While the movement within Judaism with which
hitherto we have been mainly occupied was tending
to create out of it a world-religion, outside of it circumstances
were preparing to make this tendency
succeed. The later additions to Judaism, the
supernatural system of dogma which formed the
basis of Christianity, were, as I have already said,
favourable to its expansion by reason of their harmony
with Pagan ideas. About the time at which
they entered strongly into Judaism, began a steady
break-up of the religions of the Pagan world. The
material power of Rome attacked them from below,
by destroying the national foundations on which
they rested, while Greek culture and philosophy,
advancing under the protection of that power,
assailed them from above. Under the double
pressure they faded away. In the age of the
apostles, over the greater part of the Roman empire
religion was a matter of sincere belief only
with the lower orders of the people. A few men
of thought and learning put it utterly aside.
Between these two classes there was the great
body of ordinary persons mentioned at the beginning
of our first chapter, who had lost faith
in the popular religions, but were themselves
thoroughly religious. The credulity which always
characterizes periods of religious change, when
some form of religion is destroyed, though the
religious spirit retains its energy, was universal.
Besides this break-up of the old religions in consequence
of the extension of Roman power, in
another way that extension of power more directly
prepared a path for a great proselytising system.
As national limits were overthrown, of course a
religion that ignored national distinctions could
more easily overspread the world.80 Thus when
Christianity touched Paganism everything promised
it success. In fact, the critical period in the life of
Christianity was that which immediately followed
its founder’s death. While it existed only in
Palestine, it was in great danger. When it spread
among the synagogues of Jews in foreign countries,
it had a surer footing. And when from these,
which served as a means of introducing it to them,
it turned to Pagans, it was placed beyond possibility
of failure.
It is interesting to note that Christianity failed
to conquer the Judaism from which it sprang,
while the Paganism seemingly foreign to it everywhere
succumbed to it. A few centuries after this
time every part of the Roman empire professed
Christianity as its religion, while the Jews remained
still the same. Paganism was overcome
and absorbed by Christianity, but Judaism shook
it off as an excrescence without suffering harm.
In this fact there is nothing surprising. Judaism
was too strong for Christianity to subdue it, while
Paganism was a ready prey. The Roman empire,
outside Judaism, lay before Christianity like a body
without a mind; it needed a unifying religion to
match its political unity, and this Christianity
supplied.
The general effect likely to be produced on
Christianity by its reception of Pagan disciples
may now be considered. It is obvious that Pagans,
who were steeped in religious ideas very different
from those with which the Jews were familiar,
would carry with them into Jewish Christianity
different principles of religion. To ascertain the
extent of this difference, we must compare Judaism
and Paganism.
As a pure monotheism, Judaism stood alone in
the world. A purely monotheistic religion tends
to produce humility and stress on faith. The two
great principles of human action, which Mr. Lecky
names as the alternative forces that underlie every
important movement of mankind,81 a sense of
human dignity and a sense of sin, are distinctive
marks of polytheism and monotheism. Monotheism,
with its one God so far removed from man,
inspires a feeling of human nothingness in comparison
with him. Polytheism, with its far more
anthropomorphic and less awful gods, does not
dwarf man thus, but enables him freely to compare
himself with the divinities he worships. And
monotheism, by making man appear nothing beside
God, necessarily exalts faith above good works
as a means of pleasing him; for when the distance
between them is so immense, the best that man
can do appears a trifle. Both these tendencies
of Judaism, as a monotheism, were more than
counterbalanced by other circumstances connected
with it. The humility the Jews might feel when
conscious of the difference between themselves and
God was more than outweighed by the pride they
felt in their superiority to the rest of mankind as
his chosen people who alone had the knowledge
of him.82 Their superiority to other men naturally
affected them more than their inferiority to God.
