Viscount Grey has been criticized for not
understanding the Balkan problem. If his
critics understood how complex is the story of the
last century in this part of Europe they would
withold their strictures. I, at least, do not
blame any man for failing to carry in his mind
an appreciation of all that the mixed mass of
races and religions in the Balkan country have
striven and hoped for during the recent past. In
this chapter the best that can be promised is an
account of the main facts of Balkan history. A
more detailed narrative would be confusing to
the reader. A failure to mention the subject
would leave much unexplained that is essential to
an understanding of the origin of the present
war. And we shall hardly know how to decide
what kind of a peace the future security of
Europe demands, if we leave out of consideration
the proper disposition to be made of the small
states of the Southeast.
In 1453 Turkey took Constantinople and began
a series of conquests that carried her to the
very gates of the city of Vienna. That important
stronghold seemed about to fall into her
hands in 1683, when an army of Polish and German
soldiers came to its rescue in the name of
Christianity, drove off the infidels, and wrenched
Hungary out of their hands for the benefit of
the Austrian power. This struggle proved the
highwater mark of Turkish conquest in Europe.
From that time to this, wars of reconquest have
followed one another, the pagans always playing
a losing game. But for a long time all that part
of Southeastern Europe that could be reached
from the Black Sea was held by the Turks, the
part that was easily reached from Germany
was held by the Christians, and the part that lay
between, a broad belt of hilly country, was continually
in dispute. Across it armies fought
back and forth, each side winning and losing in
turn, but with the general result in favor of the
Christians, who slowly pushed back the frontier
of their enemies.
The region held by the Turks was tenacious of
its Christian faith and recognized the religious
authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople,
who, Christian though he was, stood under the
control of the sultan. The inhabitants suffered
many hardships and were reduced to the condition
of serfs under Mohammedan masters. The
long bondage to their overlords had a peculiar
effect on their characters. They came to think it
right to use fraud, violence, and subterfuge
against their oppressors, and so they employed
religion and patriotism to defend the commission
of acts which in ordinary situations are considered
without the pale of civilized conduct. To
this day the Balkan states are not rid of their
heritage from these years of moral darkness.
The Balkan people, ruled long as Turkish
subjects, have gradually formed themselves into
five principal groups as follows: the Serbians,
dwelling in the interior of the country northwest
of Turkey proper and occupying much of the
hinterland lying east of the Adriatic; the Bulgars,
settled east of the Serbs and extending as
far as the shores of the Black Sea; the Wallachians
and Moldavians, who were of kindred stock
and became known as Rumanians because they
believed themselves the descendants of the inhabitants
of the ancient Roman colony of Dacia;
the Albanians living along the lower eastern
shores of the Adriatic; and the Montenegrins, of
the same race as the Serbians, who defended
themselves so well in their mountain strongholds
that they could say they had never been conquered
by the Turks. Many race elements
entered into these groups, but the Serbs and
Montenegrins were largely Slavic, while the
Bulgars were generally of a distinct race of
Asiatic origin, and the Rumanians were generally
Vlachs, a name given to the Latin speaking
population of the Eastern Roman Empire.
The Albanians seem to be of mixed stock, but
they have a strong sense of nationality. These
five groups correspond respectively to the five
civil divisions that have emerged from the Turkish
provinces, each playing its part in the modern
Balkan problem.
Montenegro aside, the first group to become a
state was Serbia, whose hardy mountain inhabitants
rose in revolt in 1804. A number of
brave leaders appeared and valley by valley the
Turks were forced out of the country. The
Serbs were practically independent for a time,
but the sultan did not acquiesce in their freedom,
and the constant preparedness that was necessary
to repel any attack he might launch was a source
of much expense and anxiety to the people.
In 1821 the Greeks, also under the domination
of Turkey, rose in revolt. Great sympathy was
aroused in the rest of Europe and in spite of
the disposition of the Great Powers to allow
Turkey a free hand to preserve her territory intact,
lest one of them gain over-balancing territory,
public opinion forced them to intervene.
The first to show sympathy was Russia, who had
an interest in making herself the protector of the
Christians in Turkey. The other powers resented
her assistance to the Greeks, and finally
Great Britain and France united in a project of
intervention, sending a joint fleet to the Mediterranean
which destroyed the Turkish fleet at
Navarino in 1827. The stubborn sultan remained
unyielding, and in 1828 Russia entered
the war openly, having come to an agreement
with the other Powers. She sent an army across
the border which carried all before it, and the
sultan was forced to make the treaty of Adrianople,
in which Turkey recognized the independence
of Greece and acknowledged Serbia as an
autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty.
