THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
We come now to the period commencing with the adoption of the
constitution of the United States.
We have already seen that slavery had not been authorized or established
by any of the fundamental constitutions or charters that had existed
previous to this time; that it had always been a mere abuse sustained by
the common consent of the strongest party, in defiance of the avowed
constitutional principles of their governments. And the question now is,
whether it was constitutionally established, authorized or sanctioned by
the constitution of the United States?
It is perfectly clear, in the first place, that the constitution of the
United States did not, of itself, create or establish slavery as a
new institution; or even give any authority to the state governments
to establish it as a new institution.—The greatest sticklers for
slavery do not claim this. The most they claim is, that it recognized it
as an institution already legally existing, under the authority of the
state governments; and that it virtually guarantied to the states the
right of continuing it in existence during their pleasure. And this is
really the only question arising out of the constitution of the United
States on this subject, viz: whether it did thus recognize and
sanction slavery as an existing institution?
This question is, in reality, answered in the negative by what has
already been shown; for if slavery had no constitutional existence,
under the state constitutions, prior to the adoption of the constitution
of the United States, then it is absolutely certain that the
constitution of the United States did not recognize it as a
constitutional institution; for it cannot, of course, be pretended that
the United States constitution recognized, as constitutional, any state
institution that did not constitutionally exist.
Even if the constitution of the United States had intended to
recognize slavery, as a constitutional state institution, such
intended recognition would have failed of effect, and been legally void,
because slavery then had no constitutional existence to be recognized.
Suppose, for an illustration of this principle, that the constitution of
the United States had, by implication, plainly taken it for granted that
the state legislatures had power—derived from the state
constitutions—to order arbitrarily that infant children, or that men
without the charge of crime, should be maimed—deprived, for instance,
of a hand, a foot, or an eye. This intended recognition, on the part of
the constitution of the United States, of the legality of such a
practice, would obviously have failed of all legal effect—would have
been mere surplussage—if it should appear, from an examination of the
state constitutions themselves, that they had really conferred no such
power upon the legislatures. And this principle applies with the same
force to laws that would arbitrarily make men or children slaves, as to
laws that should arbitrarily order them to be maimed or murdered.
We might here safely rest the whole question—for no one, as has already
been said, pretends that the constitution of the United States, by its
own authority, created or authorized slavery as a new institution; but
only that it intended to recognize it as one already established by
authority of the state constitutions. This intended recognition—if
there were any such—being founded on an error as to what the state
constitutions really did authorize, necessarily falls to the ground, a
defunct intention.
We make a stand, then, at this point, and insist that the main
question—the only material question—is already decided against
slavery; and that it is of no consequence what recognition or sanction
the constitution of the United States may have intended to extend to it.
The constitution of the United States, at its adoption, certainly took
effect upon, and made citizens of all "the people of the United
States," who were not slaves under the state constitutions. No one can
deny a proposition so self-evident as that. If, then, the State
constitutions, then existing, authorized no slavery at all, the
constitution of the United States took effect upon, and made citizens of
all "the people of the United States," without discrimination. And if
all "the people of the United States" were made citizens of the United
States, by the United States constitution, at its adoption, it was then
forever too late for the state governments to reduce any of them to
slavery. They were thenceforth citizens of a higher government, under a
constitution that was "the supreme law of the land," "any thing in the
constitution or laws of the states to the contrary notwithstanding." If
the state governments could enslave citizens of the United States, the
state constitutions, and not the constitution of the United States,
would be the "supreme law of the land"—for no higher act of supremacy
could be exercised by one government over another, than that of taking
the citizens of the latter out of the protection of their government,
and reducing them to slavery.
SECONDLY.
Although we might stop—we yet do not choose to stop—at the point last
suggested. We will now go further, and attempt to show, specifically
from its provisions, that the constitution of the United States, not
only does not recognize or sanction slavery, as a legal institution, but
that, on the contrary, it presumes all men to be free; that it
positively denies the right of property in man; and that it, of
itself, makes it impossible for slavery to have a legal existence in
any of the United States.
In the first place—although the assertion is constantly made, and
rarely denied, yet it is palpably a mere begging of the whole question
in favor of slavery, to say that the constitution intended to sanction
it; for if it intended to sanction it, it did thereby necessarily
sanction it, (that is, if slavery then had any constitutional existence
to be sanctioned.) The intentions of the constitution are the only
means whereby it sanctions any thing. And its intentions necessarily
sanction everything to which they apply, and which, in the nature of
things, they are competent to sanction. To say, therefore, that the
constitution intended to sanction slavery, is the same as to say that
it did sanction it; which is begging the whole question, and
substituting mere assertion for proof.
Why, then, do not men say distinctly, that the constitution did
sanction slavery, instead of saying that it intended to sanction it?
We are not accustomed to use the word "intention," when speaking of
the other grants and sanctions of the constitution. We do not say, for
example, that the constitution intended to authorize congress "to coin
money," but that it did authorize them to coin it. Nor do we say that
it intended to authorize them "to declare war;" but that it did
authorize them to declare it. It would be silly and childish to say
merely that it intended to authorize them "to coin money," and "to
declare war," when the language authorizing them to do so, is full,
explicit and positive. Why, then, in the case of slavery, do men say
merely that the constitution intended to sanction it, instead of
saying distinctly, as we do in the other cases, that it did sanction
it? The reason is obvious. If they were to say unequivocally that it
did sanction it, they would lay themselves under the necessity of
pointing to the words that sanction it; and they are aware that the
words alone of the constitution do not come up to that point. They,
therefore, assert simply that the constitution intended to sanction
it; and they then attempt to support the assertion by quoting certain
words and phrases, which they say are capable of covering, or rather
of concealing such an intention; and then by the aid of exterior,
circumstantial and historical evidence, they attempt to enforce upon the
mind the conclusion that, as matter of fact, such was the intention of
those who drafted the constitution; and thence they finally infer that
such was the intention of the constitution itself.
The error and fraud of this whole procedure—and it is one purely of
error and fraud—consists in this—that it artfully substitutes the
supposed intentions of those who drafted the constitution, for the
intentions of the constitution itself; and, secondly, it personifies the
constitution as a crafty individual; capable of both open and secret
intentions; capable of legally participating in, and giving effect to
all the subtleties and double dealing of knavish men; and as actually
intending to secure slavery, while openly professing to "secure and
establish liberty and justice." It personifies the constitution as an
individual capable of having private and criminal intentions, which it
dare not distinctly avow, but only darkly hint at, by the use of words
of an indefinite, uncertain and double meaning, whose application is to
be gathered from external circumstances.
The falsehood of all these imaginings is apparent, the moment it is
considered that the constitution is not a person, of whom an
"intention," not legally expressed, can be asserted; that it has none of
the various and selfish passions and motives of action, which sometimes
prompt men to the practice of duplicity and disguise; that it is
merely a written legal instrument; that, as such, it must have a fixed,
and not a double meaning; that it is made up entirely of intelligible
words; and that it has, and can have, no soul, no "intentions," no
motives, no being, no personality, except what those words alone express
or imply. Its "intentions" are nothing more nor less than the legal
meaning of its words. Its intentions are no guide to its legal
meaning—as the advocates of slavery all assume; but its legal meaning
is the sole guide to its intentions. This distinction is all important
to be observed; for if we can gratuitously assume the intentions of a
legal instrument to be what we may wish them to be, and can then strain
or pervert the ordinary meaning of its words, in order to make them
utter those intentions, we can make any thing we choose of any legal
instrument whatever. The legal meaning of the words of an instrument is,
therefore, necessarily our only guide to its intentions.
In ascertaining the legal meaning of the words of the constitution,
these rules of law, (the reasons of which will be more fully explained
hereafter,) are vital to be borne constantly in mind, viz: 1st, that no
intention in violation of natural justice and natural right, (like that
to sanction slavery,) can be ascribed to the constitution, unless that
intention be expressed in terms that are legally competent to express
such an intention; and, 2d, that no terms, except those that are
plenary, express, explicit, distinct, unequivocal, and to which no
other meaning can be given, are legally competent to authorize or
sanction any thing contrary to natural right. The rule of law is
materially different as to the terms necessary to legalize and sanction
any thing contrary to natural right, and those necessary to legalize
things that are consistent with natural right. The latter may be
sanctioned by implication and inference; the former only by inevitable
implication, or by language that is full, definite, express, explicit,
unequivocal, and whose unavoidable import is to sanction the specific
wrong intended.
To assert, therefore, that the constitution intended to sanction
slavery, is, in reality, equivalent to asserting that the necessary
meaning, the unavoidable import of the words alone of the
constitution, come fully up to the point of a clear, definite, distinct,
express, explicit, unequivocal, necessary and peremptory sanction of the
specific thing, human slavery, property in man. If the necessary
import of its words alone do but fall an iota short of this point, the
instrument gives, and, legally speaking, intended to give no legal
sanction to slavery. Now, who can, in good faith, say that the words
alone of the constitution come up to this point? No one, who knows any
thing of law, and the meaning of words. Not even the name of the thing,
alleged to be sanctioned, is given. The constitution itself contains no
designation, description, or necessary admission of the existence of
such a thing as slavery, servitude, or the right of property in man. We
are obliged to go out of the instrument, and grope among the records of
oppression, lawlessness and crime—records unmentioned, and of course
unsanctioned by the constitution—to find the thing, to which it is
said that the words of the constitution apply. And when we have found
this thing, which the constitution dare not name, we find that the
constitution has sanctioned it, (if at all,) only by enigmatical words,
by unnecessary implication and inference, by inuendo and double
entendre, and under a name that entirely fails of describing the thing.
Every body must admit that the constitution itself contains no language,
from which alone any court, that were either strangers to the prior
existence of slavery, or that did not assume its prior existence to be
legal, could legally decide that the constitution sanctioned it. And
this is the true test for determining whether the constitution does, or
does not, sanction slavery, viz: whether a court of law, strangers to
the prior existence of slavery, or not assuming its prior existence to
be legal—looking only at the naked language of the instrument—could,
consistently with legal rules, judicially determine that it sanctioned
slavery. Every lawyer, who at all deserves that name, knows that the
claim for slavery could stand no such test. The fact is palpable, that
the constitution contains no such legal sanction; that it is only by
unnecessary implication and inference, by inuendo and double-entendre,
by the aid of exterior evidence, the assumption of the prior legality of
slavery, and the gratuitous imputation of criminal intentions that are
not avowed in legal terms, that any sanction of slavery, (as a legal
institution,) can be extorted from it.
But legal rules of interpretation entirely forbid and disallow all such
implications, inferences, inuendos and double-entendre, all aid of
exterior evidence, all assumptions of the prior legality of slavery, and
all gratuitous imputations of criminal unexpressed intentions; and
consequently compel us to come back to the letter of the instrument,
and find there a distinct, clear, necessary, peremptory sanction for
slavery, or to surrender the point.
To the unprofessional reader these rules of interpretation will appear
stringent, and perhaps unreasonable and unsound. For his benefit,
therefore, the reasons on which they are founded, will be given. And he
is requested to fix both the reasons and the rules fully in his mind,
inasmuch as the whole legal meaning of the constitution, in regard to
slavery, may perhaps be found to turn upon the construction which these
rules fix upon its language.
But before giving the reasons of this rule, let us offer a few remarks
in regard to legal rules of interpretation in general. Many persons
appear to have the idea that these rules have no foundation in reason,
justice or necessity; that they are little else than whimsical and
absurd conceits, arbitrarily adopted by the courts. No idea can be more
erroneous than this. The rules are absolutely indispensable to the
administration of the justice arising out of any class of legal
instruments whatever—whether the instruments be simple contracts
between man and man, or statutes enacted by legislatures, or fundamental
compacts or constitutions of government agreed upon by the people at
large. In regard to all these instruments, the law fixes, and
necessarily must fix their meaning; and for the obvious reason, that
otherwise their meaning could not be fixed at all. The parties to the
simplest contract may disagree, or pretend to disagree, as to its
meaning, and of course as to their respective rights under it. The
different members of a legislative body, who vote for a particular
statute, may have different intentions in voting for it, and may
therefore differ, or pretend to differ, as to its meaning. The people
of a nation may establish a compact of government. The motives of one
portion may be to establish liberty, equality and justice; and they may
think, or pretend to think that the words used in the instrument convey
that idea. The motives of another portion may be to establish the
slavery or subordination of one part of the people, and the superiority
or arbitrary power of the other part; and they may think, or pretend to
think, that the language agreed upon by the whole authorizes such a
government. In all these cases, unless there were some rules of law,
applicable alike to all instruments, and competent to settle their
meaning, their meaning could not be settled; and individuals would of
necessity lose their rights under them. The law, therefore, fixes their
meaning; and the rules by which it does so, are founded in the same
justice, reason, necessity and truth, as are other legal principles, and
are for that reason as inflexible as any other legal principles
whatever. They are also simple, intelligible, natural, obvious. Every
body are presumed to know them, as they are presumed to know any other
legal principles. No one is allowed to plead ignorance of them, any more
than of any other principle of law. All persons and people are presumed
to have framed their contracts, statutes and constitutions with
reference to them. And if they have not done so—if they have said black
when they meant white, and one thing when they meant another, they must
abide the consequences. The law will presume that they meant what they
said. No one, in a court of justice, can claim any rights founded on a
construction different from that which these rules would give to the
contract, statute, or constitution, under which he claims. The judiciary
cannot depart from these rules, for two reasons. First, because the
rules embody in themselves principles of justice, reason and truth; and
are therefore as necessarily law as any other principles of justice,
reason and truth; and, secondly, because if they could lawfully depart
from them in one case, they might in another, at their own caprice.