The strict legalism of Judaism also prevented stress
on faith from being developed in it, as a multitude
of petty observances made it peculiarly a religion
of works. But both these principles were latent in
Judaism, and were only checked by special circumstances
attending it as a national religion. These
circumstances being removed, the latent principles
were sure to be developed. And, in fact, in Jewish
Christianity, which was neither formal nor exclusive,
their development was unmistakable.
Early Christianity was essentially distinguished
both by humility and stress on faith, as a glance
at the New Testament is sufficient to show.
Simplicity of thought also characterized Judaism.
Mysticism was abhorrent to a pure Jew, though a
hellenised Jew like Philo might be steeped in it.
Simplicity of worship, too, was a feature of Judaism;
for the splendid ritual connected with the temple
at Jerusalem was not properly a part of it, but was
merely the expression of national pride. When
away from Jerusalem, the Jew worshipped in the
simplest and purest manner. And, most of all,
morality was closely bound up with Judaism.
Josephus justly boasted that his religion made
virtue an indispensable part of itself.83 The Jews
as a whole were certainly far more moral than the
Pagans as a whole.
The opposite of all these qualities characterised
Pagan religions. Pagans felt no religious humility,
for there was no great difference between their
gods and themselves. Pride, a sense of human
dignity, distinguished them as men. They had
not to lay stress on faith, for this pride made them
fully recognize the value of their own good works.
Mysticism marked their religious thought, and
sensuousness their religious worship. Between
morality and their religions there was only the
loosest connection.
Keeping these facts in view, we can easily understand
the change in Christianity which now began.
All the characteristics of Judaism just mentioned
distinguished Jewish Christianity. Humility, stress
on faith, simplicity of thought and worship, and
the closest connection with morality clearly marked
the religion of the early Church. This was evidently
the case because the first Christians were
Jews. When, then, the Pagans came in, having
wrapped up in their religious ideas pride, trust in
good works, mysticism, a love of sensuous worship,
and a loose regard for morality, and when before
long they alone made up the Church, Christianity
could not remain unchanged. Christianity became
Pagan because Pagans became Christians. And
this is the full explanation of its corruption. The
Jews, in a religious sense, were more highly developed
than the Pagans, and so when it passed
from Jews to Pagans it necessarily deteriorated.
As Christianity was preached in the Pagan
world, it continually reached lower strata of
Paganism. At first only the best Pagans could
have entered the Church, but afterwards, as it grew
in influence, Pagans of a constantly inferior type
must have joined it. Thus the corruption of Christianity
proceeded, not merely because Pagans in
larger numbers professed it, but because, as time
went by, a lower, a more Pagan class became included
within its ranks. All during the period we
are now examining probably belonged to the
great middle order of society before mentioned,
philosophers and peasants equally being absent.
Christianity clung to the cities, and the restlessness
of city life contributed to the growth of its
theology. We will now trace the results of the
direct influence of Paganism on the dogmas of the
Church.
This influence naturally showed itself in a tendency
towards the exaltation of Christ. He would
seem to Pagans the real god of Christianity. God,
the purely Jewish divinity, the national deity of
Judaism, must have been from the beginning unattractive
to Pagans, who disliked Jews, and were
accustomed to gods that differed but little from
men. The identification by Marcionite Gnosticism
of the Jewish god with the malignant creator of
matter showed how strong this feeling could become.
But for the most part Pagans would simply
put God aside, and fix all their attention on Christ.
They would honour and exalt him, and regard
him as the representative of heaven. Thus Paganism
must have tended to develop still further the
Christology of Paulinism. The first result of this
probably appeared in connection with the Pauline
phrase “son of God.” A Jew could not misinterpret
the phrase and give it a literal meaning,
but a Pagan might do so easily. Familiar with
ideas of extremely anthropomorphic gods, Pagans
would naturally consider Christ to be the son of
God in the sense in which Herakles was the son of
Zeus. As the proportion of Jews in the whole
number of Christians grew less, the increasing
Paganism of the Church developed this tendency,
until finally it resulted in the belief in the miraculous
conception of Christ, the first distinctly Pagan
dogma of Christianity.
