On a certain memorable occasion, Walpole is
said to have made the remark, “They are
ringing the bells now; they will be wringing
their hands soon!” with reference to a universal outcry
for war on the part of Great Britain. Had it been
uttered by an Austrian statesman at the beginning of
1809, it would have been equally apposite. Thinking
men recognised that the army was not yet prepared
to meet Napoleon, despite the fact that since the Austerlitz
campaign of 1805 the improvement of her military
forces had engrossed the attention of Archduke Charles,
the Commander-in-chief. He was convinced that his
troops were not ready to take the field, and he led the
peace party solely on this account. The war party,
however, headed by Count Stadion, the able and energetic
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and aided by the
Empress, who had considerable influence over her
august husband, proved more powerful. Its supporters
felt confident that as the war in Spain necessarily
occupied so much of Napoleon’s attention, and had
drawn off such a large proportion of his troops, the time
to strike was come. Austrian diplomatists had vainly
endeavoured to woo both Russia and Prussia without
success; the Czar had no wish at that moment to break
with his ally; Frederick William trembled for his
throne.
In January 1809, war was imminent. Napoleon,
deceived as to the real state of affairs in Spain, set out
on his return journey to France on the 16th. He at
once began to organise his forces, Berthier being placed
in command until the Emperor’s arrival at the seat of
war. Napoleon’s explicit instructions were as follows:—
“By the 1st April the corps of Marshal Davout,
which broke up from the Oder and Lower Elbe on the
17th March, will be established between Nuremberg,
Bamberg, and Baireuth: Masséna will be around Ulm:
Oudinot between Augsburg and Donauwörth. From
the 1st to the 15th, three French corps, 130,000 strong,
besides 10,000 allies, the Bavarians in advance on the
Iser, and the Würtembergers in reserve, may be concentrated
on the Danube at Ratisbon or Ingolstadt.
Strong têtes-de-pont should be thrown up at Augsburg,
to secure the passage of the Lech at Ingolstadt, in
order to be able to debouch to the left bank of the
Danube; and above all at Passau, which should be
able to hold out two or three months. The Emperor’s
object is to concentrate his army as soon as possible
at Ratisbon: the position on the Lech is to be assumed
only if it is attacked before the concentration at the
former town is possible. The second corps will be at
Ratisbon by the 10th, and on that day Bessières will
also arrive with the reserve cavalry of the Guard:
Davout will be at Nuremberg: Masséna at Augsburg:
Lefebvre at one or two marches from Ratisbon. Headquarters
then may be safely established in that town,
in the midst of 200,000 men, guarding the right bank
of the Danube from Ratisbon to Passau, by means of
which stream provisions and supplies of every sort
will be procured in abundance. Should the Austrians
debouch from Bohemia or Ratisbon, Davout and
Lefebvre should fall back on Ingolstadt or Donauwörth.”
On the 9th April, when hostilities began, the strength
of Napoleon’s forces was as follows:—His newly-named
Army of Germany, on the Danube, numbered 174,000
troops, including some 54,000 of the Rhenish Confederacy;
the Army of Italy consisted of 68,000; in
Saxony there were about 20,000; in Poland 19,000;
in Dalmatia 10,500. Consequently the Emperor had
291,500 troops at his disposal, some 275,000 of whom
were ready to confront Austria by the middle of the
month. This is an enormous number when it is remembered
that he was still at war with Spain, where
300,000 men were engaged, but he had had recourse
to his old plan of forestalling the conscription, whereby
he had obtained 80,000 recruits.
The Austrian forces were divided into three armies:
that of Germany, under Archduke Charles, consisting
of 189,684 troops; of Italy, under Archduke John,
totalling 64,768, including those for action in Tyrol
under Chasteler; and of Galicia, under Archduke
Ferdinand, with 35,400; in all 289,852. The Reserves,
made up of the landwehr and levées en masse reached
244,247, but as Mr F. Loraine Petre points out in his
masterly study of this campaign, only some 15,000 of
the landwehr were used with the active army at the
beginning of hostilities. “There was little of the
spirit of war in the landwehr,” he adds, “and discipline
was very bad. One battalion attacked and wounded
its chief with the bayonet. Two others refused to
march. Eleven Bohemian battalions could only be
got to march when regular troops were added to them.