Courts could thus at pleasure become despotic; all certainty as to the
legal meaning of instruments would be destroyed; and the administration
of justice, according to the true meaning of contracts, statutes and
constitutions, would be rendered impossible.
What, then, are some of these rules of interpretation?
One of them, (as has been before stated,) is, that where words are
susceptible of two meanings, one consistent, and the other inconsistent,
with justice and natural right, that meaning, and only that meaning,
which is consistent with right, shall be attributed to them—unless
other parts of the instrument overrule that interpretation.
Another rule, (if indeed it be not the same,) is, that no language,
except that which is peremptory, and no implication, except one that is
inevitable, shall be held to authorize or sanction any thing contrary to
natural right.
Another rule is, that no extraneous or historical evidence shall be
admitted to fix upon a statute an unjust or immoral meaning, when the
words themselves of the act are susceptible of an innocent one.
One of the reasons of these stringent and inflexible rules, doubtless
is, that judges have always known that, in point of fact, natural
justice was itself law, and that nothing inconsistent with it could be
made law, even by the most explicit and peremptory language that
legislatures could employ.—But judges have always, in this country and
in England, been dependent upon the executive and the legislature for
their appointments and salaries, and been amenable to the legislature by
impeachment. And as the executive and legislature have always enacted
more or less statutes, and had more or less purposes to accomplish, that
were inconsistent with natural right, judges have seen that it would be
impossible for them to retain their offices, and at the same time
maintain the integrity of the law against the will of those in whose
power they were. It is natural also that the executive should appoint,
and that the legislature should approve the appointment of no one for
the office of judge, whose integrity they should suppose would stand in
the way of their purposes.—The consequence has been that all judges,
(probably without exception,) though they have not dared deny, have yet
in practice yielded the vital principle of law; and have succumbed to
the arbitrary mandates of the other departments of the government, so
far as to carry out their enactments, though inconsistent with natural
right. But, as if sensible of the degradation and criminality of so
doing, they have made a stand at the first point at which they could
make it, without bringing themselves in a direct collision with those on
whom they were dependent. And that point is, that they will administer,
as law, no statute, that is contrary to natural right, unless its
language be so explicit and peremptory, that there is no way of evading
its authority, but by flatly denying the authority of those who enacted
it. They (the court) will themselves add nothing to the language of the
statute, to help out its supposed meaning. They will imply nothing,
infer nothing, and assume nothing, except what is inevitable; they will
not go out of the letter of the statute in search of any historical
evidence as to the meaning of the legislature, to enable them to
effectuate any unjust intentions not fully expressed by the statute
itself. Wherever a statute is supposed to have in view the
accomplishment of any unjust end, they will apply the most stringent
principles of construction to prevent that object's being effected. They
will not go a hair's breadth beyond the literal or inevitable import of
the words of the statute, even though they should be conscious, all the
while, that the real intentions of the makers of it would be entirely
defeated by their refusal. The rule, (as has been already stated,) is
laid down by the supreme court of the United States in these words:
"Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are
overthrown, where the general system of the law is departed from, the
legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness,
to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such
objects."—(United States vs. Fisher et al., 2 Cranch, 390.)[18]
Such has become the settled doctrine of courts. And although it does not
come up to the true standard of law, yet it is good in itself, so far as
it goes, and ought to be unflinchingly adhered to, not merely for its
own sake, but also as a scaffolding, from which to erect that higher
standard of law, to wit, that no language or authority whatever can
legalize any thing inconsistent with natural justice.[19]
Another reason for the rules before given, against all constructions,
implications and inferences—except inevitable ones—in favor of
injustice, is, that but for them we should have no guaranty that our
honest contracts, or honest laws would be honestly administered by the
judiciary. It would be nearly or quite impossible for men, in framing
their contracts or laws, to use language so as to exclude every possible
implication in favor of wrong, if courts were allowed to resort to such
implications. The law therefore excludes them; that is, the ends of
justice—the security of men's rights under their honest contracts, and
under honest legislative enactments—make it imperative upon courts of
justice to ascribe an innocent and honest meaning to all language that
will possibly bear an innocent and honest meaning. If courts of justice
could depart from this rule for the purpose of upholding what was
contrary to natural right, and could employ their ingenuity in spying
out some implied or inferred authority, for sanctioning what was in
itself dishonest or unjust, when such was not the necessary meaning of
the language used, there could be no security whatever for the honest
administration of honest laws, or the honest fulfilment of men's honest
contracts. Nearly all language, on the meaning of which courts
adjudicate, would be liable, at the caprice of the court, to be
perverted from the furtherance of honest, to the support of dishonest
purposes. Judges could construe statutes and contracts in favor of
justice or injustice, as their own pleasure might dictate.
Another reason of the rules, is, that as governments have, and can have
no legitimate objects or powers opposed to justice and natural right, it
would be treason to all the legitimate purposes of government, for the
judiciary to give any other than an honest and innocent meaning to any
language, that would bear such a construction.
The same reasons that forbid the allowance of any unnecessary
implication or inference in favor of a wrong, in the construction of a
statute, forbids also the introduction of any extraneous or historical
evidence to prove that the intentions of the legislature were to
sanction or authorize a wrong.
The same rules of construction, that apply to statutes, apply also to
all those private contracts between man and man, which courts actually
enforce. But as it is both the right and the duty of courts to
invalidate altogether such private contracts as are inconsistent with
justice, they will admit evidence exterior to their words, if offered
by a defendant for the purpose of invalidating them. At the same time,
a plaintiff, or party that wishes to set up a contract, or that claims
its fulfilment, will not be allowed to offer any evidence exterior to
its words, to prove that the contract is contrary to justice—because,
if his evidence were admitted, it would not make his unjust claim a
legal one; but only invalidate it altogether. But as courts do not claim
the right of invalidating statutes and constitutions, they will not
admit evidence, exterior to their language, to give them such a
meaning, that they ought to be invalidated.
I think no one—no lawyer, certainly—will now deny that it is a legal
rule of interpretation—that must be applied to all statutes, and also
to all private contracts that are to be enforced—that an innocent
meaning, and nothing beyond an innocent meaning, must be given to all
language that will possibly bear such a meaning. All will probably admit
that the rule, as laid down by the supreme court of the United States,
is correct, to wit, that "where rights are infringed, where fundamental
principles are overthrown, where the general system of the law is
departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with
irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a
design to effect such objects."
But perhaps it will be said that these rules, which apply to all
statutes, and to all private contracts that are to be enforced, do not
apply to the constitution. And why do they not? No reason whatever can
be given. A constitution is nothing but a contract, entered into by the
mass of the people, instead of a few individuals. This contract of the
people at large becomes a law unto the judiciary that administer it,
just as private contracts, (so far as they are consistent with natural
right,) are laws unto the tribunals that adjudicate upon them. All the
essential principles that enter into the question of obligation, in the
case of a private contract, or a legislative enactment, enter equally
into the question of the obligation of a contract agreed to by the whole
mass of the people. This is too self-evident to need illustration.
Besides, is it not as important to the safety and rights of all
interested, that a constitution or compact of government, established by
a whole people, should be so construed as to promote the ends of
justice, as it is that a private contract or a legislative enactment
should be thus construed? Is it not as necessary that some check should
be imposed upon the judiciary to prevent them from perverting, at
pleasure, the whole purpose and character of the government, as it is
that they should be restrained from perverting the meaning of a private
contract, or a legislative enactment? Obviously written compacts of
government could not be upheld for a day, if it were understood by the
mass of the people that the judiciary were at liberty to interpret them
according to their own pleasure, instead of their being restrained by
such rules as have now been laid down.
Let us now look at some of the provisions of the constitution, and see
what crimes might be held to be authorized by them, if their meaning
were not to be ascertained and restricted by such rules of
interpretation as apply to all other legal instruments.
The second amendment to the constitution declares that "the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
This right "to keep and bear arms," implies the right to use them—as
much as a provision securing to the people the right to buy and keep
food, would imply their right also to eat it. But this implied right to
use arms, is only a right to use them in a manner consistent with
natural rights—as, for example, in defence of life, liberty, chastity,
&c. Here is an innocent and just meaning, of which the words are
susceptible; and such is therefore the extent of their legal meaning.
If courts could go beyond the innocent and necessary meaning of the
words, and imply or infer from them an authority for anything contrary
to natural right, they could imply a constitutional authority in the
people to use arms, not merely for the just and innocent purposes of
defence, but also for the criminal purposes of aggression—for purposes
of murder, robbery, or any other acts of wrong to which arms are capable
of being applied. The mere verbal implication would as much authorize
the people to use arms for unjust, as for just, purposes. But the
legal implication gives only an authority for their innocent use. And
why? Simply because justice is the end of all law—the legitimate end of
all compacts of government. It is itself law; and there is no right or
power among men to destroy its obligation.
Take another case. The constitution declares that "Congress shall have
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes."
This power has been held by the supreme court to be an exclusive one in
the general government—and one that cannot be controlled by the states.
Yet it gives congress no constitutional authority to legalize any
commerce inconsistent with natural justice between man and man; although
the mere verbal import of the words, if stretched to their utmost
tension in favor of the wrong, would authorize congress to legalize a
commerce in poisons and deadly weapons, for the express purpose of
having them used in a manner inconsistent with natural right—as for the
purposes of murder.
At natural law, and on principles of natural right, a person, who should
sell to another a weapon or a poison, knowing that it would, or
intending that it should be used for the purpose of murder, would be
legally an accessary to the murder that should be committed with it. And
if the grant to congress of a "power to regulate commerce," can be
stretched beyond the innocent meaning of the words—beyond the power
of regulating and authorizing a commerce that is consistent with natural
justice—and be made to cover every thing, intrinsically criminal, that
can be perpetrated under the name of commerce—then congress have the
authority of the constitution for granting to individuals the liberty of
bringing weapons and poisons from "foreign nations" into this, and from
one state into another, and selling them openly for the express purposes
of murder, without any liability to legal restraint or punishment.
Can any stronger cases than these be required to prove the necessity,
the soundness, and the inflexibility of that rule of law, which requires
the judiciary to ascribe an innocent meaning to all language that will
possibly bear an innocent meaning? and to ascribe only an innocent
meaning to language whose mere verbal import might be susceptible of
both an innocent and criminal meaning? If this rule of interpretation
could be departed from, there is hardly a power granted to congress,
that might not lawfully be perverted into an authority for legalizing
crimes of the highest grade.
In the light of these principles, then, let us examine those clauses of
the constitution, that are relied on as recognizing and sanctioning
slavery. They are but three in number.
The one most frequently quoted is the third clause of Art. 4, Sec. 2, in
these words:
"No person, held to service or labor in one state, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or
regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but
shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or
labor may be due."
There are several reasons why this clause renders no sanction to
slavery.
1. It must be construed, if possible, as sanctioning nothing contrary to
natural right.
If there be any "service or labor" whatever, to which any "persons"
whatever may be "held," consistently with natural right, and which any
person may, consistently with natural right, "claim" as his "due" of
another, such "service or labor," and only such, is recognized and
sanctioned by this provision.
It needs no argument to determine whether the "service or labor," that
is exacted of a slave, is such as can be "claimed," consistently with
natural right, as being "due" from him to his master. And if it
cannot be, some other "service or labor" must, if possible, be found for
this clause to apply to.
The proper definition of the word "service," in this case, obviously is,
the labor of a servant. And we find, that at and before the adoption
of the constitution, the persons recognized by the state laws as
"servants," constituted a numerous class. The statute books of the
states abounded with statutes in regard to "servants." Many seem to have
been indented as servants by the public authorities, on account of
their being supposed incompetent, by reason of youth and poverty, to
provide for themselves. Many were doubtless indented as apprentices by
their parents and guardians, as now. The English laws recognized a class
of servants—and many persons were brought here from England, in that
character, and retained that character afterward. Many indented or
contracted themselves as servants for the payment of their passage money
to this country. In these various ways, the class of persons, recognized
by the statute books of the states as "servants," was very numerous; and
formed a prominent subject of legislation. Indeed, no other evidence of
their number is necessary than the single fact, that "persons bound to
service for a term of years," were specially noticed by the constitution
of the United States, (Art. 1, Sec. 2,) which requires that they be
counted as units in making up the basis of representation. There is
therefore not the slightest apology for pretending that there was not a
sufficient class for the words "service or labor" to refer to, without
supposing the existence of slaves.[20]
2. "Held to service or labor," is no legal description of slavery.