The gospels supply us with almost certain
evidence that this was the way in which the dogma
originated. The genealogies in Matthew and
Luke are clear proof that the earlier traditions of
the Church made Joseph the father of Christ, and
of course the Church was less Pagan then than it
was in later times. The doctrine, as Dean Milman
points out, is utterly un-Jewish.84 The Jews
always expected the Messiah to be born in the
ordinary manner, and they reverenced God too
much to put him in the place of a human father.
So the dogma shows plainly that it was the first
triumph of Christian Paganism. Jewish Christianity
was only able slightly to spiritualize it, and
to found it in appearance upon an absurd misinterpretation
of a passage of Isaiah.85
While the beginning of the gospel narratives
was being constructed by one influence of Pagan
Christianity, the end of them was being constructed
by another. When the expectation of the second
coming of Christ was abandoned, the Church had
to assign a different meaning to his resurrection.
Originally, and especially by St. Paul, this was
closely connected with the second advent.86 St.
Paul evidently regarded the appearances of Christ
to him and to others as preliminaries of the second
advent, but now they seemed to stand in another
light. Examining the traditions which preserved
the remembrance of the visions of Christ seen by
the early Christians, the Church found them, of
course, clustered most thickly in the period immediately
after his death, when the conditions likely to
produce them were strongest. Visions seen after
that time were probably only occasional and rare,
and, with the exception of St. Paul’s, they were
sure to have little importance. Finding, then, that
nearly all the appearances of Christ had occurred
within a short period after his death, the Church
would naturally make a distinction between this
period and subsequent times. Christ obviously
seemed to have been more present then than afterwards.
It would not be long before the belief
would follow that he had actually stayed on earth
during this period, before he had ascended to
heaven. With his second coming no longer expected,
that he should have done so would seem
quite natural. The Church having to face a long
life without Christ, it was reasonable that, before
leaving it to its lonely struggle, he should have
stayed with it for a time to sustain its immaturity
and to strengthen it for its work. A solemn ascension
of Christ in presence of his disciples would
seem to be demanded as a suitable close to this
period, and with the addition of it the dogma
was complete.
As we can see by comparing Luke’s gospel with
the Acts, this stay on earth was made shorter by
an earlier than it was by a later belief. It was
probably fixed finally at forty days, in order to include
different reports of visions with places other
than Jerusalem as their scene, and possibly, through
the influence of expiring Christian Judaism, to
match the forty days of Moses on Mount Sinai.
That Christ rose on the third day after his death
was a dogma of older times accepted by St. Paul,87
founded, it is likely, on a passage of Hosea,88 and
there was no difficulty in connecting it with the
belief in his stay on earth. So the final doctrine
of the Church was that Christ rose again on the
third day after his death, stayed then forty days
on earth, and afterwards ascended to heaven, not
to return till the day of judgment and the end of
mortal things.
The evidence in favour of this explanation of
the origin of the orthodox doctrine of the resurrection
of Christ is exceptionally strong. The
accounts in the gospels, so confused and contradictory
even in comparison with the rest of them,
and telling only of occasional appearances of Christ
to his disciples, show us clearly the underlying
basis of dreams and visions on which the legend
was founded. The belief in the resurrection of
Christ on earth, we may conclude with almost
historical certainty, arose from the late combination
of the early traditions of Christ’s appearances
from heaven to his disciples.
Thus at the time to which we have now come
the Church in general believed Christ to be the
divinely begotten and humanly conceived son of
God, who had risen after his death on earth, and
then had finally ascended to heavenly glory.
Pagan principles had triumphed, and Paganism
was every moment growing stronger in Christianity.
The tendency to exalt Christ, already far
advanced, had now nothing to check it. Forces
were at work which were inevitably destined fully
to deify Christ, to lift him to the level of the Jewish
God. The Jewish elements of Christianity,
including monotheism, were thus in great danger
of utterly perishing. Christianity, in fact, was
tending to become a purely Pagan polytheistic
religion, with a human being as its most important
god, when it was saved by the influence on it at
this critical period of a fortunate development in
Jewish hands of Pagan philosophy.
