Chapter I
5
No nation nor state ever acquired an
accession of dominion so truly valuable
and beneficial, as are the acquisitions
lately made by Britain in India. But
the particular situation of her circumstances
at the time when these acquisitions fell
into her hands, enhanced the real and intrinsic
value of them to Britain. Oppressed
by a grievous debt, the annual interest
of which, exceeding four millions and a
half sterling, was levied by taxes, which
raised the price of each manufacture, her
commerce labouring under such disadvantages
was daily sinking into decay; whilst
a considerable part of this annual interest
being paid to foreigners, created such a
drain of specie, as the balance of her trade
could not supply; so that, in proportion
as her expence increased, the means of
defraying it diminished; and she was every
6year approaching towards a state of national
poverty and bankruptcy.
In such circumstances did Britain acquire
the sovereign dominion of Bengal,
and of other rich manufacturing and trading
countries in India; which, at the time
they fell to her, were capable of not only
defraying every charge of their own government
and defence, but over and above
that, of yielding annually to the sovereign
a sum equal to 1,300,000 l. sterling, as
can be readily demonstrated. Nor do we
include in this sum the benefit which Britain
had been accustomed to receive, in
her commercial capacity, by her trade
with those countries: the sum here specified
would have arisen purely in consequence
of dominion: and, whether transmitted
from those countries in merchandize
or in money, would at last have arrived
at the public treasury in specie: and
would thus have served to alleviate the
burden of those taxes, that are pressing
every branch of her domestic commerce
to ruin. And, if Britain had bestowed
the smallest attention on the political government
of those countries, she might
have continued to draw from them the
7abovementioned tribute sum in perpetuum,
without any danger of draining or impoverishing
them: nay it is certain, that
under a just, equitable and well ordered
government, their commerce and agriculture
might have been extended to a degree,
that would have enabled them to
afford a still larger annual tribute to the
sovereign. The possession of this Indian
dominion is likewise so particularly secured
from domestic and foreign danger, by
the extraordinary submissive disposition of
the natives, the singularly defensible situation
of the country, and the naval superiority
of Britain, that, by a very trifling
expence of men, and no pecuniary charge,
she might have maintained it against all
enemies. So that Britain might have derived
from this dependent dominion resources
sufficient to relieve her from all
her difficulties and distresses.
This is what Britain might have done:
and this was not simply possible, it was
easy of execution. But if we enquire
what Britain hath done, we shall find that,
instead of applying these resources by a
proper care and attention to the purpose,
for which it would seem the all-wise dispensation
8of Providence had at this critical
conjuncture bestowed them upon her,
she hath indolently and desperately thrown
them from her, and left them to the will of
blind chance. For surely it may with propriety
be said, that the government of Britain
consigned all these resources to the
guidance of blind chance, or rather to
certain destruction, when it scrupulously
withheld its own care, and implicitly confided
the sovereign charge of governing
and defending this foreign dominion to a
Company of Merchants, so evidently unequal
to such a charge, that, instead of
being surprized that these countries should
now at last be impoverished and ruined,
we have reason to be astonished, that they
have supported, for such a length of time,
the complicated evils of tyranny and anarchy.
The consequences of committing this
sovereign charge to the Company have
been long foreseen, and likewise foretold,
by some who were acquainted with the
nature of their government: but the
power and influence of those who were
sharing amongst them the plunder of those
wretched countries, blasted the credit of
9their representations: until at last, the
effects being felt at home, it hath become
impossible to totally suppress the truth.
Nay even now, that these men are forced
to partly acknowledge the ruinous situation
of this foreign dominion, yet have
they still the assurance to mislead the public
judgment, by representing the Company
as the only party concerned in the
consequence: though it is certain, that
this Indian concern, which hath been
leased or farmed out by Government to the
Company, is of the very highest importance
to the public interest, as having
been for many years the principal support
of national opulence and credit, as well
as of commerce and revenue. For, in the
article of opulence, the private fortunes
acquired in those countries by the servants
of the Company, ever since the time that
their power prevailed over the native government,
that is ever since 1757, hath
created an annual influx of specie to Britain
of about 700,000 l. and the dedomagement
paid to Government by the
Company, since the assumption of the dewanny
in 1765, is a farther influx of
10400,000 l. the drawback on teas is reckoned
about 200,000 l. and the Company
hath increased her dividend since the last
mentioned period 200,000 l. though only
one half of this last sum may be reckoned
to remain in the country, the other half
being paid to foreign proprietors. These
four sums, making together 1,400,000 l.
have been yearly drawn from India in consequence
of dominion: and, whether sent
from thence in merchandize, in bills, or
in specie, have produced so much money
to Britain: and notwithstanding the private
fortunes have been acquired by means
that have exhausted these sources of wealth,
that might otherwise have flowed perpetually
into Britain; and the dedomagement
may be considered as a base composition,
received for alienating the sovereign
rights of the British crown and nation,
and for furnishing a force to support the
most detestable tyranny of a few individuals
over fifteen millions of men, who
are to all intents and purposes British subjects;
yet did the opportune importation
of so much wealth, serve to support the
credit of the nation under the grievous accumulation
of debt contracted in the last
11war; and to prevent her feeling the drain
of specie made by her foreign creditors,
which otherwise would by this time have
completely exhausted her. By her commerce
with those countries, Britain hath
exported yearly 5 or 600,000 l. worth of
her own manufactures and merchandize,
and for these she received the commodities
of India; which commodities, being
re-exported, formed the most essential article
of her traffic with Africa, on which
her West India colonies do entirely depend;
they are likewise the most valuable
article of her trade with America.
And the duties levied by Government, on
such part of these Indian commodities as
is expended at home, create a very considerable,
and by far the most equitable and
convenient branch of revenue.
But the value and importance of this
Indian concern will appear in a still
stronger light, if we shall look forward to
the consequences that must naturally and
unavoidably ensue to the public interest
from the loss of it. The first and most
immediate of these consequences will be
national bankruptcy; or, which is the
same thing, a stop to the payment of interest
12on the national debt; for a deprivation
of that annual influx of specie from
India will quickly produce national poverty;
and an incapacity of paying in
specie the interest of the foreign creditors.
But the loss of our Indian commerce
will operate this effect still more
speedily; for, on the supposition that the
nation shall be deprived of this branch of
commerce, it must necessarily follow, that
Government will lose that branch of revenue
which arises from the home consumption
of Indian commodities; and it is
plain, that Government cannot then continue
to pay the usual expence, without
making good this deficiency of revenue
by additional taxes on land, and the necessaries
of life: but as this additional
load, falling on our little remaining commerce,
would by one year’s experience be
found insupportable, Government would
be forced to retrench its expence, in that
only article that can be dispensed with,
the payment of interest on the national
debt; and when this happens, what advantage
will the public creditor hold above
the India proprietor? The only difference
will be, that the latter will have felt his
13loss a little earlier than the former. But
national bankruptcy, though it may be the
first, is not the only, nor even the greatest,
public damage, accruing from a deprivation
of this Indian concern: loss of
future credit, of trade and navigation, and
consequently of naval power and defence,
will soon follow; and, in this general calamity,
everyone individual of the community
will come in for his share, in proportion
to his rank or situation.
Such are the consequences that must
ensue to the public interest from a deprivation
of the benefit hitherto derived from
this Indian concern: and if the nation is
to suffer so grievously by the loss of this
object, can she allow herself to be persuaded,
that she hath no interest in its preservation.
Now this object stands in danger of
being lost to the nation by two different
causes; the first being, the neglect or incapacity
of the Company to maintain and
defend it from the assault of enemies: and
the other danger arises from the oppression
and misconduct of this Company’s political
government; tending to despoil those
countries of their circulating specie, their
arts, manufactures, commerce, and inhabitants,
14which were the only means that
enabled them to afford this benefit to Britain.
The first of these dangers is scarcely
dreamt of, and yet it is perhaps immediately
imminent; at present however we
are treating of the danger to be apprehended
from the political cause.
How far the interest of this foreign dominion
hath been injured by the Company’s
political misgovernment; or how
near it may be reduced to a state of utter
inability to afford any farther benefit to
Britain, is but little known by the public.
For though people have heard in the gross,
that affairs in those countries are rather
in a bad situation, yet do not they either
understand or believe it to be so very bad
as it really is; or rather they do not comprehend
how it should be so bad; as not
being acquainted with the full power of
the cause that hath produced the evil;
and every one will form his notion of effects
that he neither feels nor sees, from
his knowledge or opinion of the nature and
power of the causes that produced them.
In the case before us, people have been
taught to consider the oppression and extortion
of its government, (of which certain
15instances are quoted) as the sole cause
of evil to Bengal: of consequence it is
supposed that Bengal hath suffered no farther
damage from its government, than
what may have been caused by some private
acts of extortion, exercised by the
few persons vested with the powers of
governing: and, besides that the authenticity
of these acts is denied or disputed,
and men who are to judge only from report
are apt to make allowance for the
prejudice or passion of the accuser who
brings a charge against individuals; still
if all these acts of oppression that have
been narrated should be fully credited;
nay, if the hearer should suppose still
more than is represented, yet cannot he
conceive or allow himself to believe that
such acts of extortion, exercised by a small
number of individuals, could suffice to reduce
the lately rich commercial kingdom
of Bengal to such a deplorable state of
misery, poverty, and distress: the cause
assigned will appear too trivial for the effect;
and of course the effect, at least the
degree of it, will be discredited.
But he who means to acquire a just notion
of the present state of those countries,
16and the extent of damage they have sustained
from their present Government,
must fully inform himself of the true nature
and condition of that Government,
and the manner of its operation on the
general interest of the people governed;
he must learn, not only that which it hath
done, but likewise that which it hath not
done; for the interest of a community may
suffer far more detriment from the nonaction,
than from the oppression, of its
government. To the end, therefore, that
every one may be enabled to form a proper
judgment on these matters, we mean to
present a general view of the nature, and
effects, of the Company’s Government in
Bengal.
THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE COMPANY’S GOVERNMENT IN BENGAL.
17
The English East India company is,
under the title of Dewan, the real
and actual sovereign of Bengal, Behar,
and Orixa: a dominion equal to almost any
one state in Europe, in respect of either
extent and fertility of country, or numbers
of ingenious and industrious subjects;
and exceeding most of them in the internal
materials of commerce, or resources of
wealth. The Company executes the government
of this dominion by a deputation,
consisting of a Governor and Council;
who reside at Calcutta, the Company’s
original presidency, or chief factory
in Bengal. And the Directors, who, as
possessing the executive authority of the
Company, may be termed the supreme
sovereigns of this Indian dominion, have
preserved to themselves the sole power of
immediately ordering, directing and controuling
18the government; for this deputed
government communicates its purposes,
receives its orders, and accounts
for its conduct to none but the Directors.
But it is evident, that the distance of
situation must render the immediate controul
of the Directors perfectly impotent,
ineffectual, and nugatory; for it would
be absurd to suppose, that the government
of Bengal should defer the execution of
any one purpose until it shall have communicated
with, and received the opinion
of the Directors, which cannot be effected
in the space of a whole year; consequently
the directors cannot interfere in the direction,
or ordering of this government, farther
than in some few cases of the most
general or invariable nature: but the
execution of even these general orders depends
upon the will and discretion of the
deputed government; seeing the Directors
cannot, at that distance, enforce it themselves:
and the same cause puts it out of
their power to prevent or restrain abuse;
so that they hold neither positive nor negative
authority in the immediate execution
of this government. And the condition
or situation of these directorial sovereigns
19at home, renders their retrospective
controul equally impotent and ineffectual;
for they have no power in themselves
to inflict other punishment on their
deputies, for the most audacious disobedience,
or for maladministration, than dismission
from their service; and this becomes
no punishment, because the delinquents
are previously prepared for it, being
ready to set out of their own accord with
a princely fortune for the mother country;
where they set the authority of the Directors
at defiance; for there these sovereigns
of India are themselves subjects, and
cannot call their quondam ministers to account,
except in an ordinary court of justice;
and the difficulty of obtaining evidence
requisite to convict in these courts;
the dread of bringing to light, in the
course of a legal process, some abstruse
mysteries of government; and the apprehension
of danger arising to the interest
of the present direction from a powerful
combination at the next election, will ever
deter the Directors from seriously prosecuting
a lawsuit against their deputies,
even in cases of peculation from the sovereign;
but if it respects only the interest
20of the subject, they will be more apt to
palliate and defend the offence. We must
therefore perceive, that this deputed government
acts perfectly independent of
either the immediate controul, or future
awe of the sovereign: whilst the sovereign
is compelled to blindly support, with its
whole power, the authority of this government;
and, without choice, to enforce
all its measures; seeing that to oppose
the will of the deputy, is opposing
the authority of the sovereign.
And, as to the native subjects, the power
of this deputed government over them is
perfectly absolute and complete. For the
inhabitants of those countries, being disposed
by nature or climate to passive obedience,
and by long custom habituated to
despotic authority, and being farther impressed
with a particular awe of Europeans,
from a notion of their natural superiority,
implicitly submit to the will of their present
government, without once daring to
either examine its right, dispute its authority,
or question its conduct. The
subject therefore holds not the smallest
voice in the administration of government;
the jurisdiction, the police, the
21finances, the military government and
defence, are all incontroulably directed
by the Company’s deputation: and the
entire interests of those countries, the
lives and property of the inhabitants, are
subjected to its discretion, and depend on
its will.
So that this deputation of the Company
executes the government of Bengal with
a power perfectly unlimited by any exterior
controul; and if we consider that it
is at the same time foreign to the country
governed, mutable, and of very short duration,
we shall find that it is equally unrestrained
by any internal check. It is
therefore the most unlimited government
on earth; or rather it is the only government
that can, with propriety, be termed
arbitrary and despotic.
For all other deputed governments are
sufficiently restrained by the authority of
the sovereign; and we have no idea of despotism,
except in governments that are
supreme or sovereign. But the idea of
actual despotism in a supreme government
is merely imaginary; seeing that, in one
and all of these governments, the power
of governing is conditional, limited by
22rule, and subjected to controul both external
and internal. For it is evident,
that, in all supreme governments, the
power of governing, and the means that
support this power, must needs be derived
from the people governed; and therefore
cannot exist in despight of their consent;
and though, in some of these governments,
the condition, upon which
this power and these means are granted, is
not specially expressed, yet is it perfectly
understood, and invariably enforced in all
of them; inasmuch as there are examples
in each, of sovereigns who have suffered
the utmost punishment, for attempting to
transgress the limits of this condition;
nay, there is scarce one instance where
the prince, thus transgressing, escaped the
resentment of the people; and examples
of this nature are most frequent in these
governments that are falsely termed despotic.
These examples must therefore
convince all sovereigns, that there is a
power in the people, superior to, and
capable of controuling them; and the
sense of this must ever prove an effectual
external controul on the conduct of a supreme
government. But self-interest,
23that primum and perpetuum mobile of human
action, which we may term an internal
check, operates still more forcibly, constantly,
and immediately on the will of a
supreme government; not simply restraining
it from doing or permitting injury, but
impelling it to promote the good of the
people governed. For a government that
is sovereign, and perpetual (or durante
vita and hereditary) cannot possibly separate
its own private interest from that of
the community which it governs; being
indeed itself a part of that community:
and this is so evident, that no prince ever
attempted to advance a distinct interest of
his own, at the expence of the general
weal, who was not a fool, before he became
a tyrant. But a wise sovereign considers
his people as the channel through which
alone he can receive substantial good or
evil; and, acting upon this principle, he
will, however absolute and disposed by
nature to tyranny, abstain from injuring
the general interest, because he is sensible
that such injury will recoil upon himself;
and he will exert himself to promote
the prosperity of his people, as the
only means of advancing his own power,
24grandeur, or wealth. So that a sovereign
prince, who understands his own real
interest, though otherwise void of virtue,
will ever study to govern well; nay, the
private vices of such a prince do often operate
public good; a striking instance of
which we meet with in our Henry the
Seventh; whose extreme and sordid avarice
was the source of English commerce
and wealth; and his mean self-love, and
jealousy of power, established universal
liberty.
But the nature of this Bengal government
differs, in every circumstance, from
that of a supreme government; being deputed,
foreign, mutable, and temporary,
it is no way interested in the lasting prosperity
of the community which it governs;
on the contrary, this government holds
an interest which is not only distinct from,
but diametrically opposite to that of the
subject. For these Governors return to
Europe immediately on the expiration of
their office, which seldom dures above
three years, often less; therefore their
sole aim is to amass all the wealth they
can, during the short term of their power,
in order to transport it along with their
25persons to their own country. But the
wealth which a government amasses, must
needs be extorted from the people governed;
consequently self-interest leads this
government to pillage and plunder the
subject: and we have seen that it is not
restrained, by any external controul, from
advancing its own distinct interest at the
expence of the community which it governs,
seeing it is perfectly exempted from
all awe of either the sovereign or the subject;
and it cannot be restrained by any
internal check, because it holds no concern
in the lasting welfare of the people.
Such then is the ruling principle of this
government: nor are the means which it
employs to promote its own interest less
extraordinary than is its power to enforce
them. For this government, which arbitrarily
directs the jurisdiction and police,
together with the imposition and collection
of taxes, doth at same time act in
the capacity of a merchant. And this
commercial despotism, or despotic power
lodged in the hands of a few foreign merchants,
hath, in its nature and consequences,
proved infinitely more destructive
to the interest of that commercial
26country, than all the operations of political
tyranny have been: for from it sprung
these cruel monopolies, which struck at
the very root of manufacture, commerce,
and even population.
To attempt describing the particular
methods which this government hath practised
to promote its own interest at the
expence of the people, in its double capacity,
of an absolute sovereign and a despotic
merchant, would be a tedious, invidious,
and even an unprofitable undertaking;
for it is almost impossible to properly
delineate the conduct of a tyranny
so various and irregular in its operations;
and, to those who are unacquainted with
the modes, customs, and interests of the
country in question, the recital of a few
particular instances would only serve to
mislead their judgment, and darken or diminish
the truth. By attending to the
general description given of the nature
views and interests of this government,
we shall form a more complete and just
notion of its conduct and deportment, than
can be acquired from any disjointed account
of particulars. Let us suppose a
few foreigners sent into a rich commercial
27country, with absolute and unlimited
power over the lives and property of the
inhabitants; actuated by no other principle
than that of acquiring riches, and stimulated
thereto not only by avarice but ambition,
or the desire of excelling; unrestrained
by any species of present awe or
future apprehension; but on the contrary,
encouraged by precedent to expect in their
own country, titles, dignity, respect, and
consequence, each in proportion to the
sum he imports; and whatever methods
we can suppose would be practised by such
foreigners, to accomplish their purpose,
within a short limited term, we may suppose
to have been actually employed by
this Bengal government. The enormous
amount of numerous fortunes, imported
by the persons employed in this government,
together with the rapidity of acquisition,
are circumstances seen and known
in this country; and these will thoroughly
warrant our supposing, that the acquirers
have availed themselves to the utmost of
their powers, as well as their opportunities.
