Country and People—The building up of the Bulgarian
State—Relations with Russia—German Influence—Alexander
of Battenberg—King Ferdinand—Bulgaria’s
Immediate Duty.
Although it is asserted on historical grounds
that the Bulgarians are a mixed race, and merely
“Slavicized” by the influence of neighbouring
Slav races, they certainly ought to be included
in the great Slav family. In many ways they
have always held aloof from the Slav Ideal, and
emphatically preferred to stand alone, but,
nevertheless, they have done great service to the
Slav cause in the past, and often fought for it
with true enthusiasm. In the early days of
Christianity the Bulgarians also did much for
Slav culture through the Bogumili—(a sect of
reformers which will be dealt with in the Chapter
on the Southern Slavs)—who spread religious
enlightenment, and through the old Bulgarian
tongue laid the foundation of the other Slav
languages. The Bulgarians, who were once
masters of a great Empire, and enjoyed worldwide
importance under Simeon the Great, had78
to share the age-long tragedy of all the Eastern
Slavs, and it speaks volumes for their national
character that they emerged from Turkish
bondage as a strong, self-reliant people. Whoever
knows the Bulgarians well, cannot fail to
respect them, even if they do not inspire great
affection. I believe as a race they are not affectionate—they
prefer to command respect. The
gentle, dreamy, love-craving element in the
character of the other Slavs is quite absent in
them, and even their fire and enthusiasm is not
a matter of sentiment, but a practical necessity—almost
a matter of mathematical calculation.
Industrious and thrifty as no other Slav nation,
cold-blooded and calculating, they have justly
been called the “Slav Japanese.” Their type
is very interesting and differs considerably from
that of the other Slavs. Almost without exception
the men are handsome and strongly built,
whereas the appearance of the women is spoilt
by their wide cheek-bones and thick-set build.
Like most of the Slav peoples they are mainly
farmers and cattle-breeders, and as the country
is fertile, they make quite a good income out of
their exports of grain, field-produce and cattle.
Although Bulgarian intellectual life springs
from the people, and the Bulgarians are essentially
a democratic nation, it is necessary to
distinguish between the educated classes and the
common people. The Bulgarian peasant is an
exceedingly good fellow; physically very active,
mentally rather stolid, he pursues his calling in
a calm deliberate way, and is not easily ruffled.
His food is most simple; he takes practically no
alcohol and, owing to his temperate mode of life,
lives to a very great age. The entire population
numbers about four millions and shows a greater
percentage of centenarians than any other nation.
The Bulgarians are very fond of music and
dancing, but they have no music or poetry of
their own, and what they do possess has been
borrowed from the Turks or other Orientals.
The traveller may often come upon the genuine
Nautch dance in a Bulgarian village, and will hear
songs sung to purely Turkish melodies. If the
Bulgarians have any advantage over the other
Slavs, it is in the beauty of their unadulterated
Orthodox faith. The people are narrowly
religious, and up to now their religion represents
the zenith of their culture. In this respect they
resemble the Russians and all the Slavs who
have retained the Slavo-Orthodox faith. It is
superfluous to enlarge on the fighting qualities
of the Bulgarians—Kirkilisse, Lule Burgas, and
Adrianople have given ample proof of these.
The educated classes are distinct from the
people in two ways: they are free-thinkers and
quarrelsome. Religion is cultivated among them
as a fashion, and the churches have become mere
rendezvous, as in Paris, Berlin and Vienna. But,
in spite of all this, one must admit that the
educated classes of Bulgaria are excellent social
organizers, though politically and intellectually
they are not particularly brilliant. The amount
achieved in social matters by these men in the
short time that has elapsed since the emancipation
is marvellous. Bulgaria in this respect has
become a truly modern state. This bright side
is, however, eclipsed by the countless blunders
they have committed in other respects. The
worst of these is their headstrong blindness in
the political administration. Bulgarian politics
have degenerated into a devastating party-system,
and are largely responsible for the tragical happenings
of recent years, in which the whole
country, and more especially the innocent mass
of the people have been involved. The chief
characteristic of the educated Bulgarian is his
distrust of everyone; he does not confine this
distrust to strangers, but extends it even to his
King and his own party leader.
Hitherto intellectual Bulgaria has created but
little, and that little is quite out of proportion
to the achievements of some other much smaller
Slav nations. Bulgarian art and literature are
merely poor reproductions of foreign originals
and by no means express the strength and
vitality of the people. Of all their poets Ivan
Vasoff, Hristoff, and Aleko Konstantinoff alone
have understood anything of the soul of the people,
and only their work will live. In art we seek in
vain for anything purely Bulgarian. But there
is one thing of the greatest value that the educated
Bulgarians have done for their nation, and for this
they deserve a true crown of laurels. I am referring
to the organization of the Macedonian bands
during the last half-century. Their perseverance
and heroism call for the greatest admiration.
The country owned by the Bulgarians is one
of the most beautiful inhabited by Slavs. Only
Dalmatia and Bosnia can compare with it, and
whoever has once been there will never forget
it. It is the land of the great Balkans in all
their wild beauty—the land of the Kazanlik
Valley with its vast glorious rose-fields; the
Vratza Gorge with its romantic cliffs, dark
primeval forests, and hills covered with lilac; the
Black Sea, and the beautiful shores of Varna
and Burgas, and above all tower the snow-capped
summits of the Vitosha. Everywhere,
and in everything, dwells a throbbing life, full of
variety and contrast, beautiful as the men of
Bulgaria and rugged as their women.
******
Bulgaria was freed from the Turkish yoke in
1878. The work of emancipation was carried
out by Russia with the help of Bulgarian bands
and many volunteers from all the Slav countries.
By the peace of San Stefano Bulgaria was
de jure declared mistress of the entire territories
from the Black Sea to Silistria, and along the
Danube as far as Vidin in the north, from Vidin
along the Morava via Ochrida as far as Yanina
in the west, from Yanina via Salonika to Kavala
in the south, and in a straight line from Kavala
to Varna in the east. De facto she was only
given independent jurisdiction over such territories
as she possessed up to the first Balkan
war. The complete liberation of Bulgaria was
by no means achieved by the emancipation, and
she continued to remain under Turkish suzerainty.
The first task after the emancipation was to
reconstruct the country on the lines of a modern
European state, and to infuse new life into it
after so many centuries of Turkish misrule.
Education was represented solely by the priests
and the schoolmasters, who had laboured for
the enlightenment of the people even before the
emancipation. Of course, there were a few
Bulgarians who possessed a European education,
and had graduated at European universities,
and upon these devolved the task of solving
the problems of the newly-created state. There
were however so few of them that, at the beginning,
many men of culture were imported from
other Slav countries, chiefly from Russia, Croatia
and Bohemia. The military administration was
entrusted to Russia, who established garrisons
of her own in Bulgaria and undertook to create
the Bulgarian army. Considering the transitionary
stage of the country at the time, it
was inevitable that the Russian military authorities
should obtain considerable influence over the
civil administration also, and that Bulgarian
affairs fell under Russian influence from the
very beginning.
Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the first
Bulgarian ruler, came to the throne under
similar conditions as King Carol to the throne
of Roumania. He was confronted with a super-human
task, and Bulgarian history can never
deny the great service he rendered the country.
He came with a definite mission and set to work
with the greatest possible zeal. He devoted
his attention chiefly to the education of the
people and to the army, and he found his most
energetic ally in the people themselves. The
prompt efficiency of the school system would
have done credit to many a more modern state.
The Bulgarians are intelligent, persevering, and
fond of learning, and popular education made
immense strides. At the present day the percentage
of adult Bulgarians who cannot read
and write is exceedingly small compared to most
other countries—it is 2-1/2 per cent. of the adult
population. The national system of compulsory
education affected the very poorest peasants as
well as the better classes. Before the foundation
of secondary schools in the country large numbers
of young men were sent to foreign secondary
schools and universities, and every year yielded
its quota of well-equipped youths capable of
providing the motive power for the machinery
of the State. Similar purposeful energy
characterized the military organization, with the
intention of forming an independent, purely
Bulgarian army. For, in spite of his great
admiration for Russia and the Tsar Liberator,
Prince Alexander felt that dependence upon
Russia—more especially a military dependence—would
render his country a vassal de facto of
Russia, no less than it was de jure already the
vassal of Turkey. He therefore strove to render
the Russian military administration superfluous
in Bulgaria by building up an efficient home army.
As soon as this was accomplished he sent a
letter of thanks to the Tsar, made a public
manifesto, gave a big dinner to the Russian
generals, and gratefully dismissed the Russian
co-operation. Then the Russian generals had to
leave Bulgaria. No one can deny that Prince
Alexander showed himself manly and self-reliant
in taking this decision, which was prompted by
a very proper ambition. But he gave mortal
offence in Russia, and from that moment he
fell completely from Russian favour. The Court
circles in St. Petersburg, which had been hostile
to him from the beginning, now began to intrigue
against him in Bulgaria, their efforts finding
a ready response in the pro-Russian party.
The first Serbian War in 1885 afforded splendid
proof of Alexander’s military organization, but
his influence was too far undermined, and even
his victories failed to save him. The tide of
adverse circumstances was too strong and led
to the inevitable but, fortunately, bloodless
coup d’état in 1886. Prince Alexander was taken
from his palace by night, transported over the
frontier and formally deposed.
Prince Alexander left Bulgaria a well-organized
State, only disturbed by internal party hatreds.
The new ruler, Prince Ferdinand of Coburg,
was received with divided sympathies. Already
in many ways his path had been smoothed
for him, but he met with far more opposition
from his own people than his predecessor, whom
Russia had installed. In spite of all this, the
machinery of State continued in the path of progress,
the constitution of the country was established
on a broad liberal basis, and the army
increased in importance from year to year.
With iron perseverance Bulgaria steadily advanced
to take her place among modern states,
and even succeeded in taking the lead in the
Balkan question. The proclamation of Ferdinand
as King of Bulgaria put an end once and for
all to the shadow of Turkish suzerainty, and since
then Bulgaria has been frankly acknowledged
as a strong, free and independent State.
******
In the course of years Bulgarian relations
with Russia have passed through many phases,
especially during the reign of King Ferdinand.
As a rule the will of Russia was decisive, but
her general influence always depended on home
politics and varied with the party in power.
Enthusiasm for Russia and antagonism against
Russian influence were alternately the order of
the day. Only the people of Bulgaria remained
constant in their confidence and affection for
Russia; they could never forget whose hand had
set them free, and even political changes could
not shake them. Certain political circles took
the emancipation from Russia as their party
cry and hoped to make the country great outside
the Russian protectorate. They desired to translate
their motto “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians”
into an absolute fact. This party was founded
by the notorious Stambuloff, and whenever
they came into power they insisted on regarding
not only Russia as the national enemy, but
also the Bulgarian people who were in sympathy
with Russia, and they did their utmost to
tyrannize the people out of this “disease.”
In fighting for this idea they coined the party
catchword—“Greater Bulgaria” in the hope
of bribing the people by promises of Macedonia,
Serbia, Greece, and even Constantinople as
future tit-bits. This particular party knew very
well that Russia would never allow the Slav
equilibrium in the Balkans to be upset, and, as it
was not over Slavonic in its sympathies, it waged
a bitter opposition against the Russian protectorate,
under which all the Balkan Slav
nations stand to benefit equally. In opposition
to Stambuloff’s party there arose another, founded
by Karaveloff, the greatest of Bulgarian patriots,
who fought with all the enthusiasm of which
grateful hearts are capable. Karaveloff saw
clearly that Bulgaria would be too weak to
stand alone for a very long time to come, and that
the Russian protectorate was a strong guarantee
against foreign hostile influence. After Karaveloff’s
death his ideas found enthusiastic partisans
in Czankoff, Radoslavoff and Daneff in spite of
minor tactical party differences. Stambuloff’s
violent death—he was assassinated in the open
street—put an end to the régime of his party for
many years, and brought the moderate pro-Russian
parties into power. But Bulgaria was
deeply injured by his policy. He bequeathed a
legacy of discord and hatred at home and provoked
Russia’s displeasure abroad. The new
pro-Russian Government did its utmost to heal
the breach, and succeeded in improving relations
with Russia, but Stambuloff’s partisans agitated
in every possible way for the re-instatement of
the radical anti-Russian party. In Dushan
Petkoff and Evlogij Genadieff they had energetic
leaders, who pursued their goal with all the
characteristic Bulgarian tenacity and a ruthless
persistence that was positively Asiatic. After
Ferdinand had established a personal régime in
Bulgaria, they realized that the turn of fortune’s
wheel no longer depended on the temper of the
nation or the strength of a party, but on the will
of the ruler, and they were content to bide their
time. Among the people they had no following
whatsoever. But whichever party is in power
by the will of the ruler is assured of a majority
in the Parliament. Elections are invariably
manipulated by terroristic pressure from the
authorities. There is no difference except that,
whereas the pro-Russian parties are content to
employ demagogic means, the Stambulovists
have had recourse to bloodshed. At last the
Stambulovists were successful; they came into
power in 1902—(in accordance with the wish
of the highest power in the land)—and established
a reign of terror equal to that of Stambuloff
himself in its cruelty, but breaking all
previous records as regards corruption. The
Stambulovists commanded a crushing majority
in the Sobranye (Parliament) and pursued a
policy of secret provocations against Russia
and the nation. General Ratsho Petroff, a
personal favourite of King Ferdinand and an
absolute nonentity, was the Premier; but the
actual dictator and leader of the Stambulovist
party was Dushan Petkoff, Minister of the
Interior. Once more the policy of the Government
took an anti-Russian trend, but in the
meantime the nation had developed and steadfastly
pursued a different policy. To be sure,
under compulsion they had given the Government
a majority but not their heart, and this heart
now belonged to Russia more than ever. This
sentiment found expression in various violent
demonstrations; it culminated in the assassination
of Petkoff (likewise in the open street)
and in the abuse showered upon King Ferdinand
as he drove to the opening of the National
Theatre at Sofia. From that point Bulgarian
policy took a totally new turn, and for a time
it seemed as if the Slav renaissance had really
taken root and Bulgaria had at last found
herself. The Balkan Alliance before the war
certainly seemed strong evidence of it.
