The Nineteenth and Their Times

Four cavalry regiments in the British Army have borne the number Nineteen.

The first was raised in Ireland, in 1759, during the Seven Years’ War, and was known as Drogheda’s Horse. In 1763, its number was changed to Eighteen, which number it bore till it was disbanded in 1821. The history of its achievements has been written by Captain H. Malet.

The second regiment that bore the number was raised at a critical period in our history, in 1779. It had but a brief and uneventful existence, and was disbanded in 1783.

The third regiment was raised as the Twenty-Third Light Dragoons in 1781, for service in India, where it was immediately sent; the first British cavalry regiment that went to India. On the disbandment of the second regiment, in 1783, the Twenty-third was re-numbered the Nineteenth, and, for fourteen years, it continued to be the only British cavalry regiment in India. During the twenty-four years of its sojourn in the East it bore a conspicuous share in every important military undertaking of the time, with the exception of the campaign against Holkar when it was too far distant from the scene of action to take part. Those twenty-four years, from Warren Hastings to Wellesley, mark the turning point of our power in India. When the Nineteenth landed at Madras our very existence in Southern India hung in the balance. The gallantry of our army was paralysed by the feebleness of the administration that directed their efforts. When the regiment re-embarked for England, the supremacy of our military power had been fully established. Under their distinguished leader, John Floyd, the Nineteenth played no small part in the campaigns of 1790, ’91, and ’92, against Tippoo, attracting to themselves an amount of interest in Southern India that no other regiment did. They assisted at the capture of Pondicherry, and the crowning victory of Seringapatam. It was their good fortune to serve under the Duke of Wellington in the first independent commands he held in the field. They took part in the destruction of the noted freebooter Dhoondia Wao; a short but stirring campaign that deserves more notice than it generally receives. At Assaye, the charge of the Nineteenth and the native cavalry brigaded with them restored the fortunes of the fight at a critical moment. They played their part at Argaum, and, a few months before sailing from India, were actors with Gillespie in his remarkable feat at Vellore. Soon after the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain, in 1812, they were sent to Canada. The conditions of that war afforded little scope for cavalry action, so that the share of the Nineteenth in the various operations was a subordinate one. The campaigns on the Canadian frontier have been so completely eclipsed by our struggles against Napoleon in Europe, that the arduous nature of the lake and forest warfare carried on by a mere handful of British troops and Canadian militia is hardly known. A squadron of the Nineteenth, under an officer whose whole career was identified with the regiment, formed for eighteen months part of the small band that upheld the honour of the British arms under Sir Gordon Drummond, at Lundy’s Lane and other actions on the Niagara frontier. In the course of the wholesale reductions that took place after Waterloo this fine regiment ceased to exist, and its place in the Army List knew it no more.

The fourth regiment, the one that now bears the title of the Nineteenth Princess of Wales’ Own Hussars, was originally raised by the East India Company on the outbreak of the Mutiny of the Bengal Army, and received its present number on the transfer of its services to the Crown. In 1882, they formed part of the expedition to Egypt under Lord Wolseley, to put down the rebellion of Arabi Pasha. In 1884, they formed part of the expedition to Suakin under Sir Gerald Graham, and fought at El-Teb and Tamai, suffering severe losses in the first of the two actions. In 1885, they were selected by Lord Wolseley to form part of the expedition to Khartoum; the only horsemen that accompanied the force. The Head Quarters of the regiment formed part of the Desert Column, under Sir Herbert Stewart, and fought at Abu Klea and Abu Krou, while a squadron of the regiment accompanied the River Column, under General Earle, and were present at the action at Kirbekan. A third portion of the regiment was at the same time employed at Suakin, where it experienced serious losses. For its services in 1885 the regiment was granted the distinctive title it now bears; a proof that it is no unworthy successor of the regiment that helped to strengthen the foundations of our power in India, under Cornwallis, Harris and Wellington, and whose honourable badges it wears, in addition to those it has won for itself.

The history of a regiment of the British Army is part of the history of the Empire at some of its most momentous epochs. To understand it properly, requires a setting of general history that cannot be dispensed with. In compiling these annals I have chiefly aimed at providing a work that shall be of interest and use to those who have served, or, in the future may serve, in the regiment. At the same time there is much which will, I believe, be of interest to the student of Indian Military History, and will not be unacceptable to the general reader.

The bones of British soldiers lie scattered far and wide. In every portion of the globe, their unmarked graves are strewed on mountain and plain, by stream and forest, by swamp and desert; silent witnesses of their devotion to their Sovereign and country. But they have not died in vain, if the remembrance of their achievements survives, to swell the hearts and nerve the arms of their successors, and to remind their countrymen what they owe to their sufferings and their valour.

In compiling these Annals I have received assistance from many unexpected sources. To Mr W. C. L. Floyd I am indebted for much assistance from the papers of his grandfather, under whom the 19th Light Dragoons won their spurs in the Mysore campaigns; to Major General Gillespie, who has kindly placed at my disposal the only authentic portrait of his celebrated grandfather; and to Lieut. General Sir Francis Norman, who collected notes of the career of the old 19th Light Dragoons, many years ago. My thanks are also due to Mr James Wilson and Major Ernest Cruikshank of the Lundy’s Lane Historical Society, who have done so much to rescue from oblivion the details of the war on the Niagara frontier, and to Mr Douglas Brymner, the Dominion Government Archivist at Ottawa. I am also indebted to Mr S. M. Milne for the kindly interest he has taken in my work; to Lt. Colonel Frank Barrow who placed at my disposal the letters written by his distinguished brother during the Soudan campaigns of 1884 and 1885, to Colonel K. J. W. Coghill, C.B., who commanded the regiment at Tel-el-Kebir, and to Colonel J. C. Hanford, C.B. (formerly Hanford-Flood) who commanded the squadron with the River Column, without whose encouragement and aid this work would not have been undertaken. I refrain from adding more names, but the list of those to whom my thanks are due is not exhausted.

From the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), to the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War (1756), the peace, nominally existing between England and France, was continually broken, out of Europe, by both parties. In India, under the veil of alliance with opposing Native Princes, war was actively prosecuted, and it was with difficulty that British interests maintained a precarious footing in that country. In North America, the French claimed the whole continent, except the ill defined New England settlements along the coast, and denied the right of the English to trade in the interior. Keeping themselves in the background, they waged a bloody war against the English settlers, by means of the Indians, whom they subsidized, and whose disguise they often adopted. Both in the East and the West, French officials were acting with the support and countenance of the Court of Versailles, and the English officials on the spot were not slow to retaliate when occasion offered. It was evident that a crisis could not long be averted, but it was advantageous to the French to postpone an open rupture as long as possible, while the French navy was being strengthened. On the other hand, it was the interest of England to hasten the rupture, when war was seen to be inevitable, since the objects to be fought for were beyond the seas. The English navy was, at that time, greatly superior in strength to the French navy, while the French military forces were eight or ten times as strong as the English army, which had been greatly reduced since the conclusion of the late war. As time went on, less pains were taken to conceal the warlike measures undertaken on either side. In the beginning of 1755, Braddock’s ill-fated expedition was dispatched to New England, while a counter-expedition for Canada was sent out from Brest and Rochefort, a few weeks later. Neither side was acting in good faith: on both sides, secret instructions for active hostilities were given to the commanders. In June, two French ships, with troops on board, were captured by Boscawen off the coast of Newfoundland. Exactly a month later, Braddock’s force was cut to pieces by the French and Indians. Still the pretence of peace was preserved. In April 1756, a French expedition sailed from Toulon to attack Minorca, which for half a century had been a British possession. Byng’s well-known failure to relieve Minorca ensued, and the place fell on 27th June.

Meanwhile the absurdity of maintaining the semblance of peace under such circumstances had become patent to the British cabinet, and in May, war was formally declared. In August, the coalition of France and Austria, soon to be joined by Russia, was declared against Prussia, and Great Britain found herself engaged in hostilities in Germany, India and America at the same time.

The early years of the war were neither fortunate nor creditable to Great Britain. After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Army within the three kingdoms had been reduced to about eighteen thousand men. In December 1755, an increase of fifteen thousand men had been voted. But armies are not made in a day, and the direction of affairs was in incompetent hands. Pitt, who alone commanded the confidence of the country, was regarded with disfavour by the King. In November 1756, Pitt was recalled to office, and a new spirit was infused into the management of affairs. A Militia Bill was introduced, the regular Army was increased to forty-five thousand men, and steps were taken for enlisting into the service of the State the Highland clans who had so recently been in arms against the Crown. In April 1757, Pitt was dismissed from office, and all again was confusion. For three months England was without a Government; at the end of that time, Pitt was again in office. But the ill effects of the political contest at home were reflected in the ill-success of our arms abroad, and two years were to elapse before the nation felt secure. The year 1757 was a gloomy one in England. A French invasion was believed to be imminent: an expedition, dispatched in May, against Louisbourg in America, failed, owing to the feebleness and tardiness of execution on the part of those to whom it was entrusted: Fort William Henry was taken by Montcalm, and its garrison massacred by the Indians. In Europe, an expedition, dispatched in September, against Rochefort, failed, through the disagreements of the naval and military officers in command. The Duke of Cumberland was forced to evacuate Hanover, and sign the convention of Kloster-Severn, and many months were to elapse before the triumph of Clive at Plassy became known in England. In 1758, matters improved somewhat. In July, Louisbourg was taken, but an attack on Ticonderago in the same month was defeated, and Lord Howe, described by Wolfe as “the noblest Englishman that has appeared in my time, and the best soldier in the British army,” was slain in a skirmish. In Germany, the British troops, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, drove the French out of Hanover, while two successful raids were made on the French coast, in which Cherbourg and St. Servan were temporarily occupied, and a great quantity of warlike stores destroyed or captured.

Pitt’s genius was now beginning to be felt in every branch of the service, and, from this time, matters improved steadily, by land and sea. In May 1759, Guadaloupe was captured. In July, Rodney destroyed the French boats in Havre prepared for the invasion of England, while Hawke blockaded Brest. In August, Boscawen defeated a French fleet in the Bay of Lagos. In the same month, the French were decisively defeated at Minden by an inferior English and Hanoverian force: on the 13th September, Quebec was taken by Wolfe, who fell in the moment of victory, and French interests in America received their death blow. To complete the year’s triumphs, on 20th November, Hawke destroyed a French fleet under Conflans in Quiberon Bay, in an action fought in the midst of a tempest. The nation could breathe freely again; there was no more fear of invasion, and England was confident of ultimate success. But Pitt’s efforts were not relaxed, and many regiments of Cavalry and Infantry were added to the Army during the year.

By Royal Warrants, dated respectively 17th March, 4th August, 10th October and 17th November 1759, the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Light Dragoons were raised for service abroad and at home. In December, steps were taken to raise the 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons in Ireland, and, in the following month, a Notification to that effect was issued from Dublin Castle.

By the Lord Lieutenant General and General
Governor of Ireland.

To the Muster Master General of this Kingdom or his Deputy.

A month later followed the Royal Warrant.

Entered at the Signet office
the 25th February 1760

Geo. Brown, Dy.

To Our Right Trusty and Right Entirely Beloved Cousin and Councillor John Duke of Bedford Lieutenant General and General Governor of our Kingdom of Ireland and to Our Lieutenant Deputy or other Chief Governor or Governors of that Our Kingdom for the time being.

On the 24th March, the Muster Master General was again addressed, and instructed that, in consequence of an application from the Earl of Drogheda, “the orders relating to the Magistrates attesting the men raised to be Protestants and to making returns of the several places where the recruits were enlisted may be dispensed with, proper certificates that the men are Protestants having been obtained from the Clergymen of the Parishes where such men were severally enlisted, and all other requisites in the Earl of Rothes’ said instructions having been complied with.”

On 25th October 1760, George II. died; in February 1763, the Peace of Paris was concluded, and the Seven Years’ War came to an end. During the whole of this time, the Regiment, which was generally known as “Drogheda’s Horse,” remained in Ireland; but little or nothing can be learned concerning it. Considerable reductions of establishment were made directly peace was assured. The 17th (Aberdour’s Horse), which had never been able to complete its strength, ceased to exist, and the 18th Light Dragoons became the 17th. The 19th in the same way became the 18th, under which number it gained much distinction in the West Indies, Holland, the Peninsula, and Waterloo, being finally disbanded in 1821. Lord Drogheda, who had raised the regiment, continued to be its Colonel Commandant till its disbandment, nearly sixty two years afterwards, an unbroken term of service with one regiment probably unparalleled.

It is impossible at this date to ascertain what was the uniform of the regiment, before its number was changed. It certainly wore the red light dragoon coat of the period, and the facings were probably white, with red and white lace, similar to what it wore after its number was changed, until blue was substituted for red in all the Light Dragoon regiments.

“The year of which we treat, presented the most aweful appearance of public affairs, which this country had perhaps beheld for many ages.”[2] The condition of affairs in England, in 1779, was truly alarming. Since the spring of 1775, Great Britain had been striving to subdue her rebellious colonies in America. The war was mismanaged, the Ministry was incapable: the successes gained were barren of results, while serious disasters had been experienced. In March 1778, France, which had long been secretly aiding the rebellious colonies, threw off the mask, and openly espoused their cause. The warlike spirit of the country was roused, and those who would have conceded peace on almost any terms to American demands, refused to consider it at the intervention of France. The French forces however effected nothing of importance during the year; towards the end of it, the probability of Spain joining the coalition against England became known, though the actual declaration of war was delayed till June 1779. The national spirit was now thoroughly roused, but there was great apprehension of invasion. Supplies were freely voted, great additions were made to the naval and military establishments, camps were formed in many places in the south of England, the militia were embodied, and militia camps formed at Cox Heath, Warley, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, and Aldborough. The most strenuous efforts were made to place the defences of the country on an efficient footing.

In April, the following Letter of Service was addressed to Major General Russell Manners, Lieutenant-Colonel of the 2nd Dragoon Guards.

Warrant.

To Our Trusty and Wellbeloved Russell Manners Esq.
&c. &c. &c.

On the same day, similar Warrants were issued for raising the 20th and 21st Light Dragoons.

In July, a small Corps of Light Dragoons, known as Lister’s Corps, was raised, and in August, the 22nd Light Dragoons was formed. At the same time, all out pensioners of Chelsea were inspected to see which of them “were fit for garrison or other duty.”

The 19th Light Dragoons were formed by drafts from the 1st and 2nd Dragoon Guards, and the 4th and 10th Dragoons, and encamped at Salisbury; where also were the 11th Light Dragoons. The 15th, 20th, and 21st Light Dragoons were encamped on Lexden Heath near Colchester. On the 9th October 1779, the 19th were inspected by Lieutenant-General James Johnston, when the effective strength was 355 Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates, and 347 horses. The Inspecting Officer reported that the Officers wore scarlet, with silver button holes and green lappels, and “were mostly young genteel men with a good air, and great attention, and tolerable horsemen.” The Non-Commissioned Officers were said to be too tall for Light Dragoons, few of them being under 5 ft. 10 in.

Further orders for recruiting were issued in February 1780, and again in February 1781. Regimental clothing accounts were formidable things in those days, and two years after the Regiment was raised it was found that the clothing money of the men drafted to the 19th Light Dragoons from other Regiments had been paid, for two years, to the wrong person; so the following warrant, directing Major-General Manners to refund, was issued.

“Warrant to make good a deficiency in the Offreckonings of the several Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons within specified from 25th April 1779 to 5th July 1781 out of ye Offreckonings of ye 19th 20th and 21st Regiments of Light Dragoons which were formed by sundry Non Commissioned Officers and Private Men turned over from the said Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons.”

“State of the numbers of Non Commissioned Officers and Privates the amount of whose Offreckonings, from 25th April 1779 to 5th July following, as also from 6th July 1779 to 5th July 1781 are to be paid over from the three new Regiments of Light Dragoons.”

From Salisbury the 19th Light Dragoons were moved to Shropshire, and were quartered at Ludlow and Bridgenorth during the summer of 1780, with three troops at each place. The declaration of war by Holland, in January 1781, caused their transfer to Norwich, and, during the summer of that year, they were distributed between Saxmundham, Bungay, Beccles, Yarmouth, Halesworth, and Woodbridge, with a troop at each place. In October, the Regiment was inspected at Yarmouth by Major-General Tryon, who reported “This Regiment is a good corps, and fitt for any Service.” Each Dragoon was armed with a sword, a pair of pistols, carbine and bayonet.

In the following spring, the Regiment was at Bury St. Edmunds and Sudbury, three troops at each place. Soon afterwards they were moved to the neighbourhood of London, for employment on revenue duties, and, in August, we find the Head quarters of the Regiment with three Troops at Epsom; the other three troops being quartered at Croydon, Mitcham, and Horsham. Soon afterwards, a Troop was sent to Bromley, and another to Ewell, one Troop being withdrawn from Epsom.

But the Regiment was not destined to see active service. In November 1782, the preliminary articles of peace had been signed, by which England recognised the independence of the United States, and the usual reduction of military establishments took place. In June 1783, the Regiment was disbanded under the following order—

Orders and Instructions for Disbanding the 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons.

To Our Trusty and Welbeloved Russell Manners Esq. Lt. Gen. Commandant of our 19th Regt, of (Light) Dragoons or to the Officer Commanding in Chief of our said Regt.

In a “Report of the Lt. Generals Johnston, Mocher and Sloper, relative to the appointments of the 19th, 20th and 21st Regts. of Light Dragoons &c.,” it is stated that the appointments are little better than lumber. The following paragraph refers to the 19th Light Dragoons—

Alarming as was the state of our affairs in 1779, it was much worse in 1781. In January, a rupture occurred with Holland, so that Great Britain found herself simultaneously at war with France, Spain and Holland, while engaged at the same time with her revolted Colonies in America. The navy was overtaxed and inadequate to the demands made on it, and the command of the sea had passed into the hands of our enemies. Gibraltar had been besieged since July 1779, the siege continuing till February 1783, the only assistance that could be given being in the shape of stores and reinforcements at uncertain intervals. In America, things had gone from bad to worse. On 19th October 1781, Cornwallis was forced to capitulate at Yorktown with the whole of his army, a disaster which practically brought the war in America to a close, though it lingered on for nearly a year and a half longer. In India, affairs were nearly as bad. The three most important of the native powers at that time were Hyder Ali of Mysore, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam of Hyderabad, and matters had so turned out that we were at war with them all three. On the outbreak of war between England and France, the French settlements quickly fell into our hands. Hyder Ali was much under French influence, and the fall of the French Settlement at Mahé, which was detrimental to his interests, aroused his resentment. He was an able soldier and administrator, and his army was, at that time, the best organised among the native powers. Collecting his forces, he fell like an avalanche on the Carnatic which he desolated. Some troops sent against him, under Colonel Baillie, were literally annihilated; another force, under Sir Hector Munro, was obliged to retreat, so that at the end of 1780, the Company’s authority in the South of India extended little beyond the precincts of the town of Madras. Reinforcements were sent from Bengal under Sir Eyre Coote. The results of the campaign of 1781 were, however, indecisive, in spite of a victory gained by Sir Eyre Coote, at Porto Novo (1st July), and some minor successes. It was estimated that one-third of the British forces were lost in the campaign. In Western India, the Bombay Government had engaged in hostilities against the Mahrattas, and met with disaster. On the coast a powerful French fleet had appeared under Suffren, one of the ablest seamen France ever produced. The European forces of the East India Company were at that time in a miserable state. Public recruiting in England was forbidden, and the ranks were filled with the refuse of society. Felons with fetters on them were shipped as soldiers; foreigners and adventurers of all ranks were received; many of whom only wanted a passage to India, in order that they might desert, as soon as possible, after they landed in the country; invalids, vagrants, and men under the proper size for military service. The whole were “in a most wretched condition, almost indeed without subordination.” The only reliable European troops in the country were the King’s troops, and the Company’s Artillery into which the best of their recruits were drafted. Lord Cornwallis, writing six years later of some troops he had recently inspected, says:

It is only by appreciating the condition and circumstances of our military services in India at this time, and the jealousy existing in the highest quarters in England of the exercise of the authority of a Government by the East India Company, that the almost independent position held by the King’s troops in India can be understood. The chief want was in Cavalry, and it is a proof of the ill-judged parsimony or poverty of the Company that, in a country so well adapted for that arm, where the cavalry of the enemy were counted by tens of thousands, they should have failed, till the time treated of, to produce an efficient mounted Corps. M. le Maitre de la Tour, a French officer in the service of Hyder Ali, writing about the events then occurring, says:

Hyder Ali’s cavalry numbered at that time about twenty-five thousand horsemen, among which was a body of French dragoons and hussars. The Company maintained no Cavalry establishment, beyond a small European troop formed, as related by M. le Maitre de la Tour. When at war, they borrowed a few hundreds of horsemen from the Nawab of Arcot, unpaid, undrilled, and undisciplined.

Sir Eyre Coote, the Commander-in-chief in India, was loud in his demands for Cavalry. In his dispatch on his victory at Porto Novo he wrote:

Again, after the battle of Arnee, (2nd June 1782) he wrote:

Under the urgent demands made on them, the Court of Directors applied to the Crown for the loan of a Cavalry Regiment, and, in accordance with the usual practice at that date, it was determined to raise a Regiment for service in India. On the 24th Sept. 1781, the following Warrant was issued to Colonel Sir John Burgoyne Bart., of the 14th Light Dragoons, a cousin of General Burgoyne who surrendered at Saratoga in 1777.

Warrant for forming a Regiment of (Light) Dragoons under the Command of Colonel Sir John Burgoyne Bart.

To Our Trusty and Well-beloved Sir John Burgoyne Bart. Colonel of Our 23rd Regiment of (Light) Dragoons, or to the Officer appointed by Him to raise Men, for Our said Regiment.

In the London Gazette, for the same date, the following appointments are made.

The roll of officers was completed in subsequent Gazettes, but several changes took place before the embarkation of the Regiment.

Colonel Sir John Burgoyne, Bart, of Sutton Park in Bedfordshire, was an officer who had served in several Regiments, the 7th Royal Fusiliers, the 52nd Foot, the 58th Foot, and was Lieutenant Colonel of the 14th Light Dragoons at the time of his appointment as Colonel of the 23rd Light Dragoons. He also held the offices of Comptroller of the Port of Chester, and Muster Master of foreign troops serving in North America. On being appointed to serve in India, he was granted local rank as Major General in the East Indies from 1st June 1781, and was subsequently made Major General in the Army, 20th November 1782.[4] It is probable that the regiment was largely composed of drafts from the regiments that furnished it with officers, viz.: the 8th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 20th, and 21st Light Dragoons. The Regiment was first brought together in the vicinity of his home, and, under order dated 28th December, marched from Bedford to Portsmouth to embark for India. The following orders and instructions had previously been issued, and subsequent events were to show how much the admonition as to disputes with the officers of the East India Company were needed.

Orders and Instructions to Sir John Burgoyne Colonel of the 23rd Regiment of (Light) Dragoons for the Conduct of his Regiment on their passage to the East Indies dated 29th November 1781.

In a letter, dated London 25th January 1782, from the East India Directors to the President and Council at Fort St. George, the Madras authorities were thus advised of the dispatch of the Regiment to India—

Establishment of a Regiment of Light Dragoons commanded by Colonel Sir John Burgoyne, Bart.

List of the Officers of the Twenty Third Regiment of Light Dragoons.

On the 5th January 1782, the Regiment embarked at Portsmouth, on board the ships Ceres and Royal Henry forming part of the East India fleet sailing under convoy of Vice Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton. In the same fleet sailed the two newly raised Infantry Regiments, a Hanoverian regiment raised to serve the East India Company for seven years, drafts for four King’s regiments then serving in India, and some recruits, raised in Ireland, for the Company’s service. Lieutenant Colonel Floyd, with the greater part of the Regiment, was on board the Ceres. Sir John Burgoyne, with the rest of the Regiment, sailed in the Royal Henry. Floyd was in command of the Regiment: Sir John Burgoyne being apparently in command of the whole of the Troops. The voyage was an uneventful one, though not without some apprehension of meeting a French fleet. It was known that a French fleet was fitting out in Brest, under the Comte de Guiche, to intercept them. On the 27th February, intelligence was received of a combined French and Spanish fleet of 41 sail of the line and 18 frigates, that was cruising to intercept the convoy. The frigate that brought the intelligence had also passed close to a French squadron of 14 sail, that had only just missed the convoy: probably the squadron from Brest. But no enemy was seen, and on 28th April, the fleet was safely anchored in Rio, where it lay till 3rd June. In those days it was the custom to carry beer for troops at sea, as a protection against scurvy. The log of the Ceres records that on 3rd March the beer had come to an end, and spirits were served to the troops. On the 15th March, the log records that there was “delivered to Lieut. Colonel Floyd, Commanding Officer of the troops on board, 1 Chest of Tea belonging to the Honble Company, for the use of the military.” Later on again the issue of spruce beer to the troops is recorded. It is evident that much attention, according to the medical lights of that day, was paid to the health of the troops, with a view to landing them in India in as healthy a condition as possible. On the 31st March, they crossed the line with all the ceremonies observed on those occasions, now long since obsolete. The log records that at P.M. the Captain “mustered the ship’s Company to know who had crossed the Line before, when we found 81 who had not, who all agreed to pay the usual forfeit except one Seaman and two Boys who were accordingly ducked three times from ye Lee Main Yard Arm.” We may be sure that all on board relieved the monotony of the voyage by taking part in the rough festivities of the day. Lt. Colonel Floyd says in a private letter, “Our dragoons are divided into two watches, and relieve each other every four hours, so the half of them are always on deck, chiefly for the sake of their health, and to assist the seamen in the operations of the ship, at which they now begin to be very handy.” On the 15th July, when nearing the Cape, a Danish ship “fresh from the Cape” was spoken, and gave news that, on the 13th, 4 French sail of the line and 9 transports were to have sailed for the Mauritius: also, that on 26th June, a French frigate and 12 transports with troops had sailed from the Cape. But nothing more eventful occurred, and on 6th Sept., the whole fleet anchored in Bombay. There the convoy was broken up, and, on 15th, the Ceres and Royal Henry sailed for Madras, where they cast anchor on 19th and 20th October. Hardly had they done so, when bad weather set in; the ships were blown from their anchorage, and, it was not till 26th and 27th October, that the Regiment disembarked; the first British Cavalry Regiment to land in India. Three deaths occurred among the men during the voyage, Private Jonas Bateman on 23rd April, Private Joseph Gardner on 4th June, and Private Simon Kemp on 23rd September.

The reinforcements were sorely needed. So badly had the East India Company’s affairs prospered that, in October, there appeared a probability of the whole of the British establishments in southern India being destroyed. Every where was discord, and disaster. The relations of the Madras Council, both with the naval and military commanders, were greatly strained. Sir Eyre Coote had been obliged to return to Bengal for a time on account of his health, and Sir Hector Munro, Commander-in-Chief in Madras, had resigned his command, while the pay of the Native Army was many months in arrears. So great had been the losses among the European officers, that, in spite of the stringent orders of the Court of Directors, the Madras Government had granted Commissions to anybody they could lay their hands on. Four naval actions had taken place off the coast during the year, between the French fleet under Suffren and the English fleet under Hughes, without any decisive result, though the balance of advantage was with the French. Trincomalee had been captured by the French, and the shattered English ships had no place nearer than Bombay where they could refit. By land, operations had been equally unsuccessful. In February, a British detachment consisting of about 100 Europeans, 1500 sepoys, 360 Cavalry, and 9 field pieces under Colonel Brathwaite, was forced to surrender to a combined Mysore and French force, and, in April, Cuddalore yielded to the same enemy. The operations of Sir Eyre Coote, who was at that time Commander in Chief in India had not been successful. In an attempt on Arnee he was outmanœuvred by Hyder, several small reverses were experienced, and, finally, he had fallen so seriously ill that he was forced to resign his command, and sail for Bengal. Negapatam was attacked by Suffren and Hyder in July, and was only saved by the timely appearance of the British fleet. To make matters worse, famine was raging in Madras. The country had been abandoned to the undisturbed possession of the enemy; great numbers of natives had flocked into the town for protection from Hyder’s Cavalry, and the ill success of our arms, together with scarcity of funds and bad management, prevented the collection of adequate supplies. “Hundreds perished daily.”[6]

In the beginning of October, there were only 30,000 bags of rice in the place, the monthly consumption being 50,000. A large quantity of rice was afloat in the roads but could not be landed, owing to all the harbour boats being taken up for the service of the fleet.[7] On 15th October, a terrible storm arose: the fleet was blown off the coast, the flag ship being so much damaged that she was kept afloat with difficulty; several merchant ships were stranded or foundered at their anchors, and all the rice afloat was lost. “The shore for several miles was covered with wrecks and with the bodies of the dead and dying.”[8] Before the storm, the Admiral had declared his intention of carrying his ships round to Bombay, and had positively refused to stop on the coast, though the absence of the fleet imperilled the safety of Madras. Some relief had been gained by the establishment of peace with the Mahrattas, in May (treaty of Salbye), though the final ratifications were not exchanged till February 1783: so that even in this quarter peace was not definitely secured.

It was under these depressing circumstances that the 23rd Light Dragoons landed in India, not to leave it again until the British arms were triumphant everywhere; a result to which the Regiment contributed in no small degree. Their arrival gave promise that future successes in the field should not be so barren in results as had frequently been the case in the past. In their dispatch of 31st October 1782, the Madras Government, showing their satisfaction at the arrival of the 23rd Light Dragoons, quote Sir Eyre Coote’s opinion that “a body of cavalry would have procured him the most solid and decisive advantages over the enemy” in the earlier operations.

The regiment landed with a strength of 360 privates fit for duty, and, by all accounts, appears to have been a splendid lot of men. Madras letters described the troops landed as “remarkably healthy, and as fine a body of men as ever came to India ... particularly Burgoyne’s men, who, when mounted, will be as fine a body of men as ever went into the field.” A contemporary writer mentions them as “this sightly corps,” and Burgoyne himself, in the midst of his troubles two years later, writes, “the men are now the finest you can imagine.” Immediately after landing, firelocks were served out to the men, and a party of them were exercised in heavy gun drill. In the course of the general mismanagement that distinguished the Madras administration at that day, the regiment was first quartered in Fort St. George, in what has been described as “a suffocating bombproof, from which three or four hundred French prisoners, afflicted with various pestilential diseases had been recently removed. The consequences were such as might have been expected. A fatal mortality so much prevailed that no less than two or three of the men were daily sent to their graves.” In consequence of the scarcity of provisions, biscuit was issued to all the European troops instead of rice. After a time, the regiment was moved to San Thomé, four or five miles from Madras. The four hundred horses ordered to be in readiness for the regiment, were not forthcoming, the few horses available in Madras not being large enough to carry European dragoons. An application for horses had been made to Bengal, but received a discouraging reply. An allowance of Rs. 600 per horse was therefore made to Sir John Burgoyne, to do his best with in mounting the regiment. The Bengal government were ready to send horses but could not find means of transport. In the Calcutta Gazette for 21st December an advertisement appears, asking owners and freighters of ships to quote rates, and state what number of horses they would convey to Madras for government. A week later, the Gazette mentions that “Lt. Colonel Eyre’s regiment of (native) cavalry is arrived at Cowgatchy from Monghyr. It is reported that this regiment is to be dismounted, and the horses sent to Madras for the European cavalry lately arrived there.” But freight for the horses was not obtained. Bengal had been denuded of troops, and it was impossible to send the horses by land without a strong escort. It was not till June following that four hundred horses arrived from Bengal, by land, and the regiment was at last complete.

1783—1785

In little more than a month after the Regiment landed, the death of Hyder Ali occurred. It brought no relief to British interests. His son and successor, Tippoo, was an experienced soldier, though inferior to Hyder in ability. He was noted for his religious fanaticism and a violent temper, joined to a most barbarous cruelty of disposition. To this was added a spirit of implacable hostility to the English, the only European power in the country that appeared formidable to him. Possessed of a full treasury and a powerful army, he at once took the field with a force that contained 900 European troops, 250 Topasses,[9] and 2000 French sepoys, besides many thousands of his own Mysore troops. To oppose him, the Madras Government could dispose only of some 2950 European, and 11,500 native troops. With this force, Major General Stuart took the field in January, and made his way by slow marches to Vellore. Meanwhile, Tippoo was forced to withdraw to the westward to defend Mysore from an attack on that side. On the arrival at Bombay of reinforcements in Sir Richard Bickerton’s convoy, about 500 of the Company’s recruits, destined for Madras, were detained, and, on the arrival of the King’s troops at Madras, about 400 of them were at once sent back to Bombay. Out of this material a force had been organized, under Major General Matthews, to advance against Mysore from the west coast. After the capture of several places, the force was hemmed in at Bednore, and obliged to surrender to Tippoo, on 30th April 1783. A great loss was experienced at this time in the death of Sir Eyre Coote at Madras, on 27th April, three days after his return to resume command of the operations. After this nothing was done till June, when an ineffective attack was made on Cuddalore by Major General Stuart. The French were on the point of striking a counter blow which would probably have proved successful, when the announcement of peace in Europe changed the complexion of affairs. The French force with Tippoo was withdrawn, but otherwise the war continued. At this point the Mahrattas intervened. Tippoo’s character and his great power rendered him a menace to the other native Princes, and it was no part of the Mahratta policy that he should be allowed to crush the English. They therefore called on him to desist from hostilities. On his refusing to comply, they signed a treaty of alliance against him with the English. In the meantime, a successful expedition under Colonel Fullarton, strengthened by the troops set free by the peace with France, had penetrated into Mysore, from the south, and threatened Seringapatam. Under these circumstances, Lord Macartney and the Madras Council induced Tippoo to sign a treaty of peace, 11th March 1784; a treaty discreditable to themselves, and disapproved of by Warren Hastings.

In a letter, dated 6th September 1783, addressed to the Court of Directors, the Select Committee of the Madras Council states that Sir John Burgoyne’s regiment, being reported fit for service, had been ordered to take the field. But the regiment did not move from San Thomé. The Council desired to send the regiment into the field without Burgoyne. On the latter notifying his intention of accompanying his regiment, under orders from General Stuart, the move was countermanded. The incident was part of the fast ripening quarrel between the Civil Government and the King’s officers, which must be mentioned on account of the serious results it had on the fortunes of the Colonel of the 23rd Light Dragoons.

From the time of their first military establishment in India, the Company had always evinced great distrust of their military officers, a feeling that was not without some justification in view of the character of the adventurers, who at first took service with the Company. The Company’s troops on their part were under the influence of the feeling, prevalent in England, that the exercise of sovereign rights by a company of merchants was derogatory to the dignity of the Crown. Hence it arose that the Company’s officers were less deferential to the authority of the Company, than they should have been, while the Company became more exacting of the respect due to them, and made it their policy to keep down the army, in numbers, in rank, and in authority. This feeling of jealousy became intensified when the services of King’s troops were placed at the disposal of the Company; and many quarrels detrimental to the public service ensued. At the time we are treating of, the King’s troops in India were the mainstay of the Company’s power. The Company was under stringent engagements to pay them regularly, instead of allowing their pay to fall into arrears, as was always the case with their own troops. They were to be commanded as far as possible by King’s officers only, and the Commander in Chief at each Presidency was appointed by the Crown. Every King’s officer, whatever the date of his commission, took rank above all Company’s officers holding similar commissions, and every field officer of King’s troops, while in India, was given a step of Brevet rank above his regimental rank. This naturally caused some ill feeling between the King’s and Company’s officers. The arrangement had first been made when there was only a single battalion of King’s troops in India. As the number of King’s troops increased, the extra rank given to the officers became a very serious grievance to the Company’s officers, which was further aggravated by the Company’s policy of maintaining a very small number of field officers, and of having their regiments commanded by Captains. The instructions for avoiding disputes with the Company’s officers, that were issued to Sir John Burgoyne, before sailing from England, had been a stereotyped formula of orders for all officers sent with troops to India for more than twenty years past: but such admonitions were of little use under conditions that made friction inevitable.

The Madras Government was possessed at that time of a perverse spirit, that led them into all kinds of extravagancies and never ending quarrels. The Members of the Council fought amongst themselves; they evaded or disobeyed the orders of the Court of Directors, and ignored the authority of the Governor General. Individually, they commanded little respect. Collectively, they mismanaged everything. They interfered in military matters, that in a time of war were peculiarly in the province of the chief military authority; and they frittered away the forces at their disposal in ill-conceived and badly equipped expeditions that frequently ended in disaster. Finally, they quarrelled with everybody who was not immediately under their orders, and wrote long winded complaints to the Court of Directors and to Bengal, instead of doing their best under the trying circumstances of the time. The King’s officers on their side were also difficult to deal with. They asserted their right to direct how and where the King’s troops should be employed, and, in other respects, claimed an independence of the Civil Government incompatible with public interests. In 1780, when the Commander in Chief, Sir Eyre Coote, had been sent down from Bengal, after the disaster to Colonel Baillie’s army, he was furnished with orders for the suspension of the acting Governor, Mr Whitehill, against whom the gravest charges had been made, and he was specially invested with powers that to a great extent made him independent of the Madras Council, including the exclusive direction of the treasure transmitted for the prosecution of the war. The temporary grant of such powers was necessary under existing circumstances, but was none the less resented by the Madras Council; though there was little active opposition till the assumption of the Governorship by Lord Macartney in June 1781. The Council complained that more was not accomplished, Sir Eyre Coote complained that his troops were sent into the field without supplies; the Council sent an expedition against the Dutch settlements, without consulting the General, and an open rupture occurred, in which the Admiral took part, in consequence of dispatches addressed to both Commanders being opened by the Resident at Tanjore. At this stage of the quarrel, Sir Eyre Coote’s health forced him to leave for Bengal. The command devolved on Major General Stuart, and the quarrel went on worse than ever.

Lord Macartney at once assumed the direction of the campaign, and made himself ridiculous by forcing Stuart to destroy three of his own forts, the preservation of which was anxiously desired by Sir Eyre Coote. Stuart, on his side, claimed the right of exercising the special powers that had been conferred on Sir Eyre Coote. Stuart’s position was a peculiar one. While on the King’s half pay list, in 1775, his services were lent to the Company, who conferred on him the rank of Brigadier General. In October 1781, the Crown gave him the commission of Major General in India, and, three months later, his commission was antedated. His position, however, differed from that of other General Officers, in that he was not borne on the strength of any regiment, and his status in England was only that of a half pay Colonel. He had done good service already in the campaign against Hyder, in which he had lost a leg by a cannon shot.

In December 1782, Stuart withdrew the garrison of Masulipatam for service elsewhere, without consulting the Government, and at once both parties entered into a paper war, that absorbed all the energies that should have been devoted to the war with Tippoo and the French. Each party bombarded the other with notes and minutes, that continued to be exchanged after the army had taken the field for Cuddalore, and the Council wrote to London and Calcutta in the gloomiest terms, expressing their fears of General Stuart’s designs.[10] In neither quarter did they elicit any sympathy. In terms of measured sarcasm Warren Hastings pointed out that their “collected mass of complaint and invective” was directed in turn against every single British authority in India except themselves, including the Naval Commander in Chief, as well as against the Nawab of Arcot and his ministers.

The Madras Government had become contemptible alike in the eyes of friends and enemies, and it was impossible to work with them. Lost to all sense of public duty, they formed the project of refusing to place the troops under command of Sir Eyre Coote on his return in April. Sir Eyre Coote was, on this occasion, nominated by the Bengal Government to take the command of all the troops on the Coast, except the garrison actually required at Madras. Not an unreasonable arrangement, as Sir Eyre Coote was Commander in Chief in India, and the Madras Government was dependent for money on Bengal. The Madras Government sent peremptory orders for Stuart to hasten his march, in order that the troops might be far distant when Sir E. Coote arrived, and passed a resolution that he should not have the command. A letter addressed by the Madras Council to Sir Eyre Coote when he was dying, drew down upon them a censure from Warren Hastings that was calculated to penetrate the most pachydermatous self-conceit, but it had apparently no effect on Lord Macartney and his Council. Even before Sir Eyre Coote’s death, the feeling of Lord Macartney and the Council against the King’s officers was shown by a minute of the Council, at the time of the preparation of the army for the siege of Cuddalore, wherein an attempt was made to deprive the Generals bearing the King’s commission of any employment in the field. In it, an endeavour was made to elicit from Major General Stuart an opinion that the public interests would be best served by leaving those officers, five in number, in garrison. This idea was resisted by Stuart, and Major General Bruce was sent with the army to Cuddalore. The frigate that conveyed the news of the cessation of hostilities with France, to the army before Cuddalore, brought also peremptory orders to Stuart to embark at once for Madras, to answer charges of misconduct. Bruce was forced by ill health to return a few days later.

The command of the force in the field then devolved temporarily on Colonel Gordon, till Sir John Burgoyne took command of the returning army on 13th August. But Sir John Burgoyne had likewise come under the displeasure of the Select Committee. In the same letter[11] to the Court of Directors in which they announced the supersession of Stuart, and their intention to give the command to Burgoyne, they wrote—

In another part of the same letter they stated that Burgoyne had claimed to be a Major General, but they had only his word for it, as the fact had not been notified to them. Yet, in the Directors’ letter of 25th January 1782, Burgoyne’s rank as Major General in the East Indies from 1st June 1781, is precisely stated.

Burgoyne was justifiably angry at the treatment his regiment had experienced. Nothing had been done by the Madras Government to have horses in readiness for the regiment on arrival. The quarters in which the men were first placed were so unhealthy, that by the middle of July, less than nine months after landing, 78 had died. His own claims to the rank and allowances of a Major General were challenged; while, in common with all the senior officers of King’s troops, he was exasperated by the animus displayed against them by Lord Macartney and the Council, and the openly avowed intention to ignore their just claims, in defiance of the intentions of the Crown. In a letter, dated 3rd September 1783, in which he reports to the Ministry at home, the fact of his having assumed the command of the army returning from Cuddalore, he dwells on the grievances of the King’s General officers, especially “the declaration of the Governor, who says no King’s officer shall ever Command in Chief here, let his rank be what it may; and that a junior officer in the Company’s service should have rank given him superior to what any King’s officer may have to entitle him to command.” It is evident that the violent measures shortly afterwards taken by Lord Macartney, were in pursuance of a long contemplated scheme for getting rid of the King’s General officers.

