Attitude of the other races to the Italian struggle.—Inconsistency
of Kossuth.—Attitude of the Provisional Government of
Lombardy.—Hesitation of Charles Albert.—His two declarations
about the Lombard war.—The war adopted by Leopold of Tuscany.—By
Ferdinand of Naples.—Confusions of the Pope.—General
Durando.—Radetzky at Mantua.—The first battle of
Goito.—Mazzini in Milan.—Casati, Charles Albert, and the Italian
Volunteers.—The Southern Tyrol.—Venice.—Manin's error.—Durando
and Manin.—Charles Albert's attitude towards Venetia.—The
Pope's difficulty.—The Encyclical of April 29.—Its effect.—The
Mamiani Ministry.—Effect of the Pope's attitude on Charles
Albert's position.—The fall of Udine, and its consequences.—Charles
Albert and Venetia.—Casati and Mazzini.—The question
of the Fusion.—Its effect on opinion.—The Neapolitan Coup
d'Etat of May 15.—The recall of the Neapolitan troops from
Lombardy.—Pepe and Manin.—Battle of Curtatone.—"The
handful of boys."—Second battle of Goito.—Capture of Peschiera.—The
vote of fusion.—The émeute of May 29 and its effects.—The
struggle and fall of Vicenza.—The Austrian conquest of
Venetia.—The vote of fusion in Venice.—The attack on Trieste.—German
feeling in Frankfort.—The various difficulties of the
Frankfort Parliament.—Effect of Archduke John's election.—Anti-Italian
decisions.—The struggle in Italy grows fiercer.—Charles
Albert's new blunders.—Mazzini's advice to the Lombard
Government.—Charles Albert at Milan.—The final treason.—The
Austrian reconquest of Lombardy.—The 8th of August in
Bologna.—Repulse of Welden.—The struggle between Frankfort
and Berlin.—The question of Posen.—The Schleswig-Holstein
war.—The Assembly and the King.—The truce of Malmö.—The
fatal vote.—The riots at Frankfort.—The "state of siege."—The
Struve-Putsch.—The Vienna Parliament.—The race struggle.—Change
of feeling towards the Magyars.—Intrigues of Latour.—Character
and policy of Ferdinand.—Jellaciç.—The conference at
Vienna.—"We meet on the Danube."—Stratimiroviç and Rajaciç.—Colonel
Mayerhoffer.—The Magyar deputation.—The mission
and death of Lamberg.—Latour and Pulszky.—Murder of
Latour.—Jellaciç and Auersperg.—Blum and Bem.—The battle
of Schwechat.—Fall of Vienna.—Death of Blum.—General
remarks.
The struggle of races described in the last chapter
had not been without its effect on the progress of
affairs in Italy. Those Austrians, whose one desire
was for the unity of the Empire, spoke of Radetzky's
camp as the only place where Austria was truly
represented; while, on the other hand, the leaders of
the different race movements were divided in their
feelings about the Italian war. The Germans, both
at Frankfort and Vienna, saw with chagrin that Lombardy
and Venetia were slipping away from German
rule; but they felt, nevertheless, that they could not
entirely condemn a struggle for freedom and independence.
The Bohemians, especially in the first part of
the struggle, would gladly have let the Italian provinces
go, if they could thereby have facilitated the
federal arrangement of the rest of the Austrian Empire.
Among the Croats there seems to have been
some division of feeling on the subject. Gaj and the
purely national party had some sympathies with
Italian liberty; but Jellaciç, and that large body of
his followers who mingled military feelings with the
desire for Croatian independence, were eager to show
their loyalty to the House of Austria by supporting
the war in Italy; and they were, moreover, not unmindful
of the rivalry between Slavs and Italians in
Dalmatia and Istria. The Magyars, in the early days
of the March movement, had been more disposed than
any race in the Empire to show friendliness to Italy;
and Kossuth's Italian sympathies had been specially
well known. But circumstances changed the attitude
of the Croats and Hungarians to Italy, as the struggle
went on; for, while the former desired to recall the
Croat forces from Italy to the defence of their home,
the latter became more and more desirous of conciliating
the sympathies of the Emperor. The wish to
preserve a strictly legal position led some of the
members of the Hungarian Ministry to dwell upon
the claims due to the Austrian Government under the
Pragmatic Sanction; and Kossuth, without sympathising
with this feeling, was easily induced to give way
to his colleagues, by his fear of the encouragement
which the recall of Croatian regiments would give to
the desire for Croatian independence; and therefore, in
spite of his belief in the justice of the Italian cause,
he strongly supported the use of Hungarian troops in
crushing out the freedom of Italy.
But, interesting as the Italian struggle was to all
the different races of the Austrian Empire, it was yet
working itself out in a way so distinct from either the
Austrian or the German movements, that we are compelled
to ignore the exact chronological order of
European events in order to understand its full significance;
and we must therefore now go back to the
events which followed the March risings and the flight
of Radetzky and Palffy. The centre of interest was
still in Milan, where Casati and the Town Council
had been changed by the force of circumstances into
the Provisional Government of Lombardy. These
men had shown, during the siege, a continual uncertainty
of purpose and readiness to compromise; and,
when Radetzky had been driven from Milan, they
showed an equal unreadiness to follow up their advantages.
In the people, however, there was no want of
willingness to carry on the struggle; and at least one
general rose to the occasion. Augusto Anfossi had
died of his wounds during the siege; but Luciano
Manara, the youth who had captured Porta Tosa, was
following up the retreat of Radetzky, placing guards
in the villages, and cutting roads. Manara found
it very difficult to carry out his plans; partly owing
to the distrust shown to him by the General whom
the Provisional Government had placed over him,
partly to the insubordination of Torres, one of the
leaders of the Genoese Volunteers, who was nominally
acting under him, and whose defiance of Manara
seems to have been at least tolerated by the Provisional
Government.
For Casati and his friends put their trust not so
much in any Lombards as in the help derived from
Charles Albert. That Prince, indeed, had hesitated
as usual till the last moment. When the news of the
Milanese rising had reached Genoa, the Genoese had
risen and sent volunteers to assist the insurgents; but
Charles Albert had not only forbidden their march,
but had sent troops to drive them back from the
frontier. So indignant were the students of Turin at
this action that they rose against Charles Albert, and
would not submit until they were allowed to volunteer.
Several officers even threatened to leave the
Army if war was not declared on Austria; Parma
and Modena were rising at the same time against the
Austrian forces, and demanding annexation to Piedmont;
while Mazzini and his friends were issuing
appeals from Paris to urge their followers to support
Charles Albert, if he would venture on war with
Austria. At last Pareto, the most democratic of
Charles Albert's Ministers, assured him that, if he did
not act, a rebellion would break out in Piedmont; and
so, on March 23, having demanded of the Austrians
the evacuation of Parma and Modena, and having
been refused, Charles Albert ordered the Austrian
Ambassador to leave Turin, and straightway declared
war. Yet even now he left doubtful the exact object
of the war; for, while he declared to the Provisional
Government that he came "to lend to the Peoples of
Lombardy and Venetia that assistance which brother
may expect from brother, and friend from friend," he
announced to the other Governments of Europe that
he had only intervened to prevent a Republican rising.
He then despatched General Passalacqua to Milan,
announcing that he himself would not arrive there
until he had won a victory over the Austrians.
But, however ungraciously Charles Albert had
done his part, he had succeeded in quickening the
enthusiasm of the Italians for a war against Austria.
Leopold of Tuscany had announced, two days before,
that the hour of the resurrection of Italy had struck,
and that his troops should march to the frontier of
Tuscany; and, on April 5, he frankly declared the
purpose of this march, and ordered his troops to help
their Lombard brothers. Riots broke out both in
Naples and Rome, and the Austrian arms were torn
down. Guglielmo Pepe hastened back to Naples,
after twenty seven years of exile, and demanded the
immediate departure of the troops for Lombardy.
Ferdinand yielded to the popular cry, and consented
to make Pepe general of the expedition. Pius IX.
was less easy to move. He had become thoroughly
scared at the progress of events; and though he had
consented to grant a Constitution, much like that of
other Princes, he could not reconcile in his mind the
contradictions between his position as Head of the
Catholic Church and as a Constitutional Italian
Prince. The former position seemed to require of
him a claim to absolute authority in home affairs,
and a perfectly impartial attitude towards the various
members of the Catholic Church, whatever might be
their differences of race or government. The latter
position seemed, on the contrary, to demand that he
should adapt himself to the freer life which was
growing up in the different Italian States, and that
he should become the champion of Italian unity and
liberty against the Emperor of Austria. His own
inclinations and sympathies would have led him to
sacrifice the new office to the old one. He was,
as already explained, much more a priest than a
prince, much more a Conservative than a Reformer.
His priestly training combined with his weak health
to make new ideas distasteful to him; and his sense
of his duties as Head of the Catholic Church worked
in with that very kindliness of disposition which had
betrayed him into the position of a reformer, to make
him oppose a fierce and dangerous war. Under these
circumstances, he looked with alarm on the new
impulse which Charles Albert had given to the anti-Austrian
feeling throughout Italy.
But he was, for the moment, in the hands of stronger
men, who were determined on driving him forward.
Massimo d'Azeglio was in Rome seconding the efforts
of Ciceruacchio for the war; and Giovanni Durando
(a brother of the Giacomo Durando who had written
on Italian Nationality) was appointed general of the
forces which were to march to Lombardy. Even
now the Pope refused to recognize the object of their
expedition; and as the troops filed past him, on
March 24, he blessed them, but only as the defenders
of the Roman territories against assailants; and when
a young man cried from the ranks, "Holy Father,
we are going to fight for Italy and for you," he
answered, "Not for me; I wish for peace, not war."
Durando, however, issued a proclamation to his
troops in which he declared that, since Pius IX.'s
approval of the war, "Radetzky must be considered
as fighting against the Cross of Christ." Pius IX.
angrily repudiated this speech in the Government
Gazette, declaring that he would soon utter his own
opinions, and that he did not require to express them
through the mouth of a subordinate. But nobody
took any notice of this protest, and the troops
marched to Lombardy.
In the meantime Charles Albert was beginning the
war in an unfortunate manner. Eager to distinguish
himself by an engagement with Radetzky, he was
resolved to march after him to Lodi instead of seizing
on the important fortress of Mantua. Mantua had
attempted to shake off the Austrian yoke at the time
when other cities of Lombardy were rising; but a
desire to act through the Municipal Council led the
citizens to hesitate in their movement. The want of
communication with other towns prevented them from
being aware of the position of the Austrian troops;
and, on the evening of March 22, Benedek, one of the
Austrian generals, was able to crush out the incipient
rising. But the news of the Piedmontese advance
once more stirred the Mantuans to action; on the
29th they rose again, threw up barricades, organized
a Civic Guard, and eagerly hoped that Charles Albert
would come to support them. When Radetzky found
that Charles Albert did not seize on this important
fortress, he availed himself of the blunder to march
at once to Mantua; and, on March 31, that city fell
again into the hands of the Austrians. This victory
at once alarmed the Piedmontese, who, under the
command of General Bava, set out, on April 8, to
Goito, a village a few miles from Mantua. The
Austrians occupied the little bridge across the
Mincio at the entrance to the village, and the
Tyrolese sharpshooters sheltered themselves behind
an inn which stands near the bridge on the Mantuan
side. The Piedmontese, mistaking the stone ornaments
on the inn for sentinels, fired at them; shots
were returned by the Austrians, and a fierce encounter
followed, during which several of the troops
from the Italian Tyrol deserted the Austrian ranks
and joined the Piedmontese. The Austrians, finding
themselves beaten, attempted to blow up the bridge;
but had only succeeded in destroying one arch before
they were driven back. By this victory the Piedmontese
obtained the command of the whole line of
the Mincio from Mantua to Peschiera, and cut off all
communication between the two wings of the Austrian
army, one of which was in Mantua and one in
Verona.