At the same time Wallachia and Moldavia, where
Rumans lived, were recognized as independent
under a Russian protectorate. Thus one sovereign
and three dependent but locally autonomous
states stood forth out of the confused
and misgoverned Christian area of Turkey in
Europe.
The rest of the region, occupied by Bulgars
and Albanians, with Bosnia and Herzegovina,
claimed by the Serbs as legitimate parts of their
national habitat, remained in an unredeemed condition
and were governed by agents appointed
by the sultan. Montenegro retained her position
of practical independence, which Turkey
had been forced to acknowledge in 1799. These
arrangements were confirmed in a more formal
treaty in 1832.
The successes of this period quickened the
spirit of nationality in the Balkans. Just as the
Greeks were swept by a wave of enthusiasm for
their classical culture and sought to revive the
language and ideals of the remote past, so the
Balkan peoples set out to revive their ancient
culture, long obscured by the shadow of Turkish
masters. Serbs, Rumans, and Bulgars made
grammars of their own languages, gathered up
what was preserved of their ancient literatures
and traditions, taught their children to revere
the national heroes, and sought in many other
ways to stimulate the spirit of nationality. The
Slavic portion turned to Russia for support,
whom they called their “big brother,” while the
Rumans cultivated an appreciation of Italy and
France, whom they considered kindred descendants
of the ancient Romans. To their national
hopes in these things was added the desire for
religious independence. They disliked being under
the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch
of Constantinople, who was appointed by the sultan,
and looked forward to a time when they
might have exarchs of their own, with jurisdiction
not limited by the Patriarch.
In 1854 Russia was ready for another advance
in the region of the Balkans, hoping to gain at
last what Peter the Great had declared was essential
to her progress, a window looking out on
the Mediterranean. Great Britain and France
came to the help of the sultan and the Crimean
War followed. After a hard struggle it ended
in Russia’s defeat, and at the Conference of
Paris, 1856, the affairs of the Balkans were again
up for settlement, but this time the victory leaned
to the side of the Turk, although it was modified
by the restraining hand of his two allies. The
purport of the treaty was to reduce the power
of Russia, and in doing so the aspirations of the
Balkans states were checked. The protectorate
the tsar had established over Wallachia and Moldavia
was destroyed, and Bulgars, who had
expected independence, remained under the rule
of the sultan, while Greece, who had desired a
large portion of Macedonia, was forced to continue
in her old boundaries. This crisis was not
the last in which the vexed Balkan question,
seemingly near solution, was made to give way
before the complicated problems of the general
European situation. Looking backward we may
well say that if Russia had secured her wish, expelled
the Turk from Constantinople and liberated
the Balkan states, the fortunes of France
would not have been lessened, and Great Britain,
safe through her supremacy at sea, would not
have lost any of the strength she had in India.
At the same time the sore spot of European
relations would have been healed, and we should
probably have had no war in 1914.
Wallachia and Moldavia were of the same
stock and wished to unite as one kingdom. They
made their desires known in the negotiations
that resulted in the Treaty of Paris, but the
Powers did not mean to create a large state on
the borders of Russia which might prove a bulwark
of influence for the tsar, and accordingly
they denied the request. The two states found
a way to accomplish their desire, soon after the
conference at Paris adjourned. Meeting to
select rulers each chose Alexander John Cuza
simultaneously, and after hesitating two years
the Powers acknowledged him as king. Thus
was formed the united kingdom of Rumania;
and its formation illustrated a weak point in the
Concert of Europe. However much the Powers
might interfere to prevent the consummation of
an act they considered dangerous, they would
think twice before trying to punish a Balkan
state, since in doing so they might set off an
explosion in the very system they were working
to keep peaceful. Rumania understood this
phase of the matter and took her chances. Her
firm course had its reward.
The influence of Great Britain was now paramount
at Constantinople. The sultan was satisfied
with his ally, since he knew that of all the
Powers he had least to fear from this state, which
had no territories in that part of the Mediterranean
and was committed to the preservation of
his rule as a means of keeping Russia away from
the Bosphorus. To justify herself for defending
the Turk, Great Britain gave the world assurances
that the sultan was about to become good.