Philosophy, from the moment of its first existence,
has always by an irresistible pressure been
driven towards monotheism. The consciousness
in the thinker of his own unity, and the inevitable
conditions of thought, alike force him to imagine
one power as the cause of all the phenomena of
life. Philosophy, when it arises in the midst of
polytheism, at first allows the orthodox gods to be
the subordinate instruments of this power, but it
soon develops a tendency to sweep them utterly
away. Then, having shaken itself free of popular
religion, it builds up a new religion of its own, in
which it asserts the existence of one supreme intelligence,
the creator and governor of the world.
When philosophy has got thus far, and has constructed
its eternal God, certain difficulties confront
it. God, as the great first cause, has to be made
perfect, for if he were imperfect thought would have
to ascend higher to find a cause of his imperfection.
But as the creator of all things, God at one time
must have existed alone, an absolute being
simply self-contemplative. When he began to
create, he ceased to be absolute, and became a
relative being contemplative of his own creation.
If as an absolute being he was perfect, how did he
remain perfect when he became a relative being?
The study of this problem has generally driven
philosophy into pantheism, but where it has maintained
its hold on theism, it has been forced to
suppose that a change occurred in God at the time
of creation, by which he remained absolute in
regard to himself, though he became relative in
regard to that which he created.
Two Gods had thus to be imagined, one absolute
and eternal, the other relative and existing from
the beginning of created things. But these two
had to be one, or else the first or absolute God
would have been relative to the second, and so the
old difficulty would have been revived. Hence
there was need of a mystery; God was one and
yet two, two persons and one substance. The first
was God as he was through all eternity, the second
was God as he was manifested in creation, his
representative with everything but himself. Thus
the second was a mediator between the first and
the world.
While for purely philosophical reasons philosophy
was thus compelled to dualise God, other reasons
also impelled it to this conclusion. Holding him
to be pure mind, it had to explain his action on
matter. Here, too, it was necessary to suppose, a
mediator between the material world and God.
And in proportion as philosophy advanced in its
theism, it extended the attributes of God and
raised him to a loftier height above created things;
and hence, to connect him with what was so far
inferior, a mediator again was needed. But in all
cases this mediator had to be a part of God himself,
or no difficulty was met; and thus in every
way philosophy tended towards a divine dualism
in mystery.
All Greek philosophy, except where it drifted
into pantheism or pure materialism, was more or
less influenced by this tendency. In Platonism
especially it is clearly marked. The ideal world
of Plato fills the place of the second or relative
God, and acts as a mediator between God the
absolute and the material world. God, according
to Plato, is not the creator of matter, which, so far
as it is recognized in his system, is given an eternal
existence. The action of God is confined to the
ideal world, of which material phenomena are a
distorted reflection. At the time of the beginning
of Christianity these features of Platonism were
strongly developed in the theology of an Alexandrian
Jew.
Outside Palestine the most important centre of
Jewish thought was Alexandria. There from the
time of the captivity a large colony of Jews had
been established. This colony became in many
respects almost independent of Jerusalem in religion;
it formed and translated its own canon of
sacred writings, and even set up a temple of its
own. Speaking the Greek language and living in
the most cosmopolitan city of the world, the meeting-ground
of eastern and western thought, the
Jews of Alexandria were naturally affected by the
speculative activity of Greek philosophy. The
high development of Judaism encouraged speculation
in its adherents. The Jewish philosopher had
not, like the Pagan, to cast his religion aside when
he began to seek out the causes of things; on the
contrary, his religion seemed to cover a great part
of the philosophical path. Under these circumstances,
it is not strange that a philosophy should
have arisen among the Alexandrian Jews.
For us this philosophy is represented by Philo,
who was born about twenty years before Christ.