The battle of Goito roused the greatest enthusiasm
for Charles Albert; and it unfortunately strengthened
the Provisional Government of Milan in their determination
to rely rather on him than on their own
people. How much popular force they might at this
time have gained was shown by an event which took
place on the very day after the battle of Goito. On
that day, April 9, Mazzini arrived in Milan. About
eight o'clock in the evening he appeared on the
balcony of the Albergo della Venezia, which stands
directly opposite the place occupied by the Provisional
Government. He addressed a few words to
the people, waving the tricolour banner. He spoke
in terms of warm approval of the Provisional Government,
and praised them for rejecting a truce which
Radetzky had proposed, and for endeavouring to
secure a complete representation of the Lombard
provinces in the Assembly which met at Milan; and
when Casati appeared he greeted him warmly. But
Mazzini soon found that, neither in the camp of
Charles Albert, nor in Milan, were the leaders disposed
to welcome the help of the Republican forces.
When Mazzini applied to the Provisional Government
to grant employment to those who had already had
experience in revolutionary wars, he was told that no
one knew where they were; and when he answered
this objection by producing the men, their services
were refused. The Swiss, who flocked in from the
Canton Ticino, were in the same way repelled; and
even a more illustrious volunteer than any of these
found cold reception in Charles Albert's camp; for it
was at this period of the war that Garibaldi arrived
in Lombardy in the full splendour of the reputation
he had won as a champion of liberty in Monte Video.
But, when he offered his services to Charles Albert,
he was told that he might go to Turin, to see if and
how he could be employed.
One of the great points of difference between the
policy of the Republicans and that of Charles Albert
was that the former desired to press forward to the
Alps and excite an insurrection against Austria
amongst the population of the Southern Tyrol.
That population, in spite of its Italian blood and
language, had been loyal to Francis of Austria in
the time of Andrew Hofer; but the ungrateful policy
of the Austrian Emperor had gradually alienated the
sympathies of the Italian Tyrolese; and, while even
in Frankfort the representatives of the Southern
Tyrol were asking for local self-government in their
own country, the population were ready to rise on
behalf of Garibaldi and Manara. But the dislike of
many of the Piedmontese officers to the war, and the
hesitation of Charles Albert between war, diplomacy,
and complete abandonment of the cause, led the
official leaders of the Lombard movement to repel
any proposal for so extending the area of the war as
to drive the Austrians to extremities, and to make
them unwilling to accept a diplomatic settlement of
the contest.
Many of those who were repelled by Casati and
Charles Albert went to find a more generous welcome
at Venice. The extremely democratic character of
the Venetian insurrection had impressed all observers;
and it was specially noted that an artizan, named
Toffoli, had been admitted into the Provisional Government
of Venice. But, hearty as Manin was in his
desire to enlist the sympathies of all classes, he could
not help being a Venetian, and not a Milanese. However
narrow and aristocratic Casati and his friends
might be in their personal feelings, they were the
official representatives of a city whose glories were
connected with the memories of a time when it was
the head of a league of free cities;[14] while Venice, even
in its long struggle against the Turks or in its resistance
to the papacy in the seventeenth century, could
never be taken as the champion of free civic government.
Manin and Casati seem alike to have been influenced
by these traditions; and while the future Council of
Lombardy had been fully constituted by April 13th,
it was not till the 14th of that month that the Provisional
Government of Venice consented to allow
the towns of Venetia to choose representatives,
who should take a real share in the government of
the province. The consequences of this hesitation
were most unfortunate. Treviso, Padua, Rovigo,
Vicenza, and Udine had formed Provisional Governments
even before they knew that Venice was free;
and they would then readily have joined the Venetian
Republic; but observing some hesitation on the part
of Venice to answer to their appeal, Vicenza offered
herself to Charles Albert. This decision excited some
indignation in Venice; for Manin had hoped that the
old towns of Venetia would be willing, under whatever
form of government, to act with the chief city;
and whatever errors Manin may have committed in
the delay, he was more zealous than either the
Milanese or Piedmontese Governments for the protection
of the Venetian towns from the Austrian forces.
Nor, indeed, was it wholly the result of the above-named
hesitation that Manin was not able to secure
that co-operation which he desired between Venice
and the other Venetian cities. There seems to have
been a tendency in the civic governments, and still
more in those officers who came to help the Lombards
and Venetians, to look rather for orders to Casati and
Charles Albert than to the rulers of Venice; and this
tendency was still further increased by the anomalous
position of the officers of the Papal troops. Durando,
the chief of these officers, was vividly conscious that
he had come to Lombardy in an independent manner,
and in spite of the discouragement of the Pope; and,
though he was willing to fight for Venice, he wished
to do so in his own manner, and refused to listen to
Manin's directions about the plan of operations. He
felt no doubt that it was safer to take orders from an
established sovereign, like Charles Albert, than from
the head of an un-"recognised" revolutionary Government;
and while he wished to march to the aid
of Padua, he desired to do so as an officer of Charles
Albert. But the same motives which led Charles
Albert to abandon the Southern Tyrol were making
him hesitate, at any rate, about extending his campaign
to Venetia. So he forbad Durando to enter
Venetia, and sent him instead to protect the Duchies
of Modena and Parma.
While these conflicting interests were weakening
the efforts of the defenders of Lombardy and Venetia,
another apple of discord was thrown into the camp by
an Encyclical from the Pope. As already mentioned,
Pius had discouraged the march to Lombardy, and
had promised to state his own opinions instead of
accepting those of Durando. His Ministers, feeling
the uncertainty of the position in which the Papal
troops were placed, urged him to come to a more
definite decision on this point. At no time was such
strong pressure brought to bear from opposite sides
on the feeble mind of Pius IX. On the one hand,
disturbances were breaking out in the provinces; and
the indignation at the Pope's hesitation was stirred
to greater bitterness by the want both of food and of
work which was being felt in Rome. On the other
hand, two powerful influences were being exerted to
induce Pius to abandon the Italian cause. In Germany
great bitterness had arisen against the Italian
war; and the German Catholics were threatening to
break loose from the Papal authority. At the same
time, Ferdinand of Naples, who had never heartily
sympathised with the struggle for Italian freedom,
was trying to inspire the Pope with jealousy of the
designs of Charles Albert. To say the truth, Ferdinand
was not without excuse in this matter; for,
while he was being driven to declare war on Austria,
the Sicilian Assembly were deposing him from the
throne of Sicily, and discussing a proposal to offer
their island to a son of Charles Albert. Therefore the
Neapolitan Ambassador was directed to use his influence
with Pius IX. for the promotion of a league
between Rome, Naples, and Tuscany, which was to
counteract the power of Piedmont. Thus, then, those
rival instincts, of the Head of the Church and the
Italian Prince, were both appealed to, to secure the
opposition of the Pope to the war; and however
much he may have been terrified by the disturbances
in the provinces, those disturbances did not tend to
increase his sympathy with the popular movement.
Such was his state of feeling, when on April 28th, his
Ministers, headed by Cardinal Antonelli, entreated
him to give his open sanction to the war. The result
of this petition was directly contrary to the desire
expressed by the signers of it; for, on April 29th
there appeared a Papal Encyclical absolutely repudiating
the Italian war.
In this document, the Pope complained of the desire
of the agitators to draw away from him the sympathy
of the Catholics of Germany; and he proceeded to
justify and explain the course that he had hitherto
followed. He alluded to the demand for reform
which had been made in the time of Pius VII., and
to the encouragement which that demand had received
from the programme presented to Gregory XVI. by
the Great Powers. That programme had included
a Central Council, improvement in the Municipal
Councils, and above all the admission of the laity to
all offices, whether administrative or judicial. Gregory
had not been able to carry out these ideas completely;
and therefore Pius had been compelled to develope
them further. In this he had been guided, not by
the advice of others, but by charitable feeling towards
his subjects. But his concessions had not produced
the result which he had hoped; and he had been
compelled to warn the people against riots. These
warnings had been in vain; and he had been forced
to send troops to guard his frontier, and to "protect
the integrity and security of the Papal State." He
protested against the suspicion that he sympathised
with those "who wished the Roman Pontiff to preside
over some new kind of Republic to be constituted out
of all the Peoples of Italy." He exhorted the Italians
to abandon all such theories, and to obey the Princes
of whose benevolence they had had experience; and
he, for his part, did not desire any further extension
of his temporal power, but would use all his efforts
for the restoration of peace.
The greatest indignation was aroused by this
Encyclical; but it was still possible for the Pope to
find protection in that superstition which Ciceruacchio
had so industriously encouraged. The cry was again
raised that the Cardinals were misleading the Pope,
and special charges of treason were made against
Antonelli. Some of the more zealous patriots even
talked of carrying off the Pope to Milan, that he
might see for himself the real condition of the war.
At the same time appeals were made to the humanity
of Pius; it was pointed out to him that, if he disowned
his soldiers, they would be liable to be treated
as brigands; and instances were quoted of the cruelty
of Austrian soldiers to those whom they had captured.
Partly moved by humanity, and partly by fear, the
Pope at last yielded; and on May 3 he summoned to
office Terenzio Mamiani, so lately under suspicion
as a half-amnestied rebel; and Mamiani speedily
avowed his zeal for the war, declaring it a holy cause.
But, in spite of this change of front, the Encyclical
produced a dangerous effect on the Lombard war;
and its first result was to strengthen the power of
Charles Albert, by compelling Durando to place himself
more definitely than before under his orders, and
by leading the Italians in general to look to the King
of Sardinia as their only trustworthy leader. Fortunately,
this accession of strength came to Charles
Albert at a moment when he was rousing himself
from that state of hesitation which had followed the
victory at Goito. That hesitation, however, had given
time for Radetzky to fortify Mantua more strongly;
while Nugent, at the head of another Austrian force,
had marched into Venetia. The Venetians, ill-supported,
were little able to stand against the invader;
and the important town of Udine fell into the hands
of the Austrians. This startled both Charles Albert
and Casati; and, while the Provisional Government
of Lombardy turned to Mazzini for advice, Charles
Albert at last consented to allow Durando to advance
into Venetia. Durando sent his subordinate officer
Ferrari before him; and on May 8, Ferrari encountered
the Austrians at Cornuta, and drove them back.
He then continued the struggle in hopes of new reinforcements
from Durando; but, when Durando had
not arrived at four o'clock in the afternoon, the
soldiers were compelled to retreat. Then they were
seized by a sudden panic, and they cried out that
either Ferrari or Durando had betrayed them. The
consciousness of the illegal position in which the
Papal Encyclical had placed them, still further increased
the panic of the soldiers; Ferrari was forced
to retreat to Mestre, and Durando to Vicenza. In
Vicenza, indeed, the latter defended himself gallantly
enough; and the people seconded his efforts. Women,
old men, and children, rushed to put out the lighted
balls which the enemy threw into the city; and, after
a struggle of about twelve hours, the Austrian forces
were compelled to retreat.
But by this time Charles Albert had again repented
of his invasion of Venetia; and, refusing to come to
the help of Durando, he turned his attention to the
fortress of Peschiera. The zeal of the Milanese
Government had been even more short-lived than that
of Charles Albert. Mazzini had proposed the formation
of a Council of War, to be composed of three
men, and to be accompanied by a levée en masse of
what were called "the five classes." The Government
consented to summon only the first three classes,
alleging as their excuse, the distrust which they felt
for many of the peasantry. Mazzini also proposed to
issue an appeal for volunteers, and to place his own
name first on the list. The Government consented;
but, before the appeal had been prepared, they had
changed their mind and withdrawn their approval
from the proposal. The Council of War was changed
into a Committee of Defence for Venetia, then into a
Committee of aid for Venetia, and finally disappeared
altogether. Charles Albert's secretary announced
that the King did not choose to have an army of
enemies in his rear, and inscriptions on the walls of
Milan threatened Mazzini with death. The leaders
of the volunteers, who had been pressing forward to
the Alps, were discouraged; and General Allemandi,
their commander, was so ill supported that he resigned
his office.