From the beginning, Stuart had been quarrelsome and unreasonable in his dealings with the rest of the Council. The Council complained loudly of the slowness of his advance on Cuddalore. For this he does not appear to have been responsible, as the delay was caused by his having to wait for the squadron and store ships which did not arrive before Cuddalore till after the army had encamped before the place. Among other causes of quarrel was the desire of the General to give effect to the views of the Bengal Government in the affairs of the Nawab of Arcot; views which were strenuously opposed by the rest of the Council. Soon after the return of the army to Madras the Council passed a resolution dismissing Stuart from the service, and conferring the Commander in Chiefship on Burgoyne. On the 17th September this was announced to Burgoyne, who was addressed as Commander in Chief, and requested to attend the Council immediately. In a General order of the same date, the Council, anticipating objections, justified their action by arguing that Stuart held only a half pay commission from the King, and that the Company could do as they pleased with him as he held no position under the Crown in India.

As Burgoyne entered the Fort a salute was fired from the ramparts, but he at once informed the Council that, while they could dispose of the command of the Company’s forces as they pleased, he had no power to supersede Stuart who held the King’s commission of Major General, and the command of the King’s troops de jure, and, so long as he was able to act, could only be deprived of his command by the King’s order. On this he was told that, if he did not accept the command, it was intended to make Lieutenant Colonel Lang a Company’s officer, a Lieutenant General, and appoint him Commander-in-Chief. Burgoyne continued firm in his resolve, but was detained till 8 in the evening on various pretexts. Meanwhile, without his knowledge, arrangements were made for Stuart’s arrest, and a letter was sent to Lieutenant Colonel Lang appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the army with the rank of Lieutenant General. The order issued a few hours previously, appointing Burgoyne Commander-in-Chief, was ignored as if it had never existed. Burgoyne was then told that he might retire. On leaving the Council room, he found the gates closed and the drawbridges drawn up, and learned that Stuart had been arrested by a company of sepoys, in his own house, and brought, a close prisoner, into the Fort, under circumstances of much indignity. The excuse afterwards assigned by the Select Committee for this extraordinary proceeding was, that they believed Stuart was about to seize the Government by force.

On the following day Burgoyne wrote to the Select Committee, expressing his intention of taking command of the King’s troops, since Stuart was incapacitated from acting. He received no reply, and, on arrival at the camp he found two orders, one constituting Lang a Lieutenant General, and the other directing Lang to take command of the whole army; thus superseding Burgoyne and four other Major Generals and several Lieutenant Colonels, who had been senior to Lang.

Burgoyne at once assembled the King’s Officers in his tent, and related to them what had passed. For his own part, he said, he should consider himself wanting in his duty, to pay obedience to any other than a senior officer of the King’s appointment: that General Stuart being deprived of the possibility of acting, the command of the King’s troops devolved on himself. He did not attempt to bias the opinions of any of the gentlemen present: he recommended the avoidance of altercation or even discussion with the Company’s officers, lest unforeseen consequences might ensue. The officers present said they would obey no orders but those of the Commander-in-Chief representing the King, viz.: Sir John Burgoyne.

The same afternoon Lang arrived in camp, and met the King’s officers in Burgoyne’s tent, where he delivered an order from the Council instructing Burgoyne to surrender the command of the Army to him. Burgoyne replied that he would give over the command of the Company’s troops to whomsoever the Council chose to appoint, but that his duty to the King required that he should not deliver over the command of the King’s troops to any person not regularly authorized by His Majesty: he placed his tents at Colonel Lang’s service. Lang replied that he had a house at the Mount, and remained silent some time, till, on the officers calling out that they would obey Sir John Burgoyne only, he got up and went away. On the same day a letter was addressed to the Admiral by Sir John, asking for advice and support, and requesting an asylum on board the flag ship, in the event of any attempt being made on his person. The Admiral was so situated that he might have discreetly acted as mediator between the contending parties had he been so disposed; but, perhaps, his previous experiences of the Madras Council made him unwilling to be mixed up in the quarrel. Anyhow, he refused to have anything to do with the matter.

Very little was needed to produce a conflict between the King’s and Company’s troops that night. The King’s troops had been exasperated at the animosity displayed by the Council towards Sir Eyre Coote and the King’s officers in general. They were alarmed at the violence offered to General Stuart, and were resolved to repel by force any repetition of this violence in Burgoyne’s case. In order to prevent surprise, guards were posted round the Camp. The Council, on their part, had been haunted all along by the idea that the King’s Officers aimed at subverting the Government. Two battalions of Bengal Sepoys with some guns were ordered down to protect Lang’s house, and the gates of the Fort were kept shut. Each party expected to be attacked, and, for the next forty-eight hours, a very slight occurrence might have precipitated a disastrous conflict.

The following day, Burgoyne summoned Major Generals Bruce, Campbell, Ogle, and Adams to confer with him, and a remonstrance, signed by the five, was drawn up and forwarded to the Council; to the effect that they were determined not to act under Lang’s orders. Lang had meanwhile issued orders for the Army to march on the following day, in order to test their obedience. Lieut. Colonel Floyd was also senior to Lang by the date of his commission. Several regiments gave assurances of support to Burgoyne and Floyd. At a conference of the senior officers a course of action was determined on, and Burgoyne withdrew from the camp, at midnight, to his house in Madras. The vedettes round the camp were at once withdrawn. The next morning, Floyd likewise withdrew from the army; handing over his command to Lt. Colonel Mackenzie of the 73rd, who was junior to Lang by date of commission. The force marched, and took up fresh ground in rear of their former position.

On reaching Madras, Burgoyne addressed a letter to the Select Committee notifying his withdrawal from the camp, and offering himself for arrest if Government had a mind to seize his person. The offer was somewhat embarrassing to the Select Committee, who evaded the point by saying that, as Burgoyne had refused to take command of the Army, Lang had been appointed in his place, and there was nothing more to be said in the matter. On this, Burgoyne deputed Floyd to carry a letter to Lord Macartney, in which he asserted his position as senior officer bearing the King’s commission, and pointed out that he alone had power to convene Courts Martial.[12]

Lord Macartney was a man of violent temper and overbearing disposition that kept him in continual hot water. He demanded unhesitating submission to his views from all with whom he came in contact. His relations with the supreme government at Calcutta were as unyielding as with those in immediate contact with him at Madras. His chief merit was his personal honesty in money matters, at a time of great laxity; a merit on which he was by no means silent, and which he did not insist on in his colleagues. He threw himself with ardour into the chronic quarrels carried on by the Madras Council with the Bengal Government and the military authorities, and, in pursuit of the quarrels, lost sight of the great interests at stake, and brought the Madras settlement to the verge of anarchy. Even before Sir Eyre Coote’s death he had been induced to believe that General Stuart had designs against the Government. This belief, for which not a scrap of evidence was ever brought forward, led him into a line of conduct that brought about corresponding and increasing opposition from Stuart. After Stuart’s arrest, the same suspicion was transferred to Burgoyne, with even less presumption of justice than had existed in Stuart’s case. Burgoyne proposed an interview in the presence of witnesses. Had Lord Macartney been less bent on the quarrel, he would have grasped the opportunity of coming to some understanding. Instead of this he used the most uncompromising language to Floyd. “Government would not recede; Government must be peremptory;” and he still affected to treat Burgoyne as having refused the command of the army. The following day, Burgoyne received a letter from the Select Committee arguing the old point of General Stuart’s commission, and asserting that Burgoyne had acknowledged the validity of Lang’s promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, in spite of which he had withdrawn from camp without Lang’s permission. The Committee would not contest with him about any authority he might undertake to exercise, unless it endangered the public safety, but would not countenance his resumption of command. Lang’s command extended to the King’s as well as the Company’s troops, and they (the Committee) would convey dispatches addressed to either Commander in Chief, to Lang. If Sir John Burgoyne thought proper to act as Commander in Chief, and to convene Courts Martial, the Committee had no objection “unless their duty forced them to interfere.” Such unworkable arrangements were bound to lead to further quarrels. On the same day, as previously proposed by him, Sir John Burgoyne had an interview with Lord Macartney, Major General Bruce and Lt. Colonel Floyd being present. Throughout the quarrel, Burgoyne had been actuated by a desire to arrive at some working arrangement that would enable the public service to be carried on, while preserving the rights of the King whose senior representative he was. In this spirit he sought an interview with the Governor. But there was no corresponding desire for peace on the side of the Governor and Council, and Lord Macartney’s behaviour was disingenuous. Burgoyne asked for explanations to some parts of the Select Committee’s letter, which he discussed generally. Lord Macartney would give no direct answer, and was very guarded in what he said. He was only a Member of the Government, not authorized to decide, but only to speak their sentiments, and to represent matters to the other Members. Would Sir John put down in writing what questions he pleased, he would engage to lay them before the Select Committee, and obtain replies to them. Lord Macartney’s intention was to obtain the same control over the King’s troops, as he exercised over the Company’s troops. To gain this end he was resolved to give the command to a Company’s officer, who would naturally be more pliable than a King’s officer, though it was a recognised principle with the British Government to keep the command of the King’s troops under an officer of their own appointment. It is almost incredible that this miserable quarrel should have gone on at a time of the greatest public distress, when Tippoo was triumphant in the field, and it was still uncertain that the Mahrattas would not take up arms again.

Stuart was, shortly afterwards, shipped off to England under close arrest, in a ship specially purchased for the purpose, though, for want of funds, the pay of the troops was in some instances over two years in arrears. During imprisonment, he was denied the use of pen and ink, and was only allowed to see Burgoyne on public business in presence of the officer on duty over him. At the time of his embarkation, he believed that it was intended to put him to death at sea.

Burgoyne assumed the command of the King’s troops without further direct opposition, but the Council lost no opportunity of thwarting him and lowering his authority, while they encouraged others to resist it. Burgoyne, on his part, cast moderation aside, and was bent on pushing his claims to extremity. He ignored General Lang, and issued orders that clashed with those of the civil government, producing confusion, perplexity, and relaxation of discipline in every rank. The Major Generals, who had joined in signing the protest against Lang’s promotion, and several others among the officers commanding regiments withdrew their support from Burgoyne. In October, Burgoyne placed Lieutenant Colonel Sterling of the 36th under arrest for disobedience of orders: the Select Committee released him. The soldiers too had their grievances about batta which should have been paid to them, but was withheld by Lord Macartney. The men of the 98th were on the eve of mutiny, and the men of Burgoyne’s own regiment formed the project of going to the Fort in a body to ask redress. Burgoyne sternly repressed both movements, but the Select Committee gave him credit for causing them. A fresh crisis in the quarrel was inevitable.

In December, General Ogle reported certain matters seriously affecting the private character of an officer of the 73rd. The rest of the officers of the regiment refused to allow the matter to be patched up, as General Ogle desired. Burgoyne had no option but to convene a General Court Martial, which he did, appointing Lieutenant Colonel Straubenzee of the 52nd as President. The Court was also to try two soldiers of the 98th, who had appealed from a Regimental Court Martial. On such occasions it was customary for the Council to appoint the Judge Advocate. They refused to nominate one for this or any Court Martial Sir John might order to assemble, and refused to grant a place in the Fort for the Court to assemble in. They also forbade Straubenzee to leave Poonamallee where he was commanding. Burgoyne then arranged for the Court to assemble at Poonamallee, but without making the change known, and ordered Straubenzee still to hold himself in readiness to preside. He also ordered Colonel Sterling to appear for trial before the Court. The Select Committee thereupon, on the 31st December, issued an order placing Burgoyne under arrest for disobedience of orders in September, and for exciting mutiny and sedition, and appointed Major General Alan Campbell to command the King’s troops. No attempt was made on this occasion to place the King’s troops under Lang.

The absurdity of the Select Committee’s action, both in Stuart’s and Burgoyne’s cases, was shown by their inability to form a Court Martial for the trial of those officers. They tried to get Burgoyne to proceed to England, but he refused to go. He proceeded, for a time, to Pondicherry under open arrest, while the dual commands of the King’s and Company’s forces continued. For the next eighteen months Lord Macartney’s quarrels and intrigues, added to his unjust measures touching the pay and allowances of the army, produced results that bid fair to end in the ruin of the British government on the Coast.

In April 1784, a mutiny occurred among four newly formed Native Cavalry Regiments at Arnee. Arrears of pay for twelve months were owing to them, and they likewise had unsatisfied claims on the Nawab of Arcot, from whose service they had been transferred. They seized the fort of Arnee, and imprisoned their officers. A month’s pay was given them, but they held out for the whole arrears. The 36th Foot and one hundred men of the 23rd Light Dragoons were dispatched to Arcot, to join General Lang. On the night of the 15th May they marched for Arnee, which they reached soon after daybreak, and after a brief parley the mutineers laid down their arms.[13] In October, one of the King’s infantry regiments at Arcot broke out into open mutiny, but were overawed by the men of the 23rd, and the two other regiments in garrison, who stuck to their officers. These were by no means the only instances of grave insubordination both among King’s or Company’s troops, due to Lord Macartney’s ill-advised measures. The officers had to complain of broken faith as well as the men.

Sir John Burgoyne’s arrest did not prevent him from looking after the welfare of the regiment. There had been many casualties among the horses,[14] as well as among the men; and Lord Macartney is said to have conceived the idea of gradually allowing the 23rd Light Dragoons to disappear from want of horses and men, and of raising a corps of European cavalry in their place. As the men died, the extra horses were taken from the regiment, and Lt. Colonel Floyd was forbidden to entertain recruits, of whom a certain number were procurable, probably from Infantry regiments on the spot. Sir John thereupon addressed the Bengal Government, by whom a reference was made to Madras recommending the deficiencies to be made good. The Madras Government thought the regiment was very well as it was, and demurred to corresponding with Sir John while he was under arrest. The Bengal Govt. pointed out that that need not prevent them from corresponding with the next officer in the regiment. They dwelt on the importance of maintaining the regiment in an efficient state, and expressed their sense of the value of the services rendered by the Regiment in dealing with the Mutiny of the Native Cavalry at Arnee, and their “desire of giving the Company’s service the full benefit of the good discipline of H.M.’s 23rd Light Dragoons.” The Madras Government replied that they would be glad if the Bengal Govt. would take over the whole of the charges of the regiment. For their part, they thought it useless to recruit for the regiment, when there were already more men than horses, and it would be better to transfer the superfluous men to the Infantry, as horses were expensive, and a diminution in their number was a useful economy. Warren Hastings brushed all such cobwebs aside, and sent 147 horses from Hyderabad to remount the regiment. In spite of their protests, the Madras Government entered into a correspondence with Sir John which was characterized on both sides by much bitterness. A detachment of the regiment was at this time at Ellore in the Masulipatum district.

There seems to have been some expectation at this time that the regiment would be recalled to England, probably on account of Lord Macartney’s recommendations to the Court of Directors. Anyhow, a Madras letter, dated 26th May 1785, published in the Calcutta Public Advertiser, says: “The 23rd Regiment is to remain in India. The appointments and recommendations of Sir John Burgoyne, are approved of.” In the middle of July, a detachment of the regiment was sent to Arcot, but was almost immediately recalled to San Thomé.

Meanwhile, Sir John Burgoyne’s troubles were coming to an end. On the news of the quarrels, resulting in Burgoyne’s arrest, reaching England, much interest was excited in the highest quarters. The matter was twice discussed in the House of Commons, on the 19th July and 9th August, and it was generally recognised that the trouble had primarily arisen from a faulty system. Burgoyne was held to have been correct in his behaviour, and received reassuring letters, written by the King’s commands, pending the official settlement of the question. It was determined to appoint at once a new Commander in Chief of Madras, besides filling the vacancy caused by the death of Sir Eyre Coote, and to remove the chief actors in the quarrel on both sides. Burgoyne continued under arrest till the nearly simultaneous arrival in Madras, at the beginning of June, of Lieut. General Robert Sloper as Commander in Chief in India, and Lieut. General Sir John Dalling as Commander in Chief in Madras. General Sloper brought with him instructions to convene a Court Martial for Burgoyne’s trial, and for Burgoyne’s return to England after the trial, whatever its result might be. Lord Macartney, at the same time, received orders for the surrender of the assignment to the Nawab of Arcot, and private intelligence of the appointment of his successor. He had been severely wounded, a few months before, in a duel with one of the Council, due to his own overbearing temper, and his health was bad. Believing that he was about to be recalled, he resigned his post, and sailed for Calcutta to confer with the Bengal Government before sailing for Europe. While in Calcutta, he received news of his appointment to succeed Warren Hastings; but his health would not permit him to stop in India, and he sailed for England.[15]

General Sloper appointed a Court Martial on Burgoyne, with Sir John Dalling as President. The Madras Council at once claimed the right to appoint the Prosecutor, which being disallowed, they wrote complaints in their usual style to the Court of Directors. Another grievance with the Council was, that they were not given a copy of the Proceedings. Their desire apparently was to prosecute the quarrel through Lord Macartney in England. The wish of the Government in England, and of the Court of Directors, was to bury the unseemly quarrel as speedily as possible, and the Proceedings were withheld. A year and a half later, the Madras Government were still writing to the Governor General for a copy. The exact charges, of which there were nineteen, cannot now be ascertained, but they partially related to Sir John Burgoyne’s behaviour in September 1783, more than three months before the date of his arrest, and charged him with causing and exciting mutiny and sedition, and refusing to take command of the King’s troops. On the 11th July, after sitting for nineteen days, the Court came to the following resolutions—

Immediately on the close of the proceedings, the Council addressed Burgoyne in peremptory and discourteous terms, desiring him to leave the country; and there appeared every chance of a fresh quarrel arising, when some influence (probably Sir John Dalling’s) intervened, and thenceforward there was peace. Burgoyne’s claims for arrears of pay and allowances, for himself as Commander in Chief, his Aide-de-camp, and his secretary, for the period he had been under arrest, were admitted; his passage money was advanced to him, and he was preparing to sail, when death overtook him on the 23rd of September at the age of forty-six. A tablet to his memory was placed in St. Mary’s Church in the Fort, by the officers of the King’s troops. Lang was withdrawn from the service by the Court of Directors who granted him a special pension of one thousand a year. Stuart, a few years later, was given the Colonelcy of H.M.’s 31st. In consequence of these disputes, the offices of Governor and Commander-in-Chief were, soon after, vested in the same person, in each of the Presidencies. In order to prevent a recurrence of the dispute in General Sloper’s case, it was ordered, at the time of his appointment, that in the event of the Company ceasing to employ him, his right to command the King’s troops should also cease. A project for amalgamating the King’s and Company’s forces in India, in order to put an end to the rivalry between the two services, was seriously considered two years later, but the only change made was to put an end to the supersession of the Company’s by the King’s officers.

In studying the details of this unhappy quarrel, the conviction forces itself upon one that there were persons in the background, who, for their own purposes, fomented the dispute, and aggravated the differences between the principal parties, by filling their minds with suspicions and ideas that were equally groundless and mischievous. This is plainly stated to have been the case by an officer of the 73rd Highlanders who published a Narrative of the war with Hyder. “Had it not been for the cordiality and good fellowship which universally subsisted betwixt the King’s and Company’s officers, who had shared the fatigues of war together, notwithstanding the artful steps that had been taken to sow the seeds of dissension amongst them, these broils might have terminated in a manner very fatal to the settlement.”[18] Long afterwards, Lord Macartney acknowledged his mistake. In December 1797, speaking to Sir David Baird, he said, “Had I known as much of you military gentlemen, when I was in India, as I have learned since, we never should have had any difference.” Sir John Burgoyne’s justification was complete.

1786–1789

One of the first acts of Sir John Dalling, after composing the quarrels between the Civil Government and the King’s troops in Madras, was to draw up a scheme for brigading the troops in Cantonments. The scheme never took shape, beyond the formation of a large Cantonment, in February 1786, at Wallajabad, near Conjeveram, about fifty miles from Madras. Among the troops detailed for the new Cantonment were the 23rd Light Dragoons. Before leaving their quarters at San Thomé, they were reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief. Being the only English Cavalry regiment in the country, the review attracted some attention, and the following account was published in the Madras Courier for 29th March 1786.

Walker & Boutall ph. sc.

Lieut: General Sir John Floyd Bart.
from a portrait believed to be by A. W. Devis.

The 23rd Light Dragoons were not cantoned at Wallajabad, but Floyd was directed to select a spot within a certain indicated area. He fixed on Shevtamodoo, about two miles from Conjeveram, and nine miles from Wallajabad.

It was here that Floyd laid the foundation of that excellence in discipline and efficiency, that fitted the regiment to play the distinguished part it was destined in after years to fill, with such success, in the stirring affairs of southern India. This will be a suitable place to give some account of this distinguished soldier.

John Floyd, born in 1748, was the son of an officer in the 1st Dragoon Guards who served at Minden, and died in Germany six weeks after the battle. In recognition of his father’s services, John Floyd was given a commission in the 15th (Elliott’s) Light Dragoons, in the year after the regiment was raised, and was present with it at the battle of Emsdorf, on the 16th July 1760, when only twelve years old. There he had his horse shot under him, while charging the French ranks, and was only saved by a brother officer who cut down his assailant. The sword of the French hussar is still preserved in the family.

The 15th Light Dragoons under Sir John Elliott and Lord Pembroke were regarded at that time as the school for British Light Cavalry. Lord Pembroke had made a special study of military equitation, concerning which he had written a book,[20] that went through several editions, and was a recognized text book on military riding. He interested himself in Floyd, and took pains to give him a complete education, and made him a proficient horseman. Later, on Lord Pembroke obtaining the command of the Royal Dragoons, he employed Floyd for twelve months in teaching his system to that regiment. In 1777–78–79, Floyd, under Lord Pembroke’s auspices, visited nearly every Court in Europe, and reported on their armies. In December 1778, he was appointed Major of the 21st Light Dragoons, and, on the formation of the 23rd Light Dragoons for Indian service, he was selected to be its Lt. Colonel. No better choice could have been made. A thorough soldier, and a horseman from his youth up, brought up in the school of two such cavalry soldiers as Sir John Elliott and Lord Pembroke, he was an enthusiastic believer in the power of cavalry. Writing from San Thomé in 1784, he says:

All soldiers know how an able commander can impress his character on a regiment, to endure long after his connexion with it has ceased. Such was the case with the regiment that gathered laurels as the 19th Light Dragoons, and no small part of its glory was due to its first Lieutenant Colonel, John Floyd. The correctness of his views as to the great part cavalry might play, and the excellence of his system, were demonstrated on many a field in which the regiment fought during its career in India.

It has already been shown[21] how, in June 1783, the 19th Light Dragoons and all Cavalry regiments above that number, on the establishment in England, were disbanded. For three years, the fate of the 23rd seems to have hung in the balance. At last, on 26th April 1786, an order was issued to the effect that henceforward the regiment was to be numbered the 19th, instead of the 23rd, a designation under which it was destined to win itself fame and honour.[22]

Before this, a change was made in the uniform of all the Light Dragoon regiments in the service. Hitherto, all mounted regiments had worn scarlet. In 1784, it was determined to distinguish the Light Dragoons, by dressing them in blue, and the following order gives the whole dress in detail.

Regulations for the Clothing of the Light Dragoons, April 1784.

No record now exists to show what facings were worn by the Regiment up to this date. Probably, their facings had never been decided on, owing to their departure from England so soon after embodiment, as, in December 1786, an order was issued, approving a pattern of yellow cloth for their facings. The blue jacket with primrose yellow facings and white or silver braid, continued to be the uniform of the regiment till December 1802, when an order came into force for Dragoon regiments, serving in India, to wear grey instead of blue. In February 1786 an order was issued directing the Colonels of Light Dragoon regiments to supply their men with blue cloaks instead of red.

The vacancy caused by the death of Sir John Burgoyne was filled by the appointment of Lieutenant General the Hon. Sir William Howe,[23] K.B., Colonel of the 23rd Foot, to be Colonel. He was an officer who had seen much active service, principally in America, where he had gained the reputation of a brave rather than of a skilful soldier. As a young man he took part in the conquest of Quebec by Wolfe, and led the forlorn hope of twenty-four men that forced the entrenched path by which Wolfe’s force scaled the heights of Abraham. He served at the siege of Belleisle (1761), where he was wounded. He commanded the British troops at the pyrrhic victory of Bunker’s Hill; and gained victories over the revolted colonists at Long Island and at Brandywine.

We get a glimpse of the regiment on 15th December 1788, when they were inspected by the Governor and Commander in Chief, Sir Archibald Campbell, who, in a minute to the rest of the Government, recorded that “H.M.’s 19th Regiment of Light Dragoons were complete in horses and accoutrements, and their discipline equal to any Corps in Europe.” In a general order he said “The rapid and accurate manner with which the several evolutions were performed, and the extraordinary velocity of their charge, than which nothing could be more regular and correct, does infinite honour to Colonel Floyd and the officers under his command, by whose unremitting zeal and attention the discipline of the corps has been carried to so high a state of perfection.”

The regimental muster rolls for 1788 and 1789 show that the strength of the 19th, in those years, varied from 300 to 350 men present at Shevtamodoo. The strength in horses seems to have exceeded that in men, but the wear and tear in horseflesh was apparently very great, and remounts in considerable numbers were constantly required.

It was during these years spent by the regiment at Shevtamodoo, that the Madras Government dealt in earnest with the question of forming a service of Native Cavalry. To assist them in this work they selected Floyd, who was given a free hand in all that concerned the discipline and equipment of the Native regiments. The system founded by him may be said to have lasted nearly up to the present time.

From this time up to the date of their departure from India, the 19th Light Dragoons never ceased to furnish non-commissioned officers and privates as instructors to the Native Cavalry, not only in Madras, but also in Bengal. In every muster roll they are shown on duty, at Madras, Vellore, Hyderabad, Seringapatam, Poonamallee, and other military stations in the Madras Presidency. In Bengal there were always from four to sixteen sergeants, corporals, and privates on this duty, as long as the regiment was in India, and, for a time, some were on similar duty in Bombay and Poona. A General Order, dated Fort William 3rd December 1795, sanctions the sergeants of the 19th Light Dragoons “now on service in this presidency instructing the native cavalry, to receive the pay and allowances of Sergeant Majors of Cavalry.” In 1798 a General Order was issued, directing “the brass chapes and sockets to be made up according to the pattern furnished by Major General Floyd.” And in December 1805, a few months before the regiment left India, each native cavalry regiment in the Presidency was ordered to send a detachment to Arcot, for instruction in one uniform system by Lieutenant Neville, 19th Light Dragoons. The system observed in the Company’s native cavalry up till 1857, may be said to have been founded by Colonel Floyd and the 19th Light Dragoons.

1790

In 1790, the Government of India again became involved in war with Tippoo. He had been constrained to sign the peace of Mangalore by the withdrawal of the French alliance, and the coalition of the British and Mahrattas against him. But the war had been a triumph for Mysore arms. South of the Kistna river, Mysore was the most powerful state in India, and no single power could hold its own against the son of Hyder Ali. But Tippoo failed to realize the increase of power of the English Company, due to five years of peace. In 1785, a quarrel broke out between him and the Mahrattas, who allied themselves with the Nizam, and invaded Mysore territory. The campaign that ensued was in Tippoo’s favour, and peace was concluded between the contending parties in April 1787. Tippoo’s warlike restlessness continued to be a menace to the other powers in India. In the end of 1787, overtures for an alliance against him, were made to Calcutta by the Mahrattas. To this, Lord Cornwallis, who had assumed the direction of affairs as Governor General and Commander in Chief in September 1786, gave a refusal. But nothing could keep Tippoo quiet. In 1788 he sent an embassy to France, to propose an alliance against the English, and, in December 1789, he attacked the Rajah of Travancore whom we were bound by treaty to protect. Preparations were at once made to punish the aggression, and orders were transmitted to Madras for the commencement of operations against Mysore.

The time had come for the 19th Light Dragoons to show their worth. One morning, early in January, came the news that war was imminent, and that the Regiment was to join the army ordered to assemble at Trichinopoly. “My men were on horseback, going to water, when the news arrived, and they received it with three most cordial cheers. Nothing but good humour and high hope prevail in the Army. My regiment is ready in all that depends on us, and willing beyond description.”[24] But great delay ensued, and some weeks elapsed before a move was made. The Madras Government disobeyed the stringent orders of Cornwallis, to warn Tippoo that an attack on Travancore would entail war, and to take all necessary steps for prosecuting war if the attack was made. There was a complete want of military preparation. Fortunately, on 19th February, Major General Medows arrived from England with full powers as Governor and Commander in Chief in Madras, and preparations for the campaign were made in earnest. A force was assembled near Wallajabad, and marched for Trichinopoly on 29th March. The 19th Light Dragoons at this time mustered 355 sabres. Meanwhile Tippoo took advantage of the delay to prosecute his conquest over Travancore, which he would have completed, had not a small force from Bombay, under Colonel Hartley, landed in Travancore, in the end of April, and taken up a strong defensive position. On 24th May, General Medows took command of the army at Trichinopoly, amounting to about 15,000 men. On the same day, Tippoo turned his back on Travancore, and made his way northwards to confront his foes.

Mysore, the heart of Tippoo’s Kingdom, is a high plateau from 2000 to 3000 feet above the sea, open towards the north, but fenced in to the East, South and West by precipitous, cliff-like ranges that overlook the low country outside, and are only passable for an army at certain places. Tippoo had also extensive possessions in the low country, from which he drew large revenues and plentiful military supplies. According to the plan of operations adopted, Medows was to advance on Mysore from the southward, and, if possible, enter it by the Guzulhutti Pass, after making himself master of the rich low country about Coimbatore, where abundant supplies could be obtained. As this movement would uncover Madras, a small force was held at Conjeveram, under Colonel Kelly, which was augmented later by a force of six battalions of sepoys and some artillery, that were dispatched overland from Bengal. On the west, a force from Bombay under Major General Abercromby[25] was destined to act against Tippoo’s possessions in Malabar, and, if events rendered it desirable, to effect a junction with Medows. On the occurrence of Tippoo’s attack on Travancore in December, the Peishwa had renewed his offers of alliance to Lord Cornwallis. This time they were accepted, and a triple convention between the Peishwa, the Nizam and the British, was concluded. By it, the two former engaged to attack Tippoo’s Northern possessions at once with 25,000 horse, and after the rains, to act with their utmost means. So dilatory were their movements, that it was not till the following year that their operations had any share of importance in the campaign.

Walker & Boutall sc.

Map to illustrate
MYSORE CAMPAIGNS

On the 26th May, the army marched from Trichinopoly, but, owing to badness of transport, it was not till 15th June that Karoor was occupied. Avaracoorchi and Darapooram were occupied, on the 5th and 10th July respectively. Tippoo was at this time at Coimbatore, where it was hoped he would make a stand. The siege guns and stores were therefore deposited in Darapooram, and the army advanced. Information was soon received of his having gone northward, and ascended the defiles on to the Mysore plateau, leaving a force of Cavalry numbering from 3000 to 5000, under Said Sahib, as a corps of observation. After recovering the heavy guns, the advance was continued, watched by Said Sahib who fell back on Coimbatore, with the intention of burning the town on the near approach of the British force. To prevent this, Floyd with the cavalry was dispatched to occupy the town, which was accomplished on 21st July, the main body arriving the following day, while Said Sahib fell back to Demiacotta on the Bhowani river. Floyd, with the 19th Light Dragoons, three regiments of Native Cavalry, two companies of sepoys and four 6 pr. guns, was dispatched in pursuit. About ten o’clock at night on the 22nd, after a thirty-mile march, he surprised near Demiacotta a small body of horse, about thirty of whom were made prisoners. The exaggerated accounts they gave him, led him to believe that the force with Said Sahib was larger than had been supposed. The Fort of Demiacotta having taken the alarm, opened fire, and, there being no forage obtainable, Floyd considered it prudent to fall back a few miles. On the 28th, he moved forward again, and, on reaching the banks of the river, discovered that Said Sahib had carried his force across the river, and was encamped on the other side. The Bhowani river, at this time, was only fordable at certain places. A few long shots from the six pounders made Said Sahib decamp, and direct his march towards the Guzulhutti Pass. Floyd then fell back to Velladi, and remained in observation of the two roads leading from Coimbatore to the Bhowani river, moving occasionally to Shawoor and Occarro. On the 16th of August, Colonel Floyd with a Corporal and six Dragoons, set out from Shawoor to visit Occarro, where there was a troop of Native Cavalry on detachment duty. On arrival at Occarro, it was reported to him that there was a body of the enemy’s horse in the neighbourhood. Taking twelve men of the troop with his original escort, he went in search of them, and discovered them close to the village. He immediately charged them, and put the whole body to flight. Four days later, Major Affleck[26] of the 19th Light Dragoons, with two troops of the 19th and an equal number of the 5th Native Cavalry, while patrolling, fell in with a large body of the enemy’s horsemen whom they instantly attacked, killing upwards of forty, and capturing twenty horses. Not many days after this, an equally successful skirmish occurred under the command of Lieut. Bayly of the 19th Light Dragoons, who, with a troop of the 19th and two troops of Native Cavalry, put a large body of the enemy’s horse to rout, and drove them into the river. In a private letter written four months later, Floyd says: “Among a great number of cavalry skirmishes I was always successful, and fully established for the first time in India, the infinite superiority of European over Native horse.”

While Floyd was thus engaged to the north of Coimbatore, a force under Colonel Oldham was sent against Erode, which surrendered, on the 6th August, after a feeble resistance. Another force, under Colonel Stuart, was sent against Dindigal, which surrendered, after one unsuccessful assault, on the 23rd August. Several other small forts in the neighbourhood were also captured. Further reinforcements were sent to Stuart, who was directed to proceed against Palghat. A breach was effected, and the place surrendered on 22nd September; but, before this, events had occurred that completely altered the aspect of affairs.

On the 26th of August, having been reinforced by three battalions of sepoys and five guns, Floyd crossed the Bhowani, and made himself master of the Fort of Satyamunglum, which was taken by surprise without any loss. A native battalion was placed in the Fort, and all Said Sahib’s detached horsemen were driven into the Guzulhutti Pass. The force was then withdrawn to the south bank of the river, the fords of which were constantly visited by strong patrols. Further reinforcements reached Floyd, whose force now consisted of the 19th Light Dragoons and three regiments of Native Cavalry, H.M. 36th, and four battalions of sepoys, with eleven guns of different calibres. Exclusive of the artillerymen, the force numbered about two thousand eight hundred fighting men.

So far, all had gone well in spite of much sickness in the army, and great difficulties due to the heavy rains. A chain of posts had been established to the foot of the Guzulhutti Pass, the flanks of the army were well protected, and Tippoo’s garrisons had been expelled from every important place in the Coimbatore district. The force under Medows, at Coimbatore, had been reduced to three native and two European battalions without their flank companies. Floyd, with the force already mentioned, was watching the Guzulhutti Pass, some forty miles to the northward. With Stuart besieging Palghat, some thirty miles south west of Coimbatore, were one regiment of Native Cavalry, one European and five Native battalions of Infantry, besides six European companies belonging to three different Regiments, and a detachment of Artillery. Besides this, there were detachments occupying Karoor, Erode, Darapooram, Dindigal, and a few other small posts. Nothing but the fall of Palghat was wanting to permit of a concentrated forward movement on the Guzulhutti Pass. To the eastward, the force that had been left at Conjeveram under Colonel Kelly had been reinforced by the division from Bengal, and had moved to Arnee, where Colonel Kelly’s death gave the command to Colonel Maxwell. It consisted of one regiment of Native Cavalry, three European and eight Native battalions of Infantry, and some Artillery, amounting altogether to nine thousand five hundred men. To the southward on the Travancore border was Colonel Hartley, with one European and four Native battalions of Infantry, moving towards Palghat, which he reached after its capture. The whole force was dangerously scattered, and Tippoo, who had excellent intelligence of all that occurred, was not slow to take advantage of the circumstance. So far, the only active measure he had undertaken had been the dispatch of a small body of marauding horse into the Carnatic by the Changama Pass. They plundered and burned Porto Novo, but did little other damage.

Leaving Seringapatam on the 2nd September, with forty thousand men and a large train of Artillery, Tippoo reached the Guzulhutti Pass on the 9th, and completed the descent in the two following days. Floyd was not unaware of the increased force in his front, and of the reports of Tippoo’s advance, and, in his report to Medows, suggested the advisability of his falling back towards Coimbatore. But the intelligence was disbelieved, and he was ordered to maintain his position. He was at that time encamped on the south side of the Bhowani opposite to Satyamunglum. On the 12th Floyd dispatched an express messenger to Medows telling of the increased forces of the enemy, and that Tippoo was advancing in person. At two o’clock in the morning of the 13th, Cavalry picquets of the 19th Light Dragoons and 2nd and 5th Native Cavalry, under Captain Child of the 19th, were ordered to reconnoitre towards the Poongar ford, about ten miles up the river. A few hours later, the 5th Native Cavalry, under Major Darley, was ordered to follow in support. By some mischance, Darley took a different road from that which Child had followed. Tippoo had however begun to pass his troops over the river the day before, after the withdrawal of the morning reconnoissance, and Child suddenly found himself opposed by a considerable body of horse. Charging them at once, he drove them into the river, whereby many were killed and drowned: he then fell back by the same road. The country all around was laid out in small enclosures with cactus hedges, rendering it very difficult to see any distance. Major Darley, advancing by the other road, charged and overthrew a body of about two hundred horse, inflicting great loss, but was, immediately after, nearly surrounded by some six or seven thousand of the enemy’s Cavalry. Sending back news to the camp, he took up a position on some high ground where his flanks were protected by cactus hedges, and kept the enemy at bay by carbine fire. After some time he was joined by the 3rd Native Cavalry, and, a little later, Floyd with the 19th Light Dragoons, and the picquets under Captain Child, attracted by the firing, came up. On seeing these reinforcements, the enemy drew off, Floyd followed them up and inflicted heavy losses on them. Two squadrons of the 19th charged a large body of the Sultan’s Body Guard that had got entangled in an enclosure from which there was no outlet, and put upwards of five hundred, it is said, to the sword. The enemy’s leader was slain by a private dragoon, while his standard bearer was cut down and the standard taken by a Corporal. The green flag of Islam was also captured. The field was cleared of every opponent, and the cavalry returned to camp. Scarcely had they dismounted when a large force was seen approaching on the north bank of the river, whence some heavy guns were brought to bear. At the same time, a second force was perceived approaching the left flank along the south bank. This necessitated a change of position by our troops, and the Sultan contented himself with keeping up a heavy cannonade, without a closer attack. During the whole day, the force remained in this trying position. Floyd’s eleven guns were not only outnumbered, but were obliged to husband their ammunition which was limited. The cannonade ceased at nightfall, and the enemy withdrew to some distance. Tippoo never liked camping too close to the English, for fear of a night surprise. Of the English guns, three were disabled, and there had been serious casualties among the troops, the horses, and the gun bullocks. Many of the bullock drivers had also deserted. The night was very dark with heavy rain, the Infantry lay on their arms, and the Cavalry remained at the heads of their horses. About midnight, it was determined to fall back upon Coimbatore, through Shawoor, the force having been driven from the direct line of retreat through Velladi. It was necessary first to bring the garrison of Satyamunglum across the river. In doing this, great delay ensued, and it was four o’clock before the troops could be put in motion. Owing to the destruction among the gun bullocks, three guns were obliged to be left behind. Fortunately for the English, the Sultan’s army had been greatly inconvenienced by the heavy rain during the night, and it was some hours before Tippoo could collect a sufficient force to follow the retreat. When he moved, his well-equipped artillery soon caught up the slow-moving British column, and pressed heavily on its flanks and rear. The first attack was made by a body of Cavalry, who fell upon the baggage, the greater part of which was lost, and the Surgeon’s mate, Sutherland, of the 19th Light Dragoons killed. The force reached Occarro about eleven o’clock, but after a short halt was obliged to resume its march, as Tippoo’s army was now moving on its flank. Owing to the exhaustion of the gun bullocks, three more guns were obliged to be left behind there. The safety of the remaining guns was assured by a number of officers sacrificing their baggage, and giving their private bullocks to draw the guns. On account of the close nature of the country, the rear guard duty had to be taken by the Infantry, and the Cavalry was sent forward. During the whole march, the force was exposed to a continuous fire of musketry, heavy guns, and rockets, which was especially directed against H.M.’s 36th. On approaching Shawoor, the enemy pressed so closely on the column, that the Infantry were obliged to form up and show a front, while the Cavalry, unable to act among the cactus hedges, led the column. At this moment, a report was spread that General Medows had arrived to their assistance, and a detachment of the 19th Light Dragoons which had passed through Shawoor, and appeared on the opposite side of the village, was mistaken for the head of his column. The news was greeted with cheers; and Tippoo was also deceived by the report which spread through both armies. The Infantry advanced, and drove back the enemy, whose discomfiture was completed by the Cavalry, who pursued on both flanks, and completely cleared the field. The force remained in Shawoor during the night, without being molested, Tippoo, who at first believed the news of Medow’s arrival, having drawn off to some distance. Floyd fired three signal guns to show his position to General Medows, who had marched on the same day to Floyd’s assistance, but not being aware of his retreat by the Shawoor route, had marched on Velladi, where he encamped that evening. Floyd had received intelligence of Medow’s march on Velladi, and, recognizing the great importance of forming a junction, marched again before daylight, and reached Velladi on the evening of the 15th. The enemy did not pursue, and the troops were enabled to get food and rest, after being three days without either. Medows however was not at Velladi, having gone on towards Demiacotta, to which circumstance may be ascribed the peaceful march of Floyd’s troops on the 15th. The junction between the two forces was effected on the 16th. The Sultan, on hearing of Medows’ movement towards Demiacotta, withdrew on the same day to the north side of the Bhowani. Had he acted with greater energy, and pressed Floyd’s force on the 15th, he might have won a great success. The troops were exhausted, and would have yielded to determined attacks on the third day of their retreat. In such an event, the disaster would certainly have extended to Medows’ force, which consisted only of five incomplete battalions, and Stuart’s force at Palghat would also have been involved in ruin. The respect with which Tippoo treated the retreating force was largely due to the gallant bearing of the 19th, and especially to the severe lesson they taught the enemy on the 13th. In addition to the six guns abandoned, the losses of the whole detachment under Floyd, during the 13th and 14th, were as follows:—

The Infantry were the principal sufferers. The losses of the 19th Light Dragoons amounted to

Five officers killed and eight wounded were among the casualties of the force, and nearly the whole of the baggage was lost. The losses of the enemy were very heavy, among the slain being Tippoo’s brother-in-law and many leaders of note. In spite of their tactical success, the result of the two days’ fighting was to depress the spirits of Tippoo’s men, while the minds of the British troops were proportionately elated at their successful retreat, in presence of such an overwhelming force. Floyd received much credit, and Medows was generous enough to acknowledge his error, in leaving the force in such an exposed position. Tippoo ascribed his want of success to the cactus hedges, and, some years later, ordered them to be levelled throughout the whole district. The gallant bearing of the 19th Light Dragoons in this portion of the campaign, made an impression that spread to every Native Court in southern India, and gained them a reputation for fighting, that clung to them during the whole of their service in India.

