The immediate effect of the battle of Bunker Hill upon the American
army—or rather armies—was one of dismay. The result was confusion. In
fact, no study of the battle can fail to impress the examiner with the
belief that outside the redoubt the whole conduct of the Americans was
haphazard. Except for Stark's regiment, which itself came on in
detachments, the reinforcements dribbled to the field in companies,
platoons, or squads. They placed themselves where the hasty judgment of
Putnam directed them, or if he was absent to beat up for more troops,
chose their own positions and fought under their own officers. Putnam
gave orders, yet was not always obeyed; and sent urgently for
reinforcements, but, though his demands were received by officers from
other colonies, got no response.[104] In this individual character of
the fighting the day was much like that of the 19th of April.
And after the battle conditions were much the same. Putnam commenced
independently to fortify Prospect Hill. On Winter Hill the New Hampshire
troops made a redoubt, and at Roxbury General Thomas hastily
strengthened his position. Even at Cambridge Ward began to fortify. Word
had been sent out to summon the militia, and as on the 19th of April
these responded with alacrity and in great numbers. It was hourly
expected that the British would sally from Boston, and the provincials
kept themselves in a confused readiness. In the meantime the British
cannon played steadily on the American fortifications, and the thunder
of the artillery spread apprehension in the neighboring country.
Abigail Adams wrote from Braintree: "The battle began upon our
intrenchments upon Bunker's Hill, Saturday morning about three o'clock,
and has not ceased yet, and it is now three o'clock Sabbath afternoon.
It is expected they will come out over the Neck to-night, and a dreadful
battle must ensue."[105] Yet the British did not come out, quiet
gradually fell on the two armies, the militia returned to their homes,
and the conduct of the siege entered on a new phase.
Now more than ever the Americans recognized that conditions were
precarious, and that the greatest need was for a better organization.
Zeal was not wanting. Whenever the British cannonade recommenced,
whenever there were rumors of an attack, the troops were ready for a
fight. But means of communication, and prompt and efficient
subordination, still were lacking. Nor does it appear that those on the
ground were able, handicapped as they were by orders from the different
provincial assemblies, to produce the necessary system. Higher political
and military authority both were needed before the army could be
efficient. Very fortunately events had been preparing to supply them.
Since the middle of May the second Continental Congress had been sitting
in Philadelphia. Among the Massachusetts delegates were Hancock and the
two Adamses. Gage on the 12th of June had consigned Samuel Adams and
Hancock to the gallows, but Hancock was serving as president of the
Congress, while the Adamses were important members of committees. They
watched and waited for the growth of a sentiment which should support
New England in its resistance.
The position of the Congress was without precedent. An illegal body, its
delegates were elected by conventions improperly constituted. It had no
authority to raise money, to purchase arms, or to direct the actions of
the provinces. Though in New England war was in progress, many of the
delegates loved the old order of things, and were not yet ready to move
toward independence. The first actions of the Congress were for conciliation.
There were those who saw that this was impossible. Of the New England
delegates, very few ever again hoped for what was called "an
accommodation." Washington, on his part, saw clearly that the end of the
old order had come. Franklin knew that independence would be the result
of the changes then in progress. Yet these men, and others like them,
knew also that they could not hurry the Congress into radical action,
and waited the effect of time. For weeks the Congress discussed and
argued, and finally passed a resolve that "an humble and dutiful
petition be presented to his majesty."[106] This would give a chance for
feelings to cool, and for the supporters of the king to work for his interest.
But events would not stand still. In England the news of Concord had not
moved the king to lenity; he saw no lesson in the tragedy, and insisted
on pressing his policy. Lord North's feeble endeavor to resign was
checked, supplies were sent to Virginia to support the governor in his
project of a rising of the slaves, a scheme was pressed to raise in
Carolina a regiment of veteran Highlanders, and orders were sent to
rouse the Iroquois against the rebels. Further, the king planned to
strengthen his forces by hiring troops from the continent of Europe.
News of all this, coming across the Atlantic, by degrees changed the
aspect of affairs, and made the members of the Congress doubtful of
reconciliation. They began to look to their own positions, and to feel
that, as Franklin said, unless they hung together they would all hang
separately. To remind them what they could do in self-defence the needs
of the army around Boston were frequently brought to their attention.