******
Bulgaria’s relations with Serbia have varied
quite as much as those with Russia, but with the
difference that in these ups and downs the nation
has always been undivided. Bulgarian distrust
of Serbia dates from the beginning of the
political independence of the former. Instead
of trying to settle their differences in a brotherly
spirit, and to eliminate the Macedonian bone of
contention by fixing the spheres of interests,
both parties—especially Bulgaria—worked themselves
up into a fever of enmity which could
only be mutually detrimental. Actual frontier
collisions added fuel to the fire, and the situation
grew steadily worse. It is safe to say that there
was never any love lost between the Serbs and
the Bulgarians, even if political opportunism at
times dictated a more friendly attitude. Many
discerning Bulgarian politicians have often tried
to promote a more cordial and neighbourly
understanding between the two states for the
sake of the Slav cause and the common good,
and their Serbian colleagues loyally supported
them in this. But their work was always undone
by the distrustful attitude of Bulgaria, which
was even increased by foreign influence. In
1885 the nation entered into the war with Serbia
with unanimous enthusiasm and a bloodthirsty
spite almost inconceivable between brother
nations. The war was fierce, and fate favoured
Bulgaria; but, instead of being content with
their success, and exhibiting a victor’s finest
quality—humanity, the Bulgarians only grew
increasingly bitter in their hatred towards Serbia,
and showed it in offensive taunts. After their
defeat the Serbs obviously could not feel very
friendly towards their neighbours, but I do not
believe they hated them in their souls. But
from one cause or another it was impossible to
find the way to friendship. The Bulgarians
declared that their differences with Serbia were
by no means settled in this war, and that the
Macedonian question would have to be decided
beyond dispute. Thus the war was continued,
unfortunately not only with the pen, but also
with arms, for the Serbian and Bulgarian bands
in Macedonia waged war upon each other more
fiercely than upon the Turks. Matters went
from bad to worse for both nations, and especially
for the Slav cause in the Balkans. Russia
exerted all her influence to reconcile the two, but
with no result beyond promises of amendment.
Several influential Slav personages were equally
unsuccessful until the youth of the Southern
Slavs entered the lists with a new plan of campaign,
and attacked the problem from the standpoint
of Southern Slav Culture. The authors
and artists of Croatia and Slavonia, who had
long stood in friendly relations with Serbia, made
it their business to include the Bulgarians in the
cause of Southern Slav Culture. As the intellectual
youth of Bulgaria was at that time passing
through a phase of national regeneration and
desired to widen their horizon, these efforts
fell on fruitful soil. Soon afterwards joint
exhibitions of Southern Slav artists were arranged
in Belgrade, Sofia, and Zagreb, and in
each case an Authors’ Congress was held simultaneously.
By these meetings and mutual intercourse
many sharp corners were smoothed away,
and many points of difference were abolished,
chiefly by the help of the Croats. Serbs and
Bulgarians meeting eye to eye at last realized
that they were brothers, sharing a common
future. The Exhibition in Belgrade coincided
with the coronation of King Peter, and we witnessed
the unexpected spectacle of Bulgarians
acclaiming the King with as much enthusiasm
as the Serbs. Those were the days of brotherhood
and fellowship. The representatives of
Bulgarian art and literature took their mission
seriously and sincerely, proving true apostles
of peace and friendship between the two peoples.
They reaped considerable success, for the tide
of mutual enmity subsided, and when King Peter
came to Sofia on an official visit he met with a
reception that expressed not merely the pomp
and circumstance of a Court but the heartfelt
cordiality of a friendly people. It must not be
forgotten that in this rapprochement good service
was rendered by those politicians of both countries
who persistently did their best to improve
mutual relations. Chief among these is the
Serbian statesman, Nikola Pašić. He cultivated
this mutual friendship so successfully that it
culminated in the Balkan Alliance, which would
have proved a lasting blessing to the whole of the
Balkans if it had not been broken by the attack
of Bregalnica. Yet the collapse of the Alliance
was not due to Bulgaria, but to other extraneous
influences.
******
I have briefly touched upon Bulgarian relations
with Russia and Serbia in order to give a brief
sketch of the only too frequent mistakes made
by Bulgaria’s official Government. The Bulgarians
possess many excellent qualities, and, as
a nation, have a distinct claim on our respect;
but they have one drawback: they are not
independent in politics, and their policy is not
the outcome of the requirements of the times,—as
a rule it is not even suited to them, but is
merely the mouthpiece of foreign influences.
Whenever these influences were Russian they at
least did not clash with the interests of the
people or do any particular harm. But, unfortunately,
Bulgarian policy has to a great extent
followed in Germany’s footsteps, and for a long
time German influence—especially in recent
years—has made alarming progress in Bulgaria.
The first to fall a victim to this influence were
Stambuloff and his followers who had made so
free with the motto “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians.”
And, in proportion to the vehemence
with which they pursued their corrupt policy,
they imported the German element into Bulgaria.
Intellectually it would be quite impossible to
Germanize the Bulgarians, but, as regards their
political economy and foreign policy they fell
more and more under German ascendancy.
The Eastern expansive policy of Germany and
Austria-Hungary, finding the doors fast closed in
Serbia, was content for the moment to ignore an
obdurate opponent, and insinuated itself into
Bulgaria as being free from the infection of
“fantastic Slav ideals.” In King Ferdinand, as
a German prince, German propaganda found a
distinct well-wisher. The Bulgarian stock market
was controlled by German trade, Austria-Hungary
and Germany founded branch banks and business
houses in Bulgaria. German and Austrian Ambassadors
could always command the ear of the
Foreign Office. And Germany bestowed her
favour or disfavour in proportion to the pro-German
or pro-Russian sympathies of the Government.
In face of this tide of Germanism all
honest Bulgarian politicians are confronted with
a herculean task, if the country is to be saved
from becoming simply a vassal state to Germany.
In the events which preceded the second Balkan
War their labours appeared to have borne fruit,
and Germany and Austria were suddenly confronted
with a fact they had never even contemplated—an
alliance between Bulgarians and the
detested Serbs, and even a military convention
between these two against Austria. But their
amazement was only a thing of the moment—German
influence redoubled its efforts, and the
second Balkan War was due to its machinations.
******
Bulgaria’s defeat in the second Balkan War
has filled the nation with a burning, unquenchable
hatred against Serbia. The realization of their
Macedonian ambition, which had been almost
within their grasp, had vanished in a bitter
disappointment and plunged the heroic victors
of Kirkilisse into an agony of sullen despair.
When the first stupefying shock was over, the
thought of revenge came uppermost, and everyone
foresaw that at the next opportunity the
brother nations would again fly at each other’s
throats.
It would be unreasonable to deny the Bulgarian
claim to part of Macedonia. If a great
national problem is to be permanently and satisfactorily
solved, the principal of nationality
cannot be ignored. But Bulgaria exceeded the
principles of nationality in her demands and
aimed at a position of supremacy in the Balkans.
By her acquisition of Thrace it became necessary
to revise the stipulations of the Alliance Treaty,
and, if the Allies could have arrived at any conclusion,
or accepted the arbitration of the Tsar,
to-day the position of the Balkans in the present
crisis would be more favourable.
The Bulgarian nation cannot be held responsible
for the crime of Bregalnica. It merely
played a passive part. The official perpetrator,
supposed to have remained undiscovered to this
day, was guided not by the will of the nation,
but by orders from Vienna and Berlin, who
desired to be revenged for the affront they had
suffered through the Balkan Alliance. Nothing
short of a despicably devastating blow aimed
at all the Balkan States would suffice, and unfortunately
they found a ready tool in the wild
ambitions of certain Bulgarian circles. Of course,
the blow was aimed at the detested Serbians,
but with the relentlessness of fate it fell upon
those who had hoped to profit by the Austro-German
intrigue. Though Bulgaria alone suffered
material loss through the war, the whole of the
Balkan States have suffered morally. For their
deadly enemy achieved his main object—the
breaking up of the Balkan union. Such was
the lamentable state of affairs in the Balkans
when the present European crisis came to a head.
The Austrian declaration of war upon Serbia
caused a positively insane joy in Bulgaria. It
was balm to the Bulgarian wounds that the great
monarchy should devour their small neighbor—their
brother nation—and not one of the heroes
who had helped in the conquest of Adrianople
be left alive! All this time they overlooked the
fact that, when Serbia had been disposed of, their
own country would have been the next dish
in the menu! It was a sordid triumph, neither
manly, nor Slav.
In their satisfaction they even forgot Russia.
No one dreamt that Russia would raise her mighty
hand and cry Halt! to the Austrian devourer.
But when the inevitable occurred, Bulgaria
suddenly found herself face to face with a problem.
Russia’s word—“Serbia’s enemies are my
enemies”—staggered the honest Bulgarian people,
who are attached to Russia, and they began
to ask themselves very seriously, “What next?”
The first upshot of this was the perceptible
cooling of the anti-Slav agitation; then the
nation began to reflect. The people and the
patriotic Slavophile circles sent their best wishes,
and their finest General—Ratko Dimitrieff—to
fight for Russia, and the official Government
proclaimed a strict neutrality. Both these facts
bode well for the future. But the anti-Slav
agitation has by no means lost all its power,
and the Stambulovist circles, in conjunction
with Austro-German emissaries, have not ceased
to stir up the people and the masses against
Serbia and against Russia. Which will prevail?
It is difficult to make any forecast,
especially if one remembers the personal régime
of King Ferdinand, who, in spite of the constitution
of the country, reigns supreme. At the
same time it would be wrong to lose hope and
we must trust that in the decisive hour the Slav
instinct will dominate all other instincts, and
thus not only assist the Slav cause, but also prove
of the greatest service to civilized Europe, and
above all things to Bulgaria herself.
Among Bulgarian authors we must also mention Pencho
Slavejkoff (a native of Macedonia), some of whose work has
been rendered into English.
I. Serbian Self-reliance—Characteristics of the Serb
People—The Power of the Folk-song—Race
Consciousness.
II. History of the Southern Slavs.
III. The Birth of a Nation—Prince Miloš—“The
Great Sower”—Alexander Karagjorgjević—Michael
Obrenović—King Milan—Fall of the
Obrenović Dynasty—King Peter—The Restoration
of Serbia’s Prestige.
IV. Serbia and Austria—A Campaign of Calumny—Annexation
of Bosnia-Hercegovina—The Balkan
Wars—Serbia rehabilitated—The Tragedy of
Serajevo.
The free and independent kingdom of Serbia is
undoubtedly the most important of the Southern
Slav States, although she has only three and a
half million inhabitants, and is shut in on all
sides by her six neighbours—Austria-Hungary,
Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Montenegro.
In 1817 she was freed from the Turkish
yoke, and in less than 100 years she has developed
into a sturdy, self-reliant state, efficient in an
intellectual, economic and military sense in99
spite of constant upheavals at home and abroad.
For all she is and has achieved Serbia is indebted
only to herself, to the capabilities, valour and
perseverance of her own children. Russia was
her only foreign protector. The Serb is a straight-dealing,
industrious man, and, like all the Southern
Slavs, essentially poetic. Judged by the standard
of modern school education the average Serbian
peasant is perhaps not so very far advanced, and
usually limits his accomplishments to reading
and writing; but he is keenly observant, and
his natural gifts and mother-wit are so great as
to warrant a very different forecast for his
future than exponents of German “Kultur”
have so far predicted. Like the Russian and the
Croat, the Serb is above all things a farmer, who
loves his bit of black earth, and cultivates it
with care; and from this love of the soil spring
his pleasures, his shrewd philosophy, his large
charity towards man and beast, and, above all,
his love of truth and justice. Shall not all the
world be just, even as the earth is just when
she bestows or withholds her gifts? From time
immemorial the Serb has had a great feeling for
family ties and the bond of the community.
The love he bears his own homestead he extends
to that of his neighbour, and then in a wider
sense to his whole country. Where his love of
country is concerned, political and economic
considerations take a second place. The Serb
loves his country as a bridegroom his bride—100passionately,
often unreasonably, but never with
calculation. He desires his beloved land for
himself—to keep it untouched by strangers. In
spite of considerable business capacity he is not
aggressive, and does not covet his neighbour’s
possessions. But, should his neighbour dare to
move his fence even one inch over the boundary,
or purposely let his cattle stray into his meadow,
then the Serb becomes fierce, wrathful and unforgiving.
The Serbian farmer has no need to
study history in order to learn where his neighbours
have removed his landmarks. His history
lives in his songs and ballads, and goes back a
thousand years. These poems tell him everything.
Every one of his beautiful folk-songs is a
piece of history, a bit of the past; and they sink
deeper into his heart than any historical education.
The dates of his power, past splendour and decline
are meaningless to him; but the sad, deeply-moving
legends in his folk-songs, telling of his
triumphs and his tragedies, plaintively thrilling
with love of country, and his tempestuous ballads
of heroism and revenge—these have fostered his
sense of patriotism, his yearning for his downtrodden
brothers, and his thirst for retribution.
These folk-songs have been handed down from
one generation to another, and to this day they
have been preserved in all their pristine purity of
text and melody in the souls and memories of
the Serbian people. It is not necessary at a time
of foreign menace to appeal to the Serb people101
with elaborately-worded proclamations and inflammatory
speeches. The refrains of their songs
suffice, and they take up arms as one man. But
the cause must be in harmony with the traditions
of the past. They fight like lions when they go
to battle with their ancient songs upon their
lips. Thus did they war with the Turks—thus
they are warring now against Austria.
To the Serb the love of his language is second
only to his love of country. The most beautiful
and melodious of all the Slav tongues,8 rich in
idiom and soft in modulation, it is specially fitted
to be the medium of folk-poesy. This language,
which is identical with that of the Croats (thence
the name Serbo-Croat tongue), has been the
sacred and abiding link between the Serbs and
their still enslaved brothers in Turkey and in
Austria. The Serbian peasant is in the habit of
calling every one who speaks to him in a foreign
language a “Schwabo”;9 but should the stranger
address him in Serbian, or, indeed, in any of the
Slav tongues, he will say: “Pa ti si naš” (Thou
art one of us). Undoubtedly, apart from their
national music, this bond of union has been one
of the strongest factors in the preparation of the
future, for through it the Serb can freely communicate
with his brothers beyond the frontier.
Those dear familiar sounds tell him that his
brothers still live and share his speech, his songs
and his yearnings. This explains the unanimous
enthusiasm of the whole nation in the Balkan
War, as well as in the present second war of
liberation. They are not the soldiers of the
king who have gone to war, but the soldiers of
an ideal. The miracles of valour these men
have performed are not the exploits of a war-machine,
but of a great heart, in which hundreds
of thousands of hearts beat as one.