On the 18th, Medows marched from Velladi, and returned to Coimbatore on the 23rd, after visiting Shawoor. At Coimbatore, he was joined by Colonel Stuart from Palghat. On the 29th he left Coimbatore again, marching northward to the Bhowani. Tippoo meanwhile had gone towards Erode, which fell into his hands on the 25th. From Erode, Tippoo marched towards Karoor, hoping to cut off a large convoy destined for Medows’ army. Medows followed, and received his convoy safely on the 7th October. Tippoo meanwhile marched on Darapooram, which he took on the 8th, and then marched towards Coimbatore, where Medows had left stores and heavy guns with but a feeble garrison. Fortunately, under orders from Medows, Colonel Hartley, on reaching Palghat, had sent on three sepoy battalions, which reached Coimbatore in time to save it from attack, and Tippoo turned off northwards when within a few miles of the place. Medows reached Coimbatore on the 15th, and, after strengthening the defences, again marched for Erode, which he reached on the 2nd November. Some slight skirmishing with a small party of the enemy’s horse occurred on the march, during which Private Parkes of the 19th Light Dragoons signalised himself, while on flanking duty, by attacking, single handed, six horsemen whom he encountered in a narrow road, and bringing in three horses and a prisoner.

Meanwhile, Maxwell’s force had advanced from Arnee, and entered the Baramahal district near Vaniembadi on the 24th October. This forced Tippoo to leave the Coimbatore district, and march northward to intercept Maxwell. So well was the movement covered, that several days elapsed before Medows discovered where he had gone. But Tippoo, failing to find Maxwell in a position favourable for attack, withdrew after threatening him for four days, and was nearly caught between two fires by Medows’ advancing force. On the 17th, the two armies formed a junction, 12 miles south of Cauveripatam. Supplies were abundant, and Medows was now at the head of the finest army the Company had ever put into the field. But Tippoo’s excellent system of intelligence, and the greater mobility of his army gave him the great advantage of choosing his own field of action, so long as he was not brought to bay in the heart of his own country. He calculated with justice that, if he moved in the direction of the Carnatic, Medows would be obliged to follow him, and relinquish his projects on Mysore. Accordingly, on the 18th, he put his army in motion for Trichinopoly by the Tapoor Pass. As fortune would have it, Medows marched on the same day, with the intention of traversing the same Pass, and reached it after the Sultan’s army had begun to enter it. The British advance brigade, under Colonel Floyd, consisted of the 19th Light Dragoons, three regiments of Native Cavalry and three sepoy battalions. The Sultan’s rear was covered by a body of two thousand Cavalry, who showed a bold front. Medows became over cautious, and waited for his artillery. So well were the Mysore Cavalry handled, that no advantage was gained beyond the cutting off from the Pass of three battalions which were forced into the jungle. Tippoo’s baggage also was unable to enter the Pass, but suffered no loss; the main body got through, and continued its march without mishap. Thus was let slip an opportunity of striking a severe blow under most advantageous conditions.

Tippoo continued his march on Trichinopoly, wasting the country as he proceeded, and hoping to make himself master of the place, which was not strongly defended, before Medows could reach it. But the swollen state of the Cauvery river saved the place from attack, and Tippoo withdrew, in time to avoid Medows, who arrived before Trichinopoly on the 14th December. Two days before this, Lord Cornwallis arrived in Madras, with the intention of taking command of the army in the field; and at once summoned Medows to bring the force to Madras. Meanwhile, Tippoo turned northwards, and, ravaging the country as he passed, attacked Tiaghur, a small rock fortress, under the walls of which a great number of the country people had gathered for protection. Here also Tippoo was rejoined by his heavy baggage, which had become separated from him at the Tapoor Pass. After two assaults, which were repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants, the Sultan left Tiaghur, and marched on Trinomalli which was not garrisoned. After a feeble resistance from the inhabitants, the place was plundered, and great barbarities committed. Turning eastward, Tippoo took Permacoil, where there was only a single company of Native Infantry, whose commander had orders to retreat if threatened. Owing to treachery, Tippoo was able to surround the place before this could be done. Tippoo then marched towards Pondicherry, where he remained some time, and dispatched an embassy to France, proposing an alliance, and asking for a force of 6000 French troops to be sent him. Medows followed the Mysore force as far as Trinomalli, whence he turned towards Madras. The siege-guns and heavy stores were left at Arnee, with a division under Major General Musgrave, and the remainder of the force reached Vellout, eighteen miles from Madras, on the 27th January 1791. Before this, a brilliant success had been gained by Colonel Hartley, who, with three battalions, completely routed a large Mysore force near Calicut, on the 10th December, capturing Tippoo’s lieutenant and two thousand four hundred prisoners, in the action and in the subsequent pursuit. The Bombay force under General Abercromby, whose movements had been greatly delayed, was not able to commence operations till the beginning of December. Then Tippoo’s garrisons in Malabar were quickly captured, and the whole province occupied.

The Mahrattas and the Nizam had been tardy in their operations. Both were unwilling to come within Tippoo’s reach, until they could be certain of his being fully occupied with the English forces. On the 25th August, the Mahrattas commenced operations, and, on 18th September, laid siege to Dharwar. The attack was so badly conducted, that the place did not capitulate till 4th April following, when the Mahratta force, under Pareshram Bhow and Hari Punt, moved on toward Seringapatam. The Nizam moved in concert with the Mahrattas, but delayed greatly, after crossing the Kistna, before attacking Kopaul, the siege of which was begun on the 28th October. The fortress capitulated on the 18th April following.

According to a muster roll taken at Clive’s Choultry on 24th December, the 19th Light Dragoons had fifty men in hospital, out of a total of 270 non-commissioned officers and troopers present. Fourteen deaths occurred in the preceding six months. During the same period, 50 horses had died, and 14 had been rendered unfit for further service, out of a total effective strength of 386.

1791–1792

Cornwallis assumed command of the army, at Vellout, on the 29th January 1791. By taking the field in person, he ensured the fullest co-operation of the civil and military administration, while it was hoped that his presence at the head of the troops, would induce the Nizam and the Mahrattas to prosecute the war with more vigour than they had yet shown. Instead of attacking Mysore from the south, as had been done in the preceding year, Cornwallis proposed to operate on a more direct line. The considerations that had led to the rejection of this line in 1790, were, that Seringapatam could not be approached without first taking Bangalore, a place only second to Seringapatam in strength. The siege of Bangalore would have to be carried on at a distance of ninety miles from the nearest depôt, Amboor; and the country between Seringapatam and Bangalore was unfertile, and not likely to furnish much in the way of supplies.

The army left Vellout on the 5th February. Tippoo, who had remained in the neighbourhood of Pondicherry, on hearing of the movement, hastily regained Mysore by the Changama and Palicode Passes. Cornwallis, after making a feint towards Amboor, which completely deceived the Sultan, turned northwards, and carried the army through the Mooglee Pass without opposition. Without firing a shot, the whole army was concentrated on the Mysore plateau by the 18th February. Here the army was joined by sixty-seven elephants from Bengal, the first occasion of these animals being employed in any considerable number by a British force. Hitherto, the movements of our armies had been greatly hampered by the difficulties of moving heavy siege guns; but on this occasion, by yoking the bullocks four instead of two abreast, and by the use of elephants to lift and push the guns in bad ground, the heavy guns were able to move with nearly as much ease as any other part of the army.

Among other beneficial changes made by Lord Cornwallis, was an improvement in the order of march of the army. Before this war, our armies in India had marched with few cavalry and very small trains of artillery. They moved in a single column two or three files deep, with the stores, baggage and camp followers on one flank, covered by a strong party. This order was fatiguing to the troops, made rapid movement impossible, caused great delay in assuming any formation on coming in contact with the enemy, and exposed the camp followers and baggage to great losses from the enemy’s cavalry. Colonel Fullarton, in his brief campaign of 1783, remedied this, to some extent, by making the army move on a broad front of three brigades, the artillery and baggage following in rear covered on each flank by other brigades. The troops marched with intervals to permit of speedily forming line in any direction.

At the commencement of the campaign of 1790 the old order was reverted to. The battering train, which marched in rear of the column, often fell so far behind, that it did not reach the camping ground till the following day. It was then placed in the centre of the column. This only had the effect of delaying all in rear of the guns, and separating the army into two portions. It was then tried to improve matters, by placing the heavy guns in front of the column. This answered better when the guns were few, but with a large battering train gave bad results. The plan adopted by Cornwallis, was to make the infantry and cavalry move in parallel columns, some distance apart. Between them, moved two columns one composed of artillery and stores, while the other was composed of the baggage and camp followers, controlled by a baggage master. The army thus moved in a huge oblong, with the fighting men on the flanks. The front was covered by the advance guard, consisting of a cavalry regiment and the infantry picquets coming on duty. In the same way, the rear was covered by a regiment of cavalry and the infantry picquets last on duty, forming the rear guard. The same order was observed in encamping. The infantry and cavalry camped in two lines, facing outwards, with the artillery, engineer corps, stores, baggage and camp followers in the space between. The order thus established by Cornwallis during this campaign, may be said to have held good in India up till the present day.

This appearance of a British army on the plateau of Mysore, marks the increase that had taken place in the military power of the East India Company during the past five years. In our previous wars with Hyder Ali and Tippoo, the operations of our armies had been confined to the low-lying country below the Ghauts, and the scene of warfare had been almost always the Company’s own territories in the vicinity of Madras, or the territories of our native allies in the Carnatic. Now, for the first time, the war was carried into the very heart of Mysore territory.

Tippoo’s movements, at this time, were characterised by unwonted indecision and want of energy. Instead of impeding and harassing the march of the army, he contented himself with watching the advance, with the intention rather of taking advantage of any mistake committed by the English commander, than of following any plan of his own.

On the 5th March, the British force reached Bangalore, and took up its ground without any loss, beyond a few casualties caused by a distant cannonade on the march. On the following day, the army changed ground, and took up a better position on the North West face of the pettah.[27] In the afternoon, Colonel Floyd was detached to the south west of the town, to cover a reconnoissance by the engineers. He had with him his own brigade, consisting of the 19th Light Dragoons under Captain Child, and five Regiments of native Cavalry, besides a Brigade of three battalions of Infantry, with a detachment of Artillery under Major Gowdie.

The work was satisfactorily accomplished, and the force was about to return, when a body of the enemy’s horse appeared. Leaving the infantry and guns, Floyd moved against it, and, on its giving way, discovered some Mysore infantry, and guns, with large masses of baggage and stores, elephants, bullock carts, camels and all the paraphernalia of an Eastern Army on the march. Tippoo was changing his ground, and, by accident, the reconnoitring party had crossed the rear of his line of march. Disregarding his orders, Floyd allowed himself to be persuaded to attack, by the young officers who were clamorous for the fray. The temptation was irresistible, and the cavalry advanced at a gallop. Some parties of infantry were charged and broken, and nine guns captured. As the advance continued, the ground became much broken with ravines and low rocky hills. The horses were exhausted, and the enemy, collecting their forces, opened a heavy fire of musketry and rockets that checked the advance. At this moment, Floyd fell from his horse, apparently dead, with a musket ball in his head. At his fall, the squadron behind him made a half wheel to avoid trampling on their leader. This threw the line into confusion, the flank squadrons took it for a signal to retire, and, in a few moments, the whole force was falling back. Fortunately for Floyd, Corporal Murray and Private Buchanan remained with him, and, examining his wound, found that it was not mortal. Murray remained with him, while Buchanan galloped after the regiment, and in a short time returned with a troop of the 19th, under Cornet Roderick Mackenzie: Floyd was mounted on Buchanan’s horse and brought back to the regiment. He was able to halt the regiment, and show a front to the enemy, which checked them; but darkness was coming on; the enemy pressed on, and the confusion was very great. The exhausted horses were scarcely able to get back through the ravines they had cleared with ease in their advance, and had it not been for the good judgment of Major Gowdie, who had advanced a mile beyond the place where he had been left, and covered the retreat with his brigade, the losses would have been very great. Lord Cornwallis, who had been able to see what was occurring from the encampment, put a division in motion, and met the whole detachment returning. Floyd’s wound was caused by a bullet through his cheek, which lodged in his neck. It was never extracted, and he carried it to his grave, but he was sufficiently recovered to take up his command again eleven days later. The losses of the detachment were as follows:—

The losses of the 19th Light Dragoons were—

Major Skelly, Lord Cornwallis’ aide-de-camp, writing of the event a short time afterwards, says: “I never saw Lord Cornwallis completely angry before that evening. To this day he cannot speak of that night’s business without evident signs of disapprobation.”

The loss of so many horses at this early stage of the campaign was a serious one, as they could not be replaced. The cavalry had been constantly employed for the last three days, and the horses had not been regularly fed. Those that did not succumb on this occasion were of little use for the remainder of the campaign.

On the following day, the pettah was taken by assault, and some much-needed supplies were obtained: but there was great scarcity of forage, and horses and transport animals suffered greatly. “The draught cattle were daily dying at their pickets; grain and every other necessary, including ammunition, were at the lowest ebb.” In these straits, Lord Cornwallis resolved to try and take the Fort by a coup-de-main. On the night of the 21st, the assault was delivered by moonlight, and in an hour the Fort was captured under the eyes of the Sultan, who made no serious attempt to cause a diversion.

The capture of Bangalore was the first great blow that had been struck against the power of Mysore, by any foe, since its establishment by Hyder Ali.

Leaving a garrison in the place, Cornwallis moved northward, on the 28th, with the twofold object of forming a junction with a corps of the Nizam’s cavalry, and of meeting a convoy that was expected from Amboor. After some delay, caused by false intelligence purposely spread by Tippoo, the British force was joined at Cotapilli, on 13th April, by 10,000 irregular horse of the Nizam’s, and, a week later, the much-needed convoy, escorted by four thousand men, was met at Venkitagheri. The combined force then returned to Bangalore, which was reached on the 28th. Arrangements were at once made for the siege of Seringapatam, against which the Sultan sought to guard himself, by wasting the intervening country; a measure that was not without effect on subsequent events.

On the 13th May, the British force reached Arikera, about nine miles from Seringapatam. The army moved with extreme difficulty, and there was great distress, owing to the inadequate transport and the wasted state of the country. The Nizam’s cavalry refused to forage beyond the outposts, and added to the scarcity: great quantities of ammunition were dependent for carriage on the private resources of officers and other individuals with the army. Before laying siege to Seringapatam, it was Cornwallis’ object to cross the Cauvery at Caniembadi, and form a junction with the Bombay force, under Abercromby, which was shortly expected. The Sultan, who had hitherto confined himself to harassing the line of march, found it necessary to offer battle, to prevent if possible the threatened junction. With this purpose he took up an extremely strong position about three miles from Seringapatam, with his right resting on the Cauvery, and his left on a rugged hill. His front was covered by a deep, swampy ravine the passages of which were defended by batteries along the whole front. Cornwallis determined to turn Tippoo’s left wing, and, by a night march, to place himself between Seringapatam and a great portion of the Mysore army. Halting at Arikera on the 14th, the force marched at night, leaving the camp standing, with the heavy guns and stores. Unfortunately, there was a storm of extraordinary violence that lasted several hours, which added to the confusion and difficulties of a night march, and, when day broke, the force had only accomplished three or four miles. All hope of surprise was at an end, but Cornwallis continued his advance. To meet the movement, Tippoo threw back his left, and in order to cover his change of front, detached a large corps of cavalry and infantry, with eight guns, to occupy a strong rocky ridge on his left, at right angles to the line of march of the British column. Owing to the depth of the ravine to be crossed, and the weakness of the gun bullocks, it took two hours before the British force could form up in line for attack; during which it was exposed to a galling artillery fire, and to some charges of cavalry, which were repulsed. The British force was disposed, with nine battalions under Major General Medows, in the first line, opposite to the enemy’s main body; four battalions in the second line, under Lt. Col. Harris; while five battalions, under Lt. Col. Maxwell, were destined to attack the enemy’s corps on the ridge to the right. The cavalry under Floyd, consisting of the 19th Light Dragoons and five Regiments of Native Cavalry, and the Nizam’s horse, were left on the opposite side of the ravine, out of reach of artillery fire.

The action commenced by an advance of Maxwell’s force against the ridge, which was taken, while the cavalry crossed the ravine, and fell on the rear of the Mysore infantry, inflicting considerable loss. But the exhausted horses could not raise a gallop, and they were obliged to fall back from a strong body of infantry, that had rallied and made a stand in some broken rocky ground. At this juncture, the Nizam’s horse, which had followed the British cavalry across the ravine, threw itself in an unwieldy mass in front of the left wing, preventing its advance, and detaining it under the fire of the enemy’s batteries in Seringapatam. This unfortunate circumstance, which by many was ascribed to treachery on the part of the Nizam’s commander, saved the enemy from destruction. The British line was for some time unable to advance, and the enemy’s guns and infantry, in great confusion, were able to withdraw under protection of their batteries across the river. Four guns were taken. The British loss was 81 killed, 339 wounded, and 6 missing. Of this, the 19th Light Dragoons lost

The army was now in such a state, owing to want of proper supplies, want of carriage, and an epidemic of smallpox, that it was necessary to join hands with the Bombay force under Abercromby, before undertaking the siege. Abercromby had encountered great difficulties in ascending the Passes into Mysore, and so excellent was the work done by Tippoo’s cavalry, that Cornwallis was without any precise information as to his advance. Nor was anything known of the Mahratta contingent, beyond the fact that they had captured Dharwar. Cornwallis therefore resolved on continuing his march on Caniembadi, to meet Abercromby. “For two marches, all the battering train and almost every public cart in the army were dragged by the troops,” and Cornwallis came to the conclusion, that the state of his force rendered a retirement on Bangalore imperative. The siege train and heavy stores could be carried no farther, and it was resolved to destroy them. On the 21st May, orders were despatched to Abercromby, who was then at Periapatam, about 25 miles to the westward, to destroy his heavy stores, and retire below the Passes, and Cornwallis’ army was retained five days in position, to cover Abercromby’s movement. On the 22nd, the whole of the battering train and heavy stores were destroyed, and on the 26th, the first march of six miles was made in retreat. The distress was very great: the troops were on half rations, and the only way of carrying what grain was available was to distribute it among the fighting men. “Great part of the horses of the cavalry were so reduced by want and fatigue, that they could no longer carry their riders; and many, unable to march, were shot at their pickets. The ground at Caniembadi, where the army had encamped but six days, was covered, in a circuit of several miles, with the carcasses of cattle and horses.”[28] “All that occurred of mortality among the cattle, during the siege of Bangalore, fell far short of the horrible scene and pestilential air of this disgusting ground.”[29]

In the middle of the first day’s painful march, a body of two thousand cavalry appeared on the left flank. Preparations were made to meet them, and shots were fired, when it was suddenly discovered that they were the advanced guard of the Mahratta force. It was not known that they were within a hundred and fifty miles of Seringapatam, and not one of the numerous messengers they had sent to convey notice of their approach, had succeeded in escaping Tippoo’s scouts. There were, in fact, two forces; one, under Hari Punt, consisting of twelve thousand horse, and the other, under Pareshram Bhow, of twenty thousand horse and foot, with two battalions of Bombay sepoys, under Captain Little. They brought with them abundant supplies, and plenty once more reigned in the British camp. Their cavalry foraged boldly in every direction, bringing in supplies from great distances, in striking contrast to the behaviour of the Nizam’s force. But they came too late to permit of an attack on Seringapatam. Had Cornwallis known of their approach five days sooner, all would have been well, and another campaign would have been spared him. But his siege train no longer existed, the Bombay force had descended the Ghauts, and there was nothing for it but to adhere to his resolve of falling back. The allied forces remained in the vicinity of Seringapatam till the 6th June, when they leisurely moved northwards to Nagmunglum, and thence eastward to Bangalore, taking the small hill fort of Hooliadroog on the way. “So reduced were the horses of our cavalry from want and fatigue, that the only service they could now render was to walk on slowly with the sick and wounded soldiers on their backs, for whom we were in great want of conveyance; and it was highly pleasing to see the cheerfulness with which the troopers walked by the side of their horses, while their distressed comrades of the infantry rode upon the march.”[30] The Mahratta cavalry effectually prevented the march being harassed by the enemy, from whom they took some convoys and elephants.

Pending the completion of arrangements for another advance on Seringapatam, the Mahratta force withdrew northwards to Sara; the Nizam’s force also withdrew to Gunjicotta, which, with several other small places, had been captured by a force of the Nizam’s.

The 19th Light Dragoons with the rest of the cavalry were sent, under Floyd, to the Carnatic, to recruit. The regiment reached Madras early in August; and, as horses to remount the cavalry were not procurable, three native cavalry regiments were dismounted in order to complete the horses required for the 19th. The 3rd and 5th Native cavalry had their ranks partially filled in the same way, so that by the end of the monsoon these three Regiments were ready to rejoin the army.

Meanwhile, the army at Bangalore was engaged in securing the passes into the Carnatic, and in reducing the numerous hill fortresses that abounded in Mysore. The most important of these, Nundydroog and Savandroog, were taken by assault on the 19th October and 21st December, respectively. Tippoo, on his side, had not been idle. In the middle of June a large Mysore force invested Coimbatore, which was weakly held. The defence was obstinate, and after a two months’ siege the place was relieved from Palghat. In October, it was invested a second time, and, the attempts to relieve it being unsuccessful, Coimbatore was forced to surrender, on 3rd November. Several parties of Mysore horse also succeeded in making raids into the Carnatic, doing much mischief. One party penetrated to within a few miles of Madras, early in January, after the cavalry had marched to rejoin Cornwallis, and carried off much plunder. During the preceding half century, the country within fifty miles of Madras had been the constant scene of warlike operations. In that period, Madras had fallen to a French attack, and been held by them for four years. Again, it had been frequently threatened and once besieged, by France, and Hyder had dictated a peace within sight of Fort St. George. Too often, the inhabitants of Madras had heard the sound of an enemy’s guns, and seen the sky red with the glare of burning villages: and now again the horsemen of Mysore were plundering and burning within sight of the Mount. But it was for the last time. Shevtamodoo was plundered and burned by one of these parties.

In the meantime, large convoys of supplies and material were being forwarded to Bangalore, the last and most important, conveying all the ammunition for the army, being escorted by the 19th Light Dragoons under Colonel Floyd. Ascending by the Pednaikdirgum Pass, on the 23rd December, and marching by Kolar, Ooscotta and Bangalore, he joined Cornwallis at Magre, near Ootradroog, on the 12th January 1792. Everything was now ready for an advance on Seringapatam, and the army was in a more efficient state than it had been at any time since the war began. Owing to Lord Cornwallis’ excellent arrangements, supplies of all sorts were in the greatest abundance. The only deficiency was in horses for the Cavalry. The losses experienced in this respect, in the previous year, had not been made good, and this arm of the service was represented only by the 19th Light Dragoons, six troops, the 3rd Native Cavalry, six troops, the 5th Native Cavalry, four troops, and the Body Guards of Lord Cornwallis and General Medows, one troop each. The force altogether consisted of 22,033 men, of which about 15,500 were infantry. The advance was still delayed by the absence of the Nizam’s force, which was occupied in the siege of Gurramconda. On the 25th January it arrived, under the command of the Nizam’s son, Secunder Jah. Part of the Mahratta contingent, under Hari Punt, had already joined Lord Cornwallis, but the greater part, under Pareshram Bhow, had gone off on a plundering expedition to the northwestward, in defiance of the agreement made six months before. It did not join the British force, till the campaign was over.

The Bombay army, under Abercromby, consisting of eight thousand four hundred men, was also on the march from the westward. Ascending by the Poodicherim Pass, Abercromby directed his march by Periapatam and Eratoor, so as to join hands with Cornwallis in front of Seringapatam.

On the 31st January, Cornwallis held a review of his whole force at Hooliadroog, for the benefit of his allies. As the Nizam’s son reached the right of the line “a salute of 21 guns was fired from the park, while the cavalry, with drawn swords and trumpets sounding, received him with due honours as he passed their front. He returned the officers’ salute, and looked attentively at the troops. The 19th Dragoons, of which they had all heard, attracted their particular notice.”[32] On the following day, the army marched, and encamped within sight of Seringapatam, at about seven miles’ distance, on the 5th February. No opposition on the march was experienced.

Seringapatam is situated on an island in the Cauvery river, four miles in length and a mile and a half broad. At the western end of the island was the fortress, the eastern portion being also strongly defended by connected batteries and redoubts. On the north side, on what may be called the main land, was an oblong space about three miles in length, enclosed by a hedge of cactus and other thorny plants, and commanded by redoubts on the highest points. In this space Tippoo was encamped. He believed that he could protract the defence, till the coming of the monsoon and the scarcity of supplies should force Cornwallis to raise the siege; he further believed that no serious attack would be made on the position, till the arrival of Abercromby’s force. But Cornwallis had plans of a very different nature. The 6th being spent in reconnoitring, orders were issued, about sunset, for the troops to parade at once for a night attack. About 8 o’clock all was ready, and the infantry advanced in three columns, the centre column being headed by Cornwallis in person. The cavalry were left to guard the camp, and the artillery were left behind also. When all was ready, Cornwallis sent word of his plans to his native allies, who were dismayed at hearing of an advance against a fortified camp without artillery, and that his lordship should have gone to fight “like a common soldier.” Moving in silence, the heads of the columns, which were more than a mile apart, came in touch with the enemy about half past ten. The attack was completely successful. One redoubt after another was carried, Tippoo’s camp was taken, some of the troops, in their ardour, crossing the stream and penetrating to the farther side of the island. The brunt of the fighting fell on the centre column, which, towards daylight, was heavily attacked by the Mysore troops, who had recovered from their first surprise. The fighting continued till five o’clock in the afternoon of the 7th, the last serious attack being headed by Tippoo’s French regiment. But nothing availed to dislodge the British troops from the positions they had gained, and Tippoo was forced to withdraw on to the island, where also our troops had made good their footing. Our loss amounted to 535 of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing. Eighty guns and an enormous quantity of supplies were captured. The enemy’s loss was estimated at four thousand killed, great numbers having been forced into the river and drowned. Greater still was the loss caused by desertion; numbers of the enemy having taken advantage of the confusion, to throw down their arms and make off to their homes. The whole loss to the Sultan, in killed, wounded and missing, was estimated at twenty thousand men.

On the 12th, the cavalry under Floyd were detached to meet Abercromby, with whom he effected a junction on the 14th. In a private letter, still extant, he writes:—

Dirom, the principal chronicler of the campaign, says:—

On the 16th, Abercromby joined Cornwallis on the north side of Seringapatam, without further hindrance, and preparations were made for prosecuting the siege. On the 19th, Abercromby made a detour, and, crossing the Cauvery, invested the place from the south. A strong Brigade, under Colonel Stuart, was entrenched on the island, and Floyd with the Cavalry was stationed about four thousand yards to the eastward, linking up the distance between Cornwallis and Abercromby. Seringapatam was completely invested. On the 22nd, an attack on Abercromby’s force was repulsed with loss, and then Tippoo, who had been for some days in negotiation with Cornwallis, realised that the time for surrender had arrived. The losses he had experienced in the fighting of the 6th and 7th, rendered prolonged resistance impossible.

It was no part of Lord Cornwallis’ policy to destroy the Mysore State, but the disposition of Tippoo, “a faithless and violent character on whom no dependence could be placed” required that his power should be so far curtailed, as to render him less dangerous. On the 23rd February, the preliminaries of peace were signed by Tippoo, and warlike operations ceased, much to the disgust of the army, whose minds were inflamed to an extraordinary degree against the Sultan, on account of the barbarous cruelties inflicted by him on all prisoners that fell into his hands. One of the stipulations was that two of Tippoo’s sons should be handed over, as hostages for the due performance of the treaty of peace. On the 26th, the young princes were received by Lord Cornwallis with much ceremony. The occasion seems to have made a great impression at the time. Three,[33] if not more, pictures of the event were painted by A. W. Devis, a well-known artist, who was present. In all of them, Colonel Floyd is prominently represented, a fine martial figure. Cornet Hale and Captain Child of the 19th Light Dragoons also appear in some of the pictures. This was evidently regarded in India as the most striking event in Lord Cornwallis’ career in the country. The base of the statue erected to him in Madras, has another representation of the scene.

The Princes remained in British territory till March 1794, when they were sent back to the Sultan with all honour.

AN OFFICER OF THE XIX^TH LIGHT DRAGOONS, 1792.

to face p. 99.

A considerable amount of prize money gained during the war was further enhanced by the surrender of their respective shares by Lord Cornwallis and General Medows, and by liberal gratuities from the Government. The share of every private soldier amounted to £14, 11. 9., the shares of other ranks being in proportion.

Sixty-seven forts and eight hundred and one guns were captured during the three campaigns; of which, fifty-six forts and six hundred and fifty-six guns were captured by the British forces, the remainder falling to their native allies.

On the 20th March, the Treaty of Peace was duly ratified, and on the 26th, the army marched from Seringapatam, for Madras, which was reached about the end of May. The 19th Light Dragoons returned to their old quarters at Shevtamodoo.

A medal for the three campaigns, 1790–92, was bestowed on the Bengal native troops who took part in them.

1793–1799.

On the 1st February 1793, the French National Convention declared war against Great Britain. The news was at once dispatched to India by the British Consul at Alexandria, and reached Calcutta on the 11th June. Lord Cornwallis acted with great promptitude, and, without awaiting further communications from England, issued orders for taking possession of the French territories in India. The troops in the vicinity of Wallajabad, among whom were the 19th Light Dragoons, were at once put in motion under Colonel Floyd, and encamped before Pondicherry on the 11th July, while the place was blockaded by sea by such ships as were available. On the 28th July, Colonel Brathwaite, who had succeeded Major General Medows as local Commander in Chief, took command of the force, which by this time amounted to 10,500 men. According to the returns of 1st August, the strength of the 19th Light Dragoons, at that date, was 274, exclusive of sick. Siege operations were commenced on the 10th August, and fire was opened on the 20th. On the 22nd Pondicherry capitulated, and was taken possession of on the following day. The British loss amounted to 248 killed, wounded, and missing. One hundred and sixty-six guns, with a great quantity of military stores, fell into the hands of our troops, and Pondicherry ceased to be a French possession until the Peace of Amiens. The part taken in the siege by the cavalry was naturally a subordinate one, as the enemy had no force in the field that could interrupt operations.

On the fall of Pondicherry, the 19th Light Dragoons returned for a time to their old quarters at Shevtamodoo. Colonel Floyd remained at Pondicherry, in command of the place, for a few months, when he was appointed to command the Southern Division of the Madras forces, with his Head Quarters at Trichinopoly. In 1794, we find the 19th quartered at Seringham, near Trichinopoly. In the following year, they were encamped on the Trichinopoly plain, and in 1796, they were moved into the cavalry cantonments at Trichinopoly.

For five years the war was confined to Europe. The French flag was not seen on the coasts of India, nor was any Frenchman in arms, with the exception of those in the service of Native States, to be found in the country. While war raged in Europe, the peace of India was practically undisturbed. In the beginning of June 1795, a detachment of the 19th was employed in the capture of an insurgent Polygar chief, named Lunkia Naik, under the following circumstances. On the night of the 7th June, Lieutenant Oliphant, with a detachment of two native officers and twenty-two sepoys, surprised and captured Lunkia Naik, at Manapur, about twenty-four miles from Trichinopoly. The Chief’s retainers gathered to the rescue in large numbers, and attacked Oliphant, who had retired with his prisoner into a Choultry, where he defended himself for nine hours, repelling several assaults. The following morning, two troops of the 19th appeared, drove off the assailants, and brought Oliphant’s detachment back to Trichinopoly, with Lunkia Naik securely tied to a trooper.

Towards the end of 1796, the 25th Light Dragoons landed in Madras from England.

In his first regimental order to the regiment, when it was raised, Sir John Burgoyne took occasion to point out that service in India was “not less honourable than lucrative.” There could be no doubt on the latter point, so far as the senior officers were concerned. The advantages given to the King’s officers in point of rank over the Company’s officers, had the intended effect of throwing most of the chief commands into their hands, and the allowances that were granted in some cases, showed how strong a shake they were able to give to the “pagoda tree.” Lieutenant Colonel Stapleton Cotton (afterwards Lord Combermere) in a letter from Madras in January 1797, wrote—

Events were in progress, that were, before long, destined to bring the British armies in India into the field again. British authority in India was menaced by French hostility in a peculiarly subtle and dangerous form. The memory of his defeats and losses in 1792, had long rankled in Tippoo’s mind, and his animosity against the English was inflamed by the numerous French officers in his employ, through whom he maintained informal relations with France. In Hyderabad, there was a fairly disciplined force of 14,000 infantry, with an adequate proportion of artillery, commanded by French officers in the Nizam’s service, who flew the tricolour flag, and were in secret correspondence with Tippoo. In upper India, Scindia’s disciplined battalions were also commanded by a French officer. Fortunately, the Mahrattas were at this time too much occupied with their own quarrels to meddle with affairs in the South. The news of French successes, under Bonaparte, induced Tippoo to believe that the time had arrived to strike a blow against the English.

In March 1796, he dispatched an embassy to Cabul, inviting Zeman Shah to invade India, conquer Delhi, and join hands with him in destroying the British, the Portuguese, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam. In the following year, Tippoo despatched ambassadors to the Mauritius, proposing an offensive and defensive alliance against the English, and asking for a French force, which he engaged to pay and to furnish with all necessary supplies. But the Governor of the Mauritius had no troops to spare, and could only send under 100 men, among whom were several officers and artificers, who landed in India in April 1798. A few weeks later, Tippoo despatched an embassy to Paris. In May 1798, Lord Mornington, afterwards known as the Marquis of Wellesley, arrived in India to take up the office of Governor General, and Tippoo’s dealings with the French became known, a few days after his arrival. It was known also that a great French expedition was preparing in the Mediterranean, which was believed to be aimed at Egypt, as in fact it was. The times were critical, and demanded prompt action: the new Governor General was not the man to waste time, when action was required. The first move made by Lord Mornington was to break up the force at Hyderabad, which for the moment was the most dangerous factor in the situation. The Nizam and his ministers were loyal to the British alliance, but the French officers present had become possessed of so much influence, that the Hyderabad Government had lost control of them, while their arrogance and overbearing conduct filled the Nizam and his ministers with alarm. The Nizam therefore willingly entered into a Treaty engaging himself to get rid of his French officers, and to break up the formidable body they had created. By dexterous measures, and by taking advantage of a mutiny that occurred in the force, it was surrounded and disarmed without bloodshed, on 22nd October. One hundred and twenty-four French officers, whose lives were at the time in danger from their own men, were removed and shipped off to Calcutta, and a serious danger successfully averted.[34] Four days before this occurrence, intelligence of the invasion of Egypt by Bonaparte reached Calcutta. Meanwhile, by way of precaution against a sudden blow from Tippoo, a force was collected at Wallajabad, among which was the 19th Light Dragoons, who marched from Trichinopoly at the beginning of August. From Wallajabad the regiment was moved to Madras; their muster roll, dated 20th September, shows that they were cantoned at the Mount on that date. The effective strength of the regiment, then present, was 361 of all ranks; of whom 12 were recruits recently received from England, and 30 were volunteers from the 12th, 19th, 73rd, and 74th Regiments. So valuable were European Cavalry, that on the bare prospect of war their numbers were at once filled up from the Infantry. The dispersal of the French Contingent at Hyderabad having been accomplished, Lord Mornington addressed Tippoo with regard to his dealings with the French Government. Preparations were at the same time made for an advance on Seringapatam from the Bombay coast, while the Madras forces assembled at Vellore. Tippoo’s replies were evasive. His object was to gain time, till the arrival of the expected French force. Delay was dangerous, and it was evident that further negotiations could lead to no good result, so, early in February 1799, the advance of the army was determined on. Meanwhile, Shah Zeman had reached Lahore, and, though he was unable to advance farther south, and was forced to return to Cabul, on account of his own territories being invaded by Persia, his presence in the Punjab necessitated the preparation of a British force in the North, to hold him in check.

Up till this time the artillery of the British Army in India was entirely drawn by bullocks. An attempt to furnish artillery of greater mobility was now made. While the army lay at Vellore, an order was issued for attaching to each regiment of European dragoons and native Cavalry two 6 Pr. guns, in order to increase their independent action.

Little mention of these guns is anywhere made during the ensuing campaign, though their efficiency on subsequent occasions is frequently mentioned. Thorn, the historian of the Mahratta War, writing four years later of the formation of the army under the Commander in Chief, says:—

In spite of the good service done by the galloper guns on many occasions, difficulties as to their control in the field frequently arose, after the formation of a corps of artillery drawn by horses, in 1805, owing to their not having formed an integral part of the Regiment they were attached to.

At first the guns closely attended their regiment, in action, seconding its efforts with their fire when possible. In line of battle they were placed in pairs, in the intervals between different corps. After a time this system was discontinued, and the guns were brigaded together under command of a Cavalry officer, or they were brigaded with Artillery guns, in which case difficulties arose as to their command. In 1815, it was ordered that, whenever galloper guns were brigaded, they should be commanded by an Artillery officer. But complaints were made that the want of uniform training rendered them unfit to be brigaded with Horse Artillery guns, and they were finally abolished in May 1819.

The 19th Light Dragoons, taking their galloper guns with them, as well as those for the 25th Light Dragoons and the 1st Native Cavalry, marched from Madras on 23rd January, to join the army under General Harris, which was assembled at Vellore to the number of nearly 21,000 men. On the 14th February, the whole force moved forward. The Cavalry under Major General Floyd comprised the 19th, 430 strong, the 25th Dragoons, and four Regiments of Native Cavalry: 2635 sabres in all, divided into two Brigades. On the 20th, the army was joined by 16,000 men from Hyderabad, about 10,000 of which were the contingent furnished by the Nizam, who, throughout the campaign, co-operated most heartily with the British Commander. The command of the Nizam’s Contingent was given to Colonel the Honourable Arthur Wellesley,[37] who had with him also his own regiment, the 33rd Foot. Simultaneously, the force from Bombay consisting of 6400 men under Lieutenant General Stuart,[38] advanced from Cannanore, and, on 2nd March, encamped on the Mysore frontier, near Periapatam.

Marching by Rycottah, General Harris crossed the Mysore frontier on 5th, and directed his march northwards, as if for the purpose of attacking Bangalore. When in sight of that place he turned southwards, and encamped five miles from Mallavelly, on the 26th March. Meanwhile, Tippoo had not been idle. On the 6th, he crossed the frontier near Periapatam, and attempted to cut off a detached Brigade of the Bombay force at Sedaseer. In spite of his great numerical superiority, the attack was repulsed with heavy loss, and Tippoo withdrew to Seringapatam. He had between seventy and eighty thousand men, about thirty thousand of which were in or near Seringapatam, the whole in a state of complete efficiency.

As General Harris’ force approached their camping ground, on the 26th, the Cavalry found themselves confronted by a large body of the enemy commanded by Tippoo in person. As the Infantry closed up, the Sultan slowly moved off, and the British force encamped within sight of the enemy, who withdrew towards Mallavelly. At daybreak, on the 27th, the army marched on Mallavelly, while the Nizam’s contingent under Wellesley moved parallel to it, on the left, enclosing the baggage between the two bodies. The front was covered by Major General Floyd with five regiments of Cavalry. On approaching Mallavelly, the heights beyond the village were seen to be occupied by infantry, while a large force of cavalry were on the British right. Wellesley’s division was directed to attack the enemy’s right, supported by Floyd and his cavalry, while the right wing of the army entered Mallavelly, and attacked the enemy’s centre. As the force advanced, the enemy drew back, as though declining an action, and preparations were made by the British troops for marking out a new encampment. While this was in progress, the enemy suddenly opened fire from twelve or fourteen guns, which did some execution. Upon this, the infantry picquets, the 25th Light Dragoons and a Native Cavalry Regiment pushed forward, and occupied a village in front of the enemy’s left, in which was a party of the enemy’s horse and rocket men, while the rest of the army formed line of battle. In the meanwhile, Colonel Wellesley’s division advanced, supported by Major General Floyd, with the 19th Light Dragoons, and 1st and 3rd regiments of Native cavalry. As the British force advanced, nearly simultaneous attacks were made by the enemy on both flanks. On the right a large body of cavalry hovered on the flanks, while a smaller corps charged the 1st Brigade under Major General Baird. The steady fire of the 12th Foot and the Scotch Brigade repulsed them with considerable loss. On the left, a body of men, about 2000 strong, advanced in good order against the 33rd, till it was thrown into confusion by a heavy fire at sixty paces’ distance. Seizing the moment, Floyd charged with his three regiments of Cavalry, and completely routed them, taking six standards and sabreing many men. “Into them, with disciplined impetuosity, dashed General Floyd at the head of the old 19th Light Dragoons and two regiments of Native Cavalry, who in a few minutes sabred nearly the whole of the fugitives.”[39] The retreat of the enemy became general, as the advance of the British continued, and by two o’clock they had completely withdrawn from the field. After the action, the army returned and camped near Mallavelly. This success was purchased with a loss of only seven killed, fifty-three wounded and six missing. The 19th Light Dragoons, which suffered the most among the Cavalry Regiments, had eight wounded, among them Captain Kennedy, three horses killed, twenty-two wounded, and three missing. It is said that, of the column charged by Major General Floyd, all but 230 were put hors de combat.