Its discipline, equipment, and leadership were poor. At last came a
petition from Massachusetts, begging that Congress should "take command
of the army by appointing a generalissimo."[107] Such a step was open
and complete rebellion, and the Congress hesitated. By private letters
to Samuel Adams the desired leader was pointed out: Washington.
The choice was doubly wise. To the Adamses it had been plain that,
though Hancock was desirous of the post, it should not be given to a New
Englander. The New England army would be knit together, and its
provincial jealousies appeased, by the appointment of a general from
another section. Further, in all the continent there was not another man
of Washington's experience, ability, and steadfastness.
Washington was then in the prime of life, forty-three years of age, and
of such physique as was needed for the bearer of the greatest burden
that had ever been put upon an American. He was tall, finely built,
majestic in carriage and impressive of feature, and accustomed from his
youth to exposure, hardship, and constant exertion. He had long been
used to depending upon himself, and had acquired an independent
judgment that was almost unerring. Further, that judgment had been
exercised on military matters. While Hancock had been at best the
captain of a militia company in time of peace, Washington had from his
nineteenth year been commissioned with higher commands, and had seen
much active service. More than one campaign owed its success against the
Indians largely to him, and it was he and his Virginians who saved the
remnant at Braddock's defeat. He had a strong temper under almost
perfect control, patience and persistence in equal amounts, and, with a
wonderful reserve, the quality of winning the confidence of all honest men.
Besides all this, he was heart and soul in the cause. While others had
discussed and hesitated, he had long ago made up his mind, not only that
the quarrel with the king would come to violence, but that all Americans
should resist to the utmost. "Shall we," he asked in a letter to a
friend, after enumerating Gage's despotic acts, "shall we after this
whine and cry for relief, when we have already tried it in vain? Or
shall we supinely sit and see one province after another fall a
sacrifice to despotism?" In a letter to a British officer at Boston, he
says, "Permit me with the freedom of a friend (for you know I always
esteemed you), to express my sorrow that fortune should place you in a
service that must fix curses to the latest posterity upon the
contrivers, and, if success (which, by the by, is impossible)
accompanies it, execrations upon all those who have been instrumental in
the execution.... Give me leave to add as my opinion that more blood
will be spilled on this occasion, if the ministry are determined to push
matters to extremity, than history has ever yet furnished instances of
in the annals of North America, and such a vital wound will be given to
the peace of this great country, as time itself cannot cure or eradicate
the remembrance of." Few in those days had such certainty of the result
of an outbreak, and few were so ready to participate in one. In the
Virginia convention he said, "I will raise a thousand men, subsist them
at my own expense, and march them to the relief of Boston." No wonder
this was designated "the most eloquent speech that ever was made." He
was not called on to make good his promise, but was sent to the two
continental congresses. At the second it was noticed that he attended
the sittings in his uniform of a Virginia colonel. Though he took no
part in the debates, he made himself felt. Patrick Henry said of him at
this time: "If you speak of solid information and sound judgment,
Colonel Washington is unquestionably the greatest man on the
floor."[108]
To make the Congress "adopt" the army at Boston, and to have Washington
appointed generalissimo, became the task of John Adams, who at this time
did the country perhaps his greatest service. There were objections to
putting a Virginian at the head of New Englanders, for colonial
jealousies, and even colonial lack of mutual understanding, might bring
about a fatal sullenness in the men. Adams discussed the matter in
private with many delegates, and could not succeed even in making the
Massachusetts and Virginia representatives agree. At last, determined to
force action, one morning he announced to Samuel Adams that something
must be done. "I am determined this morning to make a direct motion that
Congress should adopt the army before Boston, and appoint Colonel
Washington commander of it. Mr. Adams," he added in his diary, "seemed
to think very seriously of it, but said nothing."