Many people, and especially Germans, have
said that the Serbs are dirty, lazy and dull. As
regards the last of these accusations I am
ready to admit that such Germans as have come
in contact with the people may be excused for
this impression. The Serbian peasant regards
the “Schwabo” with extreme distrust. His
natural shrewdness teaches him the wisdom of
appearing as dull as possible before the unscrupulous
exploiter he knows so well. It would
be no advantage to him to inspire confidence in
that quarter, and, as a matter of fact, the Serbian
peasant has often got the better of the apostles
of “Kultur” by this little deception. English
and French travellers, who have had dealings
with the Serbs, have spoken of them in most
flattering terms. As regards the other two
indictments, they are only absurd. The Serbian
peasant works very hard indeed. If we consider
the results of his labours, which can be gauged
by the considerable export of farm-produce and
cattle, and remember that in so poor a country
as Serbia the farmer has not all the latest agricultural
improvements at his disposal, it becomes
obvious that he has achieved marvels by the
industry of his bare hands. The dirt commented
upon by his critics is nothing more than the
honest dirt of the soil on his hands and clothes;
but if the immaculate “Michels” had taken the
trouble to glance round his house they could not
have failed to notice that in cleanliness and
neatness most Serbian farm-houses compare very
well with the average farm-house of Western
Europe. A guest of gentle birth receiving hospitality
in a Serbian farm-house will certainly
find nothing to complain of in the way in
which he is fed and accommodated, and
his wants considered. Of course there are
cases of dirt and idleness in Serbia, but then
where shall we find a country quite free from
these...?
A prominent characteristic of the Serb is his
race-consciousness. Russians, Poles, Csechs, and
Bulgars are Russians, etc., first and only Slavs
in a general sense. But the Serbs and Croats
are as much Slavs as they are Serbs and Croats.
Possibly this has not always been so. Perhaps,
from being more oppressed and beset by foes
than any of the other Slavs, these nations have
come to look upon their sense of race as a sheet-anchor
to which they clung, at first with hope,
and then with heart-felt love. To a Russian,
Slavdom is the symbol of his protectorate, but
to a Serbo-Croat it is the breath of life.
******
10
In prehistoric times, the south-eastern tracts
of the Balkan Peninsula were inhabited by
Armenians, who were eventually compelled to
retreat to Asia Minor, about 700 B.C. The
next inhabitants were the Phrygians, who possessed
a well-developed civilization, and penetrated
very far westward; but with the invasion
of the Thracians from the north, the Phrygians
were likewise forced to migrate to Asia Minor
and only a few scattered groups were left between
the Danube and the Balkan Mountains, where
they remained until the Roman invasion. Unlike
the above-mentioned Semitic races, the Pelasgians
and Lepese, who formed the aboriginal population
of Greece, were of pure Indo-European
stock. They were eventually conquered by the
Hellenes, and the illustrious Greek nation sprang
from the intermingling of these three tribes.
The dawn of history shows the great Peninsula
of Eastern Europe divided between three tribes.
The Greeks dwelt south of Heliakmon and
Olympus, the Thracians west of the Tekton
valley in the eastern portion of the Peninsula,
and the Illyrians west of the Pindus. Their
territory extended north as far as the site of
modern Vienna, and south to the Gulf of Corinth.
Of these three peoples the Greeks alone attained
to a high degree of civilization and culture.
They founded several colonies on the narrow
coast-line of Macedonia, but the greater part of
the Peninsula to the west of the Vardar remained
Illyrian, and, to the east of the Vardar,
Thracian. Only the wealthier classes and the
royal family from which Alexander the Great
traced his descent migrated into these countries
from Grecian Thessaly in search of conquest.
The Roman invasion was followed by considerable
colonial development. Under the
sound administrative policy of the Romans a
certain level of civilization penetrated to the
greater part of the Peninsula, and a Latinized
dialect became the general language. The
Thracians very speedily became Romanized, as
did most of the Illyrians; the Hellenes alone
retained their national distinction. The Illyrians
eventually disappeared from Macedonia; but
their kindred tribe, the Albanians (Skipetars,
Arnauts) remain there to this day, although they
show a strong admixture of ancient Roman and
Slav blood. The Roumanians are the product of
a lingual and racial mixture of Thracian, Roman
and Slav elements.
The Great Migration broke up the Roman
Empire (476 A.D.) and Europe was re-distributed—the
resulting racial boundaries having for the
most part persisted to this day. The Germanic
tribes set their mark on the North and West,
and the Slavs on the East of Europe. In 525 A.D.
the Slavs under the name of “Εκλανεοι” are
mentioned as dwelling on the lower Danube.
From that time, and for a century, they waged
fierce warfare against the Eastern Empire, until
the latter became exhausted, and the Balkan
Peninsula was left open to the invaders from
the north.
In the first half of the seventh century, during
the reigns of the Emperors Phokas (602-610) and
Heraklies (610-642) the Slav hordes over-ran
the countries of the upper and lower Danube
like a flood from Venice to Constantinople,
sweeping southward as far as Cape Matapan.
The aboriginal inhabitants fled before them
and took refuge in mountain fastnesses, islands,
and walled towns. Christianity eventually tamed
these wild hordes, and peaceful intercourse was
once more established. Constantinople, Adrianople,
Seres, Salonika, Larissa and Patras were
the centres whence the light of Christendom
and Greek culture penetrated to the Slavs.
Who and what manner of people were the
Slavs? The Roman historian Jordanis (551 A.D.)
already distinguishes the “Sloveni,” as he calls
them, from the rest of the Slavs, whom he calls
“Veniti.” He speaks of an innumerable Slav
people (“Venetharum natio populosa”) divided
into many tribes, of which the chief were the
“Russi,” (“Anti”) between the Dniestr and
Dniepr, and the “Sloveni” on the lower
Danube. It is true that a number of different
tribes were included under this name, just as
to-day it is used to designate the whole Slav
race (“Slavyane” in Russian, “Slovane” in
Csech). Strictly speaking only the Southern
Slavs have a right to this name, and until well
into the nineteenth century they styled themselves
“Sloveni” in addition to their local
appellations of Croat, Serb, Bulgar, etc. With
the formation of local states, the local names
came more into use, but in literature and folk-poesy
the name “Sloveni” is invariably adopted.
As a matter of fact, the local names arose from
the political and historical distribution of the
race.
The geographical position of the Balkan
Peninsula, as well as the two currents of civilization
which flowed in upon the Southern Slavs
from either side, prevented the formation of a
United Southern Slav State. They split up into
several lesser states, which soon lost their
freedom, and submitted to foreign rule. Carniola
was the first to fall a victim, for she passed
under German rule as early as the eighth century.
Towards the end of the seventh century the
Finnish tribe of the Bulgars conquered the Slav
tribes north and south of the Balkan range and
incidentally adopted the Slav language as their
own. They merely retained their original name,
and their distinctive, coldly methodical genius for
organization—a racial characteristic which is
totally absent in the other Southern Slavs.
In a short time the Bulgars also conquered the
Slav tribes in Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly,
and subjugated the whole country as far as the
Morava. In the ninth century the Bulgarian
Empire reached from the Carpathians in Hungary
to the Pannonian Valley, and, as a matter of
fact, Budapest, the capital of Hungary, was
founded by the Bulgars. The Bulgarian Tsar
Boris was baptized by the apostles Cyril and
Method, who also introduced the Slav liturgy in
Bulgaria. The Slav dialect spoken between
Constantinople and Salonika was adopted as the
literary language, and the Glagolitza (Glagolithic
alphabet) and eventually the Cyrillitza (Cyrillic
alphabet) were introduced. This fact is of
world-wide importance, for on this foundation
rests the whole subsequent intellectual development
of Russia and the Balkan Peninsula—in
fact, of Eastern Europe. Under Simeon the
Great (893-927) Slav literature reached its zenith—its
golden age. The Moravian monks, who
were driven out by Svatopluk, found a hospitable
welcome in the monasteries around the Lake of
Ochrida, and developed great literary activity.
The Southern Slav monasteries sent monks and
books to Russia, and thus they became the first
instructors of their mighty brothers in the North.
Still later, the Macedonian Empire was founded
and the Emperor Samoilo resided in Ochrida.
He, however, was soon overthrown by the
Byzantine Emperor Basil II. in the Battle of
Belassitza (1018). But the Bulgarian Empire
recovered again under Tsar Ivan Asen II.
(1218-1271) and had reached the zenith of its
power when it was shattered for centuries by
the invading Turks (1391).
The central Southern Slav (Serbian) countries—Illyria,
Moesia, and Dalmatia—for a long time
remained broken up into separate counties.
Not before the twelfth century did Rasa become
the centre of a Serbian state, founded by Stefan
Nemanya (1165), to whom the Serbs owe the
famous Nemanya dynasty. After their victory
over the Byzantines at Kossovo the Serbs penetrated
further and further south towards Macedonia.
Under Dušan Silni (1331-1355) Serbian
power reached its meridian. He organized the
nation into a state and gave the people good
laws. In his time Serbia reached from the Save
and the Danube to the Gulf of Corinth, and from
the Adriatic to Mesta on the frontiers of Thrace
and Macedonia. After the battle of Belbushde
(1330) even the Bulgars had to acknowledge the
supremacy of Serbia. The Serbian Metropolitan
of Petcha was made Patriarch, the National Serb
Church was founded, and, in the Macedonian town
of Skoplye, Dušan Silni proclaimed himself Tsar
of the Serbs, Bulgars and Greeks. With an
army of 100,000 men he marched on Constantinople
in order to establish his throne there, and
to be revenged upon the Greeks who had a few
years previously called the Ottoman Turks to
Europe.11 But he died on the way,—it is said
that he was poisoned by a Greek.
Architectural and literary monuments from
the age of the Serbian rulers in the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries still clearly show traces
of the high degree of culture that had spread from
Byzantium, Venice and Florence. But these are
merely sparks which the Serbian discriminative
genius and natural ability would doubtless have
kindled into a bright flame had not the advent of
the Turks frustrated the great plans of Dušan
Silni. Constantinople would have remained in
the hands of a Christian people who love art
and progress. No other nation was so well
fitted as the Serbs to infuse new life into the
culture of the ancients. The presence of this
sane and strong young nation would have saved
the humanists their flight from Byzantium.
After the death of Dušan Silni the great
Serbian Empire crumbled into a large number
of small states, whose rulers played a dangerous
game, and intrigued one against the other,
whilst the Turks were conquering Thrace. The
Macedonian despots became vassals to the Turks,
and only a few countries like Zeta, Bosnia, and
the empire of Prince Lazar (the Serbia of to-day)
maintained their independence. So long as these
countries were free, the Ottoman invasion of
Europe was delayed, because in the Kossovo
polje (the field of Kossovo) Serbia held the key
of Europe. The Turks knew this and constantly
prepared their attacks accordingly. On Vidovdan
(St. Vitus Day, 1387) 100,000 Serbs and
300,000 Turks met in battle on the Kossovo.
The battle was fierce and the losses on both sides
were enormous. The Serbs lost their Prince
Lazar and all their nobility; the Turks the greater
part of their army and their Sultan Murat I.
In Europe the report spread that the Serbs had
been victorious; in Florence and Paris all the
bells were rung for joy, and a service of thanksgiving
was held in Notre Dame, which was
attended by Charles VI. with all his Court.
Murat’s successor, Bayazit did not penetrate
further; he permitted the Serbs to retain their
own laws, but they had to acknowledge him
as their suzerain. In 1459 Serbia was finally
crushed and fell completely under Turkish rule.
Soon after (1463) the same fate befell Bosnia and
Hercegovina. Only the mountain fastnesses of
Montenegro remained unconquered.
When Serbia began her life as an independent
State, she was still bleeding from the many
wounds inflicted upon her through centuries of
slavery, and first of all these wounds had to be
tended. The Serbian nation, intellectually and
economically bankrupt from long Turkish misrule,
was in the position of a merchant—an honest
fellow, but robbed to his last farthing, whose
ruined shop is being restored to him, and who is
expected to work up the old business to its
former prosperity out of these ruins. Years had
to elapse ere the people got accustomed to the
new order of things, and, out of the welter of
beginnings, found the way to sound civic development.
In those days Serbia fell a victim to
every political infantile disease, but on the other
hand she was inspired with a poetic, truly Slav
patriotism. Their golden freedom, which they
had so long yearned and fought for, and had now
at last won, affected the nation not as a political
event but as a great family festival, in which
all the members were united in love and joy.
They revelled in their new-found freedom; the
sordid considerations of the day were put off till
the morrow, or left to the care of a small body of
“cold-blooded” men. Civic law and order, and
regularity in the administration—unheard of
under Turkish rule—were first looked upon as
purely miraculous, and then tacitly accepted as
the inevitable consequences of freedom. The
idea of a free State is only of theoretical value to
the Serbs, the main thing for them is that they
should be a free people. As a free people they
followed their leaders—not as superiors, but as
children obey their fathers. With childlike simplicity
they gathered round their rural magistrate
to hear his instructions, and in the same spirit
they assembled under the ancient plane-tree in
the Topchider Park to hear Miloš, their first
Gospodar and Prince, dispense wise counsel and
even-handed justice. But in these council-meetings
between ruler and people was sown the
seed of the true constitution of the State, and,
like the empire of Dušan Silni in days gone by,
modern Serbia has grown up out of her own people.
And this is why Serbia is an eminently nationalistic
state, free and independent of foreign influence.
Perhaps in some ways this has been a drawback,
but it has also been a great source of strength to
Serbia. The intimate connection between the
reigning house and the people proved a bulwark
against foreign attempts at denationalization,
and gave Serbia the necessary strength to keep
herself free from Germany’s corroding influence
to this day.
In every way the patriarchal state of Prince
Miloš proved the best possible preparation for
Serbia’s political future. She matured slowly,
like an apple in the sun, and fortunately was not
compelled to ripen unnaturally. Moreover, the
inborn gifts of the Serbian people, which I have
already mentioned, proved a great help to this
process. They began to see that poetry has its
limitations, that a free people must become an
organized state, and that political order, though
it cannot be set in verse, is the only guarantee of
prosperity to the nation. Of course, legal decisions
and taxes were vexatious matters, but their good
effect on the community was recognized. The
law expressed the will of the people and was no
longer resented as an imposition.