Even then they only averaged about 500 men each,
and those badly equipped and armed.” But while
this organisation was of little practical service at the
moment, it was creating a healthy public opinion
which could not fail to be beneficial in the years to
come.
Already Napoleon’s military glory was beginning
to decline. In some of his principles he “became
false to himself,” he omitted to make his orders
to his subordinates sufficiently clear, and on one
occasion, in the early stage of the campaign, threw
away “chances of a decisive battle which would then
probably have made an end of the war.” He also exhibited
the utmost contempt for a country which
“had profited by the lessons he had taught her,” with
the result that “her armies, and her commander-in-chief,
were very different from the troops and leaders
of 1796 and 1805,” when he had crossed swords with
Austria.
Yet another failing is pointed out by Mr Petre.
“Napoleon’s wonderful successes in every previous
campaign,” he notes, “and the height to which his
power had risen, by the practical subjugation of all
Europe to his dominion, tended to fan the flame of
his pride, to make him deem himself invincible and
infallible, to cause him to assume that what he
desired was certain to happen. The wish now began
to be father to the thought. Of this we shall find
numerous instances in this campaign, the most notable,
perhaps, being when, notwithstanding Davout’s positive
assertions that the greater part of the Austrian army
was in front of himself, the Emperor persisted in believing
that Charles was in full retreat on Vienna by the right
bank of the Danube. His constant over-estimates
of his own forces, not in bulletins but in letters to his
generals and ministers, are other examples of this
failing.”
The campaign opened in Bavaria, where 176,000
Austrians assembled early in April 1809. Berthier,
doubtless acting for the best as he conceived it, instead
of concentrating at Ratisbon, Ingolstadt or Donauwörth
according to orders, had seen fit to scatter his forces,
“in the dangerous view,” as Alison puts it, “of stopping
the advance of the Austrians at all points.” As a
result of Berthier’s blunder Davout at Ratisbon and
Masséna at Augsburg were thirty-five leagues from
each other, and Archduke Charles with 100,000 troops
were interposed between them. About Ingolstadt were
the Bavarians under Wrede, Lefebvre, and the reserve
under Oudinot, the only forces available to oppose the
Austrians, whose march, fortunately for the French,
was extremely slow.
The Emperor arrived at Donauwörth on the 17th
April, and at once saw the danger. “What you have
done appears so strange,” he wrote to Berthier, “that
if I was not aware of your friendship I should think
you were betraying me; Davout is at this moment
more completely at the disposal of the Archduke than
of myself.”
It was Napoleon’s task to bring the two armies in
touch with each other so that a combined movement
might become possible. “One word will explain to
you the urgency of affairs,” the Emperor wrote to
Masséna on the 18th. “Archduke Charles, with 80,000
men, debouched yesterday from Landshut on Ratisbon;
the Bavarians contended the whole day with the
advanced guard. Orders have been dispatched to
Davout to move with 60,000 troops in the direction of
Neustadt, where he will form a junction with the
Bavarians. To-morrow (19th) all your troops who
can be mustered at Pfaffenhofen, with the Würtembergers,
a division of cuirassiers, and every man you can collect,
should be in a condition to fall on the rear of Archduke
Charles. A single glance must show you that never
was more pressing occasion for diligence and activity
than at present. With 60,000 good troops, Davout
may indeed make head against the Archduke; but
I consider him ruined without resource, if Oudinot and
your three divisions are on his rear before daybreak
on the 19th, and you inspire the soldiers with all they
should feel on so momentous an occasion. Everything
leads us to the belief that between the 18th, 19th, and
20th, all the affairs of Germany will be decided.”