However, we shall err greatly in
our estimate of the damage caused to those
countries, by their government’s prosecuting
28its own distinct interest, if we shall
confine the reckoning to only the loss of
so much specie, as hath been extorted and
exported by these foreigners: for this,
though in itself a ruinous grievance, is
merely trivial, when compared with the
havoc and waste committed on the manufacture,
the commerce, agriculture, and
population, by the methods employed to
acquire these sums. A herd of hogs,
broke into a well dressed vineyard, will
gorge their voracious maws; but that
which they eat and devour doth not destroy
the vineyard; it is their manner of
eating, their rutting up, their tearing
down, and trampling under foot.
Hitherto we have regarded this government
in only one point of view: we have
seen it acting for itself; but we have not
seen the part it acts for the people, in its
capacity of a sovereign ruler, administring
the government of a mighty state in all
its different offices or departments; and
entrusted with the care of the whole and
entire interests of a numerous commercial
nation. But, in the discharge of this sovereign
trust, we shall find the government
of Bengal a mere Vis inertiæ, void
29of the two efficient principles of action,
ability or power of acting, and will or
inclination. For how can we expect to
find the ability, of governing well, in the
men employed by the Company to execute
the government of those countries?
to attain the knowledge of any one science
or mystery, demands an effort of the
mind; but it is impossible for the brightest
natural genius to arrive at even a moderate
degree of skill in the art of governing,
which, as it is the most elevated, so
is it the most difficult, abstruse, various
and complicated of all human sciences,
without long and intense application, study,
and reflection; and, we may add, a series
of practice; and all these gradations to
skill, in governing, are wanting to our
Bengal governors. Their scholastic education
extends no farther than to qualify
them for merchants clerks; and, immediately
on being taken from school, they are
dispatched to India; where the manner
of life is consonant to the climate, voluptuous
to a degree of dissoluteness, vain,
idle, dissipated, and an enemy to study
or reflection: the juvenile part of their
life being spent in this manner, they arrive
30at the charge of government with
minds perfectly uninformed, and so very
averse to application, that they commit
and implicitly confide the charge of their
own private concerns to servants. If such
men should possess the skill or address of
governing well, it must certainly be acquired
instantaneously and supernaturally;
infused into them by miracle, like the
gift of speech into the ass of Balaam.
But the want of will or inclination is
an obstacle to their governing well, still
more prevalent than is the want of ability.
Labour, fatigue, and difficulty are evils,
to which the human mind is so naturally
averse, that, unless it is urged by some
strong impulse of passion, such as the fear
of some superior evil, or the hope and
desire of some mighty good, it will decline
and evade them: what stimulum
then can be sufficiently powerful to urge
the habitually indolent minds of our Bengal
governors to encounter the difficulties,
the labour, and fatigue attending a due
discharge of the duties of government;
which, of all human undertakings, is the
most replete with these mental evils? Yet
this government, which demands a stronger
31stimulum than any other government
that ever yet existed, is in effect urged by
no one motive or consideration to discharge
the duties of its office; for, as it holds
no interest in the lasting welfare of the
people governed, neither its hopes nor
its fears are at all interested in the good or
evil consequences that may be caused by
its own vigilance or neglect: being altogether
superior to the resentment of the
subject, and independent of the sovereign’s
authority, it is not impelled, by the fear
of immediate danger, nor the apprehension
of future punishment: and as to the
prospect of glory, applause, or respect,
which push the generous and ambitious
mind to action, our governors aim to attain
them, not by governing well, but
by acquiring and bringing home a mighty
fortune to their own country.
Men thus actuated, or rather unactuated,
must, in the discharge of their sovereign
office, be perfectly torpid and listless;
the machine of political government
stops in their hands, and stands stock still:
their minds being incapable of application,
they withdraw themselves as much as
possible from attention, and leave the trouble
32of governing to others, still less qualified
than themselves; these inferior agents being
chosen, not for their abilities or virtue, but
for their fitness to serve the private purpose
of the governors, otherwise by chance; but
they give themselves no trouble to inspect
the conduct of these agents, who in general
are unprincipled miscreants; on the
contrary, they promiscuously approve and
support every action; so that, wherever
the power of this government acts, it is
only to oppress; and all beside is left to
chance. However, the power of governing,
or rather of oppressing, is not confined
to the persons vested with the charge
of government: the numerous servants
whom this Company disperses over the
face of the country, for the purpose of
carrying on her trade, do each of them,
in his own district, assume the authority
of a despot; and communicates a like
authority to all his servants and dependants,
who, it must be allowed, are far
more unrelenting than their masters; and
thus tyranny is extended into every corner;
oppression becomes general; and the oppressed
are excluded from the very prospect
of redress; for, on appeal to the
33superior, the plaintiff is ever remanded
to the very oppressor, who punishes him
for having dared to complain. And thus
justice and protection are no where to be
found; vice goes unpunished, and innocence
unsupported; therefore every man
becomes a villain in his own defence; and
faith, confidence, truth, and honesty are
banished the land. In short, it may with
strict propriety be said by these wretched
people, Terras astræa reliquit; and tyranny
and anarchy have here set up their throne.
And to this inaction or non-exertion of
the powers of government we are to impute
the ruin of those countries, rather
than to the avarice or rapine of the persons
deputed by the Company to execute
that government. For the power of governing
being vested in only a few, the
extortion of these few might have been
long supported by a rich commercial country,
provided they had exerted themselves
to restrain and prevent all others from
plundering and oppressing. The avarice,
profusion and bloody tyranny of even
Nero, and Domitian, was felt by only
a few of their subjects at Rome; every
where else the empire flourished; because
34these imperial monopolizers of vice
would suffer none in power to be wicked
but themselves; they narrowly inspected
the conduct of their governors and officers,
and severely punished their injustice
or oppression. But where the government
doth not only plunder itself, but
suffers every one under it to plunder, that
country must in time be completely
ruined.
Now Bengal hath been subjected to a
government of this nature for these fifteen
years past; for though we commonly date
the commencement of the Company’s sovereignty
from the assumption of the Dewanny,
(as it is termed,) yet hath this
Company (at least her deputies) possessed
a really absolute authority in those countries
ever since the battle of Plassey in
1757. That action rendered them masters
of Bengal; and it was equally within
their power to assume the sovereign government
at that time, as afterwards in
1765; their own will was the only obstacle:
but notwithstanding they bestowed
it on a native Nabob, yet did they retain
an absolute superiority over him, and he
governed in a state of perfect subordination
35to their authority; for he well knew
and experienced, that the duration of
his office, and even of his existence, depended
upon their will; consequently
this dependent native government could
but little restrain the conduct of the Company’s
deputies, or protect the subject from
their rapacity; and when they, in 1765,
set aside this native government, they
only removed a screen which they themselves
had set up, and till then preserved
for their own purpose.
How far these countries may have advanced
towards the period of final ruin,
under the fifteen or sixteen years domination
of such a government, we shall not
pretend to determine, because the term
ruin is variously understood. This much
is certain, that the unbounded remittance
of specie made, for some years, by the
English Company, for sundry purposes
as sovereign; and for a much greater
number of years, and in much larger sums
by the other European Companies, who
received it from the servants of the English
Company for bills on Europe, at a
very low exchange, and employed it for
every purpose in the other parts of India
36and China, hath compleatly drained Bengal
of its wealth, and reduced it to a
state of the most abject poverty. And
the grievous oppression and rapine exercised
by the Company’s servants, and their
numerous dependants; together with the
most cruel monopolies usurped by them
over every species of merchandize, and
even the necessaries of life, hath in a great
measure suppressed commerce, and abolished
trade. Whilst the insatiable avarice
and unrestrained extortion of those
employed in the collection of taxes and revenue
having ruined the farmer, the lands
lay uncultivated and waste; insomuch
that, not to mention the immense decrease
of revenue, that naturally most fertile of
all countries, Bengal, hath suffered a more
severe famine than perhaps was ever heard
of; it being reckoned that a fifth part of the
inhabitants have died of want, and numbers
have fled from starving and oppression.
But it is not difficult to determine how
near the interest of Britain in those countries
hath approached to ruin: for Britain
is to consider them as ruined to her purpose,
so soon as they shall become incapable
of supporting a commerce beneficial
37to her; and at same time of yielding
her a consideration, in the nature of tribute,
equivalent to the expence of subjects
which she sends out annually to maintain
her dominion there. And that they
are nearly, if not totally, ruined to her,
in both these respects, we begin already
to feel, in spite of all the art or influence
used to conceal the truth.
For, in the article of tribute, we find
that, instead of receiving such a surplus
of revenue as sufficed, at the commencement
of the Dewanny, to not only pay
for the specie part of the Company’s investment
in Bengal itself, but to purchase
her cargoes, and defray all her charges in
the other parts of India, and in China,
the government of Bengal was, two years
ago, reduced to the necessity of borrowing
near a million sterling on bills, which
have been transmitted and accepted by the
Company: in like manner hath this government
been obliged to borrow last year;
though the bills have been prevented, by
an arbitrary stroke of deceit, from appearing
against them in Europe. These borrowed
sums have all been expended in Bengal
itself: and if we allow that the whole
38hath been employed to pay for the Company’s
investment, (though by the by the
specie part of the Company’s investment
cannot, at least it ought not, if she exports
the proper quantity of European
commodities, exceed half a million,) it
must even then be admitted, that the
revenue of Bengal hath barely sufficed
to defray the ordinary expence of government.
And, if so, from whence is
the tribute of Bengal, (whether we term
it dedomagement, drawback, or encreased
dividend) to arise? not from the mighty
cargoes imported; for they are purchased,
not with surplus revenue, but with borrowed
money, which must be repaid either
in India or in Europe: and as to the
profits on these cargoes, they will be more
than eat up by the charges of freight, and a
long reckoning of India interest at eight
per cent. I am sensible, that this account
is strangely perplexed and embarrassed by
intricate calculations of stock in hand,
annual importations, and future sales, &c.
but when divested of all these studied intricacies
it will stand simply thus—As is
the clear surplus of revenue received in
Bengal, so will be the amount of tribute
39received in Britain; the former will ever
exactly balance the latter. But this surplus
we find to have been, for the two past
years, equal to nothing; and the amount
of tribute received in Britain must amount
to exactly as much; consequently the dedomagement,
drawback, and increased
dividend for the two last years is still in Nubibus;
where the national part, consisting
of the two first articles, is like to remain;
unless it shall be paid out of the Company’s
capital stock, as the encreased dividend
hath been. But this revenue, which for
the two years past hath barely sufficed to
defray the expence of government, hath
not been kept up even to that extent without
the aid of violence: but violence itself
must yield to necessity, and cannot
extort that which doth not exist; moreover
the Company had, in these two years, decreased
her military expence, by disbanding
some thousand sipahis, and otherwise
diminishing the charge of her remaining
force; and the attack made by Shaw
Allum in conjunction with the Mharrattors
will, this year, compel her to re-augment
her military expence in every respect;
whilst the predatory incursions of these
40Mharrhattors will prevent the collection of
revenue; how then will she support the
augmented charge of this year, with a
revenue decreased by a variety of causes so
much below the degree of last year? Another
loan upon the strength of the capital
is the only resource; but possibly borrowing
may, for several reasons, have become
impracticable by this time; and it is certain
that troops will not, nay cannot, serve
without pay—Here is a blessed prospect
indeed.
But, leaving this to the proof of time,
we perceive that, at any rate, we have lost
the prospect of future tribute from Bengal,
through the channel of the Company; we
have not so much as the promise of dedomagement,
drawback, or encreased dividend
for this current year; and if we
can trust to our own reason, preferably to
bankrupt promises, we may give it up for
good and all. Nay, there is mighty reason
to apprehend, that even the private fortunes
will soon cease to exist; and then
Britain will cease to receive the sum of
1,400,000 l. sterling, which for a number
of years past hath been annually flowing
in to her from India, in consequence of
41dominion. And if she could barely support
her burden, when aided by this influx,
how will she, when deprived of it, answer
the annual drain of specie made by her
foreign creditors?
With respect to the present state of our
commerce with those countries, it is not
enquired, and therefore not known, whether
the Company exports the stipulated
sum of British commodities or not; and it
is still less known, whether the small
quantity she hath exported of late is disposed
of; or whether it remains in her
warehouses abroad, to swell up the account
of her stock; thus much however
reason tells us, that the inhabitants of
Bengal, who cannot procure the necessaries
of life, millions having died of
want, can but little afford to purchase foreign
fopperies or superfluities. Nevertheless
we have seen large cargoes of Indian
manufactures imported this very year;
but we are not to suppose, that these cargoes
are the produce of willing industry;
they are procured by force and compulsion;
the artisan being held to work under
the discipline of task masters, who deprive
him of his labour before it is completed,
42at a price that will not afford him
the means of living. Of the many markets
that for ages had taken off the manufactures
of Bengal, Europe is now the
only one remaining; and this one market
cannot be supplied without the application
of force. How long force might supply
the place of willing industry, we shall
not pretend to determine; but one year
more will discover the united effects of
want of artisans, want of money, and
Mharrattor incursions.
And thus have we demonstrated the nature
and condition of this Bengal government,
together with the evils it hath
caused to the country governed, not from
a recital of disputed facts, but from principles
universally understood and admitted.
For every one, the least acquainted with
the Company’s affairs, must know and will
allow that the views, the interests, the
powers and opportunities of her deputed
government in Bengal are exactly such as
we have described them; and upon this
one undisputed datum we have built our
whole demonstration; the truth and justness
of which every man is capable of
trying and proving, by the touchstone of
43his own reason. For reason, without the
aid of circumstantial proof, can judge
whether the line of conduct which we
have assigned to the government of Bengal,
is fairly inferred and deduced from
its evident and allowed principle of action:
and common sense, unassisted by demonstration,
will point out the effects that
such conduct must operate on the interest
of the country governed; and, if we farther
advert to the length of time that this
country hath been subjected to such operation,
we shall nearly guess at its present
state and condition.
And we doubt not, that what hath been
said will enable every one, who makes use
of his own reason and reflection, to form a
proper judgment for himself on certain
points of this East India business, which
have been most grossly misrepresented.
For he will thereby discover, that the object,
for which the nation hath to apprehend
at present, is not the “credit of
the Company;” which, had she been restrained
within her natural sphere, and her
conduct properly inspected by government,
could never have been injured; or, if it
had, the breach could (in such case) have
44little more affected the general weal, than
the failure of any large trading house;
which, so long as the trade remained entire,
would have been immediately replaced
by another; but he will perceive,
that the present bad state of the Company’s
credit is only an effect, or consequence,
of the ruinous situation of affairs in India;
and, of course, that the object of
national apprehension is the ruin or loss of
that mighty and important branch of national
interest, which hath been committed
to the charge of the Company, in a manner
so complete and implicit, that the
name, as well as the interest of the nation,
nay the very name of the object itself,
hath been sunk and lost in that of
the Company: this Company, which is
but the temporary farmer, having been,
to all intents and purposes, substituted in
the stead of not only the sovereign proprietor,
but even of the farm itself. And
it will farther appear, that the danger
which threatens this object is not to be
averted by blindly supporting the credit
of the Company: but, on the contrary,
that the nation will, by affording this
blind support, only furnish the means of
45completing that ruin, which is already so
far advanced. To prevent this danger demands
measures of a very different nature:
and we shall proceed to point out these
measures; which, had they been applied
in time, would, we humbly conceive,
have sufficed to prevent the ruin or loss of
this important concern: and which, if
matters are not past remedy, may yet serve
to restore them.
THE TRUE CAUSES OF EVIL AND ABUSE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, AND THE MEANS TO REMEDY THEM.
46
It is a common saying that, the cause
of an evil being known, the remedy
is readily discovered; and, upon the strength
of this maxim, several, who think they
have hit upon some one cause of evil in
the political government of Bengal, have
taken upon them to prescribe a remedy;
which is pronounced an universal panacea,
a salve for every sore: but no sooner
have they produced their ware, than the
eye hath discovered it to be mere powder
of post; or something equally unavailing.
Few of these prescriptions have at all
attracted notice; the proposal for protecting
the liberty of the subject from the
despotism of government, by the institution
of native juries, was indeed extremely
well calculated to please British speculation;
and therefore, like the device of hanging
the bell about the cat’s neck, it was
47highly applauded by those who never adverted
to the difference betwixt Britain
and Bengal, in point of general constitution
of government and disposition of the
natives. But, for practice, it must appear
a mere chimera to such as consider,
on the one hand, that men, who are
slaves to their government and its officers
in every other capacity, cannot possibly be
free in that of jurymen; and that juries,
if they are not free and impartial, avail
nothing: and, on the other hand, that if
the natives should be actually endowed
with the real cap of liberty in the jury
room, there is danger, nay, there is a certainty,
that they would make bold to wear
it elsewhere; and then, adieu to the English
dominion in Bengal. In few words,
the power of the English government, and
the freedom of native juries, are two
things that cannot possibly exist together
in Bengal; the life of the one must unavoidably
cause the death of the other:
and, however harsh this doctrine may
sound in a freeborn English ear, the force
and truth of it will immediately strike the
politician.
48Equally unavailing is that proposal for
securing the liberty and property of the
subject, from the oppression and extortion
of government, by granting to the native
a perpetual property in land; without providing
him the smallest security for the
free possession of its produce; which, so
long as government stands on its present
footing, is liable to be wrested from
him so soon as acquired.
But it would seem, that the reason why
these political physicians have been so unlucky
in their prescriptions is, that they
have proceeded upon false principles; as
having mistaken the nature of the malady.
For they have either assigned no one certain
cause of evil; or else they have traced it
no farther than to the persons who have
executed the government of those countries,
otherwise to the Directors: as if all
the evil had proceeded from some particular
viciousness in their disposition, as if
they had been sinners above all men, or
as if no men would have done the wicked
deed but they: whereas he who is the
least acquainted with human nature will
allow, that few, if any men, would have
made any better use of their powers and
49opportunities; nay he will add, that every
other government on earth, would act the
very part that this Bengal government
hath done, provided it held the same views
and interests, together with the same powers
and opportunities. And, if so, what
can be more absurd, than the proposal to
remedy the evils and abuses of this government,
by sending out Supervisors,
with the same or greater powers, and consequently
possessing greater opportunities
of promoting their own views and interests;
which are exactly the same as these
of the persons complained of; seeing that,
as the same cause of evil which existed in
the Governors, would have existed in the
Supervisors, these similar causes must have
operated similar effects.
Indeed we shall err widely, if we look
for the original cause of evil in these Governors:
for, on inspecting the preceding
description of this Bengal government, we
perceive, that their maladministration is
itself but an effect, or consequence, naturally
flowing from the total want of certain
fundamental principles or powers;
which, in every other government, serve
to restrain the party governing from doing
50or permitting injury, and impel it to
promote the good of the party governed:
and as the want of these restraining and
impelling powers hath unavoidably produced,
the first tyranny, and the latter
anarchy, it is plain, that all the evils and
abuses in the government of Bengal have
sprung from this deficiency. It farther
appears, from the same description, that
the want of these restraining and impelling
powers arises from two different
causes; the first being the particular condition
and constitution of the sovereign:
and the second is there termed the distance
of situation, betwixt the sovereign
residence and the country governed; tho’
the sequel will evince this latter to be rather
a radical defect in the nature of that
system, which the Directors have adopted
for the government of this distant dominion.