The war seemed to be rapidly changing its character;
and the desires of Charles Albert appeared to
be more exclusively concentrated on the aggrandisement
of his own Kingdom. When he had first
entered Lombardy, both he and the Milanese leaders
had announced that the form of Government would
be left undecided till the victory was won; but they
now changed their tone, and prepared for a union
between Piedmont and Lombardy. On May 12, the
Milanese Government issued a decree that the population
of Lombardy should decide by a plebiscite the
question whether Lombardy should be immediately
incorporated with Piedmont under the rule of Charles
Albert. The Republicans, held in check to a great
extent by Mazzini, had hitherto refrained from giving
prominence to their political opinions. But Mazzini
now felt it necessary to protest against this proposal;
and all the more strongly because Charles Albert's
secretary had hoped, by the offer of the premiership
in the future Kingdom of North Italy, to induce him
to assist in promoting the fusion between Lombardy
and Piedmont. He therefore now issued a protest
against the taking of any political vote of this kind
while the war was going on; both because it was
absurd and unnatural in itself; because it was a
violation of the promises of the Government; and
because it gave a pretext for foreign intervention, by
changing the war of liberation into one of conquest.
The champions of Charles Albert were infuriated at
this opposition; Mazzini's protest was publicly burnt
in Genoa; and the Provisional Government of Lombardy
resolved to go on with the Plebiscite. This
decision tended undoubtedly to bring great confusion
into Lombardy. It weakened the sympathies of
those Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians who had
been well disposed towards the Italian struggle for
independence; while it gave an excuse for the opposition
of that larger body of politicians, who had
hesitated between Liberal principles and national
prejudice, and who were now eager to declare that
the war had ceased to be a struggle for Italian
liberty, and was merely designed for the aggrandisement
of Charles Albert.
But, however much Charles Albert's interests
might suffer from his changeable policy, he always
was helped out of his difficulties by the contrast
between his questionable acts, and the unquestionable
badness of some other prince. As the Papal
Encyclical had come at the right moment to redeem
the credit which he had lost by his slackness after the
Battle of Goito, so the treachery of the King of
Naples served, at this crisis, to throw, by force of
contrast, a more favourable light on the ambitious
proposals for the fusion of Lombardy with Piedmont.
Ferdinand of Naples had reluctantly consented to
join in the Italian war. The hearty dislike of Liberty,
which he shared with the majority of the Bourbon
family, combined with his special jealousy of Charles
Albert to increase his desire to abandon this expedition.
He feared that a Kingdom of North Italy
would be the natural result of the war, even if the
popular enthusiasm did not carry Charles Albert
into schemes of greater aggrandizement; and he had
a not unreasonable grievance against the King of
Sardinia in the recent choice by the Sicilians of the
Duke of Genoa as their King. The priests in Naples,
unlike those in Lombardy and Venetia, were intriguing
on behalf of Austria, and had circulated the
rumour that St. Januarius was a friend to the
Austrian Emperor. In spite of these intrigues, a
Liberal majority had been returned to the Neapolitan
Parliament; and the King, therefore, resolved to put
still further limits on the power of that Parliament,
by demanding of the members an oath which would
have admitted Ferdinand's right to suppress the
Sicilian movement, would have enforced the complete
acceptance of the Roman Catholic faith, and
would have prohibited any attempt to enlarge or
reform the Constitution.
This oath the deputies refused; but in spite of the
advice of his Ministers, the King resolved to insist
upon it. Tumults arose in the city, and barricades
were thrown up; but the deputies, while thanking
the people for their zeal, urged them to remain quiet,
and to pull down the barricades. Some of those
who had taken part in the rising withdrew from the
streets in consequence of this appeal; but others
demanded that the royal troops, drawn up in the
piazza of the palace, and near the church of San
Francesco, should be withdrawn at the same time.
The deputies went to wait upon the King; but
whilst they were in conversation with him, they
heard the first shots fired by the soldiers upon the
crowd. Ferdinand then scornfully told the deputation
to go home and consider themselves; "for the
Day of Judgment is not far from you." He had one
great advantage on his side. That degraded class,
the Lazzaroni of Naples, had always been fanatical
supporters of the King and St. Januarius; and it is
even said, that, while the troops were firing on the
people, Ferdinand was exclaiming to the Lazzaroni,
"Go forward!" "Naples is yours!" While massacre
and outrage were raging in the streets, the deputies
sent a message to the French admiral, whose fleet
was anchored in the Bay of Naples, to entreat him
to intervene in the name of France. But he answered
that he had been ordered not to interfere in
the affairs of another people.
The deputies then passed a resolution, declaring
that they would not suspend their sittings, unless
compelled by brute force. An officer soon after
came to disperse them; and, after a written protest,
they yielded to this violence. Every liberty was
shortly after crushed out; and, though, for about a
month longer, a kind of spasmodic struggle went on
and though, after a time, the Sicilians consented to
send some help to the insurgents, the movements
were too ill-organized to have any permanent strength;
and the Government were able to suppress them by
repeated massacres.
Ferdinand's coup d'état had taken place on May 15.
In the meantime, the Neapolitan forces under Pepe
had been slowly advancing through the Papal territory
collecting volunteers as they went. The slowness
of their march had been due in part to the
suspicious attitude of the Pope, who feared that the
King of Naples might seize on those territories,
which had always been a bone of contention between
Naples and Rome. Pepe therefore had not yet left
the Papal territory, when he received orders to
abandon the war, and to return to Naples. At the
same time he was told that, if he did not wish to
return, he might resign his command to General
Statella. Pepe was resolved to advance; but it
seemed doubtful how far his authority would outweigh
that of the King, and of the subordinate officers
who were on the King's side. The Bolognese, who
had risen in March to drive out those Austrian
troops which had lingered in Ferrara, and to expel
the Duke from Modena, now rose to insist that Pepe
should lead on his forces to Lombardy. Statella
was compelled to fly from the city; and those soldiers
who returned to Naples were followed by the
curses of the Romagnoli. Several of the officers
were willing to act with Pepe; and he passed the
Po with two battalions of volunteers, one company
of the regular forces, and some Lombards and
Bolognese. But many of these deserted him even
after he had crossed the Po; and by the time he
reached Venice, there remained with him only one
battalion of riflemen, whose officer had served under
him in 1815. But, however poorly attended, Pepe
was heartily welcomed by Manin, and was soon after
made Commander-in-Chief of all the land forces of
Venice. These were composed not only of Venetians
and Neapolitans, but also of Lombards, Romans, and
even Swiss. The Neapolitan admiral, too, at first
refused to obey the orders of the King, and continued
for a time to defend Venice on his own authority.
In the meantime, while the resources of the Lombard
towns were being drained to support the designs
of Charles Albert, he was devoting his energies to
the siege of Peschiera. Radetzky, seeing that the
weakest part of the Italian army was stationed near
Mantua, resolved to march from Verona, which was
the headquarters of the Austrians, attack the right
wing of the Italian army near Mantua, drive it
across the Mincio, and so march to the relief of
Peschiera. At a comparatively short distance from
Mantua he reached the small collection of scattered
houses which formed the village of Curtatone. A
band of 6,000 Tuscans, chiefly composed of University
students, and commanded by their professors,
were marching along the road which lies between
Curtatone and Montanara, on their way to join the
Piedmontese army at Goito. There were, at that
time, open fields on both sides of the road stretching
along in an unbroken plain; and no defences had
been made; for when Radetzky, at the head of 20,000
men, came upon the Tuscan band, the latter were
far from expecting any attack. General de Laugier,
who was in command of the Tuscans, resolved to
resist; and for six hours this gallant little troop
held its own against the overwhelming forces of the
Austrians. But superiority in numbers and training
at last prevailed; and, fighting inch by inch, the
Tuscans were driven back to Montanara, and were
either killed or captured. The same "fanaticism"
which Radetzky had observed in Milan, seemed to
show itself here also; and as his officers marched the
young prisoners before him after the battle, he exclaimed
in scorn, "Did you take six hours to beat a
handful of boys?"
But the "handful of boys" had done their work;
for, when Radetzky once more marched across the
bridge at Goito, with his prisoners, he found Charles
Albert at the head of his forces ready to receive him.
The fight was fierce; the King and his eldest son,
Victor Emmanuel, were both wounded; but at the
close of the day, a new battalion dashed forward and
compelled the Austrians to retreat. The day before
this battle, while the Tuscans were still fighting
between Curtatone and Montanara, the fortress of
Peschiera had surrendered to Charles Albert; and
while he was still exulting over his triumph, there
had come to him the news that the Lombard plebiscite
had been decided in favour of the fusion with
Piedmont.
But it was not without much bitterness that it had
been so decided. Mazzini's protest against the proposal
of the fusion had been temperate and reasonable;
but it had been sufficient to attract the attention
of the enemies of Italy; and, while Gioberti had
come to Milan to arouse sympathy with the movement
for the fusion, a Jew named Urbino (who was
unknown to the Republican leaders in Milan) was
taking advantage of the differences of opinion to stir
up riots against the Provisional Government. On
May 28 (the day before the actual closing of the
poll) an anonymous placard appeared, calling on the
National Guard and the people to meet in the Piazza
San Fedele, in front of the office of the Provisional
Government. A deputation of the National Guard
was about to demand the deposition of its captain; and
the crowd which gathered in the Piazza San Fedele
mixed itself up with the deputation. One of the agitators
named Romani, demanded the convocation of a
Constituent Assembly and denounced the proposed
vote of fusion. Many even in the crowd opposed
Romani; and the President, by promises of further
security for personal freedom, was able to disperse
them. The next day, however, they gathered again,
with cries against the Piedmontese, and broke into
the civic palace. The students heard of the disturbance,
and rushed to the rescue of the Provisional
Government. Casati had at first been panic struck;
but he now gathered courage, and tried to address
the people. Urbino attempted to drown his voice by
shouting that the Government had resigned; and he
exhibited a list of a new Government, composed of
some of the leading Republicans in Milan. Casati
snatched the list from his hand, and tore it in pieces.
Many voices in the crowd denounced Urbino, and
the rioters were speedily arrested or dispersed.
The unreality of this demonstration, as an exhibition
of any popular feeling, was clear from every
circumstance connected with it. The innocence of
the Republican leaders might be gathered from a
stern protest against the proceedings issued by Mazzini
directly after; and the real source of the agitation
might not unfairly be inferred from the cries of "Viva
Radetzky," which broke out from some of the less
cautious agitators. But the Provisional Government
either was, or seemed to be, alarmed about the
possible consequences of the riot of May 29; and
Cernuschi, who had been the first to propose the
deputation to O'Donnell which had preceded the
struggle of the Five Days, and who had fought
gallantly during that struggle, was arrested at midnight
on the very night of the riot, and sent to prison.
He was soon after set free, from want of any evidence
against him; but the bitterness which his arrest had
caused against the Provisional Government did not
so soon come to an end.
This quarrel between the two sections of the
national party in Milan tended to strengthen the
power of Charles Albert. Casati had originally felt
little sympathy for the Piedmontese aristocracy; but
his growing distrust of Milanese feeling strengthened
the effect produced by the victory at Goito, and the
capture of Peschiera, and induced him to rest his
hopes for the success of the struggle against Austria
solely on Charles Albert, and the Sardinian army.