On the 19th Davout withdrew from Ratisbon, leaving
only the 65th French infantry to guard the bridge over
the Danube, and after a severe but indecisive action
at Haussen, reached Abensberg in the evening, thereby
effecting his junction with Lefebvre. At Pfaffenhofen
Masséna defeated a body of the enemy and remained
there. Archduke Charles had foolishly divided his army,
and while he was marching on Ratisbon, Archduke
Louis and Hiller, with 42,000 troops forming the Austrian
left wing, were brought to action at Abensberg by
Napoleon on the 20th. The day remained with the
French, who numbered 55,000, their enemies losing
over 2700 killed and wounded, and some 4000 prisoners.
According to Mr Petre, about 25,000 soldiers only on
either side came into action. The defeated Austrians
retreated in the direction of Landshut, several of the
energetic Bavarian battalions following them. After
a spirited fight, during which ammunition ran out
and many men were killed and wounded, the solitary
regiment which held Ratisbon was forced to surrender
on the same day, half the troops of the 65th being
taken prisoners.
On the morning of the 21st Napoleon renewed the
battle against the Austrian left. About 9000 men
were added to the enemy’s already extensive losses,
and it had the desired effect of preventing them from
joining the main army. Davout and Lefebvre also
engaged the Austrian centre, which retreated, leaving
many wounded and dead on the field.
The Emperor was now ready to give attention to
Archduke Charles who, with 74,000 troops, was bent
on destroying Davout. The French Marshal was in
a tight corner, the Austrian main army being opposed
to him, and not to Napoleon, as the Emperor had
supposed on the morning of Abensberg. As we have
seen, it was only the left wing which he had defeated
on the 20th.
When the Archduke heard that Napoleon was on
his track he abandoned the idea of attacking Davout
and made his dispositions to meet the Emperor.
Immediately they came up, the bridge, village, and
château of Eckmühl were captured by the French.
The heights were stormed in truly magnificent style,
and a brave attempt was made by the Bavarian cavalry
to capture the enemy’s battery on the Bettelberg, which
was doing considerable execution. They were driven
back, but an hour later a French cuirassier regiment
captured the greater part of the guns, with the result
that Rosenberg, the commander of the fourth Austrian
army corps, was forced to retreat. The Emperor then
ordered the cavalry and infantry to pursue the unfortunate
Imperialists, who broke away almost in a
panic.
It now became evident that a general retreat
was necessary, the Austrian left wing making in the
direction of the river Isar, the main army, after a further
sharp conflict with the enemy, reaching the Danube,
the idea being to retire into the forests of Bohemia. It
is calculated that nearly 10,000 Austrians were killed,
wounded, or taken prisoners on this terrible day.
At St Helena, where, like the old soldiers in Chelsea
Hospital, Napoleon so often “fought his battles o’er
again,” he frequently referred to the battle of Eckmühl.
On one occasion he called it “that superb manœuvre,
the finest that I ever executed,” attributing its indecisiveness
to his lack of sleep on the previous
night.
Under cover of night, and during the early hours of
the morning of the 23rd, the cumbersome baggage of the
Imperialists was hurried across the bridge which spans
the Danube at Ratisbon. This was followed by the
retreat of part of the army over a pontoon bridge
hastily put together, the Austrian rear-guard protecting
the necessarily slow and somewhat difficult passage.
Nine battalions only remained on the right bank of
the river when Napoleon was making his final preparations
to take the walled town of Ratisbon by assault.
Fighting had already begun near the town. Ladders
were secured, and the intrepid Lannes was soon
within the old-time fortress, which speedily capitulated.
In his “Incident of the French Camp” Browning has
sung of a lad who took part in the storming. He
depicts Napoleon standing on a little mound
“With neck out-thrust, you fancy how,
Legs wide, arms locked behind,
As if to balance the prone brow
Oppressive with its mind.”
The Emperor soliloquises that if Lannes “waver at
yonder wall” his plans may miscarry, when—
“Out ’twixt the battery-smokes there flew
A rider, bound on bound
Full-galloping; nor bridle drew
Until he reached the mound.