It was fortunate for the young State that
Dositij Obradović, the greatest educational genius
of Serbia, had lived before this critical time. He
laid the foundations of a national educational
system—that most necessary discipline for a
young nation—and was beyond doubt one of the
greatest men the Southern Slavs have produced
in modern times. In Serbia he is called “the
great sower.” He truly sowed the seed of
enlightenment, not only in Serbia but wherever
Serbs and Croats live. Dositij Obradović has
not educated individuals, but whole generations,
and through them the entire nation. And if the
modern State is synonymous with civilization,
then Dositij Obradović was the true founder of
Serbia. He sowed the seed, all others have only
been reapers.
Prince Miloš, who abdicated in 1839, was
succeeded by his son Milan Obrenović II. He
died, however, within a month of his accession.
His successor and younger brother, Michael, was
soon involved in serious differences with the
Senate, and had to quit the country in 1842.
Serbia now elected Alexander Karagjorgjević,
son of the Black Kara-Gjorgje, who headed the
insurrection against Turkey in 1804. In spite of
his great gifts as a statesman, he failed to maintain
himself on the throne on account of his leanings
towards Austria. The nation, who instinctively
scented their ancient enemy, mistrusted him, and
matters finally came to a crisis in 1858. The
Serbian Skuptchina (Parliament) formally deposed
Alexander and again elected an Obrenović to
the throne of Serbia. This was Miloš Obrenović,
whose short reign was not remarkable for
any striking events. His son Michael succeeded
him in 1860.
Michael Obrenović was a brilliant, broad-minded,
noble-hearted man. He found the national
harvest already well grown, and courageously
continued the work of his early predecessors.
He thoroughly understood his people, with all
their gifts and limitations, and, above all, he
realized that the moment had arrived for Serbia
to become “westernized” without sacrificing
her national qualities. He “Europeanized” the
State and made it respected at home and abroad.
The educational system made great strides and
was modernized in his reign. The finances of the
country were placed on a sound basis, agriculture
was developed on modern, rational lines, and
industrial enterprise and foreign trade made
their first appearance. Under the strong guiding
hand of their prince, the organization of the army
kept pace with the economic development of the
nation. He initiated Serbian foreign policy12 and
was the best and wisest diplomat of his country.
His policy towards Russia resulted in the Russian
protectorate, which has proved so powerful to
this very day, but it also aroused the jealousy
of Austria. Above all things Michael Obrenović
was a Serb, and his Slav policy was not only
carried on in the interests of the nation, but
dictated by his heart. He evolved the idea of a
Serbia with a seaboard on the Ægean as well as
the Adriatic. He knew that the future of his
country will never be secure until all Serbs and
Croats are united, and the ways open which will
permit of a corresponding economic prosperity.
Serbia’s demand for a seaboard is not mere
aggression, but the recognition of a vital problem
which will be disposed of as soon as her minimum
requirements are satisfied.
Under the next Obrenović, the jovial Prince
Milan (subsequently King Milan), Serbian policy
occasionally deviated from the lines laid down
by Prince Michael. Unfortunately, the good
services which King Milan undoubtedly rendered
his country are overshadowed by his many
serious mistakes. At first his genial personality
and great popularity seemed to fit him very well
for the continuation and completion of the
work Prince Milan had begun. But apparently
his ambitions did not lie that way, for his reign
presents a long record of discord at home and
abroad. The party-spirit in civil and military
affairs assumed formidable dimensions, and the
State repeatedly barely escaped shipwreck.
Milan was a spoilt man of the world. He preferred
to live abroad and often left the administration
for long periods wholly in the hands of
the Cabinet of the moment, who, in the absence
of the ruler, often found it most difficult to
maintain their authority in the face of opposing
factions. Abroad the king became acquainted
with eminent foreign nobles and statesmen, and,
as in most cases these were Austrians, he fell
under the influence of the Monarchy. The tide
of German pressure towards the East began to
filter through into Serbia, and at times the
official policy was frankly pro-Austrian. The
King was still popular, but the people gradually
lost confidence in him, and on several critical
occasions he was fain to “save” himself by
brilliant addresses to the people.13 But the
Royal blunders became increasingly frequent,
and were further aggravated by intolerable
domestic dissensions which finally led to the
divorce of Queen Natalie. Fortunately Serbia
possessed singularly able statesmen during the
reign of King Milan, and it is solely due to their
efforts that the country escaped public disaster.
The present Serbian Premier, Nikola Pašić,
already played a prominent part in those days,
and repeatedly saved his King and country in
times of imminent danger. But presently matters
became intolerable, and King Milan abdicated
in favour of his son Alexander, who was still
under age. The reign of Alexander is the
darkest period in the history of modern Serbia.
During his minority the country was governed by
a regency, and all went well; but when Alexander
assumed the sceptre himself, the state
began to crumble in its very foundations. Mentally
deficient, and therefore dangerous in all
his actions, he inaugurated a rule of autocracy,
tolerated no opposition, and endowed every one
of his mistakes with the distinction of a “supreme
command.” The rift between King and people
grew wider and more impassable, and finally
became an abyss when he insisted on raising
his mistress Draga Maschin to the position of
legal wife and Queen of Serbia. But even this
was not all. The new queen, with all the blind
conceit of a parvenue, introduced the worst type
of petticoat government at court and in politics,
which showed itself in graft, corruption, unblushing
exhibitions of contempt for the people,
and insults to statesmen, scholars and especially
to the officers of the army. When the scandal
about the supposititious birth of an heir occurred,
the wrath of the people turned to fury, and, in
the night of May 28th, 1903, the garrison of
Belgrade carried out the sentence of the nation
upon the King and Queen.
******
The accession of the Karagjorgjević dynasty,
who were really entitled to the crown, opens a
new national and political era for Serbia. An
old man was called to the throne, but a grand
seigneur of the best French school—a school
which did not produce debauchees and Boulevard-trotters,
but soldiers and statesmen of the first
order. King Peter was a Western European
in the best sense of the word. He was not only
of the blood of the black Karagjorgje, the scion
of a house of heroes, but an experienced soldier
and statesman. During the long years of his
exile he was an officer in the French army, and
in virtue of his social position had every opportunity
of garnering valuable experience both
in peace and in war. All this time he was
emphatically the “one who looked on” and
watched the development of his country from
afar—her struggles and her trials. Although he
never resigned his pretendership to the Serbian
throne he was often, surely very often, convinced
that he himself would never be called to ascend
it. But his heart and his love ruled with the
Serbian people, and probably he felt the misfortunes
of his country more keenly than any
other Serbian. It is absurd to hold King Peter
responsible for the murder of his predecessor.
Any one privileged to know him would indignantly
repudiate the thought. His accession to
the throne was merely a consequence and in no
way a cause of the Obrenović tragedy. But
Europe was too horrified at the murder to discriminate
at the time, and would accept neither
reasons nor explanations proving the necessity
of making a fresh start—and this quite apart
from the circumstance of the murder. Europe
regarded the deed and not the causes of the deed;
and refused to search her own histories for
similar deeds provoked by similar causes. Thus
King Peter was confronted with a two-fold
difficulty. On the one hand both he and his
country had forfeited the sympathies of Europe,
and on the other he succeeded to the government
of a country demoralized by the previous
reign, and torn by party dissensions. It was a
most difficult situation, so many conflicting
interests had to be reconciled! Truly a very
weighty task for an elderly and perhaps already
world-weary man.
But King Peter did not come to Serbia as a
pretender who has at last gained the crown he
has coveted; he came as the champion of the
Serb ideal of the past—whose last representative
had been Michael Obrenović,—the ideal of national
expansion, of a Serbian future. He recognized
his difficulties but attacked them without
flinching. For the Serb nation—impulsive,
tempestuous and sensitive—it was a blessing to
pass under the guidance of a calm, wisely deliberate
king. He went his way step by step, firmly,
and without illusions. Amid the tumult of
acclamations that greeted him in Belgrade his
was probably the only heart heavy with care.
He knew only too well that the violent coup
d’état was not the solution but merely the beginning
of the problem. This consciousness and
his patriotic ideal have been the ruling motives
of his reign from the very first. One of King
Peter’s first tasks was the rehabilitation of
Serbia in the eyes of Europe. Unjustly enough
the entire responsibility for the loss of Serbia’s
prestige was laid to his charge, and it was uphill
work to alter the opinion of Europe, but he
refrained from protestations and excuses. He
realized that Serbia must be regenerated in such
a fashion as to win back the full confidence of
Europe. By the wisdom of his policy and with
the help of able statesmen—principally Nikola
Pašić—he steered Serbia’s foreign policy back
into a healthy, normal channel, and within a few
years the country once more took her position
as a well-ordered European State—apart from
the calumnies and enmity of Germany and
Austria. In fact, this successful reconstruction
was proof in the eyes of Europe that the dynastic
change was a necessity for Serbia, and that in the
solution of the Balkan problem she might certainly
be trusted to take her part of the burden
as a civilized State. She proved her mettle
soon afterwards in the first Balkan War, for in
this war the ideal of the King—which he shares
with his people—scored its first great success,
when the hard-pressed nation displayed a high
degree of valour, statesmanship and true nobility.
In his ten years’ reign King Peter has gone
far to restore to Serbia her ancient glories.
During his reign her politics have become more
settled at home and abroad. Agriculture, trade
and industry have improved and expanded.
Literature and art have made miraculous strides,
so that Serbia may fairly consider herself the
equal of the Western nations; and the Serbian
army has now demonstrated its excellent organization
and great military value in three
successive wars.
King Peter, whose short reign became so
stormy towards the end, may look back on the
results of his labours with the same calm assurance
with which he took up the sceptre. He
has quickened the new soul of Serbia, and although
he retired shortly before the outbreak of the
present war, and entrusted the sceptre to his
son, his spirit still lives in his people and army
and—please God—will lead them both to victory.
IV.
Serbian relations with Austria have been an
important, and indeed the decisive, factor in
recent Serb history; and the events which are
the outcome of these relations will either bring
about the territorial consolidation of Serbia or
her final ruin. Austria-Hungary was never a
well-wisher of Serbia, although she has often
brazenly posed as her benefactor. It has always
been Austria’s aim to detach Serbia from
Russian influence, and to bring her under the
soul-saving protectorate of the Monarchy. The
nearest road to Salonika lies through Serbia, and
at all costs this route had to be secured. If only
Serbia could be made dependent upon Austria-Hungary,
it would be much better for the aims
of Germanistic expansive policy; it would also
paralyse the Southern Slavs in the Monarchy.
Knowing that the Great Powers, especially Russia,
would never permit an effective occupation of
Serbia, Austria sought by intrigues in the spirit
of Metternich to make her influence predominant
in Serbia, also economically to weaken her as a
state, by vexatious commercial treaties in the hope
of rendering her more amenable towards the
Monarchy. Serbia bravely resisted all these
attempts and suffered considerable material loss;
but she stood firm in the knowledge that she is
the first and strongest fortress in the way of
German pressure towards the East, and staunchly
believed in the ultimate success of her cause. The
brave little country had a mission to fulfil, not only
in her own interest, but in that of the Slav race
and the whole of Europe. Vienna and Berlin
knew that Serbia was a very hard nut, but they
felt confident of cracking it in the end. When
open aggression failed, they put a good face on
the matter, and assured the hard-pressed Serbs
of their kind intentions. The occupation of
Bosnia and Hercegovina was the first tangible
proof of these kind intentions, for on that occasion
Austria “delivered” two million Serbs and
Croats from Turkish bondage. Unfortunately
Serbia did not in the least appreciate this “benefit,”
whereby a large number of her kindred were
handed over to the tender mercies of Austria,
whose solicitous care of her Southern Slav
subjects was only too well known—in fact,
instead of being grateful, Serbia never ceased to
point out her own national and territorial claims
upon Bosnia and Hercegovina. Naturally this
insolent attitude on the part of Serbia provoked
the animosity, and presently the official disfavour,
of Austria. This disfavour was displayed on
every possible occasion although it always wore
a sanctimonious garb. Serbia was too weak and
unprepared to retort aggressively upon this
animosity; her defence was limited to diplomatic
measures and the moral support of Russia. It
was a marvellous achievement on the part of
her statesmen that in the face of strong popular
feeling they so long staved off an open rupture;
and that they did not let the thirty-five years of
misgovernment in Bosnia and Hercegovina, or
the oppression of the Southern Slavs, drive
them to a desperate decision. The influence of
European diplomacy was doubtless very helpful;
still, the Serbian people displayed admirable
restraint under constant provocation. Germany
and Austria, who are able to corrupt the greater
part of their own Press, and even many foreign
newspapers, and can command a whole staff
of political agitators, never relaxed their campaign
of abuse and calumny against Serbia, and
everywhere represented her as an incapable,
barbarous, and dangerous State. In this they
were only too successful. Unfortunately the
condition of Serbian home politics has often been
deplorable, and in addition to this the murder
of the King and Queen in 1903 provided ample
material for biassing public opinion in Europe.
On the whole Europe endorsed these calumnies
and refused to listen to the counter-protestations
of Russia and other Slavs, because the testimony
of barbarians and troglodytes was obviously
valueless. Serbia was frequently reduced to
desperate straits. She was really defending the
cause of civilization by stemming the tide of
Germanism in the East—she was preparing a
great world-work, and her reward was merely
contempt or a pitying smile. Without Russia’s
moral support she must have been swamped by
Austria long ago.
With the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina
in 1909 and the disgraceful circumstances
that preceded it (which I shall touch upon in a
later chapter), the mutual enmity between
Austria and Serbia reached its height. War
between Austria-Hungary on the one hand
and Russia and Serbia on the other, seemed
imminent, and was only averted by the intervention
of European diplomacy, especially by
the efforts of Sir Edward Grey. In a declaration
dated March 31st, 1909, Serbia acknowledged
the annexation as an accomplished fact, and
promised henceforth to conduct her policy in a
neighbourly and friendly spirit towards Austria.
This was the last act of self-abasement extorted
from the unhappy country, but by no means
the end of hostile agitations. On the contrary,
these only became more virulent, because Austria
considered the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina
merely a prelude to the invasion of Serbia.
Hence the necessity of representing Serbia as a
menace to the peace of Europe, and especially to
the position of the Monarchy as a Great Power.
Serbia’s prestige declined still further. But
suddenly a new contingency arose, and the
Balkan War of 1912 brought to light a series of
glorious proofs of heroism, self-control, statesmanship,
and military and national ability on the
part of Serbia. The contempt of Europe was
transformed into admiration, and Serbia suddenly
found herself appreciated at her true
value. This was a blow Austria could not
forgive, and still less the fact that the criminal
blunder of the second Balkan War, whereby she
fondly hoped that Serbia would be crushed,
proved unsuccessful. A strong and respected
Serbia was a thorn in the flesh to Austria and a
disquieting influence among her Southern Slav subjects.