A Jew by birth, and nominally always one in
religion, Philo was so steeped in Pagan thought
that he really ranks as a Greek philosopher. The
chief object of his life was to reconcile Judaism
and Hellenism, to give a philosophical reason for
every feature of the Jewish religion. In fulfilment
of this purpose, he handled Judaism with considerable
freedom, and bent its simple theology into
a mystical Platonism.
The tendency which inevitably characterized
philosophy to push God back from contact with
creation, and to preserve his shadowy glory as an
absolute being, of course influenced Philo, who
simply as a philosopher was bound to be a pure
theist. But as a Jew also, Philo was bound to
be a pure theist, with the most reverent conception
of God. Thus two forces acted on him, as
a Jew and as a Greek philosopher, driving him
to the most refined theism, and this double pressure
produced what Professor Huxley calls Philo’s
agnosticism. He was compelled to form a conception
of God utterly inconsistent with his character
as creator of the world. Philo could not
imagine that God had any relations with matter,
or that he contemplated anything except the
world of his own ideas. So philosophy, helped
by his monotheistic religion, forced Philo to pursue
the path of theological development which I have
described above, to leave God in his pure essence
absolute and unknown, and to attribute all the
phenomena of creation to a mediator between
this pure essence and created things.
In Judaism, language had already been used
which, taken literally, almost described such a
mediator. Wisdom had been spoken of as God’s
companion before creation and his assistant or
agent in all that he had done.89 In a passage of
the Psalms the word of God had been called the
maker of the heavens.90 Language of this kind
probably was merely the result of the inveterate
tendency of the Jewish mind to express itself by
means of personification and symbolism, and had
no mystical significance. But the passage last
referred to, derived of course from the formula
of creation in the first chapter of Genesis, seems
to have guided Philo in his difficulty. He made
the “Word” of God the required mediator, God’s
agent and representative in all his actions.91
Philo’s conception of the Word is shrouded in
the deepest mysticism. In language worthy of
the Athanasian Creed, he asserts that it is neither
created nor uncreated.92 At one time he makes
it distinct from God, at another a simple manifestation
of God. These contradictions reveal his
meaning only the more plainly. He regarded the
Word as the modification of God which necessarily
preceded creation, God the relative, while God
the absolute remained outside it and yet not
separate from it. Contradiction, of course, was
inevitable. As a monotheist, for him there could
be but one God; as a theistic philosopher, he had
to push this God back from contact with the
world. Hence he was compelled to imagine a
manifestation of God, distinct from him and yet
mystically one with him, to bear the burden of
creation, and to represent the divine nature with
all outside itself.
On the theological system of Philo, which was
widely diffused at the period of its greatest danger
from the pressure of Paganism, Christianity now
drew largely to avert its ruin. This product of
Pagan mysticism was exactly what it needed at
the time. It was in danger, through its deification
of Christ, of losing its monotheism and of
worshipping a human God. By identifying Christ
with Philo’s Word, every difficulty was overcome.
The doctrine of an incarnation of a divine being
in a human form had already entered into Asiatic
religion, and, in a more familiar shape, was a
common feature of western Paganism. Christ, as
the Word made flesh, could be raised to the level
of God without destroying monotheism; the Jewish
God, as the absolute and unknown, could be reduced
to the position of a constitutional sovereign;
by a mystery the impulses of the Church could
be satisfied, and yet the purity of Christianity be
preserved.
“Philo,” says Professor Kuenen, “gave the
Church a formula commensurate with her ideas
of her founder.”93 But Philo really did much
more. He gave the Church a means of reconciling
conflicting tendencies within it, of satisfying
at once the higher and the lower class of religious
instincts. And by doing so he saved Christianity.
If this means of reconciliation had not been provided,
Christianity would have sunk to the level
of Paganism, and would have fallen among the
ruins of the empire. Still we must not conclude
that the doctrine of the mystic union of the
persons of the Trinity was, except in a secondary
sense, derived from Philo. Primarily it was derived
from the necessities of Christianity. By
deifying Christ, the Church prepared the way for
that doctrine and the dogma of the Incarnation
depending on it. Before Philonism entered into
Christianity, Christ was man made God; afterwards
he was God made man; but before and
after alike he was the object of Christian worship.