Slavery is property in man. It is not necessarily attended with either
"service or labor." A very considerable portion of the slaves are either
too young, too old, too sick, or too refractory to render "service or
labor." As a matter of fact, slaves, who are able to labor, may, in
general, be compelled by their masters to do so. Yet labor is not an
essential or necessary condition of slavery. The essence of slavery
consists in a person's being owned as property—without any reference to
the circumstances of his being compelled to labor, or of his being
permitted to live in idleness, or of his being too young, or too old, or
too sick to labor.
If "service or labor" were either a test, or a necessary attendant of
slavery, that test would of itself abolish slavery; because all slaves,
before they can render "service or labor," must have passed through the
period of infancy, when they could render neither service nor labor, and
when, therefore, according to this test, they were free. And if they
were free in infancy, they could not be subsequently enslaved.
3. "Held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof."
The "laws" take no note of the fact whether a slave "labors," or not.
They recognize no obligation, on his part, to labor. They will enforce
no "claim" of a master, upon his slave, for "service or labor." If the
slave refuse to labor, the law will not interfere to compel him. The law
simply recognizes the master's right of property in the slave—just as
it recognizes his right of property in a horse. Having done that, it
leaves the master to compel the slave, if he please, and if he can—as
he would compel a horse—to labor. If the master do not please, or be
not able, to compel the slave to labor, the law takes no more cognizance
of the case than it does of the conduct of a refractory horse. In short,
it recognizes no obligation, on the part of the slave, to labor, if he
can avoid doing so. It recognizes no "claim," on the part of the
master, upon his slave, for "services or labor," as "due" from the
latter to the former.
4. Neither "service" nor "labor" is necessarily slavery; and not being
necessarily slavery, the words cannot, in this case, be strained beyond
their necessary meaning, to make them sanction a wrong. The law will
not allow words to be strained a hair's breadth beyond their necessary
meaning, to make them authorize a wrong. The stretching, if there be
any, must always be towards the right. The words "service or labor" do
not necessarily, nor in their common acceptation, so much as suggest the
idea of slavery—that is, they do not suggest the idea of the laborer or
servant being the property of the person for whom he labors. An indented
apprentice serves and labors for another. He is "held" to do so, under
a contract, and for a consideration, that are recognized, by the laws,
as legitimate, and consistent with natural right. Yet he is not owned as
property. A condemned criminal is "held to labor"—yet he is not owned
as property. The law allows no such straining of the meaning of words
towards the wrong, as that which would convert the words "service or
labor" (of men) into property in man—and thus make a man, who serves
or labors for another, the property of that other.
5. "No person held to service or labor, in one state, under the laws
thereof."
The "laws," here mentioned, and impliedly sanctioned, are, of course,
only constitutional laws—laws, that are consistent, both with the
constitution of the state, and the constitution of the United States.
None others are "laws," correctly speaking, however they may attempt
to "hold persons to service or labor," or however they may have the
forms of laws on the statute books.
This word "laws," therefore, being a material word, leaves the whole
question just where it found it—for it certainly does not, of
itself—nor indeed does any other part of the clause—say that acts of
a legislature, declaring one man to be the property of another, is a
"law" within the meaning of the constitution. As far as the word
"laws" says any thing on the subject, it says that such acts are not
laws—for such acts are clearly inconsistent with natural law—and it
yet remains to be shown that they are consistent with any constitution
whatever, state or national.
The burden of proof, then, still rests upon the advocates of slavery, to
show that an act of a state legislature, declaring one man to be the
property of another, is a "law," within the meaning of this clause. To
assert simply that it is, without proving it to be so, is a mere begging
of the question—for that is the very point in dispute.
The question, therefore, of the constitutionality of the slave acts
must first be determined, before it can be decided that they are "laws"
within the meaning of the constitution. That is, they must be shown to
be consistent with the constitution, before they can be said to be
sanctioned as "laws" by the constitution. Can any proposition be plainer
than this? And yet the reverse must be assumed, in this case, by the
advocates of slavery.
The simple fact, that an act purports to "hold persons to service or
labor," clearly cannot, of itself, make the act constitutional. If it
could, any act, purporting to hold "persons to service or labor," would
necessarily be constitutional, without any regard to the "persons" so
held, or the conditions on which they were held. It would be
constitutional, solely because it purported to hold persons to service
or labor. If this were the true doctrine, any of us, without respect of
persons, might be held to service or labor, at the pleasure of the
legislature. And then, if "service or labor" mean slavery, it would
follow that any of us, without discrimination, might be made slaves. And
thus the result would be, that the acts of a legislature would be
constitutional, solely because they made slaves of the people.
Certainly this would be a new test of the constitutionality of laws.
All the arguments in favor of slavery, that have heretofore been drawn
from this clause of the constitution, have been founded on the
assumption, that if an act of a legislature did but purport to "hold
persons to service or labor"—no matter how, on what conditions, or for
what cause—that fact alone was sufficient to make the act
constitutional. The entire sum of the argument, in favor of slavery, is
but this, viz. the constitution recognizes the constitutionality of
"laws" that "hold persons to service or labor,"—slave acts "hold
persons to service or labor,"—therefore slave acts must be
constitutional. This profound syllogism is the great pillar of slavery
in this country. It has, (if we are to judge by results,) withstood the
scrutiny of all the legal acumen of this nation for fifty years and
more. If it should continue to withstand it for as many years as it has
already done, it will then be time to propound the following, to wit:
The state constitutions recognize the right of men to acquire property;
theft, robbery, and murder are among the modes in which property may be
acquired; therefore theft, robbery, and murder are recognized by these
constitutions as lawful.
No doubt the clause contemplates that there may be constitutional
"laws," under which persons may be "held to service or labor." But it
does not follow, therefore, that every act, that purports to hold
"persons to service or labor," is constitutional.
We are obliged, then, to determine whether a statute be constitutional,
before we can determine whether the "service or labor" required by it,
is sanctioned by the constitution as being lawfully required. The simple
fact, that the statute would "hold persons to service or labor," is, of
itself, no evidence, either for or against its constitutionality.
Whether it be or be not constitutional, may depend upon a variety of
contingencies—such as the kind of service or labor required, and the
conditions on which it requires it. Any service or labor, that is
inconsistent with the duties which the constitution requires of the
people, is of course not sanctioned by this clause of the constitution
as being lawfully required. Neither, of course, is the requirement of
service or labor, on any conditions, that are inconsistent with any
rights that are secured to the people by the constitution, sanctioned
by the constitution as lawful. Slave laws, then, can obviously be held
to be sanctioned by this clause of the constitution, only by
gratuitously assuming, 1st, that the constitution neither confers any
rights, nor imposes any duties, upon the people of the United States,
inconsistent with their being made slaves; and, 2d, that it sanctions
the general principle of holding "persons to service or labor"
arbitrarily, without contract, without compensation, and without the
charge of crime. If this be really the kind of constitution that has
been in force since 1789, it is somewhat wonderful that there are so few
slaves in the country. On the other hand, if the constitution be not of
this kind, it is equally wonderful that we have any slaves at all—for
the instrument offers no ground for saying that a colored man may be
made a slave, and a white man not.
Again. Slave acts were not "laws" according to any state constitution
that was in existence at the time the constitution of the United States
was adopted. And if they were not "laws" at that time, they have not
been made so since.
6. The constitution itself, (Art. 1. Sec. 2,) in fixing the basis of
representation, has plainly denied that those described in Art. 4, as
"persons held to service or labor," are slaves,—for it declares that
"persons bound to service for a term of years" shall be "included" in
the "number of free persons." There is no legal difference between
being "bound to service," and being "held to service or labor." The
addition, in the one instance, of the words, "for a term of years," does
not alter the case, for it does not appear that, in the other, they are
"held to service or labor" beyond a fixed term—and, in the absence of
evidence from the constitution itself, the presumption must be that they
are not—because such a presumption makes it unnecessary to go out of
the constitution to find the persons intended, and it is also more
consistent with the prevalent municipal, and with natural law.
And it makes no difference to this result, whether the word "free," in
the first article, be used in the political sense common at that day, or
as the correlative of slavery. In either case, the persons described as
"free," could not be made slaves.
7. The words "service or labor" cannot be made to include slavery,
unless by reversing the legal principle, that the greater includes the
less, and holding that the less includes the greater; that the innocent
includes the criminal; that a sanction of what is right, includes a
sanction of what is wrong.
Another clause relied on as a recognition of the constitutionality of
slavery, is the following, (Art. 1. Sec. 2.):
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several states, which may be included within this union, according to
their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for
a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all
other persons."
The argument claimed from this clause, in support of slavery, rests
entirely upon the word "free," and the words "all other persons." Or
rather it rests entirely upon the meaning of the word "free," for the
application of the words "all other persons" depends upon the meaning
given to the word "free." The slave argument assumes, gratuitously,
that the word "free" is used as the correlative of slavery and thence it
infers that the words, "all other persons," mean slaves.
It is obvious that the word "free" affords no argument for slavery,
unless a meaning correlative with slavery be arbitrarily given to it,
for the very purpose of making the constitution sanction or recognize
slavery. Now it is very clear that no such meaning can be given to the
word, for such a purpose. The ordinary meaning of a word cannot be
thus arbitrarily changed, for the sake of sanctioning a wrong. A
choice of meaning would be perfectly allowable, and even obligatory, if
made for the purpose of avoiding any such sanction; but it is entirely
inadmissable for the purpose of giving it. The legal rules of
interpretation, heretofore laid down, imperatively require this
preference of the right, over the wrong, in all cases where a word is
susceptible of different meanings.
The English law had for centuries used the word "free" as describing
persons possessing citizenship, or some other franchise or peculiar
privilege—as distinguished from aliens, and persons not possessed of
such franchise or privilege. This law, and this use of the word "free,"
as has already been shown, had been adopted in this country from its
first settlement. The colonial charters all, (probably without an
exception,) recognized it. The colonial legislation generally, if not
universally, recognized it. The state constitutions, in existence at the
time the constitution of the United States was formed and adopted, used
the word in this sense, and no other. The Articles of Confederation—the
then existing national compact of union—used the word in this sense,
and no other. The sense is an appropriate one in itself; the most
appropriate to, and consistent with the whole character of the
constitution, of any of which the word is susceptible. In fact, it is
the only one that is either appropriate to, or consistent with, the
other parts of the instrument. Why, then, is it not the legal meaning?
Manifestly it is the legal meaning. No reason whatever can be given
against it, except that, if such be its meaning, the constitution will
not sanction slavery! A very good reason—a perfectly unanswerable
reason, in fact—in favor of this meaning; but a very futile one against
it.
It is evident that the word "free" is not used as the correlative of
slavery, because "Indians not taxed" are "excluded" from its
application—yet they are not therefore slaves.
Again. The word "free" cannot be presumed to be used as the correlative
of slavery—because slavery then had no legal existence. The word must
obviously be presumed to be used as the correlative of something that
did legally exist, rather than of something that did not legally
exist. If it were used as the correlative of something that did not
legally exist, the words "all other persons" would have no legal
application. Until, then, it be shown that slavery had a legal
existence, authorized either by the United States constitution, or by
the then existing state constitutions—a thing that cannot be shown—the
word "free" certainly cannot be claimed to have been used as its
correlative.
But even if slavery had been authorized by the state constitutions,
the word "free," in the United States constitution, could not have been
claimed to have been used as its correlative, unless it had appeared
that the United States constitution had itself provided or suggested no
correlative of the word "free;" for it would obviously be absurd and
inadmissible to go out of an instrument to find the intended correlative
of one of its own words, when it had itself suggested one. This the
constitution of the United States has done, in the persons of aliens.
The power of naturalization is, by the constitution, taken from the
states, and given exclusively to the United States. The constitution of
the United States, therefore, necessarily supposes the existence of
aliens—and thus furnishes the correlative sought for. It furnishes a
class both for the word "free," and the words "all other persons" to
apply to. And yet the slave argument contends that we must overlook
these distinctions, necessarily growing out of the laws of the United
States, and go out of the constitution of the United States to find
persons whom it describes as the "free," and "all other persons." And
what makes the argument the more absurd is, that by going out of the
instrument to the then existing state constitutions—the only
instruments to which we can go—we can find there no other persons for
the words to apply to—no other classes answering to the description of
the "free persons" and "all other persons,"—than the very classes
suggested by the United States constitution itself, to wit, citizens and
aliens; (for it has previously been shown that the then existing state
constitutions recognized no such persons as slaves.)