Alone, then, but determinedly following his inspiration, John Adams laid
before the Congress his proposal. First he spoke in favor of accepting
the New England army as the army of the continent; then he began a
eulogy of Washington. Hancock's eyes flashed with resentment, and
Washington himself slipped from the room. There were a few days of delay
and debate, but the energy of Adams carried his proposals. The Congress
adopted the army, appointed four major-generals and eight brigadiers,
and finally, on the 15th of June, chose the commander-in-chief. On the
17th of June, the day of Bunker Hill, Adams wrote joyfully to his wife:
"I can now inform you that the Congress have made choice of the modest
and virtuous, the amiable, generous, and brave George Washington,
Esquire, to be General of the American Army."[109]
This was a step which the Congress could not retrace. The colonies were
now in rebellion, and the members, as they realized that the noose was
preparing for their necks, voted the meagre sum of twenty-five thousand
dollars to supply with powder the army which alone stood between them
and a sudden taking off. Yet the significance of the act was not yet
understood by the colonies at large, for a few days later the assembly
of New York voted military escorts both to Washington and to the
royalist governor, who happened to arrive on the same day.
Washington himself, however, knew better than any man the consequence
of the momentous step. He foresaw that the labor would be difficult and
the struggle long. On the 16th of June he accepted his commission, but
added: "Lest some unlucky event should happen, unfavorable to my
reputation, I beg it to be remembered by every gentleman in the room,
that I, this day, declare with the utmost sincerity, I do not think
myself equal to the command I am honored with.
"As to pay, Sir, I beg leave to assure the Congress, that, as no
pecuniary consideration could have tempted me to accept this arduous
employment, at the expense of my domestic ease and happiness, I do not
wish to make any profit from it. I will keep an exact account of my
expenses. These, I doubt not, they will discharge; and that is all I
desire."[110]
As soon as he could settle his affairs, Washington started for Boston.
In New York he heard the news of Bunker Hill, and was cheered by it. He
arrived on July 2 in Watertown, where the Massachusetts congress was
sitting, and received a congratulatory address. He then pressed on to
Cambridge, which he reached on the same day. On the 3d, a year and a day
before the Declaration of Independence, and according to tradition under
the great elm still standing near Cambridge Common, he took command of the army.
The occasion was momentous, and was so appreciated by a few at the time.
Would the critical volunteer army approve of its new chief? There was
not a murmur against him. From the first Washington's magnificent
bearing and kingly self-confidence won the admiration of his men. He
brought with him to the camp at Cambridge two who were ambitious to
displace him, yet of Lee and Gates, both retired English officers, the
first never won a personal following, and the second achieved but the
meagre dignity of leadership of a cabal. From the moment when he took
command of the army, Washington was, indeed, "first in the hearts of his countrymen."
And the student of our history cannot help remarking how providential
it was that, almost at the outset of this struggle, Washington should
come to the front. Eighty-six years later, at the beginning of the
Rebellion, there was no accepted chief. Lincoln was doubted by the
North, and the army had no true leader. By a slow process Lincoln's
commanding strength became known; by an equally tedious sifting of the
generals the qualities of Grant, Sherman, Thomas, and Meade were
discovered. Only the tremendous resources of the North could have
withstood the strain of such a delay. Had the same process been
necessary at the outset of the Revolution, the colonies could scarcely
have maintained the struggle. Had not Washington been at hand, accepted
by the Congress and admired by the army, the virtual leader of both, the
chances of success would have been slight. But he was Lincoln and Grant
in one. Time and again, through the long years, it was Washington alone
who brought victory from defeat. Without him the colonies might have
won their independence as the result of an almost interminable guerilla
warfare; but with him the fight was definite, decisive, glorious,
and—for the infant republic—mercifully short.


The army was now in the hands of a soldier, one who knew, if any man
did, what was needed to make the raw militiaman into a professional.
Washington fell at once to work. "There is great overturning in camp,"
wrote the Reverend William Emerson, he who had watched Concord Fight
from the window of his study. "New lords, new laws. The Generals
Washington and Lee are upon the lines every day. New orders from his
Excellency are read to the respective regiments every morning after
prayers. The strictest government is taking place, and great distinction
is made between officers and soldiers. Every one is made to know his
place and keep in it.... Thousands are at work every day from four till
eleven o'clock in the morning."[111]
This simple statement shows, in the wonder of the clergyman, not merely
how much was now being done, but how little had been done before. As on
the day of Bunker Hill, Ward had been a headquarters general, but
Washington was "upon the lines." Many times later we find him exposing
himself recklessly; now we see him constantly on active patrol of his
outposts, supervising the new fortifications or the carrying out of the new regulations.
