food. Our agricultural products, which had fallen heavily in market value since October 1, 1845, rose with astonishing buoyancy. Western grain that had scarcely been worth transporting—frequently not worth it—became precious. A ship could earn thirty per cent of her cost in one round trip, yet hardly enough vessels could be found. So abrupt was the turn that a financial editor who had predicted on December 17, 1846, a speedy return to the distress of 1837, declared on January 30, 1847, “We are on the high road to an unprecedented prosperity.” The abolition of the British corn laws ensured our farmers not only temporary relief but a permanent market. Cotton, too, and even cotton goods were in active demand abroad; and a famine in Germany gave us additional support.[19]

Every vessel from the other side brought more of the specie that had been expected to disappear from circulation here. Between the first of January and the middle of July, 1847, approximately twenty-four millions came in, besides about five millions in the pockets of immigrants. Everybody who did anything or had anything shared in the general increase of wealth. Hoarding went out of fashion. All were spenders. In particular, a craze for dress demanded great quantities of European fabrics. The warehousing plan also stimulated importation. For the quarter ending with September, 1847, the customs duties amounted to more than eleven millions—almost half the total of the preceding year—and for the week ending with October 1 they were nearly double those of the corresponding week in 1846. In a word, gold rained upon us; the languishing treasury revived; and the credit of the government revived with it. Later, in the autumn of 1847, to be sure, the financial downpour abated, but it had already done its work. The ship of state rode now beyond the bar.[19]

Yet Polk still had to cope with difficulties. Early in December, 1847, when Congress assembled, he found it necessary to present large estimates and to admit that a deficit of nearly sixteen millions was to be expected by July 1, 1848; and there seemed to be little hope that Congress would provide additional revenue. Borrowing was inevitable, and Walker’s report of December 8 proposed a loan of $18,500,000. Nothing was done, however. The banks of New York and Boston endeavored to force upon the government a fiscal policy more acceptable to them, and a strong element in Congress, of which more will be heard in the next chapter, not only entertained a similar desire, but seemed willing to impair the credit of the administration. At length, on the nineteenth of January, 1848, a bill was introduced, and after a further delay another long debate opened. “How is the loan bill getting on, Sir?” inquired a newspaper correspondent of a Representative of the People after it had been on the tapis for about a month. “Oh, they are spouting away, spouting away, Sir,” was the careless reply. But on the last day of March a six per cent loan of $16,000,000 was authorized on substantially the same basis as the previous loans. The treaty of peace had been signed on February 2, and the new bonds brought a premium rising in some instances to $4.05 on a hundred.[20]

THE MEXICANS TAXED

In the same report (December, 1847) Walker announced, though evidently a little chastened in spirit, that relief would soon come from Mexico. What he chiefly counted upon at this time, however, was not customs duties. As early as the nineteenth of September, 1846, Polk, justly offended by the enemy’s disdainful treatment of our olive branch, decided that instead of endeavoring longer to conciliate the Mexicans by paying liberally for supplies, we should bring them to terms by levying contributions or taking needed articles without compensation, and this course was promptly recommended to General Taylor; but he replied, as we have seen, that such a policy was impracticable. Shortly after the capture of Vera Cruz General Scott received instructions of the same tenor, and he made a similar reply. Early in the autumn of 1847, however, as Mexico had again rejected the olive branch, this change of system was pressed upon Scott with fresh urgency, and before long explicit orders to make all the revenues and resources of Mexico available, as far as they could be, followed.[21]

Scott, however, knowing the laws of war and the wishes of his government, began operations without waiting for these later instructions. Almost immediately after entering the capital he laid upon it an assessment of $150,000, and set on foot an examination into the general question of drawing revenues from the country, which eventually showed that nearly twenty-three millions a year could theoretically be collected, should we take possession of the whole territory. November 25, he directed that no rent should be paid for houses and quarters except so far as contracts existed. About three weeks later, notice was given that in the districts held by the Americans all the taxes and dues previously paid to the Mexican government would be required of the authorities for the support of our army; and at the end of December an assessment equal to four times the direct taxes paid in 1843 was laid upon the states. Scott’s action was of course taken by Wool, now commanding in the northeast, as a pattern.[22]

But again Walker’s hopes were disappointed. The most important of the monopolies, tobacco, had to be given up because the American product could not be excluded, and for administrative reasons the other monopolies also were surrendered. Owing to the dangers of waste, corruption, extortion and resentment, the business of collecting taxes had to be entrusted to the state authorities, and they possessed wonderful dexterity in the arts of evasion. State assessments were actually made on México and Vera Cruz only. The owners of occupied buildings were in many cases friends, and could not well be deprived of their rents. Contracts or agreements that stood in the way had to be respected. Gold and silver were clandestinely exported. Smuggling across the northern border could not be stopped. Brigands exacted their toll. The time required for investigation and planning, and in certain instances for correspondence with our government, militated against prompt action. We strongly desired to settle with Mexico and evacuate the country, and hence—especially after the peace negotiations began—it would not have been wise to run the risk of exasperating the nation for the sake of a few dollars. In short the net proceeds, including $106,928 turned in by naval officers, were only $3,935,676.[23]

Some of this money went directly to supply needs of the army and navy, but by far the greater part of those needs had to be met in other ways. During the first nine months of 1847, it was figured that the United States exported more than $12,000,000 in specie to Mexico. Many drafts on the principal American cities were sold there, and those on the quartermasters at New Orleans, Philadelphia, Washington and New York amounted to nearly $8,000,000 before December, 1847. Payments were also made in the United States on the certificates of officers acting in the field; and about the first of August, 1847, Belmont, the New York agent of the Rothschilds, arranged with our administration to place funds in the hands of any paymaster or quartermaster named by Scott. In general the large financial operations made necessary by the transfers of money were skilfully, honestly and safely conducted. Some $24,000,000 were distributed by the pay department through its thirty-five officers, for instance, and nothing was lost by accident, robbery, theft or capture.[24]

THE COST OF THE WAR

The total money cost of the war on the American side has been given at very low and at very high amounts, and none of the estimates inspires much confidence. The excess expenditures of the army and navy appear to have been $63,605,621; of which $49,000,000 were raised by selling bonds and treasury notes, and were substantially added to the national debt. But these figures by no means answer the question. To the apparent cost we must add twelve millions paid later to Mexico, the American claims of which we relieved her, the war expenses of the treasury department, bounty lands, pensions, valid claims for damages, and other liabilities of many kinds gradually discharged after peace returned; and from the total must be subtracted the bonds and treasury notes then available for issue and the actual worth of ships, ordnance and other materials required for the war and left over. Evidently it is not feasible to reach a satisfactory conclusion, but as a very bold guess one may suggest a hundred millions.[25]

Even were that a close estimate, however, it would mean little. On the one hand lives, physical and mental sufferings, personal losses of every description, much national obloquy and a thousand minor factors would need to be considered, and on the other our gain in territory, in recognized power, in military and naval efficiency, in national self-consciousness and in particulars not so obvious. One thing, however, is clear. The war cost far less money than its opponents had expected. Webster solemnly predicted in December, 1846, that should it end the following spring, our debt would be a hundred millions, but on the first of July, 1848, the debt was less than sixty-six millions.[26]

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In Mexico the war had far more intimate relations with politics than it had in our own country. Here invading troops did not scatter our civil authorities, Presidents did not rise and fall, cabinets did not organize and melt away, revolutions and revolts did not hover continually at the door. Every part of the country contributed to the result. Supplies were voted, and troops assembled according to law. We have therefore studied Mexican politics in connection with events as these occurred, and reserved American politics to be surveyed more comprehensively; but this does not imply any lack of significance in the second topic.[1]

At first the war seemed extremely popular. The rush to volunteer showed that. A tone of opposition prevailed in New England, but it was quiet—hardly perceptible. May 21, 50,000 people gathered in front of the city hall at New York and called for vigorous measures. Hostilities appeared to be regarded by all as a just punishment for the long series of Mexican insults, barbarities and outrages. The country called; patriotism responded, and other considerations helped. Democratic politicians believed their party would gain prestige and strength. A great and common purpose would bind it firmly together. Many offices and appointments would follow, and almost everybody would gain some profit in a business way. Taylor’s “victories” on the Rio Grande intensified the enthusiasm. “Upon the duties which the present crisis invoked,” exclaimed the Philadelphia North American, “our country has but one heart,” and an invasion of the enemy’s territory “will meet the approbation of the entire American public.” Accordingly the first session of the Twenty-ninth Congress pushed its work far into the summer of 1846—even after Senator Fairfield wrote, “All nature [is] hissing”—and embodied the government’s policy in laws.[2]

THE WAR SOON UNPOPULAR

But this mood changed surprisingly. When Congress adjourned, it was in bad humor, and the country sympathized with it. News of the occupation of California produced little enthusiasm, for it had been expected. The fighting at Monterey excited interest, but it was followed at once by a long armistice, and it had no permanent effect on the downward course of public sentiment. Instead of glorying in the war, the Democrats now defended it feebly, and a great many regarded it as a grave political blunder. The fall Congressional elections went strongly against them. Every reverse could be explained, of course—in Pennsylvania a heavy storm, in New York the opposition of “every most pestilential and reckless form of law-hating faction,” apathy here, lack of organization there—but the National Intelligencer, chief organ of the Whigs, brushed explanations aside, and coldly remarked, “We presume that our President and his Cabinet are by this time convinced that they have forfeited the public confidence—the confidence, that is, of their own party; that of the other they never possessed”; and by mid-winter the political outlook for the war seemed extremely dark.[3]

The reasons for this change were complex and interesting. The people—Democrats and Whigs alike—knew they did not want Polk for chief executive. To the millions demanding, “Who is James K. Polk?” the answer had been given, “He is President of the United States”; but this excellent retort silenced instead of satisfying. Disagreeable ideas prevailed regarding the methods of his nomination and his election. Many viewed him as an Accident, an Unpleasant Surprise, a Surreptitious Incumbent; and his unpopularity not only was a disadvantage in itself, but colored the interpretation placed upon everything he did or said.[4]

Besides this initial difficulty, he was not considered a large enough man for the place, and the Cabinet seemed too much of a piece with him in that respect. The public did not hear Polk’s confidential declaration, “I intend to be myself President of the United States.” They were not aware that he risked a great deal to avoid having Calhoun and Flagg, a New York man of unusual ability, in his official family. But they felt like the Washington correspondent of the Boston Atlas, who said, They are “little fellows,” and “were they all thrown in a bag together, it would make little difference which came out first”; and they suspected that Polk aimed to eliminate all possible competitors. Many, indeed, believed it should be so. “Who would not regret,” asked Senator Mangum, “to see the choice of this great and free people thrown into shadow by over-topping talent?” The President was inaugurated on a cold, rainy, cheerless day, and sentiment, among those who counted, resembled the weather.[4]

The policy of the administration confirmed these impressions. Polk had no great ideas, no inspiring imagination, no kindling enthusiasm, no moving eloquence, no contagious humor, no winning personality. He was not exactly a “burning bush” of patriotism, hallowing the ground about him, and forcing men to put off their grimy, everyday shoes of selfish designs. To sway the nation or even the Democrats in any grand way lay beyond him. He was a partisan, to be sure, but without a party. His trumpet note—has shed “American blood upon the American soil”—came from a newspaper. Almost his only resource, therefore, was patronage, and the business of trading offices for support is essentially a mean one. It makes intrigue a profession, creates many enemies while it creates few friends and renders confidence well-nigh impossible. Without calling the President “mendacious,” one can understand how J. K. Paulding came to say, that he possessed no honesty of purpose, no frankness of heart. Tossing out a plump lie now and then would have given less offence than continual secretiveness and evasion caused. Polk described the cunning Pillow as “one of the shrewdest men you ever knew.” That gave Polk’s measure, and political necessities developed his natural disposition. “This little mole,” Blair called him. Blair was prejudiced; but for a different bête noire he would have chosen a different name.[5]

POLK DISLIKED

New York state affairs had an especially bad effect on Polk’s reputation and influence. Knowing that he had played the part of Jacob, the Supplanter, to Van Buren’s Esau at the Baltimore convention, and not expecting to be forgiven, Polk probably felt thoroughly distrustful of the Locofocos from the beginning. Silas Wright’s declining positively to run for the Vice Presidency on his ticket doubtless gave offence. His bad faith in refusing to accept Flagg, apparently to save himself from being overshadowed, after virtually agreeing to do it, seemed inexcusable. His taking Marcy into the Cabinet at the behest of an active but rather unscrupulous remnant of the “irregular” Conservatives heightened the dissatisfaction of the substantial elements. The defeat of the New York Democrats in the fall elections of 1846, which was charged by the regulars to treachery on the part of the Conservatives, created still further trouble. Making factional appointments, and especially choosing for a high post at New York City a “poor, stupid dutchman by the name of Bouck,” as an extremist called him, seemed to the faithful nothing less than party treason. In thus alienating the ablest and best Democrats of the state, who were trusted and admired by the party as a whole, and supporting a faction that had no national standing, the President made a great mistake. He “has proved himself to be a poor devil,” said one of Van Buren’s correspondents; even Tyler’s name was less execrated than “Jim Polk’s,” wrote one of Judge McLean’s; and for thus weakening the Democrats in the Empire State, he was naturally blamed in all quarters.[6]

A variety of minor yet serious complaints helped fill up the measure. Polk was equally anxious and unable to harmonize the party, and as he tried to satisfy clamorous malcontents, it came to be said that he was always ready to hang an old friend for the sake of gaining two new ones. Ranking low in ability to judge of character, enjoying but a limited acquaintance, and placing an unreasonable value upon experience in Congress, he too often appointed unfit men when he meant well, or put the right men into the wrong places. Naturally office-seekers dogged his footsteps, and numberless disappointed aspirants bore grudges deadlier than stilettos. His wriggling out of emphatic declarations in favor of our broad Oregon claims excited profound wrath in the west, and made a bad impression in other sections. Senator Hannegan proclaimed that if the President accepted the line of forty-nine degrees, he would be consigned to “a damnation so deep that the hand of resurrection” would never be able to “drag him forth”; and he did accept it.[7]

The veto of a river and harbor bill that offered captivating opportunities for looting the treasury brought upon him the woes of Tyler. The government, said the aggrieved, “is fast degenerating into a mere quadrennial elective despotism”; Polk “wants the purse of the nation for his own schemes of presidential ambition.” Finally, the apparent hampering of Taylor and Scott, and the playing off of the one against the other seemed to a multitude of citizens unworthy of a President, unpatriotic and mean; and then partisans accused him of letting Whig generals have all the glory, lest a Democratic warrior should gain the Presidential nomination in 1848. Truly, “deep and dismal was the ditch,” as B. F. Butler said, into which Polk fell.[7]

Moreover a whole sheaf of arrows, not directly aimed at him, struck his administration. The annexation of Texas rankled still in many bosoms, and the extremists were implacable. Lowell did not shrink from recommending secession:

John Quincy Adams contemplated the same extreme remedy, and Giddings went so far as to write, “Ohio is now a party to no subsisting Union.” Those opposed to the measure felt hostile to the President who had favored and consummated it; the great number whose theory had been that it would not lead to war felt obliged to argue now that Polk had brought about a conflict unnecessarily; and everything in our relations with Mexico was viewed through a fog of prejudices and animosities rising from that gory political battlefield. Not a few appointments to high military positions had seemed to rest on political expediency, and the battles near the Rio Grande had been followed by a long period of inactivity, charged by many to the government. Volunteers not accepted for the war had remarks to make, and troops returning from the front often used expressions hardly coherent enough to be termed remarks. The six-months men called out by Gaines belonged in the latter class; and although Marcy did nothing respecting them save to obey the plain requirement of the law, citizens of Louisiana applied language to him that might have kindled sympathy for Judas Iscariot.[8]

The government’s fiscal system, though of course accepted by many, excited sharp resentment. Overwhelming the country all at once with such a combination of new laws—a warehouse act, a sub-treasury bill and a “free-trade” tariff—was denounced as an unspeakable outrage, and each of those measures amounted in the opinion of many to a crime. Gideon Welles thought the idea of reducing our tariff during the war an “insane project”; and the measure as framed, a compromise between theory and expediency, satisfied hardly any one. Real free-traders complained because their principles had been sacrificed, and the New Englanders because those principles had not been sacrificed enough. The iron and coal state raged and wept by turns: she had been betrayed, and “her groans were music” to the arrogant low-tariff section cherished by the government. Only corruption and intimidation could have carried such a monstrosity through Congress; and, worse yet, “Sir Robert Walker” had been truckling to England. “British all over,” scribbled the American Sentinel on the warehousing system; and the tariff was trailed to a British lair packed with British statesmen, British capitalists, British manufacturers and British merchants. To please them our wheels of production were to stop, our banks close, and the industrious North fall in despair at the feet of an implacable South. “‘To your tents, O Israel!’” cried the National Intelligencer.[9]

DENUNCIATIONS OF THE WAR

In countless eyes the war itself soon lost its glamour. Imagining that our advance to the Rio Grande had been the cause of it, many felt bound to denounce it as unauthorized, unconstitutional, unjust, aggressive; and not a few, in dense ignorance of the history, character and views of the Mexicans, thought, like Professor Kent of Harvard University, that it was “demoniacal” to make war upon those poor innocents, as if they had not been shooting one another pretty continuously and also aching to shoot us. Not reflecting that nations begin to think of indemnities as soon, at least, as they begin to fight, and that legitimate advantages might accrue from occupying Mexican territory, people viewed suspiciously the operations of Taylor, Wool, Kearny, Stockton and Stevenson, threw up their hands, and exclaimed, “Conquest!” as if the ground they stood upon and half the world besides had not been gained by the sword. “Cormorants of territory!” hissed a Thersites. “Sages and Heroes of the Revolution, lo, the consummation of your labors!” wailed a Cassandra; Mexico is to be absorbed, and “the original, moving, burning stimulus” of the crime is the wish to manufacture glory for Polk, and gratify him with a second term. To be sure, the nation had officially endorsed the war; but multitudes were eager to have the nation disgraced, if they could only disgrace Polk.[10]

Toward the future as well as the past frowned the critics of the administration. Territory seemed likely to be acquired, and it was feared that slavery would plant its black hoof upon the soil. In Massachusetts a group of young men, who doubtless believed in freedom unselfishly, believed also that it was the coming idea, and might carry them ahead of such conservative leaders as Webster and Winthrop. Sumner was one of these; and he, without offering proof that slavery stood behind the war, pushed through the legislature some bloodcurdling resolutions against the “gigantic crime”; while Lowell, not stopping to ascertain whether negro servitude could thrive on the Pacific, sounded an appeal to sectional feelings:

From the increased political power of the South, northern agriculture, commerce and manufactures would suffer. New, sparsely settled states would have the same authority in the Senate as Massachusetts or Pennsylvania. The augmenting of Western strength would prove an injury to older sections. New Orleans would gain ground financially and commercially at the expense of New York. Annexing new territory would lessen the value of lands already in the Union. The war would increase the power of the Executive, and bring home an army of “heroes” to monopolize the offices. It was most likely to be interminable and costly, for in the autumn of 1846 Mexico showed no signs of begging for peace and Taylor no signs of accomplishing anything decisive. Privateers might ruin our commerce, and the blockade might lead to European interference. The nation, debased by dwelling upon scenes of devastation and violence, and by the absorption of aliens low in the scale of humanity, would become barbarous, cruel, rapacious, bloodthirsty. Taxes, debt, waste of public funds, corrupt elections, a great standing army, despotism, fanaticism, civil war, disunion, the reprobation of mankind and the retribution of heaven would follow.[11]

POLICY OF THE WHIGS

Under these circumstances the gyrations and contortions of Whig politics, viewed as a whole, were curious to observe. At first the party joined in shouting and voting for stern hostilities. “Doubt, division, reproach will be unknown,” announced the North American. But the Whigs presently saw, as the New York Tribune pointed out, that a full share of the burden would be theirs, while most of the glory and profit would fall to the other side. Moreover, these criticisms of Polk and the war, even when not suggested by the Whigs, seemed like yellow fields of ripening party advantage. Very soon, therefore, they withdrew to a respectable, intrenched position: they would support the war, but on its conclusion Polk and the Democrats would be called to a strict account. “I have no doubt we shall make much Capital out of it,” wrote a Whig Congressman. Presently, however, it looked as if the conclusion of the war might lie beyond the next Presidential election, and most of the party sallied forth impatiently, sickle in hand.[12]

Castigating Polk was the most obvious opportunity for the harvesters, and they used it with due zeal. Some of the jibes were good-natured. Playing on the powers legally his, the National Intelligencer happily exclaimed, “Here, there, everywhere at once, civil, military, judicial and executive, dove of peace, thunderbolt of war, and a perfect serpent of diplomacy, who was ever so various or so amazing?” Bracketing the President of the United States with a famous dwarf of the day as “Tom Thumb’s cousin, Jim Thumb,” was another merry as well as able fling. To remark, however, when he sent in a Message, that he came “puffing and blowing into Congress,” went a trifle too far, perhaps; and other pleasantries exposed themselves distinctly to that criticism. The Boston Atlas described the war Message as “perfectly characteristic of its author;—weak, wheedling and sneaking,” while some thought it better to sail on the other tack, and picture “His High Mightiness,” the arrogant, domineering tyrant of the White House, as planting “his foot upon the charter of our liberties.”[13]

Despatching Taylor to the Rio Grande was called “a well-nigh fatal blunder,” even though suggested by the “demon,” who was commonly thought rather shrewd. Letting Santa Anna go back to Mexico seemed to different Whigs like treason, treachery, folly and idiocy. Polk “takes his ease on some sixty-eight dollars per day,” while the soldiers he has driven to the field subsist on fare that “his very slaves would loathe,” the Whig Almanac luckily discovered. Bribery, duplicity, falsehood, imbecility, cowardice and infamy were a few of the other good things found in the President’s conduct; and the chief Whig organ undertook to lay him finally at rest on the greensward in this elegant fashion: “Why, the very savage of the courtyard in other times—that most brutal of mankind, the bully of the bailiwick, who chewed up an ear or nose, or scooped out with thumb a prostrate adversary’s eye—was generous in comparison.”[13]

In attempting more serious criticism the Whigs met with embarrassments. The majority of them, whose argument had been that immediate annexation of Texas would necessarily mean war, could not with inward peace declare that Polk had brought on the war by sending Taylor to the Rio Grande; and the great number whose contention had been that Mexico still owned Texas could not well deny that annexing her province by an Act of Congress, which amounted on their theory to a constitutional declaration of war, had created a state of things which made it entirely proper for Polk to send Taylor there. “Swindlers of 1844, with your ‘peaceable annexation,’ do not skulk! Here is the fruit of your doings! Look it in the face!” exclaimed the New York Tribune when the war bill passed, but it soon appeared more tactful to ignore this aspect of the matter.[14]

EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE WHIGS

Other embarrassments remained, however. It was very well for northern Whigs to indulge in what Carlyle might have called a “running shriek” against “a pro-slavery war,” but they were cautioned to let no echoes of it cross the Potomac. When a Senator greeted the war Message by saying he would later read the documents that accompanied it, and for the present would merely observe that Polk’s course was “utterly unjustifiable,” Ritchie paraphrased Master Dogberry at him: “By virtue of mine office I do suspect thee to be a thief.” While some papers denounced the government for not settling with Mexico by negotiation, others admitted that Mexico had refused to treat. When Delano announced for the sake of buncombe that he was “ready to go shoulder to shoulder with all those who supported the honor of the country,” Thurman replied that it seemed a strange method of supporting one’s country, to declare like Delano, after war had begun, when it existed both in law and in fact, that it was “illegal, unrighteous, and damnable.” Abraham Lincoln, wishing to distinguish himself before the home folks, did this feat in the House by revealing, in a manner suited to his years, that since Mexico had exercised jurisdiction on the northern bank of the Rio Grande, the first American blood must have been shed on Mexican, not American, soil; but unhappily the fact remained that Connecticut had for some time exercised effective jurisdiction over northeastern Pennsylvania, yet did not own the territory.[15]

Those who raved against Polk and his “tribe” for driving the war bill through Congress had to face Winthrop and a galaxy of other Whigs, who admitted that war did already exist. Congressmen denouncing the Executive for sending Taylor to the Rio Grande were unable to deny that notice of his march from Corpus Christi had been given on the floor of the House (March 23) long before the outbreak of hostilities, and nothing had been done about it; that on May 12 Whigs of the Senate, led by Crittenden, had recognized that American territory extended to the Rio Grande; and that after the army could safely have withdrawn from that vicinity no serious attempt had been made to bring about its recall. Partisans of the unoffending Mexicans were startled to hear the impeccable Boston Atlas confess in a moment of candor: “The conduct of that government towards us has been such as might have justified the extreme resort to war”; and those eager to berate Polk for unconstitutional aggressiveness had to digest a similar lapse on the part of the National Intelligencer, which conceded that Congress had thrown round him a mantle of indemnity by a vote “implying confidence in the rectitude of the President in beginning this war.”[16]

While Polk was roundly taken to task for appointing so many Democratic generals, Whig journals boasted that most of the leading officers belonged to their party. The military operations afforded numerous opportunities for invectives against the administration, but ere long a number of the invectives came home to stay. Taylor, it appeared, had recommended the advance to the Rio Grande; he protested against embarrassing the prosecution of the war by discussing its genesis; and the smallness of his army at the critical time, his waiting so long after the occupation of Matamoros, the terms given at Monterey, his peril at Buena Vista, Kearny’s off-hand annexation of New Mexico, Scott’s discharging volunteers after the battle of Cerro Gordo, and his famous Jalapa proclamation, all brought up against the administration, proved in every case chargeable to the Whig commanders.[16]

WHIG ORATORS

Orators caused as much pain as generals, perhaps. “Black Tom” Corwin’s brilliant advice that American soldiers in Mexico should be welcomed to hospitable graves, though it gained high rank in the nightmare school of literature, overshot the mark. It scandalized the nation. It staggered patriotism. It shocked humanity. Most of all it infuriated the troops, battling for their country in a foreign land. The speech arrived at Buena Vista soon after the struggle with Santa Anna. A rude effigy of Corwin was made up of the vilest materials, dressed in a Mexican uniform and burned; and over the ashes these lines were posted up:

The soldiers had friends at home, and of course made their sentiments known. The speech sounded the knell of its author’s great political hopes; and there is reason to believe that its reception frightened into dumbness a number of his colleagues, who had arranged to follow his lead.[17]

But other styles of oratorical attack were still feasible. Just before Congress met in December, 1846, the Whigs hung out at the Chinese Museum, Philadelphia, their Great Blue Light. In other words a powerful orator, a powerful lawyer, a powerful statesman—Daniel Webster by name—after studying on the problem for half a year, undertook, if one may quote an admirer, to “knock the sand” from under the government. Hour after hour he talked on, till he mortgaged fourteen columns of the United States Gazette, and the reporters fled; but he came far short of making out a case. Other efforts of his proved no more successful. Before the Whig convention at Springfield he argued in a tedious, prosy, court-room style. This is “a war of pretexts”—three of them, he asserted: first, that Mexico invaded American territory; secondly, that she would not receive Slidell; and thirdly, that she would not pay our claims. Did Webster fail to see that a casus belli recognized almost unanimously by our Executive and Congress was for this country at least more than a “pretext”? Did he fail to see that his other “pretexts” had not been offered by Polk as grounds for passing the war bill? And how could he say the pretexts were “all unfounded”? Did he suppose that Mexico had paid our claims? Did he suppose that she had welcomed Slidell? Of course not; but he was the attorney of New England Whiggism, trying to make a good case out of a poor one.[18]

His really effective contributions to the polemics consisted, not of arguments, but of impressive hints: “I am greatly deceived, Mr. President, if we shall not ere long see facts coming to the light, and circumstances found coinciding and concurring, which will fix on the government” its alleged guilt; and a President bringing on war in the manner charged against Polk, would commit “an impeachable offence,” as if Polk might have been impeached after Congress had assumed the responsibility for his acts. But unhappily Father Ritchie offered another citation, “Well, well, we know; or there be, and if there might; or if we list to speak.”[18]

And not only did Webster disappoint, but he mortified Whig friends. Texas had been an independent state as early as 1840, he said; our annexing it gave Mexico no just ground of complaint; she was “entirely unreasonable and senseless” in rejecting our offer to treat; if she preferred war to peace we could but fight; and now the war must be vigorously prosecuted. He squarely refused to call the invasion of her territory unjust. He seemed to approve of his son’s going to the field in the “unholy” cause of his country. He admitted that Whig policy in Massachusetts was in some respects “quite narrow.” “I am tired—and disgusted—as much as you possibly can be, with the fanaticism and narrowness of some of our People,” he wrote; and no doubt it made him still more tired to hear Lowell’s captivating but wayward muse advise young fellows, on grounds of personal advantage, to keep out of the army, and suggest that, should they get seduced by some “strutting” sergeant into taking up arms for the country, insubordination and even desertion would become them.

While such were the troubles of waking hours, the bedchamber, too, of many Whigs had its troubled moments. Ghosts walked. John Jay, a sincere opponent of our second war against England, came back, holding out a scroll that bore these words of his, “As the war has been constitutionally declared, the people are evidently bound to support it.” Came back the Rev. David Osgood, D.D., of Medford, Massachusetts, with his sermon of June 27, 1812: “My mind has been in a constant agony, not so much at the inevitable loss of our temporal prosperity and happiness, and the complicated miseries of war, as at its guilt, its outrage against heaven, against all truth, honesty, justice, goodness, against all the principles of social happiness.” Came back another Federalist, the Rev. Elijah Parish, D.D., with a sermon recommending treason as a pious duty: “New England, if invaded, would be obliged to defend herself. Do you not then owe it to your children, and owe it to your God, to make peace for yourselves?” Unlike Jay, these men appeared to be unhappy; and then certain patriots of the Hartford Convention filed by with averted eyes, each dragging after him a blasted reputation.[20]

In one thing, however, the opponents of the war succeeded. Going far beyond the limits of reasonable criticism and helpful suggestions, and indulging in language calculated to dishearten and hamper the administration, they encouraged the enemy. It is merely Polk’s war, announced the Boston Atlas, quoted in the Monitor Republicano. Mexico would have disgraced herself by receiving Slidell, declared the same journal. Her spirit, proclaimed the National Intelligencer, was fitted to “command the admiration of all men capable of appreciating the virtue of courage and fortitude under the most disastrous circumstances.” Severance, a member of Congress, openly applauded her resistance. We cannot beat her without ruining our finances, maintained Waddy Thompson. The destruction of her national independence was “the true issue,” one sheet falsely assured her, as if to whet her sword. It was entirely uncertain, proclaimed Calhoun in February, 1847, whether our army could reach Mexico City or dictate a peace if it should. She cannot be conquered, it was often said.[21]

Magazines of epithets and arguments, that became gunpowder the moment they crossed the Rio Grande, poured from the Whig presses. Leading papers invoked foreign intervention. The official journal of the Mexican government offered the thanks of the nation to Webster for threatening our President with impeachment. “If there is in the United States a heart worthy of American liberty, its impulse is to join the Mexicans,” exclaimed a Boston journal; “It would be a sad and woeful joy, but a joy nevertheless, to hear that the hordes under Scott and Taylor were, every man of them, swept into the next world.” No wonder that Polk dropped a hint about aiding and abetting the enemy. It was proper. In 1813–14 the National Intelligencer had stigmatized those who denounced the country’s war after its own present fashion as “traitors in thought and purpose.”[21]

THE DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS

Early in December, 1846, amidst feelings of depression, dissatisfaction with the government and opposition to the war, the second session of the Twenty-ninth Congress opened. The Democrats of that body found themselves in a general state of dissension. At the beginning of the year Marcy had written privately, “Our noble party [is] on the brink of ruin,” and there it still hung.[22]

Van Buren’s implacable followers nursed a grudge against Polk for the intrigues that had led to his nomination; and the partisans of Cass nursed one against them for their votes at the Baltimore convention. New York Barnburners and Old Hunkers glared at one another. Calhoun’s friends were sour because of his exclusion from the Cabinet. The old free-traders cursed Walker in their hearts for stealing their tariff hobby. The westerners had no thought of forgiving the South for dropping Oregon, and the South refused to be scared by those “Big Braggarts” of the west, who seemed to want all the funds in the treasury for their internal improvements. Many wore crape and hatchets, one might say, for the river and harbor bill. Everybody wished to blame somebody for the recent election returns. Some were quite ready to break openly with the administration. The partisans of Buchanan and those of Dallas marched with daggers drawn. “All around is dissension and distrust. Gloom overspreads the party,” wrote G. W. Thompson of Wheeling.[22]

The best of leadership was needed, and it could not be found. If a person did not understand the situation, he wondered; if he did, he wondered more. Nobody credited Polk with possessing the rod of Moses. Many disliked the man too much to respect the official. He could inspire neither love nor fear. While at one end of the avenue sat a party without a President, at the other sat a President without a party. With a large Democratic margin in each chamber, he admitted that he was practically in the minority; and at first sight this appeared the more surprising because Polk, knowing Congress and not knowing the country, labored with his eye on the former. But the explanation could easily be found. The people were not believed to be standing behind him. Within a month he was to be rebuffed three times in the House on important matters during as many days. One of his favorite measures was to go down amid shouts of laughter without a single friendly vote. The Cabinet enjoyed no greater respect. Walker seemed to be regarded as its leading spirit, but men distrusted his character as much as they admired his talents and energy. Moreover, in spite of Polk’s determination to shut Presidential aspirants from his council, both Walker and Buchanan probably felt less interest in the war than in personal schemes.[23]

These circumstances left the party to find such leadership as it could in Congress, and the leadership it found was a triangular fight—Benton, Cass and Calhoun. Benton had remarkable powers and seldom failed to be a Democrat, a Senator and a patriot, but he was egotistical, moody, overbearing, passionate; he despised Cass, he more than hated Calhoun, and he treated his fellow-Democrats in general as minions. Cass, a courtier and somewhat a scholar, lacked parliamentary experience, drew more timidity than courage from his Presidential hopes, and possessed no political convictions to reinforce his talents. Calhoun’s high character, rare intellectual strength and frank, affable manners made him personally the most influential man at the capital; but his judgment was erratic, and he aimed to stand aloof, with a following of about four Senators, as a balance-of-power faction. He was intensely narrow, too. For him there seemed to be only one region in the world; only one state in the south, and only one public man there. Cass was loyal to the administration, Benton helpful but domineering, and Calhoun unfriendly. Not a very firm tripod, this, to support a government engaged in war. With almost all the Democrats, politics—that is to say, offices—held the stage, and country occupied the background. Dissatisfaction with Polk’s appointments increased the confusion. Indeed, a “passion” for getting jobs invaded the sacred halls of legislation, and the President found not less than twenty men voting against his measures to avenge personal disappointments.[24]

THE WHIGS IN CONGRESS

Whig harmony and efficiency were happily not impaired by these allurements of the fleshpots, for the Executive did not belong to their party; but their numberless inconsistencies proved most embarrassing, and the necessity of satisfying public sentiment, and throwing the responsibility upon the administration, by voting supplies for hostilities they denounced, weakened them. No absurdities, however, were too glaring, no contradictions too thorny for what they termed their “patriotic sublimity” to ignore or surmount. They denounced the war enough to incriminate themselves when they supported it, and they supported it enough to stultify themselves when they condemned it. Combining the views of several groups, one discovered a line of policy truly remarkable: the attack upon Mexico was unconstitutional and wicked, but it should be carried on; so let us halt, send an embassy, and proffer again the negotiations that Mexico has repeatedly and recently spurned.[25]

The success of the government’s military and fiscal policies in comparison with what had been predicted, and the freedom of our commerce from Mexican and European molestation were troublesome facts; but hopes of disaster could still be entertained, and prophecies of woe still be chanted. Constructive statesmanship, they held, was not their affair. The country’s difficulties occasioned them but slight concern. On that score their detachment was charming.

In fact they found it most agreeable to hear savage growls and roars, and proclaim that all responsibility belonged to the Democrats. To heighten the turmoil Taylor and Scott were in politics, where they should not have been, and they had active and hopeful friends in Congress. Many of the Whigs, indeed, felt quite ready to put up “Old Zack” for President and “Old Whitey” for Vice President, if only they could injure Polk and whip the Democrats thereby; and their opponents, understanding the game, fended off with no more scruple.[25]

The speeches, which ran on almost interminably, were often able, sometimes eloquent, almost always prejudiced, and quite always deficient in information. Indeed, a multitude of essential or important data were wholly unknown. The same facts, the same errors, the same arguments, the same epithets, the same laudable sentiments and the same ignoble aims presented themselves over and over again. Assertions and denials, proofs and refutations, accusations and answers, flings and retorts pursued and were pursued. There was what the Public Ledger called “an everlasting begging of the question”—taking premises for granted and reaching conclusions that any one could accept, if he pleased. “How glad I shall be when I escape from the region of speeches—and get into the region of [undisguised] pigs and calves,” Senator Fairfield had exclaimed a few months earlier; and no doubt many felt in the same way now.[26]

Naturally the genesis of the conflict proved to be a favorite object of contemplation, and almost every complaint against the administration that wit could invent or stupidity fall into was brought forward. The fact that the action of the same Congress at its first session had turned the leaf upon that subject made no difference. The fact that Polk’s newspaper organ challenged in his name “the most rigorous investigation—not at any future time, but now”—into the Executive’s “whole conduct of our Mexican relations” did not signify. No such investigation was attempted, but invective continued. The opposition merely cocked its eye suspiciously at everything, and found everything iniquitous.

but the feat was now accomplished.[27]

OPPOSITION SCHEMES

For example, Congress had scarcely assembled when attacks began on the establishment of civil governments in California and New Mexico. With such unusual strength of vision it could readily be seen that Polk had been indulging in some villainy there. For a week or so excitement raged. But after a while several things appeared. Our only aim had been to mitigate the harshness of military rule, about which the kindly Whigs had felt much exercised. The action complained of had been taken under a military sanction, and was proper legally as well as by common sense, for the Executive, as commander-in-chief, possessed the fullest military authority in regions occupied by our arms. Harrison, a Whig, had proceeded after a similar fashion in Canada during the War of 1812; and our Supreme Court had even endorsed the view of a Whig lawyer, Daniel Webster by name, that British occupation of Castine, Maine, during the same war gave England rights of sovereignty there for the time being. So far as Kearny, a Whig officer, had gone wrong, the fault had been his own; and, finally, the unholy word “conquest,” which had made the Whigs most unhappy when applied by Polk to the occupation of New Mexico, was found to have been applied to the British occupation of Castine by our own Supreme Court.[28]

Behind idealistic declamation lay schemes that were distinctly practical. It was thought, for example, that if the war could be made odious, and the government’s measures be hindered in Congress, Polk would have to placate the Whigs by restoring the protective tariff. This came out beautifully in the treatment of the proposal to lay a duty on tea and coffee, which even the National Intelligencer endorsed. A Democrat, “Long John” Wentworth of Illinois, fully as noted for corporeal as for spiritual grandeur, and wrathful over Polk’s course in the Oregon and river and harbor affairs, moved the rejection of the plan, and the Whigs fell into line.[29]

It was a noble scene. Regard for the poor man filled the mouths of the orators. Though his cottons, his sugar and his salt had been cheerfully made to pay, this duty would be “inhuman,” a “tax on poverty,” a tax “against the fireside and against woman,” a tax “against the wages of weary labor” to support the “extravagance” of the “Tiberius” in the White House. But almost in the same breath came the hint, “If the administration needs money, let it re-enact the [protective] tariff of 1842.” “The first condition [of Whig support] is,” explained the Boston Atlas, “repeal the British Bill. Repeal the bantling of the House of Lords. Repeal the offspring of British paternity and precedent.” “Should they be in want of money,” proclaimed Webster, “I would say to them—restore what you have destroyed.” A fairly definite understanding to this effect seems to have existed among the Whigs; malcontents on the other side gave them help; and the proposed duty was rejected in the House by a vote of 115 to 48. Partly for the same reason troops were not promptly voted. If the government does not need money, it does not need men, said the opposition. Thus the “patriotic sublimity” of the Whigs again commanded admiration, and some of the Democrats now had a share in it. [29]

Another illustration of sublimity was the “Wilmot Proviso,” that “firebell in the night,” as Alexander H. Stephens called it, which no doubt some Congressmen accepted at its face value, and a multitude of honest citizens regarded as a New Commandment revealed on a new Sinai. The introduction of this measure, which prohibited slavery in territory acquired from Mexico, was both unnecessary and unwise. It blocked needed war legislation, added to the prevailing discord, and weakened the government in the face of the enemy.[30]

But reasons of state outweighed all such trifling considerations. The northern Whigs, to hurt their opponents and gain recruits, had for some time been taunting the northern Democrats with subserviency to the slave power, and it seemed to the latter that a declaration of independence would help their electioneering. Van Buren men, especially in the state of New York, desired to annoy Polk in return for his beating their favorite, and taking an Old Hunker instead of a Barnburner into the Cabinet. Wilmot, the only Pennsylvania Democrat that had voted for the new tariff, did not feel precisely happy about his action, and was anxious to repel the charge of truckling. His great state and New England considered the “Southern” tariff an abomination, and longed to retaliate. Many felt that Walker and Tyler had used sharp practice in the annexation of Texas for the advantage of their section. The West believed the South had actually broken a bargain by getting its help in that matter and then dropping the Oregon issue. A general sense that southern politicians had been overbearing prevailed above the line. The fear that southern domination would blight interests dear to the North exerted its usual strength; and as a final merit, the Proviso helped to make the war odious by suggesting that it aimed to extend slavery.[30]

So without regard to the logic of the situation, the welfare of the country or the needs of our armies it was urged; and then Calhoun made a profit in his turn by bringing in a series of pro-slavery dogmas to rally the southerners under his banner. The northern Whigs, for reasons just mentioned, and particularly to save themselves at home, took up the Proviso, and it fared well; but after a time the party discovered that favoring it might cost them several states in the next Presidential contest, and so the New Commandment was quietly filed away.[30]

BERRIEN’S PLAN

To replace it, however, calm the “Proviso men,” and avert a party split by preventing the emergence of a slavery issue, the “patriotic sublimity” of the Whigs evolved another idea. This was the proposition of Senator Berrien that no territory should be taken from Mexico, and that while it would be “desirable” to have the Texas boundary settled and our claims paid, we should always be ready to make terms that would leave Mexican honor “inviolate.” Here was truly a remarkable proposition. By voting three millions to facilitate a settlement with Mexico, in full view of Polk’s grounds for proposing that measure, Congress had already committed itself to the principle of acquiring territory.[31]

But other objections to Berrien’s plan far outweighed the point of consistency. If the United States was to decide what would satisfy Mexican honor, the plan could only have proved futile—even insulting; and if Mexico herself, it was ludicrous. Nothing would have satisfied Mexico’s ideas of honor except the evacuation of her territory and the surrender of Texas. When convinced by the passage of this resolution that she had nothing to lose in the end, she would have felt still less anxiety to sacrifice her daily golden egg—the money that our armies paid out—by ending the war. Implying that she had done nothing worthy of stripes, Berrien turned the war Message and the war bill into falsehoods, and accused the United States of a horrible crime—the crime of warring upon an innocent neighbor merely to do havoc. He reduced the minima of our solemn demands to mere desiderata. He represented our expenditures, our dead and our victories as elements of a senseless farce, and left us no respectable excuse for having troops in Mexico, except that we sent them down to scatter silver dollars and study the fandango. He proposed to make this nation unique in history as combining the villain, the ruffian, the simpleton and the comedian. He attempted to revive the unendurable status quo ante, leave the United States without indemnity for the past or security for the future, stimulate Mexican vanity and self-confidence, and weaken the prestige of our arms in Europe. In order to preserve Whig solidarity he aimed to deprive us, not merely of California, but of self-respect.[31]

All this Berrien proposed. Yet Webster, dreaming still of the Presidency, endorsed the plan. He was put up as a candidate by the Massachusetts Whigs on that basis; and his party, hoping to win spoils in the approaching national election by this device, quite generally accepted it. Said a correspondent of the National Intelligencer, vouched for by the editor as a Whig statesman, “No Mexican territory. Let this be the issue. Let this be the motto inscribed on the Whig banner, and victory is certain.”[31]

All these manoeuvres of the Whigs, aided by the Democratic underworking, resulted, of course, in the protraction of a war which they posed as hating. The first seven weeks of the session were almost thrown away. The opposition hung back from granting needed troops for reasons already suggested, and also lest the administration should turn the appointments to party account. Democratic dissensions and probably a wish to annoy Whig generals had a similar effect. Grudges on account of the tariff and the river and harbor veto played their part against war legislation. Men stooped so low as to argue that Polk, the President of the United States, could not be trusted with $3,000,000, when customhouse officials had larger sums in their keeping. And then his “imbecile” administration was charged with permitting the war to drag, “when by a few vigorous blows it could have been ended long since.” Its course exhibited “unsurpassed inefficiency,” declared the Boston Atlas, as well as “one unrelieved picture of wrongdoing, corruption, weakness and blunders.” Indeed, the government, “rolling this war, as a sweet morsel, under its tongue,” was detected in wilfully doing “everything in its power to prevent” the energetic operations upon which, as any one could see, its financial, political and personal credit vitally depended.[32]

CLAY’S LEADERSHIP

In November, 1847, Henry Clay, the plumed leader of the national Whig party, celebrated also as the man who elected Polk, after taking even a longer time than others to consult the omens, gave out a speech and a set of resolutions. These were intended as a chart for the party to be guided by under the pilotage of that distinguished though unlucky navigator. The author forgot having said in 1813, “an honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war,” but he remembered to condole with suffering Ireland. He forgot that a country engaged in hostilities of uncertain duration and cost cannot wisely bind itself to specific terms of peace, but reiterated the favorite Whig taunt that it was a blind war, without known aim. Historically too, he wandered a little, for he charged the President with ordering Taylor to plant cannon opposite Matamoros “at the very time” when Slidell was “bending his way” to Mexico; but Polk was unpopular, and few thought it necessary to speak the truth about him. We oppose the annexation of Mexico, Clay proclaimed, which, on the other hand was perhaps too true to be interesting; and we demand only a proper boundary for Texas, which bore him a long distance toward Berrien.[33]

But here was the master stroke: We desire to acquire no foreign territory “for the purpose” of extending slavery to it. This had the threefold merit of completely “dodging” the great question of principle, giving the northern Whigs a graven image to worship, and conceding to their southern brethren a full privilege to do anything possible in the acquired territory, after it should be ours. But unfortunately for his party the Navigator admitted that Congress had made the conflict a national war, that a long series of “glorious” victories had been won, and that since Congress had formulated no declaration regarding the objects in view, Polk—frequently accused by Whigs of carrying on the war for diabolical purposes both abhorrent and fatal to the Constitution—had been free to use his judgment. In Mexico Clay’s speech was widely circulated, and a competent observer thought it might delay peace one or two years. Such was the highest Whig leadership in what Webster called a “dark and troubled night.”[33]

One idea in the minds of not a few who endorsed the “no territory” plan was that its adoption would render the prosecution of the war aimless, and so check it abruptly. Others favored gaining the same end by stopping supplies. Ex-Senator Rives, a leader of prominence, advised Crittenden to concert measures for this purpose with Democratic “patriots”; and in fact an understanding on the point seems to have been reached. “Be prompt, when you are wrong, to back straight out,” urged the New York Tribune, demanding the recall of our troops. Other Whigs, after doing all they could to make the war aimless, argued, We are fighting for nothing, why persist? “Let us call home our armies,” insisted Corwin. “Stop the war. Withdraw our forces,” cried Sumner; and Corwin believed, early in February, 1847, that only two more votes would commit the Senate for this plan of complete national stultification, and for bringing back in a keenly aggravated state all our Mexican difficulties. Practically nobody dreamed of offering to Mexico the reparation that such an idea of dropping the war implied. The proposition was therefore hollow and insincere; little more than politics weakly flavored with sentimentality.[34]

The month after Clay’s chart appeared, the first session of the Thirtieth Congress assembled. About half the Representatives were new men, a majority belonged to the Whig party, and all had been chosen during the gloomy autumn of the previous year. By the Navigator and by other party leaders their work had been mapped out for them. The objects of the war were to be defined as at most a settlement of the Texas boundary at the Rio Grande, or a little farther north, and payment of the old American claims; supplies were to be qualified and limited accordingly, or entirely cut off; and in this manner hostilities would be ended.[35]

But politics, not principle, still dominated most of the Whigs. They viewed everything with reference to the impending election of a President; and public sentiment regarding the war had now changed. The battle of Buena Vista had aroused extraordinary enthusiasm; Scott’s victories, refuting the charges of inefficiency and silencing the prophets of calamity, had been decisive as well as brilliant; the expenses of the war were far less burdensome than its opponents had prophesied; Mexico had proved stubborn and unreasonable; the sort of opposition that had been practised was seen to be aiding the enemy, and hence fell somewhat into disfavor; and the people, believing peace and a reward for their sacrifices within reach, had made up their minds to carry the business through. Besides, many of the Whigs themselves were too proud to “back out,” and many at the north—high-tariff men—wished the war to continue. By a rather small vote and a very narrow margin—85 to 81—it was duly branded as unnecessary and unconstitutional, and Webster, now an out-an-out opposition candidate for the Presidency, approved of this little black “blister-plaster”; but in view of national sentiment “patriotic sublimity” of a practical sort now looked expensive, and a motion contemplating the withdrawal of our troops perished in the House under a vote of 41 to 137.[35]

THE OPPOSITION FAILS

It was perfectly feasible, however, to snarl, nag, procrastinate and work for personal aims; and few opportunities passed unheeded. “Tiger hunts”—ambitious members attacking rivals—used up much time. Cliques locked horns over pressing military needs. Webster seemed to forget everything except his ambition. Benton raged over the fate of the Lieutenant General bill and the censure of Frémont for disobeying Kearny. Calhoun, having allowed his hair to grow, resembled a porcupine less than before, but felt no less anxious to prove himself the sole hope of the South. Polk, instead of gaining popularity from the success of his administration, was looked upon as intoxicated by its fumes, and a section of his party advised throwing him openly to the sharks. Congressional resolutions were aimed at him. All the dying embers of controversy were solicitously fanned. The causes of the war, the conduct of the war, the instructions to Slidell, the return of Santa Anna, the occupation of New Mexico, the tariff in Mexican ports and the treatment of Taylor and Scott furnished themes for stale speeches. To chill the growing popularity of the war, direct taxes were suggested; and the chairman of the ways and means committee piled up the prospective costs far above the estimates of the government. After some two months of it Marcy gave up hope. But the Whigs knew they must do nothing serious against the war, and before long it happily ended.[36]

The results of all this personal, designing or factious opposition to the government and the war proved most unfortunate. The administration could never be sure what action Congress would take, nor when; and therefore its course was necessarily timid, weak and hesitating. Time and strength had to be consumed in foreseeing and in meeting captious objections, and in battling against public prejudices that hampered both military and financial efficiency. “We shall have three months of turmoil—our errors exposed, our good deeds perverted,” wrote Marcy to a friend at the beginning of December, 1846; and such an expectation did not conduce to satisfactory work. Bold, rapid strokes could not be ventured; caution and cheese-paring had to be the rule. In the field all this bore fruit in vexation, delay, expense and loss of life. “In the name of God,” exclaimed a man at the front, “will the politicians of our country never cease gambling for the Presidency upon the blood of their countrymen?”[37]

And the uproar had another consequence. When the treaty was ratified the government organ referred to the conflict with Mexico as “one of the most brilliant wars that ever adorned the annals of any nation”; and the chief Whig journal placed these words without criticism in its own editorial column. The trial was over, and the fiercely contesting lawyers walked off, arm in arm, to dine. The inefficient and shameless war was now brilliant and most creditable. Indeed, the Whigs chose for standard-bearer a man who represented professionally the military spirit they had raised pious hands against, who belonged to the slaveholding order so plainly viewed askance by the New Commandment, who had recommended the advance to the Rio Grande, who had aimed the cannon at Matamoros, who had advised appropriating Mexican territory by force of arms, and who owed in fact all his prominence to playing a leading rôle in the “illegal, unrighteous, and damnable” war. Nobody thought of impeaching Polk, or of bringing home to him the guilt that was to have sunk him to the bottom of the bottomless pit.[38]

RESULTS OF THE OPPOSITION

Yet all the Whig journalism and oratory stood in the record. Hosea Biglow became an immortal.[39] New Englanders gained the ear of reading people. Keen young radicals of the northeast, where the muse of history chiefly dwelt, dominated to a great extent the public thought. Polk retired from power and from life, and nobody cared to defend, or even to hear defended, a creature so unpopular and so generally denounced. Declamation that well-informed men of the day had rated at its true value came to be taken seriously. One side of the case faded from sight, the other was engraved on bronze. And so the patriotic habit of eagerly throwing stones at the Mexican War and its backers became traditional.[40]

This has been a mistake. No doubt, as we have seen, errors and misdeeds enough must be charged to the administration. All the actors were vessels of clay, like the rest of us. But in reality the least creditable phase of our proceedings was the conduct of the opposition.

---

At the time our difficulties with Mexico approached their climax, the popularity and prestige of the United States abroad were not the highest possible. England, our gentle mother, showed a particular want of regard for us.[1] Herself recently weaned from slavery, she viewed with a convert’s intolerance our adhering to that institution. Having just cured her most outrageous electoral abuses, she enjoyed hearing the London Times describe our government as “a polity corrupted in all its channels with the foulest venality.” Ever scrupulous and self-denying when a question of gaining territory was concerned, she felt shocked by American “rapacity”; and the Times, while infinitely proud that England’s banner waved in every quarter of the globe, ridiculed American “imperial pretensions” as echoed and re-echoed “in a nasal jargon, compounded at once of bad grammar and worse principle.”[3]

THE UNITED STATES CRITICIZED ABROAD

The disposition of certain states to repudiate bonds held in Great Britain, and their tardiness in paying interest, excited all the righteous indignation of the creditor. The descriptions of this country put forth by honored guests like Dickens and Mrs. Trollope, who made themselves merry and popular at our expense, furnished excuses for countless jibes; and in September, 1845, the Times discovered “great danger” that the nightmare of an old English writer would come true in the United States: “No arts, no letters, no society, and, what is worst of all, continual feare and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”[3]

If one aspect of our civilization appeared more laughable than all the rest, it was the military side. The title of General, observed the Times, was “legitimately common to the greater part of the respectable male population,” and Britannia outdid this excellent jest by telling of “majors who serve out beer, and colonels who rub down the heels of one’s horse.” Literary men were angered by our failure to amend the copyright law as they desired; and our pronounced republicanism, trumpeted by Polk in his annual Message of 1845, irritated almost everybody. The plain intimation of the same Message that European monarchies were not expected to interfere in America seemed even worse; and the President was represented as meaning that we intended to get Mexico into a dark alley alone, and rob her. The annexation of Texas, which England had exerted all her diplomatic strength to prevent, could not be forgiven, and the Oregon difficulty threatened war.[3]

Even Englishmen who believed in the rights of the people, said the Times, turned from us with “indignant scorn;” and in another of its many outbursts, which would have been terrible had they not been ludicrous, that paper warned us that, as we followed the example, we invited the punishment of self-willed Corcyra. “The most impudent, bullying, boasting nation of mankind,” was Britannia’s genial description of us; and she loved to parade “our national scorn of America and her statesmanship.” In short, McLane, the American minister at London, reported privately—with some exaggeration, one desires to believe—that a deep-seated dislike, “amounting almost to hate, of our people, of our country and of our Institutions,” prevailed universally in England.[3]

On the continent these opinions were more or less distinctly reflected. In France the heart of the people beat warmly for us and against their neighbors across the Channel; but the court and the government, regarding a close alliance with Great Britain as of cardinal importance, and the newspapers which, like the Journal des Débats, represented them with more or less fidelity, exerted a strong influence the other way. At the end of 1845 Polk deepened this, for his Message referred in cutting terms to the interference of that country on the side of Great Britain[2] in our business of absorbing Texas.[3]

The French government occupied a weak position in reference to that affair, for Guizot, the chief minister, believing that Henry Clay would be elected President and shelve it, had thought he could safely gratify England. Thiers, ardent and eloquent, now attacked his course in Parliament, insisting that an ally had been sacrificed to an enemy. Guizot, pale, scholarly and calculating, said in reply, Thiers has appealed to your instincts, I will appeal to your judgment; and pressed his theory of an American balance of power. But good-will for the United States and hatred for England were too strong for him. “What empty vocalization!” exclaimed Le National; “What unhappy exertions! What reverberating accents, like echoes in the desert! It was poor. It was cold. It was null.” Yet no doubt the sting of Polk’s rebuke lingered, though Guizot intimated in bitterly sweet language that it should not be resented, since he knew no better; and many Frenchmen who condemned their government’s policy, condemned the United States for publicly recalling it.[3]

Mexico, however, stood in a much worse position abroad than we. For many years, it is true, she had been representing herself as Andromeda, shivering at the American crocodile or what-not that was approaching to devour her; and at the end of July, 1845, in announcing to foreign governments that hostilities were shortly to begin, she repeated that while she had done everything honorable to preserve peace, the United States had exhibited “no rule of conduct toward Mexico except a disloyal and perfidious policy, and no purpose except to seize successively every part of her territory that it could obtain.”[4]

By such reiterated protestations considerable sympathy was aroused at London and Paris. Englishmen holding Mexican bonds naturally had tender feelings on the subject. British capitalists involved in Mexican silver mines and other investments, and British merchants and manufacturers, who enjoyed the lion’s pre-eminence in Mexican commerce, felt deeply interested. British finances required silver bullion, and British statesmen dreaded a further extension of our boundary toward the southwest. But the politics of Mexico excited such contempt, her financial conduct such disgust, her restrictions upon foreign trade such irritation, and her treatment of foreign powers such resentment that she could not be viewed with cordiality, confidence or even respect.[4]

MEXICO UNPOPULAR IN EUROPE

Disraeli spoke of every government of Mexico as “born in a revolution and expiring in a riot.” The chargé d’affaires of Spain told Santa Anna that, on account of the instability of chiefs and systems, it was impossible to have a settled policy toward his country. In twenty years British imports did not increase, and the number of British houses engaged in Mexican business diminished. The treaty made with France after the war of 1838 was not carried out by Mexico; and at the beginning of 1846, owing to a long-standing quarrel, which France would have settled on reasonable terms, that country was represented by the Spanish minister. Mexico has “wilfully incurred the odium of foreign Nations,” declared the British Foreign Office; and the Mexican correspondent of the Times was permitted to say in its columns that an American absorption of Mexico would be greatly for the advantage of humanity. The London Athenæum expressed the same opinion. Even Le Journal des Débats, besides complaining that every nation in Europe had been treated outrageously by Mexico, admitted that she had “sunk to the lowest point of weakness and folly.” The country “is destitute of intelligence, of energy, of principle,” said that paper; “it is a government of barbarians, but of barbarians enervated by the corrupting vices of civilization.”[4]

To conciliate public opinion abroad, our state department on May 14, 1846, one day after Congress authorized war, issued a circular to the American ministers and consuls.[5] “It is our interest, as it has ever been our inclination,” said Buchanan, “that Mexico should be an independent and powerful Republic, and that our relations with her should be of the most friendly character”; but “the avaricious and unprincipled men who have placed themselves at the head of her Government” have prevented her from acting the part of a stable and orderly nation. “For some years, in our intercourse with her, we have incurred much of the expense, and suffered many of the inconveniences of war whilst nominally at peace. This state of things had, at last, become intolerable. We go to war with Mexico solely for the purpose of conquering an honorable and permanent peace. Whilst we intend to prosecute the war with vigor, both by land and by sea, we shall bear the olive branch in one hand, and the sword in the other; and whenever she will accept the former, we shall sheathe the latter.” This despatch and the President’s recent Message[6] were to guide our foreign representatives in conversation about the war.[7]

By the Spanish-Americans the outbreak of hostilities was received with surprising calmness. Mexico endeavored to make them feel that a conflict of races had begun, and that she was leading the van in a common cause; but whether dissatisfied with her course in the past—especially with reference to preferential trade relations—thankful to the United States for the shelter of the “Monroe Doctrine,” or simply indifferent to outside concerns, they held aloof. Guatemala alone displayed a strong sympathy. The official gazette of New Granada printed Polk’s war Message in full without a word of criticism.[9]

The mother-country, Spain, would naturally have been expected to take a deep interest in the contest; but Mexico had been a rebellious daughter, had treated the Spanish subjects within her borders with cruel unfriendliness, and had recently shown a fierce aversion to the scheme of subjecting her to a Spanish prince. For commercial reasons that power desired an early termination of the hostilities, and signified as much to our government;[8] but at the same time she pledged herself to “the strictest neutrality,” and she refrained from even offering mediation. Her minister at Mexico, Bermúdez de Castro, assisted the authorities there with advice, but before the war ended he turned over the legation to a chargé, and went home. A band of Carlist officers talked of going to the scene of action in May, 1847; but if their plan was carried out, they successfully avoided publicity. About the same time El Heraldo of Madrid asked whether Europe would permit the United States to absorb, little by little, all of America; but this was academic, and the journal admitted that Mexico was then practically beyond relief.[9]

Baron von Canitz, the Prussian minister of foreign relations, when officially notified of the war, said it must be far from easy to live on amicable terms with a country like Mexico, “where anarchy reigns and where the Supreme power was constantly contested by a succession of military chieftains, who were compelled to maintain their usurped authority by the same unworthy means by which they had obtained it.” Aided by Alexander von Humboldt, who had lived in Mexico, King Frederick William followed the operations of the war attentively; but, happy enough that we were not his own neighbors, he felt no concern about a possible enlargement of our territory at the expense of Mexico. Indeed, he looked upon our success as in the interest of civilization, and at a distinguished public meeting one of the ministers referred to our future power on the shores of the Pacific with hope and approbation. For the rest, as the Zollverein had little direct commercial business with the region blockaded, Prussia busied herself with her own affairs.[10]

SENTIMENT IN ENGLAND

At London the announcement of hostilities was both unexpected and unwelcome. Ostensibly they grew out of the annexation of Texas, and for that reason were a disagreeable reminder. They took place in spite of earnest efforts to prevent Mexico from challenging the United States, and hence recalled another diplomatic failure. They seemed almost certain to injure British interests, and increase the territory and prestige of the United States. There was a notion, voiced in Parliament by Disraeli, that success might be followed by an attack upon Canada or the British West Indies. It seemed highly probable that had England postponed for a few days the offer which finally settled the Oregon dispute, better terms might have been extorted from the United States. Her policy had been to have our difficulties with Mexico kept alive until after an adjustment of that affair, and now it was thought possible that we might bring Mexico to terms at once, and use in some other unpleasant way our military preparations. The war, so much regretted by her, was seen to be largely, if not mainly or wholly, due to this policy and that of the British newspapers, which had urged Mexico to despise our military power, and to rely upon the difficulty of invading her territory successfully; and finally an uncomfortable fear prevailed that in some way the peace of the world might be imperilled.[11]

Hence disappointment and irritation were felt at the British Foreign Office. Aberdeen warned our minister that dangers of collision would be involved in a blockade and in any project of acquiring territory; and he said frankly that he could not be expected to contemplate with any pleasure the disastrous injuries the war might very probably inflict upon the Mexican government and people. Only one cause of satisfaction could be seen by the British Cabinet. An apprehension had been felt that France might be induced—through her friendship for the United States or the idea that American control of Mexico would be for her diplomatic and commercial advantage—to join us; and the French king, confirming an anticipatory declaration already made by Guizot, took position at once for strict neutrality.[11]

In the press and the commercial circles of London sympathy with Mexico was general, said our minister; and the news that Americans were fighting aroused no sentiment in our favor. Of course little could be expected of “that Napoleon of the backwoods,” as Britannia called our President. The defeat of Taylor on the Rio Grande was hoped for and counted upon; and even after his overthrow of Arista the Times, which had already predicted that our operations, in the case of hostilities, would be “utterly uninteresting and inglorious”—even “disgusting”—concluded that we should probably fail. “Bluster does not win battles, though it may begin brawls,” the editor moralized. All Europe must consider the war “an insulting and illegal aggression,” said the Chronicle; and the Post attributed our course to “the angry passions of the untamed democracy of the States,” which Polk was ready to gratify at any cost.[11]

The press of France, on the other hand, was in general friendly. Let the Americans have Mexico, and a prodigious development of the country will follow, urged Le National; would not that be preferable to seeing the English get it? To support the United States is to strengthen an ally against Great Britain, it added. Le Correspondant said, “The Anglo-Saxon race will flow unchecked over the fair provinces where the people, descendants of the conquering Spaniards, have allowed themselves to slumber in corruption”; and it argued that such a change would benefit the Roman Catholic church in Mexico by purifying and energizing it. Even Le Journal des Débats admitted that our invasion “would be something which humanity would have to applaud, in spite of the just reprobation attached to a spirit of conquest.” In view of such public sentiment W. R. King, our minister at Paris, had reason to predict, that no trouble was to be apprehended from the government, since the country would restrain it.[12] Even Guizot, when bitterest at heart, found it necessary to profess high respect for that “great nation,” the United States.[13]

ENGLAND DISPOSED TO INTERVENE

June 6, 1846—that is to say, without loss of time—Aberdeen, the British minister of foreign affairs, intimated to McLane in a private conversation, unofficially, and upon his personal responsibility, that should Polk desire it, “he would be happy, in a more formal way, to propose a mediation.”[14] This proposal, received by McLane in his private capacity only, was duly made known to our government, but it elicited no reply. Our silence did not please Palmerston, who succeeded Aberdeen about the beginning of July; and that young “fop with grey hair,” as Le Journal des Débats described him, resolved to propose mediation in such terms as to require an answer.[17]

Soon after the middle of August, therefore, he instructed Pakenham to ascertain whether a formal offer of mediation would be acceptable, and if so to make it in “the form which might be agreed upon” by Pakenham and Buchanan.[15] The only result, however, was a memorandum received from our government on September 11, which said that it duly appreciated the friendly spirit of the British Cabinet, that it desired to make peace upon just and honorable terms and had therefore made an overture to Mexico on July 27, and that it thought the formal mediation of a foreign power unnecessary and inexpedient, but would regard with favor any influence used to induce Mexico to accept this overture.[16] Later Pakenham improved every opportunity to remind Buchanan of the British government’s “anxious desire ... to be useful in bringing about a reconciliation between the two Republicks,” but he found himself unable to accomplish anything in this direction.[17]

The real question, however, was whether Great Britain would forcibly interpose. Such a policy she forbade Mexico to count on, saying that she could not be expected to assume the chief burden of a war which had resulted from the failure of that country to act upon her advice;[18] but this did not bind her own hands, and no doubt the government felt a pressure, if not a leaning, in the direction of interference. Both certain interests and certain passions demanded such a course. The Times and other newspapers pointed that way,[19] and in the House of Commons Disraeli and Bentinck spoke on that side. “A pretence only is wanting,” wrote McLane. This, however, was not precisely correct. Aberdeen told Murphy, the Mexican minister, that it would be Quixotic to take up arms on the simple ground that Mexico had been wronged; and in view of England’s own course, it would also have been ridiculous. “Scinde is ours,” exclaimed Britannia at about this time, thus announcing one more step in the conquest of India, “and we pay the penalty of the treachery by which it was acquired in the curse of possession.” What Great Britain wanted was a substantial advantage in prospect.[20]

For a time it looked as if California might provide this. Peel himself was rather dazzled by the idea of gaining San Francisco, and Aberdeen viewed with “the utmost repugnance,” wrote Murphy, the likelihood that we should acquire the province. During the last three months of 1845 the subject was thoroughly discussed by Murphy and Aberdeen, and the latter’s mind appeared to be “tormented” for a solution of the problem. The method of interposition followed in the war between Buenos Aires and Montevideo appealed to him, but he felt that France could not easily be drawn into it. The Mackintosh plan of British colonization received careful attention as possibly the means of creating a British interest in California; but Aberdeen thought it would be unbecoming, and would give the United States a just ground of offence, to put the plan in operation at so late a day, evidently for the purpose of blocking us (á propósito para las circunstancias), and he feared it would not be effective after all against American immigration. The Mexican decree of April, 1837, which mortgaged a certain quantity of lands (for instance, in California) to the bondholders appeared to promise better, and on that basis a scheme was actually drawn up at London in October, 1845, for submission to the government of Mexico. But at this juncture Herrera was overthrown, the British Cabinet felt profoundly disgusted, and Murphy’s position became uncertain.[21]

After Aberdeen retired from the Foreign Office in 1846, the suggestion of Paredes that Great Britain take military possession of California seems to have tempted Palmerston; but, aside from other objections, he shrewdly suspected that Mexico had by this time lost control of the territory. In December, 1847, Dr. Mora, who succeeded Murphy, proposed on his own responsibility a sale of California to England, arguing that by our endeavor to purchase it the United States had confessed we had no claim there; but Palmerston, though evidently tempted again, merely decided that any authorized communication on the subject should receive the attention justly due to its importance, and soon the treaty of peace put an end to the matter. No “substantial advantage” had seemed to come within reach.[21]

Nor had even a satisfactory pretext for intervention been found. McLane had urged our government to give none, and in particular to avoid all infringement upon the rights of neutrals.[22] The policy of our blockade was extremely liberal. British mail packets were exempt from its restrictions, and they were permitted to embark specie and land quicksilver at Vera Cruz and Tampico. During the blockade of Mazatlán British subjects were treated with such consideration that our courtesy was formally acknowledged, and it was admitted that Scott “invariably” guarded their interests in the sphere of his operations. Our opening the ports to all nations, establishing a low tariff, and endeavoring to protect commercial relations with the interior were boons that foreign powers had no reason to expect, and British traders appreciated our attitude.[23] By December, 1847, the merchants of London were distinctly opposed to intervention; and when the Duc de Broglie demanded in astonishment why England had viewed our military operations with such indifference, he was told that Mexico in the hands of the United States would be of far more value in regard to commerce and investments than ever before. At the same time persons of less narrow views hoped to see that country regenerated through us.[24]

BRITISH INTERVENTION NOT FEASIBLE

On the other hand embarrassments of the most serious character stood in the way of interposition. As the Globe said, the project of annexing Texas had afforded better grounds, yet England had looked aghast before the prospect of losses and risks involved in a collision with this country. So had she done in the case of Oregon; and the advantages of remaining at peace with the United States were still obvious. There were other considerations also. She wanted time to readjust her business under the régime of free trade, and Le National thought she desired to develop her India cotton fields before severing her relations with us. The political situation in Ireland and the Irish famine were grave embarrassments, and the generous aid given by the United States to the starving population of that island excited gratitude. British mercantile finances proved to be unsound, and a bad panic occurred; and manufacturing interests awoke to the fact that many rivals threatened them. The profound unrest which precipitated Europe into the revolutionary convulsions of 1848 could already be felt;[25] and finally the relations of England to France occasioned a grave sense of uncertainty.[26]

With the support of that power, said Murphy, Aberdeen would have been willing to fight.[27] Her military assistance did not particularly matter, but he was afraid that popular unfriendliness toward the government—already shown by a violent opposition in the press and the parliament—and the scarcely slumbering hatred of England might drive the country into active support of the United States, and bring on a general conflagration.[28] Such was the situation when Peel, whom Louis Philippe leaned heavily upon, stood at the head of the British government; and after he resigned at the end of June, 1846, it became far more difficult. For the new administration Louis entertained no such regard. The marriage of the Duc de Montpensier, his son, to a Spanish princess destroyed the entente cordiale. Harsh language was exchanged. Guizot and Palmerston endeavored to overthrow each other, and the British ambassador at Paris had a personal difficulty with Guizot.[29]

As for France herself, the premier’s loud advocacy of an American balance of power compelled him logically to prevent the United States, if he could, from acquiring new territory. Influential writers—Gabriel Ferry, for example—insisted that French interests, principles and prestige in Mexico demanded protection. L’Epoque, which many regarded as Guizot’s personal organ, took that ground firmly in a long and studied article, and called for joint intervention. Le Journal des Débats, our persistent enemy, suggested the same view. But the diplomatic journal, La Portefeuille, was resolute for neutrality, and the other leading papers reiterated the familiar objections against playing the British game; and hence, while it appeared reasonable to expect that Guizot would aid England more or less in a diplomatic way to limit the extension of our boundaries, no other sort of French intervention seemed at all probable.[30]

EFFECTS OF AMERICAN SUCCESS

The success of our armies clinched the argument. From the first, McLane urged that a vigorous campaign should be waged. That, he said, would be the best way to prevent interference, and he predicted that victories would overcome sympathy with Mexico. Had Taylor been defeated on the Rio Grande, as Londoners expected, those ill-disposed toward us in Europe, wrote our minister at Paris, “might have been emboldened to unfriendly or offensive demonstrations”; but as it was, reported McLane, the conduct of the American army and the magnanimity of the American general served to “inspire a respect for our country and our cause which was not felt before, and which nothing less could have produced.” The failure of Ulúa to detain Scott until the yellow fever should force him to decamp had no slight effect; and the victories at Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo, reported Bancroft, who succeeded McLane at the court of St. James, totally changed the complexion of sentiment in Europe regarding the United States. After the battles of Contreras and Churubusco the same minister said to a friend, “You should be here to see how our successes have opened the eyes of the Old World to our great destinies.” In England racial sympathy, too, could not wholly be suppressed. Scott received very handsome compliments from the commander of the British fleet at Vera Cruz and from a son of Sir Robert Peel, who was aboard one of the vessels; and Robert Anderson remarked in his diary: When our arms do something glorious, “jealousy, for the moment, is conquered by pride.” Indeed Lord Palmerston himself spoke most warmly to Bancroft of our victories as illustrating the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon.[31]

King believed they “secured a perhaps doubtful neutrality.” “Let Mexico show the determination and the power to resist,” remarked Le Journal des Débats significantly, and a way to aid her will doubtless be found, but “Europe cannot intervene effectively in behalf of a people who throw themselves away.” It is impossible to help those who will not help themselves, admitted the London Times; and Palmerston—disgusted, no doubt, like every one else, with Mexico’s failure to achieve anything except fresh revolutions—admitted to Bankhead that it would be very imprudent to break with the United States for the sake of a country which did nothing effectual to defend itself.[31]

Some things, however, it was possible to do against us. At the beginning of the conflict our minister observed in London a systematic endeavor to break down American credit, and so embarrass our military operations. Viscount Ranelagh proposed to bring over enough British officers for some four or five thousand men, and it was not their fault nor his that Murphy said the Mexicans would not serve under foreigners. A captain employed by the highly favored company of English mail packets landed Paredes, an avowed enemy of the United States, at Vera Cruz. Mexico is “the very country for the guerilla,” hinted Britannia; it “has ready-made guerillas by the ten thousand or the hundred thousand; it has hills and hollows where ten men might stop the march of 50,000.” And the same journal went still farther. In the case of an invasion, it proclaimed, “the soldier is a soldier no more; he is a burglar, a robber, a murderer”; and should foreign troops invade England, “No quarter!” ought rightfully to be the cry.[32]

But the special delight of unfriendly journals was to misrepresent our military operations.[33] Apparently Taylor’s battles on the Rio Grande surprised the editorial mind so much that few comments were ready, but after a while the Times remarked, “No hostile army has been really beaten”; and it described our success at Monterey as merely occupying “a town of log-huts.” That paper long professed to regard the war as “a border squabble,” “ridiculous and contemptible,“ “justified by hypocrisy,” “carried on with impotence,” and sure to end “in some compromise more humiliating to the United States than to Mexico.” “The Americans who have to conduct this most wearisome of wars,” it assured its gratified readers, “are least of all nations competent to the task. They have no army, and have constitutional objections to raising one. They have no money, and are resolutely determined to find none. They have no General, and have just agreed [by rejecting the plan of a lieutenant general] never to have one.”[34]

VIEWS OF OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS

“The military tactics of the Americans,” remarked the Examiner at the same stage, “have displayed an equal want of talent and of purpose”; while its fair colleague, Britannia, exclaimed: The hostilities against Mexico are “at once wretched and ridiculous.... So much for the boasting of Jonathan!” With unwinking and unsuspecting humor the Times commented thus on the fight at Buena Vista: “Beyond the fact that the Americans undoubtedly beat off, though from a strong position, a force nearly quadrupling their own, they seem to have no great grounds for triumph.” In fact they were now “worse off than ever”; they had actually lost prestige; and all the Mexicans needed to do was “to sit still and be sulky.”[34]

Scott fared no better than Taylor. His bombarding Vera Cruz was characterized as “revolting,” as an “infamy,” as “one of the most atrocious and barbarous acts committed in modern times by the forces of a civilized nation,” as “degrading to mankind.” Somehow the Times was repentant enough to publish a reply, which said: “The first broadside of Lord Exmouth’s guns at Algiers destroyed a greater number of unoffending, unarmed people, than the bombardment of Vera Cruz,” and pointed out that Scott was under some obligation to treat with humanity his own troops, whom delay would have exposed to the yellow fever. Compassionate John Bull! exclaimed the American Review; “Is it true that the English bombarded Copenhagen? Is Hindostan more than a fiction? Had Clive and Hastings any substantial bodily existence? Is not Ireland a mythe” and of course it might have added that an assault would have caused immensely more loss of life at Vera Cruz than did the bombardment.[35]

According to the Times our contemplated advance against Mexico City was “the mere dream of an ignorant populace”; while the more prudent Morning Chronicle termed it “about as visionary as that of Napoleon upon Moscow.” “There is but one thing we know of,“ added the Chronicle, “that is more difficult than for the United States army to get to Mexico, and that would be to get back again to Vera Cruz.” When the Americans triumphed at Cerro Gordo over both nature and man, the Chronicle itself had to admit that our courage was “unquestionable,” but it consoled itself by placing the American and Mexican armies on the same level as partaking “pretty considerably of the nature of mobs.” The victories of Contreras and Churubusco were viewed by the Times as calculated “to raise the confidence” of our enemy, and the editor announced that Scott, after these disastrous triumphs, was “much more likely to capitulate” than to capture Mexico. Naturally Britannia pronounced our invasion of the country “a great mistake,” and asked in deep concern, How are the Americans going to get out of it?[36]

The occupation of the capital was regarded as only one misfortune more. “The Americans have played out their last card,” roared the Thunderer, “and are still as far as ever from the game.” Worse yet, it foresaw, we were now going to crown our outrages. The churches would be robbed, and “when churches are ransacked will houses be spared? When saints are despoiled will citizens be spared?” The war never can end, added the same paper, for “the invaders of Mexico ... are not the men to build the temple of peace”; and retribution is inevitable, since the passion for conquest, which has already “extinguished” the political morality of the United States, will eventually impair their political institutions, and the annexed provinces will be an American Ireland.[36]

The treaty of peace caused no serious trouble. As early as January, 1846, Le Journal des Débats said the Americans would soon have California, and thus prepared its readers for the main feature of our terms. The United States will obtain California, for Mexico cannot pay an indemnity, echoed Le National. In reply to Aberdeen’s hint on the opening of hostilities, that it would be imprudent for this country to appropriate any Mexican territory, McLane remarked that “it was at present not easy to foresee all the consequences of a war which Mexico had so wantonly provoked, and in which the United States had so much injustice and so many wrongs to redress”; and no British statesman could have failed to understand what this meant.[37]

When Polk’s Message of December, 1846, clearly showed that we expected to retain California, the British newspapers set up an incoherent, savage growl; but the triumphs at Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo made it plain that we had earned—or were likely to earn—the rights of a conqueror, and must be taken seriously. Bancroft soon wrote that England was “preparing to hear of our negotiating for half, or two thirds, or even the whole of Mexico”; and Palmerston himself said we might as well take it all. “You are the Lords of Mexico,” exclaimed Lord Ashburton to our minister. After the occupation of the capital even Le Journal des Débats admitted that the only possible indemnity would be a province or two, and Britannia remarked, “From this time the whole country must be considered as part of the territory of the United States.” “It is becoming a fashion, rather, to expect the absorption of all Mexico,” reported Bancroft.[37]

OUR PEACE TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO EUROPE

When the treaty arrived in Europe, the convulsions of widespread revolution had begun there, people on the continent were too busy to think much about our gains, and the British did not wish to think of them; but the general sentiment of those who considered the matter appears to have been surprise at our moderation. Humboldt, though a citizen of Mexico, conceded that our terms were proper; and the critical Journal des Débats remarked, “Assuredly this is sparing a foe who lies in the dust.” Such a characterization of our behavior was for us a legitimate source of pride; and, as the respect universally paid to valor and success accompanied it all over Europe, we had ample reason to feel gratified.[37]

---

The conflict with Mexico came to pass as logically as a thunderstorm. At the beginning of her independent existence our people felt earnestly and enthusiastically anxious to maintain cordial relations with our sister republic, and many crossed the line of absurd sentimentality in that cause. Friction was inevitable, however. The Americans were direct, positive, brusque, angular and pushing; and they could not understand their neighbors on the south. The Mexicans were equally unable to fathom our good-will, sincerity, patriotism, resoluteness and courage; and certain features of their character and national condition made it far from easy to get on with them.[1]

Though generally amiable and often brilliant or charming, they lacked common sense, principle, steadiness and knowledge of the world. They were passionate, suspicious, over-subtle, self-confident and fond of gamblers’ risks. They regarded firmness on our part as arrogance, and kindness as debility. Their policy was defined by the Mexico correspondent of the London Times as a compound of Spanish intrigue and Indian cunning, dominated—it might have been added—by provincial vanity and sensitiveness. They scarcely possessed the character of a nation. The whole period from 1822 to 1848 has been classified by their National Museum as a period of anarchy. Their international duties were not recognized. Unscrupulous factions and usurpers used foreign relations as the shuttlecocks of selfish schemes. Pride, said their own statesman, J. F. Ramírez, forbade them to treat on the necessary basis of mutual consideration and concession, and insisted upon either complete victory or the consolation of having yielded to irresistible force, while procrastination put off the settlement of issues until the proper time for adjusting them had passed.[2]

WHY MEXICO WAS DEFEATED

Then between us and this difficult people arose the extraordinarily complicated question of Texas. It was characteristic of Mexico to deny the justice of the Texan revolt on the ground that settlers in her territory were bound to accept the political will of the country; but it was futile. “Nobody will be argued into slavery,” said Burke; and this was peculiarly true when the proffered slavery did not in truth represent the will of the country, and was more capricious, cruel and injurious than the régime against which the Mexicans themselves had rebelled. Our recognition of Texas not only was founded on just reasons, but was concurred in by the leading powers of Europe. The annexation of that republic meant the wise and unforced incorporation of a free people, independent both by right and in fact, after Mexico had practically abandoned all expectation of its becoming once more a part of that nation, and entertained little hope save to gratify a stubborn pride at the expense of Texas and the rest of the world.[3]

Her treatment of Texans and Americans violated the laws of justice and humanity, and—since there was no tribunal to punish it—laid upon the United States, both as her nearest neighbor and as an injured community, the duty of retribution. In almost every way possible, indeed, she forced us to take a stand. She would neither reason nor hearken to reason, would not understand, would not negotiate. Compensation for the loss of territory, in excess of its value to her, she knew she could have. Peace and harmony with this country she knew might be hers. But prejudice, vanity, passion and wretched politics inclined her toward war; her overrated military advantages, her expectations of European aid, the unpreparedness of the United States, and in particular the supposed inferiority of Taylor and his army encouraged her; and she deliberately launched the attack so long threatened.

As was just and natural, Mexico primarily owed her failure in the war to the characteristics that led her into it. From a strictly military point of view her case was not precisely hopeless. Intrinsically the rank and file of her armies, though not by nature warlike, had courage enough, and possessed an extraordinary degree of that willingness to endure fatigue and hardship, which Napoleon deemed still more important. They were more frugal and obedient than our men; and while the lack of moral and physical strength, discipline and confidence in one another and their officers made them shrink from the American bayonet and the fixed American eye behind it, they bore infantry and artillery fire as well as we did, if not better. Many engineers proved themselves excellent; many artillery officers were brave and efficient; and hence there was no reason why the infantry and cavalry might not have been well handled.

But the military point of view was by no means the only one to be considered. The want of public virtue had filled the army with miserable officers, the legislative halls with dishonest, scheming, clashing politicians, and the whole nation with quarreling factions and wrathful, disheartened people, secretly thankful to find their oppressors, whom they could not punish themselves, punished by the Americans. The hungry and beaten conscript went into battle sure that if wounded he would starve, if killed he would be devoured by the birds, and should neither accident occur he would simply drudge on as before; and the industrious, useful citizen understood, that if he should help the leaders of the nation by paying contributions, he would then have to fatten them by paying again. “We are saved by hope,” wrote the great Apostle, and the nation saw no hope. Primarily Mexico was defeated because she did not fight; and she did not fight because she had nothing to fight for. The military class, who had long pretended to be the nation, was given a chance to prove its claim, and the poor wretches who could be forced into the ranks had to support it; but the people in general, holding aloof to a great extent, said in effect, “Thou who hast consumed all the revenues without giving anything in return, thou for whom we have sacrificed so much, thou who hast used our own blood to make thyself master instead of servant—may the woe thou hast so long inflicted on us fall now on thee!”[4]

Santa Anna, the logical hero of such a nation, was also its logical scourge—a statesman unable to guide, a general unfitted to command, a leader qualified only to win revolutions, lose battles, and alternate between dictatorship and exile. Some observers—even American officers—impressed by the imposing front that he reared time after time, felt that he was a great man. Unquestionably he gathered troops and resources as no other Mexican of the time could have done. No doubt his lunge into the north and his defence of the capital were remarkable; and one could not complain of him, as did Tacitus of a Roman commander, that he was unable to harangue his army. He certainly did many things.[5]

But he did few things well. His achievements were the temporary triumphs of autocratic will-power. He suffered always from an essential want of capacity. He did not understand the Americans, and fancied that one defeat would cow us. He did not even understand his fellow-citizens, and could not realize that his long course of misconduct, and finally his negotiations with Mackenzie, had cut the root of confidence. A proclamation that sounded eloquent, he felt must be convincing. The impossibility of controlling the factional politics of such a country and also managing a war without the support of the nation—of riding two such horses at the same time—lay beyond his comprehension. Often his policy was like that of the man who ruins his constitution with drugs in order to cure a local ailment. Even his apparently noble decisions grew out of selfishness and rang hollow.

To his mind a collection of men was an army. Personal aims and feelings, instead of sound policy and the demands of discipline, controlled mostly his relations with officers. Because a revolutionary band could be held together by the hope of plunder, he imagined that a campaign could be waged on that basis. Because he thought it would be natural for the enemy to attack him in a certain way, he concluded positively that no other attack would be made. Strategy he did not attempt. And when it came to the direction of a battle, owing to ignorance and intellectual disqualifications, he lacked the quickness of perception and rapidity of combination that were essential to success. For the same reasons his total strength was never focused at the vital time and place, and a defeat became a rout.[6]

This is what a final glance at the Mexicans reveals; and now, to conclude the whole investigation, we should take a summary view of our own side.

THE AMERICAN CONGRESS

While the Congress of the United States did not approach that of Mexico in badness, there was too much resemblance. One should always remember that among the people who really make up the world and keep it going perfection is, and is likely to be, somewhat rare; but for an elect body our Congress fell below all reasonable expectations. The comedy of its political manoeuvres was only surpassed by the tragedy of them. Amos Kendall said, after the hostilities began, “There can be no peace with that people [the Mexicans] but through victory or with dishonor,” and any person of judgment could see this; yet prejudices, passions and interests prevented many from honestly supporting a national war, and turned not a few into virtual enemies of their country. Markoe wrote from Vera Cruz with reference to Clay, Webster, Gallatin and others of their school, “These great men have by their speeches done more to prevent peace than though they had each of them severally arrayed 10,000 Mexicans against Scott”; and when one recalls the expense and bloodshed that would almost certainly have been spared this country and Mexico had our government felt at liberty to spend with decent liberality in meeting Scott’s requisitions promptly, patience itself takes fire.[7]

To think of giving him so small an army that the Mexicans felt positively ashamed to yield! And then to reflect how politics went into the army itself, endangering the lives of men and the fortunes of the country through unfit appointments. “How we have been gulled and led about,” exclaimed a soldier, “by a set of political demagogues, who, regardless of the fearful responsibility, have forced themselves into positions they possess no qualifications to fill, with a hope thereby to promote their future political aggrandizement!” We recall, even though we do not endorse, the Frenchman who observed, “The more I see of the representatives of the people, the more I love my dogs”; and we also recall the opinion of a British king: “Politics are a trade for a rascal, not for a gentleman.”[8]

The President showed himself a small man, but the saying of La Rochefoucauld comes to mind: “We may appear great in an employment beneath our merit, but we often appear little in ones too great for us.” The situation in which Polk, essentially a local politician from Tennessee, found himself—called upon to re-make the fiscal system of the country, to dispose of long-standing and now critical issues with Great Britain and Mexico, to cope with a factious and unscrupulous opposition in Congress, and to face a war in a foreign land, almost unknown to us, with a handful of regulars commanded by Whigs—was extremely difficult; but he steered his course firmly to the end, set an example of honest, faithful administration, established a fiscal system under which the country enjoyed a period of great prosperity, effected with England an adjustment that in essence had been refused, enjoyed a series of uniform triumphs in the field, and obtained from our enemy the peace and the territory he desired.[9]

Indeed, he achieved a still more surprising triumph, for he disproved the favorite American axiom: “Nothing succeeds like success.” His lack of commanding qualities, his inability to win admiration and sympathy, and his resorting to small methods because he lacked the power to wield great ones, made him seem legitimate prey. He became the dog with a bad name, for which any stick or stone was good enough. Other men in public life could misrepresent the facts—as many were doing all the time—and still be honored; but if Polk “put the best foot forward,” if he allowed men to draw inferences from their wishes, if—wittingly or not—he colored things, if—even by accident—he made an incorrect statement, he was promptly denounced as a villain.

And when he had supported his tremendous burden loyally, if not with éclat; when denunciations had failed, threats crumbled, taunts miscarried, hostile predictions fallen to the ground; when our people had not risen up against the war, our treasury had not collapsed, our armies had not withered away; when our sword had been wielded with honor, our territory and commercial field been extended far to the west, our international status been elevated—after all these triumphs the bitter tongue of a partisan spit out on the floor of our national House the famous nickname, “Polk the Mendacious,” the President left office under a leaden cloud of disparagement and contempt, and later authors delighted to dip their pens in the gall of his enemies. Truly, however little we feel inclined to go into raptures over Polk, we can admire his traducers even less.

GENERAL TAYLOR

Next, in view of the civil as well as military fame gained from the war by Taylor, one thinks of him. In reviewing his operations we must beware of judging him by mere professional standards, for he was more, as well as less, than a technical soldier. The most essential qualities for a general, says the Baron de Jomini, are physical and moral courage; and in these respects the head of our army of occupation was flawless. Indeed almost all the moral qualifications of an eminent commander were his. He was a born fighter and born leader. He could think best in danger and excitement. He could inspire confidence and win devotion. The fact that one so plain could be a paladin made even the ordinary feel capable of heroism. Like all undisciplined men of great force he possessed large reserves of strength, and when an emergency stimulated these, he displayed a power that compelled those on the ground to imitate and those at a distance to admire him.[10]

On the other hand, most of the intellectual qualifications of the commander were largely wanting. To be sure he possessed a great deal of practical shrewdness, and he used moral force with a broad sort of calculation that enabled him to produce effects which a mere educated soldier could scarcely have obtained. But he did not understand the aims or the art of war, lacked initiative, failed in prevision, neglected preparation, ignored details, took little care to gather information, misunderstood the intentions of the enemy, and underestimated their strength. He preferred swinging an axe at a door to conducting the battle sagaciously from a distance. He would chat with soldiers about home, and then sacrifice their lives.

His “victories” made him famous, but the true test of generalship, observes Henderson, is “the number of mistakes”; and every stage of Taylor’s progress was marked with grave errors. Besides, “however brilliant an action may be,” remarks La Rochefoucauld, “it ought not to pass for great when it is not the result of a great design”; and not only were none of Taylor’s exploits deliberately planned, but he never understood the risks he was braving. Some ironical but loving god seemed to attend him. The life he carelessly, improvidently ventured was guarded; and insubordination, both toward the President and toward the general-in-chief, made him the successor of the first and the superior of the second. “Old Zack is the most lucky man alive,” said Colonel Campbell.[11]

GENERAL SCOTT

Scott, however, was of course the pre-eminent commander. In war he felt at home. He “is a Soldier and a General from the ground up,” wrote Consul Parrott after watching his operations. With the possible exception of Molino del Rey, the petulant indiscretion that he sometimes exhibited in civil affairs did not affect his conduct in the field. To appreciate him, “to know him at all,” said Trist, one had to see him in the military sphere. Karl von Grone, who observed him at work, wrote: “He is quiet, reserved, reflective. When, after mature consideration of the circumstances, he has formed his decision, he goes with strong, sure steps to his goal. He can manage with scanty resources, is adroit in deceiving the enemy, and where feints are not possible, deals a heavy, straight blow. When main force must break the way, he demands much from his troops; but, as he possesses their full confidence, and is recognized as a fighter of dauntless courage, he can do this.”[12]

“He sees everything, and calculates the cost of every measure,” said Robert E. Lee. He could be “quick as guncotton when neccessary,” wrote Parrott, yet deliberate and cautious under the utmost pressure. His initiative and self-reliance never failed; yet, as even the prejudiced Semmes admitted, he made full use of all the talents, as well as all the valor, of his army. Though his plans were laid with extreme care in view of all the information that could be obtained, he never permitted them to shackle him, and promptly adapted himself, whether in campaign or in battle, to a change of circumstances. Both great things and little things were given his attention, but with due reference to their comparative importance. He knew the rules of his art, and also knew when to disregard them. He could both rouse troops to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and surpass the calculations of the expert. Says Hamley, it is “impracticable” to “conceive how sustained operations can be conducted in the face of an enemy without a secure starting-point.” Scott accomplished this.[12]

Characteristics of a more personal kind supported his professional ability. The General, Trist assured his wife, was “the soul of honour and probity, and full of the most sterling qualities of heart and head; affectionate, generous, forgiving and a lover of justice.” Though few made allowances for his imperfections, he was always ready to do this for others; and his magnanimity would have been remarkable, even had he not been a natural fighting man. Such traits enabled him to get on excellently with reasonable officers, while his ability, prudence, vigilance, good cheer, steadiness, courage, sympathy, and trust in his army, and his anxiety to avoid wasting the labor and lives of the men, gave him the entire confidence of the privates. A soldier who loved peace instead of war, a general who valued the lives of his troops more than glory, a conqueror who became in the hour of triumph a friend, and a citizen who placed his country above self-interest, he was the ideal commander of a republican army.[13]

To speak broadly and leaving genius out of the account, he possessed all the military qualities of Taylor, and all Taylor lacked. Taylor could fight splendidly, Scott could also avail himself of the advantages that knowledge and skill were able to supply. The soldiers of the one believed their leader was going to win, those of the other could give reasons for their faith. The army of occupation was ready to follow its commander with eyes shut, the army of conquest with eyes open. Both were kind at heart, but Scott’s humanity was made systematically effective. Both faced perils with unwavering courage, but Scott did all he could to understand what lay before him. Both complained of the government, but Scott had reason to do so. Both disregarded instructions; but while Taylor aimed to gratify himself, Scott’s aim was to benefit his country.[14]

The advantages were not all on one side, however. Taylor had excellent control of his temper and the everyday, personal shrewdness that Scott needed. His unsophistication bore the winning appearance of ingenuousness, while Scott’s reflective and studious ways gave him the reputation of a schemer. Each needed to be supplemented, but only Taylor had a Bliss. Scott’s men felt they were serving under a strong leader, Taylor’s that they were serving with one; while to Great Demos, always undiscriminating, the one represented head, the other heart; the one science, the other heroism.[14]

Both were remarkable. Taylor was a distinguished plebeian, Scott a distinguished patrician; the first a superb captain, the second a superb general; and each a great man.