If we are obliged, (as the slave argument claims we are,) to go out of
the constitution of the United States to find the class whom it
describes as "all other persons" than "the free," we shall, for aught I
see, be equally obliged to go out of it to find those whom it describes
as the "free"—for "the free," and "all other persons" than "the free,"
must be presumed to be found described somewhere in the same instrument.
If, then, we are obliged to go out of the constitution to find the
persons described in it as "the free" and "all other persons," we are
obliged to go out of it to ascertain who are the persons on whom it
declares that the representation of the government shall be based, and
on whom, of course, the government is founded. And thus we should have
the absurdity of a constitution that purports to authorize a government,
yet leaves us to go in search of the people who are to be represented in
it. Besides, if we are obliged to go out of the constitution, to find
the persons on whom the government rests, and those persons are
arbitrarily prescribed by some other instrument, independent of the
constitution, this contradiction would follow, viz., that the United
States government would be a subordinate government—a mere appendage to
something else—a tail to some other kite—or rather a tail to a large
number of kites at once—instead of being, as it declares itself to be,
the supreme government—its constitution and laws being the supreme law
of the land.
Again. It certainly cannot be admitted that we must go out of the United
States constitution to find the classes whom it describes as "the free,"
and "all other persons" than "the free," until it be shown that the
constitution has told us where to go to find them. In all other cases,
(without an exception, I think,) where the constitution makes any of its
provisions dependent upon the state constitutions, or state
legislatures, it has particularly described them as depending upon them.
But it gives no intimation that it has left it with the state
constitutions, or the state legislatures, to prescribe whom it means by
the terms "free persons" and "all other persons," on whom it requires
its own representation to be based. We have, therefore, no more
authority from the constitution of the United States, for going to the
state constitutions, to find the classes described in the former as the
"free persons" and "all other persons," than we have for going to Turkey
or Japan. We are compelled, therefore, to find them in the constitution
of the United States itself, if any answering to the description can
possibly be found there.
Again. If we were permitted to go to the state constitutions, or to the
state statute books, to find who were the persons intended by the
constitution of the United States; and if, as the slave argument
assumes, it was left to the states respectively to prescribe who should,
and who should not, be "free" within the meaning of the constitution of
the United States, it would follow that the terms "free" and "all other
persons," might be applied in as many different ways, and to as many
different classes of persons, as there were different states in the
union. Not only so, but the application might also be varied at pleasure
in the same state. One inevitable consequence of this state of things
would be, that there could be neither a permanent, nor a uniform basis
of representation throughout the country. Another possible, and even
probable consequence would be, such inextricable confusion, as to the
persons described by the same terms in the different states, that
Congress could not apportion the national representation at all, in the
manner required by the constitution. The questions of law, arising out
of the different uses of the word "free," by the different states, might
be made so endless and inexplicable, that the state governments might
entirely defeat all the power of the general government to make an
apportionment.
If the slave construction be put upon this clause, still another
difficulty, in the way of making an apportionment, would follow, viz.,
that congress could have no legal knowledge of the persons composing
each of the two different classes, on which its representation must be
based; for there is no legal record—known to the laws of the United
States, or even to the laws of the states—of those who are slaves, or
those who are not. The information obtained by the census takers, (who
have no legal records to go to,) must, in the nature of things, be of
the most loose and uncertain character, on such points as these. Any
accurate or legal knowledge on the subject is, therefore, obviously
impossible. But if the other construction be adopted, this difficulty is
avoided—for congress then have the control of the whole matter, and may
adopt such means as may be necessary for ascertaining accurately the
persons who belong to each of these different classes. And by their
naturalization laws they actually do provide for a legal record of all
who are made "free" by naturalization.
And this consideration of certainty, as to the individuals and numbers
belonging to each of these two classes, "free" and "all other persons,"
acquires an increased and irresistible force, when it is considered that
these different classes of persons constitute also different bases for
taxation, as well as representation. The requirement of the constitution
is, that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned," &c.,
according to the number of "free persons" and "all other persons." In
reference to so important a subject as taxation, accurate and legal
knowledge of the persons and numbers belonging to the different classes,
becomes indispensable. Yet under the slave construction this legal
knowledge becomes impossible. Under the other construction it is as
perfectly and entirely within the power of congress, as, in the nature
of things, such a subject can be—for naturalization is a legal process;
and legal records, prescribed by congress, may be, and actually are,
preserved of all the persons naturalized or made "free" by their laws.
If we adopt that meaning of the word "free," which is consistent with
freedom—that meaning which is consistent with natural right—the
meaning given to it by the Articles of Confederation, by the then
existing state constitutions, by the colonial charters, and by the
English law ever since our ancestors enjoyed the name of freemen, all
these difficulties, inconsistencies, contradictions and absurdities,
that must otherwise arise, vanish. The word "free" then describes the
native and naturalized citizens of the United States, and the words "all
other persons" describe resident aliens, "Indians not taxed," and
possibly some others. The representation is then placed upon the best,
most just, and most rational basis that the words used can be made to
describe. The representation also becomes equal and uniform throughout
the country. The principle of distinction between the two bases, becomes
also a stable, rational and intelligible one—one too necessarily
growing out of the exercise of one of the powers granted to
congress;—one, too, whose operation could have been foreseen and judged
of by the people who adopted the constitution—instead of one
fluctuating with the ever changing and arbitrary legislation of the
various states, whose mode and motives of action could not have been
anticipated. Adopt this definition of the word "free," and the same
legislature, (that is, the national one,) that is required by the
constitution to apportion the representation according to certain
principles, becomes invested—as it evidently ought to be, and as it
necessarily must be, to be efficient—with the power of determining, by
their own (naturalization) laws, who are the persons composing the
different bases on which its apportionment is to be made; instead of
being, as they otherwise would be, obliged to seek for these persons
through all the statute books of all the different states of the union,
and through all the evidences of private property, under which one of
these classes might be held. Adopt this definition of the word "free,"
and the United States government becomes, so far at least as its popular
representation—which is its most important feature—is concerned, an
independent government, subsisting by its own vigor, and pervaded
throughout by one uniform principle. Reject this definition, and the
popular national representation, loses at once its nationality, and
becomes a mere dependency on the will of local corporations—a mere
shuttlecock to be driven hither and thither by the arbitrary and
conflicting legislation of an indefinite number of separate states.
Adopt this meaning of the word "free," and the national government
becomes capable of knowing its own bases of representation and power,
and its own subjects of taxation. Reject this definition, and the
government knows not whom it represents, or on whom to levy taxes for
its support. Adopt this meaning of the word "free," and some three
millions of native born, but now crushed human beings, become, with
their posterity, men and citizens. Adopt this meaning—this legal
meaning—this only meaning that can, in this clause, be legally
given to the word "free," and our constitution becomes, instead of a
nefarious compact of conspirators against the rights of man, a
consistent and impartial contract of government between all "the
people of the United States," for securing "to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of liberty" and "justice."
Again. We cannot unnecessarily place upon the constitution a meaning
directly destructive of the government it was designed to establish. By
giving to the word "free" the meaning universally given to it by our
political papers of a similar character up to the time the constitution
was adopted, we give to the government three millions of citizens, ready
to fight and be taxed for its support. By giving to the word "free" a
meaning correlative with slavery, we locate in our midst three millions
of enemies; thus making a difference of six millions, (one third of our
whole number,) in the physical strength of the nation. Certainly a
meaning so suicidal towards the government, cannot be given to any part
of the constitution, except the language be irresistibly explicit; much
less can it be done, (as in this case it would be,) wantonly,
unnecessarily, gratuitously, wickedly, and in violation of all previous
usage.
Again. If we look into the constitution itself for the meaning of the
word "free," we find it to result from the distinction there recognized
between citizens and aliens. If we look into the contemporary state
constitutions, we still find the word "free" to express the political
relation of the individual to the state, and not any property relation
of one individual to another. If we look into the law of nature for the
meaning of the word "free," we find that by that law all mankind are
free. Whether, therefore, we look to the constitution itself, to the
contemporary state constitutions, or to the law of nature, for the
meaning of this word "free," the only meaning we shall find is one
consistent with the personal liberty of all. On the other hand, if we
are resolved to give the word a meaning correlative with slavery, we
must go to the lawless code of the kidnapper to find such a meaning.
Does it need any argument to prove to which of these different codes our
judicial tribunals are bound to go, to find the meaning of the words
used in a constitution, that is established professedly to secure
liberty and justice?
Once more. It is altogether a false, absurd, violent, unnatural and
preposterous proceeding, in construing a political paper, which purports
to establish men's relations to the state, and especially in construing
the clause in it which fixes the basis of representation and taxation,
to give to the words, which describe the persons to be represented and
taxed, and which appropriately indicate those relations of men to the
state which make them proper subjects of taxation and representation—to
give to such words a meaning, which, instead of describing men's
relations to the state, would describe merely a personal or property
relation of one individual to another, which the state has nowhere else
recognized, and which, if admitted to exist, would absolve the persons
described from all allegiance to the state, would deny them all right to
be represented, and discharge them from all liability to be taxed.
But it is unnecessary to follow out this slave argument into all its
ramifications. It sets out with nothing but assumptions, that are
gratuitous, absurd, improbable, irrelevant, contrary to all previous
usage, contrary to natural right, and therefore inadmissible. It
conducts to nothing but contradictions, absurdities, impossibilities,
indiscriminate slavery, anarchy, and the destruction of the very
government which the constitution was designed to establish.
The other clause relied on as a recognition and sanction, both of
slavery and the slave trade, is the following:
"The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
the congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight,
but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding
ten dollars for each person."—(Art. 1, Sec. 9.)
The slave argument, drawn from this clause, is, that the word
"importation" applies only to property, and that it therefore implies,
in this clause, that the persons to be imported are necessarily to be
imported as property—that is, as slaves.
But the idea that the word "importation" applies only to property, is
erroneous. It applies correctly both to persons and things. The
definition of the verb "import" is simply "to bring from a foreign
country, or jurisdiction, or from another state, into one's own country,
jurisdiction or state."—When we speak of "importing" things, it is true
that we mentally associate with them the idea of property. But that is
simply because things are property, and not because the word "import"
has any control, in that particular, over the character of the things
imported. When we speak of importing "persons," we do not associate with
them the idea of property, simply because "persons" are not property.
We speak daily of the "importation of foreigners into the country;" but
no one infers therefrom that they are brought in as slaves, but as
passengers. A vessel imports, or brings in, five hundred passengers.
Every vessel, or master of a vessel, that "brings in" passengers,
"imports" them. But such passengers are not therefore slaves. A man
imports his wife and children—but they are not therefore his slaves,
or capable of being owned or sold as his property. A man imports a gang
of laborers, to clear lands, cut canals, or construct railroads; but not
therefore to be held as slaves. An innocent meaning must be given to the
word, if it will bear one. Such is the legal rule.
Even the popular understanding of the word "import," when applied to
"persons," does not convey the idea of property. It is only when it is
applied distinctly to "slaves," that any such idea is conveyed; and then
it is the word "slaves," and not the word "import," that suggests the
idea of property. Even slave traders and slave holders attach no such
meaning to the word "import," when it is connected with the word
"persons;" but only when it is connected with the word "slaves."
In the case of Ogden vs. Saunders, (12 Wheaton, 332,) Chief Justice
Marshall said, that in construing the constitution, "the intention of
the instrument must prevail; that this intention must be collected from
its words; that its words are to be understood in that sense in which
they are generally used by those for whom the instrument was
intended." On this principle of construction, there is not the least
authority for saying that this provision for "the importation of
persons," authorized the importation of them as slaves. To give it this
meaning, requires the same stretching of words towards the wrong, that
is applied, by the advocates of slavery, to the words "service or
labor," and the words "free" and "all other persons."
Another reason, which makes it necessary that this construction should
be placed upon the word "importation," is, that the clause contains no
other word that describes the immigration of foreigners. Yet that the
clause related to the immigration of foreigners generally, and that it
restrained congress, (up to the year 1808,) from prohibiting the
immigration of foreigners generally, there can be no doubt.
The object, and the only legal object, of the clause was to restrain
congress from so exercising their "power of regulating commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes"—(which power has been decided by the supreme court of the
United States, to include a power over navigation and the transportation
of passengers in boats and vessels[21])—as to obstruct the introduction
of new population into such of the states as were desirous of increasing
their population in that manner. The clause does not imply at all, that
the population, which the states were thus to "admit," was to be a slave
population.
The word "importation," (I repeat,) is the only word in the clause, that
applies to persons that were to come into the country from foreign
nations. The word "migration" applies only to those who were to go
out from one of our own states or territories into another.
"Migration" is the act of going out from a state or country; and
differs from immigration in this, that immigration is the act of coming
into a state or country. It is obvious, therefore, that the
"migration," which congress are here forbidden to prohibit, is simply
the going out of persons from one of our own states or territories
into another—(for that is the only "migration" that could come within
the jurisdiction of congress)—and that it has no reference to persons
coming in from foreign countries to our own.