That these have been the two original
causes of the tyranny and anarchy,
and consequently of all the evils and abuses
in this Bengal government, including
these of the commercial despotism, is
sufficiently evident. We shall therefore
proceed to point out the means of removing
these causes, as the only effectual method
51of remedying the evils. And as
each of the two causes hath contributed
its proper share of the evil, and each demands
a distinct remedy, we shall consider
them separately.
With regard to the condition and constitution
of the Company, we have already
mentioned the several circumstances that
disqualify her for the office of a supreme
sovereign; here therefore we shall only
recapitulate, or collect them into one point
of view. The first defect is, her impotence,
or want of power to promote good
government in her dominion: and this
proceeds from her being, with respect to
her deputed government, a meer fellow
subject, totally void of supreme legislative
and judicial powers; and consequently
incapable of inforcing obedience; or of
punishing disobedience: and this want of
authority and power in the sovereign, we
have shown to be a principal cause of despotism
in the deputed government. A
second defect in the constitution of the
Company is her want of inclination, or
rather of interest, to discharge the duty
of a good sovereign; and this arises from
the fluctuating and hourly mutable state
52of the proprietary, the temporary and
short duration of her corporate existence,
the still shorter tenor of this sovereignty,
and the annual rotation of her executive
government; for, in consequence of these
several circumstances in her situation, her
views are narrow, contracted, and rapacious;
the sole aim of all her measures
being to make the most of the present
moment. The third defect is the mercantile
capacity of this sovereign Company;
and from this defect alone flow
evils sufficient to ruin the interest of the
country subjected to her government:
for, in consequence of her mercantile capacity,
her deputed government acts as a
merchant; and, in consequence of her
sovereign capacity, all her mercantile servants
assume the authority of sovereigns.
These are the principal defects in the
being and constitution of this sovereign
Company; and it is evident, that such
defects in the sovereign, must have contributed
largely towards the existence of
abuse, in the deputed government. But
these defects might have been, in a great
measure, remedied, and their consequences
prevented, by a simple act of parliament,
53past by the national government,
at the time it thought proper to commit
the charge of this important branch of
national interest, to the care of the Company.
This act might have been entitled,
“An act for better enabling the East
India Company to administer the political
government, and to protect, maintain and
defend certain states and countries in India,
which have become subjected to the
dominion of Britain, and which, for sundry
weighty considerations, it hath been
judged proper to commit to her charge.”
And it might have been conceived in the
following, or such like terms.
“Whereas it appears, that the want of
a proper legislative authority over the ministers
and servants, employed by the
Company to execute the sovereign government
of these subjected dominions, must
be productive of many abuses, detrimental
as well to the interest of the Company,
as to the honour and interest of the British
nation. Be it enacted by &c. that, from
the time of passing this act, the Company
shall possess the power of legislation, or
making laws, for the government of this
foreign dominion: and the laws thus
54enacted by the Company, shall be equally
binding on all her ministers, servants, and
subjects, in that dominion, as are the acts
of parliament on the subjects of Britain.
And being farther sensible of the many
inconveniences, that must arise from the
Company’s incapacity of punishing the
offences committed by her ministers, and
servants abroad, otherwise than by applying
to courts of justice that are foreign
to her government; where she cannot
convict, through the difficulty of obtaining
the evidence required by the forms of
these courts; and where she is deterred
from prosecuting, by the fear of divulging
the secrets of her government; insomuch
that, rather than apply to these
courts, she must submit to the most audacious
acts of disobedience, and maladministration;
and considering that such incapacity
in the Company must discourage all
good government, and produce tyranny
and anarchy in this dominion; be it
enacted, that the Company shall have authority
to erect courts of justice, and appoint
judges; with the like powers, as
are vested in his majesty’s judges, and
courts of judicature, for trying and judging
55all suits and causes, or offences committed
within the limits of this Indian
dominion; and for punishing the same,
either capitally, or by fine, imprisonment,
and banishment, though to Europe only.
And whereas it is probable, that some of
the ministers or servants of the Company
may, by various methods, elude the justice
of her courts abroad, and escape to
Europe; in order therefore to prevent such
dangerous illusion of justice, it is enacted,
that the Company’s court of directors
shall, on due information being made to
them, have power at all times to call before
them such escaping delinquents, and
to try and punish them, for the offences
they may have committed within the limits
of this Indian dominion, in like
manner as they could have been tried or
punished by the Company’s courts abroad.
And because the liberty of appealing from
the Company’s courts of justice, to the
judgment of any other courts, must be
productive of the same inconveniences to
the Company, as a trial of the same cause
in the first instance would have been, and
must therefore deter the Company from
ever availing herself of the judicial powers
56granted by this act; it is enacted, that
delinquents shall have no liberty of appealing
from the Company’s courts abroad,
excepting to the Court of Directors at
home, or to a general court of Proprietors;
whose judgment in all such cases
shall be final. And as the Court of Directors
have, and may be, discouraged,
from prosecuting or punishing the crimes
of their rich servants, by the fear of danger
to their own private interest, from a
combination of the friends and abettors
of such rich delinquents at a future annual
election, be it enacted, that the 24 Directors,
being such at the time of passing this
act, shall continue in office, durante vita.
“And whereas it appears, that the
liberty of daily selling, transferring, and
alienating the shares in the Company’s
stock, of which this sovereign dominion
forms a part, tends to infuse into the proprietors
a spirit of rapacity, that may be
productive of much damage to the several
interests concerned; and hath many other
very pernicious consequences; whilst it
reflects disgrace on the dignity of all other
sovereigns; be it enacted, that no proprietor
in this Company’s stock, of which
57the sovereignty forms a part, shall have
power to send his share in the said sovereignty
to market, like as it were a hog or
bullock, and to sell, transfer, and alienate
the same; but that the several proprietors
of this stock and sovereignty, being such
at the time of passing this act, shall remain
and continue proprietors, without the
power of alienation, except in the cases
that shall be hereafter specified.
“And whereas it hath been represented
that the Company’s holding this sovereignty
by lease, and for a short term,
may not only alienate her care and prevent
her from studying and promoting the
lasting welfare of the country, but may
induce her to pillage, plunder and waste
it; be it enacted, that the Company shall
hold the sovereignty of this dominion,
quamdiu se bene gesserit; to the end, that
she may consider and treat it, not as the
property of another, but as her own inheritance.
“And whereas the Company exercises
traffic in this dominion; and, in consequence
thereof, her ministers do likewise
traffic; and whereas the exercise of traffic
is evidently repugnant to a due discharge
58of the duties of government, as
being unavoidably productive of destructive
monopolies and oppression; all which
it is impossible to prevent, so long as the
Company herself shall continue a merchant;
be it enacted, that this Company’s
commercial charter shall be dissolved; and
she, and her ministers, shall be restrained
from trading or trafficking, directly or indirectly,
within the limits of this Indian
dominion, under certain penalties to be
mentioned in a new charter, which shall
be granted to this Company, constituting
her the United Company of English East
India Sovereigns.”
These powers, grants, limitations, and
restrictions, would have qualified the Company,
so far as the nature of things could
admit, for administring the political government;
but, in her military capacity,
as the sovereign protector, maintainer and
defender of this Indian dominion, she hath
been still less qualified, and would therefore
have required still more extraordinary
powers. These however we shall not specify,
as apprehending, that what hath been
already demanded will shock. The grant
of supreme legislative and judicial powers
59to subjects, over their fellow subjects,
must seem an absurd communication of
that which is incommunicable: the prohibition
of selling and transferring the
shares of stock, would be termed a tyrannical
restraint on private property: the
perpetual grant of this sovereignty to the
Company, must be deemed an unjust alienation
of the Crown’s and Nation’s rights:
and the dissolution of the Company’s commercial
charter, would alter her very being
and nature. In short, if we regard
the proposed act simply, it will appear a
collection of absurd inconsistencies, and
ridiculous nonsense: but if we consider
it conjunctly with the cause or purpose for
which it is required, then every absurdity
vanishes from the act, and centers in the
cause that renders it necessary. For we
appeal to common sense, whether every
circumstance, specified in this proposed
act, is not indispensably necessary, to qualify
the Company for the sovereign office
of administring the political government of
this Indian dominion: and, if that necessity
is admitted, then doth the act become
a rational and necessary consequence, of
government’s having previously committed
60that sovereign charge to the Company.
Nay, we must take the liberty to
add, that government, by committing
such a charge to the Company, and at
same time totally neglecting to capacitate
her for supporting it, is in a great measure
accessory to all the ruinous consequences
that have ensued from her incapacity.
I am sensible it will be urged, that we
proceed upon false premises; for that government
never considered these countries
as subjected to the dominion of Britain;
that it never granted the sovereignty of
them to the Company; nor supposed her
to be the sovereign; but that it only acquiesced
in her holding the Dewanny, on
condition of her paying a part of the revenues
to the nation; and, of consequence,
that government never considered the inhabitants
of those countries as subjects to
the government of Britain. But this is a
most flimsy evasion, like that of shutting
our eyes to the sun, that we may deny it
is day: government granted to the Company
a right or permission to hold the Dewanny;
which is explained to be, the
power of collecting and appropriating the
61revenues of Bengal; and, in consideration
of this grant, government demanded
and received a share of these revenues;
government therefore, in its legislative capacity,
admits a knowledge, that the
Company did possess the power of collecting,
and also of applying the revenues of
Bengal, ad libitum; and, amongst other
purposes, to that of defraying the charges
of the military, as well as the civil, government:
and government well knows,
that the power which defrays the charges
of the military and civil government, must
hold the absolute direction of both: and
what constitutes sovereign power, but the
absolute direction of the military and civil
government, together with the disposal of
the revenues? But, exclusive of the Dewanny
contract, the Company hath applied,
in every other characteristic of a
sovereign, to government, in its legislative
capacity: she hath brought a bill into
parliament, for the grant of certain military
powers and indulgences, for the better
enabling her to defend, what she there
modestly, though vaguely, terms her territorial
acquisitions, (but which, by referring
to the Dewanny contract, is explained
62to include Bengal): and she hath
applied for certain juridical powers and
grants, for the better administration of the
jurisdiction, not in her commercial factories,
but over the whole country of Bengal:
therefore government hath been informed,
in its legislative capacity, by the
Company herself, that she administred the
military and civil government, and appropriated
the revenues of Bengal; consequently
that she was, in every sense and
respect, the actual sovereign of that country.
Now government could not be ignorant
that the Company is a subject to the national
government of Britain; and that,
as such, she could have neither right, power,
nor force to subject this dominion, or
afterwards to hold it in subjection, saving
what she derived from the national government;
consequently government, as it
understood that these countries were subjected
to the Company, must have known
that they were subjected to the dominion
of Britain. And as government did permit
the Company to retain this dominion;
and furnished her with a military force,
knowing it to be for the purpose of maintaining
63dominion, it is plain, that the
Company hath held this dominion, no
otherwise than by the grant and support of
government.
But if the Company be the sovereign
of Bengal, the inhabitants must, per force,
be her subjects; and if the Company
holds this sovereignty as a subject to the
government of Britain, by virtue of the
grant or permission of that government,
and by means of a force furnished by the
same government, in what relation can
this government regard the inhabitants of
Bengal? In that of subjects surely; tho’
the degree hath, by the deed of government,
been somewhat implicated; like
that of a child begot by the father upon
his own daughter. And subjects they have
been to the government of Britain, in
every sense and meaning; they have yielded
obedience to those subjects of this government
whom it appointed to rule over
them; and they have yielded the fruits,
as well as the duties of obedience.
But the government of Britain, which
hath thus by force subjected the inhabitants
of Bengal to its dominion; which
hath, for a series of years, held them in
64subjection; and hath, all along, exacted
from them the tribute of subjection; hath
withheld from them the protection due to
subjects. For it hath scrupulously withdrawn
itself from all regard or attention to
their government; and hath left it implicitly
to the guidance of a few merchants;
whom it knew to be perfectly unqualified
for administring any sort of government:
in consequence of which these
wretched people have, for many years,
been ruled, without law, justice, or government.
Unhappy subjects, who are
forced to obey a sovereign that refuses
them protection, and leaves them exposed
to all the horrors of tyranny and anarchy.
It will nevertheless be still insisted that
government could not, without committing
a number of irregularities and absurdities,
endow the Company in the manner
specified; as also that the Company,
when thus endowed, would still have been
altogether unequal to the charge of regularly
administring a sovereign government.
But surely government, if it would not or
could not capacitate the Company to regularly
govern those countries, ought not
to have furnished her the means of oppressing,
65ravaging, pillaging, and ruining
them; to the disgrace of humanity, and
the indelible reproach of the British name.
Government would have acted a part far
more consistent with the rules of honour
and humanity, if, instead of furnishing
to the Company this military power, it
had restrained her from availing herself of
the advantage, gained by force and chance,
over that mild, unwarlike, but industrious
people; and obliged her to leave them
to their own government.
But then the situation of affairs in those
countries, where the nation and Company
held such a valuable commercial interest,
rendered it highly improper and dangerous
to leave the native government to itself:
moreover the nation and Company could
not, in such case, have acquired the mighty
wealth and other benefits that have been
derived from the conquest, or assumed dominion,
of those countries. Oh wealth,
basely acquired, and foolishly applied!
Was there then no medium, no middle
channel, thro’ which government might
have steered the Nation and Company to
this same wealth and benefits, clear of all
these irregularities, incongruities, inhumanities,
66and reproaches? Yes surely;
and one so obvious and conspicuous, that
it is impossible to conceive how government
could be so industrious as to shun or
miss it. Had the national government
taken upon itself the charge of superintending
the government of those countries,
as reason and the nature of things directed,
then would it have furnished them a
sovereign, naturally free from all the defects
of the Company, and completely
endued with all the qualifications of power,
ability, and inclination from interest,
to protect and regularly govern them.
For it is plain, that the national government,
possessing supreme legislative,
and judicial power, must have been capable
of enforcing obedience to the laws
which it might have enacted for the good
government of those countries; and of
punishing disobedience, not only in the
natives, but in the ministers whom it
would have employed to execute that government;
as these must have been its
own subjects. And, on the other hand,
the nation being an immutable body, and
holding this sovereignty in her own right,
and by perpetual tenor; her government
67must have been actuated, by the strong
motive of self interest, to exert itself in
promoting the real and lasting welfare of
those countries. And as to the commercial
despotism, it could never have existed
under the national government.
It therefore follows, that the national
government, being perfectly free from all
the defects of the Company, would, by
the simple, natural, and rational act of
assuming the administration of government
in those countries, have prevented or reformed
all the several abuses or evils that
have sprung from the defective constitution
of the Company, as sovereign. But
besides the mighty reform of abuses, that
must have been immediately caused by thus
changing the person of the sovereign;
there is another advantage, which, though
it cannot be said to spring directly from
that change, yet would it have ensued as
a natural consequence of the national government’s
taking upon itself this sovereign
charge; and that is, the creation or
institution of a new interest in that country;
a sort of middle state, betwixt the
native subjects and their foreign government.
68The middle state here meant is the
East India Company, (or which is the
same, her servants in Bengal;) which, being
now reduced to the condition of a subject,
tho’ still retaining all her commercial
privileges and interests in that country,
would have formed an intermediate link in
the political chain, serving to connect the
natives with their government, and government
with the natives. For, in every
one circumstance that respected the liberty
of the subject, this middle state must have
held precisely the same interest as the natives;
and, in consequence, the same inclination
to oppose all oppression of government:
and, in every thing that respected
the real interest, the power, or honour of
the sovereign, the community of Natale
Solum must have led it to support the measures
of government. Therefore, this middle
state, holding a great weight in that
dependent dominion, (not indeed from its
numbers, but from the powerful support
and influence of the Company, which
would have been still very respectable in
the sovereign country,) must have carried
a mighty poise into the scale of liberty, in
opposition to the despotism of government;
69whilst, at same time, it would
have created no danger to the power of the
sovereign. And a middle state of this nature
must have been of inexpressible utility;
facilitating, in many respects, the establishment
of a regular political œconomy
in the government of these countries. For,
in such case, the sovereign could, with
propriety, efficacy, and safety, have conferred
every reasonable privilege on the
whole body of subjects in this foreign dominion:
seeing that the exertion of these
privileges might have been artfully confined
to this middle state: and, as on the one
hand, this finesse would not have, in any
shape, withheld the benefit of these privileges
from the natives; but, on the contrary,
would have rendered them more
effectually useful to the whole body of subjects,
than if they had been committed
either entirely or in common to the natives;
because the Company’s servants
would, from interest, have had the same
inclination as the natives, to exert these
privileges for the common good; and they
would have had infinitely greater power,
from their superior activity, intrepidity,
and firmness, as also from their superior
70opportunities of obtaining redress elsewhere
against any infringement made by government:
so, on the other hand, the authority
of the sovereign could have incurred
no risk from these privileges in the hands
of Europeans; whereas there is great danger
in attempting to confer on the natives
a power to controul even the despotism of
government. With this middle state the
power of juries would have been effectual
to the subject, and harmless to the sovereign:
however, we shall have occasion to
be more particular on this head in the
sequel.
But if the national government could,
by taking this sovereign charge upon itself,
have prevented or reformed these many
evils and abuses that have arisen from
the defects of the Company; and could
have likewise created other such advantages,
facilitating the establishment of a
regular government in those countries;
what reason can be assigned for government’s
declining this charge, and devolving
it on the Company? Government
could not surely suppose that this important
concern would be managed to greater
national advantage by the Company, than
71by itself: seeing that common sense might
have foreseen, what experience hath since
proved, that, under the management of
the Company, the interest of Britain in
those countries would, in the space of a
very few years, be completely annihilated;
that the countries themselves would either
be completely ruined, or otherwise lost to
enemies; and that the wealth, which was
extorted from them by rapine and general
havoc, being imported into Britain in the
hands of a few indiscreet individuals, would
create a torrent of profusion, extravagance,
luxury, and prodigality, that would sweep
all before it into the gulf of bankruptcy,
perdition, and despair. Whereas, under
the regular administration of national government,
those countries might have been
still preserved in a flourishing condition;
and, in consequence, still capable of yielding
to Britain a tribute little inferior to the
surplus revenue which the Company received
in the first year of the Dewanny:
which tribute, arriving immediately at the
public treasury of Britain, and being there
applied to the diminution of taxes, and
consequent reduction of the price of necessaries
and labour, would have proved a
72gentle universal shower, reviving our decayed
and drooping manufactures and
commerce.
But neither could government be induced
to confer this sovereignty on the Company,
by any motive of regard to the true
interest of the proprietors: seeing it was
palpably evident that this charge, being so
unmeasurably superior to her powers of supporting
it, must unavoidably crush her to
ruin, and, along with her, the countries
subjected to her rule; and, it is to be
feared, even that community of which she
forms a part. Whereas, if the national
government had taken into its own hands,
and carefully administered the government
of those countries, whilst it continued the
Company in possession of her commercial
privileges, she would have continued to divide,
in the first place, the six per cent.
which her commerce, (unaided by revenue)
afforded; even when burdened with the
necessary expence of a small military force
maintained for the guard of that commerce
in those foreign countries, and which must
have been equal to four per cent. on her capital:
but this commercial military expence
being rendered in a great measure unnecessary,
73by the immediate protection of national
government, the saving thereof
would have added two per cent. to her dividend:
and the equivalent, which government
would have paid for her fortresses, munition,
&c. being added to her capital
stock, would have encreased her dividend
nearly one per cent. more; whilst her stock
itself would, at this day, have been really,
and intrinsically worth 220 l. instead of
........ its present real and intrinsic
value.