THE AMERICAN ARMY

The soldiers, of course, did not equal their chief commanders in point of interest, but certain facts concerning them deserve attention. The total number of regulars in the war service down to July 5, 1848, was about 31,000. Of these, to use round numbers, 1600 were discharged because their term expired, 2550 for disability, and 500 for other causes; 2850 deserted; 530 were killed and 2100 wounded in battle; 400 died of their wounds; and there were 4900 ordinary or accidental deaths. Of the volunteers 59,000 actually served; 7200 were discharged for disability, and 2000 for other reasons before the expiration of their term; 3900 deserted; 1350 were wounded; 600 were killed or died of their wounds; and there were 6400 ordinary or accidental deaths. So it appears that out of some 90,000 officers and men serving, 6750 deserted, 12,250 had to be discharged before their term expired, 11,300 met with ordinary or accidental deaths, and only 1550 were accounted for by the enemy. The difference between the number mustered in and the number available at the front, and also between the number who lost their lives by fighting and the number who dropped out from other causes, was most instructive. The Americans captured seem to have numbered less than 1100. Of the volunteers, a very disproportionate percentage went from the southwest; the northwest did well, and the northeast lagged.[15]

From these figures it appears that approximately three out of one hundred regulars were killed or died in consequence of wounds and eight were discharged for disability, whereas the numbers for the volunteers were one and twelve; and in fact the showing of the regulars was still better, since the “new” regulars, officered with inferior men chosen largely for political reasons, did not equal the record of the old establishment. In many other respects also the volunteers ranked low. Not only was there a greater percentage of sickness among them, but the invalids required attendants. The volunteers wasted clothing, provisions and ammunition both heedlessly and through ignorance of administrative business; and their arms were not properly cared for.[16]

They had no intention of submitting to the discipline and routine labor of campaigning, and even at the close of the war could not be called real troops. The volunteers, wrote one of them, “will not be treated as regular soldiers.”

so another, an exceptionally good man, testified. “Soldiers will take their merry frolics,” an officer admitted. The camp slogan of a sturdy North Carolina company was: “Soldier, will you work?” “Sell my shirt first.” “Soldier, will you fight?” “Twell I die.” But even their fighting did not prove entirely satisfactory. Individually they were braver than the regulars; but the soldier’s business is to fight when the time comes, and the volunteers to a considerable extent wanted to fight when they pleased. They might do splendidly and they might not, their general knew. In a word, they were unreliable; and they even imperilled their own cause by exasperating the people. Marcy confessed that he felt disappointed. Yet there were offsets. Their patriotism and enthusiasm stimulated their officers and the regulars; and at their best—silent, grim, patient, with a look of kingship in their faces—they glorified hardships, perils, wounds, disease and death.[16]

A common idea of the regulars was expressed in the House by Tilden of Ohio, who described them as “a set of puppets ... shut up without exercise and in barracks, from year’s end to year’s end”; and the “sausage democracy” looked with contempt upon West Pointers as both puppets and aristocrats. The regulars, however, were preferable not only in camp and on the march, but on the field. In addition to being steady themselves, they helped immensely to steady the volunteers; and the regular officers furnished volunteer generals with knowledge, skill and sometimes resolution. As for their own commands, West Pointers might curse their men, but they took splendid care of them; and it was far better that men should fear their officers than that officers, like many in the volunteer army, should fear their men. General Scott said that without the science of the Military Academy his army, multiplied by four, could not have set foot in the capital; and Patterson, like him not a graduate of the school, concurred in this opinion.[17]

Our horse was to a large extent little more than mounted infantry; and our real cavalry, besides riding like the French and therefore badly, showed no mastery in sword practice. On the other hand our field artillery was excellent in personnel and material; and the engineers, though not fully trained according to the most exacting standards, earned abundant praise. More than once they made the very strength of the Mexican position help our men while they were preparing to attack; and the report of General Smith upon certain officers—“Nothing seemed to them too bold to be undertaken, or too difficult to be executed”—might have been applied to the corps as a body.[18]

In organization our armies were inferior to the best European models; but, said Gabriel Ferry in the Revue des Deux Mondes, the soldiers made up for this defect by displaying an energy adequate for every need. The infantry were criticised by foreign observers for a lack of correctness and snap in their movements. “What is called the American army,” wrote the minister of Spain, to imply that we had no real troops. But they husbanded their strength in this way; it was therefore ready for emergencies; and they had the initiative, ingenuity, independence and self-reliance that have been cultivated of late years abroad in place of conventional precision.[19]

Despite all technical defects, the faults of the volunteers and the admixture of mere immigrants among the regulars, we had soldiers to remember with pride. So many of the officers were superior men that almost all caught the inspiration more or less, and the privates felt ready to obey and follow them. The troops as a body acquired a sense of invincibility. “We may be killed, but we can’t be whipped,” was a favorite watch-word; and they fully meant it, said Karl von Grone. Dangers and hardships were bravely faced, as a rule, and often were faced with gayety. “Oh, this is a glorious life of mine,” exclaimed Lieutenant Hamilton; “a life in a land of fruits and flowers, of dark-eyed maidens and sunny skies, of snow-capped mountains and of flowering valleys; a life of adventure, of calm and storm, of bivouac and battle.”[20]

No doubt the political and social conditions of Mexico helped our troops greatly, but in addition to routing every time an enemy who was by no means intrinsically contemptible, outnumbered us and knew the ground, they had to war against deserts, war against mountains, war against fearful storms, war against a strange climate, war against a devouring pestilence; and in spite of every difficulty Scott, after capturing more than a thousand officers and more than six hundred cannon, occupied the capital of Mexico with less than six thousand men. The troops themselves, instead of boasting, pronounced it a “miracle”; but the critical and unfriendly Journal des Débats declared: “The new conquerors have equalled by their exploits the great Cortez himself, if they have not eclipsed him.”[20]

Yet after all it was “a war of conquest,” we have long been told. Popularly “conquest” is in truth an odious word, for it has commonly been associated with odious deeds: aggression and cruel tyranny; but “circumstances alter cases,” and when the facts are unobjectionable, so is the term. Legally, the idea has prevailed that conquest is robbery; but this idea seems to have grown from the old conception that the government owned the country, and such is not our opinion to-day.[21]

Forcible acquisitions may indeed be commendable. In that way Rome civilized Europe, England gave peace, order and comparative happiness to India, and our own country came into being; and none of us would undo these results. The welfare of humanity is the true principle. Life has the right of way over death; enlightenment and energy over ignorance and torpor. Possession means use; power and opportunities mean service. The primary law is that all shall move forward and coöperate in achieving the general destiny. Like individuals, every nation must run its course to the best of its ability, and if it grossly flags, pay the penalty. In the absence of any other tribunal, war must enforce this penalty. “Whosoever hath [in use], to him shall be given, ... but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that which he hath.” Such is eternal right; not the justice of the law schools, but the justice of the Supreme Power.[21]

Of all conquerors we were perhaps the most excusable, the most reasonable, the most beneficent. The Mexicans had come far short of their duty to the world. Being what they were, they had forfeited a large share of their national rights. Even Humboldt said that Mexico “ought not to expect to withhold, from the uses of civilization and improvement,” such neglected territories as New Mexico and California. A philosopher like Josiah Royce, a moralist like Francis Lieber and an unsympathetic historian like Dr. von Holst agree substantially that our duty called upon us to occupy the Golden Gate. Not merely an administration or a party, but the nation believed that our destiny called us there, and felt ready to assume the high responsibility of taking possession.[22]

Besides, while ours could perhaps be called a war of conquest, it was not a war for conquest—the really vital point. We found it necessary to require territory, for otherwise our claims and indemnity could not be paid. The conflict was forced upon us; yet we refused to take advantage of our opportunity. “It is almost impossible,” says Bryce, “for a feeble State, full of natural wealth which her people do not use, not to crumble under the impact of a stronger and more enterprising race.” But we gave back much that we took, and paid for the rest more than it was worth to Mexico. “All deserve praise, who ... have been more just than their actual power made it necessary to be,” said Thucydides; and we were not only just but liberal. Finally, we gave proof, in the prosperity and usefulness of our new territories, that our responsibility was amply met.[22]

So the account was fairly adjusted and more. But something still remains to say. A closer acquaintance with us and with real national life taught Mexico some of her mistakes, confirmed the political relations of her states, and helped greatly to liberalize her ideas and institutions. “The sad part of it is that our chastisement is merited,” preached Ramírez. “He that reflects how useful are the lessons of suffering and misfortune,” declared the minister of relations, “will admit that no one could show more clearly the deformity of our errors than the foreign invader [has done], and that there could have been no more efficacious means of elevating our reason above the bastard interests of political passion.”[23]

THE WAR LEAVES MEXICO FRIENDLY

Still warmer sentiments prevailed. One of the chief obstacles in the way of making a treaty was the desire of not a few Mexicans to have the United States annex their country; and after that plan failed, the American general-in-chief was actually invited to become dictator for a term of years, backed by American troops. With reference to Trist, our commissioner, Couto and Cuevas remarked on presenting the treaty to Congress, “Of him there remain in Mexico none but grateful and honoring recollections”; and when bidding Clifford good-by, the President expressed—in no perfunctory way—a sincere desire for the most “sisterly” relations between the two countries, as essential to the welfare of Mexico. Indeed, that nation had not felt so cordial toward the United States for many years as it did immediately after the war.[23]

In Europe, too, fairer views and feelings regarding us began to be entertained. “If nothing occur to tarnish what has been so well begun,” wrote our minister at the court of St. James in June, 1846, “the moral influence produced here and in Europe generally will be worth all the expenses of the war.” “It was a hard lesson for England to learn, but she has learned it,” reported Bancroft, who succeeded him; “that America means to go on her own way, and that Europe ... must give up the thought of swaying her destiny.” Our triumphs over Mexico, remarked C. J. Ingersoll in the House, “have been admirable lessons ... to the world, that the [wise] policy of all nations is peace with these United States.” Only on respect and appreciation can peace and mutual helpfulness be founded, and both our victories and the manner in which they were used promoted harmony between us and the powers of Europe.[23]

Humanity and moderation—such humanity and moderation as are practicable amid hostilities—gilded our arms. “The elevated and kindly character of Taylor and Scott,” said the Mexican historian, Roa Bárcena, “lessened as far as was possible the evils of war.” The Americans always treated us during the conflict with “the most noble courtesy,” wrote Ceballos. “We shall certainly consider it as an unprecedented event if this enormous booty [the wealth of the Mexican churches] escapes from pillage,” proclaimed the London Times; and it did escape. We have beaten the enemy, felt Robert E. Lee, the knightly soldier, “in a manner no man might be ashamed of.” Even Theodore Parker, though opposed to the war, made this public acknowledgment: “It has been conducted with as much gentleness as a war of invasion can be.” And a brave officer of rare intelligence uttered on the floor of our Senate these words: “We have cause to be proud of the record this war will leave behind it—a monument more lasting than brass. We, the actors of to-day, must soon crumble to dust; the institutions we now maintain, and hope will be perpetual, may pass away; the Republic may sink in the ocean of time, and the tide of human affairs roll unbroken over its grave; but the events of this war will live in the history of our country and our race, affording in all ages to come, proof of the high state of civilization amongst the people who conducted it.”[24]

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1. This is a good illustration of Santa Anna’s political ability.

2. Farías appears to have had no share in this quarrel with Salas (México á través, iv, 593).

3. The course of Mexican politics. Federalista Puro, No. 3, supplmt.; No. 6, supplmt. London Times, Feb. 9, 1847. Apuntes, 71–3, 76, 124–6. 13Bankhead, Nos. 120, 136, 140, 146, 153, 157, 160, 169, 180, 1846. 52Consul Campbell, Nov. 10, 1846. 52Consul Black, Aug. 22, 27; Sept. 17, 22, 26, 1846. Comunícación Circular de ... Peña y Peña. García, Revol. de Ayutla, 18, 20, 27. Ultimas Comunicaciones habidas entre ... Salas y ... Rejón. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 538. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 195, 199. 13Thornton to Addington, June 29, 1847. 13Gutiérrez de Estrada to Palmerston, Mar. 1, 1847. Méx. en 1847, 12–4. Ramírez, México, 12, 142–4, 149, 152–4, 156, 165, 172, 176. 83Rejón to Berdusco, Dec. 23. Eco, Nov. 4, 7, 11, 14, 1846. Escudero, Mems., 8, 13, 14. Dublán, Legisl., v, 171, 238–9. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846. 73Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 332, res.; 343, res.; 345, res.; 346; 368. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 100–1, 118, 120, 124, 126–8. 83Gov. Querétaro to Farías, Oct. 20. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 144. Rivera, Los Gobernantes, ii, 310. Lara, Resumen, 65, note. Mora, Papeles Ineditos, 64–5. 162Conner, Dec. 31, 1846. 164Id.Jan. 5, 1847. Bustamante, Campaña, 7. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1125 (S. Anna). Baz, Juárez, 43. México á través, iv, 576–7, 589, 591–2, 600–1, 698. Republicano, Sept. 28; Oct. 20, 28; Nov. 17; Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 1, 22–3; Feb. 3, 1847. Monitor Repub., Sept. 25–6, 30; Oct. 19–23, 26; Dec. 25, 1846. Diario, Sept. 23, 25, 29; Oct. 9, 12, 14, 16, 31; Nov. 24; Dec. 18–9, 22, 28, 29, 1846. And from 76 the following Procl. gov. S. L. P., Oct. 22, 1846. J. Alvarez, Oct. 22. Comte. gen. Mex., Oct. 16. Canalizo to comte. gen. Mex., Oct. 18. Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Oct. 24. Salas, procl., Oct. 25. Guerra, circulars, Oct. 14, 19, 22; Dec. 23. Relaciones to gov. Fed. Dist., Dec. 23. Relaciones circular, Oct. 19. Comte. gen. Chiapas, Nov. 3. Also others of minor importance. Otero was associated with Pedraza in the leadership of the Moderados.

4. So far as possible, revenue was anticipated, even at a great loss. E.g., if a merchant expected a cargo to arrive at Vera Cruz, he sent a broker (agiotista) to the minister of the treasury, and by paying a sum in advance he obtained drafts on the Vera Cruz customhouse that were receivable at par for the duties. Of course the merchant, the broker and the minister made profits, and the treasury lost (N. Y. Herald, Jan. 18, 1845). Another way in which the minister could make money was to accept at face value as part of a loan or payment government paper that had cost the one who tendered it only a trifle, and take a share of the net proceeds. “Agiotista” became an odious term. It was given out that Santa Anna would accept no pay, but the treasury books showed that he drew his salary for even the time while he was at Havana (335Worrall to Trist, Nov. 28, 1847). They apparently showed also that in 1846 millions were distributed among generals, brokers and others. The British minister said that Iturbe was the ninth finance minister whom he had seen devoting “his peculiar attention to the augmentation, of his private means while in office” (13Bankhead, no. 104, 1846). Another great evil was that, in spite of express prohibitions, state officials drew upon the proceeds of the tobacco monopoly. The following table illustrates the state of the treasury (1846):

	Oct. 12	Oct. 16	Dec. 26	Dec. 29
On hand	$8510	$3410	—	$1148
Rec’d	—	3500	$7162	3700
Paid	1402	3628	5713	4367

A poll tax was thought of by Rejón, but evidently the government dared not propose it (73Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 332, res., 346, 1846).

5. Mexican financial history (see also the first part of chap. xxxiii). Comunicación Circular de ... Peña y Peña. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Mar., 1845; Dec., 1846. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 368, 716. Ilustrador Católico, no. 239. Hacienda, series of Memorias. Hacienda, Manifiesto de la Admin. y Progresos. London Times, July 6, 1846. Breve Resumen. Casasus, Hist. de la Deuda contraida, etc., passim. Paredes, address to Cong., June 6, 1846 (Diario). Alamán, Liquidación. Esposición del Cong. Gen. 11Martin, Apr. 30, 1827; July 4; Aug. 25, 1828. 11Series of Mémoires on the Spanish Colonies. Sierra, Evolution, i, 178, 218. Zamacois, Méx., xii, 254. 52Consul Jones, Aug. 1, 1839. 56W. S. Parrott, Oct. 4, 11, 1845. 58Howland & Aspinwall, Mar. 1, 1847. Republicano, Feb. 2, 1847. 13Ashburnham, nos. 39, 51, 1837; 3, 97, 1838. 13Pakenham, nos. 28, 1833; 6, 1836; 44, 62, 1839. 13Bankhead, nos. 81, 1844; 6, 38, 70, 106, 1845; 21, 104, 127, 146, 169, 1846. 52Poinsett, Jan. 4; Aug. 5, 1825; July 16, 1828. 52Butler, July 16, 1832. Revista Econ., Dec. 14, 1843; Feb. 5, 1844. Tornel, Reseña, 9, 171. Macgregor, Progress, i, 674–83. Thompson, Recolls., 12, 27–8, 87. 52D. Green, Oct. 28; Nov. 12, 29, 1844. N. Y. Herald, Jan. 18, 1845. Siglo XIX, June 14, 1844; Dec. 2, 1845. Patriota Mexicano, Dec. 9, 1845. Reforma, Jan. 23, 1846. London Times, Mar. 29; May 15; Sept. 9; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845; Mar. 2, 1846. Revue Indep., Apr. 25, 1845. 52Consul Black, Aug. 23, 1845. 52Consul Dimond, no. 338, May 7, 1846. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 346, 1846. 52Consul McCall, no. 65, Sept. 26, 1845. Balbontín, Estado, 66. Wash. Union, Feb. 2, 1848 (Poinsett). N. Y. Globe, June 3, 1846. Diario, Sept. 18, 1846. Monitor Repub., Nov. 27, 1846; Jan. 9, 1847. Ward, Mexico, i., 331–7. 76To S. Anna, Nov. 25. Vicario Capitular, Contestación. Priestley, José de Gálvez, Chap. x.

6. The present financial problem. Dublán, Legislación, v., 172, 211–6, 235–7, 240. 77Relaciones circular, Nov. 27, 1846. 13Bankhead, no. 6, 1845; nos. 21, 127, 153, 167, 169, 1846. 52Consul Black, Dec. 29, 1846. Apuntes, 76, 124–6. Ramírez, México, 171. 335Worrall to Trist, Nov. 28, 1847. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 716. Ilustrador Católico, i., 281. Méx. en 1847, 14–19, 24. Don Simplicio, Feb. 13, 1847. 86Relaciones, Oct. 26, 1846. Zempoalteca, Nov. 27, 1846. Escudero, Mems., 8, 92Gov. Fed. Dist., procl., Jan. 16. 82Gov. Durango to legisl., Nov. 8, 1846. Columna de la Libertad, Jan. 8, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, i, 178, 217–8. 52McLane, no. 5, 1845. 56W. S. Parrott, Oct. 4, 11, 1845. 11Mémoire, 1828. D. Green to Calhoun, Oct. 28; Nov. 12 in Jameson, Calh. Corresp., 976–80, 991. Siglo XIX, Jan. 14, 1844. London Times, Sept. 9; Dec. 6, 1845; Oct. 8, 1846; Jan. 8, 1847. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846 (Lafragua). 73Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 316, res., 346, 371, res., 445. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 128. 75Relaciones, circulars to govs., Oct. 9; Dec. 17, 1846; circs. nos. 233, 238, 255, 1846. 75aHacienda, circulars, Oct. 10; Nov. 9; Dec. 5, 31, 1846. 86V. Cruz state treas. to gov., Jan. 11; Feb. 4, 1847. Constitutionnel, Dec. 18, 1846. Wash. Union, Jan. 18, 29; May 11, 1847. Monitor, Oct. 12. 166Pommarès to Conner, Oct. 7, 1846. Republicano, Oct. 22; Nov. 5, 13, 24; Dec. 8, 1846; Jan. 23, 1847. Monitor Repub., Sept. 25, 30; Oct. 18; Nov. 19, 30; Dec. 19, 1846. Diario, Sept. 23, 25, 29; Oct. 2, 3; Nov. 21, 23; Dec. 4, 13, 15, 21, 29, 30, 1846; Jan. 1, 7–9, 1847. México á través, iv, 589, 600, 628–9. 76S. Anna, Nov. 7, 9, 19; Dec. 3, 4, 7, 30, 1846; Jan. 1, 2, 4, 7, 1847. 76J. Alvarez, Sept. 30, 1846. 76Circ. to comtes. gen., Sept. 28, 1846.

7. The law was a compromise (Apuntes, 124). Rejón, as he frankly told the Spanish minister (note 6), was for nationalizing—i.e., confiscating—the property of the Church. Santa Anna preferred to let the clergy keep the title to their wealth, and require a loan from them now and then—a process termed “milking” (Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 992). The essential basis on which the law passed was the practical necessity of raising money for the war; but many who recognized this necessity and even the desirability of reducing the wealth and power of the Church could not bring themselves to act.

8. The law, if fully enforced, would no doubt have done much injury, however great its benefits. E.g., a great amount of land had been hypothecated to the Church with no expectation on either side that the loan which it secured would ever be paid; but the government, in order to obtain cash, intended that the loan should be paid or the land sold. Many individuals would thus have been ruined and the agricultural interests partially crippled, while on account of the small amount of money in circulation, only very low prices would have been realized for the land (13Bankhead, no. 7, 1847). Moreover, land with a Church curse upon it was sure to sell slowly, and many believed that titles obtained in this way would not hold good very long. As the clergy would give no information about their property, some exempted property was seized, and these mistakes caused trouble (México á través, iv, 631). Many objected to the law because they presumed that the proceeds of sales would reach private pockets. The principal arguments against it were summed up by the 88ayuntamiento of Córdoba as follows: “It attacks property, invades the rights of the states, contravenes the sovereignty of the Church and is anti-religious, for there can be no religion without worship, no worship without priests and no priests without Church property.” On the other hand the Puro 92ayuntamiento of the capital described the law as “A law to save our independence and religion, in which nothing is done except that one class of society is to loan its property to society as a whole,” adding, “How unfortunate would be our faith, if the religion of the Savior could be supported only with money ... charity and poverty were the example of his mission.” The metropolitan chapter of Mexico took the ground that property once consecrated to God was sacred, and that to take it would be an act of sacrilege sure to bring upon the country the wrath and punishment of heaven (92Representación). The bishop of Puebla said to his flock: “Far from us is the idea of disturbing public order, but we must notify our very dear lambs that the pasturage offered thorn is poisonous; and if for so doing we incur the wrath of men, we will strengthen our weakness with the words of the chief of the Apostles at the council of the Jews: ‘We must obey God rather than men’” (82Manifiesto). This was a clear and official incitement to insurrection.

9. The law of Jan. 11 and the struggle over it. Apuntes, 124–32. 13Bankhead, nos. 180, 1846; 6, 7, 10, 14, 17, 1847. Gaxiola, Invasión, 118. 52J. Parrott, Feb. 6. 56Beach, report, June 4. London Times, Sept. 9; Oct. 7, 1846; Mar. 11; May 12, 1847. Oil portrait of Farías, city hall, Mex. 52Consul Black, Feb. 24. Revue Indep., Apr. 25, 1845. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 822, 825–6. Católico, iii, 553. Conducta Admin, de Berdusco. Ilustrador Católico, no. 239. 88Córdoba ayunt., Feb. 4. 92Mex. ayunt. to chapter, Jan. 14. 92Ayunt., procl., Jan. 14. 92Representación of metrop. chapter to Cong. 92Segunda Protesta; Tercera Protesta del Ven. C bildo Metrop. 92Exposición que el Sr. Vicario Capit. 92Expos. del Cabildo Metrop. 92Procl. of gov. Fed. Dist., Jan. 16. 95Querét. cong., Jan. 12. 95Puebla ayunt. to gov., Jan. 16. 95Sánchez to Puebla ayunt., Feb. 16. 82Bish. Puebla, manif., Jan. 27. 82Gov. Puebla, procl., Jan. 27; Mar. 5, 15. Lamentos de los Mex. 73Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 332, res., 346, 445. Dublan, Legislación, v., 246, 255, 261–2. Registro Oficial de Durango, Jan. 26. 80Guanajuato cong., Jan. 29. Locomotor, Jan. 18. Mora, Papeles, 74–6. Negrete, Invasión iv, app., 412–4. Ramírez, México, 172, 184, 188, 190, 193, 198. Diario, Dec. 21, 1846; Jan. 7–9, 11–16, 18, 19, 26, 30; Feb. 4, 1847. Republicano, Dec. 9, 12, 1846; Jan. 8, 11, 23–4, 27, 29; Feb. 6, 11, 12; May 14, 1847. México á través, iv, 601–8, 628, 630–1, 638. And the following from 76. Comte. gen. Querét., Jan. 19, 20, 22. Id.., procl., Jan. 20. Comte gen. Puebla, Jan. 12, 28; Feb. 17. Guerra, order, Jan. 24. Min. eccles. affairs to metropol. chapter, Jan. 14. Comte. gen. Mex., Jan. 15. Comte. gen. Jalisco, Feb. 2. J. Alvarez, Feb. 2. Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Feb. 11, 15. Comte. gen. Guanaj., Jan. 29; Feb. 15, res. To comte. gen. Puebla, Feb. 24. Decrees, Jan. 15, 27; Feb. 4, 7, 10. To S. Anna, Jan. 30. S. Anna, Jan. 7, 13, 22, 26, 29; Feb. 9.

10. Beach’s mission and escape. 56Special Missions, p. 257. 56Beach report, June 4, 1847. Polk, Diary, Apr. 14, 1847. 108Mrs. Storms to Bancroft, July 23, 1846, and Marcy’s endorsement. Griffis, Perry, 224. 52Consul Black, Jan. 28, 1847. N. Y. Sun, Apr. 15; Aug. 16, 24, 1847. 166Dimond to Conner, Jan. —, 1847. Scribner’s Monthly, xvii, 300. Appleton, Amer. Biog. (article on M. Y. B.). Kenly, Md. Vol., 269. 76To comte. gen. V. Cruz, Jan. 14. 76Landero, Jan. 14. 76S. Anna, Jan. 22.

11. Apuntes, 126. 13Bankhead, no. 14, 1847. 56Beach, report, June 4, 1847. Ramírez, México, 193–4, 198–9. México á través, iv, 608, 631. 199Anon. MS. of go-between.

12. The monarchists, who were closely associated with the Church, shared in the insurrection (Apuntes, 119), and no doubt many of the Moderados took part in it (London Times, May 10, 1847), though Pedraza denied positively that he drew up the plan (Apuntes, 131).

13. The insurrection. 56Beach, report, June 4, 1847. Apuntes, 126, 128–37. 13Bankhead, no. 17, 1847. Consideraciones, 37. Méx. en 1847, 14, 19. León, Hist. Gen., 475. 52J. Parrott, Feb. 6. Bustamante, Campaña sin, etc., 5, 8, 10, 11, 13. 52Black, Mar. 6. London Times, May 10, 12. Salas, pamphlet, Mar. 3. 13Peña y Barragán, procl., Mar. 8. Séptimo Disengaño. Boletín de la Democracia, Mar. 2, 7, 13. Farías, Address. Ramírez, México, 190, 193, 198–9, 201, 204, 209. México á través, iv, 631–5. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 841–9. Arco Iris, Nov. 24, 1847. Escudero, Mems., 14, 19, 20. 82Zacatecas cong., Mar. 5. 82Jalísco legisl., Mar. 12. 77Relaciones, circular, Mar. 13. 80Méx. state legisl., Mar. 18. Balbontín, Invasión, 104. 80Lt. gov. Méx. state procl., Mar. 23. 199Anon. MS. 76Farías, procl. 83Gov. Querét. to Peña y Barragán, Mar. 2, 20. Rivera, Los Gobernantes, ii., 318. N. Y. Sun, Apr. 15; Aug. 24. Díario, Feb. 20, 21. Monitor Repub., Dec. 27, 1846; Feb. 13; Mar. 23. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1125 (S. Anna). Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 539. And from 76 the following, besides others of minor importance. Comte. gen. Querét., Jan. 20. Canalizo to Anaya, Feb. 26. J. Alvarez, Mar. 10. L. Carrión, Mar. 10. Gov. Puebla, Feb. 17; reply, Feb. 24. Plan of Puebla insurgents, Feb. 27. Govt. bulletins, Mar. 2, 5. Morales, Mar. 1. Aguascalientes legisl., Mar. 4. Gov. Zacat. to Relac., Mar. 5. Gov. Querét. to Relac., Mar. 9. Provis. gov. Jalisco to Relac., Mar. 3. Comte. gen. Jalisco to garrison, Mar. 7. Gov. Puebla to Relac., Mar. 5. Lt. Col. Indep. battal. to mistress, Mar. 15. Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Feb. 17. Gov. Méx. state to Relac., Mar. 19. Id.., procl., Mar. 18. Decrees, Mar. 1, 8, 12, 15.

On this subject Beach reported in substance as follows: When the government resolved to raise money on the Church property, I urged the clericals to an organized resistance. They consented, and at the moment of General Scott’s debarkation at Vera Cruz they made a most important diversion in his favor by raising the standard of civil war at the capital, at Puebla and in a degree at Michoacán. This occupied 5000 men and all the arms, munitions of war and means of the government in the city of Mexico for twenty-three days; effectually preventing them from aiding Vera Cruz, or strengthening Puebla or the strongholds nearer the coast. On the tenth day of this rebellion or pronunciamiento, I was informed that $40,000 would be required of the clergy to carry it on another week, and that it would be paid if the importance of the crisis justified the outlay. As General Scott had but just landed his artillery at Vera Cruz, and might be detained there for some time. I deemed that almost any outlay would be justified. The rebellion was therefore kept up, until the sudden appearance of General Santa Anna closed the affair. [One must remember, in passing judgment on the conduct of the clergy, how much they had suffered at the hands of Santa Anna and how much reason they had to fear him.]

Beach had arranged to visit Mexico on private business, and he persuaded Buchanan that he could, through Almonte and others, bring about peace. Hence he was appointed “confidential agent to the Republic of Mexico” to accomplish what he could; and, on learning the state of things at Mexico, he saw that Scott’s operations could be materially assisted by inaugurating and continuing the clerical insurrection. His report may be found in the state department archives at Washington.

14. Santa Anna left San Luis Potosí March 15 with more than 5000 men and ten guns.

15. Rejón wrote to Santa Anna, March 7, 1847, urging him to stand firmly by his manifesto of August 16, 1846,—i.e. by the Puros, and detailing a series of Moderado intrigues intended (he said) to annoy and humiliate Santa Anna until he should inaugurate a revolution, with a view to then having him shot.

16. Beach was watched for several days before he left the city. He escaped by paying for his lodgings for some time to come, leaving a trunk there, taking a carriage late at night without baggage, and choosing an unusual route (N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16, 1847). A reward of $1000 was offered for him dead or alive (ibid., Aug. 24). Notices were put up denouncing as a traitor anyone possessing a copy of the New York Sun. He was accused of having tried to bring about a clerical revolution and also to induce the states of Guanajuato, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí and Jalisco to secede and declare for the United States. See also N. Y. Sun, May 27, 1847; Polk, Diary, May 11, 1847; Kenly, Md. Vol., 269. We shall hear again of Beach’s operations.

17. Santa Anna received news of the insurrection near Cedral.

18. Santa Anna may very possibly have hoped now to combine the military class, the conservatives and the clericals into a solid phalanx behind him, and he may have commended the movement against Church property for the very purpose of making the clergy feel the need of his assistance. See Tributo á la Verdad, 76.

19. His overthrow was not really due to the law of January 11, but resulted from his radical ideas and unpractical methods, the odium of his former administration, his consequent inability to secure the coöperation of influential men, and the general state of unrest and dissension.

20. Outcome of the insurrection. Apuntes, 111, 115–8, 133, 136–8. 13Bankhead, nos. 33, 34, 1847. Méx. en 1847, 14–18. 69S. Anna, order, Mar. 14. Anglo-Saxon, Mar. 13. 56Beach, report, June 4, 1847. Bustamante, Campaña, 30. London Times, May 10. Britannia, May 15. México á través, iv, 577, 635–40. Ramírez, México, 184, 198–9, 205, 207, 209–12, 215–8. 82Gov. Puebla, boletín No. 4 (S. Anna to Farías, Mar. 6; Gil to Ruano, Mar. 6). 77Relaciones, circulars, Mar. 22; Apr. 1. Tributo á la Verdad, 76. 75Rejón to S. Anna, Mar. 7. 84Palacios to Gov. S. L. P., Mar. 17. Republicano, Mar. 24. 75aHacienda, circular, Mar. 29. Puga y Acal, Docs., 62–3. Escudero, Mems., 19. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 146–7. Dublán, Legisl., v, 262–5. Locomotor, Jan. 18. Baz, Juárez, 47. Diario, Mar. 29, 1847 (Baz). The twenty-millions law had very little effect, if any. Le Constitutionnel, June 17, 1847 (The clergy have kept none of the promises by the aid of which they obtained the repeal of the confiscation of their property).

1. “New volunteers,” those called out in November. For the ten transports see chap. viii, note 28. Jan. 18 Conner wrote to Scott that Santa Anna had moved, about January 1, against Taylor, but that from all accounts presumably Taylor had probably retired to Monterey (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 893). It was therefore natural for Scott to feel satisfied that Santa Anna, learning of the expedition against Vera Cruz, would retrace his steps and reach that place in season. At Scott’s instance a spy, selected by Consul Campbell with the aid of Consul Dimond (who visited Cuba for the purpose), was to have set out from Havana in January for Mexico City and San Luis Potosí (166Dimond to Conner, Jan. 15); but the author found no further trace of him.

2. Some transports reached Antón Lizardo Feb. 27 and notified Conner that Scott was coming (162Conner, Feb. 27). Certain troops, leaving Tampico March 1, arrived at that rendezvous in advance of Scott (139W. B. Campbell to wife, Mar. 6). By sunset on March 5 about seventy sail had appeared there.

3. To Antón Lizardo. Macgregor, Progress, i, 677. 47Conner, Dec. 1 1846; Feb. 17; Mar. 7, 10, 1847. 159Collins narrative. 298Porter, diary. 66Remarks in margin of chart of V. Cruz harbor. Le Clercq, Voyage, 401, 418. Robertson, Remins., 214–6. Campos, Recuerdos, 31. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 238. Grant, Mems., i, 125. Hartman, Journal, 6. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 123. Picayune, Mar. 26. Delta, Oct. 16. Meade, Letters, i, 187. 65Scott, gen. orders 28, 33, 34, 37. 313Saunders to Conner, Mar. 5. Oswandel, Notes, 63. Semmes, Service, 106, 109, 111. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 266. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 65–6, 68. 146Caswell, diary. 322Smith, diary. Kitchen, Record, 21–2. 270Moore, diary. 327Sutherland, letter. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 257, 261. 254McClellan to sister, Feb. 23. Moore, Scott’s Campaign, 1–4. Parker, Recolls., 49, 82. Washington Union, Apr. 6. Monitor Repub., Mar. 16. 164Scott to Conner, Feb. 22, 26. 162Conner to wife, Aug. 10, 1846; Feb. 26, 27, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 879, 892 (Conner); 896 (Hetzel); 893, 896, 899 (Scott); 568 (Jesup). Nebel and Kendall, 17. Diccionario Univ. (Antón Lizardo). Niles, Mar. 13, 1847, p. 21. 332Tennery, diary. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 65. 254McClellan, diary. 165Conner to Scott, Jan. 18; to Breese and to Aulick, Feb. 28. Hammersly, Naval Encyclop., 94. 139W. B. Campbell to wife, Mar. 6. Smith, To Mexico, 108–10. 76Garay, Mar. 5. 76Cos, Feb. 19, 21. 76Soto, Mar. 7. 76Watchman at Ulúa, Mar. 5.

4. For additional information regarding San Juan de Ulúa the reader may consult chapters xviii and xxx.

5. New York letters received in Cuba and made known at Mexico gave notice that Scott planned to capture Vera Cruz before attacking Ulúa (76Relaciones, Jan. 26); some Mexicans believed he would enter the Antigua River (which emptied a short distance to the north) with boats, and strike at once into the interior; some thought he would land at Tuxpán, and march south along the coast; and some ridiculed the idea of an attack upon Vera Cruz on the ground that, since the Americans could not possibly reach the capital by that route, it would be useless to capture the city (Monitor Repub., Mar. 28). Many argued that in any case Ulúa would protect Vera Cruz.

6. Besides fine old Spanish guns, there were new and heavy English pieces (Nacional, July 12, 1846) and twenty recently cast in the United States (Davis, Autobiog., 131). A battery of sixteen bronze long 24-pdrs., made in England in 1840, was pronounced by American artillery officers “far superior” to anything of the sort they had seen elsewhere (213 Hatch to father, Apr. 2). It was in the city. As to the amount of ordnance in the city and castle accounts differed. Scott made it 400 pieces; Hitchcock, upwards of 350; Balbontín, 113 mounted, 46 unmounted at Ulúa, 83 and 57 respectively at Vera Cruz; G. T. M. Davis, 390 effective pieces. The statement of the Mexican government, December, 1846 (based of course on earlier reports), was as follows: Vera Cruz, mounted, bronze, eleven 24’s, twenty 16’s, six 12’s, four 8’s, four 4’s, four mountain 4’s, five 12-inch mortars, seven 8-inch howitzers, and of iron, mounted, three 42-lb. mortars, three 24-lb. cannon, five 12’s, nine 8’s, six 13-inch mortars, two 9-inch mortars; Ulúa, bronze, mounted, thirty-six 24’s, four 16’s, four 8’s, two 14-inch mortars, and of iron, mounted, ten 84-lb. mortars, ten 68-lb. mortars, sixteen 42-lb. mortars, fifty-one 24-lb. cannon, two 16’s,—a total of 224 besides a considerable number of unmounted pieces in both places, some of which were doubtless mounted later (Memoria de ... Guerra). Still other guns were sent from the interior. Possibly some unserviceable ordnance may have been included in the highest American figures. Balbontín gives the number of firearms as 7369—half of the total number belonging to the government. Ripley (War with Mex., ii, 19) and Wilcox (Mex. War, 251) state that there was no ditch, but the weight of evidence seems to be against them. Perhaps the drifting sand filled the ditch before the Americans took the city.

7. It was not easy to believe that the factions at Mexico would not agree to turn their arms against the Americans on learning they had landed. March 9 the state of Vera Cruz issued a strong appeal to them and to the nation. Neutrals and valuable neutral property were taken aboard foreign war-vessels (12Matson to Giffard, Mar. 5). The American blockade had greatly impaired the resources of the state and city. A forced loan was imposed by the former, but no large receipts could be expected.

8. The accepted (not official) Mexican figures were 1030 for Ulúa and 3360 for Vera Cruz, but the authorities did not consider it obligatory to publish the correct number. 13March 11 the British consul, Giffard, reported the garrisons as about 1500 and 4000 respectively, and later (according to Mexican accounts that were probably rather flattering) more than 1000 threw themselves into the city. Santa Anna stated in April that Morales had 5000 in the town (76S. Anna, Apr. 29), but he was unfriendly to that officer. Scott’s figures were 5000 besides those who perished or escaped during the siege; but before the surrender he heard the city alone had that number (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 221). British naval officers stated there were about 6000 in city and castle (Meade, Letters, i, 188), and Col. Campbell was told there were 5–6000 (139to wife, Mar. 6). The Mexicans complained of a lack of gunners, but their own figures were 680. No doubt the troops were poorly cared for, but such was the custom. Robles counted for not a little. In the autumn of 1846 Landero, personally liked but considered wanting in ability and regarded as a tool of Santa Anna, was made comte. gen. because Morales was strenuously denounced by Santa Anna as politically unsafe (76S. Anna, Oct. 14); but on the approach of the crisis the people forced a change, and the confidence inspired by Morales enabled him (Landero admitted in his 76report, Apr. 3, 1847) to accomplish more than the latter could have done. Particular resentment was felt against Santa Anna for taking away in August, 1846, the best regiment (the Eleventh Infantry). For the names of corps at Vera Cruz and Ulúa see Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 158.

9. The situation at Vera Cruz and Ulúa. 13Consul Giffard, Nov. 1; Dec. 1, 1846; Feb. 28; Mar. 11, 1847. 52Consul Dimond, no. 336, May 2, 1846. Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occasional Papers, no. 16. 218Henshaw narrative. 280Nunelee, diary. 159Collins, diary. 6Bravo to Tola, Apr. 18, 1846. 224Hitchcock, diary, Mar. 13. 13Pakenham, no. 25, 1842. National, July 12, 1846. Constitutionnel, May 8, 1847. W. S. Parrott, Feb. 6, 1847. 80México state legislature to people. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846, p. 22. (Cisterns, etc.) Lyon, Journal, ii, 221. Orbigny, Voyage, 407–8. Robertson, Visit, i, 232, 239. Ruxton, Adventures (London, 1847), 12–15. Robertson, Remins., 225–6, 235, 237. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 541–50, 552, 569. Naredo, Orizaba, i, 107–8. Scott. Mems., ii, 422. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 248. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 288–9. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 239. Balbontín, Estado, 49–55. Tributo á la Verdad, 17–26, 29, 88. Apuntes, 152–5. S. Anna, Apelación, 33. Delta, Oct. 16, 1847. 350Weber, recolls. 12Matson to Giffard, Mar. 5, 1847; to Fischer, Mar. 8; to commodore, Mar. 10, 25. Oswandel, Notes, 102. Semmes, Service, 102, 104–6. 139W. B. Campbell to D. C, Mar. 20. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 56, 865. Otero, Comunicación, 11. Diario, Apr. 8. Republicano, Dec. 8, 1846. 86Relaciones to gov., Jan. 27, 1847; reply, Feb. 1. 86State treas. to gov., Jan. 15. 86Morales to gov., Feb. 8. 90Soto, proclam., Mar. 2. 90Id.to state congress, Dec. 1, 1846. 100V. Cruz ayunt. to prefect, June 4, 1846. 100Bravo to ayunt., June 9, 1846. 100Ayunt. to jefe of dept, Oct. 26, 1846. 100Soto, proclam., Feb. 6, 1847. 88Id., proclam., Feb. 15, 1847. Regenerador Repub. Puebla, Mar. 13; Apr. 7, 1847. 82Noticias de V. Cruz. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 267. México á través, iv, 600. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 67, 105–7. El Estado de Veracruz a Todos. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec, 1846. 146Caswell, diary. 270Moore, diary. 73Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 441, 445, Feb. 28; Mar. 2, 1847. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 67. Valois, Mexique, 40–43. 271Morales to commander of Ulúa, Oct. 20, 1846. Moore, Scott’s Campaign, 12. Conner, Castle of S. Juan de Ulloa, 13. Parker, Recolls., 79. (Learned) Monitor Repub., Nov. 13, 30, 1846; Mar. 28, 1847. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 413–4. 166Campbell to Conner, Jan. 9, 1847. 166Pommarès to Conner, Oct. 15, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 911, 1169 (Scott). Meade, Letters, i, 188. Diccionario Univ. (Ulúa). 47Conner, Oct. 4, 1846. 165Id.to Scott, Jan. 18; Feb. 5, 1847. 100Soto to jefe, V. Cr. dept., Sept. 17, 1846. 100Jefe to V. Cr. ayunt., Dec. 21, 1846. Bishop, Journal, 29. Niles, May 9, 1846, p. 160. So. Quart. Rev., July, 1851. 86V. Cruz congress, manifiesto, Mar. 9. And from 76 the following. A large amount of correspondence between the dept. and successive commanders at Vera Cruz, particularly in March, April, Sept. and Oct., 1846, Jan. and Feb., 1847, relating to the fortifications, garrison, supplies and dangers of the city and Ulúa. S. Anna, Oct. 12, 14, 20, 1846; Jan. 14, 18; Apr. 29, 1847. Morales, Jan. 20, 1847. Tampico letter to Garay, Jan. 25. Soto, Feb. 7, 15; Mar. 7, etc. Morales, Feb. 9, 15; Mar. 4, 5, etc. Boletín de la Democracia, Mar. 2, 1847 (N. Y. letter, Jan. 8). To S. Anna, Oct. 17, 1846; Jan. 30, 1847. To Morales, Mar. 6, 7. Morales, proclam., Mar. 5. Landero, report, Apr. 3. Jalapa letter, Mar. 16. Canalizo to Hacienda, Jan. 11. Landero, Jan. 25, 1847. J. Alvarez, Oct. 21, 1846. Memo., Feb. 9, 1847. Tampico letter, Dec. 30, 1846. Morales to Marín, Mar. 11.

10. What Scott called his “little cabinet” consisted of Col. Totten (chief engineer), Lieut. Col. Hitchcock (acting inspector general), Capt. Robert E. Lee (engineer) and H. L. Scott (acting as military secretary). Col. James Bankhead was chief artillery officer, Capt. Huger was acting chief of ordnance, and Maj. Turnbull was the chief topographical engineer (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 239–40). Col. Harney commanded the regular cavalry, and Capt. Edson commanded three companies of marines loaned by Conner, and temporarily attached to the Third Artillery. At this time the engineers, artillery and cavalry were kept by Scott under his immediate orders. While at Lobos Islands he laid down the rule (65gen. orders 33) that every project of siege or bombardment should first be discussed between the senior engineer and artillery officers and then reported to him for approval or amendment. Hence the detailed plan for the operations at Vera Cruz came formally from Totten, and he has been credited with originating it.

11. Simms wrote to Gov. Hammond of South Carolina that Scott’s operations at Vera Cruz lacked brilliancy.

12. Conner had reckoned upon the starvation method; but (1) the amount of supplies in the town and castle was not certainly known and, as we shall find, was too large for this method; (2) fishing was a resource of unmeasured value (even from the mole great quantities of fish were caught: Delta, Oct. 16, 1847); (3) it was possible that on some night the American line might be temporarily broken, and thousands of cattle be run into the city; (4) as British observers agreed, the Mexicans were capable of bearing privations for a long while; (5) Scott rested under an imperative obligation to remove his army from the coast in time to save it from the vómito; and (6) he had to count on reducing Ulúa after capturing the city.

13. 13Giffard, Mar. 11. Scott, Mems., ii, 422–5. Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 3–6. Davis, Autobiog., 140–1. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 223, 239. Balbontín, Estado, 53, 55. 65Scott, gen. orders 33. 12Matson to commodore, Mar. 11, 25. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 120. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16, 1847 (Scott should have left 5000 to reduce V. Cruz). So. Quart. Rev., July, 1851. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 47–9. Oswandel, Notes, 101. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 892 (Conner). McCall, Letters, 483. Moore, Scott’s Camp., 12.

14. This seems like a foolhardy performance; but other boats had gone as near without being fired upon, and the Petrita was supposed to be out of range (Mag. Am. Hist., xiv, 567). The engineers intended of course to get as near as they could with safety, and it is possible that Scott wished to set an example of fearlessness. McCall, who was on board, wrote that this occurred on Mar. 6; other accounts place it on the seventh.

15. Just as the fleet was leaving Antón Lizardo, 800 Louisiana volunteers arrived. These, with a shipload who came some hours later, gave Scott upwards of 11,000 men. His 62return of Mar. 25 included 13,470.

16. With some light guns, which would probably have been lost, a thousand Americans might have been accounted for. It has been suggested that until the boats moved toward the shore the Mexicans did not know where the blow would fall; but their own explanation was that they had no suitable troops to spare for the purpose (Tributo á la Verdad, 28). Morales had, however, what he called an Extra-muros section, i.e., militia. A lack of intelligence, enterprise or nerve was doubtless the real cause of his remissness. The one shot mentioned in the text probably came from a gun found later among the dunes (69Backus to Brady, Sept. 22, 1848). A company of sappers and miners and an iron boat loaded with entrenching tools and sand-bags accompanied Worth’s brigade. Less than half the surf-boats ordered by Scott had arrived.

17. The landing. Bullock, Six Months (1825), i, 10. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 216–8, 220, 222 (Scott); 239–40 (gen. orders 80). Ho. 1; 30, 2. pp. 1177–9. Apuntes, 153. Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occasional Papers, no. 16. 218Henshaw narrative. 280Nunelee, diary. 216Heiman, First Regt. of Tenn. 159Collins, diary. 298Porter, diary. 69Backus to Brady, Sept. 22, 1848. Robertson, Remins., 216–9. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 540, 551. Scott, Mems., ii, 413–4, 418–9, 421. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 292–303. Davis, Autobiog., 125. Tributo á la Verdad, 28, etc. McCall, Letters, 475. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 125. Picayune, Mar. 25. Meade, Letters, 187–8. 65Scott, gen. orders 28, 33, 34, 42, 45. 12Matson to commodore, Mar. 11. Oswandel, Notes, 67–70, 83. Semmes, Service, 111, 125–7. Ramírez, México, 234. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 74, 79, 167. 270Moore, diary. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., v, 37; xxiv, 422–8. Moore, Scott’s Campaign, 5. Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 1847, p. 418. Conner, Home Squadron, 18–20, 60–70. Smith, To Mexico, 113–4. Nebel and Kendall, 17. Parker, Recolls., 49, 83, 85–6. 162Conner to wife, Jan. 11; Mar. 10, United Service, July, 1895, p. 37; Dec., 1896, pp. 492–517. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 108. Jones, Tattnall, 58. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 847, 1169 (Scott); 892 (Conner). Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 71–2. 254McClellan, diary. 165Conner, Mar. 11; order, Mar. 7; to Forrest, Mar. 7. 316Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Mag. of Amer. Hist., xiv (Scammon). So. Quart. Rev., July, 1851. 139W. B. Campbell to wife, Mar. 13. 76Morales, Mar. 9, 10. 76Landero, report, Apr. 3.

18. The consuls were in close touch with one another and with the Mexicans, and hence the charge that Scott gave no warning of a bombardment falls to the ground. He could not be expected to state positively and precisely what he intended to do. By Mar. 13 Morales reached the conclusion that he would not assault (82M. to gov. Puebla, Mar. 13), and by Mar. 20 that a bombardment was to be expected (76M. to Guerra y Marina, Mar. 20). Intercourse with neutral vessels was allowed to remain open until the morning of Mar. 23 (12Matson to commodore, Mar. 25), mainly as a way of escape for neutrals (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 230) (closed then—except under a flag of truce—because affording moral aid and comfort ibid., p. 228); and Matson, the British naval commander, warned the British residents with his utmost energy that they would not be safe during “an assault or a Bombardment” (12M. to commodore, Apr. 2). He was notified in advance that intercourse with neutral vessels would shortly be cut off, and so informed Giffard officially on March 18 for the benefit of British residents (12M. to commodore, March 25). Scott’s warning note to the Spanish consul (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 219) referred to the city, not to Ulúa, for the consuls resided in the city; yet Matson and Giffard had the face to assert that on the authority of Conner they understood that only Ulúa would be bombarded. Matson admitted that he did this for effect on Perry (12to commodore, Apr. 2); and he did not question Scott’s right to act as he did (12to Perry, Mar. 27). Again, Scott’s summons stated that batteries adequate to reduce the city were in readiness, and this was further notice of a bombardment. Everything compatible with the military necessities of the United States was thus done for neutrals and non-combatants. Moreover Morales replied that Scott might attack in the way he thought most advantageous (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 227). The truth is that the people were full of fighting spirit, did not know what real war meant, and felt not a little confidence. Giffard certainly (12Matson to commodore, Mar. 25) and (as Perry reported, 47Oct. 22) the other consuls probably took under their protection large quantities of property belonging to Mexicans. By means of kites the Mexicans distributed addresses to the “honest” Americans, defying their prowess but inviting them to accept lands, as friends and brethren, in the country of perpetual spring.

19. The Americans admitted the skill of the Mexican gunners. Twenty-eight balls were put through a wall five feet high and 150 feet long, more than a mile distant. Americans were supposed to be lying behind the wall (Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 267).

20. Scott still supposed Ulúa would have to be reduced after the capture of Vera Cruz, and felt greatly troubled by the non-arrival of the larger part of the heavy ordnance, etc., that had been duly called for (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 222). He was annoyed also by his lack of enough cavalry for thorough reconnoitring, and by the passing and repassing of small boats between the city and the north shore. Owing to the treacherous weather none of the American vessels could lie close enough to the coast to stop this intercourse entirely. A sortie against the batteries was to be anticipated, but access to them was made so easy and secure that such an attack could have been repulsed. The squadron endeavored to divert the attention of the enemy while the mortars were being placed.

21. Scott’s preliminary operations. 13Giffard, Feb. 28, 1847. Engineer School, U. S. A., Occas. Papers, no. 16. 218Henshaw narrative. Charleston Mercury, Apr. 6, 1847. 280Nunelee, diary. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, p. 179. 159Collins, diary. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 216–25, 244–9 (reports of Scott and his officers). Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1177 (Conner). 298Porter, diary. 61Bankhead to Scott, Mar. 26. 60Pickett to ——, Mar. 10. Robertson, Remins., 220–27. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 552. Scott, Mems., ii, 426. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 240–5. Grant, Mems., i, 127. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 304–6; ii, 18–9. Davis, Autobiog., 126. Tributo á la Verdad, 29. McCall, Letters, 477. Hartman, Journal, 7–8. Picayune, Mar. 26, 30, 31; Apr. 2, 4. Meade, Letters, i, 191. 350Weber, recolls. 65Scott, gen. orders, nos. 33, 53. McCabe, Lee, 17. 12Matson to commodore, Mar. 11. Oswandel, Notes, 71–85. Semmes, Service, 129. 139W. B. Campbell to D. C., Mar. 20. 210Simms to Hammond, May 1. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 73, 78, 81, 84, 89. 124Blocklenger, letter. 270Moore, diary. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 106. Nebel and Kendall, 18–9. 164Scott to Conner, Mar. 16. Griffis, Perry, 216. Conner, Home Squadron, 68. Monitor Repub., Mar. 16. 164Scott to Conner, Mar. 17, 18, 19, 20. Spirit of the Times, Apr. 17. 166Dimond to Conner, Jan. 15. 166Campbell to Conner, Jan. 9. United Service, July, 1895, p. 37. Jones, Tattnall, 57. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1169 (Scott). 254McClellan, diary. 165Conner to Scott, Mar. 19. Bishop, Journal, 29. So. Quart. Rev., July, 1851. 76Morales, Mar. 10, 16. 76Cano, Mar. 26. Mag. of Amer. Hist., xiv, 567.

22. The mosquito fleet consisted of the steamers Spitfire and Vixen under Commanders J. Tattnall and J. R. Sands, and the gunboats Bonita, Reefer, Petrel, Falcon and Tampico under Lieuts. Commanding F. G. Benham, J. S. Sterett, T. D. Shaw, J. J. Glasson and W. P. Griffin (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1182). Each had a 32-pounder or 8-inch Paixhan. Additional information may be found in chap. xxx.

23. The parapet of the naval battery (known as No. 5) was of sandbags. Each of the guns weighed 6300 pounds, and was mounted on a ship-carriage, so that transportation on land was extremely laborious. They were taken ashore March 23, and some 1500 men were employed in dragging them nearly two and a half miles through the sand. Scott did not value the shell guns highly. They were 8-inch Paixhans. Captains Aulick and Mayo commanded the battery alternately. According to Robert Anderson the orders for the battery were issued by Conner (Lawton, Artill. Officer, 101) who had repeatedly offered it before Scott gave up the hope of receiving adequate army ordnance in time (Conner, Home Squad., 47, note 3). Early on the morning of March 23 Perry (who had withdrawn the mosquito fleet the previous evening) had Tattnall launch a sharp though brief attack, presumably to divert attention from the naval battery, then under construction. An officer who gained fame later as Commodore Porter was Tattnall’s pilot. The opening of Battery No. 4 (24-pounders, etc.) was delayed by a norther, and one of the howitzers was not ready as soon as the other pieces. Only about half of the siege-train and ordnance stores called for in November arrived before Vera Cruz surrendered (see chap. xviii, note 11).

24. Summons and bombardment. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 222–44 (reports of Scott and his officers; summons and reply; etc.); 230 (Scott to consuls, Mar. 25). Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1175–83 (naval reports). 13Morales, circular, Apr. 4. 13Giffard, nos. 7, 8, Mar. 22, 29. 12Matson to commodore, Mar. 25, 28; Apr. 2; to Perry, Mar. 27. 47Perry, Mar. 26; Oct. 22. Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. 216Heiman, First Regt. Trans. Ill. State Hist. Soc., 1906, pp. 179–80. Collins, diary. 224Hitchcock to Lizzie, Mar. 27. 60Perry to Mason, Mar. 25. 60Scott to Perry and reply, Mar. 25. 61Bankhead to Scott, Mar. 26. 60Pickett to ——, Mar. 10. Robertson, Remins., 227–32, 278. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 555. Scott, Mems., ii, 426–7. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 244–7. Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 24. Davis, Autobiog., 127. A Soldier’s Honor, 24. Apuntes, 155–8. Tributo á la Verdad, 30–1, 109. McCall, Letters, 480. Nebel and Kendall, 19–21. Hartman, Journal, 9–10. Picayune, Apr. 4. Meade, Letters, i, 192. F. Lee, Lee, 36–7. McClay, Navy, ii, 180–1, 183. Oswandel, Notes, 90–5. Semmes, Service, 130–42. 139W. B. Campbell to D. C., Mar. 28. Diario, Mar. 29; Apr. 10. Regenerador Repub., Apr. 7. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 267. Lawton, Artillery Off., 91–7, 101, 104. Caswell, diary. 322Smith, diary. Moore, diary. 358Williams to father, Mar. 25, 28. Judah, diary. Moore, Scott’s Campaign, 15. Arnold, Jackson, 84. Conner, Home Squadron, 47, note 3. Wash. Union, Sept. 11. N. Y. Sun, Apr. 16. 162Conner to wife, Mar. 31. Soley, Porter, 67–9. Jones, Tattnall, 57. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 913, 1220 (Scott). 180Scott to Stribling, Mar. 25. Ramsey, Other Side, 190, note. Bishop, Journal. So. Quart. Rev., July, 1851. Weekly Courier and N. Y. Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848 (letter probably by Hitchcock). Griffis, Perry, 221–3. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 519–40 76G. Gómez, Mar. 25. 76Soto, Mar. 28. 76Morales, Mar. 24. 76Vega Mar. 25.

25. March 24 the consuls requested Scott to grant a truce and allow the women and children to leave town (12Matson to commodore, Apr. 2). With perfect propriety he declined to do so (Scott, Mems., ii, 427), unless Morales should ask for a truce with a view to surrender (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 226), pointing out that due warnings had been given (note 18). He could not afford to suspend his operations or let the number of mouths be diminished; and doubtless he was counting on the moral effect of the presence of women and children. Time pressed; there were well-founded reports that a Mexican army was approaching; and cases of yellow fever had occurred (Scott, Mems., ii, 427, and see Davis, Autobiog., 141). Scott’s action looks hard, but it was humane to force an immediate surrender. Roa Bárcena (Recuerdos, 178) fully admits that the American policy was just. This move of the consuls tended to shake the confidence of the Mexicans, and led to dissensions among the officers.

March 25 Harney was sent against a force posted at a bridge near Medellín, about ten miles from Vera Cruz (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 250–2). Including reinforcements, his detachment consisted of about 500 men with artillery. The independent reports of the two principal Mexican officers give their number as 140–50 with scarcely any ammunition. Harney thought there were 2000 of them, and claimed great credit for carrying the day. His orders were to reconnoitre only. There were other insignificant affairs (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 249–55; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 915; Reavis, Harney, 186).

26. On the Mexican side. 13Giffard, Mar. 11, 29. 12Matson to commodore, Mar. 25; Apr. 2. Papeles Varios, no. 10. Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. Collins, diary. Robertson, Remins., 222. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 552–3, etc. Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 32–3. Davis, Autobiog., 138. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 220–38 (reports, etc.). Tributo á la Verdad, 29, 30, 109 (Ult. Boletín). Apuntes, 157–60. Picayune, Apr. 9. (Fish) Delta, Oct. 16. 312Morales, Apr. 3. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. Semmes, Service, 149. 82Noticias de Veracruz. 86Relaciones to gov., Jan. 27. 86Treasurer to gov., Jan. 15. 86Many letters regarding inability to pay the tax. 100Morales to ayunt., Mar. 12, 17, 20; reply, Mar. 14. 95Ibarra, proclam., Mar. 23. Regenerador Repub., Apr. 7. 82Gov. to legislature of Puebla, Mar. 9. 82Ibarra, proclam., Mar. 17. 82Morales to gov. Puebla, Mar. 13. 86Id.to Soto, Mar. 8. Lawton, Artillery Off., 106–7. Caswell, diary. Moore, diary. 375Morales to Soto, Mar. 14. Monitor Repub., Apr. 4. Spirit of the Times, Apr. 17. 80Legislature of Méx. state, address. 165Conner to Scott, Mar. 19. Bishop, Journal. And from 76 the following. Comte. gen. Puebla, proclam., Mar. 16. Arrieta, Mar. 15. Cano, Mar. 26. S. Anna, Apr. 29. Memo., Feb. 9. F. Vázquez, Mar. 26. Soto, Jan. 23, 26; Mar. 7, 9, 19, 24, 25 (two). G. Gómez, Mar. 18, 19, 20 (two). Vega, Mar. 24, 25 (two). Canalizo, Apr. 1. Morales, Mar. 5, 10, 16, 20, 24. Landero, Jan. 30, Apr. 3. Hacienda, Mar. 15. To G. Gómez, Mar. 16. To Soto, Mar. 28. And many documents of minor importance.

27. Morales, probably in view of Santa Anna’s enmity, would not surrender though he believed he ought to do so (76Landero, Apr. 3), but he turned the command over to Landero when capitulation was seen to be inevitable, and left the city in a boat during the night of March 25–6. He induced Gen. José Durán, who commanded at Ulúa, to regard himself as under Landero’s orders, it was stated by Santa Anna (76Apr. 29), and so brought about the surrender of the castle. This apparently singular move was doubtless made to save Vera Cruz from being bombarded by Ulúa. (Recognizing this danger to the city, Scott intimated, when summoning the town, that no batteries would be established in it against Ulúa, unless Ulúa should open fire upon it.) There was considerable dissatisfaction among the Americans because the prisoners were set free, for their parole was justly deemed of slight value; but it would have been costly, and perhaps not easy, to hold them at Vera Cruz or send them to the United States, and they did good service by spreading tales of American prowess. Mar. 26 the consuls went to Scott’s camp under a white flag, but he would not see them (12Matson to commodore, Apr. 2). On the morning of March 27 two boat-loads of neutrals under the French flag attempted to reach the neutral vessels at Sacrificios, but Perry would not allow them to proceed (12Matson to commodore, Apr. 2). (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 178, admits that Perry’s course was proper.) At about the same time the consuls and the second alcalde threatened that unless the military chiefs would promptly bring hostilities to an end, they would lead the non-combatants toward the American lines at the risk of being fired upon. This was said to have had great effect in town, but the chiefs had already decided to give up. Owing to bad weather the navy was not represented at all the deliberations. Some of the American military men felt that the share of the navy did not entitle its representative to sign the capitulation. It was stated by Sedgwick that, aside from the investment, only about 600 Americans took part in the operations.

28. Next to Matson’s figures our best evidence regarding the casualties is the statement of Giffard, that hundreds of women and children, harbored at the consulates, escaped from harm though the buildings suffered (13Mar. 29). Many other buildings were no doubt equally solid and equally distant from the principal scene of destruction. Vera Cruz was a great importing city, where large stocks of goods needed to be securely housed. Mercantile establishments had strong vaults, in which families now took refuge. Many found safety on the long mole. Scott asserted that most of the people were sheltered in the basements. Consequently one can hardly believe that more than 500 persons out of a civilian population probably not exceeding 3000 were injured. Lieut. Mackall believed that perhaps thirty or forty soldiers were killed or wounded (252Apr. 30). Kendall, editor of the New Orleans Picayune, who was on the ground, represented 150 as a mean estimate of the total number that perished (Picayune, Apr. 9). Landero reported 750 killed and 200 wounded (76Apr. 3), evidently an absurd statement, for a greater number must have been hurt than killed. Other Mexican estimates rose as high as 600 civilians killed, which would imply on a reasonable calculation that almost every civilian was hit. One of the best Mexican authorities (Apuntes, 165) states that 600 or more soldiers were wounded, and 400 of these lost their lives. This is far too large a percentage of fatalities. How accurate this authority is may be judged also from the fact that the Americans are said to have thrown 6700 projectiles into the town, whereas (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 244) the number was actually about 2500 (possibly besides those from the naval battery, which may have thrown 800). It is worth while to add that Scott was persistently represented (partly to exalt the Mexicans and partly to injure the Americans) as having destroyed a great number of non-combatants, but Morales wrote on March 24 that most of the killed and wounded had been soldiers.

Next let us inquire as to the provisions. Giffard stated (13Mar. 29) that when the Mexicans surrendered, the city had food enough for three days and the castle for ten; but probably he had reference only to the provisions belonging to the authorities, and perhaps, as he had objected strongly to the destruction of property and tried to stop the bombardment by sending word to Scott that hunger would force the Mexicans to yield in a few days, he felt compelled to support that representation. March 10 Conner thought the enemy had subsistence enough for about four or five weeks (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1179). 76April 29, after having talked with officers from Vera Cruz, Santa Anna assured the minister of war that Morales could have held out until he (Santa Anna) could have arrived with regular forces. Gov. Soto, who went down to the coast, where he was in communication with the city by means of boats and doubtless knew whether stocks of foodstuffs (belonging perhaps to neutrals) existed there, placed drafts for $30,000, payable at Vera Cruz, in the hands of Morales on March 24 (76Soto, March 25). This money must have been intended solely or principally for provisions, for on the fourteenth Morales had written to Soto that nothing else was needed. On the same day $2000 from Oaxaca were delivered. These sums would have purchased enough food to last beyond April 15. About March 17 a French barque ran in during a norther, which shows that supplies from the outside could be hoped for. The property loss due to the bombardment was estimated at five to six million dollars (Monitor Repub., Apr. 4). The southwest quarter of the town was demolished. It was ordered that not only Morales, but Landero and Durán should be tried. Besides disliking Morales, Santa Anna felt resentment against Vera Cruz for receiving him so coldly in August, 1846.

29. The surrender; losses (note 28). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 224–6 (Scott); 228 (consuls); 229–38 (Scott, etc.); 239 (gen. orders 80). Apuntes, 159–66. McCall, Letters, 483–4. Picayune, Apr. 9. 252Mackall to father, Mar. 30. 312Morales, Apr. 3. 12Matson to commodore, Mar. 25; Apr. 2; to Perry, Mar. 27; reply, Mar. 27. Semmes, Service, 141. Diario, Mar. 27; Apr. 4, 8. Regenerador Repub., Apr. 7. Lawton, Artillery Off., 98, 100, 106. Hiney, diary. 358Williams to father, Mar. 28. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 160. 375Morales to Soto, Mar. 14. Monitor Repub., Apr. 4, 5. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16. 166Kirby to Conner, Mar. 27. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1186. Mag. of Amer. Hist., xiv, 570. Bishop, Journal. 13Giffard, nos. 7, 8, Mar. 22, 29. Henshaw narrative. Collins, diary. 95Puebla ayunt., address, Apr. 7 (V. Cruz yielded because of “the lamentations of innocent families expecting every instant to die”). Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 177–9. Tributo á la Verdad, 109 (Ult. Bol.). Nebel and Kendall, 21. Robertson, Remins., 232. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 558–69. Scott, Mems., ii, 427–9. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 243–8. 76Landero, Apr. 3. 76Id.. to Canalizo, Mar. 31. 76Canalizo, Apr. 1. 76S. Anna, Apr. 4, 29. 76To S. Anna, May 4. 76Terms of capitulation. The date Of the capitulation was Mar. 27.

Had Vera Cruz held out until April 15, perhaps 5000 regulars would have been in Scott’s rear (chap. xxiii, note 12). With this backing, 3–4000 irregulars could probably have been embodied. By means of signals and boat communication operations in concert with the garrison of Vera Cruz could have been arranged for, and the prospect would have encouraged the city to hold out to the uttermost. Very likely Scott’s line could have been broken, and provisions introduced. He could not, then, before the advent of the yellow fever, have reduced Ulúa and Vera Cruz, and have made the preparations necessary for advancing into a hostile region in the face of a numerous enemy. When the fever became active, Santa Anna’s upper country troops could have retired quickly, leaving the Americans to be annoyed by the coast forces. Other diseases quite as fatal as the vómito prevailed in that district (Thompson, Recolls., 4). Lieut. Hatch (to father, Apr. 2) wrote that all attributed the surrender to the effect of Scott’s artillery upon the civilians, and the circumstances prove as much.

30. The northers, though in themselves a scourge, drove the mosquitoes away, and so prevented the yellow fever. They subsided about the middle of April, and then the fever was due.

31. Hardships and consolations. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1; Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 253–5; Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1185 (naval). Henshaw narrative. Charleston Mercury, Apr. 6. Nunelee, diary. Collins, diary. American Eagle, V. Cruz, Apr. 8. 60Pickett to ——, Mar. 10. Vigne, Travels, i, 8. Robertson, Remins., 223, 226–7. Campos, Recuerdos, 31. Scott. Mems., ii, 430. Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 8, 15. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 221 (gen. orders 54); 224–6 (Scott, Mar. 23). Picayune, Apr. 4. 350Weber, recolls. Maury, Recolls., 34. 12Matson to commodore, Mar. 11, 25. Oswandel, Notes, 71–4, 79–81. Semmes, Service, 107–8. Lawton, Artillery Off., 79, 88, 96. Gilliam, Travels, 40. 361Woods, recolls. Caswell, diary. 327Sutherland to father, July 15. Moore, diary. 136Butterfield, recolls. Spirit of the Times, Apr. 17. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 115. Tennery, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 879 (Conner). Bruell, Sea Memories, 57. Lancaster Co. Hist. Soc. Mag., Mar. 6, 1908 (Nauman). Our army loss was nine killed and fifty-one wounded (Ho. 24; 31, 1).

32. Occupation of city and “castle.” American Eagle, V. Cruz, Apr. 6. Nunelee, diary. Collins, diary. Polk, Diary, May 15. Robertson, Remins., 232. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 567–8. Naredo, Orizaba, 108. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 247. Davis, Autobiog., 129–30. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 229, 235 (Scott); 237–8. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1185 (Perry). Apuntes, 166–7. Picayune, Apr. 9, 10, 14. Lawton, Artillery Off., 110, 252Mackall to father, Mar. 30. 12Matson to commodore, Apr. 2. Oswandel, Notes, 98. Semmes, Service, 145–6. Regenerador Repub., Apr. 7. Lawton, Artillery Off., 102–3. 222Hiney, diary. 146Caswell, diary. 322Smith, diary. 270Moore, diary. Id.., Scott’s Campaign, 23. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 907 (Marcy); 911 (Scott). Tennery, diary. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 79–80. Bishop, Journal. Littell, no. 157, p. 326 (Hine). 139W. B. Campbell to wife, Mar. 31. Britannia, May 15 (V. Cruz letter, Apr. 1). 76Landero, gen. orders, Mar. 29–30. 76S. Anna, Apr. 29. Nebel and Kendall, 21.

Some of the National Guards broke up and took flight in order to avoid surrendering. As fast as the arms were stacked American sentries mounted guard over them. When the Mexican soldiers found the victors offering to divide rations with them, their sentiments became friendly, and most of those belonging at Vera Cruz went back to town that day.

1. According to a memo. furnished by the adjutant general to the ordnance bureau, Mar. 24, Scott’s forces were as follows. I. REGULARS. 1 Dragoons, Co. F. 2 Dragoons, Cos. A, B, C, F, I, K. *Mounted Riflemen (on foot). 1 Art., Co. K. 2 Art., Co. A. 3 Art., Co. H. (These three companies had field batteries.) Artillery serving as infantry: *1 Art., Cos. B, F, G, H, I; 2 Art., Cos. B, C, D, F, G, H, I, K; 3 Art., Cos. A, B, D, G, K; *4 Art., Cos. A, D, E, F, G, H. 1 Inf., Cos. C, E, F, G, H, K. *2 Inf., Cos. A, B, D, E, F, G, H, I, K. *3 Inf., Cos. C, D, F, G, H, I, K. 4 Inf., Cos. A, B, C, D, E, I. 5 Inf., Cos. E, F, G, H, I, K. 6 Inf., Cos. A, C, D, E, F, H. *7 Inf., Cos. C, D, E, F, I, K. 8 Inf., Cos. A, B, D, E, H, I, K. (Italics indicate the division of Bvt. Maj. Gen. Worth; asterisks that of Brig. Gen. Twiggs.) II. VOLUNTEERS. (Maj. Gen. Patterson.) Tenn. Mounted regt. Infantry: Baltimore and Wash. battal.; Ga. regt.; Ala. regt.; two Tenn. regts.; two Ill. regts.; Ky. co.; La. co.; La. regt.; two Pa. regts.; N. Y. regt.; S. C. regt. This list includes troops not mentioned by Scott (Mems., ii, 460–5). As Worth was now serving with his brevet rank his command was called a division. The same change was made in Twiggs’s case. A letter of Mar. 13 from Marcy, due to a suggestion from Polk of the day before, urged Scott to make the protection of the troops against yellow fever his prime consideration (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 904; Polk, Diary, Mar. 12, 20). At the same time it gave a slanting assent to the movement against the capital by discussing the question of roads. This was Scott’s first authorization to proceed (So. Quart. Rev., Apr., 1852), and the Cabinet had not decided to have him do so, though he had assumed that Benton’s plan, endorsed by himself, was the basis of his expedition (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 913). The hesitation of the government is illustrated by the fact that Marcy first wrote merely, “If you should occupy an interior position,” which he changed to, “If you should move into the interior” (Marcy papers).

2. This proclamation has been censured on the ground that it exasperated the Mexicans by mentioning their domestic dissensions and bad government. If so, the blame rested primarily on the American government, which had ordered Taylor to circulate a proclamation embodying such ideas (p. 1 of chap. xxxi). The word “unnatural” has been thought unfortunate as suggesting (since ordinary war seemed to Mexico perfectly normal, and Scott could not be supposed to be reflecting upon himself and his government) that the Mexicans were acting in an inhuman and indecent way; but the author does not recall seeing any such point made by them.

3. Many wagons were lost in wrecked vessels. It had been supposed that about two thirds of the animals would be obtained locally, but it was found by April 5 that not one tenth of them could be reckoned upon.

4. Harney proceeded to La Antigua on April 2 with two squadrons of dragoons, a section of artillery and two infantry companies, drove lancers from the village, captured about thirty-five horses and obtained Mexican promises of assistance from the people (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 915–6). He returned the next day. The Alvarado expedition set out on March 30. It was a joint affair designed not only (like Harney’s) to obtain draft animals and beef cattle and open up permanent markets for these desiderata, but to impress and “neutralize” the people of that section, acquire a harbor for Perry’s small vessels, provide a regular supply of water for the squadron, and perhaps capture the Mexican vessels lying there. Perry himself commanded the naval contingent, and Quitman commanded the land force, which consisted of three volunteer regiments (Ga., Ala. and S. Car.), a squadron of dragoons and a section of artillery (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 917–8). The march of about fifty miles (about 44 by the present railroad) was at times difficult and always hot. Late on April 1 Perry and Quitman reached Alvarado, a fishing town of 1200–1500 persons; and the land forces arrived the next day. They found it occupied by an American midshipman and five sailors. Lieut. Hunter, commanding a one-gun propeller, the Scourge, sent down to assist in blockading the town, had violated his orders (probably to show what the naval men were capable of doing, if given a chance to act) by opening fire, upon which the town (though it endeavored later to rescind its action) had offered to surrender. Learning that public property had been taken up the Alvarado River, here a wide, clear, deep stream, he pursued it and, to take advantage of the panic resulting from the fall of Vera Cruz, captured the industrious town of Tlacotálpam. Quitman accepted this turn of events genially, but Perry was furious, and to the disgust of many naval officers and the general public Hunter was tried and cashiered.

To Scott the results of Hunter’s error were serious (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 547). The intention had been to grant capitulations to the towns on terms that would have provided the Americans with a large number of the needed animals (Wash. Union, Sept. 11) or to obtain the same result in some other way; but Hunter’s action, though only one day in advance, gave time for the removal of the livestock. Quitman did, however, arrange with the authorities of Tlacotálpam for at least 500 horses, and opened negotiations for more and for beef cattle. How fruitful these arrangements proved cannot be stated. April 8 about 300 of the Fifth Infantry sailed from Vera Cruz for the same district (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 928), and about April 14 they brought back some wild mustangs.

On retiring from Alvarado the Mexicans burned the few small vessels that constituted the national navy, and spiked or buried the ordnance of the forts. The buried guns were, however, discovered. In all they numbered about sixty, but a large part were valueless carronades. For Quitman’s troops the expedition was unfortunate. A number died and almost all were prostrated. He was back at Vera Cruz April 6. The affair amused the American public hugely. One evidence of this is afforded by the following lines (N. Y. Sun, May 7, 1847):

5. Scott’s preparations for advancing (including the Alvarado expedition). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 903 (Marcy); 908, 912–3, 920, 928, 937, 1221, 1271 (Scott); 915 (Harney); 917 (Quitman); 918 (Mason); 939 (gen. orders). 60Scott to Marcy, Apr. 5. Courrier Français, Apr. 17. 61Harney, report, Apr. 4. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 435. Scott, Mems., ii, 431. Robertson, Remins., 238. Velasco, Geografía, iii, 203. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 230 (Scott); 547 (Jesup). Davis, Autobiog., 140. Delta, May 19. Diccionario Universal (Alvarado). 164Scott to Conner, Mar. 20. 60 Mason to J. L. Smith, Apr. 9. Semmes, Service, 148, 211. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, Mar. 2, 1847. Nebel and Kendall, 23. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1190. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 121. 270Moore, diary. Id.., Scott’s Camp., 44–9, 52. Griffis, Perry, 239. Parker, Recolls., 103–4. 12Captain of Alarm to commodore, Apr. 13. Bennett, Steam Navy, 94, 97. Maclay, Navy, ii, 185. 358Williams to father, Apr. 5. 62Adj. gen. to ordnance dept., Mar. 24. 65Scott, gen. orders 87, 91, 105. 65Id., proclam., Apr. 11. 13Giffard, no. 12, Apr. 13. Polk, Diary, Mar. 12–14. 13Pakenham, no. 7, Jan. 28. Metropol. Mag., Jan., 1908, p. 441. Soley, Porter, 71. Wash. Union, Sept. 11. N. Y. Sun, May 7, 21. Niles, May 1, pp. 131, 141; 22, p. 189. Southwest. Hist. Qtrly., xviii, 216. Steele, Am. Campaigns, i, 120. 76Marin, Jan. 2; Apr. 26. 76López, Jan. 15. 60Plan of Alvarado. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1200 (Mackenzie).

Worth, although he had been given the most prominent place in the operations against Vera Cruz, demanded the leading position in the advance, and felt deeply offended when Scott, mindful of the rights of the Second Division, replied that he would not, even to please his best friend, do an injustice (Mag. Am. Hist., xiv, 573–4). There was a route to the interior via Orizaba, but it was not available for artillery. In reply to Marcy’s despatch of March 13, which suggested that the advance be made from Tuxpán, Scott pointed out the impracticability of that plan (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 909).

6. In January Gen. R. D. de La Vega was made chief of the Division of the East and provided with an army—mostly of paper. The same month Alonzo Wenghieri offered to furnish 50,000 muskets, 25,000 tercerolas (carbines of a certain kind) and 50,000 swords at reasonable prices, but it is not certain that his offer, though endorsed by the war department, was accepted (76to Hacienda, Jan. 14). By March 12, four 16-pounders from Vera Cruz arrived at the national bridge. March 18 orders proper for the situation were despatched to La Vega, but they sound as if issued mainly for form’s sake. In February the government attempted to take control of 25,000 National Guards for the purposes of the war (76circular Feb. 3); but it soon rescinded that unpalatable assumption of authority, and confined itself to asking state governors for them (76circular, Apr. 8).

7. March 24 the northern brigades were at Querétaro on their way south (76acuerdo,[D] Mar. 24). Rangel’s brigade and some artillery left the capital March 28. March 30, 1400 National Guards, who had been turned over to the national government by the governor of the state (82Guerra to gov., Apr. 1), left Puebla to join 700 of the same class already at Jalapa, and some 12-pounders were despatched from the former city. These forces were primarily designed to aid in the defence of Vera Cruz by attacking Scott’s rear. There was great need of money, especially as the attitude of the clergy was now so dubious that even drafts accepted by them were distrusted (Diario, June 8).

8. One method of rousing the public was to excite religious fanaticism. A pamphlet, Clamor de las Ovejas, declared that some of the Vera Cruz churches were to be sold to Protestants, others to Mohammedans, others to pigs, others to worshippers of Venus.

9. Mexican preparations before Santa Anna arrived on the ground. Courrier Français, Apr. 3, 10, 17. 52Consul Black, Apr. 25. Davis, Autobiog., 142. 13Bankhead, no. 34, 1847. Apuntes, 120–2, 168. Revue Indep., Apr. 25, 1845. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 574. Diario, Mar. 29; June 8. Monitor Repub., Mar. 31. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 888. Balbontín, Invasión, 105. 94Canalizo, proclams., Apr. 2, 4. 94Soto, proclams., Jan. 22; Feb. 5. Regenerador Repub., Mar. 31. 84Guerra, decree, Feb. 13. 84Relaciones, circular, Feb. 16. Republicano, Mar. 31. Ramsey, Other Side, 221, note. And from 76 the following (out of a great number). To Rincón, Oct. 10, 11, 1846. To La Vega, Jan. 25; Mar. 18, 20, 27, 1847. Acuerdos, Mar. 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31; Apr. 1. To Gaona, Apr. 1. To Canalizo, Mar. 28, 31; Apr. 1. Gaona, Mar. 18; Apr. 1. Soto, Mar. 7, 22, 26; Apr. 3. G. Gómez, Mar. 18, 19, 25, 26. La Vega, Mar. 22, 24. Canalizo, Mar. 30; Apr. 1, 3. To Soto, Apr. 1. Soto to V. Cruz cong., Dec. 1, 1846. Morales, Oct. 15, 1846; Feb. 2, 6, 1847. Canalizo to his troops, Mar. 29. Guerra, circulars, Feb. 3, 13; Mar. 31; Apr. 8. To comte. gen. Mex., Mar. 25. Canalizo, proclam., Mar. 29. To gov. Puebla, Apr. 1. Gov. Puebla, Mar. 28. A little later Santa Anna had the spiked cannon drawn to Cerro Gordo by cattle.

10. The northern wall of the cañon is much more nearly vertical than the southern. The author went down one side and up the other by rough mule paths.

11. Accounts differ as to the number of men and guns on each tongue but agree that B was much more strongly guarded than A and C. It had supporting works. After the battle R. E. Lee wrote that the highway was commanded by thirty-five Mexican guns (F. Lee, Gen. Lee, 38). Allowing four for El Telégrafo, five for the battery at the camp, and seven for D, we should have nineteen left for the tongues. In all, according to the chief Mexican artillery officer, there were forty-one pieces, so that Santa Anna was able to send additional guns to his left. There seems to have been a 12-pounder at A, but most of the guns were light. The four 16-pounders were at D, and commanded the highway.

12. After the battle Santa Anna reduced his numbers to about 6000 infantry (only about half of them permanent) and 1500 or 2000 cavalry (76May 7; Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 112); but on March 20 (76to La Vega) he had placed the troops from La Angostura at 6000 (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 194, says 5650) to which must be added at least 2000 from the capital (ibid.), 2000 (besides a brigade that arrived just before the battle) from Puebla (note 7), and contingents from Jalapa, Coatepec and other places. Mexican accounts run from Santa Anna’s figures up to 15,000 (Republicano, June 1, correspondent). Canalizo, April 3, proclaimed that more than 12,000 were coming, and the troops to whom he referred did not include all who were present. 13Bankhead placed the number from Mexico at 2500. Roa Bárcena (Recuerdos, 195) specifies 3, 4, 5, 6 and 11 Line regiments, 1, 2, 3, 4 Ligero regiments, 5 and 9 cavalry, and 12 smaller corps of foot and horse. Canalizo’s demand that all citizens rally to the colors does not seem to have been very effective; but many who had given their parole at Vera Cruz were forced to take up arms (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 189). It appears safe to estimate that Santa Anna had at least 10,000, probably 11,000, and quite possibly 12,000 men besides the Puebla brigade under Arteaga, which arrived after the fight had begun. The brigade from Mexico arrived April 11, and the three brigades from the north April 12. After the battle Santa Anna and others attempted to represent the troops as of wretched quality. But certainly he had picked the corps brought from the north, and there is no reason to suppose that the other troops were below the average. Santa Anna pretended that he lacked ammunition, but great quantities were found in the camp after the battle (Oswandel, Notes, 139). The distribution of it was very likely defective, however. It was asserted also that some of the cannon cartridges contained no powder. They should have been inspected. Twenty-nine Irishmen served in the hospital force (76acuerdo, Mar. 30). The army was fairly well supplied with money. April 10 38,000 pesos went from the capital, and the bishop of Puebla sent 10,000.

13. Santa Anna had water brought from El Encero by a ditch, but it only began to run just as the battle opened.

14. Mexican preparations, Apr. 4–16. Delta, May 1. Picayune, May 2. 312Anaya to S. Anna, Apr. 9. 312Guerra to gov. Puebla, Apr. 9. 312Pablo to S. Anna, Apr. 8. 312Guerra to S. Anna, Apr. 9. 312Baranda to S. Anna, Apr. 8. Courrier Français, Apr. 17. Repub., Apr. 22; June 1, 9. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 49. Grant, Mems., i, 134. Apuntes, 121, 169–75. Tributo á la Verdad, 41. S. Anna, Apelación, 33–7. Suárez y Navarro, Causas, 68. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 121. Diario, Mar. 29; Apr. 3, 9, 30; June 10. Gamboa, Impug., 29–32. Ramírez, México, 214, 229. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 157, 189. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 574. Dublán, Legislación, v, 264–5. Monitor Repub., Apr. 24, 27, 28; May 3; Oct. 24. 13Bankhead, no. 34, Apr. 1. Oswandel, Notes, 139. 82Pavón, Apr. 29. Sedgwick, Corres., i, 86. 76Gaona, Apr. 8. 76To Canalizo, Apr. 2. 76To S. Anna, Apr. 9. 76Canalizo, Mar. 29; Apr. 3, 24. 76S. Anna, Apr. 6, 7, 11, 13, 17, 29; May 7. 76Uraga, May 1. 76Memorias by heads of war dept., Nov., 1847. 76Decrees, Apr. 8, 10. 76A great number of less important papers.

No doubt, as Willisen (“Higher Theory of War”) and others have said, combining strategical defensive with tactical defensive is as a rule to be condemned; but here the circumstances were peculiar. The Americans were pursued by the yellow fever, and only a decisive victory could save them from ruin. Hence Santa Anna’s policy cannot be censured unceremoniously. Ripley (War with Mexico) gives the name El Telégrafo to La Atalaya, an error that of course leads to much confusion. Robles had a series of objections to the Cerro Gordo position. It could be turned; the rough and woody country made it possible for the enemy to get near; cavalry could not be used; the line was too long; a threatened point could not be easily reinforced; water was lacking; retreat, especially with artillery, would be difficult (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 197–8).

15. One of the field batteries was Taylor’s; the other was Talcott’s howitzer and rocket battery (R. Jones to ordnance dept., Dec. 3, 1846). Steptoe’s field battery and a squadron of dragoons accompanied Patterson later. The statement regarding the artillery outfit is from Lieut. Hatch (213to father, Apr. 7), who went with Twiggs.

16. Scott has been called rash for sending his army forward and exposing it to attack piecemeal. But (1) had it all formed one column it would have been no safer against a raid from some crossroad; (2) had it been attacked in front, numbers would not have signified, and the individual superiority of the Americans as well as their superior artillery would have given them the advantage; and (3) Santa Anna, having possession of such fine defensive positions, was not likely to make a venturesome attack, especially as the battle of Buena Vista had shown how tenaciously the Americans could defend themselves. The two last points bear also upon the criticism that Santa Anna ought to have attacked Twiggs before the arrival of Pillow and Shields (see remark at the end of note 14). The volunteer division left Vera Cruz April 9 under Patterson. It consisted of two brigades, for Quitman’s men had not sufficient transportation, and probably needed time to recover from the effects of the Alvarado expedition. Capt. Loch, a British naval officer off Vera Cruz, was as much surprised as Scott when it was found that Santa Anna had a large force at Cerro Gordo (12to commodore, Apr. 9).

17. From the national bridge to Cerro Gordo the pavement was not in very good condition. Above the latter point stone blocks took the place of cement. In places, where these had never been laid, or had been taken up by revolutionists, or had been overlaid with stones by floods, the highway was extremely bad.

18. The position looked impregnable but was not, for a besieging force could easily deprive the garrison of provisions and water.

19. The march from Vera Cruz to Plan del Rio. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 920–2, 928 (Scott); 921 (gen. orders 94). Hartman, Journal, 10. Picayune, Dec. 9. Delta, May 15. 312Gutiérrez to gov. Puebla, Apr. 9. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 274 (Twiggs). 217Henshaw papers. Stapp, Prisoners of Perote, 159–60. Raleigh Star, May 5. 280Nunelee, diary. 159Narrative based on papers of F. Collins. 220Higgins to Clutter, Apr. 1, 1851. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 36–48. Davis, Autobiog., 142–4. Apuntes, 169. Ward, Mexico, i, 12; ii, 177–88. Robertson, Visit, i, 269. Ruxton, Adventures (1849), 22–5. Tudor, Tour, ii, 171–5. Bullock, Six Months (1825), i, 32–42. Orbigny, Voyage, 409–10. Robertson, Remins., 238–40, 242. Latrobe, Rambler, 297. Velasco, Geografía, iii, 28, 37, 54, 64. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 123, 132. Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occas. Papers, no. 16. 291Pierce, diary. Journal Milit. Service Instit., v, 38 (Coppée). Bishop, Journal. 60G. W. Smith to Stevens, Apr. 23. Hawthorne, Pierce, 78–85. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 121. 185Memo. on the route. 356Whitcomb, diary. Carleton, address. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 32. 236Judah, diary. Wash. Union, May 1. Vedette, viii, no. 5. 322Smith, diary. Norton, Life. 270Moore, diary. 358Williams to father, Apr. 21. 152Claiborne, memoirs. 136Butterfield, recolls. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. 66Stevens to J. L. Smith, May 7. 66G. W. Smith to Stevens, May 1. 65Scott, gen. orders 91. Thompson, recolls., 11–12. Poinsett, Notes, 25–9. 335Calendario de Ontiveros. 12Loch to Lambert, Apr. 9. Oswandel, Notes, 108–10, 119. Semmes, Service, 162–75. 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Apr. 19. 254McClellan, diary. Mag. Amer. Hist., xiv, 575. Littell, no. 162, p. 546. 139W. B. Campbell to wife, Apr. 8. Moore, Scott’s Camp. 71Diccionario Universal (Puente Nacional).

20. Twiggs and his operations, Apr. 11–13. Maury, Recolls., 29. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 274 (Twiggs). 217Henshaw papers. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, p. 181. 159Narrative based on the papers of Francis Collins. Polk, Diary, Apr. 30. 66Tower to Twiggs, Apr. 16. 60Scott (on Twiggs), remarks on a letter from Worth. Id.., Mems., ii, 432. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 250. Grant, Mems., i, 131. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 25–6, 51–4. Brackett, U. S. Cavalry, 141. Davis, Autobiog., 143–6. Apuntes, 173–5. Robertson, Remins., 240. 270Moore, diary. Lancaster Co. Hist. Soc. Mag., Mar. 6, 1908 (Nauman). Bishop, Journal. 210Bragg to Hammond, Dec. 20, 1847; May 4, 1848. 327Sutherland to father, Aug. —; Nov. 28, 1847. 358Williams to father, Apr. 21. 152Claiborne, mems. 112Beauregard to Patterson, Apr. 20. 204Gouverneur, diary. 66Tower to Maj. Smith, undated. 273Mullan, diary. Lee, Lee, 38. 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Apr. 13. Hist. Teacher’s Mag., Apr., 1912, p. 75. Ho. 60; 30, 1; pp. 921 (gen. orders 94); 928 (Scott). So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1852. 170Crooker to father, Apr. 27. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 268. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 331. Some may ask why Scott put a general like Twiggs forward. Twiggs had a rank and a position that had to be recognized, and his officers and men had their right to see honorable service and win distinction.

21. Major J. L. Smith commanded the engineer company of fifty-one men. Lee had ten of the men, and under his direction Lieut. Foster with eight had charge of building the road “located” by Lee. Lieut. Mason also worked on the road. McClellan with ten was assigned to Pillow’s command, and G. W. Smith with ten to Harney’s (66G. W. Smith to I. I. Stevens, Apr. 23). Tower had charge of the reconnoitring on the Mexican right.

22. I. I. Stevens, one of the engineer officers, 66reporting on May 7, stated in the most distinct manner that according to this plan El Telégrafo was not to be attacked before the highway in its rear should have been occupied in strength, and that insistence upon this point constituted the essential difference between this plan and the operations previously suggested by Beauregard. Scott wrote to Marcy (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261) that he had intended to turn the Mexican position and attack in the rear. He clearly indicated as much in his Memoirs (ii, 432), and his orders for the battle were that Twiggs’s division, supposed to be already near the highway, should move before daybreak to occupy it, while the orders only contemplated an attack in front as likely to be made before 10 o’clock. It was well understood in the army that his plan was to bag Santa Anna’s army, and this implied—since some of the Mexicans were likely to retire early—that the way of escape must be cut off before a frontal attack should be launched. Stevens tried to reach the highway via the Mexican right, but was taken ill and had to return (Stevens, Stevens, i, 124).

23. Scott’s operations, Apr. 12–16. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261 (Scott). Picayune, May 1, 2. 217Henshaw papers. A Soldier’s Honor, 24. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, p. 181. 159Narrative based on the papers of F. Collins. Scott, Mems., ii, 432. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 250. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 56–8. Davis, Autobiog., 144–8. Bishop, Journal. 322Smith, diary. 112Beauregard to Patterson, Apr. 20. 111Stevens to J. L. Smith, May 7. 111G. W. Smith to Stevens, Apr. 23. 111Tower to J. L. Smith, undated. 111Mason to J. L. Smith, Apr. 24. 65Scott, gen. orders 105, 111. 332Tennery, diary. McCabe, Lee, 19, note. 12Loch to Lambert, Apr. 9. Oswandel, Notes, 113–5. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 122–4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 929 (Scott); 939 (Twiggs); 940 (Pillow).

24. The range had to be estimated (322W. B. Smith, diary), and perhaps it was not easy to rectify the estimate by seeing where the shot struck. Many of them flew much too high.

25. Scott’s orders for the battle gave no directions for such a charge. His plan was to place Twiggs’s division and Shields’s brigade, supported by Worth’s command, on the highway in Santa Anna’s rear and attack from that quarter. From one of his reports it appears that he made some suggestion to Twiggs about the possibility of a frontal attack on El Telégrafo—presumably in the case of some unlooked-for turn of events; but he did not expect that officer to create the turn. The charge seems to have been ordered by Scott during the night (213Hatch to father, Apr. 21). To be sure, Scott’s orders spoke of a frontal attack, but evidently the reference was to Pillow’s movement.

The officers of the Rifles were taken by Polk from civil life. Scott offset this by having Major Sumner of the Second Dragoons, a veteran and able soldier, command the corps; but as Sumner had been disabled on Saturday, Major Loring was now at its head. When moving from shelter he exposed his men to being enfiladed by the enemy’s cannon, and the other troops actually cried out, “That’s the way to murder men” (218Henshaw). This illustrates how political appointments are likely to work on the firing line. The Rifles were expected to join in the attack on El Telégrafo after repulsing the enemy on the left, but a part of them were unable to do so (p. 352).