The Church adhered closely to the philosophical
basis of the doctrine. Christ, as the Word, was
made the sole instrument of creation, God the
relative; God the absolute, the Jewish God, was
left in lonely supremacy, unnoticed except in the
theological philosophy of Christianity. We can
see the doctrine in its early shape best in the
fourth gospel, which was written about the middle
of the first half of the second century, in order
to give it a basis in the life of Christ.94 The
gospel was probably composed in Asia Minor,
where Gnosticism and the Asiatic fondness for
mystery would naturally facilitate the development
of the doctrine. “In the beginning was the Word,
and the Word was with God, and the Word was
God. All things were made by means of him,
and without him was not anything made.”95 That
is, at the beginning of creation, the Word existed
with and as God, and became the agent by whom
all things were created. But of course to the
Church the Incarnation was the most important
fact. “The Word became flesh;”96 Christ was
God incarnate. The Church might now safely
worship its founder. As God, the human Christ
could be adored, while nominally monotheism was
maintained.
It was long before the doctrine was finally
settled. Not until early in the fourth century, at
the Council of Nicæa, did the Church define the
dogma in its fulness. During this period different
opinions prevailed respecting it, until at last, on
the question of Arianism, two great parties made
it their battle-ground. In the controversy the
orthodox contention was philosophically justifiable.
Christ, as God the relative, had to be of one
substance with God the absolute, or no absolute
God remained; while if in substance also he was
not eternal, he ceased to be God at all. Arianism,
in fact, was simply Christian rationalism; it endeavoured
to explain the relationship of God the
Father and God the Son. But the essence of the
dogma is pure inexplicable mystery, and rationalism
could not touch it without destroying it. In
the Nicene Creed it is stated in its proper form.
“I believe in one God, maker of heaven and
earth, and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten
son of God, begotten of his father before
all worlds, very God of very God, begotten,
not made, being of one substance with the Father,
by whom all things were made.” Here the philosophical
basis of the dogma is shown in the
clearest manner. God was modified and Christ
produced before creation began, and by means of
Christ the work of creation was performed. We
must carefully remember that the Nicene Council
did not assert the eternal existence of Christ as
a distinct being. He existed eternally, but in God
the absolute before the creation of things. This
is declared plainly in the damnatory clauses attached
to the original creed by the Council, one
of which anathematized him who should say that
Christ had not existed before he was begotten.
It was not until long afterwards, in the Athanasian
Creed, that the eternal existence of Christ as a
person of the then fully developed Trinity was
made a dogma of the Church, notwithstanding the
absurd contradiction in terms involved in its statement.
As expressed in the Nicene Creed, putting
aside the misleading words “Father” and “Son,”
inherited from an earlier belief, there is no such
direct contradiction in the doctrine. God as one
existed eternally; God as two persons only from
the beginning of things.
Thus the mystery of one God in two became
a part of Christianity. The Church believed in
God, and worshipped him as manifested in Christ.
The incarnation of God was henceforth the doctrine
dearest to the Christian. His God was thus
brought near to him, and presented to him in a
form he could readily grasp. And, besides, the
love felt by the Church for its founder was strengthened
by the belief that he had renounced divine
glory to come to the assistance of men. The God
who had become man in his love for men, and
for their sakes had endured suffering and shame,
inspired the passionate devotion which, in the
darkness of medieval Christianity, shone with a
blaze of light. As the figure of the human Christ
faded away in the dim distances of the past, the
figure of the divine Christ was able to replace it,
and to kindle anew the flame of zeal which had
marked the beginning of the Church.