And while the divisions in Milan strengthened
Charles Albert's power in Lombardy, the weakness
of the cities of Venetia, though due to a large extent
to the previous vacillation of Charles Albert, was yet
compelling them more and more to appeal to him as
the recognised leader of the most important Italian
force in the North of Italy. This tendency had been
resisted by Daniel Manin, who was strongly opposed
to the fusion of Venetia with Piedmont; and when
he found that Charles Albert was unwilling to help
the Venetians on any other terms, he had been
disposed to turn for help rather to France than to
Piedmont. But the prestige of Charles Albert's
victories in Lombardy were attracting Vicenza and
Padua to the scheme of fusion; and nothing but the
proof that Venice could save Vicenza could counteract
this tendency. Manin and Tommaseo felt so
much the importance of this point, that they even left
Venice for a few days to go to the help of Vicenza;
and the coldness of Charles Albert towards the
defence might, if Vicenza had held out, have worked
in favour of Manin's views. But Radetzky also saw
the importance of this siege, and resolved to lead the
attack in person. He appeared before the city on
June 9, and on the following day succeeded, after a
fierce struggle, in occupying the heights which surrounded
it. The defence speedily became hopeless;
and, though Durando was afterwards blamed for the
surrender, and even suspected of treason, there seems
little reason to suppose that the town could have
obtained better terms than those which were now
granted it, if it had attempted a longer resistance.
The garrison was allowed to go out with arms and
baggage; the lives and property of the inhabitants
were to be safe; and a full amnesty was to be granted
for the past; the garrison only binding themselves
not to bear arms for three months. The fall of
Vicenza seemed to mark the crisis of the struggle in
Venetia. Padua, Treviso, and Palmanuova rapidly
fell into the hands of the Austrians; and the citizens
of Venice now began to believe that, so far from
being able to defend the freedom of their countrymen,
they could only hope to secure their own freedom by
surrendering themselves to Charles Albert.
It was while this feeling was at its height, that the
Venetian Assembly met on the 3rd of July. Manin
recapitulated the circumstances of the war. He had
failed to obtain even recognition for his Government
from the French Republic. He admitted the growth
of the feeling in favour of the fusion; and he advised
his Republican friends to suppress for a time the
assertion of their special political creed, and to accept
the fusion as their only hope of safety. Tommaseo,
indeed, protested against the proposal; but Manin's
influence, assisted by the growing sense of weakness,
prevailed; and on July 4, the representatives of
Venetia by 127 votes against six declared their
province united to Piedmont. Manin, however,
resigned his office, as being unable to act as Minister
under a Monarchical Government.
But while Charles Albert seemed to be gaining
partizans in Lombardy and Venetia by the growing
necessities of those provinces, he was exciting against
him the opposition of those who might at one time
have been favourable to the Italian cause. On
June 16, the Sardinian and Venetian fleets had
attacked Trieste. As a military incident in the
Italian war, this attack was probably of little importance;
but its effect on the relations between the
German and Italian movements for freedom and unity
was of far greater importance than could be estimated
by merely military results. For, in Germany more
than in almost any other country of Europe, the
movement for national freedom and unity was necessitating
an amount of self-assertion on the part of the
body which represented those ideas, which unavoidably
brought it into collision with many whom it
ought to have hailed as allies. Both the necessity
and desire for this German self-assertion had been
evident from the first opening of the Frankfort
Constituent Assembly on the 18th of May. Even a
small but picturesque incident which took place on
the first day of its meeting indicated the strength of
the exclusive and defiant German feeling. An old
man of seventy-nine had attempted, during the first
stormy sitting, to address the Parliament, but his
voice had been drowned in the general hubbub. On
the following day, the member for Cologne called the
attention of the Parliament to the fact that the
deputy so unceremoniously treated was the poet
Arndt; and thereupon the whole Assembly rose, and
expressed to him their thanks for his song on the
German Fatherland.
This desire to assert its position as the representative
of German feeling had been quickened in the Parliament
by two signs of resistance to its authority. The
fiery Republicans of Baden had returned in indignation
to their State, when they found that the Preparatory
Parliament would neither establish a Republic, nor declare
itself permanent; and, provoked by the arrest of
one of their members, they had rushed into open insurrection,
which only the influence of Robert Blum
had prevented from spreading to the Rhine Province.
And, while they were preparing to suppress the
Republican opposition, the Frankfort Parliament were
startled to hear that an Assembly had met in Berlin,
which claimed, like them, to be a National Constituent
Assembly; and this rivalry was made the
more alarming by the assistance which Prussian
soldiers were at that time giving to the Grand Duke
of Hesse-Darmstadt in suppressing a popular movement
in Mainz. The Frankfort Parliament indignantly
resolved that, "This Assembly of the Empire
has alone the power, as the one legal organ of the will
of the German people, to settle the Constitution of
Germany, and to decide about the future position of
the Princes in the State." And they further resolved
that every Prince who would not submit to their
decisions "should be deprived, with his family, of the
princely rank, and should descend into the class of
citizens, and that his crown and family property
should become the property of the State." While
they thus boldly claimed to rule the internal affairs
of Germany, they were equally zealous in asserting
her rights against those who desired to infringe them.
They had resented the resistance of the Bohemians
to the proposed absorption of Bohemia in Germany;
and, while they were disposed to make some concessions
to the Poles of Posen, they made them in a
somewhat grudging spirit, and were eager to retain
in Germany all of that province which they could
prove, to their own satisfaction, to be Germanized.
It was obvious that, while such was their state of
mind, the Frankfort Parliament would watch with
jealous eyes the movement for Italian liberty. They
could not, indeed, deny that the Italians had some
claim to freedom; or that the authority exercised by
Austria in Lombardy was, both in its origin and
character, exactly of the kind most opposed to the
ideas embodied in the Frankfort Parliament. But
the extreme desire to claim Austria as a part of united
Germany naturally led the Frankfort Parliament to
look at least with tolerance on the special prejudices
of the Viennese. While they were thus divided in
their minds between principle and prejudice, the news
of the attack on Trieste came like a God-send to those
who were looking for an excuse to sacrifice their
Liberal principles to the desire for German aggrandizement.
The Parliament, therefore, resolved unanimously
that any attack on the German haven of
Trieste was a declaration of war against Germany.
A resolution of this kind naturally prepared the way
for more decided hostility to the Italian cause; and
another decision at which they soon after arrived
gave new force to the anti-Italian feeling. Even if
some Viennese Democrats might desire, or at all
events approve, the separation of Lombardy and
Venetia from the Empire, there could be no doubt
that this feeling was not shared by the members of
the House of Hapsburg. When, therefore, on June 29,
Archduke John was chosen Administrator of the
German Empire, the Frankfort Parliament almost
unavoidably identified itself with the domineering
policy of the Austrian Germans. While, then, they
claimed security for German freedom, the Parliament
triumphed savagely over the fall of the liberties of
Bohemia, refused even provincial independence to the
Southern Tyrol, and demanded that Northern Italy
should be retained in the Austrian Empire.
How far the support of the German Parliament
gave any encouragement to Radetzky it may be difficult
to say; but it is certain that, during the month
of July, his efforts to recover his ground in Italy
became more daring in character. No longer confining
himself to Lombardy and Venetia, he now marched
his troops into Modena, and attempted to restore the
Austrian authority in that Duchy. Charles Albert
was roused in his turn by this new invasion. His
chief general, Bava, rallied his forces, and drove the
Austrians first across the Po and then across the
Mincio. Charles Albert's whole feeling seems to have
been suddenly changed by these successes; abandoning
the hesitating policy which he had pursued in the
beginning of the war, he now became desperate even
to rashness; and, rejecting the advice of General
Bava, he tried to push forward to Mantua. Radetzky,
during Charles Albert's delays and hesitations, had
had time to reinforce his strength, to revive the discipline
and vigour of the army, which had been utterly
broken during the retreat from Milan, and to choose
the best positions for defence and attack. Therefore,
on July 24, he was more than ready for Charles
Albert's rash attack; and at the battle of Somma
Campagna he speedily routed the Piedmontese, and
drove them back across the Mincio. But Charles
Albert's zeal for action was not yet exhausted, and
he marched against Valleggio, in the hope of cutting
off Radetzky from Verona. In this march the King
seems again to have acted contrary to the advice of
his generals; and part of the march was conducted in
such tremendously hot weather, and with such bad
arrangements for the provision of food, that many of
the soldiers died on the road from heat and hunger.
A victory gained by General Bava, near Custozza,
strengthened the delusions of Charles Albert; but
Radetzky soon recovered his ground; the hasty march
and the want of food weakened the forces at Custozza,
and the Piedmontese were shortly after defeated on
the very ground on which they had just been victorious.
Charles Albert's assumption of military
authority and his defiance of his generals, led to
continual confusions and misunderstandings. The
result of one of these confusions was that General
Sonnaz suddenly left an important fortified position,
under orders for which both Charles Albert and
General Bava denied their responsibility. On discovering
his mistake he hastened back to his position,
to find that it had been in the meantime occupied by
the Austrians; and when he then attempted to recover
it he received one of the most severe defeats of the
campaign.
In the meantime the Provisional Government of
Lombardy were exciting the greatest irritation by
their want of vigour in the conduct of the war, and
by the discouragement which they gave to the
volunteers. As an extreme instance of this latter
fault, may be mentioned their treatment of Francesco
Anfossi. He was a brother of Augusta, the leader
of the Five Days' Rising, and had served with distinction
at Brescia; yet, on his arrival at Milan, he
was suddenly arrested without any reason being
given. When the news of Charles Albert's defeat
arrived in Milan, the Provisional Government once
more became alarmed, and again called Mazzini to
their help. He had had much difficulty in preventing
some of his more fiery followers from imitating
the example of Urbino, and organizing an insurrection
against the Provisional Government. Therefore
Casati and his friends knew that they could depend
upon his help whenever they should ask for it. His
former proposal for a Council of War was now
accepted, and he was asked to name the citizens of
which it should be composed. Of the three whom
he named, there was only one who had been a steady
Republican; while one of them had laboured to
promote that fusion of Venetia with Piedmont to
which Mazzini had been opposed. The duties of this
Committee were to fortify the town, and to provision
the army. They proclaimed a levée en masse, and
prepared to fortify the lines of the Adda. They also
made special requisitions for corn and rice, and
arranged for the bringing in of considerable provisions
from the country; though some of these were
lost by the refusal of the Piedmontese officers to
provide guards for the protection of the convoy.
They then despatched Garibaldi to raise volunteers;
and in three days he had under arms 3,000 men, and
was marching to Brescia.
In the midst of these arrangements, the Committee
suddenly heard that the Austrians had crossed the
Adda, and that Charles Albert was retreating before
them. They sent messengers to the Piedmontese
camp to learn the intentions of the King; and were
dismayed at receiving the answer that he intended
to come himself to defend Milan. They then sent
messengers to recall Zucchi and Garibaldi from the
line of the Adda to the actual defence of Milan.
But the management of the defence was now taken
out of their hands; and on August 2 the Committee
were obliged to resign their authority to the Piedmontese
General Olivieri. Olivieri, while urging the
Committee of Defence to remain in office, refused
their proposal to summon the people to the barricades.
But when Charles Albert was attacked by
the Austrians under the walls of Milan, the barricades
were thrown up in spite of Olivieri. It was,
however, then too late to save the Piedmontese from
defeat, and, on August 4, the King sent for the
Municipal Council, to tell them that he had resolved
to come to terms with Radetzky. Restelli, one of
the Committee of Defence, denied the failure of food
and money which Charles Albert had pleaded as one
of his grounds of surrender; and when the Town
Council assented to the proposal, Maestri, another of
the Committee, denied their claim to speak on behalf
of the citizens. The news that the King was intending
to desert them, roused the Milanese to fury; and
on August 5 Charles Albert promised in writing to
stay to defend the city; and General Olivieri even
promised to go to Radetzky to obtain good terms.