26. Events of Apr. 17–18 {except Pillow’s operations). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 255–95, 298 (Scott’s orders; reports of himself and officers). Maury, Recolls., 37, 44. Hartman, Journal, 11. M’Sherry, El Puchero, 221–3. Picayune, May 1, 6, 9, 19. Delta, May 1, 15; June 18. 252Mackall to father, Apr. 18. 335Trist, May 7, 25. 217Henshaw papers. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1905, p. 213; 1906, pp. 182–3. 159Narrative based on F. Collins papers. 6Riley court of inquiry. 60Plympton to Scott, July 27. 60E. K. Smith to Plympton, July 23. 60J. R. Smith to Polk, Nov. 30, 1848. 60Twiggs to J. R. Smith, Nov. 9, 1848. 60Morris to J. R. Smith, Nov. 15, 1848. 66Russell court of inquiry: orders 155. 223Hirschorn, recolls. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 46–52, 98–114. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 251–2. Grant, Mems., i, 132. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 59–84, 88, 90–1. Davis, Autobiog., 148–52, 155–8. Apuntes, 175–83. Tributo á la Verdad, 42, 49, 62, 136. S. Anna, Apelación, 34–41. Id.., Manifiesto, 1847, 7. Eye witness, Complete History, 79–80. Robertson, Remins., 248–52. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 137–40, 267. Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occas. Papers, no. 16. N. Y. Times, July 16, 1916 (Worth). Bishop, Journal. Nebel and Kendall, 24–5. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 67–8. 66G. W. Smith to Stevens, Apr. 23. Mansfield, Mex. War, 195. 210Bragg to Hammond, May 4, 1848. 254McClellan, diary; to sister, Apr. 22. Diario, Apr. 28, 30; May 20; June 10, 23, 30. Republicano, Apr. 21, 23, 27; June 9; July 10. 84Ampudia to gov. S. L. Potosí, Oct. 10. Gamboa, Impug., 30. Kenly, Md. Vol., 337. Ramírez, México, 227–9, 231, 261. 298Porter, diary. London Times, June 15. Wash. Union, May 10, 11; Oct. 23. Monitor Repub., Apr. 20, 23, 24, 27; May 3, 6; Nov. 1, 30. Spirit of the Times, May 29; June 5. 124Blocklenger, recolls. 327Sutherland to father, Aug. —. Vedette, ii, no. 2. 322Smith, diary. 307Roberts to wife, Apr. 21. 178Davis, diary. 270Moore, diary. 358Williams to father, Apr. 21. 152Claiborne, memoirs. 112Beauregard to Patterson, Apr. 20. 66Stevens to J. L. Smith, May 7. 66Tower to J. L. Smith, undated. 66Mason to J. L. Smith, Apr. 24. Arnold, Jackson, 87. 66G. W. Smith to Lee, Apr. 20. 66Lee to Twiggs, undated. 65Scott, gen. orders 249. 60Riley to Westcott, Nov. 30. 332Tennery, diary. Giménez, Apología. Ho. 85; 30, 1. Journal U. S. Artill.,1892, pp. 419–20. Lee, Gen. Lee, 38. Oswandel, Notes, 116, 122–8. Semmes, Service, 178–81, 183. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 887–94. 82Soto to gov. Puebla, Apr. 18. 82Pavón to Puebla sec. state, Apr. 29. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1089 (Hitchcock). Niles, May 22, pp. 183, 188. 148Chamberlain, recolls. Elderkin, Biog. Sketches, 66. Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit., xlii, 128. Henderson, Science of War, 215. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 126. Smithwick, Evolution, 286. 76S. Anna, Apr. 17, 21; May 7. 76Canalizo, Apr. 18, 21. 76Carrera, May 1. 76Circular, Apr. 20. 76Ampudia, Apr. 25. 76To Brito, May 25. 76Alvarez, Oct. 28. 76Canalizo to Villaba & Co., Apr. 24; to son, Apr. 24. 76Memorias by heads of depts., Nov., 1847.

Remarks on the battle (April 18). The perfect confidence displayed in Scott’s orders for the battle is noteworthy. No doubt it had a great effect on the troops. The orders to Worth were rather vague. Probably this was because the course of the battle was expected to indicate how his division could be used to the best advantage, but possibly on account of his intense jealousy of Twiggs it was not deemed wise to say clearly that he was to support Twiggs. In fact he followed Twiggs, ascended El Telégrafo, saw the white flag at the tongues, and sent Harney and Childs (Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 74) to accept the surrender of the Mexican right wing. The movement assigned to Twiggs was hazardous, but the military quality of Santa Anna and the Mexican troops was now well understood.

General Shields was struck by a grape shot that passed through the upper part of his body; and his recovery, due to high surgical skill and the most devoted nursing, seemed almost miraculous. When Shields fell, Col. E. D. Baker took command. Canalizo was ordered to charge Shields’s brigade; but the ground was only partly cleared, and Santa Anna reported that a charge was not practicable. Canalizo was, however, accused by many of causing the Mexican defeat by letting the Americans reach the highway. He could have dismounted all his cavalry, as he did his cuirassiers, and 2000 fresh troops—especially if aided by those at the tongues—might have done a good deal; but probably he believed that the battle had already been lost. When Shields’s men approached the highway they came upon a party of Mexican surgeons, and on learning their business became instantly, according to the surgeons, their friends and protectors (Diario, Apr. 30). The chief Mexican surgeon stated that the Americans made no distinction between the two nationalities in bringing wounded men to the hospitals (Courrier Français, May 5). Worth’s command, deprived of its expected share in the battle through Twiggs’s departure from Scott’s plan, played the part of a reserve. Harney’s charge may have been launched just when it was because a thinning out of the summit of El Telégrafo (probably due to sending troops against Riley) led to the belief that the La Atalaya guns were doing great execution (Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 81). Harney placed the Seventh Infantry on his right, deploying some of the men as skirmishers to guard that flank, and the Third on his left, protected by the Rifles. (In consequence of Loring’s incompetence (213Hatch to father, Apr. 21) the Rifles did not charge in a body or effectively.) This line was supported by the First Artillery. Some of Harney’s men joined with Riley’s in capturing the minor crest. The La Atalaya battery fired over the heads of the charging Americans as long as this appeared to be safe. Vázquez died bravely at his post, whereas a number of high Mexican officers proved recreant. After the fighting began near the summit of El Telégrafo the Mexican cannon placed there could not be used, for they would have injured Mexicans as well as Americans. Santa Anna appears to have done all in his power to stem the tide of defeat. About 1000 Puebla men under Gen. Arteaga arrived during the battle. They were placed at the headquarters battery, but took flight early. S. Anna’s line was about a mile and a half long.

27. It has been argued that Pillow’s attack should have been a “mere feint,” i.e. threat. But (1) Scott had reason to fear that the purpose of a “mere feint” would be detected as soon as the grand battle should begin, and that the feint would fail of its purpose (see Donaldson and Becke, 387); and (2) Pillow had troops of superior mettle, who probably would not have been satisfied to make a mere threat (Nebel and Kendall, 25, note). In ordering this attack Scott violated Napoleon’s principle, which was to turn the enemy’s flank without dividing his own army (Johnston, Foundations, 180), but the circumstances warranted doing so. In particular Santa Anna had shown that he did not wish to be aggressive, and Scott intended to keep him busy (see Hamley, Operations, 160).

28. Pillow had also a few Tennessee horse and (attached to Haskell’s regiment) a Kentucky company—in all about 2000 men (Robertson, Remins., 244).

29. The text is based primarily on the full and minute account given in the diary of George B. McClellan (who accompanied Pillow and whose integrity and technical ability will not be questioned) and the following documents: reports of Engineers Stevens (66May 7) and Tower (66undated); Haskell and sixteen officers (Picayune, May 29); Haskell (ib., June 28); Pillow, reply (ib., June 9); Id., 61substitute report, May 29 (to take the place of his published report, which he admitted was not correct); 139letters of Col. Campbell, an able and fair man (who said privately the affair was most badly managed; also that Pillow was no general, and on the field had no judgment or decision); 224Williams to Hitchcock, June 4, 1849; Wynkoop, July 16, in Picayune, Sept. 19; Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 125 (Stevens says, e.g., that Pillow’s attack failed because “made prematurely, with great precipitation, without order in the assaulting columns, and before the supporting columns were in position, and at the wrong point,” and that it, “both as to time and as to direction, was earnestly remonstrated against by the engineer officer directing the attack, by the personal staff of the general, and by Col. Campbell, second in command”). Of course Ripley, who wrote his history of the war in consultation with Pillow, gives a misleading account of this affair as of others.

The author used also the following sources: Sen. 51; 32, 1. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 257 (Scott); 258 (orders 111); 294 (Patterson); 296 (Pillow). 217Henshaw papers. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 109. 69Pillow to adj. gen., June 25, 1848. 69Ripley to adj. gen., June 25, 1848. 66Tower to Twiggs, Apr. 16. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 50. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 251. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 593. Grant, Mems., i, 133. Davis, Autobiog., 146. Apuntes, 173, 181. Weekly Courier and N. Y. Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848. Robertson, Remins., 244–8. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 139. 293Pillow to wife, June 9. 293Rains to Mrs. Pillow, Apr. 18. Republicano, June 9, 24. Picayune, May 9; Sept. 11. México á través, iv, 654. Hillard, McClellan, 18, 19. Nat. Intelligencer, June 11. Monitor Repub., June 24. 358Williams to father, Apr. 21. Vedette, viii, no. 5. Oswandel, Notes, 110–1, 122–35. Semmes, Service, 182–3. Hitchcock in semi-weekly Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1848. 100Mata, Apr. 18. 82Pavón to Puebla sec. state, Apr. 29. 288Tapper to wife, May 3. Niles, June 5, p. 219; Oct. 2, p. 75. Boston Atlas, Dec. 13. Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 116. 316Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Johnstone, Foundations, 180. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1852. 181Armstrong to Donelson, July 4. 139Cummings to Campbell, May 12; June 13. 76Carrera, May 1. 76S. Anna, May 7. The reason why reversing the regiments caused trouble seems to have been that infantry were accustomed to manœuvre and fight in a certain formation, and felt awkward if the right was unexpectedly brought out on the left. As Wynkoop had farther to march than Haskell and did not wish to attack before his support was in position, placing Campbell third in the line of march involved a delay. One derives a lesson on the value of official reports from Patterson’s representation that Pillow was wounded while gallantly leading his brigade (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 295).

30. The American soldiers were not pleased with this policy. The American government expressed itself against it and, placing an undeserved value on Mexican officers, ordered that no more of them should be paroled except for special reasons. It is probably enough to say that Scott was in the best position to judge; but one may remark that Santa Anna’s difficulty was not so much to obtain men as to obtain arms. Further grounds for releasing them are mentioned in Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 257. According to Gen. Pavón, Gen. La Vega and twenty-four other officers were not paroled. Some six declined to give their paroles. Among the spoils were a large amount of ammunition, $11,791.19 in cash (Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 24), and a wooden leg (supposed to have belonged to Santa Anna) now preserved in the capitol at Springfield, Ill.

31. Pursuit, losses, prisoners, spoils. Ho. 60; 30, 1, 948, 1012, 1221 (Scott); 1089 (Hitchcock); 1233 (Marcy). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 258 (gen. orders 111); 262 (Scott); 276, 278, 283, etc. Scott, Mems., ii, 443. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 253. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, 86–7, 106–7. Tributo á la Verdad, 62. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 189. S. Anna, Apelación, 40. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 140, 179. Ho. 24; 31, 1. Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. Republicano, Apr. 27.; June 9. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 122, 136. Courrier Français, May 5. México á través, iv, 655. Monitor Repub., Apr. 24; May 6. 322Smith, diary. Williams to father, Apr. 21. 152Claiborne, mems. 332Tennery, diary. 82Pavón to Puebla sec. state, Apr. 29. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16. Niles, May 15, p. 164; May 29, p. 201. McClellan, diary. Nebel and Kendall, 25. Robertson, Remins., 249, 253. 76Carrera, Apr. 27; May 1. 76Ampudia, Apr. 25. 76Canalizo, Apr. 18. 76Id.., undated. 76S. Anna, May 7. 76Junta directiva, May 3. 76G. Gómez to Gaona, Apr. 18. The cavalry appear to have been late in beginning the pursuit. Ripley (War, etc., ii, 75) says Scott was so busy that he forgot to send for the cavalry, but Scott’s orders for the battle put the responsibility on the commander of that corps, which was placed in reserve on the highway with a field battery (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 259). In places, too, they found the highway cut or blocked.

32. A deputation of the ayuntamiento met Patterson (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 296), and were promised protection on condition that no liquor should be sold to the troops. The term “nondescript costumes” applies primarily to the volunteers, but probably some of the regulars had lost parts of their outfits.

33. Scott’s report was a model in concealing facts; and Worth, writing to a member of his family, called it “a lie from beginning to end.” Gen. U. S. Grant, doubtless recording without investigation his early impressions, wrote in his Personal Memoirs (i, 132): “Perhaps there was not a battle of the Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place,” and such has been the accepted opinion, though a thoughtful comparison of the orders with Scott’s own report (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 258, 261) is enough to disprove this view. For example, Scott in his orders, intending to attack from the enemy’s rear, assigned no troops to the frontal attack on El Telégrafo, which was the main feature of the actual battle. Unpublished documents of a wholly unbiassed character disprove it still further. As two more illustrations, the artillery, for which infinite trouble was taken to make a passable road, did not figure at all in the battle (though a section of Taylor’s battery went that way in season to join in the pursuit), and a court of inquiry declared that Riley’s brigade, which played a most important rôle, was diverted from its original destination—a finding approved by Scott (65gen. orders 249). Robert Anderson said that if Scott’s orders had been carried out, not a Mexican would have escaped (Lawton, Artillery Officer, 137); and Davis, Shields’s aide, stated that Twiggs failed to execute Scott’s orders and disappointed Scott’s expectations (Autobiography, 148). See also notes 22 and 25. It is possible that one reason why Scott in his report commended Twiggs’s course was that, even if satisfied as to the practicability of his own plan, he did not care to raise an issue on that question. Obviously it would have been impossible to prove now that the plan was practicable, and a bitter, harmful controversy would have resulted. That on general principles such an exposure of the American flank was very hazardous could not be denied.

34. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 296 (Patterson). 217Henshaw papers. 159Narrative based on F. Collins papers. Robertson, Remins., 253–7. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 16. (King Death) Griffis, Perry, 217. 298Porter, diary. Monitor Repub., Apr. 24, 27. 322Smith, diary. 66G. W. Smith to Stevens, May 1. Oswandel, Notes, 140. 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Apr. 19. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 948 (Scott). 254McClellan, diary. Ramírez, México, 260.

1. Worth’s advance. Henshaw narrative. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 255. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 154. Davis, Autobiog., 173. Delta, July 8. Picayune, May 19. 159Collins papers, Apr. 21; June 19. México á través, iv, 655. Tornel, Breve Reseña, 345. Robertson, Visit, i, 303. Orbigny, Voyage, 411. Lyon, Journal, ii, 181. Balbontín, Estado, 22. Velasco, Geografía, iii, 97, 99. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 141–4. Robertson, Remins., 276. 68Scott to Worth, May 6. Colección de Itinerarios. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. Oswandel, Notes, 162. Semmes, Service, 217–22. 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Apr. 25. 185Memo. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 261 (Scott); 300 (Worth). Ramírez, México, 228–9. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 236–9. 254McClellan to sister, Apr. 22. 236Judah, diary. Moore, Scott’s Campaign, 10–2. Norton, Life. Diccionario Universal (Las Vigas and Perote). 327Sutherland to father, undated. Ward, Mexico, ii, 193–5. Green, Journal, 238. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 944–6, 948 (Scott). 364Worth to daughter, Apr. 30. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 58, 60, 110. Tributo á la Verdad, 43–6. 76Gaona, Mar. 4, 8, 15; Apr. 8, 19. 76To Id.., Apr. 17. 76Canalizo, Apr. 21, 24, etc. 76Baneneli, Apr. 24. 76Bravo, Apr. 23. 76S. Anna, Apr. 27. The distance from Jalapa to Perote was called about thirty miles.

2. “Convoy” will be used to signify a line of wagons or pack-mules or both transporting merchandise or supplies under escort. Among the difficulties in getting articles from the coast were the sandy road, the heat, the weakness and insufficient number of animals, the shortage of wagons, and above all the want of good drivers and conductors (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 127). Scott had supposed that successive bodies of new troops would escort the convoys up, but the diversion of these to the Rio Grande for some time (in consequence of S. Anna’s advance against Taylor) made it necessary to weaken his forces by sending escorts from Jalapa (61Scott to Wilson, Apr. 26). The policy of treating the Mexicans kindly required more self-support and therefore larger trains than would otherwise have been necessary. Moreover, in order to avoid a reverse, which would have had consequences of peculiar gravity in Mexico, Scott had to avoid risks.

3. It has been argued (e.g. by Semmes) that Scott was in fact able to obtain subsistence from the country all the spring and summer, and therefore the matter involved no difficulties (Service, 208); but Scott had to ascertain beforehand through agents (Delta, May 18) both that subsistence existed and that it could be obtained; and to make the success of his precautions a basis for asserting that he should not have waited to take them, is unreasonable. Scott said later that he might have rushed ahead by depending upon the provisions near at hand, but that within a week the army would have had to scatter and fight for supplies (Mems., ii, 553). The resources of the country were found to be mostly at a distance from the line of march (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 949). Time was required to select intelligent, reliable agents, and they needed time to go and come. A particular reason for deliberation lay in the fact that the new crops would not be ready before about the middle of June. It should be added that some statements of Semmes and others regarding material elements of the situation are contradicted by Scott’s reports written at the time. Semmes was probably influenced by Worth, whose aide he was.

4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 904. Marcy forgot this when he severely censured Scott for dismissing the men before their time was out (ibid., 1245).

5. By the 61field return of May 7 Scott had: Engineer Co. (Smith), 43; Ordnance Co. (Huger), 60; First Div. (Worth), 2331; Second Div. (Twiggs), 2216; Dragoons (Harney), 433; volunteers (Quitman), 2030. The disparity between Scott’s numbers as figured at Washington and his numbers as counted at the front is suggested by the fact that on April 26 his volunteers (aside from those now discharged) were estimated by the adjutant general as 4994 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 928). The regiments that went home were the Georgia, the Alabama, the Third and Fourth Illinois, and the First, Second and Third Tennessee.

6. Scott at Jalapa (except his proclamation, etc.: Note 8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 910, 944–8, 954–8, 1221 (Scott); 983–92; 950 (H. L. Scott); 904, 953, 1241 (Marcy); 967 (Worth). 61Scott to Wilson, Apr. 26. 68Worth court of inquiry, proceedings. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, i, 278; ii, 118–23, 126–7, 129–30, 143–4. 66Beauregard to Smith, May 10. 52Trist to Buchanan, May 7. Davis, Autobiog., 164–6. Hartman, Journal, 13. 330Scott to Cadwalader, Apr. 25. 304Patterson, orders 10, May 1. (The district) Robertson, Visit, i, 278; Ruxton, Adventures (1915), 56; Kendall, Narrative (N. Y., 1844), ii, 398; Orbigny, Voyage, 410; Lyon, Journal, ii, 186; Velasco, Geografía, iii, 99. 362G. A. Worth to Van Buren, May 20. Robertson, Remins, 261, 275. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. 218Henshaw narrative. Löwenstern, Le Mexique, 26. 68Scott to Worth, May 6. 65Scott, gen. orders 128, 129, 135–6, Apr. 30, 30; May 4, 5. 332Tennery, diary. Thompson, Recolls., 13. Oswandel, Notes, 142, 149, 152. Sen. 14; 30, 1, p. 6 (Scott). Semmes Service, 189–90, 207–10. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528 (Hitchcock). 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Nov. 2, 1846. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124, 129 (Scott). Picayune, May 4, 7, 11; Nov. 14. Steele, Amer. Campaigns, i, 110. 335Scott to Trist, July 21, 1848. 61Field report, May 7, 1847. 61Scott to Wilson, May 2. Moore, Scott’s Camp., 68. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 236. 322Smith, diary. 270Moore, diary. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Polk, Message, Feb. 13 (Richardson, iv, 515). Scott, Mems., ii, 452, 466, 553. London Times, Aug. 6. Diario, Aug. 5. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 133, 135. (Bounty) U. S. Statutes at Large, ix, 184. Upton, Mil. Policy, 215. So. Qtrly. Review, Apr., 1852, 376–85. 6lScott, memo., Nov. 29, 1846 (12 new regts.). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45–6. 364Worth to daughter, Apr. 30. Bishop, Journal. 112Beauregard to Smith, May 2. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 60. 60Scott to Marcy, Apr. 5. Stevens, Campaigns, 16. 139Five colonels to Scott, May 1. 62Adj. gen. to Brooke, May 29. (Govt. will move) 76To S. Anna, Apr. 21.

The Spanish minister reported that if Scott had been prepared to attack the capital immediately after April 18, he could have taken it without a shot (no. 517, June 29). Patterson left the army at this time because the return of so many volunteers destroyed his command, and Pillow left because he had been appointed a major general and wished to bring on his division. Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 514) says Scott could have established a garrison of 4000 at Mexico and held the city. But assassinations and sickness would soon have reduced his numbers. Parties sent out for provisions and forage would have been cut off. The Mexicans, not yet thoroughly beaten, would have been encouraged by the isolation of so weak a force, as they had been by the size of Taylor’s army. They might have been able to starve out the garrison. The result would probably have been at best that a rescue-army would have had to fight its way to the capital without the assistance of Scott, his regular officers and his veteran troops. He had no right to take such a risk, especially when it seemed very doubtful whether success in holding the capital would signify much.

7. This agent, whose name has been given as Campos and (probably correctly) as Campomanes, appears to have been the parish priest of Jalapa (Baz, Juárez, 47, note). The paper, which was printed first in Spanish and then in English (76Hitchcock to Worth, May 12), may be summarized as follows: It is my duty, Mexicans, to make known certain facts that are purposely concealed from you. For the sake not only of ourselves but of the whole American continent and of republican institutions, we of the United States made every effort consistent with honor to adjust our difficulties with Mexico, but the patriotic Herrera was thrown from power, and the new government, ignoring your interests in order to further its monarchical designs, compelled my nation to take up arms. Like you, we hoped that good would result from the overthrow of Paredes, and therefore we permitted Santa Anna to return; but, again like you perhaps, we were mistaken as to his intentions. What has followed, you know. Your troops, whose devotion and valor we admire, have been badly led, and even betrayed or deceived; and he has not only rewarded those who waged civil war at Mexico, but insulted the brave defenders of Vera Cruz. Recently the battle at Cerro Gordo showed what you may expect from him. Everywhere generals long supported in idleness by the nation have exhibited a lack of honor or skill, while the dead or wounded soldiers, abandoned on the field, have not been given by their leaders even the poor recompense of a grave. The clergy and all other peaceable and useful citizens have been, and still are, taxed, menaced and sacrificed, whereas criminals go unpunished. Can this be called liberty? The Mexicans, I am sure, have the courage to admit mistakes that involve no dishonor, and to adopt for the future a policy of peace, of liberty and of harmony with their brethren of the United States. My troops, as your bishops and priests will testify, have not committed the outrages alleged against us for the purpose of exciting your anger. We adore the same God as you, and many of our people and of our army are Roman Catholics. We punish crime and reward merit; we respect property—especially that of the Church—and we seek your friendship. Abandon prejudice, then; cease to be victims of the ambitious; act as a great American nation. If, however, the war must go on, my country will send—should they be needed—100,000 men, and settle the pending difficulties in a decisive manner. Guerilla warfare, should it be persisted in, would lead to reprisals, and you could not blame us for your sufferings. I have set out for Puebla and Mexico, and shall certainly reach those places; but my desire is peace, friendship, union. It is for you to choose between these and war (Tributo á la Verdad, doc. 18).

It has been said that this proclamation, by opening old political sores and insulting the Mexicans, did more harm than good (Southern Quarterly Review, April, 1852, p. 394); but (1) even the formal reply made to it admitted its truth, and the facts outlasted any temporary resentment that may have been produced in some minds; (2) it was intended for the common people, with whom plain, solid interests had more influence than high-flown sentiments of pride; (3) the clericals, who suggested the contents of the proclamation, were shrewd men; (4) the fury of Santa Anna against it (76May 18) is sufficient evidence that he saw it would injure him; and (5) we have direct proof that it was received eagerly by the Mexicans. See, for example, Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 240–1.

Closely allied with the clerical party were the monarchists, who, though comparatively few, wielded much influence on account of their wealth and social position. They had good reason to fear the United States but they hated Santa Anna; and it was suspected that they wished the people to realize that without European aid they were helpless.

Among minor matters attended to by Scott at Jalapa were the establishment of a battery commanding the city, and the creation of the military department of Jalapa (Plan del Río to La Hoya, inclusive).

8. The understanding with the clericals, etc. (Beach) 56Report, June 4; N. Y. Sun, May 19, 22. (Agent) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 255–6; 68Id.to Worth, May 10; Baz, Juárez, 47, note; Apuntes, 192; Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (Scott). Tributo á la Verdad, 49, 54, 56 and doc. no. 18 (proclam. of May 11). S. Anna, Apelación, 41–3. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 311. Consideraciones, 3, 7, 22–3. (Priests tolerant) Kendall, Narrative (N. Y., 1844), ii, 341–3; Consideraciones, 32, 37; Lawton, Artill. Officer, 160–1, 175. (True) 13Bankhead, no. 57, May 29; Impug. del Manif. London Times, July 15. Apuntes, 193. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 127 (Marcy). Ramírez, México, 239, 256–7, 263, 272. México á través, iv, 661. 236Judah, diary, May 2, 6, 17, 26. 95Protest, Apr. 12. Monitor del Pueblo, Apr. 29. 95Sánchez, proclam., Apr. 29. 95Orders, May 8. 95Ayunt., proceedings. Picayune, June 30. 82Otero, proclam., Apr. 26. 82Baranda to gov., Apr. 24 and reply (draft). 82Isunza, proclam., May 13. (Crowning) Scott, Mems., ii, 549. (Proclam. of May 11) Wash. Union, June 12. Courrier des Etats Unis, May 22. Mata, Reflecciones. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 967, 995 (Worth); 968 (proclam.) Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 190. 76Winette, statement, May 2. 76To S. Anna, May 14. 76S. Anna, May 18. 76Hitchcock to Worth, May 12 (intercepted). 76Fúrlong, May 17.

9. His intellectual plane is suggested by the fact that after the battle he promptly sent instructions to his mistress but not to his second in command (76Canalizo, Apr. 24).

10. At this juncture appeals were again made to the Roman Catholics, particularly the Irish, of the American army, and apparently 2–300 deserted while at Jalapa (Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 144). One appeal said, “Are Catholic Irishmen to be the destroyers of Catholic temples, the murderers of Catholic priests, and the founders of heretical rites i this pious country?” A large amount of money seems to have been collected by Santa Anna at this time. The Manifiesto of Vera Cruz State (Monitor Republicano, Dec. 19, 1847) asserted that in fifteen days he obtained 120,000 pesos, though he said (May 9) he had received less than 25,000 (Gamboa, Impug., 35).

11. Santa Anna’s flank position was even more favorable than Washington’s at Morristown. While he lingered near Vera Cruz, Scott could not feel safe, and his trains were in imminent danger. Had he remained there, Scott, whose small numbers would not have permitted him to send an adequate detachment to Orizaba, might have felt compelled to go there with his whole army, and much embarrassment might have resulted (Steele, American Campaigns, i, 125–6. W. B. Lane, The United Service, June, 1896, p. 485. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, 146).

12. Santa Anna’s operations till he reached Puebla. Only the principal documents can be cited here. Tributo á la Verdad, 48–9, 54, 136. Picayune, May 6. Diario Sept. 10. 312Guerra to S. Anna, Apr. 8. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 265–7, 570, 634. S. Anna, Apelación, app., 72–3, 76. 366Id.., Address to Amer. soldiers, Apr. —. Id.., Detall, 8. Defensa de ... Estrad. S. Anna, Manifiesto, Mar. 24, 1848. 12Loch to admiralty, Apr. 20, 1847. Apuntes, 183–91. Gamboa, Impug., 36. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 274. 13Bankhead, no. 42, 1847. Courrier Français, May 5. Ramírez, México, 261. México á través, iv, 660–1. 88Córdoba ayunt., proceedings, Apr. 26–9. 82Official docs., Apr. 20–30. 82Prefect of Matamoros, Apr. 26. (Indians) 82Prefect Tlapa, May 13. Republicano, May 4. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Nat. Intelligencer, June 2. Monitor Repub., May 4, 23. (Tlacotálpam) Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 547. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 190. S. Anna, Comunic. Oficial. Carreño, Jefes, cclxx. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 260. 76Carrera, Apr. 27. (Chiquihuite.) 76Acuerdo, Mar. 29; 76Soto, Apr. 3; 76to Soto, Apr. 1. 76Canalizo, Apr. 21, 24, 28. 76To S. Anna, Apr. 21. 76To Canalizo, Apr. 21. 76To Bravo, Apr. 21. 76Fúrlong, May 9. 76Gov. to comte. gen. Oaxaca, May 4. 76S. Anna, Apr. 27. 76Id.to Rosa, Feb. 5, 1848.

13. Santa Anna’s operations after he reached Puebla (except the Amozoc fight). Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 250–2, 255, Tributo á la Verdad, 49–53, 56–7. S. Anna, Apelación, 41–3. Id.., Detall, 8. 166Pommarès to Conner, Aug. 29, 1846, confid. Donnavan, Adventures, 99. Dos Palabras. London Times, July 9. Apuntes, 192–3. Gamboa, Impug., 33–5. Ramírez, México, 260, 282. México á través, iv, 661. 95Protest, Apr. 12. Monitor del Pueblo, Apr. 29. 82Comte. gen. to gov., May 10. 82Letter to secy., May 11. 95Puebla ayunt., proceedings, May 10–15. 82Isunza, proclam., May 12. 199S. Anna to Giménez, May 15. Diario, May 10. Monitor Repub., May 13, 23; Dec. 12. Baz, Juárez, 47, note. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 190. 312Bishop Puebla to S. Anna, Apr. 8. 76S. Anna, Apr. 27, 29; May 11, 15. 76To S. Anna, Apr. 20, 30. 76To Bravo, Apr. 21. 76To Gaona, Apr. 21. 76Carrera, Apr. 23. 76Fúrlong, May 9. 76S. Anna to Rea, May 12.

14. The American advance to Puebla (including the Amozoc fight). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 944–8, 957 (Scott); 967, 994 (Worth). 61Scott to Wilson, Apr. 23. 218Henshaw narrative. Tributo á la Verdad, 50. Scott, Mems., ii, 460. Grant, Mems., i, 135. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 159, 161, 175–6. S. Anna, Apelación, 41–2. 303Worth to Quitman, May 10. 159Collins papers, May 20; July 3–8. Robertson, Visit, i, 312. Orbigny, Voyage, 412. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 145, 156, 162, 170–4, 207–8. Journal Milit. Serv. Instit., xvii (Van Deusen). Löwenstern, Le Méxique, 31. Smith, To Mexico, 153, 163, 165 (nothing in U. S. equal to Puebla), 166. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 527. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 191, 276. 213Hatch to father, June 3. 68Scott to Worth, May 6. Colección de Itinerarios. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. Semmes, Service, 225–6, 230–7. Apuntes, 193–6. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (Scott). Gamboa, Impug., 36. México á través, iv, 662. 236Judah, diary. Moore, Scott’s Camp., 84–96. Rosa, Impresiones, passim. 270Moore, diary. Steele, Amer. Camps., i, 107, 110. Diario, May 16. Ward, Mexico, ii, 201. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 140, 142. 364Worth to daughter, Apr. 30. 76Prefect of S. J. de los Llanos, May 11. 76Comte. milit. Huamantla, Apr. 29. 76To Bravo, Apr. 26. 76Fúrlong, May 5. 76Bravo, Apr. 23. 76S. Anna, May 13, 15. 76To S. Anna, May 14. 76S. Anna to Rea, May 12. And others.

Santa Anna, to justify his course, said he felt compelled to leave Puebla on account of the unfavorable local conditions and the approach of the Americans (Detall, 8). Worth did not have outposts and scouts on the alert, as he should have had, at Amozoc, and knew nothing about the roads (Stevens, Stevens, i, 142). Scott’s delay showed that he did not feel strong enough to advance to the capital. That city was therefore in no danger from his army. If Santa Anna, instead of going there, had now gathered all the Mexican strength between Puebla and Vera Cruz and prevented reinforcements from reaching Scott, the latter would have been in a hard position.

15. The Puebla ayuntamiento archives contain the agreement signed at Chachapa by Worth. Later he sought to modify this (68orders 31), calling it merely a memorandum (68to H. L. Scott, June 16), and on May 20 he signed a new 95version. Naturally the Pueblans held to the former (68Dorán to Scott, June 17). For general orders 20 see p. 455.

16. Semmes represents Worth’s régime as entirely satisfactory to the civil authorities (Service, 275). This illustrates the fact that caution is necessary in reading what he says when Worth is concerned, for the records of the ayuntamiento give a different impression. For Worth’s characteristics see chap. xii, note 8. The Southern Quarterly Review, April, 1852, 406, note, said Worth “was quite superficial, had no solid or profound attainments, nor was he gifted with grasp of mind requisite to high combinations and extended operations.” Robert Anderson remarked once that he hoped Worth would not, “from a fit of passion, alter his opinions” (Anderson Artill. Officer, 32). Hitchcock in N. Y. Courier and Enquirer (semi-weekly), Mar. 1, 1848: Worth has striking manners and great felicity in conversation, but is utterly destitute of stability and judgment.

17. Worth’s operations at Puebla. 68Worth court of inquiry, proceedings, documents. Weekly Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848. Tributo á la Verdad, 12, 48, 51–2. 224H. L. Scott to Worth, June 20. 61Scott to Wilson, Apr. 26. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 257. (Alarms) Grant, Mems., i, 136; Delta, July 8; 218Henshaw narrative; 307Roberts, diary; Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 527–8. 303Gen. orders 128. Collins papers. Robertson, Visit, i, 314. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 30. Bullock, Six Months (1825), i, 83. León, Hist. Gen., 477. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 169, 174–5, 226. Journal des Débats, July 6, 1847. Semmes, Service, 210, 254, 264, 275. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 912. Apuntes, 193–5. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (Scott). Gamboa, Impug., 33–4. Ramírez, México, 261, 267–8, 272. México á través, iv, 662. 236Judah, diary. Monitor del Pueblo, Apr. 29. 95Ayunt., orders, May 8. 95Ayunt., proceedings and corresp. with Worth. 95W. to first alcalde, May 18. 82Bravo, proclam., Apr. 28. 82Isunza, proclam., May 13. 270Moore, diary. Davis, Autobiog., 274. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 61, 86–7. Monitor Repub., May 2, 21; June 5. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 994 (Worth). Niles Jan. 15, 1848, p. 311. 364Worth to Sprague, July 29, 1847. 76S. Anna, May 13, 16. 76Fúrlong, May 13. 76Worth, May 12. 76Bravo, Apr. 30. 76Worth to Furlong, May 17. 76To Fúrlong, May 20.

Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 115) points out very pertinently that Worth placed his troops injudiciously at Puebla. Worth’s errors bore most unfortunate fruit. Scott, before knowing or suspecting what had been conceded to Mexican laws, made sharp comments on the attitude of the Puebla authorities. Naturally he felt seriously troubled. Worth even allowed them to try citizens who had killed American soldiers, and of course the culprits were acquitted (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 527; 95ayunt. to Worth, May 22). Scott thought seriously of evacuating the city and recapturing it in order to wipe out that concession; but, concluding that such a course would be rather farcical, he simply overrode the concession by republishing general orders 20 (chap. xxxi, note 22). This action and the comments angered Worth. Scott angered him further by requesting him to withdraw the 68circular of June 16, which was impolitic, implied that Worth held an independent command, and if entitled to credence (Lawton, Artill. Officer, 227) should have been given to headquarters, so that all the troops could be warned (224H. L. Scott to Worth, June 20). Worth therefore demanded a court of inquiry (65gen. orders 196). Quitman, Twiggs and P. F. Smith formed the court and sat on June 30. Their 68conclusions strongly condemned the circular, the terms granted to Puebla and Worth’s complaints against Scott; and they pronounced him worthy of a severe rebuke, as certainly he was. Scott could not avoid approving the verdict and publishing it in orders (65no. 196), but these orders were made known only to chiefs of the general staff and commanders of divisions and brigades. From this time Worth was no doubt in his heart a mortal enemy of Scott. Unhappily, more will be heard of this matter. As for criticising Scott, Worth wrote on July 29 (364to S.) that Scott might have entered Mexico city by May 20, in which case (it was Worth’s “firm belief”) “peace would have immediately resulted”—a very superficial judgment. Worth added: “We gain victories and halt until all the moral advantages are lost.” Hitchcock well said that Worth looked only at his ability to march troops to a certain place, while Scott had to see also how the advance could be supported and supplied (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). (Other references for this note. 68Scott to Worth, June 16. 68Worth to Scott, June 20. 68Id.., order 61, June 20. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 226–8. 68Worth to H. L. Scott, June 16. 68Scott to Worth, May 6. Nacional (Atlixco), May 16. Davis, Autobiog., 270–1, 274.)

18. At Jalapa he left Brev. Col. Childs with the First Artillery (five companies), the Second Pennsylvania and three companies of the First Pennsylvania; at Perote seven companies of the First Pennsylvania with some artillerists; and at each place a troop of dragoons (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125). The stock of ammunition was still inadequate, and the paymaster had only half of his estimate for January-April (ibid., 124–5).

19. Domínguez, leader of the Spy Company, had been an honest weaver, it was said, but on being robbed by a Mexican officer, took to the road and became a brigand chief. When the Americans reached Puebla he was living there quietly with his family; but, knowing the insecurity of his position, he accepted Hitchcock’s offer to become a scout. His band consisted at first of five men but rose to about 100, and probably might have been increased to 2000 (Lawton, Artill. Officer, 266). He and men of his even entered the capital in disguise. While he was at the head of the company, the actual captain was a Virginian named Spooner, who had been a member of his band; and the two lieutenants also were foreigners. The men seem to have served and obeyed orders faithfully, and their leader refused very advantageous terms offered by Santa Anna. (For the Spy Co. see Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 259, 263–4, 330, 335–41, 344–5. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 187. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 266. Henshaw narrative, Aug. 8. 69Domínguez to Polk [Sept., 1848].)

20. Hargous, an American merchant of Vera Cruz, was Scott’s financial agent (Picayune, June 30). Without him one hardly sees what the Americans could have done. An intercepted letter from the wife of Brev. Col. Childs, abusing Polk roundly, gave considerable comfort to the enemy. Another letter imparted much information about military matters. One is again surprised that our war department did not use a cipher.

21. Scott instructed the commander at Vera Cruz what to do in case of attack, and gave the commander at Jalapa full directions with reference to the sick and wounded (about 1000) lying there (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 997). There were also about 1000 sick at Vera Cruz and 200 at Perote (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 129). The people at home did not understand Scott’s situation. Regiments nominally 800–1000 strong had actually less than 300 (185— to Duncan, July 20).

Owing to the state of public sentiment in Mexico, cutting loose from Vera Cruz was much less hazardous than it seemed. Besides, the smallness of the American army made the problem of subsistence and forage comparatively simple. Marcy was candid enough to admit that Scott understood the advantages of holding Jalapa, and was the best judge as to the advisability of giving it up (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1003–4). The British consul at Vera Cruz reported it as the unanimous opinion of the merchants of that place that with five times his actual force Scott could not have kept the line to the interior open (13no. 19).

22. Scott at Puebla. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 954, 957, 993, 997, 1012–3 (Scott); 967 (Worth); 998, 1002–4 (Marcy); 1021–7 (Scott and Quitman). Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124, 129, 135 (Scott); 242 (Trist). Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 912, 925. Henshaw narrative. Haynes, Scott’s Guide. Tributo á la Verdad, 56. Scott, Mems., ii, 453–4, 460, 466. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 256–9, 261, 266, 270, 341–4. Grant, Mems., i, 136. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 135–6. Davis, Autobiog., 169. Picayune, May 19; June 30; Aug. 20; Nov. 14. Delta, June 12; July 9. Republicano, June 6, 7, 14. (Sickness) 223Hirschorn, recolls.; Delta, July 9; Lawton, Artill. Officer, 145, 154, 242; 291Pierce, diary; Scott, June 4 (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 129); Moore, Scott’s Camp., 119; 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29; 316Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Polk, Diary, Apr. 2, 10, 12; July 9, 13, 15. 159Collins papers, May 22. León, Hist. Gen., 477–8. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 153, 177–8, 189, 203, 206, 211–6, 228, 233–4, 242–6, 256, 265, 272, 274. 68Worth court of inquiry, docs. 68Scott to Worth, May 6. 65Gen. orders 206, 211, 238; July 9 12, 28. (4000 available) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 257. Simples Observaciones (written by Hitchcock). 60Wilson to Marcy, Aug. 1. 335Trist to wife, Aug. 6. Oswandel, Notes, 223, 240. Semmes, Service, 210, 239, 247, 263, 275–6, 278–81. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 524. 224L. V. to M. O., Aug. 21 (intercepted Mex. letter). 185[Duncan] to Lewis, July 20. 307Roberts, diary. 236Judah, diary. 95Ayunt. to Bravo, Apr. 29. 95Amable to prefect, Aug. 18. 270Moore, diary. 327Sutherland to father, Aug. —. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Kennebec Journal, May 21. Repub. Banner, May 19. Nat. Intelligencer, June 1. Monitor Repub., May 2; June 5, 8. Sedgwick, Corres., i, 101. 132Atocha to Buchanan, Aug. 1. Baz, Juárez, 47, note. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 87–9. 364Worth to S., July 29; to daughter, Apr. 30. Ohio Arch. and Hist. Qtrly., Apr.-July, 1912, p. 292. 61Scott to Wilson, May 2. Steele, Amer. Camps., i, 122. And from 76 the following and others. R. Rueda, statement [June 18]. Acuerdo, July 13. Soto, July 3. Soldier from Puebla, statement, July 17. Alvarez, June 16; July 28. Isunza to Canalizo, July 20. Bravo, proclam., Apr. 28. Fúrlong, May 17. To Fúrlong, May 20. “Ein Deuttcher,” circular to Germans. To Alvarez, June 19. Worth to first alcalde, May 17; to ayunt., May 18.

Alvarez stated that he had an organized party at Puebla preparing for an insurrection, and meanwhile was systematically promoting desertion.

The alarm caused by Santa Anna’s advance against Taylor led to the temporary diversion of troops (intended for Scott) to the Rio Grande, but on April 30 Marcy sent Scott statements showing that about 3500 new regulars were expected to land at Vera Cruz before June 1 and that some 5500 volunteers also had been ordered to him. Unfortunately the despatch was captured by the enemy, and Scott did not receive another copy of it until June 6 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 922–5, 1012). (Expected) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 994. The official counting of the votes was deferred until Jan., 1848.

23. Richardson, Messages, iv, 508. Benton wanted full powers to negotiate (Polk, Diary, Mar. 8, 1847), and was willing to take the position mainly with a view to its diplomatic functions (Cong. Globe, 29, 2, pp. 246–7).

24. The new regiments (which brought the regular army up to 1356 officers and 29,534 men) were to serve during the war and then be disbanded. One of them was the Third Dragoons. Another consisted of “voltigeurs,” theoretically an equal number of infantry and of mounted men (the former to be taken up on the horses of the latter, when celerity of movement should be desired) with a battery of small guns that could be taken apart and transported on mules (Niles, May 15, 1847, p. 161); but practically the Voltigeurs were foot-riflemen (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 924). The regiments destined for Scott were the following: (Brig. Gen. Pierce’s brig.) 9 Inf. from N. Eng. under Col. Ransom, 12 Inf. from N. and S. Car., Mo., Ark. and Texas under Lieut. Col. Bonham in the absence of Col. Wilson, and 15 Inf. from Ohio, Mich., Wis. and Iowa under Lt. Col. Howard in the absence of Col. Morgan; (Brig. Gen. Cadwalader’s brig.) 11 Inf. from Pa., Del. and Md., under Col. Ramsey, 14 Inf. from Ill., Tenn. and La. under Col. Trousdale, Voltigeurs from Pa., Md., Va., Ga., Ky. and Miss. under Col. Andrews (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 924). Each regiment was theoretically to consist of 851 men including 47 officers (ibid.), but the two brigades going to Scott were not expected to muster quite 3500. Scott was authorized to change the organization should the exigencies of the campaign require (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 922). Each private serving a year or more was to receive 100 acres of government land or $100 in treasury scrip as a bounty. The law of March 3 provided also that (in view of the deficiency in field officers caused by the lack of a retirement law) an additional major might be appointed in each regiment, that individuals might be accepted to fill vacancies in volunteer corps, that non-commissioned officers might be brevetted to the lowest commissioned rank, that distinguished privates might be given certificates of merit and $2.00 extra per month, that two companies might be added to each artillery regiment, that one more company in each artillery regiment might be equipped as field artillery, that unfilled regular or volunteer regiments should be consolidated and the supernumerary officers discharged, etc. (These laws were quite elaborate and cannot be given in full here; see U. S. Statutes at Large, ix, 123, 184.) After receiving Scott’s report on the battle of Cerro Gordo, Polk ordered five companies of the Third Dragoons to him.

25. Reinforcements provided. Upton, Milit. Policy, 206–7. 62Adj. gen. to Scott, May 10. 65Id.., gen. orders 57, Dec. 22; 2, Jan. 8; 8, Mar. 4; 17, Apr. 15. Semmes, Service, 314–5. 354Welles papers. Polk, Messages, Dec. 29 (Jan. 4, 1847), 1846; Feb. 13, 1847 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 508, 513. 108Polk to Bancroft, Jan. 30. Wash. Union, Jan. 4, 7, 11, 12, 14, 21, etc. Nat. Intelligencer, May 26. Cong. Globe, Sen. and Ho., Dec. 28 to Mar. 3 (One needs to examine the proceedings and speeches considerably in detail). (Voltigeurs) Niles, May 15, p. 161. Amer. Review, Sept., 1847, p. 223. Statutes at Large, ix, 117, 123, 184. Boston Atlas, Jan. 14. 316Bragg to Sherman, Mar. 1, 1848. 61Ransom, Apr. 12; May 9, 21; June 26. 61Scott to Wilson, Apr. 26. 330H. L. Scott to Cadwalader, Apr. 25. 61Adj. gen. to Scott, Dec. 17, 1846; Jan. 23; Mar. 20; May 6, 10, 22, 1847; to Cadwalader, Apr. 28; to qtr. mr. gen., Apr. 21. Ho. 42; 29, 2: adj. gen., Jan. 13. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 6, 10; July 16. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 121 (Marcy). Senex, Myth. Ho. 48; 29, 2 (adj. gen.). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45, 50. 62Marcy to Brooke, Mar. 22; to Pierce, Mar. 22; to govs. Ala., Miss., La., Mar. 22. 61Adj. gen. to Cadwalader, Mar. 26. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 866, 944, 948, 1221 (Scott); 873, 905–6, 922, 953, 1241 (Marcy); 924, 926 (statements). 69Scott, mems. for adj. gen., Nov. 29, 1846. Polk, Diary.

The principal references for the attempt to give Benton the chief command are the following. 345Benton to Polk, Mar. 6; to Van Buren, Jan. 26. Polk, Diary, Nov. 10, 11, 18; Dec. 3, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18–21, 24, 25, 1846; Jan. 2, 4, 16, 19, 22–3; Feb. 4-Mar. 12; Mar. 19–20, 22; Apr. 6, 14, 28; May 10–4; July 17, 1847. 210Simms to Hammond, May 1. 354Welles papers. 345Blair to Van Buren, Dec. 26, 1846; Mar. 13, 1847. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 727. Dix, Speeches, i, 166. London Times, Feb. 18; Mar. 17; Apr. 17. Meigs, Benton, 364–7. Benton, View, ii, 698. Id.., speech: Niles, June 5, 1847, p. 223. Scott, Mems., ii, 401. Public Ledger, Jan. 8, 27; Mar. 1. Cong. Globe,29, 2, Senate, Jan. 11, 14, 15 (Badger’s speech the most important one made on the subject), 25 (Benton); House, passim. Blaine, Twenty Years, i, 76. Buchanan, Works, viii, 365, 367. Mag. of Amer. Hist., xiv, 575. Wash. Union, Mar. 11. 61Benton to adj. gen., Mar. 9.

This call of Apr. 19 included (infantry) a regiment, each, from Ills., Oh., Ind.; a battalion (5 cos.), each, from N. J., Mo., Ga., Ala., La.; three cos. from the Dist. of Columbia; two cos., each, from Pa., Md., Va.; and one co. from Fla.; also (horse) two cos. from La. and one co., each, from Oh., Ills., Ga., Ala., Ark. A regt. consisted of ten cos. Each co. included a capt., a first lieut., two second lieuts., four sergts., four corps., two musicians and eighty privates. A co. of horse had also one farrier and blacksmith (62memo., Apr. 21). Of vols. Scott was now to have two brigades: I, *one N. Y. and *two Pa. regts. and two Pa. cos.; II, *one S. Car. and *one La. regt., one La. and one Ga. battal., two cos. La. horse and one co. Ga. horse (asterisks mean, “already in Mexico”). There were certain exceptions as to the dates of calls which it seems unnecessary to specify.

After the lieutenant general plan failed, Benton was nominated as a major general, and was promptly confirmed by the Senate, and a bill authorizing Polk to place him in supreme command was urged upon Congress (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1219); but as it appeared doubtful whether the chief authority could be conferred upon him, Benton declined the position abruptly (345letters dated Mar. 9). This episode caused no material delay in war legislation.

26. One unfortunate result of giving up the line of communication was that new troops had to wait at Vera Cruz until assembled in sufficient force to defy the enemy, and some of them fell sick in consequence; but this was not fairly chargeable to the evacuation of Jalapa, for the irregulars did their worst below that city. It was the intention of the government that Quitman should go to Taylor, but Scott retained him because his services were valued and he could not be sent away without a heavy detachment (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 137). Having only two full regiments, though a major general, Quitman naturally felt aggrieved (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1024). To illustrate once more the difference between paper figures and real ones, the Washington Union stated on July 20 that more than 15,000 reinforcements had marched from Vera Cruz. The text shows how many did go. July 19 Marcy wrote that 1900 men were en route to Vera Cruz (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1003). The fact was that on August 2 or 3 about 850 men left that place for the interior under Col. L. D. Wilson of the Twelfth Infantry (60Wilson, July 31).

27. Reinforcements arrive. (Other references will be given when the guerillas are studied: chap. xxix.) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1002, 1241 (Marcy); 1012, 1221 (Scott). Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 4, 13, 16, 18, 20–25 (McIntosh et al.). Scott, Mems., ii, 453, etc. 65Id.., gen. orders 250, 1847. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 265, 269. Davis, Autobiog., 174–5. 69Marcy to Pillow and Quitman, Apr. 14. Hartman, Journal, 15. Picayune, Aug. 20. Delta, Oct. 1. Upton, Milit. Policy, 213–4. Polk, Diary, May 10. 159Collins papers. 291Pierce, diary. 61Cadwalader to Wilson, June 13. 62Adj. gen. to Scott, May 10, 22. 287Parrish, diary. 60H. Wilson to Marcy, Aug. 1. 60L. D. Wilson to Marcy, July 31. Mansfield, Mex. War, 224. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 136. 236Judah, diary. Monitor del Pueblo, Apr. 29. 178Davis, diary. 335Dimond to Trist, July 14. Semmes, Service, 314. Wash. Union, July 20. 180Pillow to wife, June 14. 61H. Wilson to adj. gen., June 7, 14. 61Pillow to adj. gen. [June 19]. Henshaw narrative. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 215, 238–41, 272–4. 61Jones to Wilson, Apr. 29. 76Soto, July 17, 21, 23, 25, 31; Aug. 3, 11. 76Canalizo, July 8. 76Alvarez, July 5. 76Hitchcock to Worth, May 12. 76Many other documents.

28. Under general orders 218, July 16, 1847, the following artillery companies were ordered to be equipped (i.e., were recognized) as light (field) artillery in accordance with the law of March 3, 1847: First Regiment, Co. I, Capt. J. B. Magruder; Second, Co. M, J. F. Roland; Third, Co. E, T. W. Sherman; Fourth, Co. G, S. H. Drum. Co. M was not organized in time to serve during the war; the others were already in the service.

29. Scott, Mems., ii, 460–5. Grone, Briefe, 84. 60Marcy to Quitman, Apr. 14. Upton, Milit. Policy, 214. 159Collins papers, June 18. 236Judah, diary, Apr. 26. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 274. Aldrich, Marine Corps, 104. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1002 (Marcy); 1012 (Scott). 62Adj. gen. to Scott, May 22. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., iii, 415.

The general staff (as given by Scott in his Mems., ii, 460–3) included at this time: Lt. Col. Hitchcock, asst. inspect. gen.; Capt. H. L. Scott (not related to the General) actg. adj. gen.; First Lt. T. Williams, Bvt. First Lieut. G. W. Lay and Second Lieut. Schuyler Hamilton, aides; Maj. J. P. Gaines (one of the Encarnacion prisoners, who had escaped) vol. aide; Maj. J. L. Smith, Capt. R. E. Lee, and Lieuts. P. G. T. Beauregard, I. I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, G. B. McClellan and J. G. Foster, engineer officers; Maj. Wm. Turnbull, Capt. J. McClellan, Second Lieut. George Thom and Bvt. Second Lieut. E. L. F. Hardcastle, topog. engs.; Capt. Benjamin Huger, First Lieut. P. V. Hagner and Second Lieut. C. P. Stone, ordnance officers; Capt. J. R. Irwin, chief quartermaster; Capt. J. B. Grayson, chief of subsistence dept.; Maj. E. Kirby, chief paymaster; Surgeon Gen., Thomas Lawson. The Marine Corps, which had no regimental organization, included, Mar. 2, 1847, 1283 privates. On that day Congress raised the number to 2293, and added twelve “commanding officers” (Sen. 66; 30, 1). In May, 1847, the secretary of the navy, in order to help strengthen Scott, offered a part of this corps (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 957). Perry did not think it wise to detach all of the men whom the department proposed to contribute (47July 4), but a battalion under Lieut. Col. Watson and Maj. Twiggs marched to Puebla with Pierce.

30. Picayune, Aug. 20; Nov. 14. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 244, 246, 274–5. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 135 (Scott). 65Scott, gen. orders 246, Aug. 5. Collins Papers. Smith, To Mexico, 178. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 271.

1. This chapter is amply supported. About 1400 documents were used in writing it. As, however, any investigator consulting on this subject the 76archives would easily find the pertinent papers, only the most important ones belonging to that collection will be cited.

2. Affairs at Mexico to Apr. 20. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith). 341Black, memorial, Dec. 20. 312Anaya to S. Anna, Apr. 9. 312Baranda to S. Anna, Apr. 9. Monitor Repub., Apr. 11. Picayune, May 12. Semmes, Service, 328. 92Gov. Federal Dist. to Mex ayunt., Apr. 10. 92Mex. ayunt., proclam., Apr. 27. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1088. Niles, May 15, p. 168 (Gamboa). Kenly, Md. Vol., 338. N. Y. Sun, May 19. Apuntes, 198–9. Otero, Comunicación. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 483. From 76 the following. Memo., Apr. 10. Salas, Apr. 12. Ords. to generals, Apr. 2. Ords. to Liceaga, Apr. 10. Relaciones to gov. Fed. Dist., Apr. 11. Almonte, May 14. To comte. gen. Guanajuato, Apr. 16. To J. P. Gálvez, Apr. 9. Measures recommended, Apr. 6, 14. Relaciones, Apr. 12. Berrospe to Monterede, Jan. 20, 1846.

3. This specimen may be quoted: “The cunning dissimulator, Ibarra [a member of the Cabinet], venomous as a serpent, crawls forth obscurely from his lurking-place to-day in order that he may set his malignant teeth to-morrow in the vitals of the republic.... Off with the heads of the vile traitors!” One ingenious writer said: If Santa Anna will not sacrifice his vanity by admitting he is incompetent, why should we sacrifice our lives and property? April 21 a general amnesty for political offences was declared in the vain hope of producing harmony (76to Bustamante, Apr. 21).

4. This important law provided (México á través, iv, 656): 1, The government is authorized to take all steps necessary to carry on the war and preserve the republican system; 2, but it must not make peace with the United States, cede territory, conclude negotiations [particularly with reference to a monarchical régime] with foreign powers; 3, make colonization contracts, impose punishments or confer civil or military appointments except those placed within its authority by the Constitution; 4, any arrangement between the United States and authorities superseding the present government shall be void; 5, any person, whatever his status, who treats with the United States is hereby declared a traitor; 6, should Congress be unable to meet, its place shall be taken by a council of government, consisting of the senior member present of each state delegation.

5. Affairs at Mexico, Apr. 20 to May 18. S. Anna, Apelación, 44–5; app., 76. Id.., Detall, 8. Dublán, Legislación, v, 267 (Apr. 20). Giménez, Mems., 107–9. Méx. en 1847, 20. Picayune, May 6, 20. Defensa de ... Estrada. 312Basadre to S. Anna, Apr. 9, very private. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Manifiesto del Supr. Tribunal. Molina, El Asalto. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Boletin de Noticias, May 14. Republicano, May 10, 22. Courrier Français, May 5. London Times, June 15; July 9. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 196–8. Encarnacion Prisoners, 67. 52Trist, no. 7, June 13. 92Donations, Mex., May 1–6. 92Bravo, proclam., May 6. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 570. 92Ayunt., call for volunteers, May 20. Consideraciones. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 967 (Worth). 80Olaguíbel to Relac., Aug. 15. Lara, Resumen, 66, note. México á través, iv, 655–6, 661, 704. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 210–2. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 255. Ramírez, México, 229, 233–4, 239, 241, 246–7, 250–1, 256, 272–7, 284. 88Metropol. dean, May 8. Monitor Repub., Apr. 22; May 3, 8, 10–11. S. Anna, manifiesto, Mar. 24, 1848. Apuntes, 199, 200–1, 203–4. 80Guerra to gov., Mar. 11; Apr. 22. 80Gov. to Bravo, May 5. Diario, Apr. 25, 28; May 3, 4, 6, 12, 15. From 76 the following. Decrees, Apr. 26; May 1. Junta directiva, May 1, 3. Acuerdo, Apr. 20, 25. Circular, Apr. 30. Garrison, estado, May 13. To generals, Apr. 25. To Brito, May 25. J. J. Miñón, Apr. 24. Deserters, May 15. Circular, May 4. Basadre, May 16, res. To Alvarez, Apr. 26. To Monterde, May 18. To S. Anna, Apr. 20–2. To Bravo, Apr. 24. To Bustamante, Apr. 21. Almonte, Apr. 28, 30; May 8, 12, 15, 18. Monterde, May 9. Bravo, May 11, 16. Rincón, May 17. S. Anna, May 16.

6. Affairs at Mexico, May 18 to June 2. Negrete, Invasion, iii, app., 61–72, 81–3; iv, app., 261–8, 273–4. Tributo á la Verdad, 56, 74–6. Giménez, Memorias, 109–11. S. Anna to Congress, May 28 (Biblioteca Nac.). Id.., Apelación, app., 83–8. Id.., Detall, 8. Defensa de ... Estrada. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 177–8. Portrait of Anaya: city hall, Mex. Picayune, July 15; Aug. 7, 8. Monitor Repub., May 20; June 3, 4, 14; Dec. 12 (S. Anna, Nov. 19). Republicano, May 10; June 5, 10, 15, 26. México á través, iv, 662, 664–7. Ramírez, México, 229–30, 233, 284–6. 13Bankhead, nos. 59, 60, May 29. London Times, July 9, 16; Aug. 6. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 290–3. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 157, 196–204. Encarnacion Prisoners, 67. 80Guerra to gov. Méx., May 20. Diario, May 19, 21, 23–4; June 8. Boletín de la Democracia, May 25. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 260. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 967. Apuntes, 201, 204. Otero, Réplica. Dublán, Legislación, v, 264. 76Bravo, May 15, 16, 24, 30. 76S. Anna to Rosa, Feb. 5, 1848. 76Valencia, June 7, 1847. 76Mora, June 5. 76To Brito, May 25. 60Bravo, proclam., May 6. 76S. Anna, May 21.

The statesmen who met S. Anna were Manuel Baranda, Ignacio Trigueros and J. F. Ramírez.

7. A signal illustration of the incompetence of the Mexican government, particularly Congress, was afforded by its treatment of Great Britain. At the end of August, 1846, Bankhead, under the instructions of the Foreign Office (13to Bankhead, no. 20), proposed mediation to Mexico, but the offer was not welcomed. Santa Anna and Rejón believed that it proceeded wholly from self-interest, and that, in order to prevent her commerce from suffering longer from the war and other interests from becoming imperilled, England was ready to sacrifice the honor and welfare of their country (73Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 332, res., 343, res., Sept. 24, 27, 1846); and, moreover, the Mexicans still felt quite able to cope with the United States (13Bankhead, no. 130, Sept. 7, 1846). In October, under renewed instructions (13no. 11), Bankhead again submitted the proposal (13nos. 162, 180), and later he returned to the charge (Apuntes, 202). The subject was unwisely referred by the Mexican Executive to Congress, but nothing was done (ibid.). After the battle of Cerro Gordo, however, the administration thought negotiations might be used to delay the American advance (ibid.; Ramírez, México, 246) and the Puros hoped the subject might be made embarrassing to the government (Ramírez, México, 224). Violent, acrimonious and dangerous debates followed in Congress and, in order to embarrass the Executive (13Bankhead, no. 45, 1847), enough Puros remained away (at the time set for voting) to destroy the quorum (ibid.). The matter was then dropped (Ramírez, México, 246, 274). The general feeling was that British mediation would signify British control and a dishonorable, disadvantageous peace (London Times, June 15; Monitor Repub., May 18). But, even if this view contained some elements of justice, trifling with a great power and throwing the vital interests of Mexico into the cockpit of party politics could not be excused.

8. The political situation after June 2. S. Anna, Apelación, app., pp. 3, 6, 8, 10, etc. Id.., Detall, 8. 87Coalition junta, July 7; Aug. 8; etc. Republicano, June 4, 5, 9, 15, 16, 20, 22, 26. 312Baranda to S. Anna, Apr. 8. México á través, iv, 667, 704. Iniciativa que el Hon. Cong. del Estado de Zacat. Otero, Réplica. 13Bankhead, nos. 60, May 29; 64, 65, 70, June 29. Id.., no. 125, Dec. 30, 1845 (Tornel has no reputation for honesty). London Times, Aug. 6. 77Gov. S. Luis Potosí, June 19. 13Thornton to Bankhead, June 14. 52Consul Black, no. 389, Sept. 12, 1846. Encarnacion Prisoners, 68, 77–8, 86. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. 77Letter from Coatepec, June 26. 82Treas. to sec. state of Puebla, June 14; reply, June 15. 82Guerra to gov. Puebla, Aug. 2; reply, Aug. 7. 80Legisl. of Méx. state, Mar. 26; June 12. 80Id.., address, Apr. 26. 80Coalition, address, Aug. 4. Verdadero Liberal, Aug. 12. 80Coal. junta to gov. Méx., June 17. 80Id.., dictamen, July 4. 80Oaxaca state, exposición, June 26. 83Gov. Querétaro to gov. S. Luis Potosí, Apr. 9. Diario, June 7, 8, 11, 24, 30; July 3, 9, 18. Monitor Repub., May 3, 4, 26–7; June 3, 7, 11, 13, 14–16, 18, 19, 24, 30; July 6, 7, 9; Dec. 12 (S. Anna, Nov. 19). Niles, Oct. 30, p. 141. 83Gov. Querétaro to Farías, Oct. 20, 1846; to Anaya, May 4; to all govs., May 7. 82Gov. Jalisco to gov. Puebla, Apr. 13. 82Gov. Méx. to gov. Puebla, Apr. 12. Ramírez, México, 237, 244–6, 254, 263, 272, 288–90. 80Gov. Méx. to Bravo, May 5. 76To Alvarez, June 29. 76Extracto re Guanajuato. 76J. J. de Echeverría, June 6. 76Arellano, July 9. 76Olaguíbel to Relac., Apr. 19. 76Hacienda to Basadre, Aug. 9. 76Reyes, June 1, 22. 76Basadre, Aug. 9. 76Yáñez, June 15. 76Mora, Apr. 28.

In February, 1847, a revolutionary government satisfactory to the people was set up in Oaxaca state, and this supported the national cause to the full extent of its ability. A factional combination made up in Congress, however, took the side (May 8) of the deposed authorities. This action naturally caused great dissatisfaction in Oaxaca (76exposición de la cong. de Oaxaca, June 26), and it was particularly imprudent because Gen. Antonio de León and his officers were partisans of the revolutionary party (Ramírez, México, 255).

9. July 9 the Mexican Army of the East included, according to a document published by Santa Anna, 17,548 officers and men. A. López (Décimo Calendario, 57) placed the army, including the National Guards, at 30,000 on Aug. 9. The only official Mexican accounts of the forces present in and near the capital early in August was made up during the following November, and are far from complete; but they were stated to have been five times as large as those existing in November, which were 8109 total, 6785 available (75report at meeting of govs.; México á través, iv, 701). The unofficial statements cannot be harmonized with these accounts nor (except when drawn from the same source) with one another. It does not help us to know what corps were present (see Roa Bárcena), for we have not the number of men in each of them. The commanders of brigades in the Army of the East were Generals Terrés, Martínez, Rangel, Pérez, León and Anaya and Col. Zerecero. The three sections of Valencia’s army were commanded respectively by Mejía, Parrodi and Salas. A portion of Alvarez’s force consisted of semi-savage “pintos”—men from the hot region, who were marked with spots (11Mémoire). They lay flat when charged upon, and hewed the enemy down with heavy knives (machetes), and they were expected to fill the Americans with terror.

10. The hill (El Peñón Viejo) was about 1000 yards in length at the base, and the higher of its two summits reached an elevation of about 400–450 feet (66reports of Lee, Stevens and Mason, Aug. 12, 26). The work of fortifying it was skilfully as well as thoroughly done. Engineer I. I. Stevens made out nearly forty guns. Topog. Engineer M. L. Smith thought there were about sixty (Sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 4). A large stock of rations was placed here (76acuerdo, Aug. 5).

11. Santa Anna’s preparations (see note 1). 66Stevens to J. L. Smith, Aug. 12, 26. 66R. E. Lee, J. L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Aug. 12. S. Anna, Apelación, 44–7. Id.., Detall, 8–11. 60Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 26. Picayune, June 30; Aug. 8. Donnavan, Adventures, 29. Pacheco, Exposíción. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 91–4, 123–5. Scott, Mems., ii, 466. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 274. 224Intercepted Letters (ed. by Hitchcock). (Embezzlement) Consideraciones, 25; Apuntes, 207. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). Apuntes, 205–10, 223–8. Molina, El Asalto. Raleigh Star, Sept. 1. 13Thornton, June 29. 178Davis, diary. Portrait of Lombardini: city hall, Mexico. 350Weber, recolls. N. Orl. Delta, July 18. Verdadero Liberal, May 20. (San Patricio cos.) Dublán, Legislación, v, 290; Diario, July 15. México á través, iv, 668–71. 70“Guerra,” no. 1120. London Times, May 10; Sept. 6. Semmes, Service, 348–9. Dublán, Legislación, v, 280, 284, 289, 294. 73Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 517, June 29; 534, res., July 28. 73Lozano, No. 2, Aug. 24. Gamboa, Impug., 51. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 205–6. 335Thornton to N. P. Trist, July 29. Encarnacion Prisoners, 69. 60Wilson to Marcy, Aug. 1. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 23. Diario, May 24; June 5–10, 14–6, 18, 20, etc. Monitor Repub., May 31 (Eleventh Inf.); June 13–5, 18, etc.; Dec. 12 (S. Anna, Nov. 19). Niles, June 19, p. 251. 13Bankhead, no. 74, 1846. (Honduras) 60Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 26, 1847. (Powder from N. Orl.) 166Consul McFaul to ——, Nov. 12, 1846. Ramírez, México, 268. The following from 76 are cited for particular reasons. Valencia, proclam., May 14. Estado of garrison, May 13. Ayunt., Mexico, June 3. Recommended measures, Apr. 6, 14. Circulars, June 12; July 24. S. Anna to Alcorta, June 12; Aug. 3. Valencia, July 19. Statement, lines of defence, June 29. J. Terrés, report on cavalry [Nov.]. J. de D. Peza, report on infantry, Nov. 29. Acuerdos, May 21, 23–4; June 5, 6, 8, 19, 25; July 17, 18, 19, 28, 30; Aug. 2, 3, 5, 6. To Alvarez, June 3, 30, etc. To Mora, June 26; July 2, 20, 23, etc. To Lombardini, June 26; July 2, 5, 7, 11, 22, 31, etc. Alvarez. May 29; June 9, 16; July 5, etc. Mora, July 9, 19, 20, 22, etc. Lombardini, July 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, etc. Olaguíbel, Aug. 20. Decrees, June 5, 8; July 10, 12; Aug. 8, etc.

Among other preparations were the following: information about the defence not to be published, and no communication to be had with points occupied by the Americans; the troops to be trained in firing (June 6); the state of siege to be rigorous (June 28); as much wheat as possible to be ground and stored in the city, and the rest to be removed from the Valley; all Americans, even if naturalized, to leave the city (July 12); the American prisoners (e.g., from La Encarnación) to go to Toluca; prices of provisions fixed; no persons to be tried for acts not injurious to a third party. Naturally there was much evasion of these edicts. A Council of Defence composed of the heads of the executive departments most concerned in the work began to meet on July 2 (76acuerdo, June 29; Lombardini, July 6). After the near approach of the enemy the shops (excepting those selling provisions and those of the Plaza del Mercado) were to close, civilian horses and carriages to keep off the streets, and no civilian to leave the city [without a pass] except those who had brought in coal and provisions [but on August 13 permission was given old men, women and children to go out]. By August 24 nearly all civilians [of any importance] left the city (73Lozano, no. 2). After the Americans came within easy reach the usual efforts to cause desertion among them were made by the Mexican government. The Paixhan guns cast by the Mexicans were believed by them to equal the American ordnance (Apuntes, 207).

12. Diario, Aug. 10–13. 77Relaciones, circular, Aug. 9. 73Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24. Apuntes, 206–8, 210–20. México á través, iv, 671–2. Ramírez, México, 296. 76To Basadre, Aug. 10. 76To Alvarez, Aug. 12. 76Relaciones to gov. Zacat., Aug. 11. 76Olaguíbel, Aug. 11. 76Decree, Aug. 8.

13. April 30 Marcy had promised that by the end of June, Scott should have about 20,000 men (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 922). Scott felt he needed that number in addition to the garrison of Puebla (Sedgwick, Corres., i, 141). He has been criticised for having his small army march in four divisions a day apart. Twiggs and Quitman together had only about 4000 men and it has been represented that, even had they and the cavalry combined, Santa Anna could have crushed them before Worth could have reached the scene (Semmes, Service, 326); but, as a day’s march was only 12–15 miles (Hardcastle in Sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 10), Worth was but five hours (in case of emergency much less) behind Quitman, and an attack strong enough to crush Harney, Twiggs and Quitman, provided as they were with heavy ordnance, could not have taken place in a moment nor without warning. Scott expected to be attacked on the march (Scott, Mems., ii, 466). He might have avoided the high mountains by taking the route via Tlaxcala and Apam; but this route was long and unsuitable for his trains. There were nearly 1000 wagons (335Trist to Buchanan, Aug. 22).

14. These works were abandoned because not in keeping with Santa Anna’s plan. Very likely the fact that it would not have been easy to subsist a large force here counted also. Many of the Americans believed Santa Anna had built the works in the expectation of using them to cut Scott off after defeating him in the Valley, and set their teeth the harder. All felt that they must conquer or die.

15. Scott’s march to Ayotla. Scott, Mems., ii, 465–7. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 266, 271. Grant, Mems., i, 164–5. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 190–3. Davis, Autobiog., 192. Missouri Republican, Nov. 3, 1857 (Hitchcock). 217Henshaw papers. 218Henshaw narrative. Haynes, Gen. Scott’s Guide. 183Drum, recolls. 376Nicholson, recolls. Donnavan, Adventures, 98. 159Collins papers. (Route) Lyon, Journal, ii, 106; Thompson, Recolls., 33; Velasco, Geografía, i, 25; Cardona, Méx. y sus Capitales, 129; Robertson, Visit, i, 321; Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 33–4; Tudor, Tour, ii, 211; LeClercq, Voyage, 178–9; Mason, Pictures, ii, 6; Bullock, Across Mex., 67–8. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 274, 281–7. 65Gen. orders 246, Aug. 5. 291Pierce papers. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (map). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). G. W. Smith, Co. A. Carleton, Address. 178Davis, diary. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124 (Scott); 186–8. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303 (Scott). app., 37. Kenly, Md. Vol., 344. Rosa, Impresiones Nebel and Kendall, 27. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 280–1. Colección de Itinerarios. Oswandel, Notes, 242, 245. Semmes, Service, 235, 286–9, 325–8, 452–3. 73Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 534, res., July 28; 550, Aug. 21. 73Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24. 335Trist, statement, July 25, 1849. 236Judah, diary. Diario, July 2. Sedgwick, Corres., i, 108, 141. Smith, To Mexico, 188–93. Wilson, Mexico, 168. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 138. Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 37. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1032 (Scott). 132Atocha to Buchanan, Aug. 1. Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 187. Michigan Pioneer Soc. Colls., vii (Toll). So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852, pp. 406–7. 316Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Ramírez, México, 239. Monitor Repub., Oct. 1 (Gamboa). Manifiesto que dirige ... Alvarez.

16. S. Anna, Apelación, 44; app., 146–50, 157–61. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 186–7. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 534, res., July 28. Monitor Repub., Dec. 12 (S. Anna, Nov. 19). And from 76 the following. To Canalizo, June 30. To Alvarez, June 29, 30; July 13, 28; Aug. 6, 9, 12, 14, 21. To Valencia, Aug. 9, 11, 13, 14, 15. Canalizo, June 23; July 19; Aug. 9, 10, 11. Alvarez, July 5, 8; Aug. 6, 8, 8, 9, 9, 10, 10, 11, 12, 12, 25. Valencia, Aug. 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14. Expediente against Valencia. Acuerdo, Aug. 13.

17. The choice of approaches. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 272–4. Grant, Mems., 164–5. Mo. Republican, Nov. 3, 1857 (Hitchcock). Weekly Courier and N. Y. Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848 (letter from Hitchcock). 217Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. Haynes, Gen. Scott’s Guide. 61Hamilton to Scott, Oct. 17, 1850. 66R. E. Lee, I. I. Stevens, J. L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Aug. 12, 26. Chase, Polk Admin., 225. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 333–7. 221Hill, diary. 159Collins papers. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 289. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (M. L. Smith). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). 178Davis, diary. 136Butterfield, recolls. S. Anna, Detall, 11. 52Trist nos. 11, 12, Aug. 14, 22. 185Letters from Worth, Duncan and others. 335H. L. Scott to Worth, Aug. 13. Picayune, Oct. 8. Nebel and Kendall, 27. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303, app., 27. Apuntes, 208, 225. Semmes, Service, 348–52, 355–8. Ramírez, México, 293. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 461–2 (Lee); 522–7 (Hitchcock). 68Charges against Duncan (Scott). 236Judah, diary. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 12. Diario, Aug. 18. 377Capt. Willing (paper published by Engineer School, Washington). Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 148–9, 190. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852, p. 412. 76Order to Lombardini, June 19. 76To Mora, July 2. 76Acuerdos, Aug. 5, 8. 76Mora, Aug. 2. 76Gugerson to Alvarez, Aug. 10. 76(Spies) Alvarez, Aug. 12; Valencia, Aug. 13, 14; Becerril, Aug. 13; spy, Aug. 12; etc. 76Bravo, Aug. 13. 76To Bravo, Aug. 13.

The Mexicaltzingo plan was said to be, that while the rest of the troops should force their way between Lakes Chalco and Xochimilco by a broken causeway commanded by five batteries on a hill, Worth should pass round or across the latter lake and coöperate with them wherever he could do so to the best advantage (Davis, Autobiog., 193; etc.). Under orders from Scott (Hitchcock in Mo. Republican, Nov. 3, 1857; 377paper; 335H. L. Scott to Worth, Aug. 13; 68charges against Duncan) to examine the Chalco route, Worth (at Duncan’s suggestion) had Duncan, supported by strong detachments, reconnoitre that route on August 14 under the pretence of obtaining provisions. Duncan, who reported (305Aug. 14) favorably, was sent to Scott late that day to give an account of the reconnaissance and deliver a 305letter from Worth, which argued against dividing the army. Not receiving credit in Scott’s report Duncan published (Picayune, Oct. 8; Dec. 18) a letter claiming in effect to have caused the change of plan (chap. xxix, p. 187). But the letter proved that he knew less about the matter than he supposed (68charges); it did not prove that the change of orders resulted from his report; and there is no proof that Scott intended to divide the army—though he collected boats enough for about 2000 men with a view to crossing or to making the Mexicans believe (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 335) he intended to cross the lake and it was thought that as many more could be obtained—or definitely decided to attack Mexicaltzingo. On the other hand Scott stated (68charges) that he was himself investigating (305Mackall to ——, May 10, 1848) the Chalco route while Duncan was doing so, and that a spy sent from headquarters reported favorably upon it (68charges); and he denied squarely that he gave up the Mexicaltzingo for the Chalco route in consequence of Duncan’s report (68charges). Extreme secrecy and all possible mystification of the enemy were necessary, and on account of Worth’s unfriendliness Scott had special reasons for not opening his mind fully to him. Other generals have purposely kept their subordinates in the dark (see Henderson, Jackson, i, 421, 441; Id.., Science of War, 42). Instead of proving that Worth was the better general, Worth and Duncan proved the opposite, for they showed that Worth committed himself to the Chalco route on very incomplete data, whereas Scott studied three routes and reserved his decision until, as far as was possible, he had full information before him. As usual, when Worth’s relations with Scott were concerned, we find Semmes inaccurate and biassed here. Ripley uses the incident against Scott at great length and very unfairly. Facts regarding the Mexicaltzingo route are brought forward, though not known to the Americans at the time (Ripley, War with Mexico, 194). We are told (p. 191) that Scott ordered Duncan to study the Chalco route after Duncan had proposed to do so, as if Scott had not previously ordered Worth, Duncan’s commander, to investigate the route. It is alleged that the case did not warrant “a departure from the rules of the [military] art to so great a degree” [as was proposed by the Mexicaltzingo plan]; yet Ripley shows that the Texcoco route was impracticable (pp. 179, 186), that El Peñón was virtually “impregnable” (p. 188), and that the Chalco route was considered out of the question (p. 190). This was a situation clearly warranting extraordinary measures. On p. 202 Ripley seems to argue that the orders to attack Mexicaltzingo cannot have been given to conceal the movement that Scott actually made, since any movement against that point would have caused Santa Anna to place troops in that vicinity, detect promptly Scott’s real intention, and defend the southern line, and so the ruse would have defeated itself. But (1) the question concerns orders, not—as Ripley assumes—an actual movement toward Mexicaltzingo; (2) Santa Anna had troops in the vicinity of Mexicaltzingo, but the results anticipated by Ripley did not follow; (3) indeed, though Ripley was not aware of the fact, Santa Anna concluded Aug. 14 (76to Valencia) that Scott was going to S. Agustín, and merely had the reserves at S. Antonio garita go with five 4-pounders to S. Antonio hacienda (76to Valencia, Aug. 14), for he was relying on his fortified points; and (4) since the same troops could not defend at the same time the works near Mexicaltzingo and also the road to S. Agustín, orders involving a threat against the former would have tended, without costing Scott anything, to keep the latter clear.

The vulnerable point of El Peñón Viejo was that owing to its steepness the cannon could have little action on the slopes (66Stevens to Smith, Aug. 26). A particular disadvantage in attacking Mexicaltzingo would have been that (Santa Anna said) such a movement could have been detected in good season, and reinforcements could have been placed there promptly (76to Bravo, Aug. 13). As the American generals needed information that could only be obtained from Mexicans, they were peculiarly exposed to the artifices of spies, and some of these gained a confidential footing with Worth and even with Scott.

18. To S. Agustín. 218Henshaw narrative. S. Anna, Apelación, 47, 50; app., 146–51. Id.., Detall, 12. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 195. Davis, Autobiog., 192–5. 217Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. 221Hill, diary. 159Collins papers. Latrobe, Rambler, 121. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 290, 293. Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (map). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). G. W. Smith, Co. A. 204Gouverneur, diary. 178Davis, diary. Gamboa, Impug., 38–9. México á través, iv, 672. Apuntes, 220, 229. Arróniz, Manual, i, 243. Semmes, Service, 352–5, 370–5. Nebel and Kendall, 28. 12Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1. Steele, Campaigns, i, 123. 236Judah, diary. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 275. Moore, Scott’s Camp., 129. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, 168. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 139. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303 (Scott); app., 28 (Twiggs); 37 (Sumner); 39 (McKinstry). 76To Alvarez, Aug. 11, 21. 76To Valencia, Aug. 14, 15. 76To Lombardini, Aug. 14. 76Acuerdos, Aug. 15, 16. 76To Herrera, Aug. 15. 76Becerril, Aug. 15. 76Valencia, Aug. 14, 15. 76Alvarez, Aug. 16, 17, 19, 22, 25. 76To Alvarez, Aug. 14, 15. Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 647 (Lee to Mason).

Santa Anna’s policy seems to have been wise. Any detachments that he could have thrown hastily in front of Worth must have consisted of inferior troops, and would no doubt have been routed. The last portion of the Chalco route was over ground which, though in part hilly, was firm (T. F. Davis, diary). The brush with Twiggs was greatly exaggerated by the Americans, some of whom estimated the enemy as 12,000 strong, and felt that a victory was gained, whereas Alvarez had no intention of fighting, and did not come within musket range. It has been said (Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 289) that Scott should have had the cavalry, Worth and Pillow advance without heavy baggage, and reach S. Agustín in twelve hours. But (1) there was a distinct advantage in keeping Worth’s division intact, (2) Scott’s van was less likely to be attacked than his rear, (3) Scott probably understood that Santa Anna intended to rely on his fortified positions, for he was well posted about affairs at the capital (13Thornton to Bankhead, June 14), nothing could be kept secret there, and Santa Anna’s Plan was known to many, (4) Scott’s judgment on the point was likely, especially in view of his fuller knowledge of the facts, to be better than Ripley’s, and (5) it was justified by the event. The Chalco route was the one taken by Cortez (Gamboa, Impug., 38). In leaving Peñón Viejo Santa Anna had money and provisions remain there for a prospective “distant march” (76to Herrera, Aug. 15). Whether this referred to a pursuit of the Americans or his own flight can only be guessed, but as the order was addressed to Herrera, one inclines to the former view.

19. 52Trist, no. 11, Aug. 14. México á través, iv, 672–3. Apuntes, 220–2, 230. S. Anna, Detall, 11–2. 95Notice to first alcalde, Aug. 19. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 446. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, Mar. 2. 76To Valencia, Aug. 14, 15, 16. 76To Lombardini, Aug. 14. 76Valencia, Aug. 15, 16. 76To Alvarez, Aug. 16. 76Acuerdo, Aug. 16.

1. The basis for distances is Smith and Hardcastle’s map of the Valley (Sen. 11; 31, 1). A garita had to be a somewhat formal place, for municipal duties were levied and collected there, and some accommodations for the officials and the guards were necessary. The last word of “S. Antonio Abad” was commonly omitted. For the sake of distinction the Acapulco road will be called the “highway” and the road via Tacubaya, San Angel and Ansaldo the “turnpike” (Trist’s word for it). The name Contreras was applied by Americans to three places, to none of which it belonged. Contreras was a village on the turnpike some distance south of Padierna. San Agustín was also known as Tlálpam.

2. August 14 Valencia’s 76return (estado) included 486 officers, 5078 rank and file, 1447 horses, one siege 16-pounder, three siege 12-pounders, five 8-inch (68-pound) howitzers and fifteen smaller guns. One of the guns was assigned to Torrejón and he saved it. Another small one disappeared. The name of the rounded hill where Valencia took post was Peloncoahutitlán.

3. Valencia had one excuse, for very possibly he believed (in view of Santa Anna’s delay at San Luis Potosí, abandonment of Tampico, apparent neglect of Vera Cruz, etc.) that the President traitorously intended to leave open a door by which Scott could reach the capital; but none the less he was a conscienceless conspirator and the mortal foe of Santa Anna, disgusted with subordination, and eager to overthrow his chief. His past conduct had been thoroughly suspicious, and his manifiesto of August 22 does not bear analysis well. To remove him would have seemed an act of jealousy, if not treason, and very likely have caused a mutiny. Santa Anna hoped that the national crisis would hold him in line for the time being. Besides, Santa Anna did not know precisely where Valencia proposed to make a stand (Diario, Sept. 1). When he learned, he sent General Mora to reconnoitre the position (76to Valencia, August 19). Again, he could not afford to raise an issue with Valencia now, for the latter (doubtless with the help of his engineers) had divined Scott’s plans better than the former, and undertaken to guard a quarter left open by the President. Finally it was quite possible that Santa Anna thought Valencia would be taught a lesson by the Americans. It is unnecessary to discuss the merits and disadvantages of Valencia’s position, for they will appear plainly in the narrative (see Balbontín, Invasión, 110–11). Had the Americans been willing to do as he wished, the hill would have been entirely satisfactory. Of Valencia’s intellectual quality the following specimen is suggestive: “Soldiers of Liberty, anarchy put out its head, but your arms drowned it in a moment.”

4. Mexican preliminaries. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 304, 306 (Scott); 348–9 (Smith); app., 80 (Alexander). Collins papers. 66Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. Semmes, Service, 393. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 276 (Longstreet); 570. 224Intercepted Letters (14, L. V. to M. O.; 26, to Old Gentleman). Apuntes, 221, 230–6. Balbontín, Invasión, 111. Gamboa, Impug., 41. 70“Guerra,” no. 30 (F. Pérez). México á través, iv, 672–3, 677. Long, Memoirs, 54. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852, pp. 408–9. Latrobe, Rambler, 90. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Hardcastle to Smith; Smith to Abert). Valencia, Manifiesto. Calderón, Life, i, 314. 178Davis, diary. Prieto, Mems., ii, 213. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 534, res., July 28. S. Anna, Apelación, 51–2; app., 140–54, 157–60. Id.., Detall, 12. Monitor Repub., Dec. 17, 1847. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 276. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 279–83. 76Acuerdo, Aug. 16. 76To Lombardini, July 22. 76To Alvarez, Aug. 21. 76Zerecero, Aug. 25. 76To Valencia, Aug. 16. 76Expediente contra Valencia.

The defences of Valencia’s camp were somewhat extended later, but not enough to render them formidable.

5. According to a topographical officer (Washington Union, Nov. 3, 1847) the only route from San Agustín to Mexico of which the Americans knew when they reached the ground was the highway. This surprises one at first. But the turnpike beyond San Angel was a local road serving only a few farms, the small villages of San Gerónimo and Contreras, and a manufacturing establishment near Contreras. It seemed to be of no strategic significance, and was not likely to be heard of at a distance. The fortifications along the highway were largely developed after Scott turned toward San Agustín. Valencia’s movements were impromptu. Scott had an Englishman residing at Mexico in his pay, and we know that two persons brought data on Aug. 19 (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 162). Apparently Scott did his duty as to seeking information.

6. American preliminaries. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 304, 307, 315, 348–50 (reports of Scott, Worth and Smith); app., 41 (Mason); 66 (Smith); 101 (Magruder); 118 (Cadwalader). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 307. Picayune, Sept. 8; Oct. 21. 66Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. Semmes, Service, 380, 393. 224Intercepted Letters (26, To Old Gentleman). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 275. Grant, Mems., i, 142. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 188 (Trist, no. 12). 76Expediente contra Valencia. 236Judah, diary. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Hardcastle to Smith). Monitor Repub., Dec. 17. Diario, Aug. 19.

7. Quitman had only the Second Pennsylvania, the Marines, Steptoe’s battery and a troop or two of dragoons (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 341); but Worth’s division was available in case of need. See Claiborne, Quitman, i, 347.

8. Pillow, as was decided by a court of inquiry (Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 332–45) on the testimony of such men as Lee (p. 78), Smith (p. 102), Riley (p. 147) and Shields (p. 268), did not devise the plan on which this victory was gained; and when Lee brought word to Scott of Smith’s plan he washed his hands of it (335Trist, draft of address; Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 333); but he had the audacity to claim that Smith merely executed the precise plans and views laid down by Pillow for his guidance (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1018). Pillow could claim the credit only on the ground that he was the senior officer on the field, and that Smith’s operations were a logical consequence of the events; but Scott was the senior of Pillow, and all that occurred was—as Smith pointed out (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 104)—the logical consequence of Scott’s order to gain possession of the San Angel road. The consensus of opinion was expressed by Twiggs: “General Smith deserves the whole credit” (Stevens, Stevens, i, 196). Moreover the famous letter signed “Leonidas”—prepared at Pillow’s quarters doubtless with his connivance (Hitchcock in Mo. Republican, Oct. 2, 1857; Republican Banner, Feb. 23, 1858), conveyed by his agency (Davis, Autobiog., 285) to the New Orleans Delta, which published it Sept. 10 (chap. xxix, note 31), and fathered (when exposed) by an untruthful subordinate of his—“puffed” Pillow in the most extravagant manner for this “unparallelled victory,” and represented Scott not only as leaving everything to Pillow but as blundering sadly. E.g. it said, “The army had been marching through marshes and almost impassable roads, nearly half around the city, to find some points upon the enemy’s works that could be successfully assailed,” the provisions had been nearly exhausted, and the mountains prevented going farther; Pillow’s “plan of battle [at Contreras], and the disposition of his forces were most judicious,” and he “achieved this signal and brilliant victory.” (For the letter signed “Leonidas” see Sen. 65; 30, 1 (pp. 385–9, and the testimony of Pillow, Burns, Freaner, Trist); 335Pillow to Trist, Aug. 31, private; St. Louis Evening News, Oct. 2, 1857; chap. xxix, pp. 435–7.) Pillow’s design in having such a statement prepared and placed before the people in advance of the official reports was probably to influence public opinion in the United States so as to make him an available candidate for the Presidency or enable Polk to put him in Scott’s place. As Pillow was known to have great influence with the President, and was an active, affable, plausible man, he naturally had a following; but the sentiment of the able and honest officers towards him was one of contempt. “The ass Pillow,” “that consummate fool,” said the future General D. H. Hill (diary) of Pillow as he showed himself on Aug. 19. A sensible Pennsylvanian wrote in his diary, Aug. 10, that Pillow was without question “the poorest and most unpopular” of the generals (Oswandel, Notes, 249). Col. W. B. Campbell characterized him as light, impetuous, of little military judgment and no skill (139to D. Campbell, Mar. 20, 28; Apr. 18, 25); and a correspondent of the future Gen. W. T. Sherman described him as “a mass of vanity, conceit, ignorance, ambition and want of truth” (316Judd, Feb. 26, 1848). The doings of the Pillow court of inquiry (Sen. 65; 30, 1) were carefully digested and analyzed by the author; but as the subject concerns only incidentally the history of the war, space cannot be taken to present this analysis.

9. Valencia could see that retreat meant his personal ruin, and he preferred to argue that honor required him to hold his ground.

10. Persifor F. Smith, a graduate from Princeton, was admitted to the bar at Philadelphia, practised law at New Orleans, and had considerable military experience in the Florida war. He was a simple, scholarly, unassuming man; but all ranks appreciated his ability, attainments, clear perception, valor, promptness and steadiness.

11. The battle of Contreras. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303, etc.; app., pp. 66, etc. (reports of Scott and his officers). S. Anna, Apelación, 52–5; app., 154–6, 160. Id.., Detall, 12–4. Picayune, Sept. 8; Oct. 21. 221Hill, diary. 61Twiggs to Marcy, Feb. 7, 1848. 66Lee to Smith, Aug. 21, 1847. 60Riley to Westcott, Nov. 30. Semmes, Service, 381, 385, 392. 224Intercepted letters (14, L. V. to M. O.; 25, note by E. A. H.; 28). Apuntes, 237–43. McSherry, El Puchero, 73, 76. Murphy, Hungerford, 99. Delta, Sept. 9; Nov. 12; Dec. 1. Monitor Repub., Sept. 27 (Salas); Dec. 12 (S. Anna). Porvenir, Aug. 26, supplem. (Valencia). 65Scott, gen. orders 258. Balbontín, Invasión, 111–8. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 276–8, 281. Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 207, 218–20, 223–6, 228–9. Davis, Autobiog., 196–8. 66Foster to Smith, Aug. 23. 66McClellan to Smith, Aug. 23. 66Beauregard to Smith, Aug. 25. 66Tower to Smith, Aug. 25. 66Mason to Smith, Aug. 24. Prieto, Mems., ii, 222–7. López, Décimo Calendario, 58. 80Olaguíbel, Aug. 20–1. 199Anon. MS. written by a person of importance. 307Roberts, diary. Gamboa, Impug., 42–3. 350Weber, recoils. 70“Guerra,” no. 30 (F. Pérez). Ramírez, México, 298. México á través, iv, 677. 217Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. 327Sutherland to father, Nov. 28. Jackson, Memoirs of Jackson, 41. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 188. Long, Memoirs, 54–9. Wash. Union, Sept. 20. Diario, Aug. 24; Sept. 1. So. Mag., July, 1874, p. 75. 204Gouverneur, diary. 277Burnett, statement. United Service, June, 1896 (Lane). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 62 (H. L. Scott); 68–9 (Williams); 72–4, 298, 300 (Gen. Scott); 75–9, 463 (Lee); 81–6 (Cadwalader); 97 (Deas); 99–106 (Smith); 137–8 (Canby); 147–51 (Riley); 162 (Hooker); 180 (Hodge); 182–4, 188 (Ripley); 208–9 (Rains); 230–1 (Beauregard); 232–3 (Hitchcock); 246 (Morgan); 267 (Shields); 270 (Howard); 283, 286–7 (Twiggs); 334–5 (verdict); 570. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 174–9, 196. Carreño, Jefes, ccxc (Pérez), ccxciv (Torrejón). Niles, Oct. 30, pp. 138–9. Cong. Globe,34, 1, p. 105 (Foote). Lancaster Co. Hist. Soc. Mag., Mar. 6, 1908. Giménez, Mems., 266. 291Pierce to Appleton, Aug. 27. 291Gardner to Canby, Aug. 30. 291Pierce to Hooker, Aug. 22. Engineer School, U. S. A., Occas. Papers, No. 16. Valencia, Manifiesto. 178Davis, diary. Stevens, Vindication, 4–7. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 281–3. 76Tornel, Aug. 19. 76Orders to Valencia, Aug. 26. Kenly, Md. Vol., 421. 73Lozano, No. 2., Aug. 24. 210Bragg to Hammond, Dec. 20. 125Bonham to wife, Aug. 24; to adj. gen., Feb. 26, 1849. So. Qtrly. Rev., Apr., 1852, pp. 415–26. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 41. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 72–3. 112Beauregard to Smith, Aug. 25. 76Valencia, Aug. 19. 76J. B. Argüelles, Aug. 22. 76Alcorta to Alvarez, Aug. 21. 76Alvarez, Aug. 21.

Remarks. This engagement was called by the Mexicans the battle of Padierna. At first Valencia had a reserve under Salas at Ansaldo, but he drew this in at about the time when the battle began. He then placed Torrejón’s cavalry between Ansaldo and his main position. A turn in the road near his position enabled him to command the turnpike for some distance. For further details regarding his dispositions see Apuntes, 236. During the afternoon of Aug. 19 the Ninth Infantry (Ransom) and a battalion of the Twelfth under Lieut. Col. Bonham crossed the ravine and remained about 200 yards from Valencia’s camp until 9 or 10 o’clock, partly occupying usefully Valencia’s attention. When these troops retired, Mexicans attacked the guard at Padierna, but American reinforcements defeated them. R. E. Lee and G. B. McClellan helped set up Magruder’s battery, and T. J. (“Stonewall”) Jackson commanded one section of it a part of the time. These officers distinguished themselves highly. Riley understood he was “sent across the pedregal to cut off the retreat of the enemy and check reinforcements” (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 148). When Smith moved to the right, he had Magruder resume firing to divert attention from that movement. Magruder’s men tried to save themselves by falling flat at each Mexican discharge, and the ground sheltered them somewhat, yet fifteen were killed or wounded. His guns were withdrawn over the rocks after nightfall.