It would be insulting the understanding
of ministry, to suppose that it had been
restrained from assuming this sovereign
charge, by any delicacy of regard to the
ideal right of the Company; derived from
either conquests, as subjects; or from the
sham grant of a man, who had not power
to dispose of a single bega of land, nay,
not of a cocoa-nut-tree in that country;
and consequently whose grant of the sovereignty
of Bengal could contribute nothing
more to investiture or possession, than his
grant of the crown of Britain could.
Though if we should (for the sake of argument)
suppose, that ministry had really
admitted some such right, we must still
74esteem its acquiescence in that right a most
absurd and wildly mistaken indulgence;
seeing it evidently tended to the ruin of
the party whom it meant to favour.
There hath been, however, one weighty
argument against government’s assuming
this Indian charge, which is, the danger
arising to national liberty from government’s,
(or, in other words, the crown or
ministry’s) acquiring such an accession of
influence, as must arise from the possession
of the many emoluments, places, posts,
&c. annexed to this Indian charge: whereas
liberty is completely secured from such
danger, whilst the Company possesses it.
And the certainty of this double maxim,
viz. the danger from government’s possessing
this charge, and the security whilst it
is in the hands of the Company, is as generally
established as almost any one human
principle: for, being violently enforced
by those whose personal views lead
them to oppose administration, and at same
time not simply allowed, but even inculcated
by ministry itself, it hath been readily
credited by those who, their personal interest
not being so deeply concerned, were
less curious to investigate the truth.
75It may be deemed presumptuous in an
individual, to question the orthodoxy of
a maxim so powerfully enforced by one
party, readily allowed by the other, and
almost universally credited: tho’ the extraordinary
circumstance, of two violent
rival parties concurring so exactly on a
point, where their personal interest seems
to be so materially and so oppositely engaged,
would lead a bystander to suppose,
that either one of the two parties must be
mistaken; or otherwise, that one or both
must misrepresent: at any rate, that uncommon
instance of candour, in ministry’s
preaching up a doctrine so repugnant to
that which it pretends to be its own personal
interest, would induce such bystander
to suspect its sincerity. However, as a
right understanding of this point may considerably
import the public, at this critical
juncture, I shall venture disclosing my sentiments,
at the risk of censure for prolixity,
as well as impertinence.
With regard to the first part of the maxim,
I conceive that the danger to liberty,
from government’s holding this charge in
its own hands, is supposed to arise from
the influence which the minister would
76acquire, over the two subject branches of
legislature, (those bulwarks of liberty) by
means of the many emoluments, places,
posts, &c. annexed to the possession of that
charge. But before we admit that the ministers
holding this charge would be creative
of that dangerous influence, we ought
to be satisfied that he doth not already possess
it, by other means; for, if he doth
already possess such influence by other
means, it is plain that the Indian charge
cannot confer it; nor will it avail to shut
one door, whilst there are others open to
admit him. And that the minister hath
long been in full and plenary possession of
such influence, we have ever heard asserted
by these very men who so loudly enforce
the danger of his acquiring it, by means
of this Indian charge: nay, we have much
better authority than their contradictory
assertions, (even that of fact and daily experience,)
for believing that the minister
hath and doth possess posts and places, and
that, on any emergency, he hath in his
power other means equally effectual, towards
creating and holding such influence,
in a degree as plenary and complete
as his own heart can desire. And,
77if the minister doth already possess
such influence by other means, it is plain,
that the Indian charge cannot confer it;
nor will it avail to shut one door, whilst
there are others open to admit him. And
that the minister hath been long in full
and plenary possession of such influence,
we have ever heard asserted by those very
men, who so loudly enforce the danger of
his acquiring it, by means of this Indian
charge: nay, we have much better authority
than their contradictory assertions,
(even that of fact and daily experience,)
for believing that the minister hath and
doth possess posts and places, and that on
any emergency he hath in his power other
means equally effectual, towards
creating and holding such influence, in a
degree as plenary and complete as his own
heart can desire. And, if the minister
doth already possess an influence so fully
sufficient, it must be allowed that, in so
much as respects parliamentary influence,
this Indian charge would be a thing superfluous
and useless to him; like meat to
a man that hath already filled his belly;
the absence of it can withhold nothing
that he wants, and the acquisition cannot
78confer more than he already possesses. I
may venture to add, that we certainly
hold our liberty by some latent security,
more powerful than that of parliament
itself, which neither the minister’s influence
over parliament, nor posts and
places, will ever induce him to attack, or
enable him to subdue; for that, otherwise,
we should have been divested of our privileges
and liberty long ago. And, upon
considering these several circumstances, I
conclude, that if this Indian charge was
in the hands of government to-morrow, it
would neither enable, nor induce the minister,
to attempt a jot more against our
liberty, than he hath done, can do, and
will do, without it. However, by way
of reinforcing my argument, I shall add
that, if the plan which I mean to propose
should be carried into execution, it
would leave but few of these emoluments,
&c. to the immediate disposal of
the minister; and, possibly, this declaration
may but little recommend it to his
favour.
But still, if we were to admit a real
danger to liberty from the minister’s possessing
these emoluments, &c. it remains
79to be proved that liberty hath been, is,
and will be secured from such danger, by
the Company’s holding that Indian charge.
And, when the nature of this security
comes to be examined, I apprehend it will
be found more difficult to prove this latter
part of the maxim, than the former.
For it is notorious that, ever until the late
distraction in the Company’s affairs, the
arbitrary application of these emoluments,
posts, &c. was vested in the Directors;
and indeed the entire powers and interests
of the Company; insomuch that the Directors
might, with propriety, be termed
the Company. So that the whole security
of national liberty, and, of course,
the sole obstruction to the minister’s dangerous
views, depended on the integrity
and independent spirit of 24 Directors;
of whom, again, one or two generally
leads all the rest. Consequently, to come
at the fingering of these dangerous emoluments,
&c. the minister had only to
subvert the integrity, or subdue the independance,
of these Directors. And, to
effect this, a minister possessed more than
one infallible recipe. By artfully joining
the mighty influence which he held in the
80Company’s stock thro’ his numerous dependants,
to one or other of two parties
contending violently for the direction, he
could reduce both to a perfect dependance
on himself: by the same means he could
hold them in subjection: but still more,
by the awe of wresting from them the
sweet management of this Indian sovereignty,
which they were sensible he could
do by a word. And thus he could work
upon their fears. But inclination would
naturally and powerfully lead the Directors
to throw themselves into the arms of
a minister; not so much for his immediate
assistance; tho’ even that might be of
great use, for rendering matters easy with
the proprietors, as well as parliament and
the nation; but because, on these terms,
they secured, in him, an omnipotent supporter
and all powerful advocate, against
the day of distress, which they well knew
must come, and that soon: whereas, otherwise,
they must lay their account
with finding him a severe judge, and bitter
prosecutor.
By these several operations on the hopes
and fears of the Directors, it was extremely
easy for a minister to render them as
81pliant as a glove; as obedient as a spaniel,
to fetch and carry at bidding. And the
Directors being once reduced to this state
of dependance, it is evident, that the minister
must possess a full and arbitrary
power over all the emoluments, posts,
places, &c. appertaining to this Indian
charge. But the disposal of the present
emoluments, &c. was a trivial matter,
compared with other advantages, which
this Indian business, whilst in the hands
of the Company, presented to an artful
and enterprising minister. For, under
the plausible and indeed undeniable pretext
of qualifying the Company for administring
this sovereign charge, he might
have drawn from the legislature certain
military as well as political powers; which,
being gradually augmented as occasion
offered, might have at last established a
sort of power, in this government, distinct
from and independent of the legislature:
the exertion of which power, being confided
to the Directors, would in fact have
rested with the minister. Here indeed was
a real danger to liberty; provided it had
been possible to hold up this Indian business,
in the hands of the Company, for
82any length of time; for, notwithstanding
I consider national liberty as inexpugnable
to the open assaults of a minister, yet,
from such a secret convenient and commanding
post as this mentioned, he might
have made frequent sly and successful incursions
on the confines of liberty; which
would have greatly straitened her quarters,
and wasted her strength.
On the other hand, if that Indian charge
had been vested in the national government,
liberty must have been perfectly
secured from this last mentioned danger;
for, in such case, there could have been
no pretext for demanding these extraordinary
distinct powers; and, consequently,
no opportunity of establishing that truly
dangerous imperium in imperio. And even
in the application of the ordinary powers,
emoluments, &c. a minister must
have been subjected to many troublesome
checks, and restraints. His Majesty, who
can have no views distinct from the general
interest of his people, must have held
a principal voice in every measure; as
likewise must some others his counsellors.
Parliament too must have proved an inconvenient
restraint on a minister; particularly
83in the article of estimates and accounts
of revenue, which must have been
submitted to its inspection; and notwithstanding
the certainty of carrying points
by a majority of voices, yet, as there will
ever be some refractory members, these
might have carried tales to the public;
which, provided this charge had been in
the hands of national government, would
have judged itself interested in the affair;
and would therefore have taken the liberty
to criticise his measures, or censure
his misconduct. Whereas, this business
being secured, as private property, in the
hands of the Company, king, parliament,
and nation were all excluded from
participation: the proprietors alone had a
right to examine measures or accounts;
and, the majority of them upon all questions
being mercenary retainers to ministry
and the direction, they must have ever
been a mere servile pecus. So that the
business might have been snugly confined
to three or four ministerial associates,
with their faithful dependants in Leadenhall
Street; whilst the minister needed
never appear in the affair; free from care,
charge, or trouble; and irresponsible for
84either measures, or consequences; he
might enjoy all the sweets, without the
least alloy of bitter.
Sure I am if I had been minister, and
minded to make a job of this Indian business,
I would certainly have exerted myself
most sedulously to preserve it in the
hands of the Company. And, to divert
the nation from ever turning her eye towards
it, I would have strenuously inculcated the
rights of the Company, national faith,
the impossibility of conducting this business
otherwise than through the Company;
and, above all things, I would, by my
emissaries, have alarmed the public, with
fears of danger to their liberty, should
this business ever come into the hands of
government; whilst, by the same canal,
I would have trumpeted forth my own
candour, disinterestedness as a minister,
indifference to power, and delicate regard
to national liberty and private property, in
thus disclaiming an object so replete with
ministerial advantages, which was within
my power. And thus would I have continued
the game, until it was up: and
then I would have directed the enquiries,
which decency and regard to appearances
85extorted from me, in such a manner as to
suppress, instead of investigating: though,
at same time, I would have boldly expressed
my indignation at the Company’s
misconduct; and loudly denounced vengeance
against the individuals that had
shared in the plunder; not a soul that
was guilty should escape. And, to wind
up the whole affair dextrously, I would
have tasked my own powers, and those of
my myrmidons, to represent all these Indian
acquisitions as a transitory, casual,
and accidental piece of business; which
was altogether out of our tract; and
which, if the nation had ever engaged
in maintaining them, would have ruined
and exhausted her: and so the nation was
to thank me, for withholding her from
ruin.
In this manner, I say, would I, who
am a reptile, have acted, had I been minister,
and minded to make a job of this
business: but I am far from intimating
or insinuating that our ministers, who
are men of high birth and strict honour,
could be capable of admitting even a
thought of taking such base advantages.
86All that I have said is only meant to show,
that a minister, if he had the inclination,
possessed an infinitely fairer opportunity,
of converting this business to sinister purposes,
whilst it was in the hands of the
Company; than he possibly could have
had, from the same business, under the
conduct of national government. And,
from thence, I would infer that, had this
business been in the hands of government,
our liberty, nay and our property too,
would have been secured from many dangers,
to which they have been exposed,
whilst this business hath been in the hands
of the Company.
I cannot then conceive what other objections
could be started against government’s
taking upon itself the charge of
this Indian dominion: unless it be the old
trite arguments of timid sluggish indolence,
want of enterprize, &c. That, the
distance of situation rendering it impossible
for Britain to properly maintain and
govern this dominion, it would become
an object of no true value or importance,
but rather a heavy load exhausting her
strength. But it is now more than time
for the nation to recal her faith from men
87whom she hath sufficient ground to suspect
of deceit; and, rousing her senses, to take
the liberty of trying these matters by the
standard of her own reason; which we
shall endeavour to aid by the following
hints.
To properly demonstrate the true value
and importance of this Indian dominion to
Britain, would demand a volume; we
have, in the first part, presented a slight
sketch of it; here therefore we shall offer
only one or two remarks respecting its importance
to our finances; and though we
do not offer these remarks as the result of
exact calculation, yet will they serve to
throw a light on this subject. Ever since
the last war Britain hath paid annually
to foreign creditors, in interest, about
1,500,000 l. and this is paid, not in
paper, but all in hard money; or,
otherwise, in what is equivalent, the stoppage
of so much hard money as is reckoned
to come into Britain by the balance
of her trade. On the other hand, the
net specie balance of trade with all the
world, (exclusive of that part which
strictly and properly may be termed the
produce of Indian dominion,) after deducting
88the imperceptible and enormous
drain of specie made by smuggling, doth
not at this day perhaps amount to 800,000 l.
The difference then betwixt her numerical
specie disbursement and receipt in balance
of trade, must needs have been made good
from some other fund than the circulating
stock of specie, otherwise circulation must
in that number of years have totally ceased.
And this fund we need not mention to
have been the dominion in India. Ever
since 1757, the private fortunes acquired
there in consequence of dominion or conquest,
having been remitted either in bills
on foreign Indian companies, or in diamonds,
have created an annual influx of
specie, (or what is equivalent,) to the amount
of at least 700,000 l.[1] The Company
89too received since that period, and
previous to the Dewanny, though by virtue
of dominion or conquest, sundry large
sums of money; which she invested in
merchandize; and, thereby, saved to Britain
so much specie as she would, otherwise,
have transmitted for the purchase
of such merchandize; and it doth not require
demonstration to prove, that all such
saving is, in every respect, the same as the
90influx of an equal sum. And ever from
1765, till some time in 1770, the Company
paid for all her cargoes, not only in
India but in China, with the surplus revenue
of Bengal: and of course this surplus
revenue hath, for that space, saved,
(which is the same as gained) annually to
Britain, the whole sums which the Company
used to transmit for the purchase of
her cargoes in India and China; and
which, on an average, may be reckoned
500,000 l. per annum: but these cargoes
were, from 1765, encreased to an enormous
degree; and if we add only 200,000 l.
for such encrease, we shall find that the
surplus revenue of Bengal hath, by the
return of trade, created an annual influx
to Britain of at least 700,000 l. in specie:
and this, added to the private fortunes,
makes 1,400,000 l. received yearly by
Britain, from Indian dominion.
But, for these two years past, the ruinous
situation of those countries, and the
consequent deficiency of revenue, hath
obliged the Company to either transmit
money from Europe, or otherwise to borrow
money abroad, on bill or bond, for
the purchase of all her cargoes in India as
91well as China: and the Company, by thus
borrowing, for the purchase of cargoes,
and even the expence of her government,
hath absorbed the private fortunes, which,
till then, had been transmitted to Britain,
by bills on foreign companies. We must
therefore perceive, without descending to
tedious investigation, that the ruined state
of those countries, having cut off surplus
revenue, hath, for these two years past,
diminished the annual influx to Britain
from Indian dominion, at least one half,
or 700,000 l. And this diminution of
influx, whilst our drain continues the
same, we already begin to feel in our circulation:
though this felt effect is not yet
traced up to its cause. Of what mighty
importance then must this Indian dominion
have been, to the circulation of Britain:
when this circulation feels severely,
from only two years partial deprivation of
the benefit formerly derived from that
dominion? And what effect must a total
deprivation of that benefit operate, in a
few years, on this circulation; whilst,
we are continuing to pay to our foreign
creditors about 1,500,000 l. per annum in
numerical specie; exclusive of other less
92noted drains, which, it is most probable
mount it up much higher? And yet it is
evident, that Britain must, unavoidably,
be deprived of this whole benefit, so soon
as she shall lose her dominion in India;
whether that loss shall be caused by enemies,
or by the ruin of the countries subjected.
Nay, by losing the dominion of
Bengal singly, she must not only incur
a deprivation of almost the whole dominion
benefit; but she must likewise lose by far
the most valuable part of that commerce,
which was carried on by the Company with
those countries, previous to dominion.
For the commerce with Bengal, alone, is
of much greater value, than that with all
the rest of India: and, as to the trade
with China, it is the most pernicious and
losing trade to the nation; however convenient
it may be to government.
And if we shall then advert to the
benefit and support which the finances of
Britain have received from this Indian dominion,
for so many years past, though
under the most preposterous management;
but, still more, if we shall advert to the
nature and degree of benefit that, under
proper management, might have been derived
93in perpetuum from this Indian dominion,
in not only the article of finance,
but in other weighty respects: and, if we
shall, yet farther, look forward to the
dismal consequences that must unavoidably
ensue to Britain in these several respects,
from a deprivation of this Indian
dominion and its benefits; can we tamely
surrender our reason to the ipse dixit of men
who are hardy enough to tell us, that Indian
dominion is of no value nor utility
to Britain.
Nor do these men less abuse our understanding,
by holding forth the difficulty of
maintaining and defending this dominion:
seeing that, of all nations in the world,
Britain is, by a variety of circumstances,
the best qualified to maintain and defend
maritime or commercial dominion in India.
For, as she exceeds all the world in
naval force, she is, through that circumstance
alone, the most capable of defending
such dominion, against the assault of
European enemies: and had Britain availed
herself of evident advantages, had she
established her naval and land defence upon
the plan that shall be explained, British
dominion in India might, at this day, have
been secured from even the attempt of
94European rivals: they might have admired
and envied, but they would not have dared
to attack. And these European rivals are
the only dangerous enemies to British dominion
in India: for as to the neighbouring
native powers, they would, from fear
as well as inclination, have been amicable
to Britain; provided her government in
those countries had acted with common
honesty, and common decorum, or prudence;
and not as common robbers. And,
as to the unhappy native subjects themselves,
their loyalty hath been sufficiently
proved, by so many years patient submission
to the most intolerable of all possible
governments. Wherein then consists
the difficulty of maintaining and defending
British dominion in India?