Apart from fortifying, which he drove early and late, his immediate
difficulties were with the army organization, and these difficulties
began immediately. He brought with him commissions for his
major-generals and brigadiers, and the commissions of the former he
bestowed at once. The fourth major-general was Putnam of Connecticut,
who had had as his colleague Joseph Spencer, of the same colony.
"General Spencer's disgust," wrote Washington on the 10th of July, "was
so great at General Putnam's promotion, that he left the army without
visiting me, or making known his intention in any respect."[112]
Upon this, Washington prudently withheld the other commissions, and
proceeded cautiously, with regard to jealousies among the officers. By
careful diplomacy he succeeded in retaining for the new establishment
the services of most of the colonial brigadiers, for Spencer returned,
and Thomas, who saw his juniors promoted over his head, agreed to take
rank beneath them. Only one among the new appointees, Pomeroy, the
veteran of Louisburg who had fought at the rail fence at Bunker Hill,
declined his commission. He had marvelled that in the battle Warren
should be taken and he, "old and useless," be left unhurt. Now he
withdrew from further service on account of his age; yet, going later
upon a volunteer expedition, he died of exposure.
Before the jealousies of the higher officers were settled, Washington
turned to the smaller fry. He now had to meet the nature of the New
England volunteer. "There is no such thing," he wrote before very long,
"as getting officers of this stamp to carry orders into execution.... I
have made a pretty good slam among such kind of officers as the
Massachusetts government abounds in, having broke one colonel and two
captains for cowardly behaviour in the action on Bunker Hill, two
captains for drawing more pay and provision than they had men in their
company, and one for being absent from his post when the enemy appeared
and burnt a house close by it.... In short, I spare none, and yet fear
it will not all do, as these people seem to be attentive to everything
but their own interest."[113]
Washington was experiencing the difficulties which Lincoln was later to
know, in dealing with the host of fair-weather soldiers and jobbing
self-seekers who come to the front at the outset of a war. There was
every reason why for some time he should estimate the New England
character from what he saw of its worst side. Yet before the seven
years of war were over he knew its better aspect. Massachusetts sent to
the war nearly twice as many men as any other colony, and Connecticut
was second. Measured by this standard, Washington's own colony came
third in devotion to the cause.[114]
We know that later he acknowledged his appreciation of the devotion of
New England to the cause and to his person. It is particularly
interesting to learn that he reversed his judgment in one of the cases
mentioned above. Among those cashiered for disobedience of orders and
alleged cowardice at Bunker Hill was John Callender, captain of an
artillery company. The trial went against him, and Washington dismissed
him "from all further service in the continental service as an officer."
Callender, determined to wipe off the stain on his honor, remained as a
private in the artillery service, and found his opportunity at the
battle of Long Island, where the captain and lieutenant of his battery
were shot. "He assumed the command, and, refusing to retreat, fought his
pieces to the last. The bayonets of the soldiers were just upon him,
when a British officer, admiring his chivalrous and desperate courage,
interfered and saved him."[115] Washington ordered the record of
Callender's sentence to be expunged from the orderly book, effected his
exchange, and restored him his commission.
Yet in too many of the cases the sentence of incompetence or cowardice
was just. Even when simple laxity of discipline was at the bottom of
trouble, the effect was exasperating. Washington had much to teach the
minor members of his army. That it was in all outward aspects a truly
volunteer assemblage, we have the testimony of an eye witness. "It is
very diverting," wrote the Reverend William Emerson, "to walk among the
camps. They are as different in their form as the owners are in their
dress; and every tent is a portraiture of the temper and taste of the
persons who encamp in it. Some are made of boards, and some of
sailcloth. Some partly of one and partly of another. Again others are
made of stone and turf, brick or brush. Some are thrown up in a hurry,
others curiously wrought with doors and windows, done in wreaths and
withes in the manner of a basket. Some are your proper tents and
marquees, looking like the regular camp of the enemy.... However, I
think this great variety is rather a beauty than a blemish in the
army."[116]
When we consider, however, that the men were dressed as variously as
they were housed, and armed as from a museum of historical curiosities,
we can easily see that the commander would not agree with the clergyman
that such variety was to be admired. We find him advocating the purchase
of uniforms. If nothing better can be had, he will be content with
hunting-shirts, since a common costume would have a "happy tendency to
unite the men, and abolish those provincial distinctions, that lead to
jealousy and dissatisfaction."[117] Washington strove also, but by the
end of the siege was still unable, to provide for his men some form of regulation firearm.