On the 29th and 30th, the army crossed the Cauvery at Sosilay. This move was entirely unexpected by Tippoo, who had made up his mind that the army would march directly on Seringapatam to attack it, as Cornwallis had attacked it seven years before. In this belief, he had wasted the whole country in the vicinity on the north bank of the river. By this adroit move General Harris was favourably situated to join hands with the Bombay force on its arrival, while he was able to draw abundant supplies from the villages in his neighbourhood, and from the rich country in his rear, which Tippoo had preserved for himself. Continuing his march westward, within five miles of Seringapatam, and watched, but not molested by Tippoo’s cavalry, General Harris took up ground for the siege, on the 5th April, opposite the west face of the fort of Seringapatam, and at a distance of two miles from it. The left of the army rested on the river; the cavalry were encamped in the rear of the army.

On the 6th April at daybreak, Floyd with four regiments of Cavalry, among them the 19th Light Dragoons, six regiments of Infantry, twenty guns, and a corps of the Nizam’s horse, marched westward to join the Bombay force under Major General Stuart. On the 8th, he established communication with Stuart, and on the 10th, the two forces were united at Periapatam. During the whole march, Floyd’s force was closely attended by the enemy’s cavalry, who were however unable to make any impression.

The Rajah of Coorg, our constant and loyal ally, had accompanied Major General Stuart to Periapatam, from which place he was to return to look after his own territories, and to arrange for forwarding supplies to the army.

At half-past seven in the evening of the 13th, Floyd’s signal guns were heard in General Harris’ camp, and were answered ten minutes later to show that they were understood.[41] Twenty-four hours later, the united forces of Floyd and Stuart joined General Harris in front of Seringapatam. On the same date letters reached the army from the Governor General congratulating them on the success at Mallavelly. These letters were brought by a native messenger, written on a very narrow slip of paper, and sealed up in a quill. This was the general method of communication, public and private, as would appear from the following notice in the Calcutta Gazette.

Fort William, Public Department, 10th April 1799.

Some of these notes, 2 inches wide by 6⅜ inches long, are still in existence.

Some solicitude was experienced at this time concerning supplies, and the cavalry were busily employed in protecting and bringing in convoys. On the 16th, Floyd, with five regiments of cavalry and the left wing of the army, brought in a party of Brinjarries who had been sent out to the southward to collect cattle and grain. On the 19th, Floyd marched again with the whole of the regular cavalry, a brigade of infantry, and the Nizam’s cavalry, towards the Coveripoorum Pass, for the purpose of protecting two large convoys of provisions en route from Coimbatore and the Baramahal. On the 30th, he was joined by the convoy from Rykottah, at the head of the Pass, but it was not till the 6th May that the Coimbatore convoy arrived, and on the 11th, the whole returned to Seringapatam bringing with them forty thousand bullocks, most of which carried loads of grain, twenty-one thousand nine hundred sheep and other necessaries, thus placing the subsistence of the army out of danger for many days.

But the campaign was already at an end. A practicable breach having been made, at one o’clock on the 4th May, Seringapatam was stormed by the British troops, and after two hours’ desperate fighting the British colours were planted in the fortress. Tippoo’s dead body was found at night under a heap of slain, the short-lived Mahommedan Kingdom of Mysore was at an end, and the most imminent menace to British rule in India was averted. This gallant feat of arms cost the British force a loss of 367 in killed, wounded, and missing, of whom 321 were Europeans. Nine hundred and twenty-nine guns and an enormous quantity of warlike material fell into the hands of the victors. The French officers found in Seringapatam had commissions from the French Government. By Tippoo’s orders, all the European prisoners who fell into his hands during the siege had been barbarously put to death. A number of prisoners also, who had fallen into his hands in former wars, and who had been detained, in breach of agreements in 1784 and 1792, were massacred by his orders at the commencement of hostilities.

In an order published after the siege, General Harris thus spoke of the Cavalry Division:—

The 19th Light Dragoons remained in Mysore during the settlement of the country, in the course of which the representative of the old ruling family was replaced on the Mysore throne. On the 13th November they parted from Wellesley at Ooscottah, and marched for Vellore, and so back to their old quarters at Trichinopoly, which they reached about the end of the year.

Great reluctance appears to have been felt by the Government in England, to treat services performed under the East India Company as worthy of recognition by the Crown. The Court of Directors issued a medal in 1808 to the officers and men of the King’s and Company’s troops who had taken part in the operations in Mysore, but the royal permission for the King’s troops to wear the medal in England was not granted till 1815, in which year General Harris was raised to the peerage for his services in 1799. In 1818 his lordship made a special representation for some permanent badge to be bestowed on the regiments concerned, when permission to bear the word “Seringapatam” on colours and appointments was granted.

1800–1802

For nearly nineteen years, ever since the regiment had existed, the 19th Light Dragoons had served under Major General Floyd in quarters and in the field, and now the time had come for separation. In January 1800, Floyd sailed for England, the last of the officers originally appointed to the regiment. Soon after his arrival in England, he was appointed Colonel of the 26th Light Dragoons, and his connection with his old regiment was permanently severed. He afterwards become Colonel of the 8th Light Dragoons, and was appointed Governor of Gravesend and Tilbury. He maintained his interest in everything calculated to improve our cavalry system to the end of his life. A General Order from the Adjutant General’s office in Dublin, dated 7th October 1811, contains a Riding Lesson, “suggested by Lieut. General Floyd,” which Officers Commanding cavalry regiments are directed to practise. It is the foundation of our present riding school system. In 1816, he was created a Baronet for his services, and died at the age of 70, two years later.

The regiment did not remain long at Trichinopoly. It was soon called on to take part in a short but remarkable campaign. When Seringapatam fell, there was a prisoner in Tippoo’s power, named Dhoondia Wao, a noted freebooter, who had at one time been in the service of Hyder Ali. During Lord Cornwallis’ campaign in 1791–92, he had deserted from the Mysore service. After the conclusion of peace, he collected a party of desperate men, and committed depredations in the country round Dharwar. Being hard pressed on one occasion by the Peishwa’s troops, he took refuge in Mysore territory, thinking to make his peace with Tippoo. On falling into Tippoo’s hands, he was forcibly converted to Mohammedanism, and thrown into prison, where he remained till Seringapatam fell. In the confusion consequent on the capture of the place, he was set at liberty by an officer who did not know his character. He at once collected a number of Tippoo’s disbanded soldiers, and made for the Bednore district. In the confusion consequent on the overthrow of Tippoo’s power, he gained possession of many of the principal forts in the province. His adherents rapidly increased in number, and he ravaged the surrounding country, his exactions being accompanied by acts of the most atrocious cruelty. Being provided with artillery, ammunition and money, he asserted his right to the Bednore province, and assumed the title of King of the Two Worlds. It was the golden age of adventurers. Forty years earlier, Hyder Ali had founded a kingdom on the ruins of the ancient principality of Mysore. In the far north Runjeet Singh was founding a Sikh State in the Punjab. Between the Ganges and the Jumna, Perron was aiming at forming a province under French protection. On the borders of the Indian desert, Thomas, the Irish sailor, had established an independent principality in Hurrianah, while other adventurers like Ameer Khan and Ghuffoor Khan, the future founders of the States of Tonk and Jowrah, traversed the centre of India at the head of plundering hordes. Outside British territory was universal confusion and anarchy, in which any man possessed of a bold heart and a discerning brain might hope to carve out a Kingdom for himself, whatever his faith or nationality. Any Chief whose service promised plenty of plunder could command a following, which in a few months of successful enterprize might swell to the dimensions of an army. But Dhoondia had neither the talents nor the opportunity to become more than a brigand on an unusually large scale.

Walker & Boutall sc.

SKETCH MAP
to illustrate
the march of the Army in pursuit of Dhoondia Wao in July, August, and September 1800.

Early in July 1799, the Commander in Chief sent two flying columns into the field against him, and the Head Quarters of the Army were also moved northwards for the same purpose. Several forts in the hands of Dhoondia’s men were taken by storm, a number of the freebooters were killed in various encounters, and, on the 17th August, Dhoondia himself was defeated and forced to take refuge in the Peishwa’s territory. There he was attacked by one of the Peishwa’s officers named Dhoondia Punt Gokla, his elephants, bullocks, and guns captured, and his remaining followers dispersed. It was thought that the last had been heard of Dhoondia Wao, but in a few months he was in the field again with a larger force than ever. Having been joined by the whole of Tippoo’s disbanded cavalry and a number of disaffected men from the Hyderabad country, he obtained possession of several places in the Southern Mahratta country, and threatened to re-enter Mysore. Dhoondia’s head quarters were in what is now the Dharwar district, from whence he ravaged impartially the Peishwa’s and Nizam’s territories adjoining, as well as the newly conquered Mysore country under British administration. His belief, no doubt, was that the three powers concerned would never act in unison, and that, if at any time he was hard pressed on one side, he would always be able to secure a retreat by crossing into the adjoining territory, where mutual jealousies would afford him a temporary asylum. A force of 5000 horse and a large body of infantry, sent against him by the Peishwa, was defeated. His adherents increased in numbers, till it was found that he was at the head of 40,000 men, and beyond the control of the feeble government of the Peishwa, in whose territory he had established himself. Owing to these circumstances, in the beginning of May 1800, orders were sent to Colonel the Honble. A. Wellesley, who was in full civil and military charge of Mysore, directing him to assemble a field force, as speedily as possible, and pursue and destroy Dhoondia Wao’s forces wherever he should find them. To prevent Dhoondia from again securing himself by taking refuge in the Peishwa’s country, the consent of the Peishwa was obtained for the British troops to follow Dhoondia into Mahratta territory, if necessary. The campaign was one of unusual character. The task was not the subjugation and occupation of a particular tract of country, nor the coercion of an enemy with whom terms were eventually to be made. The object in view was the extirpation of a band of freebooters, whose numbers had swelled to those of a formidable army, provided with artillery and ample resources, and who had possessed themselves of a province belonging to a power with whom we were in alliance. “You are to pursue Dhoondia Wao wherever you may find him, and to hang him on the first tree.” So ran Wellesley’s instructions. By the 24th June, Wellesley’s force, which assembled at Chitteldroog, had crossed the Toombadra river near Hurryhur, and on the 27th, it marched on Ranee Bednore. The force consisted of H.M.’s 19th and 25th Light Dragoons, three regiments of Native Cavalry, two regiments of European Infantry, and five regiments of Native Infantry. A detachment of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, between three and four thousand strong, co-operated under Lieut. Colonel Bowser: the Peishwa also sent a force to assist, acting independently. A body of the Nizam’s horse also joined Wellesley’s force. On reaching Ranee Bednore, the advanced guard was fired on: the fort was at once attacked and carried by escalade, and Dhoondia’s garrison, about 500 in number, put to the sword. So atrocious had been the cruelties committed by Dhoondia’s men, that quarter was seldom given to any of them found in arms. The next few days were spent in clearing the neighbourhood of Dhoondia’s partisans, and in obtaining supplies, Wellesley then moved to Deogheri, where four days were spent in making a bridge across the Werdah river, and constructing a small redoubt to protect it. Meanwhile, a disaster had occurred to the northward. Dhoondia Punt Gokla, the Mahratta Chief who had inflicted a defeat on Dhoondia Wao the previous year, was at Kittoor, with 10,000 horse, 5000 foot and eight guns, for the purpose of co-operating with the British. He was suddenly attacked by Dhoondia Wao on 30th June, his guns taken, his force routed, and himself killed.

Wellesley, having crossed the Werdah river, marched to Savanoor on the 12th July, leaving a small detachment to protect the bridge. The plan Wellesley had in his mind, and which he eventually carried out, begins to appear. It was to seize all fortified places in Dhoondia’s hands, and, if he still remained in arms, gradually drive him eastwards into one of the narrow angles formed by the Kistna, Toombadra and other rivers, and destroy him. It was the time of full monsoon, and the rivers could only be crossed by the aid of boats, which were difficult to procure. If Dhoondia was kept constantly on the move, he would be unable to make them. At Savanoor, Wellesley received news that Dhoondia was advancing to attack him. He accordingly took up a position in front of the town. Dhoondia reconnoitred the position, and retreated, without attacking, to Koondgul. Wellesley followed him, and, reaching that place after a twenty-two mile march, and after the troops had been above twelve hours under arms, carried it by escalade on the same day. But Dhoondia had gone on, leaving only a garrison of 600 men behind him. On the 16th, Wellesley relieved Sirhetty which was being besieged by one of Dhoondia’s adherents, and then returned to Savanoor for the baggage and stores he had left behind there in his rapid advance.

On the 19th, Wellesley was joined at Savanoor by the Mahratta Cavalry that had been so roughly handled on the 30th June, when Dhoondia Punt Gokla was killed, and on the 22nd, he moved in the direction of Dummul, where the King of the Two Worlds was said to be. Dhoondia had however moved off, leaving a garrison of 1000 men in the place. The garrison was summoned, but refused to surrender. The place was immediately attacked and carried by escalade, 26th July. On the following day, Wellesley marched to Gudduck, and occupied the fort which was evacuated before his arrival. Dhoondia, having thus lost all his forts in Savanoor and in the Dharwar country, moved northwards with the intention of crossing the river Malpurba. While encamped at Soondooti, he heard of Wellesley’s approach, and broke up his army into three divisions. One division with the baggage encamped opposite Manoli, without crossing the river. Wellesley’s intention had been to await the arrival of Lieut. Colonel Bowser’s column that was operating to the eastward, but on hearing of the division of Dhoondia’s force, and of the baggage being on the Malpurba near Manoli, he resolved to attack at once. Making a rapid march of twenty-six miles, he fell upon the enemy with the cavalry at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of the 30th, effecting a complete surprise. The enemy were driven into the river, where great numbers of those who escaped the swords of the horsemen were drowned: six guns, and a great number of animals, especially horses, were captured, and the whole force destroyed.

Meanwhile, Dhoondia with another Division had doubled back westward along the south bank of the Malpurba. His adherents were beginning to leave him. Part of the Hyderabad detachment, augmented by a native cavalry regiment from Wellesley’s force, was now placed under Colonel Stevenson, and directed to follow Dhoondia along the Malpurba, while Wellesley moved parallel with Stevenson in the same direction, at a distance of fifteen miles from the river. On the 5th August, Wellesley reached Kittoor, where he halted for some days, for the purpose of making boats to cross the Malpurba. Here he learned that Dhoondia had crossed the Malpurba near its sources, and had again turned eastward to Cowdelghee. Stevenson meanwhile had marched on Hanoor. Dhoondia’s track was marked by the dead bodies of human beings and animals.

The 16th, 17th and 18th were occupied by Wellesley in crossing the Malpurba, to Hoobli: Lieut. Colonel Capper with a Brigade of infantry and a regiment of native cavalry were left on the south side of the river. At this time, Stevenson was marching along the south bank of the Gutpurba river by Hanoor, Gokauk, Cowdelghee and Bhagelcottah; Bowser was at Shapoor; while Wellesley moved eastwards along the north bank of the Malpurba. Dhoondia was steadily being pressed into the fork of the Gutpurba and Malpurba rivers. South of the Malpurba, Capper was moving parallel with the other British forces, through Soondooti, Hooli, and Jellahal. The only chance of Dhoondia’s escape was by a ford across the Malpurba, a little above its junction with the Kistna, but the swollen state of the river seemed to render the passage improbable. Still, to provide for this contingency, the Mahratta cavalry with Capper were directed to push on and hold the ford; but the rough handling they had received on the 30th June, at Kittoor, was still fresh in their minds, and they refused to leave the British camp. As fortune would have it, the improbable happened. The Malpurba suddenly fell, and Dhoondia crossed it on the 24th and 25th. He was however obliged to abandon five guns, some ammunition, arms &c. and ten thousand grain-carrying bullocks, all of which fell into Wellesley’s hands. Capper, who had taken the forts of Hooli and Syringhi by escalade on the 22nd, was at Jellahal when he crossed.

Dhoondia was now in the fork of the Kistna and Toombadra rivers, and had placed himself, for the moment, so far on the flank of his pursuers that, by rapid marching, he might have doubled back to Savanoor, where he would have done much mischief in destroying supplies prepared for Wellesley; or he might have crossed the Toombadra, with the aid of some local Chiefs who were believed to be favourable to him, and entered Mysore. To prevent the execution of either design, Wellesley crossed the Malpurba at Jellahal, and marched, first to Hunmunsagur, and then southward to Khanagheri, which he reached on the 7th September: Stevenson continued his march westward, crossed the Malpurba, and reached Hoonagoonda, on the 5th; from thence he continued eastward towards Deodroog. Between the two forces, were the Nizam’s and Peishwa’s horse, collected in one body. The chase was now drawing to a close. On the 8th, Wellesley left Khanagheri with the cavalry, and pressed on to Buswapore, the infantry and baggage following more slowly. On the 9th, he reached Yepalpurri, the infantry being fifteen miles behind at Shinoor. On the same day, Dhoondia broke up his camp at Mudgheri and moved northwards towards the Kistna, but, sighting Stevenson’s force, he turned south again, and encamped three miles from Conaghul, and about nine miles from Wellesley at Yepalpurri.

Wellesley had news of Dhoondia’s position the same evening, but the night was so bad, and the horses of the cavalry so fatigued, that he did not move till next day. Marching early on the 10th, he came on Dhoondia’s force, consisting of about 5000 horsemen, at Conaghul six miles from Yepalpurri. Dhoondia had left his camp and baggage, and was on the march westward, with the view of passing between the Nizam’s and Mahratta cavalry and Wellesley’s force, which he believed to be at Shinoor. He drew up at once in a very strong position, with his rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of Conaghul, “and stood for some time with apparent firmness.” Wellesley formed the 19th and 25th Light Dragoons and 1st and 2nd Native Cavalry into one line, and charged at their head.

“Such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by those four regiments, which I was obliged to form in one line in order at all to equalise in length that of the enemy, that the whole gave way, and were pursued by my cavalry for many miles.”[42] Dhoondia’s body was recognised among the slain, and brought into camp on a galloper gun of the 19th. The same evening, Colonel Stevenson came up with the remains of the retreating enemy near Deodroog, and entirely dispersed them, capturing their remaining guns, baggage and cattle.

The episode of Dhoondia Wao is an instance of the danger likely to arise out of the overthrow of a military government, when a large number of disbanded men are suddenly thrown out of employ without means of subsistence. It was the overthrow of Tippoo’s kingdom and the dispersal of his large army that enabled Dhoondia to gather together so formidable a force. In like manner, it was the disbanding of so many French officers and soldiers in 1814, that gave Napoleon’s return from Elba a chance of success, and, in more recent times, the trouble that arose after the conquest of Burmah in 1886 was partly due to the large number of armed men suddenly deprived of means of subsistence, and left without control.

The short three months’ campaign had been a most harassing one to the troops, and especially to the cavalry, while it lasted. Writing to the Commander in Chief, at the close of operations, Wellesley says “The 19th and 25th Light Dragoons were in fine order when they joined the force, and I am happy to say they remain so in spite of the very harassing nature of the operations in which they have been engaged.”

The 19th had been commanded by Major Paterson during the campaign. At its close the regiment returned to Seringapatam with Wellesley. Early in 1801, they were moved to Cheyloor. The country was still in a very disturbed state. Several of the Hindoo feudatory Chiefs, known as Polygars, claimed independence for themselves on the overthrow of Tippoo’s rule; and, from their jungle fastnesses, committed depredations on the surrounding country. Chief among them were the Pyche Rajah, Kistnapah Naik, and a zemindar chief who styled himself the Rajah of Bullum. The Mysore forces were unable to deal effectually with them without the aid of British troops. Towards the end of the year, arrangements were made to settle accounts with the Rajah of Bullum, and, on the 8th January 1802, Wellesley left Seringapatam with 540 European infantry of the 77th and the Regiment de Meuron, four battalions of Sepoys, 500 pioneers, ten guns, and four mortars. On the 8th, he was joined, at Chinroypatam, by the 19th Light Dragoons, under Major Paterson, and the 5th Native Cavalry, with their galloper guns.

The Rajah of Bullum occupied a tract of dense forest, called Arrekeery, near the Coorg border, about eighteen miles in circumference, covering the approach to Mysore by the Bissolee Pass. In this tract of forest were a number of fortified villages defended by dense bamboo hedges, and all approaches through the forest were defended by bamboo barriers. For two years the Bullum Rajah had been able to defy the newly resuscitated power of the Mysore Rajah; plundering the adjoining British districts in Canara, and closing the road between Mysore and the coast. After three days spent in reconnoitring the ground, Wellesley delivered his attack at 10 A.M. on the 16th. The infantry, in three divisions, entered the forest simultaneously at three different points. The 19th accompanied the column headed by Wellesley, which was destined to attack the principal posts. The attack was completely successful, and, after a brief conflict, all resistance ceased. The loss of the troops was trifling. The 19th had two men wounded. The Rajah managed to escape, but was captured three weeks later by some Mysore horsemen. Before returning to Seringapatam, Wellesley reviewed the 19th at Hassan on the 13th February, when he issued the following brief order: “Colonel Wellesley will have great pleasure in reporting to the Commander-in-Chief the excellent state in which he found the 19th Light Dragoons.” The Regiment then marched to Sara, where arrangements were made to build barracks for them. Hardly were the barracks completed, when so much sickness broke out in the regiment, that they were moved back to their old quarters at Cheyloor at the beginning of June. A fortnight later, as matters did not improve, they were ordered to Arcot. They were soon to take the field again, to encounter the most formidable army then existing in India.

In order to understand the state of affairs existing in India at the beginning of 1803, a brief retrospect is necessary. The Mogul Empire had ceased to exist except in name. The old Emperor Shah Alum, still occupied the palace at Delhi, but only as a blind pensioner of the Mahrattas. Everywhere on the ruins of Mahommedan rule new Hindoo States had come into vigorous existence, and were even beginning to quarrel over the spoils. In the North the Sikhs, and to the East the Goorkhas, were fast forming powerful States. In the South, the short-lived kingdom of Hyder Ali and Tippoo had been swept out of existence, while the power of the Nizam was gradually growing weaker under the encroachment of his Mahratta neighbours. In the great tract of country stretching from the Sutlej to the Kistna, and from the Company’s territories in Bengal to the Bay of Cambay, a tract measuring approximately a thousand miles from North to South, and from East to West, the supremacy of the Mahratta Chiefs was complete. Calcutta, Benares, Bombay, Hyderabad, and Madras were all within easy striking distance of their predatory hordes. Their principal Chiefs were the Rajah of Satara, the Peishwa with his seat of government at Poona, the Scindia with his capital at Oojain, the Holkar whose capital was at Indore, the Gaekwar at Baroda, the Bhonslay of Berar, whose capital was Nagpore, and the Rajah of Kolapore. The nominal Chiefship of the whole confederacy rested in the Rajah of Satara, the descendant of Sivaji, the founder of the Mahratta power. But the Satara Rajahs had long sunk into the grade of petty princes devoid of military or political influence. As the power of the Satara Rajahs declined, that of the Peishwa, the hereditary Prime Minister, rose. Ruling at first in the name of the Satara Chief, the Peishwas had in time grown into independent princes, wielding the whole power of the Mahratta Confederacy. But the power of the Peishwas in its turned waned, so that, in 1776, the Peishwa Rughonath Rao was forced to seek asylum with the English in Bombay. Since then a partial revival of the Peishwa’s power had taken place under the protection of Scindia, who had become the foremost Chief in the Confederacy; and partly owing to the abilities of the Peishwa’s Minister, Nana Farnawis.

At the beginning of 1803, Scindia was the most powerful Chief in India. Drawing great revenues from a vast area, he held Delhi with its pensioner monarch in the North, received tribute from the Rajpoot States in the centre, and had a predominant voice in the Councils of the Poona Court in the Deccan. The fiction of ruling in the name of the Satara Chief had long ceased to be maintained: government in the name of the Peishwa was fast becoming a fiction. A cardinal point in the policy of Nana Farnawis was to promote friendship with the English Government, in order to preserve some check on Scindia’s predominance. One of the most important sources of Scindia’s power was the large force maintained by him, disciplined and commanded by Europeans. At that date, India swarmed with adventurers of every nationality, two-thirds of whom were of French extraction. Their presence in India was an important factor in the politics of the day. Every Chief, however unimportant he might be, had Europeans to lead his troops. The first Chief in India to thoroughly recognize the importance of European organization and discipline had been Hyder Ali of Mysore. But his efforts had been directed rather to forming complete Corps of European Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, which never exceeded a few hundreds in number. He also had many Europeans as leaders of his native troops, but little was done by him to discipline native troops on the European model. It was Madho Rao Scindia who first developed the system of disciplining his native troops in European fashion under the celebrated De Boigne, which quickly rendered him the most powerful Chief in India. At the time of which we are treating, his nephew and successor, Dowlut Rao Scindia, had in his service a force estimated at 43,650 men, with 464 guns, armed and disciplined in European fashion, and commanded by Europeans. This formidable body of men had lived in a state of continuous warfare ever since it was first raised in 1784. At the head of Scindia’s disciplined forces was the Frenchman Perron, who, had raised himself practically to an independent position. Acting as Scindia’s lieutenant in the North, he ruled over a great tract of country, extending from the Jumna to the foot of the Himalayas, and from the Sutlej to the Chumbul, and, owing to difficulties in which Scindia had become recently involved in the Deccan, he entertained dreams of independence. Perron was known to be in correspondence with the French Directory at Paris, and the British government was again threatened with the possibility of the establishment of French power in India on the ruins of the Native States in the North-West and the Deccan. Perron and the British Governor General each recognised in the other his most formidable foe. Next in importance to Scindia, among the Mahratta Chiefs, was Holkar, whose military talents made him Scindia’s most dangerous rival. His disciplined battalions, commanded by Europeans, were second only in number and efficiency to Scindia’s. Fortunately the dissensions between these Chiefs had reached a height that made co-operation between them out of the question.

From the conclusion of the Treaty of Salbye, 17th May 1782, to the end of 1802, no serious clash of interests had occurred between the British government and the Mahratta Chiefs. While Scindia and Holkar alternately extended their conquests at the expense of the Mahommedan and Rajpoot States, or strove together for supremacy at Poonah, the British Government preserved an attitude of neutrality, till events occurred that led Scindia into direct collision with the British power.

In 1798, dissensions broke out between Scindia and the widows of his late uncle Madho Rao Scindia; in the following year, the ladies fled for protection to the Rajah of Kolapore, who was then at war with the Peishwa. Raising a large force, the Kolapore Chief advanced on Poona, and severe fighting ensued. The Peishwa and Scindia were hard pressed, the flame spread, and the whole Southern Mahratta country was thrown into disorder. Taking advantage of his rival’s difficulties, Holkar took the field in Malwa, and ravaged Scindia’s territories. Perron meanwhile was fully occupied in the North in preparations to resist a threatened Afghan invasion, and could render no assistance to his master. At this juncture Nana Farnawis died (13th March 1800), and a fresh dispute over his property arose between Scindia and the Peishwa. Fresh umbrage was taken by Scindia at the permission granted by the Peishwa for British troops to follow Dhoondia Wao into Mahratta territory. In the midst of these embarrassments, Scindia’s presence in Malwa to oppose Holkar became imperatively necessary, and he left Poona. His movements were, however, so slow and ill-considered that Holkar was able to overwhelm in succession two of his disciplined brigades, under M‘Intyre and Hessing (July 1801), and plundered Oojain. Roused by this disaster, Scindia quickly dealt a counterstroke on the 14th Oct. 1801, when he signally defeated Holkar in front of Indore, and plundered that city. Failing however to follow up the blow, his possessions in Kandeish were devastated by Holkar, who was soon in the field again, moving towards Poona. Scindia’s General, Sadasheo Bhow, interposed between Holkar’s army and the capital; but Holkar was not to be denied, and, on 25th Oct. 1802, the combined armies of Scindia and the Peishwa were completely defeated at Poona, after a sanguinary engagement which was fought under the eyes of the British Resident. Dismayed at this catastrophe, the Peishwa fled to the coast, where he was received on board a British vessel, and conveyed to Bassein, near Bombay. There, on the 31st December, was signed the Treaty of Bassein, by which the Peishwa formally placed himself under the protection and guidance of the British Govt., with whom he concluded an offensive and defensive alliance. It soon became evident that the Peishwa’s treaty had aroused Scindia’s hostility, and that he was preparing for war.

Till recently, Scindia had viewed the Company’s power with comparative indifference. Their undertakings had not always been successful; their resources, so far as he was able to judge, were greatly inferior to his own, and, with his disciplined battalions, he believed himself able to give a good account of any army the British Government could bring into the field. His resentment was first awakened by the treaty concluded in September 1798 between the Company and the Nizam, on whom the Mahratta Chiefs conceived that they had claims. On the outbreak of the war between Tippoo and the English, Scindia formed the project of attacking the Nizam, but the fall of Tippoo, before he could take the field, caused him to abandon the plan, and Scindia became aware that the Company’s power was more formidable than he had suspected. It was, however, no policy of wanton aggression on our part that brought about the wars waged by the Marquis of Wellesley. The real contest was between the British and French power in India. England and France were locked in a deadly struggle, which in India, on the French side, was fought out by Native Chiefs directed by French officers in correspondence with the French Directory in Paris. Had it not been so, our policy would have been directed to smoothing over matters in India, while our whole weight was thrown into the scale elsewhere. But circumstances did not allow of this, and it was in pursuance of the policy forced on us, that, first, Tippoo the centre of French influence in India was struck down; next, the French party at Hyderabad were dispersed by our assuming protection of the Nizam; and finally Scindia, the Rajah of Berar and Holkar were humbled by the defeat of their disciplined armies by Lake and Wellesley.

The assumption of the protectorate of the Peishwa, was regarded by Scindia as a challenge for the mastery of India. A defensive alliance was offered to him by the British, which he rejected, and his apprehensions were worked on by the Bhonslay Rajah of Berar, who was the prime mover in the war that followed. The quarrel with Holkar was patched up, and an alliance was formed between Scindia, Holkar and the Bhonslay to be directed against the Peishwa, the Nizam, and the East India Company. An able and comprehensive plan for simultaneous action was devised by Perron, by which one hundred and fifteen thousand predatory horse and ninety-four battalions would have at once carried fire and sword into the Company’s and the Nizam’s territories, and would have prevented any co-operation between the three powers thus assailed. But the plan came to nothing. Perron’s intrigues had aroused the distrust of Scindia, while the long existing animosity between Scindia and Holkar was too recent and too bitter to allow of prompt co-operation. The Mahratta Chiefs calculated on the British forces not moving till after the rainy season, and expected no active hostilities before October. Holkar’s forces were so tardily set in motion, that they were still on the Nerbudda when the battle of Assaye was fought. On receipt of the news he withdrew his troops to Indore, and avoided compromising himself farther.

Scindia, having suspended all operations against Holkar, had marched southwards to Burhanpore, towards the end of February, where he was joined by the Nagpore Rajah. Their joint forces then advanced towards the Nizam’s frontier where they encamped.

As soon as Scindia’s hostile intentions became known, a force of nearly 20,000 men was assembled at Hurryhur, on the north-west frontier of Mysore, under Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley. The restoration of the Peishwa to his capital was the first thing to be done. On the 9th March, Wellesley marched for Poona with 10,617 men, among whom were the 19th Light Dragoons, drawing 412 sabres. The remainder of the force was commanded by Colonel Stevenson, acting in concert with Wellesley. On the 20th April, Wellesley reached Poona, the last sixty miles being covered in 32 hours by the cavalry, who had been pushed on ahead to save the city from being plundered.[43] Holkar’s forces withdrew on his approach, and, on the 13th May, the Peishwa arrived from Bassein escorted by British troops. Wellesley then advanced to Walkee, six miles from Ahmednuggur, while negotiations with the confederated Mahratta Chiefs continued. By the end of July all hope of preserving peace had disappeared. The British Resident with Scindia was therefore directed to withdraw, which he did on the 3rd August.

The campaign that ensued was remarkable, not only for its complete success, but for the extended nature of the operations carried on simultaneously by a number of bodies of troops, acting to a great extent in complete independence of each other, after the signal for hostilities had been given. No better lesson in the art of war could be studied than in the dispositions made by the Marquis of Wellesley to bring matters to a successful issue, when the maintenance of peace was no longer possible. A brief resumé of them here will not be out of place. As the negotiations with Scindia made the warlike intentions of that Chief more and more evident, troops were assembled at various points, so that, on the outbreak of hostilities, the distribution of forces on both sides was as follows.

The combined Mahratta Chiefs, without Holkar, could dispose of 87 battalions of Infantry, 500 guns, and over 80,000 Cavalry. In the north, Perron had his Head Quarters at Alyghur, a fortress on which much dependence was placed. He had over 16,000 regular Infantry, about 5000 regular Cavalry, and a great number of irregular troops. En route to join him from the Deccan were 25,000 men, under a French officer, Dudrenec, of whom nearly 8000 were regular Infantry. With Scindia, in the Deccan, were over 16,000 Infantry and upwards of 50,000 Mahratta Cavalry. In Bundelcund, under Shumshere Bahadoor, were about 3000 regular Infantry, 20 guns, and 10,000 Cavalry. All fortresses and fortified towns were strongly held, and there were many detached corps of considerable strength in Cuttack and elsewhere.

On the British side, a force under the Commander-in-Chief, General Lake, consisting of 10,500 men, was assembled at Cawnpore, destined to act against Perron. At Allahabad, a force of 3500 men, under Lt. Colonel Powell, was assembled to operate in Bundelcund. At Chunar and Mirzapore, 2000 men were stationed under Major General Deare, to cover Benares and act on the defensive. From the Saone, near Sasseram, to Pachet on the Damodar river, a similar force was so disposed, under Lt. Colonel Broughton, as to cover the Company’s territories in that region. This force was afterwards reinforced, and took the offensive in the eastern provinces of Berar. Farther to the south east, at Midnapore, a force of 1300 men, under Colonel Fenwick, was posted to cover the frontier and threaten Cuttack. At Ganjam, a force of 3540 men was ready, under Lt. Colonel Campbell, to operate in Cuttack, supported by 500 men at Balasore, under Captain Morgan, and 854 men under Lt. Colonel Ferguson, at Jalasore. The Cuttack operations were however carried out by Lieut. Colonel Harcourt, in consequence of the serious illness of Lt. Colonel Campbell at the very commencement of field operations.

In the Deccan, to operate against Scindia, 8900 men, under Major General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, were encamped at Walkee near Ahmednuggur. Farther to the eastward, and north of the Godavery, was Colonel Stevenson with the Hyderabad subsidiary force, consisting of 7900 men and the Nizam’s own troops, acting as a separate corps in co-operation with Wellesley. In Guzerat, 7350 men under Colonel Murray, acting under the orders of Wellesley, furnished a corps of 2187 men north of the Nerbudda, covering Baroda, and a second corps of 2094 men, south of the Tapti between Songhur and Surat: the remainder being employed to garrison Surat, Cambay, and Baroda, thus effectually cutting off Scindia’s access to the coast. In addition to these, garrisons of 1600 men and 2000 men were posted at Poona and Hyderabad respectively, to ensure tranquillity and protect those capitals, while a reserve of 4032 men, under Major General Campbell, was stationed at Moodgul, south of the Kistna.

That the strain on the Company’s resources was very great is evident from the fact that the Governor General sent his Body Guard into the field, though he himself remained in Calcutta. The truest policy demanded that the war should be actively prosecuted and brought to a decisive termination as soon as possible, before further complications should arise; not the least of which was the expected arrival of a French squadron from Europe. How clearly this policy was recognised and adopted, and how splendidly it was carried out may be seen from the mere record of achievements. The rapidity with which blow after blow was struck, will be best gathered from the following table:—

Our interest is, however, mainly with the forces commanded by Major General Wellesley.

1803–1804

Wellesley reached Ahmednuggur on the 8th August. The fort was an exceedingly strong one, and the pettah or fortified town was also strongly held. An immediate assault on the pettah was ordered, which was completely successful. The town was taken, at a cost of 27 killed and 92 wounded: the 19th Light Dragoons had one man wounded. This was a brilliant opening to the campaign, which impressed friends and enemies alike. A Mahratta Chief, commanding a body of the Peishwa’s horse in Wellesley’s camp, wrote to his friends in Poona: “These English are a strange people, and their General a wonderful man: they came here in the morning, looked at the pettah wall, walked over it, killed all the garrison and returned to breakfast!” In attacking fortified places that did not require regular siege operations, Wellesley successfully followed the plan, both in 1800 and on this occasion, of attacking by escalade directly he appeared before the place.

At daybreak on the 10th, a battery was opened against the fort, which surrendered on the 12th.

After arranging for the settlement of the Ahmednuggur district, Wellesley crossed the Godavery at Toka, and advanced to Aurungabad, which he reached on the 29th August. The crossing of the Godavery took seven days to complete. Scindia’s force meanwhile had entered the Nizam’s territory by the Ajunta Pass, and had taken Jaulna. The Mahratta army then moved southwards, as if intending to cross the Godavery and attack Hyderabad, but were baffled by Wellesley moving southward along the left bank of the Godavery. They therefore turned northward again, from Partoor, towards the Ajunta Pass, and encamped in the neighbourhood of Bokerdun and Assaye. In the interval, Stevenson, who had been operating to the north-eastward, returned and retook Jaulna on the 2nd September. On the 6th, and again on the 9th, he surprised the camps of two parties of Mahratta horse, after which he halted at Budnapore, near Jalgaum. Wellesley was delayed on the Godavery till the 18th, pending the arrival of a large convoy.

On the 21st, he reached Jalgaum, where he concerted a plan of operation with Stevenson. According to the best information, the enemy was believed to be at Bokerdun and Jaffirabad, about thirty miles distant, but the enormous numbers of the enemy’s cavalry made it impossible to procure trustworthy information by reconnoissance. It was agreed that the two forces should advance next day by separate roads, and fall on the enemy on the 24th. At the end of the first day’s march, on the 22nd, news was brought to Wellesley, at Paugri, that the enemy was moving westward, and was making for the Ajunta Pass. The news was false. Stevenson’s line of march lay about fifteen miles westward of Wellesley’s. On the 23rd, Wellesley made a fourteen-mile march to Naulniah. On arriving there, he found that, instead of being ten or twelve miles from the enemy, as he had anticipated, he was only half that distance from them. He was also told that their cavalry had moved off, and the infantry were about to follow. It was necessary to ascertain the truth at once. The baggage was accordingly left at Naulniah, under charge of a battalion of Native Infantry and the rearguard picquets,[44] and the rest of the force moved forwards. The General, at the same time, pushed on ahead with the Cavalry. Without counting the force detached to guard the baggage in Naulniah, Wellesley’s force consisted of nearly 6000 men (of whom about 1600 were Europeans), and 14 guns, of which eight were the 6 Pr. galloper guns of the Cavalry. There were also contingents of the Mysore and Peishwa’s horsemen. After going about three miles, he suddenly, about one o’clock, came in sight of the enemy’s camp beyond the Kaitna, near the village of Assaye, in a peninsula formed by the junction of the Kaitna and Juah rivers. The Kaitna was only passable at certain points; the Juah had less water in it, but had very steep banks. Along both rivers the ground was much broken by ravines.

Walker & Boutall sc.

BATTLE OF ASSAYE
23rd. September 1803.

Wellesley’s position was a difficult one. He had unexpectedly come into close contact with a vastly superior force ready to receive him, instead of being in the act of moving off, as he had been led to expect. Stevenson’s force, in co-operation with which he had intended to fight the action, was ten or twelve miles away. Should he retreat to Naulniah and wait for Stevenson, he would be followed and forced to fight under disadvantageous circumstances, and, owing to the enemy’s great superiority in cavalry, would probably lose a portion of his baggage. He resolved to cross the river and attack at once. He saw that if he could carry his force across the Kaitna anywhere near its junction with the Juah, the great superiority in numbers of the Mahrattas would be to a certain extent neutralized by the narrower front on which they would be obliged to engage. At the same time, should his attack fail, Wellesley was liable to be forced back into the acute angle formed by the two rivers, and be destroyed, like Charles XII. at Pultava. It was a choice of risks, and Wellesley chose the smaller one. The direct ford was commanded by the powerful Mahratta artillery, which made crossing at that point extremely hazardous. Examining the ground with his glasses, Wellesley noticed the two villages of Peepulgaon and Waroor close together on opposite sides of the river, and, in spite of the denial of his guides, jumped to the conclusion that there must be a ford there. A search showed that he was right, and word was sent back for the infantry to direct their march on Peepulgaon. Meanwhile the Cavalry (A. in plan) remained facing a large body of the enemy’s Cavalry (B. in plan), that had crossed the river. By this time, the Mahratta camp had been struck, and their army appeared drawn up in a long line (C. in plan), covered by the Kaitna, with a great mass of cavalry on the right, and the guns on the left.

As the British force moved across the enemy’s front, part of it came within range of the Mahratta Artillery, but beyond a Staff Officer being slightly wounded, and the General’s orderly dragoon having his head carried off by a round shot, no loss was incurred. The crossing of the Kaitna was effected without opposition, and the British force was drawn up across the fork between the two rivers in three lines (F. in plan). The first two lines, with an interval of about 300 paces between them, were composed of infantry, H.M.’s 78th Regiment being on the left of the first line, and H.M.’s 74th on the right of the 2nd line. The cavalry formed the third line. The Peishwa’s and Mysore cavalry remained on the south side of the Kaitna (D. in plan), to keep in check a large body of the enemy’s cavalry. There was a good deal of delay in crossing the Kaitna, which was taken advantage of by the enemy to change front to the left of their first line, and they now occupied a long line (E. in plan), with its left resting on the village of Assaye, and defended along the whole front by upwards of one hundred guns. The village of Assaye was occupied with infantry, and had a number of guns disposed in front of it. The Mahratta line of battle, exclusive of a large body of troops detailed to guard stores and baggage, consisted of thirteen battalions of disciplined infantry, one hundred and fifteen guns, and over thirty-five thousand horsemen. There were also a large number of undisciplined infantry.