And with regard to the so much talked
of expence or drain of native strength,
we may surely, with good reason, say
that this objection militated much stronger
against maintaining that dominion under
the Company, than under national government:
tho’ the nature and extent of even that
drain under the Company, is most grossly
misrepresented. For I am well informed
that the Company’s annual recruit, since
the time she completed her dominion force,
95hath never exceeded 1200 men; and I am
afraid it hath in general fallen short of
1000; notwithstanding she laboured under
many disadvantages, from which national
government would be exempted: such as
being obliged to put up with very indifferent
and unhealthy recruits, for want of
better; too little attention paid to the
manner of transporting them; and still
less to their health and manner of living
in the country: whilst her governors expended
numbers of them on unnecessary
predatory wars. And even this recruit
we are not to reckon a drain of real strength
from Britain: seeing that, the Company’s
recruits have been mostly fellows of the
most desperate circumstances, who had no
means of subsisting at home; and who
therefore would, if the Company had not
taken them off, have been taken off by
the gallows, or otherwise would have emigrated
to America or some other country,
in search of bread; and would thus have
been equally lost to Britain. So that,
upon rationally considering this matter,
we shall find that, for the maintenance of
dominion in India, the Company hath not
drained this country, of 100 men annually,
96that could, in any sense, be termed
useful, or a real strength to it. But,
setting aside the precedent of the Company,
it is certain that, to maintain and
defend the mighty dominion of Bengal,
demands an European force very little superior
in number to the garrison of that
barren fortress Gibraltar: and to maintain
and defend the whole territorial possessions,
together with the commerce of Britain in
India, requires a force very little exceeding
the aforesaid garrison with that of its
filler fortress in Minorca. And the annual
recruit, necessary to keep up this force,
after allowing largely for climate, and
every other circumstance, would, on a
complete plan of defence, not exceed 900
or at most 1000 men: and, of this recruit,
at least 200, would be wanted annually
to maintain commerce, if there was no
dominion. Nay, if this is judged too
great a drain for Britain, one fourth part
of that number may be reduced, by recruiting
that proportion of foreign protestants:
such being easily procured; and,
in such a low proportion, they can in no
respect be dangerous. And can Britain,
regard 6 or 700 men annually as too great
97a drain, for the maintenance of that important
dominion and commerce, which
is as one of the capital limbs of her body;
and at same time bestow a nearly equal
share of her strength on maintaining these
two barren, and I had almost said useless,
fortresses; the pecuniary charge of which
she pays out of her proper finance, never
to return; whilst Indian dominion defrays
its own charge.
The only remaining objection then to
Indian dominion is, the difficulty of properly
governing it. But this difficulty
doth not arise, like that in America, from
the indomitably obstinate spirit of the subjects;
on the contrary, it arises from their
over passive or submissive disposition, and
incapacity of resisting the power of government:
and this, instead of being an
objection, is the most valuable qualification
of a dependent dominion. To remove
this difficulty demands no exterior
aids, no exertion of powers or force; it
depends entirely on the will of the sovereign;
and a very little art, a very little
care, with a little honesty, would serve
to completely remedy it; as we doubt not
to evince.
98In fine, Bengal, being one of the richest
commercial countries is, to Britain as
a commercial nation, the noblest and most
truly valuable acquisition that providence
could possibly bestow on her: by the mild
disposition of its inhabitants it is the most
facilely governed and maintained; and, by
the nature of its situation, it is the most
defensible foreign dominion on this globe;
particularly to Britain which excels in
naval force. And one may almost venture
to say that providence, by throwing
Bengal into the arms of Britain, seems to
have intended that this, the richest commercial
state in Asia, which, through the
effeminacy of its inhabitants, is incapable
of maintaining its own independance,
should be subjected to Britain, as being
the fittest, through similarity of commercial
disposition, interest, and modes,
to properly govern it; and, through her
superiority in naval force, the best qualified
to defend and protect it from all
enemies.
In what light then must posterity
regard the policy of Britain, during
the third quarter of the eighteenth century:
when it shall find her, in the East,
99slighting and giving up that glorious field,
which annually yielded a golden crop, to
be rutted up and trodden down by hogs
and viler beasts: whilst, in the West, she
was tugging with all her might, exerting
her utmost study, care and attention, much
strength, and more money, on cultivating
the sea sands; straining to subdue nature;
and forcing the horse to drink in spite of
inclination? Will it not be said, that she
would have acted a far wiser part, if she had
left nature and time to slowly operate in
America, the effects which they will unavoidably
produce, in spite of all her efforts;
and had converted her care and attention,
to properly govern, and maintain,
that noble, rich, and grateful dependent
dominion in India; which, upon such
terms, would have poured, into her publick
treasury, resources, that would have
served to alleviate her burden of taxes;
and, consequently, to reduce the price of
necessaries, of labour, and of manufactures;
which, again, would have preserved
her commerce, not only with America,
but with other countries; and would
at same time have preserved to her thousands
of industrious and useful subjects,
100who, through want of employment, were
forced to emigrate from her to America.
And, by the same care and attention to
the government and revenue of that Indian
dominion, she would have prevented
the inundation of eastern profusion and
extravagance; which chiefly contributed
to convert this formerly graniferous island,
into a pasture for horses of parade and
stately pride; insomuch that, instead of
supplying her neighbours as formerly, with
some hundred thousand pounds worth of
grain annually, she could not feed the greatly
reduced number of her own inhabitants;
nor furnish the means of living to the industrious
agricultor, and peasant; who, in
search of livelihood, fled from her to America;
thereby debilitating her own best
source of strength, and prematurely accelerating
the manhood of those otherwise
infant colonies.
Nevertheless there still remains a possibility
of retrieving this error in policy;
or at least of preventing a farther encrease
of the evils that have arisen from it; provided
that, in the first place, this Indian
dominion shall still be in our possession:
and, in the second place, that national
101government shall, by taking upon itself
the charge of administring the government
thereof, remedy that first and radical
cause of evil and abuse which hath
existed under the Company’s government:
and shall, at same time, with honest and
sincere intention, spirit and activity, apply
a proper remedy to that which hath
been assigned as the second cause of evil,
and the nature of which remedy shall be
explained in the sequel. For, upon such
terms, there is no doubt that a regular
system of government may be established
in that dependent dominion; under which
it may be restored to its pristine prosperity,
nay, it may be elevated to a state still
more flourishing than it ever knew; and,
in consequence, to a capacity of yielding
a still superior degree of benefit to Britain;
and in a manner widely different, and truely
salutary to her.
But I must again repeat, that it is vain
to expect this reform of evils from the
management of the Company; loaded as
she is with so many natural defects, which
it is out of the power of art to remedy,
otherwise than by conferring upon her the
sovereign government of Britain, along
102with that of this dependent dominion.
For the execution of these two sovereign
governments is, by the nature of things,
inseparable: it being morally impossible,
that any power can execute the sovereign
government of those Indian countries, as
a dominion dependent upon Britain, unless
that power shall possess the sovereign
execution of government in Britain.
However, it would be still more vain to
look for any good from that extravagant
fancy of joining the Company, with government,
in this sovereign charge. What
quota of powers, proper to her and wanting
to government, can the Company contribute,
to render her a necessary or useful
associate with government, in this sovereign
charge? I doubt not that the proposer’s
intentions were good and honest:
but his scheme would be so far from promoting
his or any one good purpose, that it would
produce the very opposite effects. For, instead
of checking and contrasting, it would serve,
in the first place, to furnish, in the Directors
and their governors, a convenient
cloke of excuse to ministry and its governors,
with the nation; whilst ministry
and its governors would serve the Directors
103and their governors a like good turn
with the proprietors: they would mutually
vouch for and screen each other; neither
would be responsible, and neither
would act; and thus, between stools, &c.
in the second place, commercial despotism
which, by separating the Company
from the powers of government and the
consequent jealousy of privilege, must have
been completely suppressed, would, under
this double-headed monster, flourish with
redoubled vigour: the national governors
would, by their connection with the Company’s,
become merchants as well as tyrants;
and the Company’s governors
would, by their power in the government,
continue tyrants as well as merchants: and
thus the candle would burn at both ends.
In the third place, the Company which,
by being excluded from the powers of government,
would have contributed so essentially
in the nature of a middle state to
the establishment of a regular political system
in those countries, must, by being
joined in the execution of government, entirely
lose that virtue: instead of supporting
liberty, she would join in promoting
tyranny; and would still continue a ruinous
104pest to those countries. Indeed that
strange partnership of Nation and Co. in
this sovereignty business, is a cure infinitely
worse than the disease.
In short, there is no alternative: if
Britain means to preserve the possession of
that mighty benefit derived from dominion
and commerce in India; if she means to
prevent the absolute ruin of the Company,
and her creditors; if she hath any regard
to the loud cry of oppression sent
forth to her for a series of years, by her
numerous wretched subjects in those countries;
and means to save them from final
destruction, she must furnish their government
with a sovereign, or head, properly
qualified to administer it: for this is the
foundation, as well as the crowning of all
good government; it is the center upon
which the machine revolves, from which
every line issues, and in which every line
terminates; it is sine qua non, for without
it no regular government can exist.
And what proper sovereign can Britain
furnish to that dependent dominion, unless
it be her own sovereign government?
We have shown that the nation and her
supreme government are perfectly equal to
105the charge: to them there is not the
smallest difficulty in supporting it. Neither
is there the smallest difficulty to her
executive government or ministry, provided
it shall possess an ordinary share of spirit,
activity, or enterprize; and shall proceed
with sincere and upright intention.
For, a regular form of government being
once established abroad, and a properly
digested office or department formed at
home, the business would go on with great
smoothness and facility to ministry.
Nevertheless, as I have assumed the liberty
of prescribing in this important and
almost desperate case, I am sorry, that a sincere
regard to the welfare of the patient
should compel me to add, (by way of concluding
on this head,) that, unless ministry
shall act upon a principle, and with a
spirit, extremely different from that which
it hath hitherto discovered in this business,
it would be much more adviseable to continue
the charge in the hands of the Company:
for it can be but ruined under her.
However, in strong hopes of a melioration
in these respects, which depends altogether
on the will of government, I shall proceed
106to disclose that plan, which, in the hands
of a properly qualified sovereign, would, I
doubt not, serve to establish a regular system
of government in India.
A PLAN, FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF POLITICAL GOVERNMENT IN INDIA.
We have before observed, that the
second cause why these restraining
and impelling powers, which alone can
prevent tyranny and anarchy, have been altogether
wanting in the Company’s system
of government, appears to be the distance
of situation, betwixt the sovereign residence
and the country governed. And we
shall here add that, if national government
should adopt the same system, this
107distance would operate, under it, effects
the same in nature as these under the Company;
and nothing but the difference in
other circumstances, betwixt the national
government and Company, could prevent
these effects from being likewise equal in
degree. For it is evident that, if the executive
government of the nation should, as
the Directors have done, preserve to itself
the charge and power of immediately superintending
and controuling the execution
of government in that Indian dominion,
the distance of situation would create to
that government an equal impossibility of
advising and directing measures, of enforcing
the execution or observance of orders,
and of preventing or restraining abuse:
consequently, in the immediate execution
of all measures, the national governors
would possess the same unlimited power, as
the Company’s governors have done. And
the only advantage to that Indian government,
from national governments assuming
from the Company the charge of administering
it, would arise from the following
circumstances. First, the superior retrospective
or ex post facto authority of national
government, enabling it to judge and punish
108the maladministration, or disobedience
of its ministers. Second, The superior
inclination or disposition of national
government (arising from its perpetual interest
in the property) to exert itself in
promoting proper measures. Third, The
suppression of commercial despotism. And
fourth, The existence of the Company as
a middle state betwixt the natives and their
foreign government. All which innovations,
arising from national government’s
taking upon itself the administration of
this Indian government, though they are
indispensably necessary and highly conducive
to the establishment of a regular political
system, yet do we perceive that they,
singly and unsupported, cannot suffice to
create that due proportion of restraint on
the power, or of impulse on the will of the
deputed executive government, which is
absolutely necessary to the perfect suppression
of tyranny, anarchy, and abuse. Nor
is it possible to complete this restraint and
impulse, to that sufficing degree, unless by
a proper exertion of the sovereign’s own
supreme influence.
But we find that, upon the Company’s
system, the distance of situation renders
109the influence of the sovereign altogether
impotent to this effect: and if we should
take it for granted that her system hath
been just or complete, then must we conclude,
that this sovereign impotence is a
consequence naturally and unavoidably arising
from the distance; and, therefore,
above the remedy of art. But, if we
consult our own reason, we shall perceive
that the Company’s impotence, in that
particular respect, proceeded from a radical
defect or error in her system; which
might have been remedied by art. For,
it is evident, that the distance of situation
was in every circumstance similarly and
equally obstructive to the Company’s immediately
or personally executing the government
of that Indian dominion, as it
was to her immediately restraining or enforcing
the manner of execution: and yet
we find that the Directors could discover
a remedy for the first of these obstructions,
by the succedaneum of appointing
a deputed executive government. And, as
the second sprung from the same cause,
and was exactly similar in its nature, common
sense must surely have instructed her,
that it was to be removed by a similar remedy;
110it being certain that, if the Directors
had thought proper to institute in
India a deputation properly qualified to
controul their executive deputation, the
measures of those Indian governments
might have been enforced or retrained by
the sovereign rending in Europe, as effectually
as they have been executed by
the same sovereign: that is to say, as effectually,
as the defective constitution of
the Company, (which equally disqualified
her for controuling as for executing,)
could admit.
But it could not be ignorance, or want
of common sense, that prevented the Directors
from instituting a controuling deputation
of this nature: seeing they had
before them the precedent of these other
European nations, who hold any possessions
in India: all of whom have provided
something of this kind: for instance, the
Dutch government at Batavia. Sound
policy quickly pointed out to the Dutch,
the absurdity of committing the charge of
their dispersed concerns in India, to a multiplicity
of distinct heads, all acting under
no other constraint, or restraint, than that
of the Company’s Directors residing in
111Europe. Therefore, so soon as the Dutch
Company began to extend her possessions
in India, she instituted one supreme government
at Batavia, with full powers,
and authority, to direct and controul the
executive government of all her other settlements.
And this government acts in
India as an intermediate power, betwixt
the Company residing in Europe, and her
various possessions in that distant country;
and as the perpetual residentiary supervisor
of all her interests there. The Directors
communicate all their purposes
immediately to it; and it disperses orders
and instructions to all the subordinate governments;
which again transmit to it a
regular account of their situation, wants,
or transactions. All governors, chiefs, &c.
are immediately responsible to it: all appointments
to, and removals from, office
in the subordinates, are made immediately
by it: and all complaints or appeals, against
the misconduct or injustice of these governors,
are immediately addressed to it.
In fine, it may be termed the center of the
Dutch government in India. And though
this government can in no shape be termed
the complete model of a deputation, fit
112to controul or enforce the execution of
sovereign government, in various territorial
dominions; yet, to this institution, defective
as it is, the Dutch owe it, that
the government of their numerous subordinate
possessions in India hath been conducted,
for about two hundred years,
clear of any enormous abuse.
But if the Dutch and other European
nations, which hold little other concern
in India than a few settlements established
there for the purpose of commerce, found
it necessary, for the regular management
of these commercial concerns, to institute
a sort of intermediate supreme power,
as a local check on the rest of their settlements:
how much more incumbent
was it on the English Company, to constitute
an immediate directing and controuling
power, over the conduct of her deputies,
who were entrusted with the charge
of executing the sovereign government,
of sundry mighty states; a charge of such
superior intricacy, weight, importance,
and delicacy; and so very liable to be
abused.
What may have been the motive of the
Directors for thus wilfully omitting an institution
113so evidently useful and necessary,
I shall not pretend to determine. Possibly
they might apprehend that if, upon
their acquiring this mighty sovereign dominion,
they should alter that which had
been all along their commercial system,
such alteration might induce the nation
to enquire into the cause of it, and so discover
the nature of their dominion, which
they have ever carefully hid from the public.
Though, it is more probable, they
might perceive, that the institution of such
an intermediate power would greatly interfere
with their own personal influence,
power, and emoluments; seeing it must
have possessed the immediate disposal of
places and posts, as well as a considerable
share in the direction of affairs: and, in
order to prevent this, they preserved to
themselves the power, of immediately superintending,
and directing, the execution
of government in those Indian dominions.
But whatever the motive of the Directors
may have been, it is certain, that
the want of a deputed controuling power
in India, hath been a radical and grievous
defect in their system: which hath produced
114a number of those evils that have
been falsely ascribed to the distance of situation.
And though we are far from alledging,
that it was possible for the Company
to establish in those countries a government
in any degree regular, seeing that
the numerous natural defects in her constitution,
unavoidably producing many
destructive abuses, must have ever proved
an insuperable obstacle to that; yet
do we affirm that, the institution of a
duly qualified intermediate controuling
power, would have totally prevented some,
and would have greatly diminished most,
of these enormous abuses which, upon
the system of the Directors, have served
to ruin those countries.
Now we have seen that the national government
would, by taking upon itself
the charge of administring that Indian
government, remedy or suppress all the
abuses that have sprung from the defective
constitution of the Company, (besides
creating other circumstances of high utility,
that could not exist under the Company’s
government.) And as the distance
of situation, preventing the sovereign from
immediately exerting his supreme influence
115over the deputed executive government,
is the only remaining cause of evil or
abuse; it is plain that, if it is possible to
construct in India, a deputed power, upon
such principles, as that it shall effectually
and completely supply the place of the
sovereign, in immediately directing, enforcing,
and controuling the measures of
the deputed executive government, then
must the only obstruction to the establishment
of a regular political system, be remedied
and removed. Consequently the
grand desideratum, the only thing that is
wanting, to enable the national government
of Britain to regularly administer
the government of those Indian dominions,
is the institution of a deputed controuling
power in India, properly qualified to fulfil
the purposes that have been here specified.
And that it is possible, to constitute an
intermediate power in India, that shall
effectually and faithfully direct, enforce,
and controul the measures of the deputed
executive government in those Indian dominions,
I doubt not to evince: though,
at same time, I am fully sensible of the
many real difficulties, arising from nature
116and circumstance, to obstruct it; as likewise
of the many artificial difficulties proceeding
from the endeavours of those
who have an interest to obstruct such a
measure; and who have influence to enforce
their objections, however futile, on
the understanding of others.
But before we proceed to describe the
plan upon which we mean to construct
this controuling deputation, it will be necessary
to explain the extent of its charge,
or number of the government’s composing
that dominion which it is meant to
controul. For tho’, in our description of
the Company’s government in India, we
confined our account to that of Bengal
alone, as being the most important and
best known part of her dominion; yet
doth the Company possess, besides Bengal,
certain other territorial governments,
of no small value and importance, in respect
of either revenue or commerce. All
which governments being formed upon
the same system as that of Bengal, do not
less demand reform, supervision, and controul.
For, in the first place, the government
of Madrass possesses a very considerable
117and valuable territorial dominion, avowedly
in the name and right of the Company.
This same government doth likewise,
in every thing beside the name, possess
the absolute sovereignty of that rich
commercial province of Arcot, or the
Carnatic, in which it is situated: for, notwithstanding
it tolerates a nominal Nabob,
whose name it uses in most acts of government;
and who, consequently, for the
Company’s convenience, possesses the shadow
of sovereignty; yet, as the government
of Madrass holds the charge of defending
the country, and maintains the
military force requisite thereto, it is the
actual sovereign: seeing that, in all Indian
or Asiatic governments, he who holds
the sword must be the absolute lord and
master. And, notwithstanding all the
Company’s parade of appearances, this
Nabob of Arcot is, in respect of sovereign
power, as much a pageant as he of Bengal:
a mere screen or blind, placed before
the Company’s sovereignty.
Bombay is likewise embarked in dominion,
since it seized on the rich commercial
city of Surat, with its district, &c.