The second great dogma of Christianity had
now been developed. The Incarnation took its
stand beside the Atonement in the doctrines of
the Church. Henceforth Christian theology was
a mixture of Judaism and Paganism. For when
this new essentially Pagan dogma of the Incarnation
was added on, the old essentially Jewish
dogma of the Atonement had entered too deeply
into the life of Christianity to be laid aside. Both
had to be accepted by the Christian. And, unfortunately,
they happened to be utterly inconsistent.
The doctrine that Christ had borne the
penalty of human sins, and had died as an atoning
victim, did not harmonize with the doctrine that
Christ was God. That God has forgiven human
sins and laid the penalty on a victim chosen for
the purpose, is a doctrine strange indeed, but
perfectly natural when viewed from a Jewish standpoint;
but that God has forgiven human sins and
laid the penalty on himself is a doctrine which,
viewed from any standpoint, cannot be other than
a hopeless puzzle.
Incompatible as the two dogmas are, Christian
theologians of course have endeavoured to reconcile
them. Only one explanation of the difficulty has
been seriously offered. This is, that an absolutely
sinless victim was required to become an atonement
for human sins, and that such a victim could
not be found outside the person of God himself.
A reference to Pauline Christianity at once disposes
of this explanation. Even if Christ as
merely a man could not be sinless, he might be
more than man without being actually God. From
its very beginning, the Church regarded Christ,
as the Messiah, as one greater than ordinary men,
though still thoroughly human. Long before the
dogma of the Incarnation was in existence, Christians
looked on Christ as sinless, and connected
his sinlessness with the Atonement.97 Nevertheless,
the explanation is the best available. It has
created the doctrine of the “contract in the council
of the Trinity,” as Mr. Arnold calls it. God the
Father’s sense of justice could be satisfied only by
the self-sacrificing love of God the Son, and hence
the death of Christ upon the cross. It is certainly a
characteristic example of a theological explanation.
The two great dogmas remained really irreconcilable.
The Jewish dogma of the Atonement
and the Pagan dogma of the Incarnation entered
into Christianity as the results of opposite religious
tendencies, and they could never be brought into
harmony. The inevitable attempt to reconcile
them is chiefly responsible for the formation of
the complex mass of theology which so greatly
distinguishes Christianity. One or the other can
strongly influence individual Christians, but it is
impossible for both at once to occupy the same
mind.
Now that we have examined the chief consequences
of the transition from Jewish to Pagan
Christianity, and dealt with the greater part of the
doctrine of the Trinity, we must investigate the
means by which that doctrine was completed by
the inclusion of the third person, the Holy Spirit.
Throughout the earlier books of the New Testament
we find constant references to the Spirit as a
presence abiding with the Church. As used most
frequently, the term simply means inspiration, the
influence of God on individual Christians. This
sense was derived directly from the Old Testament.
Jahveh’s messengers to his people are there often
described as filled with his spirit, as inspired by
him for their mission. Naturally the early Church
believed that this inspiration was continued under
the new dispensation, and that the apostles, its
leaders, were filled with the spirit of God to enable
them to perform their work. But a new feature
was introduced into the belief; the Church held
that not merely leading Christians but all Christians
were thus filled with the spirit of God. This was
the natural consequence of the Messianic prophecies.
Among the glories of the Messianic times, the
prophets often included, as the result of the reconciliation
of Jahveh and Israel, the resting of the
inspiration of God on all his people, all being his
servants just as they were themselves. Of course
the early Jewish Christians applied these prophecies
to themselves, and believed that the spirit of God
rested on all the people of his true Israel, the
Christian Church.
But in the early books of the New Testament
we also find the term “spirit” used in a sense
applicable only to a distinct being. St. Paul, in
a remarkable passage, speaks of the Spirit as interceding
with God for man.98 In order to understand
the origin of this belief of the early Church that
the spirit of God, as a distinct being, sustained it
in its struggle with the world, it must be remembered
that the Jewish Christians regarded Christianity
as a movement from among the unconverted
Jews similar to the movement of ancient Israel
from among the Egyptians. They continually
looked for analogies between their circumstances
and what was related of the exodus from Egypt.