Henceforth the Viennese Foreign Office concentrated
its efforts on the destruction of Serbia
at all costs. First of all Serbia was confronted
with a demand for such trade concessions as
would render her economically dependent upon
Austria, and the next commercial treaty was to
have placed Austria in the position of a “most
favoured nation.” In politics Austria had recourse
to the invention of the spectre of a “Greater
Serbia,”—an idea which hitherto had merely
possessed intellectual significance, and whose
representatives were a few hot-heads quite
unconnected with Serbian official policy. To
make this new propaganda convincing Austria
employed a large number of agents provocateurs,
whose masterpiece appears to have been the
attempt upon the Archduke Francis Ferdinand
at Serajevo, June 28th, 1914. Truly, when all
the side-issues are taken into account, it seems
more than likely that the attempt at least was
staged by Austrian agents. Was the assassination
merely an accident?14 It is to be feared that
this is one of the unhappy mysteries which will
never be fully cleared up.
The Country of the Black Mountain—Women Warriors—King,
Poet and Farmer—Historical Sketch of
Montenegro—Petar I., Petrović—Petar II.—Pro-Russian
Policy—A Royal Poet—Nikola I.
All I have said about Serbia applies equally to
Montenegro. The nations are one and the
same: they are identical in every respect and
only geographically divided. Montenegro is the
Serbian advance guard on the Adriatic. It is
the eagle’s nest of Europe, the loftiest symbol
of freedom and independence. Nature herself
has given this people an impregnable fortress,
and placed in their hands the keys of Southern
Slav liberty. From the height of their barren
Black Mountains the valiant high-spirited Montenegrin
has looked down for centuries on the
rise and fall of his kinsmen all around him. In
all the tragedies that have passed in the shadow
of his eyrie he has played his part, both as
dauntless warrior, and the bard of freedom who
from his mountain heights sang the song of the
future to his enslaved brothers. The Montenegrin
has always been the same. In war-time130
he is a warrior, in times of peace a shepherd
armed to the teeth. He is inseparable from
his weapons, but only uses them against his
enemies. Though his aspect is martial and his
glance fierce, he bears a kindly, loveable heart.
Comparing his outward appearance with his soul,
one might call him a lion with the heart of a
dove. A friend, whoever he may be, is welcomed
with open arms, and his rough, powerful hand can
be gently caressing as a child’s. But an enemy
will be crushed by its weight; for the Montenegrin
hates his foe, hates him passionately,
fiercely and implacably, and he is ever on the
watch for him. Even at tender age the children
are decked with weapons and have to learn
the use of them under the eyes of their elders.
And the enemy is always the “Schwabo.” The
women are just as efficiently trained to arms
as the men, and it has often happened that the
Montenegrin Amazons played a decisive part in
warfare; and, when weapons were scarce, the
women rolled mighty rocks from the heights
down upon their enemies. Fighting is a grim
pleasure to the Montenegrin in war-time, and
his recreation in times of peace. Whoever has
travelled in the Montenegrin mountains cannot fail
often to have noticed two goatherds in the midst
of their herds, fencing with their “Handzars”
(the sheathless scimitar of the Montenegrins) and
not far off two goat-girls similarly engaged.
The Montenegrin is not a great farmer. The
soil is poor and barren; yet every patch of fertile
ground is utilized to the utmost of its resources,
and good soil is often carried from a great distance
and deposited in the stony corries for the
cultivation of a little maize and corn. But the
Montenegrin cares less for a full stomach than
for a light heart. It is a people that is for ever
singing, and the wealth of Serbo-Croat folk-songs
provides them with ample material.
The relations between the Montenegrins and
their rulers is without parallel in Europe. Certainly
the King is the “Gospodar” (ruler), but
he is really only the chief warrior, the chief
farmer, and the chief poet of his country. The
dynasty is descended from Montenegrin farmers
and is deep-rooted in the people themselves.
The Montenegrin does not consider his King so
much the head of the State, as the leader of the
nation, and relations between them are familiar
and fraternal. The King is the father, and the
people are his children in a perfectly patriarchal
sense. There is no trace of Western European
formality in their intercourse. The familiar
“thou” is used on either side, and the simplest
peasant shakes hands with the King as a matter
of course. But in war time the King’s word is
law, and the unquestioning discipline of the
people is founded on their mutual relations in
times of peace—founded on the love of the people
for their ruler.
The Montenegrins are Serbs by nationality,
and their Royal House, like that of Serbia, has
sprung from the people. Neither country has
ever been ruled by a foreign prince.
In olden times it was the custom that the
elders of the nation, without special regard to
diplomatic qualifications, should guide the fate
of their country by the rules of ancient custom.
Chief among them was the Vladika,15 who possessed
no special privileges as ruler but merely
took precedence in virtue of his ecclesiastical
dignity. His education was limited to what was
necessary for his clerical duties, and he knew
little or nothing of state-craft. The character
of a given reign depended mainly on the prevailing
relations with the Turks, and Montenegrin
affairs prospered in proportion to the peaceable
or aggressive attitude of these neighbours. A
well-ordered state, enlightenment, and education
were luxuries no one desired or required, and the
people lived and fought merely for the needs
of the day. But, although they are naturally
gifted, the nation could not develop without
any means of education; and, apart from the art
of war they were simple and unlettered as
children. Mere adventurers have several times
taken advantage of this simplicity. The most
flagrant instance was that of Stjepan Mali, a
Russian swindler, who gave himself out to be a
scion of the Vojevode family Petrović and proclaimed
himself lord of Montenegro.
Affairs improved when Vladikas of Crnojević
family were succeeded by Vladikas of the
true Petrović stock in the leadership of the
country. The first of these, Petar I., Petrović,
was still content to follow in the footsteps of his
predecessors, and influenced the education of his
people only in so far as he himself was cultured.
His immediate successor Petar II., Petrović
Njegoš, earned undying fame in the history of
Montenegro.
Petar II. became Vladika and Gospodar of
Montenegro at the age of seventeen. At the time
of his accession he was scarcely more than a
Montenegrin peasant lad, accustomed to dealing
with attacks from the Turks, but otherwise
without education. The young ruler knew nothing
whatever of system or the deeper meaning of
learning and education, when he took the helm.
Times were troubled and difficult, for, even in
Montenegro opinions were divided. There were
several other pretenders—not so much because
of internal dissensions as in consequence of
foreign intrigue. It was not a matter of indifference
for the neighbouring states whether the
ruler of Montenegro was their friend and tool,
or whether he was a man of independent personality
and inclined to follow Montenegrin
tradition in considering Russia. The Sandjaks
of Skutari and Hercegovina (at that time still
the Sandjak Novipazar) were Montenegro’s
vulnerable point. For nearly a century Montenegro
had already sought ways and means of extending
her territory as far as the frontier of modern
Serbia. Moreover, from the days of Peter the
Great an idea had existed that, with the help of
the Serbs of Old Serbia, and the Serbs and Croats
of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro should
prepare the way for the emancipation of her
kindred from the Turkish yoke. Poverty, however,
lack of numbers on the part of Montenegro,
and the vacillations of Russian diplomacy
frustrated these plans, and Vladika Petar I. did
not feel strong enough to embark on this enterprise.
Petar II. realized that, before Montenegro
could hope to attempt this task, she would have to
strengthen her hands—and those of her brothers
awaiting liberation—by a thorough-going pro-Russian
policy, which would secure them the
protection of the Russian Empire. She must also
provide her children with the means of education.
He knew well that nothing can be done with
an unlettered people. The lines laid down by
him were quite correct. Russian society understood
the Prince’s aims and gave him sufficient
financial assistance for the foundation of schools,
etc., and Russian diplomacy supported him
strongly in his politics. Petar II. set about his
educational mission with devotion and perseverance,
and even found time to complete his own
studies. When he attained to man’s estate he
was already famous as one of the finest of the
Southern Slav poets, and as one of the patrons of
culture among the oppressed Slav peoples.16 But
his path was by no means strewn with roses.
The very strength of his independent personality
laid him open to insidious intrigues. True, he
followed Russia’s advice, but, while he was still
a youth, full of the healthy, impetuous ardour of
his mountain home, he often transgressed the
rules of European diplomacy. Diplomacy failed
to understand his actions, and he, being a true
Montenegrin, could not wait with his hands folded
to see what diplomacy might achieve, while the
Turks were harrying his borders. Even the
Russian Consul in Dubrovnik (Ragusa) often
complained to his Government that the Prince
“was better fitted for a grenadier than for a
Vladika” (Bishop). And, of course, Vienna always
stirred up enmity against him. But Petar II.
remained a staunch Montenegrin warrior, and
the older he grew the less he was able to adapt
himself to the wiles of diplomacy. He devoted
himself to his people, who loved, honoured, and
revered him. But foreign intrigue began to
tell upon him. Disappointments increased with
advancing years, and he found little but bitterness
in the onerous duties of a prince; this
bitterness and disappointment find eloquent
expression in his poems. At last circumstances
became so unendurable to him that he thought of
abdicating, and was probably only deterred from
his purpose by his ardent love for his people.
For, despite all vexations, he cannot have failed
to see that his presence was not useless and that
his work and activities were bringing a blessing
to his people and laying the foundations of the
future.
His nephew and successor, Danilo I., was the
last “Vladika” on the Montenegrin throne. He
was far better versed in the arts of diplomacy,
but his reign will never rival that of his uncle in
importance. He fell a victim to assassination
in 1860 at Kotor (Cattaro) and was succeeded
by his nephew Nikola I., the first secular prince
of Montenegro.
In Nikola I. fate bestowed upon Montenegro a
ruler with a remarkably strong character and
first-rate diplomatic talent. The country was
re-organized from within, without giving offence
to any of the sacred traditions of the Montenegrins.
In Nikola’s foreign policy veritable
masterpieces were achieved from time to time.
Without departing from the traditional pro-Russian
policy Nikola established excellent relations
with all non-Slav states, especially with
Austria, and made the utmost use of every opportunity
whereby his country and people might
benefit. A man of great personal charm, highly
cultured and refined, Nikola I. has enthusiastic
friends and admirers in every part of the world.
The unity of the Southern Slavs is one of his
favourite ideals, and he has laboured unceasingly
to promote this cause. His personal relationship
to several of the Royal Houses of Europe made
it possible for him to work effectively and win
friends for the Slav cause where another might
have failed to do so.
What Nikola I. has done for Montenegro
during the fifty years of his reign is more or less
generally known. The education of the people,
which began under Petar II., has made splendid
progress under Nikola I., and to-day Montenegro
can boast a large number of statesmen, poets,
scholars and men of letters for so small a country.
When the Balkan crisis arrived, Nikola, then
already King of Montenegro, true to the spirit
of his fathers, unhesitatingly and enthusiastically
placed himself and his people at the disposal
of Serbia and won glorious victories, in consequence
of which his territories were considerably
enlarged. After the Balkan War, King Nikola
surely looked forward to a time of peace and
prosperity. But his hopes were doomed to
disappointment, for recent events have called
him to another and more important task.
I. A Homogeneous People—A Militant Past—The
Bogumili—National Bondage—Napoleon—Illyrism—Agreement
with Hungary—Count
Khuen-Hedervary.
II. The greatest representative of the Southern Slavs—Strossmayer’s
generosity and courage—Fall of
Count Khuen-Hedervary—Death of Strossmayer.
III. False Dawn—Conference of Fiume—Ban Paul
Rauch—Monster Trial in Zagreb—The Friedjung
Case—Cuvaj—Frano Supilo.
IV. Dalmatia, Istria, Carniola—The Italian Element—Bosnia-Hercegovina—Conclusion.
The whole south of the Dual Monarchy is inhabited
by Slavs. The Kingdoms of Croatia,
Slavonia, and Dalmatia, with the Duchy of
Carniola, Istria, and Bosnia-Hercegovina—these,
comprising a population of about seven millions,
belong almost exclusively to one race. Whereas
in all other countries of the Monarchy (especially
in Hungary and Bohemia) the different races are
represented in varying percentages, the non-Slav
population in Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and
Hercegovina amounts only to about 5-1/2 per cent.,
in Carniola and Istria to 4 per cent., and in
Dalmatia only to 2 per cent. The considerable
number of Croats and Slovenes (750,000) living
in Southern Hungary (in Torontal, Bacs-Bodrog
and Temes) must be added to the above-mentioned
seven millions.
Ethnologically speaking, the inhabitants of all
these countries form one people, and are a brother
nation to the Serbs in the Kingdoms of Serbia and
Montenegro. Their language, customs, historical
past and achievements in art, science and literature,
are identical. The sole difference between
them is that the Croats and Slovenes are Catholics,
while part of the inhabitants of Bosnia are
Mohammedans. Those confessing the Serbo-Orthodox
faith (more than a third of the population)
also own to the national name and call
themselves Serbs. This compact and homogeneous
national body would certainly have
become a most important factor in the Monarchy
had they not been cut in two by administrative
policy. Here as elsewhere throughout all her
dominions Austria has applied her principle of
dividing and dismembering, and the Southern
Slav provinces were shared between two spheres
of power. Croatia and Slavonia were allotted to
the Hungarian; Carniola, Dalmatia and Istria
to the Austrian sphere, and a mixed Austrian
and Hungarian administration was introduced
in Bosnia and Hercegovina. This system made
a unanimous political rally of the Southern Slavs
quite impossible, and provided German and
Magyar propaganda with a more manageable field
of operations. In both spheres unremitting
efforts were devoted to the task of eliminating
the Southern Slav element, stifling Slav thought,
and transforming the Slavs into slaves. But the
Southern Slav is endowed with unusual tenacity;
the most zealous efforts on the part of the Government
were frustrated by his dogged resistance,
and they merely defeated their own ends. German
“kultur” and Magyar lack of culture were held
in equal abomination by the Slav nations upon
whom they were to be inflicted, and the ruthless
spoliation to which they were likewise subjected
engendered a deep-seated animosity. The
Northern Slavs, who possess more practical
business capacity than the Southern, did not
allow themselves to be economically strangled,
and even contrived to hold their own in this
respect; whereas the Southern Slavs, being mainly
an agricultural people, found themselves the
helpless victims of Austrian and Hungarian
rapacity. Dalmatia, one of the loveliest spots in
Europe, has for the last century known no
privilege except that of paying taxes, and Austria’s
mal-administration of that country has become
proverbial. Croatia and Slavonia fare little
better. They have to pay 56 per cent. of their
revenues to Hungary. This tax figures under
the head of “contributions to mutual interests,”
chiefly represented by the railways and the postal
system. The net annual income from these
two sources amounts to 250 million Kr., but
of this Croatia never receives a penny! The
net profit all goes to Hungary who brazenly
employs it to subvention the Magyar propaganda
in Croatia. The condition of Carniola
and Istria is almost as deplorable as that of
Dalmatia, and in Bosnia and Hercegovina the
Austro-Hungarian Government has for thirty-five
years built villages “after the pattern of Potemkin,”
for the edification of foreign journalists,
while the people have been left to starve, or
sink into poverty and ignorance. The numerous
foreign tourists who have travelled in these
beautiful countries have seen nothing of Austria’s
“work of civilization,” as they are kept to the
beaten tracks specially prepared for them, and
they only see the country like a carefully staged
panorama on the films of the Royal and Imperial
State Cinematograph! But had these travellers
caught a glimpse of the abject misery of the
people, their pleasure in these beautiful countries
would have been spoilt, and they would have
better understood why the inhabitants are rebelling
against the “blessing” of Austro-Hungarian
rule.