But he did not go; and Charles Albert, after a
secret agreement with Radetzky to put the Porta
Romana into his hands, fled secretly from Milan on
August 6. Many of the Piedmontese officers were
so indignant at this desertion, that they offered to
remain in the city and share in its defence; and the
cry was raised of "Long live Piedmont!" and "Shame
to Charles Albert!" But resistance was in vain;
and on August 7 Radetzky entered Milan. Garibaldi,
who was already on his march to Milan, attempted,
with the help of General Medici, to carry on the
struggle on the banks of the Lago Maggiore; and
Mazzini joined this little band, encouraged them to
persevere in their defence, and attempted, though in
vain, to form a connection with the defenders of
Venice. But the struggle was hopeless. The Lombard
cities rapidly fell into the hands of Radetzky;
and on August 11, Venice, left alone in her defence,
disowned her connection with Charles Albert, and
recalled Manin to power.
After this defeat thousands of Lombards left their
country; and the following extracts from a litany
composed at this period express, better than any
mere description, their feelings about this catastrophe:—"All
Italy is our country; and we are not exiles,
because we remain on Italian soil. Yet we are
pilgrims, because a vow binds us to go on a pilgrimage
to the Holy Land, that is to say to Lombardy when
it is freed. For the heart of our country is the
house of our fathers, the place where we were born,
where we have learned to pray, and where love was
revealed to us, where we have left our dead at rest,
our mothers, our sons, and our brothers in tears.
Kyrie Eleison," &c.... They then call on Christ,
the Virgin, and the Saints to deliver Lombardy
from the Austrians, and invoke them to their aid, by
the memory of the special sufferers in the cause of
Liberty, among whom they particularly specify the
Brothers Bandiera, and the defenders of Milan and
Pavia; and they end with a prayer that they may not
die until they have saluted Italy "one, redeemed,
free, and independent."
Radetzky, however, had another enemy to punish
besides the Lombards and the Piedmontese. The
action of the Pope, however uncertain, and one may
even say unwilling, had given a force to the anti-Austrian
movement which no other Prince could
have given; and, as long as the Liberals ruled in
the Papal States, Radetzky considered his work unfinished.
About three weeks, therefore, before the
surrender of Milan, a body of 6,500 Austrians had
crossed the Po, and had once more entered Ferrara.
The Bolognese, always the most politically energetic
of any of the subjects of the Pope, desired at once to
march to Ferrara; but the Pro-Legate, who ruled in
Bologna, tried to check the popular movement; and
refused to take any more energetic step than the
issue of proclamations. He even appealed to the
Bolognese to remember the fate of Vicenza as a
warning against useless defences. But the people
would not listen to him; and a declaration of the
Pope that he would defend the frontiers of his State,
increased their desire for action. Encouraged by
the peaceable action of the Pro-Legate, and by no
means alarmed at his proclamations, General Welden
entered the Porta Maggiore of Bologna at the head
of his forces on the 7th of August. Near that gate
a path leads up to a raised piece of ground called
the Montagnola, which is covered with grass and
trees. To this the Austrian forces made their way;
but, in spite of the warnings of the Pro-Legate,
Welden's demand for hostages was flatly refused.
The people rang their bells, and rushed to the barricades;
an old cannon was brought out and carried
up to the Montagnola, and by six o'clock in the
evening of the 8th of August, barricades had been
thrown up near every gate of the city. The Austrians
were driven out; and Monsignore Opizzoni,
who was in a country house outside the town, was
rescued by the citizens, and brought into Bologna.
The dreamy, old-world city at once became full of
new life; neighbours flocked in from the surrounding
districts; and soldiers who had left the city, in the
belief that it was indefensible, now returned to its
help. The Pro-Legate issued an encouraging address
to the citizens; and Welden complained that the
rulers of Bologna were unable to control the excited
spirits of the city. The Ambassadors of England,
France, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, and even Naples,
who were resident at Florence, protested against the
renewal of the Austrian attack; the enthusiasm for
the Bolognese spread to Venice, where a large subscription
was raised for the families of those who
had fallen on August 8; and finally on August 15
a meeting took place between Welden and the representatives
of the Pope, which resulted in an order to
the Austrian forces to recross the Po.
In the meantime, whatever help the Austrian
generals might have received from the approval of
the Frankfort Parliament, that assistance must have
lost its value, as the position of the Parliament became
weaker and weaker. One great difficulty, as
already mentioned, was the growing rivalry of Berlin;
and this became the more dangerous to German
liberty, as the supporters of the original struggle
for freedom continued to lose their influence in the
Prussian Court. Camphausen, the new Prime Minister,
repudiated the March Revolution as decidedly
as Schmaltz had repudiated the popular element in
the struggles of 1813. Prince William of Prussia,
the brother of the King, who was considered the
leader of the reactionary party, had returned to
Berlin; and, though he now professed to accept the
Constitution, he was believed to mean mischief.
The actual liberties, indeed, of the citizens of Berlin
had not yet been attacked; but a warning of their
future fate was given by the treatment inflicted
on Posen. Mieroslawski, the leader of the Polish
movement in Posen, had been received with enthusiasm
in Berlin during the March rising; and the
King had then given permission to the different
provinces of Prussia to decide whether or not they
should be absorbed in the new Germany. The Posen
Assembly had decided by twenty-six votes to seventeen
against the proposed absorption; and as a means of
carrying out this decision, they had removed certain
Prussian officials from office in their province. The
King of Prussia had at first seemed to approve this
change, and had despatched General von Willisen to
secure the Poles in their national rights. But when
the German party in Posen offered resistance to this
policy, the King yielded to them, withdrew General von
Willisen, and sent in his stead General von Pfuel, who
placed Posen in a state of siege, and punished all who
had taken part in the Polish movement.
But, however alarming these signs might be to the
more Liberal members of the Frankfort Parliament,
the attitude of the majority of that Parliament towards
the Poles had not been so generous as to
justify them in passing severe condemnation on
the Prussian Ministry. It was in another part of
Europe, and in a very different struggle, that the
power of the Frankfort Parliament over the King of
Prussia was to be finally tested. The March rising
in Denmark had, unfortunately, like the risings in
Pesth and Frankfort, been accompanied with a desire
to strengthen their own country at the expense of its
neighbours; and an Assembly in Copenhagen had,
on March 11, denounced the claims of Schleswig to a
separate Constitution as eagerly as the Liberals of
Pesth had demanded the suppression of the Transylvanian
Diet, and the Liberals of Frankfort the
absorption of Bohemia in Germany. The Schleswig-Holstein
Estates, however, thought that the time had
come for a more definite demand for independence:
and, on March 18, they put forward five proposals
which they embodied in a petition to the King.
These were to the effect that the members of the
Estates of both Duchies should be united in one
Assembly for the purpose of discussing an Assembly
for Schleswig-Holstein; that measures should be taken
to enable Schleswig to enter the German Confederation;
that in consideration of dangers both from
within and without, measures should be taken for a
general arming of the people; that liberty of the
Press and freedom of public meeting should be
granted; and that the Prime Minister of Denmark
should be dismissed. The arrival of the bearers of
this petition in Copenhagen caused great indignation
among the Danes; and, on March 20, a meeting was
held to pass five counter-resolutions in favour of the
claims of Denmark over Schleswig; and the temper
of the meeting was sufficiently shown by the fact
that, while the four resolutions which asserted the
power of Denmark were easily carried, a resolution
proposing a Provincial Assembly for Schleswig was
rejected by an enormous majority. War was declared
on the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein; and, in
order to prevent those Duchies from having due
notice of the war, the members of the deputation
were detained in Copenhagen until the expedition
had actually sailed. On March 27 the Danish forces
appeared before Hadersleben; and thereupon the
Schleswig-Holstein Estates declared that the Duke
of Schleswig-Holstein was no longer free, and formed
a Provisional Government.
The meeting of the Preparatory Parliament at
Frankfort had naturally increased the hopes of the
people of Schleswig-Holstein; and they elected seven
representatives to take part in the deliberations of that
Parliament. But the Schleswig-Holstein question
seemed doomed to bring into prominence all the
difficulties which hindered the establishment of the
freedom and unity of Germany. The old Bundestag
had, even before the meeting of the Frankfort Parliament,
declared its sympathy with the Estates of
Schleswig-Holstein; and, though it expressed its
approval of the election of the Schleswig-Holstein
representatives to the Frankfort Parliament, it
claimed, as against that body, the sole right of
directing the Federal forces of Germany. The King
of Prussia was, no doubt, glad enough to pit the
older body against the representatives of the newer
Germany; and it was avowedly under the authority
of the Bundestag that, in the month of April, he
marched his forces into Schleswig-Holstein. But it
soon became clear that neither the representatives of
the old League of Princes, nor the Assembly which
embodied the aspirations for German freedom and
unity, would be able to control the King of Prussia.
Early in June he showed an inclination to come to
an understanding with the King of Denmark and to
evacuate North Schleswig. The leaders of the
Frankfort Parliament felt that, in order to control
this dangerous rival to their authority, they must
create some central Power which should be able
entirely to supersede the Bundestag; and it was, to
a large extent, under the influence of this feeling,
that the Archduke John was chosen Administrator
of the Empire.
But, however much strength the Frankfort Parliament
might gain in Germany by this election, it was
hardly to be expected that the choice of an Austrian
Prince would lead to more friendly relations between
Frankfort and Berlin; and, in July, it began to be
rumoured that a truce of a more permanent kind was
about to be made between the King of Prussia and
the King of Denmark, while the King of Hanover
seemed disposed to second the former in his defiance
of the Constituent Assembly at Frankfort. At last,
in September, the crisis of the struggle came. It
then became clearly known that a truce of seven
months had been agreed to at Malmö between Prussia
and Denmark. During that period both the Duchies
were to be governed in the name of the King of
Denmark as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein; and the
man who was chosen to act in the King's name was
Count Moltke, who had been previously protested
against by the people of Schleswig-Holstein on
account of his tyrannical acts. He was to exercise
all power except that of legislation, which, indeed,
was to cease altogether during the truce; and he
was to be assisted by four Notables, two of them to
be nominated by the King of Denmark and two by
the King of Prussia.
The Frankfort Parliament felt that this truce would
sacrifice the whole object of the war; and, on the
motion of Dahlmann, they resolved, on September 5,
by 238 votes against 221, to stop the execution of
the truce. The Ministry, who had been appointed
by Archduke John, thereupon resigned, and Dahlmann
was empowered by the Archduke to form a
new Ministry. At the same time the Estates of
Schleswig-Holstein met, and denied that any one had
the power to dissolve them against their will, or to
pass laws or lay on taxes without their consent. A
public meeting of the Schleswig-Holstein citizens declared
that they would not submit to the new Government;
every one of the four Notables refused to act
with Moltke; and, when he applied to the Provisional
Government for protection, they sent him a passport
to enable him to leave the country. But the Frankfort
Parliament very soon began to shudder at its
own audacity; and, when Robert Blum urged upon
it the desirability of speedily putting in force its
decree about Schleswig-Holstein, the Parliament
decided that there was no urgency for this motion;
and some of the more timid members began to plead
the danger of a quarrel with Prussia. Arndt, who
had voted for the condemnation of the truce, now
changed sides, and urged that the Parliament should
accept it, in order to convince the Danes "that they
are a brother People;" while even those who still
condemned the action of Prussia began to propose all
sorts of compromises. At last, on September 16,
the Assembly rescinded its former vote, declaring,
by 257 against 236, that it was unadvisable to hinder
the execution of the truce.