He found, further, that the number of the troops had been overestimated.
After waiting eight days for returns which he expected in an hour after
his requisition, he found that, instead of the twenty thousand troops he
had been led to hope for, he had but sixteen thousand effective men.
With these he had to maintain a front of eight miles, against an enemy
who could at will strike at any point.
In such a situation the only safeguard was fortification. Before
Washington's arrival the redoubts on Prospect and Winter Hills had been
completed, with scattered minor works. Washington at once began by
strengthening these, and by finishing all uncompleted works. Then, in a
manner characteristic of the whole siege, and which never failed to
take the British by surprise, one August evening he sent a party to
Plowed Hill, "within point blank shot of the enemy on Charlestown Neck.
We worked the whole night incessantly one thousand two hundred men, and,
before morning, got an intrenchment in such forwardness, as to bid
defiance to their cannon."[118]
The British cannonaded for two days, but the Americans, finding to their
disappointment that no assault was intended, finished the work at their
ease. Similarly, as we shall see, Washington later took Lechmere's
Point, commanding the river and the Back Bay. Before many weeks the
works at Roxbury were made "amazing strong," and the rebels were in
position to welcome an encounter. But there was no assault, and
Washington had instead to meet the vexations of his office.
These were often trivial enough. A company would protest against the
appointment of an officer unknown to them, a town would apply for
special guard, a prisoner would demand the privilege of wearing his
sword.[119] Washington met such requests with unvarying courtesy, but
with firmness; even to the governor of Connecticut he refused troops for sea-coast protection.
One little correspondence throws a gleam of unconscious humor on the
dull routine of Washington's correspondence. Hearing of hardships
suffered in Boston by prisoners taken at Bunker Hill, Washington wrote
to remonstrate. Gage returned answer two days later; its original is
found in Burgoyne's letter book, "as wrote by me." It begins in the
usual style of the literary general: "Sir, To the glory of civilized
nations, humanity and war have been made almost compatible, and
compassion to the subdued is become almost a general system. Britons,
ever pre-eminent in mercy, have outgone common examples, and overlooked
the criminal in the captive." Entering a general denial of Washington's
charges, the letter goes on to bring counter-accusations, and finally,
after giving valuable advice, the writers exhort Washington—of all
men!—to "give free operation to truth."
Truly, as Burgoyne's biographer admits, there is something irresistibly
ludicrous in the spectacle of such generals lecturing such a man. The
sequel was honorable to the American chief. At first determined to
retaliate upon some prisoners in his hands, he changed his mind,
apparently because they, having been captured off Machias as their
vessel neared land, had "committed no hostility against the people of
this country."[120] The general therefore gave them the practical
freedom of the town of Northampton.
One other correspondence caused about this time a flutter of excitement.
Charles Lee was one of Washington's four major-generals, a man who had
seen military service in many parts of Europe and America. He had served
in the British army from 1747 until 1763, when, his regiment being
disbanded, he served in Poland and Turkey, and finally, in 1772, came to
America. Here he took up, almost violently, the cause of freedom,
perhaps because of disappointment in the English service, perhaps
because he foresaw opportunity. At any rate, he made himself
conspicuous, and was generally regarded as the foremost military man in
America, Washington alone excepted. Events proved that Lee acknowledged
no superior, and impatiently desired to be rid of his chief. Washington
was always on formal terms with his subordinate, no doubt because he
read in his character, besides a certain ability, an unstable
temperament and a hasty judgment. When once Lee was at Cambridge he
immediately rushed into a correspondence with Burgoyne, under whom he
had served in Portugal thirteen years before.