An angel was believed to have led the Israelites
against their enemies,99 and the Church would
naturally expect a corresponding representative of
God to watch over its progress. But by the
prophets the name “spirit” had been given to
this angel;100 and so the early Christians, believing
that the spirit of God rested on the Church, personified
it vaguely and made it a divine representative
abiding continually with them. They
regarded it as the substitute for the personal
presence of Christ which had come to them immediately
after his death. And thus the belief in the
Holy Spirit was connected with the expectation
of the second advent; it had come when Christ
had left the Church, and when he returned its
mission would be ended.
When the expectation of the second advent was
abandoned, and a stay on earth after his death
was assigned to Christ, the Church’s ideas of the
Spirit underwent a further development. As it
was the substitute for his presence, it could only
have come after his ascension. Just as the ascension
had been imagined as a suitable close of Christ’s
stay on earth, so now a solemn ceremony was
imagined to mark the entrance of the Spirit on
its mission. The day of Pentecost, the recognized
anniversary of the delivery of the law on Mount
Sinai, appeared the fittest time for this ceremony.101
As the founding of the law was regarded as the
true beginning of the life of Israel, the coming of
the Spirit seemed to match it and to form the true
beginning of the life of the Christian Church.
The construction of this tradition, as we have it
in the Acts of the Apostles, was one of the last
results of the influence of Judaism on Christianity.
At about the same time this influence was shown
in another doctrine in connection with the belief
in the Holy Spirit. I have already said that, when
the mainly Pagan dogma of the miraculous conception
of Christ was created, Jewish Christianity
was able slightly to spiritualize it. By making
the Spirit the agent on the divine side of that
conception, the dogma was as far as possible
purified from its taint of grossness.
Until after the time of the Nicene Council, the
general belief in the Holy Spirit remained in this
vague undefined form. The Church regarded it
as a personified influence, and gave it little attention.
In the Nicene Creed there is no dogma of
the Trinity; only two persons of the Trinity as
yet existed. In the fully developed Creed merely
vague language is applied to the Spirit; it is spoken
of as a distinct being, but its union with the
Father and the Son is not asserted. The phrase,
“Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son,”
shows, as Feuerbach points out,102 how loose an idea
of personality was attached to it, and is very
different from the precise terms in which the Creed
defines the production of the Son. The subsequent
dispute between the Eastern and Western Churches
in reference to the “filioque” of the Latin form
of this Creed rendered it impossible for Christian
theology to remain satisfied with the Nicene
definition of the Spirit. Always regarded as
divine, there was now a natural tendency to declare
it to be God. A mystery of three in one was a
puzzle no more perplexing than a mystery of two
in one. And so the Holy Spirit was included in
the divine Government, and the dogma of the
Trinity was complete.
The full doctrine of the Trinity, philosophically
expressed, is this. God the Father is God the
absolute, incomprehensible and unapproachable by
created things. God the Son is part of God the
relative, the creator and saviour of the world. God
the Holy Spirit is the rest of God the relative, the
sustainer and guide of the world. Thus it is
evident that the third person of the Trinity philosophically
has no existence; its functions are only
carved out of those of the second. And this
philosophical non-existence of the third person has
its reflection in theology. In spite of the Athanasian
Creed, the Holy Spirit is only a shadow in
Christian belief. Intellectually the sincere Christian
is convinced of the existence of God the
Father; emotionally he is convinced of the existence
of God the Son; but of the existence of God
the Holy Spirit he is not convinced at all, and he
asserts it merely in the empty forms of traditional
dogma.
We have now dealt with all the chief dogmas of
Christianity. The Atonement, the Incarnation,
the full doctrine of the Trinity, and the more important
of the circumstances believed to be connected
with the life and death of Christ—in fact, all
the dogmas of the Creeds, have passed under our
review. Only minor doctrines, in regard to which
there are differences of opinion among Christians,
remain to be noticed.