The leaders of the German Left had felt that concession
to the King of Prussia in this dispute implied
the sacrifice of the whole object of the Parliament's
existence; and Robert Blum had declared, shortly
before the final vote, that it must now be decided
whether Prussia was to be absorbed in Germany or
Germany to become Prussian. But the decision of
the Frankfort Parliament so roused the fierce Democratic
feeling in the city that the movement of
resistance to Prussia passed out of the control of
Robert Blum, and fell under the leadership of far
fiercer and more intolerant spirits. Several thousand
Democrats belonging to the Frankfort clubs held a
meeting, on September 18, at which they called upon
the members of the Left to leave the Frankfort Parliament
and form a separate Assembly. Zitz, a representative
of Mainz, and nineteen other members,
accepted this proposal; and, in the meantime, the
Frankfort mob, headed by a man who bore the
ominous name of Metternich, threw up barricades in
the streets, and prepared for a regular insurrection.
The Ministry, in great alarm, sent for troops; and
Bavarian, Prussian, and Austrian generals alike responded
to the appeal. Robert Blum and Simon,
the member for Breslau, in vain tried to make peace;
entreating the Ministry to withdraw the troops, and
the insurgents to pull down the barricades. But the
Ministry would not listen to any advice, and the
insurgents threatened Blum and Simon with death.
Auerswald and Lichnowsky, two members of the
Right, were killed in the riot. Many fled from the
city; and it is said that, when Archduke John wished,
at last, to make a truce, no member of the Ministry
could be found to countersign the order for the
withdrawal of the troops. The struggle went on
fiercely during the 19th; but there was no organization
capable of offering permanent resistance to the
soldiers; and, by ten o'clock at night, all the barricades
had been swept away; and the Ministry soon
after declared Frankfort in a state of siege.
These events gave a shock to the hopes for combining
German freedom with German unity which
they never after recovered; and the alternative which
Blum had propounded, whether Prussia should be
absorbed in Germany or Germany in Prussia, was,
from that day, to be exchanged for the question
whether Austria or Prussia should absorb Germany.
There were some, however, who did not at once give
up their hope for a solution more favourable to freedom
than either of those alternatives. In several
parts of Germany Republican feeling seemed to have
been growing for some time past, and the fiercest and
most daring of the Republican leaders were still to be
found in Baden. The rising which had followed the
dissolution of the Preparatory Parliament had, indeed,
discredited Hecker and his friends with many of the
more moderate Democrats; and this feeling, by alienating
the party of Hecker from Robert Blum, had
deprived that able and temperate statesman of the
power which he might have gained as the head of
a united Democratic party. That rising had also,
unfortunately, brought about a collision between
Baden and Bavaria, and, at least, a feeling of suspicion
between Baden and Würtemberg. But, though
the Democratic party, as a whole, had been weakened
by the Baden rising, and though even the special
South German movement, which had seemed, in
March, to have gained so strong an influence, had
been disunited, yet, on the other hand, a certain
form of popular enthusiasm had undoubtedly been
roused by Hecker, of a kind which the wiser Democrats
had failed to excite; and the attempt of the
members of the Right in the Frankfort Parliament
to annul Hecker's election, on account of his
insurrection, had marked him out as a martyr for
liberty.
But when the Baden Republicans gathered for action
after the Frankfort riots, it was, for some unknown
reason, to Struve, rather than to Hecker,
that they offered the leadership of the movement.
Struve seems to have had fewer gifts for the work of
a leader of insurrection than his colleague had possessed.
He had been, as was proved by his programme
in the Preparatory Parliament, interested
rather in the redress of material grievances than in
the assertion of Constitutional Liberties; and, though
he now proclaimed the Republic from the Town
Council House in Lörrach, he rested his appeal to
the people mainly on the ground of the burdens still
pressing on the cultivators of the land; and he did
not allude to the Schleswig-Holstein question, nor
did he allege any Constitutional reason for proclaiming
the Republic. Blum had seen that Republicanism
was not popular in Germany; and, though he looked
forward to a Republic as the ultimate goal of his
political aspirations, he felt, during the sitting of the
Frankfort Parliament, as Mazzini had felt during the
war in Lombardy, that any violent attempt to enforce
Republican opinions would be dangerous to liberty.
Indeed, it was clear that the only possibility for even
a temporary success in an insurrection at that time
would have lain in an appeal to the national feeling
about the Schleswig-Holstein war. The movement,
therefore, failed, and failed ignominiously. The
Federal troops were sent against the insurgents; at
the first collision the latter were easily defeated; and
the insurrection was only remembered as the Struve-Putsch.
Since, then, the Frankfort Parliament no more
embodied the hopes of the Liberals; since Republican
risings seemed hopeless; and since it was hardly
to be expected from human nature that those who
had desired to establish German unity at Frankfort
should consent at once to rally round that Prussian
Parliament which had helped to defeat their efforts;
the eyes of all who would not give up the cause for
lost turned instinctively to Vienna. There, ever since
July 10, a Parliament had been sitting, which seemed
to enjoy securer freedom than could be found in other
parts of Germany. This security was partly due to
the influence of the same prince who had so much
increased the dignity of the Frankfort Parliament;
for the Archduke John was the one member of the
Royal House who had a genuine respect for liberty.
He had consented, not only to open the Viennese
Assembly, but, a little later, to get Pillersdorf dismissed
from office, on the ground of his having lost
the confidence of the people; and, in August, Ferdinand
himself was induced to return to Vienna, and
thus to give a still further sense of security to the
supporters of parliamentary government. Nor was
this Parliament without more solid results; for it
abolished in Austria that system of feudalism which
had already been swept away in Hungary.
But, in spite of this apparent success, the seeds of
division and bitterness were too deeply sown to allow
of lasting liberty in Vienna. The workmen's movements,
so often leading to riot, had been one cause of
weakness; but the most lasting and fatal cause was
that terrible race hatred, which, more than anything
else, ruined the Austrian movement for freedom in
1848. The opposition of the Bohemians to the May
rising in Vienna had intensified against them the
indignation which had already been roused by their
attitude towards the Frankfort Parliament; and the
June insurrection in Prague had been exaggerated
by German panic-mongers into an anti-German "St.
Bartholomew." When Dr. Rieger, Palacky's son-in-law,
pleaded for delay in the election of the President
of the Assembly, on the ground that the Bohemian
members had not had time to arrive, he was hooted
in the streets, and only saved from actual violence by
the intervention of Dr. Goldmark; and, when Rieger
protested against the illegal arrest and secret trial of
one of the Bohemian leaders in Prague, Bach, who had
now become the most popular of the Ministers with the
German party, evaded the appeal. Indeed the utterances
of the German party in Vienna were marked by
a combination of a somewhat arrogant assertion of
popular authority, as represented by the Assembly,
with contempt for the aspirations of other countries.
This combination of feeling was perhaps best illustrated
by the meeting of July 29, when a majority of the
Assembly, in calling upon the Emperor to return to
Vienna, indignantly rejected the word "bitten"
(entreat) from the address, and substituted the word
"fordern" (demand). On the day of this important
assertion of popular rights, the news of Radetzky's
victories in Italy was received with loud applause in
the Chamber, and a solemn Te Deum was shortly
afterwards decreed in honour of these victories.[15]
But, offensive as this contrast between the more
vulgar side of democratic feeling, and the indifference
to the liberties of Italy and Bohemia must seem to
the student of this period, there was one direction in
which the more generous instincts of the Viennese
Democrats were shown; although, even in this
matter, the generosity of principle was to be sadly
clouded by the savagery of act. The political question
which called out this better feeling was the relation
of Vienna to Hungary. It will be remembered that
the enthusiasm for Hungary, which had been awakened
by Kossuth's speech of the 3rd of March, had been
considerably damped by the attitude which the
Magyar leaders had taken up towards the May
rising in Vienna; and the more democratic tone of
Jellaciç on that occasion had led the Viennese, for a
time, to turn for sympathy to Agram rather than to
Buda-Pesth. But no concessions to monarchical
feeling which Kossuth might be disposed to make,
could reconcile the most influential of Ferdinand's
advisers to the independent position which the Magyar
Ministers had obtained. The courtiers, indeed, who
helped to form the Camarilla, might shrink at first
from any sympathy with the daring and independent
attitude of the Serbs and Croats. But the party in
Vienna which was opposed to Hungarian liberty had
been swelled, since March, by the accession of men
who were not theoretic opponents of rebellion, but
who simply desired that the new free Government
should be as thoroughly centred in Vienna as the old
system of Metternich had been.
The most important representative of this phase of
opinion was the War Minister Latour. Ever since
he had taken office, in the latter part of April, he
had been trying to make use of the discontented
races in Hungary to weaken the power of the
Magyars and to strengthen the authority in Vienna.
Although he could not at once bring round his
colleagues in the Ministry to these intrigues, nor
persuade the courtiers to sympathize with the national
leaders at Agram and Carlowitz, yet there were points
in the position of affairs of which Latour was able to
make skilful use for the accomplishment of his ends.
Of these circumstances one of the most striking was
the character of the Emperor. Ferdinand had shown
himself, ever since his accession, most desirous of
doing justice between the rival races of his Empire.
The great difficulty of balancing the claims of German
and Bohemian, Magyar, Croat, and Serb, might well
have perplexed a stronger brain and weakened a
steadier will than that of Ferdinand the Good-natured
(der Gütige); and when the painful disease, with
which he was always afflicted, is taken into account,
it will seem more wonderful that he ever maintained
a steady political purpose for however short a period,
than that he was constantly hesitating and changing
his course, as new aspects of the question pressed
themselves on his attention.
This confusion and its natural results are well
illustrated by a story which, though obviously incapable
of proof, yet, none the less, may be supposed
to embody the popular feeling about this weak but
well-meaning monarch. The story is, that during
one of his conferences with a Serb deputation, Ferdinand
had listened with tears to the descriptions of
the cruelties inflicted by the Magyars; but that, just
when he seemed about to give them a favourable
answer, he happened to glance at a note from Metternich
which was lying beside him on the table, and,
taking it up, he read these words: "Die Serben sind
und bleiben Rebellen" (the Serbs are and remain
rebels). This sentence checked Ferdinand's sympathy,
and he at once dismissed the deputation with vague
words.
Upon this desire to do justice to both sides, and
this weakness under the pressure of a stronger will,
Latour found it easy to act. A Conference at Vienna
between representatives of the rival races was obviously
an expedient, which it was easy to recommend to
Ferdinand, while it gave admirable opportunities for
secret intrigues. Moreover, whatever objections
might be entertained by the courtiers to other leaders
of the Slavonic races, there was one, at least, who
stood on a somewhat different footing. Jellaciç was
a personal favourite of the Archduchess Sophia, the
wife of Archduke Francis Charles, the next heir to
the throne. He had been a colonel in the Austrian
army, and his appointment had been looked on at
Buda-Pesth as quite as much an assertion of Imperial
authority, as of Croatian independence. On the other
hand, the fact that he had been entrusted by the
Croatian Assembly, on June 29, with almost dictatorial
powers, only ten days after he had been declared
a traitor by the Emperor, made him a trustworthy
representative of the independent nationalists
of Croatia; and while, therefore, Latour saw in him
a fit tool for his purpose, Ferdinand naturally hoped
that a meeting between Jellaciç and Batthyanyi in
Vienna might lead to a satisfactory settlement of the
quarrels between Hungary and Croatia.
In this hope the Emperor was encouraged by Archduke
John, who offered himself as a mediator between
the contending parties. But, unfortunately, the
double responsibility which Archduke John had taken
upon himself interfered with the execution of his good
intentions; for while he was urging compromises on
Magyars and Croats, the burden of his duties as
Administrator of the German Empire compelled him
to hasten away to Frankfort. And thus Batthyanyi
and Jellaciç were left face to face in a city where
there were few who desired to reconcile them, and
where the most influential people desired to aggravate
their divisions. It must be said, however, in justice
to Jellaciç, that some of the points on which he
insisted in the controversy have been somewhat
misunderstood in respect of their spirit and intention.