If, then, "migration," as here used, has reference only to persons
going out from one state into another, the word "importation" is the
only one in the clause that is applicable to foreigners coming into our
country. This word "importation," then, being the only word that can
apply to persons coming into the country, it must be considered as
substantially synonymous with immigration, and must apply equally to
all "persons," that are "imported," or brought into the country as
passengers. And if it applies equally to all persons, that are brought
in as passengers, it does not imply that any of those persons are
slaves; for no one will pretend that this clause ever authorized the
state governments to treat as slaves all persons that were brought
into the country as passengers. And if it did not authorize them to
treat all such passengers as slaves, it did not authorize them to treat
any of them as such; for it makes no discrimination between the
different "persons" that should be thus imported.
Again. The argument, that the allowance of the "importation" of
"persons," implies the allowance of property in such persons, would
imply a recognition of the validity of the slave laws of other
countries; for unless slaves were obtained by valid purchase
abroad—which purchase implies the existence and validity of foreign
slave laws—the importer certainly could not claim to import his slaves
as property; but he would appear, at the custom-house, as a mere pirate,
claiming to have his captures legalized. So that, according to the
slave argument, the simple use of the word "importation," in the
constitution, as applied to "persons," bound our government, not only to
the sanction and toleration of slavery in our own country, but to the
recognition of the validity of the slave laws of other countries.
But farther. The allowance of the "importation" of slaves, as such,
under this clause of the constitution, would imply that congress must
take actual, and even the most critical cognizance of the slave laws of
other countries; and that they should allow neither the mere word of the
person calling himself the owner, nor any thing short of the fullest and
clearest legal proof, according to the laws of those countries, to be
sufficient to enable him to enter his slaves, as property, at the
custom-house; otherwise any masters of vessels, from England or France,
as well as from Africa, might, on their arrival here, claim their
passengers as slaves. Did the constitution, in this clause, by simply
using the word "importation," instead of immigration, intend to throw
upon the national government—at the hazard of making it a party to the
illegal enslavement of human beings—the responsibility of
investigating and deciding upon the legality and credibility of all the
evidence that might be offered by the piratical masters of slave ships,
to prove their valid purchase of, and their right of property in their
human cargoes, according to the slave laws of the countries from which
they should bring them? Such must have been the intention of the
constitution, if it intended, (as it must, if it intended any thing of
this kind,) that the fact of "importation" under the commercial
regulations of congress, should be thereafter a sufficient authority for
holding in slavery the persons imported.
But perhaps it will be said that it was not the intention of the
constitution, that congress should take any responsibility at all in the
matter; that it was merely intended that whoever came into the country
with a cargo of men, whom he called his slaves, should be permitted to
bring them in on his own responsibility, and sell them as slaves for
life to our people; and that congress were prohibited only from
interfering, or asking any questions as to how he obtained them, or how
they became his slaves. Suppose such were the intention of the
constitution—what follows? Why, that the national government, the only
government that was to be known to foreign nations, the only government
that was to be permitted to regulate our commerce, or make treaties with
foreign nations, the government on whom alone was to rest the
responsibility of war with foreign nations, was bound to permit, (until
1808,) all masters, both of our own ships and of the ships of other
nations, to turn pirates, and make slaves of their passengers, whether
Englishmen, Frenchmen, or any other civilized people, (for the
constitution makes no distinction of "persons" on this point,) bring
them into this country, sell them as slaves for life to our people, and
thus make our country a rendezvous and harbor for pirates, involve us
inevitably in war with every civilized nation in the world, cause
ourselves to be outlawed as a people, and bring certain and swift
destruction upon the whole nation; and yet this government, that had the
sole responsibility of all our foreign relations, was constitutionally
prohibited from interfering in the matter, or from doing any thing but
lifting its hands in prayer to God and these pirates, that the former
would so far depart, and the latter so far desist from their usual
courses, as might be necessary to save us, until 1808, (after which time
we would take the matter into our own hands, and, by prohibiting the
causes of the danger, save ourselves,) from the just vengeance, which
the rest of mankind were taking upon us.
This is the kind of constitution, under which, (according to the slave
argument,) we lived until 1808.
But is such the real character of the constitution? By it, did we thus
really avow to the world that we were a nation of pirates? that our
territory should be a harbor for pirates? that our people were
constitutionally licensed to enslave the people of all other nations,
without discrimination, (for the instrument makes no discrimination,)
whom they could either kidnap in their own countries, or capture on the
high seas? and that we had even prohibited our only government that
could make treaties with foreign nations, from making any treaty, until
1808, with any particular nation, to exempt the people of that nation
from their liability to be enslaved by the people of our own? The slave
argument says that we did avow all this. If we really did, perhaps all
that can be said of it now is, that it is very fortunate for us that
other nations did not take us at our word. For if they had taken us at
our word, we should, before 1808, have been among the nations that were.
Suppose that, on the organization of our government, we had been charged
by foreign nations, with having established a piratical government—how
could we have rebutted the charge otherwise than by denying that the
words "importation of persons" legally implied that the persons imported
were slaves? Suppose that European ambassadors had represented to
president Washington that their governments considered our constitution
as licensing our people to kidnap the people of other nations, without
discrimination, and bring them to the United States as slaves. Would he
not have denied that the legal meaning of the clause did any thing more
than secure the free introduction of foreigners as passengers and
freemen? Or would he—he, the world-renowned champion of human
rights—have indeed stooped to the acknowledgment that in truth he was
the head of a nation of pirates, whose constitution did guarantee the
freedom of kidnapping men abroad, and importing them as slaves? And
would he, in the event of this acknowledgment, have sought to avert the
destruction, which such an avowal would be likely to bring upon the
nation, by pleading that, although such was the legal meaning of the
words of our constitution, we yet had an understanding, (an honorable
understanding!) among ourselves, that we would not take advantage of the
license to kidnap or make slaves of any of the citizens of those
civilized and powerful nations of Europe, that kept ships of war, and
knew the use of gunpowder and cannon; but only the people of poor, weak,
barbarous and ignorant nations, who were incapable of resistance and
retaliation?
Again. Even the allowance of the simple "importation" of slaves—(and
that is the most that is literally provided for—and the word
"importation" must be construed to the letter,) would not, of itself,
give any authority for the continuance of the slavery after
"importation." If a man bring either property or persons into this
country, he brings them in to abide the constitutional laws of the
country; and not to be held according to the customs of the country from
which they were brought. Were it not so, the Turk might import a harem
of Georgian slaves, and, at his option, either hold them as his own
property, or sell them as slaves to our own people, in defiance of any
principles of freedom that should prevail amongst us. To allow this kind
of "importation," would be to allow not merely the importation of
foreign "persons," but also of foreign laws to take precedence of our
own.
Finally. The conclusion, that congress were restrained, by this clause,
only from prohibiting the immigration of a foreign population, and not
from prohibiting the importation of slaves, to be held as slaves after
their importation—is the more inevitable, from the fact that the power
given to congress of naturalizing foreigners, is entirely
unlimited—except that their laws must be uniform throughout the United
States. They have perfect power to pass laws that shall naturalize every
foreigner without distinction, the moment he sets foot on our soil. And
they had this power as perfectly prior to 1808, as since. And it is a
power entirely inconsistent with the idea that they were bound to admit,
and forever after to acknowledge as slaves, all or any who might be
attempted to be brought into the country as such.
One other provision of the constitution, viz: the one that "the United
States shall protect each of the States against domestic violence"—has
sometimes been claimed as a special pledge of impunity and succor to
that kind of "violence," which consists in one portion of the people's
standing constantly upon the necks of another portion, and robbing them
of all civil privileges, and trampling upon all their personal rights.
The argument seems to take it for granted, that the only proper way of
protecting a "republican" state (for the states are all to be
"republican,") against "domestic violence," is to plant men firmly upon
one another's necks, (about in the proportion of two upon one,) arm the
two with whip and spur, and then keep an armed force standing by to cut
down those that are ridden, if they dare attempt to throw the riders.
When the ridden portion shall, by this process, have been so far subdued
as to bear the burdens, lashings and spurrings of the other portion
without resistance, then the state will have been secured against
"domestic violence," and the "republican form of government" will be
completely successful.
This version of this provision of the constitution presents a fair
illustration of those new ideas of law and language, that have been
invented for the special purpose of bringing slavery within the pale of
the constitution.
We have thus examined all those clauses of the constitution, that have
been relied on to prove that the instrument recognizes and sanctions
slavery. No one would have ever dreamed that either of these clauses
alone, or that all of them together, contained so much as an allusion to
slavery, had it not been for circumstances extraneous to the
constitution itself. And what are these extraneous circumstances? They
are the existence and toleration, in one portion of the country, of a
crime that embodies within itself nearly all the other crimes, which it
is the principal object of all our governments to punish and suppress; a
crime which we have therefore no more right to presume that the
constitution of the United States intended to sanction, than we have to
presume that it intended to sanction all the separate crimes which
slavery embodies, and our governments prohibit. Yet we have
gratuitously presumed that the constitution intended to sanction all
these separate crimes, as they are comprehended in the general crime of
slavery. And acting upon this gratuitous presumption, we have sought, in
the words of the constitution, for some hidden meaning, which we could
imagine to have been understood, by the initiated, as referring to
slavery; or rather we have presumed its words to have been used as a
kind of cypher, which, among confederates in crime, (as we presume its
authors to have been,) was meant to stand for slavery. In this way, and
in this way only, we pretend to have discovered, in the clauses that
have been examined, a hidden, yet legal sanction of slavery. In the name
of all that is legal, who of us are safe, if our government, instead of
searching our constitution to find authorities for maintaining justice,
are to continue to busy themselves in such prying and microscopic
investigations, after such disguised and enigmatical authorities for
such wrongs as that of slavery, and their pretended discoveries are to
be adopted as law, which they are sworn to carry into execution?
The clauses mentioned, taken either separately or collectively, neither
assert, imply, sanction, recognize nor acknowledge any such thing as
slavery. They do not even speak of it. They make no allusion to it
whatever. They do not suggest, and, of themselves, never would have
suggested the idea of slavery. There is, in the whole instrument, no
such word as slave or slavery; nor any language that can legally be made
to assert or imply the existence of slavery. There is in it nothing
about color; nothing from which a liability to slavery can be predicated
of one person more than another; or from which such a liability can be
predicated of any person whatever. The clauses, that have been claimed
for slavery, are all, in themselves, honest in their language, honest in
their legal meaning; and they can be made otherwise only by such
gratuitous assumptions against natural right, and such straining of
words in favor of the wrong, as, if applied to other clauses, would
utterly destroy every principle of liberty and justice, and allow the
whole instrument to be perverted to every conceivable purpose of tyranny
and crime.
Let us now look at the positive provisions of the constitution, in
favor of liberty, and see whether they are not only inconsistent with
any legal sanction of slavery, but also whether they must not, of
themselves, have necessarily extinguished slavery, if it had had any
constitutional existence to be extinguished.
And, first, the constitution made all "the people of the United States"
citizens under the government to be established by it; for all of
those, by whose authority the constitution declares itself to be
established, must of course be presumed to have been made citizens under
it. And whether they were entitled or not to the right of suffrage, they
were at least entitled to all the personal liberty and protection, which
the constitution professes to secure to "the people" generally.
Who, then, established the constitution?
The preamble to the constitution has told us in the plainest possible
terms, to wit, that "We, the people of the United States" "do ordain
and establish this constitution," &c.
By "the people of the United States," here mentioned, the constitution
intends all "the people" then permanently inhabiting the United
States. If it does not intend all, who were intended by "the people of
the United States?"—The constitution itself gives no answer to such a
question.—It does not declare that "we, the white people," or "we,
the free people," or "we, a part of the people"—but that "we, the
people"—that is, we the whole people—of the United States, "do
ordain and establish this constitution."
If the whole people of the United States were not recognized as
citizens by the constitution, then the constitution gives no information
as to what portion of the people were to be citizens under it. And the
consequence would then follow that the constitution established a
government that could not know its own citizens.
We cannot go out of the constitution for evidence to prove who were to
be citizens under it. We cannot go out of a written instrument for
evidence to prove the parties to it, nor to explain its meaning, except
the language of the instrument on that point be ambiguous. In this case
there is no ambiguity. The language of the instrument is perfectly
explicit and intelligible.
Because the whole people of the country were not allowed to vote on the
ratification of the constitution, it does not follow that they were not
made citizens under it; for women and children did not vote on its
adoption; yet they are made citizens by it, and are entitled as citizens
to its protection; and the state governments cannot enslave them. The
national constitution does not limit the right of citizenship and
protection by the right of suffrage, any more than do the state
constitutions. Under the most, probably under all the state
constitutions, there are persons who are denied the right of
suffrage—but they are not therefore liable to be enslaved.