While the British lines were forming, the movement was covered by artillery fire. This was quickly responded to by the Mahratta guns, which caused such severe losses among the British gun bullocks, that the guns had to be left behind when the advance was made.

Wellesley had not given the enemy credit for being able to change their front with so large a force, without falling into disarray. On perceiving the alteration in the enemy’s position, he saw that it was necessary to extend his front. He accordingly ordered the picquets, which formed the right of the first line, to move obliquely to the right, so as to allow the native infantry battalions in the second line to come up on the right of the first line, H.M.’s 74th being directed to take the right of the whole. Wellesley’s intention was to force back the enemy from their guns, then, operating by his left, to throw them back on the Juah, and complete their destruction with his cavalry. Wellesley himself led the left of the line, while Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell and the cavalry were ordered to support the right, which was still greatly outflanked. Particular orders were given to the officer in command of the picquets, which formed the battalion of direction, to keep out of gunshot of Assaye. But the losses caused by the Mahratta artillery were so severe, that the advance became necessary before the formation was complete. Every shot told, knocking over men, horses, and bullocks, and putting several of the British guns out of action. Wellesley on the left, impatient to advance, sent repeated messages to the officer commanding the picquets. He was told that the guns were disabled, to which he replied “Well, tell him to get on without them.”

As the line advanced, the Mahratta infantry gave ground, abandoning their guns. By mistake, the officer commanding the picquets continued his oblique movement too far, and led direct on Assaye, masking the 74th; a mistake that had an important influence on the course of the battle. This caused a great gap in the British line, separated the picquets and H.M. 74th from the rest of the line, and brought them under a tremendous fire of artillery and small arms. They were further impeded in their advance and thrown into disarray, by having to pass some cactus hedges. The Mahratta infantry, as they fell back from their guns, separated into two distinct bodies. The greater number threw back their right, forming a second line (H. in plan), with the Juah river at its back, and its left still resting on Assaye; while one whole Brigade, under a German named Pohlman, continued to retreat directly to its rear (M. in plan). At the same time, great numbers of the enemy threw themselves down, pretending to be dead, and allowed the British line to pass over them. The British line swung round to its right (I. in plan), to attack the enemy’s second line, and, here the first critical period of the battle occurred. The picquets and H.M. 74th Foot were no longer able to advance under the terrible fire to which they were exposed. Numbers fell at every step; all formation was lost, and a body of Mahratta horse, wheeling round the village of Assaye, charged the 74th in flank, sabreing numbers of them. They also recaptured some of their own guns, and gained possession of some of the British guns that had not been able to keep up with the advance, killing the gunners and turning the guns against the British rear. It was a critical moment, and, with a soldier’s instinct, Maxwell saw that the time for action had come. Advancing with his brigade, Maxwell charged the enemy’s left, driving them into the Juah with great slaughter: then, as the rest of the line advanced and drove the enemy into the nullah, the Cavalry crossed the Juah, and charged the broken masses of the enemy (J. in plan), making a horrid slaughter of them, and driving them off the field.

But the battle was not yet over. A great body of the enemy still remained, holding Assaye and the ground between the village and the Juah, while the guns they had got possession of in different parts of the field played on the rear of the exhausted British troops. Pohlman’s brigade also was unbroken, and threatened an attack. Two sepoy battalions sent successively against Assaye were repulsed. Maxwell’s cavalry were still across the Juah in pursuit of the broken Mahratta battalions, and, had the Mahratta horsemen behaved at this juncture with the same spirit that had led them to charge the 74th, the day might have been theirs. At this crisis, Maxwell with the cavalry returned from across the Juah, and formed up on the left of the British line. Directing Maxwell with the 19th Light Dragoons and two of his native regiments to face Pohlman’s brigade, Wellesley took H.M.’s 78th and a regiment of Native Cavalry, and moved against Assaye. The enemy did not await the attack, but retreated across the Juah in tolerable order. In this movement, the General had his horse killed by a cannon shot. Then, moving along the whole line first occupied by the enemy (E. in plan), he recaptured all the guns, not without some severe fighting. Meanwhile, Maxwell led the 19th Light Dragoons and the two native regiments (L. in plan), to charge Pohlman’s brigade. Both men and horses were exhausted with the efforts they had made, and the attack, instead of being delivered perpendicular to the enemy’s front, was made obliquely against Pohlman’s left. The well disciplined Mahrattas reserved their fire till they could deliver it with good effect, and Maxwell fell dead pierced by a grape shot. The fall of their leader checked the squadrons almost at the moment of contact, and the British horsemen swept to the left, receiving the fire of the Mahratta infantry as they passed, at so close a distance, that several of the squadron officers had their horses wounded with bayonets. No further effort was made, the squadrons “halted, and then walked, and then trotted back.”[46] The British troops were so few in numbers, so weakened and fatigued by their exertions, as to be incapable of farther efforts, and Pohlman marched off the field without farther molestation. Thus ended the conflict. The Mysore and friendly Mahratta horse, who throughout the contest had only one casualty, would not pursue without the British cavalry, and the British cavalry were too exhausted to give them a lead. Out of the small British force, there were, among the Europeans, 198 killed, 442 wounded, and 4 missing; among the Natives, 230 killed, 696 wounded, and 14 missing. The 19th Light Dragoons, who had the greatest share of casualties among the cavalry, lost two officers killed, Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell and Captain Boyle, four officers wounded, Captains Cathcart and Sale, and Lieutenants Wilson and Young; fifteen Rank and File and eighty-seven horses killed, thirty-six Rank and File and thirty-six horses wounded, two horses missing. Of the enemy, it was computed that twelve hundred lay dead on the field, and four thousand eight hundred were wounded. One hundred and two guns,[47] seven stands of colours, and a vast quantity of ammunition and stores remained in the hands of the victors.

It was eight o’clock in the evening before the field was entirely clear of the enemy. The cavalry were then sent back to Naulniah to bring on the camp equipage, &c., which they did the following morning. The rest of the force bivouacked as best they could on the bloody field. Wellesley, who had had one horse killed, and another wounded with a spear, passed the night on the ground, close to an officer whose leg was shot off, and within five yards of a dead officer.

Long after his victorious career was ended, he spoke of Assaye as the bloodiest battle for the number engaged that he ever saw. Of the ten officers forming the General’s staff eight were wounded or had their horses shot. The 74th and the picquet battalion were almost annihilated; one picquet half company alone had 21 killed, 22 wounded, and three missing. The 74th lost 401 of all ranks, killed and wounded. Two of the native cavalry regiments, being newly raised, were not as forward as they should have been, so that the brunt of the cavalry work was borne by the 19th Light Dragoons and the 4th Native Cavalry. Much of the heavy loss suffered by the British troops was due to the misunderstanding of Wellesley’s orders by the officer commanding the picquets, though, as Wellesley generously said, in a letter written a month later, “I must acknowledge that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the picquets on that day against Assaye.” The early use of the cavalry, however, prevented the total destruction of the enemy that he had intended. The exhaustion caused by their efforts too early in the battle, prevented them from entirely breaking up and routing the disciplined Mahratta infantry.

A singular circumstance is said to have occurred after the battle. Each of the Commanders of the three armies, put to death his head spy.

Ample testimony has been borne to the conspicuous gallantry of the 19th in this hard fought field.

Among other incidents may be mentioned the case of Cornet Serle of the 19th who was under arrest at the time of the action, for some disagreement with his commanding officer. At the commencement of the battle he broke his arrest, and joined his corps, and, by his gallant behaviour throughout the day, regained permission to wear his sword again.

Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell’s splendid service was fittingly recognized by the East India Company, who granted a pension of £300 to his widow, “although we find that there is no example of the Company’s making any allowance to the widow of a King’s Officer.”[51]

In his dispatch to the Governor General, dated the day after the battle, Wellesley wrote: “I have also to draw your Excellency’s notice to the conduct of the Cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th Dragoons”: and, in a General Order published in Calcutta on the 30th October, it was said, “The Governor General in Council has remarked with great satisfaction the gallant and skilful conduct of the Cavalry, commanded by Lt. Colonel Maxwell and particularly of His Majesty’s nineteenth regiment of Light Dragoons, a corps distinguished in India by a long and uninterrupted course of arduous service and of progressive honour.” Honorary colours in commemoration of the battle were granted to the 19th Light Dragoons, the 74th and 78th “to be used by those corps while they shall continue in India, or until His Majesty’s most gracious pleasure be signified through his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.”

The damage inflicted on the Mahratta host was far in excess of that indicated by their loss in men and material. Many of the disciplined battalions had been destroyed, and hearty co-operation between the leaders was at an end. They fled northwards through the Ajunta Pass, abandoning some guns which were afterwards picked up by Stevenson, and then separated. Scindia, who believed that he had not been loyally supported by the Berar Rajah, retreated to Thalnair in Khandesh; the Berar Rajah retired to his fortress at Gawilghur, while five battalions belonging to the Begum Somroo, four of which had been employed to guard the Mahratta camp, and therefore took no part in the action, retreated to Burhanpore, whence they made their way back to Sirdhana in the North West, and took no further part in the campaign.

The sound of Wellesley’s guns at Assaye was heard by Stevenson, who at once broke up camp and attempted to join him; but being without information, and misled by his guides, he marched first on Bokerdun, which he did not reach till next day, being entangled in a nullah during the night. His force was greatly harassed by night marching and want of rest, so that he did not join Wellesley till the evening of the 24th. All the 25th he remained at Assaye, in order that his surgeons might assist the wounded, and, on the 26th, marched in pursuit of the enemy. Wellesley remained encamped near the field of battle till the 8th October, to make arrangements for the care of his numerous wounded, and for the captured guns and stores. Nor was there urgent necessity for an immediate move, till something was known of the movements of the enemy. The General’s first movements after the battle were in the direction of Aurungabad, as Scindia showed an intention of marching on Poona. Then, learning that Scindia had turned back towards Burhanpore, on which place Stevenson was advancing, Wellesley turned northwards to Ajunta. Stevenson meanwhile had occupied Burhanpore on the 15th, and attacked the fortress of Asseerghur, which surrendered on the 21st. Wellesley, hearing that Scindia and the Berar Rajah had joined forces again, and were threatening Stevenson, descended the Ajunta Pass on the 18th, and moved northwards; but, on receiving news that Asseerghur had fallen, and that the confederates had again separated, he retraced his steps, ascended the Pass on the 25th, and marched to Aurungabad to protect some convoys which were threatened by the Berar Rajah. From Aurungabad he made several attempts to surprise the Bhonslay’s camp without success, although he forced him to move his camp five times between the 29th and the 31st.

Wellesley continued moving slowly eastwards, to cover the Nizam’s territory, till the 11th November, when he struck northwards from Patree to Rajoora, which he reached on the 23rd. For some days, Scindia, under the influence of his defeat at Assaye in conjunction with bad news from his forces in the North West, had made overtures for a cessation of hostilities, and, on the 23rd, an armistice was agreed on; the principal condition of which was that Scindia should separate himself from the Berar Rajah, and take up a position fifty miles east of Ellichpore.

The agreement was not however faithfully observed by Scindia, some of whose troops took part in the subsequent battle. The Berar Rajah, meanwhile, had entered his own territories, and was encamped at Argaum. On the 27th, Wellesley reached Akola, and, about 2 o’clock in the afternoon on the 29th, he joined Stevenson at Parterly, for the purpose of undertaking the siege of Gawilghur with their united forces.

The Berar Rajah, who was encamped at Argaum about six miles from Parterly, had meanwhile opened negotiations with Stevenson for a suspension of hostilities, so preparations were made for encamping at Parterly. On putting out the picquets to take up the ground, they were molested by parties of the enemy, and, a reconnoissance showed the Mahratta army drawn up in battle array, on an extensive plain in front of the village of Argaum. The troops were at once ordered to fall in, and the two divisions moved to the front in parallel columns. At about 1000 yards in front of the enemy was the village of Sirsoni. It was Wellesley’s intention to pass by the left of the village, and then, wheeling to the right, to form line in front of it, parallel with the Mahratta line of battle. The column was led by the native infantry picquets, accompanied by some field pieces drawn by bullocks, followed by two native infantry battalions, all of whom had taken part in the battle of Assaye. On the head of the column clearing the village, the Mahratta guns opened fire with great effect. The bullock drivers lost their presence of mind and the management of their cattle, which turned round and threw into confusion the ranks behind them. The troops coming up in rear, not knowing the cause of the confusion, and suffering from the cannonade, were seized with panic, and fell back in disorder, to seek shelter behind the village. Wellesley, who was close by, giving orders to the brigadiers, seeing what had happened,

The lesson is one to be borne in mind by those to whose lot it may fall to rally troops thrown into disorder under fire.

In order to cover the formation, some guns were brought into action on each side of the village, and, as each battalion came into position, it was made to lie down, which further helped to steady the troops. The infantry were formed into a single line, with Stevenson’s division on the left, while the six cavalry regiments of the two divisions, under command of Lieutenant Colonel the Honble. Arthur St Leger, were formed in two lines in rear of the right. The British left was covered by the native auxiliary horse. The Mahratta line was about five miles in length, the infantry and guns in the centre, with cavalry on both flanks.

It was half past four in the afternoon before the British line advanced. On the signal being given, the British cavalry moved rapidly forward, and brought their galloper guns into action against a great body of the enemy’s cavalry and rocket men. Meanwhile, the infantry advanced steadily against the Mahratta centre. When almost within musket shot, a body of the enemy’s infantry, nearly a thousand strong, composed of Arabs or Pathans, dashed forward against the 74th and 78th, and perished almost to a man under the Highland musket and bayonet. Almost at the same moment, a body of Scindia’s cavalry charged the British left, and were repulsed with loss, while the 19th and the five native regiments on the right charged the cavalry in front of them. The Mahrattas did not stand the shock, but broke and fled, and at once the whole of the enemy’s force was dissolved in flight. The cavalry pursued for many miles, killing great numbers, and capturing many elephants and camels, and much baggage. Thirty-eight guns and many standards fell into the hands of the victors. The British loss amounted to 46 killed, 308 wounded and 7 missing. As at Assaye, the principal loss fell on the 74th and 78th, who, between them, lost 13 killed, and 84 wounded. The 19th Light Dragoons had 6 men wounded. The battle of Argaum was fought on a perfectly level plain intersected by small water courses, without any buildings or other natural obstacles between the two lines, after they had been formed, and was carried out exactly like a field day as then practised. The pursuit of the enemy by the British cavalry was maintained for six miles, and was then taken up and continued by the allied Mysore and Nizam’s horse for another twenty miles. The loss of the enemy, in the battle and subsequent pursuit, was estimated at five thousand men. At Assaye, the principal Mahratta loss fell on Scindia’s troops; at Argaum the loss fell chiefly on the Berar forces.

The victory at Argaum effected a complete separation of the Mahratta confederate chiefs. Scindia still had a considerable force in the field, but it had ceased to be formidable after Assaye. The Berar Rajah’s field army had disappeared, and his territories lay open to the invading British force. Scindia’s capital was far off, and he might yet give trouble, so Wellesley determined to finish once for all with the Berar Rajah, in order that he might be able to devote undivided attention to Scindia afterwards.

The day following the battle, Stevenson marched in pursuit of the enemy: Wellesley followed a day later, and the two divisions were re-united at Ellichpore on the 5th December. Thence they marched on Gawilghur, a fortress of great strength, regarded as the key of the Deccan, in which the defeated infantry from Argaum had taken refuge. The place was taken by assault on the 15th, with the loss of 13 killed, no wounded, and three missing. Fifty-two guns, together with a great quantity of small arms and military stores, fell into the hands of the victors. Nagpore, the Berar Rajah’s capital, now lay open to the British troops, and the Rajah hastened to sue for peace. The negotiation was conducted with the decision that characterized all Wellesley’s actions, and peace was concluded at Deogam, on the 17th, two days after the fall of Gawilghur. His hands being now free on this side, Wellesley gave notice to Scindia, that, on the 27th, he should regard the agreement for suspension of hostilities at an end, unless that Chief came to definite terms. Left without an ally, with his armies defeated both in the North-West and in the Deccan, Scindia had no hope of continuing the struggle with success, and peace was signed in Wellesley’s camp on the 30th December, at Surjee Anjengaum.

Thus triumphantly ended a war which for boldness of conception of campaign, rapidity of execution, the great extent over which it was waged, and the hard fighting that characterized it both in the North and South, stands in marked contrast to any war we had previously waged in India.

But the most valuable result to England was that she learned from the Assaye campaign that she had in her army a General who was fit to cope with the best Generals of Europe.

The war was over, and arrangements were made for the return of the troops to their quarters. Leaving Stevenson’s division, Wellesley turned southwards to Jaulna, which he reached on the 19th January 1804. A few days before the conclusion of peace, in writing to the Commander-in-Chief, Wellesley remarked: “The 19th Dragoons have now better horses than I have ever seen with them.” It was well that it was so, for a severe effort was still required of them. The Nizam’s dominions were at that time infested with banditti, mostly disbanded soldiers, who plundered the country in all directions, and had become so daring that they had not hesitated to attack detachments of British troops. On reaching Jaulna, news was brought to Wellesley of a large body of freebooters who were plundering the country to the southward. Crossing the Godavery, he marched to Neemgaum, where, on the 2nd February, he received information of the whereabouts of the marauders. He accordingly made up a light flying column consisting of the 19th Light Dragoons and the rest of the cavalry that had been with him at Assaye, the remnants of the gallant 74th, a sepoy battalion, and details from other sepoy regiments, 150 pioneers, and four guns,[55] and marched on the 3rd, reaching Sailgaon on the 4th, a distance of about thirty miles in a direct line. Marching again the same night, he came up with the freebooters about 9 A.M. on the 5th. The cavalry charged at once, slaying great numbers and dispersing them, at the same time capturing their guns, camp, and stores. An unfortunate mishap occurred on this occasion. The 19th mistook some of the allied Mahratta horse for the enemy, and charged them, cutting down two or three of them, and having one of their own number cut down, before the mistake was discovered. The achievement was remarkable for the long and rapid marching performed by the troops. Writing of it, two days later, Wellesley says:

Well might he add:

The force then marched for Poona.

Hardly had peace been secured, when Holkar, who had hitherto held aloof, took the field. The 19th Light Dragoons took, however, no part in the campaign that followed, but remained encamped at Panwell near Bombay till the end of 1804, when they marched for Arcot.

In 1807, the royal permission was given to the regiment to wear a badge of the Elephant with the word “Assaye,” on colours and appointments, in commemoration of the gallantry displayed by the regiment in the battle and during the campaign. Nothing can be traced of the honorary standard presented to the regiment for Assaye There can be no doubt that it was given to the 19th as it was to the 74th and 78th.

General Visct. Howe, K.B.
or O.C. 19th Light Dragoons.

1805–1807

In January 1801, a second Lieut. Colonel had been added to the establishment of the regiment, in the person of Major Edgar Hunter, promoted from the 2nd Dragoon Guards, without purchase. Lt. Colonel Hunter remained in England, and never joined the regiment. The vacancy caused by Maxwell’s death at Assaye was filled for a time by the Governor General, at Sir Arthur Wellesley’s recommendation, appointing Lieutenant Colonel William Wallace of the 74th Highlanders to command the 19th Light Dragoons. But the appointment was not confirmed in England, and, the following year, Wallace was transferred to H.M. 80th, to make way for Major James Kennedy, who had been promoted to fill the vacancy. A little later, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Wilson was brought from half-pay of Hompesch’s Mounted Riflemen to be Lieutenant Colonel, in place of Hunter, who was placed on half-pay. But Wilson also did not join the regiment, and, three months later, exchanged into the 20th Light Dragoons with Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie, who, during the short time he was with the 19th, was destined to perform one of the most curious feats of arms ever done by an individual.

In an age prolific of daring deeds Gillespie was already widely known as the hero of many a desperate adventure. Headstrong and impetuous by nature, in action he was a brave and gallant soldier to whom nothing appeared impossible. The only child of a Scotch gentleman settled in Ireland, at the age of ten Gillespie was gazetted as Ensign to the 45th Foot, from which he was transferred as Lieutenant to the 104th. On that regiment being disbanded in the beginning of 1783, he was transferred as Cornet to the 6th Dragoon Guards, then quartered in Ireland. Four years later, he was concerned in an affair that attracted much notice at the time, and nearly brought his military career to an abrupt close. While quartered at Athy in Kildare, an altercation took place one day in Gillespie’s room, between one of his brother officers, named Mackenzie, and a Mr Barrington, brother of Sir Jonah Barrington, whose estate was in the neighbourhood. In a duelling age, the Barringtons were remarkable for their fire-eating propensities. A meeting was fixed upon for the following morning, Barrington insisting on fighting in a particular part of his family estate. Gillespie attended as second to Mackenzie. Shots were exchanged without result, and it was proposed by the seconds that the affair should be considered at an end. Barrington objected, and a fierce quarrel arose between him and Gillespie. A challenge to fight on the spot was given and accepted. Gillespie, knowing Barrington’s reputation as a duellist, drew out his handkerchief, proposing that each should hold one end of it. Both fired at the same moment: Barrington fell shot through the heart, but Gillespie escaped with only a slight wound, the bullet having glanced off a button. Gillespie was tried at the summer assizes of 1788, at Maryborough, for wilful murder, and acquitted by the jury, with a verdict of justifiable homicide.

In 1792, Gillespie was promoted to a Lieutenancy in the newly raised 20th Light Dragoons, which was enlisted for service in Jamaica, and maintained at the expense of the island. In the attack of Port-au-Prince in St Domingo he distinguished himself, along with Captain Rowley of the Navy, by swimming ashore, their swords in their mouths, as bearers of a flag of truce. They were fired on as they swam, and would have been shot on landing, if Gillespie had not made himself known as a freemason to the Governor, who was also a fellow craftsman. While in St Domingo, an attack at night was made on Gillespie’s house by eight men. Awakened by the cries of his servant, who was being murdered, he attacked the assailants with his sword, and killed six of them. The remaining two fled, after inflicting a dangerous wound on him. On exchanging to the 19th, he obtained permission to find his way out to India overland, and travelled through Germany, which was then in the hands of the French, Austria, Servia, Constantinople, where he fought a successful duel with a French Officer who picked a quarrel with him, Aleppo and Baghdad. The journey was a hazardous one at that time, and he had more than one narrow escape. On reaching Arcot, the command of the whole garrison devolved on him, in virtue of his brevet rank. Hardly had he assumed the command, when an event occurred at the neighbouring station of Vellore that will always be associated with Gillespie’s name.

Matters relating to food, dress and other petty details of social life, which in Europe are treated as matters of personal caprice, have, in the East, become so intermingled with religious observances, that they have, in the course of time, come to be regarded as an essential part of the religion of the people, and of paramount importance in the conduct of their lives. Nowhere are these quasi-religious observances so tenaciously held as in India, and nowhere do they relate more to matters which in other countries are held to be of trivial importance. The lesson is one that is continually forcing itself on the notice of Indian administrators, and is continually being forgotten.[56]

After the fall of Seringapatam, in 1799, the strong fortress of Vellore was selected to be the place of residence of the numerous family of Tippoo Sultan. Beyond being required to reside in Vellore, they were under no restraint. They were in receipt of large money allowances from the British Government, and they had gathered around them a swarm of needy followers who were ripe for any mischief. In November 1805, Lieutenant General Sir J. Cradock, who had assumed the command of the forces in Madras a few months earlier, issued an order establishing a new pattern of turbans for the native army. Two months later, a volume of regulations for the army was issued from the Adjutant General’s office, in which Native soldiers were forbidden from wearing caste marks on their faces while in uniform, and the shaving and trimming of beards and mustachios was prescribed, in a manner to assimilate sepoys to English soldiers. In April, made-up patterns of the new turbans were sent to different regiments. The men took it into their heads that these turbans closely resembled the hats worn by half-castes and native Christians; and, connecting this with the orders about caste marks and shaving, leaped to the conclusion that their forcible conversion to Christianity was intended. A sepoy battalion at Vellore at once made known their refusal to wear the turban. The Commander-in-Chief, unable to understand the feelings aroused by his orders, treated the refusal as a mere matter of insubordination. The battalion was sent away from Vellore, another being brought in its place; and a number of non-commissioned officers and men in the battalion were punished. Hardly had this taken place, when it became known that in other places the same objections to the new turban had been manifested. The attention of Government was now roused, but still nothing was done to repeal the obnoxious order. The punishment that had been meted out to the battalion at Vellore only served to confirm the fears of the rest of the native garrison. Meetings were held, at which retainers of the Mysore princes attended, and did their best to foment mischief and increase the fears of the sepoys, while at the same time communications were opened with other sepoys in the different Madras garrisons, encouraging them to combine in resisting the attack on their religion. In the beginning of July, the garrison of the fort consisted of four companies of H.M.’s 69th regiment amounting to 11 officers and 372 rank and file, and a battalion and a half of sepoys, amounting to 35 native officers and 1775 rank and file, with their European officers. A considerable number of the sepoys lived in the pettah, their arms being kept in the fort. The fort and garrison were under the command of Colonel Fancourt of H.M.’s 34th Regt. No suspicion existed that any danger threatened; while the Government departments were still corresponding with each other, and deliberating about the new turban, and the feeling it had caused in the native army, without further warning, the storm burst.

It happened that a field day for one of the sepoy battalions had been ordered for the early morning of the 10th July. It was customary on such occasions for the sepoys, instead of remaining in their huts in the pettah, to sleep inside the fort, in order to get under arms without delay in the morning. The sepoy guards inside the fort were furnished by the other native battalion. So favourable did the opportunity appear to the mutineers, that it led to a premature explosion of the plot that had been formed in concert with sepoys in other stations. At three o’clock in the morning of the 10th, a general attack by the sepoys was suddenly made on the men of the 69th and the European officers in the fort. At the same moment, the guards and sentries were attacked and overpowered, the sick men in hospital massacred, the officers’ quarters surrounded and fired into, while the principal body of mutineers poured volley after volley into the barracks where the 69th were sleeping, and brought two fieldpieces to play on them, obtained from the magazine. The men surprised and shot down in their sleep, and without officers, could do little more than shelter themselves as they best might, and hold the entrance to the barracks. Colonel Fancourt, with several other officers, was shot down at once, and the complete massacre of every European in the fort appeared inevitable. Without waiting for the completion of their work, the mutineers brought out one of the sons of Tippoo, and proclaimed him Sultan, hoisting at the same time a Mysore flag that had been prepared for the occasion.

In the confusion and darkness, a few officers and a sergeant of the 69th, named Brady, managed to meet in the quarters of one of the officers. After maintaining themselves some time, they broke out and forced their way into the 69th barracks, on which a heavy fire was still kept up. Having rallied the survivors, they sallied out through the windows, and gained the adjoining ramparts under a heavy fire. It was now broad daylight, and the men, who had had at the outset only six cartridges each, had scarcely any ammunition left. Nevertheless, they made their way along the ramparts, driving the mutineers before them, till they reached the Magazine which was on the opposite side of the fort. Finding that all the ball ammunition had been already removed by the mutineers, they retraced their steps as far as the work over the main gateway, after pulling down the rebel flag. Here they resolved to make their last stand, their numbers greatly reduced, the only unwounded officers left being two Assistant Surgeons, and the whole party being exposed to a continual fire to which they were scarcely able to respond. They had obtained a few cartridges from the pouches of dead mutineers, with which they still kept up a feeble appearance of defence. In the confusion of making their way along the ramparts to the Magazine, some thirty men of the 69th, with two or three officers, got separated from the main body. Finding a rope suspended from the wall, which had been used to admit mutinous sepoys, they let themselves down by it, and took refuge in a small detached redoubt, where Lt. Colonel Forbes with a few unarmed sepoys who had remained faithful, had taken post. Hopeless as the whole situation appeared at this juncture, help was fast approaching. It happened that Major Coates of the 69th and several of the native infantry officers resided outside the walls. On being aroused by the firing and tumult, and being unable to enter the fort, Coates guessed what had happened, and at once dispatched an officer to Arcot with a letter to Gillespie.

Gillespie had appointed that very morning to ride over to Arcot, to breakfast with Colonel Fancourt. He had mounted his horse at daybreak, and started on his ride, accompanied by Captain Wilson of the 19th, when he was met by Coates’ messenger riding at full speed, who told him that the gates of the fortress were shut, that there was heavy firing and a dreadful noise within. Making at once for the Cavalry lines, Gillespie was in a few minutes hastily galloping along the road to Vellore, at the head of a squadron of the 19th under Captain Wilson, and a troop of the 7th Native Cavalry, leaving orders for the rest of the cavalry and the galloper guns of the 19th to follow as soon as possible, under Lieut. Colonel Kennedy. As the troopers approached the walls, they were seen by the little party who still held out over the gateway. The 69th had been in Jamaica four years before. To Sergeant Bradys astonishment, he beheld at the head of the little band of dragoons the well-known Colonel Gillespie, whom he had seen only a short time before in the West Indies. “If Colonel Gillespie be alive, God Almighty has sent him from the West Indies to save our lives in the East!” he exclaimed. The moment was indeed most critical. The small party over the gateway had fired their last cartridge, and the sepoys, who for a time had dispersed to plunder, were gathering to complete their work. On seeing the relief party advancing, a great number of the mutineers retired to the further ramparts, leaving the gateway and one bastion in possession of the little party under Sergeant Brady. The entrance to the fortress was through four successive gates. The two outer gates were fortunately open, and the drawbridge was down. Encouraged by Gillespie, some of the 69th let themselves down by their pouch and bayonet belts, and opened the third gate from within, not without losing several of their number, but the fourth and the strongest gate was beyond their powers. In order to open it, Gillespie formed the desperate expedient of forcing the wicket and opening the gate from the inside. The wicket was forced, and Gillespie for a brief interval, accompanied by Captain Wilson and three men on foot, stood inside the fort, exposed to the fire of the square and palace yard full of men. But their efforts to break the locks and force the bars were fruitless, and, seeing that perseverance in the attempt could only end in their destruction, the little party withdrew. Still casting about for some means of joining the party over the gateway, Gillespie suddenly spied a rope. The end was at once thrown up and secured, and in a few minutes, by its assistance, Gillespie joined the remnants of the 69th over the gateway. Seeing a pair of regimental colours on the wall Gillespie seized them, and, collecting as many of the 69th as he could find, at once headed a bayonet charge against a three gun battery, out of which the enemy were driven. Though there was not a single round of ammunition procurable, a gun, turned round and pointed towards the mutineers, held them in check, at a time when every minute was valuable. But the effect did not last long, and just as it seemed as if no further effort could be made to stave off the impending fate of the party, the remainder of the 19th with their galloper guns suddenly appeared at the gate. Forcing his way back to the wall above the gateway, Gillespie gave orders for the gate to be burst open, which was done with the first shot. The great square was full of men ready to dispute the entrance of the cavalry, and the entrance being very narrow, and moreover being commanded by two guns, Gillespie called on the remnant of the 69th for one final effort. Putting himself at their head, a gallant bayonet charge was made to clear the entrance for the cavalry, which was attended with further loss. The dragoons poured in, headed by Captain Skelton of the 19th, and supported loyally by some of the 7th native cavalry, and the work of retribution commenced. Between three and four hundred of the mutineers were cut down in the fort, while numbers, who escaped by a sally port, were caught and slain outside, by a squadron of the 19th under Lieutenant Young, and a party of the 7th Native Cavalry under Lieutenant Woodhouse. One party of mutineers maintained themselves for some time in one of the barracks, firing on all who approached; till some of the 19th dismounted and stormed the building, putting them all to the sword. By 10 o’clock all was over, and the safety of the fortress secured, but Gillespie has left it on record that, had he delayed scaling the wall for five minutes, none of those inside the fort could have escaped. The loss of the 69th amounted to 115 rank and file killed, and 76 wounded. Of the officers of different regiments, fifteen were killed and five wounded. Several, who had been unable to make their way to the 69th barracks, saved themselves by concealment during the tumult. Among the 19th Light Dragoons, one trooper was killed and three wounded, a loss that would have been much greater but for the gallantry of the 69th in clearing a space for the cavalry to form in after entering the fort. Gillespie was accidentally ridden down by a dragoon, and badly bruised, in the mêlée.

Investigation showed that the sepoys in many other stations were prepared to mutiny, and, but for the failure at Vellore, which was the centre of disaffection, would have risen. By Gillespie’s resolution and intrepidity in stamping out the mutiny before it could gather force, a great and unexpected danger had been averted. Well might the Commander-in-Chief say that Gillespie had performed “a military wonder.” The princes of Tippoo’s family were at once sent down to Madras, escorted by the 19th Light Dragoons, and embarked for Calcutta, on board the Culloden, on the 30th. The 19th remained in Madras three days, encamped by the Race Stand, and then returned to Arcot. Gillespie was employed at Wallajabad and other places where dangerous symptoms of disaffection had appeared. At the same time, he was appointed to be Inspector and Exercising officer of Cavalry in the Presidency, but the appointment was discontinued as unnecessary, a year later, by the Court of Directors. To show their appreciation of his services, the Court of Directors granted Gillespie a money reward of £2500. A proportionate sum was granted to Sergeant Brady, who was also recommended for a Commission, and each non-commissioned and private of the 19th Light Dragoons who had been employed at Vellore, received a gratuity of one month’s pay. Suitable rewards were also given to the men of the native cavalry, who behaved loyally on the occasion. In consequence of the mutiny, both the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief were recalled to England.

Gillespie’s connection with the 19th practically terminated three months later, when the regiment left India, and the rest of his career does not come within the scope of this history. On the regiment sailing for England, he remained in India, and, in the following year, exchanged into the 8th Light Dragoons with Lieut. Colonel John Ormsby Vandeleur. His gallant deeds at the conquest of Java, and subsequently, while in command of the troops there, can never be forgotten. His death was in keeping with his whole life. He fell under the walls of Kalunga in the Deyrah Dhoon, on the 31st October 1814, at the beginning of the first Nepaul War, while vainly trying to force an entrance at the head of some dismounted dragoons, after the first attack had failed. His remains were carried to Meerut for interment. By the irony of fate, on the 10th May 1857, the first shots of the great sepoy mutiny were fired within a mile of the monument over his grave, and were the beginning of events that at one time threatened to involve British power in the East in ruin, and that have changed the whole course of Indian history. If that gallant spirit was still permitted to take interest in the events of that day, how it must have chafed at the exhibition of incapacity and indecision that led to such disastrous consequences. In view of what happened at Vellore, it is allowable to believe that the Great Mutiny of 1857 would never have assumed the proportions it did, had the first outbreak been met by the same display of energy and resolution as was shown, under similar circumstances, fifty-one years earlier. On the 2nd January 1815, before the news of his death reached England, Gillespie was gazetted as K.C.B. A monument to his memory, by Chantrey, was erected in St Paul’s Cathedral, at the expense of the nation.

G. Chinnery, pinx. Walker & Boutall, ph. sc.

Major General R. R. Gillespie
from a miniature in the possession of his grandson Colonel Gillespie.

The time had now arrived when the 19th was to bring to a close its long and distinguished career in India. Orders were received for the regiment to march to Madras, for embarkation to Europe by the next homeward bound fleet. At Poonamallee, on 5th October, they made over their horses to the 25th Light Dragoons, who had been brought down from Bengal, by sea, to take their place. In the twenty-four years that had elapsed since the regiment had landed in India, great were the changes it had witnessed. At the time of its arrival, the very existence of the British settlements in Southern India hung by a thread. England had then been at war with France, and the two countries were still at war. But the conditions were changed. Now the French flag had disappeared from India, and not a single native power dared meet a British army in the field, without risking its own existence. From a trading corporation the East India Company had grown into a great and powerful government, whose supremacy in India was unchallenged. In achieving this result, the 19th Light Dragoons had played no small part. On their first arrival in India the prevailing sentiment with which they were regarded was curiosity. The horsemen of native powers were numbered by tens of thousands. Their method was to waste and ravage the country round an enemy’s force, to harass the line of march, to cut off stragglers, to intercept convoys and to wear down an enemy by these indirect methods. To charge home, sword in hand, into the ranks of an unbroken enemy was foreign to their ideas of properly conducted warfare. The first appearance of the 19th in the field came therefore as a surprise to friend and foe; it was like the introduction of a new weapon. Before the first campaign against Tippoo was six months old, the reputation of the 19th Light Dragoons had penetrated to every part of southern India. The impression thus created grew with every successive appearance of the regiment in the field of action; and, as long as they remained in India, they continued to evoke an amount of interest and attention that was bestowed on no other regiment in the service. One who charged with them at Assaye and Argaum, and fought his way into Vellore with them, though not belonging to the regiment, wrote of the nineteenth as “a fine specimen of what a regiment ought to be. They called themselves the ‘Terrors of the East.’ Indeed, such was the respect in which they were held by the natives, that when they embarked for England, all the black town of Madras was emptied to see them off.” Before sailing, an entertainment in their honour was given by the Commander-in-Chief, and the subjoined orders were published:—

General Order (Madras Govt.).

Fort St. George, October 10th, 1806.

General Order. (Lieut. General Sir J. Cradock)

Head Quarters, Choultry Plain,

Oct. 13th, 1806.

And so, on the 20th October 1806, twenty-four years to a day since they first arrived in Madras, the 19th Light Dragoons with their honours thick upon them, embarked in the Streatham, William Pitt, and Jane Duchess of Gordon, to sail for England three days later, under convoy of the squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Sir Edward Pellew. The voyage was uneventful. Table Bay was reached 30th December, and St Helena 23rd January. On the 18th April 1807, the regiment disembarked at Tilbury, one detachment being landed at Plymouth, and marched to Northampton. A muster taken a week after landing shows the strength of the regiment to have been 245 rank and file. Recruiting parties were at once sent out to Birmingham, Glasgow, Dublin and Waterford.

1808–1813

During the following six years the regiment remained at home, and took no part in the stirring events then occurring in Spain and Portugal. At the end of 1808, they moved from Northampton to Norwich and Ipswich, with a detachment at Birmingham, while their recruiting parties were actively engaged in different parts of the United Kingdom. In March 1809, the regiment moved to Romford, and, in December, embarked for Ireland. For two years the regiment remained in quarters at Tullamore, Philipstown and Longford. By an order dated 23rd April 1811, the establishment was augmented from 400 to 570 privates, making the total strength of all ranks 685. In March 1812, the regiment marched to Clonmel, and in June, to Dublin. The regiment was soon to proceed on active service again.

KING’S GUIDON.
SQUADRON GUIDON.

GUIDONS OF THE XIX^TH LIGHT DRAGOONS.

to face p. 172.

On the 18th June, 1812, the United States declared war against England. The declaration reached the British Government on the 30th July; but, as the British Orders in Council respecting the trade of neutral nations, that had been put forward on the American side as the chief reason for the war, had been rescinded on 23rd June, it was still believed in England that peace would be maintained. In spite of the hostilities that immediately commenced, it was not till October that conditional orders for reprisals were issued, and the formal declaration of war by Great Britain was not made till 9th January 1813. The war party in the States had the upper hand at the time: they were determined on war, and cared little for the pretext. To outward appearance, it seemed, in 1812, that England could not much longer hold out against Napoleon, who had the whole continent of Europe, except Russia, at his feet, while the British armies in Spain seemed to make no progress. In truth Napoleon’s power was already beginning to totter. The British armies in Spain, hardened and consolidated by three years of war under their great leader, were invincible. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz had fallen, and Wellington had already begun his victorious advance that was to carry him across the Pyrenees. At the same time Napoleon was preparing for his disastrous invasion of Russia which dealt the first deadly blow to his power. But the war party in the United States were unable to discern this. The British troops in Canada were few in number, the colonists were believed to be lukewarm in their loyalty to Great Britain, and the war party promised their countrymen that Canada would prove an easy prey. Under the thin veil of resenting injuries a war of conquest was intended.

On 6th March 1813, an order was issued for three squadrons of the 19th Light Dragoons, completed to eighty rank and file per troop, to be held in readiness to embark for North America, under Lieut. Colonel the Hon. J. O’Neill. The horses of the officers, sergeants and corporals were to be taken, but all other horses were to be left behind. In the same month the regiment reached Cork, and embarked on 4th April, in company with other troops, under convoy of the Sybelle frigate and Cygnet sloop; almost the first reinforcements sent from England to Canada since the United States’ declaration of war. They reached Quebec about the 17th May,[57] and were at once sent to La Prairie on the St Lawrence near Montreal.

The war in which the regiment was about to engage, was one in which cavalry could play only a subordinate part. The country in which they were to operate was a vast expanse of forest and swamp, with a few sparsely inhabited clearings. The chief mode of communication was by boat. The war was one to be fought out by small bodies of men far from their supports, wielding the axe and the oar as much as the rifle: forage was hard to get, and there was little place for mounted men. Under these conditions, the 19th Light Dragoons were only engaged in small detachments, never more than a squadron, seldom more than a troop. Their duties were of a most harassing kind, on outpost and reconnoissance duty. Never once did they have an opportunity of crossing swords with the enemy’s cavalry. The only cavalry charges recorded during the war were those made by the United States’ cavalry that overwhelmed Proctor’s force at the battle of the Thames, and the charge repulsed by the 89th at Chrystler’s Farm.

Walker & Boutall sc.

THE CANADIAN FRONTIER
in 1812.

Immediately on landing, one troop, taking with it only ten horses, was dispatched to Upper Canada. With it went Lieut. Colonel O’Neill and a convoy of ammunition. The three hundred horses, that were to have been ready by 1st July, had not been obtained. A fortnight later, a second troop followed, with sixty-five horses, most of which had been brought from Ireland with the regiment. The squadron was destined for the Niagara frontier, where it was engaged, under Captain Lisle, till the end of the war.

