POLITICS IN TUNIS.
A survey of the situation — M. Roustan’s policy —
The first campaign — The Treaty of the Bardo — The insurrection —
Bombardment of Sfax — Occupation of Tunis — March upon Kairwan —
Capture of Kairwan — Results of the French policy — English
interests — Estrangement of Italy.
I have completed the record
of my visit to Tunis, but I shall hardly have accomplished my whole
task until I have said something regarding the remarkable political
situation which I found in existence there. From the foregoing
pages I have excluded politics as far as possible; but the
political problem which Tunis at this moment presents to the world
is so remarkable, that it is impossible to pass it by unnoticed;
and I shall attempt, therefore, in this concluding Chapter, by
giving some extracts from my diary referring to this aspect of my
visit, to convey to the reader an idea of the state of things
existing in the Regency at the time when I was there. Those who
trouble themselves
to read these pages will see that more than once I have indulged in
the gratuitous blunder of prophesying. My prophecies were not only
written on the dates mentioned, but were printed a few days
afterwards in the Standard newspaper. I do not think
however that my predictions as to what must be the result of M.
Roustan’s adventures in Tunis have proved to be very far wrong.
Writing several weeks before the famous Roustan-Rochefort trial, I
gave in outline most of the facts which were brought to light
during the course of that trial, and upon some other points of
interest, such as the probable action of the insurgent Arabs after
the fall of Kairwan, I foretold with tolerable accuracy what has
actually come to pass. Let me say at once, however, that the credit
of this is not due to me, but to those clear-sighted and
dispassionate men with whom I had the good fortune to be brought in
contact during my stay in the Regency, and who did so much to
enlighten my mind as to the real nature of the situation existing
there.
And here it may be proper to observe, by way of showing that
England is not without an interest of her own in Tunisian
politics, that not fewer than 10,000 subjects of the Queen are to
be found in the Regency. It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that
these are almost all Maltese, the number of actual Englishmen in
the Regency being probably under twenty. As coachmen, boatmen,
gardeners, artisans, and coffee-shop keepers, the Maltese find
plenty to do in all parts of Tunis. Their moral character is not
very high, and at times they give her Majesty’s Consul-General not
a little trouble; but they are English subjects, protected by
treaty; and it is the undoubted duty of our government to watch
over their interests. That recent events in Tunis have not been
very favourable to these persons is only too certain. Some thirty
British subjects have been killed during the course of the war
between the French and the Arabs, and an enormous quantity of
property, belonging not merely to Maltese, but to English merchants
trading through agents in the Regency, has been destroyed. The loss
of life is chiefly due to the Arabs; but the loss of property is
almost entirely due to the French, who have peculiar notions as to
the rights of neutrals, where a question of loot is concerned.
English trade with Tunis is very large. The esparto grass, which is
exported from Sfax and other places on the coast, is almost all
brought to this country; and the name of one English firm, Messrs.
Perry, Bury, and Co., of Manchester, seemed to be on the lips of
all the traders in the Gulf of Hammamet. England as a great
consumer of the products of Tunis, naturally supplies that country
in turn with many of the articles required by her inhabitants, and
it was pleasing to see that genuine English goods—Manchester
cottons, Sheffield knives, and London pickles, sauces, and tinned
meats—enjoyed a practical monopoly in the towns of the Regency. It
is not, therefore, correct to represent this country as having no
interest in Tunis. At the same time it would be a mistake to
exaggerate the extent of that interest, or to give way to any
imaginary fears, because France, by one of the most cynical acts of
aggression on record, has made herself the mistress of the
destinies of the country. Her act is a serious one so far as the
Italians are concerned; but England, so long as she retains Malta
can afford to look on at the endless schemes and counter-schemes of the rivals,
with something like indifference.
When I reached Tunis the second act in the comedy devised by M.
Roustan was in full progress. The Bey had succumbed to the
inevitable, when the French Consul waited upon him in his palace at
Manouba, and, pointing to the Republican troops drawn up within
sight of the windows of the room where they were seated, warned the
unlucky Ruler that the occupation of Tunis would be immediately
effected, unless the treaty which was presented to him were signed.
Those who were in Tunis at that time know what anguish prevailed,
not merely at the palace but in the capital, during this crisis.