The tone of his letter was highly literary. Lee reminded Burgoyne of
their old friendship, and then, with many flourishes, went at his
business. He lamented the infatuation of the times, when men of the
stamp of Burgoyne and Howe could be seduced into an impious and
nefarious service, and reminding Burgoyne of various bygone incidents,
called to his mind his experience with the wickedness and treachery of
the present court and cabinet. He spread himself at large on the
principles of the present struggle, rejoiced that Burgoyne came by
command of the king rather than his own desire, and warned him of the
miscreants who had infatuated Gage. Then, explaining how his three years
in America had acquainted him with facts, Lee begged Burgoyne to
communicate the substance of the letter to Howe, who to his horror
seemed to be becoming the satrap of an Eastern despot. Protesting his
devotion to America as the last asylum of liberty, Lee signed himself
with the greatest sincerity and affection.
The letter was written before Bunker Hill, but not answered until the
8th of July. In his reply, Burgoyne hinted, with references to Locke,
Charles the First, and James the Second, that he was equally well
grounded in the principles of liberty. He urged Lee to lay his hand upon
his heart, and say whether the Americans wanted freedom from taxation or
independency. He, Burgoyne, with the army and fleet, and the king
himself, was actuated only by the desire to maintain the laws. Then,
having letters from England which were to be delivered into Lee's own
hands, Burgoyne proposed a personal interview at the lines on Boston
Neck, and sent the compliments of Howe, Clinton, and Percy.
It must be admitted that Burgoyne's purpose in this proposal was quite
other than to deliver letters, or even to argue upon political
differences. In a letter to Lord North Burgoyne explained his real
purpose in entering into correspondence with a rebel. In the proposed
interview he would have cut Lee short in his paltry jargon, and pressed
upon him the real facts in the case. Next he would have shown him the
glory accruing to a successful mediator, and then, playing upon his
pride, his interest, and his ambition, would have suggested a return to
his allegiance. Burgoyne supposed that the reference to a mediator would
have brought to Lee the memory of General Monk, and would have flattered
him with the same intention to restore the state.
There is upon this plan of Burgoyne's but one comment to be made, and
that has been clearly stated by his own biographer. "If an American
General could have been found base enough to purchase his restoration to
the favour of his late Sovereign by gross treachery to his adopted
country, an English General should surely not have thought it worthy of
his character and position to bribe him to such an act."[121]
Lee was not caught in the trap, though perhaps not owing to his own
caution. Burgoyne's letter was laid before the Provincial Congress,
which forbade the meeting. In a brief letter Lee explained that it was
feared that the interview might create jealousies and suspicions.
Burgoyne caught at this statement as showing, in the American staff,
dissensions fruitful of future results; but the hope was never
justified. Lee's future share in the siege faded into insignificance,
and his damage to the American cause was not to come until later.
Washington may have supervised the correspondence and influenced its
result. It affected him not at all, but in the midst of many such little
affairs he found opportunity for really aggressive work. Once he was
well fortified, the next step was to vex and disturb the enemy by
cutting off supplies by sea, and making the approach to Boston
difficult. For the latter purpose a detachment went boldly in broad
daylight and burned the lighthouse at the harbor's mouth. Since the
first attempt was not satisfactory, the same men went again, and
finished the job. Other little expeditions, carried on against either
the harbor islands or the shipping near the town, were successfully
undertaken. The men for such purposes were the fishermen of the
sea-coast towns, thrown out of work by the fisheries bill, and burning
with patriotic feeling.
Washington turned them to still better account in beginning a navy. To
be sure, the little fleet which presently was busily at work was at
first a spontaneous growth, for whenever a store-ship or king's sloop
ran aground or made land at the wrong harbor, dories and fishing-vessels
swarmed out to board it. Even before Washington's coming privateers were
acting for the country, but with no better standing than pirates, for
they sailed under no flag and bore neither commission nor letters of
marque. The provinces of Connecticut and Rhode Island legalized the
achievements of those who were busy in their waters, but for the
adventurous spirits who dared the men of war in Massachusetts Bay
nothing was done until Washington found the way. Since, even though the
need was imperative, he could not properly authorize the existence of a
navy, we find him, on the second of September, wording a commission in
the following manner: "You being appointed a captain in the army of the
United Colonies of North America, are hereby directed to take command of
a detachment of said army, and proceed on board the schooner Hannah,
at Beverly." And thus the American Navy began its existence. Its vessels
were few and small, being chiefly "converted" fishermen; its purpose was
to intercept stores and gain information; and it was especially
forbidden to engage with armed vessels, "though you may be equal in
strength, or may have some small advantage." Before the end of the siege
this little company of vessels was invaluable to Washington.