It has been said with force that it would have been better had Scott been on the ground from the first. But he did not wish or expect to fight; no doubt he had much administrative work on hand; he was not far away; and he believed that his instructions to Pillow provided for all probable contingencies. It seems to be true that Pillow, a most plausible and insinuating talker, had gained a certain ascendency over him. Probably for this reason, as well as owing to his general wish to gratify his officers, Scott permitted Pillow to make statements in his report on the battle, which, as the trial of Pillow showed, ought not to have been there (210Bragg). Pillow later urged the point that Scott approved of his dispositions; but it was Scott’s practice to accept what his officers did, and make the best of it. Scott was slightly wounded in the leg during the afternoon of August 19 but did not mention the incident at the time. Later the wound made him trouble.

The Fifteenth Infantry (Morgan) did not act with the rest of Pierce’s brigade on Aug. 19, for Pillow had detached it as a reserve. Pierce was injured by falling from his horse, and hence Col. Ransom took command of the brigade. Late in the afternoon Valencia placed a 4-pounder and two battalions of infantry on the turnpike toward Ansaldo to prevent more Americans from reaching San Gerónimo (Balbontín, Invasión, 114), but this force accomplished nothing. At first he had thought the Americans crossing the pedregal in groups, partly concealed by the ground and trees, were mere scouting parties. It was found impossible at the Pillow trial to decide at just what time Scott arrived on the lookout hill (the lower summit of Zacatepec). The variation of careful witnesses was an hour and twenty-five minutes. Watches appear to have been out of order, and therefore one cannot be positive regarding the precise time of any event.

Smith’s plan to attack Santa Anna on Aug. 19 has been criticised as unsound (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 339, note). But he believed a repulse of Santa Anna would ensure the defeat of Valencia; he wanted to dispose of Santa Anna before his forces could become stronger; he did not wish (having no artillery) to let him cannonade at his leisure; and probably the situation of the American right appeared to require unusual boldness. Lee (66to J. L. Smith, Aug. 21) attached less importance to this operation. Tower (66to J. L. Smith, Aug. 25) said the inexperience of the new troops, particularly Cadwalader’s, had something to do with leading Smith to give up the plan. Doubtless Pillow’s fiasco, Aug. 19, tended to inflate Valencia’s confidence and so to ensure his destruction. Valencia’s artillery accomplished nothing against the Americans at San Gerónimo, partly because the trees and rough ground hid and protected them, and partly because the guns he used were not very powerful. Smith supposed he was Shields’s senior, and retained the command after the latter’s arrival at San Gerónimo. Shields refrained from claiming it, knowing that Smith had made preparations to attack and understood the situation best. Cadwalader, as well as Shields, outranked Smith; but doubtless he felt unequal to the situation, and he did not assert his rights. During the night the few houses at San Gerónimo were required for the wounded.

Santa Anna has been too much criticised for his course. Valencia did not see the Americans in force, Aug. 19, until after one o’clock, and we do not know how promptly he reported the fact. Santa Anna stated that at about two o’clock he received word from Valencia that cannon fire had begun. He was then at San Antonio, yet in about four hours he had a considerable force near San Gerónimo. He reasonably hesitated about attacking an unknown number of Americans in an admirable defensive position. His cavalry could have done nothing in the ravines, lanes and woods which composed it, and his artillery little. Had he attacked, as he threatened to do, late on Aug. 19, he would have been beaten. After Riley joined him, Smith had about 3600 men (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 105). Had Santa Anna advanced by the turnpike he would have exposed his flank to Smith. Valencia had got himself into a hopeless impasse, and the best thing he could have done was to tear himself out of it, as Santa Anna ordered. Santa Anna sent orders to Pérez in the afternoon to help Valencia, but overtaking that brigade (which had set out for the purpose) took charge of it. Shields brought about 600 men (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 344).

Smith’s plan of attack against Valencia was not perfectly safe, for, as Napoleon said, the ground of a night attack should be thoroughly known; but the circumstances warranted the risk. Friday morning Tower, who had discovered the ravine (66Tower to J. L. Smith, Aug. 25), led Riley’s brigade, and Beauregard led Smith’s. As soon as Valencia was routed, orders were given to complete the road begun Aug. 19, but this was soon found to be unnecessary. The Fifteenth regiment, on account of its distance from Riley, reached Valencia’s camp too late to take part in the battle. It should be remembered that Smith’s troops did not know of the demoralization of the Mexicans, and expected to find them elated and confident. Apparently Shields made a mistake in leaving San Gerónimo to go to the road on Friday morning, but the mistake was natural. Valencia went to Toluca with a few troops. He was notified to present himself for trial, which would have meant death. Some irregulars made a trivial attack upon Quitman (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 347), but Alvarez’s troops did not come near San Agustín. Twiggs had a lame foot at this time, and he was not under fire Aug. 19. Brookes (Brooks) was on his staff.

Ripley (War with Mexico ii, 291) intimates that Scott sent Pillow and Twiggs forward, Aug. 19, without taking much into account Valencia’s army and cannon, and permitted the Mexicans to open the battle when they pleased. This seems careless on Scott’s part; but, as the text shows, Scott did not know Valencia had marched to Padierna, and had no reason to suppose (particularly in view of the threat against S. Antonio) that large Mexican forces would be there. Ripley suggests (p. 292) that it was improper to let Valencia see the road-building, learn the Americans were moving that way, and prepare to receive them; but road-building ceased when the Americans came in view of Valencia, and after that time he had little opportunity for preparations. Ripley complains (p. 293) that it was confusing to have Twiggs open the battle, Pillow take charge of it, and Scott supersede Pillow; but it is not customary for the general-in-chief to ride at the head of his forces on a road-building expedition, and under the circumstances the above arrangement was natural. He remarks (p. 297) that Riley’s reconnoitring with a view to assaulting Valencia’s rear proves that he understood his mission was more than to occupy S. Gerónimo and await orders [i.e. understood that Pillow sent him to do what Smith did]; but Riley testified that he had no such understanding, and reconnoitred on his own responsibility to obtain information that might prove useful (Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 147–8). Ripley, in his efforts to sustain Pillow’s claims, says (p. 297) that Riley fell back because of his “believing himself unsupported,” yet says that Riley “relied” on being supported. He explains (p. 298) Pillow’s not informing Riley of the despatch of Cadwalader by saying that a single mounted officer could not cross the pedregal; but an officer could cross on foot, and all or most of the officers were afoot (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 304). Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 488) observes that placing four brigades successively between superior forces of the enemy involved a great risk; but it should be remembered not only that it was worth while to take the risk and that the American troops were of superior quality, but that Santa Anna was not present when Riley went to S. Gerónimo, Valencia could not see what was taking place in that quarter, he was expecting a frontal attack all the afternoon, S. Gerónimo was a splendid defensive position, and the Mexicans could not see how large forces occupied it.

Had Santa Anna and Valencia coöperated with judgment and good-will, Scott’s army would perhaps have been crushed; but had the Mexicans been sensible and patriotic, we should have had no war. How much Scott knew about the mutual relations of Santa Anna and Valencia one cannot say, but in all probability he was well informed regarding them. As scarcely needs to be pointed out, this battle and that of Churubusco had a great effect in discouraging, not merely the Mexicans in the vicinity but those at a distance. Men intending to fight or to provide money drew back at once (e.g. 76Isunza, Aug. 24).

12. Santa Anna’s course after the battle of Contreras. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert). 224Intercepted letters (14, L. V. to M. O.; 22, diary; 23, narrative; 26, to Old Gentleman). Apuntes, 209–10, 241, 244, 250–4. Semmes, Service, 396–7. Picayune, Oct. 8. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 325; app., 69 (reports of Scott and others). S. Anna, Apelación, 53 Id.., Detail, 14–5. Balbontín, Invasión, 120–1. 217Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. 61Huger, Aug. 22. 70“Guerra,” no. 30 (F. Pérez, Rangel, Argüelles, Zenea). México á través, iv, 678. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Diario, Sept. 1, 2. Monitor Repub., Oct. 24; Dec. 13, 17. Carreño, Jefes, ccxc (Pérez), ccciv, cccvi. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 446; iv, app., 283–4. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 295. Remarks on Mason and Hardcastle’s Plan of Worth’s operations (Sen. 1; 30, 1). 76Report of losses, Churubusco, Aug. 21. 76Rincón, Aug. 20. 76Argüelles, Aug. 22. 76Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26.

13. To guard against contingencies Scott had ordered Worth with Garland’s brigade and Quitman with his troops to proceed toward San Gerónimo on Friday morning, leaving San Agustín guarded by Harney (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306–7). This has been thought risky. But Scott had no doubt learned from Lee that Santa Anna was operating in the vicinity of San Gerónimo, where was evidently the critical field, and hence probably he felt that there was little danger of an attack upon San Agustín that Harney aided, if necessary, by Clarke’s brigade (not far distant) could not meet.

14. Scott’s course after the battle of Contreras. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306–9, 338, 344; app., 36 (reports of Scott, Pillow, Shields, Kearny). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278, 281–2. Davis, Autobiog., 199. Picayune, Sept. 8. 66Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. 335Trist, draft of address. Wash. Union, Sept. 15. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 74, 632 (Scott); 77 (Lee). So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 81–2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1018 (Scott). Smith, To Mexico, 199.

15. Worth’s operations at Churubusco. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 333; app., 36,41–2,44–65 (reports of Scott and officers). 221Hill, diary. 68Bonneville court-martial (testimony of Hoffman, Nelson, Pemberton, Worth, Armistead, Ruggles, etc.). 335Trist, draft of address. Semmes, Service, 394–400. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert). Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464 (Lee). 224Intercepted letters (14, L. V. to M. O.; 23, narrative; 26, to Old Gentleman). Apuntes, 244–6. Picayune, Sept. 22; Oct 8. Delta, Sept. 26. 76Zerecero to Guerra, Aug. 25. 76Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26. Balbontín, Invasión, 120–2. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278, 282. 260Henshaw, comments on map. Stevens, Stevens, i, 198. 61Huger, report, Aug. 22. 65Scott, gen. orders 327, Oct. 28. Gamboa, Impug., 47. 70“Guerra,” no. 30 (Pérez, Perdigón Garay). Ramírez, México, 299–301. 73Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24. 236Judah, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1018 (Scott); 1076 (Hoffman). Carreño, Jefes, cccvi (Pérez). So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 82–4, 90–1. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 294–5, 298. Smith, To Mexico, 199–202. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 284. S. Anna, Detall, 15. Monitor Repub., Dec. 17.

16. Twiggs’s operations. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 322, 325, 348, etc.; app., 69–82, 85–8, 96–7, etc. (reports of Scott and officers). 221Hill, diary. 12Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1. Apuntes, 246, 250–3. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 230. 66Stevens to Smith, Aug. 24. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 98 (H. L. Scott). Stevens, Stevens, i, 180–4, 199. Stevens, Vindic., 4–7. Carreño, Jefes, 29. Michigan Pioneer Soc. Colls., ii, 173; vii, 117. So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 87–90. Engineer School, U. S. A., Occas. Papers, no. 16. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xvii (Van Deusen). 76Argüelles, Aug. 22. 76Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26. Davis, Autobiog., 199. 70“Guerra,” no. 30 (G. Pérez). Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 447. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 43. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 73–4. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278–9, 282.

17. Shields’s operations. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303, 306, 315, 325, 333, 342; app., 76, 106, 113, 118, 128, 130–4 (reports of Scott and officers). 66Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 342–3. City of Charleston, Year Book, 1883, p. 523. 303Shields to Quitman, Aug. 21. 221Hill, diary. 335Trist, draft of address. Semmes, Service, 402. 224Intercepted letters (22, diary; 25, to E.). Hawthorne, Pierce, 100. Apuntes, 246–7. Murphy, Hungerford, 102. 76Zerecero to Guerra, Aug. 25. Balbontín, Invasión, 121–2. Davis, Autobiog., 200–1, 286. 70“Guerra,” no. 30 (F. Pérez). Stevens, Stevens, i, 198. Ramírez, México, 300. Carreño, Jefes, ccxciv (Torrejón), cccvii (Pérez). 170Crooker to mother, Sept. 1. So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 93–9. Oil painting of Butler: sen. chamber, Columbia, S. C. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert). 291Pierce to Appleton, Aug. 27. Monitor Repub., Dec. 17. 125Bonham to adj. gen., June 15, 1848. Nat. Intelligencer, Jan. 3, 1848. Stevens, Vindication, 4–7. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 285. 277Burnett, statement. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 279. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464. S. Anna, Detall, 15.

18. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 325, etc.; app., 35, 42, 46, 49, 64, 77, 127, etc. (reports of Scott and officers). Semmes, Service, 397, 401–2. 224Intercepted letters (17, J. U. to J. P. F.). Apuntes, 254–8. 76Argüelles, Aug. 22. 76Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26. Balbontín, Invasión, 122. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 233. Carreño, Jefes, cccvii (Pérez). Niles, Jan. 22, 1848, p. 323.

19. S. Anna, Detall, 15–6. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 313, 318, 340, 347; app., p. 36 (reports of Scott and officers). Picayune, Oct. 21. Apuntes, 247. Charleston Courier, Oct. 2. Balbontín, Invasión, 123. Fate of F. D. Mills. Grant, Mems., i, 146. Davis, Autobiog., 202. 223Hirschorn, recolls. De Peyster, Kearny, 140, 142–5. Journ. U. S. Cavalry Assoc., Mar., 1911, p. 841. Ramsey, Other Side, 287, note. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 285–6.

Remarks on the battle of Churubusco. The active fortifying of the convent did not begin until the afternoon of Aug. 18 (76Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26); one gun arrived there on the morning of the twentieth and the rest were left by Santa Anna later that day (Apuntes, 252); and hence Scott could not well have learned from spies what the situation was in that quarter. It is bootless to say (Calderón, Rectificaciones, 43) that Santa Anna should have prevented Scott from reaching Coyoacán. Neither he nor his army was in a condition to fight without fortifications, and they could not have stopped the Americans anywhere if not at Churubusco. On the Mexican right at the convent were two 8-pounders and a 4-pounder; in embrasures at the front, an 8-pounder and a 4-pounder; en barbette at the left an 8-pounder; and in an embrasure defending the left flank a 6-pounder. A detachment of the Independencia battalion under Peñúñuri occupied Coyoacán when the Americans approached, and retired with some loss. The fight at Churubusco convent was actually begun by the Mounted Rifles, but their orders were merely to escort the reconnoitring party, and the First Artillery was expected to clear the way by turning the supposed one-gun battery (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 330). Riley had only the Second and Seventh Infantry at Churubusco. The Fourth Artillery was on guard at Valencia’s camp. Scott ordered that Worth should attack and turn San Antonio after finding the Americans were in its rear, but when he sent Lee to give the signal to Worth, Lee found Worth had already done this.

Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 250–1) says that Scott ordered Pillow to do what Twiggs did and vice versa. But (1) nothing of this is found in Scott’s or Pillow’s report; (2) Scott would not have been likely to order two bitter enemies (Worth and Twiggs) to coöperate in an indefinite manner, and (3) H. L. Scott testified at the Pillow trial that he carried from Gen. Scott to Twiggs the order to attack the convent (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 98). Davis, Shields’s aide, says on the other hand (Autobiog., 199) that Scott knew by reconnaissances of a remarkably strong fortification at Churubusco, and ordered Twiggs to take the route actually taken by Shields. But (1) Davis’s first statement is not correct; (2) Scott was at Coyoacán, where the roads forked, and would have recalled Twiggs, had he seen that officer take the wrong road; (3) Scott felt in haste to strike the retreating Mexicans, and the quickest way to do that was apparently by the road to Churubusco; and (4) H. L. Scott’s testimony, supported by the reports of Gens. Scott and Twiggs, seems to be decisive. Davis’s account contains other errors, and appears to have been written long afterwards from memory.

What Scott intended to do after concentrating we do not know. Probably, as was his custom, he held several plans in suspense, awaiting developments and fuller information regarding the enemy, which the delay expected in Worth’s operations would have given him time to acquire. But his promptness in sending off Pierce and Shields, and his attempt to hold back one of Smith’s and one of Pierce’s brigades, suggest that he aimed to get behind Santa Anna himself and force a decisive battle. Gen. U. S. Grant endorsed Scott’s strategy at Churubusco as faultless and said the engineers served him perfectly (Mems., i, 145); but Stevens’s confession is decisive on both points (Stevens, Stevens, i, 180, 184, 196, 199). Stevens states expressly that Scott had intended to reconnoitre before attacking at Churubusco.

Worth’s attacking the bridge without reconnoitring was mainly due to over-confidence and eagerness; but the intense ambition and rivalry of Worth and Twiggs probably had something to do with the undue haste of both. Of course Semmes (Service, 398, 446) asserts that Worth advanced with deliberation and reconnoitred the bridgehead, but the evidence, especially that given at the trial of Major Bonneville, is decisively against him. Ripley, on the other hand, states that a reconnaissance was not practicable (War with Mexico, ii, 267); but while a complete reconnaissance could not be made, the cornfields on the right would have enabled an officer to advance unseen, and at a glance learn something regarding the obstacle in front. This would have been to save, not lose, time.

Scott was accused of having no plan and leaving his generals to attack as they saw fit, and was criticized especially for fighting to gain a road neither needed nor used by him, from which the enemy could easily have been manoeuvred, had they cared to hold it (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 378); but the text explains these apparent errors. The battle was, however, in effect a blunder, even though not chargeable to Scott as such. Still, the ardor of the army was something not to be thrown away by delaying, and the promptness of the Americans prevented Santa Anna from completing his preparations. (Greene, Russian Army, 433: Excessive prudence has a bad effect on the morale of the men.) Perhaps Scott gained as much as he lost in this way. Moreover, had he manoeuvred the Mexicans out of Churubusco, it would have been necessary to fight them elsewhere, when they would probably have been more ready to fight; the moral effect of this victory on both armies would not have been gained; and our military annals would not have contained this page. The moral effect on the Mexicans, however, was largely offset by pride in the stubborn resistance they had offered, and by the armistice that Scott immediately offered. One could not always determine just where firing, heard from a distance, was taking place. Probably for this reason we have inconsistent reports that make it impossible to determine precisely where and when the battle began. The Sixth Infantry, moving toward the bridge a considerable distance in advance of Worth himself, were said to have received the first fire from the convent (Hoffman: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1076), but Scott reported that the attack upon the convent began some time before that upon the bridgehead. Stevens (I. I. Stevens, 198) supports him. The writer in “Apuntes” says that Worth was checked by ammunition wagons in the road, and that Santa Anna, seeing this, recalled Pérez to defend the bridge; but the wagons appear to have caused no such delay as this writer assumed. The rest of Santa Anna’s force (which this writer says kept on towards Mexico) was mainly cavalry, and presumably this cavalry assisted in flanking Shields. Brev. Lieut. Col. C. F. Smith’s battalion consisted of two companies from the Second Artillery, one from the Fifth Infantry and one from the Eighth Infantry (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 316).

The Fifteenth, but only one battalion (commanded by Capt. Wood) of the Twelfth Infantry was with Pierce, and a battery of mountain howitzers. Pierce, who had been thrown from his horse the day before, fainted and fell out before coming into action, so Shields commanded both brigades. Lee was the engineer officer with Shields. Seeing the need of more troops, he went back to Scott and obtained the Mounted Rifles and a troop of the Second Dragoons, but these men did not reach the spot in time to fight. Scott has been criticized for not sending a stronger force in this direction; but in fact he did not even retain an escort, and the Rifles were Twiggs’s reserve (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 309). The South Carolina regiment, commonly known as the “Palmettoes,” was made up of superior material. Men fit to be officers were in the ranks. Shields’s movement was partly based on a misapprehension, for the Mexicans could retreat from Churubusco via Mexicaltzingo; but anyhow it was wise to aid the frontal attack on the bridge by applying pressure on the flank. Shields seems to have marched too far north to coöperate effectively with the attack upon the bridgehead. Presumably he did so in order to reach Santa Anna’s rear. The combined effect of this movement and the outflanking of the Mexican left was to extend the American line enormously, and expose it to a (happily very improbable) counter-attack. At about three o’clock the Americans were in three sections, badly separated by distance or by the enemy, while the Mexicans, besides fighting behind strong defences, were all actually or virtually in touch one with another, and able to give mutual support.

Shields naturally overestimated the numbers opposed to him. Perhaps the Victoria and Hidalgo battalions from San Antonio passed along the highway to Mexico at this time. They would not fight. They thought hunger, sunburn and blistered feet bad enough. The Americans believed that they fought at least 32,000 men on Aug. 20 (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 313); but this was a great exaggeration. Rangel’s brigade was in town; Alvarez’s was far away; and there must have been a large number of soldiers guarding the fortifications, and attending to the general requirements of the service. The number fighting that day on the Mexican side seems to have been about 16,000, though Mexican authors have tried to reduce it to 12,000 or 13,000 (e.g. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 375).

Scott’s dragoons were divided and assigned to special duties at this time (Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 38). Pillow and a part of his troops joined Worth, but figured very little in reports of the fighting. The Eleventh and Fourteenth Infantry attempted to cut the Mexican line from the bridge to the convent, but on account of the heavy fire were ordered to lie down. Col. Andrews explained that his regiment (Voltigeurs) came up later than Worth’s division, and could not fire without endangering troops ahead of him (Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 122); but this is not convincing, for he must have left Coyoacán at about noon, and there was room enough at the front.

It was stated at Puebla in October, 1847, that 260 Americans fought with the Mexicans at Churubusco (Flag of Freedom, i, no. 1). Some of these men cut their way through (70“Guerra,” no. 30, Perdigón Garay), and reached Mexico (ibid., Rangel). Some eighty appear to have been captured. They were fairly tried. A number were found not guilty of deserting, and were released. About fifteen (Hartman, Journal, 18), who had deserted before the declaration of war, were merely branded with a “D,” and fifty of those taken at Churubusco were executed (65Scott, gen. orders 296). There was bitter complaint because any were spared, but Scott declared he would rather be put to the sword with his whole army than do an injustice in the matter (Davis, Autobiog., 226), and urged the courts to find grounds for reducing the number of executions (335notes on letter to Ho. of Repres.). It was said that more than once the American deserters killed Mexicans who tried to raise a white flag at the convent. For the deserters and their fate consult: 12Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1; Picayune, Sept. 8; Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 319, 344; Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 230; 70“Guerra,” no. 30 (Rangel, Perdigón Garay); Judah, diary; Amer. Star, Mexico, Sept. 20; Diario, Sept. 2; Flag of Freedom, Puebla, i, no. 1; 178Davis, diary; Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 452; Hartman, Journal, 17–8; Scott, 65gen. orders 281–3; Davis, Autobiog., 224–7). Hancock and Longstreet, destined to be on opposite sides at Gettysburg, here fought together. Twiggs was at this time under fire (Stevens, Stevens, i, 199). Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 493) explains the stiff defence of the convent as due to the presence of “men of Spanish (not Indian) descent”; but (1) the Victoria and Hidalgo battalions, which would not fight (supra) were still more truly “Spanish” (vol. ii, p. 3), and (2) the nearly worthless officers were always of such descent.

20. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 465, 478. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 313–4, 348, 384. Ho. 24; 31, 1. 76Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26. 76Quijano, Sept. 3. 76Olaguíbel, Aug. 27. Ramírez, México, 299. Monitor Repub., Dec. 17 (S.Anna). 76Alcorta, Aug. 30. 12Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1. Semmes, Service, 408. 76Report, Aug. 21. 224Intercepted letters, passim. 76Cuerpo Médico, report, Aug. 24.

21. Mich. Pioneer Soc. Colls., ii, 173. Stevens, Stevens, i, 199. Encarnacion Prisoners, 55. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278–80. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 331. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464 (Lee). Apuntes, 247. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 377.

1. The American situation after the battles of Aug. 20. 260Henshaw, comments on map. 61Trousdale, Aug. 22. 217Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21, etc. 218Henshaw narrative. Vedette, vii, no. 9 (Toll). St. Louis Republican, Sept. 27. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314 (Scott). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 284–5, 294. McSherry, El Puchero, 88, 100. 364Worth to daughter, Sept. 2. 61N. C. to Elizabeth Miller, Nov. 30. Semmes, Service, 413. London Chronicle, Nov. 12. N. Y. Herald, Feb. 5, 1848 (Pierce). 236Judah, diary. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 129 (Scott). Semi-weekly N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1848. 358Williams to father, Oct. 1. 291Pierce to wife, Aug. 23. Davis, Autobiography, 189. 350Weber, recolls. 303Shields to Quitman, Aug. 21. 221Hill, diary. 68Scott’s statement to court of inquiry, Apr. 17, 1848. Gamboa, Impug., 49. Picayune, Sept. 9. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 460 (Turnbull).

Semmes (Service, 413) says that eventually Scott had to disperse the elements of peace, and incorrectly adds that they seemed to reassemble all the more rapidly. But Scott had reason to believe that what it required months to do later could be done now in only a few weeks. He reported that understanding his nation’s desire for peace and “Willing to leave something to this republic—of no immediate value to us—on which to rest her pride, and to recover temper—I halted our victorious corps at the gates of the city” (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314). Even the fiery Worth deemed it best not to enter Mexico at this time (364to daughter, Sept. 2).

2. 108Marcy to Bancroft, Apr. 28. Polk, Messages, May 11; June 16, 1846; Feb. 10, 1847 (Richardson, iv, 437, 451, 511). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 328 (Scott); 334 (Marcy). 297Benton MS. (with Polk’s notes) received by Polk, July 4, 1846. 69Worth to Bliss, Nov. 29; Dec. 14, 1846.

3. Bankhead reported, Oct. 10, 1846, that he was weary of arguing in favor of treating with the United States; that the dominant faction, positively refusing to negotiate, were crying, “A levy of 40,000 and make terms only on the other side of the Nueces!”

4. The overture of July, 1846. Sen. 107; 29, 2, pp. 1–3. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 43–4. 13Pakenham, nos. 93, July 13; 107, Aug. 13; 119, Sept. 28; 130, Nov. 12, 1846. 13Bankhead to Pakenham, Oct. 10. 256Marcy to Wetmore, June 13. Locomotor, June 27. 158Cobb to wife, June 4. National, June 22. Pregonero, June 11. Monitor Repub., June 22. 162Buchanan to Conner, Oct. 1. 162Conner, July 19. 13Bankhead, nos. 92, 104, 105, June 29; July 30; 125, Aug. 31; 128–30, Sept. 7, 1846. Rejón to Buchanan, Aug. 31 (in Memoria de ... Relaciones, 1846). Polk, Diary, Sept. 19, 20, 26. Buchanan, Works (Moore), vii, 40, 82, 87. Indicador, Aug. 27. Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 28. Diario, Dec. 6, 13, 25. 52Black, May 21; June 9; July 4. 166Id.to Conner, July 9; Aug. 1. 166Pommarès to Gregory, July 2. 166Id.. to Conner, July 4, 21; Aug. 12. Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy, 298. Polk, Message, Dec. 8 (Richardson, iv, 494). 297Mackenzie, July 7. 76Comandante, V. Cruz, Aug. 26. See vol. i, pp. 217, 502, 504.

Sept. 26 Buchanan replied to Rejón that the United States did not wish to ignore in the peace negotiations the causes of the war, since to do that would be to abandon the just claims of the United States (Polk, Diary, Sept. 26; Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44). The necessity of explaining his previous despatch illustrated once more the Mexican superiority in diplomatic fencing. Buchanan added that delay would make it the harder to end the conflict. Polk regarded the Mexican reply as a refusal to treat (Diary, Sept. 19). In consequence he proposed aggressive operations in Tamaulipas (chap. xiii, p. 263) and the imposition of contributions in lieu of paying for needed supplies (chap. xxxiii, p. 264). Buchanan, however, directed Conner to notify Slidell, who was still on waiting orders at New Orleans, whenever the Mexican government should announce that it was “disposed” to treat (162Oct. 1).

5. Polk, Diary, July 26, 30, 31; Aug. 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 1846. Id.to Senate, Aug. 4, 8 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 456, 466). Id.., Message, Dec. 8, 1846 (ib., 494–5). Benton, View, ii, 681–2. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, pp. 1211–21. See also the long debates on the subject in Senate and House, Jan. and Feb., 1847 (Cong. Globe). Von Holst, United States, iii, 293. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 40, note, 45 (Sevier), 60 (Cass). Boston Atlas, Feb. 17, 1847. 13Mora to Palmerston, May 26, 1847. Diario, May 24; June 8, 1847. Republicano, June 11, 1847. 13Thornton to Bankhead, June 14, 1847. (Consul Black notified) 13Pakenham, no. 40, Mar. 29, 1847. Wash. Union, Aug. 12, 1846. 108Polk to Bancroft, Jan. 30, 1847. Daily Telegraph, Oct. 16, 1852.

The request for two millions apparently grew out of the negotiation with Santa Anna; see chap. ix, note 38. Polk’s object was probably to be able to supply funds promptly to the Mexican administration making a treaty, and to satisfy it that it would be able to gain the needful military support. The three millions could not be used until after Mexico should have ratified the treaty (Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 46 (Berrien), 60 (Cass); Washington Telegraph, Oct. 18, 1852), and the government was required to account for the expenditure of the money (U. S. Stat. at Large, ix, 174; Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 45). An improper use of it was therefore impossible.

6. The overture of January, 1847. Ho. 85; 29, 2. Washington Union, Oct. 9, 1846 (N. Y.); Apr. 22; June 11, 1847. 162Matson to Conner, Feb. 20, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 36–7. 162Conner to wife, Feb. 17. 132Benton to Buchanan, Jan. 14. 132Atocha to Buchanan, July 3. 132Buchanan to Atocha, Jan. 18; to Scott and Perry, Apr. 23. Niles, May 1, p. 129; May 15, p. 162. Von Holst, United States, iii, 332. Courrier des Etats Unis, Aug. 15, 1846. Buchanan, Works (Moore), vii, 198, 211. 13Bankhead, nos. 141, Sept. 29, 1846; 16, Mar. 2, 1847. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 444, res., Mar. 1. Tributo á la Verdad, 26. 58Dobson, Feb. 14. Epoca, Feb. 23. 86Gefe V. C. dept. to gov., Feb. 9. Don Simplicio, Feb. 17. Diario, Aug. 18. Webster, Writings, ix, 158. 52Black, Feb. 24. 13Pakenham, nos. 107, Aug. 13, 1846; 40, Mar. 29; 56, Apr. 28, 1847. Nat. Intelligencer, June 10, 1845; May 3, 1847. 52Shannon to Cuevas, Mar. 1, 1845. 69A clipping from Republicano. Polk, Diary, Nov. 7, 1846; Jan. 12–19; Mar. 20, 1847. Picayune, May 6, 1847. Delta, Mar. 13. 76Morales, Feb. 9.

At Atocha’s suggestion the American commissioners were to have power to suspend hostilities after actually meeting Mexican commissioners. Such was Webster’s idea (Writings, ix, 158). The plan would have given Mexico a fine opportunity to protract the negotiations, let our war expenses accumulate, and cause our war spirit to languish. The Mexican reply said that the Texas affair [besides being atrocious in itself] was “a cover to ulterior designs, which now stand disclosed” (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 37). The failure of the overture naturally angered Polk, and he declared for a most energetic military movement against the capital (Diary, Mar. 20). In April Atocha, who loved to represent himself as “sole agent for Santa Anna’s gamecocks and all, and his particular friend in every respect” (162Conner, Feb. 17), returned to Mexico ostensibly on private business, but with 132letters of introduction from the government to Scott, Shields and Perry. “O God”, exclaimed El Republicano, “send unto us shells, rifles, shot and every kind of projectiles and misfortunes; burn and destroy us, reduce us to ashes, annihilate us, but ... permit not that Atocha be the broker of a treaty of peace!”

7. The Mexican attitude. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 190, 205–12 (Trist), 174. Picayune, May 12; July 8; Oct. 15, 17. Apuntes, 264. 13Bankhead, nos. 42–3, Apr. 30; 58, May 29; 83, Aug. 29. Polk, Diary, Apr. 16. Ramírez, México, 224, 234, 239, 248, 263, 271, 275. Meade, Letters, i, 180. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44. México en 1847, 34. 77Undated clipping from N. Y. Sun describing a Mexican society to promote annexation to U. S. 47Mexican letter, Orizaba, [Sept., 1847]. 13Pakenham, no. 40, Mar. 29. 13Bankhead to Pak., Oct. 10, 1846. Semmes, Service, 426. 335Belton to Hitchcock, Aug. 23. Ocampo, Obras, 263. Republicano, Oct. 24, 1846; May 8, 11; June 9, 11, 1847. Esperanza, Aug. 8, 1846. Eco de Tampico, Nov. 11, 1846. Zempoalteca, July 15, 1847. 80Speaker in México legislature, Apr. 21. London Times, July 15; Oct. 27; Nov. 6, 16, 1846; Jan. 8, 13; Feb. 9; Mar. 15; May 10, 1847. Tributo á la Verdad, 27. M’Sherry, El Puchero, 189. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 332, res., Sept. 24, 1846. Encarnacion Prisoners, 83. Opinion del Ejército, Nov. 13, 1846. Cong. Globe,29, 2, app., 211 (Corwin); 323 (Calhoun). 335Eayres to S. Anna, Oct. 10, 1846; reply, Oct. 21. 52Black, Sept. 22, 28, 1846. 92Mex. ayunt. to gov. Fed. District, Sept. 3, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 36. Wash. Union, Sept. 28; Oct. 6, 27, 1846; Apr. 22; May 22; July 10; Aug. 5; Oct. 5, 1847. Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 7, 1846; Feb. 5, 1847. N. Y. Express, Nov. 12, 1846. Iris Español, Oct. 30, 1846. Regenerador Repub., Dec. 23, 1846. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 58–9 (Calhoun). 132Cushing to Buchanan, Oct. 31, 1847. Constitutionnel, Nov. 10; Dec. 5, 1846; Aug. 17, 1847. Correspondant, Sept. 15, 1846. London Globe, Nov. 16, 1846. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 270. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 144. Monitor Repub., Sept. 2; Nov. 14, 18, 1846; Apr. 21, 29; May 15, 17, 27, 1847. Diario, Oct. 8; Nov. 21; Dec. 20, 23, 1846; Feb. 13, 14; Mar. 31; Apr. 11; May 5, 21, 23, 25; June 10, 18; July 8; Aug. 29, 1847. 76Mora, Apr. 23, 1847. See also chap. xxxiv, note 21, and the corresponding text.

8. Appointment of Trist. Polk, Diary, Dec. 3, 4, 9, 1846; Jan. 18; Apr. 10, 14, 16, 21–2, 1847. 335Buchanan to Trist, July 13, 1847. Mansfield, Mexican War, 275. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 310. 52Trist to Buchanan, July 31, private. Ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 43 (Buchanan). 57Trist, reports. Polk, Message, Dec. 7, 1847 (Richardson, iv, 536). Benton, View, ii, 704. Chase, Polk Administration, 215–6. 335Mrs. Trist to T., July 13. 345Blair to Van Buren, Dec. 26, 1846; July 7, 1847. Delta, May 1, 1848. 335Trist to Mann, Dec. —, 1853 (draft). 335Document by Trist re his wife. 335Trist, draft of letter to the Times. Amer. Hist. Review, x, 312–4 (Reeves). 335Trist to Felton, June 14, 18—. 335Id.., memorial (draft). 335Buchanan, Aug. 28, 1845 (appointing Trist chief clerk). For Buchanan: 354Welles papers; Monitor Repub., Mar. 10, 1848 (Landa); Poore, Perley’s Remins., i, 332.

9. Trist’s early relations with Scott in Mexico. 335Trist’s credentials, etc. 335Walker to Trist Apr. 15. 335Buchanan to Relaciones, Apr. 15. Pennsylvanian, Apr. 18. Boston Post, Apr. 15. 335Trist to wife, Apr. 18, 25, 28; May 4, 8, 15, 21, etc.; to Buchanan, May 21. 335Trist’s sister to T., May 22. 335Trist, drafts and memoranda. Scott, Mems., ii, 399–401, 576, 579. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 150, 153, 159, 181 (Trist); 126, 135, 157, 172 (Scott); 123, 128, 131 (Marcy); 108–9. 335Buchanan to Trist, July 13, private. Ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 43, 47, etc. 52Trist to Scott, May 9. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 940 (Marcy); 993, 1218 (Scott). Kenly, Md. Vol., 336. Mansfield, Scott, 364. Polk, Diary, Apr. 15, 16; June 12–15; July 9, 13, 15, 17; Aug. 24. 52Buchanan to Trist, July 13. London Times, July 15; Aug. 16 (Genevese traveller: Scott warned). Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 38. Polk, Message, Dec. 7, 1847 (Richardson, iv, 535). 47Scott to Semmes, May 9. 48Mason to Perry, Apr. 15, confid. 335Trist to Scott, Sept. 30 (draft). Oswandel, Notes, 155–6. Semmes, Service, 197–201. 345Blair to Van Buren, Mar. 3, 1848. 335Trist to Ho. Repres., Feb. 12, 1848 (draft). Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3 (Buchanan to Conner, July 27, 1846). 132Mason to Buchanan, June 28. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer in Niles, July 10. Buchanan, Works (Moore), vii, 270–9. So. Qtrly. Review, Apr., 1852, pp. 386–93. (Semmes episode) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 976–92. 335Trist to Felton, June 14, 18—.

The government desired to keep the despatch of the peace commissioner secret, lest Whigs should defeat the plan (Polk, Diary, Apr. 16), but a member of the Cabinet betrayed the fact (335Trist to Mann, Dec. —, 1853). Scott had been given some reason to expect that he would be (as he naturally desired to be) one of a peace commission (Mems., ii, 576), as would have been very proper, and no doubt he was not pleased to find he had been ignored. He was further exasperated at this time by the arrival of Lieut. Semmes, as a representative of the navy, to see about the case of a naval prisoner (Rogers: chap. xxx, p. 444), as if Scott had not been able and willing to attend to the business, and in fact had not already attended to it (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 989), and by Semmes’s demand (which had to be refused) for an escort (Semmes, Service, 198, etc.; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 977–92). It would not have been proper to detach one soldier unnecessarily. May 31 Marcy wrote to Scott that Trist was “directed” to show the General his instructions (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 123); but Buchanan used the word “authorised” (52to Trist, July 13). So did Polk (Message, December 7, 1847) and Marcy to Scott on July 12 (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 133). Polk and the Cabinet were greatly disturbed by the quarrel between Scott and Trist, blaming both but of course blaming Scott most. Polk proposed to recall them, but Marcy said Scott could not be spared at that time, and the rest of the Cabinet agreed with him (Polk, Diary, June 12, 14; July 9). Polk said Scott had thrown away “the golden moment” to make peace. But, as Scott knew (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 120), the Mexican Congress by its law of April 20 (vol. ii, p. 81) had made peace negotiations practically impossible. A military officer is not expected to execute an order if the condition of things when he receives it is essentially different from that known or assumed by his superior at the time of issuing it. Trist admitted later that he had been misinformed about the Mexican situation, and was not sorry Scott did not promptly forward the despatch (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 819, 825). As for the power to grant an armistice, Scott held that the army, cut off without supplies in the heart of a hostile country, must be free to take military security for its own safety (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 121). Trist was given authority to draw any part of the three millions appropriated to facilitate making a treaty. Buchanan to excuse himself wrote (52to Trist, June 14) that Scott would not have replied to Trist as he did, had he waited to see Trist’s instructions. This amounted to saying that, since Scott knew nothing about those instructions, his letter was natural. Marcy admitted (May 31: Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 122) that Scott ought to have seen the instructions, the projet and Buchanan’s despatch, of which Trist had a copy. Dec. 26 256Scott had written privately to Marcy that he had heard from Congressmen of a plan to place Benton over him, but did not believe a word of it; and Jan. 16 he again had expressed his gratitude and loyalty to the President. But it should not be forgotten that while the administration was entitled to full credit for its meanness and blundering, the trouble arose primarily from Scott’s having gone deeply into politics. He was not politically active now. Jan. 16 he 256wrote privately to Marcy, “On setting out, on my present mission, I laid down whiggism, without taking up democracy,” but the politicians were not fitted to believe this manly and truthful declaration. The Whigs insisted that Trist had been sent to embarrass and perhaps to ruin Scott.

10. Thornton, later Sir Edward Thornton, British minister to the United States, saw Scott also, who gave him to understand that he should advance against Mexico July 1 or 2 unless a reply to Buchanan’s despatch should seem probable (13T. to Addington, June 29). Thornton believed that Rejón was intriguing with Scott to have the Americans come to Mexico, install the Puros and make peace with them, and that Rejón’s party were insisting upon war for this reason (ibid.). Baranda had tried to catch Scott in some entanglement by means of secret negotiations through the British legation, but had failed (13Bankhead, nos. 47, 54, 1847). Bankhead exerted all his influence with the government in favor of negotiations. June 22 the minister of relations replied politely to Buchanan that his despatch had been referred to Congress, with which the settlement of the matter rested (Diario, June 26).

11. Scott 335wrote to Trist, July 17, to the following effect: I concur with you, several of my generals and many foreigners of high standing here and at Mexico in believing that our occupation of twenty principal towns, besides those we already hold, probably would not within a year or more force the Mexicans to accept a peace on terms honorable to the United States without the pledge in advance or the payment of money to some of the principal authorities. This is expected as a preliminary to any negotiation. We must pay $10,000 down to one high official, and $1,000,000, probably to be divided among many, on the ratification of a treaty. With your concurrence I sent $10,000 to Mexico yesterday, and at the proper time I will unite with you in pledging $1,000,000. I have no question as to the morality of this course, nor have you. We have tempted the integrity of no one. The overture, if corrupt, came from parties already corrupted. We merely avail ourselves of that corruption to obtain an end highly advantageous to both countries. Such transactions have always been considered allowable in war. We do not know that this money would not go into the same channels as that which our government is willing to pay publicly for territory would go into.

June 4 Poinsett said he should be “surprised” if the Mexicans could be made to accept the terms of the United States (345to Van Buren). June 11 Buchanan said privately he should not be “much disappointed” should the war continue for years (132to Frémont). July 16 Marcy could see no hopes of terminating it (256to Wetmore). Hence the fears of Trist and Scott do not seem unreasonable. The $1,000,000 was to have been deducted from the sum to be paid by the United States government (224Hitchcock, memo.) Who the intended go-between was cannot be stated, though on settling his accounts Scott told confidentially who received the $10,000 (Scott in N. Y. Herald, Nov. 3, 1857); but there is reason to believe that it was Miguel Arroyo, who will presently appear as secretary to the Mexican peace commissioners. It has been said (Rives, U. S. and Mexico, ii, 501) that Scott acted as he did with reference to peace because anxious to get back to the United States for personal political reasons. Had this been true, Scott would have resigned under the cloud of glory rising from his capture of Mexico City. We have political letters written by Taylor at this period, but Scott seems to have shown no such activity. On the other hand he wrote to Marcy (note 9), “On setting out, on my present mission, I laid down whiggism.”

July 16 Scott mentioned the subject of paying for a treaty to a number of his principal officers at what came to be called improperly a council, stating (cf. supra) that he felt no scruples about it (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 257). Pillow, who had already assented heartily to the plan (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 317), supported that view of it strongly (68Shields to Marcy, Mar. 11, 1848). Quitman, Shields and Cadwalader opposed it. Probably their opinions had no practical effect, for Scott had already committed himself, and the Mexicans soon ceased to desire peace. July 7 Trist sent to Buchanan a copy of a note written by him (52to Thornton) which could hardly fail to suggest to a politician that something peculiar was afoot, and early in August “Gomez,” an army correspondent of the St. Louis Republican, gave some account of the negotiations (published Nov. 22, republished by the Baltimore Sun, Dec. 6). Polk and the Cabinet made no sign, however. But on Oct. 28 and January 18 Pillow, now a bitter enemy of Scott, wrote to Polk about the affair (Polk Diary, Dec. 11, 18, 20, 28, 1847; Feb. 16, 19, 1848), pretending (224Hitchcock, memo.) that Scott had beguiled him into supporting the plan, and that his better nature had almost immediately reacted against it. Pillow and Polk doubtless thought that here lay an opportunity to do Scott a great injury, and took the matter up with much apparent indignation; and in March, 1848, Marcy confidentially ordered the officers sitting in the Pillow court of inquiry to make an investigation (Polk, Diary, Mar. 14, 16; 68Marcy, Mar. 17). They did what they could, but the investigation came to nothing, for Trist and Scott would not implicate the British legation. See 68proceedings of the court and statements of generals; Daily Democrat, Chicago, Sept. 15, 1857; 256Marcy to Towson, Mar. 17, 1848; 68Scott to Marcy, Jan. 28, 1848, and Shields to Marcy, Feb. 12, 1848; Davis, Autobiography, 177; 224Hitchcock, memo.; Claiborne, Quitman, i, 326; 256memo. Scott overlooked the facts that such a bargain could not be kept secret indefinitely, and that, even if ethically justifiable and in accordance with the practice of giving presents to Indian chiefs and Barbary pirates, it would give great offence to American pride. The latter point was urged forcibly by Shields. To buy peace of a vanquished enemy seemed to him and Quitman humiliating and degrading.

12. The Puebla negotiations. 52Trist to Buchanan, nos. 7, June 13; 9, July 23 (and P. S., July 25); 12, Aug. 22. 52Thornton to Trist, July 29. 13Thornton to Bankhead, June 14; to Addington, June 29. 13Pakenham, no. 116, Sept. 13, 1846. 335Trist to Scott, June 25, confidential; July 16, confidential. 335Worth to Trist, July 2, 22. 132Atocha to Buchanan, July 3. 335[Thornton] to Hargous, undated. 335Trist to Thornton, July 3. 335Scott to Trist, July 17; to P. F. Smith, July 6. 335Trist to Buchanan, no. 8, July 7. 335—— to Trist, July 8. St. Louis Republican, Nov. 22. Baltimore Sun, Dec. 6. Diario, May 21, 23–5; June 8, 26, 27; July 2, 18, 24–6; Aug. 18. Monitor Repub., May 13; June 18, 25, 27–8. 335—-- to ——, July 21. 335Otero to Pesado, July 13. Picayune, June 30; Aug. 8; Oct. 1, 15. Republicano, June 24–5. Scott, Mems., ii, 579. 47Semmes to Perry, July 28. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 314–21, 326. Polk, Diary (see note 11). 68Quitman to Marcy, Mar. 9, 1848. 68Pillow to Marcy, Jan. 18, 1848. 52Buchanan to Trist, no. 7, Dec. 21, 1847. 68Shields to Marcy, Mar. 9, 1848. Raleigh Star, Aug. 25, 1847. 60Wilson to Marcy, July 31; Aug. 1. London Times, May 10; Aug. 6; Sept. 6. Ramírez, México, 239, 255–6, 263, 271. Davis, Autobiography, 177–8, 207–9. 224Hitchcock, Memorandum. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 2, 1848. Missouri Republican, Sept. 16, 1857. 68Scott to Marcy, Jan. 28, 1848. 68Shields to Marcy, Feb. 12, 1848. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 38, 40. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44. Sen. 34; 34, 3, pp. 21, 37–9. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 144, 150, 229, 232, 235, 238, 240, 259–61, 269–70. 335Trist to Thornton, July 30. 335E. E. Smith to Trist, Aug. 31. 335Trist to Scott, Sept. 30 (draft). 256Marcy to Wetmore, July 16; Oct. 21. Otero, Comunicación. Dictamen de la Comisión, etc., 29, 30. Republicano, May 8, 21; June 9, 28. 82J. J. Otero, proclam., Apr. 25. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 115–20. 52J. A. Jones to Polk, May 2. Delta, July 15. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 260–1, 264–9, 326. 60Scott to Marcy, Apr. 5. 13Bankhead, nos. 184, Dec. 30, 1846; 6, Jan. 29; 34, Apr. 1; 42, 46, Apr. 30; 47, May 6; 54, 58–60, May 29; 61, June 26; 67, June 29; 75, July 29, 1847. 68Scott to Towson et al., Apr. 17, 1848. 335H. L. Scott to Trist, May 29, 1852. Wash. Telegraph, Oct. 13, 22, 1852. London Chronicle, Aug. 6. 335Trist to Scott, Sept. 1, 1861. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 524–5. 56M. Y. Beach, June 4. Wash. Union, June 2; July 10; Aug. 5, 20. N. Y. Sun, May 22, Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 830 (Trist); 945, 1011, 1085 (Scott); 922 (Marcy). 132Atocha to Buchanan, July 3; Aug. 1; Sept. 4, 21. 132Dimond to Buchanan, Aug. 2. Klein, Treaty, 255. Buchanan, Works (Moore), vii, 484. N. Y. Herald, Nov. 3, 1857 (Scott). Furse, Organization, 143. Réplica á la Defensa. Semmes, Service, 310, 413. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Apuntes, 199. 185—— to Lewis, July 20. 335Trist, marginal notes on Sen. 52; 30, 1. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 135, 172 (Scott); 181–6, 231–46, 306 (Trist); 194 (S. Anna). 76Orders for Guzmán and Avila. 76Alvarez, July 16.

Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 149) represents Scott as desiring a reconciliation with Trist in order to play a brilliant part in bringing about peace and so increase his political popularity. This view, which befits a pupil and friend of Pillow and furthers the purpose of both to injure Scott, is disproved by a number of circumstances and particularly by the fact that, after the reconciliation took place, Scott, while ready to do all in his power for peace—even at the sacrifice of military glory—kept himself entirely in the background so far as that business was concerned. July 23, 1847, Trist wrote to Buchanan: Scott’s whole conduct with reference to the duties with which I am charged “has been characterized by the purest public spirit, and a fidelity and devotion which could not be surpassed, to the views of the government, in regard to the restoration of peace” (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 831). Aiming to further the negotiations with Santa Anna, Scott sent from Puebla to Mexico a 335Memorandum that he would advance and would either defeat the Mexicans in view of the capital (if they would offer battle) or capture a strong position, and then, if able to restrain his troops, would halt and give the Mexicans an opportunity to save the capital by making peace (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 524). Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 167–9) endeavors to relate this honorable incident in a way to represent Scott as the dupe of Santa Anna and to compliment Pillow. But the fact that for good and purely American reasons the general-in-chief pursued this very course after the negotiations had ended, refutes Ripley; and it also proves that in offering to make that agreement Scott did not allow his military plans to be influenced by the enemy, as was charged, for by the morning of Aug. 20, as no sign of a disposition to treat had met Scott, he regarded the Memorandum and every other vestige of an understanding as no longer binding upon him “in any degree” (68Scott to court, Apr. 17, 1848, confid.). Scott was ready, in the interest of his country and humanity, to do anything, compatible with his duty, to obtain peace.

Rives (op. cit., ii, 445) states that in consequence of a letter of July 16 from Pacheco, minister of relations, to Congress a committee of Congress reported that the restrictions placed by the law of Apr. 20 on the prerogatives of the Executive had been removed by the recent “Act of Reforms” of the Constitution. This would have been an important point; but the facts are that the committee’s report, now lying before the author, was dated July 13 and did not mention the law of Apr. 20, and that Congress was not in session to receive Pacheco’s reply of July 16 to its report (52Trist, no. 9, July 23).

13. Pacheco asked Bankhead to use his good offices with Scott to save the city from sack; but as neither the United States nor Mexico had shown favor to the offer of British mediation, he would not act. It is hard to see how, with due regard to Polk’s declarations and the real desire of the United States for peace, Scott could have taken the risk of scattering the Mexican government and the elements of peace by refusing to remain outside the city for a time; and remaining outside involved an armistice, because—for one thing—the only large stock of provisions on which he could count lay in town. Hence censure of Scott for making the armistice came from Polk with a very bad grace (52Trist, no. 22; 221Hill, diary).

14. The making of the armistice. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 186, 190, 231–2 (Trist); 189 (Pacheco), 192 (Scott). 52Trist to Buchanan, no. 12, Aug. 22. 52Bankhead to Trist, Aug. 20, 21. Contestaciones Habidas, 3–7, 11–19. Picayune, Sept. 9. Apuntes, 260–3, 268–9. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314 (Scott); 356–9. Kenly, Md. Vol., 350. 68Scott, statement to court, Apr. 17, 1848, confid. 13Bankhead, nos. 76, Aug. 21; 82, Aug. 29. Raleigh Star, Sept. 22. 221Hill, diary. México á través, iv, 681. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 279–80, 284–6. Davis, Autobiog., 189, 207, 215–6. 224Intercepted letters (Hitchcock, ed.). 259Intercepted letter. Chicago Democrat, Sept. 15, 1857. 61Gates to adj. gen., Aug. 31. Henshaw narrative. S. Anna, Apelación, 61–2. 291Pierce to wife, Aug. 23; to Appleton, Aug. 27. 335Trist, memo., July 29. Semmes, Service, 412, 415–9, 427, 446. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1848. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 170, 178, 191, 196–8, 204, 281, 288, 460, 465, 543. 80Relaciones, circulars, Aug. 23, 30. 80Relaciones to Olaguíbel, Aug. 31, res. 73Lozano, no. 5, res., Aug. 28. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 447–8; iv, app., 286. 335Trist, notes on a letter to Ho. of Repres., Feb. 12, 1848. Wash. Telegraph, Oct. 13, 1852. 236Judah, diary. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 114. So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 112–6. S. Anna, Detall, 16. Monitor Repub., Dec. 12 (S. Anna, report, Nov. 19). 70“Guerra,” no. 30 (F. Pérez, statement, June 17, 1853). Ramírez, México, 301. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. 76To Lombardini, Aug. 21. 76Tornel to Lombardini, Aug. 24. 76Circulars, Aug. 26; Sept. 1, 6, 7. 76Many others. Mora was accompanied by Arrangóiz, lately Mexican consul at New Orleans.

Quitman and Pierce, who had not been able to distinguish themselves in the recent battles, and P. F. Smith were armistice commissioners for the Americans and Generals Mora and Quijano for the Mexicans. They met at Mackintosh’s house. In brief the terms, as drawn up, were as follows: 1, cessation of hostilities; 2, to continue while the peace commissioners are negotiating or forty-eight hours after one of the commanders-in-chief gives formal notice of its termination; 3, during the armistice no military work, offensive or defensive, shall be begun, enlarged or reinforced; 4, neither army shall be reinforced; troops and munitions en route shall stop twenty-eight leagues [about seventy-five miles] from Mexico; 5, no troops of either side shall advance “beyond the line now actually occupied”; 6, the intermediate ground shall not be trespassed upon by military men except when acting as messengers or engaged under a white flag on other business; 7, neither side shall prevent the other from receiving provisions; the Americans may obtain supplies from city or country; 8, prisoners shall be exchanged; 9, Americans residing at Mexico and banished thence may return; 10, either army may send messengers to or from Vera Cruz; 11, the Americans will not interfere with the administration of justice when Mexicans are the parties; 12, they will respect private property, personal rights and trade; 13, wounded prisoners shall be free to move for treatment and cure; 14, Mexican army health officers may attend on such Mexicans; 15, commissioners shall superintend the fulfilment of this agreement; 16, the agreement is to be approved by the commanders-in-chief within twenty-four hours (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 310). Santa Anna struck out article 9, but through passports the same end was reached (52Trist, no. 13); and it was agreed that “supplies” (recursos) in article 7 should cover everything needed by the army except arms and munitions. For Scott’s draft see Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 543.

It is believed that enough has been said in the text to show the wisdom of making the armistice, and more space cannot be given to the subject. Any one interested in it should read Trist’s 52no. 22 (most of it in Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 231–66). It should be borne in mind that the Mexicans believed the armistice was greatly for the advantage of the Americans. Alcorta, minister of war, said that Scott’s purpose in proposing it was solely to give his troops a needed rest, collect his wounded, obtain provisions and prepare batteries (Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 448). It was believed that his losses had been severe (61undated Mexican letter). The reasons avowed by Santa Anna for accepting the armistice were to let the troops rest and recover morale, to gather the wounded and the dispersed, and in general to undo the effects of the recent battles; also to show the world that Mexico was willing to discuss peace, and to convince all that the American demands were unreasonable. The weakest point about the armistice was Scott’s not requiring that Chapultepec should be surrendered or evacuated, as at one time he intended to do (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 285). The reason for his policy was, in brief, that he believed Santa Anna fully intended to make peace, and, understanding the immense difficulties that Santa Anna would have to meet, he did not wish to increase them (52Trist, no. 13). Besides, magnanimity—which is a strong quality, not a weak one—to a beaten foe often produces good results. Perhaps Scott erred on this point; but if so, it was a noble error and not hastily to be censured. Apparently by oversight, neither Scott nor Trist had been instructed what to do should the Mexicans ask for an armistice with a view to peace. Hence Scott was left to take the course that seemed to him best, and that he did. Pillow claimed great glory for opposing the unsuccessful armistice. Rives says (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 501) that Scott was too eager for a return to the United States to be “critical” of Santa Anna’s honesty. This is to say that Scott was unfit to be a corporal. Everybody was suspicious of Santa Anna. See Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 248–52. Rives further says (p. 507) that Scott should have seen that Santa Anna, situated as he was, would have accepted any conditions; but Santa Anna certainly would not. He did not accept our peace terms. Rives also alludes to Scott’s “amiable weakness” in the matter (p. 508)—very erroneously, the present author thinks.

15. Picayune, Sept. 9; Oct. 16, 17. Gamboa, Impug., 49, 50. Apuntes, 270–1, 286. 13Bankhead, nos. 77, Aug. 27; 83, Aug. 29. 221Hill, diary. Ramírez, México, 275, 303. México á través, iv, 686. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 280, 287–92, 294. Grant, Mems., i, 148. Davis, Autobiog., 211. 224Intercepted letters (Hitchcock, ed.). Henshaw narrative. Haynes, Gen. Scott’s Guide. 259Intercepted letter. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, Nov. 30, 1848). 291Pierce to Appleton, Aug. 27. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 297, 301, 303, 306. 178Davis, diary. Diario, Sept. 2, 4, 8. 335Belton to Hitchcock, Aug. 23. 335E. E. Smith to Trist, Aug. 31. 335Memo. in Spanish, Aug. —. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 415. Semmes, Service, 424. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (Hardcastle). 80Relaciones, circular, Aug. 23. 80Alcalde S. Fe to Olaguíbel, Aug. 29. 80Olaguíbel to legislature, Aug. 30; reply, Sept. 1. 80Valencia to O., Aug. 21, 23. 80O. to Guerra, Aug. 22. 80Guerra to O., Aug. 24; reply, Aug. 29. 199MS. written by leading citizen. 73Lozano, nos. 5, res., Aug. 28; 8, res., Sept. 17. Encarnacion Prisoners, 81, 83–4. Monitor Repub., Nov. 16 (Alvarez). Carreño, Jefes, cccxv, note. 260Henshaw, comments on map. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Apuntes, 271–2. And from 76 the following (and many others). Alvarez, Aug. 22, 23, 24, 26, 29. To comandante Toluca, Aug. 24. Acuerdos, Aug. 23, 25, 26, 28, 31; Sept. 1, 4. To Alvarez, Aug. 21, 25, 28. Tornel, Aug. 27, 27, very res., 29. To Ugarte and comtes. gen. Guanajuato, S. Luis Potosí and Querétaro, Aug. 29. Cosío, Sept. 6. J. Y. Gutiérrez, Sept. 2, res. To Lombardini, Aug. 9, 22, 24, 25. Alcorta, Aug. 22. Quijano to Lombardini, Aug. 23, 24. To comte. gen. Mexico, Aug. 27, 29, 30. Bravo, Aug. 28. To Herrera, Aug. 25. To Relaciones, Aug 27. Tornel to comte. gen., Sept. 4. Pacheco to Tornel, Aug. 23. Circulars, Aug. 26; Sept. 1, 6, 7. Alvarez to Olaguíbel, Oct. 30. Olaguíbel, Aug. 27.

Paredes, who had been banished, landed at Vera Cruz on Aug. 14 (Paredes, Breve Exposición).

On August 26 a long train of army wagons went to the capital for provisions and was turned back; but an explanation came promptly from Santa Anna. The next day a similar train, while waiting in the main plaza of the city (76Tornel, Aug. 27), was attacked by the populace because the teamsters appeared to gaze with indifference, if not insultingly, at a religious procession (Carreño, Jefes, cccxv; Henshaw narrative). Immediately the prevailing hostility against the Americans and a suspicion that Santa Anna was planning to introduce Americans in this way and betray the capital (Arco Iris, Nov. 29, 1847) led to a riot, in which six or seven of the Americans were injured and two killed. Tornel, now governor of the Federal District, tried without effect to quell the mob; but Herrera, comandante general, succeeded (Apuntes, 271). Mexican troops defended the wagons (Davis, Autobiog., 211). Santa Anna felt and expressed deep regret for the incident (76to Relaciones, Aug. 27), and some Mexican officers were punished for imprudence (76to comte. gen. Mex., Aug. 27). Scott viewed the affair philosophically. After this Herrera and Tornel took precautions (76Tornel, Aug. 29), the business was done at a very early time in the morning, the wagons did not actually go into the city (76to comte. gen. Mex., Aug. 29), and an officer of the American commissary department, disguised as a peasant, had charge of them. Minor riots occurred later, however, and after a time the place where the supplies intended for Scott were kept was discovered and sacked (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 291). Owing to the non-success of the negotiations, about $300,000 of American cash had to be left in the town. Both cash and provisions had been arranged for by the indefatigable Hargous (ibid.) During the armistice the American equipments, artillery, etc. were put into the best possible order.

16. Santa Anna had much difficulty in persuading good men to serve as commissioners. Trist met the Mexican commissioners first on Aug. 27 at Atzcapuzalco, about eight miles from Tacubaya (Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 191, 195), but at the second session (Aug. 28) it was agreed to meet at the house of Alfaro (Casa Colorada) near Tacubaya and within the Mexican lines. The instructions drafted for the Mexican commissioners, Aug. 24 and 29, were avowedly drawn as if Mexico had “triumphed,” and represented merely a basis for bargaining (Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 313–5, 369–71). The commissioners were authorized at first only to receive and transmit the American propositions; but, believing they would be given (as they were on Aug. 31: ibid., 335) full powers, like his own, to negotiate, Trist laid his projet (ibid., 326–30) before them on Aug. 27 (see Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 389, note 1). Aug. 29 Santa Anna and his Cabinet discussed this (Sen 52; 30, 1, 330). Aug. 30 he discussed it with his generals (Diario, Aug. 31). Sept. 1 the Mexicans presented to Trist their full powers, and the discussion of his terms began. Sept. 2 they were discussed further, and, as agreement was found to be impossible, Trist proposed that the armistice be extended. A large gathering at the palace then discussed the situation (Apuntes, 278). Sept. 3 Santa Anna ordered that no more provisions and other articles that could be useful to the Americans should leave the city (76to comte. gen. Mex.). Sept. 4 Pacheco, the minister of relations, issued a 77circular intimating that unless Trist should moderate his terms, negotiations would be broken off. Cabinet consultations followed, however (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 202). Sept. 5 Pacheco notified the Mexican commissioners that the Nueces-Rio Grande district and New Mexico would not be surrendered (ibid., 373–5). Sept. 6 the final meeting was held and the Mexican counter-projet presented (ibid., 375–80). The Spanish chargé had thought that, owing to Santa Anna’s disposition to jockey, the negotiations would last a long time. This was prevented by Trist’s frank, direct methods. Trist was now in good health except for a severe toothache. He and Scott worked in perfect harmony.

Santa Anna was extremely anxious to gain foreign support and, if possible, a foreign guaranty of the boundary (73Lozano, no. 3, res., Aug. 25). Seiffart, the Prussian minister, who had felt annoyed by the insignificant rôle to which the negative policy of his government and his own lack of capacity had condemned him, now broke out with an unauthorized expression of sympathy for Mexico, and Santa Anna endeavored to use this as a lever on his colleagues (73Lozano, no. 8, res., Sept. 17). But France had no representative on the scene. Bankhead, besides entertaining considerable displeasure because his advice and the British offer of mediation had not been effective, had been for some months, and still was, too ill to take a strong position (73Lozano, no. 5, res., Aug. 28); and Ramón Lozano, the Spanish chargé (the minister having left for home on the conclusion of the armistice), would not act without instructions, and personally expressed the opinion that it would not be easy to obtain a European guaranty of the new line (73nos. 5, res., 8, res.).

17. The negotiations (including S. Anna’s difficulties). Sen. 52; 30, 1, must be studied closely by any one desiring to investigate the subject, and hence citations of the documents that it contains need not be given. 52Trist to Buchanan, nos. 13, Aug. 24; 15, Sept. 4, confid. 335Thornton to Trist, July 29. Sen. Report 261; 41, 2. Sen. 20; 30, 1. Ho. 40; 30, 1. Ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 43, 47, 56, 59. 52Contestaciones Habidas, 1847, with Trist’s notes, throughout. Delta, Nov. 13. Picayune, May 12; June 30; Sept, 9; Oct. 1, 15, 16, 17. Apuntes, 264–9, 277–9, 283, 286. 52Buchanan to Trist, no. 3, July 13. 13Bankhead, nos. 83, Aug. 29; 87, Sept. 28. Constitutionnel, Aug. 17. Ramírez, México, 234, 241, 271–2, 274, 278, 303. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 287–9. Davis, Autobiog., 209. 224Intercepted letters (Hitchcock, ed.). 108Buchanan to Bancroft, Sept. 29. 224Letter from member of Congress (intercepted), Aug. 21. Henshaw narrative. Pacheco, Exposición. 284Comunicacion que sobre ... dirigió ... Otero. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 483 (Otero). Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 388–408. México en 1847, 34. London Times, May 10; Oct. 26. Polk, Message, Dec. 7, 1847; Feb. 2, 1848 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 536–9). 291Pierce to Appleton, Aug. 27. 47Private letter from Orizaba, undated. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 240, 271. 13Thornton to Addington, June 29. Arco Iris, Sept. 16. Opinión Pública, Aug. 29. Diario, Aug. 31. 335E. E. Smith to Trist, Aug. 31. 83Gov. Querétaro to Relaciones, Sept. 4. 83Gov. Jalisco to Relaciones, Aug. 31. 83Farias, Otero et al., declaration, Aug. 22. 83Querétaro legislature to Rel., Sept. 4. Semmes, Service, 414, 426, 446. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 540. 80Gov. S. L. Potosí to Olaguíbel, Aug. 28. 80Gov. Querétaro to O., Aug. 21; reply, Aug. 27. 80Relaciones, circulars, Aug. 23, 30. 80Olag. to Relac., Aug. 26. 80Olag., proclam., Aug. 26. 80Relac. to Olag., Aug. 31, res.; Sept. 6, 8. 80Proceedings of Coalition junta, Aug. 4, 25. 80México legisl., Aug. 27. Porvenir, Aug. 24, supplmnt, 199MS. written by a leading person. 82Gov. Oaxaca to gov. Puebla, Sept. 9. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 550, Aug. 21. 73Lozano, nos. 3, res., Aug. 25; 5, res., Aug. 28; 6, Sept. 10; 8, res., Sept. 17. Encarnacion Prisoners, 83. 80Coalition junta to México state, Aug. 14. 92Mexico ayunt. to gov. Fed. District, Sept. 3. N. Y. Herald, Feb. 5, 1848. Nat. Intelligencer, Aug. 31. Monitor Repub., May 26, 31; Oct. 8. 132Atocha to Buchanan, Sept. 4. Amer. Hist. Review, x, 319 (Reeves). Amer. Review, Jan., 1848, 5–14. So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 114–5. Republicano, May 11. 181Buchanan to Donelson, Jan. 29. Prieto, Mems., 236. 364Worth to S., July 29; to Marcy, Oct. 30. 221Hill, diary. S. Anna, Detall, 16. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 74. 86Relaciones, circular, Sept. 4. and from 76 the following (and many others). Cosío, Sept. 6. J. Y. Gutiérrez, Sept. 2. To Herrera, Aug. 25. To Bravo, Aug. 31. To comte. gen. Mexico, Sept. 3. To Canalizo, Aug. 12. To comte gen. Querétaro, Sept. 4. Gov. Michoacán, Sept. 3. Alvarez to Olaguíbel, Oct. 30. To Alvarez, Aug. 21.

Santa Anna said in his manifesto: “A perpetual war is an absurdity; because war is a calamity, and the instinct of self-preservation, which is even stronger and more powerful in nations than in individuals, recommends that no means whatever should be omitted that may lead to an advantageous arrangement. To adopt this course the constitution gives me competent authority. Consecrated to interests so noble and highly privileged, it is my duty to maintain at all cost the respect and reverence due to the supreme authority with which I am invested .... I will be yet more explicit: sedition and attempts at subverting the government shall be exemplarily punished” (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 250). (Trist’s “vague remark”) Ibid., 253.

The Mexican commissioners were instructed (Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 314, 369–71) to draw Trist into discussions that not only would have given them opportunities to create awkward dialectic situations, as Rejón and others had done with reference to Texas, but might have excited fresh discord in the United States regarding our treatment of Mexico. For example, they were to ask the motives and aims of the war, and whether the United States based its expectations upon force or upon friendly negotiation. The ground was taken that since Mexico was now ready to give up Texas, all reason for the war had ceased to exist [as if the fighting that had already occurred, its loss of life, triumphs and expenses, signified nothing]. It was urged that since no title except to Texas had been claimed by the United States, we could continue the war only for the odious sake of conquest or the unheard-of purpose to punish Mexico because she was unwilling to sell her lands and her people (see Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 391, 400–1, 588, note 3).

In justification of his plan to extend the armistice, Trist pointed out that the American sick and wounded would recover, the rainy reason end, the inundations diminish, the roads improve and the temperature fall (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 259). Ripley, on the other hand, asserts (op. cit. ii, 350) that the Americans would have been “dependent upon the good faith of the Mexicans for all of the conveniences and many of the necessaries of life,” and, at the end of forty-five days, after living in unhealthy villages, would hardly have been fit to act. But had Santa Anna accepted Trist’s proposal he would have done so with the strong expectation of peace and American assistance, and hence would have treated our army well; and Tacubaya, S. Angel and S. Agustín were not only salubrious but delightful in comparison with the capital, and free from its temptations. With reference to Trist’s departing from his instructions by proposing to refer a point back to Washington, it is interesting to recall Napoleon’s dictum (which bears also on Scott’s action supra regarding the sealed despatch): “A general-in-chief cannot exonerate himself from responsibility for his faults by pleading an order of his sovereign or the minister, when the individual from whom it proceeds is at a distance from the field of operations, and but partially, or not at all, acquainted with the actual condition of things” (Maxims, p. 59).

18. There was probably some basis for certain of Santa Anna’s charges against the American troops. Scott allowed a day to pass, it was said, in order to enable Americans in town to get away. Ripley (op. cit., ii, 352) says this was done to allow unarmed inhabitants to do so. But it was good policy to prevent such persons from leaving, and such had been Scott’s course at Vera Cruz (chap. xxii, p. 32). Naturally Santa Anna wavered back and forth, and Trist believed that at about three o’clock, Sept. 5, he almost decided to accept the American terms (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 251).

19. The termination of the armistice. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 195–203, 231–66 (Trist); 307, 346, etc. 52Trist to Buchanan, no. 15, confid., Sept. 4. Sen. 20; 30, 1, pp. 9, 14. Contestaciones Habidas (1847), 22, 26, 28, 30, 34. Picayune, Oct. 16. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 354, 360. 303H. L. Scott to Quitman, Aug. 31. National, Nov. 14. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 291–4. Haynes, Gen. Scott’s Guide. 217Henshaw to wife, Sept. 13. London Times, Nov. 13. Sen. 34; 34, 3, pp. 21, 37–9. Ho. 40; 30, 1. 291Pierce to wife, Aug. 23. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 309. 335Trist to Thornton, confid., Nov. 24 (the Americans kept the armistice faithfully). 335Memo. in Spanish, Aug. —. Semmes, Service, 415. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (Hardcastle). 80Relaciones to Olaguíbel, Aug. 31, res.; Sept. 6, 8. 73Lozano, no. 7, Sept. 16. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 448. 92Tornel to Méx. ayunt., Aug. 30. 187Thomas to Eddy, Aug. 26. N. Y. Sun, Oct. 5. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 67. Ramsey, Other Side, 330, note. And from 76 the following (chiefly showing orders contrary to the armistice). To Alvarez, Aug. 28. Tornel, Aug. 27, very res.; Sept. 3. Bravo, Sept. 5. Acuerdos, Sept. 3, 4. Orders to Tenth Infantry, Aug. 28. To govs. Puebla and four other states, Sept. 6. To govs. México, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Sept. —. To Relaciones, Aug. 27. S. Anna, proclam., Sept. 7.

20. The armistice as viewed in the United States. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 138 (Marcy); 231 (Trist, no. 22). Sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 14 (Trist). Apuntes, 278–9. Polk, Diary, Feb. 7, 19; Mar. 16, 1848. London Times, Oct. 29, Ramírez, México, 241. Polk, Message, Dec. 7, 1847 (Richardson, iv, 536). 13Crampton, no. 42, Oct. 13. Wash. Union, Oct. 4–6. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Oct. 21. 58Jones to Polk, May 2. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 448. 354Welles papers. 191Fairfield to wife, Jan. 10. N. Y. Herald, Dec. 15. Monitor Repub., Dec. 21. Baltimore Sun, Oct. 5. Ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 56 (Buchanan). 335Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 24–5, 1847.

It has been said with truth that the war was waged on the theory that Texas extended to the Rio Grande, but the United States could have neutralized (and this is the most that was considered by Trist: Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 258) the region between that river and the Nueces without implying in the least that our claim to it had not been valid. The fact that Santa Anna and Pacheco thought that an extension of the armistice would benefit the Americans (ibid., 260) is a striking, though by no means the only, answer to Polk’s charge that it would have been greatly to our disadvantage (ibid., 259). Ramírez (México, 241) pointed out that inaction was bad for the Mexicans, since they lacked funds to support troops long. Santa Anna could not materially increase his army after Sept. 1, and he subsisted it with extreme difficulty (Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 259–60). The armistice in general was regarded by the Mexicans as an American trick. The American Review (Whig) argued that the rejection of the counter-projet (which conceded to us Texas as far as the Nueces and California down to 37 degrees) proved that Polk was fighting, not for peace, but for conquest; but the counter-projet did not recognize the American claim to the Rio Grande line nor to an indemnity for the costs of the war, which Mexico had forced upon us. Any one interested in the equity of the matter should read the reply to the Mexican commissioners drafted by Trist (Sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 14).

21. Army feeling. 252Mackall to wife, Feb. 21, 1848. Picayune, Oct. 17. 221Hill, diary. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 271, 290. 291Pierce to wife, Aug. 23; Sept. 1. Robertson, Visit, ii, 344. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 309. Diccionario Universal (Mixcoac). Semmes, Service, 414, 427. Calderón, Life, i, 142, 146. N. Y. Sun, Sept. 16. Such scenes were noted with keen appreciation not only by officers but by privates, as diaries and letters attest. Clear afternoons and evenings occur now and then even at the height of the rainy season.

1. Hardcastle’s map (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 312) and (as elsewhere) the author’s observations. So. Qtrly. Rev., Oct., 1852. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 295–6. Balbontín, Invasión, 126. Grant, Mems., i, 149. 66J. L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Sept. 25. 66Stevens to Smith, Sept. 25. Semmes, Service, 436, 440. Apuntes, 290–1. Picayune, Aug. 8. Delta, Oct. 14. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 355 (Scott), 373 (Sumner), 425–6 (Smith). Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 259. 269Molina, recolls.

The foundry was decreed in July, 1846 (76report on artillery, Nov., 1846; Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec.). The building it occupied had been a powder mill. The principal entrance to El Molino was by an archway near the south end. Sept. 5 Scott heard that bells had been sent to El Molino to be cast into cannon (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 355). Santa Anna did in fact call for gifts of bells, etc. to be used for military purposes (76Carrera, Sept. 6).

2. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 381–2 (S. Anna to Scott, Sept. 6). 76To Herrera, Sept. 6. 100Guerra, circular, Sept. 11. Apuntes, 290–2. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 75. Id.., Detall, 23. 76Acuerdo, Sept. 4. Giménez, Memorias, 266. 76Alvarez to S. Anna, Sept. 25. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 293. Balbontín, Invasión, 125–6. Grant, Mems., i, 151. Mason to Smith: note 1. 76Alvarez, Sept. 6. Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 134–5 (Duncan). Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 424.

3. Ramírez, México, 299. 73Lozano, nos. 2, 8, res., 1847. 199Anon. MS. Kenly, Md. Vol., 346. S. Anna, Apelación, 49. Giménez, Memorias, 111. 358Williams to father, Oct. 1. Exposición dirigida. 179Diario Esactísimo. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 295–6. 100Alcorta, circular, Sept. 11. 76Tornel, decree, Sept. 7.

4. Smith, Co. A, Corps of Engineers. 221Hill, diary. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 296. 260Henshaw, comments on map. 217Id.to wife, Sept. 13. 65Scott, gen. orders, Sept. 7. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 354 (Scott), 361 (Worth), 425 (Smith). 178Davis, diary. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 298 (Scott). Mason to Smith: note 1. 66Foster to Smith, Sept. 8. 66Beauregard to Smith, Sept. 20. 224Hitchcock, introd. to intercepted letters. So. Qtrly. Rev., Oct., 1852, 302. Semmes, Service, 431–4.

Under Scott’s orders, Pillow with the Ninth and Fifteenth Infantry was at S. Borja and Riley’s brigade (Twiggs’s division) at Nalvarte on Sept. 7, evening (Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 363). Late on Sept. 7 Quitman’s division also was sent to the south front of Mexico. Reconnoitring was done there on rather an extensive scale during the night, and the Mexicans were thoroughly roused.

5. The battle of Sept. 8. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 354, 375 (Scott), 361 (Worth), 368 (return), 373 (Sumner), 374 (Huger), 425 (Smith), 430 (Hitchcock); app., pp. 134–165, 192 (officers). Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1237 (Perry). 179Diario Esactísimo. Stevens, Stevens, i, 204–7. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 170. Semi-weekly N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1848. Elderkin, Biog. Sketches. So. Qtrly. Rev., Oct., 1852, 298–315. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 463–9; iv, app., 295–9. S. Anna, Detall, 23–5. Balbontín, Invasión, 125–9. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 296–9, 303. Grant, Wems., i, 152–3. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 238, 240. 217Henshaw to wife, Sept. 13. 218Henshaw narrative. 61Letter from Mexico, Sept. 11. 69May to Harney, Nov. 17, 1848. 69Steele to Harney, —, 1848. 69Harney to Marcy, May 22, 1848. 66Mason to J. L. Smith, Sept. 25, 1847. 66Stevens to Id.., Sept. 25. 66G. W. Smith to Stevens, Sept. 20. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 352. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. 221Hill, diary. 304Kirby to Mrs. E. K. Smith, Sept. 12. 60Andrews to Daniel, Dec. 10. Louisville Democrat, Dec. 17. 68Testimony at Bonneville court martial. London Times, Nov. 13. Semmes, Service, 436–449. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 503. Apuntes, 210, 294–304. 100Relaciones, circular, Sept. 8. 199Anon. MS. Correo Nacional, Dec. 10. Gamboa, Impug., 52. 70“Guerra,” no. 155 (testimony of Garay). 70“Guerra”, no. 274 (testimony at the trial of Andrade and Jáuregui). Picayune, Oct. 14; Nov. 3. 350Weber, recolls. Delta, Oct. 14, 26. Ramírez, México, 304–6. México á través, iv, 687–9. Davis, Autobiog., 271. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Diario, Sept. 8. 364Worth to daughter, Sept. 28; to S., Dec. 27. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 238–9. 73Lozano, no. 7, 1847. Moore, Scott’s Camp., 155–63. Steele, Amer. Camps., i, 117. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 137. Bartlett, Pierce, 153. Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 259. Giménez, Memorias, 112, 266. 205Graham, memo. book. 178Davis, diary. Diccionario Univ. (León). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, Nov. 30, 1848). Molina, El Asalto. 291Pierce to Hooker, Sept. 15. Stevens, Vindication. 328Sweet, statement. 69Huger, Sept. 9. Lawton, Artill. Off., 311–4, 323, 326. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 426–7, 437–9, 447–53. 76Herrera to Relaciones, Oct. 14. 76Ortega, Sept. 13. 76To comte gen. Mex., Oct. 29. 76M. Andrade, Sept. 9; Nov. 3. 76J. Y. Gutiérrez, proclam., Sept. 11. 76Noriega, Nov. 19. 76Alcorta, circular, Sept. 11. 76Comte gen. Oaxaca, Sept. 15. 76Id.of Querétaro, Sept. 14. Calderón, Rectificaciones.

Remarks on the battle of Sept. 8. In forming an opinion of the battle as a military operation one must ignore the fact that the position gained was used later as a stepping-stone, for at this time Scott was not planning to capture Chapultepec. It appears surprising that Scott, knowing that heavy Mexican forces were on the spot, apparently desiring to fight there, should have thought that a place as valuable to the enemy as he deemed El Molino (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 355) ought to be attacked at night, and could be taken easily (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 579) by men unacquainted with ground and buildings familiar to the enemy, and should have neglected to have more of his troops near at hand; but we do not know what details were included in the information upon which he so confidently relied, nor do we know the source of it (ibid., 298). Pillow reported, apparently during the evening of September 7, that the cannon and machinery had been removed (ibid., 298, 579); no smoke appeared to issue from the mill; no sound of boring could be heard (Semmes, Service, 431). It has been suggested that Scott felt over-eager to punish Santa Anna for disappointing his expectations of peace; but he doubtless had learned from Trist of Santa Anna’s political difficulties. He was, however, angry on account of the violations of the armistice. The principal information on which Scott acted was understood to have come through Trist; it had been correct; but Scott seems to have erred in overlooking the chance that conditions might change in two or three days. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 528) states that the attack was based on a “rumor.” This is an error. On account of the apparent incorrectness of Scott’s information and the massing of Mexican troops in and near El Molino, some Americans suspected that Santa Anna set a trap for him. But the fact that Santa Anna left this quarter and took away a considerable part of his troops early in the night of Sept. 7—leaving behind, according to Roa Bárcena (Recuerdos, 427) 4000 infantry and artillery privates—disposes of that idea. It has been said that Scott might have stopped work at the foundry (had work been then proceeding) by cutting off the supply of water (i.e., power); but he wished to seize the finished cannon supposed to be there (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 298) and the large quantity of powder that he had heard was at Casa Mata.

The only argument advanced in favor of a night attack seems to have been the danger of fire from Chapultepec. In reply it was said that (as had been seen at Cerro Gordo) a plunging fire did little harm. The distance of Chapultepec seems almost to nullify this reply; but as a matter of fact the cannon of Chapultepec appear to have done no execution in the battle. Worth’s officers met him after dark, Sept. 7, and later one of them submitted his general plan of operations to Scott, who discussed it at considerable length and finally (virtually admitting that a night attack was not advisable) approved all of it except the following point. Worth strongly desired to effect a lodgement in the grove of Chapultepec, which he believed he could take at a cost of fifty men (364Worth to S., Dec. 27). (Indeed, he pushed some of his troops several hundred yards that way: Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 138; Davis, Autobiog., 271). But Scott refused positively to have this done. Semmes (Service, 447) says that Worth desired to capture Chapultepec at this time because with his remarkable intuitive judgment he saw, as Scott saw later, that this was the true approach to the city; but Scott’s later opinion was due to a study of the ground which neither he nor Worth had at this time been able to make and to Mexican fortifying not yet done. Even if Worth could have carried Chapultepec rather easily, the prudent maxim that one should not buy (because it can be got cheaply) what one does not want, appeared to apply with especial force after losses that could be so ill afforded had been suffered; and it was not certain that the castle could be taken without a struggle. One costly surprise was enough for one day. Engineer Stevens (Stevens, Stevens, i, 206) thought an attempt should have been made to reconnoitre the Mexican right with a view to turning the position; but to push a reconnoitring party between the Mexican right wing and the cavalry of Alvarez must have looked extremely hazardous.

Clarke’s brigade consisted of the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Infantry, it will be recalled. Cadwalader had the Voltigeurs and Eleventh and Fourteenth Infantry. C. F. Smith being ill, his battalion was commanded by Captain E. K. Smith, who was mortally wounded. Semmes (Service, 445) says that Cadwalader’s brigade and Drum’s guns had been added at Worth’s request, but Hitchcock (Fifty Years, 296) and Scott’s general orders of Sept. 7 show that Scott originally intended to give Worth one of Pillow’s brigades. Worth could no doubt have had more light guns, but it was said that projectiles for the heavy guns were so few that it was necessary to husband them closely. Scott, however, stated (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 377) that he had plenty of such ammunition. Ripley (op. cit., ii, 461) says that “the nature of the orders [given to Worth] forbade an attack by artillery”; but (1) there is no evidence to prove this; (2) artillery was used on Casa Mata, only not long enough; (3) it was used again later with success (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 527; Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 136). See Stevens, Stevens, 206. Indeed, it seems to have been unnecessary to attack Casa Mata. It could not have held out long after the fall of El Molino. Ripley admits (p. 462) that the battle “was confused,” but adds, “storming is always a work of confusion.” Here he confounds occurrences with management. The former must involve noise and confusion in such an affair, but the latter should not.

Sumner had one troop of the First Dragoons, six troops of the Second, part of a troop of the Third, and a company of Mounted Rifles. Foster had ten pioneers. Drum had three guns, but one of them was sent out on the road to Mexico, and during the battle one of the others became disabled by the breaking of a priming wire. Semmes—determined, as usual, to defend Worth at all hazards—says that during McIntosh’s charge Duncan’s battery was called away to repel the Mexican cavalry; but Duncan’s report (Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 136) shows that his guns did not turn against the cavalry until masked by McIntosh’s troops. The part of Cadwalader’s brigade that moved to the left was the Voltigeurs. After the repulse of Clarke’s brigade some of the Voltigeurs went into the ravine and moved toward the rear of Casa Mata. This perhaps helped to force the Mexicans out, and certainly resulted in the capture of many prisoners. Vigorous pursuit of the Mexicans was in general impracticable on account of the character of the ground and the fire from Chapultepec. Finding the engagement far more serious than he had expected, Scott summoned forces from the southern front of the city and from Mixcoac, but these could not arrive soon enough to give material assistance. Jackson’s section of Magruder’s battery came from Mixcoac in time to contribute a little to the final repulse of the Mexican cavalry. Worth blamed Scott for saying in his report that Pierce’s brigade interposed between Garland and the Mexicans, and asserted that it did not arrive until a considerable time after the battle ended (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1079); and it was felt by others, too, that Scott erred here. But from the 178diary of a man in the Ninth Infantry it seems clear that that regiment—a part of Pierce’s brigade—did as Scott stated.

The number of Americans actually engaged was 3251 (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 369). Our loss was 116 (including nine officers) killed, 665 (including forty-nine officers) wounded, and eighteen privates missing (ibid., 384). We captured 685, including 53 officers. One third of Clarke’s brigade, including one half of the officers, were killed or wounded (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 145). The Fifth Infantry seemed little more than a company after the battle (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 297).

Santa Anna stated later (Mi Historia, 75) that Iturbe, a wealthy resident of Tacubaya, notified Tornel that Scott intended to enter the city during the night of Sept. 7 by the San Lázaro garita, on the eastern side of Mexico, and that for this reason he (Santa Anna) took troops away from El Molino; but Santa Anna always laid the blame for his mistakes upon some one. No doubt Scott’s feint against the southern side of the city and his not attacking during the afternoon were enough to cause alarm, but Santa Anna blundered in going to the southeast corner of the city, for an American attack there must have developed slowly owing to the swamps, whereas an attack upon El Molino could be made quickly. He reached the scene of the battle at about half-past nine, and claimed that, but for his arrival, Chapultepec might have been lost (Apelación, app., 111). The government represented that he was in command during the battle (Apuntes, 304). By Scott’s orders Casa Mata was blown up. The Mexicans believed that a shot of theirs exploded the magazine. Andrade was tried and acquitted. Had he been as much at fault as Alvarez alleged, the latter should have replaced him on the spot with another officer. About noon the Mexican cavalry (or at least Andrade’s division) were ordered to charge, but on reaching the battlefield found the Americans had retired. It has been suggested (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 448) that a part of the Mexican cavalry should have been dismounted and placed between El Molino and Casa Mata; but one may feel sure that Alvarez would not have consented to that arrangement. One hesitates to think what the results of the battle might have been, had not Santa Anna withdrawn previously with a considerable part of his troops; and of this movement Scott was not aware, though he may have hoped that his feint against the city would have an effect of that sort.

After the battle the American troops reoccupied in general the positions held by them before it.

6. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 297–9, 303. 224Id.., introd. to intercepted letters. 217Henshaw to wife, Sept. 13. 73Lozano, no. 7, 1847. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. 221Hill, diary. Semmes, Service, 447–9. London Times, Nov. 13. 76Ortega, Sept. 13. 100Guerra, circular, Sept. 11. 76J. Y. Gutiérrez, proclam., Sept. 11. Apuntes, 303–4. 199Anon. MS. Picayune, Oct. 14. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 361 (Worth), 430 (Hitchcock); app., 156 (Cadwalader). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert, Nov. 30, 1848). 69Huger, Sept. 9, 1847. Ho. 24; 31, 1. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 145 (Lee). Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 468. N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 17, 1882 (Mayne Reid). S. Anna, Detall, 24. 70“Guerra”, no. 273 (trial of Bravo). Stevens, Stevens, i, 206.

7. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 375 (Scott) and map. 73Lozano, no. 7, 1847. Semmes, Service, 430. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, 2–3. Niles, Oct. 9, p. 89. 92Piedad judge, Sept. 9. Diccionario Universal (México). Robertson, Visit, ii, 344.

8. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 376 (Scott), 425–7 (Smith). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77 (Lee), 185 (Ripley), 579 (Pillow says he reported to Scott on Sept. 9 that the Mexican works opposite Piedad, where Pillow then was, could be carried easily). Davis, Autobiog., 223. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 298–300. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, pp. 4–5. 66Lee to J. L. Smith, Sept. 15. 66Beauregard to Id.., Sept. 20. 111Id.to Id.., Sept. 27. 218Henshaw narrative. 76To Olaguíbel, Sept. 11.

Ripley (op. cit., ii, 470) and Rives (op. cit., ii, 528) reflect upon Scott for having no reconnaissances made between Aug. 20 and Sept. 7. But to make them would have violated the meaning and spirit of the armistice, which prescribed an “absolute cessation of hostilities” (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 310), and it was highly important to show the strictest good faith during the delicate negotiations. Rives (ibid.) says “no preparation whatever had been made for the contingency of renewed hostilities.” This statement results from a lack of information. Numberless things had been done to put the army and its equipment into fighting trim. Rives says also (ibid.) that the Mexicans, had they been enterprising, could easily have beaten our army in detail at this time. This seems to be a mistake (see Sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 8). A frontal attack upon Worth could certainly have been repulsed, and an attempt to strike Pillow, Twiggs or Quitman would have exposed their own flank and rear. Moreover it was clear that Santa Anna had no intention of assuming the offensive. Rives says himself he had none (op. cit., 466), attributing his decision to “well-justified distrust of his own army”; and since the decision was made (July) nothing had occurred to reassure him. Napoleon said, “A well-established maxim of war is, not to do anything which your enemy desires.”

9. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77–8, 145 (Lee), 81 (Cadwalader), 112–3 (Beauregard), 123 (Trist), 169 (Hooker). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 375 (Scott), 427 (Smith). Exposición dirigida, 6. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, pp. 6–15. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 300. 113Beauregard, remins. 66Id.to J. L. Smith, Sept. 20. 111Id.to Id.., Sept, 27. 69Letter of Sept. 11 from Mexico. Semmes, Service, 430. (Gunners) 76Carrera, report, Dec., 1847. (Key) Apuntes, 304, 317. Wash. Union, Dec. 9. 210Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 21, 1848. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña, 870. Stevens, Stevens, i, 207.

Ripley (op. cit., ii, 472) remarks that even after taking Chapultepec Scott was “yet at a distance of two miles from the city, with the positive certainty of running upon the citadel if the direct route were pursued.” But two miles on a broad, good causeway signified little, it was unnecessary to take the direct route, and Scott had no intention of taking it. Ripley admits (p. 473) that Scott reasonably supposed that the defences at S. Cosme were comparatively weak.

10. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 428 (Smith). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77 (Lee), 112 (Beauregard), 169 (Hooker), 257 (Quitman). 113Beauregard, remins. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 300. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 353–5. The description of Lee is based principally upon a picture (seen at the Confederate Museum, Richmond) made soon after the Mexican war. The weather was still unusually favorable for military operations.

11. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 294–6. Evidence at the trial of Bravo (70“Guerra,” no. 273). S. Anna, Detall, 22. 76To Monterde, May 24. 76Monterde, June 18, 21–2. 76To Lombardini, July 6, 23; Aug. 3. 76Tornel, Sept. 12. 76To Bravo, Sept. 10. 76Bravo, Sept. 14. 76Liceaga to Lombardini, Aug. 22. 76Reports on Bravo’s conduct, July 21, 24, 1848. Apuntes, 317. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 459.

12. Sen. 1; 30, 1, map; pp. 400 (Pillow), 410 (Quitman). 76Bravo, Sept. 14. Negrete, Inv., iv, app., 294–6. Semmes, Service, 450–1. Tornel, Sept. 12. To Bravo, Sept. 10. Apuntes, 307–8. 357Wilcox, diary. 70Evidence at the trial of Bravo (“Guerra,” no. 273). Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 396–8. (Impreg.) 221Hill, diary. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 285, 302.

The southeastern corner of the rectangle was irregularly cut off. A bullet-proof wall, about fifteen feet high, protected the eastern end, and ran along the southern line of the rectangle with platforms or scaffolds for infantry on its inner side, while a stone aqueduct—its arches filled in here with heavy masonry—extended (in the Anzures causeway) along the northern side of the rectangle, and continued via S. Cosme to the city. Cultivated fields, adjacent to El Molino, occupied about a third of the rectangle. On each side of the north-and-south drainage ditch there was an embankment. The next section—perhaps one sixth—of the rectangle was occupied by the swamps and cypresses, and then came the hill—extremely steep except at the west, and steep there. A road or wide path led east through the grove to the foot of the hill. The opening in the south wall, covered by the exterior, unarmed redan (B), had a ditch outside of the redan for additional protection. The road that went up to the college was defended inside the main gateway with a 9-pounder (placed here Sept. 12). The circular (arc of a circle) redoubt (C) was at the glorieta (an open space furnished with seats, etc.). One or two other slight fortifications probably existed.

The south wall of the terre-plein had a parapet except near the southeast corner. Along the base of the west wall ran a fosse about twelve feet wide and ten deep. Rather extensive mines (to be fired by powder-trains laid on or just under the surface of the ground) lay below the fosse; and beyond them—about half-way down the slope—stood a redan (E) for some fifty men, which seems to have been about 125 feet from the wall. This west wall was a priest-cap: i.e., it was indented like a shallow V, so that its two halves could afford support to each other. In the central portion of the terre-plein stood the masonry edifice of the military college with an open terrace at its eastern end and some stone buildings with flat, parapeted roofs, at its western end. A half-round bastion on each of the long sides afforded room for a heavy gun commanding in each case a semicircle. (The one in the southern bastion seems to have been disabled on Sept. 8.) East of the southern bastion, in a smaller projection, stood a lighter gun looking toward the lower gateway; behind the somewhat zigzag parapet westward two or three smaller pieces covering the road and the southwest approach; on the terre-plein commanding the upper gateway a couple of light howitzers; and at the western end, specially screened with timber and sand-bags, two heavy pieces, which swept the approach from El Molino. (One of the pieces was a 68-pound howitzer. Ripley is precise in his account of the size and the placing of the guns, but the evidence is against him. He says there were eleven. There seem to have been thirteen; but one of them was not mounted, and two were now disabled.) Timbering, proof against bullets, covered much of the lower story, the parapeted azotea of the main edifice and some other parts of the buildings; and sand-bags afforded further, though inadequate, protection at a number of peculiarly exposed points.

13. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 377 (Scott), 397 (Twiggs), 399 (Riley), 400 (Pillow), 410 (Quitman), 422 (Huger); app., 197 (Pierce), 201 (Cadwalader), 230 (Porter). Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 185 (Ripley). 260Henshaw, comments on map. 217Id.to wife, Sept. 13. 66Lee to J. L. Smith, Sept. 15. 66McClellan to Smith, Sept. 20. 66Beauregard to Smith, Sept. 20. 111Id.to Id.., Sept. 27. 304Andrews to Lovell, Sept. 19. 304Hunt to Id.., Sept. 15. 304Steptoe to Id.., Sept. 16. 304Porter to Id.., Sept. 16. 304Wilcox, diary. Ramsey, Other Side, 457. 327Sutherland to father, Aug. —. 178Davis, diary. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 426. 76Carrera, Sept. 1.

14. Negrete Invasión, iv, app., 299–300. 61Letter from Mex., Sept. 11. Apuntes, 305–6, 309–10, 314. Ramírez, México, 307–8. Diario, Sept. 11. 73Lozano, no. 7, 1847. S. Anna, Apelación, 57. Id.., Detall, 25. 76To Bravo, Sept. 10. 76Bravo, Sept. 11. 76Tornel to Carrera, Sept. 9. 92Ayunt. to S. Anna, Sept. 11. 92Letter from Piedad, Sept. 11. 199Anon. MS.

15. 76Bravo, Sept. 14. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 427; iv, app., 299–300. 179Diario Esactísimo. London Times, Nov. 13. S. Anna, Detall, 26. 76To comtes. gen. Querétaro and Guanajuato, Sept. 12. Arco Iris, Nov. 30. Apuntes, 310–2. 70Trial of Bravo (“Guerra,” no. 273). 70Trial of Terrés (“Guerra,” no. 155). Molina, Asalto. 269Id.., recolls. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 241–3. Rangel, Parte (with notes).

16. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 377 (Scott), 410–2 (Quitman); app., 231 (Mackenzie). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 143 (Lee), 193, 200–1 (Worth), 259 (Quitman). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 301–2. Henshaw narrative. 376Nicholson, recolls. 221Hill, diary.

17. The battle of Chapultepac Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 375, 391–425; app., 169–231 (reports of Scott and officers). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 119 (Tilton), 146 (Lee), 155–6, 158 (Bennett), 170, 172 (Hooker), 204–9 (Rains), 217–8 (Drum), 219 (Bates), 220–1 (Johnston), 222–4 (Loeser), 270–5 (Howard). Stevens, Stevens, i, 208–10. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 137. Cong. Globe,34, 1, pp. 105–7. Sen. Report 32; 34, 1. Brown, Ninth Inf., 70. Henderson, Science of War, 97 (“The issue of battle”). So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, pp. 15–42. 76Bravo, Sept. 14. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 428–9; iv, app., 300–4. Balbontín, Invasión, 131. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 302–3. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 242–7. Davis, Autobiog., 231–2. Henshaw narrative. 180Pillow to wife, Oct. 18. Weekly N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848. 61Seymour, Oct. 31, 1847. 69H. V. Johnson et al. to Polk, Apr. 6, 1848. 376Nicholson, recolls. 183Drum, recolls. 223Hirschorn, recolls. 66G. W. Smith to Stevens, Sept. 20. 66Tower to J. L. Smith, Sept. 23. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 361–2, 380–6. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. 221Hill, diary. 200Reid to Gladden, May 27, 1849. S. Anna, Detall, 16, 26–9, 38–42. 151Numerous reports and letters regarding Quitman’s operations. 113Beauregard, remins. (based on diary and notes). 151Wilcox, diary. 303Quitman papers. National, Nov. 14. 179Diario Esactísimo. 60Riley to Westcott, Nov. 30, 1847. 60Loring to P. F. Smith, Sept. 27. 68Testimony at Bonneville court martial. 60Miller to sister, undated. 60Id.to mother, Mar. 24, 1848. London Times, Nov. 13, 1847. 335Reynolds to Trist, Sept. 27. Oswandel, Notes, 426. Semmes, Service, 453–5. Arco Iris, Nov. 30. Apuntes, 311, 314–6. 199Anon. MS. Rangel, Parte (with notes). Eco del Comercio, May 1, 1848. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (M. L. Smith, Nov. 30, 1848). Gamboa, Impug., 55. 70“Guerra,” no. 1044 (trial of Alemán). 70“Guerra,” no. 273 (trial of Bravo). Monitor, Apr. 27, 1848. 70“Guerra,” no. 155 (trial of Terrés). Statue of Bravo at Puebla. Delta, Oct. 14, 26; Nov. 3, 20. México á través, iv, 690–5. 76Bravo, Dec. 27. Dunovant, Battles, 5–10. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Monitor Repub., Oct. 24; Dec. 16 (S. Anna). Nashville Repub. Banner, Oct. 28, 1857. 292Pillow to wife, Oct. 18. Spirit of the Age, Feb. 10; July 29, 1848. Pacheco, Exposíción. Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 257–9. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 47. Vedette, iv, nos. 3, 8, 12. 327Sutherland to father. Aug. —. 178Davis, diary. Flag of Freedom, Nov. 27. Molina, El Asalto. 269Id.., recolls. 291Pierce to Appleton, Sept. 26. 51Marine off., Oct. 20. Reynolds, Exculpation. 131Brindle, statement. Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 396–402. Encarnacion Prisoners, 84. Hist. Teacher’s Mag., Apr., 1912 (Vieregg).

Remarks on the battle of Chapultepec. Chapultepec had been a protected summer palace, not a fortress. At this time the upper stories that one sees now did not exist. There were perhaps three times as many large trees in the grove as at present. For military reasons the small trees had recently been cleared away. Scott had a small map of the city, apparently purchased from the British courier (Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 25). The Twelfth Infantry guarded the stores at Mixcoac, and Sept. 10 Harney was sent there with a body of dragoons. Sumner was then placed in command of all the dragoons at Tacubaya (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 421). P. F. Smith’s brigade remained at Mixcoac until the morning of Sept. 13. Lee, Beauregard, Stevens and Tower reconnoitred the southern front. Scott was there nearly all day Sept. 9, and on the morning of the eleventh. The purposes in view were to study the Mexican preparations, ascertain the nature of the ground, and find places for batteries. In general the ground, even where covered with water, appeared to be firm enough for infantry, and suitable places for batteries were found.

Bravo was appointed to the command of Chapultepec on August 27. Sept. 9 Alvarez was ordered to take the cavalry to Guadalupe. According to 76Bravo, Sept. 14, the garrison of Chapultepec on the morning of Sept. 12, aside from gunners and engineers, was the Tenth Line Infantry (250), Mina battalion (277), Unión battalion (121), Querétaro battalion (115), Toluca battalion (27), Patria battalion (42). These 832 men were disposed as follows: defending the road to Tacubaya, 160; redoubt on south side of hill (apparently at B), 215; glorieta redoubt (C), 92; entrenchment at the right of the glorieta (D), 42; north side of the hill, 80; buildings at summit, 243 (76Bravo, report, Sept. 14). The buildings near the gateway batteries were defended principally by the Matamoros de Morelia battalion.

At the conference of Sept. 11 Engineers Smith, Lee, Stevens and Tower favored attacking San Antonio, and Quitman, Shields, Cadwalader and Pierce took that view. Pillow did the same. Riley and Twiggs sided with Scott though not for positive reasons. Hitchcock and Trist do not seem to have expressed opinions. Worth and P. F. Smith were engaged elsewhere. Scott’s attacking Chapultepec against the advice of Lee illustrated the fact that his success in Mexico was not due to that officer, as the value of Lee’s services and his later fame have led some to imagine.

Gen. U. S. Grant regarded the battles of Sept. 8 and 13 as wholly unnecessary (Mems., i, 154). But here, as elsewhere in referring to the Mexican War, he seems to have been merely recording youthful impressions. He says that, had Scott gone round those positions, the Mexicans would have evacuated them; but Scott did not wish the Mexicans to evacuate El Molino and Casa Mata, taking with them their gunpowder and (supposed) foundry material: i. e., Grant failed to understand the question. With regard to Chapultepec also it is an issue between a lieutenant and the major general commanding. Scott did not overlook the idea of going round (Worth: Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 199); and hence, as he understood the case far better than Grant did at the time or when he wrote his Memoirs, one concludes that his judgment was correct. He stated (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 377) that [Grant’s] plan would have required too wide and hazardous a circuit. The following other objections against it may be suggested. Grant’s plan would have required the army to abandon the roads for difficult fields and marshes, limited the practicability of defending the rear in case of attack, weakened greatly the effective feinting upon which Scott counted (ibid., 376), produced a bad moral effect—especially in view of the recent battle—by suggesting that he dared not attack Chapultepec, exposed our assaulting troops to a cannonade from the rear, and left behind them a menace of other uncertain but alarming possibilities. The capture of Chapultepec, on the other hand, worked morally as well as physically in our favor, and was thought by Scott likely to have an even greater effect than it had (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 169); and it was stated by our engineers that mortars planted there would command a large part of the city. It has been said that our batteries were too far from the target; but it was not known what guns Chapultepec had, and no doubt our engineers and artillery officers ventured as far as appeared expedient. Clearly, however, too much was expected of our batteries.

Battery No. 1, to play on the south side of the fort, was laid out by Lee; No. 2, opposite the southwest angle of the fort, by Huger. The batteries did not fire accurately at first (179Diario Esactísimo). This seems to have been due to a lack of platforms for the guns. Quitman’s division supported No. 1, which was particularly exposed, and in the afternoon he made a bold reconnaissance of the road, discovering artillery and a ditch in his front (Claiborne, Quitman, ii, app., 308). The Mexicans made advances toward No. 1 on Sept. 12, but canister repelled them. To hinder reinforcements from reaching Chapultepec, Quitman by Scott’s order placed fifty men well forward on the road in the night of Sept. 12–13, and some skirmishing occurred. A 9-pounder protected with sand-bags was planted just in front of No. 1. The intention had been to establish an advanced battery, but the Mexicans prevented this. Two New York companies supported No. 2. Battery No. 3 had a brass 16-pounder. This, becoming unserviceable, was replaced with an iron 24-pounder. Batteries 1, 2 and 3 commanded the south and west fronts of Chapultepec fort, and No. 4 commanded its interior. No. 1 stood about 1000 yards from the south front of the fort; No. 2 about 1400 yards from its southwestern angle; No. 3 about 1140 yards from its west front; and No. 4 a little nearer than No. 3 (Hardcastle’s map in Sen. 1; 30, 1).

Pillow reoccupied El Molino early Sept. 12 and his division slept there the following night. Early Sept. 13 Twiggs resumed operations at La Piedad, and the Mexicans endeavored to draw him on. Steptoe had two 12-pounders and two 24-pound howitzers. The weakness and gradual discontinuance of his fire and the fact that Twiggs did not expose his infantry rendered this feint ineffective. Scott states that Taylor’s battery also was at La Piedad, but it does not seem to have been used at this time. Perhaps, as the Mexicans were likely to attack, it was held in reserve.

The storming parties were composed of volunteers. In some and possibly in all cases some slight reward was offered. In a number of regiments so many volunteered that it became necessary to draw lots. Scott thought Pillow would need one brigade; but Pillow sent for Worth’s whole division and received one (Clarke’s) brigade of it. Ripley (op. cit., ii, 420) states that Pillow asked for only one of Worth’s brigades, but against him is the testimony of Scott, of Worth and of Semmes, who bore Pillow’s message. Some of Clarke’s men arrived in time to fight. After the battle Pillow admitted that not over 1000 of his men took part in the assault (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 408). He had too many. They were in one another’s way. Pillow stated that the garrison was 6000, thus probably reckoning almost every Mexican soldier within a mile of the hill. Pillow wrote (180Oct. 18): I led “to the very Cannon’s mouth, where I was cut down—Then my men picked me up and carried me forward under my orders and with a shout of exultation and triumph, scaled the ditches and wall.” In fact he seems to have received a painful wound on the ankle from a glancing grapeshot at the foot of the hill (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 378), and was not carried to the summit until serious fighting had ended (Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 156, 172, 204, 217, 222, 224). Cadwalader succeeded him in command. Lt. Col. Hébert with the Eleventh Infantry, assisted by Sumner’s dragoons and in effect by Trousdale and Jackson, kept off a strong force of lancers that menaced the American rear from the direction of Los Morales.

Sept. 13 when Santa Anna finally sent the San Blas battalion (perhaps 400) toward the summit, the approach of the Americans forced it to halt—apparently at the entrenchment (D) near the glorieta. The Third Ligero was ordered to reinforce this battalion, but the college fell before it arrived, and it retired. Other troops were sent to the lower parts of the hill. Some perished, some retreated, some were captured. The Hidalgo battalion fought on the Tacubaya road. Reserves of 2–5000 were on the Belén causeway near Chapultepec.

A Mexican lieutenant of engineers named Alemán had charge of firing the mines, and he was ordered to do his work. At his trial he said that he found his way blocked by Mexican troops, and that before he could reach his post the Americans were there. Some, if not all, of the canvas pipes containing the trains had already been found and cut by our troops. The Americans got over the fosse by laying ladders across it. The man who first reached the Mexican flagstaff appears to have been Capt. Kimball, a Vermonter but born in New Hampshire. He stood on guard there till Seymour, who commanded his regiment after Ransom’s fall, arrived. Sept. 13 the Americans took revenge for the atrocities perpetrated upon our wounded on the eighth.

The second in command in Casey’s party was Capt. Paul, but Capt. B. S. Roberts, whose company stood at the head of it, led the successful charge. Gen. Rangel reported that by this time the Mexican muskets had become useless and the one cannon that directly enfiladed the road had been accidentally disabled. It is quite clear, particularly in the light of Mexican evidence, that the fort on the summit was carried before the gateway batteries. Quitman rendered no essential service in the capture of Chapultepec, though he kept many Mexicans occupied. His troops that went up the hill were not needed. (Even Clarke’s brigade was a greater reinforcement than the situation called for.) Shields states that the three regiments turned off to the left because the Mexicans in Quitman’s front were found too strong, and if these could not be beaten before those three regiments were detached, evidently the remainder of Quitman’s command was not strong enough to beat them. When Roberts led the successful charge, Worth (whom Clarke rejoined), Trousdale and Jackson had appeared at the northeast of Chapultepec and menaced the rear of the gateway batteries. Except thirty to fifty under Capt. Terrett the Marines did not distinguish themselves. Their commander, however, said that their ammunition failed, and other officers stated that Quitman ordered the corps to halt. This was their first battle.

P. F. Smith had the Mounted Rifles (minus two companies detached), First Artillery and Third Infantry (minus two companies detached). It was hoped that he could strike the Belén aqueduct, break through, and take the Mexican flank and rear. Smith’s brigade not being strong enough—under the difficulties of the ground and in view of Quitman’s halt—to attack Santa Anna’s reserves, veered toward the causeway, and under the partial shelter of maguey opened fire. His right companies took part in the final charge against the gateway batteries. Had Quitman given Smith the pioneer party with planks, etc., for bridging the ditches, and a storming party, and supported him with two of the regiments that went up the hill, Smith could have struck the Mexicans effectively on the Belén route, while Quitman himself was doing what he could on the Tacubaya road with the rest of his command. A great number of prisoners could probably have been captured in this way (Stevens, Stevens, i, 214–5). Gen. Rangel reported that the corps which defended the work on the Tacubaya causeway lost one third, and that almost every member of his staff was wounded Sept. 8 or 13. The serious fighting inside the fort lasted only four or five minutes. When the final assault occurred, the effective defenders, all told, probably did not number more than 275. Bravo’s sword was returned to him. He was charged by Santa Anna with bad conduct, but when tried was fully exonerated. In reference to Chapultepec the author was kindly assisted by Señor D. Ignacio Molina, head of the cartography section of the Mexican government, who was a student at the military college in Sept., 1847, and, being an engineer by profession, could be relied upon.

18. Pillow estimated the Mexican killed, wounded and captured at Chapultepec at about 1800 (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 408), and mentioned that the prisoners included Gens. Bravo, Noriega, Monterde [Dosamantes, Saldaña], three colonels, seven lieut. colonels and 40 captains. The actual number of Mexicans captured in the operations of Sept. 13–14 was 125 officers, 698 men besides about forty students (Hitchcock in Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 430). As to their killed, wounded and missing, one can only guess. The American loss on Sept. 12–14 was: killed, 10 officers, 128 rank and file; wounded, 60 officers, 613 rank and file (Ho. 24; 31, 1). What part of this loss was incurred at Chapultepec cannot be stated. (Black) McSherry (M’Sherry), El Puchero, 108.

19. The Belén operations. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1019, 1021–5. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 381–3 (Scott), 398 (Twiggs), 414–6 (Quitman), 423 (Huger); app., 180 (Bonneville), 184 (Smith), 191 (Beauregard), 215 (Seymour), 223 (Smith), 225 (Shields), 230 (Porter). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 188 (Ripley). 633 (Pillow). Carreño, Jefes, 166. Niles, Oct. 30, pp. 137–8. Sen. Report 32; 34, 1. Brown, Ninth Inf., 62. Haskin, First Artill., 115. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, pp. 43–4. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 133, 145–9; iv, app., 304–8. Balbontín, Invasión, 132. Davis, Autobiog., 209–10, 232–4, 262–3. 376Nicholson, recolls. 218Henshaw narrative. 69Dimick to Woodbury, Dec. 1, 1848. 69Childs to Dimick, Dec. 2, 1848. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 347, 364, 367–9, 372, 385–6. 151Reports and letters. City of Charleston, S. C, Year Book, 1883, p. 523. Rowland, Miss. Register, 418. 113Beauregard, remins. 357Wilcox, diary. 303Reports. 60Loring to P. F. Smith, Sept. 27. 60Dimick to Id.., Sept. 20. 60Id. et al. to P. F. Smith, Oct. 19, 1848. 60Id.to adj. gen., Nov. 30, 1848. 69Williams to Porter, Apr. 11, 1857. 65Adj. gen., orders 7, Feb. 20, 1847. Rodriguez, Breve Reseña, 870. Gamboa, Impug., 56. 70“Guerra,” no. 155 (trial of Terrés). Picayune, Nov. 20. Delta, Oct. 14, 26, 1847; Jan. 11, 1848. México á través, iv, 695. Dunovant, Battles, 11–17. Wash. Union, Sept. 11. Monitor Repub., Nov. 3; Dec. 16. South. Mag., July, 1874, p. 78. 364Worth to daughter, Sept. 28. Ramsey, Other Side, 249, note. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 246. 270Moore, diary. 335Statement re Quitman by Trist. 80Relac. to Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. Statements to the author from Quitman’s daughters. 327Sutherland to father, Aug. —. 178Davis, diary. 269Molina, recolls. Reynolds, Exculpation. Stevens, Vindication. S. Anna, Detall, 21, 29–32. Raleigh Star, Nov. 3. 76Tornel to Carrera, Sept. 9. Apuntes, 309, 317–22. Diccionario Universal (México). 68Bonneville court martial. Semmes, Service, 457. Monitor Repub., Nov. 3 (Terrés). Stevens, Stevens, i, 210–1. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 492–3.

Remarks on the Belén operations. The Mexicans retiring by this road were commanded by Gen. Lombardini. The principal corps was the Activo regiment of Morelia. The ditch across the Tacubaya causeway at the gateway batteries was promptly filled in by the Americans to permit passage. A part of the men who captured the gateway batteries pursued the fleeing Mexicans, but not far. A part of the Sixth Infantry, having gone astray, joined Quitman. It has been suggested that Scott made a mistake in not giving orders, before the attack upon Chapultepec, for subsequent operations, and thus left the troops to their own devices; but it was impossible for him to calculate in advance what the situation would be, and he went as soon as possible to the summit of the hill, which was the proper place for surveying the field and issuing suitable commands.

The Belén garita presented a hard problem because, having been more threatened than the San Cosme garita, it seemed likely to be more strongly guarded, because, being nearer to the forces protecting the southern front, it could be more quickly and effectively reinforced, and because it was supported by the citadel, which could only be approached over open ground. Scott, therefore determined to make only a feint at Belén (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 382). Quitman, however, owing to the abortive Alvarado expedition, had not figured at Cerro Gordo. Aug. 20 and Sept. 8 his duty had been to guard the rear. Hence he had won no éclat under Scott, and, feeling that Scott was unfriendly to him, he apparently resolved at this time to take the bit in his teeth (Davis, Autobiog., 232). During his operations against the city Scott repeatedly signified his disapproval of them, but Quitman refused to retire without a positive order (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 386), and, since Quitman had committed him, Scott, although extremely annoyed (Davis, Autobiog., 234–5), wisely refrained from giving this. Gen. U. S. Grant said, “It is always, however, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed” (Mems., i, 152). This principle authorized Quitman’s moving toward the city but not the later part of his operations. At the expense of his men, therefore, Quitman was guilty of virtual insubordination—though not of positive disobedience—for personal reasons. This fact it is necessary to make clear. But his men were no doubt as willing as he to risk their lives, and it was only natural that Quitman should seek to distinguish himself. That motive had to be recognized, for without it probably few volunteer officers would have been in the field. Ripley (op. cit., ii, 549) says that according to Scott’s report orders were repeatedly sent to Quitman to prevent his too rapid advance, but Quitman did not receive them and could not find the staff officer who had borne them. What Scott said (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 382) was that he repeatedly communicated his “views” to Quitman, and Davis (Autobiog., 234–5) supports this statement. The purpose of Ripley’s remark apparently was to hint that Scott’s statement was untrue.

The intermediate battery (at what was called the Bridge of the Insurgents) seems to have been built for four guns but to have had only one, two, three guns in place, or perhaps none. The accounts disagree. Quitman and Smith, both of them volunteer officers, appear distinctly to have colored their reports in favor of the Palmetto regiment, which was second to none in gallantry, but was not enabled by circumstances to do all it would gladly have done here. The First Artillery, on the other hand, did not receive the credit it deserved. It was merely a question of precedence, not of courage, but vigorous protests against their reports were the consequence. Perhaps, however, the real explanation of their inaccuracies is that the reports represent orders of which circumstances (unknown or forgotten by them) prevented the execution.

Sept. 9, believing Scott would attack the southern side, Santa Anna had two guns removed from the Belén garita. The “citadel” had originally been a tobacco factory. Terrés was treated by Santa Anna with the utmost contempt and even subjected to personal violence, but a court martial exonerated him, and he was regarded by Scott with marked respect (Delta, Jan. 11, 1848).

20. The S. Cosme operations. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 381–2 (Scott), 391–3 (Worth), 421 (Sumner), 424 (Huger), 428–9 (J. L. Smith); app., 166 (Huger), etc. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1072–3, 1077, 1079. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., v, 46; xxxiii, 444. Wilson, Grant, 63–7. Stevens, Stevens, i, 211–2, 215. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, p. 44. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 430–41, 450; iv, app., 305–8. Grant, Mems., i, 150, 155–9. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 249. 66Lee to J. L. Smith, Sept. 15. 66McClellan to G. W. Smith, Sept. 14. 66Stevens to J. L. Smith, Sept. 25. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 379. 113Beauregard, remins. 60Paul to Lovell, Sept. 20. Semmes, Service, 457–61. Apuntes, 316–22. Rangel, Parte (with notes). 70“Guerra,” no. 273 (trial of Bravo). Delta, Oct. 14. S. Anna, Detall, 30–2. México á través, iv, 695. Monitor Repub., Dec. 16 (S. Anna). 76Mora to Lombardini, Aug. 9; to Guerra, July 22. 76Lombardini, Aug. 22. Jackson, Mems., 43. 80Relac. to Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. G. W. Smith, Co. A, Corps of Engins. 51Letter from Marine officer, Oct. 20. 51Terrett, undated. 51Henderson to sec. navy, May 12, 1848. Stevens, Vindication. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. Arnold, Jackson, 130, 177. Dabney, Jackson, 47–9. Murphy, Remins., 69. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 496–502.

Remarks on the San Cosme operations. The Mexicans retreating by this route were commanded by Gen. Rangel, assisted by Gen. Peña y Barragán and Lt. Col. Echeagaray. It is impossible to be as precise as would be desirable in describing the first part of Worth’s advance, for the reports are both vague and inconsistent. This is mainly, no doubt, because the officers wrote from memory and without the aid of a map. Ripley observes (op. cit., ii, 484) that Worth’s movement “had the great element of success, celerity.” In reality, it was very slow, but unofficial accounts and the Mexican reports contain evidence that the resistance was not only vigorous but more than once temporarily triumphant. The one-gun redoubt seems to have been abandoned when the hill yielded. Ripley observes also (op. cit., ii, 485) that Worth did not need to advance rapidly: “Time was not immediately pressing.” But this is a mistake, for substantially all the Mexican preparations at the S. Cosme garita were made after Worth’s advance began. The fortification (unarmed) near the English cemetery was at the bridge of Santo Tomás. The Mexican infantry was withdrawn from this position because the Americans could have struck the S. Cosme highway (by a cross-road) between it and the city; but a large body of cavalry under Torrejón remained and charged in order to gain time for Rangel to make preparations at the garita.

While Quitman was struggling with the intermediate battery, Duncan of Worth’s command sent a gun from La Verónica causeway into a road that extended some distance toward the right, and fired at the Mexicans. He and Worth believed they gave Quitman material assistance, but this does not appear to have been the fact, for the distance was found to be much greater than they supposed (113Beauregard). The better way to aid Quitman would have been to press forward without loss of time, and threaten the rear of the Mexicans opposing Quitman. Later some of Worth’s guns did aid Quitman by firing at the garita.

With remarkable daring Capt. Terrett of the Marines, Lieuts. Gore and U. S. Grant of the Fourth Infantry, a few other officers and a small party of men captured the unarmed work near the junction of La Verónica and San Cosme roads by moving to the left round the English cemetery, and took the parapet on the San Cosme highway. From the latter Worth recalled them because the American guns behind them were about to open. Cadwalader, sent to Worth by Scott, was placed by the former at the English cemetery to guard Worth’s left and rear. Sumner, after pursuing the Mexicans for some time, was detached to protect Tacubaya. Scott joined Worth near the English cemetery and directed him to carry the garita (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 392), but he soon returned to the base of Chapultepec so as to be within easy reach of all his scattered forces (ibid., 382). By Scott’s order Huger sent to Worth four siege guns and a mortar, but on account of the nature of the ground none of these pieces was used against the garita (ibid., 424). Santa Anna brought four guns to the garita, but only three of them were available. The stampede from the garita seems to have been due in part to a cornet signal for retreat, meant for a single corps. The cavalry under Alvarez entered the city during the afternoon of Sept. 12. Grant was assisted by Lieut. Lendrum of the Third Artillery in handling the mountain howitzer.

21. The night of Sept. 13–14. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 383 (Scott), 393 (Worth), 416 (Quitman), 424 (Huger), 429 (J. L. Smith); app., 168, etc. (officers). Ho. 60: 30, 1, pp. 1077–9 (Worth), 1079 (Scott). 179Diario Esactísimo. Stevens, Stevens, i, 213, 215. Sen. Rep. 32; 34, 1. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 129, 450; iv, 108, 116–22; app., 309–10. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, p. 49. Davis, Autobiog., 235–7, 287–90. 217Henshaw to wife, Sept. 13 [partly later]. 218Henshaw narrative. 61Gates, Oct. 6. 376Nicholson, recolls. 151Steptoe to Lovell, Sept. 16. London Times, Nov. 13. 92S. Anna to Mex. ayunt., Sept. 15. 80Fernández to gov. Michoacán, Sept. 13. 80Relac. to Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 83. Gamboa, Impug., 57–8. 70“Guerra,” no. 954 (trial of Bonilla). 366Ayunt. poster, Sept. 25. Monitor Repub., Sept. 27 (Pacheco); Oct. 2 (S. Anna). S. Anna, Contestación. Lawton, Artill. Off., 315. 73Lozano, nos. 4 and 8, res., 1847. Ramírez, México, 318. 92Mex. ayunt. to Scott, Sept. 13, 11 P.M. S. Anna, Apelación, 58–9. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 48. Giménez, Memorias, 114. Stevens, Vindication. Raleigh Star, Oct. 27. 112Beauregard to Quitman, Sept. 17. 113Id.., remins. Rangel, Parte (with notes). Claiborne, Quitman, i, 370. 221Hill, diary. Semmes, Service, 463. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 304. S. Anna, Detall, 32–3. Apuntes, 334–5. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 503–4.

Quitman sent to Scott for heavy cannon and ammunition, and the latter, though offended by Quitman’s course, had them supplied. During the night, under Beauregard’s direction, two batteries inside the Belén garita (for a 24-pounder, an 18-pounder and a 24-pound howitzer) and a breastwork on the right for infantry were made ready. Steptoe, sent here by Scott, was on hand to superintend the firing. To assault the citadel across about 300 yards of open ground, even with the aid of these pieces, would have been a very serious affair, and it was most fortunate for Quitman that Worth’s entering the town where no citadel existed made it unnecessary.

It has been supposed that Huger’s brief bombardment caused Santa Anna to evacuate the city (Semmes, Service, 463); but Santa Anna knew, without being shown again, what the American artillery could do, and he seems to have decided upon his policy before this firing occurred. Santa Anna’s chief published reasons for the evacuation were that he wished to save the city from bombardment, assault and sack, and save the army, arms and cannon for future operations. Gamboa complained that no provision was made before the evacuation for the security of the people, the archives, etc. But Scott’s previous conduct was an adequate pledge, and the council relied upon his regard for international law. Considering Santa Anna’s known love of money, the vast Mexican interests now imperilled, and his summary manner of deciding the question of evacuation, one cannot help suspecting that inducements were offered him. The council was probably held merely to divide the responsibility for what he had resolved to do.

It was charged that Santa Anna let the criminals out of jail expressly to attack the Americans, and to bring odium upon us by committing outrages that could be attributed to our troops. One cannot be sure about this matter; but it is noticeable that Gamboa, in piling up all possible charges against the President, only accused him of failing to prevent the criminals from getting free. Santa Anna must have been completely exhausted, but it seems to be true, as was stated by the British minister (Bankhead, no. 86, 1847), that some one in authority let about 2000 men out of confinement. Very likely it was hoped that the Americans would be guilty of disorder; but the palace at least was sacked before they entered it. Some of the Mexican soldiers acted like brigands, it was reported—even robbing the British consul. No preparations to evacuate the town had been made. Some one might and should have had sentinels posted at the public buildings and offices ready to surrender them in a proper manner. See chap. xxix, note 2.

On account of illness Pierce had no part in the battles of Sept. 8 and 13. Probably in order to occupy a place in the reports he appeared at the Belén garita at about four A.M., Sept. 14 (though he belonged to Pillow’s division) on the ground that the Ninth Infantry was then serving under Quitman. Although Scott refused to grant a capitulation or sign any pledge, he seems to have indicated quite definitely to the commission how the capital would be treated (Negrete, Invasión, iv, 122), and in particular that in consideration of being protected it would have to pay $150,000 for necessaries and comforts to be given our troops. The ayuntamiento attempted to force Scott to make pledges by saying that otherwise it could offer no security to his army or its property. This was ingenious, and so was its solemn Protest (Negrete, Invasión, iv, 108) that it had no intention of submitting voluntarily to any foreign authority.

Scott’s report offended Worth by saying that he did not pass the garita until Sept. 14 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1077). This was technically an error, and Scott so acknowledged in writing (ibid., 1079). But one cannot suppose he intended (though Worth imagined he did) to belittle Worth, for his plan had been to give that officer the glory of capturing the city, and he was displeased to find that Quitman had taken precedence of Worth (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 377). Moreover, Scott stated expressly in his report that Worth, had he not halted in obedience to orders, might have anticipated Quitman (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 383). Scott seems, indeed, to have intended, in giving Worth the command on Sept. 8 and destining him to take possession of the city, to close the breach between that officer and himself, but Worth contrived, by taking needless offence on both occasions, to widen it. Another complaint was that Scott ordered Worth to stop at the Alameda, and thus enabled Quitman to reach the palace first (Semmes, Service, 464); but apparently this was because Scott intended to join Worth there (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 417), for when Scott proceeded from Tacubaya to the city on the morning of Sept. 14 he took the long route via San Cosme, not knowing what Quitman had done.

Semmes (Service, 469) states that S. Anna left 40 pieces of artillery behind when he evacuated the city. Gamboa asserted that at the end of the fighting, Sept. 13, there were still 9000 Mexican soldiers besides 4000 National Guards (Impug., 59). The Spanish chargé reported that when the fighting ended Santa Anna had 12,000 troops. As the minister of relations was his guest at the time this would seem almost equivalent to an official estimate (73Lozano, no. 7, Sept. 16). Mounted and unmounted, the Americans found twenty-two cannon at the citadel (304Geary to Quitman, Sept. 14). In spite of Santa Anna’s efforts to prevent the capture of the city, many still believed that he was in league with the Americans (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 419).

22. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 383 (Scott), 393 (Worth), 398 (Twiggs), 417 (Quitman). Niles, Oct. 30, p. 137. Sen. Rep. 32; 34, 1. Scott, Mems., ii, 535. Davis, Autobiog., 237. 376Nicholson, recolls. 224Introd. to intercepted letters. 66Beauregard to Quitman, Sept. 17. 304Watson to Shields, Sept. 16. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 362, note, 376. 113Beauregard, remins. 151Roberts to Union, July 12, 1848. 357Wilcox, diary. Arroniz, Manual, i, 411. 65Scott, gen. orders 286. Semmes, Service, 464. Apuntes, 326. London Chronicle, Nov. 12. 307Roberts, diary. 187Thomas to Eddy, Oct. 26. Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 255. Norton, Life, 172. 327Sutherland to father, Aug. —. Lowell (Mass.) Journal, Sept. 14, 1852. Verse by Grace Greenwood (in Stevenson, Poems).

Epitomizing his operations in the Valley, Scott said his army had beaten thirty-odd thousand men, posted behind defences at chosen positions, killed or wounded more than 7000, taken 3730 (one seventh officers), including thirteen generals, and captured more than twenty colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, 57 wall-pieces, 20,000 small arms, and an immense quantity of munitions (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 384–5). The total American losses on Sept. 12, 13 and 14: note 18.

1. The chief documents relating to Taylor’s field. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 31–2. 63Marcy to Taylor, July 15, 1847. 169Taylor to Crittenden, May 15; Sept, 15, 1847. Delta, Aug. 3. Wash. Union, June 17. 76Mora, Mar. 31; Apr. 7; May 12. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1118–49, 1170, 1172, 1175, 1177, 1180, 1185–8, 1195, 1197–8 (Taylor); 1003, 1193–4 (Marcy). 76A. Chávez, July 29. 76González to Urrea, July 12. 76Valencia, June 7, 19, 26. 76Filisola, Aug. 10. 76Extracto, Aug. 10. Scott, Mems., ii, 409–11, 460. 354Welles papers. 330Taylor, Aug. 16. Spirit of the Age, Feb. 17, 1848. 76Peña y Barragán, June 26, 1847. Charleston Mercury, Sept. 2. Polk, Diary, May 11. 61Adj. gen. to Brooke, May 29; to Taylor, July 16; to Talcott, Mar. 24. 69Wool to Bliss, Aug. 25. (Tampico) Kenly, Md. Vol., 241, 244, 252; 69Riley to Bliss, Dec. 14, 1846; 61Shields to adj. gen., Jan. 19, 1847; 66Beauregard to Gates, Feb. 24; 76I. Múñoz, Dec. 19, 21, 25, 1846; 65Gates, special orders 7, Feb. 25, 1847; 76Váldez to F. de Garay, Jan. 3, 1847; 76Garay, Jan. 22, res., 29, res.; 76J. J. Landero, Jan. 25; 76S. Anna, Jan. 9; 76F. de Garay, Jan. 22; 76to Mora, May 24. (Tamaulipas authorities) 76J. Cárdenas to Relaciones, Nov. 16, 1847; 76Urrea, Nov. 15; 75Memoria de ... Relaciones, Nov. 19; 76gov. Tam. to comte. gen. Tam., Jan. 17, 1848; 76Id.to Relaciones, Nov. 29, 1847; 76Tam. congress, decree, Nov. 14. (Taylor’s going home) 61Taylor, Oct. 26, 1847; Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 145 (Marcy); 330Taylor to Gen. —, Aug. 16, 1847; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1199, 1213–4 (Taylor); 1210 (Jones). (Costume) Delta, Aug. 3, 1847. 69Wool, gen. orders, Dec. 22, 1847.

The distance from Camargo to Mexico City seems to have been about 820 miles by the direct road. As early as May 11, 1847, Polk remarked to the Cabinet that it was more important to reinforce Scott than Taylor (Diary). In March, 1847, Taylor had: (regulars) 2 cos. of First Dragoons; ditto, Second Dragoons; four artillery cos. (C of 1st; C and E of 3d; B of 4th) with batteries; five artillery cos. as infantry; (volunteers) Arkansas horse regt.; ditto, Kentucky; two cos. Texas horse; two regts. Kentucky foot; three Ohio foot; three Ind. foot; two Ill. foot; two Miss. foot; one each Va., No. Car., So. Car. and Mass. foot (62adj. gen. to ordnance dept., March 24, 1847). June 16 Taylor wrote that Wool would soon have at Buena Vista six regular companies (Second Dragoons, Fourth Artillery), four cos. of volunteer horse (First Arkansas, Third Texas), and Marshall’s brigade (in all about 2500); that there would be a small garrison at Monterey, and that the troops on or coming to the Rio Grande would go to a camp of instruction at Mier. He reckoned that by August 15 he would have about 8000 effectives (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1177, 1180). The New Orleans Delta of Aug. 3 said Wool had at Buena Vista about 2900, Taylor at Monterey 800, and the posts at Cerralvo, Mier and Matamoros about 3300. In May and June the time of practically all Taylor’s 12-months men (thirteen regts.) was out. Only enough for one company would reënlist. The government intended Taylor should have after losing these men fully 10,000, to wit (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 924–6): (regulars) Hopping’s brigade consisting of Tenth Infantry (N. Y., N. J.) under Col. Temple; Thirteenth Infantry (Va., Ga., Ala., Fla.) under Col. Echols; Sixteenth Infantry (Ky., Ind., Ill.) under Col. Tibbatts; and also the Third Dragoons; (volunteers) Marshall’s brigade (one regt. each from *Miss., *Va. and *No. Car., five Va. companies—*three of them already in Mexico); Lane’s brigade (Ill. regt., Ill. horse co., Ind. regt., five N. J. cos., one Fla. co., one Ark. horse co., five Texas horse cos.); Cushing’s brigade (*Mass. regt., Ohio regt., Ohio horse co., five D. C. and Md. cos., five Ala. cos., one Ala. horse co.). (The star means “already in Mexico.”) In spite of this it was charged that the government was leaving Taylor with only a corporal’s guard. Troops began to leave Taylor’s for Scott’s field during the latter part of August. Taylor retained the Tenth and Sixteenth regular regts. and the battery of Deas (Co. B, Fourth Artillery) and sent to Scott, besides Hays’s men and a body under Cushing, three regts. of volunteers (Mass., Ohio, Ind.): an aggregate of 2957 (62adj. gen., Oct. 6). He estimated that Hays had about 400. Wool, who had been commanding at Saltillo and Buena Vista, moved to Monterey after Taylor left that place, and Col. John Hamtramck succeeded him. A letter from Buena Vista dated Jan. 17, 1848, said that Hamtramck then had 2600 and Wool at Monterey 1400; and that the total force in that field amounted to five light batteries, four infantry regiments, ten companies of dragoons and four companies of horse (Spirit of the Age, Feb. 17, 1848).

About 200 American prisoners (privates), who were supposed by themselves and other Americans to have been exchanged for Mexicans captured at Cerro Gordo, were sent by the Mexican government in May, 1847, to Huejutla, about 120 miles from Tampico on the road to Mexico, in order to prevent them from escaping or being recaptured, and suffered terrible privations in the mountains. July 7, 1847, Gates, commanding at Tampico, sent Col. De Russey of the Louisiana volunteers, with 126 men (including 35 mounted men) and a 6-pdr. under Capt. F. O. Wyse to endeavor peaceably to obtain the release of these prisoners, or, if that could not be done, to rescue them. De Russey sent word to Gen. F. de Garay, the Mexican commander in that district, regarding his mission, but was ambushed near Huejutla. With some loss he beat off his assailants, and after fighting more or less three days on his retreat, succeeded, after receiving aid from Tampico, in reaching that place. His loss was 12 killed and 7 wounded. Later the prisoners were released on parole. The garrison of Tampico at this time was only about 650 effectives; but July 31 five companies of Ill. vols. were ordered to go there from N. Orleans. In April, 1848, Gen. Shields was ordered to take command at Tampico. (For this paragraph: Encarnacion Prisoners, 70; 65Gates, special orders 41, July 7; 61Id.., July 21, Aug. 24; 365Wyse, May 15, 1876; 61adj. gen. to Gates, July 31; Ho. 24; 31, 1; Tampico Sentinel, extra, July 18; 76Garay, July 19, 28; 76V. de Mora, Sept. 10; Apuntes, 380–4; Niles, Aug. 7, p. 357; 61adj. gen. to Shields, Mar. 30, 1848.)

In the summer of 1847 discipline at Buena Vista was in a bad state (76Filisola, Aug. 10; 76report of a trustworthy spy). In August a mutiny occurred (Sen. 62; 30, 1), and Wool discharged dishonorably two lieuts. and two privates (Ho. 78; 30, 1). Polk countermanded this discharge on the ground that Wool had exceeded his authority (256Marcy to Wool, Jan. 17, 1848). A court of inquiry was ordered (Ho. 60; 30, 1, 1207–8). This fully vindicated Wool (Sen. 62; 30, 1).

By the autumn of 1847 the Americans occupied Tamaulipas and Nuevo León pretty effectively, but in Coahuila held only Saltillo and its vicinity. In Feb. and March, 1848, that state was overrun (61Wool, Mar. 2, 1848; 76gov. Coahuila, Mar. 29, 1848), and on March 7 Mazapil in northern Zacatecas was made an American outpost (61Wool to Price, Apr. 5, 1848; 76comte. gen. Zacatecas, Mar. 10). The Americans tried repeatedly without success to apprehend Gov. Aguirre, who was known to be hostile. Finally, about the middle of Dec., 1847, they burned his house and destroyed the clothing of his family who were there (76report to comte. gen. Durango, res., Dec. 21, 1847).

Valencia’s plan of combined operations appears to have been an elaboration of a suggestion of Filisola. By June 22 Filisola, then at Durango, was ready to advance. July 31 he feared his men would disband from lack of means. About Aug. 1 he moved. Many deserted or fell sick. August 11 he had 634 available privates. Avalos was in a similar condition, and his brigade shrank rapidly. Most of the troops placed under Filisola’s orders were diverted or simply failed to appear, and finally on Aug. 23, 1847, he was ordered to Querétaro. (This paragraph is based upon numerous 76reports from the officers concerned.)

Price’s campaign. In Oct., 1847, it was feared at Santa Fe that the Mexicans intended to attack New Mexico (Santa Fe Republican, Oct. 9), and a considerable American force appears to have gone to the southern part of the province (76prefect El Paso, Oct. 26). In November El Paso was the scene of preparations to march south. The people of Chihuahua state had mostly been cowed at Sacramento, but Trias and a few others were determined to fight. He obtained 500 muskets that were landed at Guaymas, and his arsenal turned out eight small field pieces. At Santa Cruz de Rosales he took post with 804 men, besides officers. Price had 665 men, but his artillery was much superior to that of the Mexicans. His object was to get the munitions and other public property that Trias had brought from Chihuahua City. Trias said he knew officially that a treaty had been signed; but, as the Mexicans were more noted for astuteness than for veracity, Price would not believe him. He did, however, wait about a week. After some fighting Trias and his entire force surrendered. He lost 238 killed. The American loss was 4 killed and 19 wounded (62adj. gen. to Price, Oct. 4; Nov. 20, 1847. 256Marcy to Price, May 22, 1848; to Wool, May 23. 76Trias, Nov. 30; Feb. 15; Mar. 21. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 76–7, 113–36. 61Corresp. between Price and Trias, Mar. 10, etc. Ho. 24; 31, 1. Eco del Comercio, June 22, 1848. 76Chávez to Armijo, Oct. 21, 1847. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 535–7. México á través, iv, 710. 61Justiniani and Trias, report, Mar. 22, 1848. Apuntes, 397–401). Price exhibited energy and courage in this campaign but poor judgment. A force occupying El Paso would have protected New Mexico, and to go even beyond the city of Chihuahua and fight so serious an aggressive battle long after the capture of Mexico City and in the face of positive assurances that a treaty had been signed was hardly reasonable. One suspects that commercial interests were behind this campaign. Gen. Butler ordered restitution made (60to Marcy, Apr. 7).

2. The chief documents relating to hostilities at Mexico. 221Hill, diary. National, Nov. 14, etc., 1847. 65Scott, gen. orders 289, 296. Apuntes, 325, 330–9, 362. London Chronicle, Nov. 12. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 451, etc.; iv, app., 310–2. S. Anna, Apelación, 59, 60, 63. Gamboa, Impug., 59, 60. Ramírez, México, 317–8. Semmes, Service, 466–7. 92Ayunt. proclams. 92Corresp. between Veramendi and S. Anna. 92Ayunt. to Quitman, Sept. 15–6. 92Mexican officials to Veramendi, Sept. —. 92Quitman, proclam., Sept. 26. 92Veramendi, proclam., Sept. 27. Arco Iris, Dec. 1. Picayune, Oct. 14; Nov. 20. N. Y. Sun, Oct. 14. Diario Esactísimo. Niles, Oct. 30, p. 138. 364Worth to daughter, Sept. 28. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 248–58. 357Wilcox, diary. Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 25. 366Poster. S. Anna, Detall, 33–4. London Times, Nov. 13. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 383–4 (Scott), 393 (Worth); 399 (Riley); 417 (Quitman); 424 (Huger); app., 169 (Smith), 185 (Smith), 188 (Morris), 190 (Plympton). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 304–5. Monitor Repub., Sept. 28. Grant, Mems., i, 162–3. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 378. Engineer School, Occas. Papers 16. 73Lozano, no. 7, 1847. Davis, Autobiog., 240. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 507–11, 542. American Star, Oct. 14.

Santa Anna sent an order to Herrera to return to Mexico, but by the time Herrera received it he was so far away that he did not think it best to go back, and the order was soon rescinded. One of the 92proclamations of the president of the ayuntamiento, 12:30 p.m., Sept. 14, said: “The general in charge of the American forces which have occupied the city this morning has informed the Ayuntamiento that if within three hours, counted from the time this notice is posted, there is not an entire cessation of the acts of hostility now being committed with palpable imprudence and to the grave prejudice of the peaceable citizens, he will proceed with all rigor against the guilty, permitting their goods and property to be sacked and razing the block in which are situated the houses from which the American troops are fired upon.” There is no evidence that the last threat was executed. In another 92proclamation of the same day the people were called upon to “reciprocate the civilization” of the American army, and to leave national affairs to the nation. In a 92third the people were told that Scott had refused to give the pledges asked for by the ayuntamiento until the hostilities should cease. The action of the ayuntamiento brought upon President Veramendi the most violent denunciations and menaces of Santa Anna. Veramendi 92replied that he “idolized” his country, and was only trying to avert the disasters to which it had been doomed by “the most well-proven rapine, the most lamentable demoralization of our people, and not by true patriotism or zeal to prevent the sacking of the churches” and other outrages. Veramendi wrote finally that it would be a waste of time to continue the discussion; that the authorities would do their duty and accept the verdict of public opinion.

The Americans commonly believed that the convicts were released from the prison by Santa Anna with the expectation that their crimes would be charged to the Americans; and on the other hand Otero asserted that the Americans released them to prey upon the people. His view was certainly erroneous; and the other, though not without support, may have been so. In the confusion the jailers perhaps left the prisoners unguarded or released them to save them from starving. Some believed that the real purpose of the uprising was to plunder the houses of the city under cover of the disorder, and there is reason to think this motive existed. No doubt, too, some Americans robbed the houses of innocent citizens from which they supposed, or pretended to suppose, that bullets had come (221Hill, diary). As late as December an uprising was planned. Scott had agents (including a member of Congress and a governor) to give him information (Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 38). Scott’s general orders 289, Sept. 18, for the distribution of the troops in the city show that all the principal sections were covered, and that a guard and two guns defended each of the principal gates. No private house was to be used for quarters till all suitable public buildings had been occupied, nor then without the owner’s consent or an order from headquarters. Officers were to be with or near their troops.

3. The chief documents. Lieber, Guerrillas, 19, 20. Diario, Apr. 28; May 2, 4, 10, 23, 1847. 80Address of Méx. legislature, Apr. 26. Republicano, May 8. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 138 (Marcy). Porvenir, May 27. Picayune, Feb. 23; May 6; Dec. 9. Kenly, Md. Vol., 312. Ramírez, México, 241, 244, 260. México á través, iv, 712. 256Marcy to Kearny, Dec. 10, 1846. 76Mora, Apr. 23, 1847. 86Vera Cruz congress, manifiesto, Sept. 28. 76Soto, proclam., undated. 92Address of citizens, Apr. 6. 61Salas, proclam., Apr. 21. 76S. Anna, May 16. 76Relaciones to Olaguíbel, Aug. 16. 257[Hughes] to Frank, Nov. 11. 76Decrees, Apr. 28; May 1. Roa Bárcena, Rec., 250–5, 262.

In Spanish guerrilla means a party, each member of which is a guerrillero. The value of the work done by the Spanish guerillas was commonly much overrated by the Mexicans. Not only did the “patriotic” irregulars act atrociously in Mexico during the revolution against Spain, but those organized by the viceroy behaved so badly that he disbanded them (México á través, iii, 234). Guerillas (“light corps of the National Guard”) were decreed by the Mexican government on April 8, 1847. A citizen after obtaining authorization from the state or the national government, could raise a body of volunteers (not less than fifty), rank according to the number from lieutenant to colonel (800), and give his name to the corps. Other corps were to be supported by the state or the central government. Goods taken from the enemy were to be divided among the captors and could be sold without paying duty. August 16, 1847, the government ordered that the people within thirty leagues (about eighty miles) of every point occupied by the enemy should rise en masse, and attack them with “the arms each may have, fire-arms or cold steel, great or small, long or short—in a word, if there be nothing else, with sticks and stones” (76Relaciones to Olaguíbel).

Other guerilla leaders in Vera Cruz state were M. Senobio (near the coast), the Spanish priest J. A. Martínez, Juan Aburto, F. Mendoza and J. M. Vázquez. T. Marín had charge of the guerillas near Córdoba. Jarauta was ordered to bring together a number of small parties that were simply preying upon the people. In the autumn of 1847 he offered to join the Americans, but Gen. Patterson, who arrived at Jalapa just then, would make no arrangement with him (Kenly, Md. Vol., 328–31; 257[Hughes] to Frank, Nov. 11).

4. 76Urrea, Aug. 12, res. 76Canales to Urrea, Feb. 5; Aug. 6; to alcalde of Guerrero, Apr. 4. 69Lamar to Bliss, Apr. 21. 245Canales to ——, Apr. 4. Apuntes, 387–8. Republicano, June 11. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1138–42; 1197 (Belknap). 256F. J. Parker to F. Smith, Apr. 1. Picayune, Feb. 23. Smith, Chile, 294, 298. 245Boyd to Bee, Apr. 4. 148Chamberlain, recolls.

If a train moved in sections with troops between them its length was increased so much that more strength was believed to be lost than gained. The “roads” were usually narrow, especially in rough country. For Urrea see chap. xx, p. 400.

5. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1138, 1142, 1180, 1211 (Taylor). 61Wool to adj. gen., Dec. 20, 1847; Feb. 4; Mar. 2; May 9, 1848; to Hunter, Dec. 14, 1847; to Hamtramck, Dec. 18; to Lobo, July 25; to Marcy, Feb. 26, 1848; 65orders, 11, Dec. 17, 1847. 65Id.., orders 66, Feb. 26, 1848. 69Commrs. of N. León towns to Taylor, Apr. —, 1847. 61McDowell to Butler, Jan. 18, 1848. 348Pattridge to Miss W., July 21, 1847. Apuntes, 387. Republicano, Apr. 14, 1847. Niles, May 8, 1847, p. 152. 212Hastings, diary. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes, mem., 43). 148Chamberlain, recolls. 76Aguirre, proclam., Aug. 27, 1847. 76Canales to R. Uribe, Apr. 10. 76Urrea, May 27. 76Jefe político, Saltillo, to ayunt., Sept. 28; Nov. 4.

Final action regarding the fine of $96,000 was made contingent on the conduct of the people (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1139). General Mora, commanding at San Luis Potosí, thought he could take advantage of a small massacre perpetrated by Americans to score a point, but Taylor disposed of him summarily (ibid., pp. 1138–41).

6. Sun of Anahuac, Aug. 25, 1847. Apuntes, 385–7. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, 1847. 350Weber, recolls. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 579. Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 278, 281. Picayune, Oct. 15; Dec. 19. Kenly, Md. Vol., 323. Oswandel, Notes, 153, 166, 215. 76Mora, Apr. 23, 1847. 76Rea, Nov. 14. Dublán, Legislación, v, 284, 288. Diario, May 2, 10; June 27 (S. Anna, decree, June 26). 76Lombardini, May 27. 76Guerra, circular, June 26.

7. 61Wilson to adj. gen., Aug. 21, 1847. (Losses) Ho. 24; 31, 1. 68Court of inquiry, Puebla, July 17. 221Hill, diary, Nov. 8. 69Hughes to Capt. Scott, Jan. 8, 1848. Grone, Briefe, 33, 37, etc. 61Lally to Wilson, Aug. 11, 26. 61Briscoe, report, Mar. 1, 1848. 65Scott, gen. orders 250, 1847; 45, 1848. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 579, 582. Delta, Oct. 1, 5, 1847. Kenly, Md. Vol., 304–8, 318. Apuntes, 386–7. 234McDaniel to Johnson, Jan. 28, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1068 (Marshall); 1069 (Miles); 1082 (Scott). Niles, Sept. 18, 1847, p. 35; Oct. 16, p. 103. 291Pierce, diary. 291Bonham to Pierce, July 27. 61Cadwalader to Wilson, June 13. 287Parrish, diary. 76Soto, June 10, 14; July 19. 76Mendoza to Soto, June 16. 178Davis, diary. Diario, June 23. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 482 (Lally); 488 (Sears); 489 (Ridgely); 491–5; app., 4, 13, 16 (McIntosh); 18 (Cadwalader); 21 (Wynkoop); 23 (Walker); 25 (Pierce). Roa Bárcena, Rec., 252, 254, 262. Oswandel, Notes, 381. June 6 McIntosh lost six killed, fifteen wounded.

For McIntosh and Pierce see chap. xxiv, pp. 76–7. McIntosh left Vera Cruz June 4 with 132 wagons, about 500 pack-mules, 170 dragoons, 100 dismounted dragoons and about 450 infantry. The wagon horses were weak mustangs; the mules unbroken and vicious; the teamsters Mexicans, mostly new to the business. The wagons became too much separated. The dragoons acted imprudently. A court of inquiry exonerated McIntosh. The guerillas destroyed the fine bridge at Plan del Río in the hope of stopping Cadwalader, who marched from Vera Cruz to reinforce McIntosh. Lally had two companies of the Fourth Infantry, two of the Fifth, one of the Eleventh, three of the Twelfth, one of the Fifteenth, two of the Voltigeurs and one of Louisiana horse. The “missing” numbered twelve. He admitted that at the national bridge only his artillery gave him the victory. Lally had been appointed from civil life, and, though military in appearance, did not understand his present business (Grone, Briefe, 46–8). Hearing at Perote that Lally had been repulsed, Colonel Wynkoop with two companies of infantry and one of cavalry marched to Jalapa in thirty-six hours. Naturally the Americans greatly overestimated the numbers of the guerillas they were fighting. In November, 1847, the guerillas operated so near Vera Cruz that the farmers would not bring milk and vegetables to the city unless escorted. January 3, 1848, Lieut. Col. Miles left Vergara with some 500 wagons and a large number of pack-mules. He had 1300 troops, but only 150 of them were cavalry. The train extended at least nine miles. In spite of unusual precautions 250–300 of the pack-mules were captured near Santa Fe. Most of the goods thus lost belonged to Mexican merchants. In February, 1848, a party under Lieut. Col. Briscoe was attacked on its way to Orizaba. A number of other encounters are mentioned by Mexicans.

8. Oswandel, Notes, 156, 215–6, 365, 382. 13Giffard, nos. 19, May 30; 37, Oct. 20, 1847. 13Doyle, no. 1, Jan. 13, 1848. 61Hughes to [Wilson], Sept. 13. 65Scott, gen. orders 127, Apr. 29; 372, Dec. 12, 1847. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 174, 186, 194, 196. 128Id.., diary. 12Pell to Lambert, Nov. 30. Zirckel, Tagebuch, 50, 53, 61–2. Correo Nacional, Dec. 21. Henshaw narrative. Grone, Briefe, 37–61. 61Twiggs to Marcy, Mar. 1, 1848. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 310. Scott, Mems., ii, 575. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 579, 582. 152Claiborne, mems. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 138 (Marcy). Delta, Dec. 23. Apuntes, 386. 62Adj. gen. to Wilson, Aug. 12. Moore, Scott’s Camp., 72. Ramírez, México, 241–3, 260. Fraser’s Mag., xxxviii, 91–6. 76J. G. Terán, May 17. Stevens, Stevens, i, 134. Vera Cruz Eagle, May 29. 61Wilson to adj. gen., June 7. 159Collins papers. Polk, Diary, July 16. 76Soto, July 23; Aug. 11. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 60–1. Flag of Freedom, i, no. 4. 305Richardson, recolls.

It was a common practice of these guerillas to mutilate wounded Americans. The lasso was one of their weapons. Their rule was to take no prisoners. After Scott had to abandon his communications with Vera Cruz, the government felt extremely anxious to have the line re-opened and kept open. August 12, 1847, the commander at Vera Cruz was assured that this was “of the first importance,” and troops were sent to him expressly for the purpose. The volunteers in general, personally brave and enterprising, did good service against the guerillas (Stevens, Stevens, i, 134); but as the latter almost always had horses, there was a particular need of cavalry on our side. About the first of July, 1847, the governors of Illinois and Georgia were called upon for two and five companies respectively of mounted men to help keep this line open. Polk himself selected Hays’s regiment (Diary, July 16). Walker, though stern with the guerillas, would not permit his men to pillage. Rebolledo was betrayed, and was taken by Mexican counter-guerillas in November, 1847; but he was defended by an American named Kennedy, who resided at Jalapa, and was merely imprisoned. Jarauta was shot in July, 1848, for revolutionary activities. Marcy wrote to Scott that the guerilla system was “hardly recognized as a legitimate mode of warfare, and should be met with the utmost allowable severity” (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 138), and ordered him to destroy the rendezvous of the guerillas. The guerillas failed completely to affect the general course of the war, as they were expected to do, but even as late as March, 1848, the road from Vera Cruz to Jalapa was safe for large parties only. Hays’s Rangers seemed to aim to dress as outlandishly as possible, and with their huge beards looked almost like savages. The officers were like the men in looks and costume. The horses were of all sizes and colors. For arms each had a rifle, a pair of pistols and one or two Colt’s five-shooters (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 310; Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 174). Hays’s usual order for attack was to point at the enemy and shout, “Give ’em hell!” (Zirckel, Tagebuch, 11).

9. 128Brackett, diary. Tributo á la Verdad, 58. Grone, Briefe, 33. 61Childs, Jan. 13, 1848. (Hostilities) 47Perry, Nov. 2, 1847. 76Mendoza to Soto, June 16, 1847. 47Private letter (Mexican), Orizaba, [Sept., 1847]. 307Roberts, diary. Porvenir, May 27. Picayune, May 6. 76Acuerdo, July 30. 76Mora, Apr. 23, 1847. 76Relaciones to Guerra, Aug. 26. 76Soto, Sept. 12. 86Llorea to Soto, June 12. 76Marín to Soto, Sept. 22, 25. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, 1847. Diario, June 11. 214Hays and Caperton, Hays. 257[Hughes] to Frank, Dec. 16. México á través, iv, 662.

10. 128Brackett, diary. 80Méx. legislature, address, Apr. 26, 1847; decree, May 31. 61Childs, Jan. 13, 1848. Flag of Freedom, i, no. 3. Gamboa, Impug., 66. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 53, 215. Apuntes, 386. Nacional, Dec. 18. S. Anna, Apelación, 29. 82Puebla state treas. to secy., May 10. And from 76 the following. Bravo, May 22, 1847. Guerra, circular, May 4. Lists of guerilla patents issued. Gov. Oaxaca, proclam., Jan. 25, 1848. Peña y Barragán, Nov. 24, 1847. To Torrejón, Dec. 28. Rea to Peña y Barragán, Nov. 26; to Guerra, Nov. 14. Rules of Rea’s officers. Alvarez, June 16. Rea said he had commanded regulars. He treated some captured Americans with much civility.

11. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 385 (Scott); 471 (Childs); app., 33 (Gwynn); 34 (Morehead). 13Thornton, no. 5, Oct. 29, 1847. National, Nov. 14. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 113, 117, 131. 356Whitcomb, diary. Zirckel, Tagebuch, 102. 95Puebla ayunt., proceedings, Aug. 31. 65Scott, gen. orders 246, Aug. 5. 66J. L. Smith to H. L. Scott, July 13. Scott, Mems., ii, 550. Flag of Freedom, i, nos. 1, 5. Kitchen, Record, 63–9. Lawton, Artill. Off., 278. 270Moore, diary. Oswandel, Notes, 248, 254, 259, 265, 268, 293. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 85. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 313. S. Anna, Apelación, 60. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 202, 206. México á través, iv, 699. 76Comte. gen. Puebla, Sept. 18. 76Relaciones to Guerra, Dec. 11. Moore, Scott’s Camp., 116, 214–6. 73Lozano, no. 9, 1847. 82Puebla congress, decree, Aug. 12. Ramsey, Other Side, 394–5. Smith, To Mexico, 171. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 517. S. Anna, Detall, 33, 35.

The cavalry were under Capt. Ford, the artillery under Capts. Kendrick and Miller, and the infantry (six companies) under Lieut. Col. Black (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 471). Capt. Rowe, Ninth Infantry, commanded a hospital that was persistently attacked. A considerable number of the sick were able to do light duty. Some civilian employees helped. Childs had authority from Scott to organize the convalescents into companies and battalions (65Scott, gen. orders 246). Scott spoke of the garrison as “competent” (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 303), and no doubt it was as nearly equal to the dangers that appeared to threaten it as was the army that advanced from Puebla. But the garrison was weaker than Scott had intended it to be, for many convalescents had represented themselves as well. Four Pennsylvania companies, Ford’s company and Miller’s company held S. José, which was a poor building for the purpose and badly placed. Guadalupe was occupied as a protection to Loreto.

Guerillas entered Puebla Aug. 12. Childs at once gave notice to the prefect that, should the people attempt to overpower the garrison, “the City would probably suffer” from his artillery (69Aug. 12). The first attack upon the Americans gave the guerillas about 700 mules and some other property. The next day some fifty armed teamsters and others went against the guerillas, and only fifteen of them returned. The authorities of the city were disgusted with the operations of the guerillas. About the first of September, by order of the state congress, the National Guards moved to help recover the city from the Americans, but the orders given them seemed to show little determination to coöperate with Rea or fight in earnest, and hence many became disheartened and deserted (82Ochoterena). Typhoid fever broke out among the American sick and carried off many (Moore, Scott’s Camps., 218). News of the capture of Mexico was brought in by a courier disguised as a lépero. S. Cristóbal was on the road from Mexico to Puebla via Apam, which Santa Anna chose to take. Alvarez went via S. Martin.

12. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 471 (Childs); app., 28 (Black); 34 (Morehead). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1029 (S. Anna); 1030 (Childs). Ramsey, Other Side, 396. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 113, 117. Moore, Scott’s Camp., 218, 223–4. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña, 1848. 95Puebla prefect to ayunt., Sept. 17. 95Rea to prefect, Sept. 23. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 314. Flag of Freedom, i, nos. 1, 5. 270Moore, diary. 76S. Anna to Guerra, Sept. 23, 30. Gamboa, Impug., 60. S. Anna, Detall, 35–6.

13. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 460; iv, app., 295. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 347. Flag of Freedom, i, no. 3. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 324. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 71, 80, 101. 152Claiborne, mems. 76Isunza to Relaciones, Oct. 12. 76S. Anna, Sept. 30; Oct. 4. México á través, iv, 699. 82J. A. Ochotorena, Oct. —. 82S. Anna to gov. Puebla, Oct. 6. 82P. M. Herrera to Puebla sec. state, Oct. 7. 82Id.., diary. Zirckel, Tagebuch, 50, 53, 61–2. 61Taylor, order, Aug. 16. Apuntes, 347–8. 321Smith, diary. 327Sutherland to father, undated. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 477 (Lane). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1030 (Lane); 1198 (Taylor). 246Lane, Autobiog. Rosa, Impresiones. Semmes, Service, 234. Hartman, Journal, 14–5. Smith, To Mexico, 161. S. Anna, Detall, 36. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 519.

From Perote, hearing that large Mexican forces were in his front, Lane took four companies of the First Pennsylvania, Walker’s company of Mounted Riflemen, some convalescents and three guns under Taylor (Third Artillery). Wynkoop of the First Pennsylvania commanded these men. Before long they returned to Perote. Santa Anna reported that he took from Puebla 3500 men. His worst trouble was with his Puebla National Guards, who thought the expedition was a treasonable scheme of his to get them away from Puebla. On finding his command melting away, he sent all but about 1000 cavalry back to Puebla under Alvarez. From Puebla Alvarez retired to Atlixco and thence to the south. Later he took possession of Cuernavaca in the state of México.

14. The Huamantla affair. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1031 (Lane). Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 477 (Lane). Apuntes, 348. Perry, Indiana, 234. (“Peg-Leg”) 166Pommarès to Conner, Aug. 4, 1846. Norton, Life, 154, 157. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 88–94. 129Id.., diary. Zirckel, Tagebuch, 96–8, 155. Flag of Freedom, Oct. 23; 24, extra; 27. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 460–3; iv, app., 315–6. Correo Nacional, Mar. 30, 1848. S. Anna, Apelación, 65. 222Hiney, diary. Grone, Briefe, 65–7. 152Claiborne, mems. Gamboa, Impug., 61. 147Chamberlain, diary. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 519. S. Anna, Detall, 37. Besides losing Walker, Lane had 23 men wounded (Ho. 24; 31, 1).

Lane was born in 1814. For a time he was a trader at Lawrenceburg, Indiana; and then he studied law in the manner of that time and region. He was not a man of much education. He meant thoroughly well in a rough way, but was rather careless about discipline. His men realized that he did not look out for their comfort or husband their strength, but admired his courage, energy and shrewd planning so much that they forgave him. He was called the Marion of the war.

To guard his baggage, etc., Lane left at the hacienda the Fourth Ohio (Col. Brough), three regular companies under Capt. Simmons, and Lieut. Pratt (Second Art.) with two guns. Walker had his own company of Mounted Riflemen, two companies of Louisiana cavalry, and one company of Georgia cavalry (Brackett, Lane’s Brig., 89). Lane had, in the following order, the Fourth Indiana (Col. Gorman), four Pennsylvania companies (Col. Wynkoop), five guns (Capt. Taylor), a battalion of the Ninth Infantry (Maj. Lally) and six companies of regulars (Capt. Heintzelman). Santa Anna, hearing that a few Americans were on their way to Huamantla, sent a party of Puebla mounted police to protect the town. Evidently this was the party that Walker saw approaching it.

Much was written about this fight. It was said that Walker was ordered not to advance beyond supporting distance; that he was authorized to act according to circumstances; that he dashed ahead because he received word that the Mexican guns were being taken away, etc.; but Lane reported that he ordered Walker to move ahead (“within supporting distance”) and, should the Mexicans be found in force, to wait for the infantry (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 477). He reached the town about forty-five minutes before the infantry did. Santa Anna was repulsed by the Fourth Indiana. In spite of Lane, much plundering was done by the victors, in whose defence it was urged that citizens fired from the houses. Though Walker captured two guns, he had no priming tubes, and therefore could make little, if any, use of them. Lane’s loss was about twenty-five killed and wounded. Santa Anna reported two killed, seven wounded, and a number missing, but his loss was estimated by Americans at 100.

15. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 108. 356Whitcomb, diary. Perry, Indiana, 253. Zirckel, Tagebuch, 103. 76Scott to Childs, Sept. 16. Negrete Invasión, iii, app., 460. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 347. Flag of Freedom, i, no. 5. Oswandel, Notes, 339–41. 76Alvarez, Oct. 13. 76Rea to Alvarez, Oct. 13. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 471 (Childs); 476 (Lane). (“Rough paw”) 335Trist to wife, Mar. 14, 1848.

Santa Anna overtook Lane at El Pinal, but admitted that the Americans marched so cautiously that he could accomplish nothing. The loss of the garrison, Sept. 13 to Oct. 12, was fifteen killed, thirty-seven wounded (Ho. 24; 31, 1). The loss of the Mexicans was estimated by Americans at 300–500.

16. Diccionario Universal (Atlixco). México á través, iv, 662, 702. Calderón, Life, ii, 93. Zirckel, Tagebuch, 112. 76G. Rodríguez, Oct. 14. 76Rea, Oct. 24. 356Whitcomb, diary. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 479 (Lane).

17. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 479 (Lane). Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 75–6 (Marcy, report). Grone, Briefe, 69. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 522–3. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 146, 149–51, 164. Zirckel, Tagebuch, 110–3. Flag of Freedom, i, nos. 1, 3. 76Alvarez, Dec. 14. 76Rea, Oct. 24, 1847; Feb. 10, 1848. 76Memo. to head of plana mayor, Feb. 19, 1848. 61Dumont to Lane, Nov. 15. 307Roberts to Iowa State Hist. Soc., Dec. 14, 1863.

Lane had the Fourth Ohio, Fourth Indiana, Lally’s and Heintzelman’s battalions, Wynkoop’s four Pennsylvania companies, Taylor’s (3) and Pratt’s (2) guns, and a squadron of the Third Dragoons (Capt. Ford) on the Atlixco expedition. When he entered the town the city authorities met him, surrendered, and asked protection. Lane had one killed and one wounded; the Mexicans admitted a loss of 219 killed and 300 wounded. On his way back to Puebla Lane turned off with 450 men to Guexocingo to capture two guns just made there. They had been removed, but he destroyed the carriages (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 481).

October 29–30 an expedition from Puebla visited Tlaxcala (356Whitcomb, diary). November 9–10 at night Lane with a force of dragoons went over this road again, and recovered twenty-one loaded wagons that had been captured by guerillas, besides seven that they had set afire as he approached. Thirteen Mexican officers and many horses and cattle were taken. This time he had about 100 cavalry, 200 Indiana and 200 Ohio men. He returned to Puebla in the night of Nov. 12–13 without having lost a man. In the evening of Nov. 22 he left Puebla for Izucar de Matamoros with about 200 mounted men. In the morning he surprised (76Arenal to Rea, Nov. 26) a body of Mexican irregulars, causing considerable loss, captured three cannon (76Peña y Barragán, Nov. 28) and much ammunition, and rescued a number of American prisoners. On his return, Nov. 24–5, he was attacked by Rea, but again triumphed (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 87). One or two Americans were killed and several wounded. If Rea’s report can be believed, the Americans greatly exaggerated, as was natural, his numbers and losses (76to Peña y B., Nov. 26). In January, 1848, Lane with four companies of Texas Rangers, two of the Third Dragoons and one of Mounted Riflemen was sent from Mexico to clear the roads of guerillas (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 75). In the course of his rapid march he almost succeeded in capturing Santa Anna, then residing at Tehuacán. He finally proceeded to Orizaba and Córdoba, captured public property, recovered stolen merchandise, and released American prisoners (Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 89–95). February 17 he set out from Mexico with 250 Rangers and 130 of the Third Dragoons against the guerillas north and northeast of the capital (ibid., p. 76). February 25 he captured the town of Sequalteplán after a stiff skirmish, killing a considerable number and taking some fifty prisoners. It was said that Jarauta led the guerillas here. For Lane’s operations subsequent to the Atlixco expedition: Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 168, 174, 192, 205, 234–45. Whitcomb, diary. Zirckel, Tagebuch, 122–3. 61Dumont to Lane, Nov. 15. 76S. Anna, Feb. 1, 1848. Id.., Apelación, 65. Amer. Home Journal, Aug., 1906. Flag of Freedom, i, no. 1. T. F. Davis, diary. Claiborne, memoirs. 76Puebla comte. gen., Nov. 28. 76Rea to Peña y Barragán, Nov. 26. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 75–6 (Marcy, report), 86–103. Mention should also be made of Capt. Ruff, who on July 30, 1847, with eighty-two Mounted Riflemen attacked about 300 Mexicans (guerillas and infantry) entrenched in houses and a church at S. Juan near Ojo de Agua. With a loss of one man wounded, he killed or wounded about seventy to ninety of the enemy, it was believed (69Porter to Mrs. P., July 31; Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 25–6 (Smith); Smith, To Mexico, 187).

18. (Destruction, etc.) Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 205–6 (Trist); Exposición dirigida. 52Trist, no. 16, confid., Sept. 27, 1847. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 130–2, 134–6, 155–65, 421–6. 13Bankhead, no. 86, Sept. 28. Pacheco, Exposición. Colección de Documentos, 4. S. Anna, Contestación al Oficio. México á través, iv, 700. 76Rosa to Herrera, Sept. 29. 76M. Ocampo to Herrera, Sept. 24. 80Méx. legislature, decree, Sept. 18. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 74.

Real or at least additional reasons for the decree of Sept. 16 were probably that Santa Anna intended to leave the country or desired to let it try to get on without him. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 584) denies that Peña was timid: but (1) Bankhead and Trist so described him; and (2) his conduct in the negotiations with Slidell and with Trist confirms their opinion. In the latter case all the strength of his entourage was required to make him face the situation.

19. 76Rosa to Herrera, Sept. 29. México á través, iv, 700. Gamboa, Impug., 65. 52Trist, nos. 16, confid., Sept. 27; 17, confid., Oct. 1; 18, Oct. 25. 52Id.to Hetty Parker, Sept. 28. Colección de Documentos, 110. 80México legislature, decree, Sept. 23. 80Id.., comtee. on constit. points, report, Sept. 18. 80Olaguíbel to Méx. legisl., Sept. 25. 80Michoacán legislature, decree, Sept. 24. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 566. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 155–61. (Toluca) Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844; Encarnacion Prisoners, 75. 73Lozano, no. 9, 1847.

Peña admitted that it was impossible to fulfil the constitutional requirements, but said it was a public duty to establish a government as near them as was practicable (Colec. de Docs., 110). The legislature of México state denounced Peña as representing the peace element, and refused to recognize any federal authority except the Lagos Coalition; but its decree was not favorably received by the public, and Olaguíbel would not promulgate it.

20. 75Circular del ... Peña ... á los Gobernadores, Sept. 27. 75Circulares del min. de relac., Sept. 27. 75Peña, manifesto, Oct. 13. 75Rosa to prest. of Congress, Oct. 14. 52Trist, no. 16, confid., Sept. 27. Communicaciones habidas. Correo Nacional, Oct. 18. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 176, 408–11, 421–6, 469–83. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 90. 6Anderson papers. 76Peña, circular, Nov. 16. 6S. Anna to J. M. Guerra, Oct. 25. Id.., Contestación al Oficio. Id.., Comunicación Oficial. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 385 (Scott). 75S. Anna to Congress, Nov. 1.

Scott assisted Peña by giving safe-conducts to several members of Congress (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 385). Santa Anna took the ground that he was still legally responsible for the government of the country, and therefore must be allowed to exercise the powers of a President. Nov. 1 he made this demand formally (Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 469). He also tried to create trouble for the new government by proclaiming that his removal from the command of the army was intended to cause his personal destruction or to pave the way for a disgraceful peace. He further said he could not be placed on trial until Congress should declare there were grounds for trying him. But he found he had no prestige left. Rosa said to Santa Anna that his resignation of the Presidency had been consummated by actually giving up the executive power, and that, in view of public opinion, it would be impossible to prove Peña’s impartiality and maintain discipline in the army, unless the conduct of the general defeated at Cerro Gordo and in the later battles were officially inquired into (ibid., 421). In reply to another letter from Santa Anna he said (Nov. 11) that Peña would not discuss the resignation further, that his authority had been recognized by all the states and by Congress, and that Congress admitted no right on Santa Anna’s part to resume the Presidency. In January, 1848, Rosa issued a circular reproaching Santa Anna for his past political conduct.

21. 76M. Ocampo, Nov. 27. 76Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Mar. 16, 1848. 76Guerra to Relaciones, Feb. 14. 76Gov. Oaxaca to Relaciones, Dec. 27, 1847. 76Milit. comte. Orizaba, Jan. 20, 1848. México á través, iv, 699–700. Kenly, Md. Vol., 391–7. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 205–6. 76S. Anna to Reyes, Oct. 16, 1847. Correo Nacional, Oct. 26, 1847; Apr. 4, 1848. 76J. M. Miñón to Guerra, Oct. 20. Comunicaciones habidas. 47Perry, Nov. 3. Eco del Comercio, Apr. 6, 1848. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 927; iv, 8–9. Monitor Repub., Nov. 10, 1847. 179Diario Esactísimo, Sept. 15. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 519–21, 532. 69Thomas to Twiggs, Mar. 6, 1848. 69Seymour to Hughes, Mar. 27. 69—— to adj. gen. of the Amer. army, Mar. 29. 69Hughes, safeguard to S. Anna, family and attendants, Mar. 17. 69Hughes to Twiggs, Mar. 15. S. Anna, Detall, 37. 13Doyle, nos. 29, 38, 1848.

Santa Anna’s military reports had excited resentment because he had been liberal with censures, particularly to relieve himself of blame.

Santa Anna was ordered to turn the command over to Rincón or (temporarily) Alvarez. But he said that he did not know where Rincón was, and that on account of the position of the Americans he could not safely send his artillery to Alvarez. Reyes marched north. Santa Anna then chose Tehuacán for a place of residence instead of going nearer Guatemala, because he still had hopes of regaining power through intrigue or revolution. His presence was not desired there by the people, presumably because it endangered them. They made it difficult for him to stay; and his friends, whose opinions he asked, now felt that his remaining in the country would injure them. See also chap. xxxii, p. 242. He sailed from La Antigua on or about April 4 in a Spanish brig for Venezuela, it was understood, after expressing warm appreciation of the treatment received at this time from the Americans (69to Gutiérrez, Mar. 11, 1848). Some thought he had increased his wealth since his return to Mexico.

22. Chief documents used. S. Anna, Apelación, app., 138–9. Id.. Comunicación Oficial. Suárez y Navarro, Causas, 70–2. México á través, iv, 700–1. Dublán, Legislación, v, 300–4, 307–14, 333–5. Apuntes, 339–40. Curtis, Buchanan, i, 590. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 399. 335Thornton to Trist, Dec. 5. 75Anaya at meeting of govs., Nov. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 572. And from 76 the following. Director gen. of artill., Dec. —, 1847. Suárez y Navarro, Nov. 9. J. de D. Peza, Nov. 29. Sección de operaciones, Nov. —. J. M. Márquez to Mora, Nov. 29. Rincón, Jan. 8, 1848. Olaguíbel, Oct. 29; Dec. 24, 1847. Id.to Alvarez, Oct. 23, 26. Bustamante, Oct. 2. Memorias of the chiefs of sections, Nov. —. To plana mayor and to Filisola, Nov. 19. Orders for reorganizing the army, Dec. 1, 20. Min. of war, memoria, Nov. 19. Diario, división del oriente, Sept. 29-Oct. 15. Rosa to Herrera, Sept. 29. Comte. gen. Querétaro, Sept. 16. To Bustamante, Oct. 30; Dec. 30. Quijano, Jan. 27, 1848. Gen. staff, memo., Dec. 31, 1847. Filisola, Dec. 27. Alcorta (plana mayor), Dec. 27. Gen. in chief of infantry, Oct. 14. Rosa, Nov. 2. Alvarez, Oct. 20, 28; Nov. 19. To Alvarez, Oct. 28, 31. Alvarez to Olaguíbel, Oct. 21. To Rea, Nov. 1. To Olaguíbel, Oct. 23. Valencia, Jan. 4, 1848.

Nov. 19 a detailed statement of the available forces gave the figures as 6785 scattered over twelve states. The largest body (2683) was at Querétaro. Oct. 14 the Army of the East had only one 16-pounder, one 12-pounder, one 6-pounder, three 5–3/4-pounders, one 4-pounder and two 24-pound howitzers. It was pointed out that even if men could be raised, they would be of the poorest sort, and long before an efficient army could be created, the Americans might be expected to attack them. Herrera probably had about 4000 men when he left Mexico, but he could not prevent wholesale desertion on the way to Querétaro. (Gamboa asserted that Herrera took only 2–3000 infantry from Mexico, but his statements are not always to be relied upon.) Jan. 2, 1848, Valencia was captured by the Americans.

Filisola and Alcorta agreed substantially in recommending an elastic, evasive plan of campaign: bodies of, say, 2000 men to be stationed at strategic positions; the one attacked to fall back upon the next; these to fight or join the third, as might seem best; those not otherwise engaged, to strike for the American rear; and thus a campaign of movements, in which the Mexicans would have the advantages of mobility, of knowing the country, and of having the coöperation of the people, would be pursued in order to wear out the Americans. But the means of carrying out this system were lacking. In October the government planned to have three sizable armies; but by the end of December it limited its ambition to having two small brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, each headed by a colonel.

23. Chief documents. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 60–2. 108Bancroft to Polk, Dec. 3, 1846. 256Barnard to Totten, Oct. 11, 1847. 66Id.to Id.., Dec. 15, 1847 (Taylor) 169Peyton to Crittenden, Jan. 25, 1848; 169Taylor to Crittenden, Nov. 15, 1847. 354Welles papers. Davis, Autobiog., 257–8. Wash. Union, Jan. 7, 1848, N. Y. Sun, May 17, 1847. Niles, Oct. 23, 1847, p. 114. Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 155. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 60–2 (Marcy, report). Calhoun Corres., 718 (to Clemson). Public Ledger, Jan. 4, 1848. 169Rives to Crittenden, Feb. 8, 1847. Richardson, Messages, iv, 542–4. 13Crampton to Palmerston, nos. 71, 1847; 5, 1848. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 7. Polk, Diary, Oct. 30, 1847. 61Scott, Sept. 18. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 138–40, 211. 256Totten to Marcy, Nov. 23, 21. 256Trist to Buchanan, Sept. 28. Picayune, Dec. 15. See chap. xxxii, p. 235.

Sept. 17, at a gathering of generals, one of the best proposed retiring at once to Vera Cruz. For the defensive plan see chap. xviii, p. 348. General Butler (Calhoun, Corres., 1146) and apparently Daniel Webster (Boston Courier, Feb. 20, 23, 1847) favored this plan. Had it been adopted we should in all probability have been forced sooner or later to resume active operations after having given up the results of much fighting. It seemed hardly possible that a majority in Congress would soon be able to agree upon a policy, and it looked as if injurious debates on the subject might occur. Marcy particularly advised Scott to prevent the formation of a new Mexican army, but authorized him to use his own judgment as to military operations. They were not, however, to be modified in consequence of Mexican peace proposals (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 140). For the difficult situation of the United States see the first paragraphs of chap. xxxii.

24. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1031, 1033, 1036, 1039, 1047–50, 1067 (Scott); 1006–9 (Marcy); 1060, 1260 (Jesup). Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 98 (H. L. Scott). 364Worth to S., Dec. 27, 1847. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 140–4. 76Comte. gen. Mexico, Jan. 10, 1848. 61Scott to Twiggs, Dec. 26, 1847. 65Id.., gen. orders 376, 389 of 1847; 7 of 1848. 356Whitcomb, diary. 12Pell of sloop Daring to Lambert, Nov. 30, 1847. 66Lee to Totten, Jan. 1; Feb. 1, 1848. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 310–1. 178Davis, diary. Picayune, Feb. 27.

In June and August, 1847, the First and Second Illinois regiments (12-months men) were replaced with “for the war” regiments bearing the same names. As we have seen (note 8) Illinois and Georgia were called upon about the first of July for mounted companies. June 23 Louisiana was asked to furnish two mounted, acclimated companies to clear guerillas from near Vera Cruz. July 16 a Pennsylvania foot regiment, organized some time earlier at Carlisle, was accepted. July 16 a proposed battalion of Mississippi riflemen was accepted as infantry. July 19 an Illinois horse company and a Delaware infantry company were accepted. July 24 a Maryland artillery company was authorized, and Missouri was requested to furnish an artillery company, two infantry companies and two mounted companies. August 17 Polk found that 6000 of the 50,000 volunteers authorized by the war bill had not been called out, and that the Cabinet were in favor of calling more of them (Diary). That day Ohio was asked for an infantry regiment. August 21 an infantry company, tendered by W. J. Corcoran of Washington, D. C., was accepted. August 26 Tennessee and Kentucky were called upon for two infantry regiments each, and an Indiana regiment was accepted. Sept. 6 a North Carolina company was accepted on the condition that it should be ready for muster by Oct. 10. Sept. 7, owing to the delay of the Carlisle company, a Pittsburgh, Pa., company was accepted in lieu of it. Sept. 8 two Ohio companies were asked for. Sept. 27 Marcy stated that nearly or quite all of the 50,000 volunteers had been accepted (Niles, Oct. 30, p. 144). Oct. 8 another Tennessee regiment (ten extra companies were ready) and a Michigan regiment were called for. Aug. 23 only one of the five Mississippi companies was ready. The government explained that men did not wish to serve on foot. The battalion was completed near the end of December (Rowland, Register, 416). Alabama and Virginia also were backward at this time. The Act of March 3, authorizing individual enlistments of volunteers, provided no means for its execution, no bounty and no clothing, and volunteers received less pay than the regulars (62adj. gen. to Hamtramck, Feb. 28, 1848). Naturally men did not care to leave home singly and be kept at dépôts for perhaps weeks, waiting for enough to be collected to be sent on. In Aug. and Sept. the transportation of troops was embarrassed by a serious epidemic of yellow fever at New Orleans. Transportation difficulties at Vera Cruz caused delays later.

Nov. 30, 1847, the authorized regulars were 1336 commissioned officers (eleven generals, thirty-five in general staff, 115 medical men, thirty-one in pay department, forty-three engineers, thirty-six topographical engineers, thirty-six ordnance officers, 118 officers in three dragoon regiments, thirty-five in Mounted Riflemen, 208 in four artillery regiments, 648 in sixteen infantry regiments, forty-seven in one regiment of Voltigeurs and foot riflemen) and 28,960 enlisted men (3408 dragoons, 1146 Mounted Riflemen, 5492 artillery, 17,664 infantry, 1104 Voltigeurs and foot riflemen, 100 engineer soldiers, forty-six ordnance sergeants, seventeen military storekeepers); but according to the returns (not all recent) the enlisted men numbered not more than 20,333 (adj. gen.’s report in Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 72). Of 12-months volunteers there were (mounted) one regiment of seven companies, one battalion and four independent companies, and two companies of infantry: aggregate, eighty-two officers, 2037 non-commissioned men and privates. Of volunteers “for the war” there were theoretically seven generals; 125 staff officers (including quartermaster’s, commissary’s and medical departments, and twelve (additional) in the pay department); of horse one regiment, two battalions, twenty-two independent companies (total, 184 officers, 4871 others); of foot artillery three companies (twelve and 342 respectively); of infantry twenty-two regiments, five battalions, eight independent companies (1159 and 27,603 respectively): aggregates, 1355 and 32,816 respectively. The number still on the rolls (Nov. 30) “for the war” was not supposed to exceed 20,286. This number was believed by the adjutant general to be “much beyond” the number of effectives.

There were supposed to be in the field 19,818 regulars and (aside from 803 on California service) 21,124 volunteers (officers and men); en route 1691 regulars, 100 volunteers: total (including the California men), 43,536. Scott’s army (regulars) was figured as 15,071 in the field, 1396 en route, 555 at Vera Cruz, 79 at Tampico; (volunteers) in the field and at Tampico, 14,955. His operating army, including the sick and the disabled, was estimated as about 30,209. Wool’s army was figured as (regulars) 3,642 in the field, 295 en route and (volunteers) 2790: total, 6727. Price was believed to have 255 regulars (dragoons), 2902 volunteers; and Mason (California) 216 regulars (one company of dragoons and one company of artillery), 803 volunteers (adj. gen.’s report, Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 72). All the figures were approximate and there were discrepancies in the reckoning.

Nov. 20 the adjutant general stated the regulars sent to Scott as reinforcements thus: of the old establishment (absent companies, reorganized companies and recruits), 5564; new establishment (troops raised and organized after March 4, 1847), five companies of Third Dragoons, the Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth (nine companies), Fourteenth and Fifteenth Infantry, the Voltigeurs, and recruits for the same, 6345 (62to Scott); and also six companies (360) of Marines under Lieut. Colonel Watson. Scott’s returns were infrequent or were lost on the way. Perhaps he dared not run the risk of exposing them to guerillas. Hence as a rule one must accept general statements. Quitman’s division, being now very small, was broken up, and he was permitted to report at Washington for a new command (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 395). As a rule no officer was permitted to leave the army except “with a view to the good of the service or the recovery of health” (61Scott to Patterson, Oct. 28, 1847). Oct. 22 even leaves of absence that had been granted or promised were cancelled. The government ordered the reinforcements to leave Vera Cruz promptly, and Bankhead was put in the place of Wilson there in order to obtain more efficient management (62adj. gen. to Scott, Nov. 9). After about the middle of October the troops at Mexico were thoroughly drilled, and by the middle of November came to be better disciplined than ever before.

April 29, 1847, although the 12-months army was about to disband, Marcy requested Patterson and Butler to remain in the service as major generals, and Marshall, Lane and Shields to remain as brigadier generals. Marshall arrived at Mexico City January 21, 1848. It is not possible to state how many troops came with each of the officers. Col. Hays brought five companies of Rangers. Lt. Col. Johnston had about 1300 men when at Puebla. In general about half of a command fell out from sickness and other causes between Vera Cruz and Mexico (125Bonham to mother, Dec. 7, 1847). Fruits, liquor, insufficient clothing and at this time the measles were the chief causes of sickness.

Scott’s announcement (65gen. orders 376) was dated Dec. 15. Jan. 6 Scott had 14,964, of whom 11,162 were effectives (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1061). By Feb. 13 his rank and file amounted to 26,910, and 2000 recruits were en route (62adj. gen. to Cass, Mar. 9, 1848). Though 5546 of the rank and file and 181 officers were then sick, he had been for some time strong enough to occupy Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí, but the peace negotiations (chap. xxxii) affected his plans. The new posts were at Río Frio (between Mexico and Puebla), and the national bridge and San Juan (between Jalapa and Vera Cruz). Early in March, 1848, a post was established at Ojo de Agua between Puebla and Perote. The purpose of the posts was to defend the line against the guerillas and furnish escorts for trains, couriers, etc. Jalapa and Puebla were held somewhat strongly. At the former there were on January 8, 1848, three infantry companies and a rifle company from the District of Columbia, two infantry companies, a rifle company and a battery (six guns) from Baltimore, four New Jersey infantry companies, a Pennsylvania infantry company and a mounted company. Sickness and other causes reduced the effectives, however, to 556 (69Hughes to H. L. Scott, Jan. 8, 1848). Puebla was held, Feb. 22, by some 2500 men: the Fourth Indiana, Fourth Ohio, Fourth Artillery, Fifth Ohio (five companies), Second Artillery (two companies), and two Florida companies (Perry, Indiana, 287). Pachuca was occupied Dec. 29 by the Ninth Infantry (178Davis, diary). Cadwalader marched for Toluca Jan. 6 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1062). Jan. 29 Col. Clarke set out for Cuernavaca with a brigade (66Lee to Totten, Feb. 1). His approach compelled Alvarez to break up the small force he had been holding at that point and hastily retire.

Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 524) says that Scott neglected “the proper military measures of occupation” in order to favor peace negotiations contrary to the “policy” of his government; but the most fundamental policy of that government was to bring about a satisfactory peace; Scott had not sufficient forces to carry out a military occupation of the country until late in December; and by that time peace was within reach.

25. Twiggs to H. L. Scott, Jan. 16, 1848; to adj. gen., Jan. 17; to Bankhead, Feb. 3. 69Id.to Marcy, Feb. 19. 61Scott to Twiggs, Dec. 26, 1847. 61Hughes to [Wilson], Sept. 13, 1847. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 241–2. Free American, Jan. 14, 1848. 152Claiborne, mems. Velasco, Geografía, iii, 176. Leclercq, Voyage, 386. Moreno, Cantón, 380. 88Córdoba ayunt., proceedings, Feb. 16. Picayune, Feb. 27.

There was a convenient road from Orizaba to Paso de Ovejas on the national highway about thirty miles from Vera Cruz. The recently captured goods had been in charge of Lieut. Col. Miles (note 7). Bankhead arrived at Córdoba Feb. 13 and left for Orizaba Feb. 17. The Michigan volunteers remained there. Other reasons for this expedition will be mentioned in chap. xxxiii.

26. Remarks of Gov. J. D. Porter of Tenn. to the author (vanity, ignorance of war). Ill. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1906, p. 178 (unfit to serve as corporal). 180Pillow to wife, Dec. 8, 1846 (re Taylor). Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 252 (Trist’s opinion). 307B. S. Roberts, diary, Nov. 26, 1847 (“ass by nature”). 335Trist, notes for letter to Ho. of Repres. (“Lie”; lack of probity; Scott’s confidence, etc.). 252Mackall, Sept. 18, 1847 (no vainer peacock or greater ass; gave no aid in the final battles). 292Pillow to wife, Dec. 12, 1847 (eye to Presidency). 335Paper prepared by Trist (re Polk’s brother). 277Pillow to Maj.— (beautifully illustrates “wriggling”). Scott, Mems., ii, 416. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 338 (vanity). 297Pillow to Polk, May 30, 1844 (“fatal blow”). M’Sherry Puchero, 179 (not considered a general). Chap. xxiii, note 29 (generalship). (Recommendations) 180Pillow to wife, Dec. 8, 1846. (Confidence) 335Trist, notes, supra. Pillow’s letters generally.

For uncomplimentary opinions regarding Pillow see chap. xxvi, note 8. It should be remembered, however, that later he became a political issue in Tennessee, and many things said of him then were colored by partisanship; also that the prejudice of many regulars in reference to the volunteers may have counted.

27. (After Monterey) 364W. to S., Oct. 2, 1846. (Ambition) Scott, Mems., ii, 416. (Restive) Lawton, Artill. Officer, 276. (Affection) Grant, Mems., i, 151; 335Trist, notes for letter to Ho., supra (Pillow: Scott’s fatherly affection for Worth will always get the better of any resentment); Lawton, ibid. (Rejected) 364W. to —, Mar. 3, 1848. (Friend) 183Drum, recolls.; 224Hitchcock, diary, Apr. 14, 1846. (Ounce) 364Worth to daughter, June 10, 1846.