Though sound policy must direct Britain
118to reprobate all territorial dominion on
that side of the peninsula; as causing a
dangerous division and weakening of her
force and defence.
But the same policy will instruct Britain
to regard dominion on the east side of that
peninsula in an opposite light; because,
on that side lay all the truly valuable dominions
which she already possesses.
To fully explain what is the true interest
of Britain, respecting territorial dominion
in India, would be, here, foreign and tedious;
and, to slightly touch on that subject,
might afford ground for censure and
criticism: we shall only observe, in the
general, that Britain ought to value only
such dominion in India as is maritime:
because, in the first place, these are ever
trading and manufacturing countries; and,
as such, are highly useful to her proper
commerce; they are likewise capacitated,
by their own active foreign trade, to
richly reimburse her for her expence of
native strength in defending them, as well
as for her trouble in governing them: and,
in the second place, being accessible to her
naval force, they are easily maintained
and defended by her. Therefore, so much
119of this maritime dominion as she can
maintain and defend, without creating any
additional expence of native strength; and,
upon a footing so connected with that
truly valuable dominion which she already
possesses, as not to cause any dangerous division
of that original strength, so much
of this maritime dominion in India may
be truly useful and advantageous to her;
on any other terms it may be detrimental.
Such is the present state of British dominion
in India: and such is the interest
of Britain, with respect to future augmentation
of dominion in that country.
And we have undertaken to plan the construction
of an intermediate power or deputation,
which, under the national government
of Britain, shall effectually and
faithfully superintend, enforce, and controul
the measures of these several governments
that, at present are, or in future
may be, subjected to Britain: and which
deputation shall of course, in the first
place, enable the national government of
Britain to establish a regular system of political
government over this whole present
or future dominion: and, in the second
place, shall constitute a complete system of
120military government, and secure defence,
for all the several branches of this dominion.
At present we are on the subject of
political government.
The properties requisite to qualify this
intermediate power, or deputation, for effectually
superintending, enforcing, and
controuling the political government of
dominion in India, are, first, virtue and
integrity, to faithfully and honestly discharge
the duties of its office: and, second,
power or ability, to effectually fulfil
the purpose of its institution. The latter
is more easily conferred; but the former
is rendered difficult, by sundry obstructions,
arising from the nature or disposition
of the persons who must necessarily
be employed to compose this deputation.
For it is needless to observe, that
this controuling power cannot be lodged
in the subjects native of the dependent dominion;
the nature of the government, as
well as the nature of their disposition, rendering
that impracticable; (as hath been
shewn): otherwise this difficulty might
be more easily surmounted. But, the Indian
subjects being set aside, there remains
no choice; this controuling deputation must,
121per force, be composed of British born
subjects: whilst the several governments,
which it is meant to controul, are at same
time executed by British born subjects.
And, from this circumstance, it follows, that
the personal interest of the party controuling
must naturally be the very same, with
that of the party controuled: and, of
course, the views of both must likewise
be the same.
This similarity or sameness of personal
interest and views it is that creates the
difficulty of conferring virtue, integrity,
honour, and fidelity, on the controuling
deputation. For it is morally certain, that
the similarity of interest and views will,
naturally and invariably, draw the party
controuling, to concur and join, instead
of controuling or opposing, the measures
of the party executing, (seeing such measures
tend to promote that which is their
common interest) provided that this party
controuling shall possess the power, and
opportunity of so joining interest, with
the party executing. And it is no less
certain, that this controuling deputation
must, unavoidably, possess the opportunity
of thus joining interests, unless it can,
122by some means, be prevented and restrained
from joining and uniting the action of
its own proper powers, with the action of
these powers that are proper to the executive
office. Whereas, if it shall be
found possible to divide and separate the
action of these two different powers, the
one from the other, in a manner so distinct,
that each shall act, in the sphere assigned
to it, with freedom and liberty; and
neither shall have the opportunity of transgressing
the limits prescribed, to its own
proper department, by the sovereign;
then, and in such case, it is not only possible,
but certain, that this controuling
deputation may, and will be, prevented
from joining interests, with the executive
deputation; and, consequently, from promoting
the very measures which it was
meant to restrain. And, from thence I
conclude, that the only possible and certain
means of conferring, on this controuling
deputation, virtue and integrity to faithfully
and honestly discharge the duties of its
office, is to cut it off from all opportunity
of joining the powers of its office,
with those of the executive; or of assuming
any share in the executive government:
123in other words, it must be restrained
from interfering, either directly or indirectly,
personally or by proxy, in the
immediate execution of measures, in any
one of these governments which it is meant
to controul.
But it is evident that, if this controuling
deputation shall exist or reside within
any one of those dominions whose government
it is meant to controul, it will
be morally impossible to prevent it from
joining its powers, and, consequently, its
interests, views, and measures, with the
deputed executive power of that government
where it resides. For, by virtue of
its authority, which from the nature of
its office must needs be supreme over the
executive deputation, it will usurp at least
a part if not the whole power of execution:
or otherwise it will, by consent, join
and unite its powers with those of the executive,
in order to promote their mutual
interest, by measures diametrically repugnant
to the purpose of its institution. Nor
is it possible, in this case, by any art, device
or separation into parts, to prevent
this usurpation or union: let the controuling
power be termed judges, supervisors,
124officers of the revenue, or what else; and
let the office of controuling be divided,
into as many parts as can be conceived;
still, the difference of term, will not
alter the nature of the men employed;
nor will the division of parts separate
their interest. All the various persons,
composing this office, will still be Europeans;
the same as these who compose
the executive office; and so, all the persons
in both offices will be foreign to the
country governed, acting by an authority
which is deputed mutable and temporary;
consequently they will all hold the same
view; which is, to amass all the money
they can during the short term of their
office, in order to transport it to their
own country: and as all of them would,
by virtue of their residing within the same
government, possess the same powers, and
the same opportunities of exerting them,
they would all be irresistably attracted, by
the omnipotent sympathy of self-interest,
to join their several powers, in promoting
that which is the common view of one
and all of them. In fine, if these controuling
and executive deputations, which
thus, from the community of the natale
125solum, hold one and the same interest, shall
both reside together in one and the same
government, and thereby possess the same
opportunities, it will be equally impossible
to prevent these two deputations, however
artfully separated into parts, from
joining and uniting their different powers,
&c. as it is to preserve separate the guttæ
of quicksilver; which, however gently
and carefully they are dropt upon the
same confined and smooth surface, will
meet, join, and conglobate into one united
mass. But if the controuling
deputation shall be thus permitted to join
its powers with these of the executive,
and consequently forfeit its virtue and integrity,
with respect to that one territorial
government where it resides, it thereby
becomes disqualified and unfit to controul
the measures of any one other government:
for the judge who is himself corrupt,
is but little qualified to judge or
punish corruption in others. I therefore
conclude that, in order to preserve the
virtue and integrity of this controuling
deputation, it is indispensably necessary
that it should not reside within the limits
of any one of these territorial governments;
126these being the governments
which it is meant to controul.
On the other hand, it is equally certain,
that this controuling deputation cannot execute
in person, or assume any personal share
in the execution of measures, in any one of
those governments where it doth not actually
reside; it being impossible that it
can act personally where it is not personally
present. It therefore follows that, by
situating or placing this controuling deputation
at a sufficiently proper distance from
all these several territorial governments, it
may be prevented from assuming a personal
share in the immediate execution of
measures in any one of them. And being
thus, by the situation of its residence,
cut off from all opportunity of acting
personally, it may likewise be precluded
from acting secondarily, or usurping by
proxy any influence, in the immediate execution
of these governments, if it shall,
after the manner of the Dutch government
at Batavia, be strictly prohibited
from exercising its supervising authority
any where without the limits of its own
fixed residence; and from delegating or
deputing its powers to any person or persons,
127its own members or others, who
shall reside, or may be beyond these prescribed
bounds. For though the system
of the Dutch government at Batavia is,
in many respects, far too rude and unpolished;
yet is it, in this particular, most
nicely circumscribed: that government
being restrained, in the most precise manner,
from delegating and transferring its
authority; or from deputing any power
to examine into cases, of even the most
dubious nature, within the subordinates:
but to obviate any inconvenience, that
might otherwise arise from such restraint,
it hath a power to call before it, from the
subordinates, all persons or records necessary
to information. For the Dutch were
well aware, that the supreme government,
if it should be permitted to carry its supervising
authority on any pretext into the
subordinates, would gain an occasion of
interfering in the execution of those measures
which it was intended to controul.
We must then perceive, that this controuling
deputation being seated at a properly
sufficient distance from all these territorial
governments, and the exercise of
its powers being expressly confined to that
128particular seat of residence, it will, by such
means, be effectually restrained from interfering,
in any shape, either directly or
indirectly, in the execution of any one of
those governments which it is intended to
controul. And we must farther perceive
that, by virtue of such effectual restraint,
that clear separation of office, which alone
can prevent the junction or union of the
powers, interests, and views of this controuling
deputation with those of the executive,
will be completely accomplished.
Seeing that, the action of the controuling
power being strictly confined within the
limits of its own proper sphere, the executive
power must remain at full liberty
to act distinctly and freely in the office
assigned to it by the sovereign.
The principal source of corruption, and
grand stumbling block of virtue, being
thus removed, the integrity of this controuling
deputation may be established on
a firm and solid basis, by skilfully dividing
the parts which go to compose it: and,
in particular, by clearly separating the political
and judicial powers: which, if they
shall be judiciously divided into two distinct
departments, mutually independent and
129uninfluenced, will, each of them, act as
an effectual check, and powerful impulse,
on the other: so as to prevent either from
abusing its authority, or neglecting its
duty. Whereas, if the political power
should, at same time, possess the power of
judging, trying and determining, or should
even possess any influence over the judicature,
there is danger that it might, on
some occasions, sacrifice its duty to its interest.
And this is the very capital error
of the Dutch system at Batavia, inasmuch
as that government, possessing the judicial
power, hath thereby the opportunity of
perverting justice, sometimes to the prejudice
of its constituent, and often to the
detriment of its subordinates.
Nor would we be here understood to
signify, by judicial power, a simple court
of judicature, established for the purpose
of deciding litigated cases of property;
the judicial power here meant, must extend
to every thing that respects a due execution
of the jurisdiction and police, in the subordinate
governments. Therefore its authority
must not be passive, and confined
to such matter as shall come before it by
complaint; but it must be active, assuming
130cognizance of all public nuisance,
trespass, or delinquency, that may be
brought before it by information. For,
here, juries may exist with great propriety
and efficacy, seeing that the Company
will, on account of her commerce,
keep a number of servants at this supreme
settlement; there will likewise be, no
doubt, many free merchants (as they are
termed): and, consequently, there will
never be wanting a choice of persons unconnected
with, and uninfluenced by the
political government; and therefore fit to
form a grand inquest; as well as petit or
special juries, to decide in either criminal
cases, or disputes of property. And this
judicial power must farther be endued with
all proper and necessary officers; particularly
an attorney general: it must likewise
be divided into distinct courts; resembling,
as nearly as circumstances will
admit, or occasion requires, the courts
of justice in the sovereign country.
Nevertheless, we do not presume to dictate
or prescribe the exact or complete form
of this judicial power: we would only
hint at the main purposes of its institution;
a due consideration of which will readily
131suggest the particular form, to those
whose province it may be to construct it.
We shall only observe that, in order to
confer a due weight on the judicial power,
it is not sufficient that it should be independent,
in its corporate capacity; the
judges and officers composing it must, in
their personal capacity, be placed as far as
possible beyond the influence of the political
power. The salaries annexed to their
offices must be such as will afford dignity,
as well as independance: whilst, on the
other hand, they shall be debarred, under
the severest penalties, from holding, either
directly or indirectly, any place, post, emolument,
or employment, of any nature,
distinct from that of its own proper department.
Moreover, the political power
should hold no voice in conferring the degrees
of this department: that should be
vested in the judicial power itself, with
reference to the confirmation of the sovereign.
This judicial power may be termed the
supreme Court of Judicature, for the
whole British dominion in India: to which
all the subjects, under the several governments,
whether natives or Europeans, may
132readily appeal, against the oppression of
their governors, or the perversion of justice:
and, on which they may securely
depend for redress; provided it shall be
placed above the influence of the political
power. This supreme court of judicature
would likewise be of inexpressible
utility, as a check on the power, and an
impulse on the will, of the political
branch.
We may add, that a judicious subdivision
of the political power, into different
departments, might contribute considerably
to its virtue.
These are the outlines of that measure,
by which we propose to preserve this controuling
deputation free from corruption:
and we doubt not but, upon this plan,
when meliorated and improved by the superior
understanding of others, a controuling
power may be constructed, which
shall be completely qualified, in point of
virtue and integrity, to faithfully and honourably
superintend, enforce, and controul
the execution of political government
in those Indian dominions. And
this is, by far, the most difficult, delicate,
and important part of the undertaking.
133For, as to the power and ability, requisite
to qualify this deputation for effectually
fulfilling the purpose of its institution,
that is readily bestowed. The degree
of power is altogether in the disposal
of the sovereign. And, its efficacy or
ability depends, principally, upon the
choice of such a situation for the seat of
its residence, as shall enable it to keep up,
at all seasons, a ready and speedy correspondence
with the several subordinate governments,
With regard to the choice of situation
proper for the residence of this controuling
power; (which is indeed a point of
high importance,) we shall readily conceive,
from adverting to its nature and
the purposes of its institution, that this
residence ought to be some convenient sea
port; situated at a considerable distance
from the limits of all these territorial governments;
but, at same time, so centrically
near to each, that the communication,
to and from it, shall, in either monsoon,
be not only practicable, but certain
and speedy. I shall reserve the farther
explanation of this intended seat of residence,
till I come to treat of the military
134system; because there are some properties,
particularly requisite to a proper centre of
military defence: and it is proposed that
the same power, and consequently the
same residence, that superintends the
political government, should likewise direct
the military government and defence,
of this dominion.
But this supreme controuling power being
thus centrically situated, with respect
to the several subordinates, as that it shall
at all times hold a ready and speedy correspondence
with each, will be thereby
enabled to effectually superintend, enforce,
and controul the execution of political
government in that whole dominion. For,
in the first place, the ready and speedy
communication with all the subordinates,
affording to the supreme power an opportunity
of obtaining, from each, the most
early intelligence of every transaction, incident,
or occurrence; as likewise of immediately
transmitting the orders and instructions,
that may be suitable to the occasion;
will cut off from the several governors
of the territorial dominions all
pretext for acting discretionally. And,
in consequence, that despotic and arbitrary
135power, which hath subsisted under the
Company’s system, will be completely suppressed.
And, from adverting to this circumstance,
we shall perceive the importance
of a proper choice of situation, for
this supreme center of government.
In the second place, this ready correspondence
with all the subordinate governments,
enabling the supreme power to
acquire a minute and complete knowledge
of every circumstance, respecting the state
and nature of the general police, in this
whole dominion, will qualify it for originally
planning, and for afterwards improving,
all such designs and measures as
can contribute to the institution of regularity
and good order. It will likewise
attain an intimate knowledge of the whole
manoeuvre of finance, respecting the mode
of collecting as well as appropriating the
revenue and taxes: and it will be thereby
enabled to project judicious forms, with
different offices, as mutual checks upon
each other, in that branch: which will
serve to remedy that incredible extortion,
rapine, and peculation: which, by ruining
the farmer of the lands, hath almost
totally suppressed agriculture, and greatly
136depopulated those miserable countries;
whilst it hath grievously defrauded the sovereign
of his right. And all these planned
modes, being approved and confirmed
by the sovereign, would be continued in
vigorous and perpetual action, by the vicinity
of the supreme political power: and
all these several measures, being enacted
into laws, the strict observance of them
would be effectually enforced by the same
vicinity. And thus, that supreme power
will, not only establish, but perpetually
conserve a just regularity in police, and an
exact oeconomy in finance.
In the third place, the supreme judicial
power will, by its neighbourhood to these
dependent dominions, acquire a just knowledge
of the modes, customs, and dispositions
of the inhabitants; and, by that, it
will be enabled to devise the best forms or
offices, together with skilful rules for administring
the jurisdiction, in a manner truly
effectual, and at same time consonant
and agreeable to the humour of the subject. It
will likewise be capable of afterwards
improving and adding to these forms
and rules, as future occasion may require,
or better information may suggest. All
137which forms or offices may, by the approbation
of the sovereign, be established into
standing courts; and the rules enacted
into laws. And a punctual observance of
all these laws enacted, either for the regular
administration of justice, or conservance
of the police, will be completely
enforced, by the awe of this supreme
tribunal: the communication with which,
from all parts of that dependent dominion,
being easy and speedy, will afford a
ready access and opportunity to all the
subjects, of presenting their complaints,
against any oppression of their government,
or denial, or perversion of justice:
whilst the same ready communication will
render the trial of all litigated cases, speedy
and easy. A mighty innovation this,
from the former mode of justice in those
dominions; when it was impossible for even
Europeans to obtain redress, in our distant
precise European courts, against the
most glaring oppression of government:
and the natives were excluded from even
that distant and deceitful prospect of remedy.
And in order that the course of justice
may be rendered thoroughly complete, it
138may be enacted, after the manner of the
Dutch, that no person, who hath held
any office of power or trust within the
subordinates, shall depart immediately
from thence for Europe; but shall be
obliged to repair to the supreme residence;
there to remain for three months; to the
end that any person or persons who may,
by any means, have been restrained, during
the existence of his office, from preferring
their complaint against him, on
the score of either public or private trespass,
may there have the free opportunity
of prosecuting him.
The supreme political power shall immediately
appoint to all offices, as well
political as military, within the subordinate
governments; with reference held to
the future approbation, and confirmation,
of the sovereign: and it shall preserve regular
minutes of all such appointments,
orders, and other transactions made in its
supreme capacity; which minutes, together
with regular and properly vouched
accounts of the collection, as well as the
appropriation of the revenue, shall be
punctually transmitted, by every occasion,
to the sovereign. The judicial power
139shall likewise keep an exact register of all
trials, causes, and proceedings; more particularly
those of the grand inquest and
assizes: this latter to be signed by all the
judges and officers of the court, and attested
by the foremen, with a majority of
the juries: two copies of which shall be
regularly transmitted to Britain; one to
the sovereign; and the other to the Company;
which, as holding a material interest
and share in these law proceedings,
hath a claim to such participation of
knowledge. All which minutes, accounts,
and proceedings, being communicated to
the sovereign, will enable him to act as
an ultimate check on the political government,
the finance, and the jurisdiction
of that Indian dominion.
Such is the form of this intermediate
power, through which I propose to convey,
into the execution of government in those
distant Indian dominions, that plenary exertion
of the sovereign’s restraining and
compelling power, which, alone, can suffice
to prevent tyranny and anarchy. And
notwithstanding the materials are, through
hurry and want of time, rude, unpolished
and coarsely arranged, yet do I flatter myself,
140that candour will allow them to be
solidly good, proper, and fully sufficing to
construct, at least, the groundplot, or
basis, of a regular political system. Sure
I am, the high propriety, nay the indispensable
necessity of such a measure,
must immediately strike every person
who employs his own judgment,
however slightly, to consider, first, the
nature, interests, and views of the executive
government in those Indian dominions;
as being foreign, deputed,
mutable, and temporary. Second the
timid, passive, and slavishly submissive disposition
of the native subjects. And third,
the distance of situation, betwixt the sovereign
residence, and the scene of government;
which, rendering the immediate
restraint and constraint of the sovereign
perfectly impotent, confers on this
foreign executive deputation an unlimited
and arbitrary power, of promoting its own
personal views and interest, by measures,
which tend to the intolerable oppression
of the wretched inhabitants, and the utter
ruin of those subjected countries; as well
as to the mighty detriment of Britain’s
dearest interest, and the blackest reproach
141to her reputation. Nor can all this be
remedied or prevented, but by such a measure
as is here proposed.