Those who did take part in the actual ratification of the constitution,
acted in behalf of, and, in theory, represented the authority of the
whole people. Such is the theory in this country wherever suffrage is
confined to a few; and such is the virtual declaration of the
constitution itself. The declaration that "we the people of the United
States do ordain and establish this constitution," is equivalent to a
declaration that those who actually participated in its adoption, acted
in behalf of all others, as well as for themselves.
Any private intentions or understandings, on the part of one portion of
the people, as to who should be citizens, cannot be admitted to prove
that such portion only were intended by the constitution, to be
citizens; for the intentions of the other portion would be equally
admissible to exclude the exclusives. The mass of the people can claim
citizenship under the constitution, on no other ground than as being a
part of "the people of the United States;" and such claim necessarily
admits that all other "people of the United States" are equally
citizens.
That the designation, "We the people of the United States," included the
whole people that properly belonged to the United States, is also proved
by the fact that no exception is made in any other part of the
instrument.
If the constitution had intended that any portion of "the people of the
United States" should be excepted from its benefits, disfranchised,
outlawed, enslaved, it would of course have designated these exceptions
with such particularity as to make it sure that none but the true
persons intended would be liable to be subjected to such wrongs. Yet,
instead of such particular designation of the exceptions, we find no
designation whatever of the kind. But on the contrary, we do find, in
the preamble itself, a sweeping declaration to the effect that there are
no such exceptions; that the whole people of the United States are
citizens, and entitled to liberty, protection, and the dispensation of
justice under the constitution.
If it be admitted that the constitution designated its own citizens,
then there is no escape from the conclusion that it designated the
whole people of the United States as such. On the other hand, if it be
denied that the constitution designated its own citizens, one of these
two conclusions must follow, viz., 1st, that it has no citizens; or, 2d,
that it has left an unrestrained power in the state governments to
determine who may, and who may not, be citizens of the United States
government. If the first of these conclusions be adopted, viz., that the
constitution has no citizens, then it follows that there is really no
United States government, except on paper—for there would be as much
reason in talking of an army without men, as of a government without
citizens. If the second conclusion be adopted, viz., that the state
governments have the right of determining who may, and who may not be
citizens of the United States government, then it follows that the state
governments may at pleasure destroy the government of the United States,
by enacting that none of their respective inhabitants shall be citizens
of the United States.
This latter is really the doctrine of some of the slave states—the
"state-rights" doctrine, so called. That doctrine holds that the general
government is merely a confederacy or league of the several states, as
states; not a government established by the people, as people. This
"state-rights" doctrine has been declared unconstitutional by reiterated
opinions of the supreme court of the United States;[22] and, what is of
more consequence, it is denied also by the preamble to the constitution
itself, which declares that it is "the people," (and not the state
governments,) that ordain and establish it. It is true also that the
constitution was ratified by conventions of the people, and not by the
legislatures of the states. Yet because the constitution was ratified by
conventions of the states separately, (as it naturally would be for
convenience, and as it necessarily must have been for the reason that
none but the people of the respective states could recall any portion of
the authority they had, delegated to their state governments, so as to
grant it to the United States government,)—yet because it was thus
ratified, I say, some of the slave states have claimed that the general
government was a league of states, instead of a government formed by
"the people." The true reason why the slave states have held this
theory, probably is, because it would give, or appear to give, to the
states the right of determining who should, and who should not, be
citizens of the United States. They probably saw that if it were
admitted that the constitution of the United States had designated its
own citizens, it had undeniably designated the whole people of the then
United States as such; and that, as a state could not enslave a citizen
of the United States, (on account of the supremacy of the constitution
of the United States,) it would follow that there could be no
constitutional slavery in the United States.
Again. If the constitution was established by authority of all "the
people of the United States," they were all legally parties to it, and
citizens under it. And if they were parties to it, and citizens under
it, it follows that neither they, nor their posterity, nor any nor
either of them, can ever be legally enslaved within the territory of the
United States; for the constitution declares its object to be, among
other things, "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves, and our
posterity." This purpose of the national constitution is a law
paramount to all state constitutions; for it is declared that "this
constitution, and the laws of the United States that shall be made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing
in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding."
No one, I suppose, doubts that if the state governments were to abolish
slavery, the slaves would then, without further legislation, become
citizens of the United States. Yet, in reality, if they would become
citizens then, they are equally citizens now—else it would follow that
the state governments had an arbitrary power of making citizens of the
United States; or—what is equally absurd—it would follow that
disabilities, arbitrarily imposed by the state governments, upon native
inhabitants of the country, were, of themselves, sufficient to deprive
such inhabitants of their citizenship, which would otherwise have been
conferred upon them by the constitution of the United States. To suppose
that the state governments are thus able, arbitrarily, to keep in
abeyance, or arbitrarily to withhold from any of the inhabitants of the
country, any of the benefits or rights which the national constitution
intended to confer upon them, would be to suppose that the state
constitutions were paramount to the national one. The conclusion,
therefore, is inevitable, that the state governments have no power to
withhold the rights of citizenship from any who are otherwise competent
to become citizens. And as all the native born inhabitants of the
country are at least competent to become citizens of the United States,
(if they are not already such,) the state governments have no power, by
slave laws or any other, to withhold the rights of citizenship from
them.
But however clear it may be, that the constitution, in reality, made
citizens of all "the people of the United States," yet it is not
necessary to maintain that point, in order to prove that the
constitution gave no guaranty or sanction to slavery—for if it had not
already given citizenship to all, it nevertheless gave to the government
of the United States unlimited power of offering citizenship to all. The
power given to the government of passing naturalization laws, is
entirely unrestricted, except that the laws must be uniform throughout
the country. And the government have undoubted power to offer
naturalization and citizenship to every person in the country, whether
foreigner or native, who is not already a citizen. To suppose that we
have in the country three millions of native born inhabitants, not
citizens, and whom the national government has no power to make
citizens, when its power of naturalization is entirely unrestricted, is
a palpable contradiction.
But further. The constitution of the United States must be made
consistent with itself throughout; and if any of its parts are
irreconcilable with each other, those parts that are inconsistent with
liberty, justice and right, must be thrown out for inconsistency.
Besides the provisions already mentioned, there are numerous others, in
the constitution of the United States, that are entirely and
irreconcilably inconsistent with the idea that there either was, or
could be, any constitutional slavery in this country.
Among these provisions are the following:
First. Congress have power to lay a capitation or poll tax upon the
people of the country. Upon whom shall this tax be levied? and who must
be held responsible for its payment? Suppose a poll tax were laid upon a
man, whom the state laws should pretend to call a slave. Are the United
States under the necessity of investigating, or taking any notice of the
fact of slavery, either for the purpose of excusing the man himself from
the tax, or of throwing it upon the person claiming to be his owner?
Must the government of the United States find a man's pretended owner,
or only the man himself, before they can tax him? Clearly the United
States are not bound to tax any one but the individual himself, or to
hold any other person responsible for the tax. Any other principle would
enable the state governments to defeat any tax of this kind levied by
the United States. Yet a man's liability to be held personally
responsible for the payment of a tax, levied upon himself by the
government of the United States, is inconsistent with the idea that the
government is bound to recognize him as not having the ownership of his
own person.
Second. "The congress shall have power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes."
This power is held, by the supreme court of the United States, to be an
exclusive one in the general government; and it obviously must be so, to
be effectual—for if the states could also interfere to regulate it, the
states could at pleasure defeat the regulations of congress.
Congress, then, having the exclusive power of regulating this commerce,
they only (if any body) can say who may, and who may not, carry it on;
and probably even they have no power to discriminate arbitrarily between
individuals.—But, in no event, have the state governments any right
to say who may, or who may not, carry on "commerce with foreign
nations," or "among the several states," or "with the Indian tribes."
Every individual—naturally competent to make contracts—whom the state
laws declare to be a slave, probably has, and certainly may have, under
the regulations of congress, as perfect a right to carry on "commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes," as any other citizen of the United States can have—"any thing
in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding." Yet this right of carrying on commerce is a right
entirely inconsistent with the idea of a man's being a slave.
Again. It is a principle of law that the right of traffic is a natural
right, and that all commerce (that is intrinsically innocent) is
therefore lawful, except what is prohibited by positive legislation.
Traffic with the slaves, either by people of foreign nations, or by
people belonging to other states than the slaves, has never (so far as I
know) been prohibited by congress, which is the only government, (if
any,) that has power to prohibit it. Traffic with the slaves is
therefore as lawful at this moment, under the constitution of the
United States, as is traffic with their masters; and this fact is
entirely inconsistent with the idea that their bondage is
constitutional.
Third. "The congress shall have power to establish post offices and
post roads."
Who, but congress, have any right to say who may send, or receive
letters by the United States posts? Certainly no one. They have
undoubted authority to permit any one to send and receive letters by
their posts—"any thing in the constitutions or laws of the states to
the contrary notwithstanding." Yet the right to send and receive letters
by post, is a right inconsistent with the idea of a man's being a slave.
Fourth. "The congress shall have power to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries."
Suppose a man, whom a state may pretend to call a slave, should make an
invention or discovery—congress have undoubted power to secure to such
individual himself, by patent, the "exclusive"—(mark the word)—the
"exclusive right" to his invention or discovery. But does not this
"exclusive right" in the inventor himself, exclude the right of any
man, who, under a state law, may claim to be the owner of the inventor?
Certainly it does. Yet the slave code says that whatever is a slave's is
his owner's. This power, then, on the part of congress, to secure to an
individual the exclusive right to his inventions and discoveries, is a
power inconsistent with the idea that that individual himself, and all
he may possess, are the property of another.
Fifth. "The congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters
of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land
and water;" also "to raise and support armies;" and "to provide and
maintain a navy."
Have not congress authority, under these powers, to enlist soldiers and
sailors, by contract with themselves, and to pay them their wages,
grant them pensions, and secure their wages and pensions to their own
use, without asking the permission either of the state governments, or
of any individuals whom the state governments may see fit to recognize
as the owners of such soldiers and sailors? Certainly they have, in
defiance of all state laws and constitutions whatsoever; and they have
already asserted that principle by enacting that pensions, paid by the
United States to their soldiers, shall not be liable to be taken for
debt, under the laws of the states. Have they not authority also to
grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to secure the prizes, to a
ship's crew of blacks, as well as of whites? To those whom the State
governments call slaves, as well as to those whom the state governments
call free?—Have not congress authority to make contracts, for the
defence of the nation, with any and all the inhabitants of the nation,
who may be willing to perform the service? Or are they obliged first to
ask and obtain the consent of those private individuals who may pretend
to own the inhabitants of this nation? Undoubtedly congress have the
power to contract with whom they please, and to secure wages and
pensions to such individuals, in contempt of all state authority. Yet
this power is inconsistent with the idea that the constitution
recognizes or sanctions the legality of slavery.
Sixth. "The congress shall have power to provide for the
organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the
United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment
of the officers, and the authority of training the militia, according
to the discipline prescribed by congress." Also "to provide for
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions."
Have not congress, under these powers, as undoubted authority to enroll
in the militia, and "arm" those whom the states call slaves, and
authorize them always to keep their arms by them, even when not on duty,
(that they may at all times be ready to be "called forth" "to execute
the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions,")
as they have thus to enroll and arm those whom the states call free? Can
the state governments determine who may, and who may not compose the
militia of the "United States?"
Look, too, at this power, in connection with the second amendment to the
constitution; which is in these words:
"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed."
These provisions obviously recognize the natural right of all men "to
keep and bear arms" for their personal defence; and prohibit both
congress and the state governments from infringing the right of "the
people"—that is, of any of the people—to do so; and more especially
of any whom congress have power to include in their militia. This right
of a man "to keep and bear arms," is a right palpably inconsistent with
the idea of his being a slave. Yet the right is secured as effectually
to those whom the states presume to call slaves, as to any whom the
states condescend to acknowledge free.
Under this provision any man has a right either to give or sell arms to
those persons whom the states call slaves; and there is no
constitutional power, in either the national or state governments,
that can punish him for so doing; or that can take those arms from the
slaves; or that can make it criminal for the slaves to use them, if,
from the inefficiency of the laws, it should become necessary for them
to do so, in defence of their own lives or liberties; for this
constitutional right to keep arms implies the constitutional right to
use them, if need be, for the defence of one's liberty or life.
Seventh. The constitution of the United States declares that "no state
shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts."
"The obligation of contracts," here spoken of, is, of necessity, the
natural obligation; for that is the only real or true obligation that
any contracts can have. It is also the only obligation, which courts
recognize in any case, except where legislatures arbitrarily interfere
to impair it. But the prohibition of the constitution is upon the
states' passing any law whatever that shall impair the natural
obligation of men's contracts. Yet, if slave laws were constitutional,
they would effectually impair the obligation of all contracts entered
into by those who are made slaves; for the slave laws must necessarily
hold that all a slave's contracts are void.