28. (Told) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1226 (Scott). (Brother officer) 183Drum, recolls. (his name was Lieut. Col. Black of Pa.). (Root) 183Drum, recolls.; Davis, Autobiog., 286. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 14, 1847. (Favorably) Picayune, Jan. 17, 1848 (the plan ripening fast); 149Eells to Chase, Feb. 24, 1848 (W. may be the Dem. nominee); 185Pillow to Duncan, June 4, 1849 (W. had a good chance of nomination); 182Bowdon to W., Mar. 18, 1848, strictly confid. (Clashes, conciliate) Infra. (Antagonism) 169Mills to Crittenden, Jan. 28, 1848; Grant, Mems., i, 172.

For remarks on Worth’s character see chap. xii, note 8 and chap. xxiv, note 16. At Vera Cruz Worth ridiculed Scott’s methods in comparison with his own at Monterey (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528), and his journalistic champion, the editor of the New York Sun, took the same line (Aug. 16). He was determined to have an assault, in which he would naturally have played a conspicuous part (Mag. of Am. Hist., xiv, 569). He was enraged because Scott properly had Twiggs lead the advance from that city (ibid., 562; see also chap. xxiii, note 5). Apparently in order to become prominent in the coming battle, he seems to have left Vera Cruz without a suitable supply of provisions—contrary to orders (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). Probably because Scott, for reasons of policy, praised Twiggs’s conduct at Cerro Gordo in his report, Worth pronounced the report “a lie from beginning to end” (364to S., Dec. 27, 1847). He was impatient and offensive because Scott would not permit him to advance upon Puebla as soon as he wished to go (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528; 364W. to daughter, Apr. 30, 1847). Next, his wrath was excited there because, in accordance with the verdict of a court martial, Scott censured—in the mildest possible manner—his improper conduct (p. 361; Delta, Jan. 6, 1848). Wholly without authority he announced that his division was to lead the movement from Puebla against Mexico (236Judah, diary, May 6), though it was Twiggs’s turn to lead. He accused Scott of trying to belittle his achievements at Churubusco (364to S., Dec. 27, 1847). He blamed Scott for the losses resulting from his own imprudence at Molino del Rey and for not permitting him to attack Chapultepec that day; and he protested because Scott, doubtless by accident, did not credit him with the technical distinction of actually passing the San Cosme garita on Sept. 13 (p. 416; Sedgwick, Corres., i, 169). Unmoved by Worth’s conduct, Scott seems to have given him all the prominence to which he was entitled. It was understood that he assigned him to command on Sept. 8 with a special view to conciliating him (Grant, Mems., i, 151); and it is clear that he intended to have him capture the city of Mexico (p. 412). It is probable that Scott had shown some egotism and irascibility in the course of the strenuous campaign, but no doubt almost every high officer had done the same, for all had tempers and believed in themselves; and it is extremely doubtful whether any one had shown more kindness and magnanimity than he—particularly toward Pillow and Worth. Even after all the trouble, Scott wrote (Mems., ii, 416) that Pillow’s nature was free from malignity, whereas Pillow’s letters prove the contrary strikingly.

29. (Intimate) 185Duncan papers, passim. (Widow) 185P. to D., Sept. 3, 1848. (Urged) 185P. to Polk, June 21, 1849. (Made) Scott, Mems., ii, 416; Cullum, Biog. Register, i, 447. (Trouble) Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 305. (Gather) 329Taliaferro to —, Apr. 26, 1848; Scott, Mems., ii, 417.

Pillow boasted of his power, and on that basis threatened men whom he wished to control (Taliaferro, supra; Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 117). How strong this influence was is illustrated by the fact that Col. Campbell of Tennessee, who had stated repeatedly that Pillow had no military ability (pp. 353, 377), recommended him for appointment as a major general (139to Polk, Feb. 19, 1847). It is interesting to note, in comparison with the character of the cabal against Scott, that he was supported by such men as Trist, E. A. Hitchcock, Robert E. Lee and Robert Anderson.

30. (Reports) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1015–20; Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 389–91, 629–34; Lawton, Artill. Officer, 319–20. (Same) Lawton, Art. Off., 319–20; Weekly N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848; 169Mills to Crittenden, Jan. 28, 1848. (Terms) Remarks in note 29.28; 169Mills to Crittenden, Jan. 28, 1848; 364W. to ——, Mar. 3, 1848 (“an ass will be an ass”). (Trickily) Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 391; Davis, Autobiog., 285; note 31. (Another) Semmes, Service, 358–9. (In U. S.) Picayune, Oct. 8. (Tampico) Semmes, Service, 360. (Mexico) Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 117. (Improper) Ib., p. 454 (Marcy). (Necessary) 169Mills, supra; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1087, 1225–6 (Scott).

31. (Gen. orders 349) Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 455. (Stigmatize) 210Alvord to Hammond, Apr. 21, 1848; 210Bragg to Hammond, Dec. 20, 1847. (Assumed) Picayune, Oct. 8; Dec. 18. (Defiant) Stevens, Stevens, i, 223. (Not written) Infra. (Seized) Semmes, Service, 361–4; Spirit of the Age, Mar. 9; Apr. 13, 1848. (Charges) Polk, Diary, Dec. 30, 1847; Jan. 1; Apr. 18, 1848; infra. (Appeals) Infra. (Arrest) 256Marcy to Butler, Jan. 13, 1848.

See note 28. For the Leonidas letter see p. 376. This letter Pillow seems clearly to have smuggled into a packet sent by Freaner, the correspondent of the New Orleans Delta, to his paper, after Freaner had rejected its twin (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 14) on the ground that it was incorrect, and the editor, inferring that it was endorsed by Freaner, printed it (ibid., 250; Delta, Apr. 7, 1848). When Scott finally opened his eyes (after August 20) to the rascality of Pillow (335Trist, notes, supra), Pillow realized he had gone too far. He refused to ask for a court of inquiry when challenged to do so (335Hitchcock to Pillow, Nov. 24, 1847, and note by H.), told Quitman that he could not face an investigation (335Trist, statement), and wrote to his wife that he was going to resign and live quietly (292Oct. 27, 1847). Then, it would appear, he induced Burns (335ed. of Delta to Trist, May 16, 1848), a paymaster in his division, to assume the authorship of the Leonidas letter (the worst count against him), and became confident, even defiant, with reference to Scott (180to wife, Nov. 25). The friend to whom Duncan wrote, in sending his letter to the press, modified it freely, and inserted in it a passage regarding the Chalco route (p. 372) taken from a letter written by a man named Chason. So he explained to Duncan (185—— to Duncan, Jan. 1, 1848).

Gen. orders 349, Nov. 12, 1847, said (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 455): “It requires not a little charity to believe that the principal heroes of the scandalous letters alluded to did not write them, or specially procure them to be written, and the intelligent can be at no loss in conjecturing the authors—chiefs, partizans, and pet familiars. To the honor of the service, the disease—pruriency of fame, not earned—cannot have seized upon half a dozen officers (present,) all of whom, it is believed, belong to the same two coteries.” The next two sentences were still stronger: “False credit,” “despicable self-puffings and malignant exclusions of others,” “the conceited and the envious,” “indignation” of the honorable officers. Though in the right, Scott allowed himself to go too far in his use of language, as he did at other times. Commenting on the order, Braxton Bragg, though not one of Scott’s friends, said in substance: Half the reputations in the war have been made by false reports and newspaper misrepresentations [this was to a large extent true], and it has gone so far that Scott has at last issued a strong order (210to Hammond, Dec. 20, 1847). Another correspondent of Gov. Hammond of South Carolina said he was glad that Scott had undertaken to expose “such quackery, charlatanry, imposture and lying braggadocio” (210Alvord, Apr. 21, 1848). This appears to have been the general sentiment of the officers (numerous citations could be given).

On the publication of gen. orders 349 Worth asked Scott whether the charge of scandalous conduct referred to him. Scott replied that it referred to the authors and abettors of the Leonidas letter, and that he could not be more explicit. Worth declared the reply unsatisfactory, and handed to Scott a sort of appeal to the President that referred insultingly to the former (68Scott, charges, Nov. 27). Scott therefore charged him with “behaving with contempt and disrespect towards his commanding officer.” He was arrested for insulting Scott in a letter to Marcy (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 471). The charges against Duncan were writing a (published) letter in violation of the army regulation no. 650, and making in it a false statement about the adoption of the Chalco route in order to magnify himself and Worth (68charges, Nov. 27). “Arrest” signified confinement to the city of Mexico. The New York Tribune said truthfully with reference to the troubles between Scott and the generals: “The duties of a Commanding General in the heart of an enemy country, with an army flushed with victory yet inactive, and under the influences incident to so perilous a position, are very delicate, and can only be met by firmness and the maintenance of rigorous discipline” (Nat. Intelligencer, Dec. 28, 1847).

32. (Conviction) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1218 (Scott); infra. (Censures) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1229, 1248 (Marcy); Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 131 (Marcy). (Relieved) 256Marcy to Butler, Jan. 13, 1848. (Rank) 60Butler to Marcy, Mar. 2. (Deposed) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1044. Lee, Lee, 46. (Army) 152Claiborne, mems.; Oswandel, Notes, 481, 483; 221Hill, diary; 252Mackall, Feb. 21; Picayune, Mar. 23; 13Doyle, no. 27, 1848; Lee, Lee, 44; 210Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 24; Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 321. (Departure) Lowell Journal, Sept. 14, 1852; Picayune, Mar. 23; Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 328. (Looked) 327Sutherland to father, Feb. 15, 1848.

Jan. 9, 1847, a 137correspondent of Calhoun wrote, “Unless some powerful influence is soon brought to bear we [in Charleston, S. C.] fear we shall stand forth discredited and degraded in the sight of all the world.” It is hard to see how the country, without Scott, could have avoided this.

Scott’s chief complaints were a failure to supply seasonably the desired means for waging the campaign, interference with the rights of the commanding general (e.g. in Harney’s case), the plan to place a civilian (Benton) over him, the apparent intention to let Trist interfere in military affairs, and the refusal to provide a chief of staff satisfactory to him (Lawton, Artill. Officer, 319). See also chapter xxvii, p. 129. All the charges except those against Pillow were withdrawn. The latter should have been placed before a court-martial, and so Polk and the Cabinet decided (Polk, Diary, Jan. 3, 1848). But—probably because he feared that his friend would be convicted—Polk concluded to have first a court of inquiry in order to ascertain what the evidence was, and perhaps dispose of the matter (ibid., Jan. 8). The court was selected by Polk—doubtless with a view to Pillow’s acquittal (ibid., Jan. 15). The fact that Pillow was entirely satisfied with it (180to wife, Feb. 27) is almost enough to prove this. The British chargé reported that it seemed to favor Pillow (13Doyle, no. 39, 1848). Two of the members were brevetted later, though one of them (Scott publicly stated) had no other connection with the war, and the connection of the other had been slight (Scott in N. Y. Herald, Nov. 3, 1857).

The principal charges against Pillow were, first, that Pillow’s claim to have won the battle of Contreras was unfounded, on which the verdict went against him (Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 317, 333); and, secondly, that he was directly or indirectly the author of the Leonidas letter. In order to maintain that he wrote it (which he had strongly denied on three occasions (ibid., 56–7, 131), Burns had to admit that he had spoken falsely in it (ibid., 33, 388–9), and he swore that he believed he wrote certain interlineations (ibid., 32) which it was found had been written by the editor of the Delta (ibid., 250); but he stuck to it that he had dared to steal into Pillow’s private office, and remain there long enough to copy the substance and to a large extent the phraseology of a long document (ibid., 32). And therefore, although statements substantially equivalent to those of the Leonidas letter were brought home to Pillow (ibid., 389–391), Pillow had to be acquitted. John Sedgwick, later General Sedgwick, wrote: I think the court must acquit Pillow, “but the sentiment of the army will never acquit him” (Corres., i, 182). Naturally a lawyer like Pillow had a great advantage at the trial over Scott, upon whom it was incumbent to conduct the prosecution. His handling of the case was extremely clever. The same court was instructed to inquire into the so-called “council” of Puebla (p. 391), and thus Scott was virtually put on trial, yet, contrary to the articles of war, had no opportunity to question witnesses (Mo. Republican, Nov. 5, 1857). Pillow was before another court of inquiry (Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 338–73), and the evidence convicted him, morally at least, of attempting to appropriate, in violation of the articles of war, a captured Mexican howitzer. Pillow’s appeal to the government grew out of Scott’s approving the findings of this court, and his arrest resulted from the disrespect shown in connection with the appeal.

June 4, 1847, Scott wrote to Marcy: “Considering the many cruel disappointments and mortifications I have been made to feel since I left Washington, or the total want of support and sympathy on the part of the War Department which I have so long experienced, I beg to be recalled from this army the moment that it may be safe for any person to embark at Vera Cruz, which I suppose will be early in November” (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 131). This application was denied and (since the circumstances on which it was based appeared to change) became obsolete. A correspondent of Governor Hammond of South Carolina said it was “absurd, unjust, ridiculous, and impolitic, in this crisis of events here, to remove the victorious general, whose prestige with the Mexicans is great, very great, both for war and peace” (210Alvord, Feb. 24, 1848). He attributed the recall to “Mr. Quackery Pillow.” The recall was dated January 13 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1044). Scott turned over the command to Butler on February 18 (65gen. orders 59). March 14 the British chargé reported that signs of relaxed discipline were visible (13Doyle, no. 27). As early as August 7, 1847, Polk had contemplated substituting Butler for Scott (Diary). Nov. 25 Pillow wrote that this was to be done (180to wife). Early in January, 1848, some members of the Cabinet favored giving Taylor the place, but Polk would not (Diary, Jan. 4).

May 6, 1848, the adjutant general stated that the army under Butler consisted of 26,785 (aggregate present), of whom 174 officers and 4611 men were sick, and that it occupied the following places: Mexico, Toluca, Cuernavaca, Pachuca, Río Frio, Puebla, Perote, Jalapa, national bridge, Orizaba, Córdoba and Vera Cruz. Some of the returns, however, on which the statement was based were several months old (62to Cass). By May 1 Scott, Pillow, Pierce, Cadwalader, Quitman, Shields and Cushing had left the country. May 23 S. W. Kearny was appointed governor of Mexico City (65orders 103).

.1. Sen. 187, 263; 29, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 774–5 (Bancroft). Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 377–8. (War bill) Vol. i, p. 181. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 973. (Expense) Ho. 188; 29, 1; Sen. 139; 29, 2. In Jan., 1846, there were also 3 receiving ships and 11 small unarmed vessels and storeships. In ordinary and building there were 2 (5) ships-of-the-line, 5 (3) frigates and razees, 6 (2) sloops-of-war, 2 (0) brigs and 3 (1) steamers, carrying 576 (614) guns. (The figures in parentheses represent vessels building.) The time of the crews of the Savannah and Warren expired before July 1 and Sloat was authorized to send them east. Three schooners—the Bonita, the Reefer and the Petrel—built at New York for Mexico but not paid for, were purchased (Niles, June 13, 1846, p. 226; see chap. xiii, note 31). In Oct., 1847, there were also one ordnance transport and six storeships.

2. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 945. U. S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, xiv, 539 (S. C. Rowan, recolls.). Griffis, Perry, 200. Ho. 24; 30, 2 (Mason to Speaker). (Reputation) 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, 1847. Sen. 69; 30, 1 (punishments). 374Shubrick to Conner, July 17, 1845: “The time has been when the conviction of an officer of having told a deliberate, premeditated, official lie would be fatal to him, so far at least as the opinion of a Court Martial would go, but that time has passed—alas! for the Navy.” In the course of a short cruise, 1847–48, Farragut had to “rid the service” of five junior officers and bring to trial a first lieutenant for drunkenness (Mahan, Farragut, 97). Mar. 5, 1847, 120Capt. Mervine charged a lieutenant with being intoxicated repeatedly while commanding at S. José, Calif., amidst a hostile population. July 10, 1847, 120J. H. Brown, S. Francisco, Calif., wrote to Biddle that officers got drunk at his house and did havoc. 120Commander Hull informed Biddle, Mar. 4, 1847, that a midshipman came aboard intoxicated. Many seamen were of foreign birth, but only 26 out of 853 officers.

3. 354Welles papers. Ho. 188, 191; 29, 1. Howe, Bancroft, i, 292. Polk, Diary, Sept. 9, 1846; Feb. 20, 1847. 108Buchanan to Bancroft, Sept. 29, 1847. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Nov. 28, 1845. Seward, Seward at Wash., i, 51. “Bancroft” was of course George Bancroft, the historian.

4. 48Bancroft to Conner, Aug. 30, 1845, secret. London Times, June 11, 1846. 52Bancroft, no. 25, 1847. 52King, no. 28, 1846. 52Martin, no. 14, 1847. Picayune, May 7, 1846. 58Spofford, Tyleston & Co., Dec. 11, 1846. 13Bankhead, no. 79, 1845. 58Emory, Stetson & Co., June 5, 1847. 46Newell to J. Y. Mason, Nov. 25, 1846. Sen. 1; 30, 1, 945 (Mason, report). Richmond Enquirer, Aug. 15, 1845. Phila. No. Amer., June 20, 1845. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec. 9, 1846. México á través, iv, 569. 13Pakenham, no. 42, 1846. 52Saunders (Madrid), nos. 9, 12, 1847. 52Littlefield to Saunders, May 2, 1847. N. Y. Herald (weekly), May 16, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 566 (Jesup). Boston Atlas, May 18, 1846. Buchanan, Works, vii, 325–6 (to W. R. J.), 355–6 (to T. N. C.). 49Bancroft to Conner, Aug. 29, 1846. What is said of Cuba applies to Porto Rico also.

5. (Action of Mexico) 13Bankhead, nos. 68, 100, 147, 150, 161, 1846; London Times, Jan. 8, 13, 15, 1847; Dublán, Legislación, v, 161; 52Slidell to Buchanan, Mar. 27, 1846; 52Martin, no. 11, 1847; 297Mackenzie (S. Anna) to Buchanan, July 7, 1846; Semmes, Service, 80–1; México á través, iv, 569; 52Consul Black, Sept. 28; Oct. 29, 1846; 73Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 294, res., 368, 1846; 52Bancroft, no. 16, 1847; 76Tornel, circular (regulations), July 26, 1846; Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846; 52Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846; Diario, July 27; Oct. 3, 1846. Irving (Madrid), no. 8, 1847. London Times, Jan. 8, 13, 15, 1847. Semmes, Service, 80. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 40–1. 52Saunders (Madrid), no. 9, 1847. 76Almonte, Dec. 10, 1846. Buchanan, Works, vii, 334–42 (to R. M. S.).

6. 52Martin, no. 11, 1847. 52Bancroft, no. 16, 1847. 52Irving, July 18, 1846. Richardson, Messages, iv, 495–6. Sen. 1; 30, 1, 945–6 (report). Wash. Union, July 22, 1847. The 29th Cong., second session, provided for the punishment of the citizens (apprehended on privateers) of those states having treaties with the U. S. which made their acts piracy (Wash. Union, Mar. 9, 1847; 13Pakenham, no. 26, 1847). 108Bancroft to Buchanan, Feb. 3, 1847. 13For. Off. to Bankhead, no. 34, 1845. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 811 (Berrien). Buchanan, Works, vii, 23, 52. The suggestion of commissioning American privateers excited opposition in Europe. It was feared that they would molest neutrals. Even in the U. S. it was opposed (Dayton in Senate, Jan. 27, 1847). Nothing came of it.

7. (England) 13Bankhead, nos. 79, 1845; 150, 1846; 13To Bankhead, nos. 34, 1845; 1, 1847; London Times, Jan. 22, 1847; Britannia, Jan. 23, 1847; 52Bancroft, no. 16, 1847; Monitor Repub., Nov. 21, 1846; 52Bancroft, no. 18, 1847; 108Id.to Buchanan, Feb. 3, 1847; 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 294, res., 368, 1846. (France) 52Martin, nos. 11, 15, 1847; 52Guizot to Martin, Feb. 26, 1847. (Spain) 73Bermúdez de C., nos. 294, res., 368, 1846; 52To Consul Campbell, May 14, 1846; 77Mex. Consul, Havana, Dec. 10, 1846, res.; 76Almonte, Dec. 10, 1846; 72Instructs. to capt. gen., June 18, 1846; 52Irving, July 18, 1846; nos. 5, 8, 1847; 71docs. relating to Cuban ports; Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 40; Boston Courier, Jan. 20, 1847; Buchanan, Works, vii, 334 (to R. M. S.). Sen. 1; 30, 1, 945–6 (report). Picayune, Aug. 26, 1846. Conner, Home Squadron, 12.

8. Richardson, Messages, iv, 548–9, 561. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 774–5 (Bancroft). Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 377. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 951. 59Circular to U. S. ministers, May 14, 1846. 47Conner to Bancroft, May 14, 1846. 52Consul Chase, Jan. 20, 1846. 76Parrodi, July 2, 1846. 52McLane (London), no. 54, 1846. 13Giffard (V. Cruz), June 30, 1846. 162Morris to Conner, Oct. 24, 1846. 313Conner, instructions, May 14.

American vessels were excluded on the score of impartiality and also because the admission of them would have defeated the main purposes of the blockade (Richardson, Messages, iv, 571). A particular advantage of the blockade is that it enables a belligerent to close ports that it is not desirable or not possible to capture and hold. Under the U. S. regulations vessels lying in Mexican ports on the announcement of the blockade could remain twenty days and then leave with or without cargo. Approaching vessels could not be captured or detained unless previously warned in writing by a cruiser (313Conner, instructions). Vera Cruz and Tampico remained open for British mail packets (ibid.). Fishing boats were not molested. Bona fide British property, including cochineal, could be embarked on British war vessels at Vera Cruz (13Bankhead, no. 23, 1847). From the end of June, 1846, Conner permitted British mail packets to land quicksilver and take bullion. Engagements made before the war could be fulfilled (313Saunders to Callaghan, June 23, 1846). A difficult question came up concerning the floating property of neutrals residing in Mexico (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 1305). Mexico decreed that since her ports of entry were blockaded, all her other ports might give free entrance to vessels forcing the blockade (70“Guerra,” no. 1079), and that no tonnage dues should be charged during the continuance of the blockade (76Guerra, circular, Oct. 10, 1846). England had to admit that she was the last nation to protest against a strict blockade, but warned us that difficulties might arise in the enforcement of it (52McLane, no. 50, 1846); and she would not have our announcement published in the London Gazette since, said Aberdeen, it might check trade and after all not be made good (52McLane, no. 55). Spain insisted upon neutral rights with peculiar jealousy. The Spanish commander even claimed free access to blockaded ports under arts. 14 and 15 of the treaty of 1795, but found that art. 16 warranted the blockade. Spain’s vessels were treated with special indulgence, but she made many complaints. For Spain: 72Instrs. to capt. gen. of Cuba, June 18, 1846; 52Irving, no. 2, 1846; 52Istúriz to Irving, Aug. 5, 1846; 71papers relating to complaints; Buchanan, Works, vii, 240–1, 290–2; 47Span. commander to Conner, June 24, 1846; reply, June 26.

9. 48Bancroft to Conner, Aug. 30, 1845, secret. Picayune, Mar. 11, 1847. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 377 (Mason, report). Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1163 (Conner). 76Parrodi, May 20, 1846. 76Capt. of port, Tampico, May 20. Semmes, Service, 106. Conner, Home Squadron, 9. Negrete, Invasión, iii, 173. 313Conner, proclam., May 14. 313Id.., instructions, May 14. 313Saunders to C., June 20; Oct. 24; to Amer. consul, May 20. 313C. to Saunders, July 22; Sept. 30. 164Conner, reports, spring of 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 525 (spec. orders 128). Niles, Oct. 10, 1846, p. 85. 47Conner, Oct. 8. (Goatzacoalcos) About 140 miles S. E. from V. Cruz.

It does not seem worth while to follow the movements of particular vessels. Sept. 30, 1846, the blockade was extended southeast to the River S. Pedro y S. Pablo. (Difficulties) 47Conner, Sept. 22, 1846; Picayune, Mar. 11, 1847; Griffis, Perry, 210; 313Saunders to Wash. Union, Oct. 10, 1846; 313Id.. to Conner, Oct. 24; Semmes, Service, 106; 162Conner, Jan. 28, 1847. (Somers) Sen. 43; 29, 2; Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 945, 950; 374Semmes to Conner, Dec. 10, 1846; 13Pakenham, no. 151, 1846.

Just after the blockade began at Vera Cruz Gen. Bravo, commanding there, permitted several American vessels to leave the port, and in acknowledgment of his liberality two Mexican merchant vessels were sent in to him with their cargoes, crews and passengers. Courteous notes were exchanged (76Gacyores to Bravo, May 27; reply, May 28; Bravo, May 26). At Tampico Capt. Saunders and the city authorities were mutually considerate (313S. to Bancroft, June 6, 1846).

10. (Designed) London Times, Dec. 10, 1846. Comte. gen. V. Cruz. July 9, 1846. Sen. 1; 30, 1, 945, 950–1. 13Pakenham, no. 98, 1846. 162Conner, Dec. 18, 1846. Foltz, Report. Niles, Oct. 10, 1846, pp. 84–5. 47Conner, July 22, 1846. Semmes, Service, 100. Parker, Recolls., 58, 62, etc. McClay, Navy, ii, 177–8. Bennett, Steam Navy, 98. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1233 (Perry).

11. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 441, 1847. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 540. Henshaw narrative, Mar. 17, 1847. Smith, To Mexico, 117–8. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1233 (Perry). 13Giffard, Jan. 31, 1847. Picayune, Mar. 11, 1847. Contributory tariff: pp. 261–3.

12. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 775 (Bancroft). (Mex. navy) Balbontín, Estado, 19; Diario, Apr. 4, 5, 1846; 70“Guerra,” no. 1120; 13Giffard, Dec. 20, 1846. 76Acta of naval offs., Mar. 12, 1846. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec, 1846. 76Mora y Villamil, Mar. 12, 1846. 76Orders to Marín, Mar. 9, 1846. 76Marín, Apr. 26, 1847. N. Y. Sun, June 8, 1846. Niles, May 1, 1847, p. 131 (Hunter).

13. 375Perry to Mason, Nov. 16, 1846. Conner, Home Squadron, 9, 11, 14. Parker, Recolls., 67, 71. 162Morris to Conner, June 24; Oct. 24, 1846. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1172 (Conner), 1191–2 (Perry). 46Perry, Nov. 16, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 252–3. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 287, 293. 166Perry to Conner, Dec. 27, 1846. 166Reports on condition of engines, boilers, etc. Bennett, Steam Navy, 93. 47Conner, Sept. 22, 1846. Soley, Porter, 64. 165Conner, Nov. 24, 1846.

14. 162Conner’s letters to his wife. Curtis, Buchanan, i, 603 (Slidell). Soley, Porter, 53–4. Semmes, Service, 114, 128. Conner, Home Squadron, 6, 23. 162Bancroft to Conner, Dec. 10, 1845. 162Matson to Id.., Feb. 27, 1847.

15. 48Bancroft to Conner, Aug. 30, 1845, secret. Polk, Diary, Jan. 17, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 774–5 (Bancroft). 69Conner to Taylor, Feb. 4. 47Id.to Bancroft, May 14. 162Id.., May 20. 61Bancroft to Conner, Jan. 17. London Times, June 29; Dec. 10. Semmes, Service, 100. 76Bravo, May 4. Tampico Eco, June 9, 16. 76Parrodi, June 8, 17. 76Vilar to Parrodi, June 8. 162Saunders to Conner, June 20. 313Id.to Id.., June 17. 313Id.to Wash. Union, Oct. 10. Niles, May 23, 1846, p. 178. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 377 (Mason, report). Conner, Home Squadron, 9. Bennett, Steam Navy, 34–5, 43, 62–3, 67–8, 71. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1163 (Conner). Picayune, Aug. 26. For Conner’s coöperation with Taylor see vol. i, pp. 466, 469.

The Princeton was the earliest naval steam propeller. She was rigged as a ship. Saunders opened fire, June 8, because he feared new fortifications (near the mouth of the Pánuco) would make it hard to capture Tampico. He did little damage. The enemy replied feebly. Suspecting that the Mexican gunboats intended to sail out and raid American commerce, he determined to capture them by surprise in the night of June 14–15. He had no good pilot. The boats had much difficulty in finding the channel, which had recently shifted, and were even compelled to row more than half a mile against a swift current within pistol shot of the shore. One of them grounded twice. The moon came out. The Americans were discovered and fired upon. They replied; and then, as a surprise was no longer possible, they retired according to orders. May 28 Conner, on the Cumberland, was at Pensacola; the St. Mary’s off Tampico; the Mississippi and Falmouth off V. Cruz; the Raritan there or on her way to that port; the Lawrence (which seems to have been a brig but was not mentioned in the department’s list of vessels under Conner on May 13) assisting the army; and the Somers on the Yucatan service (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1163). Aug. 10 the Cumberland (still the flag-ship), Potomac, Falmouth, Mississippi, Princeton, Flirt and the three gunboats (Bonita, Reefer, Petrel) lay at Antón Lizardo; the St. Mary’s and Porpoise were off V. Cruz; the John Adams off Tampico; the brig Truxtun had gone to Chagres, and the brig Perry had gone to look for privateers near Cape S. Antonio (Picayune, Aug. 26). These data give one an idea of the usual distribution of the vessels.

16. The affair of Aug. 7. 165Conner to Bancroft, May 31. 47Id.to Id.., Aug. 10. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 630 (Conner). Picayune, Aug. 22, 26. N. Y. Sun, Dec 7. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 381. Semmes, Service, 88. Parker, Recolls., 66–7. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 287. 76Landero, Aug. 10. 76Comte gen. V. Cruz, July 15. Esperanza, Aug. 27. Locomotor, Aug. 10. For Alvarado, vol. ii, p. 344. For Antón Lizardo, vol. ii, p. 17. The Americans felt the more chagrined because British naval men witnessed their failure.

17. The Affair of Oct. 15. 162Morris to Conner, Sept. 21. 47Conner, Oct. 17. 162Id.., Oct. 16. United Service, July, 1895, p. 33. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 630–1. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 290, 293, 298–306. Picayune, Nov. 8. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 381. Griffis, Perry, 199. Semmes, Service, 88. Conner, Home Squadron, 17. 76Marin to comte. gen., Oct. 17. 76Landero, Sept. 5, 14; Oct. 12. 76Soto, Oct. 18. 76Marin to Soto, Oct. 15. Diario, Oct. 29, 30. 76Guerra, circular, Oct. 21. Wash. Union, Nov. 30. London Times, Dec. 10.

According to Conner’s son (Home Squadron, 17), the secretary of the navy on Sept. 22 instructed Conner to attack Alvarado, supposing he had been reinforced, and it has been said that the attack should not have been made without more strength; but the difficulty was that the American forces could not be made available. It is not easy to see how Conner was at fault unless, as perhaps on Aug. 7, he might have landed in boats under such protection as his cannon could give, stormed the fort that stood near the beach, and then landed more men. Conner does not seem to have thought that sailors could do much ashore. He had a landing-force (Conner, Home Squadron, 15), but whether at this time and place is not clear. Probably a bold, though unsuccessful, attack would have been better than to back out. He is said to have argued, after the failure of Aug. 7, that even success would not have been worth what it would have cost (Picayune, Aug. 26); but this left moral effects out of the account. It was said by a naval man that he should have added the McLane’s tow to his own and gone ahead; but it seems extremely doubtful whether he could have advanced against the current. Conner’s report (Oct. 17) says the Mississippi could not get near enough to make any impression on the fort, but a Mexican account printed in La Esperanza, Aug. 27, stated that some shot from our vessels struck more than 200 yards behind the fort, and one sees no reason to suppose that the statement was an invention. Conner seems to have thought of coming to Alvarado again, for in Jan., 1847, the Mexicans reported that the bar was being sounded (76Landero, Jan. 28). For the capture of the place at the beginning of April, 1847, see vol. ii, p. 344. Apr. 2 a naval expedition went up the river, returning on Apr. 4 (66J. L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Apr. 9).

18. The first Tabasco expedition. (Perry) 46Perry, Aug. 15, 17; 165Conner to P., Oct. 6; Conner, Home Squadron, 12–3. 162Conner, Oct. 30. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1165–70 (Perry’s report, etc.). Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 632–9. Diario, Nov. 7, 1846 (Traconis’ reports, etc.). 47Perry to Mason, Nov. 16. Taylor, Broad Pennant, 316. 76Gov. of Chiapas, Oct. 27. 60Champlen to Polk, Dec. 4. Semmes, Service, 89. Conner, Home Squadron, 9. Information given to the author by a Mexican civil engineer residing in Tabasco. Apuntes, 389–90. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, 1847. Aldrich, Marine Corps, 97. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 639. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 381. Parker, Recolls., 73–4. 76Traconis, Nov. 16. Temístocles, Dec. 31. 76Santalo’s testimony, Nov. 2. 76Comte. gen. Tab, Apr. 6. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 950. 166List of vessels captured. 166Perry to Conner, Nov. 11. 166Merchants to Perry, Oct. 26. 76Traconis, proclam., Aug. 12. 13Giffard, Jan. 31, 1847. Meade, Letters, i, 169.

As Perry was assigned to the Mississippi on Oct. 6, and commanded this important expedition so soon afterward, it has been supposed incorrectly that virtually, if not formally, the squadron was divided. The hope of the United States at the beginning of the war had been that Tabasco would be neutral. The orders were not to disturb it in that case (49Bancroft to Conner, May 19). Perry’s expedition was followed in Nov. by a revolution in Tabasco based ostensibly on the failure of the Mexican government to protect the state; but really the outbreak was due to local rivalries, and probably it caused the national government no material annoyance (76Alcorta, Jan. 4, 1848; México á través, iv, 599; 13Bankhead, no. 186, 1846; 76Acta of garrison, Nov. 19, 1846; Wash. Union, Jan. 18, 1847). Frontera was a valuable point, for the Americans could obtain water and cattle there and hinder illicit commerce. The Tabasco River is now called usually the Grijalva.

19. For the Tampico and Pánuco expeditions: vol. i, pp. 279, 281. 162Mason to Conner, Nov. 29, 1846, priv. and confid. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1175 (Conner), 1176 (Perry). Semmes, Service, 90. Bennett, Steam Navy, 93. 47Conner, Dec. 17. 166Perry to C., Dec. 27; to Benham, Dec. 23; to Sands and Parker, Dec. 21. 166Benham to Perry, Dec. 22. 166Parker to Perry, Dec. 22. 166Conner to Hunt, Feb. 8, 1847. 166Sands to Conner, Feb. 20. 13Giffard, Jan. 31, 1847. The expedition set out on Dec. 17.

Many of the people of Tabasco supposed, when Perry arrived off Frontera in Dec., that he was going to S. Juan Bautista to avenge his “defeat”; and as he did not, they presumably felt more haughty than ever (Temístocles, Dec. 31).

20. Niles, Oct. 31, 1846, p. 132. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 775. (Bancroft) Mason to Conner, Oct. 26. Soley, Porter, 59. Farragut, Farragut, 158, 197. United Service, Feb., 1897 (Conner). México á través, iv, 419. Scott, Mems., ii, 422. N. Y. Eve. Post, June 10. 165Conner to Bancroft, June 11 (impregnable if properly equipped and manned). Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec, 1846. Wash. Union, June 17. Diccionario Universal (Ulúa). Journal des Débats, Aug. 11, 1838. 162Morris to Conner, June 10, 24; Oct. 24, 1846. See chap. xviii, p. 349, and note 2.

Oct. 3, 1846, the garrison were in a state of mutiny because hungry (76Morales, Oct. 4; S. Anna, Oct. 14), but the Americans did not know this. Conner suggested that he be given a landing brigade, so that he could make a combined land and water attack (Conner, S. Juan de Ulloa, 15). During the siege of Vera Cruz Perry planned to bombard the fortress and attack it with boats on a dark night in conjunction with the land forces (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1191). Many original documents bearing on the construction of Ulúa could be cited, but they would have only an antiquarian interest. David D. Porter and David G. Farragut are the men referred to. The eagerness of certain young officers led to some enterprises that were not altogether felicitous. Contrary to orders Lieut. Parker burned the Creole (Criolla), the last scrap of Mexican commerce, under the guns of Ulúa at night: but this injured Hargous, the American merchant, who owned or had chartered her (374Semmes to Conner, Nov. 28; Dec. 6, 1846; 374Parker to Semmes, Nov. 27). It has been said that this ended a secret correspondence by which Conner obtained valuable information (Conner, Home Squadron, 7), but circumstances had probably put a stop to that about six weeks before (166Pommarès to Conner, Oct. 17). A plan was laid to blow up a Mexican powder magazine near V. Cruz, but this resulted in the capture of Passed Midshipman R. C. Rogers and another man (162Semmes to Perry, Dec. 6, 1846; 162Wright to Semmes, Dec. 6; Semmes, Service, 91). For the capture of Vera Cruz and Ulúa see chap. xxii.

21. 162Conner, Sept. 30, 1846. 374Perry to C., Nov. 24. 162Morris to C., Oct. 24. Picayune, Jan. 6, 1847. Curtis, Buchanan, i, 603–4. Griffis, Perry, 210–1, 221. 108Appleton to Bancroft, Feb. 24; Apr. 27, 1847. Parker, Recolls., 92. Sen. 1; 30, 1, 945 (Mason, report). 163Semmes to Conner, Sept. 29, 1850. 165Conner to Perry, Mar. 20, 1847. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Apr. 6, 1847. Conner’s reputation in the navy at the present day is that of a coward—one of the numberless instances of historical injustice.

22. Capture of Tuxpán. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1192–8, 1202 (Perry and others). Semmes, Service, 150–5. 76Cos, Jan. 18; Apr. 4, 16, 29. Picayune, Jan. 2. Griffis, Perry, 241. 76Soto, Aug. 31, 1846. 76Cos to ayunt., Apr. 24. Parker, Recolls., 78, 106–7. 76Proceeds. of Tuxpán ayunt., Apr. 22. Captain of the port, Apr. 26. American Star (Jalapa), May 2. Wash. Union, May 13, 17; June 4; Sept. 11. Soley, Porter, 72. Eagle (V. Cruz), Apr. 28. Jones, Tattnall, 64–5.

Perry’s force, consisting of the steamers Mississippi, Spitfire (a vessel—similar to the Vixen—which had joined the squadron in November), Vixen and Scourge, the schooner-gunboats Reefer, Petrel and Bonita, the frigate Raritan (carrying 180 officers and men from the Potomac besides her own complement), the sloops Albany, John Adams, Decatur and Germantown, the bomb-vessels Vesuvius, Ætna and Hecla, and 300 officers and men from the ship-of-the-line Ohio, which stopped at Vera Cruz, on her way to the Pacific, to assist Scott, who were distributed on the Mississippi and smaller vessels, gathered first at Lobos Ids., where the forces were drilled about a day for the attack. Next, after having been separated by a norther, they met off the bar. The Mexicans were driven a short distance from the town, but further pursuit into the chaparral would have been vain. An expedition went some distance up the river from Tuxpán (Semmes, Service, 154). The city government had not wished Cos to defend the town, and hence he withdrew all his troops from town before the attack. Most of his troops soon scattered. The city would not help support them, but furnished the Americans with supplies cheerfully. At Perry’s request steps were taken to maintain order. He now left the Albany and Reefer off the river, and sent the Hecla to blockade Soto la Marina, the Germantown to search the coast north of Lobos Ids., the Ætna to occupy Tabasco River, the Porpoise and the Vesuvius to hold Laguna. Besides the flotilla mentioned above he probably had under his command at this time the gunboats Falcon and Tampico (vol. ii, p. 338; Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1182). For the loss of the Truxtun in Aug., 1846, which led to a great deal of discussion regarding the conduct of Carpender, her captain, see 162Conner, Aug. 24; 47Id.., Aug 24; 47Carpender to Conner, Aug. 24; Mason to Polk, Oct. 28, 1846; Semmes, Service, 82; N. Orl. Commerc. Bulletin, Sept. 8; Parker, Recolls., 78; Docs. in Conner papers; comte. gen. V. Cruz, Aug. 23 and docs.; Taylor, Broad Pennant, 260; Wash. Union, Sept. 12, 22; Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 14.

23. (Small ports) Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1204–8, 1223, 1228–9; 76Buchanan to authorities of Tapantla, May 10, 1847. The main purposes of taking the small ports were to gather fresh provisions, exclude contraband trade, and obtain funds under the contributory tariff (chap. xxxiii). The usual terms required a renunciation of Mexican allegiance during the war, obedience to American orders, and the payment of all revenues to the United States.

An indefinite number of citations bearing upon the situation in Yucatan could be given, but the following are deemed sufficient. Bankhead, no. 11, 1846. Journal des Débats, Sept. 13, 1842. Constitutionnel, Nov. 2–3, 1846. Polk, Diary, Aug. 29, 1845; Feb. 27, 1847. Sen. 43; 30, 1. 49Bancroft to Conner, May 19, 1846. 49Mason to Id.., Oct. 16, 1846; Feb. 25, 1847; to Perry, Mar. 17, 1847. Semmes, Service, 84. 335Tinsley to Trist, Aug. 6, 1846. 335Robira to Id.., June 7, 1847. Sen. 40, 42, 43, 45, 49; 30, 1. Gaceta de Ciudad Victoria, Jan. 27, 1846. Picayune, Oct. 8, 1846; Jan. 12, 1847. México á través, iv, 599. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 382. Suárez y Navarro, Causas, 6–9. Richardson, Messages, iv, 581–3. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846. 76Barbachano, procl., July 2, 1846. Temístocles, Dec. 27, 1846. 13Pakenham, no. 33, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 256–7 (Walker). Wash. Union, Jan. 18, 1847. 366Declar. of Mérida. 166Perry to Conner, Dec. 27, 1846. 166Conner to Sands, Feb. 8, 1847. 166McFaul to ——, Nov. 12, 1847. Buchanan, Works, vii, 222. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1175–6 (Conner), 1204 (Perry). 165Gen. orders, Dec. 15, 1846. (May cruise) 47Perry, Dec. 27, 1846; Sept. 21, 1847. 47Conner, Dec. 29. May 15 Laguna port was opened to commerce; May 18 Frontera.

24. Second Tabasco expedition. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1207–23, 28–32 (Perry and officers). 47Perry, June 25. 47Correspondence of Perry and Bigelow, July 18–23. Bennett, Steam Navy, 97. Negrete, Invasión, iii, 153–6. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 526–8. 76Correspondence of Bigelow and Echagaray, July 1, 2; letters of E., May 31; June 9, 18, 23; July 5. México á través, iv, 703. (Later) Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1233–6 (Perry); 47Perry, Aug. 16.

On the way to S. J. Bautista Perry had six men wounded. Many fell from exhaustion. June 30 on an expedition to Tamulté, about three miles out, three were killed and eight wounded. The Mexican leaders were Bvt. Gen. Domingo Echagaray and three Maldonado brothers.

Aug. 16, 1847, the squadron was disposed as follows: (Raritan and Albany had gone home); Mississippi, Pensacola; sloop Germantown, Antón Lizardo, preparing to distribute supplies; sloop Decatur, blockading Tuxpán; sloop Saratoga, V. Cruz, maintaining connection with the army and watching the police; sloop John Adams, expected from Tuxpán probably to join bomb-vessel Stromboli in Goatzacoalcos River; gunboats Reefer and Petrel at Tampico; gunboat Falcon at Alvarado; steamer Scourge, bomb-vessel Ætna, gunboat Bonita at Frontera; bomb-vessel Vesuvius, gunboat Mahonese at Laguna; steamers Vixen and Scorpion in reserve; steamers Spitfire and Petrita laid up with injured engines; bomb-vessel Hecla ashore on Alvarado bar. Aug. 18, 1847, Perry ordered that all merchant vessels should be visited on their arrival in port to detect irregularities (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 788).

25. For the share of the navy in the conquest of California see chap. xvii. (Impossible) 13P. J. Blake of Juno, Apr. 10, 1848; 53Pakenham to Buchanan, Dec. 14, 1846; 13Id.., no. 57, 1846. (Proclam. and orders) Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 670, 673–4. Du Pont, Official Despatches, 9. (Cancelled, etc.) 53Pakenham to Buchanan, Dec. 14; 12Walker to Seymour, Mar. 26, 1847; 132Howland & Aspinwall to Buchanan, Sept. 22, 1847; 13Pakenham, no. 139, 1846; Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 1303 (Mason); 48Mason to Biddle, Mar. 30, 1847; 48Orders, Dec. 24, 1846; 247Biddle to Larkin, Mar. 6, 1847. 47Stockton to Du Pont and to Hull, Aug. 20, 1846. 47Id.., reports, Aug. 22; Nov. 23. 47Hull to Stockton, Sept. 12. 47Du Pont to Stockton, Oct. 12. 76Peinbert to ——, res., undated. Calif. Star, i, no. 9. (Guaymas) Du Pont, Official Despatches, 13; 47Correspondence of Du Pont, Spanish vice consul, and Campusano; Sonorense, Oct. 9; 76comte. gen. of Sinaloa, Nov. 11; 76gov. Sonora, Oct. 16; 76Campusano, Oct. 5; Cyane, journal; U. S. Naval Instit. Proceeds., 1888, p. 539 (Rowan). (Mazatlán) 171Cyane, journal and abstract of journal; 47Du Pont to Stockton, Dec. 1; Id.., Official Despatches, 19; 12Walker to Seymour, Mar. 26, 1847; 76Téllez to Bustamante, Feb. 17, 1847; 13A. Forbes, Apr. 17, 1847; 13Bankhead, no. 9, 1847. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 378–80. Sen. 1; 30, 1, 948. Balbontín, Estado, 19. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. (Spring) 120Shubrick to Biddle, May 4, 1847; 120list of captures. Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 82–100. 76Letter from Mazatlán, May 5; 247Biddle to Larkin, Mar. 6, 1847. 47Shubrick, May 31; June 1; Aug. 11, 1847. (Monopoly) 12Seymour, Dec. 26, 1846, no. 70. (After May) 61R. B. Mason to adj. gen., Feb. 1, 1848; 47Shubrick, May 31, 1847. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xxxii, 249.

Stockton intended to cruise for the protection of our whalers, etc., and also to invade Mexico by way of Acapulco (vol. i, p. 338); but affairs in California prevented. The Malek Adel was bravely cut out at Mazatlán, Sept. 7, 1846, under the Mexican guns. Guaymas was cannonaded because the Mexicans refused to give up two gunboats, preferring to burn them. As there were two harbors at Mazatlán, a single vessel could not blockade the port satisfactorily. In the spring of 1847 Shubrick was ordered to blockade both Mazatlán and Guaymas, but for this reason he kept both the Independence and the Cyane at Mazatlán. In Feb. and March, 1847, there might have been serious trouble between the British commander, Sir Baldwin Walker, and Captain Montgomery of the Portsmouth owing to conflicting orders and interests; but the former, having far the stronger force, knew he could afford to be considerate, and the latter treated British commerce so well that our government was thanked by England (13to Crampton, June 30, 1847; Sherman, Sloat, xxiv; and note particularly Journ. Milit. Serv. Institute, xxxii, 249–53). Shubrick was at Mazatlán in May, 1847, but left at the beginning of June. The Cyane remained a little longer. She and the Portsmouth anchored there, at the end of June, but both sailed away within two days. Biddle was ordered Jan. 6, 1846, to take command of the squadron, but did not receive the orders until Dec. 31 (at Lima). Mar. 2 he took command. His vessels then were the Columbus (74 guns) on which he arrived, Independence (razee, 54), frigates Congress (44) and Savannah (44), sloops Portsmouth (20), Levant (20), Cyane (20), Warren (20), Dale (16) and Preble (16), storeships Erie (8), Lexington (8) and Southampton (6), and the captured Malek Adel (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 948; 48Bancroft to Shubrick, Aug. 21, 1846). The Savannah and Levant went home; and the Warren, on account of its condition, was assigned to guard duty (120Shubrick to Stockton, Mar. 1, 1847). The Ohio reached the squadron in the early part of 1848. Besides blockading, cruising for prizes, looking after the American whalers, and watching for possible privateers, long voyages were necessary to obtain provisions and instructions. The latter were usually very tardy and the commanders had to follow their own judgment in the main. Monterey, Calif., was in general the base of operations.

26. (Succeeded) 49Bancroft to Shubrick, Aug. 21, 1846; 120Shubrick to Biddle, Mar. 5; July 20, 1847; 47Shubrick, July 21. (Notice) 47Id.., Aug. 11. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1072–5 (Shubrick). 76Téllez, Nov. 4, 1847. (Guaymas) Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1075–83 (Lavallette et al.), 1110 (Shubrick); Correo Nacional, Nov. 30; 13Wooldridge, Nov. 18. (Mazatlán) Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 95; Lummis, Mex. of To-day, 150; Mofras, Explor., i, 173; Gaxiola, Invasión, 162.

Guaymas, a place of considerable importance, was summoned Oct. 19. The Mexican troops and people decamped, and the cannon were removed. Hence the cannonade did little harm. A civil official reported the evacuation to Lavallette of the Congress, who was there with the Portsmouth (Montgomery). As Campusano, who was believed to have 600–800 troops and 6–8 guns, remained in the vicinity and cut off water and provisions, the town was abandoned by its foreign residents also. American marines landed, but soon reëmbarked. Nov. 17 a landing party was ambushed in the town, and the Dale, then occupying the harbor, took part in the firing. One American was wounded. The harbor of Mazatlán was open to the worst winds.

27. The references to Téllez in 76 are almost innumerable. It seems enough to cite here: M. Gutiérrez, May 19, 1846; To J. I. Gutiérrez, May 13, 17; To Téllez, Aug. 18; J. I. Gutiérrez, May 9; also Gaxiola, Invasión, passim; Apuntes, 371–3; 13Bankhead, no. 74, 1846; Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 99. See also chap. xvi, note 5. Téllez, who was a generous, careless person, arrived at Mazatlán at the head of an expedition bound for Upper California. During the year before the war the receipts from the customhouse were about $3,000,000. He pronounced May 7, 1846, in favor of federalism as an excuse for insubordination. In Jan., 1847, fearing the government might overpower him, he pronounced for Santa Anna as dictator. He pretended to be a loyal Mexican, and the government wavered between recognizing him as comandante general of Sinaloa and trying to crush him. Finally it decided on the latter course. Cut off from his financial resources by the Americans, he could not support his forces, and toward the end of Jan., 1848, he gave up. J. P. Anaya was then comte. gen. (Capture of Mazatlán, etc.) Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1089–92, 1104, 1110, 1117; Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 144–5; Apuntes, 374–5; 76Téllez, Nov. 10, 14, 15; 61Shubrick to R. B. Mason, Dec. 6; 13Wooldridge, Nov. 18; Gaxiola, Invasión, 163–6. The Erie had arrived at M. on Nov. 1. (Nov. 20) Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1105–8; Wise, op. cit., 150–7; 76Téllez, Nov. 20; U. S. Naval Instit. Proceeds., 1888 (Rowan, p. 555); Apuntes, 376; 76Horn, Nov. 15, 21; Gaxiola, Invasión, 186. A land party of 94 and a boat party of 62 set out from Mazatlán at about 1 A.M. The Mexicans, who were commanded by Lieut. Carlos Horn, a Swiss, ought to have been routed, but they had received notice of the expedition and were on the alert. The American land party fell partially into an ambuscade, and the boat party were misled. After some desultory fighting both sides retired. The Americans lost 1 killed and 21 wounded. The Mexican loss was probably somewhat larger.

Dec. 13 Americans routed a Mexican advanced party about twenty miles from the city, inflicting some loss and suffering none (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1083–4; Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1121). The Mexican blockade was evaded easily by bribery.

(Fortifications) Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1120 (Halleck), 1131 (Shubrick); 76J. P. Anaya, Mar. 11, 1848. (Safe) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1083 (Shubrick).

(S. Blas) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1084 (Shubrick); comte. gen. of Jalisco, Jan. 11; Feb. 22, 1848; Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1127 (Bailey), 1128 (Chatard). S. Blas was blockaded under a fresh notice issued Jan. 1, in consequence of the delay. (Manzanillo) Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1129 (Shubrick); princ. comte., Colima, Jan. 18; comte. gen. Jalisco, Feb. 1, 29. Altata was blockaded Feb. 13 by a hired schooner, the Triton (76comte. gen. Sinaloa, Feb. 21). (Expeditions) Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1133–7, 1158–61; comte. gen. Jalisco, Feb. 1. Jan. 31 Shubrick reported that not one Mexican cannon was mounted on the coast except at Acapulco (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1129). Early in Nov., 1847, T. A. C. Jones set out from the east to meet the Ohio at Valparaiso and succeed Shubrick.

28. The fort at Acapulco was now in a ruinous condition. The cannon were removed and (it was reported) sold by Juan Alvarez. Shubrick (47Aug. 11, 1847) said it was worse than useless to blockade Mazatlán without blockading S. Blas, because vessels unable to enter at M. would then enter at S. B. and pay duties to the Mexicans. He forcibly urged upon Scott and Col. Mason, commanding in California, the importance of providing troops (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1035; 61Dec. 6, 1847), and Mason sent as far as Oregon for volunteers (Sherman, Memoirs, i, 38); but every effort to find men was in vain (61Mason, May 19, 1848). All that Mason could spare went to Lower California. With the men who were ashore Shubrick said he could have sealed up the west coast (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1084).

Mason to Stockton, Jan. 11, 1847. S. José was occupied Mar. 30; S. Lucas Apr. 3; La Paz Apr. 13. In August two companies of N. Y. volunteers under Lt. Col. Burton arrived on the ground. The passing of men and munitions from the mainland to the Peninsula was promptly cut off by our navy. The towns of Mulejé (opposite Guaymas) and Comandú, several hundred miles to the north of La Paz, were the centres of the opposition. Citizens of the former under Vicente Mejía and of the latter under J. M. Moreno, all commanded by Manuel Pineda, marched south with no little devotion. Pineda moved against La Paz (held by Burton); the other two leaders against S. José (held by Lieut. Heywood of the navy). The latter were repulsed without much difficulty, but only the arrival of the Cyane, Dec. 8, ended a series of small skirmishes at La Paz. In Jan. S. José had to undergo a more serious attack. By the twelfth our garrison (27 marines, 15 seamen, some 20 volunteers) found itself, after a desultory siege of about three weeks, in a critical situation; but on the fourteenth Du Pont arrived in the Cyane, and this ensured the defeat of the Mexicans on the following day. March 22 about 150 American troops, who had left Monterey Mar. 5, arrived at La Paz. Burton, having now about 270 men, assumed the offensive, and the skirmish of Mar. 30 at Todos Santos (without loss on the American side) ended the hostilities. The American casualties in all the skirmishing were insignificant. For the principal documents see Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 103–12, 1055–64, 1086–8, 1095–1102, 1110–2, 1117–8, 1122–7, 1129–31, 1137–55; Ho. 17; 31, 1; Sen. 18; 31, 1, pp. 293, 299, 488–504; Du Pont, Official Despatches, 23, 31, 35; 76Pineda to comte. gen. Sonora, Oct. 3, 1847; 47Shubrick, Dec. 4, 21; 76Princ. comte. of Mulejé to V. Mejía, Oct. 3; 76Pineda and Mejía, Oct. 3; 76Relaciones to Guerra, Feb. 26, 1848. U. S. Naval Instit. Proceeds., xiv, pp. 304–25.

29. 13Bankhead, no. 168, 1846. London Times, Jan. 30, 1847. 73Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 441, 445, 1847. 163Semmes to Conner, Sept. 29, 1850. Conner, Home Squadron, 3–4, 21. Bennett, Monitor, 40–1. 162Matson to Conner, Mar. 28, 1847. 162Mason to Id.., Nov. 29, 1846, priv. and confid. Richardson, Messages, iv, 570–2. 13Giffard to Bankhead, May 27, 1846. 166Shubrick to Conner, Aug. 19, 1845, priv. Buchanan, Works, vii, 240–1, 290–2. 47Conner, June 30, 1846.

Spain complained of us, but unjustly. Some thought inefficiency was shown by the number of American vessels lost (besides the Somers and the Truxtun, the Boston, the Hecla and the Neptune were wrecked, the Perry and the Cumberland were damaged, and some minor losses were suffered), but considering the character of the coast this opinion seems unfair. An important feature of the war was the demonstration of the superiority of steam vessels.

30. 76Lavallette, proclam., Oct. 26, 1847. Apuntes, 375–9. Conner, Home Squadron, 14. Negrete, Invasión, iii, 139–46; app., 399. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1092 (articles), 1109, 1129–33 (Shubrick). 47Letter to Shubrick, Dec. 23, 1847. 47Lavallette, orders, 5, 6, 1847; 3, 5, 1848. Semmes, Service, 85–7. Gaxiola, Invasión, 166–81, 217, 223. Duties to the amount of $150,000 were collected. Conner reported, June 30, 1846, that the blockade had deprived Mexico of $500,000 in duties. This paragraph belongs logically in chap. xxxi, but is placed here to complete the subject.

1. For the conduct of naval men see pp. 208–9 and note 30 of that chapter.

2. The American policy. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 155–8, 165–6, 284. Matamoros Flag, July 14, 1846. 60Marcy to McElroy, May 19, 1846. Polk, Diary, May 19–20. Our proclamations had some effect upon the people, but probably not much. They were accustomed to meaningless promises.

3. Gen. Patterson once asserted that volunteers were no worse than regulars, but the evidence of other officers and of the Mexicans was overwhelmingly against him. Regulars committed offences, but these appear to have been commonly pilfering, and to have been chargeable mostly to fresh recruits. It is probable, however, that the volunteers often bore the blame for acts done by soldiers dishonorably discharged, deserters, teamsters and other civilian employees and by the many “black legs” and “human vultures” who followed the army. The great difficulty was to identify the culprits. Mexicans were often afraid to testify against our soldiers.

4. After Matamoros was captured, crowds of women and girls continued to bathe naked in the river. The same thing occurred elsewhere.

5. A Mexican wrote to Gen. Mejía that Taylor expressly refused to accept any responsibility for such men, and that he said the people might kill them.

6. The Matamoros district. 91Ayuntamiento archives. Davis, Autobiog., 102. Meade, Letters, i, 86, 91, 105, 108–9, 147. 218Hershaw narrative. Tilden, Notes, 21. Robertson, Remins., 71. Scott (256 to Marcy, Jan. 16, 1847, private) gave an appalling account of the outrages and added, “As far as I can learn, not one of the felons has been punished.” 291Cushing to Pierce, May 4, 1847. Smith, Chile con Carne, 292–4. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 22. Buhoup, Narrative, 50. Oswandel, Notes, 37, 49, 193. V. Cruz American Eagle, Apr. 10, 1847. 13Giffard to Pakenham, May 28; to Bankhead, May 20; June 9. 13Bankhead, no. 118, 1846. French, Two Wars, 58. 65Taylor, gen. orders 62, May 17; 65, May 23; 94, Aug. 2. 65Patterson, orders, Sept. 29; Oct. 14. Picayune, Aug. 4, 25. New Orl. Commer. Bulletin, Sept. 22. 69Cushing, order, Sept. 24, 1847. 69Longoria, statement, Aug. 17. 60Patterson to Bliss, Oct. 21. 60Taylor to Hepburn et al., Nov. 2. Zirckel, Tagebuch, 45–6. Matamoros Reveille, June 24. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 118, 122, 124, 137. Giddings, Sketches, 89. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1178. Niles, Aug. 1, 1846, p. 341; Sept. 12, p. 23. Davis, Recolls., 236. Spirit of the Times, July 4. Sedgwick, Corresp., i., 4–5. New London Morning News, Dec. 10. History Teacher’s Mag., Apr., 1912 (Vieregg). 308Shields to Walker, Aug. 3. Nat. Intelligencer, Dec. 23, 1846. 193Foster to father, Aug. 14, 1846 (Matamoros a “complete sink of pollution”). 180Pillow to wife, Sept. 6, 1846. 76Mejía, June 20. 76Spanish consul, Matamoros, June 7. 76García to Parrodi June 20; Aug. 10. 76Division of the North, Noticias, July 8. 76Gaceta de Tamaulipas, July 16. 76Parrodi, June 3. 76Carroll to Faulac, Aug. 9.

7. In June, 1847, Taylor expressed the opinion that the Texan horse had scarcely made one expedition without committing murder, and asked that no more should be sent to him (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1178). Some of them committed outrages at Parras, where the Americans had been kindly treated, and Wool then ordered that Texan volunteers should not be sent on distant expeditions except under “extraordinary circumstances” (69McDowell to Hamtramck, Dec. 10, 1847).

8. E.g.: No soldier quartered outside the town (as nearly all were) could enter it without a pass signed by his captain and his colonel. Such passes were good for only one day, and only two could be issued the same day in the same company. Soldiers could use only a particular road and had to leave the city before the retreat was sounded (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 508). Besides punishing offences, our commanders endeavored, first of all, to prevent the sale of liquor; secondly, to shut out gamblers and other undesirable followers of the army; and, thirdly, to inculcate a sense of humanity and a regard for the rights of the people. In April, 1847, well-to-do refugees were ordered to return to Monterey under the threat of occupying their houses, for while absent they were beyond the reach of American taxes and were encouraging guerillas (97Monterey judge, Apr. 14, 1847). A similar policy was followed elsewhere.

9. American officers were not, however, flabby in protecting the lives of their men, and sometimes the authorities or the people of a place where one of these fell a victim to Mexican hate were held responsible until the culprit was discovered (e.g., 61Wool to Pleasanton, Jan. 15, 1848). Such wholesale justice was often the only possible kind, and there is ample evidence that even the cruel retaliation practised by our soldiers had good effects.

10. The Monterey district. Meade, Letters, i., 108, 130, 147, 161. 218Henshaw narrative. Picayune, Jan. 27, 1847. 212Hastings, diary, May 28, 1847. Giddings, Sketches, 221, 325. Buhoup, Narrative, 108. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, 120. 144Cassidy, recoils. Anon, diary. 97Ayunt., Saltillo, Apr. 14, 1847. 93Ayunt., Monterey, Oct. 8, 1846; May 18, 1847. Durango Registro Oficial, Oct. 15, 1846. Epoca, Oct. 17. London Times, June 15, 1847. 221Hill, diary. 280Nunelee, diary. 303Orders 149, Dec. 3, 1846. Everett, Recolls., 216–9. 13Giffard to Bankhead, May 20, 1846. 13Bankhead, no. 118, 1846. Diario, Oct. 9, 24; Nov. 2. Monitor Repub., Oct. 18, 28; Nov. 20. Washington Union, Dec. 29. National Intelligencer, Sept. 10; Nov. 11; Dec. 7, 23. Metropol. Mag., Dec., 1907 (Hamilton). Henry, Camp. Sketches, 222–5. Smith, To Mexico, 85, 89. 61Hamtramck to McDowell, Jan. 20, 1848. 65Wool, orders 67, Feb. 26, 1848. 65Taylor, gen. orders, 126, Oct. 5, 1846; 149, Dec. 2. 65Patterson, orders, Sept. 29; Oct. 14. 65Wool, orders 7, 15, 25, 31, 64, 66–7, 94, 112, Jan.-Mar., 1848. 65Taylor, special orders 114, Sept., 1847. 65Wool, special orders 147, 156, Dec., 1847. 61Wool to Hamtramck, Dec. 18, 1847. 61McDowell to Hamtramck, Dec. 10, 1847; to Butler, Mar. 2, 1848. 61Wool to Pleasanton, Jan. 15, 1848. 307Roberts, diary, Nov. 28; Dec 5, 1846. Delta, Aug. 15, 1847. 147Chamberlain, diary. Apuntes, 65. Gaceta Extraordinaria, Victoria, Aug. 17, 1846. Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, i, 281. 69Morales to Taylor, Sept. 29; Oct. 6. 65Worth, orders, Oct. 8. 69Id.to Bliss, Sept. 27; Oct. 5. 61Id.., endorsement on statement of Gaines. 61Taylor, June 4, 1847. 61Wool to Jones, May 9, 1848. J. Davis in Cong. Globe, 37, 1, app., p. 1034. 93Mitchell, proclam., Apr. 6, 1847. 93Tibbatts, orders, Sept. 8, 1847. Republicano, Apr. 14, 1847. Carpenter, Travels, 13, 29, 30. 52Dimond, no. 341, May 24, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 430–1, 1125, 1138, 1178 (Taylor); 508, 512–3, orders 126, 146, 149; 533, spec. orders 113. Niles, Nov. 14, 1846, p. 165; Nov. 21, p. 180; Apr. 10, 1847, p. 89; Oct. 23, p. 115. 370Taylor to Louisville Legion, Dec. 1, 1846. Hist. Mag., May, 1870 (Deas). Sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 43. 214Hays and Caperton, Life of Hays. Observador Zacatecano, Dec. 27, 1846, supplement. 76González to S. Anna, Nov. 21, 1846. 76Garcia to Parrodi, Aug. 10, 1846. 76Ampudia, Oct. 4, 1846. 76J. F. Rada, Oct. 17. 76Letter from Cadereita, Apr. 5, 1847. 76Many others.

By the end of the war desolation marked the route from the Rio Grande to Saltillo except at the sizable towns. To the credit of the volunteers it should be added that on Mar. 9, 1847, two priests and other citizens of Monterey presented a 93petition to Taylor to let the Kentucky regiment garrison the city, not only because those soldiers were accustomed to it, but because their “well known morality and good conduct” inspired “security and confidence.”

11. Some of the orders were: Strangers now here and Mexicans arriving must report for examination, no Mexican may have arms or leave town without permission, all Mexicans conducting themselves properly are entitled to civil and kind treatment as well as protection, and the troops must not molest them under pain of severe punishment (Jan. 25, 1847); All officers are to see that soldiers annoying the Mexicans are punished (Feb. 1); Not only officers but men are to arrest any soldier maltreating a Mexican (Feb. 12); Gambling-houses and drinking-houses must be broken up, no one may stay in town who would countenance such things, “improper intruders” will not be tolerated, and quiet must be maintained (March 16); Officers in town without my express permission must return to the camp at Buena Vista (June 6); No one may reside at Saltillo, if able to work, without some honest vocation, a tariff of prices will be issued from time to time, public exhibitions and dances without permission are prohibited, Mexican houses may not be taken for private uses without the consent of the owners (July 9). Some of these orders were merely repetitions of orders previously given. The policy was to have no more troops in town than were needed to guard property, etc. To prevent serious outrages, soldiers were forbidden to leave the camp at Buena Vista armed (65Aug. 10, 1847); and this was the rule elsewhere.

12. The Saltillo district. Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, i., 299. 300Prickett, letters. 97Ayuntamiento archives. 97Jefe político to ayunt., Nov. 30, 1846. 34Stokes to Graham, Aug. 8, 1847. Perry, Indiana, 138, 142. 61Paine to Porterfield, Jan. 24, 1848. 69Worth to E. González, Dec. 16, 17, 1846. 65Wool, orders 202, 209, 219, 245, etc., Jan.-Mar., 1847. 65Id.., orders 275, 286, 308, 315, 341, 350, 394, 455, May-Sept., 1847. 65Id.., orders 138, Dec. 14, 1847. 61McDowell to Hamtramck, Dec. 28, 1847. Picayune, June 1; July 2, 1847. 65Worth, orders, Nov. 16, 19, 23. 97Id.., proclam., Nov. 19. 69Id.to Saltillo officials, Nov. 17, 23. 69Gov. Saltillo, order, Jan. 11, 1848. Correo Nacional, Mar. 3, 1848. 348Pattridge to Miss W., Aug. 25, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1111, 1125 (Taylor). Littell, no. 165, p. 88 (Saltillo, May 11, 1847). 364Worth to daughter, Jan. 4, 1847. Monitor Repub., Mar. 29, 1847. Arnold, Jackson, 87–90. And from 76 the following and many more. González to Worth, Nov. 30; reply, Dec. 2. Relaciones, Feb. 1, 1848. González to S. Anna, Nov. 21, 1846. Orders of Worth, Nov. 16, 19, 22, 23, 1846. González, protest, Nov. 22, 1846. Worth to González, Nov. 28; Dec. 17, 1846. S. Anna, Jan. 4, 1847 (with docs. from González). Worth to ——, Nov. 17, 1846. Hunten to González, Mar. 29, 1847. Filisola, Aug. 10, 1847. Avalos, Aug. 5, 1847.

13. It was left for a regular to show the benefit of discipline, for he visited a suburban village, terrorized some 250 able-bodied Mexicans, and went calmly from house to house collecting blackmail.

14. The Tampico district. 99Ayuntamiento archives. 146Caswell, diary, Apr. 1, 1847. Eco, Dec. 9, 1846. 99Shields to ayunt., Dec. 28, 1846; Jan. 2, 1847. 13Consul Glass, Aug. 21, 1847. 69Gates, orders 17, 26, 28, 35, Mar.-Apr., 1847. 159Collins, diary (introduction). 65Gates, orders 30, 48, 49; special orders 7, 10, 30, 41. Picayune, Jan. 2, 8; Feb. 18; Mar. 19. 69Shields, orders 3, Dec. 22, 1846; to Bliss, Jan. 13, 1847. 61J. L. Gardner, Nov. 23, 1846. 61Gates, Dec. 4, 1846. 61Id.., orders, Sept: 18, 1847. 61Shields, orders, Jan. 1, 2, 6, 1847. 61Id.., Dec. 23, 1846; Jan. 19, 1847. 75Hacienda to Relaciones, Dec. 3, 1847. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 12, 24, 37, 39, 40, 46–7. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 276–81. Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, i, 299. 76I. Múñoz, Nov. 26, 1846, 76R. M. Núñez, Jan. 25, 1847. 76Testimony of Mateo Dorante. 76F. de Garay, Jan. 22, 1847. 76Docs. sent by Garay. 76A. González to Urrea, Feb. 1, 1847. 76Many others.

15. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 333–6 (Marcy). 224Hitchcock, diary, Mar. 26, 1846. 52W. S. Parrott, Oct. 4, 1845. 52Slidell, no. 3, Dec. 17, 1845. 61Taylor, no. 10, Feb. 7, 1846. 61Carbajal to Taylor, Feb. 6, 1846. 61Id.., memo., Feb. 6. 61Canales to Taylor, Jan. 29, 1846. 61[Mesa to Taylor], statement. Monitor Repub., June 14, 1846. 93Ayunt. to gov. N. León, Dec. 31, 1846. London Times, June 15, 1847. Picayune, Aug. 11, 1846. Ampudia, Manifiesto, 1847. Henshaw narrative. 69Unsigned statement. 285Mejía to Paredes, July 20, 1846. 52Butler, Aug. 1, 1832. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 46–7. Niles, Nov. 21, 1846, p. 180. 76Comte. gen. Nuevo León, broadside, Aug. 12, 1846. 76Ampudia, Sept. 9, 1846. 76Mora y Villamil, Apr. 19, 1847, res. 76Many others.

The number of citations could be multiplied, and the author may write an article or brief monograph on the subject.

16. July 7, 1847, the veteran ex-editor of the Washington Globe said in a 345letter: My son [Frank P. Blair, who had been U. S. district attorney of the province] “represents the state of things in New Mexico as horrible. It seems that even respectable men at home, have become so depraved by the license of the region they are in, that they stick at no enormity whatever.” A little later the most concise report from Santa Fe ran thus, “All is hubbub and confusion here, discharged volunteers are leaving, drunk, and volunteers not discharged are remaining drunk” (Niles, Nov. 6, 1847, p. 155).

17. Here, as in California, military rule was softened by having a subordinate civil administration. The reader will understand, of course, that not everything was bad. In the scanty space that can be given to the subject here it is necessary to speak in broad terms.

18. New Mexico. Nat. Intelligencer, Dec. 8, 1846; Apr. 1; May 13; Aug. 11, 1847. Wash. Union, Mar. 18; Apr. 21, 1847. N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 22, 1847. Prince, Concise History, 182–6. 13Doyle, no. 29, Mar. 14, 1848. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 58–9. 52Alvarez, Sept. 4, 1846. 63Marcy to Kearny, May 10, 1847. 61Kearny order, Sept. 22, 1846. 61Grier, Feb. 15, 1847. 61Newby, Sept. 18; Oct. 8, 1847. 61Price, Feb. 26; Aug. 14, 1847. 60Marcy to Price, Mar. 30, 1847; to Edwards, Mar. 25, 1847. 61Ingalls, Feb. 16, 1847. 61Fischer, Feb. 16, 1847. Bancroft, Pacific States, xii, 431. 61Broadside, Feb. 15, 1847. 68Court-martial, Feb. 4, 1848 (S. Fe). 69Vigil, Mar. 26, 1847. Sen. 18; 31, 1, pp. 183–6. Inman, Old S. Fe Trail, 113–40. 345Blair to Van Buren July 7, 1847. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, 1847. Anzeiger des Westens, Sept. 24, 26; Nov. 16, 1846; June 21, 1847 (Kribben). 243Kribben, letters. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 172, 174–7 (Kearny). Ho. Report 52; 37, 3. Niles, Apr. 24, 1847, pp. 119, 121; June 19, p. 252; Aug. 14, p. 375; Nov. 6, p. 155. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Aug. 13, 1847. Ho. 5; 31, 1, p. 104. Report of Conner, Indian Affairs, 1858, p. 188. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 11, 13, 17, 21, 24, 31, 33, 34, etc. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 520, 524, 531–5, 545. 256Polk to Marcy, June 2, 1846. 201Gibson, diary. Picayune, Mar. 5, 1847. Ho. 41; 30, 1, pp. 498, 511–2, 551. Richardson, Messages, iv, 507, 594, 639. Wash. Union, Oct. 3; Nov. 25, 1846. Parkman, Calif, and Ore. Trail, 416–20. Elliott, Notes, 233, 247. 224Santa Fe letter (printed). Sen. 23; 30, 1 (Abert). Ruxton, Adventures (1847 ed.), 185, 189. Benton, View, ii, 683. 61Price, Sept. 18, 1847. 212Hastings, diary. Cooke, Conquest, 39, 41, 50. 239Mead to Kemper, July 26, 1841. Hughes, Doniphan’s Expedition, 131. 61Wooster, Sept. 25, 1846. Sen. 7; 30, 1 (Emory). Ho. 24; 31, 1. Price, portrait (Mo. Hist. Soc.). 61Id.to delegates; to adj. gen., Feb. 6, 1848. 65Id.., orders 10, Feb. 5. 61Prince to Vigil, Dec. 21, 1847. Numerous documents relating to the subject may be found among the Vigil papers (N. Mex. Hist. Soc.). Cutts, Conquest, 217–35, 240–3. 76Varela, Sept. 6, 1847. 76Chávez to Armijo, Aug. 24, 1847. 76Ugarte to Filisola, July 2, 1847. 76Bent, proclam., Jan. 2, 1847. 76Many others. The American loss in fighting the insurgents was 8 killed, 52 wounded.

Chihuahua was merely an addendum to Santa Fe. The people seemed to regard our troops “as a race of devils and with just reason,” wrote a soldier in his diary. Once two Americans, fighting in their cups, tore each other’s clothes off and went stark naked through the streets. Of course property suffered. The women, however, in spite of husbands, fiancés and priests, were devoted to the Americans, and when the time for evacuation came some followed their lovers for leagues, and a few even for days. For the state of things in Chihuahua: Sen. Misc. 26; 30, 1. The Anglo-Saxon, (Chihuahua), no. 1. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 110. Ho. Report 404; 30, 1, pp. 6, 13. Rondé, Voyage, 136, 138–9. 212Hastings, diary. 201Gibson, diary. Anzeiger des Westens, June 21, 1847 (Kribben). Republicano, April 10, 1847.

19. Kearny claimed the right to govern, but Stockton and Frémont insisted that his instructions to take possession of California and establish a civil government there had been made obsolete by events. Kearny perforce accepted the situation for a time, and with his dragoons went north at the end of January. The friction between him and Frémont was acute. Finally, when both were on their way east, Kearny had Frémont arrested. On charges—essentially insubordination—preferred by the General, Frémont was tried by a court-martial and sentenced to be dismissed from the army (65adj. gen., orders, Feb. 17, 1848). Polk remitted the sentence, but Frémont resigned. This controversy having been merely incidental to the war, more space cannot be given to it; but, as the opinion of the author may be desired, he will say, after reviewing all the documents of the case, that he thinks Frémont was a provokingly unprincipled and successful schemer, and that Kearny showed himself grasping, jealous, domineering and harsh.

20. The Mormons were free July 16, 1847, and but one company could be recruited from the battalion. This served till March 14, 1848. A part of the New York regiment was sent to Lower California (chap. xxx, note 28, and the gold-diggings led some to desert. February 1, 1848, Mason had only 621 effectives (61Mason to adj. gen., Feb. 1, 1848).

21. California. (This note, as written, included nearly two hundred items; but, as the subject concerns the history of the Mexican War only incidentally, it has been condensed.) Reports from military and naval officers in the adjutant general’s office and the navy (squadron and captains’ letters) archives. 323–5Stevenson, letter book, gen. order book, regtal. ord. book. Colton, Three Years, 24, 32, 155, 172, 175. Cooke, Conquest, 45, etc. Ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 28, etc. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 160, 229, 242, 245–6. Benton, View, ii, 715, 718. Clark, First Regt., 12, etc. 316Sherman papers. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 49–50, 65. Calif. Star, Mar. 6, 1847. London Times, Aug. 13–4, 1846. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 55–7, 947. Sherman Letters, 39. Wise, Gringos, 47, etc. Hughes, Doniphan’s Exped., 204–30, 244–8. 256Marcy papers. 247Larkin papers. Bancroft, Pacific States, xii, 478; xvii, 417, etc. 4Amador, Memorias, 172. 122Bidwell, California, 180. 210Hammond papers. Annals Amer. Acad., xii, 70–1 (R. D. Hunt). 349Watterston papers. 120Biddle papers. Cutts, Conquest, 65, 71, 123, 164, 248. Wash. Union, Sept. 30; Dec. 9, 1846. N. Y. Journ. of Commerce, Dec. 30, 1846. Diario, Oct. 16, 1846. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 604 (Benton). Annals of the Am. Acad., xii, 71 (Hunt). Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 22, 1846. Buchanan, Works, vii, 332. 132Buchanan papers. Hall, S. José, 154–6. Sherman, Home Letters, 96, 113. Id.., Mems., i, 29, 34, 56. Niles, Aug. 29, p. 416; Sept. 12, 1846, p. 20; Oct. 23, 1847, p. 115. Sen. 33; 30, 1. Ho. Rep., 817; 30, 1. Sen. 439; 29, 1. Ho. 17; 31, 1. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 47, 51, 53, etc., 1037, 1069. Revere, Tour, 78. Sen. 7; 30, 1. Sen. Rep. 75; 30, 1, pp. 14–5. Sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 23, 28–30. Sen. 18; 31, 1, pp. 398–401. Tuthill, Calif., 208–13. Schafer, Pacific Slope, 269. Porter, Kearny, 31. Willey, Trans. Period, 66, 70. Royce, Calif., 197. 120Cits. to Biddle, Mar. 2, 1847. Tyler, Concise Hist., 202–52, 277, 288. Stockton, Life, 158. 372Hyde, statement. 70“Californias” (see Richman, California, for many of the most important). 76Pérez, Oct. 22. 76Comadurán to comte. gen. Sonora, Nov. 14; to Cooke, Dec. 16. 76Id.., Nov. 21; Dec. 17. 76Cooke to Gándera, Dec. 18. 76Cuesta, Dec. 30, 1846; July 23, 1847. 76Estado, Tucson, Dec. 3, 1846. 76Limón to Cooke, [Dec. 16]; reply, [Dec. 16]. 76Cuesta to mil. comte. Arispe, Dec. 18. 76Vanguard section, estado, Dec. 23; etc.

For the Mormons see vol. i, p. 290. P. St. G. Cooke, acting as It. col., led the Mormon battalion from Santa Fe, New Mex., to California.

22. “Head Quarters of the Army, Tampico, February 19, 1847. General Orders, no. 20. 1. It may well be apprehended that many grave offences not provided for in the act of Congress ‘establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States,’ approved April 10, 1806, may be again committed—by, or upon, individuals of those armies, in Mexico, pending the existing war between the two Republics. Allusion is here made to atrocities, any one of which, if committed within the United States or their organized territories, would, of course, be tried and severely punished by the ordinary or civil courts of the land. 2. Assassinations; murder; malicious stabbing or maiming; rape; malicious assault and battery; robbery; theft; the wanton desecration of churches, cemeteries or other religious edifices and fixtures, and the destruction, except by order of a superior officer, of public or private property, are such offences. 3. The good of the service, the honor of the United States and the interests of humanity, imperiously demand that every crime, enumerated above, should be severely punished. (Paragraphs 4–6 demonstrate the necessity of a code supplemental to the rules and articles of war.) 7. That unwritten code is Martial Law, as an addition to the written military code, prescribed by Congress in the rules and articles of war, and which unwritten code, all armies, in hostile countries, are forced to adopt—not only for their own safety, but for the protection of the unoffending inhabitants and their property, about the theaters of] military operations, against injuries contrary to the laws of war. 8. From the same supreme necessity, martial law is hereby declared, as a supplemental code in, and about, all camps, posts and hospitals which may be occupied by any part of the forces of the United States, in Mexico, and in, and about, all columns, escorts, convoys, guards and detachments, of the said forces, while engaged in prosecuting the existing war in, and against the said republic. 9. Accordingly, every crime, enumerated in paragraph No. 2, above, whether committed—1. By any inhabitant of Mexico, sojourner or traveller therein, upon the person or property of any individual of the United States’ forces, retainer or follower of the same; 2. By any individual of the said forces, retainer or follower of the same, upon the person or property of any inhabitant of Mexico, sojourner or traveller therein, or 3. By any individual of the said forces, retainer or follower of the same, upon the person or property of any other individual of the said forces, retainer or follower of the same—shall be duly tried and punished under the said supplemental code. 10. For this purpose it is ordered, that all offenders, in the matters aforesaid, shall be promptly seized and confined, and reported, for trial, before Military Commissions to be duly appointed as follows: 11. Every military commission, under this order, will be appointed, governed and limited, as prescribed by the 65th, 66th, 67th, and 97th, of the said rules and articles of war, and the proceedings of such commissions will be duly recorded, in writing, reviewed, revised, disapproved or approved, and the sentences executed—all, as in the cases of the proceedings and sentences of courts-martial; provided, that no military commission shall try any case clearly cognizable by any court-martial, and provided also that no sentence of a military commission shall be put in execution against any individual, whatsoever, which may not be, according to the nature and degree of the offence, as established by evidence, in conformity with known punishments, in like cases, in some one of the States of the United States of America. 12. This order will be read at the head of every Company serving in Mexico.” This order helps to explain the later improvement at the north which we have noted.

23. The ordinary safeguard ran thus: “By authority of ... The person, the property, and the family of ... [or such a college, mill, etc., and the persons and things belonging to it] are placed under the safeguard of the United States. To offer any violence or injury to them is expressly forbidden; on the contrary, it is ordered that safety and protection be given to him, or them, in case of need.” Safeguards were given to towns also. The following is a specimen: “Safeguard. Office of the Civil & Military Governor, Puebla, 22nd January, 1848. Whereas the Municipality of the town of San Martin, on the main road to Mexico, has presented a Solicitation to this Government with regard to certain permissions and protection this Safeguard is given to said Municipality in the following terms.—1. The authorities and inhabitants of San Martin, their families and private property are placed under the protection of the United States forces, as long as they remain quiet, neutral and peaceable and will therefore be left unmolested and not interfered with by the troops and followers of the United States army. On the contrary their civil authorities will be respected, and protection and assistance will be given to them such as they should need or claim.—2. All honorable and peaceable inhabitants guaranteed to be such by the Municipality have permission to carry arms for the defence of the community, their persons and their property against robbers.—3. They are allowed to organize a neutral police force of twenty five armed and mounted men for protection of the town against robbers and for assisting the authorities in executing their duties, the criminals taken prisoners by them to be delivered over to the Governor of Puebla.—4. Permission is likewise granted to said authorities and inhabitants to defend themselves against any one who comes to plunder, rob or attack them, may he be robber, guerrillero [i.e., “guerilla”], or an American soldier.—5. The Municipality of San Martin has permission, to arrest and remit to their commanding officers all American soldiers, they may find within the district of San Martin, drunk dispersed or deserters.—6. It is strictly prohibited to the troops and followers of the United States army to open the prison at San Martin and put the criminals in liberty.—7. A copy of this Safeguard has been forwarded to the General in chief of the United States forces in order to communicate it to the commanding officers of the army, and of divisions, which have to pass by San Martin. Another copy has been remitted to the commanding officer of the military post at Rio Frio.—”

24. Numerous large monasteries, occupied by only a few monks, were found useful, and the use of them for such a purpose gave no offence (Scott, Mems., ii, 580).

25. Scott’s policy. Scott, Mems., ii, 393–6, 547–9, 580. Hitchcock in Republic, Feb. 15, 1851. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 147. 69Safeguard. 60Scott, May 26, 1846. 65Gen. orders 20, Feb. 19, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 873. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 55. So. Qtrly. Review, Jan., 1852, p. 133.

26. Scott called upon “the 97 honorable men in every 100” to seize in the act and report the “scoundrels” committing outrages (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 914). He thus enlisted, he believed, the coöperation of “thousands of good soldiers” (60to Marcy, Apr. 5, 1847). As in civil life, it was of course impossible to apprehend all the criminals.

27. The impracticable attempt to keep liquor out of the city was not tried here. A system of license and supervision was adopted. April 1 two taverns were authorized to sell liquor (to be used on the premises).

28. Worth’s successors in the governorship were Col. Henry Wilson up to about the middle of December, 1847; Gen. James Bankhead for a few days; Gen. Twiggs until Mar. 25, 1848; Col. Wilson for a day or two; Gen. S. W. Kearny. When Wilson left in December, 1847, the merchants and consuls gave him a vote of thanks (Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 585). Mar. 30, 1848, the Mexican ayuntamiento was restored.

29. Thompson, Recolls., 4. Dysentery was prevalent and dangerous. Dec. 29, 1847, a responsible writer at Vera Cruz stated that not less than 1,200 Americans had succumbed there to the climate since April.

30. The Vera Cruz district. 52Trist, May 7, 1847. Bullock, Six Months (1825 ed.), i, 19, 20. 100Ayuntamiento archives. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 572–3, 584–5. Lyon, Journal, ii, 214, 221. Flag of Freedom, i, no. 4. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 112, 115, 117, 119. Niles, Sept. 25, 1847, p. 53, etc. 361Woods, recolls. 144Cassidy, recolls. 327Sutherland, letters. 322Smith, diary. 152Claiborne, mems. 270Moore, diary. Oswandel, Notes, 105–6. 86S. Anna to Soto, Apr. 14, 1847. Wash. Union, July 26, 29, 1847. Amer. Eagle, V. Cruz, Apr. 3, 13; Oct. 11, 16, 1847. 76J. Soto, July 3, 1847. 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Apr. 19, 1847. 13Giffard, Apr. 13; May 15; June 15, 1847. 221Hill, diary. 69Scott to Patterson, Mar. 30, 1847. 65Wilson, orders (1847) 20, 23, 64, 116, 128, 142. 65Bankhead, orders 167. 65Twiggs, orders 11, 14. 65Wilson, orders (1848), 130. 65Kearny, orders 172. 65Scott, gen. orders 75, 87, 101. 60Wilson to Marcy, Aug. 1, 1847. 61Worth, orders 1–7. 61Kearny, Apr. 9, 1848, and endorsement. Don Simplicio, Apr. 21, 1847. Diario, Apr. 13, 1847. Long, Lee, 68. 60Scott, Apr. 5, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 914 (Scott); 938 (Dorich). 166Pommarès to Conner, Oct. 7, 1846. Stevens, Stevens, i, 117–8. 12Pell of Sloop Daring, Nov. 30, 1847. Kenly, Md. Vol., 288–9.

31. The Córdoba district. 88Ayuntamiento archives. Moreno, Cantón, 378, 380, 382–3. London Saturday Review, 1865, p. 6. 65Bankhead, orders 11, 12, 28.

32. The Orizaba district. 94Ayuntamiento archives. Cubas, Cuadro, 54. Velasco, Geografía, iii, 179. Diccionario Universal (Orizaba). 65Bankhead, orders 38, 100. 69Colección de Itinerarios.

33. Neither at Jalapa nor elsewhere were there many complaints from women. Here the soldiers gave parties. Harlots were the only women present, but they were treated—to the great amusement of the town—as ladies (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 247).

34. The Jalapa district. 90Ayuntamiento archives. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 62–3. Vigne, Travels, i, 14–16. Bullock, Six Months (1825 ed.), i, 55. Velasco, Geografía, iii, 28, 37, 54, 97. 257Orders and letters from G. H[ughes] to Frank [Markoe]. Oswandel, Notes, 196, 389. Semmes, Service, 205, 215. Nacional, Dec. 22, 1847; Jan. 5, 1848. 69Alcalde to gov., Nov. 25, 27, 1847. 69Orders, Dec. 3, 10, 15, 1847; Feb. 4; Apr. 25; May 7, 1848. 69Patterson to Pillow, Sept. 22, 1846; to ——, Nov. 24, 1847. 69Am. gov. to alcalde, Nov. 26; Dec. 13, 1847; Jan. 17; Feb. 28; Mar. 15, 1848. 69Hughes, proclam., Nov. 30, 1847. 287Parrish, diary. 332Tennery, diary. Picayune, May 28; Dec. 19, 24, 25, 1847. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 365–8, 382. Wash. Union, May 22, 1847. 159Collins papers. Lyon, Journal, ii, 186. Ward, Mexico, ii, 193. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 58–9. Grone, Briefe, 62. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 900–2; iv, 20, 28–34. 69Hughes to prefect, May 31, 1848; to Scott, Jan. 5, 1848; to first alcalde, Mar. 27, 1848; orders, Nov. 29, 30, 1847; Jan. 10; Feb. 19; May 4, 5, 1848. 69Id.to officers, Jan. 15, 1848. 68Court of inquiry, Jalapa, May 31, 1848. Arco Iris, Dec. I, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1029. Niles, Jan. 1, 1848, p. 276. 76Soto, proclam., Sept. 10, 1847. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 235–6, 245–7. Hartman, Journal, 13. 327Sutherland to father, undated. 13Bankhead, no. 42, 1847 (the conduct of Scott and his officers at Jalapa is “highly extolled”).

35. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 272. The presence of Scott, Worth and other superior officers who, as the soldiers knew, could not be trifled with, may help to explain the mystery. (Later some outrages occurred.) The troops were kept within a large square space with sentries at each corner, and the boundaries of it could not be crossed after dark by either civilians or soldiers (Republicano, June 14). At one place on the way to Puebla, wrote a soldier in his diary, a sentry was placed at every shop, and even women selling bread on the street were guarded.

36. Personally Lane discouraged outrages. Once when some of his famished men had robbed a poor man’s cornfield Lane, besides having him paid the full amount of the damages, added as much more from his own pocket (Brackett, Lane’s Brig., 74–5). It was said that priests were sometimes ill-used, but this was natural enough when they were capable of coöperating with guerillas, inducing American soldiers to desert, and harboring such deserters.

37. The Puebla district. Flag of Freedom, i, nos. 1, 5. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 272. 270Moore, diary. 95Childs, proclam., Nov. 11, 1847 (placard). Oswandel, Notes, 345, 390. 95Ayuntamiento archives (proceedings, correspondence with Worth, orders of Worth, etc.). 95Fúrlong, proclam., Oct. 14, 1847. 95Childs, proclam., Oct. 25, 1847. 95The bishop to Scott, Dec. 1, 1847. 95Fúrlong to Scott, Dec. 1, 1847. 95Ayunt. to prefect, Oct. 26, 1847. 304Worth, orders, May 16, 1847. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 121, 125, 131, 136, 165, 210. 356Whitcomb, diary. Republicano, June 13, 14, 21 (El National), 24, 1847. 69Fúrlong to Am. gov., Aug. 10, 1847. 69Prefect to Childs, Oct. 14; Nov. 2, 8; Dec. 20, 1847; Feb. 8, 1848. 69Childs’s official papers 61Scott, gen. orders 187, 1847. Nacional, Dec. 18, etc, 1847. 95Report of the committee appointed to confer with Scott, Jan. 4, 1848. 75Jefe político Tlaxcala to Scott, Nov. 23, 1847. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 122–3. Donnavan, Adventures, 100. Colección de Documentos (Childs, orders, Oct. 16). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1030 (Childs).

There was special feeling about churches. The bishop of Puebla complained to Scott that our soldiers desecrated a church at Tlaxcala, and stole some priests’ robes. But the soldiers had found that the church was the base of the guerillas they were pursuing, and discovered the robes on the floor. Our officers made great efforts to prevent outrages here and to restore the stolen property (Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 211; Zirckel, Tagebuch, 123; etc.). It seems to have been true that no church was desecrated by Americans that had not been desecrated by Mexicans, and used for hostile purposes.

38. The lépero dared not attack a sober American soldier. The scheme was to get the soldiers intoxicated, and, when they staggered and fell, knife them. After a time our men invented a trick to meet it. They would pretend to be intoxicated, fall to the ground, and make ready for the would-be assassin; and finally the léperos feared a drunken soldier even more than a sober one. Carrying concealed weapons was forbidden; suspected persons were searched; and any one found guilty was given twenty lashes on the bare back. This had an excellent effect.

39. A specimen case was that of private Gahagiun of the Seventh Infantry (65gen. orders 378). For breaking into a house and taking some ladies’ clothing he was sentenced to receive fifty lashes on his bare back “well laid on with a rawhide,” to be confined at hard labor during the rest of his term, to be then dishonorably discharged and drummed out—$250 of his pay to go to the person robbed and the rest to be confiscated. Mexicans as well as Americans were publicly flogged. In extreme cases hanging was the punishment.

Scott made the following daily details in order to ensure order and discipline (65gen. orders 298, September 24, 1847): “1. A general officer of the day to report to me; to superintend the good order and discipline of the garrison, visit the guards and outposts, organize patrols, and receive reports regarding order and discipline. 2. A field officer of the day of each division and of the cavalry brigade to superintend the troops in quarters, be present at the mounting and dismounting of the guards, have control of the in-lying pickets, etc. 3. One third of each regiment not on other duty will constitute its portion of the in-lying guard. 4. A captain or subaltern of the day of each regiment will superintend the quarters, attend the parading of regimental guards, have the roll called frequently and at unexpected times, visit company kitchens and messes, etc.” The drill of the troops was kept up, and of course it was only when off duty that they could be disorderly. Doyle reported that a gentleman from Pachuca, a place at some distance from Mexico, said: “Nothing can be better than the behavior of the American troops at Pachuca” (no. 5, 1848). On the other hand Lane’s men were guilty of excesses at Tulancingo. In 65gen. orders 395, December 31, 1847, Scott said: “Men free at home, must maintain the honor of freeman when abroad. If they forget that, they will degrade themselves to the level of felons and slaves, and may be rightfully condemned and treated as such; for felons, according to the laws of God and man, are slaves” (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1066).

40. Quitman strictly forbade (Sept. 21) “any interference with or mutiliation of the books, papers, or records contained within the Palace.”

41. Matamoros, Monterey, Tampico, Jalapa and Puebla had an American newspaper; Vera Cruz and Mexico two.

42. In consequence of the incapacity of our medical men and particularly their ignorance of the effects of the climate, diseases not considered dangerous by residents often proved fatal to the American soldiers (13Thornton, no. 5, 1847).