Under her insistance a series of reforms was announced,
but they did not go far in the realization.
Some of the promises referred to the government
of the Balkans, but they were as fruitless
as the others. Meanwhile French and
British merchants found large profits in Turkish
trade.
The tsar was humiliated by his loss of influence
in the Southeast, and in 1877 he began another
war against Turkey. He thought the time
favorable for such action. Impeded for a while
at Plevna, in Bulgaria, he at last swept the enemy
before him and took Adrianople on January 16,
1878. His successes created great enthusiasm
among the Serbs, Bulgars, and Rumans, who
flocked to his victorious standard. The panic-stricken
sultan sued for peace and at San Stefano
signed a treaty which granted all that was demanded
of him. Serbia, Montenegro, and
Rumania were recognized as completely independent,
Bulgaria as an autonomous tributary
province, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were assured
of important administrative reforms.
Russia was awarded some territory not strictly in
the Balkans, but her greatest gain was the prestige
she now had as liberator of Christian states.
The treaty of San Stefano alarmed Great
Britain and Austria, both of whom felt that they
had major interests at stake. They got a congress
of the Great Powers to meet at Berlin,
1878, which revised the treaty in what they were
pleased to call the interest of European peace.
Complete independence was announced for
Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro, and the sultan
accepted the fact of their perfect sovereignty.
By the treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria was to
include Macedon and eastern Rumelia, making
one great buffer province between the Turkish
and the Christian states. The three parts were
now left distinct, Bulgaria proper being autonomous
but under Turkish suzerainty, and the
other two less independent.
To create a “Big Bulgaria” as a bulwark
against Turkey had been Russia’s chief hope in
the war. Her initial success awakened enthusiasm
in all the Balkan people, and the results
were expressed in the way in which they rallied
to her aid. At last, said the onlookers, an opportunity
had come to found a strong Balkan
confederacy which would play an important
part in the development of the Near East. The
hand of Russia seemed strong enough to hold
these nascent states to one policy, allay their incipient
jealousies, and bring them to a great common
ideal. If such a course could have been
adopted the future of Europe would have been
profoundly altered. It was defeated by that
Concert of Europe which was supposed to exist
in order that the world might be spared the burden
of war. It was really prevented through the
operation of the forces of national selfishness,
safely esconced in the system which we have
called the Concert of Europe.
The ambition of Austria-Hungary played a
large part at the Congress of Berlin. This nation
had long looked upon the region that separated
her from the Adriatic as a sphere through
which she was justified in extending her power at
the expense of Turkey, and she now felt that
the time had come to realize her plans. If she
waited, Russia would acquire such an influence
as to forestall Austrian advancement. Her eyes
were fixed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, for some
time in revolt against Turkish misgovernment.
Her influence was such that the congress gave
her the right to occupy and administer the two
provinces under the reservation of sovereignty to
the sultan. The inhabitants, who were largely
Slavic, were forced to accept the decision, although
they did not relax their cherished hopes
of independence. They were pawns thrown to
Austria as a balance for the gains of Russia.
The transaction only whetted the Austrian appetite
for more and deepened the Serbian resentment
for Austria.
Great Britain had her advantage out of the
bargain also. She retained her position of paramount
friend at Constantinople, justifying herself
with the assurance that the sultan would
carry out reforms in his empire. She seemed
to think that the “Sick Man of Europe” would
cure himself under her guidance and then defend
himself against states that tried to oust him from
his seat of power. To enable her to watch the
bedside of her patient from a convenient position,
as well as to safeguard the Suez Canal,
Great Britain was given the right to occupy and
administer the island of Cyprus under nominal
authority of Turkey. To be perfectly fair we
must admit that there is little moral difference
between her acquisition of Cyprus and Austria’s
gain in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and it is clear
that in this case the Concert of Europe was a
concert for the gain of selfish ends. It is also
worth while to note that two of the Great Powers
took no benefit from the agreement. France
was slowly recovering from the war of 1870–1871
and was in no condition to fight, although
in 1881 she established a protectorate over Tunis.
The German Empire, newly founded and not yet
fully adapted to the imperial system, was also in
no condition to undertake a stiff encounter.
There were many Germans who wished that their
government should not allow the other states to
get large gains of territory while Germany got
nothing; but they yielded to Bismarck’s wise
policy which held that it was not yet time
for Germany to assume an aggressive position
in the world. The impatience of the German
patriots lost nothing through having to
wait.