It is much easier to understand why the political
horizon in the Southern Slav corner of Europe is
always clouded if one is given a clearer view of
the Chartered rights, as opposed to the actual
position, held by the Southern Slavs in the
Monarchy; but this view is not usually obtained
through the official channels of Vienna and
Budapest. According to these, all ancient charters
of liberty are so many “scraps of paper,” and
the actual law merely the right of the strongest.
The Hapsburgs did not come as victors with the
rights of a conqueror to the Southern Slav provinces.
They became rulers of these countries in
virtue of voluntary treaties, and they themselves
issued manifestos and bulls, in which the integrity
and independence of the Southern Slav countries
are incontestably guaranteed. Centuries ago, while
the Hapsburg dynasty was endangered by constant
wars, and especially during the Turkish invasion,
these guarantees were faithfully observed. But
with the altered conditions of affairs the Southern
Slavs had to wage a bitter struggle for their
rights.
Of all this group Croatia-Slavonia alone still
retains the slightest degree of autonomy, while
the countries belonging to Austria have been
deprived of every vestige of self-government,
and only appear to be distinct dominions in the
State by their mock Landtags, whose decisions
are almost invariably disregarded. Croatia-Slavonia,
which belongs to Hungary, has to this
day at least theoretically maintained her political
independence. Croatia was once more guaranteed
this independence by the agreement between
herself and Hungary in 1868. When the Hapsburg
Empire was reconstructed in 1867 the
constitutional independence of Croatia could not
be set aside, especially as this reconstruction
was founded on the Pragmatic Sanction, which
provided for the separate constitutional independence
of Croatia under guarantee of the Royal
Oath. Moreover, the events of the revolution
of 1848 were still too fresh in the memories
of the Hungarian statesmen who had laboured
for the establishment of Hungary’s State Constitution
from 1861 till 1867, and in their dealings
with Croatia they did not dare to repeat the
mistakes they had made in 1847 and 1848.
Francis Deak, the chief of these statesmen, knew
very well that the catastrophe that overtook
Hungary in 1848 would never have been so
great, if the Croatian national forces had fought
side by side with Hungary. Thus it was his
wish to conclude a lasting peace with Croatia
on a just basis. Under Deak’s influence, and
with the co-operation of Croatia’s leading representatives,
an agreement was concluded which
assured Croatia the position of a State enjoying
equal rights with Hungary, with complete self-government
as regards her internal affairs, a
separate legislative parliament, and her own
army; only the railways and the postal and
financial systems were to be under mutual
control, and Croatia was guaranteed a proportionate
share of the revenues from these sources.
The Croatian tongue was to be the official language
in the Landwehr, and in all courts of law,
whether joint or autonomous. The important
Croatian seaport Fiume was declared a “corpus
separatum adnexæ rex,” and thus constituted
a joint open port. I shall presently show how
Hungary kept her side of the bargain.
******
A Southern Slav patriot has said that no
greater misfortune has befallen the Southern
Slavs, than to pass under the dominion of civilized
Austria. Had they been obliged to share the
fate of their brothers, the Serbs and Bulgarians,
they would certainly have tasted all the misery
of the Turkish yoke, but to-day they would be
free, as an independent State with a right to
their own national and intellectual development.
The one thing Turkey has left untouched in the
Serbs and Bulgars—the heart of the people—is
the very thing that Austria has sought to
destroy in her Southern Slav subjects. Turkish
captivity has steeled the hearts of the Slavs she
oppressed, but Austrian captivity has cankered
them and made them effete.
In many respects this pessimistic view is
justified. The struggle of the Southern Slavs for
national life has passed through many phases,
and has exhausted itself in many more. For
centuries the Southern Slav stood under the
protection of “Heaven militant,” and his motto
was “For Faith and Freedom,” for with him faith
was always first. All his culture consisted in
imaging the Christ as the “Otac i voyskovodya
illyrskyh Kralyeva” (Father and leader of the
armies of the Kings of Illyria). The Holy Cross
was transformed into a standard of war, and his
enthusiasm for this false ideal led him so far
astray, that the baptized arch-enemy was nearer
to him than his own unbaptized brother, and
the Church dearer to him than his country.
But these traits do not originate in the character
of the Southern Slav. He was educated into them
and impregnated with them from without, and
always by his greatest enemies, the Germans or
the Turks. The Germans made a national
mission of the Crusades, and the Turks usually
went to war on religious grounds and called their
armies the Hosts of the Prophet. Following the
example of the Turks, and imitating the Germans
in their appropriation of the Deity, Slav Christianity
was infected by the fanaticism of the
Church of Rome, and became synonymous with
militancy and the spirit of the condottieri. The
heart of the nation grew vitiated, and the Illyrians
callously neglected their lovely land, which ought
to have been a Garden of Eden. And those who
were so liberal with their promises of Heaven
and constantly cried, “Thy Kingdom is not of
this world!” were well pleased that these things
should be so, for they coveted the lost Empire
of the Southern Slavs for an earthly paradise of
their own.
Unfortunately this dark page in the history of
Southern Slavdom followed directly upon one
of the most brilliant periods in the intellectual
development of Southern Slav culture. It was
a period when the national culture of the Southern
Slavs put forth some of its most vigorous, fairest
and sanest blossoms—the time of the Bogumili
(“beloved of God”) whose work of enlightenment
spread from Bulgaria over the whole of the Slav
South. The Bogumili were strongly opposed to
the poetic glorification of the Crusades, because
they grasped the fact that the extolling of such
an ideal can never open the mind to heretic culture—the
culture based on free choice according to
conscience—which was eventually to undermine
the foundations of the sacrosanct Roman Empire
and lay the first solid foundations of true culture.
The Bogumili taught that true culture is not
spread by crusades, but springs from Christian,
human contemplation. They deprecated personal
worship, and replaced it by a worship of ideals, of
spirit, and of thought. Wyclif, Huss and Luther
are always quoted as the foremost apostles of the
heretical culture. But in the Hungarian Crusaders
the Bogumili found bitter enemies. Bogumilist
activity in Bosnia and Croatia was stifled in blood,
and the people, who were beginning to protest
against the lying cult of Cæsarism wedded to
Papistry, were simply butchered in the name of
the Cross. The blood-baths on the fields of
Bosnia filled the people with consternation, but
could not stifle Bogumilism. True, its progress
was checked in the Southern Slav region, but it
secretly penetrated westward, whence the Patarenes
in Italy and the Catharists, Albigenses and
Waldenses in France spread it all over the world.
It is interesting to note that at the very moment
when Bogumilist culture was destroyed among
the Slavs themselves, they bequeathed this very
Bogumilism to the rest of Europe—the first and
only gift from the Southern Slav race as a whole
to the spiritual life of Europe. It was the true
“antemurale Christianitatis”—the outworks of
Christianity—purified from Byzantine and Roman
elements. What they gave was perhaps not so
very much their own as the vigour with which
they transplanted the ideal and the doctrine
of a spiritual life, from the mountains of Asia
Minor to the West. Theirs was the work of
emissaries and outposts.
To resume, during the time of Turkish power,
the Southern Slavs had ceased to be the “outworks
of Christianity” and had become merely
a soldatesca in the service of the foreigner, fighting
indifferently for Cross or Crescent. It was
a terrible time of national abasement, more
especially because it followed so closely upon the
great era of spiritual exaltation. The gradual
loss of Southern Slav independence likewise
dates from this period, and from that time until
quite recently they were unable, as a race, to
produce a truly Southern Slav culture. Only
those among them who travelled westward,
where Bogumilism continued to thrive and
flourish, found the way of true culture. Among
these exceptions were Marko Marulić (Marcus
Marulus), a Spalatine noble, whose works were
translated from the Latin into all the principal
European tongues, and Flavius Illyricus, whom,
after Luther, Germany considers one of her
greatest teachers. In their souls these men
were merely Bogumili and nothing more. With
them we may also class John of Ragusa, who
led the whole Council of Bâle against the Pope
and proposed to negotiate calmly and justly
with the Hussites and Manichees. Just such a
man was Bishop Strossmayer in our own day,
a man of whom I shall presently speak further.
Their liberation from the Crescent put an end
to the period of religious militancy among the
Southern Slav people. The warlike element is
perhaps of great historic moment. It certainly
fended the Southern Slavs over the abysses of
Turkish barbarism to freedom in the Christian
sense of the word, but by no means to national
freedom. When the Turkish invasion was rolled
back and the everlasting wars were over, the
symbol of the sword was exchanged for that
of the plough, and God as God was no longer
adorned with weapons, but imaged in a nobler
spirit as the highest conception of peace. And,
as the people accustomed themselves to peace,
and once more came in touch with the soil, a
new spirit grew up within them, or rather it
was the re-awakening of an old spirit that for
a while had been silenced by the clamour of
weapons—the spirit of love for the homestead
and the community. Nationalism still slumbered
but, like a guardian angel, the national
tongue watched over its slumbers. Through
storm and stress, in spite of travels and intercourse
with foreign-speaking mercenaries, this
language has remained pure and unalloyed. This
was the seed of the future from which sprang
the great awakening; for so long as a people
preserves its language it possesses a Nationality.
Liberty of conscience, and the transformation
of the warrior into a husbandman, were also the
beginning of a change in the souls of the people,
which, while groping its way back towards its
own essential beauty, began to feel the hidden
wounds within, and strove to rid itself of the
canker. The old beautiful mode of life, the
patriarchal family feeling and the bond of union
in the community were restored, and the gentle,
plaintive melodies echoed once more in farm
and field. And this regeneration grew and
expanded until it brought the revelation of
national union, patriotism, and finally the love
for all that belongs to the Slav race.
******
The Napoleonic era found this people already
fully developed. They had found their soul
and knew what they wanted. Napoleon, who
treated most of the people he conquered without
much consideration, was filled with unusual
admiration for the Southern Slavs that came
under his rule. By the peace of Schönbrunn
(October 14th, 1809) he acquired Triest, Görz,
Carniola, part of Carinthia, Austrian Istria, the
Croat seaboard with Fiume, and all Croatia
south of the Save. Napoleon united all these
countries with French Istria, Dalmatia and
Ragusa into one “Province of Illyria,” and thus
for one short moment fulfilled the dearest wish
of all the Southern Slavs. Illyria was organized
as one military province divided into six civil
provinces; Maréchal Marmont was appointed
Governor and in the name of Napoleon carried
out sweeping reforms throughout the country.
Trade and industry were signally improved and
the people were granted far-reaching national
liberties. The use of German as the official
language was abolished in the schools and law
courts and Serbo-Croatian introduced in its
place. Special attention was devoted to road-making
and education, and the Croats were
permitted to edit their own newspapers in the
Croat tongue, which would have been considered
high treason under Austria. Although the
French rule was only of short duration (till
1817) it did more for the Southern Slav lands in
three years than Austria did during the century that
followed. But the main thing was that this rule
aroused the national thought so effectively
that henceforth it ceased to be a dream and
became a factor to be reckoned with. From
that time dates the unremitting struggle against
Germanism and Magyarism, and the agitation
for a national union of all the Southern Slavs.
The first-fruits of the complete national regeneration
were seen in the great movement started
in 1835 and known by the name of Illyrism.
Illyrism began with a small group of patriots
and poets whose leaders were Ljndevit Gaj and
Count Janko Drašković. They founded newspapers
and periodicals, published patriotic books
and poems, and roused the national enthusiasm
of the people to the highest pitch. In this mission
they successfully sought help and advice from
other Slavs, especially the Csechs and Serbs;
they were also the first to come into touch with
Russia. Austria-Hungary tried sharply to repress
this movement, and for the first time found herself
confronted by a united nation bent on going its
own way. The Illyrist movement cannot point to
any positive political results, but it laid a foundation
for future political and national activity and
did an incalculable amount of pioneer work
which would have been most difficult to carry
out under the conditions that followed. In
1843 the name of Illyrism was prohibited by an
Imperial edict, and it was hoped by the Austrian
authorities that this would be the end of the
patriotic movement. But their labour was lost.
In fact, under the spur of persecution the patriots
passed from their idealistic literary campaign to
more tangible activities. By the prohibition of
the Illyrian name the motto of the poetic propaganda
was lost, and it became the duty of the
patriots to lead their politics into less sentimental
paths, and enter upon a campaign of cold
reasoning in place of poetic sentiment. This
was all the more necessary as the national cause
was greatly endangered by several new regulations.
Following closely upon the prohibition
of the Illyrian name came an order for the
introduction of the Magyar tongue in the Croatian
law courts. When the Croatian counties protested
in Vienna that Croatia was privileged
to choose her own official language, and that
no one had the right to interfere with this privilege,
they met with a brusque rebuff. Up
to now the Government had hardly dared to
attempt the Magyarization of Croatia, but now
they decided to enforce it in spite of the newly-awakened
national consciousness. The Croats
now realized that it was a case of war to the knife.
The Hungarian Government proclaimed that
all countries and nationalities subjected to the
crown of St. Stephen must be made one people,
one state, and be taught to speak one language—in
short, they were to become Magyars. They
were determined to break the national resistance
of the Serbs and Croats by force, or preferably,
by corruption. In this enterprise
Hungary found an able assistant in Ban Haller.