43. The Mexico district. Davis, Autobiog., 246, 258, 261–2, 277. Henshaw narrative. Donnavan, Adventures, 93, 97. Instrucciones Otorgadas. Wise, Gringos, 260. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 314–5, 321. Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 1163–5. Quitman, orders, Oct. 6, 1847, in Papeles Varios. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xv, 627. McSherry, Puchero, 163. Vedette, ii, no. 10 (Brooks). Norton, Life, 172. 321Smith, diary. 358Williams to father, Dec. 27, 1847; Feb. 22, 1848. 152Claiborne, mems. Oswandel, Notes, 431, 433, 455, 525, 583. 92Ayuntamiento archives. 69aArchives of Federal District. 80Archives of México state. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 307. 80Gracida to Butler, Feb. 25, 1848. 13Doyle, nos. 1, 5, 27, 1848. Britannia, Sept. 28, 1847 (Daily News). Claiborne, Quitman, i, 395. Calderón, Life, i, 139–40. National, Nov. 14, 1847. 60N. C. to J. L. Miller, May 7, 1848. 62Jones to Bedinger, Mar. 11, 1848. Captain of Vols., Conquest, 27. 65Scott, gen. orders, Sept. 14, 16, 17, 24; Dec. 18, 31, 1847. London Times, Nov. 12, 13, 1847. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 205–12. Picayune, Oct. 15; Nov. 14; Dec. 19, 29, 1847. Delta, Nov. 6, 7, 12; Dec. 19, 24, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 384 (Scott). Kenly, Md. Vol., 413. México á través, iv, 703–4. 65Scott, gen. orders 190, 355. Rodriguez, Breve Reseña, 1848, 1849, p. 5. 13Bankhead, no. 86, Sept. 28, 1847. 73Lozano, no. 8, res., Sept. 17, 1847. Ramírez, México, 318. N. Y. Journ. Comm., Feb. 28, 1848. Monitor Repub., Dec. 7, 20, 1847. 277Veramendi to Quitman, Oct. 8, 1847. 366Memb. municip. council to ——, Nov. 14 and reply. (Mexican letter) Nacional, Nov. 14, 1847. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 260–3, 270–1. Apuntes, 362–7, 369. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1065. Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. 132Nowell to mother, Oct. 21, 1847. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 153. Stevens, Stevens, i, 219. 121Placards and Notices. Lancaster Co. Hist. Soc. Mag., Mar. 6, 1908. 214Hays and Caperton, Life of Hays. London Chronicle, Nov. 12, 1847. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 543. Lane (Adventures) shows that our officers were by no means all saints, but this is not a fact to occasion surprise.

Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 571) complains that immorality was promoted at Mexico by giving licenses to gambling places; but it would not have been possible to prevent the soldiers from gambling among themselves and in “dives,” and no doubt Scott believed it would be best to have the gambling done where some control could be exercised over it, and where the men would not be in danger of the assassin’s knife. Ripley admits that gambling “flourished” before licenses were given (p. 570). Ripley suggests (p. 574) that “active operations would have been the immediate and effectual remedy” for the immorality; but, as we have seen, there were not enough troops, etc., for active operations, and perhaps shooting Mexicans needlessly would have been no better business than gambling. Ripley admits (p. 577) that most of the troops were kept outside the city. Riley’s brigade was at Tacubaya, Patterson’s division at S. Angel, and a part of Butler’s division at El Molino del Rey. The other part and Smith’s brigade remained in town.

44. Probably fearing American interference or influence, the Mexican government at Querétaro discountenanced such elections (México á través, iv, 704). As the records are by no means complete, it is necessary in this and other cases to assume that like causes produced like effects, unless there is some evidence to the contrary. General conclusions could not otherwise be reached.

45. At Tampico Shields appointed three Mexican alcaldes and also (to act with these in cases between Americans and Mexicans) an American court of three American citizens.

46. Gaceta de Tamaulipas, July 16, 1846. 65Scott, gen. orders 238. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 314–5. Davis, Autobiog., 246. 224Letter from C. to Scott, Nov. 14, 1847. Instrucciones Otorgadas. Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, i, 299. Moreno, Cantón, 378, 380, 382. Quitman, order, Oct. 6, 1847, in Papeles Varios. Defensa de Iriarte. McSherry, El Puchero, 163. 358Williams to father, Feb. 22, 1848. V. Cruz American Eagle, May 22; Apr. 3, 1847. Ayuntamiento archives, Jalapa, Córdoba, Orizaba, Puebla, Mexico, Tampico, Saltillo. 92Quitman, proclam., Oct. 6, 1847. 366Id.., poster, Sept. 16. 95Worth to Puebla ayunt., May 31, 1847; to alcalde, May 17, 1847; reply; proclam., May 22, 1847; to alcalde, May 22. 303Id.., orders 34. Nacional, Jan. 28, 1848. 13Doyle, No. 5, 1848. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 251, 549. Diario, May 14, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1047 (Scott). 65Bankhead, orders, Feb. 16, 1848. 61Hamtramck to McDowell, Jan. 20, 1848. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 17, 39, 40, 194, 208. 63Marcy to Davenport, Aug. 6; Dec. 14, 1847. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 165. 69Gov. Jalapa to alcalde, Nov. 26; Dec. 13, 1847; Jan. 17; Mar. 15, 1848; orders 352; to ayunt., Feb. 28, 1848. 69Gates, orders 26, 35. 65Wilson, orders 116, 142, 1847. 65Twiggs, orders 11. 65Kearny, orders 172. 65Wool, orders, July 9; Dec. 14, 1847; Jan. 26, 1848. 65Butler, orders 43, 1848. 61McDowell to alcalde, Dec. 30, 1847. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 205 (Trist). Picayune, Jan. 2; Mar. 19; Dec. 19, 23, 1847. Republicano, June 14, 1847. Kenly, Md. Vol., 380. 61Worth to Bliss, Sept. 28, 1846. México á través, iv, 703–4, 711. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 900, 902; iv, 28–34. 69Worth to commrs., Nov. 23, 1846; orders 61, 1846. 69Scott to Hughes, Jan. 28, 1848. 61Shields, Jan. 19, 1847; orders, Dec. 26, 1846; Jan. 1, 2, 6, 1847. 61Worth, orders 2, Mar. 30, 1847. 76Worth to E. González, Nov. 23, 28, 1846. 76S. Anna, Jan. 4, 1847, with docs. 76Garay, Jan. 22, 1847, and docs. 76Worth, proclam., Nov. 30, 1846. 76Morgan to Martinez, Jan. 18, 1847. 76Aldrete to Mejía, Aug. 30, 1846. For taxes, etc., see chap. xxxiii. 76Mora, Feb. 18; Mar. 8, 1848. 76Many others.

47. An English soldier in our army said with reference to the better class at Tampico: they were shy of “the strange, wild-looking, hairy-faced savages of the half-horse and half-alligator breed, who galloped about the streets and plazas mounted on mules and Mexican ponies, and armed with sabres, bowies, and revolvers, and in every uncouth variety of costume peculiar to the American backwoodsman”; adding that the Mexicans addressed them as “Gentlemen,” but in their absence spoke of them with intense bitterness as “cursed volunteers” (Ballentine, Eng. Sold., i, 276–7).

48. The foreigners residing at Mexico generally received the American army well.

49. In a soldier’s written vocabulary occurred these words: weaves (for huevos), chickketer (chiquita), sennereters (señoritas), irrancus (naranjas), onerpas (un peso), leavero (libro). There were cases in which women went long distances to give information to officers they had never seen. After the battle of Cerro Gordo ladies at Mexico wore their hair loose “à la Scott,” and were rebuked by the press.

50. Social relations. Scott, Mems., ii, 580. Grant, Mems., i, 118. Meade, Letters, i, 86, 180, 185. 148Chamberlain, recolls. Bullock, Six Months (1825 ed.), i, 55–6. Flag of Freedom, i, no. 5. 257G. [Hughes] to Frank [Markoe], Dec. 13, 1847. 242Kingsbury to mother, Oct. 14, 1846. 8Anon. diary. Oswandel, Notes, 211, 433. Jamieson, Campaign, 48. Semmes, Service, 173, 205, 215, 263. Biog. de Alamán, 40. 221Hill, diary. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 131, 136, 138. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 912. Picayune, May 28, 1847. Kenly, Md. Vol., 368. 69Hughes to Scott, Jan. 5, 1848. 349Pattridge to Miss W., May 22, 1848. Apuntes, 363. Wilhelm, Eighth Infantry, i, 430. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 145. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 276–7. Spirit of the Times, July 4, 1846. Perry, Indiana, 141. 76Document sent by Garay, Dec. 30, 1846. 335Belton to Hitchcock, Aug. 23, 1847.

51. This money had a powerful influence in keeping the people quiet.

52. Scott, Mems., ii, 396, 580. Grant, Mems., i, 102. Gutiérrez de Estrada, Méx. en 1840. 110Barbour, diary. 95Belton, proclam., July 16, 1847. 13Doyle, no. 1, 1848. Delta, Jan. 19, 1847. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña, 1848. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 24. New London Morning News, Dec. 10, 1846. Apuntes, 368. 350Weber, recolls. Cong. Globe, 45, 3, pp. 1627–8 (Shields). Picayune, Sept. 14, 1847.

1. 52Trist, nos. 16, confid., 17, confid., 18, 22–3. (Trist’s despatches, as printed in Sen. 52; 30, 1, are not in all cases complete.) Sierra, Evolution i, 223. (Outrages) Arco Iris, Nov. 9, 1847. Razonador in Nacional, Jan. 5, 1848. Nacional, Jan. 19, 1848. 80Almonte to Olaguíbel, Sept. 16, 1847. 335Thornton to Trist, Dec. 5, 1847. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 308–9, 315. Calhoun Corresp., 1163, 1166. 349Partridge to Miss W., May 22, 1848. 125Bonham to mother, Dec. 7, 1847. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, pp. 17–23. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 327, 331. Wash. Union, May 22, 1847. 291P. F. Smith to Pierce, undated. Monitor Repub., Dec. 3, 14, 1847. Picayune, Dec. 23, 1847; Jan. 7, 8, 1848. 13Doyle, no. 18, 1848. (Damages) 76Circular, Oct. 3, 1847.

2. Sierra, Evol., i, 223. 13Thornton, no. 6, 1847. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 571. 52Trist, nos. 18, 22–3. Picayune, Nov. 30, 1847; Feb. 20, 1848. Protesta de la Diputación. Tributo á la Verdad, 58. Nacional, Jan. 8, 19, 1848. 80Olaguíbel, proclam., Dec. 9, 1847. 335Thornton to Trist, Dec. 5, 1847. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 23, 40, 45, 74. Correo Nacional, Feb. 7, 19; Mar. 21, 1848. (Aguas Cal.) 76Guerra to Relaciones, Jan. 24, 1848. 76Olaguíbel, Nov. 29. 76Gov. Oaxaca to Relaciones, Dec. 27. Monitor Repub., Nov. 15, 27, 29; Dec. 29, 1847. 366Correspondence between gov. S. L. Potosí and A. O. de Parada. 335Trist, memo, of second conference. 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Dec. 20, private, 27 private, 28, private, 1847. No. American (Mexico), Dec. 14, 1847. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Nov. 1, 1847. 304Duncan to Quitman, Nov. 27, 1847. Webster, Letters, 343. 61Scott, Sept. 18. (Bankhead) 132Cushing to Buchanan, Oct. 31, 1847. 125Bonham to mother, Dec. 7, 1817; Jan. 12, 1848. Gallatin, War Expenses. 345Poinsett to Van Buren, June 4, 1847; Mar. 9, 1848. 304Duncan to Quitman, Nov. 27. No. American (Mex.), Dec. 14. P. F. Smith, supra. Eco del Comercio, May 9, 1848. Correspondant, Nov. 15, 1847. Times, Jan. 15, 1848.

The substantial war elements were the Eventualists, Monarchists and Santannistas. The 76archives for this time are full of reports of political disturbances.

3. Polk, Diary, Nov. 20, 23, 30; Dec. 4, 18, 1847. 132Donelson to Buchanan, May 15, 1847, private. Ho. 60; 30, 1, 1037 (Marcy). 52Trist, no. 22. P. F. Smith: note 1. Richardson, Messages, iv, 537–46. See chap. xxix, p. 183. Had the war continued it would not have been against Paredes or Santa Anna and the military class. It would have seemed to be a war of conquest directed against the Mexican nation, and even the peace party would have had to turn against us.

4. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 585. 13Thornton, nos. 6, 7, 1847. 52Trist, nos. 16, confid., 18–20. 335Id.to Rosa, Oct. 20, 1847. Monitor Repub., Nov. 8, 10, 13; Dec. 29. Ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 58 (Rosa). Richardson, Messages, iv, 572. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 22–3. México á través, iv, 704–5. Exposición ó Programa. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 483, 516.

Trist reopened the negotiations naturally by forwarding to Luis de la Rosa, the minister of relations, a letter (dated Sept. 7) written by him as a reply to the note and counter-projet of the Mexican peace commissioners dated Sept. 6. In this he argued that Texas possessed good grounds for rebelling, and became independent; that, having been rightfully annexed by the United States, she had to be protected against invasion; that any previously existing boundary between her and Mexico had been obliterated by the revolutionary war, and she had a right to claim the Rio Grande as the boundary; that as Mexico would not negotiate on the subject, Polk was compelled to accept that delimitation; that in the resulting war the United States had occupied Mexican territory and now justly held it by right of conquest, yet not by the odious title of conquest resulting from war without good cause—not from a mere desire of obtaining territory (Sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 21). This letter and a brief accompanying note, which stated that his powers had not been withdrawn and expressed a desire to resume the negotiations, were transmitted by Thornton, now acting (in the absence of Bankhead and Doyle) as British chargé, who strongly urged upon Rosa the renewal of the negotiations (52Trist, no. 19). Rosa replied favorably, but said he was too busy just then, and needed certain documents. Later Peña explained the delay as resulting from the provisional character of his administration (52to Trist, Nov. 22). In reality the government desired to ascertain and influence public and Congressional sentiment before acting (Exposición dirigida). Rosa’s reply to Trist said there appeared to be little hope of peace, but this was for self-defence (Trist, no. 20).

5. 52Trist, nos. 19, 23. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 239. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 23. Monitor Repub., Nov. 17, 18, 23, 27; Dec. 26. (Deserters) Nat. Intellig., June 24, 1848. 76Rosa to govs., Oct. 20. 75Report of the meeting of governors. México á través, iv, 706. 335Thornton to Trist, Nov. 25, 1847. Dublán, Legislación, v, 305. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 567–8, 571–6. 335Davidson to Thornton, Nov. 23. Picayune, Nov. 30.]

At the meeting Puebla, Querétaro, Michoacán, Guanajuato and S. L. Potosí states were represented by their governors, Zacatecas by her vice governor, and Jalisco by a commissioner. The President and the ministers were present. The meeting was advisory and confidential. The government took the ground that the war could not be continued and that Mexico should endeavor to obtain, not an honorable peace, but one as little humiliating as possible, and one that would save Mexican nationality; but it preferred war and promised to carry it on if given the necessary men and supplies. The governors naturally showed their repugnance to peace on such a basis, but could not offer adequate resources, and the one rational conclusion was inevitable. A report of the discussions may be found in the Gobernación archives, Mexico. The sessions began on Nov. 19 and concluded on Nov. 27. The insurrection came to a head on Dec. 19. News of Trist’s recall helped to quiet the war party (52Trist, no. 22).

6. Pillow, address in Chicago Daily Democrat, Sept. 15, 1857. Polk, Diary, Oct. 4, 5, 20–3, 25; Dec. 30, 1847; Jan. 2, 1848. 52Sec. state to Trist, Oct. 6, 25. Richardson, Messages, iv, 541. 335Memo. of Trist on despatch of Oct. 6. Sen. Rep. 261; 41, 2. Ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 59–61 (Trist).

A private 335note (Oct. 24) from Buchanan to Trist, taken in connection with Polk’s Diary, suggests a suspicion on the part of the administration that, in intimating that the United States might possibly not insist upon the Rio Grande line, Trist had purposely played into the hands of the Whigs, who were now asserting that the intermediate region did not belong to us. This suspicion and the idea that Trist was helping Scott to injure the President’s friends in the army would explain a great deal of wrath. Another personal 335note (Oct. 24) from Buchanan shows that the terms offered by Trist in September were now regarded as too moderate to be popular, and gives one the feeling that, especially since Trist had shown a disposition to weaken them, the prestige of the administration demanded his recall. Oct. 25 Buchanan said Trist had offered to give up a part of California, but Trist denied this (335memo.). Oct. 6 Marcy directed Scott to inform the Mexican authorities of Trist’s recall (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1008). Trist’s patriotism and sense of duty do not seem to have been affected by his recall. Nov. 27 he wrote to Buchanan that a commission should be sent to take up his work on the spot (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 230); and the next day, through Mrs. Trist, he 335adjured Buchanan to lose “not a minute” about this, proposing Scott and Butler. Dec. 31 Polk received indirectly a similar recommendation from Gen. Twiggs, and Sen. Davis (the Col. Davis of Monterey and Buena Vista) pointed out to him that, should Mexican commissioners go to Washington, probably their government would be overthrown during their absence, and they might be shot as traitors on their return (Diary, Dec. 31). Polk therefore virtually decided that Butler should take Trist’s place as well as Scott’s (ibid., Dec. 31; Jan. 2). Pillow (Address) attributed to his letter the recall of Trist.

7. Sen. Report 261; 41, 2. Ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 59–66 (Trist). Sen. 60; 30, 1, p. 61 (Peña). 52Trist, nos. 21, 23. 13Thornton, nos. 11, 14, 1847. 335Id.to Trist, Nov. 22, confid.; Nov. 22, private; Nov. 25. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 583, 585. 335Trist to Thornton, Nov. 24, confid., Nov. 25, private. 75Peña at meeting of govs. 52Peña to Trist, Nov. 22. Trist’s departure had to be delayed by the necessity of testifying at Pillow’s trial.

8. (Traitorous) London Times, Mar. 15, 1848. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 140, 144 (Scott). 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 28, 1848. Scott, Mems., ii, 576. 13Thornton, no. 21, confid. Id.to Trist: note 7. Sen. Rep. 261; 41, 2. Trist, no. 22. 13Id.to Thornton, Dec. 4, 1847. 335Id.to Id.., Nov. 24. 335Id.to wife, Dec. 4.

It has been said that Trist’s decision was due to Scott, but Trist was not under Scott’s control. Scott tried without success to dissuade him from breaking with Polk (335statement by Trist in his papers). Trist 335wrote to his wife, Dec. 4, “Knowing it to be the very last chance, and impressed with the dreadful consequences to our country which cannot fail to attend the loss of that chance,” I decided to-day at noon to attempt to make a treaty; the decision is altogether my own. Sen. Rep. 261, the basis of which was evidently supplied by Trist, says that Freaner, the correspondent of the New Orleans Delta, was “the only man who had been in any way instrumental in determining Mr. Trist to make the attempt.” It has also been said that Scott and Trist wished to make the treaty because Polk now wanted more of Mexico, and they desired to “spite” him; but neither man was of such a type, no suggestion of the scheme appears in Trist’s official or personal letters or in Thornton’s reports to the Foreign Office, and public considerations are quite enough to explain Trist’s course. Sen. Rep. 261 says that on Dec. 4 occurred an incident “in itself of the most casual, and trivial, and commonplace kind,” which led to Trist’s making the treaty. This has been thought to mean the postponement of the train with which he was to have gone down; but the above description does not seem to fit this important occurrence, and the author is inclined to believe that it refers to a chance meeting of Trist and Freaner, while Trist’s decision hung in the balance. Freaner was regarded by Trist as an honest man of unusual sagacity, and he was a strong, sympathetic character. Peña held that, since his peace commissioners had been appointed, he could deal with the subject through them only, and hence, as they were at a distance, he could not possibly send a proposal to Mexico for Trist to carry home, as it was suggested to him to do. Trist counted on one fact as lessening his responsibility: the government could disavow his work without embarrassment (52no. 22). See Napoleon’s dictum (chap. xxvii, note 17, p. 398).

9. 13Thornton, no. 21, confid., 1847. 13Doyle, nos. 1, 3, 1847; 10, 1848. 52Trist, nos. 23–5. 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Dec. 27, 1847, private. Sen. 60; 30, 1, pp. 61 (Peña), 62 (Trist). (Rincón) México á través, iv, 705–7. 335Memo. re withdrawal of notice. 335Thornton to Trist, Nov. 24, priv.; Dec. 5, 11, confid. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 590. 335Trist to Peña, Dec. 26, 1847. Lee, Gen. Lee, 43. Noticias Muy Importantes. Richardson, Messages, iv, 545. 335Powers of the commrs. 335Trist, minutes of meetings, etc.

Doyle arrived at Vera Cruz on Nov. 30, and soon received from the Foreign Office a despatch (13no. 40) making clear its attitude of benevolent neutrality (Doyle, no. 3). Polk’s message encouraged the Eventualists, because it showed that if they could defeat the present negotiations, the war would continue, the peace party would fall from power, and then the Eventualists would have American support in setting up a government according to their ideas. Rincón pretended to be ill. Associated with the ministry of Relaciones at this time as confidential advisers were such men as Pedraza, Lafragua and Cuevas.

10. Sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 21. 335Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 24, personal. 335—— to Id.., Oct. 25. 335Dimond to Id.., Oct. 27. 73Lozano, no. 3, res., 1847. 335Trist, notes and memoranda. 335Notes of Trist and Couto. 335Thornton’s translation of Mexican draft of treaty. 335Notes from Doyle and Thornton. (Unreasonable) México á través, iv, 706. Sierra, Evolution, i, 223. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 592, 596–7. 13Doyle, nos. 10 (with memoranda), 29, 1848. 13Palmerston to Mora, June 20, 1848. 52Trist, no. 27. Exposición dirigida, 6. (Trist’s conduct) Negrete, Invasión, iv, 324.

Trist relied for guidance on his original instructions (Ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 43–7), the projet of a treaty accompanying the instructions (ibid., p. 47), 52instructions of July 13 and 19, 1847, former treaties of the United States, and our general principles and policy (52Trist, no. 27). See also Polk’s Diary, Apr. 13, 1847. In regard to the western end of the boundary the instructions were faulty, and Trist found it necessary to use his judgment (52enclosure in his no. 27). Greatly fearing the designs of the Monarchists, he desired to have a secret article binding upon Mexico the constitution of 1824, and was willing to promise in return that enough American troops to support the government should remain five years; but the proposition was declined (13Doyle, no. 10, 1848). There was a difficulty in doing anything about Tehuantepec, for British interests were involved, and that matter was dropped by Trist in order to facilitate the adjustment of the boundary (Exposición, supra). It did not signify much now, for the United States had its eye upon a better route (J. S. Reeves in Amer. Hist. Rev., x, 323). The subject that consumed the most time was the status of the people of the surrendered territory (Trist, no. 27). The Mexicans asked that their civil law should continue to rule there until the territory should be organized into states, but Trist (perhaps in the interest of slavery) would not consent (13Doyle, no. 10).

11. 13Doyle, nos. 10, 12, 13, 1848. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 568, 579, 591, 602–3, 605–6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1039 (Scott). 52Trist, nos. 25–7. México á través, iv, 706–8. 335Trist to wife, Dec. 26, 1847; to Scott, Jan. 28, 1848; to commrs., Jan. 29, 1848. 13Doyle to commrs., Jan. 28–9. (S. L. P.) 83Gov. S. L. P. to gov. Querétaro, Feb. 5, 1848; 77Relaciones, circular, Jan. 17; Nacional, Jan. 26 (plan); Feb. 2; Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 41, 43; México á través, iv, 706. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 28.

Peña became the chief executive again because the expiration of Anaya’s term (ordered by the Congress that elected him to occur on Jan. 8, since it was expected that the new Congress would have assembled by that date) left the country without a head, and the position devolved upon him as chief of the supreme court. L. de la Rosa was then appointed minister of relations. The plan of the S. L. P. governor was that four states—S. L. P., Zacatecas, Guanajuato and Jalisco—should combine, repudiate the national government, and continue the war, expecting other states to join them; but public opinion, even in his own state, failed to support him. Almonte was actively working against peace at this time, basing his arguments particularly on the attitude of the peace party in the United States and the poverty of the American treasury. Jan. 30 he called attention to the Whig majority in our House, said our Congress would probably refuse to send more troops to Mexico, and urged the Mexican government to procrastinate. The reply of the government was a mere acknowledgment of receipt. Feb. 14 he argued that Walker’s report showed we could not continue the war much longer. On the other hand there seems to be some reason to believe that personal relations and interests may have influenced the Mexican commissioners in favor of making the treaty (Puga y Acal, Documentos, letter no. 74). Marcy to Scott, Oct. 6, 1847: Your military operations are not to be modified by Mexican proposals to negotiate (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 140).

12. 13Thornton, no. 11, 1847. 13Doyle, nos. 4, 1847; 13, 14 and 18, 1848. Sen. 60; 30, 1, p. 65 (Trist). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1082 (Scott). Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 604–7. 13Doyle to commrs., Jan. 28, 29; to Rosa, Jan. 29. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 315–6. México á través, iv, 706–8. 335Memo. from Freaner.

The Mexican government naturally desired to keep all information about the treaty from its enemies. The public came to believe, however, that an important act had taken place on Feb. 2. Freaner carried the treaty to Washington. For two weeks escorts had been waiting at the proper points on the road to Vera Cruz. The Spanish representative, under his instructions, took no part in these negotiations. The Prussian minister, lacking both official authorization and personal influence, was equally inactive. France had no minister on the scene.

Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 557) says that “no man who so palpably disobeys the direct instructions of his government” as did Trist, could be fit to negotiate a treaty; suggests (p. 564) that it was improper to let the British coöperate in the matter; and argues (pp. 582–4) that Scott should have broken up the negotiations or else assumed the full responsibility for them, withholding from the Mexican government the fact of Trist’s recall. All this and the rest are mere fault-finding, and the critic could and would have been much more severe, had the course he recommended been adopted. Of course he proves the obvious facts that Scott and Trist, in the interest of two nations and to accomplish what their government ardently desired, at great personal risk disregarded mistaken instructions, accepted British assistance without which they would probably have failed, and obtained a treaty which Polk himself, though he hated both of them, felt constrained to accept; but this was a truly glorious achievement. Scott had no right to act as Ripley says he should have done. The armistice, a military affair, was properly his concern, but negotiating a treaty was diplomatic business. Mackintosh, says Ripley (p. 563), had a hand in the negotiations, but this seems to be an error. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 524–5) says “it might perhaps have been well to replace Trist by a stronger man.” But every possible man had been considered (p. 126), and a stronger man would probably have tried to drive the Mexicans and have failed. Trist they liked and trusted, yet could not deceive or frighten.

The chief points of the treaty signed on Feb. 2 were as follows (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 38): Art. 1. Peace. 2. Immediate armistice, and so far as possible a restoration of the constitutional order in the places occupied by the Americans. 3. After ratification by both governments the blockade to cease, the customhouses held by the Americans to be given up, and the interior to be evacuated as soon as practicable. Mexico to assist. Duties collected after Mexico’s ratification to be paid over to her. 4. Immediately on the exchange of ratifications all Mexican places and public property to be given up, and all prisoners surrendered. The process to be completed within three months, unless the sickly season should require American troops to remain longer at designated points. 5. The new boundary (Rio Grande, southern and western lines of New Mexico, the Gila, the Colorado, the line between upper and lower California). The line to be run and marked by a joint commission within a year after the exchange of ratifications. No change in it to be made except with the free and formal consent of both nations. 6. The United States may navigate the Gulf of California and the Colorado to the Gila, and the two governments will arrange for “a road, canal, or railway” within a marine league of the Gila, should it be found practicable. 7. The navigation of the Gila and of the Rio Grande to New Mexico to be free to both countries. 8. All Mexicans in the transferred territory may go or stay, will have full power over their property, and may elect within a year to remain Mexican citizens. 9. Mexicans not so electing shall be “admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States,” and meantime shall have the rights “now vested in them according to the Mexican laws.” No interference with Roman Catholic worship, property or ecclesiastical administration. 10. Mexican grants of lands (made before May 13, 1846) to be valid, and the period for fulfilling conditions to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications. 11. The United States to prevent or punish Indian incursions from its territory, and exact satisfaction for damage done, etc. 12. The United States to pay Mexico $15,000,000. (As to method of payment, see p. 248.) 13. The United States to pay the claims against Mexico already decided. 14. Also to assume all other claims arising before Feb. 2, 1848. 15. The latter claims are to be passed upon by an American commission (which will be supplied by Mexico, on demand, with needed books, etc.), and not more than $3,250,000 may be paid to satisfy the claims. 16. Each nation may fortify any point within its territory. 17. The commercial treaty of 1831, so far as compatible with this treaty, revived for eight years. 18. Supplies for American troops in Mexico to enter free of duty. 19. Provisions respecting merchandise brought into Mexican ports occupied by the Americans. 20. A provision regarding certain merchandise arriving at Mexican ports shortly after the restoration of the customhouses. 21. Should difficulties arise between the two countries, negotiations and arbitration—not reprisals or hostilities—to be employed, unless the circumstances forbid. 22. Provisions for resident merchants and prisoners in case of war between the two nations. 23. Ratifications to be exchanged at Washington in four months or, if practicable, sooner. Secret article. The four months of Art. 23 may be extended to eight months.

13. If we hold that Texas extended only to New Mexico, the treaty gave us 619,275 square miles (Donaldson, Public Domain, 124, 134). (Little) 198Gallatin, note on peace treaty; Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 618; 13Palmerston to Mora, June 20, 1848. The U. S. Supreme Court held (Merryman vs. Bourne, 9 Wallace, 592) that the acquisition of California was “complete on the seventh of July, 1846.” It said, “Conquest is a valid title, while the victor maintains the exclusive possession of the conquered country”; and the United States intended to do this in the region we took. On this and other points see Klein, Treaty, 247–81; Butler, Treaty-Making Power, i, 78, 168–9; U. S. Cavalry Journal, xxv, p. 18; Reid, Problems, 271–5. It was necessary to take territory from Mexico to offset our claims, quashed by the war (Richardson, Messages, iv, 537), and partially offset the costs of a war forced upon us, for, had the treaty awarded us a money indemnity, she would not have been willing and morally able, even if theoretically able, to pay it. (See Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 40–1.) Aside from the question of right, too, the American people would have been profoundly dissatisfied to see our armies return empty-handed, and this feeling would probably have meant more, to Mexico than the loss of her nominal territory (see Root in Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., p. 395). Mexico could give up more easily what she did than any equivalent territory. (Map) Gadsden line at N. E. is disputed.

An apparent inconsistency may be noted here, for on p. 138 of vol. i it was intimated that an agreement with Mexico was needed to fix the boundary of Texas. The explanation is that the United States had demonstrated its ability to hold the line, but the republic of Texas was not strong enough to prevent Mexican troops from going and remaining north of the Rio Grande.

The Mexican commissioners rejected the line of 32°, desired by the United States (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 91), for three reasons: 1, it would be for a long distance only a mathematical boundary; 2, it was liable, when surveyed, to cut off important points like Paso del Norte; 3, it would prevent land communication between Sonora and lower California (Exposición dirigida). It was proposed at one time to divide S. Diego, but for that concession Trist demanded too much. Besides, S. Diego belonged distinctly to upper California. Lower California was relinquished because inaccessible and poor. Not only for sentimental reasons but because otherwise the treaty, they believed, could not possibly be ratified, the Mexican commissioners were determined to hold all of Sonora and Chihuahua. Tamaulipas, happily, had made no protest against relinquishing her claim to the intermediate region (52Trist, no. 27). To ask the consent of the people in the acquired territory was not deemed necessary by the United States (Butler, op. cit., i, 83–4), but citizenship was not forced upon Mexicans by the treaty (art. viii). Art. x was demanded by the Mexicans (13Doyle, no. 10, 1848). Art. xix harmonized the American pledge that goods imported during our occupation of the ports should pay only the American tariff (52Buchanan to Trist, June 14, 1847), with the Mexican view that our tariff could not be operative beyond the limits of our occupation (Exposición dirigida).

An error regarding the assumption of our claims has prevailed. Two classes of claims were provided for: 1, those liquidated under the convention of 1839 but not covered by the three Mexican instalments (vol. i, p. 81); 2, all unliquidated claims antedating Feb. 2, 1848. Under the first head the United States paid, under the act approved July 29, 1848 (Statutes at Large, ix, 265), $2,090,253.19 including interest (A. J. Peters, asst. sec. treas. to the author, Nov. 30, 1915); under the second head the claims commission awarded (in 1852) $3,208,314.96, including interest (Sen. 34; 32, 1; documents preserved in the state dept.). The treaty provided that under the second head the U. S. should not be liable for more than $3,250,000. The phraseology of our projet regarding this matter, when literally translated, did not readily penetrate the Mexican mind, and hence was re-worked (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 294). Roa Bárcena (Recuerdos, chap. xxxiv) gives many interesting details derived from the papers of Couto. Other details may be found in the Trist papers, Doyle’s reports, and the Exposición dirigida (Negrete, Invasión, iv, 296).

14. The armistice. 13Thornton, no. 21, 1847, confid. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 590–1. 13Doyle, nos. 10, 28, 29, 1848. 52Trist, no. 26. 335Thornton to Trist, Nov. 22, 1847, confid. 335Trist to Scott, Jan. 28, 1848. 335[Peña] to Mex. commrs., Jan. 11, private. 76Many communications, principally between the Mexican government and the Mexican armistice commrs. (instructions, reports, etc.), Feb., 1848. 60Butler to Marcy, Mar. 3, 13. 76Id.., Feb. 21, appmt. of W. and S. 76Lay to Mora, Apr. 27. 76To Lombardini, Mar. 4. (Terms) Dublán, Legislación, v, 345–8; Negrete, Invasión, iv, 334, 342; 111Butler, gen. orders, no. 18, Mar. 6, 1848. 76Circular, Mar. 10. México á través, iv, 706, 709. 76Otero, Mar. 31. 291Winship to Pierce, Mar. 5. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 140 (Scott).

As we have seen, the Mexican government had frowned on elections held in occupied territory, probably fearing American pressure upon the voters. The reader may note an apparent inconsistency here. The war is represented sometimes as so lucrative that its continuance was desired by Mexicans, and yet it is said that the districts occupied by our troops felt its burdens, and for that reason desired peace. Both currents of sentiment existed. In some districts and at some times the one predominated; in other districts and at other times the other. Doyle assisted materially in the armistice negotiations. The armistice was signed on Mar. 2. Its terms were: 1, suspension of hostilities; 2, neither side to extend its occupation of territory; 3, all civilians to travel freely, all military persons under white flag; 4, “contributions” for February and March under American 65orders 376 and 395 to be suspended, etc.; 5, Mexicans to exercise full political rights, and officials recognized by the Mexican government to be recognized by the Americans; *6, no Americans to interfere with Mexican elections; *7, Mexican authorities to levy and collect taxes; *8, Mexican postal facilities might be re-established, and the Americans would protect them; *9, the Mexican government might take the stocks of monopolized articles; *10, public offices not occupied by Americans to be given up, and also, as soon as conveniently possible, all religious and charitable buildings; *11, Mexican courts to act exclusively except when a person belonging to the American army was originally a party, or the interest of the American government is concerned; *12, police to be established; *13, person and property to be protected; *14, Mexico to act freely against savages on the northern frontier, and American commanders to help with influence; 15, church property to be respected; 16, armed bodies assembled anywhere, to commit hostilities not authorized by either government, to be opposed by both governments; 17, the armistice to remain in force during the period fixed by the treaty, unless notice of terminating it is given. The starred articles have particular reference to territory occupied by the Americans. Some of the articles merely make obligatory what the Americans had been doing. Next after Art. 1, Art. 16 was chiefly important. The purpose of it was to prevent insurrections, and it could not fail to have that effect. The first intention was to keep Art. 16 secret, but the wisdom of publishing it soon became clear. The armistice was published at Querétaro on March 11. Some slight and unavoidable violations of it, particularly in the pursuit of guerillas, occurred, but no serious trouble.

15. Polk, Diary, Feb. 19. (Learned) Vol. i, p. 123. Calhoun Corresp., 1119–21. 137Fisher to Calhoun, May 25, 1847. 52Trist, no. 27. 210Simms to Hammond, Jan. 15, 1847. Nat. Intellig., May 19; Nov. 20, 1847. N. Y. Sun, May 17, 20; Aug. 20–1, 1847. London Times, Oct. 29, 1847. Dodd, Walker, 25. Bourne, Essays, 227–36. Benton, View, ii, 704. 108Storms to Bancroft, July 23, 1846. (Baker) Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 279. (Secession) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 204–14, 287. U. S. Mag., Feb., 1847, p. 100.

16. Polk, Diary, May 13, 1846; Nov. 23; Dec. 7, 1847; Feb. 21, 1848. 13Crampton, nos. 59, 1847; 8, 9, 1848. 108Bancroft to Greene, Nov. 3, 1847. Richardson, Messages, iv, 541. 345Niles to Van Buren, Jan. 20, 1848. 108Buchanan to Bancroft, Dec. 29, 1846, priv. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 197. Foote, Remins., 220. Monitor Repub., Mar. 10, 1848 (C. Landa). Calhoun Corresp., 741 (to A. P. C. and Mrs. C.). N. Y. Journ. Comm., Dec. 11, 1847; Feb. 4, 1848. N. Y. Herald (weekly), Nov. 30, 1847. N. Y. Sun, Jan. 24, 1848. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, pp. 157–60 (Dickinson), 215 (Crittenden), 219 (Foote), 256 (Dix), 302 (Sevier), 321 (Cass); app., 488 (Tompkins), 349 (Breese). Nat. Intellig., Jan. 31, 1848 (Cass). 345Blair to Van Buren, Dec. 29, 1847.

17. 13Crampton, no. 19, 1848. 345Niles to Van Buren, Jan. 20, 1848. 345Dix to Id.., Jan. 27, 1848. (Mad) 335Statement by Trist, Nov. 4, 1857. Calhoun Corresp., 742 (to C.), 751 (to J. E. C.). Public Ledger, Jan. 4, 1848. N. Y. Sun, May 17, 1848. Bourne, Essays, 235. Cong. Globe, see note 16; also 428 (Cabell). Meade in Ho., Jan. 31, 1848, and Ho. debate on Ten Regt. Bill, Jan. 24-Feb. 3, passim. Niles, Feb. 5, 1848, p. 354. Sen. Misc., 8; 30, 1. 137Hatcher to Calhoun, Jan. 5, 1848.

18. Polk, Diary, Sept. 4, 7, 1847; Jan. 4, 15, 24–5, 1848. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 146, 148 (Marcy). 52Trist, nos. 22, 25. 335Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 27, 1847, priv. 335Trist to Thornton, Nov. 24, confid.; to wife (for Buchanan), Nov. 28. 13Crampton, no. 38, 1847. 132Buchanan, memo., Jan. 5, 1848. 60Butler to Trist and reply, Mar. 17, 18, 1848.

19. Polk, Diary, Jan. 4, 5, 23, 1847; Feb. 19–21, 1848. 52Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 6, 25, 1847. Amer. Rev., Feb., 1848, p. 110 (Everything done by Congress for the war has been done under Polk’s pledge to make peace as soon as justice and honor could be satisfied.). Richardson, Messages, iv, 544, 573–5. (P.’s looks) Monitor Repub., Mar. 10, 1848 (C. Landa); Tyler, Tyler, ii, 457. W. E. Dodd in Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, pp. 17–23. Id.., Walker, 25–6. Picayune, Feb. 26; Mar. 3, 1848. (Sevier) Wash. Union, Feb. 4, 1848. 13Crampton, no. 19, 1848.

Polk intimated to the Senate that the treaty would need to be amended. Trist was confidentially authorized to pay $20,000,000 for what he actually obtained, $5,000,000 more for Lower California, and $5,000,000 for the right of transit across the isthmus of Tehuantepec (Polk, Diary, Apr. 13, 1847; Ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 44).

20. Polk, Diary, Feb. 19–21. 297Report of Cabinet meeting, Feb. 20, certified by Polk’s private secy. Sen. Report 261; 41, 2. Sen. 69; 30, 1, pp. 66–72 (Buchanan). 13Crampton, no. 21, 1848. Richardson, Messages, iv, 573–5. Klein, Treaty, Public Ledger, June 15, 1849 (Dallas).

Buchanan probably desired to have the treaty go to the Senate. He would then share in the credit of the administration, should it be popular, and in the contrary event would be able to say that he opposed it (Polk, Diary, Feb. 21). Polk’s accepting the treaty as the best agreement that could be obtained under the circumstances completely vindicated Trist’s decision to make it and Scott’s coöperation.

In April, 1848, the question of occupying Yucatan came up. The indigenes appeared to be on the point of exterminating the whites and as a desperate resource Yucatan offered herself simultaneously to England, France and the United States. Apr. 29 Polk recommended intervention to Congress, and this has been thought (Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, 17–23) to mean that he was ready to take Yucatan, upset the treaty, and bring about the dismemberment—perhaps the annexation—of Mexico. But the treaty, which had now been ratified by our Senate, contained in art. 5 a provision expressly intended to prevent us from annexing more of Mexico’s territory without her consent (see Buchanan to Hilliard, Works, viii, 56), and to believe that after giving this pledge our Executive proposed to reverse his entire policy regarding Mexico and be guilty of such bad faith would require much more evidence than we have. It seems to the author that humanity combined with an avowed desire to keep European powers out of Yucatan fully explain what Polk did (see Polk’s Diary, Apr. 25). Congress decided against occupying Yucatan. Its troubles were settled by an agreement between the two parties (Nat. Intelligencer, May 17).

21. Sherman Letters, 46–7. Polk, Diary, Feb. 28. Public Ledger, June 15, 1849 (Dallas). N. Y. Journ. Commerce, Feb. 25–6; Mar. 1, 11. Niles, Feb. 26, 1848, pp. 401–3. 139Fulton to Campbell, Mar. 5. 198Berrien to Gallatin, June 7. Morse, J. Q. Adams, 307–8. Adams was stricken down two days after the treaty reached Washington. By this time the Senators understood its contents fairly well, no doubt.

22. Polk, Diary, Feb. 25-Mar. 10; Apr. 27. 13Crampton, no. 21, 1848. Meigs, Benton, 378. Benton, View, ii, 694. 210Woodward to Hammond, Feb. 23. 210Alvord to Id.., Feb. 24. Calhoun Corresp., 743 (to Mrs. C.), 745 (to T. G. C.). (Politicians) Benton, View, ii, 710. 253McLean, remarks. 345Blair to Van Buren, Mar. 3, 1848. N. Y. Journ. Commerce, Feb. 25; Mar. 1–3, 7, 11. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 3–37 (proceedings). Wash. Union, Mar. 2, 4. Balt. Clipper, Mar. 4. Balt. Patriot, Mar. 3. Nat. Intellig., Feb. 28; Mar. 4. Public Ledger, Feb. 24. N. Y. Herald, Oct. 30, 1847. Johnson, Douglas, 123. Webster, Writings, x, 3–33. Boston Courier, Feb. 24, 1848. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 497 (Dayton).

The Whigs were suspected of trying to gain enough Democratic support so that they could not be charged with beating the treaty as a party (Polk, Diary, Mar. 3; Public Ledger, Mar. 8). Webster’s policy was not only unpatriotic but unintelligent, for a continuation of the war would probably have led either to defeat or to larger acquisitions; but perhaps he believed no bad results would occur before the next Presidential election. He knew the country as a whole wanted the treaty ratified for the sake of peace (Writings, x, 7), and he was unable to make the New England Whig Senators join him against the treaty. Calhoun wrote to Gallatin that, owing to diversity of opinion in the Senate, not even a majority could have been obtained for any proposition different from the corresponding proposition of the treaty (198Mar. 13, 1848). What increased the danger involved in rejecting the treaty was the prospect that, with both Scott and Taylor out of the field, operations—even should they not become unsuccessful—would lack the interest which had largely prevented the public from thinking of the cost and other ills of the conflict, and hence it would be impossible to support the war (132W. R. King to Buchanan, Oct. 5, 1847; Seward, Seward at Wash., i, 62). Feb. 28 the committee on foreign relations reported the treaty without recommendation. Webster at once proposed a commission. His motion was tabled Mar. 2 (Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 4, 9).

For Frémont (Benton’s son-in-law) see chap. xxxi, note 19.

Benton was probably opposed to the treaty also because he had held that Texas ended at the Nueces. There was a particular reason for saying that we obtained the new territory by cession rather than by conquest. The latter construction would have raised the troublesome questions, What place is there under our Constitution for a conquered province, and what right has our government to hold foreigners in subjection (210B. Tucker to Hammond, Mar. 16, 1848)? Four senators did not vote. For an analysis of the vote see Rives, op. cit., ii, 636–7.

23. Dallas in Public Ledger, June 15, 1849. Sen. 69; 30, 1, pp. 66–72 (Buchanan). Art. 10 was thought insulting to Texas and contrary to the terms of annexation. Probably American courts would not have enforced it, and almost certainly it would have caused much litigation. Sevier and Clifford were authorized to give Mexico (if necessary), after her ratification of the amended treaty, a choice between the two methods of payment (52to S. and C., Mar. 22, 1848). For the treaty as drawn and as amended see Ho. 50; 30, 2.

24. Polk, Diary, Mar. 11, 12, 14–18, 20, 23. Welles papers. 52Buchanan to Clifford, Mar. 18, 1848. Polk to Senate, Mar. 18: Richardson, Messages, iv, 577. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 318. Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 47–52 (Buchanan), 55 (Clifford, Sevier). Benton, View, ii, 711. 335Memoranda.

The amount paid for nominal services in securing the consummation (in Mexico) of Trist’s treaty was $28,728.67, while he received nothing for doing the real work. Years later he was paid (Sen. Rep. 261; 41, 2). It is true that disgust with Polk’s course toward Scott and himself, and particularly with Polk’s employing a man like Pillow, led Trist to say he would not serve again under Polk (335Nov. 28, 1847); but had the President now acted a manly part, Trist would no doubt have accepted the appointment given to Sevier. For R. E. Lee’s feeling on the matter see Lee, Gen. Lee, 46. In the night of Mar. 11 Maj. Graham left Washington to notify Butler of the ratification of the treaty (Polk, Diary). Buchanan’s letter to the minister of relations (Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 47–52) gave a conciliatory explanation of the amendments.

25. 13Doyle, nos. 18, 29, 1848. 83Relaciones, circular, Feb. 6. 76Circulars, Feb. 16, 18. Atalaya, Feb. 2, 1848. Correo Nacional, Feb. 7. Kenly, Md. Vol., 464. Exposición dirigida. Negrete, Invasión, iv, 296–334. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 615, 619. Rejón, Observaciones. Communicación circular. México á través, iv, 708–9. Eco del Comercio, Mar. 15. 80Junta legislativa of Méx. state to gov., Dec. 17, 1847; reply from Peña, Dec. 28. In view of previous notes, further citations here seem unnecessary.

26. (Impression) Polk, Diary, Mar. 9; Calhoun Corresp., 757 (to T. G. C.). 60Butler to Marcy, Mar. 3, 13; Apr. 7. 13Doyle, nos. 18, 29, 41, 52, 1848. Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 55–6 (S. and C.), 72 (Rosa). Correo Nacional, Feb. 7. México á través, iv, 710. Long, Memoirs, 62. Apuntes, 393. (Hunt up) 291Winship to Pierce, Mar. 5. 52Trist, nos. 25, 27, 29. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 64. 125Bonham to mother, May 14. Picayune, Feb. 27. (Hawked) Wash. Union, Apr. 9, 25 (letters from Mexico).

It was feared that Polk’s haste in sending Sevier and Clifford would lead the Mexican Congress to feel that we were eager for peace; that the inexperience of those diplomats might tempt the Mexicans to test their ability; that the recall of Scott and Trist would have an unfavorable influence, and that Mexican Congressmen might hold off in order to be bought by the Americans with funds said to have been provided for the purpose (Polk, Diary, Feb. 7). On the other hand the refusal of the government to appropriate any part of the fifteen millions coming from the United States produced a good effect. It was an excellent sign that Almonte failed to get elected to the Senate. A quorum assembled May 3. Congress opened formally May 7. By May 9 the treaty was before it.

27. Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 61 (S. and C.), 62–72, 76. Apuntes, 393–5. Exposición dirigida. Negrete, Invasión, iv, 296; app., 399. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 295–6. México á través, iv, 710. Public Ledger, June 15, 1849 (Dallas). (Preparations) Richardson, Messages, iv, 544, 546. Wash. Union, June 9. Nat. Intellig., Mar. 14. 13Crampton, no. 19, 1848. 13Doyle, no. 54, 1848.

Peña said he regretted the amendments but—especially since no new negotiation was deemed possible—did not think the treaty should be rejected on account of them. The vote in the Chamber of Deputies, May 19, was 51 to 35; in the Senate, May 24, 33 to 4 (60Butler to Marcy, May 26). Action of the New Mexico Legislative Assembly looking toward absorption in the United States was of great assistance, for it stopped the cry that loyal citizens were being sold. Some 300–500 American deserters, who were at Querétaro, took a strong stand for peace, because they were likely to be captured and shot, should the war continue; and the Mexicans felt considerable responsibility for the deserters. Polk’s Message of Dec. 7, 1847, declared strongly for pushing the war at the expense of Mexico, if she would not make a treaty, and announced that California and New Mexico would not in any event be relinquished. Under this spur our Congress voted additional forces. The Whigs held off, but dared not refuse to support the war (p. 291). The speeches particularly worthy of attention were those of Cass (Mar. 14) and Webster (Mar. 23). Noisy popular demonstrations of joy were lacking because there had been no business disturbances, no invasion and no sinking of ships, the seat of war was distant, for nine months nothing striking had occurred there, Taylor and Scott were out of the field, and few had personal reasons for feeling interested in our Mexican relations.

28. Richardson, Messages, iv, 679–87. Sen. 69; 30, 1, pp. 72–3. Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 56–79. 60Butler to Marcy, May 21. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. Kendall, Narrative (N. Y., 1844), ii, 185, 192. (Distance) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1047 (Scott). Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 267–70. Richardson, Messages, iv, 630, 644. Nat. Intellig., June 24, 1848. Portrait of Peña: city hall, Mex.

Apparently the Mexican government deferred the appearance of Sevier and Clifford at Querétaro (especially as they insisted upon having an American escort) lest it should seem to be acting under pressure or lest some untoward accident should occur. This course was doubtless wise. May 19 they were invited to come, for the Deputies had just ratified the treaty and the Senators were sure to do so. Sevier was ill on May 26. He returned to the United States soon after the formalities were concluded, but Clifford remained as our minister. Rosa arrived at Washington in November, 1848, as the minister of Mexico. During their stay at Querétaro our commissioners were led to embody in a protocol some explanations of the treaty. In 1849 the Mexicans asserted that the protocol gave them additional advantages; and the Whigs—apparently encouraged by Benton, who was accused of acting in collusion with the Mexican minister—undertook to make trouble for the administration and perhaps invalidate the treaty. But it was unreasonable to pretend that such a document could modify a treaty previously ratified by the American Senate and the Mexican Congress. Besides, Sevier and Clifford gave explicit notice, before drawing up the protocol, that they had no power to modify the treaty (52Clifford to Cuevas, Apr. 30, 1849). At length the Mexican government admitted formally that the protocol was merely explanatory (52Lacunza to Clifford, July 13, 1849). See also on this subject Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 76–9. Polk, Diary, Feb. 4, 6, 8, 10, 1849. Foote, Remins., 332–5. Sen. 1; 31, 1, pp. 69–89. Ho. 5, pt. 1, 31, 1, pp. 69–89. Meigs, Benton, 378–9. Richardson, Messages, iv, 679–87. Foster, Amer. Diplom., 320. Buchanan, Works, viii, 350 (to C.).

29. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. The chief cause of difficulty was that Clifford referred certain matters to Washington that he should have settled himself, and thus caused delay. The worst consequence was that the customhouse at Vera Cruz did not pass into Mexican hands at the appointed time, because no one had authority to surrender it. At length, however, Gen. Smith assumed the responsibility of doing this, and Clifford endorsed his action. Similar difficulties arose at Tampico and Mazatlán. (On this topic one may consult: 52Buchanan to Clifford, Aug. 15, 1848; 13Giffard, Apr. 10; July 16; 52Clifford to Smith, June 27; July 4; 52Smith to Clifford, July 8; and reply, July 18; 52Otero to Clifford, June 21; July 1; Buchanan, Works, viii, 177, 268, 272, 284.) Complaint was made because a body of our troops, in order to go from Monterey, Mex., to New Mexico, crossed territory not actually in our possession. June 30 arrangements were completed for paying the $3,000,000 which Trist, and then Butler, had been authorized to draw (Polk, Diary, Feb. 23; 52Clifford, no. 15; Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 107–9). July 4 the treaty was duly proclaimed by Polk (Richardson, Messages, iv, 627; Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 173); and two days later he recommended that provision be made for carrying it into effect (details in note 31). Mexico appropriated funds to bring from the surrendered territory such of her citizens as might desire to leave it (Negrete, Invasión, iv, 342–9).

30. Evacuation of northeastern Mexico. 61Wool to Jones, Mar. 21; June 8, 15; 61Jones to Butler, May 17; 61Id.. to Wool, June 7, 17; 65gen. orders 25; 65Wool, orders 156, June 12 (announcing that peace had been made); 76A. de Leano, Monterey, June 25 (possession given yesterday); 76Aguirre to Id.., Saltillo, June 29 (S. evacuated, June 14). 76Clarke to Mex. commander, Mazapil, Mar. 18. July 6, 61Wool wrote to the adj. gen. from the Brazos that four cos. of dragoons would soon set out for California, and Bragg’s battery and one co. of dragoons for S. Fe under orders from the war dept.; and that all the volunteers except five mounted cos. had embarked.

The northwest. 61Price to Rails, Apr. 16; 61Id.to vice gov. Chihuahua, Apr. 16; México á través, iv, 710; 76Price to Mex. commrs., May 1; 69Wool to Marcy, June 22; 61Id.. to adj. gen., July 6. On Aug. 6 news of peace and the retention of upper Calif. (which went overland from La]* Paz in Lower Calif.) reached Mason at Monterey. He then ordered the N. Y. vols. discharged. This process was completed on Oct. 26 (Sen. 18; 31, 1, pp. 573, 626). 61Mason to adj. gen., Aug. 19 (anticipatory orders given to Burton in Lower Calif. to evacuate on learning of peace). Sen. 18; 31, 1, p. 513 (Burton to Mason, June 27: official news of peace have come).

Naval evacuation. Ho. 50; 30, 2, p. 52 (Buchanan). 48Mason to Shubrick or Jones, Mar. 11, confid. 48Id.to Jones, June 27 (Polk wished to retain Lower Calif., but did not wish to prevent peace by insisting; do what you rightfully can to help friendly Mexicans come to the U. S., if they wish to do so). July 15 at La Paz 47Jones and Shubrick agreed that such persons should be transported to California, and that, in extreme cases of destitution caused by Mexican vengeance, reasonable compensation should be made out of the military contributions collected in that quarter. 76Comte. gen. Sonora, July 13 (U. S. vessels left Guaymas July 5). Gaxiola, Invasión, 215 (Lavallette evacuated Mazatlán June 17). The treaty had been received at Mazatlán on June 13. Ho. 50; 30, 2, p. 52 (B.). 52Jones to Anaya, June 13.

31. 60Butler to Marcy, May 21; June 2. 80Memo., May 30. 13Doyle, no. 66, 1848. 52Clifford, no. 13, 1848. México á través, iv, 711. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 88. (Herrera) 52Rosa to Sevier and Clifford, June 2; 80Relaciones circular, June 13. Grant, Mems., i, 118. Sen. Rep. 32; 34, 1 (Naylor).

Arrangements were made by Butler and the ayuntamiento so that local Mexican guards began to patrol the city as soon as the Americans marched out (92memo.). Our troops began to leave the capital on May 30 (60Butler to Marcy, June 2). The order of march was: heavy artillery; Patterson’s division (vols.); Marshall’s division (vols.); Col. Bonham and third division (regulars); Kearny and second division (regulars); Butler and first division (regulars). Divisions were as a rule two days apart. Worth remained at the capital for a time after June 12 to dispose of surplus property. After Butler sailed (June 21) Worth was in command. July 6 Polk presented the consummated treaty to Congress, recommending the appropriation of $12,000,000 for Mexico, provision for a commissioner and a surveyor to run and mark the boundary line, and provision for commissioners to adjust the American claims against Mexico assumed by the United States (Richardson, Messages, iv, 587–93). Herrera was declared President on May 30.

32. 61Thomas to Brooke, May 21. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 585. 13Giffard to Doyle, Aug. 1. México á través, iv, 711. 61P. F. Smith, July 11. 61Worth to Smith, June 27. 254McClellan to “Tom,” May 23. (Symbol) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 911 (Scott). (Verse) Oswandel, Notes, 587.

It seems unnecessary to cite the numerous orders regarding details.

For the embarkation see Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 201. For one reason or another a few men remained in Mexico. There was a plan to march some of the troops north from the capital, but it did not seem wise to ask the consent of the Mexican Congress. The original intention was to have the men going by water land as near their homes as practicable, but the northern men objected strenuously to the tedious voyage. The Mexicans and Americans awaiting execution were released. The members of the Mexican Spy Co. were offered $20 apiece and a trip to Texas. Our sick and wounded soldiers were provided for on their arrival in the United States.

1. On Mexican finances see also vol. ii, pp. 6–8.

2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1070, table. Sen. 14; 30, 1, pp. 13–24. 61Scott, memoir on Mexican finances received at the war dept., Jan. 6, 1848. Mexican national accounts were kept in so peculiar a way, and the officials were so much more anxious to conceal than to reveal the truth, that it would be extremely difficult and very likely impossible to state precisely all the details regarding the finances of the government.

3. Ramírez, México, 243–4. Dublán, Legislación, v, 135, 172, 211, 240, 246, 255, 261–3, 286. 80Guerra to Hacienda, Sept. 8, 1847. Diario, Dec. 31, 1846; June 17; July 6, 1847. 76Guerra, circulars, June 17; July 6, 1847. S. Anna, Apelación, 67. 82Proclam. of act’g. gov. Puebla, Nov. 30, 1847. 80Méx. state legislature, address, Apr. 26, 1847. 76S. Anna, Nov. 16, 1846. Vera Cruz state, or at least her governor, showed much zeal, but all her resources were needed for home use. See also chap. xxi, p. 9.

4. 75Report of meeting of govs., Nov., 1847. S. Anna, Apelación, 45, 67. Courrier des Etats Unis, May 22, 1847. Encarnacion Prisoners, 69. México á través, iv, 667. Apuntes, 206–7. Republicano, June 17, 1847. 76Memo., Apr. 6, 1847. Picayune, Aug. 7, 8, 1847. London Times, Sept. 6, 1847. Semmes, Service, 313. Ramírez, México, 238. Gamboa, Impug., 67. Dictamen de la Comisión, 29–30. 92Mexico ayunt., Sept. 9, 1847. 92Tornel to Mexico ayunt., Sept. 12. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1063 (Scott). Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 126, 489.

The clergy may have given something in addition to the $1,500,000. See the end of chap. xxi, p. 15. The arrangement with the bondholders was known as the “conversion of 1846.” This loan gave Mackintosh a particular reason for desiring to have peace made. The loan was to have been repaid in nine months. During July and August, 1847, Santa Anna appears to have raised in one way and another, as indicated in the text, about $1,000,000. The pay of officials was reduced or withheld. For forced loans see chap. i, note 7. In July, 1847, though foreigners were exempt from forced loans, Santa Anna evaded the agreement by taking money without going through the ceremony of promising to repay it.

5. 80Lombardini to Mexico ayunt., Aug. 13, 1847. 75Meeting of govs., Nov., 1847. Diario, July 1, 1847. Ramírez, México, 260. 90Jalapa ayunt., Apr. 10, 1847. 94Canalizo to Orizaba ayunt., Apr. 4, 1847. 82Comte. milit., S. Martín, to Puebla sec. state, Mar. 31, 1847. 312Anaya to S. Anna, Apr. 9, 1847. 76Many memoranda, orders, etc. There was waste, of course, as well as injustice and peculation. This was brought out at the meeting of governors.

6. Ho. 6; 29, 1 (Walker, report, Dec. 3, 1845). Sen. 2; 29, 2 (Id.., report, Dec. 9, 1846). Ho. 9; 29, 1 (Id.., estimates, Dec. 4, 1845). Ho. 51; 29, 1 (war dept. contracts). Ho. 56; 29, 1 (Marcy, report, Jan. 9, 1846). Ho. 81; 29, 1.

7. Bankers’ Mag., ii, 202–4. [E]N. Y. Herald (weekly), May 16, 23; June 6; July 3; Aug. 8, 15, 29, 1846. London Times, July 15, 1846. 198Gallatin to Everett, Dec. 16, 1847. 354Welles papers (Hist. of 29 Cong., 2 sess.). Nat. Intelligencer, Nov. 28, 1846.

8. Wash. Union, Nov. 30, 1846. N. Y. Herald (weekly), May 16; June 6, 1846; June 19, 1847. Scott, Repudiation, 37, 47, 162. Green, Repudiation, 11, 13, 15. Niles, Dec. 4, 1847, p. 218. (Sévigné) Buchanan, Works, vii, 66. London Spectator, May 30, 1846. 354Welles papers. Dewey, Financial History, 245. Bolles, Financial History, 580–2. Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit., xiv, 198.

The huge state debts were mostly due to extravagant enterprises often supported by fraudulent banking. Delinquency was in reality a salutary suspension of payments that prevented bankruptcy, but the creditors did not know this at the time, and felt little disposed to be charitable.

9. Taussig, Tariff Hist., 113–5. Niles, June 6, 1846, p. 212; Aug. 1, 1846, p. 345; Aug. 14, 1847, p. 369. Boston Atlas, Jan. 6, 1847. Ambler, Ritchie, 264. Webster, Letters, 337–9. 308Shields to Walker, Aug. 3, 1846. Sen. 105; 29, 2 (Walker to Dallas, Feb. 1, 1847). Ho. 227; 29, 1. Ho. 7; 30, 2 (Walker, report, Dec. 9, 1848). (Walker, Jarnagin) Welles papers. (Haywood) 1Allen to “Effie,” July 25, 1846; 210McDuffie to Hammond, July 20, 1846. N. Y. Herald (weekly), Aug. 1, 29; Dec. 19, 1846; Jan. 29, 1848. N. Y. Globe, Jan. 9, 1847. Bankers’ Mag., i, 136; ii, 74. Ho. 6; 29, 1 (Walker, report, Dec. 3, 1845). Sen. 2; 29, 2 (Id.., report, Dec. 9, 1846). U. S. Stat. at Large, ix, 42, 53, 59, 106. Lalor, Cyclop., ii, 495; iii, 864. Phila. No. American, July 16, 1846.

Walker’s report of December 3, 1845, enunciated and defended his tariff principles (Ho. 6; 29, 1). These were: 1, to collect only enough revenue for the economical administration of the government; 2, to have no duty higher than the lowest rate that will yield the greatest revenue (e.g. some luxuries are so easily smuggled in that a high duty would produce little); 3, below such a rate to permit discrimination, if thought desirable (e.g. less on necessaries than on luxuries); 4, to lay the maximum rate on luxuries; 5, to have only ad valorem duties; and, 6, to discriminate against no section or class of the nation. He expressed the opinions that many of the high duties were becoming prohibitive and therefore unprofitable, and that the increased risk and costs of transportation during a war would cause nearly all of them to become so. Besides, he said, “at least two thirds of the taxes imposed by the present tariff are paid, not into the treasury, but to the protected classes” (Niles, Aug. 1, 1846, p. 349). Walker also charged that the specific duties, which formed a part of the 1842 tariff, taxed most highly the cheapest articles and therefore produced relatively little (Sen. 105; 29, 2: to Dallas). It was argued by others that war would sufficiently hinder importing to make a protective tariff unnecessary (Wash. Union, May 28, 1846).

The essential idea underlying the tariff of 1846, though it was not strictly a revenue tariff, was that it would increase the revenue by stimulating importation. But opponents argued that unless Europe should take a greatly increased quantity of our agricultural products—which there was no reason to expect—we could not pay for larger imports; while, should foreign goods be “dumped” at low prices upon our markets, American manufacturers would be ruined. Even in the year ending June 30, 1845, the balance of trade had been $7,251,589 against us, and we had exported $8,606,495 in specie (Bankers’ Mag., i, 136). Under the tariff of 1842 the average rate of duty was 24 per cent; under that of 1846, 18 per cent.

One natural effect of the uncertainty caused by the new fiscal laws was to check business, but this was offset by its tendency to check speculation and inflation. The specie feature tended to contract the currency, and many deemed this unfortunate in view of the large calls for money likely to result from the war. Good judges thought its enforcement would have to be deferred, therefore. A special cause of alarm was that in preparing for the second war with England the duties had been increased instead of reduced. Senator Haywood of North Carolina opposed the new scale of duties as sure to plunge the country into debt, opposed putting them into effect so promptly (Dec. 1, 1846), and opposed the adoption of such a combination of new financial measures (Wash. Union, Aug. 18, 1846). He therefore resigned, and this endangered the plan of the administration.

The warehouse system consisted in deferring the payment of assessed duties without an interest charge, the government retaining the goods meanwhile as security for the eventual payment of them. Goods could therefore wait for a purchaser, instead of going—if not at once in demand—for what they would bring at a forced sale. This encouraged importation and built up extensive stocks, which in turn attracted purchasers from afar (Walker, report, Dec. 9, 1846, in Sen. 2; 29, 2). This system, like that of the sub-treasury, proved highly advantageous. The specie provision of the sub-treasury bill required the government to accept only specie after Dec. 31, 1846, and to pay out only specie after Mar. 31, 1847 (U. S. Stat. at Large, ix, 64), with the exception of treasury notes.

10. N. Y. Tribune, Jan. 24, 1848. Sen. 105; 29, 2 (Walker to Dallas, Feb. 1, 1847). Sen. 392; 29, 1 (Polk, Message, June 16; Walker, June 15, 1846, etc.). Polk, Diary, Sept. 29, 1846. Ho. 6; 29, 1 (Walker, report, Dec. 3, 1845). Sen. 2; 29, 2 (Id.., report, Dec. 9, 1846). Ho. 6; 30, 1 (Id.., report, Dec. 8, 1847). Ho. 2 and 10; 29, 2. Ho. 9, 51, 56, 81, 82; 29, 1. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 395. Sen. 27; 30, 1.]

The warehouse bill also delayed the payment of duties. Walker’s estimate of the customs revenue for 1846–7 was $27,835,731 (report, Dec. 9, 1846, in Sen. 2; 29, 2). The receipts were actually $23,747,865 (report, Dec. 8, 1847, in Ho. 6; 30, 1). Walker pointed out that nearly half a million was due on warehoused goods (Niles, July 31, 1847, p. 337); but these goods might not all have been imported, had it been necessary to pay the duties at once, and some of them were practically sure to be exported, and hence not all the duties assessed upon them could be considered a part of the revenue, as Walker intimated. The Democrats feared that taxes would make the war unpopular, and the Whigs hoped to obtain that result by less expensive methods.

11. Sen. 392; 29, 1 (Walker to Polk, June 15, 1846). Gallatin, War Expenses, 15–6. Niles, Sept. 19, 1846, p. 48; Oct. 3, 1846, p. 80. Bankers’ Mag., i, 193–4, 322. N. Y. Herald (weekly), July 18; Aug. 15; Sept. 19; Oct. 31, 1846; Jan. 9, 1847. Bayley, National Loans, 70–2. Polit. Sci. Qtrly., i, 375–84. N. Y. Tribune, Jan. 24, 1848. U. S. Stat. at Large, ix, 39. Knox, U. S. Notes, 63–4.

The Act of July 22, 1846, was based upon and virtually embodied that of Oct. 12, 1837. Notes redeemed could be reissued. Any fraction of the $10,000,000 could be issued in notes or in stock (bonds) at the President’s discretion, but the amount of both could not exceed that figure. The bonds were to conform to the Act of Apr. 15, 1842, and to “be redeemable at a period not longer than ten years from the issue thereof.” Walker thought that only a war with a powerful maritime nation, exposing our commerce to peril and causing a great loss in customs revenue, would be thought to warrant excise and direct taxes. (The idea of a direct tax was widely unpopular, because such a tax would be based upon population, and therefore would favor the capitalistic sections.) Before issuing treasury notes Walker used up much of the surplus lying in the banks. The notes were issued at par. They could not become a circulating medium. For redemption they went to the city banks. So long as these banks had deposits of public funds, they were accepted as cash. After that, their tendency was to fall. About Oct. 1, 1846, the notes were quoted at 98–1/2 in St. Louis. For a time the New Orleans banks would not receive the notes, but retaliation brought the banks round. Since only specie and treasury notes were to be receivable after Jan. 1, 1847, for dues to the government, the sub-treasury Act aided the notes. On the other hand the issuance of the notes offset the specie requirement of that Act, and therefore prevented or modified some of its anticipated consequences—particularly a drain upon the specie of the banks. One advantage of the notes was that, should the war suddenly end, they could be withdrawn and the interest on them stopped. This was not true of loans.

12. Ho. 6; 29, 1 (Walker, report, Dec. 3, 1845). Polk, Diary, Sept. 29, 1846. Gallatin, War Expenses, 14–6. Niles, Sept, 12, 1846, p. 17. De Knight, Currency, 69. N. Y. Herald (weekly), June 6; Aug. 15, 1846; Jan. 9, 1847; Jan. 29, 1848. Bankers’ Mag., i, 193–4.

The authority to issue these notes was limited to one year; but on Jan. 28, 1847, the time was extended to six months after the ratification of peace with Mexico, with the proviso that the notes thus authorized should not exceed $5,000,000 in amount (§ 15, U. S. Stat. at Large, ix, 121–2). In his report of Dec. 9, 1846, Walker stated that $3,853,100 of these notes had been issued, $1,766,450 bearing interest at one tenth of 1 per cent (De Knight, Currency, 69), and the residue at 5–2/5 per cent per annum payable on redemption. Nov. 2, 1846, treasury notes of prior issues amounting to $412,283.97 were outstanding. The surplus, July 1, 1846, was $9,126,439. Sept. 29, 1846, the treasury contained “only a fraction over” four millions (Polk, Diary, Sept. 29).

13. 13Pakenham, nos. 127, Oct. 29; 130, Nov. 12, 1846. (Walker) Wash. Union, May 10; Dec. 9, 1847; N. Y. Express, Dec. 12, 1846; Welles papers; Boston Courier, Feb. 17, 1848; 345G. A. Worth to V. Buren, Dec. 16, 1847; 198Gallatin to Newboldt, Feb. 8, 1848; 198Id.to Rockwell, May 8, 1848; 181Buchanan to Donelson, May 13, 1847. Miss. Hist. Soc. Pubs., vi, 363. Dodd, Walker, 24, etc. Wash. Union, Nov. 16; Dec. 8, 1846. N. Y. Express, Nov. 18, 1846. Bankers’ Mag., i, 321–2. N. Y. Herald (weekly), Sept. 19; Nov. 7, 14, 28, 1846. Bayley, National Loans, 71. De Knight, Currency, 70. Niles, Oct. 10, p. 81; Oct. 17, p. 97; Oct. 24, p. 128; Nov. 7, pp. 146–7, 1846. Sen. 105; 29, 2 (Walker to Dallas, Feb. 1, 1847). Polk, Diary, Oct. 1, 13, 15–7, 22, 30; Nov. 7, 1846. London Times, Oct. 27, 1846. Sen. 2; 29, 2 (Walker, report, Dec. 9, 1846). Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 124 (Ingersoll). Dewey, Financial History, 256.

Professor Tucker proved, it was said, that Walker’s argument for free trade made an error of $1,000,000 per year in the productive industry of the United States. Stewart of Pennsylvania charged him in Congress with a number of errors. Rockwell of Connecticut made a startling analysis of treasury statements (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, pp. 404–7); but it would lead us too far afield to enter upon such a discussion. $4,999,149 of the loan was issued (Bayley, Nat. Loans, 71). On $363,900 there was an average premium of .277 of 1 per cent, while the rest went at par (De Knight, Currency, 70). Opponents of the government attributed the success of the loan to Marcy’s statement that it would not be necessary to call for more volunteers. As a new call for volunteers went out almost immediately after the bids were opened, he was charged falsely with having played a trick on the public (N. Y. Express, Nov. 18, 1846). For the truth in this matter see vol. i, p. 351. Most of the loan was taken at New York, but it became fairly well distributed. Walker’s offering the loan only ten days after advertising an issue of $3,000,000 in notes (Niles, Nov., 1846, p. 147) was rather alarming, it must be admitted. A less reasonable criticism on his policy was that he could and should have borrowed liberally June 1 and July 1 at 5 per cent. At those dates he had a large surplus, the tariff had not been changed, and the administration did not expect a serious war.

14. Sen. 2; 29, 2 (Walker, report, Dec. 9, 1846). Dewey, Financial History, 255–6. U. S. Stat. at Large, ix, 118. 247King to Larkin, Nov. 7, 1847. Polk, Diary, Feb. 16. 13Pakenham, no. 13, Nov. 12, 1846. Niles, Apr. 24, 1847, p. 113; June 5, p. 224; Aug. 21, pp. 392, 400; Feb. 5, 1848, p. 354 (McLean). Wash. Union, Jan. 14; Apr. 12, 1847. N. Y. Herald (weekly), Apr. 24; Nov. 30, 1847; Feb. 26; Mar. 4, 11, 18, 1848. Bayley, Nat. Loans, 72. De Knight, Currency, 71–2. Knox, U. S. Notes, 64, 69. 108Buchanan to Bancroft, Dec. 29, 1846, priv.

The estimated deficit, July 1, 1847, was $4,779,042 (Walker, report, Dec. 9, 1846 in Sen. 2; 29, 2). By the Act of Jan. 28, 1847, the treasury notes were to be redeemable in one or two years, to bear interest (not more than 6 per cent) at the discretion of the President, and to be convertible into bonds. None could be issued, used as security for loans, or bought up by the government, at less than par plus the accrued interest. New notes could be issued for those redeemed, but the total outstanding amount of notes and bonds issued under the Act could not exceed $23,000,000. The public lands were in effect pledged as security for the loan, which was made payable at any time after Dec. 31, 1867. The Act provided that the notes to be issued under it and all previous treasury notes could be converted into 6 per cent stock (bonds).

It was predicted that the loan could not be placed at better than 90, if at all (N. Y. Express, Dec. 14, 1846). Bids (to be in by Apr. 10) for $18,000,000 of it were invited on Feb. 9, 1847. The New York and Boston banks appear to have agreed on a price, but some New York capitalists offered more, and they in turn were outbid by Corcoran and Riggs of Washington, who seem to have taken a very large part of it. The bids above par totalled about $55,000,000, and the premiums offered ran as high as 2 per cent. It has been called a mistake to pay 6 per cent on long-term bonds, and this is proved by the premium they soon commanded. But before the bonds were issued grave doubts regarding their acceptability were entertained, and a saving in interest was of relatively little importance. Many had expected that the whole amount($23,000,000) would be issued in treasury notes and practically increase the amount of the currency; but the amount issued at first was largely taken for investments (N. Y. Herald (weekly), Mar. 20, 1847). Hence the currency in circulation was diminished. However, the specie coming from abroad soon made up for this.

Bids for $5,000,000 of notes were invited on Feb. 26. The Rothschilds (represented by A. Belmont) were soon understood to be interested, and were in fact successful to a large extent in the bidding. Their bidding encouraged American capitalists. Probably the notes could safely, and therefore should, have been made convertible into 5 per cent, instead of 6 per cent, bonds. The interest paid on them at redemption was 5–2/5 or 6 per cent (De Knight, Currency, 71).

June 1, 1817, Walker reported treasury notes as outstanding (minus $789,700 of cancelled notes on hand): of issues prior to July 22, 1846, $303,817; of issues under the Act of July 22, $3,565,600; of issues under the Act of Jan. 28, $8,100,000; net total, $11,179,717 (Niles, June 5, p. 224). About the middle of August, 1847, they sold at 106–1/2, but within a week (probably because reports that Scott had captured Mexico City were found to be false) they fell at New York to 103–1/2. The issuing of more notes was objected to on the ground that it would virtually mean a government bank controlled by a party. It was argued by some that notes for small amounts bearing interest at a nominal rate should have been put out. These, it was said, would have been purchased by persons of small means, who actually put their savings into specie needed by the government. The question was raised why Polk asked in December, 1846, for funds to cover the fiscal year 1847–8 (N. Y. Express, Dec. 14, 1846). Walker’s report included estimates for that period, but this fact does not seem to be an adequate explanation. One suspects that Polk and Walker knew the money would be needed, and thought this the easiest way to get it.

15. Richardson, Messages, iv, 516. Pakenham, no. 6, Jan. 28, 1847. Sen. 2; 29, 2 (Walker, report, Dec. 9, 1846). Ho. 6; 30, 1 (Id.., report, Dec. 8, 1847). Ho. 7; 30, 2 (Id.., report, Dec. 9, 1848). Sen. 105; 29, 2 (Id.to Dallas, Feb. 1, 1847). Sen. 392; 29, 1 (Id.to Polk, June 15, 1846). Taussig, Tariff Hist., 115. Welles papers. Polk, Diary, Jan. 2, 1847. Niles, Jan. 2, 1847, p. 288. Boston Courier, Feb. 17, 1848. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, pp. 281, 298. N. Y. Herald (weekly), Jan. 9, 1847. (Pessimists) 345G. A. Worth to Van Buren, May 20, 1847.

In Dec., 1847, Polk had to admit that a deficiency of $15,729,114 on June 30, 1848, was probable. The British minister reported that one reason for proposing the tax on tea and coffee was a wish to defeat anticipated attempts of the protectionists to repeal the tariff of 1846. It was suspected that Walker made the appeal to Congress in order to display his influence or to relieve that body of responsibility for modifying the tariff it had so recently voted. The motives of the House were mixed. Some members doubtless objected to the plan on principle, others because they wished to be consistent with their action in accepting that tariff, others because the estimated return from such a tax ($2,500,000 or $3,000,000 per year) did not seem enough to meet the requirements, and others, perhaps, to rebuke what struck them like dictation on Walker’s part; but the main considerations appear to be those mentioned in chap. xxxiv (e.g., p. 285.) The vote in the House was taken Jan. 2, 1847. Walker persisted, but without effect. Benton’s idea was adopted in 1854. See “Public Lands, Bill to reduce and graduate the price of,” in Senate index of Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 and 2 sess.; 30 Cong., 1 sess., etc.

16. Ho. 6; 30, 1 (Walker, report, Dec. 8, 1847). Ho. 7; 30, 2 (Id.., report, Dec. 9, 1848). 13Pakenham, no. 147, Dec. 29, 1846. Stockton, circular, Aug. 15, 1846. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 905 (Marcy); 930, 1085 (Scott); 931 (Worth). London Times, June 8, 1846. Richardson, Messages, iv, 548–9, 570, 672. Vattel, book 3, chap. 9, sect. 161. Balt. American, Feb. 17, 1847. Wash. Union, Apr. 12, 1847. N. Y. Herald (weekly), May 1, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 552, 558, 561 (Polk); 553 (Walker). Niles, Apr. 24, 1847, p. 113. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1075 (Shubrick). 47Shubrick, Apr. 15, 1848. 76Lavallette, proclam., Oct. 26, 1847. Sen. 24; 30, 1 (Polk, Message). Ho. 20; 30, 2 (Polk, Message). Polk, Diary, Mar. 10, 1847.

We do not positively know that Walker originated the idea of the tariff in Mexican ports, nor that it had any relation to the tea and coffee tax; but one would naturally assume as much, and so the Washington Union stated (Niles, Apr. 24, 1847, p. 113). At first, however, Walker did not perceive that the tariff would have to rest upon the President’s military authority. Contributions took the place of the pillage formerly practised in war. An advantage of the plan, perhaps not contemplated at first, was that it would greatly discourage smuggling, and therefore, since imports would mostly have to pass the inspection of American officers, contraband could much more fully be excluded. This tariff was fiercely attacked in Congress, but the position of the Executive was impregnable. Complaint was also made that Americans as well as neutrals had to pay it; but had they not done so, they would have been able to defy competition, foreign nations would have complained, the Mexicans would have benefited by the low prices of merchandise, and the United States would have obtained no revenue.

The American policy prior to March 31, 1847, is shown by Walker’s circular of June 30, 1846 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 158) and by Marcy’s 63instructions to the commanding officer at Tampico, Dec. 15, 1846. The latter said: Only United States vessels may enter, and those only when carrying articles produced in the United States or imports upon which United States duties have been paid, and on all such goods no duties will be charged. “But in a spirit of accommodation” clearances to Tampico of cargoes of foreign products, etc., in American vessels will be granted (duties having been paid) without being unloaded in the United States. Vessels admitted at Tampico may take out return cargoes of the property of Americans or neutrals without paying export duties; and specie belonging to neutrals may be freely exported. Indeed this export of specie should be encouraged, since it prevents Mexico from seizing the means of waging war. Pakenham complained that this policy would give American goods (which would not have to pay a duty) a monopoly of the Mexican market; but it seemed impossible at this time to run the risk of the military injury liable to result from admitting neutral vessels generally. He seems to have felt inclined to protest, but he did not find that the ministers of France, Spain and Germany intended to do so (13no. 147). Previous to Dec. 15, 1846, American goods had been extensively smuggled into Mexico across the Rio Grande, and of course that process continued.

17. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 975, 1014 (Marcy); 1083 (Shubrick). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 552–76, 583, 585 (Marcy); 585 (circular); 586 (Walker); 951 (Mason). Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1073, 1086 (Shubrick). Sen. 14; 30, 1, pp. 9 (Marcy); 10 (Walker). London Times, June 8, 1846; June 15, 1847. Polk, Diary, June 11; Nov. 6, 1847. Richardson, Messages, iv, 531–2, 548. 52Chargé Martin, no. 31, May 15, 1847. 13Consul Glass, July 12, 1848. Ho. 6; 30, 1 (Walker, report, Dec. 8, 1847). Ho. 7; 30, 2 (Id.., report, Dec. 9, 1848). Constitutionnel, May 15, 1847. 13Mora to Palmerston, May 19, 1847. Nat. Intelligencer, Apr. 24, 1847. 48Mason to Perry, Apr. 3; June 16, 1847.

In some cases the Mexican tariff was reduced very much more than one half, and many articles of daily use, that had previously been prohibited, became available. No tonnage dues were assessed on vessels (chartered by the United States) laden exclusively with supplies for our army or navy (60Marcy to Scott, May 10, 1847), and United States officers, soldiers and sailors were exempted from the operation of the order to pay duties (Richardson, Messages, iv, 548). At Matamoros, Tampico and Vera Cruz the military governors acted as collectors. At places held by the navy, naval officers did so. On the Pacific coast it proved necessary to modify the tariff. June 11, 1847, the regulations were somewhat modified (Polk, Diary, June 11), and additional changes were made in Nov., 1847 (Polk, Diary, Nov. 6; Sen. 14; 30, 1, p. 11). July 31, 1847, the duty on books was made 20 per cent ad valorem (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 585).

Chargé Martin reported from Paris that the French newspapers, alarmed by the protest of the Mexican consul at Havre, called on their government to demand guaranties from ours. Martin justly took the position that our admitting French commerce to Mexican ports was a pure favor, to be enjoyed at the risk of those caring to take advantage of it, but expressed the opinion freely that in the treaty of peace we should protect the interests invited by our policy, as in fact we pledged ourselves to do and did (Walker, report, Dec. 8, 1847 in Ho. 6; 30, 1, 619; chap. xxxii, p. 468).

18. N. Y. Herald (weekly), May 1, Dec. 4, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1037 (Marcy). Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1148 (Shubrick). 13Consul Giffard, no. 37, Oct. 20, 1847. Richardson, Messages, iv, 548. 13Consul Glass, Dec. 1, 1847; July 12, 1848. 75Hacienda to Relaciones, Dec. 3, 1847. 75Gov. Tamaulipas to Relaciones, Dec. 10, 23, 1847. 75Gates, order, Nov. 27, 1847. 76Hacienda to Guerra, Dec. 3, 29, 1847. 13Crampton, no. 30, Aug. 13, 1847. 76—— to Amador, Feb. 2, 1848.

The governor of Tamaulipas wrote frankly to the central government that prohibition would merely promote robbery and smuggling while injuring good Mexicans. He therefore did nothing except to collect a duty. Yet Gates, commanding at Tampico, had to send escorts with traders, and could not fully protect them.

19. N. Y. Express, Dec. 1, 1846. Sumner, Amer. Currency, 167. Economist, Apr. 24, 1847. Gallatin, War Expenses, 3, 10. Bankers’ Mag., i, 513–6, 609–12, 673–4; ii, 201, 706–7. N. Y. Herald (weekly), Dec. 19, 1846; Feb. 6; Apr. 17, 24; July 24, 31; Nov. 20; Dec. 11, 1847. Niles, Feb. 13, 1847, p. 384; Feb. 27, p. 416; Sept. 11, p. 18; Sept. 25, p. 60; Oct. 2, p. 80; Oct. 9, p. 82; Oct. 23, p. 128; Nov. 6, p. 145. 52Bancroft, no. 46, Dec. 4, 1847. Welles papers. 198Gallatin to Everett, Dec. 16, 1847. Ho. 6; 30, 1 (Walker, report, Dec. 8, 1847). Ho. 7; 30, 2 (Id.., report, Dec. 9, 1848). 181Buchanan to Donelson, Jan. 29, 1847.

During the year ending June 30, 1848, almost thirty-seven and a half millions in breadstuffs were exported (Walker, report, Dec. 9, 1848 in Ho. 7; 30, 2). As early as March, 1847, the Bankers’ Magazine estimated the increase in the value of our “present” exports of grain and cotton as $12–15,000,000. The customs receipts for the year ending June 30, 1847, were $23,747,865; for the following year $31,757,071. Of course the rising tide of prosperity, besides increasing the customs receipts and bringing specie, enhanced the credit of the government generally, and assisted the country in other ways to support the burden of the war. The crops of 1847 were fine in Europe; the importations were found there to have been excessive; and prices fell sharply. British business proved to be far less solid than it had been supposed to be. Bancroft, our minister, reported “a whirlwind of bankruptcies overspreading the land” (no. 46, Dec. 4, 1847). Orders for American goods were cancelled. Owing to a want of confidence the practice of consigning goods to English houses, with bills drawn on the consignees for a considerable part of their value, was to a large extent abandoned. Every vessel from England brought large parcels of American bonds to be sold for what they would fetch. Early in November the rate of exchange went up and specie began to be exported from this country, though much remained in the interior. Numerous failures occurred in the United States. All called in their resources. But here the trouble did not prove to be long or very serious; and while another year of war might have caused embarrassment, the country, despite the revolution in France, soon found itself comfortable.

20. Ho. 6; 30, 1 (Walker, report, Dec. 8, 1847). Ho. 7; 30, 2 (Id., report, Dec. 9, 1848). U. S. Stat. at Large, ix, 217. 13Crampton, no. 40, Apr. 2, 1848. N. Y. Herald (weekly), Jan. 29, 1848. Bayley, National Loans, 73. De Knight, Currency, 73. For the debates in Congress consult the Cong. Globe. Boston Courier, Feb. 23, 1848. 345Niles to V. Buren, Dec. 16, 1847. Polk, Diary, Feb. 1, 1848.

The debate in the House began Feb. 8 and ended Feb. 17. In the course of the discussion it came out that the treasury really had about $7,000,000 more than had been supposed, but that $4,000,000 were desired by the war department to make good certain deficiencies. The amount of the loan was therefore reduced from $18,500,000 to “not more than” $16,000,000 (Bayley, Nat. Loans, 73). The power to borrow under this Act was to continue one year. The bonds were to bear not more than 6 per cent interest, be sold at not less than par, and be reimbursable at any time after July 1, 1868. Before July 1, 1868, the secretary could purchase the bonds at the market price (but not below par). Coupons could be attached to the certificates, and such certificates be transferable by mere delivery. The secretary of the treasury was required to advertise for bids—these to be received 20–60 days from the date of the earliest advertisement at Washington. In order to give the loan the aid of assured peace, Walker arranged the advertising so as to defer the time of opening the bids until June 17, 1848. The premium obtained was $487,169. Though assisted with this loan, the treasury ended the fiscal year with a balance of only $153,535.

21. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 354 (Taylor); 994 (Scott); 1005 (Mason); 341, 1007, 1037 (Marcy). 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Dec. 20, 1847, private. 256Marcy to Scott, Nov. 17, 1847. Sen. 14; 30, 1, pp. 5 (Marcy), 6 (Scott). Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 423–4. Polk, Diary, Sept. 19, 1846; Aug. 31; Oct. 4, 5, 1847. 63Mason to Scott, Sept. 1, 1847. Richardson, Messages, iv, 546–8. 13Crampton, no. 58, Nov. 28, 1847. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124 (Scott); 145 (Marcy). Scott, Mems., ii, 552–3. Diario, May 23, 1847. Republicano, June 9, 1847. Ho. 6; 30, 1 (Walker, report, Dec. 8, 1847).

For the olive branches (i.e. offers to treat) see pp. 122–4. A particular difficulty in attempting to live on the country would have been the general sparseness of the population, especially since the Americans had to keep together. For this reason, though some of the enemy expected us to rouse the nation by undertaking to enforce such a policy, the wiser Mexicans did not look for it. On the ground that places would be occupied alternately by the contending armies, the British chargé at Washington deplored the order to exact contributions; but the course of the war preserved the Mexicans from this misfortune in a way he did not anticipate.

22. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1048, 1062, 1081, 1085 (Scott), 1050, 1063, 1066 (gen. orders). J. Parrott to Marcy (note 21). 256Id.. to Id.., Dec. 28, 1847, private. 60Butler to Marcy, Mar. 7, 1848. 69Wool to Marcy, Jan. 24, 1848. Sen. 14; 30, 1, pp. 11, 13. 63Marcy to Gates, Mar. 7, 1848; to Davenport, May 2, 1848. 65Scott, gen. orders 358, 376, 395 (1847); 15, 31 (1848). Scott, Mems., ii, 553, 582. Grant, Mems., i, 170–1. 61McDowell to Hunter, Feb. 20; Mar. 5, 1848. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña, 1849, 5. 69Scott to commander at Jalapa, Jan. 6, 1848. 61McDowell to Monclova ayunt., Mar. 5, 1848. 80Actg. treas., Méx. state, Feb. 29, 1848. 60Taylor to Marcy, Nov. 20, 1847. 60Butler to Marcy, Mar. 2, 7, 1848. 92Mex. ayunt., session of Sept. 16, 1847. 92Quitman, proclam., Sept. 22. 92Veramendi to ayunt., Sept. 24. 65Wool, orders 157, Dec., 1847. Delta, Dec. 19, 1847 (“Mustang”). 61Memoir on Mex. finances. Sen. 19; 30, 1, pp. 2–4 (Scott). Moreno, Cantón, 380. 69Wool to Taylor, Mar. 7, 1847. 61McDowell to Webb, Apr. 15, 1848. 358Williams to father, Dec. 27, 1847.

Besides the $150,000, Scott collected some $70,000 (about $12,000 captured at Cerro Gordo, nearly $50,000 for captured tobacco, and smaller amounts for licenses, etc.). Polk was accused of inconsistency for holding that Mexico could pay us no indemnity except in territory and yet expecting to draw large revenues from that country (Amer. Review, Jan., 1848, p. *2). The reply is threefold: 1, in the latter case he assumed that Mexico was to be deprived by military force of the revenues normally used by a nation; 2, even if a Mexican government might have had the physical power to raise a cash indemnity for us, it could not actually have obtained the money from the people for that purpose, as our own armies were expected to do by force; and, 3, Polk’s expectations were not realized. Polk was also charged with encroaching upon the prerogatives of the House both in taxing the Mexicans and in spending the proceeds. Webster and Calhoun concurred in this view (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, 495–6). But if Gen. Taylor had a right—as all admitted—to impress a Mexican donkey into the service of his army, Polk had a right to do all that he did in this regard. The authority of the commander-in-chief in the enemy’s country, waging war according to the Constitution, was quite broad enough to cover it. See Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 423–4.

The estimated possible revenues were as follows: import duties, $12,000,000; duties on goods passing to the interior, $2,400,000; direct taxes on real estate, professions, trades, etc., $3,000,000; duties on the production of gold and silver, $600,000; melting and assay dues, $50,000; export duties on coined gold and silver, $1,000,000; revenue from the monopolies, $3,525,000 (61Memoir). Transit dues on animals and goods, including the duties at city gates (alcabalas), were to be discontinued. For a short time in 1847 Perry allowed logwood to be exported under a 10 per cent duty. It seemed impracticable to seize the mines, for the miners would probably have fled on the approach of American troops.

Scott resolved not to take the ordinary state and city revenues, because he felt that such a course would be “to make war on civilization”; since every civilized community requires the means of paying for administration, without which it would fall into anarchy (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1049). His broad taxation orders were based upon an announced intention of spreading over the country. He proposed to send out expeditions soon. One actually proceeded, as we have seen, to Toluca, another to Cuernavaca, and another to the important mining town of Pachuca (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1048, 1061–2). The occupation of Córdoba and Orizaba was partly in pursuance of the same policy (61Scott to Twiggs, Dec. 26, 1847). He proposed in particular to send 7000 men to San Luis Potosí in order to open the communication between Tampico and the mining city of Zacatecas. But his lack of troops and the peace negotiations prevented this.

In order to force the products of the mines into circulation for the benefit of both Americans and Mexicans, Scott forbade the exportation of gold and silver bullion, and on gold and silver coin exported he imposed a duty of 5 per cent (65gen. orders 362). Walker’s and Polk’s views on these points had been different from Scott’s, and Scott’s action was taken subject to revision at Washington, where he presented his reasons. At the end of April, 1848, Walker’s instructions were put into force by General Butler.

Scott instructed his officers to execute his orders in a conciliatory manner, if possible, but apply force should that be necessary. Should there be no other way, the commanding officer was to collect the assessment in money or some equivalent from the wealthier inhabitants.

In the northeast Wool carried out the financial purposes of the government to the best of his ability, beginning at Saltillo as early as May, 1847, with a revenue system, the occupation of buildings, and the seizure of cattle, mules, etc. He punished refractory towns and places violating pledges of neutrality with special taxes. Mar. 2, 1848, he reported that all were paying their taxes. The owners of houses taken for the use of the army were indemnified through a tax on all the real estate of the vicinity. In northwestern Mexico only coast towns were in our hands. California and New Mexico, which the United States government intended to retain, were of course viewed in a different light. Naturally all possible attempts were made by the Mexicans to protect their property against us. Subsistence, forage, etc., continued to be paid for, since the interests of the army prescribed that policy still. Our officers were not permitted to have any interest (e.g. claim for special services) in cases of seizure, etc.

23. Richardson, Messages, iv, 591, 651, 678. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 107–9. 69Hughes to Scott, Jan. 5, 1848. 63Marcy to Twiggs, Mar. 7, 1848. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1062 (Scott). Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 588. Ho. 47; 30, 2, pp. 2 (Marcy), 109 (Mason). Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1131 (Shubrick). 47Shubrick, Apr. 15, 1848. 69Wool to Marcy, Jan. 24, 1848. Sen. 14; 30, 1, p. 11 (Scott).

Import, export and tonnage duties produced in all only $3,434,665; contributions from other sources, $553,055; captured money and property, $163,573; assessments on states and the City of Mexico, $225,649; and state and municipal revenues, together with some other sources of income, $163,055. From these amounts the costs of collection, drawbacks on goods disposed of to men in the service, and the expenses of the state and municipal governments had to be deducted. It was to make up for surrendering the monopolies that Scott quadrupled the state assessments originally contemplated. $769,650 derived from the military contributions were applied on the first instalment due to Mexico. All of the $3,000,000 appropriated by the Act of March 3, 1847, was paid to her shortly after she ratified the treaty of peace (Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 107–9; Richardson, Messages, iv, 588).

24. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 589. 13Pakenham, no. 74, June 13, 1846. Ho. Rep. 503; 31, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1004 (Marcy). Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (Scott). Scott, Mems., ii, 583. Polk, Diary, Aug. 18–20, 24–5, 28; Nov. 13, 1847. Wash. Union, Dec. 9, 1847. N. Y. Herald (weekly), May 23; June 20; Oct. 31; Nov. 7, 1846; Aug. 21; Oct. 16; Nov. 6, 1847. Ho. Report 503; 31, 1. Picayune, Sept. 14, 1847. 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Dec. 20, 27, 1847, private. 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Aug. 9, 1846.