Meanwhile, in spite of the belief in England that war would not be prosecuted by the States, when the rescinding of the orders in Council was known, hostilities had been in active progress from the first declaration. The British regular troops in Canada, in June 1812, were about 4500 in number; of which 3000 were in garrison at Quebec and Montreal, the remainder being scattered along the Upper Canada frontier. Their small number was effectively supplemented by the Canadian militia, who fought for the protection of their homes with a gallantry and devotion that could not be exceeded. Their numbers were however liable to constant fluctuations owing to the frequent necessity for their presence at their homes for agricultural purposes. A considerable number of Indians also, at times, co-operated; allies of doubtful value, who could never be relied on, and whose numbers varied from day to day. In population and resources the United States were in the proportion of more than ten to one compared to Canada. On the British side therefore the war was necessarily of a defensive character. The points on which Canada was most vulnerable were, 1. on the Detroit frontier between Lake Huron and Lake Erie; 2. on the Niagara frontier between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario; and, 3. on the line of the St Lawrence between Kingston and Montreal. The United States’ plan was to invade Canada on all three points, and three separate expeditions were prepared for the purpose. The first attack was made on the Detroit frontier, where, under pretence of punishing some Indians, troops had been assembled before the declaration of war.

Before noticing the more important operations of 1812, it is necessary to mention the capture of the United States’ fort and island of Mackinaw, which was effected by a party of regulars, militia and Indians, under Captain Roberts, on 17th July, and retained till the end of the war. The capture was of some importance, as the island commanded the navigation between Lakes Michigan and Huron.

On the 12th July, a United States’ force of 2500 men, under General Hull, crossed from Detroit, and occupied the small village of Sandwich. On the same day Hull issued a proclamation that struck the keynote of the war. In it he called on the Canadians to seek his protection, threatening them with a war of extermination should they venture to take up arms against him. Acting in the spirit of this proclamation, the United States’ troops throughout the war committed excesses against the non-combatant population that had long been condemned by all civilized nations, and effectually alienated any sympathy they might have found among the Canadians. The reprisals, that are inevitable in such cases, followed, and the war was marked by a rancour on both sides, that contrasted strongly with the more decorous but not less deadly warfare that was being waged by French and British troops in Spain.

The small British force of 350 men in the neighbourhood of Detroit, consisting mainly of militia, and not counting Indians, were gathered at Amherstberg under Lieutenant Colonel Proctor. Hull, instead of advancing at once, and overwhelming it, remained at Sandwich, indulging in petty outpost affairs. Proctor passed a small force across the river, and cut off his supplies, which forced Hull to withdraw his force, on the 7th August, from the Canadian side, and retreat to Detroit. On the 12th, Major General Brock, commanding in Upper Canada, reached Amherstberg with three hundred men, and, three days later, crossed the river, and advanced on Detroit. On the 16th, Hull capitulated with his whole force. Over fifteen hundred prisoners, thirty-three guns, 2500 stands of arms and the Michigan territory passed into the hands of the British.

At this time a lull in the war took place through the action of Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, Governor, and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, who, throughout the war, was the evil genius of the British cause. In the United States’ manifesto the British Orders in Council had been put forward as the chief cause of the war. On hearing that the orders had been repealed, Sir George Prevost believed that the war would not be persevered with. He accordingly, in spite of the hostilities that had occurred, proposed an armistice to the United States’ commander of the force threatening Montreal, till the latter should receive further orders from Washington. But the United States’ government were determined on war, and hostilities were resumed on 8th September. The armistice was of much advantage to the States, as, while it lasted, they were able to convey without hindrance, by water, the supplies collected at Oswego for the use of their troops destined to act on the Niagara frontier, at a time when the British had an undoubted superiority on Lake Ontario.

The United States’ force threatening the line between Lakes Erie and Ontario numbered 6300 men, under General Van Rensselaar. To oppose them, Major General Brock had but 1200 men (by one account 1500), a large proportion of which were militia and Indians. These troops were posted at Fort Erie and Fort George, the two extreme points of the line, with a few companies at Queenston and one or two other points to command landing places. Early in the morning of the 13th October, about 1600 United States’ troops crossed at Queenston, and made good their footing. In the course of the fighting General Brock fell at the head of his men, and the United States’ commander was badly wounded. Reinforcements coming up, in the afternoon, from Fort George, under Major General Sheaffe, brought the British-Canadian force on the spot up to about 1000 men including Indians. An attack was made on the enemy’s position: they were driven into their boats, and the United States’ General Wadsworth, with 958 officers and men were made prisoners. One gun and a colour were also captured. The loss on the British side cannot be exactly stated. Besides the General, one officer was killed and two wounded. Among the rank and file there were about 16 killed and 70 wounded, and about a dozen Indians: but the success was dearly bought with the death of Sir Isaac Brock.[58]

At one in the morning of 28th November, another attempt was made to cross, about two miles below Fort Erie. But the crossing was mismanaged, and the whole attempt carried out in a half-hearted way. After inflicting and sustaining some loss, the United States’ troops re-embarked, and thus ended for the year all serious operations on this part of the frontier.

The United States’ force intended to operate against Montreal was equally unsuccessful. Assembled at Plattsburg on Lake Champlain, about 7000 strong, under General Dearborn, it advanced to the frontier on 15th November. On this being known in Montreal, the available troops, about 1900 strong more than half of which were militia, advanced to La Prairie. Nothing however occurred beyond an unimportant skirmish between small detachments, after which, Dearborn retreated to Plattsburg, and went into quarters for the winter. Thus ended hostilities for the year. At every point the United States’ forces had been foiled by inferior numbers. Fort Detroit and the State of Michigan, together with the island of Mackinaw, commanding the navigation between Lakes Michigan and Huron, remained in British hands. The only real success gained by the United States was in the naval strength they had been able to develop on the Lakes, owing to superior resources, and to the absence of any assistance to Canada from England. The superiority thus bloodlessly established had important results on the subsequent course of the war in Upper Canada. By sea, successes were scored by the United States in five frigate duels, mainly due to the superior size and armament of the United States’ ships. Effectual measures were then taken in England, and the United States’ flag practically disappeared from the high seas for the rest of the war. The complete mastery of the sea by Great Britain caused the U.S. government to direct their naval resources to the Canadian lakes, a result that had an important bearing on the succeeding years’ warfare.

The United States’ plan of operations for the following year was, as before, to invade Canada with three separate corps. The first was destined to retake Detroit, and acquire possession of Amherstberg. The second attack was to be made from the eastern end of Lake Ontario, to capture Kingston and Toronto, then known as York, and then, in co-operation with a force collected at Buffalo, to act against Forts George and Erie on the Niagara frontier. The third was to operate against Montreal, by a combined advance from the neighbourhood of Plattsburg, and from the eastern end of Ontario.

On the Detroit frontier the Canadian forces numbered about 2,300 men, more than half of which were Indians, under Colonel Proctor; opposed to a U.S. force of double that number, under General Harrison.

On the 18th January, a force of 1000 men under General Winchester, advancing from Sandusky, drove in the British picquets at Frenchtown, forty-five miles from Detroit. On the 22nd, Colonel Proctor advancing from Detroit with four guns and 950 men, half of whom were Indians, attacked General Winchester in front of Frenchtown, and gained a complete victory. Winchester with 538 men were taken prisoners. In consequence of the greatly superior numbers of the U.S. troops in the neighbourhood, Proctor then withdrew to Detroit and Sandwich. Little further occurred till 23rd April, when Proctor led a small expedition against a U.S. work on the Miami river called Fort Meigs. The attempt was unsuccessful, and Proctor returned to Sandwich about 12th May. The only noteworthy incident was the severe punishment inflicted on the U.S. force in a sortie on the 5th May, in which nearly 500 were taken prisoners. The British loss was comparatively small. On the 2nd August, Proctor made a similar attempt on a fort newly constructed at the mouth of the Sandusky river. After an attempt to storm, which was repulsed with the loss of 100 killed and wounded, he retired. After this no further movement on either side occurred till September, when a change in the situation was wrought by a success gained by the U.S. navy on the lake. On 10th September, a naval action was fought on Lake Erie, between six British and nine U.S. ships, in which the latter were completely victorious. This rendered Proctor’s position extremely critical. He at once evacuated Detroit and Amherstberg, and, with a force of less than 1000 men, not counting Indians, retreated along the river Thames, closely followed by Harrison. On the 5th October, he decided to make a stand. Attacked by a greatly superior force, he was at once overwhelmed by charges of cavalry, of which Harrison had 1200 in the field, and the greater part of his men made prisoners. Proctor, with some 200 men only, made good his retreat to Ancaster, eighty-five miles distant. The celebrated Indian Chief, Tecumseh, was slain on this occasion, and the state of Michigan passed again into United States’ keeping. Harrison, after destroying Moravian town, in the neighbourhood of which the action had been fought, returned to Detroit and Amherstberg, and, shortly afterwards, embarked with a portion of his force for the Niagara frontier.

Active operations at the eastern end of Lake Ontario commenced in April. Early in that month, a United States’ force of about 6000 men was collected at Sackett’s Harbour, which was the United States’ chief naval depot on the lake. On 27th, the U.S. lake squadron with 2000 troops on board appeared off Toronto,[59] and at once began to land under the guns of the fleet. Major General Sheaffe, who had 500 regular troops and militia and some Indians, after ineffectually opposing the landing, was forced to withdraw towards Kingston, and the town was occupied by the enemy. General Pike, commanding the U.S. troops, was killed, and both sides suffered considerable loss by the explosion of a magazine. On the 8th May, after burning the public buildings, the U.S. force withdrew, and were conveyed to the mouth of the Niagara river, where they landed, with a view to joining in operations against Forts George and Erie. The vessels were then employed in bringing further re-inforcements from Sackett’s Harbour, for the contemplated attack on Fort George.

The British force on the Niagara frontier consisted at this time of 1800 regular troops, 500 militia, and 40 Indians, under Major General Vincent. On 27th May, the U.S. force, numbering 6000 to 7000 men, under General Dearborn, crossed under cover of the guns of the flotilla and of Fort Niagara. After a stubborn contest, in which they suffered a loss of 445 killed and wounded, the British troops evacuated Fort George, and retired to Burlington Heights at the head of Lake Ontario. Fort Erie was also evacuated. Four days later, Dearborn detached 3500 men under Generals Chandler and Winder to follow Vincent, and, on 5th June, the U.S. force encamped at Stoney Creek, seven miles from Vincent’s position. In this critical position Vincent resolved on a night attack. At 2 o’clock in the morning, 700 men of the 8th and 49th regiments, led by Colonel Harvey, penetrated the U.S. camp. Four guns were captured; the greatest confusion was caused in the surprised camp, from which the enemy were driven. In order to conceal the smallness of his force, Harvey withdrew before daylight, taking with him two guns and 123 prisoners, among whom were the two United States Generals. In this spirited affair the British loss amounted to 23 killed, 136 wounded and 55 missing. The U.S. force, after burning its tents and stores, fell back precipitately to Forty-mile Creek, 11 miles in rear of the field. Two days later, a small British squadron from Kingston, under Sir James Yeo, bringing some reinforcements for Vincent, appeared and drove the U.S. force from their camp which was taken possession of. Harvey’s gallant exploit had saved the frontier. On the 24th June, in retaliation for the affair at Stoney Creek, a U.S. force under Colonel Boerstler attempted to surprise an outpost of Canadian rangers at Beaver Dam, under Lieutenant Fitzgibbon. Through the loyalty of the wife of a Canadian farmer, Fitzgibbon received timely warning. Disposing of his little force of 200 men, mostly Indians, to the best advantage, the advancing enemy were caught in an ambush, and, after suffering some loss, Boerstler capitulated with 25 officers, 519 men, two guns and a stand of colours. Fifty-six of the U.S. force were killed and wounded, Boerstler himself being among the latter. At the moment of capitulation, a reinforcement of 200 men under Major du Haren joined Fitzgibbon, and enabled him to guard his prisoners. These successive reverses dispirited the U.S. troops in this part of the frontier to such an extent, that they suffered themselves to be blockaded in Fort George by very inferior numbers. On the 4th and 11th of July, Forts Schlosser and Black Rock were captured by separate coups de main, and the military stores destroyed or carried off. In the second affair Lieutenant Colonel Bisshopp, an officer of great promise, was unfortunately killed. On the 31st July, the United States’ squadron on Ontario paid a second visit to Toronto, which was undefended, and burned some more buildings. This unexpected move on the part of the enemy occurred just as the first troop of the 19th dispatched from Lower Canada was near Toronto, and the ammunition and baggage were captured.

Meanwhile, Major General de Rottenburg had taken over command on the Niagara frontier, from Vincent, and, on 20th July, the first troop of the 19th from Lower Canada joined the army at Four Mile Creek. Two days later we find the General reporting “two of our cavalry vedettes were taken yesterday by the enemy.” On the 17th August, Lieutenant Gladwin of the 19th was wounded in a skirmish near Fort George. About the 20th August, Sir George Prevost joined de Rottenburg, bringing with him some reinforcements, among which was the second troop of the 19th Light Dragoons, completing the squadron under Captain Lisle. On the 24th, a demonstration was made against Fort George. The advance was led by thirty of the 19th, under their Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. J. O’Neill. Beyond driving the enemy, for a short time, out of the town of Newark, and capturing 60 or 70 prisoners the demonstration was without result. The British force suffered the loss of an officer and ten men, who advanced too far, and were taken prisoners. On the 11th September an engagement took place between the two Ontario squadrons, the day after the engagement on Lake Erie, already mentioned. In this also the U.S. squadron had the best of it, but there were no decisive results. In both engagements the British squadrons were at a disadvantage through want of regular sailors: the greater part of their crews consisting of Canadians and soldiers. Early in September, Sir George Prevost returned to Kingston, leaving General de Rottenburg in command. On the 1st October, part of the U.S. force embarked at Niagara, and were conveyed to Sackett’s Harbour to join in operations against Kingston and Montreal, leaving General McClure in command at Fort George and Niagara. The following day, the 49th and 104th Regiments, under de Rottenburg, started for Kingston, which they reached on the 16th, leaving Vincent in command on the Niagara frontier. Their presence secured Kingston from attack, and helped to furnish the force that triumphed at Chrystler’s Farm. Two companies of de Watteville’s regiment, proceeding from Toronto to Kingston, were less fortunate, being captured by the U.S. squadron. On the 9th October, the news of Proctor’s defeat on the Thames reached Vincent, causing him to withdraw from the neighbourhood of Fort George, and fall back to Burlington Heights; where he was joined by the remains of Proctor’s force. The difficulty in obtaining supplies, always great, were apparently almost insurmountable at this time; for we find Vincent recommending that Major Lisle’s squadron should return to Kingston and Montreal. The discouragement in the British force was very great. Sir George Prevost, believing that Upper Canada was lost, sent orders to Vincent to collect his troops, and bring them to Kingston; but the order was not obeyed.

The U.S. troops in Fort George under McClure, at this time indulged in a series of cruel and wanton excesses against the Canadian inhabitants in the neighbourhood. In order to put some check on these excesses Vincent detached a small force of about 500 men under Colonel Murray in the direction of Fort George. With them went a troop of the 19th. As Murray advanced, McClure’s outposts fell back. On Murray making a sudden dash forwards, McClure precipitately abandoned Fort George, on 12th December, and retreated across the Niagara river, after burning the little town of Newark: an inhuman act at such an inclement season of the year, and the more inexcusable, in that he left in the Fort, without destroying them, his tents standing, a great quantity of stores, and some guns. “With the same intention, Queenston was deliberately bombarded with red-hot shot from the batteries at Lewiston. Many isolated farm houses were destroyed by marauding parties of soldiers, or, when they proved too substantial for instant demolition, were rendered uninhabitable by removal of the doors and windows. The few cattle still remaining in the possession of the country people were mercilessly slaughtered or driven away, and their grain and flour removed or destroyed.”[60] At this juncture, Lieutenant General Drummond,[61] who had been appointed to the command of Upper Canada, arrived and took command of the troops. Following up the success at Fort George, Drummond resolved on attacking Niagara. On the night of the 18th December, a force of 550 men of the 41st and 100th, under Colonel Murray, was silently ferried across the river, three miles above the Fort. Advancing silently in two columns, with unloaded muskets and bayonets fixed, the enemy’s picquets were seized before any alarm could be given: one party escaladed one of the bastions, while the other entered by the gate that had been left open for the relief of sentries. The garrison made but a feeble resistance, and, in a few minutes the British force was in complete possession of the Fort, with 27 guns, over 3000 stand of arms and 344 prisoners. The drummers of the 100th found their way to the roof of the principal building, and played “The British Grenadiers” as a signal of success to their comrades across the river. This brilliant success was gained with a loss of only six men killed and five wounded. A few hours later, a second force was ferried across, and seized Lewiston after a slight skirmish, capturing two guns and other military stores. In retaliation for the burning of Newark, Lewiston and four neighbouring villages were laid in ruins.

The U.S. force, about 2500 strong, was now commanded by General Hall, and quartered at Black Rock and Buffalo. Intent on following up his success, Drummond placed his head quarters near Fort Erie. On the night of the 29th, Major General Riall, with 600 men and about 100 Indians, crossed the Niagara river about two miles below Black Rock, drove in a U.S. picquet, and took up a position at a bridge over a small stream. At daylight on the 31st, the Royal Scots, about 800 strong, with a detachment of Major Lisle’s squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons, the whole under command of Lt. Colonel Gordon, crossed over, under fire, to land above Black Rock. Joining hands with Riall, Black Rock was attacked and occupied after a short resistance, the defending force retreating to Buffalo. The advance was continued, and Buffalo taken after a poor resistance: 130 prisoners and 8 guns were captured, and four armed vessels of the U.S. squadron on Lake Erie, burned. Black Rock and Buffalo were burned to the ground. The work was completed by Major Lisle’s squadron, which swept the frontier from Buffalo to Lewiston, bringing the operations to an end on the 2nd January 1814. The British troops were then withdrawn to the Canadian side, with the exception of a garrison left in Fort Niagara. Thus closed operations at this part of the frontier for the year.

The operations of the year on the eastern frontier have now to be recorded. Taking advantage of the frozen state of the St Lawrence, skirmishing parties of U.S. troops, from Ogdensburg, crossed the river in January and February, and committed depredations on the Canadian side. In order to put an end to these attacks, Major Macdonell, with 480 men and three field pieces, crossed the ice on the morning of the 22nd February, drove the enemy from their position, capturing 11 guns and over 70 prisoners. After burning two armed schooners and two gunboats, as well as the barracks, Macdonell returned to the Canadian shore. This brilliant little affair was accomplished with the loss of eight killed and fifty-two wounded. On the 27th May, an expedition, under Sir George Prevost, sailed from Kingston to capture Sackett’s Harbour. Owing to the incapacity and irresolution of Sir George Prevost, the affair ended in failure. After unnecessary delay, which enabled the enemy to make preparations for defence, the troops landed, on 29th, and drove the enemy from their positions. In anticipation of having to capitulate, their navy-yard and ships were set on fire by the enemy, and a great quantity of naval stores and provisions, captured at York, destroyed; when Sir George Prevost, against the advice of his officers, gave the order to retreat, at the moment that success was in his grasp. The troops re-embarked and returned to Kingston, with about 100 prisoners, having suffered a loss of 50 killed and 211 wounded. The capture of Sackett’s Harbour by the British would have had a tremendous influence on the war. It was the principal United States’ base on the lake, and its capture would have given Canada the complete supremacy of Lake Ontario as long as the war lasted, besides the possession of the great quantities of naval and military stores that had been collected there by the United States’ Government.

On the 3rd June, an attack was made by four armed vessels of the U.S. squadron on Lake Champlain, upon the post of Isle aux Noix, about 40 miles from Montreal; resulting in the capture of two U.S. sloops. On 29th July, a flotilla, composed of the two captured vessels and three gunboats, transported over land from the St Lawrence, embarked about 1000 men of the 13th and 100th regiments under Lieutenant Colonel Murray, and arrived, the next day, before Plattsburg. The U.S. militia in charge of the place, retired without making any resistance. The barracks and blockhouses were burned, and a quantity of naval stores carried off. Four thousand U.S. troops under General Hampton, destined to act against Montreal, lay inactive at Burlington, without interfering with Murray.

Nothing further of importance happened till October, when the U.S. preparations for the attack on Montreal were complete. For this purpose, a corps of 8800 men, under General Wilkinson, was assembled at Grenadier Island, at the eastern end of Ontario, fully provided with boats. At the same time a second corps of about 5700 men, under General Hampton, was assembled on Lake Champlain. The two corps were intended to join hands at St Regis, and act in combination. The first movement was made by Hampton. Advancing from Plattsburg, he reached Four Corners on the Chateaugay river, about 8th October. To oppose him, Sir G. Prevost detached a body of Canadian militia, about 1000 strong, under Lt. Colonel de Salaberry, who, after some skirmishing to ascertain the direction of Hampton’s advance, took up a position on the west bank of the Chateaugay river.

On the 21st, Hampton crossed the frontier, and advanced, cutting roads for his guns, and repairing bridges as he moved forward. During the night of the 25th, Hampton detached a brigade under Colonel Purdy to ford the Chateaugay river, march down the right bank, and take the Canadian position in rear, while he himself assailed it in front. De Salaberry’s position, a naturally strong one in a dense forest, intersected by ravines, had been further strengthened by breaking down bridges in the front, and making timber breastworks. Hampton commenced his attack at 10 o’clock on the morning of the 26th, but it was not pushed home. By keeping his men under cover, and placing buglers in the woods, de Salaberry gave the impression to the enemy of having a much greater number of men than had been supposed. Meanwhile, Purdy’s brigade, which had lost its way in the woods, came up, attracted by the firing, and overthrew a company of Canadians on the right bank. Re-inforcements coming up under Macdonell, the officer who distinguished himself at Ogdensburg in February, Purdy was driven into the woods with loss and confusion, and took no further part in the battle. So disorganised were his troops that, during the following night, they opened fire on each other, causing themselves further losses. Seeing the failure of the flank attack on which he had principally depended, and believing the Canadian force in his front to be stronger than it was, Hampton drew off and fell back, first on Four Corners, and, a few days later, to Plattsburgh; whence his force shortly afterwards went into winter quarters. This brilliant affair was fought entirely by the Canadian militia at a cost of 5 killed, 16 wounded, and four missing. A month after the action, an officer and twenty-five men of the 19th Light Dragoons were dispatched to join de Salaberry at Chateaugay.

It was not till 5th November that Wilkinson’s corps left Grenadier Island, in a flotilla of between two and three hundred open boats, protected by gunboats, and entered the St Lawrence. According to the original plan, the capture of Kingston had been intended; but this was relinquished on the arrival there of the re-inforcements sent under de Rottenburg. On arriving near Ogdensburg, the force was landed on the south bank of the river, and marched down to a point 14 miles below that place, in order to avoid the risk of passing the small Canadian post of Fort Wellington at Prescott. The boats were brought down at night with muffled oars. On the 9th, the force was again landed, this time on the left bank, in order to pass the rapid known as the Long Sault. The following day, one division, under General Brown, marched to occupy Cornwall; the other division, under General Boyd, was retained at the head of the rapid, to oppose a British force that was hanging on their rear.

Directly the start of the U.S. expedition down the St Lawrence was known in Kingston, as many men as could be safely spared, had been detached under Lieutenant Colonel Morrison of the 89th, convoyed by a few gunboats, to follow on Wilkinson’s rear. At Fort Wellington, Morrison received a further accession of force, which brought up his numbers to 800 rank and file. On the 9th, he landed, thirteen miles lower down, and, in a few hours, was in touch with Wilkinson’s force. During the following day some skirmishing took place, and then Morrison, finding that Boyd was preparing to attack him in force, took up a position at a place named “Chrystler’s Farm.” Morrison’s force was made up of some companies of the 49th, 89th, some militia, three 6 Pr. guns and thirty Indians. Boyd had 2500 men, among which was a strong force of cavalry, and ten guns. Unlike all previous actions in this war, the battle of Chrystler’s Farm was fought in open country. This conferred an advantage on the better trained and disciplined British troops, that atoned for their inferiority in numbers. The action commenced about 2 o’clock in the afternoon of the 11th, and, after three hours’ fighting, in the course of which a charge of United States’ dragoons was defeated by three companies of the 89th, Boyd fell back, repulsed at every point, with the loss of one gun, 339 killed and wounded, among the former of whom was the U.S. General Covington, and over 100 prisoners. The British loss was 21 killed, 148 wounded and 12 missing. Boyd fell back on his boats, and embarked after the action, crossing over to the right bank of the river. The following day, he descended the rapid, and joined Brown’s force near Cornwall. The cavalry, and some of the artillery, marched along the Canadian bank, without embarking. Morrison, with his small force, continued his march down the left bank. On his force being re-united, Wilkinson learned that he could expect no aid from Hampton. He at once decided on giving up the attempt on Montreal, and retreating by the only way open to him. Embarking his whole force, on the 13th, he descended the St Lawrence to the mouth of the Salmon river, and ascended that river seven miles to French Mills. Here he lay, expecting to be attacked, till 12th February, when he set fire to his boats, huts, and blockhouses, and retreated to Plattsburgh and Burlington on Lake Champlain.

Thus, in loss and disaster, ended the second and most serious attempt against Montreal, made during the war. A handful of Canadians at Chateaugay, in the woods that gave their special fighting powers a signal opportunity, and a small number of British troops at Chrystler’s Farm, where the field of action gave full scope to their training and discipline, had saved Canada.

Of the three invasions of the Canadian frontier, the one by Detroit was alone successful. Proctor’s defeat on the Thames was irreparable. Fortunately for Canada, it was the point at which the enemy’s success was least important. Vincent’s spirited affair at Stoney Creek was the turning-point of the year’s campaign. Had he been overwhelmed, the Niagara frontier would have been lost, and the re-inforcements that saved Kingston from attack could not have been spared. The fall of Kingston might have led to the fall of Montreal.

The operations of the year showed the extreme importance to Canada of the mastery on Ontario, and the retention of Kingston. The whole country was an almost trackless forest. The only way of moving troops and stores was by water. Full subsistence for the troops in Upper Canada could not be procured among the scanty population, and they were largely dependent for rations on pork and biscuit from England. So long as the waterway was open, the defence of the Niagara frontier was possible. As the supremacy of the U.S. navy on Lake Erie made it impossible for the British to continue the war on the Detroit frontier, so a decisive defeat on Lake Ontario would have lost the Niagara frontier also. But, till the end of the war, the U.S. navy never succeeded in establishing more than a temporary supremacy on Ontario.

The failure of Wilkinson’s expedition showed the risk of attacking Montreal, while Kingston was strongly held by a hostile force. An expedition, once launched on the St Lawrence, could not re-ascend against the current, and was liable to be caught between two fires, as actually happened in Wilkinson’s case. The true objective of the United States, throughout the war, was Kingston; the possession of which would have made them masters of Upper Canada without a further effort, and would have placed Montreal in jeopardy. But Kingston was never seriously attacked during the whole war.

On the Canadian side, the importance of gaining possession of Sackett’s Harbour was not clearly recognized. The capture and retention of that place would have practically secured the Niagara frontier, and assured the safety of Montreal. But Sir George Prevost’s half-hearted and abortive attack in May, was the only attempt made during the war. To both sides, the capture of their enemy’s depôt on the lake was of supreme importance. The keys of successful attack and defence were at Sackett’s Harbour and Kingston.

1814–1821

The plans of the United States’ government for the campaign of 1814 varied considerably from those of the preceding years. They realised the mistake they had made in advancing on Montreal without first getting possession of Kingston, and they recognized the delusion on which they had acted, in believing that the Canadians would welcome their troops wherever they appeared on Canadian soil. It was, indeed, the unflinching loyalty of the Canadians to the British flag that had so far preserved Canada, as the troops England had been able to spare, would, by themselves, have been inadequate for the purpose. The United States’ plans for 1814 were therefore directed to the following objects. To retake the island of Mackinaw; to renew the invasion of the Niagara frontier; and, after getting possession of Forts George and Niagara, to proceed against Kingston. The United States’ officers on the Niagara frontier, had also learned that enthusiasm without discipline was of little value, when opposed in the open field to a disciplined enemy; the winter and spring therefore were utilised by them in enforcing a higher degree of drill and discipline than had hitherto been aimed at. This resulted in a marked improvement in the fighting qualities of their troops during the remainder of the war.

In the middle of April, a reinforcement of 100 men, conveying a quantity of much-needed supplies and stores, under Colonel McDouall, was sent from Toronto to Mackinaw, which was reached after a most difficult journey on 18th May. A great number of Indians then flocked into the post, which prompted McDouall to fit out a small expedition of 150 men with 500 Indians against a small post that had been lately established at Prairie du Chien on the Mississippi, 200 miles north-west of the present town of Chicago. Moving by water, the expedition, under Colonel M‘Kay, was completely successful, and the post was captured with two guns, and 61 prisoners, on 19th July, at a cost of only three Indians wounded.

On 26th July, a U.S. expedition from Detroit, consisting of five armed vessels and about 750 troops, arrived off Mackinaw, and landed on 4th August, when they were completely repulsed in an attack on McDouall’s position, regaining their ships with loss and confusion. No further attempt was made, but part of the expedition uselessly remained in the vicinity for some time, losing two armed vessels, which were taken, on 3rd and 6th September, by a small party of seamen and militia under Lieutenants Bulger and Worseley. No further fighting took place in this quarter, and Mackinaw remained in the hands of the British till the end of the war.

On the 30th March, General Wilkinson at the head of 4000 U.S. troops advanced from Plattsburgh, crossed Lake Champlain on the ice, and attacked a small British force, in a stone mill at La Colle, under Major Handcock. Wilkinson was repulsed with some loss, and returned to Plattsburgh.

The position of the British troops on the Niagara frontier early in the year was very discouraging. The hardships they had undergone during the operations in December had caused great sickness, so that the abandonment of Fort Niagara was at one time seriously entertained.

A great number of Indians on the United States’ side were forced to take up arms. Marauding parties from Detroit made frequent incursions, carrying off loyal inhabitants, and destroying Delaware and Point aux Pins. By the end of January, Black Rock was re-occupied by United States’ troops, whence they annoyed Fort Erie by artillery fire. It was in the midst of these difficulties that Drummond was obliged to send the re-inforcements under McDouall to Mackinaw, as already mentioned, and to further weaken his available forces by withdrawing a regiment from Toronto to strengthen Kingston.

By great exertions and the employment of soldiers in the shipyards, the British naval forces on Ontario had established a superiority. Drummond wished to attack Sackett’s Harbour, and destroy the enemy’s vessels there; but Sir George Prevost refused to provide the necessary troops. On the 5th May, Drummond made a successful dash from Kingston, with a force of about 1000 troops, upon Oswego. They landed on the 6th, captured the fort, destroyed all military stores that could not be carried off, and re-embarked. This successful attack delayed the United States’ operations on the Niagara frontier for several weeks, and enabled a strict blockade of Sackett’s Harbour to be established.

Early in March, Major Lisle, with a troop of the 19th Light Dragoons and a few militia, was placed in the little village of Dover, near Long Point on Lake Erie, to watch any attempt of the enemy from that side against Burlington. On the 15th May, eight hundred U.S. infantry crossed the lake in armed vessels, and landed. Major Lisle withdrew his men, and Dover was burned to the ground; after which the invading force re-embarked.

By the end of June, the United States’ troops on the Niagara frontier had gathered in great numbers, and it was evident that an invasion was imminent. Drummond had vainly urged on Sir George Prevost the necessity of reinforcing the troops on the frontier; but Sir George was convinced that the principal attack would come from Lake Champlain, and withheld the much-needed troops. From Toronto to Long Point on Lake Erie, Drummond’s force did not much exceed 4000 men. A number of important points had to be guarded, and the force under General Riall on the actual frontier was only about 2200 men, including Indians, distributed on a length of thirty-six miles, and including the garrison in Niagara. Only about seven hundred men were available for field operations. At the end of June, the strength of Major Lisle’s squadron was six officers, eleven sergeants, and one hundred and eighteen rank and file, in five different detachments, at Fort George, Queenston, Chippewa, Fort Erie, and Long Point.

On the morning of the 3rd July, the United States’ force, 4000 strong, under General Brown, was ferried across in two divisions above and below Fort Erie, under cover of a fog. A picquet of the 19th Light Dragoons narrowly escaped being cut off, and the fort was at once invested. It was occupied at that time by a garrison of 170 men, and, though in no condition to make a proper defence, it was expected to maintain itself for a short time. It was however surrendered after the exchange of a few cannon shots. Riall, with his inferior numbers, contented himself by maintaining a small corps of observation in his front, while he himself remained encamped on the left bank of the Chippewa. On the 4th, Brown advanced, driving before him the corps of observation which destroyed the bridges as it fell back. A detachment of the 19th Light Dragoons under Lieutenant Horton, covering the rear, became involved in a skirmish in which they drove a party of the enemy into a house, which would probably have been captured had not assistance come to them. Four men and eight horses of the 19th were wounded in the skirmish. Brown encamped that night within sight of Riall’s position.

Riall was reinforced on the 5th by the arrival of the 8th regiment from Toronto, and, greatly under-estimating Brown’s force, which now amounted to about 5000 men with nine guns, he resolved on leaving his field works, and attacking. At three in the afternoon, Riall, whose force now amounted to about 1900 men, threw forward a body of militia and Indians on his right flank. After some desultory skirmishing they were driven back by increasing numbers, and fell back on the three light infantry companies, who received their assailants under U.S. General Porter with a terrific volley, driving them back in complete disorder, till they themselves were in turn forced to fall back by superior numbers. Riall, meanwhile, had passed the Chippewa, and drawn up his whole force in order of battle with three guns. After some cannonading, he formed six companies of the Royal Scots, and five companies of the 100th in two columns, and led them against the enemy’s centre. They were received with a tremendous fire against which they were unable to advance: almost every field officer, excepting Riall himself, was struck down, and the columns, suffering heavy losses, were obliged to withdraw, leaving their dead and many of their wounded on the field. The 8th regiment covered the retreat, which was not pressed, and the force recrossed the Chippewa to its former position. “The guns were removed only by the gallant exertions of some troopers of the 19th Dragoons, who attached their own horses to the carriages, and rode off with them in the teeth of the enemy.”[63] The British loss amounted to 515 killed, wounded, and missing, which fell principally on the Royal Scots and 100th, who lost 422 officers and men out of a total of 950 engaged. The 19th Light Dragoons had one sergeant and five men wounded. General Riall, in his dispatch after the battle, says:—

In consequence of this repulse, nearly the whole of his Indians and many of the militia left Riall, in order to look after their families. On the 8th, Brown threw a bridge across the Chippewa, three miles up the stream, thus turning Riall’s right. Riall thereupon broke up his camp, and withdrew to Fort George. Brown continued his advance, occupied Queenston Heights, and took up a position, investing Fort George, with his right resting on the Niagara river, and his left on the lake. Riall, after strengthening the garrisons in the forts, withdrew in the direction of Burlington Heights. To do this, he executed a remarkable night march, to avoid the enemy by whom he was hemmed in. At midnight, his force entered the lake, which is very shallow for a hundred yards from the shore, and, wading through the water for two miles and a half, he marched round the left wing of the investing army, without being detected by their vedettes. For ten days Brown lay inactive, looking for the arrival of the U.S. Ontario squadron to enable him to strike a decisive blow. But the squadron had been blockaded in Sackett’s Harbour ever since the capture of Oswego, and was unable to render him any assistance. Frequent skirmishes took place, in which the United States’ troops suffered losses, often at the hands of the Canadians who were roused to fury by the outrages committed on them. On one occasion the U.S. General Swift was killed by a patrol of the 8th regiment; a wagon train was destroyed, and the picquet guard at Erie cut off to a man. In retaliation for these losses, the United States’ troops burned the village of St David’s, and destroyed every dwelling-house between Queenston and Niagara Falls; under circumstances of such barbarity that the Colonel in command was dismissed from the army.

Meanwhile, Riall received some reinforcements from Toronto, and a great number of militia again joined him, badly armed and undisciplined, but exasperated beyond measure at the brigand-like acts of the invaders. This enabled him to advance, and threatened Brown’s communications. On the 20th, Brown advanced to Fort George, and commenced preparations for a siege, in the hopes that Riall would again hazard an engagement with inferior forces to relieve the Fort. Two days later, Riall with 1700 regular troops, 700 militia, and some Indians, took post in front of Twelve Mile Creek, in readiness to fall upon Brown if he should commence active operations against Fort George. On the 23rd, Brown received intelligence that the U.S. squadron was closely blockaded in Sackett’s Harbour, and was in no position to render him assistance. He at once broke up his camp, and withdrew to the right bank of the Chippewa, with the intention of depositing all unnecessary baggage and stores at Erie, and then making a rapid advance on Burlington and Toronto. On the same day, General Drummond reached Toronto, from Kingston, with the 89th regiment. These were at once sent forward, under Lieutenant Colonel Tucker, to Fort Niagara, with instructions to take drafts from the garrisons of the different forts, and to march, on the 25th, to Lewiston, where Brown had established a base of supplies. Riall was, at the same time, ordered to advance towards the Chippewa. Drummond himself embarked for Niagara, on the afternoon of the 24th, leaving Toronto with only a few invalids as a garrison.

At midnight of the 24th, Riall detached about 900 men under Lieutenant Colonel Pearson, with whom was a troop of the 19th Light Dragoons under Major Lisle, to advance and occupy the high ground near the Niagara Falls. By seven o’clock the next morning, after a fourteen-mile march, Pearson occupied a hill by Lundy’s Lane, within three miles of the United States’ camp, and one mile from the Niagara Falls. At the same time, Drummond landed and commenced his march along the left bank of the Niagara river, while Tucker, in accordance with previous orders, marched along the right bank on Lewiston. Lewiston was captured at noon, and the two parties reunited at Queenston. Sending back part of the force, Drummond, with 815 men and two guns, held on his way to Lundy’s Lane. Brown, on receiving intelligence of Tucker’s advance on Lewiston, believing that his more considerable stores at Fort Schlosser were threatened, and that Pearson’s party at Lundy’s Lane was only a strong patrol, resolved to make a countermove on Queenston and Fort George. Riall’s remaining brigades at Twelve Mile Creek were under arms at daybreak to support Pearson. Their advance was then countermanded, and they remained in camp till noon, when a force, numbering 1230 rank and file, with four guns, under Colonel Scott, was ordered to march at once for Lundy’s Lane. On neither side was there any immediate expectation of a battle.

A little before five in the afternoon Brown detached a force of about 1800 men and two guns under General Scott to advance on Queenston. On coming in contact with Pearson’s outposts, Scott became aware that the force in front of him was stronger than he had supposed, and delayed his attack, while he sent back to Brown for more troops. Riall, who had ridden on to join Pearson, took Scott’s brigade for the advance of Brown’s whole force. He at once sent back word to the force advancing from Twelve Mile Creek, which was still three miles away, to retire on the heights near Queenston, and ordered Pearson to retreat on that point. After retiring half a mile, Riall and Pearson met Drummond advancing. Drummond at once took the command, ordered the position at Lundy’s Lane to be re-occupied, and sent word to countermand Riall’s last order to Colonel Scott, whom he directed to press on and join him.

Scott (U.S.), fearing an ambush, advanced with great caution, which just allowed time for the British force to regain the hill before it could be occupied by the enemy. Drummond’s force now amounted to about 1700 men, thus disposed. On the summit of the hill were two guns: a little behind them were five companies of the Royal Scots, a detachment of the 41st, the 89th, with their left resting on the road running parallel with the river from Queenston to Niagara Falls. The line was prolonged towards the river by some of the 8th and some militia. On the road, somewhat retired, was Major Lisle’s troop of the 19th Light Dragoons. Both flanks were thrown forward, the woods on the right of the line being occupied by the Glengarry regiment, a corps of the Macdonald clan raised in Canada, that fought all through the war with great distinction. By a curious coincidence, Drummond had under his command three regiments, in which he had served as a regimental officer; the Royal Scots, the 8th, and the 41st.

Scott commenced his attack about half past six, along the entire front. On Drummond’s right and centre, the attack was not pushed home, and the British guns on the hill, from their advantageous position, had a decided superiority over the attacking artillery. But on Drummond’s left, the attack was successful. A battalion, ordered by Scott to make a wide turning movement through the dense forest between the road and the river, suddenly attacked the Canadian militia in flank, threw them into disorder, and captured some prisoners, occupied the road, and forced back Lisle’s troop of the 19th for over a mile. At this juncture, General Riall was severely wounded, and, being taken to the road, was conducted by mistake, in the growing darkness, into a party of the enemy, by whom he was at once made prisoner. The Canadian militia, however, quickly recovered themselves, and formed up in rear of the 89th, at right angles to them, covering the flank and rear of the British position. They also cleared the road to the rear, and the enemy made no further headway on this flank during the remainder of the battle.

Scott now made a determined attack, with the rest of his troops, on the British centre. It was repulsed after some severe fighting, in which both sides suffered heavily. A lull in the action then occurred, during which the artillery on both sides maintained their fire. Scott, while reforming his ranks, was joined by Brown and the rest of the United States’ troops; at the same time, Drummond was joined by the rear division of Riall’s troops, which had been marching and counter-marching, under conflicting orders, since they left Twelve Mile Creek. With them came the second troop of the 19th.

Drummond employed part of his reinforcement to strengthen his right, while the remainder formed a second line in rear of the first. A field gun was also brought up in line with the two guns on the hill.

The United States’ commander was now convinced that the capture of the hill and the guns on it was necessary to success. Forming a brigade, 1400 strong, in the hollow of the hill, he sent them straight against the guns. Part of them recoiled under the heavy fire, but one battalion was able to approach under a screen of dense thickets, and gained a position behind a log fence within twenty yards of the guns without being observed. Pouring in a volley, they rushed on the gunners with the bayonet, and were at once masters of the guns, which were turned upon the British line. A large body of United States’ infantry were then brought up on to the hill, and their artillery ascended the slope at a gallop. In doing this, one gun, of which the drivers were killed by a sudden volley, was taken by the horses into the British ranks, and secured.

Walker & Boutall sc.

BATTLE OF LUNDY’S LANE
9 p.m. 25th. July, 1814.
From L.L.H.S. Publications.