“Then off there flung in smiling joy,
And held himself erect
By just his horse’s mane, a boy:
You hardly could suspect—
(So tight he kept his lips compressed,
Scarce any blood came through)
You looked twice ere you saw his breast
Was all but shot in two.
“‘Well,’ cried he, ‘Emperor, by God’s grace
We’ve got you Ratisbon!
The Marshal’s in the market-place,
And you’ll be there anon
To see your flag-bird flap his vans
Where I, to heart’s desire,
Perched him!’”
Napoleon’s eye flashed with the pride of victory,
but presently:
“Softened itself, as sheathes
A film the mother-eagle’s eye
When her bruised eaglet breathes;
‘You’re wounded!’ ‘Nay,’ the soldier’s pride
Touched to the quick, he said:
‘I’m killed, Sire!’ And his chief beside
Smiling the boy fell dead.”
The Emperor himself was slightly wounded while
directing operations. A spent musket-ball struck his
right foot and caused him considerable pain. “Ah!
I am hit,” he remarked quietly, adding with grim
humour, “It must have been a Tyrolese marksman
to have struck me at such a distance. Those fellows
fire with wonderful precision.” The matter soon got
noised abroad; the news was passed from rank to
rank that the “little Corporal” was wounded. Anxiety
was evident in almost every face. Men who had seen
many a comrade struck down and had not so much as
moved a muscle of their features took on a look of care
and of pain until reassured that the Emperor’s injury
was a mere contusion. A louder cheer was never
raised during the whole of his career, than when Napoleon
rode along the lines a little later. Not till then were
“his children” convinced of his safety.
Thus ended what has been called the Campaign of
Ratisbon, during the five days of which, according to
Major-General August Keim, the Imperialists lost
nearly 40,000 troops in killed, wounded, and prisoners.
Truly a prodigious number and eloquent proof of the
valour and energy of their opponents.
There was now nothing to prevent Napoleon from
presenting himself before Vienna, but while his troops,
flushed with success, were marching towards that
picturesque city, their leader heard grave and disquieting
news. The Bavarians under Wrede had been
defeated on the 24th April by the retreating Austrians+
under Hiller, who was endeavouring to come up with
Archduke Charles. Bessières had also been forced to
retire. In addition Prince Eugène and the army of
Italy had met with disaster at the hands of Archduke
John at Sacile eight days before, and had not an immediate
concentration of the various Austrian armies
become essential for the defence of Vienna the consequences
must have been serious.
Marshal Macdonald points out in his “Recollections”
that a defeat in Italy was of secondary importance;
the decisive point was Germany. There is, however,
a moral point of view to be taken into consideration
in warfare, to which he also draws attention. “It
might have a bad effect,” he says, “upon the Italian
mind, already prejudiced against us, kept under as
they were, but not conquered; and upon that of the
Germans and their armies, although they had been
so often beaten, and their territory so often invaded
by us. But they were like the teeth of Cadmus; no
sooner was one army destroyed than another came to
take its place. They seemed to rise out of the ground.”
Napoleon was aware that the Tyrolese had broken out
in revolt, and that similar movements were expected
in other places.