Scott spent nearly $64,000 of the funds that he derived from the Mexicans for blankets and shoes given to private soldiers; and $10 each were given to a large number of wounded men when they left the hospital. Probably Belmont’s arrangement left the Rothschilds a handsome profit, for John Parrott, who had been our consul at Mazatlán, offered, if the government would open a credit of two or three millions in London, to take charge of supplying cash in Mexico at the rate of five dollars for every pound sterling, and a pound sterling would have cost the government only about $4.80. One main purpose of our government in laying an export duty on gold and silver was to facilitate the exchange of treasury notes for specie with Mexican citizens; but probably little was accomplished, for nearly all the specie in Mexico was held by foreigners. In the offices at Washington a good deal of carelessness in making estimates and handling funds appears to have prevailed (e.g. Polk’s Diary, Aug. 18–28, 1847), and Walker’s relations with Belmont and with Corcoran and Riggs were perhaps a little too intimate (ibid.); but one finds no reasons for suspecting Walker of crookedness. Of course property was handled more or less wastefully in the field, and contractors took an advantage sometimes. Roa Bárcena (Recuerdos, 249) states that some men buying grain, etc., for the American army required the sellers to give receipts for larger sums than were paid to them. See also Polk, Diary, July 10, 1847. The largest loss resulted from Gaines’s unauthorized calls for troops, which probably cost $1,500,000 (13Pakenham, no. 74, 1847).

25. Sen. 15; 30, 1. Semmes, Service, 472–3. Bancroft, Pac. States, viii, 545. Ho. 70; 30, 1, p. 11. Ho. 9, 27; 30, 2. Polk, Diary, Nov. 7, 1846; Feb. 16; Nov. 6, 9, 1847; Jan. 24, 1848. Sen. 27; 30, 1. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29, 1847. Richardson, Messages, iv, 591. Ho. 6; 29, 1 (Walker, report, Dec. 3, 1845). Ho. 7; 30, 2 (Id.., report, Dec. 9, 1848). Lalor, Cyclop., iii, 864. N. Y. Herald (weekly), Apr. 10, 1847; July 1, 1848.

26. (Webster) Wash. Union, Dec. 11, 1846; Niles, Jan. 9, 1847, p. 303. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 912 (Stephens). The national debt, Oct. 1, 1845, was $17,075,446 (Walker, report, Dec. 3, 1845). July 6, 1848, Polk gave it as $65,778,450 including the bonds and treasury notes still available for issue (Richardson, Messages, iv, 591). Walker’s report, Dec. 9, 1848, gave the increase of the national debt over that of March 4, 1845, as $48,036,151.

In a sense the war with Mexico cost too little. The estimates were pared below our needs. Troops could not be called out when they should have been. Transports and many other necessaries were lacking at critical times. This point will come up in the text of the next chapter. At the end of the war the country and the treasury were in a sound condition, and the government’s income was ample. A period of solid prosperity ensued. It may be worth mention that American capitalists offered more than $100,000,000 for the less than $50,000,000 of government securities, and that the total received by the treasury in premiums was $555,511 (Walker, report, Dec. 9, 1848, in Ho. 7; 30, 2).

An account of the money market during the war (based mainly on the financial columns of the New York Weekly Herald) may be of interest. During the early spring of 1846 the Oregon controversy with England was a strong depressing influence. The outbreak of the war with Mexico caused a panic (May 11), but this passed immediately (May 12), and by May 19 the market was rather buoyant, largely in consequence of favorable news from Taylor. It then declined; but about the middle of June there was a plethora of money, and much activity prevailed in consequence of the settlement of the Oregon controversy. This faded gradually away into dulness, but quickened again about the first of August. Fluctuations followed. The first half of September saw a decline. Sept. 5 United States bonds that had sold at 113 before the war brought only 102, but the prospect of foreign demands for grain caused a revival (Sept. 20-Oct. 3). Dulness then returned; the general feeling about the war was reflected in very low prices about the middle of November, and Dec. 7 was a “blue day.” Though the treasury required all payments to it to be in specie on and after Jan. 1, 1847, it did not begin to pay out specie until Apr. 1. Hence it piled up coin during the interim. Jan. 3, 1847, the market was rather stringent. During the second half of February, the Bank of England rate rose from 3 to 4. Prices continued to decline until by April 4 good prospects at the seat of war and an influx of specie turned the tide. May 1 the New York banks were said to have more than $12,000,000 in specie. May 10 Reading R. R. difficulties precipitated a panic, but this was only a flurry. Money was extremely abundant in a few days (May 19) and prices advanced until about the middle of July. During the second week of August the increasing war expenses bore hard on the market, and treasury notes fell about 2 per cent. About Oct. 1 the report that Scott had entered Mexico City was found to be untrue, and a panic set in (Oct. 4), due to that fact and bad news regarding the financial situation in Europe. The “explosion” of “corners” followed. By Nov. 11 the banks were “shaking in the wind,” and a crisis came on at once (Nov. 14). Paper money was loudly called for. After a troubled month, however, money became much easier and prices responded (Dec. 19). Another month, and the banks (really in a tight place themselves) were believed to be tightening everything to force a change in the financial policy of the government (Jan. 25, 1848); but by Feb. 10 natural conditions revived buoyancy, and there was a loud call for more treasury notes. Things then quieted down, but the arrival of the draft of a treaty stimulated activity once more. Absurd rumors about the terms of the treaty next caused a temporary reaction; but when it was accepted, prices went up (Mar. 11). For the day-by-day prices of United States securities, Dec. 1, 1846, to Dec. 1, 1847, see Ho. 6; 30, 1, p. 71.

Other financial legislation of the war period. U. S. Statutes at Large, ix, p. 35, Act of June 27, 1846, sec. 2: $75,000 in U. S. stock belonging to the Seneca Indians to be cancelled, and interest to be paid them on a credit of that amount to be entered on the books of the secretary of the treasury. P. 94, Act of Aug. 10, 1846: Mexican Indemnity Stock (see Bayley, National Loans, 71, modified by statements of this work). P. 106, Act of Aug. 10, 1846: Treasury notes, stolen and put into circulation, to be redeemed by the government. P. 125, Act of Feb. 11, 1847, sec. 9: Any non-commissioned officer, musician and private entitled under this Act to receive a certificate or warrant for 160 acres (or 40 acres) may take instead of it $100 (or $25) in 6 per cent treasury scrip, redeemable at the pleasure of the government. P. 248, Act of July 19, 1848: Three months’ extra pay to all who actually served out their term or were honorably discharged, or the heirs of those who lost life or died after being honorably discharged. P. 249, Act of July 21, 1848: Act of July 4, 1836, granting half-pay and pensions to widows, orphans, etc., made applicable to cases of these in the Mexican War. P. 412, Act of March 3, 1849: To provide for settling accounts of those who received money from military contributions, etc., in Mexico. P. 414, Act of March 3, 1849: To provide payment for property lost or destroyed in the military service of U. S. P. 520, Act of Sept. 28, 1850: Bounty lands to be given to certain officers and soldiers who served in the Mexican War.

1. The chief sources for this chapter were personal correspondence, the debates of Congress, and periodicals representing all shades of politics. The leading newspapers were examined for every day of the war and also before and after it.

2. Parker, Sermon. Rhodes, U. S., i, 88. Weekly N. Y. Herald, May 23. No. Amer., May 15, 21. 191Fairfield to wife, July 10, 1846.

3. London Times, Aug. 31. Welles papers (account of 29 Cong., 2 sess.). 108Marcy to Bancroft, Apr. 28, 1847. Calhoun Corresp., 717 (to T. G. C), 1096 (Fisher). 13Pakenham, nos. 119, 132, 1846; 6, 9, 1847. 139Gentry to C, Feb. 20, 1847. 139A. to D. C., Jan. 20, 1847. Journal des Débats, Nov. 4, 1846. (Elections) N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 26, 1847; 132Stokes to Buchanan, Jan. 3, 1847; Welles papers; Schurz, Clay, ii, 289; Von Holst, U. S., iii, 336; N. Y. Herald, Nov. 7, 14, 1846; Wash. Union, Oct. 16, 22; Nov. 9, 14, 19, 27, 1846; May 5, 1847; Nat. Intellig., Nov. 7, 1846. Pub. Ledger, Dec. 23, 1846. In the winter we find some state legislatures passing resolutions (Ho. 93, 97; 29, 2) in favor of prosecuting the war, but these are signs of prevailing discouragement.

4. (Nomination and election) Smith, Annex, of Texas, 250–2, 310–5. 345Gilpin to Van Buren, May 24, 1846. 234A. Johnson to ——, July 22, 1846, private. London Times, July 15, 1846. Welles papers. Nat. Intellig., Nov. 20, 1847. (Cabinet) Polk, Diary, Feb. 8, 1847; 345Blair to Van Buren, Jan. 29; Feb. 29, 1848; 297correspond. between Polk and M. Van Buren, C. Johnson, A. V. Brown and others, Dec, 1844-Feb., 1845; Poore, Perley’s Remins., i, 334; Welles papers; 297Simpson to Polk, Nov. 13, 1848. (Myself) Tenn. Hist. Mag., Sept., 1915 (to C. J., Dec. 21, 1844). Boston Atlas, Dec. 31, 1846. 206Mangum to Graham, Feb. 21, 1845. (Polk’s discretion distrusted) Cong. Globe, 29, 1, pp. 554 (Allen), 567 (Webster).

What is said of Polk in this and succeeding paragraphs should be supplemented by referring to vol. i, pp. 128–9 and to the concluding chapter.

5. For a study of Polk’s character see vol. i, pp. 128–9. 345Pauling to Van Buren, Feb. 5, 1847. (Pillow) Polk to Johnson, May 17 [14], 1844: Tenn. Hist. Mag., Sept., 1915. Seward, Seward at Washington, i, 37, 51. 345Frearoon to Van Buren, Jan. 23, 1847. 345Blair to V. B., Jan. 29, 1848. Tyler, Tyler, ii, 457 (Gardiner). 345G. A. Worth to V. B., Mar. 20, 1847. 139Gentry to Campbell, Feb. 20, 1847. Schurz, Clay, ii, 289. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 273, 292, 336. Boston Atlas, Dec. 12, 1846. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 75 (Badger). Kohl, Claims, 71.

Taking advantage of the feeling about Polk’s personality and methods, his enemies felt warranted in straining points against him. It was called treachery to negotiate with Santa Anna while negotiating with Paredes (No. American, Dec. 15, 1846), even though the latter negotiation had practically ended before the former began. His dwelling upon our claims against Mexico in his annual Message of 1846, which it was quite proper to do in reviewing the Mexican situation, was represented as an afterthought, intended to justify a blow already struck and discrediting the assertion that Mexico had caused the war by invading our territory (Boston Atlas, Dec. 12, 1846). It was pointed out that the proclamation sent to Taylor for distribution ascribed to the United States aims different from those professed in the Message of May 11 (Nat. Intellig., Aug. 14, 1846), as if Polk could be required to say everything every time.

6. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 21; Oct. 5; Nov. 7; Dec. 12, 1846. Welles papers. 345Wright to Van Buren, Nov. 10, 1846. 345Cambrelong to Id.., Nov. 30. 345Thompson to Id.., Dec. 23. 345Blair to Id.., Dec. 26. 345Albany Atlas, extra, Dec., 1846. 345G. A. Worth to V. B., Mar. 20, 1847. 253Mower to McLean, Aug. 27, 1846. 132Wright to Buchanan, Sept. 8, 10, 1846. Bigelow, Tilden, i, 110–1. Blaine, Twenty Years, i, 78. Buchanan, Works, viii, 365–7. 234A. Johnson to ——, July 22, 1846, private.

The “Conservative” party arose in 1837 from the opposition to Van Buren’s sub-treasury plan, which Silas Wright championed. Many honest Conservatives, realizing they had been mistaken, left the party; but their places were taken by canal claimants.

7. Welles papers. Calhoun Correspond., 713 (to Mrs. C). (Hang) 234A. Johnson to ——, July 22, 1846. (Office-seekers) Polk, Diary, Feb. 24; Apr. 7, 1847, etc. (Oregon) Polk, Diary, Feb. 24, 1846; Polit. Sci. Qtrly., xxvi, 458 (R. L. Schuyler); Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 815 (Delano); Boston Atlas, May 20, 1846; Blaine, Twenty Years, i, 65; Wash. Union, Aug. 18, 1846. (Veto) 253Mower to McLean, Aug. 8, 1846; 108Appleton to Bancroft, July 16, 1847; Wash. Union, Aug. 3, 1846, quoting Nat. Intellig.; N. Y. Herald, Aug. 15, 1846; No. American, Jan. 14; Dec. 20, 1847. (Generals) Von Hoist, U. S., iii, 298; Rhodes, U. S., i, 89; Buchanan, Works, viii, 365–7; Calhoun Corresp., 727–8 (to D. G.). 345Butler to Van Buren, Nov. 6, 1847.

8. Lowell, Biglow papers, i, 59. (Adams) 260Winthrop to N. Hale, Wash., “Sunday.” (Giddings) Wash. Union, June 30; July 2, 1846. Cole, Whig Party, 118–9. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 258–80. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 309. (La.) Vol. i, p. 205 and note 3; N. Orl. Jeffersonian in Nat. Intellig., Aug. 28, 1846; Wash. Union, June 30; July 2; Aug. 11, 1846. Calhoun Corresp., 1096–7 (Fisher). N. Y. Tribune, May 13; Dec. 15, 1846. 137Prescott to Calhoun, Aug. 20, 1847.

9. Ho. 85; 29, 2. 253Mower to McLean, Aug. 8, 1846. Taussig, Tariff Hist., 114–5. 345Welles to Van Buren, July 28, 1846. London Times, Dec. 3, 1846. Courrier des Etats Unis, Oct. 17; Nov. 6, 1846. N. Y. Sun, July 9, 1846. N. Y. Express, Nov. 10, 17, 21, 30, 1846. Niles, July 18, p. 305 (Sentinel); Aug. 1, p. 345 (Nat. Intellig.); Sept. 12, p. 17, 1846. Boston Courier, July 8, 1846. Blaine, Twenty Years, i, 65. Boston Atlas, Jan. 6, 1847. Wash. Union, Aug. 18, 28, 1846. Nat. Intellig., Aug. 5, 1846. N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 3, 1846. No. American, July 16, 17; Aug. 1; Dec. 9, 1846. (Betrayed) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 314.

10. 241W. to J. Kent, Dec. 11, 1846; Jan. 17; Mar. 5, 1847. Amer. Review, Oct., 1847, 333–46. Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 210–1. London Times, Dec. 3, 1846. Sherman Letters, 38–9. Webster, Writings, x, 12. Winthrop, Winthrop, 61. 13Pakenham, no. 98, 1846. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 28, 1846. No. American, Dec. 30, 1846; Jan. 18, 1847. Rhodes, U. S., i, 91. Wash. Union, Sept. 30, 1846 (Mass. convention). Nat. Intellig., July 18; Dec. 25, 1846; Apr. 17; Nov. 20, 1847. St. Louis Republican, July 23, 1846. Journ. of Comm. in Wash. Union, Aug. 6, 1847.

Stephen A. Douglas, who stood quite close to the administration, said in the Senate: “Conquest was not the motive for the prosecution of the war; satisfaction, indemnity, security, was the motive—conquest and territory the means” (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 222).

11. Ho. 23, 81, 85; 29, 2. Sen. 97; 29, 2. Webster, Writings, ix, 260; x, 12; xiii, 359. Sherman Letters, 38–9. Boston Advertiser, Oct. 3, 1846. Niles, Sept. 18, 1847, p. 44. Rhodes, U. S., i, 91. Blaine, Twenty Years, i, 65. Winthrop before the Mass. convention (note 10). Courrier des Etats Unis, Oct. 17; Nov. 6, 1846. Wash. Union, Apr. 29, 1847. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 140, 144, 146. Lowell, Biglow papers, i, 56. Livermore, War, 92. Curtis, Webster, ii, 324. Amer. Review, 1847, p. 441. 13Pakenham, no. 93, 1846. Benton, Abr. Debs., xvi, 54 (Morehead). (West) 198Berrien to Gallatin, June 7, 1848. The North American of Oct. 8, 1847, used this language: “The abstract question of the extension of slavery is not the only nor the greatest issue of this contest. The great question is, shall we become the dependants and vassals of a Southern political ascendancy?... The nabobs of the South will dictate to us the terms upon which, in the face of their hostile policy, we shall struggle for existence. Our agriculture, our manufactures, our commerce, will be committed to their guardianship—the guardianship of the wolf over the lamb.” At the Springfield Whig convention, Sept. 29, 1847, Webster said he would “resist any further increase of slave representation,” which meant the same thing (Writings, xiii, 362). Nat. Intellig., Dec. 29, 1846. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, app., 919 (G. Davis). (Heroes) 345Law to Van Buren, Aug. 2, 1847. Welles papers. Calhoun Corresp., 1096–7 (Fisher). Nat. Intellig., May 13, 1846. London Times, Dec. 18, 1846. 13Pakenham, no. 93, 1846. Louisville Journal, Mar. 31, 1847. N. Y. Express, Apr. 2, 1847. Wash. Union, Aug. 13, 1847. (Debasement, etc.) Amer. Review, 1847, p. 441; Lyell, Second Visit (N. Y., 1849), ii, 257; Ho. 81; 29, 2; Monitor Repub., Feb. 2, 1847 (quoting Boston Atlas); Nat. Intellig., Nov. 28 (quoting N. Y. Eve. Post); Dec. 29, 1846; Norfolk Herald, Apr. 12, 1847; etc.

12. N. Y. Tribune, May 19, 1846. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, pp. 788 (Crittenden), 835. Welles papers. 169Rives to Crittenden, Feb. 5, 1847. Hammond, Wright, 672. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 252. Amer. Review, Feb., 1847, 109, 118. Wash. Union, Mar. 19, 1847. Schurz, Clay, ii, 289. Detroit Free Press, Nov. 28, 1846. Cincin. Enquirer, Dec. 16, 1846. No. American, May 12, 1846. N. Y. Herald, Dec. 19, 1846. (Capital) 139Fulton to Campbell, Jan. —, 1847.

The proper stand for the Whigs was pointed out by Gov. Briggs of Massachusetts in general orders: “Whatever may be the difference of opinion as to the origin” of the war, the constitutional authorities have declared that a war exists; patriotism and humanity dictate that it should be brought to a speedy and successful end; hence all should coöperate (Niles, July 11, 1846, pp. 293–4). It will be noted that the author is dealing in this chapter with politics, not the convictions of private persons, which, even when mistaken, were entitled to respect, because sincere and associated with worthy sentiments.

13. Nat. Intellig., May 13, 15; July 18; Sept. 19, 1846; Jan. 27; Aug. 5; Dec. 11, 1847. 253Mower to McLean, Mar. 1, 1847. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, app., 919 (G. Davis); 29, 2, 34–6 (Giddings). Boston Atlas, May 15, 18, 20; June 11, 1846. Balt. American, Dec. 2, 1846. N. Y. Tribune, May 26, 1846; Sept. 3; Nov. 18, 1847; Jan. 7, 1848. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, 566 (Hilliard). ($68) [Tribune] Whig Almanac, 1847, p. 21. (Express) Wash. Union, June 19, 1847. These and the citations of the following notes could be multiplied.

14. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 274–5. 198J. R. Ingersoll to Gallatin, Dec. 25, 1847. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 78 (Colquitt). Louisville Journal, Sept. 17, 1847. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, app., 643 (Giddings); 30, 1, app., 227 (Cobb). Mr. Winthrop’s Vote on the War Bill. Webster at Phila. (Writings, iv, 26–34). Wash. Union, Dec. 6, 1847. N. Y. Tribune, May 15, 1846. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Aug. 31, 1847. Giddings, Speeches, 259.

15. N. Y. Tribune, May 13, 1846. 130Gentry to Campbell, Feb. 20, 1847. Wash. Union, May 12; Oct. 1, 1846; May 15, 1847. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, pp. 815, 931; app., 928–32. Boston Atlas, Dec. 11, 1846; May 13, 1847. Ky. Observer, July 8, 1846, in Wash. Union, July 14. N. Y. Tribune, May 13, 1846. Winthrop, Speeches, i, 573–4. Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, i, 317–20, 327–45. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, pp. 154–6 (Lincoln’s speech). Though Lincoln’s speech was later than the time referred to in the text, his argument was not. (Conn.) Clark, Conn., 200–1.

16. 375Taylor to Davis, Feb. 16, 1848, in Madigan, cat., 1914. Pennsylvanian, Nov. 4, 1846. Winthrop, Speeches, i, 574. N. Y. Eve. Post, June 4, 1846. Wash. Union, July 14, 1846; Mar. 29, 31; Aug. 16, 20, 1847; Jan. 2, 13, 1848. U. S. Gazette, Oct. 13, 1846. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, pp. 534 (Brinkerhoff); app., 916 (Hudson). Boston Atlas, Dec. 11, 1846; May 13, 1847. Nat. Intellig., May 16; Oct. 19; Dec. 18, 1846; Apr. 17; May 17; June 22, 1847. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Aug. 9, 17, 1847. (Recognized) Crittenden’s amendment: vol. i, p. 473; Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 276. (Smallness) Vol. i, pp. 161, 455–6, 464.

Another interesting fact was that on Mar. 26, 1846, McIlvaine of the House, discussing an appropriation bill, raised the issue that in sending Taylor to the Rio Grande Polk had been “invading Mexico,” yet, although the bill was objectionable from several points of view, it passed by a vote of 111 to 38 (Cong. Globe, 29, 1, pp. 558, 574). See also Lumpkin’s speech, ibid., 834–7. Polk was mercilessly ridiculed for believing that Santa Anna would favor peace, but his opponents had to admit that a Whig general, Taylor, believed (or appeared to believe) Ampudia’s assertions to the same effect (chap. xii, p. 504) made under circumstances that rendered the idea far less plausible.

17. See vol. ii, p. 73. Wash. Union, Feb. 25, 1847. St. Louis Republican, July 3, 1847. McCulloch, Men and Measures, 65. Seward, Autob. of W. H. S., 774. An undated slip from the Chicago Times, found by the author, contained a letter from Burlington, Ia., which stated that Col. Sweney, proprietor of the Barret House, had known Corwin well from boyhood on, and that he had heard Corwin say with tears in his eyes that his speech was made by arrangement with Webster and others, who desired to prevent the appropriation of more money for the war, and agreed to follow Corwin.

18. For a discussion of the Philadelphia speech see vol. i, p. 458. Webster, Writings, iv, 7; ix, 253; xiii, 348–50. Public Ledger, Dec. 6, 15, 1846. N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 4, 7, 1846. N. Y. Herald, Aug. 22, 1846. N. Y. Sun, Dec. 5, 1846. Wash. Union, Dec. 2, 4, 7, 11, 1846; Mar. 10; Oct. 14, 16, 1847. Charleston Mercury, Dec. 8, 1846. 253Dowling to McLean, Mar. 24, 1848. Nov. 6, 1846, at Faneuil Hall, Boston, Webster called forth rapturous applause by saying, in a manner quite unworthy of a Senator and a great constitutional lawyer, “In my judgment it is an impeachable offence” for the President so to act as to involve the country in war without the consent of Congress (Niles, Nov. 21, p. 186). This, if it meant anything, was a begging of the question. Webster could not deny that the President had a right to repel invasion without consulting Congress, and Polk believed the Mexicans had invaded our territory, thus precipitating the war.

Polk’s Message of May 11 mentioned, as was natural, the rejection of Slidell and the failure of Mexico to pay our claims, but its practical gist was contained in the following sentence: “As war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself, we are called upon by every consideration of duty and patriotism to vindicate with decision the honor, the rights, and the interests of our country.”

19. (Independent, ground) Webster, Writings, iv, 24; xiii, 351. (Senseless, fight) Ibid., ix, 157–60. (Prosecute) Ibid., iv, 33; N. Y. Tribune, Dec. 3, 1846. (Refused) Writings, ix, 157. (Approve) Pierce, Sumner, iii, 112. (Narrow) Webster, Letters, 350. (Tired) Writings, xviii, 246. Lowell, Biglow Papers, i, 54, etc. (see a paper, written by the present author, on the Biglow papers in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceeds., May, 1912, p. 602).

20. (Jay) Pellew, Jay, 310. The clerical quotations in the text are from a non-partisan paper, the N. Y. Herald, Feb. 20, 1847. The extract from Osgood may be found in his Solemn Protest, p. 13. That from Parish the author has not been able to verify, but presumably it was correct. That such sentiments were entertained will not be questioned. Osgood denounced the authors of the war as “desperate in wickedness,” etc. See quotations from him and others in Cong. Globe, 29, 1, app., 930–1. Weekly N. Y. Herald (non-partisan), Jan. 16, 1847: They who oppose this war will one day stand before the country like the men of the Hartford Convention. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 139.

21. Boston Atlas, May 18, 20, 1846. Monitor Repub., Feb. 2, 1847. Nat. Intellig., May 11; Oct. 15 (Thompson), 26, 1847; Jan. 26, 1848. (Hudson) Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 418. N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 6, 1847. (Calhoun) Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 58. Wash. Union, Sept. 24, 1846; June 2, 1847. Diario, Dec. 20, 1846. Meade, Letters, i, 180. (Joy) Boston Daily Chronotype in N. Y. Globe, May 14, 1847. 137McLane to Calhoun, Jan. 18, 1848. Richardson, Messages, iv, 473. (1813–14) Wash. Union Dec. 10, 1846. See also vol. ii, p. 125.

In the office of the sec. of relaciones was found a large collection of extracts from American speeches and newspapers (N. Y. Herald, Feb. 5, 1848: Gen. Pierce). Whig journals assured Mexico that her cause was just; that a majority of the Americans detested the war; that our treasury could not bear the cost; that our government was incompetent; that it was disloyal to our commanders; that our armies could not win the war; that soon the administration would be rebuked and its policy be reversed. The government “stand ready to yield anything that Mexico may demand as the price of peace,” asserted the N. Y. Courier and Enquirer (Wash. Union, July 10, 1847). For numerous other quotations see Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 347. April 27, 1847, El Progreso of Querétaro said: The peace party in the United States “have been encouraging us to sustain ourselves until we could obtain from them a satisfactory arrangement of our difficulties as soon as they should come into power” (Wash. Union, May 28, 1848).

22. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 21; Dec. 5, 12, 1846. Welles papers (Review of Pol. Hist. of U. S.; 2d sess. of 29 Cong.). 253Mower to McLean, Aug. 27, 1846. 345Blair to Van Buren, Jan. 20; Nov. 27, 1846. 345Gilpin to Van Buren, May 24, 1846. 345Thompson to Van Buren, Dec. 23, 1846. 345M. Van B., Jr., to Van Buren [Apr. 28, 1846]. Polk, Diary, July 13; Sept. 11, 1846; Jan. 5, 1847. 108Appleton to Bancroft, Feb. 24, 1847. 108Wescott to Bancroft, Mar. 1, 1848. 253Reed to McLean, Oct. 26, 1846. 206J. Graham to Gov. G., Jan. 10, 1847. Courrier des Etats Unis, Oct. 17, 1846. 379Ewing to ——, Mar. 11, 1846. Wash. Union, Nov. 19, 1846. Niles, May 16, 1846, p. 175. 234A. Johnson to ——, July 22, 1846, private. N. Y. Journ. of Comm., Dec. 9, 1846. N. Y. Herald, Nov. 14, 1846. Bragg to Van Buren, Mar. 10, 1847. Seward, Seward at Washington, i, 37, 68, 71. “Old Hunkers” and “Barnburners” (the Van Buren wing) were the two N. Y. factions.

23. Welles papers: note 22. 253M. Brown to McLean, June 5, 1846. Bragg: note 22. 345Gilpin to Van Buren, May 24, 1846; Apr. 6, 1847. Seward, Seward at Washington, i, 37, 51. Nat. Intellig., Jan. 6, 1847. Picayune, Feb. 26, 1848. N. Y. Journ. Comm., Jan. 7, 1847. Public Ledger, Feb. 12, 1847. N. Y. Tribune, Jan. 12, 1847. Polk, Diary, Nov. 7, 1845; Jan. 28; Mar. 22, 23, 1846; Jan. 14, 1847. 345Blair to Van Buren, Nov. 27, 1846. Boston Atlas, Jan. 9, 1847. 345Welles to Van Buren, July 28, 1846. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Apr. 23, 1848. (Aspirants) 231Jackson to Blair, Dec. 14, 1844.

24. The author’s remarks on Benton, Calhoun and Cass are based on sources too numerous to be specified, and will not, it is believed, raise any question. The principal out-of-the-way sources are the following: Welles papers: note 22. 137aCalhoun to Mathews, Sept. 19, 1847. 210Hammond-Simms corresp., Mar.-Nov., 1847. 253M. Brown to McLean, June 5, 1846. 345Blair to Van Buren, Jan. 20, 1846. 345Poinsett to Van Buren, June 4, 1847. 345Gilpin to Van Buren, Nov. 23, 1845. London Times, Apr. 17, 1847. 206J. Graham to brother, Jan. 10, 1847. Polk, Diary, May 21; June 22, 29, 30, 1846; Jan. 9, 14, 15, 22; Feb. 8, 13; Apr. 7, 16, 1847. 108Appleton to Bancroft, Feb. 24, 1847. Calhoun Corresp., 707 (to T. G. C). 132King to Buchanan, Oct. 5, 1847. Calhoun, Works, iv, 371. Boston Atlas, June 1, 1846. Boston Courier, Feb. 23, 1847. Penna. Mag., xi, 462 (Dallas, Dec. 16). 168D. H. Lewis, May 11, 1848. Wash. Union, Feb. 13, 18; Mar. 15, 17; Apr. 5, 1847. N. Y. Journ. Comm., Feb. 15, 1847. Public Ledger, Feb. 12, 16, 1847. 210Tucker to Hammond, Apr. 24, 1847.

Allen of Ohio, noted for vanity and a powerful voice, felt so disgusted about the outcome of the Oregon business, that at the beginning of this session he threw up the chairmanship of the committee on foreign relations and declined to serve on any committee. Niles, an excellent man, was a protectionist, like the Pennsylvania Senators. Hannegan was a man of force but a rabid westerner. He, Dickinson and Breese were distinctly Cass men. Calhoun’s partisans were Butler (So. Carolina), Lewis (Alabama) and the Florida senators, while Colquitt and Speight were thought to be guided considerably by him; but as time went on his influence over most of this group waned. Of the Whig Senators Webster spent most of his time in the practice of law. Crittenden was in general honest and sensible; but he and Clayton had induced Jarnagin to vote for Walker’s tariff, believing that it would discredit the Democrats, and the failure of this unworthy trick damaged their prestige considerably. Clayton had unusual ability and experience, but was crafty and insincere. Mangum enjoyed a deserved respect, but was not of striking ability.

Of the House Democrats, P. King stood high in the confidence of his colleagues, and had no little skill in leading. C. J. Ingersoll was the most important Pennsylvanian, but his attainments and eloquence were accompanied by erratic judgment. Thurman surpassed the other Ohio Representatives in good conduct and talents, but Brinkerhoff displayed more activity than he. Douglas ranked first in the Illinois group, and perhaps first among the supporters of the administration in the House. Dromgoole (Virginia) possessed remarkable legislative abilities and reputation; but did not care to exert himself overmuch. McKay (North Carolina) and Haralson (Georgia) were chairmen, respectively, of the ways and means and the military committees, but did not distinguish themselves. Rhett, an able and acute man, was a more consistent representative of South Carolina principles than Calhoun. Of the Whigs Severance (Maine) possessed more than average ability. Winthrop (Massachusetts) was a gentleman, a fine speaker and debater, honest, scholarly and conservative—an ideal public man. Hudson (Massachusetts) had energy and character but was too partisan. J. R. Ingersoll (Pennsylvania) had good abilities and good sense. Giddings (Ohio) has to be considered a calculating fanatic, not enthusiast, of the abolition school. Vinton (Ohio) stood among the best on either side of the House in wisdom, sincerity and good conduct.

25. Welles papers: note 22. 13Pakenham, no. 150, 1846. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 252–4. 139Fulton to Campbell, Jan. —, 1847. 198Ingersoll to Gallatin, Dec. 25, 1847. (Embassy) Webster, Writings, ix, 157, see vol. ii, p. 123; Wash. Union, June 27; Oct. 1, 1846. Public Ledger, Dec. 8, 1846. (Sublimity) No. American, Jan. 11, 1847. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 111, 139. Charleston Mercury, Jan. 26, 27, 1847. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Dec. 5, 12, 1846. (The generals, etc.) Marcy to W., Nov. 14, 1846; Greeley, Recolls., 211; Welles papers; 345Wright to Van Buren, Jan. 28, 1847; 169Letcher to Crittenden, Dec. 20, 1847; 13Crampton, no. 9, 1848; Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 224; Calhoun Corresp., 713, 715–6 (to Mrs. C.); 108Buchanan to Bancroft, June 14, 1847; 206J. Graham to Gov. G., Jan. 10, 1847; 181Buchanan to Donelson, May 13, 1847; Wash. Union, Jan. 30. Scott was “in” politics but inactive.

“Old Whitey,” it will be recalled, was Taylor’s favorite horse. When the author refers to the course of “the Whigs” or “the Democrats” it is to be understood, of course, that exceptions existed.

26. The principal speeches have been cited elsewhere. They are to be found, of course, in the Congressional Globe under the proper headings, and less fully in Benton’s Abridged Debates. Public Ledger, Feb. 25, 1847. 191Fairfield to wife, Apr. 14, 1846.

27. See particularly the debate on the $3,000,000 bill and the Ten Regiment bill, and, in the House, the Loan bill. Wash. Union, May 18, 1846.

28. Polk, Diary, Dec. 19, 1846. Benton, View, ii, 678. House proceedings in Cong. Globe, 29, 2, Dec. 8–16. Richardson, Messages, iv, 506–7, 594–600. U. S. vs. Rice: 4 Wheaton, 246, 253. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, § 1318. Butler, Treaty-making Power, i, 128, 168–9. (Decision, Castine, Harrison) Wash. Union, Dec. 11, 15, 26, 1846; Dec. 12, 1847. Kent, Commentaries, i, 282. Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 130, col. 1. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 261, note 1, 336. (Kearny a Whig) Richmond Whig in Nat. Intellig., Oct. 19, 1846. (Unhappy) Amer. Review, Feb., 1848, p. 110. Public Ledger, Feb. 8, 1847.

The National Intelligencer had the hardihood to state (Dec. 25, 1846): “It is the opinion of the President that the fact of conquest annexes foreign provinces to the United States.” The Texans complained because the part of New Mexico claimed by them was occupied by Kearny; but since the enemy had held it by military force this action was proper, and Buchanan assured Henderson that the temporary military occupation would not affect the rights of his state (Buchanan, Works, vii, 215). The author did not find Harrison’s proclamation in Ms.; but Mr. D. M. Matteson discovered it in Niles, Nov. 27, 1813, p. 215. Copies of official documents in the Burton Historical Collection, kindly furnished to the author, throw further light on the fact that American sovereignty over a portion of Canada was declared in 1813. The subject is certainly an interesting one.

29. The Whigs wished to repeal all of the new fiscal policy. Welles papers: note 22. Wash. Union, Mar. 9, 1847. Lyell, Second Visit (N. Y., 1849), 256. Public Ledger, Dec. 8, 1846. (Nat. Intellig.) Charleston Mercury, Jan. 12, 26, 1847. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 122. Niles, Jan. 2, 1847, p. 288. Boston Atlas, Jan. 6; Feb. 6, 1847. (Webster) Niles, Jan. 9, 1847, p. 303. N. Y. Journ. of Comm., Jan. 4, 1847. N. Y. Tribune, Feb. 14, 1847. No. American, Dec. 24, 1846; Jan. 4, 1847. Polk, Diary, Jan. 22, 1847. Nat. Intellig., Jan. 14, 1847 (if the government desires the coöperation of the Whigs, let it repeal the tariff and sub-treasury Acts). Note also the treatment of the important public land question (vol. ii, p. 261).

30. Cong. Globe, 29, 1, pp. 1211–21. Greeley, Amer. Conflict, i, 189. Smith, Annex. of Tex., 314, 351–2. Welles papers. McLaughlin, Cass, 229. Cole, Whig Party, 119, 122–4. Polk, Diary, Dec. 19, 23, 1846; Jan. 4, 16, 22, 23, 1847. Benton, View, ii, 695. Wilson, Rise and Fall, ii, 15, 16. 13Pakenham, no. 5, 1847. 108Polk to Bancroft, Jan. 30, 1847, private. Meigs, Benton, 371. Amer. Hist. Assoc. Report, 1911, i, 187–95 (C. E. Persinger). Cong. Globe, 29, 2, pp. 453–5, 541–55. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 301, 306–7. Calhoun, Works, iv, 323. 137Fisher to Calhoun, Aug. 22, 1847. Stephens, U. S., 391. Cutts, Questions, 154. Garrison, Extension, 254–68. Boston Atlas, Jan. 4, 1847. Blaine, Twenty Years, i, 73. So. Qtrly. Review, Jan., 1851, p. 196. Wash. Union, July 3; Aug. 12, 1846; Jan. 16, 1847. N. Y. Herald, Jan. 16; Feb. 20, 1847. Merriam, Bowles, i, 48. 139Gentry to Campbell, Apr. 18, 1848.

The Proviso, offered as an amendment to the $2,000,000 and $3,000,000 bills, was objected to because: 1, J. Q. Adams, Benton and others argued that any territory acquired from Mexico would come to us “free” by law, and slavery would not exist there unless subsequent legislation and also the natural conditions should be favorable to it; 2, the question would necessarily be settled when Congress should have to decide regarding the government of such territory, and present action would not bind a future Congress; 3, it did not relate to American territory, property or citizens—in short it related to nothing that existed; 4, the only way to reach the end aimed at by the Proviso would be through a treaty, and, should the treaty be violated, Mexico would have a right to interfere with our domestic affairs; 5, the President would have no right to sign such a treaty, for the subject belonged to Congress; 6, the American Senate would not ratify such a treaty, and hence the adoption of the Proviso would prevent peace and the acquisition of territory; 7, it was insulting to Mexico to legislate about territory belonging to her, would scandalize the world, and might prolong the war; 8, the Proviso stood in the way of needed war legislation, tended to alarm the South and lessen its interest in the war, incited to discord at a time when harmony was peculiarly desirable, promoted sectionalism, and, if adopted, might render the administration powerless to wage the war successfully. As is well known, Brinkerhoff of Ohio was the father of the Proviso, but for strategical reasons Wilmot was asked to introduce it. Wilmot himself did not insist upon the Proviso, when Polk explained to him some of the difficulties. For a convenient review of the later history of the Proviso principle see Lalor, Cyclopædia, iii, 1115–7. The Proviso threatened Whig unity and success, of course, because the northern wing and the southern wing of the party could not agree regarding slavery.

31. 137Fisher to Calhoun, Aug. 22, 1847. (Committed) Richardson, Messages, iv, 536–41. 169Rives to Crittenden, Feb. 5, 8, 1847. 330J. P. to Z. Taylor, Sept. 8, 1847. Merriam, Bowles, i, 48. Curtis, Webster, i, 303–7, 324 5[missing hyphen of 324–5?F1]. Webster, Writings, ix, 257–9; xiii, 328. 13Pakenham, no. 18, 1847. Lalor, Cyclopædia, iii, 1105. Amer. Review, Oct., 1847, 345–6. Louisville Journal, Sept. 17, 1847. Cincinn. Enquirer, Nov. 15, 1847. Cong. Globe, 29, 2, pp. 555–6 (Webster); app., 296–302 (Berrien). 132Donelson to Buchanan, Jan. 8, 1847. 132Bancroft to Id.., Oct. 18, 1847. Boston Courier, Feb. 14, 1848. Corwin to F., Feb. 4, 1847: Ohio Phil. and Hist. Soc. Pubs., July-Sept., 1914. Benton, Abr. Debs., xvi, 42 (Berrien). Wash. Union, Feb. 8, 25; Sept. 8, 13, 16; Oct. 5, 1847. Public Ledger, Feb. 8, 17, 1847. Cole, Whig Party, 119–22. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 159. Nat. Intellig., Sept. 7, 1847.

Berrien’s words (Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 42): The war “ought not to be prosecuted ... with any view to the dismemberment of that republic, or to the acquisition by conquest of any part of her territory”; this government “will always be ready to enter into negotiations, with a view to terminate the present unhappy conflict on terms which shall ... preserve inviolate the national honor ... of Mexico”; “it is especially desirable ... that the boundary of the State of Texas should be definitely settled, and that provision be made by the republic of Mexico for the prompt and equitable settlement of the just claims of our citizens.” Naturally the Whigs endeavored to recommend the “No territory” idea by dwelling on other points (e.g. the country was already large enough; this plan would prevent a struggle between North and South over slavery; without it no treaty with Mexico could be ratified). How much merit these arguments possessed, it is unnecessary to point out; but no doubt there was more or less honest belief in them, especially among the rank and file. The people in general, however, were against giving up all the fruits of our victories, and even Calhoun admitted that we could not get out of the war with credit unless we made a large gain in territory.

32. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Dec. 5, 12, 1846. 108Appleton to Bancroft, Feb. 24, 1847. 108Polk to Bancroft, Jan. 30, 1847, private. Welles papers. Public Ledger, Mar. 2, 1847. Boston Atlas, Jan. 18, 21; Feb. 8; Mar. 3, 1847. Polk, Diary, Jan. 19, 1847. Nat. Intellig., Aug. 11, 1846; July 22, 1847. N. Y. Journ. Comm., Jan. 7, 1847. N. Y. Express, Sept. 4, 1847. N. Y. Tribune, Jan. 8, 1847; Jan. 27, 1848. Balt. American in Wash. Union, Sept. 8, 1847. No. American, Dec. 30, 1846; Oct. 6, 1847. Slidell to Buchanan, Nov. 5, 1846: “The fate of the administration depends on the successful conduct of the war” (Curtis, Buchanan, i, 601).

33. (Elected) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 307–9. 169Burnley to Crittenden, Dec. 12, 1847. 132R. Taylor to Buchanan, Nov. 18, 1847, private. Seward, Seward at Washington, i, 57–8. Schurz, Clay, ii, 290–2. Wash. Union, Nov. 16–18, 24 (Clay’s speech in full, which Colton does not give complete), 27, 29; Dec. 1, 1847. N. Y. Sun, Nov. 16, 1847. N. Y. Herald, Nov. 17, 1847. Cincinn. Enquirer, Nov. 15, 1847. (Abhorrent) Amer. Review, Feb., 1848, 110. Lexington Observer, Nov. 17, 1847. Clay, Works (Colton, ed.), iii, 60–7. No. American, Dec. 4, 1847. Cole, Whig Party, 120. Shackford, Citizen’s Appeal, 18. Hill, Lawrence, 76. (In Mexico) 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Dec. 27, 1847, private. Webster, Writings, xiii, 328.

34. 169Rives to Crittenden, Feb. 8, 1847. 13Pakenham, no. 132, 1846. Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 211–8 (Corwin), 282–9 (Severance). Corwin to Follett, Feb. 4, 1847: Ohio Phil. and Hist. Soc. Pubs., July-Sept., 1914. N. Y. Tribune, Jan. 25, 1847. No. American, May 27, 1847. Sumner, Orations, ii, 143, 187. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 138, 140. 253Dowling to McLean, Dec. 7, 1847.

35. Semmes, Service, 69. 253Mower to McLean, Nov. 22; Dec. 13, 1847. 345Niles to Van Buren, Jan. 20, 1848. 137Rhett to Calhoun, May 20, 1847. 169Prunt to Crittenden, Dec. 5, 1847. London Times, Feb. 15, 1848. 13Crampton, no. 42, 1847. Calhoun Corresp., 727–8 (to D. G.), 737–9 (to W. T.). Sherman Letters, 38. Welles papers. 108Polk to Bancroft, Jan. 30, 1847, private. Nat. Intellig., Aug. 17; Dec. 27, 1847; Jan. 10, 1848. Public Ledger, Dec. 25, 1847; Jan. 31; Feb. 11, 1848. Bourne, Essays, 227. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, pp. 93 (withdrawal), 94 (vote), 95 (unconstitutional), 391–2 (Schenck), 396 (Henley), 495, 530 (Webster), 566 (Hilliard). Amer. Review, vi, 331, 342. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 289, 337. Amer. Hist. Assoc. Report, 1911, ii, 83 (Lamar). N. Y. Journ. Comm., Jan. 27, 1848. Cincinn. Atlas in Wash. Union, Aug. 25, 1847. Ohio State Journal: ibid., Aug. 30. Wash. Union, Nov. 4; Dec. 16, 1847. 335Dimond to Trist, Oct. 27, 1847. 335Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 7, 24, 1847, private. N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 5, 1847. N. Y. Herald, Dec. 4, 1847. 198G. Davis to Gallatin, Mar. 6, 1848. 345Law to Van Buren, Aug. 2, 1847.

Public sentiment was well voiced by the governor of Virginia in a 42Message to the Assembly, Dec. 6, 1847 (exec. letter book, no. 73, p. 325): “Shall the insolent Mexican go unpunished? Shall the glories of Palo Alto, Resaca de La Palma, Monterey, etc., pass away in a dream, leaving no solid memorials behind them of a skill, a gallantry, and a self-sacrificing devotion unsurpassed in the history of man? I regard this war as a practical question, and to be disposed of accordingly. That morbid sympathy that lives only for Mexico—that Mexico which murders the drunken soldier, and lances the wounded on the field of battle—I cannot approve, nor can I respect that closet philosophy that calls on us to surrender everything because we are victorious. No, my sympathies are for my country, for the gallant dead, for those whose mighty deeds have given a bolder and a broader light to our glorious constellation, for the widows and for their orphans.... I would be just to Mexico, but just also to my own country.”

The difficulty of reaching an agreement in Congress about the relation of slavery interests to the war was thought by the British representative to stand in the way of compelling the administration to stop hostilities (13Crampton, no. 71, Dec. 30, 1847), and no doubt had considerable effect. In the speakership contest 220 Representatives voted (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 2). To hold that Congress had power to prescribe the objects of the war was virtually to declare Congress the supreme commander and treaty-making power. It was also to declare the nation impotent to wage the war, for, as the parties stood, it could not pass a bill over the President’s veto.

36. 345Poinsett to Van Buren, June 4, 1847. 345Blair to Id.., Dec. 9, 1847. Webster, Writings, x, 262 (re Ten Regiment bill: the war unnecessary and unconstitutional). 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 28, 1848. Public Ledger, Dec. 15, 1847; Jan. 31; Feb. 2, 1848. Wash. Union, Mar. 24, 1848. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, pp. 57–8 (Goggin), 154–6 (Lincoln), 267–9 (resolutions), 415–7 (Smith), 495–6, 530–5 (Webster), etc. (Direct taxes) N. Y. Journ. Comm., Dec. 25, 1847. (Chairman) N. Y. Herald, Feb. 13, 1848 (financial article). Nat. Intellig., Jan. 17, 1848.

The British chargé at Washington, though that legation was strongly in sympathy with the Whigs, reported that the Whigs lost no opportunity to embarrass and discredit the administration (13Crampton, no. 19, Feb. 9, 1848). Slidell’s instructions never having been acted upon, were practically a dead letter, and it was important not to make them public, lest the Mexicans, knowing on what terms the United States had been willing to restore friendly intercourse, should use the information to embarrass future negotiations; but the House, admitting this point by promising to keep them secret—which everybody knew could not be done—demanded them, and resented Polk’s wise refusal to transmit them. The National Intelligencer (Dec. 18, 1847) asserted that Slidell had been “ordered not to negotiate a settlement of the Boundary of Texas ... unless in complication with the cession to the U. S. of California,” which was positively false. Polk, Diary, Jan. 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 17, 23; July 6, 1848. After peace was declared he sent them (Richardson, Messages, iv, 594–600).

The Mexican tariff gave rise to some of the best declamation of the war period. The National Intelligencer accused Polk of exercising “absolute monarchical power” in that matter (Apr. 3, 1847). The Albany Statesman (Apr. 9) said, “This is surely the most flagrant usurpation and the most matchless piece of impudence with which any ruler in modern times has ever ventured to insult an intelligent people.” In March, 1848, the subject came up in Congress, and Webster (Writings, x, 262) declared the President had no right to lay the duties, and that the duties were paid by Americans and neutrals; whereas in fact his military powers gave the President ample authority, and of course the duties were added to the prices of the goods. The National Intelligencer went so far as to deny that the President had any military initiative whatever, and to assert that as commander-in-chief he was merely “a subordinate” of Congress (see Wash. Union, Aug. 21, 1847).

37. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Dec. 5, 1846. Spirit of the Age, Feb. 3, 1848.

38. Wash. Union, June 9, 1848. 157Barclay to Cobb, Dec. 24, 1847. Nat. Intellig., June 10, 1848. (Illegal) Delano’s words, p. 277. (Advised) 370To Davis, Apr. 18, 1848. (Mil. spirit) Wash. Union, May 22, 1847. Norfolk Herald, Apr. 12, 1847. Every Representative who had voted or said that Polk began the war unconstitutionally was bound to move for his impeachment.

39. By “Hosea Biglow” the author means, of course, the ideas expressed by Lowell in his Biglow Papers.

40. As early as Jan. 2, 1847, the N. Y. Herald, a non-partisan journal, said the course of the Whigs with reference to the war had almost ruined them in public estimation. Indeed that fact has been in a general way recognized (Pierce, Sumner, iii, 111; Schurz, Clay, ii, 289; Von Holst, U. S., iii, 252). Probably the reasons why the Democrats behaved better than the Whigs were that (1) circumstances did not involve them in such dilemmas, and (2) they had the responsibilities of conducting affairs.

1. It should be remembered that American newspapers and public men were saying unpleasant things about England at this period. The dislike was mutual as well as natural. She still entertained, no doubt, a smouldering resentment against this country for having dared to become independent, and she noted with a jealousy that is quite easily understood the rapid growth of her sometime colony in population, wealth and commercial importance.

2. Polk said: “Even France, the country which had been our ancient ally, the country which has a common interest with us in maintaining the freedom of the seas, the country which, by the cession of Louisiana, first opened to us access to the Gulf of Mexico, the country with which we have been every year drawing more and more closely the bonds of successful commerce, most unexpectedly, and to our unfeigned regret, took part in an effort to prevent annexation and to impose on Texas, as a condition of the recognition of her independence by Mexico, that she would never join herself to the United States” (Richardson, Messages, iv, 387). For further information regarding the interference of England and France see J. H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas. Polk was treated alternately by the Journal des Débats and by most of the English press as a nonentity and as a power for evil.

3. Standing of the United States abroad. 108Sumner to Bancroft. Feb. 1, 1846. (Hate) 297McLane to Polk (received June 21, 1846). Bennett, Mems., 386. 52Bancroft, no. 25, May 3, 1847. 77Mangino, no. 10, Mar. 8, 1837; Jan. 29, 1846, res. Smith, Annex. of Texas, 382. London Morning Post, Apr. 5, 1846. Jameson, Calhoun Corresp., 653, 698. N. Y. Herald, June 8, 1844. 77Murphy, nos. 17, Nov. 1, 1845, res.; 2, Jan. 1, 1846. Nat. Intelligencer, June 22, 1847. 132Donelson to Buchanan, Jan. 8, 1847. 52King, nos. 21, 25, 28, 29, Jan. 1, 30; June 1, 30, 1846. Constitutionnel, Jan. 15, 1846. National, Nov. 28, 1844; Dec. 3, 1845; Jan. 22; May 16, 1846. 52McLane, nos. 18, May 21, 1830; 5, Sept. 18, 1845; 54, 55, June 3, 18, 1846. Morning Chronicle, Dec. 25, 1845; Jan. 17; July 27, 1846. Britannia, Jan. 10; Mar. 28; Apr. 18, 1846. Spectator, Feb. 7; Sept. 26, 1846. Examiner, Mar. 29, 1845. Standard, Nov. 25, 1844. Richardson, Messages, iv, 387. Times, Sept. 23; Dec. 27, 1845; Jan. 26, 1846; Mar. 27, 1847. Journal des Débats, Jan. 22; May 15, 1846; Jan. 2–3, 1848.

Martin, our chargé at Paris, wrote (52no. 17, Aug. 15, 1845) that the skill, prudence, firmness and disregard of European interference exhibited by our government in dealing with the annexation of Texas had improved our position in Europe; and McLane expressed the opinion (no. 5, Sept. 18, 1845) that our spirited preparations during the summer of 1845 to fight Mexico had had a good effect; but these were matters to increase respect rather than favor. The London Morning Chronicle of July 27, 1846, after we had shown our prowess, politely explained our occasional coarseness of manners and speech as due to the working out of the principle of political equality, and asserted that the English middle classes viewed the United States with admiration and pride as a “magnificent demonstration of the progressive energy and self-governing power of their own victorious race.” Probably a similar feeling lurked in the upper and controlling classes. McLane’s report to Polk, cited at the end of the paragraph, was made in June, 1846; but such a state of feeling could not have arisen in a few months.

4. Standing of Mexico abroad. Duflot de Mofras, Exploration, i, 32. (Odium) 13Foreign Office to Bankhead, no. 53, Dec. 31, 1844. 13Bankhead, no. 99, July 30, 1846. 52McLane, nos. 18, May 21, 1830; 69, Aug. 15, 1846. 77Mangino, no. 10, Mar. 8, 1837. 77Relaciones to ministers at London and Paris, July 30, 1845. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846. 77Murphy, no. 5, Apr. 1, 1845. 77Peña to Garro, no. 24, Oct. 28, 1845. 77Cuevas to Garro, no. 15, July 30, 1845, res. (Told) 73Lozano, no. 3, Aug. 25, 1847, res. V. Cruz Locomotor, July 26, 1846. Amer. Review, Jan., 1846, p. 87. Dwinelle, Address, 11. London Athenæum, Sept. 13, 1845. Journal des Débats, Feb. 18; July 9, 1845; July 8, 1846. National, Nov. 19, 1844; Jan. 18, 1846. London Morning Chronicle, Sept. 15, 1846. Thompson, Recollections, 236. Spectator, Sept. 19, 1846. Examiner, Aug. 2, 1845. Smith, Annexation, 382, etc. London Times, Apr. 11; Aug. 25, 1846.

Even during the war Mexico gave offence to England by her treatment of the offer to mediate (vol. ii, p. 368) and by her action regarding her debt. In the latter business Bankhead charged her with a “breach of publick faith” (77to Relaciones, May 18, 1847).

5. Buchanan wished to give a pledge to take no Mexican territory, insisting that unless we should do so, if interrogated, it was “almost certain that both England and France would join with Mexico.” Polk refused, however, to do this, adding that such an inquiry would be “insulting” and would not be answered, and adding also that he would like to obtain a proper territorial indemnity (Polk, Diary, May 13, 1846). Doubtless Buchanan had an eye to his standing with the northern Democrats, who did not wish the area of slavery extended.

6. See vol. i, p. 181 for the Message.

7. For this paragraph. Buchanan, Works, vi, 484–5. 59Confidential circular, May 14, 1846. See also Ho. Rep. 752; 29, 1, pp. 50–2.

8. For commercial reasons Spain was particularly jealous of our blockade, and although treated with special indulgence, she complained more than any other power; but no real friction resulted. See chap. xxx, notes 7, 8.

9. For these two paragraphs. 52Martin, no. 13, May 15, 1847. Gutiérrez de Estrada, México en 1840, p. 32. Gaceta de la Nueva Granada, Aug. 16, 1846, etc. Peruano, passim. Comercio, passim. 72Span. govt. to capt. gen. Cuba, June 18, 1846 (including correspondence with the Spanish minister at Washington). Dix, Speeches, i, 214, note. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 207. Heraldo, Apr. 26, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1009. Buchanan, Works, vii, 290–2; viii, 282–3, 298–9. 52Irving, July 18; Aug. 15; Oct. 8, 1846. 52Saunders, nos. 1, Aug. 6; 6, Nov. 16, 1846; 8, Feb. 13; 24, Nov. 6, 1847.

R. M. Saunders, the American minister, mistakenly invited an offer of mediation from Spain, but she felt very much afraid that we should reject it, and also that it might give offence to England and France. No written communications on the subject passed between him and the Spanish government, however. El Heraldo also remarked that the war would tend to unite the Spaniards of both Americas against the U. S., and that Spain, seizing the opportunity, should offer them her protection and tolerate no other influence. Such a suggestion was not likely to help Mexico.

10. 108Bancroft to Polk, June 3, 1847. 355Wheaton, no. 287, June 23, 1846. 181Donelson to Buchanan, July 7, 19; Sept. 18, 1846. 132Id.., Jan. 8; Feb. 21, private, 1847. 181Canitz to Wheaton, June 25, 1846.

Baron Gerolt, the Prussian minister at Washington, sympathized with and assisted our government (181Buchanan to Donelson, May 23, 1848).

11. 297McLane to Polk (received June 21, 1846). 13To Bankhead, nos. 18, 34, May 31; Oct. 1, 1845; 15, June 1, 1846. 52McLane, nos. 5, Sept. 18, 1845; 50, 54, 55, 69, May 29; June 3, 18; Aug. 15, 1846. 77Murphy, no. 2, Jan. 1, 1846. 52King, no. 28, June 1, 1846. Journal des Débats, Feb. 4, 1845. 137Saunders to Calhoun, June 27, 1846. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183–4. London Morning Post, Jan. 17; Apr. 5, 1846. 335McLane, May 29, 1846. Morning Chronicle, Feb. 3; May 30, 1846. Morning Herald, June 24, 1846. Britannia, May 3, 1845. Times, Sept. 1, 1845; May 14; June 1, 11; Aug. 25, 31, 1846. 13Bankhead, no. 94, Sept. 29, 1845. 52Everett, no. 337, July 4, 1845. Calhoun Correspondence, 698.

12. McLane did not feel quite so confident. His private 297letter of January 17, 1846, to Polk said that in case of war with England he was not sure popular sentiment would be able to restrain the French government; but the representative of Mexico at Paris believed that in such an event the government would probably be unable to “neutralize the effects of the innate hatred of the French toward their neighbors and rivals,” the British (77Mangino, Jan. 29, 1846, res.).

13. 77Garro, May 30, 1845, res. 11Mexique, xi, 215 (Deffaudis). 297McLane to Polk, Jan. 17, 1846, private. Charleston Mercury, Sept. 8, 1846 (Paris letter). 52King, nos. 25, 28, 29, Jan. 30; June 1, 30, 1846. National, June 27, 30, 1846. Correspondant, May 1; Nov. 15, 1846; Jan. 15, 1817. Morning Chronicle, Feb. 3, 1846. Journal des Débats, Feb. 4; July 9, 1845.

14. Aberdeen’s intimation was construed in England as an offer of mediation, while the American government insisted that no such offer was made by him; but this difference of view did not lead to friction. Pakenham told Buchanan he had received no instructions on the subject, but knew that his government would be glad to bring about peace by interposing its good offices. Buchanan replied that he was afraid formal mediation would prove a vain and “entangling” affair for the mediating power. So thought Pakenham, for he believed the United States would make territorial demands which England would not be willing to countenance or advise Mexico to accept. Buchanan added that we should be glad to have England persuade Mexico to listen to reason, since our government was anxious to establish peace on just and even generous terms (13Pakenham, no. 82, June 28, 1846). Pakenham concluded that our government relied on “the anxiety which England must feel, for the sake of her trade with Mexico and the safety of British interests committed in so many ways in that country, to see peace reëstablished between the two Republics” (13Id.., no. 93, July 13, 1846). Senator Archer hinted to Polk that he (Archer) could bring about mediation through his friend Pakenham, but met of course with no encouragement (Polk, Diary, Sept. 4, 1846).

15. This was described by Palmerston in Parliament as a definite offer of mediation (Morning Chronicle, Aug. 26). The settlement of the Oregon difficulty made such an offer more proper than it would have been at an earlier date.

16. Buchanan was absent from Washington at this time (Pakenham, no. 16). According to the New York correspondent of the London Times, the Americans feared that unsuccessful mediation might be construed as giving some color of right to authoritative interposition (Times, Oct. 15, 1846).

17. British mediation. Polk, Diary, Sept. 4, 10, 11, 1846. 52To McLane, no. 44, July 27. 52McLane, nos. 55, 69, June 18; Aug. 15, 1846. 52Boyd, no. 3, Sept. 18. 13To Pakenham, no. 10, Aug. 18, 1846. 13Pakenham, nos. 82, 93, 99, 107, 116, 119, 132, June 28; July 13, 29; Aug. 13; Sept. 13, 28; Nov. 23, 1846; no. 56, Apr. 28, 1847. London Times (Bentinck, Disraeli), Aug. 25; Oct. 15, 1846. 1Ms. speech of Aug. 6, 1846. Morning Chronicle, Aug. 26, 1847. Journal des Débats, (fop) June 30; Aug. 27, 1846.

Both of these British attempts to mediate were accompanied with similar offers to Mexico, which proved equally unfruitful (vol. ii, p. 368). At the end of October Bankhead was instructed to advise Mexico that, since the United States had rejected the British good offices, she should settle with us at once on the most favorable terms that she could obtain.

18. For the benefit of the Mexican government, the Foreign Office wrote to Bankhead (13no. 15), June 1, 1846: “She [Great Britain] would find herself engaged in a war with a Nation with whom she would have no personal cause of quarrel, in behalf of a Nation and Government which she has repeatedly warned in the most friendly and urgent manner of their danger, and which, solely in consequence of their wilfull contempt of that warning, have at last plunged headlong down the precipice from which the British Government spared no efforts to save them”; and Bankhead was instructed to let Paredes know “the real state of the case without disguise.” Aberdeen’s thus declining to interfere on behalf of Mexico was particularly natural in view of the talk that had occurred with the Mexican minister at London while the Oregon issue was pending (vol. i, p. 115, and note 27 infra). As a step intended to settle that issue had now been taken, it appeared probable that there would be no longer any occasion to tow Mexico along, and, as Aberdeen was aware on June 1 that hostilities had occurred near the Rio Grande, it seemed important to disentangle himself completely, so as to be able to act with a free hand.

19. July 26, 1846, the Times asserted that a war with the United States “would be the very farthest from being unpopular” (denied the next day by the Morning Chronicle so far as the mass of the Liberals were concerned), and on September 28 said there had been few modern cases in which England could have “imposed” her arbitration with greater reason than upon the United States and Mexico.

20. For this paragraph. 13To Bankhead, nos. 18, May 31; 34, Oct. 1, 1845; 15, June 1, 1846. 77Murphy, no. 17, Nov. 1, 1845, res. London Globe, Aug. 25, 1846. London Spectator, May 30; Sept. 26, 1846. 13Palmerston, memo. of reply to Bankhead’s no. 46, Apr. 30, 1847. 52McLane, no. 54, June 3, 1846. London Times, July 26; Aug. 25, 26; Sept. 16, 1846. Morning Chronicle, July 27, 1846. Britannia, Mar. 9, 1844; Apr. 18, 1846; Jan. 9, 1847. Examiner, May 30, 1846. Morning Herald, June 24, 1846.

21. 77Murphy, nos. 15, Oct. 1, 1845, muy res.; 17, Nov. 1, 1845, res.; 19, Dec. 1, 1845, res.; 4, Feb. 1, 1846, res. 77Peña y Peña to Murphy, no. 14, Dec. 27, 1845. Diario, Dec. 29, 31, 1846. Mora, Papeles Inéditos, 71–3. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183–4. 13Mora to Palmerston, Dec. 15, 1847. 13Palmerston, memo. in reply to Mora, Dec. 25, 1847; Jan. 1, 1848, to Mora. 13To Bankhead, nos. 18, May 31, 1845; 15, June 1; 4, Aug. 15, 1846. London Times, Sept. 10, 1845; July 15, 1846. For the attitude of England in reference to California see chap. xvi, note 8.

22. Aberdeen told Murphy about the first of August, 1845, that the course of England and France in the event of war between Mexico and the United States would very likely depend upon incidents that might occur, and gave Murphy the impression that he would like to have the war take place and prove favorable to Mexico (77Murphy, no. 9, August 1, 1845). Some friction arose between American authorities and French subjects in California. The United States justly attributed it to the latter, but took occasion to assure France that we would not “tolerate” any action on the part of American agents giving “just cause of complaint” to foreigners inhabiting regions occupied by our troops (Buchanan, Works, vii, 372).

23. The London Examiner of May 15, 1847, said: “Much of the British goods in depot at the West Indian Islands have been forced into Mexico through the medium of the new American custom house at Tampico;” the capture of Vera Cruz will facilitate this operation; “and thus, instead of quarreling with the Americans in behalf of Mexico, we, or at least our traders, are quietly sharing with the Americans the profits of Mexican subjugation.” See, however, chap. xxxiii, p. 263.

24. For this paragraph. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 951. (Broglie) 108Bancroft to Polk, Oct. 18, 1847. Howe, Bancroft, ii, 10, 17. 297McLane to Polk (received June 21, 1846). 52Id.., no. 69, Aug. 15, 1846. 52Bancroft, nos. 25, May 3; 46, Dec. 4, 1847. 13Pakenham, nos. 102, Aug. 13; 111, Sept. 13, 1846. 13Crampton, no. 21, July 29, 1847. (Invariably) 13Doyle, no. 5, Jan. 13, 1848. 132Bancroft, Nov. 3, 1846. Buchanan, Works, vii, 290–2, 366–8, 372–3. National, May 1, 1847. Correspondant, May 1, 1846. 53Buchanan to Pageot, July 21, 1847. Examiner, May 15, 1847. 77Murphy, no. 9, Aug. 1, 1845. See chap. xxx, note 8. The Mexicans expected that the injury done to neutral commerce by the war would lead foreign nations to help them (13Bankhead, no. 162, 1846). For privateering see vol. ii, pp. 191–3; for the low tariff, see vol. ii, pp. 261–3.

25. Revolutionary movements broke out in Italy (January), France (February), Germany, and Austria (March). Louis Philippe lost his throne.

26. For this paragraph. 108Bancroft to Polk, Jan. 4; May 14, 1847. 108Id.to Buchanan, Nov. 3, 1847. Howe, Bancroft, ii, 5. London Globe, Aug. 25, 1846. 52Bancroft, no. 46, Dec. 4, 1847. National, Nov. 24, 1845. Correspondant, Feb. 1, 1846. 297McLane to Polk, Aug. 2, 1846. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 294, res., July 28, 1846. 13To Bankhead, no. 15, June 1, 1846. 52Martin, no. 13, May 15, 1847. 52Boyd, no. 2, Sept. 3, 1846.

Peña y Peña (Comunicación Circular) said publicly and distinctly in 1848 that foreign powers signified to Mexico that they regarded the annexation of Texas as an accomplished fact; and he added that the one most interested to prevent the aggrandizement of the United States felt that its economic interests required it to digest in silence its own grievances rather than compromise those interests by declaring war.

27. Aberdeen said to Murphy that England did not wish to fight the United States alone, but added that “if France would join her, the case would be very different”; and he actually requested the French minister at London to sound Guizot on the subject (77Murphy, no. 15, Oct. 1, 1845, muy res.). After another talk Murphy reported to the same effect: “[Aberdeen] would not mind in the least having a war [with the United States] if he could drag France along behind him” [Nada le importaría esa Guerra si pudiese arrastrar tras sí á la Francia] (77no. 17, Nov. 1, 1845, res.). It is of course possible that Murphy attached too much seriousness to Aberdeen’s remarks; but the authorities at Mexico had to take his reports as they stood.

28. Murphy, who seems to have been at this time in the most intimate relations with Aberdeen, reported (77no. 15, Oct. 1, 1845, muy res.): France, in accordance with her long-standing disposition and animosities, “would be capable not only of opposing the views of Great Britain, but even of going so far as to make common cause with the United States against her, forcing Louis Philippe to adopt this extreme course however repugnant it might be to him. It is therefore not strange that the British minister views with dread anything that might expose him to war with the United States without securing a perfect understanding in advance with France, not because he needs the aid of her physical strength in a conflict with those States, but to commit her in such a manner that her physical strength would not be added to that of the enemy, causing perhaps a general conflagration of incalculable consequences in the world.”

29. For this paragraph. 108Bancroft to Polk, Jan. 19, 1847. Howe, Bancroft, ii, 5–6. 52Boyd, no. 3, Sept. 18, 1846. 77Murphy, nos. 15, Oct. 1, muy res.; 17, Nov. 1, res., 1845. 132Bancroft, Nov. 3, 1846. 52King, no. 29, June 30, 1846. Journal des Débats, July 9, 1845; Oct. 6, 1846. 52Martin, no. 11, Feb. 28, 1847. Dict. Nat. Biog. (article on Peel).

Dec. 28, 1847, Chargé Thornton was instructed (13no. 2) that, should Mexico propose British mediation, he was merely to say that he would transmit the proposal to London.

30. 108Bancroft to Polk, Jan. 19, 1847. 52Martin, nos. 34, Aug. 31, 1846; 13, May 15, 1847. Dix, Speeches, i, 207. Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 1847, 429–31. Washington Union, Oct. 6, 1846 (Paris letter, Sept. 17). (L’Epoque) Niles, July 25, 1846, p. 336. 52King, no. 29, June 30, 1846. Courrier des Etats Unis, July 20, 1846 (résumé of the French press). 77Mangino, Jan. 29, 1846, res.

31. 297McLane to Polk (received June 21, 1846). 52Id.., nos. 50, May 29; 54, 55, June 3, 18, 1846. 132Bancroft, May 18, 1847. Journal des Débats, Sept. 19; Dec. 21, 1846. 13Palmerston, memo. of reply to Bankhead’s no. 46, Apr. 30, 1847; to Mora, May 31, 1847. London Times, Sept. 16, 1846. 335McLane, May 29, 1846. 108Bancroft to Polk, May 14; June 3, 1847; to Greene, Nov. 3, 1847. Howe, Bancroft, ii, 18, 28. (Anderson) Lawton, Artillery Officer, 232. 52Bancroft, no. 25, May 3, 1847. 52King, nos. 28, 29, 31, June 1, 30; July 20, 1846.

J. F. Ramírez, who saw numerous letters from Europe, concluded by April 3, 1847, that Mexico would receive no aid from that direction (Ramírez, México, 224–5).

32. (Credit) 297McLane to Polk (received June 21, 1846). (Ranelagh) 76Murphy, Oct. 1, 1845; Mora, Papeles Ineditos, 97. (Paredes) Buchanan, Works, vii, 411–3; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 787, 789, 791, 796, 798; 47Perry to senior British naval officer at V. Cruz, Aug. 18, 1847, and reply, Aug. 21. Britannia, Oct. 17, 1846; Jan. 3, 23; June 5, 1847.

33. There are three reasons for presenting the newspaper quotations of this chapter: 1, They form a part of the history; 2, many indicate that the American task was not considered an easy one; and 3, many show how the Mexicans were encouraged by the European press. This encouragement stood constantly in the way of our making peace. It is well to remember that gibes, quite as offensive, against England could be found in American journals of that period.

34. Times, Oct. 30; Nov. 9, 1846; Jan. 1; Feb. 18; Mar. 15; Apr. 20, 26, 1847. Britannia, Feb. 20, 1847. Examiner, Dec. 22, 1846.

35. Times, May 10, 12, 1847. Amer. Review, Mar., 1848, p. 249.

36. 297Bancroft to Polk, Jan. 28, 1848. Journal des Débats, Nov. 4, 1846; Feb. 22, 1847. Constitutionnel, Dec. 18, 1846. Times, Aug. 31, 1846; Jan. 1; May 10; Sept. 30; Nov. 13; Dec. 2, 1847; Jan. 4, 20, 1848. Chronicle, Mar. 6; June 1; Sept. 30, 1847. Britannia, Oct. 9, 30; Nov. 13, 1847.

Some of the French papers also bore heavily upon the operations of 1846. Le Journal des Débats said they had been a failure; that no foresight, energy or skill had been displayed; that the war had proved costly and was likely to prove endless. Le Constitutionnel thought our resources might not hold out. But the press of France made no such exhibition of conscious weakness and humiliation trying to hide themselves (108Bancroft to Polk, Jan. 28, 1848) as did that of England.

37. 108Bancroft to Polk, Jan. 4, 19; May 14; June 3; Nov. 18, 1847; Jan. 28, 1848. 52McLane, no. 50, May 29, 1846. 52Boyd, no. 3, Sept. 18, 1846. 52Bancroft, no. 25, May 3, 1847. Journal des Débats, Jan. 21; June 1–2, 1846; Oct. 5, 1847; Aug. 15, 1848. 132Bancroft, May 18, 1847. 52King, nos. 21, Jan. 1; 29, June 30, 1846. National, June 18, 1846. 13To Thornton, no. 2, Dec. 28, 1847. 13Mora to Palmerston, Apr. 22; May 26; Dec. 15, 1847; June 26, 1848. 13Palmerston to Mora, May 31 (2); Oct. 7, 1847; June 30, 1848. Britannia, Nov. 13, 1847.

Dr. J. M. L. Mora, beginning in April, 1847, endeavored to secure British aid in settling the terms and guaranteeing the permanence of peace, and did not give up until near the end of June, 1848; but Palmerston would not meddle, and cautioned the representative of England that, should a request for British mediation be presented to him, he should simply say the proposition would be transmitted to London. Dec. 28, 1847, the British Foreign Office wrote to Thornton (13no. 2) that Cuevas had asked England to guarantee the treaty of peace; that it was highly improbable the United States would join in making this request; that to guarantee the treaty without a joint application would be equivalent to a contingent alliance with Mexico against the United States; and that England was not likely to take that step in any event.

1. Webster in the Senate, June 24, 1846: “We certainly wished her [Mexico] success.... We wished her well; and I think now that the people of the United States have no desire, it would give them, I think, no pleasure, to do her an injury beyond what is necessary to maintain their own rights. The people of the United States cannot wish to crush the republic of Mexico; it cannot be their desire to break down a neighboring republic; it cannot be their wish to drive her back again to a monarchical form of government, and to render her a mere appanage to some one of the thrones of Europe” (Writings, ix, 158). Crittenden spoke as follows in the Senate, May 11, 1846: “From the first struggle for liberty in South America and Mexico, it was the cherished policy of this country to extend to them sympathy, comfort, and friendship.... They were regarded as a portion of that great system of republics which were to stand forth in proud contrast with the Governments of the Old World.... As the head of the republican system, our policy was to cheer and cherish them, and lead them in the way to that liberty we had established, and of which we had set the example ... it was our interest to cherish them, and cultivate their friendship” (Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 788). As it may be thought that these statements were made for public effect, the following passage is quoted from resolutions passed by the people of Bloomington (now Muscatine), Territory of Iowa, June 5, 1846: “Mexico, being a sister republic, has been looked to by citizens of the United States with the sincere hope that that country would become an enlightened, free and liberal nation ... and thereby, become another beacon (as the United States already is) to the monarchies of the world, to show them that men are capable of governing themselves, and let them see the advantages of a free, republican government” (Iowa and War, no. 12). These statements were no doubt fundamentally true despite the resentment produced by the outrages perpetrated upon Texans and Americans, etc., which was mainly directed toward official Mexico.

Senator Hannegan rebuked sentimentality (often feigned for political reasons) in these words: I cannot “participate in the sympathy which I have heard invoked in behalf of Mexico as a sister republic. In the first place the wrongs she has done us, and our citizens resident within her borders, show no very sisterly affection on her part; and in the next, I must confess my want of sympathy with any people where anarchy rules in the name of liberty. Her history is a libel upon republican government. When human sympathy shall follow insubordination, misrule, and bloodshed, then, but not till then, will it be properly invoked for Mexico” (Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 517, col. 1). 354Welles papers.

2. London Times; Aug. 6, 1847. Webster to Thompson, Apr. 5, 1842: “Every nation, on being received, at her own request, into the circle of civilized Governments must understand that ... she binds herself also to the strict and faithful observance of all those principles, laws, and usages, which have obtained currency among civilized States.... No community can be allowed to enjoy the benefit of national character, in modern times, without submitting to all the duties which that character imposes” (Ho. 266; 27, 2, p. 32). Mex. Nat. Museum, Boletín i, no. 9. Ramírez, México, 235. London Spectator, Dec. 9, 1911: “When a country can not manage its own affairs, and can not keep order among its own people, it has already lost its independence.”

3. This and following paragraphs are of course a very incomplete summary, which the reader can fill in from the first chapters of this work. With reference to the annexation of Texas Cass justly said: “The peace [and prosperity] of the world cannot be put to hazard by the pertinacious obstinacy of any nation, which holds on to nominal claims, without the power or the disposition to maintain them” (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 425). It was the reasonable opinion of many that if Taylor had had a strong army, well placed [especially had he been a general capable of impressing the Mexicans] there would have been no war (e.g. 132W. R. King, June 1, 1846; So. Qrtly. Rev., Nov., 1850, 428).

4. Grant, Mems., i, 168–9: “I have seen as brave stands made by some of these men [Mexican troops] as I have ever seen made by soldiers.” 113Beauregard: The Mexicans stood artillery and infantry fire “fully as well as our own troops,” etc. Picayune, Oct. 4, 1846 (Haile): All admit that the Mexicans handle guns in battery as well as we could. 364Worth to S., Nov. 2, 1846. The Americans won mostly with the bayonet. The Mexicans lacked the discipline and the confidence in themselves, one another and their officers which were necessary to sustain them against a charge. Constitutionnel, Aug. 17, 1847. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 443; 489 (Otero). S. Anna, Apelación, 57. Id.., Comunicación Oficial. 76To Ocampo, Dec. 18, 1847 (the chief cause of our ills is a want of military men possessing a political conscience). Richtofen, Zustände, 59, 60. 76Mora, Apr. 14, 23, 1847. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Consideraciones, 7, etc. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 242. 76Olaguíbel to Relaciones, Aug. 15, 1847. Puebla Nacional, Jan. 19, 1848 (Payno). México á través, iv, 698–9. Pacheco, Exposición. Ramírez, México, 234–5.

The Mexican newspapers did much to sap courage. From north to south there was a chorus of disheartening epithets for the adored patria: sad, unfortunate, lamentable, ill-starred, suffering, doomed. The whole diapason of misery filled the air. On all sides echoed confessions—on one another’s account, of course—of mistakes, blunders and vices; egotism, cynicism, deceit, selfishness, hypocrisy, rancor, partisanship, dissension, indifference to the welfare of the nation, unscrupulous ambition, malfeasance in office, wholesale plundering, rascality favored by the authorities, personal degeneracy, social demoralization, military incompetency. Even the orthodox estimate of the Americans tended the same way. What had become of justice in heaven and hope on earth when our “infamous,” “incompetent” generals could triumph again and again, with a handful of barbarians and adventurers, cowardly, ill-clad, ignorant, debased and undisciplined, over devout Catholics and valiant patriots? A particular fact tended to promote dissension. There were three groups of states—the north, the centre and the south; and the first and the third felt that their interests had always been sacrificed to those of the centre. This paragraph and most of the other paragraphs of the present chapter are of course to be read in the light of what has already been said. For this one may refer to the index.

Some readers may feel that the author is inconsistent in saying (vol. i, p. 116) that Mexico wanted the war and here that she was not really in it; but (1) many persons desire things which they feel unwilling later to pay for, and (2) the course of the war was very different from that which Mexico had expected. The nation desired the uprising against Santa Anna, December, 1844, but was soon dissatisfied with the results of it.

5. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 150; Kenly, Md. Vol., 391; Encarnacion Prisoners, 69; Stevens, Stevens, 145.

6. Balbontín, Invasión, 135–6. Scott, Mems., ii, 466. 13Doyle, no. 1, 1848. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 242. 13Bankhead, no. 86, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, i, 376. 76Mora, Apr. 28, 1847. Monitor Repub., Nov. 8, 1847. Id.., Nov. 30, 1847 (Uraga). Apuntes, 347. México á través, iv, 698.

Judging Santa Anna one must allow for the facts that his subordinates were incompetent, and that neither he nor they had known what real armies and real wars were. But this condition of things was far more due to him than to any other person. It should be remembered, too, that while the Americans had numbers against them, they possessed the advantage of the offensive. But this, again, was very largely the fault of Santa Anna.

7. (Kendall) Wash. Union, Mar. 1, 1847. 257C. to F. Markoe, Jan. 3, 1847. Our commanders never had enough troops to garner the fruits of victory. 256Scott to Marcy, Jan. 16, 1847, priv.: “For God’s sake give me a reinforcement of 12,000 regulars, at the least, for a sure and uninterrupted march from Vera Cruz upon the city of Mexico.” Upton, Military Policy, 215: If Scott had had 15,000 regulars after Cerro Gordo he could have taken Mexico City. If troops, vessels, etc. had been supplied promptly, there would have been no battle of Cerro Gordo (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 908).

8. Scribner, Campaign, 21.

9. Polk’s Diary contains ample evidence regarding the character of his administration; e.g. May 16, 19; June 23–4; Aug. 18; Sept. 22, 24, 1846; Aug. 19, 23; Nov. 10–1, 1847; Jan. 24, 1848. (Period) Lalor, Cyclopædia, iii, 864. As Taussig says (Tariff Hist., 122), our prosperity from 1846 to 1860 should not be attributed solely to the tariff of 1846. London Examiner, Jan. 2, 1847 (“Polk has been the greatest of American conquerors, the most successful of American diplomatists,” and yet his recent Message does not boast). Curtis, Buchanan, ii, 72. Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 138 (Dallas said of Polk: “He left nothing unfinished; what he attempted he did”).

Our problem was hard. The report of the quartermaster general, Nov. 24, 1847, said that our nearest dépôts were farther from the source of supply than Algiers from Marseilles, yet we had accomplished more in a few months at the beginning of the war than France had accomplished in Africa in seventeen years (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 549). Polk’s relations with Pillow offer a curious problem in psychology and in morals; but one sees from his diary how deeply Buchanan’s cleverness impressed his plodding mind, and a person like Polk, with more taste than talent for subtlety, was naturally fascinated by Pillow’s readiness and cunning. Besides, he was much indebted to Pillow. His treatment of Scott is another problem. Perhaps he felt that as President he was above the ordinary requirements of fair dealing, and certainly he was intensely partisan.

10. Jomini, Précis, i, 143. Grant, Mems., i, 100. Greene, Army Life, 142 (Napoleon). 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Nov. 2, 1846.

11. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1851, p. 31. Polk, Diary, Nov. 21, 1846; Mar. 28; May 6, 1847, etc. Garrison, Extension, 242. Henderson, Science of War, 14. 139W. B. to D. Campbell, Mar. 20, 1847. Amer. Hist. Review, Apr., 1919, 446, 454–6, 462 (Marcy).

12. 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Apr. 19, 1847, private. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 246. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 187. Grone, Briefe, 80 (punctuation modified). Semmes, Service, 378. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1255 (Jesup). (Shackle) Hitchcock in Mo. Republican, Nov. 3, 1857. 113Beauregard, remins. Hamley, Operations, 20. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 465 (Lee).

13. 335Trist to Mrs. T., Oct. 18, 1847. 335Id., Notes for letter to Ho. of Repres. Lawton, Artill. Off., 151, 246. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 190–1. 52Trist, Aug. 14, 1847. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 465 (Lee). Hitchcock in semi-weekly N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1847. Id. in Republic, Feb. 15, 1851 (re a Mexican book). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1255 (Jesup). Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 635 (after Mexico was captured, Scott became “the most sincere and powerful of the friends of peace”). So. Qtrly. Rev., xviii, 428.

14. Lawton, Artill. Off., 151. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 190. Picayune, Oct. 22, 1847. Grant, Mems., i, 139. 253Harvey to McLean, June 13, 1847.

15. The earlier statements issued by our government were in many instances incorrect. The figures of the text are from the adj. gen.’s report of Dec. 3, 1849 (Ho. 24; 31, 1). They may be given more precisely as follows. I. Regulars. Apr., 1846, 7224 in all. On the Texas frontier, May, 1846, 3554 present and absent. 27,470 (15,736 of “the old establishment,” 11,186 of the new regiments, and 548 Marines), including recruits, joined the army in Mexico. The total in the service up to and including July 5, 1848, was about 31,024 (35,009 were recruited from May 1, 1846, and 32,190 of these were put en route; but some died or were killed in Mexico before becoming attached to a regiment, and some cannot be accounted for). Losses. A: Old establishment. Discharged on expiration of term, 1561; for disability, 1782; by order or by civil authority, 373; total, 3716. Killed in battle, 41 offs.—422 men; died of wounds, 22—307, respectively; ordinary deaths, 49—2574; accidental deaths, 5—134; total deaths, 117—3437. Wounded in battle, 118—1685. Resignations, 37. Desertions, 2247. B: New regiments. Discharged on expiration of term, 12; for disability, 767; by order or by civil authority, 114. Killed in battle, 5 offs.—62 men; died of wounds, 5—71; ordinary deaths, 36—2055; accidental deaths, 0—30; total deaths, 46—2218. Wounded in battle, 36—236. Resignations, 92. Desertions, 602. C: Marines serving with the army. Killed in battle, 1—5; died of wounds, 0—3; ordinary deaths, 3—33; total, 4—41. II. Volunteers. Mustered in, May, 1846, and later (16,887 mounted; 1129 artillery; 55,244 infantry) 73,260, including 3131 commissioned officers. Of this number 14,448 (3-months and 6-months men; two regiments of 12-months men from Ohio and Missouri; one Iowa company) did not serve. Total serving, 58,812. Discharged before the end of their term, 9169, including 7200 for disability. Killed in battle and died of wounds, 607; ordinary deaths, 6216; accidental, 192; total, 7015. Wounded, about 1340. Resignations, 279. Desertions, 3876. The number of ordinary deaths and discharges for disability was probably still larger, for the returns were incomplete. Some “ordinary” deaths probably resulted from wounds. July, 1848, there were (officers included) 24,033 regulars and 23,117 volunteers. Nearly all official figures of casualties are approximate. (Discrepancies exist in the accounts) One may consult also: Ho. 42, 48; 29, 2. Sen. 36; 30, 1. Ohio Arch. and Hist. Qtrly., 1912, p. 280. Ill. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, p. 17 (W. E. Dodd). Lawton, Artill. Off., 317. Sen. 4; 29, 2. Picayune, Nov. 4, 1847. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1114. 117R. Jones to Mayer, Feb. 8, 1849. Brackett, Lane’s Brigade, 131, 292. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, app., 311. Semmes, Service, 472. 61R. Jones to Cass, Mar. 9, 1848. Cong. Globe, 45, 3, pp. 1627–8 (Shields). U. S. Army and Navy Journal, Apr. 25, 1885, p. 787. 288Naylor, Alphab. list of American prisoners (1063 in all). Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 56. Mich. Pioneer Soc. Colls., vi, 20. Rowland, Register, 412. 61Wool to Jones, Jan. 7, 1848.

One of the principal histories of the war gives the deaths resulting from battle as 5101, and the total number as “not less” than 25,000! Many men afflicted with chronic diseases enlisted in the hope of deriving benefit from the climate of Mexico, but died there. Many came home bringing the germs of disease or with enfeebled constitutions.

16. (New regiments) 364Worth to S., Sept. 5, 1846. (Invalids) 291Smith to Pierce, Feb. 2, 1848; 254McClellan, diary, Dec. 5, 1846; Meade, Letters, i, 161–2. (Waste) Meade, Letters, i, 161–2. (Arms) 256Scott to Marcy, Jan. 16, 1847, private. (Undisciplined) 221Hill, diary; 95report of comtee., Jan. 4, 1848; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 336 (Taylor); 327Sutherland to father, Aug. —, 1847; Scott, supra. (Close) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 346; Olmsted, Journey, 463. (One) 280Nunelee, diary. (Another) Oswandel, Notes, 476. (Officer) 146Caswell, diary. (N. Car.) Greensborough (N. C.) Morning Post, Apr. 5, 1903. (Braver) Grant, Mems., i, 167–8. (Unreliable) Balbontín, Invasión, 75; Smith, To Mexico, 151. (Imperilled) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 336, 1178 (Taylor); 1049 (Scott); Scott, Mems., ii, 540. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 6, 1847. (Stimulated) Cong. Globe, 35, 1, pp. 971–2 (Quitman); Stevens, Campaigns, 12; 152Claiborne, mems.

To suppose, as many appear to do, that the only business in war is to fight, is as if one should think that in railroading the only work is to run the trains. The following from Scott’s 256letter to Marcy, Jan. 16, 1847, is pertinent: “A regiment of regulars, in fifteen minutes from the evening halt, will have tents pitched and trenched around, besides straw, leaves or bushes for dry sleeping; arms and ammunition well secured and in order for any night attack; fires made, kettles boiling, in order to wholesome cooking; all the men dried, or warmed, and at their comfortable supper, merry as crickets, before the end of the first hour.... Volunteers neglect all those points; eat their salt meat raw (if they have saved any at all) or, worse than raw, fried—death to any Christian man the fifth day; lose or waste their clothing; lie down wet, or on wet ground—fatal to health, and, in a short time, to life; leave arms and ammunition exposed to rain and dews; hence both generally useless and soon lost, and certainly hardly ever worth a cent in battle,” etc., etc. So in the field “the want of the touch of the elbow (which cannot be acquired with the best instructors in many months); the want of the sure step in advancing, falling back and wheeling; ... the want of military confidence in each other, and, above all, the want of reciprocal confidence between officers and men” cause frightful losses.

McClellan wrote in his 254diary: “I have seen more suffering since I came out here than I could have imagined to exist—it is really awful—I allude to the sufferings of the Volunteers. They literally die like dogs—were it all known in the States, ... all would be willing to have so large a regular army that we could dispense entirely with the Volunteer system.” Trist stated in a 335letter to the N. Y. Tribune, July 14, 1853, that the volunteer system was a debasing humbug, because the generals, aiming at political success, posed as great commanders with no basis except the courage of their men and the skill of their (regular) aides. Worth said that the intelligent volunteers ridiculed the system, except for home defence, more than the regulars did (364to Capt. S., Nov. 2, 1846).

Webster said the advantage of the volunteer service was that it was generous and patriotic, entered into mostly to gain distinction, and because it gave men what they liked—an opportunity to bear arms under officers chosen by themselves (Webster, Letters, 347); but one sees at once that these views came far short of covering the case practically. That very ambition to win distinction, for example, made them dissatisfied and insubordinate when expected to do the ordinary work of soldiering (169Taylor to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847); and volunteer officers like Pillow did not compare with regulars like Scott and Taylor in kindness toward the men. The battle of Buena Vista was popularly supposed to have proved the efficiency of volunteers, but failed to do so (see chap. xx; 316Bragg to Sherman, Mar. 1, 1848; 330Taylor to brother, Mar. 27, 1847; Zirckel, Tagebuch, 9), though they had had a sufficiently long training (Upton, Military Policy, 209). The Marquis de Radepont, who accompanied Scott’s army to observe its operations, was particularly astonished that the General had so little control over the volunteers, a state of things that more than once endangered all, he said. Scott, Taylor, Worth, Twiggs, Wool, Quitman, Smith and Shields were not West Pointers, but the first five were professionals. Some of the volunteer officers, who had been in business, surpassed the regulars in such work as transportation.

17. (Tilden) Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 543. (Aristocrats) N. Y. Herald, June 20, 1846. (Steadied vols.) Stevens, Camps., 12; Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 178; Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 346. (Reg. offs.) Grant, Mems., i, 168; 364Worth to S., Sept. 5, 1846; 13Crampton, no. 17, 1848; Collins, diary, Jan. 29, 1847; Lawton, Art. Off., 276. (Took care) 254McClellan, diary, Dec. 5, 1846; 148Chamberlain, recolls. (Science) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 310; Cullum, Biog. Register, i, p. xi.

18. Grone, Briefe, 83. Commerc. Review of S. and W., Dec, 1846, 426–30 (Poinsett). Grant, Mems., i, 143. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 332 (Smith). Observador Zacatecano, Dec. 27, 1846, supplem. (Requena). Owing probably to the exigencies of the case the engineers were given a somewhat exaggerated importance. Some of their officers were not experts; were perhaps hardly more than engineers by commission. And engineers were frequently employed to do reconnaissance work that was more properly the function of infantry patrols.

19. Commerc. Rev.: note 18. Grone, Briefe, 70, 81. Revue des Deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 1847, 385. 73Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, 1847.

20. (Immigrants) Ho. 38; 30, 2. 278Niehenke, statement. 136Butterfield, recolls. Grone, Briefe, 84. Metrop. Mag., Jan., 1908. (1000) Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 431. (600) Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 293. (6000) Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 384. (Miracle) 358Williams to father, Oct. 1, 1847. Journal des Débats, Aug. 15, 1848.

21. (Legally) 250Lieber to Ruggles, Apr. 23, 1847. Curtis, Buchanan, i, 609. Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 125. (Welfare) London Athenæum, Sept. 13, 1845. (Right of way) Von Holst, U. S., iii, 272; London Atlas, May 18, 1844.

We are now trying to outgrow the old view of war and the analogous view of commercial and industrial competition, but in 1846 these had not become practical issues. This paragraph is to be understood in a broad, large way, of course. The London Chronicle said: In our colonies we fine owners who in a certain number of years do not develop their lands, and this fine is preparatory to ejectment; “The Americans have acted on this principle after a kind of public lynch-law” (Aug. 13, 1845). (Its direct reference was to the annexation of Texas, but the principle applied to the war with Mexico.) Rives argues that the war was “begun for the purpose of acquiring territory” in payment of our claims, and that therefore its morality was questionable (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 657–8). But (1) the territory was wanted in payment of what was justly due us, and therefore we could rightfully collect, and that Mexico could pay us only in land was not our fault; (2) the war was not entered into by us for the purpose of obtaining territory; and (3) it was not “begun” by the United States.

22. (Humboldt) 181Donelson to Buchanan, Sept. 18, 1846. Royce, Calif., 51. Lieber: note 21. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 269–72. (Nation) Chap. vi, note 11; Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 387 (Giles); Polk, Diary, Dec. 19, 1846; Jan. 23, 1847; 1Senator Allen in secret session, Aug. 6, 1846; Curtis, Buchanan, i, 609; Howe, Bancroft, i, 286. Public Ledger, June 15, 1849 (Dallas). Welles, Study. (Bryce) This quotation is taken from a writer of good standing. The present author has not been able to find the passage, but presumes it was correctly quoted. Davis, Autobiog., 291–2.

July 6, 1848, Polk informed Congress that we had more than 700 whaling ships in the Pacific, representing not less than $40,000,000, and employing fully 20,000 seamen, and that owing to the acquisition of California we were less than thirty days from Canton. These facts explain how important that acquisition was, and how serious it would have seemed to let a European power make it.

23. Ramírez, México, 319. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849, p. 8. (Obstacle) Vol. ii, p. 234. (Invited) Scott, Mems., ii, 581–2. (Trist) 335Thornton to Trist, May 26, 1848. 52Walsh, Nov. 10, 1848. (Europe) J. H. Smith in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceeds., June, 1914, p. 462; Howe, Bancroft, ii, 5; 108Bancroft to Greene, Nov. 3, 1847; 108Id.to Polk, Jan. 19, 1847; Bennett, Mems., 386. (Harmony) Richardson, Messages, iv, 587, 631; 132McLane to Buchanan, June 18, 1846; Wash. Union, Nov. 3, 1846; N. Y. Herald, July 25, 1846; Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 125.

The war helped to save Mexican nationality because (1) it was to some extent a national issue; (2) it cut off the parts most likely to set the example of secession; (3) contact with the Americans convinced the people of Tamaulipas, N. León, etc., that they could not hold their own in competition with our citizens; (4) the Mexicans received a stern lesson in political wisdom, which was taken to heart for a time, and had some permanent effect; and (5) the money that we paid strengthened the Mexican government. The war helped the liberals, for it demonstrated our superiority.

24. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 635. Ceballos, Capítulos, 123. London Times, Nov. 13, 1847. Lee, Gen. Lee, 43. Parker, Sermon. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 499. Webster, Writings, x, 9. For Scott’s treatment of prisoners see, e.g., Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1055–9.

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