And now we shall take a slight glance
at the operation of this measure, on the
jurisdiction, and police, of the subordinate
dominions. And though, for the sake of
perspicuity, we confine the view to Bengal
alone, as being the most eminent part,
yet will the effects be equally felt through
the whole.
As to the fundamental establishments of
Governors, Councils, &c. these are sufficiently
obvious; as likewise are the proper
chambers of revenue: and these, with
the minutiæ appointments of inferior offices,
will be more properly provided and
improved, by the better judgment, true
information, and future experience of the
supreme controuling power. Here we
mean to offer only one or two hints on the
mode of jurisdiction and police.
And first, with regard to the courts of
justice, I should propose that the mayor’s
court at Culcutta should still subsist, as a
court of equity for the whole country:
and a most equitable court it is, if properly
regulated: for the truth of which assertion,
142I appeal to all those who knew it
previous to that alteration of the Company’s
charter of justice, which rendered
it dependent on, and subservient to, the
Governor and Council: never was justice
more exactly or more expeditiously administered,
than it was by this court, previous
to that alteration. In order therefore
to restore it to its primitive utility, it
ought to be restored to its original state.
Let the judges or aldermen, who at present
compose it, continue such: being servants
to the Company, or free merchants, they
must be unconnected with, and uninfluenced
by the national government. And, in
the case of death, or removal, the vacuum
to be supplied by the court itself, from
amongst the Company’s servants, or free
merchants only: and if any alderman
shall, subsequent to entering on his office,
accept of any post or place under government,
let that be an express disqualification
and vacation of his office; which is
to be immediately made good, by the
choice of another person, properly qualified.
The newly elected aldermen to be
presented, for acceptance, to the supreme
143court of judicature only. And the officers
of this court to be chosen by itself.
But as it would be impossible for the
mayor’s court to dispatch all the business
that might be brought before it, there
ought likewise to be a court of law; consisting
of a chief justice, with three judges;
to be appointed by the sovereign. And
this court should guide itself, by such laws
as may be enacted for the jurisdiction of
those countries; otherwise by equity.
Appeals from this court of law, as well
as that of equity, to be made immediately
to the supreme court of judicature; and
from thence to his Majesty in council.
If it is thought proper, there might be
another mayor’s court, of the same nature,
established at Cossimbuzar, in the
neighbourhood of the old capital, Maxadavad.
And as to the forms, for the more universal
distribution of justice to the natives,
these will be adjusted by the supreme supervising
power; as before mentioned.
We shall only observe, that their courts of
Zemindary and Cutchery are, as they stand
at present, a grievous nuisance.
144But the noblest institution for protecting
the liberty and property of the subject,
from the extortion and oppression of their
foreign government, and of its inferior
train of native harpies, who are infinitely
more rapacious than the Europeans, would
be that of juries, properly constructed.
Let the grand inquest of the country be
held at Culcutta, four times in the year:
and let the juries, both grand and petit,
be expresly composed of Company’s servants,
or free merchants, Europeans, and
none others: the judges of law, or at
least two of them, to sit on the assizes:
the sheriff to be chosen annually, from
amongst the Company’s servants.
The powers of this grand inquest, if
adapted to the situation of things, must
be enlarged beyond these of our juries in
Britain; where there are judicial and political
aids, that must be wanting in those
countries: for instance, the enquiry must
not be confined to place, but must extend
every where through the country: it must
likewise have authority to bring before it
all manner of nuisance or trespass committed
against the liberty or property of
the subject, natives as well as Europeans.
145And the judges should have no power to
reject or postpone the bills, found by the
grand jury: but should bring them on to
decision, in turn, as presented. Moreover,
as the extent of enquiry may render it impossible
for the more distant defendant to
appear with his evidences, during the sitting
of that assize to which the bill hath
been presented against him; let summons
be issued, upon the bill’s being presented,
for such distant defendant to appear at next
assizes; or let some other method be found,
either by means of the grand jury’s meeting
a sufficient time before the commencement
of trials, or by some extraordinary
power vested in the judges or sheriff
to produce such distant defendant with his
evidences in due time. And as this same
extent of enquiry may, on the other hand,
produce inconvenience to the subject, by
affording occasion to litigious persons of
distressing others, by bringing them from a
great distance to these assizes, on frivolous
or ill grounded complaints, it may be ordered
that, where the cause shall appear to
the court truly litigious, the plaintiff shall
be bound over to stand suit at law, for damages
to the defendant: and, one or two
146examples, of this nature, will prove a
barr to frivolous litigation.
And least the judges should, by any
means, be influenced to act that part which
the Company’s governor and council commonly
act, when they absurdly preside at
these assizes, as his Majesty’s judges in their
own cause; namely, to dismiss the Court,
so soon as the grand jury shall find a bill
that may be disagreeable to them; it may
be ordered that neither the judges, nor
any officer of the Court, shall have power
to adjourn the assizes, until all the trials
shall be decided; or, otherwise, by the
consent of a majority in both juries.
The principal check however upon the
conduct of these assizes, would be that of
obliging the Court to keep exact registers,
of all trials, and proceedings; signed and
attested, as before mentioned. And if any
part of either jury shall except to the authenticity
of such register, which shall be
publickly exposed in the Court, then,
such dissenting part shall have a right to
protest, and assign its reasons. Three copies
of which register, with protest, (if
any,) shall be dispatched, by the earliest
occasion, after each assize. One copy to
147the supreme Court of Judicature, which
will, thereby, have the earliest notice of
any abuse; and, with the concurrence of
the supreme political power, shall have the
opportunity of immediately correcting it.
A second copy shall be transmitted to the
sovereign; who will act as an ulterior
check on the supreme controuling power.
And a third copy to the Company for the
reasons before specified.
But, as this single inquest at Calcutta
cannot possibly carry justice to the extremes
of that extensive country, circulating
assizes may be held, at least once,
or if possible twice a year, at Muxadavad
as the center, and at Patnah as the northern
extreme; two judges to go this northern
circuit: and the other two judges
to go on an eastern circuit, at Dacca.
And, as there may not be a sufficient number
of Company’s servants, properly qualified,
to form complete juries at these
northern and eastern assizes: I would propose
that, to make up any such deficiency,
natives should be mixed with the Europeans.
Which mixture, if it shall be
artfully tempered, in the following manner,
would produce all the efficacy of entirely
148European juries; and, at same time,
none of the bad effects, that might be apprehended,
from an attempt to confer
freedom and impartiality on juries entirely
native.
Let, at least, one half of both the grand
and petit juries be Europeans; and the
remaining part natives: and if it should
happen, that there cannot be collected,
at the assize factory, and from the neighbouring inferior
factories, so many Company’s
servants as shall make up half the
usual number of jurymen; then, let the
whole number be diminished, to the sufficing
half of Europeans. Let the unanimity
of verdict, in such mixt juries, be
dispensed with; and let the majority of
voices, in either jury, find the bill or verdict;
as is the custom in Scotland. And
let an additional provision be made to the
oath of the juryman, purporting that he
shall not, on any account, disclose the
opinion given by any individual, in the
jury room.
By this artful mixture, and these precautions,
the native jurymen would be liberated
from that slavish dread, of future
revenge from their own countrymen employed
149under government; seeing it would
be impossible, for these native officers of
government, to discover the particular opinion
of each individual; which, if the
juries were entirely native, they would
infallibly do, to the utter ruin of the poor
native jurymen. So that the native Jurymen,
acting thus with freedom, under the
cloke and protection of the Europeans,
would answer all the effectual purposes of
Europeans. Whilst, being sensible that
they owed their freedom and impartiality,
together with all the other benefits arising
from juries, to their connection with the
Europeans; this freedom conferred on
them in the jury room, would not in the
least diminish their awe and deference to
government. The proceedings at these
circuit assizes to be registered and transmitted
in like manner as at Calcutta.
These juries would prove the Magna
Charta, the palladium, and true security
of Indian liberty and property, against the
despotism and extortion of their foreign
government. And it evidently appears
that the virtue of these juries, (as being,
at one and the same time, truly effectual
to the subject, and perfectly safe to the
150sovereign,) entirely depends upon the circumstance,
of completely excluding the
Company and her servants, from the smallest
participation in the executive powers
of government. But the efficacy of these
juries, and of other inferior institutions
made through the supreme controuling
power, being once felt and known, would
speedily induce the natives to purchase
perpetual property in lands: seeing they
would perceive themselves thoroughly secured
in the produce of those lands. And
this, being divulged abroad, would draw
the inhabitants of the neighbouring countries
to the standard of Britain; together
with their wealth, and industry. By
which means the British dominion in India,
which, at present is, through oppression
and consequent famine, in a great
measure deserted and depopulated, would
again be completely peopled and cultivated:
arts, manufactures, and commerce would
soon be restored to their former state; nay,
they would be extended to a degree far
superior: and these countries would, of
course, be enabled to richly repay Britain
for the blessings conferred by her, of perfect
151security in liberty and property; blessings,
never before known in India.
And all this may be effected by means
of that intermediate supreme controuling
power: which would, not only create,
but preserve, the full and vigorous efficacy
of all these institutions, in the subordinate
dominions. Whereas, if it was even possible,
(though indeed it is morally impossible,)
to institute, by any temporary
means, all these powers, forms, rules,
and regulations in those dominions, yet
is it evidently certain that, so soon as these
temporary means were withdrawn, the
virtue and efficacy of all these institutions
would immediately vanish, and be suppressed
by the power of the executive government;
which, from the nature of
things, must unavoidably be, either despotic
over the native subjects, or cannot
exist at all.
But this same controuling power, as it
would, on the one hand, by its fixed residence
in the immediate neighbourhood,
perpetually preserve the action and motion
of all these institutions, like to a power
ever present to wind up the springs of the
machine; and, so, would check all the
152bad effects of that naturally necessary despotism
in executive government: so would
it, on the other hand, effectually support
the power and authority of that executive
government; and prevent its being encroached
on, by an over exertion of the
privileges conferred on the subject. For,
on this side too, there is a danger; which
will be readily comprehended, by those
who consider the nature of government;
and, at same time, the disposition of human
nature. But all danger, of preponderating
either scale, would be prevented,
by the vicinity of the controuling power:
which, holding the balance in its hands,
and nicely diminishing from one, or
adding to the other scale, would ever preserve
a just equilibrium, betwixt the liberty
of the subject, and the power of
government.
Nor would the institution of new regulations
be the only means, in the hands
of the controuling power, of preventing
the dangerous over exertion of privilege:
it would likewise possess the instantaneous
power of seizing, or otherwise of ordering
to its own residence, all such persons as
should prove over troublesome, or dangerous
153to the due authority of executive government.
For, though it would be extremely
absurd to trust a power of this nature, immediately
in the hands of executive government;
which would, infallibly, employ
it to its own worst purposes: yet
might such power be safely trusted to this
controuling government; which could not
have the same motives to abuse it.
Nevertheless, we do not mean that this,
and all these other powers, should be unlimitedly
confided to this controuling deputation:
we still preserve a check over
it, in the national government. And a
most effectual check too; by means of the
beforementioned copies of registers, immediately
transmitted to Britain, from the
subordinates; as likewise by its own minutes,
accounts, and registers.
So that here would be a regular gradation
of effectual political checks. The
privilege of juries, and other institutions
in the subordinate dominions, being preserved
in vigorous action, by the influence
of the intermediate controuling power,
would prove an effectual check on the despotism
or extortion of executive government;
and would thus completely secure
154the liberty and property of the subject.
And the same influence of the controuling
power would sufficiently check the luxuriancy
of privilege; and support the power
of government; thus preserving an exact
poise betwixt both. Whilst the sovereign,
at a distance, could deliberately and effectually
watch the hand that trimmed the
scales.
And thus the institution of this intermediate
controuling and impelling power,
would completely remove every obstruction
arising from the distance of situation:
it would serve as an intermediate link of
the political chain: or, as a bridge of
communication, joining this dependent
Indian dominion to the sovereign country.
But, all obstruction arising from the
distance of situation being thus removed,
what difficulty can the national government
of Britain find, in administring the
political government of that Indian dominion?
Upon this plan, that task appears
to me more facil, less pregnant with difficulty,
charge, or care, than it is to govern
any one, the most pretty, of our foreign
Colonies: nay it appears equally easy, as
it is to govern the neighbouring Isle of
155Man: seeing that the opposition of the
subjects, to the authority of government
in this Indian dominion, though they be so
infinitely more numerous, is not greater
than is the opposition of the few subjects
in Man. The only difficulty, that
could exist to national government, was
that of duly tempering, or abating, the
power of the deputed executive government:
and it appears, that this may be
completely effected by means of this
intermediate controuling power; which,
in the hands of the sovereign, would act
upon the government of this Indian dominion
as the pegs or keys upon the strings of
a musical instrument; of which one
being gently strained, and another properly
relaxed, would create, and perpetually
preserve, a perfect: harmony, or concord,
in this political system.
A PLAN, FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND OF SECURE DEFENCE, IN INDIA.
156
The Company’s system of military
government and defence in India is,
at least, equally defective, faulty, and absurd;
and, therefore, doth equally demand
reformation, as doth her political system.
For the same cause that renders the power
of the Company’s several deputed governors
perfectly arbitrary and discretional,
in civil matters; namely, the Directors
having preserved to themselves the charge
of immediately directing and superintending
those governments; confers, upon
these deputed governors, a like arbitrary
and discretional power, in military matters.
And surely it is impossible to conceive
any thing more ridiculously extravagant,
157than is this military system of the
Company; which affords to each governor
of four different capital settlements,
the absolute, independent, and discretional
power, of applying the military force
of his own government; and likewise of
directing the measures of defence: whilst
each, of these four governors, holds a particular
interest of his own, which is, not
only distinct from, but opposite to that of
all the others.
Can it be supposed that four men, thus
opposite in their personal views and interests,
and thus independent of each other,
should heartily concur in general measures;
or should cordially unite in a system of
common defence? Common sense informs
us that they will not; and experience convinces
us that they do not. For it hath
been known that one, of these settlements,
hath furnished arms and ammunition;
and hath otherwise befriended a power,
at open war with one of the others. And,
in the case of any one of these settlements
being attacked, the others are extremely
backward in supporting it; because
each, of the four governors, giving
the preference to his own particular
158charge, in which his own personal interest
is more immediately concerned, considers
all communication of his force, to any
of the other settlements, as a diminution
of his own security, and even of his importance.
So that, upon such terms, the
union betwixt these four distinct, and mutually
independent, governments, can
scarcely be termed federal.
Moreover, each of these four governors
possesses, within the limits of his own government,
the discretionary power of
making war and peace. And, so, hath
the opportunity, whenever it shall suit the
purpose of his own personal interest, to
pick a quarrel, and engage his government
in war, with some one of the neighbouring
native states. Nor is this an imaginary
evil; or a simple supposition of what may
possibly happen; it is a real case; an abuse
that hath actually existed. For we can
produce several instances where these governors,
more particularly on the coast of
Cormondel, have commenced, and industriously
protracted, wars with the neighbouring
states, expressly for the purpose of
plunder and peculation.
159And, from this discretionary power of
peace and war lodged in the hands of these
several governors, and the consequent abuse
thereof, flow the following evils to the
sovereign. First, the governor, thus
warring, exhausts and consumes the treasure
of his constituent; to the end that he
and his associates, may gain occasion to
pocket a part. Second, by these offensive
wars, he wastes and destroys that force,
which was intended by the sovereign for
defence: and, thereby, exposes his own
charge, naked and defenceless, to the attack
of other enemies. And third, by
these wanton unnecessary and unjust wars,
he provokes the hatred and jealousy of all
the neighbouring states; and, thus, converts
into enemies, those native powers,
who would, otherwise, be amicable and
friendly to the sovereign.
To correct these, and many other abuses
of a like nature, which flow from this absurd
military system of the Company, it
is evidently and indispensably necessary,
that there should be instituted, one supreme
head of military government.
Which, being vested with the supreme
power of making peace and war in India,
160shall restrain these several territorial governors,
from engaging in unnecessary wars
with their neighbours. And which, possessing
the supreme direction of the common
force, shall, in the case of particular
or general danger, apply that force to
the most proper and necessary purposes.
Now it is naturally proper, that the
same intermediate supreme power, which
superintends the political government,
should likewise supremely superintend the
military government, and defence, of
those Indian dominions. And, for this
latter purpose, the choice of a proper situation,
for the residence of that supreme
power, becomes likewise a point of most
essential consequence. For it is evident, on
the one hand, that this military superintending
power ought not to exist in any
one of these territorial governments; nay
it ought not to reside in the immediate
neighbourhood of any one rich native
state; because, in either of these two situations,
it is liable to be tempted, by
views of avarice or ambition, to apply the
general force, to its own personal purposes;
and, if so, the cure would be worse than
the disease: and, on the other hand, it is
161no less evident, (from the reasons assigned
on the similar head in the political system)
that this supreme military power ought to
be situated so centrically near, to all the
several territorial governments, as that it
may, at all times and seasons, be capable
of keeping up a ready and speedy correspondence
with each.
The distant and unconnected situation,
of these four capital governments, is likewise
a mighty obstruction to a secure system
of defence. For, the wind, blowing
in those seas for six months from one
quarter of the compass, and for the other
six months from the opposite quarter, doth,
alternately, cut off in a great measure all
naval communication betwixt these four
governments. For instance, during the
violence of the south west monsoon, that
is, from the middle of April till the middle
of July, it is almost impracticable for
ships to pass from Bengal to Madrass: and,
during the three more moderate months
of that monsoon, this passage is difficult
and tedious. And during the north east
monsoon, the passage is much the same
from Madrass to Bengal. But the communication
betwixt Bombay, and these
162two settlements, is still more obstructed.
For Bombay, being situated in lat. 19 deg.
north, on the west side of the peninsula
of India, it is almost impossible, from the
latter end of November till the middle of
February, for ships from Bombay, bound
for the Bay of Bengal, to round the island
of Ceyloan: and, for the other three
months of the north east monsoon, they
are obliged, in order to weather Ceyloan,
to stand over to the eastward almost as far
as Atchen head, and back again to the
island; a run of about 20 degrees. From
the end of April till August, it is almost
impracticable for ships from the Bay and
bound for Bombay, to round Ceyloan;
and in the other three months of the south
west monsoon, that passage is difficult and
tedious. And, even in the fair passage,
the run betwixt Bengal and Bombay is
seldom made in less than a month. Moreover,
during the force of the south west
monsoon on the west side of the peninsula,
that is, from the middle of May till
the middle of August, it is extremely dangerous
for ships to attempt running in for
Bombay: the weather being then so extremely
thick, that sometimes a solar observation
163cannot be obtained for several
days together: and if a ship should, in
such circumstances, run in for the land,
which in such weather is not distinguishable
at three leagues distance, and should
miss the opening of the harbour, which
is but small, it is more than probable that
she would not be able to clear the shore,
with the wind blowing fiercely right on,
and rolling before it a heavy sea. As to
Bencolen, circumstances are nearly the
same with it, as betwixt Bengal and Madrass.