Mr. Reade had been the adviser of the Bey up to this point. His
Highness had placed himself entirely in his hands, and the English
Consul-General had given him the best possible counsel. It was at
Mr. Reade’s instigation that the Bey had not only desisted from
offering any resistance to the progress of the French troops
through his territory, but had despatched his brother, the heir
apparent, Si Ali Bey, at the head of the Tunisian army, for the
purpose of cooperating with the French commander in his operations against
the “Kroumirs.” Everybody in Tunis knew then what everybody in
France knows now, that the ravages of the so-called Kroumirs were a
mere pretext for the invasion of the Regency, and that the
expedition was sent forth in the interests of French financiers,
who found their interests threatened by the schemes of Italian
rivals.
The first and natural wish of the Bey was to oppose the French
invasion by force; for he was perfectly conscious of the fact that
the Republic had not the shadow of justification for its attack
upon his territory. Mr. Reade, by his urgent solicitations induced
the Bey to abstain from the fatal step of resistance; he even went
further, and, as I have shown, got him to send his own brother and
the Tunisian army, not to oppose but to cooperate with the French.
In the meantime, it was hoped that by urgent diplomatic
representations to the different courts of Europe some steps might
be taken to avert the impending catastrophe. M. Roustan and his
friends were greatly disappointed when they learned that the Bey,
by the wise advice of Mr. Reade, was not going to fall into the trap they had laid
for him, by offering any resistance to the advance of the French
troops. To most men this step on the part of his Highness would
have seemed a fatal bar to further action on their part. M.
Roustan, however, did not allow himself to be materially hindered
by the Bey’s discreet conduct. Abandoning even the semblance of a
pretext he brought the French troops up to the village of Manouba,
within four miles of Tunis, and within sight of the Bardo and the
Bey’s private palace. Then, as we have seen, he presented his
monstrous treaty for signature. The Bey’s agony, as I have said,
was intense. He knew that to permit the occupation of Tunis would
be to seal his own doom. Henceforth he would be merely a puppet in
the hands of M. Roustan, and the greater part of his Arab subjects
would treat him with the contempt due to a traitor. On the other
hand, he could not fail to see that the Roustan treaty was merely
the prelude to the seizure of his sceptre by the French. With the
aid of Mr. Broadley, an English barrister, he drew up a dignified
protest against the action of France, and telegraphed this to all
the courts of
Europe, during the few hours which his hard taskmaster was good
enough to allow him for consideration. Up to the date of my leaving
Tunis—November 3rd—not one of the recipients of this protest, which
was sent off in May, had found time to acknowledge its receipt. So,
deserted by Europe, and alas! no longer allowed to feel confidence
in Mr. Reade’s power to help him, the Bey signed the treaty, and
placed himself in the hands of M. Roustan.
This was the first act of the comedy. It was followed by an
interval, during which there was apparent peace in the Regency.
Mustapha, the barber’s boy who had become Prime Minister, was
shipped off to Europe, and M. Roustan installed himself as master
of the land. All manner of concessions were granted to French
companies. Railways, harbours, agricultural banks, public works of
every description were projected. The Italians found themselves
driven to the wall. Even English subjects, like Mr. Levy, saw their
rights rudely interfered with; for M. Roustan was master, and all
others had to submit. But presently there came a change. The French
troops were returning to their own country. It did not suit the
purpose of the Ministry to allow the people of France to imagine
that anything like a war was in progress. So it was announced in
the Chambers that the Treaty of the Bardo had settled everything,
and that it was no longer necessary to keep any large army of
occupation in Tunis. It was at this moment that the insurrection
broke out at Sfax. The Arabs there proclaimed themselves
independent of the Bey, who had sold them to the infidel, and
invited their countrymen to join them. The first news of this
insurrection was sent up to Tunis by Mr. Gallia, our Vice-Consul at
Susa, who happens to have also a residence and place of business at
Sfax. Mr. Gallia’s reward was to have his house plundered by the
French troops when they entered Sfax. Of the bombardment of that
place by the French, and of its capture, and the loot by the
victorious troops, I need only say here that it resulted in the
spread of the insurrectionary feeling throughout the Regency. The
whole Arab race boiled over with indignation; and outrages, and
murders as horrible as that which occurred at the railway station
at Oued Zergha, became common. The French troops were hurried back
to the Regency; three columns were formed for the advance of an
army against Kairwan, the sacred city, which was suspected of being
the centre of disaffection, and Tunis itself was occupied by a
large force of Republican troops. It was at this moment that I
arrived in the Regency, and from this point the following extracts
from my letters will afford some idea of the political
situation.