No treaty ends the march of time, and the
Balkan situation continued to develop along the
old lines. In 1881 Greece acquired Thessaly in
accordance with a promise made to her at the
Congress of Berlin. In 1885 East Rumelia declared
herself united to Bulgaria, acting in defiance
of the will of the Congress of Berlin. The
Powers did not interfere for the same reason
that they did not act when Wallachia and Moldavia
united in 1862. To attempt to undo the
union would have precipitated a general war.
The Concert was stronger to prevent a given
action than to correct it after it was done.
Serbia, however, took the action of the two
provinces as a menace and declared war against
the new state of Bulgaria. She seemed about
to throw herself on her adversary when she suddenly
made peace, evidently feeling she was not
strong enough to carry on the war alone.
Thenceforth the Powers showed that they did
not mean to allow the Balkan states to profit
by seizing parts of the decaying Turkish Empire.
But for their restraint it seems that the
Turk would have been expelled from Europe
before the end of the nineteenth century.
Their intention was clearly manifested in regard
to the island of Crete, whose population
long suffered from Turkish oppression. In 1896
the island was in revolt and the sultan was forced
to promise reforms. The assurance proved
empty and in 1897 Greece interfered in behalf
of Crete. In the war that followed the Greeks
fought heroically but alone and were no match
for Turkey in operations on land. They made
peace without success, but through the instrumentality
of the Great Powers the sultan agreed
to allow Crete self-government under an elected
assembly. The powers let it be known that
they would not have the island annexed to Greece,
which they did not mean to make a preponderating
influence in the Balkans. Now appeared a
great Cretan leader, Eleutherios Venezelos,
whom his admirers call the Cavour of Greece.
Under his influence the Cretan assembly voted the
union of the island with Greece in 1905, but again
the Powers interposed, insisting that the sovereignty
of the sultan should not be abrogated.
However, they permitted the Greek king to appoint
a representative to rule the island as a
Turkish fief, and Greek officers were allowed to
train the Cretan soldiers and police. At last
the Balkan war (1912–1913) brought the completion
of union, the Great Powers yielding their
assent.
The explanation of the conduct of the Powers
in this incident is to be found in the delicate
nature of the whole Balkan question. With
Austria and Russia keenly aroused and each of
the Balkan states anxiously looking for the
moment when the rest of the sultan’s territory in
Europe was to be divided between them, it was
evident that a little thing could precipitate a
serious conflict. It was in view of this phase of
the situation that the Balkans were called “the
tinder-box of Europe.”
It will be observed that while these things
happened the Balkan states were developing
steadily in national resources and spirit. Greece,
Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania became vitally
organized powers, it became more and more evident
that they were no longer mere pawns in
the diplomatic game, and the time was fast approaching
when they would wish to take parts
on their own initiative. So assertive were they
becoming that it was certain that the time would
soon come when the Great Powers would tire of
the process of holding conferences to keep these
states out of trouble. It is not an easy task to
serve as custodian for a “tinder-box.”
A fair warning of this kind of danger occurred
in 1908. For twenty-three years Bulgaria
had remained undisturbed, giving herself
to a rapid process of educational and industrial
development, in both of which lines she had
come under the influence of German methods.
Suddenly she threw off her nominal Turkish
sovereignty and declared herself an entirely independent
state. At the same time, and
evidently by agreement with the German Empire,
Austria-Hungary announced that she would
hold Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral part of
her empire, thus superseding the “occupation”
that was authorized by the congress of Berlin, in
1878. Serbia took the matter as a great injury,
but she could do nothing alone. Her natural
ally was Russia, then recovering from the severe
losses of the war against Japan. Had the tsar
been ready for war it is doubtful if he would
have drawn the sword in this instance; for a
world war would have resulted, and the nations
were not yet ready to think of such an undertaking.
But Serbia nursed her wrongs and to
Russia the sense of her shame grew as she thought
how her weakness had been flaunted in the face
of the world. The day came when the fire could
no longer be smothered.
To understand Serbia’s feelings we must recall
the national ideal by which her hopes had
been formed for many years. Most of the
people of Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina,
Novi-Bazar, and the northwestern corner of
Macedonia were Serbs by blood. To unite them
into a great Serbia had long been spoken of in
Serbia as the “Great Idea.” When, therefore,
Austria took definite possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina
the “Great Idea” seemed defeated
forever. Rage and despair possessed the Serbs
wherever they lived, patriotic societies voiced the
feeling of the people, and vengeance was plotted.