But in Washington's army lay his chief hopes—and also his chief
difficulties. That whenever there was a chance for a fight the men were
very ardent, he was glad to acknowledge. But that when there was nothing
to relieve the monotony of the camp they were indifferent to all
discipline, he knew only too well. They were incorrigible traders of
uniforms and equipment, sticklers for seniority upon but a few months'
service, insistent for furloughs for return to labor on their own
affairs, and troublesome even in demanding pay by lunar instead of
calendar months. In order that their Yankee ingenuity might find less
time to invent more trouble for him and for themselves, Washington very
sensibly worked them hard at his fortifying, "Sundays not
excepted."[122]
There were, however, difficulties which could be got over neither by
work, nor by thought, nor by gradually licking an army into shape.
Powder and arms both were lacking.
Powder was scarcely to be had anywhere. It was little made in the
colonies, especially not in the neighborhood of Boston. Again and again
we find Washington writing for it, and occasionally reporting his exact
situation. More than once the army had but nine rounds to a man. On the
twenty-fourth of August Washington writes: "We have been in a terrible
situation, occasioned by a mistake in a return; we reckoned upon three
hundred quarter casks, and had but thirty-two barrels."[123] A few days
later the situation was better, but still was bad enough, for he writes:
"We have only one hundred and eighty-four barrels of powder in all
(including the late supply from Philadelphia), which is not sufficient
to give twenty-five musket cartridges to each man, and scarcely to serve
the artillery in any brisk action one single day." He sent to Bermuda to
seize a supply, but his vessels arrived too late. Supplies did slowly
dribble in, and sometimes came in encouraging quantities when a
store-ship was captured. But there never was plenty on hand, and too
often not enough, for the powder would deteriorate in bad weather, as
was shown at a skirmish at Lechmere's Point. As the troops formed for
duty, cartridge boxes were examined, "when the melancholy truth
appeared."[124] Further, the men, from whom the lack of powder was
concealed, were fond of amusing themselves by indiscriminate shooting.
We find General Greene, in an order to his troops, threatening severe
punishment to those who shot at geese passing over the camp. And so,
with little acquisitions of powder, and steady depletion, Washington was
never for a day properly supplied.
His difficulty in finding muskets, though never so great, was always
considerable. The gunsmiths of Philadelphia, who had been expected
speedily to equip his army, were not able to supply a satisfactory
portion of the arms required, so that Washington was reduced to sending
agents through the neighboring towns to buy guns. Their success was
small. He tried also to buy the muskets of those men who, on the
expiration of their term of service, went home. Here again the result
was poor, for the men, mindful of the possibility of militia service,
were very unwilling to part with their arms.
Yet the men had an ineradicable propensity to dicker among themselves.
Arms and equipment changed hands in true Yankee fashion; even clothing
was traded in, and the camp, when the men were off duty, must at times
have been as busy as a market. Nothing better shows this than the diary
of David How, whose brief entries prove him to be a true New Englander.
Months later than Washington's first attempts to buy arms from the men,
we find entries as follows.
"13 (January, 1776) I Bought a gun & Bayonet & Cateridge Box of Joseph
Jackson and gave 42/6 Lawfull Money for the Whole. I have been Makeing
Cateridges this Day....
"20 I Bought a frock & Trouses of Parley Macingtyre and give 6/Law.
"22 Peter Gage Staid Hear Last Night and I bought 3 Pare of Shoes of him
@ 5/6 per pare
"23 I sold a pare of Shoes for 6/8.
"26 I Sold my Cateridge box For 4/6 Lawfull Money.
"16 March I sold my gun to Timothy Jackson for Three pound Lawfull Money."
We see in David How, even when soldiering, the qualities which later
made him one of the richest men in Haverhill. The diary shows, also,
what appears to be the visit to the camp of a shoe pedler. Modern
disciplinarians would scarcely condone this, nor would they permit How's
opportunity of making money when cooking for his company. For he writes:—
"24 day (January, 1776) I Cook this day & Bought 3 Barrels of Cyder for 9/per Barrel.