For over two hours this desperate struggle in the dark continued, with varying fortunes. At one moment, the 103rd, a young regiment, was forced back in disorder; at another the U.S. guns were captured, and two of them spiked. Neither side could make headway, in spite of frequent attacks and counter-attacks. Drummond was severely wounded but kept the field: nearly one-third of the British force were killed and wounded. The U.S. forces were in equally bad case. Three of their generals were wounded, while the rank and file had lost heavily. In the confusion and darkness the whole force had become disorganized; Scott’s brigade, that had commenced the fight, had dwindled to a few companies: there were an enormous number of stragglers. Closing their ranks for a last attack the wearied British troops, headed by the light company of the 41st, regained possession of the hill and of the guns, just as Brown had decided on withdrawing. Desultory firing continued for a few minutes: it was not till near midnight that the British troops, wearied by prolonged marching and fighting, remained in undisturbed possession of the field. Two of the enemy’s guns remained in their possession, while one British gun was carried off.

Thus ended the battle of Lundy’s Lane, the most severely contested action of the war. On the British side both generals were severely wounded, one of them being taken prisoner. Out of a total strength of somewhat less than 3000, the total British loss amounted to 5 officers and 76 men killed, 30 officers and 532 men wounded, 14 officers and 219 men missing and prisoners. The disproportion of wounded to killed, in this and other actions, was mainly due to the frequent use of buckshot by the enemy. The heaviest losses fell on the Royal Scots and 89th, who, out of a total of about 900 present, suffered a loss of 426. The 19th Light Dragoons had two wounded and one missing, together with three horses killed, ten wounded, and one missing. The United States’ loss was never correctly stated. Of the four generals engaged, three were wounded, while the disorganization of their force of about 4500 men engaged, and the loss of 16 officers killed and 56 wounded, makes it probable that their loss in killed and wounded was not less than 1200. Several hundred prisoners remained in the hands of the British. In his dispatch, General Drummond writes, “In reviewing the action from its commencement, the first object which presents itself as deserving of notice, is the steadiness and good countenance of the squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons, under Major Lisle, and the very creditable and excellent defence made by the incorporated militia-battalion &c.” This refers to the first period of the action when the left of the line was forced back.

The following day, General Ripley, who had succeeded to the command of the United States’ troops, advanced across the Chippewa to see to his dead and wounded; finding the field in occupation of the British, he immediately retired, broke down the bridge, destroyed a quantity of camp equipage and stores, and retired precipitately to Erie, which he reached on 27th. The light troops, cavalry and Indians were sent in pursuit, and made a few prisoners. On reaching Erie, Ripley at once set to work to enlarge and strengthen the defences, in anticipation of attack.

Drummond, after repairing the bridge, and receiving some reinforcements that brought his effective strength up to 3150 men, followed in Ripley’s footsteps, and appeared before Erie, which he invested on 3rd August. Ripley’s position was now very strong, with new earthworks and batteries extending from the fort to the edge of the lake. On the river side he was covered by the batteries at Black Rock: while from the lake, his defences were flanked by the fire of three gunboats. On the night of the 3rd, Drummond threw a small party of about 450 men across the river to capture the batteries at Black Rock. Failing to effect a surprise, they recrossed, with the loss of 25 men k.w.m. Two days later, the spirits of the besieged were raised by the arrival of General Gaines to supersede Ripley. On the night of the 12th, a daring exploit was performed by Captain Dobbs of the Royal Navy. With 75 seamen from Lake Ontario, he attacked and captured, in open boats transported overland, two of the three gunboats on Lake Erie: the third gunboat cut its cable, and escaped. On the 13th, Drummond’s batteries opened fire on the enemy’s works, and continued the cannonade on the following day, preparatory to a grand assault. At 2 A.M. on the 15th, the assault was delivered in three columns. The right column, headed by Sergeant Powell of the 19th Light Dragoons, “who was perfectly acquainted with the ground, volunteered to act as guide, and preceded the leading subdivision in the most intrepid style,” was to attack a work called Snake Hill at the border of the lake. The picquet of cavalry under Captain Eustace, 19th Light Dragoons was detailed to act with the right column. The rest of the squadron was drawn up in the rear of the most advanced battery, in readiness to receive prisoners, and conduct them to the rear. The centre and left columns were to assault the fort at different points. The scaling ladders with the right attack were too short; after prolonged efforts, and suffering great losses, the column was obliged to retire without gaining a footing. The left column also was beaten back, losing its leader and many men. The centre column, which was the weakest of the three, led by Lt. Colonel Drummond, the general’s nephew, alone effected a lodgment, and maintained its position till daylight, in spite of the most desperate efforts of the garrison. Lt. Colonel Drummond fell; but his men, reinforced from the left column, continued to resist all attacks made to dislodge them, till a tremendous explosion of stored ammunition took place, killing many, and forcing the remainder to retire. Almost every officer with the centre and left columns was killed or wounded. This disastrous repulse cost the British force a loss of 905 of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing; great part of the loss being ascribed to the explosion.

Drummond continued the blockade, and his troops now began to suffer greatly from sickness. On the 2nd September, General Brown, who had recovered from his wound received at Lundy’s Lane, resumed command of the U.S. forces at Erie, in place of Gaines who had been severely wounded. On the morning of the 7th, a United States’ picquet, consisting of an officer and 21 men, was surprised and cut off to a man, by a small party of infantry and a detachment of the 19th Light Dragoons under Captain Eustace, the whole commanded by Captain Powell, D.A.Q.M.G. The General Order of the same day says: “Sergeant Powell, 19th Light Dragoons, has been named to the Lieutenant General as having again distinguished himself on this occasion.” This brave soldier was subsequently taken prisoner, and is believed to have died before he could be exchanged. On the 17th September, favoured by a heavy fall of rain, Brown made a sortie in three strong divisions. The battery guards were surprised, and the whole line of entrenchments was for a time in the assailants’ hands; till Drummond, bringing up troops from the camp, drove out the enemy, and recovered possession of his batteries. The sortie cost the British troops 609 killed, wounded and prisoners, in addition to three of their few heavy guns destroyed, and other damage. This, together with continuous bad weather and increasing sickness among his troops, caused Drummond to give up the blockade, on the 21st, and withdraw his Head Quarters across the Chippewa on the 24th, which was done without molestation. A strong body of troops was maintained in advance of the Chippewa, occupying the line of the Black Creek. In his dispatch of 2nd October to Sir George Prevost, Drummond reports the capture by the enemy of a patrol of a corporal and six men of the 19th Light Dragoons. “The Dragoons must have been most culpably careless and confident, or the circumstance could not have happened.” About the 8th October, General Izard, with a large body of U.S. troops, arrived by land at Lewiston, from Sackett’s Harbour. Instead of crossing the river to Drummond’s rear, as he should have done, he continued along the river to Black Rock, and assumed the command at Erie. Izard’s force now amounted to over 8000 men, from whom some decisive action was to be expected. Izard advanced to Black Creek, and offered battle, which Drummond was not strong enough to accept. Beyond some skirmishing, Izard made no further use of his superiority of force, awaiting co-operation from the lake. But the U.S. squadron on Ontario was held fast in Sackett’s Harbour by Sir James Yeo. Izard remained inactive till 20th October, when he fell back, and carried his force across the river to Black Rock and Buffalo. On the 5th November, he blew up Fort Erie and evacuated the place. Drummond at once disposed the men in winter quarters. Major Lisle’s squadron was ordered to hold itself in readiness to proceed to Lower Canada, and one troop under Captain Eustace was sent to Ancaster.

Several times during the summer marauding parties from the United States, taking advantage of the undefended state of the Detroit frontier, had crossed the border, plundering and burning, and carrying off peaceable inhabitants. Drummond was unable to spare any force to meet this evil, and the province suffered cruelly. Towards the end of October, a mounted force of 1500 undisciplined men, under General McArthur, crossed the border by Lake St Clair, and marched to Moravian town on the Thames river, continuing eastwards in the direction of Burlington Heights, where only a few militia and some 300 of the 103rd, under Lt. Colonel Smelt, were stationed. Smelt at once moved forward to Grand River with about 170 men of the 103rd, 27 of the 19th Light Dragoons, 150 militia and some Indians. After making a demonstration of crossing, McArthur turned back and regained Detroit, on the 17th November, without having effected anything beyond the destruction of a great quantity of property. “Both in their advance and in their retreat their progress was marked by plunder and devastation.” Captain Eustace and his party marched to Dover.

A return, dated 8th November, shows that out of 7552 men on the frontier between Toronto and Long Point, 1327 were in hospital at that date. The total strength of the 19th Light Dragoons’ squadron was 123, of whom 34 were sick.

The operations for the year were at an end on this part of the frontier. Fort Niagara still remained in British hands, and the projected attack on Kingston had not been made. The only results of the strenuous efforts made by the United States’ government, at this point, had been to show the improvement of their troops, both in generalship and fighting power, since the beginning of the war. Beyond this, there was nothing to show for the offensive operations undertaken by the United States during the year.

The abdication of Napoleon, and the peace concluded in Paris at the end of May, set free for service in America the troops serving under Wellington in the south of France. A number of regiments were embarked at once for Quebec, so that, by the end of August, Sir George Prevost had upwards of 16,000 British troops in Lower Canada. With them came instructions to attack Plattsburgh, which, to observers at a distance, appeared to be the point from which the most formidable attack might be directed against Montreal. The strategy was at fault, as the experience of the preceding year had shown that, while Kingston continued to be held in force, no attack from Plattsburgh was likely to be successful. On the other hand, a British success at Plattsburgh could lead to no decisive result. The true point of attack was Sackett’s Harbour, on Lake Ontario. The occupation and retention of this point would have destroyed the U.S. naval power on the lake; Montreal and Kingston would have been secured from attack; and Sir Gordon Drummond would have been master of the situation on the Niagara frontier. The U.S. government gauged the situation more correctly, and denuded Plattsburgh of troops to reinforce Sackett’s Harbour. The event showed that Plattsburgh was only of secondary importance.

For the expedition against Plattsburgh Sir George Prevost formed three brigades on the frontier extending from the Richelieu river to the St Lawrence commanded by Major Generals Power, Robinson and Brisbane. The whole division was under command of Major General de Rottenburg, and amounted to 11,000 men. With it was the rest of the 19th Light Dragoons not engaged on the Niagara frontier.

On the 3rd of September, Sir George Prevost, advancing by Chateaugay from the St Lawrence, crossed the frontier to Chazy, and, on the 5th, reached, without opposition, a point eight miles from Plattsburgh. The U.S. troops about Plattsburgh, at the time, amounted to about 1500 men, of inferior quality, under General Macomb. This force was augmented by about 3000 militia from the surrounding neighbourhood during the operations, but neither in quality or numbers was it fit to stand before the troops under Prevost. On the 6th, the army advanced on Plattsburgh, driving in the U.S. pickets and outposts. So feeble was the resistance made that General Macomb mentions in his dispatch that the British troops pressed on in column, not even deigning to fire, except by their flankers and advanced patrols, on the militia that they brushed out of their way. In the advance, the 19th Light Dragoons had one man and two horses wounded, two men and six horses missing. Plattsburgh stands on the Saranac creek which runs at right angles into Lake Champlain. The high ground on the south side of the Saranac was occupied by Macomb with some hastily constructed redoubts. The houses on the north of the Saranac were occupied by British troops, on the 6th. On the lake lay the U.S. squadron, consisting of four vessels and ten gunboats. The British squadron, consisting of four vessels and twelve gunboats, was still at the north end of Lake Champlain, awaiting the completion of the flag-ship which had only been launched ten days previously, and whose crew had hardly joined her from Quebec. Sir George Prevost had only to advance on the 7th to make himself master of the feeble defences opposed to him, when he suddenly conceived the idea that he must await the co-operation of his lake squadron. For four days Prevost lay inactive, while he urged Captain Downie with his ill-prepared ships to join him, and engage the enemy’s squadron: the time was utilised by Macomb in strengthening his defences and collecting reinforcements. On the 11th, the British squadron appeared in sight, and engaged the U.S. ships, while Prevost put his troops tardily in motion. They forded the Saranac, and ascended the opposing heights, when, with victory in their grasp, they suddenly received the order to withdraw to their former positions. The British lake squadron, after a most deadly contest of over two hours, had been completely defeated, and Sir George Prevost at once threw up the sponge. The same night, leaving his sick and wounded, together with a quantity of stores, he commenced a retreat, which much resembled a flight, to the Canadian frontier. In the many wars in which the British army has fought, it would be hard to find a parallel instance in which British troops have been so mishandled. The co-operation of the fleet was unnecessary, as the enemy’s squadron could not have maintained its position with the whole of Plattsburgh in British hands. Nine thousand of Wellington’s veterans, who had defeated Napoleon’s choicest troops again and again, were made to retreat from an inferior force that could not have withstood them for an hour, with a loss of less than 40 killed since they had crossed the frontier. No wonder that the enemy first took the retreat for a ruse de guerre, and that a British General broke his sword, vowing he would never serve again. In the whole of the operations against Plattsburgh, the land forces under Prevost’s immediate command suffered a total loss of 37 killed, 150 wounded and 55 missing. In their anger at the fiasco, an immense number of men deserted during the retreat, causing a greater loss than a successful prosecution of the enterprise could possibly have entailed. The 19th Light Dragoons while covering the retirement, lost five men and horses taken prisoners.

Only brief mention need be made of land operations elsewhere, as they do not come within the scope of operations in which the 19th Light Dragoons were concerned. In the middle of August, a combined military and naval expedition fitted out from Bermuda, under Major General Ross and Vice Admiral Cockburn, landed at Benedict in the Potomac river, 50 miles from Washington, and marched on that town. At Bladensberg, on the 24th, Ross encountered a U.S. army of about 8000 men under General Winder, and gained a complete and easy victory, taking 10 guns.[65] Washington was occupied the same evening. On the following evening, after burning the most important public buildings, in retaliation for the outrages committed on the Canadian non-combatants, the force retired, and re-embarked on the 29th, without molestation.

At daylight on the 12th September, the same force landed 13 miles from Baltimore, and advanced on that place. On first coming in touch with the enemy, Ross was killed by a chance shot. Colonel Brook assumed the command, and at about five miles from Baltimore a United States’ force of about 7000 men was encountered and overthrown in less than half an hour. Two field pieces and many prisoners were captured. Preparations were then made for a combined attack on the city, when it was discovered that the harbour was so effectually closed by sunken vessels, that naval co-operation was impossible. It being considered that, under these circumstances, the loss that must be incurred in taking the place by storm would be out of proportion to any benefit to be gained, the troops were withdrawn, and re-embarked without the slightest molestation, on the 15th. The troopships, after hovering on the coast, rather aimlessly for another month, then set sail for Jamaica, where an expedition was preparing against New Orleans.

The mistake that had been made by the United States government in the early part of the war, in under-rating the difficulty of conquering Canada, and in believing that the inhabitants would join the invaders, was now to be repeated by the British government. British Ministers had been brought to believe that the inhabitants of Louisiana were disaffected to the U.S. government, and that the State could easily be taken possession of. With this object, an expedition against New Orleans had been planned in England; and, it was in order to save the troops for this purpose, that the attack on Baltimore had been abandoned. New Orleans, though a great commercial centre, was devoid of any military importance, and the expedition was destined to furnish another example of the faulty strategy that was exhibited on both sides during the war.

On the 8th December, the expedition under Major General Sir Edward Pakenham, appeared off the coast, and, on the night of the 12th, captured the enemy’s squadron of gunboats. On the 16th, the landing of the troops commenced, at the mouth of the Pearl river. Considerable delay ensued, owing to the swampy nature of the ground, and the advance did not approach the city till the 23rd. General Jackson, in command at New Orleans, occupied a long line of entrenchments at right angles to the river. He was also assisted by armed vessels on the Mississippi which inflicted severe losses on the British troops, and greatly delayed their advance. On the morning of the 8th January, the attack was made, and repulsed with heavy slaughter. Pakenham fell at the head of his men; Major General Gibbs died of his wounds the following day, and Major General Keane was severely wounded. The total loss amounted to 2119 killed, wounded and missing. So strongly were the enemy posted, that his loss did not exceed about 80 men. Under this disastrous repulse the expedition withdrew on the 18th, and re-embarked. A portion of the expedition was then directed against Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point, which capitulated, on 12th February, without resistance. Twenty-eight guns and over 300 prisoners fell into the hands of the British.

In the middle of March, news was received that a Treaty of Peace had been signed at Ghent on 24th December, and the war was at an end.

During the summer of 1814, the Head Quarters of the regiment was moved from La Prairie to Chambly, where they remained as long as the regiment was in Canada. The four troops left behind in Ireland had been moved, on the embarkation of the regiment for Canada, to Radipole Barracks, near Weymouth; and thence to Maidstone, in February 1814. In July of the same year, the regiment lost its Colonel, Lord Howe, by death. In his place, Lieutenant General Sir William Payne Bt., was transferred as Colonel, from the 23rd Light Dragoons. He was an officer who had served in the Royal Dragoons, and commanded the British Cavalry at the battle of Talavera. His connection with the regiment was very brief, as, in the following January, he was appointed Colonel of the 12th Light Dragoons. In his place, Major General Sir John Ormsby Vandeleur K.C.B., Lieutenant Colonel in the regiment, was appointed Colonel.

Sir John Vandeleur had entered the army in 1781, and saw service in Flanders in 1794, and at the Cape of Good Hope in 1796. He commanded a brigade of cavalry, under Lake, in the wars against Scindia and Holkar, 1803–5, and especially distinguished himself at Laswaree, and on other occasions. In 1807, he exchanged into the 19th as already mentioned.[66] In 1811, he commanded an infantry brigade in Spain, under Wellington, and, at Ciudad Rodrigo, led the assault after Craufurd’s fall, when he was severely wounded. Afterwards he commanded the 4th cavalry brigade at Waterloo, and succeeded to the command of the whole of the cavalry, on Lord Uxbridge being wounded.

During 1814, gold lace was substituted for silver in the uniform of the regiment.

In May 1815, sanction was granted, under the following order, for Major Lisle’s squadron to wear the badge “Niagara” for their services on the Niagara frontier. The privilege seems to have been extended later to the whole regiment.

Horse Guards
19th May 1815.

Lt. General
Sir George Prevost Bt.
or General Officer Commanding Canada.

Detachments of the regiment were quartered at La Prairie, Isle aux Noix, Blairfindie, Quebec, Montreal, and St John’s.

In 1816, the whole of the ten troops of the regiment, amounting to 620 rank and file, appear to have been in Canada. At the very end of the year, the strength of the Canadian establishment was fixed at 5000 rank and file. In order to bring it down to this number, the 19th were held under orders to return to England, but, it was not till the following 6th August that they embarked at Quebec, and landed at Tilbury, 13th September. On landing they marched to Romford, where they remained till the following March.

The execution done by the Polish lancers at Waterloo induced the military authorities in England to arm four regiments with lances. Accordingly, the 9th, 12th, 16th, and 23rd Light Dragoons were equipped as Lancers, in September 1816. But great reductions in the military establishments were in progress, and, in October 1817, the 23rd were disbanded, their horses being made over to the 19th, whose establishment was reduced to eight troops. At the same time, the 19th were ordered to be equipped as lancers.[67]

In March 1818, the regiment was moved to Hounslow and Hampton Court, with detachments at Pimlico and Kensington. On the 26th May, the regiment, together with the 10th Hussars, was reviewed at Hounslow by the Prince Regent, and, in November, they were on duty, at Datchet, for Queen Charlotte’s funeral.

The regimental muster rolls show that in October the regiment had 455 rank and file.

In June of the following year the regiment moved to Brighton, with troops at Hastings, Arundel and Rottingdean.

A year later (June 1820), the regiment was ordered to Nottingham, with troops at Mansfield, Sheffield, Loughborough, Peterborough and Derby. In spite of the distance, they marched to Hounslow to be reviewed, on 4th August, in company with the 10th Hussars and 12th Lancers, by George IV., when His Majesty expressed his “unqualified approbation” of the three regiments.

OFFICERS OF THE XIX^TH LANCERS, 1818.

to face p. 218.

During the winter, the regiment marched to Manchester, and, in the end of May, embarked for Ireland, where they were quartered at Newbridge. But further reductions were in progress, and, on 23rd August 1821, warrants were issued for the disbandment of the 18th Light Dragoons and 19th Lancers, which were carried into effect on 10th September. The strength of the 19th, at the time of disbandment, was 103 officers and non-commissioned officers, 336 rank and file, 273 horses.

(1858–1882)

In May 1857, the mutiny of the Bengal Native Army occurred, which so profoundly changed the nature of British administration in India. Through carelessness and false economy, the East India Company had allowed the number of European troops in India to sink to a dangerously low level, in proportion to the number of native troops. As against some 230,000 native soldiers, the European troops numbered less than 40,000 men, of whom about 23,500 were royal troops. The Company’s European troops in India consisted, at that time, of nine battalions of Infantry, seventeen troops of Horse Artillery, and forty-eight companies of Foot Artillery. Apart from other measures for restoring tranquillity, it was determined to raise three additional battalions of Infantry, and to replace the mutinous Bengal Native Cavalry by Europeans. Of the ten regiments of regular Bengal Native Cavalry, seven had mutinied, and two had been disarmed.

In November 1857, intimation was sent to the Governor General that it had been decided to form four regiments of Cavalry, for the Company’s service, of men recruited in England, of ages between 20 and 30 years, and of a standard height not less than 5 ft., and not exceeding 5 ft. 4 in. Each regiment was to consist of ten troops, with 70 privates per troop, together with the usual number of officers, non-commissioned officers and staff. All accoutrements, arms, and equipments were to be of a lighter description than those in common use by British Cavalry: and the men were to be collected at a depot in England (Warley), to be trained for three months, before being embarked for India. A lower standard of height than that of the Royal Army was adopted, with the intention that the recruiting for the Royal Army should not be interfered with, and it was thought that, by tapping a new stratum of recruits, men would be easily obtained. These anticipations were justified. The whole nation had been roused by the sufferings of our countrywomen in India, and recruits flocked in. Three weeks later, the Court of Directors were obliged to write to the Governor General that, in consequence of the very rapid recruiting, accommodation could not be provided for the men, in England, and it was necessary to embark a large body of them, for Calcutta, at once.

With regard to these undersized men, it may be said here, that a large number of them made excellent soldiers in time; but there was a considerable proportion of them, big men on short legs, over 25 years of age at the time of enlistment, who were unfit for cavalry purposes.

After being kept some time near Calcutta, the men were gradually forwarded to Allahabad, where they were collected in June 1858, an almost undisciplined mob, without permanent officers, without horses, and without equipments. On the 17th June, we find Major General Sir William Mansfield (afterwards Lord Sandhurst) writing to Major General Sir Hope Grant, then in the field against the rebels: “We are about to organize the four regiments of Bengal Dragoons, and to divide the recruits into four bodies without delay. How would it suit you to have one of these young corps attached to the ‘Bays’ (2nd Dragoon Guards), and another to the 7th (Hussars)? Not a man has ever been on a horse, and the men are at present armed with muskets.”

By the end of June, the apportioning of the men into regiments was complete, and, on the 3rd July, the regiment with which our interest lies, became established as the Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry, to be quartered at Allahabad. The other three regiments marched for various cantonments in North Western India. A fifth regiment was formed at Peshawur, in November, of volunteers from Royal infantry regiments, who had been formed into a cavalry corps for temporary service during the Mutiny.

To officer each of these regiments, the officers of two of the ten mutinied or disbanded Bengal Native Cavalry regiments were utilized: but, instead of placing them upon a single list, they were kept on separate lists for promotion, which were styled Right and Left Wings, corresponding to their late regiments. All officers newly appointed, who had belonged to neither of the old Native regiments, were to be borne on the strength of the Right Wing, so that, in process of time, the Left Wing was destined to disappear; but the process would have been one of thirty years or more, according to the rate of promotion then existing in the Company’s service.

The Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry was officered by the surviving officers of the 1st and 3rd Bengal Native Cavalry, both of which regiments had mutinied. For remounts, the men were given a number of horses hastily purchased at the Cape of Good Hope and in Australia, most of them wild unbroken bush horses that had never been handled. An officer who served with the regiment at this time, writing of it forty years afterwards, says:—

On the 1st November 1858, the Crown assumed the government of India, and the East India Company thenceforth ceased to exist. No attention was paid to the view that might be taken of the change, in the ranks of the Company’s army. The British soldier, though he yields to discipline, never forgets that he is a soldier by his own free will; he objects to be treated like a conscript. The late Company’s European soldiers quickly came to believe that their rights had been infringed. Had they been asked to volunteer for service under the Crown, they would have done so almost to a man; but they objected to be handed over “like bullocks,” as they expressed it. The Indian government consulted its legal advisers, who treated the objection as a purely technical one, prompted by a wish for the offer of a bounty. So long as the men were retained for the local service for which they had enlisted, it was considered that they had no grievance. It was decided that the men had no case, and a General Order to this effect was published in April 1859. The agitation quickly assumed a serious aspect, and, during May, there was a time when, in a few cantonments, a collision between the Royal and the late Company’s European troops appeared possible. The movement was not confined to the newly raised regiments, but was equally shared in by the old soldiers of the late Company, who had shown their fine qualities on many a hard fought field. The behaviour of the 1st Bengal European Light Cavalry was similar to that of the local European forces in most other places. All guards and barrack duties were performed without demur, but the men refused to turn out for parade. On one occasion the canteen was broken into, and an attempt was made to release prisoners. Mutinous language was used to officers in a few instances, and shots fired in defiance, but not with evil intent. Under the circumstances already related, it is surprising that nothing worse occurred. In one instance alone, in one of the newly raised infantry regiments, was there a dangerous attempt to act as an organized armed body hostile to the State. This was speedily repressed, and the ringleader shot.

The Calcutta government quickly recognized its mistake. In the end of June, orders were published allowing the men the option of discharge, but no bounty was offered to those who elected to remain, while those who took their discharge were not allowed the option of re-enlistment, as long as they remained in the country. Under the feeling of exasperation that had grown up, upwards of 10,000 men elected to take their discharge, of whom 2800 re-enlisted on reaching England.

The trouble with the Indian local European forces, in 1859, has been frequently cited as a cogent reason against the maintenance of a body of British troops in India, for local service only; a measure that would overcome many difficulties now felt in army administration. Those who study the events of 1859 must recognize that the trouble arose, not from the conditions of service, but from the mistakes of those in authority at Calcutta. The “White Mutiny” was no mere outbreak against discipline: it was the vindication of the men’s claim to be consulted in the disposal of their services.

While these events were in progress, orders were received for the regiment to march to Cawnpore, which it did in June.

Early in 1861, it was determined to cease the maintenance of any European force for local service in India, and, on 6th May, the officers, non-commissioned officers and men were called on to volunteer for General Service. They responded, almost to a man, and the regiment received the designation of the 19th Light Dragoons. In the same way, the Bengal 2nd and 3rd European Light Cavalry became the 20th and 21st Light Dragoons; the 4th and 5th being disbanded. At the same time, the establishment was assimilated to that of other British cavalry regiments in India, viz. nine troops (one at the depot in England) with 585 corporals and privates: 693 of all ranks. Three months later, under Horse Guards order of 17th August 1861, the designation of the regiment was changed to the 19th Hussars. The standard for recruits was assimilated to that of other Hussar regiments.

At the beginning of February 1862, the regiment was moved to Lucknow.

On the 30th July, in the same year, the complete roll of officers was gazetted.

The greater number of them had belonged to the Company’s 1st and 3rd Bengal Native Cavalry.

In September, General William Pattle C.B. was gazetted to be Colonel of the regiment. He was an old Company’s officer who had entered the service in 1800. He served under Lord Lake in the Mahratta campaigns of 1803 and 1804, and was present at the battles of Alyghur, Delhi, Laswaree, the siege of Bhurtpore &c. He served through the Mahratta war of 1817–18, and commanded the cavalry under Sir Charles Napier, during the conquest of Scinde, and at the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad.

Under orders from the War office, dated 6th January 1863, the establishment was reduced by one troop, leaving seven service troops and one at Maidstone.

In the autumn, orders were received for the regiment to march to Meerut, where it arrived 28th November. Here the regiment remained till the end of 1867. The only events to be noticed during these four years are a reduction of establishment by 56 privates in 1866: and the presence of the regiment at the great Durbar held by the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, at Agra, in November 1866, when the 19th were brigaded with the 2nd Dragoon Guards.

In the beginning of 1865, the regiment lost its Colonel by death. In his place Lieutenant General John Hall was appointed Colonel.

On the 10th December 1867, the Head Quarters of the regiment, with four troops, marched for Benares, being followed, a month later, by the remaining three troops, who marched to Cawnpore.

In the ordinary course of relief, the regiment was intended to leave India in 1872. In a sudden fit of economy, the Indian Government decided to get rid of two cavalry regiments, so that, without any previous warning, the regiment received telegraphic orders, on 18th January 1870, to proceed to England immediately. Similar orders were sent to the 7th Hussars, then serving in India. Volunteering was at once opened to men electing to serve in other regiments remaining in India, and, on 24th January, the regiment was re-united at Allahabad, whence it proceeded to Bombay, where it embarked on board the Jumna on the 14th February. So unexpected had been the move, that a draft for the regiment, from England, joined it four days before sailing. The strength of the regiment leaving India, was as follows: 18 officers, 51 sergeants and corporals, 7 trumpeters, 257 privates, 28 women and 55 children.

On the 22nd March, the regiment landed at Dover, and proceeded to Canterbury, whence all the Cavalry Depot troops, excepting those of the 20th and 21st Hussars, had been moved to Maidstone. But the British Government were as unwilling to have the home military establishment increased by the two regiments thus sent from India, as the Indian Government had been to retain them, and the idea of disbanding two regiments was entertained. The Manchester school was predominant; shortsighted financial considerations alone had any weight. The changes rung in the establishment of the regiment for the next four months show the hesitating counsels that prevailed. On the 1st April, one troop was absorbed. A month later, the establishment was nominally fixed at 25 officers, 457 Sergeants and privates, and 300 horses, but recruiting to make the regiment up to that strength was forbidden. At the end of June the establishment of horses was reduced to 200. A week later, the war between France and Germany broke out, while the question of the strength of military establishments was still being bandied about between the Treasury and the War Office. On the 1st August, orders were received to complete the strength of the regiment up to 540 of all ranks, which was done by the end of September. The number of horses was also raised to 350.

Consequent on the increase of establishment, an eighth troop was formed in February 1871.

In May, the Head Quarters of the regiment and five troops marched to Brighton; the other three troops going to the camp at Shorncliffe.

On the 17th June, an inspection of the regiment was held at Brighton by its Colonel, General John Hall.

In August 1872, the regiment marched to Aldershot, and, a few days after arrival, marched to take part in the Wiltshire manœuvres at Pewsey, where it was brigaded under the command of Major General Shute C.B.; returning to Aldershot in September.

During 1872, the regiment lost its Colonel, Lieutenant General Hall, who was succeeded by General John Yorke C.B. He was an old officer of the Royal Dragoons, which regiment he commanded in the Crimean War, and was severely wounded at Balaclava.

In June 1873, the regiment marched to Windsor, to take part in the review held in honour of H.M. the Shah of Persia, on the 24th; returning to Aldershot the following day.

In August, manœuvres were held at Dartmoor, in which the regiment took part; proceeding by train as far as Exeter, and returning to Aldershot by route march. The fine appearance of the regiment, and its proficiency in outpost and reconnoissance duties attracted more than usual attention on this occasion.

Early in 1874, the regiment was granted the privilege of wearing the badges so gloriously earned by the old 19th Light Dragoons.

Horse Guards 24th Feb. 1874.

To the
Officer Commanding
19th Hussars.

It will be observed that the “Seringapatam” badge, granted to the old 19th Light Dragoons for four campaigns in the last century, was withheld. The 23rd of September is now observed as an annual holiday in the regiment, in commemoration of Assaye.

On the 19th May, the regiment took part in the review held at Aldershot, in honour of H.I.M. the Emperor of Russia.

At the end of June, the regiment marched to new quarters at Hounslow, with a troop at Hampton Court, and another at Kensington.

At the end of July 1875, the regiment marched to Leeds, with troops at Preston and Bury.

In June 1876, the regiment proceeded to Ireland. After going through the drill season at the Curragh, it went into quarters at Longford, Gort, Castlebar, Dunmore, and Athlone. In the following spring it returned to the Curragh, and, in October, marched to Dublin, where it was quartered in the Royal Barracks and Arbour Hill. In the following August, it again marched to the Curragh, whence, after a month, it marched for Ballincollig, with out-quarters at Cork, Cahir, Limerick, Bandon, Fermoy, and afterwards Waterford. In these quarters the regiment remained till May 1880, when it was again ordered to the Curragh. In August, the regiment again marched to Dublin, leaving one squadron at the Curragh. Three months later, a wing was ordered to Ballinrobe and Lough Mask, by rail, in aid of the civil power, returning to Dublin after a fortnight’s work, in, what was then called, the “Boycott” campaign.

In May 1881, the regiment moved to Dundalk, with two troops at Belfast and one at Belturbet. The time was one of much excitement in Ireland, when the Land League conspiracy was in full force, and the regiment was employed, during the winter, in much harassing work in support of the civil power.

While at Belfast the regiment became possessed of some greatly prized relics of the old 19th Light Dragoons, through the generosity of a lady whose husband had served in the old regiment. As is well known, all cavalry regiments except Hussars and Lancers, at the beginning of the century, had a standard or guidon for each squadron. After their return from India, and shortly after the conferring of the Elephant and Assaye badges (1807) the 19th Light Dragoons received a new set of guidons.[68] On the regiment being equipped as Lancers (1817) the guidons could no longer be used, and, on the disbanding of the regiment they became the property of the Colonel, Sir John Vandeleur. At his death he bequeathed them to his relative Major William Armstrong of Farney Castle, Thurles, who had served in the 19th from 1809 to 1819. Major Armstrong’s widow now made known her wish to restore the guidons to the regiment that bears the number and badges which the old regiment so worthily earned. On the 28th March 1882, the Belfast squadron paraded, under Lieutenant Colonel Coghill, and received the guidons with a royal salute. The Princess of Wales’ Own Yorkshire Regiment (formerly the 19th Foot) lent the services of their band, and the guidons were marched in all honour, through the town, to barracks, where they were deposited in the Mess Room, after a royal salute and an address to the squadron from Colonel Coghill.

The honorary guidon granted to the old regiment for Assaye, has not been traced. If it is still in existence, it is to be hoped that the possessor will restore it to its rightful guardians.

According to the old custom one guidon in each regiment was known as the King’s. The King’s guidon was of crimson silk with the Union badge in the centre. The regimental guidons were of the same colour as the regimental facings, with the regimental badge in the centre. Guidons were discarded on active service, after 1811, if not earlier.[69]

AN OFFICER OF THE XIX^TH HUSSARS, 1882.

to face p. 232.

In June 1882, the regiment received orders to return to England, and, while on the march for Aldershot, where it arrived 14th July, news was received that it was to proceed at once to Egypt on active service. Weak and sickly men were drafted into Depot, to remain behind, the four squadrons being completed by volunteers from other regiments and from the Reserve. The following officers also were attached to the regiment, for service.

1882–1884.

In June 1879, Mahomed Ismail, the Khedive of Egypt, was deposed by the Sultan, at the instance of England and France, in favour of his son Mahommed Tewfik, and a control of Egyptian finances was established by the two western powers. In the beginning of 1881, a spirit of insubordination began to show itself among the officers of the Egyptian army, who quickly recognised their own power to enforce demands, and adopted as leader, one of their number, Said Ahmed Arabi, better known as Arabi Pasha. By September, the pretensions of the army had so far increased that, they forced the Khedive to dismiss his Ministers. Attempts were soon afterwards made to get rid of the Anglo-French control. Arabi’s influence increased daily; he caused himself to be appointed Minister of War; and, by April 1882, had practically got the whole of the country into his hands. The Khedive was helpless. In May, the French and English fleets were sent to Alexandria, in order to strengthen the Khedive’s hands. But matters did not improve: Arabi openly assumed the direction of affairs, and began to strengthen the forts commanding the Alexandria harbour. On the 11th June, serious riots broke out in Alexandria, in the course of which a number of Europeans were killed, and their houses pillaged. It was seen in England that a military expedition to restore order would probably be necessary, and preparations, in anticipation, began to be made.

In the meantime, the work on the Alexandria fortifications had so far advanced as to endanger the safety of the fleets. The French Government was unwilling to take action: the remonstrances of the British Admiral were met by evasions and denials from Arabi Pasha. At last, on 11th July, after due notice, the forts were bombarded and destroyed by the British fleet. A force of seamen and marines was landed to secure the safety of the Khedive, and put an end to the pillaging and burning of the town by Arab marauders, and, on the 17th, two battalions of British infantry, from Cyprus, under Major General Sir Archibald Alison, landed to hold the town. On the 20th, the British Government definitely decided to send a military expedition to Egypt, to restore the Khedive’s authority. The French Government refused to co-operate, and withdrew from further action.

The force sent from England and the Mediterranean stations amounted to 25,450 men, of whom 2400 were cavalry: the whole being commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Garnet Wolseley. There being no fear of their being attacked at sea, they were sent without convoy, as soon as the ships could be got ready. By the 11th August, the last transport had sailed from England for Alexandria. The 19th Hussars were among the last to go. On the 10th August, they embarked at Southampton, in the Assyrian Monarch and the Montreal, with a total strength of 33 officers, 553 non-commissioned officers and privates, and 464 horses, under command of Lieutenant Colonel K. J. W. Coghill. Previous to this, a detachment of 20 men under Lieutenant Aylmer had sailed in the Orient as escort to H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught. It was also arranged for a Contingent from India to operate from Suez, consisting of one battalion of British infantry, three battalions of Native infantry, and three regiments of Native cavalry, under command of Major General Sir Herbert Macpherson.

Arabi’s army, at the beginning of July, consisted only of about 9000 men. By calling out reserves, and enlisting Arabs, it soon reached the number of 60,000 men, and eventually amounted to 100,000.

Before the expedition left England, it had been determined to seize the Suez Canal, and advance on Cairo from Ismailia; but, as it was expedient that the Canal should not be blocked or injured, Alexandria was appointed as the rendezvous of the troops on the Mediterranean side, and measures were taken to spread the belief that the advance on Cairo would be made from that place.

The greater part of the troops being gathered at Alexandria, on the 18th August, preparations were made as if an attack on Aboukir was intended. Troops were re-embarked, and sailed under convoy of the fleet, at noon on the 19th, anchoring in Aboukir Bay the same afternoon. After dark, while demonstrations of bombarding the Aboukir forts were made, the transports weighed anchor, entered the Canal, and commenced landing at Ismailia on the 20th. The movement was unexpected by the enemy, and no resistance was experienced. By the 22nd, complete command had been gained of the whole Canal from Port Said to Suez. On the 21st, Nefisha, four miles in front of Ismailia, was occupied. Early on the 24th, a small force was pushed forward to El Magfar, which was occupied after a slight skirmish, in which Lieutenant Aylmer’s detachment of the 19th Hussars took part. At El Magfar, it was found necessary to push on to Tel-el-Mahuta, to secure the water supply. The place was strongly occupied by the enemy, and the small British force was exposed to long range fire of guns and small arms, for many hours, while reinforcements were coming up, which did not happen till the evening. The next morning, the whole force advanced, and occupied Tel-el-Mahuta after a slight opposition, while the cavalry pushed forward, and occupied the enemy’s camp at Mahsamah without resistance. Seven guns, with a large quantity of small arms, ammunition and stores, fell into the hands of the British troops. Early on the 26th, Kassassin was occupied by a brigade of infantry under Major General Graham, and the troops from Suez began to arrive at Ismailia.

The 19th Hussars, in the Assyrian Monarch and the Montreal, did not reach Alexandria in time to take part in these operations. They reached Ismailia on the 24th, and completed their disembarkation by the evening of the 26th. The duty assigned to them was to act as Divisional troops; the Right Wing, consisting of two squadrons under Lieutenant Colonel Coghill, formed part of the 1st Division under Lieutenant General Willis; the remaining two squadrons, under Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Webster, formed part of the 2nd Division under Lieutenant General Sir E. Hamley. One troop was detailed as escort to Sir Garnet Wolseley throughout the campaign. The Right Wing joined the Head Quarters of the 1st Division at Tel-el-Mahuta, on the evening of the 27th.

On the 28th, a demonstration was made by the enemy against Graham’s force at Kassassin. The Right Wing of the 19th was ordered in support to Mahsamah; but, on its being ascertained that no serious attack was intended they returned to Tel-el-Mahuta. Graham, having been reinforced, and expecting the Heavy Cavalry Brigade to join him, made a general advance after sunset. The orders for the heavy cavalry had, however, miscarried, and did not reach Major General Lowe for several hours. Making a wide sweep into the desert, Lowe fell upon the left of the enemy in the dark, and charged, rolling up their infantry; the darkness made pursuit impossible. The sound of the heavy firing, caused the Division at Tel-el-Mahuta to turn out again, but after a brief advance they returned to camp, with the exception of the 19th Hussars, who pushed on to Kassassin, which they reached at daybreak. It was not till noon, after visiting the scene of the previous night’s encounter, that they were able to off-saddle and rest.

The following twelve days were spent in preparing for the advance on Tel-el-Kebir, 13 miles from Kassassin, where Arabi’s army had constructed a formidable line of entrenched works. During these days, the 19th Hussars and the Indian Native Cavalry were employed in continual outpost and reconnoissance duties. On the 5th, Lieutenant Holland was badly wounded.

By the 8th, all was ready for massing the whole force at Kassassin preparatory to the advance on Tel-el-Kebir. Early on the 9th, Arabi advanced in force on Kassassin, attacking in two separate bodies simultaneously, one in front from Tel-el-Kebir, and the other in flank from Es Salihiyeh. Willis repelled the double attack with ease, and pushed the enemy back to within cannon shot of Tel-el-Kebir, capturing four guns.