This prohibition upon the states to pass any law impairing the natural
obligation of men's contracts, implies that all men have a
constitutional right to enter into all contracts that have a natural
obligation. It therefore secures the constitutional right of all men
to enter into such contracts, and to have them respected by the state
governments. Yet this constitutional right of all men to enter into all
contracts that have a natural obligation, and to have those contracts
recognized by law as valid, is a right plainly inconsistent with the
idea that men can constitutionally be made slaves.
This provision therefore absolutely prohibits the passage of slave laws,
because laws that make men slaves must necessarily impair the obligation
of all their contracts.
Eighth. Persons, whom some of the state governments recognize as
slaves, are made eligible, by the constitution of the United States, to
the office of president of the United States. The constitutional
provision on this subject is this:
"No person, except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United
States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be
eligible to the office of president; neither shall any person be
eligible to that office, who shall not have attained the age of
thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident of the United
States."
According to this provision, all "persons",[23] who have resided
within the United States fourteen years, have attained the age of
thirty-five years, and are either natural born citizens, or were
citizens of the United States at the time of the adoption of the
constitution, are eligible to the office of president. No other
qualifications than these being required by the constitution, no others
can be legally demanded. The only question, then, that can arise, is as
to the word "citizen." Who are the persons that come within this
definition, as here used? The clause itself divides them into two
classes, to wit, the "natural born," and those who were "citizens of the
United States at the time of the adoption of the constitution." In
regard to this latter class, it has before been shown, from the preamble
to the constitution, that all who were "people of the United States,"
(that is, permanent inhabitants,) at the time the constitution was
adopted, were made citizens by it. And this clause, describing those
eligible to the office of president, implies the same thing. This is
evident; for it speaks of those who were "citizens of the United
States at the time of the adoption of the constitution." Now there
clearly could have been no "citizens of the United States, at the time
of the adoption of the constitution," unless they were made so by the
constitution itself; for there were no "citizens of the United
States" before the adoption of the constitution. The Confederation
had no citizens. It was a mere league between the state governments. The
separate states belonging to the confederacy had each their own citizens
respectively. But the confederation itself, as such, had no citizens.
There were, therefore, no "citizens of the United States," (but only
citizens of the respective states,) before the adoption of the
constitution.—Yet this clause asserts that immediately on the adoption,
or "at the time of the adoption of this constitution," there were
"citizens of the United States." Those, then, who were "citizens of the
United States at the time of the adoption of the constitution," were
necessarily those, and only those, who had been made so by the adoption
of the constitution; because they could have become citizens at that
precise "time" in no other way. If, then, any persons were made
citizens by the adoption of the constitution, who were the individuals
that were thus made citizens? They were "the people of the United
States," of course—as the preamble to the constitution virtually
asserts. And if "the people of the United States" were made citizens by
the adoption of the constitution, then all "the people of the United
States" were necessarily made citizens by it—for no discrimination is
made by the constitution between different individuals, "people of the
United States"—and there is therefore no means of determining who were
made citizens by the adoption of the constitution, unless all "the
people of the United States" were so made. Any "person," then, who was
one of "the people of the United States" "at the time of the adoption of
this constitution," and who is thirty-five years old, and has resided
fourteen years within the United States, is eligible to the office of
president of the United States. And if every such person be eligible,
under the constitution, to the office of president of the United States,
the constitution certainly does not recognize them as slaves.
The other class of citizens, mentioned as being eligible to the office
of president, consists of the "natural born citizens." Here is an
implied assertion that natural birth in the country gives the right of
citizenship. And if it gives it to one, it necessarily gives it to
all—for no discrimination is made; and if all persons, born in the
country, are not entitled to citizenship, the constitution has given us
no test by which to determine who of them are entitled to it.
Every person, then, born in the country, and that shall have attained
the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within
the United States, is eligible to the office of president. And if
eligible to that office, the constitution certainly does not recognize
him as a slave.
Persons, who are "citizens" of the United States, according to the
foregoing definitions, are also eligible to the offices of
representative and senator of the United States; and therefore cannot be
slaves.
Ninth. The constitution declares that "the trial of all crimes,
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury."—Also that
"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war
against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort."
It is obvious that slaves, if we had any, might "levy war against the
United States," and might also "adhere to their enemies, giving them aid
and comfort." It may, however, be doubted whether they could commit the
crime of treason—for treason implies a breach of fidelity, trust or
allegiance, where fidelity, trust or allegiance is due. And it is very
clear that slaves could owe allegiance, trust or fidelity, neither to
the United States, nor to the state governments; for allegiance is due
to a government only from those who are protected by it. Slaves could
owe to our governments nothing but resistance and destruction. If
therefore they were to levy war against the United States, they might
not perhaps be liable to the technical charge of treason; although there
would, in reality, be as much treason in their act, as there would of
any other crime—for there would, in truth, be neither legal nor moral
crime of any kind in it. Still, the government would be compelled, in
order to protect itself against them, to charge them with some crime or
other—treason, murder, or something else. And this charge, whatever it
might be, would have to be tried by a jury. And what (in criminal
cases,) is the "trial by jury?" It is a trial, both of the law and the
fact, by the "peers," or equals, of the person tried. Who are the
"peers" of a slave? None, evidently, but slaves. If, then, the
constitution recognizes any such class of persons, in this country, as
slaves, it would follow that for any crime committed by them against the
United States, they must be tried, both on the law and the facts, by a
jury of slaves. The result of such trials we can readily imagine.
Does this look as if the constitution guarantied, or even recognized the
legality of slavery?
Tenth. The constitution declares that "The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it."
The privilege of this writ, wherever it is allowed, is of itself
sufficient to make slavery impossible and illegal. The object and
prerogative of this writ are to secure to all persons their natural
right to personal liberty, against all restraint except from the
government; and even against restraints by the government itself, unless
they are imposed in conformity with established general laws, and upon
the charge of some legal offence or liability. It accordingly liberates
all who are held in custody against their will, (whether by individuals
or the government,) unless they are held on some formal writ or
process, authorized by law, issued by the government, according to
established principles, and charging the person held by it with some
legal offence or liability. The principle of the writ seems to be, that
no one shall be restrained of his natural liberty, unless these three
things conspire; 1st, that the restraint be imposed by special command
of the government; 2d, that there be a general law authorizing
restraints for specific causes; and, 3d, that the government, previously
to issuing process for restraining any particular individual, shall
itself, by its proper authorities, take express cognizance of, and
inquire cautiously into the facts of each case, and ascertain, by
reasonable evidence, that the individual has brought himself within the
liabilities of the general law. All these things the writ of habeas
corpus secures to be done, before it will suffer a man to be restrained
of his liberty; for the writ is a mandate to the person holding another
in custody, commanding him to bring his prisoner before the court, and
show the authority by which it holds him. Unless he then exhibit a legal
precept, warrant or writ, issued by, and bearing the seal of the
government, specifying a legal ground for restraining the prisoner, and
authorizing or requiring him to hold him in custody, he will be ordered
to let him go free. Hence all the keepers of prisons, in order to hold
their prisoners against the authority of this writ, are required, in the
case of each prisoner, to have a written precept or order, bearing the
seal of the government, and issued by the proper authority, particularly
describing the prisoner by name or otherwise, and setting forth the
legal grounds of his imprisonment, and requiring the keeper of the
prison to hold him in his custody.
Now the master does not hold his slave in custody by virtue of any
formal or legal writ or process, either authorized by law, or issued by
the government, or that charges the slave with any legal offence or
liability. A slave is incapable of incurring any legal liability, or
obligation to his master. And the government could, with no more
consistency, grant a writ or process to the master, to enable him to
hold his slave, than it could to enable him to hold his horse. It simply
recognizes his right of property in his slave, and then leaves him at
liberty to hold him by brute force, if he can, as he holds his ox, or
his horse—and not otherwise. If the slave escape, or refuse to labor,
the slave code no more authorizes the government to issue legal process
against the slave, to authorize the master to catch him, or compel him
to labor, than it does against a horse for the same purpose.—The slave
is held simply as property, by individual force, without legal process.
But the writ of habeas corpus acknowledges no such principle as the
right of property in man. If it did, it would be perfectly impotent in
all cases whatsoever; because it is a principle of law, in regard to
property, that simple possession is prima facie evidence of ownership;
and therefore any man, who was holding another in custody, could defeat
the writ by pleading that he owned his prisoner, and by giving, as proof
of ownership, the simple fact that he was in possession of him. If,
therefore, the writ of habeas corpus did not, of itself, involve a
denial of the right of property in man, the fact stated in it, that one
man was holding another in custody, would be prima facie evidence
that he owned him, and had a right to hold him; and the writ would
therefore carry an absurdity in its face.
The writ of habeas corpus, then, necessarily denies the right of
property in man. And the constitution, by declaring, without any
discrimination of persons, that "the privilege of this writ shall not be
suspended,"—that is, shall not be denied to any human being—has
declared that, under the constitution, there can be no right of property
in man.
This writ was unquestionably intended as a great constitutional guaranty
of personal liberty. But unless it denies the right of property in man,
it in reality affords no protection to any of us against being made
slaves. If it does deny the right of property in man, the slave is
entitled to the privilege of the writ; for he is held in custody by his
master, simply on the ground of property.
Mr. Christian, one of Blackstone's editors, says that it is this writ
that makes slavery impossible in England. It was on this writ, that
Somerset was liberated. The writ, in fact, asserts, as a great
constitutional principle, the natural right of personal liberty. And the
privilege of the writ is not confined to citizens, but extends to all
human beings.[24] And it is probably the only absolute guaranty, that
our national constitution gives to foreigners and aliens, that they
shall not, on their arrival here, be enslaved by those of our state
governments that exhibit such propensities for enslaving their
fellow-men. For this purpose, it is a perfect guaranty to people who
come here from any part of the world. And if it be such a guaranty to
foreigners and aliens, is it no guaranty to those born under the
constitution? Especially when the constitution makes no discrimination
of persons?
Eleventh. "The United States shall guaranty to every state in this
union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of
them against invasion; and, on application of the legislature, or of
the executive, (when the legislature cannot be convened,) against
domestic violence."
Mark the strength and explicitness of the first clause of this section,
to wit, "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
union a republican form of government." Mark also especially that this
guaranty is one of liberty, and not of slavery.
We have all of us heretofore been compelled to hear, from individuals of
slaveholding principles, many arrogant and bombastic assertions,
touching the constitutional "guaranties" given to slavery; and
persons, who are in the habit of taking their constitutional law from
other men's mouths, instead of looking at the constitution for
themselves, have probably been led to imagine that the constitution had
really given such guaranties in some explicit and tangible form. We
have, nevertheless, seen that all those pretended guaranties are at most
nothing but certain vague hints, insinuations, ciphers and innuendoes,
that are imagined to be covered up under language which legally means
nothing of the kind. But, in the clause now cited, we do have an
explicit and peremptory "guaranty," depending upon no implications,
inferences or conjectures, and couched in no uncertain or ambiguous
terms. And what is this guaranty? Is it a guaranty of slavery? No. It is
a guaranty of something flatly incompatible with slavery: a guaranty of
"a republican form of government to every state in this union."
And what is "a republican form of government?" It is where the
government is a commonwealth—the property of the public, of the mass of
the people, or of the entire people. It is where the government is made
up of, and controlled by the combined will and power of the public, or
the mass of the people—and where, of natural consequence, it will have,
for its object, the protection of the rights of all. It is indispensable
to a republican form of government, that the public, the mass of the
people, if not the entire people, participate in the grant of powers to
the government, and in the protection afforded by the government. It is
impossible, therefore, that a government, under which any considerable
number of the people, (if indeed any number of the people,) are
disfranchised and enslaved, can be a republic. A slave government is an
oligarchy; and one too of the most arbitrary and criminal character.
Strange that men, who have eyes capable of discovering in the
constitution so many covert, implied and insinuated guaranties of crime
and slavery, should be blind to the legal import of so open, explicit
and peremptory a guaranty of freedom, equality and right.
Even if there had really been, in the constitution, two such
contradictory guaranties, as one of liberty or republicanism in every
state of the Union, and another of slavery in every state where one
portion of the people might succeed in enslaving the rest, one of these
guaranties must have given way to the other—for, being plainly
inconsistent with each other, they could not have stood together. And it
might safely have been left either to legal or to moral rules to
determine which of the two should prevail—whether a provision to
perpetuate slavery should triumph over a guaranty of freedom.
But it is constantly asserted, in substance, that there is "no
propriety" in the general government's interfering in the local
governments of the states. Those who make this assertion appear to
regard a state as a single individual, capable of managing his own
affairs, and of course unwilling to tolerate the intermeddling of
others. But a state is not an individual. It is made up of large numbers
of individuals, each and all of whom, amid the intestine mutations and
strifes to which states are subject, are liable, at some time or other,
to be trampled upon by the strongest party, and may therefore reasonably
choose to secure, in advance, some external protection against such
emergencies, by making reciprocal contracts with other people similarly
exposed in the neighboring states. Such contracts for mutual succor and
protection, are perfectly fit and proper for any people who are so
situated as to be able to contribute to each other's security. They are
as fit and proper as any other political contracts whatever; and are
founded on precisely the same principle of combination for mutual
defence—for what are any of our political contracts and forms of
government, but contracts between man and man for mutual protection
against those who may conspire to injure either or all of them? But
these contracts, fit and proper between all men, are peculiarly
appropriate to those, who, while they are members of various local and
subordinate associations, are, at the same time, united for specific
purposes, under one general government. Such a mutual contract, between
the people of all the states, is contained in this clause of the
constitution. And it gives to them all an additional guaranty for their
liberties.