"25 day I Bought 7 Bushels of Chesnuts & give 4 pisterens per bushel.
"30 We have Sold Nuts and Cyder Every Day This Week."
It was in the face of this well-nigh incorrigible tendency to make money
out of the situation that Washington struggled to turn his militiamen
into soldiers. We gather from his orderly books that he had difficulties
with disorders of many kinds, not the least of which were caused by the
visits of "pretended suttlers"[125] who sold bad rum. To check
drunkenness he licensed the sutlers and limited their activities, and
for general discipline he worked steadily to show officers and men alike
what was expected of them. And all the time he diligently tried to
purchase weapons, though with so little success that at last he even
took up the question of implements more primitive than muskets. There
was in camp a company of Stockbridge Indians, who were so successful as
to waylay a British sentry or two and kill them with arrows. Franklin,
perhaps taking the hint from this, wrote to prove that the long-bow
might be revived, but Washington would have none of it. Pikes, however,
whose use in European warfare was fairly recent, he would consider. A
number were ordered, and after them a second set of stronger make, the
first being "ridiculously short and light."[126]
In October came to light the treason of Dr. Benjamin Church. As already
shown, he had for some time before the 19th of April been in
communication with Gage. On the 22d, when he went into Boston with the
knowledge of the Committee of Safety, he doubtless saw the general in
person. An occurrence now showed that he was writing to the British
commander, though his agency was not at first suspected. From Newport
came a letter, brought by an American patriot to whom it had been given
by a woman from Cambridge, who had requested to have it delivered to
some officer of the British vessel stationed in the harbor. The American
kept the letter, and, suspecting its purport, opened it. It was in
cipher. This in itself was suspicious, and the letter was brought to
Washington, who caused the woman to be arrested and questioned. At first
she was obstinate, but finally she named Church as the writer of the
letter. He in his turn was put under guard, but had had time to destroy
any papers that might betray him. The letter when deciphered proved to
give little information besides the numbers of the American forces. From
first to last Church had been of little value to Gage.
But the army and country, as Washington wrote, were "exceedingly
irritated." Church was a man of pleasing address and ready language, and
had stood high in Boston for years. He had written Whig pamphlets, had
been an orator on the Massacre, and had served on many committees,
notably the Committee of Safety. In consequence he had been given the
highest office that a physician could look for, that of surgeon-general
to the army. Resentment at his betrayal was extreme, and Abigail Adams
was probably right when she wrote, "If he is set at liberty, even after
he has received a severe punishment, I do not think he will be safe."
Church was not set free. As a member of the Massachusetts Congress he
was brought before the House, and allowed to make his defence, which was
elaborate and able. Church claimed that he was writing to his brother,
and that his intentions were harmless; but he was not believed, and was
expelled from the House. Later the Continental Congress adjudged him
guilty, and ordered him confined in jail. Released later on account of
his health, he was allowed to sail for the West Indies. His vessel was
never again heard from.
This was Washington's foretaste of the treason of Arnold. It may have
disturbed him deeply, but of that he gave no sign. So far as we can see,
he dismissed the matter from his mind and went on with his work of
providing a way for assaulting the town. Congress desired this, the
country looked for it, and his own fiery nature urged him to the risk.
On the 11th of September, having previously notified his generals that
he would lay the question before them, he had called a council of war,
and proposed an attack upon Boston. They were unanimously against it.
Now, in October, he again laid the matter before his council of war, and
reached practically the same result, General Greene alone thinking the
scheme practical, "if ten thousand men could be landed at Boston."[127]
If it is true that councils of war do not fight, the result was natural;
but the situation was a very difficult one. The British had made
Charlestown practically impregnable against anything except surprise, by
a powerful redoubt on Bunker Hill. As for Boston itself, it was
fortified at all prominent points, and was very strongly garrisoned by
veteran troops. The Neck could not be forced, and to cross in boats over
the Back Bay was a hazardous undertaking. It was common sense,
therefore, to wait until ice should make it possible to assault the town
at several points. With his wonderful patience Washington accepted the
situation, and contented himself with wishing that the British would
attack him. There were continual rumors that the British plan was laid,
and deserters frequently came from Boston prophesying a sally; but still
the regulars lay in their fastness, and did not move.