Now it is evident, that this obstructed
naval communication, betwixt the four
chief governments must, in many respects,
greatly weaken the common defence:
and must greatly augment, to the sovereign,
the charge, in both men and money,
of maintaining and defending those
dominions and possessions. Seeing it must
necessitate him to keep up, in each of
those governments, a force sufficient to
defend it against the whole united strength
of an offensive enemy, without trusting
to any aid from the others: because, otherwise,
he runs the risk of losing them all
164singly, to a force that can overpower but
one of them.
But all the danger, inconveniences, and
extraordinary expence, arising from this
obstructed naval communication, may be
obviated and removed, by establishing one
supreme center of military defence; so
situated, with respect to the several parts
of those truly valuable territorial dominions,
as that the communication betwixt
it and them shall, in either monsoon,
be not only practicable but speedy and
easy. For it is evident that, in such a situation,
this supreme center of defence
could, at all times, receive speedy notice
of any impending danger, or actual attack;
and that, upon such notice, it could immediately
transport its own garrison, by sea;
as well as collect aid from the other settlements.
So that the garrison of this supreme
center of defence would act as an
army of observation; ever ready to pour
in, at any quarter, on the back of an aggressive
enemy. And, of course, such a
center of defence must connect, and unite,
the strength of all the several parts
of British dominion in India.
165Now it appears that, the situation of
residence, becomes a circumstance, highly
essential to the efficacy of each purpose,
proposed from this supreme intermediate
power. And it farther appears that one,
and the same, situation is required, for all
these several purposes: seeing that, from
a convenient naval port, situated at a proper
distance from the limits of all the territorial
governments; and, at the same time,
so centrically near to each, that the communication
with all the several parts of
dominion will be speedy and easy; this
supreme power would, in the first place,
completely and effectually, faithfully and
honourably superintend, enforce, and
controul the measures of political government,
as well as the conduct of military
government: and, in the second place, it
would unite and connect the general strength
of those dominions, and completely secure
the defence of the whole.
But, of the several settlements possessed
by the Company in India, Bengal and Madrass
are evidently disqualified for this seat
of residence; not only because the communication
betwixt them and the other settlements
is, at certain seasons, altogether cut
166off; but because they are, themselves, territorial
governments; and therein, the very object
to be controuled. Bencolen is, in every
respect, out of the question. And, there
then remains only Bombay; which is so
far possessed of the properties requisite to
this residence, in that it is, at present, not
greatly embarked in territorial dominion;
and is, likewise, a sea port. But in respect
of communication, with the truly
valuable possessions of Britain in India,
Bombay is altogether unfit to be either the
residence of the supreme controuling power,
or yet the center of defence; as must
appear from the preceding description;
which was more particularly enlarged,
for the express purpose of evincing this.
Far from being a proper center of defence,
all the force that is lodged at Bombay
becomes detached, and completely
lost to the defence of Britain’s truly valuable
possessions; at least on any sudden emergency.
Indeed Bombay is, in every
thing, respecting either dominion or commerce,
a dead load, and useless settlement;
saving it be for the sole purpose of a naval
port, or a place for refitting our squadrons.
167But the choice of Bombay for a naval
port, is the most dangerous and fatal error,
in the whole absurd system of the Company’s
defence: seeing that, by this absurd
choice, Britain loses the use of her naval
force; which is her capital strength of defence,
against the attack of France, her
only dangerous enemy in India—As will
appear—It is impossible that ships, the best
fitted from Europe, can subsist, in those
seas, for two years, without a thorough
repair: and more particularly in time of
war; when action hath happened, and is
again expected. And this thorough repair
they cannot obtain but in a
naval port, properly filled with docks, or
careening platforms. Bombay is the only
naval port, thus fitted by Britain, in India;
consequently the squadron of Britain
must retire, at least every second year, to
Bombay, for repair. But the British
squadron being once retired to Bombay,
(as is common, in October,) which is situated
in lat. 19 degrees north, on the west side
of the peninsula; it is as effectually excluded,
for five months, from the bay of
Bengal, and more particularly from Bengal
itself, as if it was still in Europe. And,
168during these five months, the enemy may
either scour that Bay with single cruizers,
or she may transport, and, without opposition,
land a force in Bengal; and these
said five months are the very fittest in the
whole year for land operations. This must
be thoroughly understood by all those who
are acquainted with the navigation of those
seas: and could be here readily demonstrated;
was it not that, by publickly
pointing out our own weakness, we should
point out to the enemy her strength.
It is most certain that, if France understands
her own advantage, (and it is to be
apprehended she is but too well acquainted
with it): she may either waste and consume
the British squadron, through preventing its
repair; or otherwise she may effect every
purpose, against Bengal, nay against Madrass,
with as great security, as if there
was no British squadron in India: ever so
long as Britain shall continue her only naval
port at Bombay. Nor is there any alternative.
For as to that ridiculous notion,
of carrying a squadron of large ships
up the river of Bengal to repair, no commander
in his senses would, in the time of
war, when he expected to be equally
169matched by the enemy, so soon as the season
arrived, incur the risk of losing some
of his ships, in the passage up and down
that incredibly dangerous river; and still
less would he subject himself to the certainty
of losing half his hands, by that
putrid unhealthy air at Culpee, or Ingelee.
Neither would he be mad enough, in the
while of a hot war, to use that dangerous
expedient, of half repairing at Trincamalay;
where he is liable to be surprized
by an enemy, in the act of repairing. In
fine, so long as Bombay continues to be
our only naval port, our commanders
must, of necessity, either waste and lose
their squadron; or else they must retire to
Bombay, at the least, once in two years;
and, thereby leave the seas, with all our
valuable possessions in the Bay of Bengal,
freely exposed to the attack of an enemy,
for five months.
It therefore follows that, if Britain
means to avail herself of her naval force,
which is the principal defence of her dominion
and commerce in India, she must
establish a proper naval port, on the east
side of the peninsula; because, on that
side lay all her truly valuable possessions,
170and commerce. And that port, which I
mean to propose, is in every respect completely
qualified for this purpose: though
I cannot, in this publication, specify the
place; lest the enemy should anticipate,
and take the advantage of our shameful
neglect.
I am sensible it will be immediately exclaimed
that we have already too many
possessions in India; and that this is no
time to increase our settlements there; and
thereby to increase the drain of our native
strength, as well as the expence of treasure.
But, to this, I answer, that this new
establishment would not encrease the number
of our capital settlements in India: on
the contrary, it would diminish it, from
four to three: for it would suppress, in
the first place, Bombay; which is in every
respect a truly useless settlement; and would
therefore be exchanged for this new settlement;
which would serve to connect the
whole strength of this dominion; as well
as to promote a variety of other very important
purposes. In the second place,
Bencolen would be reduced to the degree
of a subordinate, immediately under the
171direction of the resident at this new settlement;
and completely secure under its
protection.
As to the drain of native strength, this
establishment would, instead of adding,
considerably decrease it: for the garrison,
together with the artillery, &c. of Bombay,
would be transported thither; as likewise
would the better part of the garrison at
Bencolen: and these two garrisons, being
placed there, would form an army of observation,
for all our valuable possessions,
as hath been described; consequently the
territorial governments would not demand
that degree of force, which is requisite at
present, when each stands on its own
bottom.
And with regard to the expence of
treasure, I shall only observe that, it is
most unaccountably absurd in Britain to
send out to India, a squadron of 17 ships
of the line, besides frigates, (as she did in
last war,) for the protection of her dominion
and commerce in that country; which
squadrons become evidently unprofitable
to that purpose, through the circumstance
of wanting a properly situated naval port;
when less than a single year’s charge, of
172such squadron, would suffice to completely
fit up a naval port, so situated as that,
from thence, her naval force would completely
effect its intended purpose. For I
affirm, that the port which I propose would
be completely fitted up, in every respect,
as a naval port, for less expence than one
year’s charge of such squadron; seeing
that I do not propose docks, but platforms
for careening, as at Batavia; and these are
prepared, in infinitely less time, and at
much less charge than docks; whilst they
are far more convenient and expeditious
for repairing large ships, than these docks
at Bombay. And, as to the fortification
immediately requisite, it would be but little
expensive, and would demand but little
time to rear it: because it would be
perfectly accessible to the ships; and so,
whilst it protected them, would be protected
by them.
Moreover no part of the treasure, expended
on originally fitting this naval port,
would come immediately out of Britain’s
proper treasury; for the whole would be
defrayed by the dependent dominion in
India. And this new establishment would,
in a very little time, not only support its
173own charge, but would richly reimburse
Britain for her original cost. Seeing it
would, in the first place, as a colony or
settlement, yield her immediate treasure,
together with sundry commodities peculiar
to itself; and, in a little time, it would,
under proper conduct, produce rich manufactures.
In the second place, it would,
as an Emporium, (for which purpose it is
perfectly adapted by its situation,) greatly
improve the commerce of Britain in India:
and as a centrical magazine or warehouse,
for the commodities of China as
well as India, it would reduce the term
of the Company’s voyages to one year;
and, thereby, reducing the expence of her
carriage nearly one third, it would enable
her to sell cheaper; and consequently advance
her commerce in Europe. Likewise
the Company’s ships rendezvousing
and departing from this port for Europe,
under proper convoy, this would secure
her trade from that imminent danger to
which it is exposed, from her ships rendezvousing
singly, at that button of an
island, St. Helena: a circumstance that
may, in the very first year of a French
war, completely ruin this Company; as
174that enemy is now perfectly acquainted
with her route. Now Bombay is perfectly
useless to all these, and indeed to every
other purpose; as can be readily demonstrated:
and the whole benefit derived from
it, as a colony or settlement, in the year, doth
not suffice to defray one month’s expence.
But this new establishment, being once
fitted up as a naval port, from whence the
squadrons of Britain can, in either monsoon,
command all her valuable possessions;
this same establishment would, at same
time, completely suit for the residence of
that supreme intermediately superintending
power. For this port is situated, at such
a distance from all the territorial governments,
as would suffice to effectually prevent
the controuling power, from interfering
in the immediate execution of government.
And, having said that it is
perfectly well situated for a naval port, it
follows that the communication, betwixt
it and all the parts of the British dominion
in India, must be speedy and easy, in
either monsoon: and consequently that,
from this residence, this supreme power can
effectually superintend, enforce, and controul
the measures of political, as well
175as of military, government, in this whole
dominion. And, being the center of
naval defence, it must be the only proper
center of land defence: seeing the
squadron will be ever at hand, to transport
its land force, to any part of this
dominion, that may be in danger.
And thus have I accomplished that
which I proposed: having planned the design
of an intermediate power which, in such
a situation as hath been described, would
establish a completely regular system of government,
civil as well as military, in
the whole present or future dominion of
Britain in India: nay which would, in
the hands of national government, render
the task of governing this Indian dominion,
as facil and easy, as it is to govern
the small Isle of Man. And, the
seat of its residence being at same time
the center of naval and land defence, it
would completely connect the, otherwise,
divided strength of the several governments:
and would establish the general
defence, upon a footing so secure, that no
enemy, either European or native, would
dare to attack British dominion in India.
It likewise appears that the drain of native
176strength, requisite to maintain this whole
dominion, would but little exceed that
which Britain expends on maintaining the
two barren fortresses, of Gibraltar and
St. Philips’s. Whilst no part of the pecuniary
charge, of either establishing or
afterwards supporting this system of government,
nor yet of the land and even
naval defence, would come out of the
treasury of Britain; but would all be
defrayed by the dependent dominion.
I have farther demonstrated the moral
impossibility of governing and maintaining
this Indian dominion, by means of the
Company; upon any other terms, than
these, of constituting her sovereign at home
as well as abroad; and of conferring, upon
her Directors, the sovereign execution
of government in Britain, as well as in
that dependent dominion.
And I have endeavoured to rouze and
awake the nation, to some sense of, and regard
to, the interest she holds in this Indian
dominion; by a slight descriptive
sketch of the nature, and degree, of benefit
received by her from it, for some years
past. And, as the sensation received from
fact and experience makes ever a stronger
177impression on the mind, than that which
is conveyed by speculative argument, I shall
here again apply to the experience of the
public, on this topic; which cannot be
too much inculcated, nor presented in too
many different points of view; at this
truly critical juncture, when nothing less
than the most speedy application, of the
most vigorous measures, can prevent the
total loss, of this most important object to
Britain; either through the final ruin of
the countries themselves; or, otherwise,
by the assault of enemies.
Britain feels a general failure of credit,
not only in the East India Company, but
in individuals: and this failure of credit
she can ascribe to no other cause, than to
some extraordinary defect of numerical
circulation, or a deficiency of numerical
specie, sufficient to support the wonted
credit of paper. How happens this want
of numerical specie to be so severely felt,
all of a sudden; or from whence should
such defect arise? Assuredly from a decrease
of her wonted influx of numerical
specie; whilst her drain of that specie
continues to be at least the same as formerly.
But what channel or source, of
178Britain’s influx, hath been dried up so suddenly,
as to create this surprizing failure
of numerical circulation? We have shown
it to originate in Indian dominion; which
being, through misgovernment, reduced
to a ruinous state, the consequent wonderful
decrease of revenue, hath obliged the
Company, to absorb and dry up that channel
of Indian private fortunes; which, till
within these two years, used to convey into
Britain, by foreign Company’s bills, &c.
at least 700,000 l. per annum, in numerical
specie, or what is equivalent. And as
Britain hath, during the two years that
this channel was dried up, been continuing
that drain, which she could barely support,
when aided by that private fortune
influx, it is plain that, within these two
years, she must have diminished the standing
stock of her numerical circulation,
at least, 1,400,000 l. And one year, more
of only an equally decreased degree of
influx, will diminish her circulating stock
2,100,000 l. and so on. But a total deprivation
of the influx received, for some
years past, from Indian dominion, will,
annually, double the diminution of circulating
stock.
179And, from this view, the nation may
draw the following just inferences: first,
the mighty value and importance, of this
Indian dominion, to Britain; in point of
financial aid; as well as in other weighty
respects. Second, the mighty alteration
of circumstances, in these Indian countries,
since the time they became subjected
to the dominion of the Company; as also,
the present ruinous state of that dominion.
And from these two inferences she
may deduce, that conclusion which hath
been just mentioned, that nothing less than
the most speedy application of the most
vigorous and effectual measures, can possibly
save those countries from final ruin;
and Britain from consequent bankruptcy,
poverty, loss of credit, of commerce, navigation,
naval power, &c.
I have, in this hasty production, sketched
out the nature of the necessary measures;
but the application of these measures depends
entirely upon the nation’s exerting
her own attention. I am far from meaning
to work upon the passions, I apply only
to the reason and understanding of men;
for had not respect to decorum, and to the
dignity of government, restrained me, I
180might, on this subject, have thrown out
many things, that must have excited discontent
and indignation. Nevertheless the
importance and urgency of the case obliges
me to add, (and, without this, all I
have said can avail nothing,) that unless the
nation shall exert herself most vigorously
in this her own dearest concern, she must
not look for any such effectual measures, as
will suffice to prevent these disasters.
For the nation must consider, that her
present administration consists of the very
men who transacted, and (by their truly
reverberating eccho) confirmed, to the
Company, the second[2] grant of the Dewanny:
knowing that this Dewanny was
nothing other than the sovereignty of a
181mighty dominion, dependent upon the
Crown, and Nation, of Britain: and, consequently
that, by subjecting the numerous
inhabitants of those countries to the dominion
of a few merchants, incapable of administring
any sort of government, they
were consigning over to tyranny and anarchy,
intolerable oppression and ruin, many
millions of men, who were, to all intents
and purposes, subjects of Britain. And
they are the men who, during the four
years that elapsed since that grant, have
furnished the force to support this tyranny
and anarchy: and, in spite of——enacting
a farce,
wherein the Directors were compelled to
perform the same part in Europe, that the
native Nabobs have exhibited in India.
It cannot, therefore, be expected that
they will, willingly, change their plan of
conduct: seeing that, besides their former
motives, they have the additional one of
obstinacy; or shame of standing self-condemned,
for past mismanagement, should
they now alter their measures. It is rather
to be supposed that they will continue
the cloke of the Company; together with
the Directorial farce: and that, to support
182the broken credit of the Company, (broken
by collusive management,) they will,
through eccho, grant her a power, to force
her paper upon the public, for its money.
As also that, under the pretext of honouring
the nation with some share in the charge
of this sovereignty, (under the Company,
but no share in the profits,) they will gradually
thrust her shoulders under that whole
load, which, as the Company must manage
it, will soon become intolerable. And,
by the aid of these fresh reinforcements,
they will juggle it and bungle it, and bungle
it and juggle it on, for one, or possibly
two, years longer: and then Nation and
Company will both tumble together, into
the pit of bankruptcy, perdition, and despair.
But shall the nation, with eyes open,
suffer the pilot to crowd stemlings on the
rocks, which have already grazed the
ship’s bottom? No, we must about ship,
and call another hand to the helm. Matters,
it is to be hoped, are not yet past remedy;
the channel is obvious; if the nation
will but put to her hand. His Majesty
can have no real interest but what is
common with that of his people: and,
183however the views of the Crown may, in
some cases, differ a little from these of the
people; in this particular case they must
both exactly concur. He will, here,
hearken to the voice of his people: and
a little popular heat will force into administration
something of that patriotic ambition,
fire, spirit, and enterprize, which
alone can save this nation from dreadful
impending misfortunes.
But if the nation, sunk in the bed of
slavish sloth, inebriated with the transforming
Circean cap, enervated and emasculated
by the lewd embraces of sensual
pleasure, shall slight and disregard her own
dearest concerns: like the prodigal debauchee,
who chides from him the faithful
friend that attempts recalling him to sober
reflection; and implicitly confides in the
management of a steward, who hath already
wasted the better part of his fair
patrimony: then let the nation, some two
or three years hence, recollect, that she
was advised of her danger, by a hasty production,
issued about the middle of January,
1773: though not thought of, until
that most disinterested of all possible ministers
had, by way of remedying all evils,
184dispatched his Secret Committee to the India
House: there to inspect the Company’s
private œconomy: a thing, with which
neither law, justice, government, nor nation
hath any thing to do; and which,
unless in cases of bankruptcy, is sacred to
the meanest individual. As if, from the
Company’s books of accounts, it was possible
to discover the cause of abuse in the
government of those Indian dominions:
or, as if schemes of saving to the Company,
one shilling per ton, freight of her
cargoes: or, three pence per pound, in
warehouse room, would retrieve the, almost
ruined, Interest of Britain in India.
FINIS.
Transcriber’s Notes:
Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected.
Typographical errors were silently corrected.
Spelling and hyphenation were made consistent when a predominant
form was found in this book; otherwise it was not changed.