Probably it was the feeling that this wide-spread
hatred should be uprooted in the most thorough
manner that prompted Austria to make the heavy
conditions that were demanded as atonement for
the crime of Sarajevo.
After Austria took the fateful step of 1908
Turkey still held the territory just north of the
Bosphorus, organized as the province of
Adrianople. She also had in Europe the provinces
of Macedonia, Albania, and the sanjak
of Novi-Bazar. To drive her out of these possessions
was the object of the Balkan states. In
1911 Italy began a war against the sultan to
gain Tripoli. The Balkan States seeing their
enemy embarrassed, concluded that the hour of
fate had come. They formed the Balkan
League, made up of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia,
and Montenegro, and made ready for war.
Their action alarmed the Great Powers, who
brought the Concert of Europe to bear against
the League. They gave the allies fair notice
that they would not permit them to take any of
the sultan’s territory in Europe, even though
a war was won against him. The reply to this
threat shows how weak the Concert had become.
It was voiced by Montenegro, the smallest of
the states, whose king immediately declared war
and called on his allies to aid him in driving the
pagan out of Europe. The call was accepted
gladly and an ultimatum was sent to the sultan,
who, relying on the promise of the Powers, defied
his opponents.
In the war that followed Turkey was confronted
by a united army of nearly a million
men. It was impossible to withstand them and
in two months most of Macedonia was lost, Constantinople
was threatened, and Turkey asked
for an armistice. Negotiations began in London,
the Powers seemingly forgetting their empty
threat that they “would not permit at the end of
the conflict any modification of the territorial
status quo in European Turkey.” The allies demanded
hard terms which seemed about to be
accepted by Turkey when by a coup d’état the
“Young Turks,” a patriotic party of reformers,
got possession of the government at Constantinople
and resumed the fighting. Although they
fought well, they could not withstand the large
numbers that were against them. Janina fell to
the Greeks, Adrianople was taken by a Serbo-Bulgarian
force, and Scutari was taken by the
Montenegrins. The Turks now yielded definitely
and negotiations for peace were resumed.
Behind the diplomatic proceedings was the following
interesting situation: Austria-Hungary
was dismayed at the prospect of having a strong
and permanent league organized in the Balkans;
for it would probably make it impossible for her
to realize her desire to extend her territory in
that direction. She was especially unwilling to
allow Serbia and Montenegro to hold the conquered
shore of the Adriatic, since it was here
that she designed to gain additional outlets to
the seas. Italy at the same time was alarmed at
the extension of Serbian power, since she, also,
did not relish the prospect of having a strong
state on the eastern side of the sea. It was with
unexpected short-sightedness, however, that she
was willing to block Serbia in order to promote
the schemes of Austria, a far more formidable
rival in that quarter, if she were ever firmly established
there. Both states, therefore, appeared
at London to limit the expansion of Serbia, and
Germany supported them, seemingly on the
principle that she was merely standing by the
members of the Triple Alliance. It has been
supposed that she expected that Ferdinand, heir-apparent
of Austria, when he came to rule, would
promote a vital union of the two great Mid-Continental
empires. If we accept this theory, we
must conclude that she had a still more vital reason
for wishing Austria to have a large Adriatic
coast-line, with important commercial harbors.
These considerations ran exactly counter to
Serbia’s hopes in Albania. She had already occupied
the Albanian port of Durazzo and expected
to make it the center of a fair commercial
life. When ordered to withdraw she did not dare
refuse; but it was a great humiliation to her to
cut off the possibility of her future growth. For
a second time Austria had given her a vital blow,
and there was another wrong to be remembered
by those Serbians who were inclined to remember.
By the decree of the Powers Albania was made
an autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty,
and later on a German prince was appointed to
rule it.
While these affairs were being discussed
Montenegro besieged Scutari, in northern Albania
and continued operation until the place
was taken, notwithstanding the purpose of the
Powers was well known. Her courageous conduct
won the admiration of lovers of brave men
everywhere. Eight days after the capture of
Scutari, Austria announced that she would enter
the war if the place was not evacuated, and Italy
and Germany declared they would support her.
Throughout all Slavic countries arose a cry of
indignation. In Russia especially it was loud
and bitter; and it seemed that a great war was
about to begin when King Nicholas, of Montenegro,
gave the world the assurance of peace by
withdrawing his army from Scutari.