A “Magyar party” was organized in Croatia
with a view to reconciling the people to Magyar
demands, but, unfortunately, it consisted chiefly
of adventurers and social riff-raff; the work of
Magyarization made no progress, but only
further incensed the Southern Slavs. One of the
consequences of this hatred was that in 1848 the
Croats and Serbs enthusiastically followed Ban
Jellacić in the campaign against Hungary.
******
After the conclusion of peace between Hungary
and the Crown the Croats were rewarded in a
truly Austrian fashion for their assistance in
putting down the rebellion: once more they were
handed over to the tender mercies of Hungary.
This ingratitude roused a perfect tempest of
indignation, but at the same time the Southern
Slavs finally learnt their lesson. Henceforth
they would look for help to no one but themselves,
and they resolved that the coming struggle must
be fought to a finish. The Southern Slav leaders
knew very well that nothing could be done by
revolutionary propaganda, but that their first
task must be to establish a footing from which
they could conduct a constitutional campaign.
They formed a strong Nationalist party in
Croatia, which co-operated with the Dalmatine
and Slovene parties, laid down their programme
on a broad national basis, and organized a campaign
of passive resistance among the people.
Of course the success of these labours was largely
due to the fact that Hungary was weakened by
the revolution and inclined to be somewhat
less aggressive. Croatia, on the other hand, was
fresh, strong, and self-reliant. Of course the
results were not apparent at once, but the agreement
of 1867 was a consequence of Croatia’s
united stand. This agreement by no means
satisfied all the aspirations of the Southern Slavs,
but it gave them the required footing against
Magyar oligarchy. Upon the conclusion of the
agreement, Croatia received her first constitutional
Ban, who was henceforth to be responsible
to the Croatian Parliament. Unfortunately the
King made this appointment upon the recommendation
of Hungary, who saw to it that the
first Ban, Baron Levin Rauch, should be a
mere exponent of the Hungarian Government.
Contempt of the constitution, and corruption,
were the first-fruits of the agreement under
Hungarian influence in Croatia, with the result
that all Croatian patriots—including those who
had helped to conclude the agreement—passed
over to the Opposition. This Opposition worked
on rigidly constitutional lines, and, as more
radical parties arose, they formed the constitutionally
correct, though barren, Croatian Constitutional
party. Space forbids me to enumerate
all the means by which the first “constitutional
Ban” strove to carry out his orders from Budapest.
By suddenly imposing a new election law
he secured a large and obsequious majority in
Parliament, which effectively barred the co-operation
of the Opposition in national affairs.
But the Opposition attacked the Government
outside Parliament, through the press. When
this systematic corruption and disregard of the
agreement had gone too far, M. Mrazović, the
leader of the Opposition, published a sensational
indictment against Baron Rauch, accusing him
of underhand dealings. Baron Rauch took proceedings
against Mrazović for libel in the military
courts, but Mrazović substantiated his accusations
and was acquitted. Baron Rauch resigned, and
the Nationalist Party scored its first victory.
He was succeeded by Ban Bedeković, another
Hungarian nominee, who was, however, unable
to prevent a triumphant Nationalist victory in
the election of 1871. The Hungarians asserted
that this victory had been subsidized by funds
from Russia and Serbia, and this accusation
contains the substance of all subsequent charges
of high treason. The Opposition replied with a
manifesto, in which they clearly set forth the
gravity of the numerous infringements of the
constitution. Because of this manifesto, the
Government wished to take proceedings against
the leaders of the Opposition for high treason, but
they refrained through fear of offending European
public opinion. At this time the Constitutionalist
Kvaternik, a good patriot but wholly unpractical,
started an armed rebellion among the peasantry
in the Rakovica district. It was put down by
a strong military force, and Kvaternik lost his
life. The October manifesto, in conjunction with
the rebellion in Rakovica, afforded Andrassy
(then Minister of Foreign Affairs) a pretext for
opposing every form of Slavophile policy and
ascribing both the manifesto and the rebellion
to Russian influence.
The policy then inaugurated remains in force
to this day. Brutal Imperialism is rampant
in Croatia, and the Agreement has become a
mere “scrap of paper.” But oppression begets
opposition, and during these critical times the
Southern Slavs found not only their greatest
tyrant but their greatest patriot. From 1883
to 1903 Count Carl Khuen-Hedervary was Ban of
Croatia, and the twenty years of his administration
have been the blackest period as regards
political, economic and personal thraldom.
Countless Magyar schools were scattered throughout
the country to promote the denationalization
of the people; espionage and Secret Police
flourished as in Darkest Russia. The archives of
the State, with the Constitutional Charters of
Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, were incorporated
with the State archives in Budapest, and, last
but not least, the Agreement itself was falsified by
the pasting of a slip of paper over the specification
of Fiume as a “Corpus separatum adnexæ rex”
converting it into a “corpus separatum adnexæ
Hungariam,” whereby this important Croatian
seaport became exclusively Hungarian property.
But this same period also witnessed the labours
of the greatest of all Southern Slavs, the benefactor
and father of his people, Bishop Josip
Juraj Strossmayer.
Bishop Strossmayer (1815-1905) was the most
generous benefactor of his people, their greatest
patron of science and art, and the very incarnation
of their political programme. He was
the first to break down the local artificial barriers
between Serb and Croat—the first to preach the
gospel of united Yougoslavia. Labouring in a
period when all national effort was suppressed in
every possible way, when Slav sympathies were
accounted high treason, he rose to a position of
unassailable eminence, which enabled him to
set the mark of his powerful personality like a
leitmotive on the whole nineteenth-century history
of the Southern Slavs. Born of peasant stock
and, like all gifted Slav boys, destined for the
church, Strossmayer began his patriotic activity,
while he was still a student and youthful priest,
by joining the Illyrist movement. His exceptional
abilities were soon noticed in connection
with the national movement, and Vienna and
Budapest awoke to the dangerous possibilities
of his personality. Determined to put an end
to his patriotic labours they appointed him
court chaplain, and trusted that the society of
the court with all its splendour and gaiety would
dazzle the handsome young priest, and wile
him away from the service of his country. But
Strossmayer made a most unexpected and highly
diplomatic use of his position. He brilliantly
succeeded in deceiving his surroundings as to
his sympathies, and when barely over thirty he
secured his appointment to the Episcopal See
of Djakovo. Hereby he also became Vladika
of Bosnia and Syrmia, and shortly afterwards
was created governor of the Virovitica district.
At this point Strossmayer’s life-work for his
people began in earnest. Holding a most distinguished
position, and with the vast revenues
of his bishopric at his disposal, he opened the
flood-gates of his activities, and Vienna and
Budapest saw with horror and amazement the
mistake they had made. Strossmayer assumed
the leadership of the Nationalist party; and in
Parliament, where he took his seat in the double
capacity of bishop and elected deputy, he showed
himself a brilliant orator, a subtle politician,
and an astute diplomat. He was the incarnation
of a keen, but determined and wise Opposition.
He also became an intellectual leader of his
people and accomplished more than anyone else
before him. He founded the Southern Slav
Academy of Science and Art, which in the very
terms of its foundation embodies the intellectual
unity of the Southern Slavs. He also founded
the Croatian University; and, being a great art
connoisseur, he spent years in accumulating an
exceedingly fine private collection, which he
presented to the nation. He built the Cathedral
at Djakovo, and at his own expense sent hundreds
of young Serbs and Croats to foreign art schools
and universities. Every intellectual enterprise,
whether literary, artistic or scientific, found in
him a munificent patron. His entire income
was devoted to the welfare of the nation, and the
sums that Strossmayer spent in adding to the
greatness and fame of his country amounted
to many millions during the long years of his
office. But his dearest wish was the realization
of the Yougoslav ideal, the breaking down of all
local barriers between Serbs and Croats, and the
creation of a united people. With this end in
view, and in spite of his position in the Roman
Catholic Church, Strossmayer went so far as to
advocate that the Serbian Græco-Orthodox,
and the Croatian Catholic, Churches should unite
and become one National Church. He knew
that the future of his people could never be
realized within the confines of the Monarchy,
but that it must be identified with that of all
the other Southern Slav nations, and founded
upon a purely Slav basis. Strossmayer did not
confine his efforts to winning converts among
his own people for this idea. He knew too well,
that at the decisive moment the nation would
require strong support from without, and, at the
risk of being accused of high treason, he entered
into friendly relations with Russia, which should
bring the big and powerful brother of the North
nearer to his down-trodden little brother in
the South. He succeeded in finding influential
friends in Russia as in other countries, and his
nation is still proud of his friendship with the Tsar
Alexander III., Leo XIII., Gladstone, Crispi and
Gambetta. Before Strossmayer entered the lists
no one in Europe had taken the slightest interest
in the Southern Slav problem. The slippery
diplomacy of Vienna—which is only equalled in
duplicity by that of Turkey—had for centuries
successfully diverted the attention of Europe
from the Southern Slav peoples in the Monarchy,
and the general assumption about them was that
they were a horde of uncivilized semi-barbarians,
fed by Austria at great sacrifice and treated
by her with the utmost forbearance. The
spectacles through which Europe viewed these
nations were made in Vienna and Budapest, and
no one took the trouble to bring an independent,
unbiassed mind to bear upon the problem.
Many Southern Slav patriots made desperate
though vain efforts to bring even a grain of truth
before the European public; a Jesuit Vienna
and a Judaized Budapest were too strong for
them. The world thought more of the colourless
anational Austrian culture, and the borrowed
pseudo-culture of the Magyars than of the
culture of the Slavs, which for a thousand years
has been the spontaneous expression of their
national individuality, with a literature worthy
of the lyre of Homer. Not only Austro-Hungarian
politics, but the age itself was unpropitious
to the Southern Slavs. They possessed
no importance for the European balance of power;
and it is one of the bitterest ironies of history,
that for a very long time the Southern Slavs
fought less for their own advantage than for the
interests of Europe. For, even as the Southern
Slavs were for centuries the bulwark against the
tide of Ottoman invasion from the East, they
subsequently became an equally strong bulwark
against the rising tide of Germanism towards the
East. With every fibre of their being they kept
the gate of the East fast closed against either
foe—not only for themselves, but in the interests
of European civilization.
Strossmayer was the first who succeeded in
re-awakening the interest of Europe in this
struggle, and, even if his efforts were not crowned
with immediate practical success, he at least contrived
to cast a doubt on the complacent assurances
of Vienna and Budapest. Strossmayer was
a man with a tremendous personality, and his
word was invariably accepted. He was also past-master
in the art of not saying too much—thus
avoiding the appearance of exaggeration. Even
in his world-famous speech in the Council of the
Vatican (1871, under Pius IX.), when he spoke
in Latin for sixteen consecutive hours against the
doctrine of Papal infallibility, he left some things
unsaid, for he was interrupted in “the midst of
his speech” by the Archbishop of Paris, who embraced
and kissed him, and assured him that what
he had already said was amply convincing.
Strossmayer’s activity was pursued with ruthless
enmity in Vienna and Budapest, and, even
as he was the best-loved man among his own
people, he was the best-hated enemy of the
Germans and the Magyars. They tried by every
possible means to minimize his power, and
agitated in the Vatican for his recall to Rome.
But Leo XIII. was not only the personal friend
of Strossmayer, but also the friend of the Slavs,
and Viennese diplomacy failed in its object.
Then followed disgraceful intrigues, and endeavours
to represent Strossmayer as a traitor.
Among other accusations, it was alleged that he
had exchanged incriminating telegrams with the
Tsar, in which he was said to have advocated
the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces
from Austria. Strossmayer’s reply to these insinuations
was truly characteristic. Several years
after this alleged exchange of telegrams the
Emperor Francis Joseph came to Croatia for
the grand manœuvres, and Bishop Strossmayer
was one of the guests at the great reception
in Belovar, where the Emperor had his headquarters.
The Emperor took the opportunity
to sharply reprimand the Bishop for his conduct.
Strossmayer retorted with equal sharpness
“My conscience is clear, your Majesty,” then
brusquely turned his back and ostentatiously
walked out of the hall. Circumstances made it
impossible to celebrate Strossmayer’s courage,
but the people rejoiced in this new proof that
their champion feared no risk when it was a
case of defending the freedom and interests of his
people.
Strossmayer was no dreamer, but above all
things a practical statesman. He knew that
whoever hopes to win a final success must first
carefully prepare the ground. Any attempt to
detach the Southern Slav Kingdoms from the
Monarchy by force would have been unadvisable,
and moreover, a dangerous and futile enterprise.
Therefore, the political party of which Strossmayer
was the leader made it their business to see
that the stipulations of the Agreement were
scrupulously observed, knowing well that a strict
observance of the Agreement—if only for a time—would
give the nation the much-needed chance
of economic improvement, and thus pave the
way to future independence. In this policy
they were supported by the entire nation, who
by their very unanimity proved their political
fitness. Twenty years’ martyrdom under Count
Khuen-Hedervary had not enervated the nation;
on the contrary, they grew strong through
adversity; and, with their eyes fixed upon their
spiritual guide and protector, they steadfastly
went forward towards their goal. Khuen-Hedervary’s
bribery, intimidation, everlasting trials for
high treason, prison and the gallows, all these had
only incited them to further resistance. When,
bowed with age, Strossmayer finally had to
resign his active part in politics, we saw the
people whom his spirit had inspired suddenly turn
upon their oppressors. In 1903, the whole country
rose in rebellion as one man, and Khuen-Hedervary’s
power was broken. Even he had to
admit that his twenty years’ rule of ruthless
oppression had merely defeated its own object,
that it had united the people whom he had sought
to weaken, and strengthened that which he had
hoped to destroy.
Strossmayer lived to see Khuen’s resignation,
and his last days were cheered by a gleam of
light—which alas! proved only illusory—shed
upon the path of his country; yet as he closed
his eyes for ever, he realized that he had not given
his all to Croatia in vain, and that the hour was not
far off when his ideals should become realities.
He died in 1905, but his spirit lives on in his
people and his memory shines among them like
a guiding star to point the way.
The popular rising in 1903 opened new channels
for the national struggle; it was also the prelude
to the hardest and bitterest time that the
Southern Slav people have yet been called upon
to face. Khuen’s successor was Count Theodore
Pejacsević, a Croatian noble, who was no great
statesman, but at least a good administrative
official. He gave the distracted country a
brief time of quiet, equitable government, and
deserves great credit for abolishing Khuen’s
system of corruption. Meantime the strongly
Nationalist parties in Croatia had formed a
block,—the Serbo-Croat Coalition,—and Count
Pejacsević found it impossible to raise a pro-Hungarian
majority in Parliament. Shortly
afterwards the Hungarian Opposition also rose
into conflict with the Crown, and the situation
became involved both in Hungary and Croatia.