Soon after dark on the 12th, the whole force consisting of 17,000 men, with 61 guns, moved out of camp to some high ground in front of Kassassin, in preparation for an attack on Arabi Pasha’s entrenched lines. At 1.30 in the morning, the troops moved silently forwards through the desert, their march directed by a naval officer steering by the stars. The four infantry brigades, in two lines, led the way, supported on the right by the heavy cavalry brigade and horse artillery, and on the left by the naval brigade. In rear of the naval brigade, followed the 19th Hussars under Lieutenant Colonel Coghill. One troop of the regiment remained at Mahsamah, and another at Tel-el-Mahuta, to guard those points. At five in the morning the attack was delivered; after half an hour’s severe fighting, the British infantry was in complete possession of the lines. While the heavy cavalry pushed on to Zagazig to cut off fugitives, the 19th, under Coghill, passed through an opening in the entrenchments, and seized the Tel-el-Kebir railway station and bridge, cutting off a great number of fugitives. Thence the pursuit was continued for three hours, when the 19th returned to the enemy’s late camp. In the afternoon they started again in the track of the heavy cavalry, leaving a troop to protect burial parties, and reached Belbeis that evening. On the following evening Cairo was taken possession of, and Arabi surrendered himself. The only casualty in the regiment was Lieutenant Barclay who was struck by a fragment of shell from one of the first guns fired by the enemy at Tel-el-Kebir.

The war was over. A medal, with clasp for Tel-el-Kebir, was given to all who took part in the campaign. The medals were presented to the regiment by Lady Dufferin, in Her Majesty’s name, in the following February. H.H. the Khedive also gave a star.

A few weeks after the arrival of the regiment in Cairo, a virulent epidemic attacked the horses. In order to shake it off, the regiment was moved to Helouan, at the end of the first week in November, with 248 sick horses, 56 having died in Cairo. A good deal of sickness also set in among the men. In the following March the regiment returned to Cairo, and occupied the Abassiyeh barracks, having lost 18 men and 141 horses in the interval. When the regiment went to Egypt it had four coloured squadrons, chesnut, bay, brown, and black, while the band were mounted on greys. Experience showed that the greys bore the climate better than any others; the chesnuts also bore the climate well. The dark coloured horses suffered most, and were more liable, than the others, to sore backs. In respect to age, the percentage of deaths among horses between five and ten years, was double that among horses between ten and fifteen years. In the hurry of departure from England, about twenty horses, over fifteen years of age, were taken. They were employed as waggon horses, and had perhaps harder work than those under saddle; yet they stood the climate and work better than all the others.

Affairs in Lower Egypt, to outward appearance, seemed to be settling down so satisfactorily that, in November, the regiment received orders to hold itself in readiness to proceed to England. This prospect endured only for a week, when news from Upper Egypt was received, altering all arrangements.

While the British government were busying themselves with Lower Egypt, they paid scanty attention to the Soudan, which they regarded as a burden and encumbrance that Egypt would do well to get rid of. The Khedive’s government did not hold this view, and continued to occupy themselves in dealing with a movement that had originated in Kordofan, the importance of which was greatly under-estimated at the time. Simultaneously with the insubordination of the Egyptian army and the rise of Arabi Pasha, another pretender to power, of a more serious type had arisen in the South. In May 1881, an Arab, in Kordofan, named Mahomed Ahmed, proclaimed himself to be the Mahdi, and preached a religious war. Matters were not improved by communications from Arabi, published in the Soudan, proclaiming that the Khedive’s government was at an end, and that no obedience should be paid to it. By the end of 1882, the Mahdi had gathered a large force of fighting men, and had inflicted several disastrous defeats on the Egyptian troops. In April 1883, an Egyptian force, which came to be known as the “English Army,” was organized at Khartoum, under the command of Major General Hicks, who had with him a number of English officers, to advance on Kordofan, and put down the revolt.[70] In October, this force was utterly destroyed, and the whole of the Soudan was in a blaze. It was at once realized that the reconquest of Kordofan and the complete suppression of the Mahdi would require operations on a scale that could not then be undertaken. A complete withdrawal from the Western Soudan was therefore determined on. To effect this, Colonel Gordon with £40,000 was sent to Khartoum. Meanwhile, the uprising of the tribes had developed in another direction.

In August 1883, a slave trader, named Osman Digna, in the Eastern Soudan, had raised the tribesmen, in the name of the Mahdi, and attacked the Egyptian posts in the vicinity of Suakin, the principal seaport of the Soudan, laying siege to Sinkat and Tokar. An Egyptian force for the relief of these places was organized in Cairo, and sent down, under Major General Baker, in December. On the 4th February 1884, while advancing to the relief of Tokar, it was utterly destroyed, Baker and his staff making their escape with difficulty. The fall of Sinkat and massacre of its garrison quickly followed. The presence of British men-of-war at Suakin, alone saved that place. It was evident that without British troops nothing could be done. But beyond securing the safety of Suakin and effecting the relief of Tokar, the British Government had no definite plans.

To effect these objects, a force was organized at Cairo, under Major General Graham, and dispatched from Suez. The 19th Hussars commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Webster, left Cairo on the 17th February, and embarked in the Osiris and the Neera, with a strength of 20 officers, 457 non-commissioned officers and men, and 395 horses. Three hundred of the horses were small Syrian Arabs procured from the Egyptian cavalry. The force was destined to land at Trinkitat, about 50 miles south of Suakin, and the nearest point on the coast to Tokar.

The Osiris reached Trinkitat on the 22nd February, and the portion of the 19th on board, disembarked the following day. In a reconnoissance made on the 24th, they came in touch with the enemy at once. The Neera, less fortunate, struck on a rock off Suakin, and became a total wreck, though men and horses were all saved; but they did not reach Trinkitat till the 25th. The regiment was brigaded with the 10th Hussars and mounted infantry, about 750 men in all, under Colonel Herbert Stewart. On the 28th, the whole force, consisting of about 4500 men, moved from Trinkitat to Fort Baker, but, before this, the news of the fall of Tokar had been received.

On the 29th, the force advanced against the enemy, who occupied a strong position at El Teb. Moving in a large square, they found the Arab force in position on an isolated ridge covered with bush scrub, and protected with parapets and rifle pits. A squadron of the 10th Hussars covered the front and left face of the square; a troop of the 19th covered the right face. The rest of the cavalry were disposed in rear of the square, in three lines, commanded respectively by Lieut. Colonel Wood, 10th Hussars, Lieut. Colonels Barrow and Webster, 19th Hussars. By their defeat of General Baker, and the capture of Tokar, the enemy had become possessed of guns, small arms and ammunition, which they used very efficiently. As the British force came within range, the cavalry cleared away from the front of the square, which moved to the right, across the front of the position, so as to attack the left flank of the enemy, and the British guns came into action. In forty minutes, the enemy’s guns being silenced, the square moved forward again. As they approached the ridge, the enemy’s fire ceased, and, in small groups of twenty and thirty men, the Arabs dashed at the face of the square with the most reckless valour. Not one of them succeeded in reaching it. Again the British infantry advanced, and again with desperate courage a great force of Arabs hurled themselves on the British bayonets. There are no braver men than the Arabs of the Soudan. Armed with sword and spear, in spite of hundreds being shot down, many of them succeeded in coming hand to hand with their foes and the matter was decided by the bayonet. Thus, fighting at every step, the British infantry swept steadily along the whole line of the enemy’s position, capturing seven guns in their progress. The enemy’s number was computed at from 6000 to 10,000 men. Of these, over 2000 lay dead on the ridge. As the remainder drew off across the plain beyond, the first two lines of British cavalry swept round the end of the ridge, and pursued. After driving the main body of the enemy before them for some distance, it was found necessary to return to encounter a large body of the enemy they had passed in the broken ground, and that now interposed between them and the infantry. The 10th Hussars, and two squadrons of the 19th under Lieutenant Colonel Barrow, charged a large body of Arabs composed of horsemen, men on camels, and footmen, and at once became involved in a desperate hand to hand conflict. This body of Arabs had not been engaged with our infantry, and were quite fresh. Thirty Arab horsemen charged one of the leading squadrons, three of them getting through and wheeling their horses in pursuit regardless of the second line. The Arab swordsmen and spearmen, taking advantage of the scrub and broken ground, hamstrung horses as they passed, and then attacked the riders. Captain Freeman of the 19th and several men were killed, and many wounded. Of all those who lost their horses in the mêlée, Colonel Barrow alone escaped alive. His horse was killed, and he received a thrust from a spear that passed through his arm and penetrated his side. Surrounded by numbers of the enemy, he must have been killed, had it not been for the devotion of Quarter Master Sergeant William Marshall who rode to his assistance, seconded by Sergeant Fenton and Private Boseley. Marshall gave the Colonel his hand. Running in this fashion, in rear of the charging squadrons, Barrow, with the heavy spear swaying to and fro in his side, managed to get free of the enemy before he sank down. His attendant trumpeter, in spite of sixteen terrible wounds, kept his horse going, and escaped from the press, to die of his injuries later. Captain Jenkins, on whom the command of the two squadrons devolved, on Barrow being disabled, was engaged by three of the enemy at once. His horse was wounded in three places, but he himself escaped with a slight wound. Horsemen, as a rule, have little difficulty in dispersing and driving before them disordered infantry: but, so extraordinary was the activity and bravery of the Arabs, and the skill with which they used their spears and two-handed swords that, in the uneven ground covered with low mimosa bushes, they were more than a match for horsemen. It was not till some men had dismounted, and opened fire on them, that they sullenly drew off and retreated.

Meanwhile, the other two squadrons of the regiment, acting independently under Lieutenant Colonel Webster and Major Hanford-Flood, had cleared the flank of numerous small parties of the enemy. By 1.30 the action was at an end. The total British loss was 34 killed or died of wounds, and 155 wounded. To this the 19th Hussars contributed one officer killed, two wounded, 13 non-commissioned officers and men killed or died of wounds, 20 wounded; a heavier loss than fell on any other regiment engaged at El Teb. Every single casualty in the regiment was caused in hand-to-hand combat, by sword or spear. For his gallant behaviour, Quartermaster Sergeant William Marshall received the Victoria Cross. Lieutenant Colonel Barrow’s wound was of so terrible a nature that it was not thought possible he could survive, but he lived to go through another and more arduous campaign.

On the following day the force advanced on Tokar. Sergeant James Fatt of the 19th while scouting in advance, rode boldly into the village, while it was still uncertain whether there would be any opposition, and brought out one of the villagers. Osman Digna’s camp was taken without resistance: two guns and a great quantity of small arms, ammunition and stores, captured from General Baker’s force, being taken by the cavalry.

On the 5th March, the regiment paraded, for inspection by General Graham and Colonel Stewart, and received complimentary addresses from both officers.

On the 6th, the force re-embarked at Trinkitat, and landed at Suakin the following day, to encounter Osman Digna in person, who was encamped at Tamai, sixteen miles from Suakin. On the night of the 12th, the whole force bivouacked in front of Osman Digna’s position; the infantry at about one mile, the cavalry four miles in rear of the infantry. At eight the next morning, the advance commenced: the two infantry brigades in squares, the cavalry in rear of the left. The Arab skirmishers, who had pelted the British encampment with rifle fire during the night, fell back, increasing in numbers as they retired. Seeing a great number of the enemy in front of them, massed in a ravine, the front line of the 2nd brigade charged with the bayonet, destroying the formation of their square. The active Arabs broke into the opening, stabbing and slashing at close quarters. Numbers followed, and for a few minutes a catastrophe was imminent. The cavalry galloped forward on the left, dismounted, and poured volley after volley into the flank of the advancing Arabs, while the bayonet and spear contended for victory within the square itself. The 1st brigade, which had repulsed a similar charge, swept the right face of the 2nd brigade square with its fire, and, in a few minutes, the last surviving Arab who had penetrated the square had paid the penalty. The ranks were reformed, and the infantry advance was resumed, the cavalry clearing away the numerous small parties of the enemy who still clung to the broken ground. The battle was over. In those few minutes over 2000 of the enemy had fallen, out of an estimated number of 12,000: of the British force, 109 officers and men were killed, and 112 wounded. The 19th Hussars lost one killed and two wounded.

On the following day the force advanced to Tamai, burned Osman Digna’s camp, and returned to Suakin. For a fortnight the force lay at Suakin, the cavalry and mounted infantry being employed in daily reconnoissances. On the 27th, the whole force advanced for a distance of 25 miles to ascertain if the enemy remained in any force. A few hundreds only were found. Beyond some desultory skirmishing, which drew from the General in command a highly complimentary order, nothing serious occurred, and the force returned to Suakin.

It being considered that the objects of the expedition had been fully attained, the force was broken up and withdrawn. The 19th embarked on the 1st April, and returned to Cairo on the 6th.

By G.O. 10 of January 1885 the regiment was permitted to add the date “1884” to the badges on its appointments. A medal with clasps for El Teb and Tamai were granted to those present.

1884–1899

In the meantime, matters in the Western Soudan had steadily been getting worse. In March, the Mahdi’s forces had reached Khartoum; by the end of May Berber had fallen, cutting off communication between Khartoum and Cairo, and the wave of rebellion rolled steadily northward. Still the Government in England did nothing. They had resolutely ignored the whole Soudan question, and allowed matters to drift. Gordon’s urgent advice to occupy Berber with British troops, in order to keep open the route to Suakin, had been disregarded, and his demand for Zobehr Pasha to be sent to Khartoum, as the only chance of saving the situation, was emphatically refused. It was not till August, that the British Cabinet recognised that some effort might be required to relieve Khartoum, and even to defend Lower Egypt from the Mahdi. By the middle of August preparations were made for dispatching a small body of troops to Wady Halfa, and a squadron of the 19th Hussars was held in readiness. Then followed more delay. It was not till the middle of September that preparations for an advance beyond Wady Halfa began to be made in earnest.

On the 25th October, three squadrons of the regiment, under Lieut. Colonel Barrow, left Cairo, and reached Wady Halfa, by rail and steamer, on 12th November, with a total strength of 21 officers, and 353 Non-Commissioned officers and men. Two instances of the eager spirit to get to the front, that animated the whole regiment, must not go unrecorded. At the moment of leaving the barracks in Cairo, a man met with an accident that necessitated his being left behind. In a minute one of the men detailed to remain at Cairo stepped forward in his place, in marching order, with kit complete. He had got himself ready on the chance of some such opportunity occurring, and it is pleasant to know that he got it. At Assiout, next morning, a stowaway was discovered, a bandboy, who accounted for himself by saying “He was the only man in the band without a medal, and he could not stand it.”

Experience had shown that English horses could not stand hard work under a tropical sun, with scarcity of water and desert fare. It was therefore decided, before leaving Cairo, to mount the regiment entirely on the small Syrian Arab horses used by the Egyptian cavalry. Three hundred and fifty of these little horses had been sent up in advance, and were taken over by the regiment on arrival at Wady Halfa. The regiment was at this time in superb condition. The men had an average of seven years’ service, and most of them had been through the preceding campaigns of Tel-el-Kebir and Suakin. From Wady Halfa the regiment marched, by squadrons, to Korti, where it arrived on the 20th December.

Here was assembled the expeditionary force, under General Lord Wolseley; perhaps the most singular force ever put into the field by Great Britain, to fight in one of the most remarkable campaigns; starting from a base a thousand miles from the sea. In addition to the 19th Hussars, who were the only horsemen with the force, and nine battalions of infantry, there were four Camel Corps, composed respectively of picked men from different Heavy and Light Cavalry regiments, the Foot Guards, and Infantry of the Line; a Naval Brigade of Bluejackets and Marines; a Battery of Royal Artillery, and two Camel Batteries. The boats by which the Nile had been ascended had been built in England, and were managed by Canadian voyageurs, some of whom were of Indian blood, and by Kroomen from the west coast of Africa, while the camels were managed by Arab drivers brought for the purpose from Aden.

The original intention had been to follow the course of the river the whole way to Khartoum, but now a fresh disposition became necessary. A letter from Gordon, dated 4th November, was received, showing that provisions in Khartoum were running short, and time would not allow of the slow but less hazardous advance along the river. The new plan was to send a compact flying column across the desert to Metemmeh, under Brigadier General Sir Herbert Stewart, for the purpose of opening communication with Khartoum. A second column, under Major General W. Earle, was to ascend the river, clearing away all parties of the enemy, and, eventually, to recapture Berber. The rest of the force was to remain at Korti, where Lord Wolseley’s Head Quarters were fixed. The 19th Hussars were destined to furnish a contingent to both columns.

The Desert Column

The task before the Desert Column was no easy one. Between Korti and Metemmeh 176 miles of barren desert have to be traversed. At two places only is water in any considerable quantity procurable; at Jakdul 98 miles from Korti, and at Abu Klea, about 53 miles from Jakdul. The first operation was to establish a post at Jakdul, where as yet the enemy had not appeared.

On the 30th December, a force of 1107 men of all ranks, with 2200 camels, started from Korti, under Sir Herbert Stewart. With them went 2 officers and 32 men of the 19th. Being the only horsemen with the force, the whole of the scouting duties devolved upon the men of the 19th. The rest of the force were mounted on camels. One gallon of water for each man, and two for each horse, were carried on camels. In the early morning of the 2nd January, the Jakdul wells were reached, in 63 hours after leaving Korti. Only a few stragglers of the enemy were sighted. On the same evening the force set out on its return to Korti, leaving a garrison of 420 men at Jakdul.

On the 8th January, Sir Herbert Stewart again started with the main column, consisting of 1607 men, 2228 camels, and 306 camel drivers. The 19th Hussars, on this occasion, mustered 135 officers and men, with 155 horses, under Lieut. Colonel Barrow. On the 14th, the column left Jakdul: about 1800 combatants of all ranks, with 1118 camels. Early on the 16th, the 19th were pushed on ahead of the column, and came in touch with the enemy in front of the Abu Klea wells. A patrol, under Major French, pursued a small body of men right into the gorge leading to the wells, and captured one of them, on the spot where next day’s action was fought. A number of horsemen appearing and threatening to cut him off, French was obliged to relinquish his prisoner, and retire to the entrance of the gorge. Here Barrow dismounted his men in order to keep the road open for Stewart’s force. Though threatened on both flanks by the enemy’s horsemen, the position was easily held by carbine fire, and the power of the enemy to dispute the advance of the column at this point was checkmated. On the arrival of the column a zeriba was formed for the night, three and a half miles from the water. As the camp was being formed, the enemy appeared in considerable numbers, and opened a distant fire, wounding one man and several horses of the 19th. As darkness closed in the enemy became bolder, and, during the whole night, the force was exposed to a constant fire which did little harm beyond disturbing the much needed rest of the men. At daybreak, the fire increased in intensity; several officers and men were struck down, and the 19th had several horses killed and disabled while standing at their pickets. At 9 A.M. the force was formed in square, preparatory to an advance towards the water which was of such vital importance. While the square was forming, the 19th were ordered to move out and hold in check a body of some 500 of the enemy, horsemen and footmen combined, who threatened to get round to the rear of the square. An hour after the hussars had left, the square advanced. The small force moved slowly, frequent halts being necessary to permit of the camels, loaded with ammunition and water, closing up. The ground was uneven, with ravines and hollows that prevented the full strength of the enemy being seen. Suddenly a great body of Arabs, 5000 strong, rose from a fold in the ground, and rushed at the square. So rapid and overwhelming was their attack, aided by the inequalities of the ground, and the fact that the fire from the square was at first impeded by its own retiring skirmishers that, in spite of the heavy fire poured upon them, the Arabs succeeded in penetrating the square, as at Tamai, stabbing and slashing in every direction. At the same moment, a squadron of horsemen charged the square, but were repulsed. For five minutes the hand-to-hand conflict raged, till the last Arab who penetrated the formation was killed. The remainder, who had been heavily punished by rifle and artillery fire drew off, though for a time it seemed doubtful if they would not renew the attack. The 19th, who had helped the square with dismounted fire, followed and cut off many stragglers, but the number of the enemy was too great to admit of a charge on the main body. The horses also were hardly able to move out of a walk, having been thirty hours without water. In this brief conflict the small British force lost 74 killed, and 94 wounded, some of whom died of their injuries. As at El Teb and Tamai, the fatal skill with which the Arabs used their weapons is shown by the relative numbers of killed and wounded. Of the Arabs, whose strength was estimated at about 9000 men, 1100 dead were counted in close proximity to the square.

On the retreat of the enemy, Barrow pushed on and occupied the wells, from which the enemy had to be driven by carbine fire. It was late at night before the infantry obtained the much needed water.

The greater part of the 18th was spent in building a small fort at Abu Klea, and establishing a post there, for the protection of the wounded and defence of the wells. While this was in progress, the 19th returned to the battle field and buried the British dead. Late in the afternoon the small column moved out, to traverse the 25 miles of desert that must be crossed before the Nile could be reached. The 19th Hussars led the way. As night closed in, progress became very slow. Men and camels were exhausted, and, in the darkness, great confusion ensued. Night marching over an unknown route is a doubtful expedient. In the early morning of the 19th, the line of the Nile, with villages, was sighted about six miles distant. But between them and the column was a gravel ridge on which the enemy appeared, and soon, dense masses of them were visible, swarming out to meet the column. In view of the distress for want of water, it had been Sir Herbert Stewart’s wish to reach the Nile without fighting; but this was now impossible. The camels were collected together, and a zeriba of brushwood, saddles, boxes &c. formed. By 8 o’clock the enemy’s fire became heavy. Among the earliest to be struck was the commander of the column, Sir Herbert Stewart, who received a wound that afterwards proved mortal. Speaking to Colonel Barrow just before he received the fatal wound, he said, “Take care of the 19th Hussars, they have done well.” The command devolved on Colonel Sir Charles Wilson. It was necessary to drive the enemy away, but nothing could be done till the zeriba was complete, and, owing to the exhaustion of the men, the work proceeded slowly. In the interval there were many casualties, and here the 19th Hussars lost Quarter Master A. G. Lima, who was killed by a shot through the head.

At last all was ready. The 19th Hussars came in, and picketted their horses, which were so exhausted as to be scarcely able to carry the men. Colonel Barrow and his men were detailed to assist in holding the zeriba, while the rest of the force marched out to engage the enemy. By 2 o’clock the square had formed up outside the zeriba, and moved off. With it went a few dismounted men of the 19th, under Lieutenant Craven.

As the square moved towards the Nile, the enemy’s fire increased, and many men fell. The progress made was very slow. The bush and sandhills on three sides swarmed with Arabs. As the square neared the ridge, the men dropped fast under the heavy rifle fire to which they were exposed. Suddenly the enemy’s fire ceased, and a great swarm of Arabs poured down on the square. There were no skirmishers to mask the fire, as at Abu Klea, and the Arabs were met by a steady fire that swept away the foremost ranks wholesale. Not an Arab lived to reach the square, and a ringing British cheer went up as the enemy were seen to be flying in all directions. The way to the Nile was no longer closed. Half an hour after dark the river was reached, near the village of Abu Krou. It was not till the afternoon of the 20th that the 19th Hussar horses were able to drink. Half of them had been 72 hours without water; none of them less than 56 hours, yet only 3 succumbed. If English horses had been employed, probably not one would have survived.

During the whole march from Korti the entire scouting duty had been taken by the 19th Hussars, so that, each day, they covered far more ground than the rest of the force. The men also were thoroughly exhausted with the tremendous efforts they had been called on to make, but their health continued to be good. There was wonderful freedom from sickness of any kind. The casualties in the whole force on the 19th January, amounted to 1 officer and 22 non-commissioned officers and men killed; 8 officers and 90 non-commissioned officers and men wounded. Many non-combatants also were killed or wounded.

The 20th was occupied in placing the village of Gubat in a state of defence, and, at dawn of the 21st, Barrow and his Hussars rode out to reconnoitre Metemmeh, preparatory to an attack in force. So exhausted were the horses that all the Hussars could do was to ride up in a body to some high ground on the north of the village, while the rest of the force opened fire from the east side. While the attack was proceeding, four small steamers sent down by Gordon from Khartoum on the 14th December, appeared in sight, and landed some native troops. They brought intelligence of Arab reinforcements being on the march from Khartoum. It was important to husband ammunition, and incur no further losses of men, so the attack was withdrawn. But the Arab reinforcements never reached Metemmeh. The news of the disastrous defeats their comrades had sustained at Abu Klea and Abu Krou, caused them to retrace their steps.

Reconnoissances having shown that no large force of the enemy was in the vicinity, Sir Charles Wilson started on the 24th for Khartoum, with two of the steamers, taking with him two hundred men. On the 28th, after great difficulties, Khartoum was reached, and found to be in the hands of the Arabs. The town had been captured by the Mahdi, two days before, and Gordon was dead. On the 4th February, Sir Charles Wilson and his party rejoined the camp at Gubat, after adventures that read more like a page of romance than of modern history. In the interval, both his steamers had been wrecked, and the whole party had been continuously under fire for eight days and a half. In the meantime, the force at Gubat received some reinforcements and supplies from Korti. The 19th were engaged in daily skirmishes with the outlying pickets of the enemy who showed a wholesome respect for them: “Even the fierce Baggara horsemen appeared unwilling to cross swords with our Hussars,” wrote one who was present with the force. On the 11th, Major General Sir Redvers Buller arrived to take command of the force, with orders to retire on Abu Klea.

On the 14th February, Gubat was evacuated, and Abu Klea reached on the 15th, followed by the enemy who annoyed the force with long range rifle fire. At Abu Klea, on the 17th, a smart skirmish took place which cost the force 3 killed and 27 wounded. Among the killed was Sergeant Horwood of the 19th Hussars, who was acting as Sergeant Major with the Mounted Infantry. It had been intended to occupy Abu Klea permanently, in view of a second advance on Khartoum in the autumn; but want of food, scarcity of water, and the complete breakdown of transport necessitated Buller’s withdrawal to Korti. On the 16th, the 19th Hussars marched out for Jakdul, leaving at Abu Klea with Sir R. Buller a small detachment under Major French. The march was a painful one, about half the men being on foot. While on the march they heard of Sir Herbert Stewart’s death near Jakdul. Wishing to be present at the funeral of the commander they had served under in two campaigns, they made a long forced march into Jakdul, but arrived too late. They had the melancholy satisfaction of erecting a walled enclosure, with headstone, round his grave. On the 3rd March they left Jakdul, and reached Korti on the 8th. On the 23rd February the last of the desert column left Abu Klea, and returned to Korti, 16th March. In a dispatch from Jakdul, dated 26th February, Sir R. Buller wrote of the 19th Hussars:—

Meanwhile, the men of the 19th, left at Korti, had not been idle. In February they were engaged in establishing two watering posts in the desert, distant respectively twelve and thirty miles from Korti, for the use of the retiring force. The water was conveyed in tin lined biscuit boxes, and every animal in camp was pressed into the service.

The River Column

The primary object of General Earle’s column was to clear the river line of all hostile parties as far as Abu Hamed, punishing, en route, the Monassir tribe of Arabs who had treacherously murdered Colonel Stewart and a small party sent down by Gordon from Khartoum, in September. At Abu Hamed a base was to be established for a further advance on Berber. The force, under General Earle, consisted of four battalions of infantry, a battery of Egyptian Artillery, an Egyptian Camel Corps, and one squadron of the 19th Hussars; the latter under Major Hanford-Flood, amounting to 91 sabres and 107 horses. The total strength of the force was about 3000 officers and men.

The force left Korti, in detachments, for Hamdab, about 50 miles up the river, whence the final start was to be made. On the 18th January, 60 men of the 19th Hussars together with the Egyptian Camel Corps, under Major Flood, made a forced march into the desert to surprise a party of the enemy collected at the wells of El Kooa, 35 miles from Hamdab. The Arabs having received timely notice of their coming, hastily broke up their camp and disappeared, before Flood’s arrival. The detachment returned to Hamdab after 32 hours’ absence.

On the 24th, the start was made; the Hussars, Camel Corps and baggage, marching along the left bank, the infantry and stores in boats. Progress was very slow, the banks of the river being rough and difficult, and the frequent rapids and cataracts causing great labour in tracking the boats up. On the 27th, the cavalry skirmishers first came in touch with the enemy, but beyond a harmless interchange of shots at long range nothing occurred. This happened frequently, the enemy falling back, day by day, as the river column advanced. The progress of the boats was very slow owing to the succession of rapids here formed by the Nile. Major Flood’s men worked and camped independently, reconnoitring along the left bank, far ahead of the main body, and, owing to the rocky nature of the ground, often at a considerable distance from the river. The rocky ridge, on which the battle of Kirbekan was afterwards fought, was ascended and mapped, and a reconnoissance of the 19th Hussars was pushed some way into the Shukook Pass, five days before the action. On the 6th February, a two days’ halt at Birti became necessary, in consequence of the fall of Khartoum making a change of plans possible. The enemy meanwhile had fallen back to the Shukook Pass.

On the 8th, the advance was resumed, and it became known that the enemy, about 1000 strong, had advanced from the Shukook Pass, and taken position in some extremely strong ground at Kirbekan, in front of the Pass, about 14 miles from Earle’s Head Quarters. The 8th and 9th were employed in reconnoitring, and closing up the troops preparatory to the attack. On the 8th, Major Flood, with twenty of his men, exchanged volleys with the enemy, and drove in some of their advanced posts. On the 9th, the whole of the mounted troops felt the enemy again. That night the troops bivouacked in their allotted stations, the most advanced of the infantry being only a short mile from the enemy’s position.

On the morning of the 10th, General Earle, with 1196 men of all ranks, moved forward to the attack. The enemy occupied a position on a line of low rocky eminences at right angles to the river, and a detached steep ridge in echelon with the rocky eminences. It was determined to march right round the rear of their position by the desert side, closing their retreat, and attack them in flank and rear from the river side. Two companies of the Staffordshire regiment, with two guns were left in front of the position to occupy the enemy’s attention, and keep down their fire. The 19th Hussars led the way, and the force marched right round the enemy’s position till the river was again reached in the enemy’s right rear. As soon as they saw their retreat was cut off, a number of the enemy tried to escape by swimming the river, many of them being shot in the attempt. But a considerable number of them still held their ground. The Black Watch were accordingly ordered to assault the line of rocky eminences, while the Staffordshire regiment assaulted the ridge. As the Black Watch won their way along the lower eminences, a desperate rush was made by a body of the enemy, which was repulsed, and the eminences crowned by the Highlanders; the Arabs gallantly fighting to the last man. In the moment of victory, General Earle was killed by a shot from a hut which he had incautiously approached. The assault on the high steep ridge offered greater difficulties, but the position was gallantly carried by the Staffordshire men. Both regiments had their commanding officers killed.

In the meantime, Flood’s Hussars and the Egyptian Camel Corps had gained the entrance to the Shukook Pass, and captured one of the enemy’s camps, in which were a number of standards, camels and donkeys. The enemy opened fire from the surrounding hills without effect. The victory was purchased with the loss of three officers and nine men killed, four officers and forty-four men wounded. The enemy’s force was subsequently ascertained to have been from fifteen hundred to two thousand men, but of these only about six hundred fought well.

The advance of the column was continued, on the 12th, under Colonel H. Brackenbury, on whom the command had devolved by General Earle’s death. The enemy had disappeared, but progress was slow, through the continuous rapids. On the 20th, a suitable place was found for crossing the Nile. A scouting party of the 19th was first rowed across, and brushed away some of the enemy’s scouts. By the afternoon of the 21st, the whole force was transported to the right bank, at Hebbeh, the scene of Colonel Stewart’s murder in September. The murderers had fled, and beyond the destruction of their property no other punishment could be meted out to them. By the evening of the 23rd, the whole force was concentrated at Huella, 26 miles from Abu Hamed.

All was ready for the advance on Abu Hamed, where a strong force of the enemy was known to be posted. Hardly had the troops commenced their march, on the 24th, when orders were received from Korti directing their return to Merawi. Sir Redvers Buller’s withdrawal from Abu Klea rendered a farther advance on Berber out of the question, and the River Column had to return. While the main body commenced to descend the river, Major Flood’s squadron scouted another six miles towards Abu Hamed, without seeing an enemy. Descending by the right bank, Merawi was reached on the 5th March, and, on the 6th, after recrossing the river to Abu Dom, the River Column was broken up. One troop of the 19th was left at Abu Dom, while the remainder marched for Korti.

In spite of the extremely hard work, the health of the troops, as with the Desert Column, had been excellent. Not a single man of Major Flood’s party had been on the sick list, from the time of leaving Korti till the date of return. Of the horses, three had succumbed. The performance of the small Arab horses both with the River and Desert Columns, carrying a heavy weight, on scanty fare and less water, is a marvel of endurance.

The next few days were spent in arranging for the distribution of the troops into summer quarters, in anticipation of the advance on Khartoum in the autumn. The quarters selected for the 19th were Merawi, Abu Dom, Tani, Kurot, Abu Kussi, and Dongola. By the 1st April, they were all located in the assigned positions. Before leaving Korti, the regiment was inspected by Lord Wolseley, who addressed them in terms of commendation that will long be remembered in the regiment.

Operations near Suakin

While their comrades had thus been busy on the Nile, the remnant of the regiment left at Cairo had found work to do. The effect of the operations, near Suakin, in March 1884, had been quite temporary. Osman Digna had recovered his authority, and was again threatening the port. It was also considered that, by making a diversion at Suakin, the operations near Berber and the reopening of the Suakin-Berber road would be facilitated. It was determined, therefore, to send a sufficient force to crush Osman Digna, and to make a railway line to Berber. The capture of Berber, before the great heat of the summer set in, was then considered feasible.

Before the force, which was to be commanded by Lieut. General Sir Gerald Graham, could arrive, a weak squadron of the 19th Hussars, under Captain Apthorp, was dispatched from Cairo on the 24th January, together with two Horse Artillery guns, followed next day by a battalion of infantry. On landing at Suakin, reconnoissances were instituted to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy. On the 1st February, a small force of all arms reconnoitred, under Major General Fremantle, towards Hasheem, 8 miles west of Suakin. The Arabs were found in great numbers, in a position too strong to attack. The infantry were formed in square, while the cavalry and guns were sent forward to try and draw the enemy out of their position. But the memory of El-Teb and Tamai were too fresh in the Arab mind for them to be induced to attack the arrayed infantry. They refused to quit their position, and after a prolonged skirmish, General Fremantle’s force returned to camp. One Egyptian trooper was wounded, and the 19th Hussars lost a horse.

On the 3rd, Captain Apthorp was sent with 40 of his own men and 40 Egyptian troopers to reconnoitre along the Berber road. At Hamdoob, 10 miles from Suakin, a camp and village, occupied by the enemy, was surprised and burnt. While the small party were thus occupied, a great body of Arabs, 5000 strong, had moved from Tamai and Hasheem to intercept them, and took post in a ravine two miles from Hamdoob, completely blocking their return to Suakin. The Arab force was so well concealed that the squadron was almost in contact with them before their presence was discovered, and the great mass of Arabs, footmen and men mounted on camels, bore down on the small body of cavalry at once. There was no time to dismount and fire, and it was hopeless to attempt to break through: nothing was left them but to ride for Suakin by a circuitous route. Turning eastwards the squadron started on a long gallop round the enemy’s flank. The Arabs followed in overwhelming numbers, and, moving on a shorter line, together with their knowledge of the ground, were able to harass the squadron for several miles. The 19th lost 8 men and 11 horses, while the Egyptian troop lost three men and six horses.

The number of Arabs in the neighbourhood of Suakin was too great to allow of distant reconnoissances, little more of interest occurred, therefore, till the arrival of Sir Gerald Graham’s force. Early in March, they began to arrive, but the whole force was not completed till nearly the middle of April. On the 17th March, the 19th Hussar squadron re-embarked for Cairo in order to join the Head Quarters of the regiment at Dongola, in readiness for the advance on Khartoum in the autumn.

Our interest with the Suakin force ceases here. It is sufficient to say that it amounted to 12,500 men, composed of troops from England, a contingent of native troops from India, and a contingent from New South Wales consisting of two batteries of artillery, and 500 infantry. It had also with it a balloon detachment, the first occasion on which balloons were used by British troops in warfare. On the 20th March, it fought a successful action at Hasheem, and again on the 22nd, at Tofrik, when an enormous number of the enemy were killed at a rather heavy cost to the British troops engaged. On the 3rd April, Tamai was occupied, and the last of the enemy’s force broken up. By the end of April, 18 miles of railway were completed, and the tribes in the neighbourhood had given in their submission; when the intention of the British Government to abandon the advance on Khartoum became known. On the 17th May, the withdrawal of the troops commenced, and again Suakin was left with only a small force to protect the port.

We left the three squadrons of the 19th at Dongola and other stations south of that place, with all thoughts concentrated on preparations for the autumn advance on Khartoum. The regimental establishment was increased by 110 men, bringing up the strength to 740 sabres. Four strong squadrons were being prepared for the field: but over 13 years were to elapse before Khartoum was again seen by British troops. About the 22nd April it was announced that the intention of advancing on Khartoum in the autumn had been abandoned, and orders were issued for the withdrawal of the troops. The retirement commenced on the 26th May, when Merawi was evacuated. The troops were withdrawn down the river in detachments, each post being evacuated in turn as it became the southernmost point of occupation. On the 22nd June, the Head Quarters of the 19th marched out of Dongola, the last of the force to leave for Lower Egypt. At Wady Halfa the hot and tedious march came to an end, and from that point the regiment reached the railway at Assiout in barges. At Wady Halfa, Korosko and Assouan they made over their horses to the 20th Hussars, and, by the 14th August, the regiment was reunited in Cairo. In the whole campaign the regiment had suffered a total loss of two officers, Lt. Colonel Taylor (died of fever) and Quarter Master Lima, and 18 non-commissioned officers and men.

In July 1885, Her Majesty was graciously pleased to confer on the regiment the designation of “Princess of Wales’ Own,” in recognition of “its distinguished services in Egypt and the Soudan.”

By G.O. 10 of January 1886 the regiment was permitted to bear on its appointments, the words “Nile 1884–85” “Abu Klea,” in commemoration of the ascent of the river Nile and the operations in the Eastern Soudan.

From a Photograph.

Colonel Percy Barrow, C.B.

At the beginning of 1886, the regiment experienced a severe loss in the death of its commander, Colonel Percy Barrow. The desperate wound he had received at El Teb, on the 19th February 1884, was one from which complete recovery was impossible. In spite of grave inconvenience to himself, he had gone through the most arduous part of the Nile campaign without flinching, while the skill and judgment with which he handled his men during the march of the Desert Column won the applause of the whole force. While preparing the regiment for some regimental games, a violent exertion re-opened the old wound, and after thirty hours of intense suffering he expired on the 13th January, in his 38th year. In him the army lost a soldier of great promise. The son of a well known Indian Officer, Major General Lousada Barrow, who commanded a Corps of Volunteer Cavalry in the Indian Mutiny and at the relief of Lucknow, Percy Barrow entered the 19th Hussars as Cornet in 1868. In 1879, he was selected to command a corps of Mounted Infantry and some irregular troops in the Zulu war; and served through the Boer war of 1881 in command of the Mounted Infantry. The soldierly spirit that animated him, and his intense devotion to everything that concerned the welfare of the regiment, can only be appreciated by those who have been privileged to read his letters written in quarters and in the field. Telegrams of condolence to the regiment from Her Majesty the Queen and from Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales testified to the general appreciation of the loss the public service had suffered in his death. His remains were removed to England and interred at Saltwood near Hythe. To command the regiment, his brother-in-law, Colonel Boyce Combe, was transferred from the 10th Hussars to the 19th.

In May, the regiment was ordered to proceed to England, and embarked at Alexandria on the 19th, in the Geelong and the Iona, leaving their horses behind them. On the 6th and 7th June, they landed at Harwich and Woolwich, and proceeded to Norwich, three troops being sent to Colchester. The regiment was much gratified at the receipt, on landing, of a telegram, welcoming them to England, from H.R.H. the Princess of Wales. In July, one of the Colchester troops was recalled to Head Quarters. The establishment of the regiment was fixed at 24 officers, 469 warrant officers non-commissioned officers and men, and 300 horses.

In the following March, the two troops at Colchester were sent to Birmingham, being replaced, in September, at Colchester by two troops from Head Quarters.

In October, the establishment was increased by 132 rank and file and 80 horses. For this purpose the necessary horses were transferred to the regiment from the 14th and 21st Hussars. A month later, by which time 56 recruits had been enlisted, the order was cancelled, and the horses were transferred to the 18th and 20th Hussars. At the end of the year, the Colchester squadron rejoined Head Quarters.

In April 1888, the regiment marched from Norwich and Birmingham to Hounslow, Hampton Court and Kensington.

In September, the regiment was brought on the strength of the 1st Army Corps, and its establishment increased to 707 of all ranks with 424 horses.

In March 1889, under Army Order No. 136, the regiment was granted permission to wear “Mysore” on its appointments, in commemoration of the campaigns against Tippoo in the last century, in which the old 19th Light Dragoons had borne so distinguished a part. The badge is certainly more appropriate than the old one of “Seringapatam” which was discarded.

In the same month the regiment lost its Colonel, Major General John Yorke, C.B. In his place Major General and Honorary Lieut. General Coote Synge Hutchinson was gazetted to the regiment. He was an old 2nd Dragoon Guards’ officer, and had served with that regiment through the Indian Mutiny.

In the following June, the regiment marched to Aldershot. On the 3rd July, it was employed in London on the occasion of H.M. the Shah of Persia visiting the City.

In September 1890, the regiment took part in the manœuvres on Berkshire Downs.

On the 26th June 1891, a special inspection of the regiment was held by H.R.H. the Princess of Wales; and, on the 8th July, the 19th took part in a review at Hounslow before H.I.M. the German Emperor.

The regiment was again destined for foreign service. At the end of July, it marched to Shorncliffe, and, on 1st September, embarked at Portsmouth, in the Euphrates, for India, arriving at Bombay on the 28th, whence it was forwarded by train to Secunderabad in relief of the 7th Hussars. In November the regiment was transferred, by train, to Bangalore.

Towards the end of 1892 the squadron system was substituted for the troop system in the regiment.

In October 1896, the 19th P.W.O. Hussars were transferred to Secunderabad. Here we must take leave of the regiment. The history of a regiment in quarters possesses little interest. “Soldiers in peace are like chimneys in summer.” When the time comes for the 19th P.W.O. Hussars to take the field again, they will be found like their predecessors, over one hundred years ago, “ready in all that depends upon them, and willing beyond description.”

YEARLY LISTS OF THE OFFICERS OF THE NINETEENTH.