Then came that unhappy turn of affairs by
which the Balkan League was dissolved and the
hope disappeared that a strong power would
arise which would take the Near East out of the
position of pawn for the greed of the Great
Powers. Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria had made
an ante-bellum agreement for the disposal of the
territory they would take from Turkey, and the
first was to have a large part of Albania. Denied
this region she asked her allies to make a new
allotment. Bulgaria raised strong objection,
since the new demand, if granted, would mean
that her gains would be smaller than was first
agreed. Angry speeches led to war, and after
a sharp struggle Bulgaria was beaten and forced
to make peace without honor. While they were
locked in the conflict Turkey seized the opportunity
to recover Adrianople, and eventually held
it. It illustrates the sordid nature of some of
the Balkan states that Rumania entered this war
for purely predatory purposes. She had remained
neutral during the common effort to drive
the Turk out; but now that Bulgaria was marching
to sure defeat she came into the battle against
her, and at the end of the war she demanded and
was given a large part of Bulgarian territory.
The “July War,” as this stage of the Balkan conflict
is called, left the allies filled with bitter
hatred for one another, and Bulgaria, weakened
as she was, felt little inclined to lean on any of
her immediate neighbors. She was ripe for the
reception of Teutonic offers of friendship, and
the result was soon seen of all men.
I have thus followed the complex story of the
Balkan States to the year 1913. Through a
century of war and intrigue Serbia, Bulgaria,
Rumania, Greece, and the small state of Montenegro
had emerged from the Christian lands over
which the Turks had ruled. Russia and Austria
had taken small portions of those lands and had
definite plans to secure influence over larger portions.
In the Balkans Russian prestige was
great, but if a state feared it she was apt to look
to Austria, or to Germany—which was the same
thing—as a means of balancing against Russia.
At the same time it was known that Russia was
planning to construct strategic lines of railroad
leading to the Black Sea along the western border
of her empire, and this was considered an
ominous sign for the future. Altogether, the
“tinder-box” was ready for ignition.
As to Turkey, her fortunes shrank steadily.
At the end of the Balkan War she retained only
1,900,000 subjects in Europe, inhabitants of the
district around Adrianople. She was becoming
a distinctly Asiatic power, and the sultan must
have felt that his hold on Constantinople was
precarious. At the same time, as we shall see
later on, Great Britain had secured a foothold
on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and Russia
was extending her influence in Persia, two threats
from the eastward. Any far sighted Turk could
see that his country was in danger of being
crushed in a vise of foreign aggression. To
which of the great states should Turkey turn for
that protection which had long been her safety?
Not to Russia, whose ambition was for Constantinople
itself, nor to Great Britain, who
seemed to desire the Euphrates Valley, and who
was safely established in Egypt. In her extremity
she listened to the suggestions of German
wooers, who promised industrial development,
railroads, and financial aid. Here was
laid the foundation of Turko-German sympathy
which was to be very important in the Great
War.
After a calamity has occurred it is easy to
point out the course by which it might have been
avoided. It seems certain that if we stood again
where the world stood in 1914 we should not do
what we did in 1914. So we can see in what
respects the events of the Balkan history went
wrong. But the men who settled the crises of
the past were not able to see what we see. They
had the same blindness for the future that we
have for that which lies before us now. They
fumbled their problems as most men fumble
problems, as we shall, perhaps, go on fumbling
until the end of time. It is asking much to expect
that statesmen shall be as wise as we who
review their deeds.
But there are great facts in history which it is
possible to know and use with profit. One of
them is the incompetency of the principle of the
Concert of Europe to deal with a situation like
that we have reviewed in the Balkans. Concert
predicates a group of satisfied great states, without
over-reaching ambitions, who are willing to
unite their efforts to restrain small states, or even
one large state, from a course which shall force
the rest of the world into conflict. When a
group of great states have united to carry out a
certain policy, and another tries to restrain the
first group, concert is in great danger of breaking
down. That was the situation in the Balkans.
These states were drawn into the whirl
of general European politics, and they intensified
its velocity at one particular corner, so that
what may be contemplated as a harmonious rotary
movement broke into a twisting tornado.
If, when the present war is over, the nations of
the world undertake to go on under the old system,
trusting to concert as the means of avoiding
war, there is no reason to expect that the future
will be less turbulent than the past.