Those who object to this guaranty, however, choose to overlook all these
considerations, and then appear to imagine that their notions of
"propriety" on this point, can effectually expunge the guaranty itself
from the constitution. In indulging this fancy, however, they
undoubtedly overrate the legal, and perhaps also the moral effect of
such superlative fastidiousness; for even if there were "no propriety"
in the interference of the general government to maintain a republican
form of government in the states, still, the unequivocal pledge to that
effect, given in the constitution, would nevertheless remain an
irresistible rebutter to the allegation that the constitution intended
to guaranty its opposite, slavery, an oligarchy, or a despotism. It
would, therefore, entirely forbid all those inferences and implications,
drawn by slaveholders, from those other phrases, which they quote as
guaranties of slavery.[25]
But the "propriety," and not only the propriety, but the necessity of
this guaranty, may be maintained on still other grounds.
One of these grounds is, that it would be impossible, consistently with
the other provisions of the constitution, that the general government
itself could be republican, unless the state governments were republican
also. For example. The constitution provides, in regard to the choice of
congressional representatives, that "the electors in each state shall
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous
branch of the state legislature." It was indispensable to the internal
quiet of each state, that the same body of electors, who should
participate in the suffrage of the state governments, should participate
also in the suffrage of the national one—and vice versa, that those
who should participate in the national suffrage, should also participate
in that of the state. If the general and state constitutions had each a
different body of electors within each state, it would obviously give
rise at once to implacable and irreconcilable feuds, that would result
in the overthrow of one or the other of the governments within the
state. Harmony or inveterate conflict was the only alternative. As
conflict would necessarily result in the destruction of one of the
governments, harmony was the only mode by which both could be preserved.
And this harmony could be secured only by giving to the same body of
electors, suffrage in both the governments.
If, then, it was indispensable to the existence and authority of both
governments, within the territory of each state, that the same body, and
only the same body of electors, that were represented in one of the
governments, should be represented in the other, it was clearly
indispensable, in order that the national one should be republican, that
the state governments should be republican also. Hence the interest
which the nation at large have in the republicanism of each of the state
governments.
It being necessary that the suffrage under the national government,
within each state, should be the same as for the state government, it is
apparent that unless the several state governments were all formed on
one general plan, or unless the electors of all the states were united
in the acknowledgement of some general controlling principle, applicable
to both governments, it would be impossible that they could unite in the
maintenance of a general government that should act in harmony with the
state governments; because the same body of electors, that should
support a despotic government in the state, could not consistently or
cordially unite, or even unite at all, in the support of a republican
government for the nation. If one portion of the state governments
should be republican, like Vermont, where suffrage is open to all—and
another portion should be oligarchies, like South Carolina, and the
other slave states—another portion limited monarchies, like
England—another portion ecclesiastical, like that of the Pope of Rome,
or that of the ancient Jews—and another portion absolute despotisms,
like that of Nicholas, in Russia, or that of Francia, in Paraguay,—and
the same body, and only the same body, of electors, that sustained each
of these governments at home, should be represented in the national
government, each state would send into the national legislature the
representatives of its own peculiar system of government; and the
national legislature, instead of being composed of the representatives
of any one theory, or principle of government, would be made up of the
representatives of all the various theories of government that prevailed
in the different states—from the extreme of democracy to the extreme of
despotism. And each of these various representatives would be obliged to
carry his local principles into the national legislature, else he could
not retain the confidence of his peculiar constituents. The consequence
would be, that the national legislature would present the spectacle of a
perfect Babel of discordant tongues, elements, passions, interests and
purposes, instead of an assembly united for the accomplishment of any
agreed or distinct object.
Without some distinct and agreed object as a bond of union, it would
obviously be impracticable for any general union of the whole people to
subsist; and that bond of union, whatever it be, must also harmonize
with the principles of each of the state governments, else there would
be a collision between the general and state governments.
Now the great bond of union, agreed upon in the general government, was
"the rights of man"—expressed in the national constitution by the terms
"liberty and justice." What other bond could have been agreed upon? On
what other principle of government could they all have united? Could
they have united to sustain the divine right of kings? The feudal
privileges of nobles? Or the supremacy of the Christian, Mahometan, or
any other church? No. They all denied the divine right of kings, and the
feudal rights of nobles; and they were of all creeds in religion. But
they were agreed that all men had certain natural, inherent, essential
and inalienable rights, among which were life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness; and that the preservation of these rights was the
legitimate purpose of governments among men. They had avowed this
principle before the world, had fought for it, and successfully defended
it, against the mightiest power in the world. They had filled the world
with its glory; and it, in turn, had filled the world with theirs. It
had also gathered, and was then gathering, choice spirits, and large
numbers of the oppressed from other nations unto them. And this
principle—in which were involved the safety, interests and rights of
each and every one of "the people," who were to unite for the formation
of the government—now furnished a bond of union, that was at once
sufficient, legitimate, consistent, honorable, of universal application,
and having more general power over the hearts and heads of all of them,
than any other that could be found to hold them together. It comported
with their theory of the true objects of government. This principle,
therefore, they adopted as the corner-stone of their national
government; and, as a matter of necessity, all other things, on which
this new government was in any degree to depend, or which was to depend
in any degree upon this government, were then made to conform to this
principle. Hence the propriety of the power given to the general
government, of "guaranteeing to every state in the Union a republican
form of government." Had not this power been given to the general
government, the majorities in each state might have converted the state
governments into oligarchies, aristocracies, monarchies or despotisms,
that should not only have trampled upon the minorities, and defeated
their enjoyment of the national constitution, but also introduced such
factions and feuds into the national governments, as would have
distracted its councils, and prostrated its power.
But there were also motives of a pecuniary and social, as well as
political nature, that made it proper that the nation should guarantee
to the states a republican form of government.
Commerce was to be established between the people of the different
states. The commerce of a free people is many times more valuable than
that of slaves. Freemen produce and consume vastly more than slaves.
They have therefore more to buy and more to sell. Hence the free states
have a direct pecuniary interest in the civil freedom of all the other
states. Commerce between free and slave states is not reciprocal or
equal. Who can measure the increase that would have been made to the
industry and prosperity of the free states, if all the slaves in the
country had been freemen, with all the wants and energies of freemen?
And their masters had had all the thrift, industry, frugality and
enterprise of men who depend upon their own labor, instead of the labor
of slaves, for their prosperity? Great Britain thought it policy to
carry on a seven years' war against us principally to secure to herself
the control and benefits of the commerce of three millions of people and
their posterity. But we now have nearly or quite the same number of
slaves within our borders, and yet we think that commerce with them and
their posterity is a matter with which we have no concern; that there is
"no propriety" in that provision of the national constitution, which
requires that the general government—which we have invested with the
exclusive control of all commerce among the several states—should
secure to these three millions the right of traffic with their fellow
men, and to their fellow men the right of traffic with them, against the
impertinent usurpations and tyranny of subordinate governments, that
have no constitutional right to interfere in the matter.
Again. The slave states, in proportion to their population, contribute
nothing like an equal or equitable share to the aggregate of national
wealth. It would probably be within the truth to say that, in proportion
to numbers, the people of the free states have contributed ten times as
much to the national wealth as the people of the slave states. Even for
such wealth as the culture of their great staple, cotton, has added to
the nation, the south are indebted principally, if not entirely, to the
inventive genius of a single northern man.[26] The agriculture of the
slave states is carried on with rude and clumsy implements; by listless,
spiritless and thriftless laborers; and in a manner speedily to wear out
the natural fertility of the soil, which fertility slave cultivation
seldom or never replaces. The mechanic arts are comparatively dead among
them. Invention is utterly dormant. It is doubtful whether either a
slave or a slave holder has ever invented a single important article of
labor-saving machinery since the foundation of the government. And they
have hardly had the skill or enterprise to apply any of those invented
by others. Who can estimate the loss of wealth to the nation from these
causes alone? Yet we of the free states give to the south a share in the
incalculable wealth produced by our inventions and labor-saving
machinery, our steam engines, and cotton gins, and manufacturing
machinery of all sorts, and yet say at the same time that we have no
interest, and that there is "no propriety" in the constitutional
guaranty of that personal freedom to the people of the south, which
would enable them to return us some equivalent in kind.
For the want, too, of an enforcement of this guaranty of a republican
form of government to each of the states, the population of the country,
by the immigration of foreigners, has no doubt been greatly hindered.
Multitudes almost innumerable, who would have come here, either from a
love of liberty, or to better their conditions, and given the country
the benefit of their talents, industry and wealth, have no doubt been
dissuaded or deterred by the hideous tyranny that rides triumphant in
one half of the nation, and extends its pestiferous and detested
influence over the other half.
Socially, also, we have an interest in the freedom of all the states.
We have an interest in free personal intercourse with all the people
living under a common government with ourselves. We wish to be free to
discuss, with any and all of them, all the principles of liberty and all
the interests of humanity. We wish, when we meet a fellow man, to be at
liberty to speak freely with him of his and our condition; to be at
liberty to do him a service; to advise with him as to the means of
improving his condition; and, if need be, to ask a kindness at his
hands. But all these things are incompatible with slavery. Is this such
an union as we bargained for? Was it "nominated in the bond," that we
should be cut off from these the common rights of human nature? If so,
point to the line and letter, where it is so written. Neither of them
are to be found. But the contrary is expressly guarantied against the
power of both the governments, state and national; for the national
government is prohibited from passing any law abridging the freedom of
speech and the press, and the state governments are prohibited from
maintaining any other than a republican form of government, which of
course implies the same freedom.
The nation at large have still another interest in the republicanism of
each of the states; an interest, too, that is indicated in the same
section in which this republicanism is guarantied. This interest results
from the fact that the nation are pledged to "protect" each of the
states "against domestic violence." Was there no account taken—in
reference either to the cost or the principle of this undertaking—as to
what might be the character of the state governments, which we are thus
pledged to defend against the risings of the people? Did we covenant, in
this clause, to wage war against the rights of man? Did we pledge
ourselves that those, however few, who might ever succeed in getting the
government of a state into their hands, should thenceforth be recognized
as the legitimate power of the state, and be entitled to the whole force
of the general government to aid them in subjecting the remainder of the
people to the degradation and injustice of slavery? Or did the nation
undertake only to guarantee the preservation of "a republican form of
government" against the violence of those who might prove its enemies?
The reason of the thing, and the connexion, in which the two provisions
stand in the constitution, give the answer.
We have yet another interest still, and that no trivial one, in the
republicanism of the state governments; an interest indicated, too, like
the one last mentioned, in the very section in which this republicanism
is assured. It relates to the defence against invasion. The general
government is pledged to defend each of the states against invasion. Is
it a thing of no moment, whether we have given such a pledge to free or
to slave states? Is there no difference in the cost and hazard of
defending one or the other? Is it of no consequence to the expense of
life and money, involved in this undertaking, whether the people of the
state invaded shall be united, as freemen naturally will be, as one man
against the enemy? Or whether, as in slave states, half of them shall be
burning to join the enemy, with the purpose of satisfying with blood the
long account of wrong that shall have accrued against their oppressors?
Did Massachusetts—who during the war of the revolution furnished more
men for the common defence, than all the six southern states
together—did she, immediately on the close of that war, pledge herself,
as the slave holders would have it, that she would lavish her life in
like manner again, for the defence of those whose wickedness and tyranny
in peace should necessarily multiply their enemies and make them
defenceless in war? If so, on what principle, or for what equivalent,
did she do it? Did she not rather take care that the guaranty for a
republican government should be inserted in the same paragraph with that
for protection against invasion, in order that both the principle and
the extent of the liability she incurred, might distinctly appear?
The nation at large, then, as a political community under the
constitution, have both interests and rights, and both of the most vital
character, in the republicanism of each of the state governments. The
guaranty given by the national constitution, securing such a government
to each of the states, is therefore neither officious nor impertinent.
On the contrary, this guaranty was a sine qua non to any national
contract of union; and the enforcement of it is equally indispensable,
if not to the continuance of the union at all, certainly to its
continuance on any terms that are either safe, honorable or equitable
for the north.
This guaranty, then, is not idle verbiage. It is full of meaning. And
that meaning is not only fatal to slavery itself, but it is fatal also
to all those pretences, constructions, surmises and implications, by
which it is claimed that the national constitution sanctions, legalizes,
or even tolerates slavery.