It has been urged, for instance, that in demanding
the centralization at Vienna of financial and military
administration, he was contending solely for the
interests of the Court, and not at all for Croatian
independence. This, however, is scarcely just; for
Jellaciç had good reason to believe that Slavonic
liberty needed protection from the Magyar Ministers
of Finance and War, since, in July, Kossuth, as
Minister of Finance, had refused supplies for the
Croatian army; and even the Serbs, who were still
in partially hostile relations with the Court, had discussed
the question of placing themselves under the
Ministry at Vienna, as a protection against the Magyars.
There were, however, other proposals made
by Jellaciç, which could scarcely be covered by this
explanation, such as the demand that Hungary should
take over a share of the Viennese debt, and that more
troops should be sent to Italy; and it was natural,
therefore, that Batthyanyi should construe the proposal
about the War and Finance Ministry, rather as
a blow at the liberties of the Magyars, than as an
assertion of Croatian independence. It was obvious
that for purposes of conciliation the Conference was a
hopeless failure; and Batthyanyi, after in vain urging
Jellaciç to abandon these proposals, rose in indignation
exclaiming, "Then we meet on the Drave."[16]
"No," said Jellaciç, "on the Danube." And so they
parted with the consciousness that war was no longer
avoidable.
But though the Conference had failed, so far as
regarded its apparent purpose, it had served to complete
the change in the policy of the Court, and in
the position of Jellaciç. From this time forward he
ceased to be the complete champion of Croatian
liberty, and became the soldier of the Emperor; and
from this time forward, therefore, the German Democrats
of Vienna resumed their old faith in Kossuth,
and considered his enemies as their enemies. The
policy of Latour had been accepted at Court, and
Ferdinand was whirled away in the vortex of aristocratic
opinion, and official intrigue. On August 4
Ferdinand officially declared his confidence in
Jellaciç; about September 1, the Viennese Ministry
announced to the Hungarians that the March laws
which had secured a responsible Ministry to Hungary
were null and void, as having been passed without
the sanction of Ministers at Vienna; and Ferdinand
endorsed this opinion.
In the meantime, even the Serb movement which
the Viennese courtiers had looked upon with special
suspicion, was passing into hands more favourable to
the authority of the Emperor. In the latter part of
July, Stratimiroviç had gained great successes in the
Banat; and his alliance with Knicsanin, the Servian
General, had led him to hope that he might be able
to throw off the authority both of Vienna and of
Buda-Pesth. But the Patriarch Rajaciç, who had
entered with such hesitation into the insurrection,
saw his only possibility of safety in placing the movement
under the authority of the Emperor. He
therefore set himself against the influence of Stratimiroviç;
and on his return from Agram to Carlowitz,
he was able to use his authority as Patriarch, backed
by the influence of Jellaciç, to recover the reins of
government, and to limit the authority of Stratimiroviç
to military affairs. At the time of the return
of Rajaciç, the war had begun to languish; but in
the middle of August the Magyars renewed their
attacks, and besieged the Serb town of Szent-Tomas.
Stratimiroviç marched to the defence, and gained
such successes that some of the Magyars raised the
cry of treason against their Generals. General Kiss
was therefore sent down to take the place of those who
had forfeited the public confidence. At first the
result of the war was doubtful; for victories were
alternately gained by the Serbs and the Magyars;
but at last Kiss, by a dexterous movement, succeeded
in preventing Stratimiroviç from joining his forces
with those of Knicsanin, and thus turned the whole
tide of the war against the Serbs. This change of
affairs naturally favoured the designs of Rajaciç; Stratimiroviç,
finding that much of the popular feeling
was turning against him, resigned his authority, and
Colonel Mayerhoffer, an Austrian officer, was sent
down to take his place. Some of the soldiers of
Stratimiroviç were, indeed, indignant at this change;
and Rajaciç was obliged to make some advances to
reconciliation; but Suplikaç, the Voyvode, backed
Rajaciç in his general plans; and by the help of their
joint influence, Latour was able to turn the Serb
cause into a new prop for the rule of the Emperor.
It is pathetic to see how, in spite of irresistible
evidence, Ferdinand still clung to the hope that he
might succeed in reconciling the leaders of the
different races in his Empire, and yet more strange to
see how he still believed that Latour would co-operate
with him for this object. He now chose as his mediator,
a Hungarian named Lamberg, to whom he gave a
commission to settle matters between the contending
parties, and to restore order in Hungary. Lamberg
was known to Batthyanyi, and seems, to some extent,
to have enjoyed his confidence; for Batthyanyi declared
that he would himself have counter-signed
Lamberg's commission, if Latour would only have
submitted it to him in time. But Latour, whose
object was very different from that of his good-natured
master, despatched Lamberg to Buda-Pesth
without that sanction which could alone secure
him legal authority in the eyes of the Hungarian
Ministers.
Some days before the arrival of Lamberg in Pesth,
a striking proof had been given of the growing sympathy
between the German Democrats of Vienna
and the Magyars, and also of that fierce race-hatred
between Germans and Bohemians which had been
stirred up by the circumstances of the June rising in
Prague. The Magyars had despatched a deputation
to the Viennese Parliament, in the hopes of reviving
the old alliance between Buda-Pesth and Vienna.
The more generous side of the Democratic spirit had
been reawakened in the Germans of Vienna by many
of the recent events. Even those who had sympathized
with the reconquest of Lombardy had been
alarmed at the kind of government which the Austrian
generals were trying to introduce into that province;
and one of the members of the Assembly asked what
should they think if the army which was now in Italy
were to stand before the gates of Vienna? This
feeling of alarm at the growth of a military power
independent of Parliament had naturally been increased
by the suspicions of Latour's intrigues with
the Serbs and the Croats. When, then, on September
19, the Magyar deputation, among whom were
Eötvös and Wesselenyi, asked for an audience from
the Assembly, that they might explain their position,
the leading German Democrats urged their admission,
but the Bohemian leaders protested against it, denouncing
the Magyars both for separating from
Austria and for oppressing the Slavs. Schuselka
attempted to mediate between the two parties, maintaining
that though the Magyars had done many
indefensible things, yet, as a matter of justice, the
Parliament ought to hear their petition; but the
Ministerialists, combined with the Bohemians, were
too strong for opposition; and, by a majority of eighty,
it was decided not to admit the deputation.
This refusal of the Viennese Parliament brought to
an end the last hope of a peaceable settlement of the
Hungarian difficulties. On September 27, Lamberg
entered Buda-Pesth, to which the Hungarian Diet
had now been transferred. It must be remembered
that the Magyars had just been irritated at Ferdinand's
denunciations of the March laws of Hungary,
and alarmed at his expression of confidence in Jellaciç,
who had just crossed the Drave and invaded Hungary.
When, then, Lamberg arrived in Pesth, with a commission
unsigned by any Hungarian Minister, his
arrival was naturally looked upon as a further indication
of an attempt of the Austrian Ministry to crush
out the liberties of Hungary. A slight thing was
sufficient to cause these suspicions to swell into a
panic; and the news that Lamberg had at once
crossed the Danube, to visit the fortress of Buda,
seemed, to the excited Magyars, a sufficient proof of
his dangerous intentions. The cry was raised that
the fortress was going to be seized and military law
established. The fiery students of Pesth hastened
out into the streets; and as Lamberg returned
across the suspension bridge into Pesth, he was
attacked and murdered. Batthyanyi, terrified at
this act, resigned his premiership and fled to Vienna;
and the Diet of Hungary passed a resolution condemning
the murder. Ferdinand was now more
easily urged to violent action. On October 3 he
declared the Hungarian Diet dissolved, proclaimed
Jellaciç Dictator of Hungary, and appointed Recsey
Prime Minister in place of Batthyanyi. Jellaciç,
however, did not find it easy to assert the authority
which was now given him. He had hoped that, in
the confusion which followed the death of Lamberg,
he would be able to carry Pesth by storm; but he
was driven back, and before the end of October the
Croats had been expelled from Hungary.
In the meantime the suspicions of the Viennese
had been increasing, and on the 29th of September
Dr. Löhner, one of the original leaders of the March
movement, publicly denounced Latour for his intrigues
with Jellaciç. These intrigues had now been
placed beyond a doubt by certain letters which had
fallen into the hands of the Hungarian Ministry.
Pulszky, who was at this time in Vienna, took the
opportunity to publish these letters in the form of a
placard, while he complained to Latour of the permission
given to Jellaciç to raise recruits in Vienna,
and threatened, if these proceedings continued, to
excite a revolution in which the Viennese Ministers
would be hung from lamp-posts. There were, indeed,
revolutionary elements enough in Vienna at this
time. The friendship between the workmen and the
students had led to the formation of a special workman's
Sub-Committee under the Committee of Safety.
This body actually undertook to find employment for
all who were out of work, and even to pay them wages
while they were out of work. This offer naturally
caused a rush of workmen to Vienna, from all parts
of the Empire. The attempt to sift and regulate the
claims for employment led to new bitterness; and
demands for impossibly high wages provoked rebuffs,
which were answered by threats of violence. The
Ministry tried to induce the workmen to leave the
city, by urging them to join the army in Italy; but
the students defeated this attempt by reminding the
workmen that the war in Italy was a war against
liberty. The suspicions of the Ministers were now
excited, not only against the workmen, but against
the students; and, after a riot in the latter part of
August, the Committee of Safety had been dissolved,
and the lecture-rooms of the University closed. But
this repression, far from weakening the bitterness in
Vienna, only drew closer the links between the poorer
students and the workmen; for, while the richer
students left the city, the poorer ones, finding it
difficult to support themselves after the closing of the
lecture-rooms, were subscribed for by the workmen.
Thus then the suspicions roused by the intrigues of
Latour were strengthened considerably by the general
condition of Vienna at this period.
Latour, however, was resolved not to yield. The
defeats which Jellaciç was experiencing in Hungary
only made it the more necessary that those who sympathized
with him should send him help; and on the
5th of October the news spread through Vienna that
an Austrian regiment was about to march to Hungary
to the assistance of Jellaciç. The students went to
the head-quarters of one of the grenadier regiments,
and urged them not to join in the march. An officer,
who arrested one of the students, was attacked and
wounded; and when one of the grenadiers, who had
been wounded in a quarrel, was sent to his barrack,
his comrades seemed to consider it as a kind of arrest,
and demanded his surrender. The National Guard
joined in this demand; and thus a state of confusion
arose which made it easy for the students and the workmen
to hinder the march of the regiments which were
starting for Hungary. An Italian battalion refused
to proceed further, and the march was hindered for
that day. But General Auersperg, who commanded
the forces in Vienna, was resolved to continue the
attempt; and so, on the following day, the soldiers
were despatched to the station which lies beyond the
Tabor bridge. But, when they arrived on the bridge,
they found that the students and the National Guard
were before them, and that the barriers had been
closed against them. Auersperg was alarmed at this
resistance, and recalled the troops; but collisions
had by this time taken place between the soldiers and
the people in other parts of the town; and a fierce
fight was raging in the Stephansplatz, and even in
the church itself.