It is unnecessary to follow all the Emperor’s movements
on his march to the Imperial city. Bessières,
with comparatively few troops at his disposal, came
in conflict with a much larger force under Hiller, and
was repulsed. The Marshal somewhat retrieved this
mishap by crossing the Inn at Passau, where he took
several hundred prisoners. These “affairs” were but
skirmishes to the battle of Ebelsberg (sometimes spelt
Ebersberg) on the 3rd May 1809 between General
Hiller and the French vanguard under the impetuous
Masséna, at which Napoleon was not present. Hiller
had taken up his position at Ebelsberg, crossing the
long wooden bridge over the turbulent Traun, a tributary
of the Danube, to which admittance was only gained
by an extremely narrow gateway beneath a tower,
while the whole structure was at the mercy of the guns
in and near the castle on the heights above. For
purposes of defence the situation approached the ideal,
the only thing needed being a skilful commander. The
day proved that the Austrian general was lacking in
nearly all the qualities possessed by the French officers
who opposed him, and was unworthy the men who fought
in the ranks. A desperate struggle led by the fearless
Coehorn took place on the bridge; men were flung into
the surging waters below, while the Austrian artillerymen,
perhaps not knowing that many Austrians were
on the frail structure, fired at the combatants on the
bridge with disastrous results to their own side. To
make matters worse several ammunition waggons blew
up. It was a repetition of the scene on the Bridge of
Lodi, only the carnage was more terrible. Once across,
the castle became the next objective of the French,
but it was not captured until many a gallant soldier
had lost his life in a hand-to-hand struggle in the town
below. Hitherto only a comparatively small number
of Masséna’s troops had maintained the fight, but the
Marshal now hurried fresh men across the bridge to
support those engaged with the enemy. Gradually the
men fought their way to the castle, and Mr Petre tells
us that of one regiment which appeared before it,
Colonel Pouget, who commanded, alone escaped without
a wound.
“The entrance to the castle,” Mr Petre writes, “was
by a vaulted archway open at the outer end, but closed
by a strong wooden gate at the inner end. Above was
a window, closely barred with iron and with loopholes
on either side. From all of these there poured a heavy
fire, especially from the grated window. The losses
of the besiegers, as they stood and returned the fire
from the exposed space between the archway and the
mouth of the hollow road, were fearful. Men crowded
up to take part in the fight, which was directed by
Pouget from the angle of the archway, whence he could
both see his own men and the grated window. The
French infantry fired as quickly as they could; some
even used the dead bodies of their comrades to raise
them more on to a level with the window. Then Pouget
sent for a well-known sportsman, Lieutenant Guyot,
who, taking post within five yards of the window,
poured in shots as fast as loaded muskets could be handed
to him by the soldiers. Other picked marksmen joined
him, and, at last, the Austrian fire began to fail. Sappers
had now arrived and were at work breaking in the
thick gate.
“In the enthusiasm of the fight Colonel Baudinot
and Sub-Lieutenant Gérard of the 2nd battalion had
managed to get forward, though most of their battalion
was blocked in the narrow road behind. These two
intrepid men, followed by a few others as brave as
themselves, managed to find a way by the cellar ventilators,
whence they got into the castle. Between
Gérard and a grenadier of the garrison, who entered
a room on the first floor simultaneously, there was a
desperate encounter, which was not interfered with
by the entrance of a third visitor in the shape of an
Austrian round shot. Just at this moment the gate
was broken in, and the garrison, including, presumably,
Gérard’s grenadier, very soon surrendered as prisoners
of war.”
Surely no more thrilling adventure than this is to
be found in any story book? And yet it is but one
of many that might be related of this campaign alone,
could this volume be extended beyond the present
limits.
But the storming of the castle of Ebelsberg was not
yet over. The burning town had been cleared of the
Imperialists, who were now pouring a veritable hail of
shot on the besiegers from the surrounding heights,
and their situation was perilous in the extreme, cut off
as they were from their friends and surrounded only by
their foes. Why the Austrians should have begun to
retreat when such an opportunity was offered them to
annihilate the enemy is beyond comprehension. Such
was the case, and they hastened towards Enns,
leaving two thousand killed and wounded, and over
that number of prisoners. The French also lost very
heavily. Late in the afternoon Napoleon came up,
and in company with Savary, entered the town. He
was by no means pleased with the terrible sights which
met him on all sides, and bitterly lamented the heavy
losses which his troops had suffered. Savary states
that the Emperor remarked: “It were well if all
promoters of wars could behold such an appalling
picture. They would then discover how much evil
humanity has to suffer from their projects.” If he
did thus speak, it shows how blinded he had become by
his own egotism; for Napoleon had certainly forced
the war on unhappy Austria, now sorely discomfited
by the turn events had taken.