The Hungarian Opposition applied to the Serbo-Croat
Coalition for support in their struggle and
promised that, if their party were returned, they
would grant all Croatia’s demands as embodied
in the Agreement of 1867. Negotiations were
carried on by Francis Kossuth and Geza Polonyi
on behalf of Hungary, and by Frano Supilo as
delegate of the Serbo-Croat Coalition. These
negotiations resulted in the Resolution of Fiume
(October, 1905), which stipulated for the political
co-operation between the Hungarian and Serbo-Croat
parties, and secured considerable advantages
to Croatia in the event of success. The
Resolution of Fiume was in every way a masterpiece
of policy and diplomacy, and was in all
its details the achievement of Frano Supilo, who
was the popular leader in Croatia at the time.
In the election of 1905 the Coalition won a
brilliant victory. Not one Government candidate
was returned, and the small Opposition
consisted of partizans of Ante Starćević’s one-time
idealist, patriotic constitutionalist party, which
however, since his death, had passed under the
control of Jewish solicitors, and was so committed
to a purely Austrian Christian-Socialist
policy. As the Hungarian Opposition had likewise
scored a victory, the Croatian Cabinet was
composed of representatives of the Serbo-Croat
Coalition, with Count Pejacsević retained in
office as “ut conditio sine qua non.” Croatia
enjoyed a short respite and began to look forward
to better times. But her hopes were once more
doomed to disappointment. The perfidious
Magyars once more failed to keep their word.
So long as they needed the Serbs and Croats they
were full of love and brotherliness, but when
they had gained their point, they discarded the
mask of false friendship. Francis Kossuth,
having become Handelsminister (Minister of
Trade) in the Hungarian Cabinet in 1907, introduced
a bill on the control of the Railways which
was the most flagrant and outrageous infringement
of the Agreement as yet attempted. It provided
that thenceforth the language used on the
railway-system, even in Croatian territory, was
to be Hungarian, although it had been specially
stipulated in the Agreement—which stands in
the place of a fundamental constitutional law—that
Croatian was to be official tongue in all
joint offices within Croatian territory. The
Serbo-Croat Coalition, which is represented by
forty members in the Hungarian Parliament, rose
in wrath against the Bill, and declared war to the
knife upon the Hungarian Government. The
conflict in the Hungarian Parliament is known
all over Europe. The Croats and Serbs pursued
a policy of obstruction, which fairly paralyzed
the House and made parliamentary discussion
of the Railway Bill quite impossible. To get
it passed Kossuth so worded his Bill that it was
contained in one paragraph, empowering the
Government to deal with the Pragmatic (administrative
business of the country) at their
discretion as part of the Order of the Day.
The rupture with Hungary was now complete.
The Serbo-Croat Coalition transferred the conflict
to Croatia, and the nation began to agitate for
detachment from Hungary. The Parliament
was dissolved, but the Coalition was again
victorious in the election. On the resignation
of the Croatian Government, Alexander v.
Rakodczay was appointed Ban, but failing to
raise a party friendly to the Government he was
forced to resign his office in two months. The
next Ban to be appointed was Baron Paul Rauch,
who boldly entered his capital town of Zagreb,
but was received with hostile demonstrations and
showers of stones. It speaks well for his courage
that he was not affected by this reception, and
even introduced himself to the Parliament with
great pomp. His reception in Parliament was
one great demonstration of hostility, so that he
could not even read the Royal message. He
had to fly the building with his Ministerial staff,
and Parliament was officially dissolved the same
day. Baron Rauch formed a Government party
of venal upstarts and discredited characters,
secured the support of the now thoroughly
demoralized “constitutionalist party,” and
ordered a new election. Everything was done
to intimidate the electorate, with the result that
not one of Rauch’s candidates was returned.
This Parliament was dissolved without even
having been summoned, and Rauch embarked
on a reign of terror which can only be compared
to that of Germany in the Cameroons. He
organized the Jewish-constitutionalist party into
bands which went by the name of the “Black
Hand.” Their motto was “For the Emperor,
and for Croatia,” and their weapons were murder
and assault, which they were allowed to use with
impunity against their opponents. At the same
time an organized judicial persecution of the
Serbs was set on foot. But even this tyranny
could not break the national resistance.
At this juncture a new contingency arose.
The Monarchy was preparing to annex Bosnia
and Hercegovina, and a suitable pretext had to
be found. The Government accordingly invented
the “Greater Serbian agitation.” The heroic
struggle of the Serbo-Croat Coalition was represented
as being the outcome of a Greater Serbian
agitation, and Baron Rauch was commissioned
to unmask this “widespread criminal conspiracy.”
In the summer of 1908, to the amazement
and consternation of the people, large
numbers of Serbs, chiefly priests, school-masters
and business men, were arrested, and the official
Press triumphantly announced that a horrible,
widespread and highly treasonable propaganda
had been discovered! The preliminary investigations
lasted a long time, and March 3rd, 1909,
saw the opening of the proceedings against the
“traitors” who had conspired with Serbia for
the detachment of all the Slavonic South from
the Monarchy. The trial lasted till October 5th,
when all the accused parties received very heavy
sentences. Immediately afterwards the Austrian
historian Dr. Heinrich Friedjung stated in the
Viennese Neue Freie Presse, that the leaders of
the Serbo-Croat Coalition were also implicated
in this conspiracy, especially Frano Supilo,
Grga Tuškan and Božidar Vinković, and that
his accusation was founded on documentary
evidence. Hereupon the whole Serbo-Croat
Coalition took proceedings against Dr. Friedjung
for libel. The result of this case, which was
fought in Vienna, caused a European sensation.
It was conclusively proved that all the documentary
evidence against the Coalition, both in the Zagreb
and the Viennese trials, had been forged by order
of Baron Aehrenthal, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and Count Forgach, the Austrian Ambassador
in Belgrade. Friedjung himself confessed
as much in court. The consequence
of this unparalleled exposé was, that the King-Emperor
had to rescind the sentences already
passed in the Zagreb trial.17 Meantime, however,
the desired object had been gained, and Bosnia-Hercegovina
was annexed contrary to the will
of all the Slavs.
But, with scandalous details incidental to
the annexation, Baron Rauch’s mission had been
brilliantly fulfilled. Soon afterwards Kossuth’s
perfidious Government was turned out and
Croatia’s old oppressor, Count Khuen Hedervary,
became Premier. Khuen, however, was a
personal enemy of Rauch, and occasioned his
recall. In his place Nikolaus von Tomašić
was appointed Ban of Croatia—a most eminent
and highly-respected Croatian scholar, but
politically a satellite of Khuen. He did his
best to restore order, and to this end negotiated
with the Serbo-Croat Coalition. Frano Supilo
protested most emphatically against this. He
had already had exhaustive experience of Magyar
perfidy, and had no desire to see his people once
again walk into the trap. But the Coalition
was perhaps weary of the struggle—perhaps
they still hoped for fair dealing, and accordingly
entered into a compact with Tomašić which
made peaceful government possible so long as
the rights of the nation were respected. On
the strength of this compact several Government
candidates were returned at the next
election; after which Tomašić promptly ignored
the Coalition and governed only with his
own party. Supilo’s prophecy was fulfilled,
and the Coalition had once more to join the
Opposition. Tomašić was overthrown but the
Austro-Hungarian Government replied by sending
Herr von Cuvaj, the Terrorist Commissioner,
and suspending the Constitution. These were
the days of bitterest misery and unscrupulous
tyranny in Croatia. Cuvaj ruled with the knout,
and the knout only. Police espionage flourished,
and all personal, political and civil liberty
was set at naught. All this time the Balkan
War was raging, and woe to the Serb or
Croat who dared to rejoice at his brother’s
victories. But, when the Balkan Alliance was
victorious, the Southern Slavs knew that from
henceforth they could rely on a measure of
support from their kinsmen. Vienna and
Budapest were equally perspicacious and realized
the advisability of changing their tactics.
Cuvaj was recalled and Count Stephen Tisza,
one of the most inveterate enemies of the Slavs,
sent Baron Skerlecz to Croatia with instructions
to conciliate the Croats. The effete Serbo-Croat
Coalition was once more cajoled, and, for the
third time, it entered into a disastrous compact
with Hungary. This time one of the consequences
was the expropriation of the Croatian
sea-board in favour of Hungary. Moreover,
the present crisis found the Coalition helplessly
committed to the Government.
But the people had stood firm. The dire
sufferings of recent years have begotten a new
and healthy movement, which includes the
entire youth of Croatia. The younger generation
has lost faith in political parties, and begun to
go its own way along the path which leads
away from Hungary and away from Austria,
back to union with their scattered kindred.
Their aim is the establishment of a great, free
and independent Southern Slav State. At the
head of this younger generation stands a man
of magnetic personality—Frano Supilo.
The Southern Slavs in Dalmatia, Carniola and
Istria fared little better than their brothers in
Croatia and Slavonia. I have already alluded
to the economic neglect of Dalmatia. In
politics, Germanization was practised in much
the same way as Magyarization in Croatia.
Dalmatia unfortunately does not enjoy independence,
even on paper, and thus her oppression
could wear a perfectly constitutional guise. The
Dalmatian “Sabor,” like that of Istria and
Carniola, is an assembly quite at the mercy of
the viceroy for the time being, who would never
dream of convoking it, unless he had made quite
sure that no inconvenient resolutions would be
passed. As a rule these “Sabors” enjoy prolonged
periods of rest, and the people are only
represented by their delegates in the Viennese
Reichstrat. There these delegates certainly
make a brave fight, but they are too few, and
their voice is drowned by the huge German
majority. Because of this and also through the
fault of the Slovene Roman Catholic party,
Carniola has become strongly Germanized,
especially as regards the administration of the
schools. But the Dalmatians and Istrians are
a sturdy, progressive people, Slav to the backbone,
and all attempts at Germanizing them
have proved as futile as the beating of waves
upon the shore. Beside the German danger,
this people also has the Italian danger to contend
with. For opportunist reasons the Austrian
Government has always favoured the Italian
element (4 per cent. in Istria and 2 per cent. in
Dalmatia) and granted them concessions, which
have given rise to the most absurd anomalies.
For instance, the election law in Istria is so
framed, that 96 per cent. Slovenes and Croats
send fewer delegates to Vienna than 4 per cent.
Italians. The same injustice prevails in the
Parish Council election law, but in spite of this
the Italians would never secure their majority,
if special Government regulations did not compel
all officials and State employees to vote Italian.
If to-day Italy is apparently able to claim a sphere
of interest in Istria, this is the outcome of a chance
state of affairs, arbitrarily created by the Austrian
Government. As an instance of this policy, I
will state that shortly before the outbreak of
the war the Government seriously contemplated
the foundation of an Italian University for a
population of 700,000 souls, while strenuously
opposing the foundation of a Slovene University
for 1,400,000 Slovenes and Croats
in Carniola and Istria. Of course this
policy made the Italians aggressive, and they
continued to extend their sphere of interest
until it actually included the Quarnero Islands,
although these islands do not possess one single
Italian inhabitant, and these very islands are the
most sacred possession of the Southern Slavs.
They are the only spot in Slav territory
where the old Slav tongue is still spoken
by the people. This fact is amply borne out
by publications of the Southern Slav Academy,
and also of the Russian Academy, which sends
its scholars year by year to these islands to study
the language. In the province of Dalmatia the
populace have themselves dismissed the Italian
question from the order of the day, and the local
government of Zadar (Zara) is the only possession—and
a very problematical one at that—which
the Italians might claim, and that only
because of the truly mediæval election laws. For,
as soon as vote by ballot for the Parliamentary
elections was introduced in the Austrian Crown
lands, the Croatian candidate was returned by a
majority of 7,000 votes over his Italian colleague.
The pro-Italian attitude of Austria was and
is as insincere as the rest of her policy. It
is simply dictated by the “divide-et-impera”
principle, because an alliance between Slavs and
Italians would have been fatal to the Government.
One nationality was played off against the
other, and the Italians proved willing tools in
the hands of Austria. The influence of Italian
culture, which has for centuries been received
with love and admiration by the Southern
Slavs, has created an Italian-speaking zone of
culture in the coast-lands of the Adriatic; and
the Italians, assisted by the Austrian Government,
have made the most of this zone until
they have actually had the audacity to include
it in their sphere of national aspirations. Thus
Austria created an enemy both for herself and
the Slav peoples, an enemy with whom the
Southern Slavs have never before had any real
quarrel. Antagonism led to bitter conflicts, and
if the Slav population in Dalmatia and Istria
have begun to detest the Italian zone of culture
it has been purely in self-defence and for fear of
having to pay with their national existence
for the amity and admiration of centuries.
Nowadays, the Italians themselves admit that
Dalmatia and Istria are indigenously pure Slav
countries. Probably the present struggle has
also revealed to them the true value of Austria’s
favours.
In Bosnia and Hercegovina, Austria pursued
the same heartless policy. Out of the three
religions of one people she made three nationalities,
and then fostered dissensions between
them. Her policy was especially bitter against
the Serbs, who are in the majority and also the
more highly-educated element of the population
and therefore more able to give effective support
to the just claims of Serbia. Austria was not
in the least interested in the prosperity of the
country, and merely created an intolerable chaos
by her political intrigue in a land that had already
suffered beyond endurance. Her evidences of
civilization exhibited before Europe were pure
humbug, and the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina
one of the most flagrant acts of injustice
ever perpetrated on a nation.
If the present war is decided in favour of the
Allies—and this is the prayer of all the Slavs—it
will become necessary to settle the Southern
Slav problem once and for all. This can only
be done satisfactorily by respecting the principle
of nationality, and by a just delimitation of the
various national zones. In disputed territories,
such as Istria or the Quarnero Islands, a referendum
ought to decide.
The Slavs have been tortured long enough.
For centuries they have guarded European
civilization against the inroads of Ottoman Islam,
which has always been synonymous with bigotry,
barbarism and sloth, and should never be confounded
with Arab Islam, or Hindu Islam, to
whom the whole world of science, art and
philosophy is eternally indebted. Austria and
Prussia are the natural heirs of Ottoman Islam,
and the Southern Slavs have made a heroic stand
against this latter-day Prussian Islam.
Civilization owes them a debt of honour, and
it is only their due that Europe should give them
justice.