Then suddenly there rose the cry "Latour is
sending us the murderers of the 13th of March;"
and a rush was made towards the office of the
Ministry of War. Fears had already been entertained
by several members of the Assembly, that a personal
attack would be made on Latour; and Borrosch, one
of the German Bohemian members, Smolka, the Vice-President
of the Assembly, Dr. Goldmark, and others,
hastened to protect Latour from the vengeance of the
crowd. Borrosch, with the same humane ingenuity
which Lafayette had shown on a similar occasion, promised
that Latour should have a formal trial, if the
crowd would spare him. The crowd cheered Borrosch
and his friends; and many of them promised that they
would protect Latour's life. Borrosch rode off, supposing
Latour to be safe; but Dr. Fischhof, feeling
that matters were not yet secure, persuaded several
members of the National Guard to act as special protectors
to Latour; and as the best means of effecting
this object, some thirty or forty of them undertook
to arrest him. But the excitement of the crowd had
been roused anew, and they burst into the War Office.
Smolka then entreated Latour to resign. The Minister
consented; but the passions of the crowd would not
be appeased. The unfortunate man attempted to
hide from their pursuit: but they dragged him from
his hiding-place, and thrust aside his defenders.
Fischhof warded off the first blow that was aimed at
him. A student, named Rauch, attempted also to
protect him; but all was in vain; and he was dragged
down the staircase and into the square in front of the
War Office. With his white hair floating about him,
he was lifted on to the lamp-post which then stood
in the square. He struggled against his enemies,
and compelled them to drop him once; but again he
was lifted on to the post, and this time the hanging
was completed, the crowd tearing his clothes from
his body and dipping their handkerchiefs in his blood.
This outburst of savagery, instead of satisfying the
fury of the people, had quickened their thirst for
blood; and their desire for vengeance was now
turned against the Bohemian Deputies. Strobach,
who had been chosen President of the Assembly,
had objected to hold a sitting at all on that
day, declaring that executive rather than legislative
functions were needed just then. For this
refusal some of the members wished to prosecute
him; and armed men appeared in the gallery of the
Assembly threatening violence to the Bohemian deputies.
Those deputies, finding that they could no
longer deliberate freely, soon after fled from the city,
and issued from Prague a protest against the Reign
of Terror, which they declared to be dominating
Vienna. In the meantime Ferdinand, having consented,
on the day of Latour's death, to the formation
of a Democratic Ministry, fled, on the next day, from
Vienna to Schönbrunn, and shortly afterwards to
Innspruck; and he soon notified his feelings to the
Viennese by a proclamation in which he too denounced
the reign of violence in Vienna.
Hardly had the Viennese recovered from the surprise
caused by the flight of their Emperor, than they
heard that Jellaciç, having abandoned his hope of
conquering Hungary, was marching against Vienna.
General Auersperg, who had withdrawn his troops to
the Belvedere after the collision between the soldiers
and the people, was still assumed by the Viennese to
be in some degree favourable to their cause; and
they entreated him to repel the attack of Jellaciç,
and to call for help from the Hungarians. Auersperg,
however, rejected this proposal, withdrew his troops
secretly from the city, and, on October 11, openly
joined Jellaciç.
The Assembly were now anxious to appeal to the
Frankfort Parliament for help, and entreated them
to send representatives to Vienna. Robert Blum,
who had grown weary of the state of affairs in Frankfort,
and who believed that the only remaining hope
for Germany was in Vienna, consented, in company
with four others, to accept this embassy. The Parliament
in Vienna still imagined that they could keep
within legal forms; but this desire irritated those
fiery politicians who felt that the struggle was now
on a revolutionary footing; and they therefore desired
to overthrow the Assembly, and to establish a more
determined body in its place. But Blum, who had
been accustomed to hold in check the violent members
of his own party in Frankfort, supposed that, in
Vienna also, he was bound to resist revolutionary
methods; and, though he was ready to encourage
the Viennese in the defence of their city, he objected
to the proposal for the violent dissolution of the
Assembly, on the ground that such a proceeding
would give an excuse to the tyrants for a dissolution
of the Frankfort Parliament.
A man of much more importance in such a siege
than Robert Blum could be, arrived about the same
time in Vienna. This was Joseph Bem, a Galician
of about fifty-three years of age, who had served in
Napoleon's expedition to Russia, and had greatly
distinguished himself as colonel of the Polish artillery
at the battle of Ostrolenka. He had also commanded
the Polish artillery in the insurrection of 1830, and
had attempted to organize a Polish legion, for the
help of the Portuguese, during their struggle against
the Absolutist party. He had been wounded in one
of these wars, was obliged to use a staff in walking,
and was small and delicate in his appearance. He
had gained both friends and enemies in Poland, and
was known for his strong democratic sympathies.
Although he was not appointed to the official headship
of the National Guard, he soon became the
centre and life of the defence. But he found that
the men with whom he had to act did not understand
the position in which they were placed; for, when
he attempted to urge the National Guard to march
out against the army of Jellaciç, they twice refused
to follow him, on the ground that they were only
intended for the defence of the city.
And, if the rulers of Vienna were feeble in their
attitude towards their enemies, they were not less
feeble in their treatment of the one people, from
whom they might have expected help in this emergency.
The advance of Jellaciç against Vienna had
naturally increased the sympathy of the Magyars for
the Viennese, and Pulszky urged the latter to summon
the Hungarian army to their rescue. This formal
invitation was the more necessary because the Hungarian
officers were in many cases confused in their
minds as to their strict legal duty in this war. Archduke
Stephen, the Count Palatine of Hungary, after professedly
assuming the command of the army, had
suddenly fled from the country, and thus weakened
the legal position, both of his subordinate officers,
and of the Hungarian Diet, of which he was the
nominal head. Ferdinand had repeated his former
dissolution of the Diet in a proclamation of the
20th October; Prince Windischgrätz, professing to
act in the name of the Emperor, issued a declaration
from Prague forbidding the Hungarian officers to
fight against Jellaciç; and soon after, followed up
this proclamation by marching against Vienna.
General Moga, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian
forces, hesitated to resist the Imperial orders;
but, whilst the generals were debating among themselves,
Kossuth arrived in the Hungarian camp to
urge them to advance. After some delay his influence
prevailed; and on October 28 began the march of the
Hungarian army for the relief of Vienna.
In the meantime, all those in Vienna, who really
cared to save it, were trying to rouse their fellow-townsmen
to action. Robert Blum made an address
to the students in favour of making "no half-revolution,
but a complete change of the system;" and on
the 25th October, three days before the Hungarians
had begun their march, Bem had succeeded in persuading
the National Guard to make their sortie.
But confusion followed this attempt; some of the
Guard fled; others were mistaken in the darkness
for enemies, and fired on by their comrades. Bem's
horse was killed under him, and he was compelled to
retreat. Windischgrätz, who had now been appointed
to the complete command of the besieging force,
demanded the surrender of "the Polish emissary
Bem, who in a quite uncalled-for manner, had mixed
himself up in the affairs of Vienna." This recognition
of the independence of the Polish provinces of
the Austrian Empire was not accepted by the
Viennese; nor did they consent to surrender any of
the other people who were demanded by Windischgrätz.
Bem roused the soldiers again to the defence,
and drove them to their work with abuse. The
Students' Legion distinguished itself by its courage;
and some of the workmen seconded them bravely.
But Messenhauser, the official leader of the National
Guard, declared that the struggle was hopeless, and
urged the people to yield.
Many were now disposed to abandon the defence;
when suddenly, on October 30, there arose a cry that
the Hungarians were approaching. Messengers went
up the high tower of St. Stephen's Church, and looked
out towards the plain of Schwechat, where the Hungarians
and Austrians had at last joined battle. The
Viennese had been advised by their Hungarian friends
to tear up the railway lines; but they neglected this
precaution; and thus Windischgrätz had been able to
send more troops to Schwechat. But the great weakness
of the Hungarians was due to the hesitation of
General Moga, and to the want of confidence felt in
him by his subordinate officers. Troops were ordered
to advance, and then suddenly to halt, without any
apparent reason; several of the new recruits ran
away; and at last a general panic seized the army,
and they fled before the Austrians, continuing to retreat,
even after the enemy had ceased to pursue them.
The rumours of Hungarian help had encouraged
some of the Viennese to oppose the surrender of
their city; and this opposition was continued even
after the defeat of the Hungarians had been officially
announced. This division of opinion between the
leaders and a great part of the people, led to riots in
various parts of the town. Under these circumstances,
Windischgrätz refused to accept the peaceable surrender
offered by the leaders, and, instead, bombarded
the town, and then entered it, while it was
still on fire. Bem managed to escape; and so did
three of the representatives of the Frankfort Parliament;
but Blum and Fröbel were arrested. The
latter was discovered to have written a pamphlet,
which implied a desire to maintain the unity of the
Austrian Empire; and, on this ground, he was set
free. But Blum was proved to have acted as a
captain of one of the corps of the National Guard,
during the defence; his speech to the students, about
the complete change of system, was supposed to imply
a desire for a Republican movement; and so on the
8th November he was condemned to death, and on
the 9th he was shot.
Great indignation was excited in Germany by this
execution; and the unpopularity which the Frankfort
Parliament had incurred by their assent to the truce
of Malmö, was increased by their having refused to
interfere to protect Blum from arrest. Yet it seems
as if the remarks, made above in the case of Confalonieri,
may be applied again to Blum. That Blum
should die, and Windischgrätz triumph, was no doubt
sad; but Blum's execution was rather the result of a
system of Government, than a specially illegal or
tyrannical act. Blum had staked his life on the issue
of the struggle, by coming to Vienna during the siege.
If there were any alternative to his death, it was the
one proposed by Socrates to his judges; and in the
case of Blum, as in that of Socrates, the actual result
was the best for his honour.
But, as for the capture of Vienna itself, it is difficult
to over-estimate its importance in the history of
the Revolution. As the fall of Milan had broken the
connection of the Italian struggle with the European
Revolution, so the fall of Vienna destroyed the link
which bound all the other parts of the Revolution
together. Race hatred, and a narrow perception of
their own interests, might hinder the Viennese from
understanding their true position; but the March
rising in Vienna had given to the various Revolutions
a European importance, which they would scarcely
have attained without it; and the attention of each
of the struggling races in turn had been riveted on
the city which Metternich had made the centre of
the European system. In a still more evident manner
was the link broken between Germany and the rest
of Europe, and apparently between the most vigorous
champions of liberty in the different parts of Germany.
This last aspect of the fall of Vienna has been embodied,
by a poet named Schauffer, in verses, which
appeared a year after the event, and which contain
also a worthy tribute to those fiery youths whose
determination and enthusiasm were to so large an
extent the cause of all that was best in the Vienna
insurrections; though their national prejudices, and
their want of self-control, contributed largely to the
ruin of the movement which they had inaugurated.[17]
Their hearts beat high and hopeful,
In the bright October days;
Not March's glorious breezes
Could bolder daring raise.
No more with idle drum beats,
But with cannons' thundering tone,
Marched forth to guard the ramparts,
Vienna's Legion.
Once more they come to guard it,—
The freedom won by fight;
Once more 'tis force must conquer,
When blood is shed for right.
A steely forest threatens,
Ere yet the day be won;
But the Fatherland, they'll save it,
Vienna's Legion.
And, as the Spartans hurled them
On the Persian's mighty horde,
They burst on the barbarian,
To smite with German sword.
Their lives into the balance
In careless scorn they've thrown;
And victory crowns their daring,
Vienna's Legion.
Thus did they struggle boldly,
For many a day and night;
Thus were they crushed, o'er wearied
By the tyrant's conquering might;
Grey warriors wept in anguish
O'er many a gallant son;
E'en in defeat 'twas victor,
Vienna's Legion.
Their deeds will well be honoured
In the victor's glorious lay;
Our youth lay dead in battle,
But they would not yield the day.
Let others crouch and tremble!
No pardon will they own;
They dare not live in bondage,—
Vienna's Legion.
In the days of bright October
They shouted in their pride;
Their blows fell thick and boldly,
They struck their strokes—and died.
The gallant lads have fallen;
In blood the Legion lie;
But in the grave that hides them
Is buried—Germany.