Tunis, October 18th.—It is difficult to convey to the
mind of the English reader an idea of the state of things now
prevailing in Tunis, at a distance of barely four days from London;
and it would probably be still more difficult to make any man of
ordinary honesty understand the full meaning of that drama—half
comic half tragic, and wholly disreputable—which is now being
played out by the most cynical of actors under the eyes of the
entire world. The visitor to Tunis at this moment finds himself in
a country in which a state of war prevails. At Goletta immense
French transports may be seen, disembarking troops and stores
sufficient for a campaign against Germany. All along the short line
of railway between the port and the capital, French camps are scattered; trains of
artillery may be seen in slow progress towards the front, and
ambulances provided with all the appliances which modern surgery
has invented are also visible. Here, in Tunis, French sentries are
mounted upon the crumbling white walls of the Kasbah, the great
citadel of the place; French camps are pitched in the open spaces
within the forts; French patrols pass through the streets at
regular intervals, and the Grand Hotel, where a French general is
installed, is the real headquarters of the Government of the city.
Yesterday three columns of French troops, numbering in all some
30,000 men, began their march—two from the neighbourhood of Tunis,
one from Susa—towards the sacred city of Kairwan, which has been
selected as the special place to be honoured by a demonstration of
French valour. If ever there was a country in a state of war, it is
Tunis at the present moment. And yet no war has been declared; no
pretext for military operations has been discovered, and a portion
at least of the Parisian press maintains that no war exists. Even
more startling than the contrast between the state of things
visible here, and
that in the existence of which official France pretends to believe,
is the contrast between the condition of Tunis now and its
condition twelve months ago, or even more recently.
At the beginning of the present year there was no European
country which could vie in peacefulness, in security of life and
property, with Tunis. There were of course certain tracts of wild
mountainous country in the north-west portion of the Bey’s
territory, where it would have been unsafe for any European to
venture. But apart from these very limited districts, there was no
part of Tunis where life was not perfectly safe. So recently as
last April, Lord and Lady Bective visited Kairwan; and they not
only did so in perfect safety, but they were received as honoured
and welcome guests by the Arabs of that famous city. Here in Tunis
no one thought for a moment of any danger from the native
population. The tourist could wander at his will among the
interesting ruins which abound in the neighbouring country, not
only without dread of being subjected to violence, but with a
feeling of absolute security which he could hardly entertain in
London or Paris. Now, all this is changed. No man would dare to travel half a dozen
miles from the city—to do so would be to court almost certain
death. It would be almost as dangerous to venture into any of the
villages which lie under the very shadow of the walls of Tunis. And
even within the city itself, Europeans are warned on no account to
venture out after dark. If you walk through the Arab quarter,
averted faces and muttered curses meet you on every side; while the
air is filled with rumours of an impending catastrophe. Twice
during the present week the French troops in the city have been
roused in the dead of night, and marched hurriedly to a central
point, in order to resist a general rising of the Arabs, which
everybody expected, and which it was believed had already begun.
The imaginations of the non-Mussulman population, stimulated by all
that they see around them, are still further excited by the
horrible and, alas! true stories of tortures perpetrated upon
unhappy Christians who have fallen into the hands of the Arabs; and
everywhere a feeling not only of insecurity but of positive dread,
has replaced that which prevailed last year. And these are the
first results of that famous treaty which M. Roustan wrung from the Bey less
than six months since, and by which France, or rather her Consular
Agent, was made absolute master of the properties and the destinies
of the Tunisian Government and people. It is obvious to everybody
now that a fatal blunder was made by the French Cabinet when it
placed itself in the hands of M. Roustan. It is a blunder which has
already cost an enormous sum of money, and a serious expenditure of
life, and it is one which may yet have consequences of the gravest
kind, affecting not merely France but other European countries
whose interests are still dearer to the Englishman.
It is not my business, however, to enter into a political
disquisition on the origin and objects of the Tunisian expedition.
I have done my duty when, as an eye-witness, I point out the
extraordinary results of the Roustan policy up to the present
moment. That policy has, in the first place, compelled France to
enter upon a war on a large scale against a nation with whom it
professedly has no quarrel; and, in the second place, it has
entirely destroyed the security of life and property in Tunis, and
has made one of the
most peaceful and harmless races in the world, the bitter enemies
not merely of France, but of all the powers and peoples of Europe.
With more than 50,000 French soldiers in Tunis, and yet with the
very streets of the capital itself in such a state that Europeans
dare not move about them freely, it can hardly be contended that
the civilizing and pacifying mission of the French Consular Agent
has been altogether as successful as might have been desired. As to
the secret history of that mission—the history which is upon the
lips of everybody in Tunis—it is not for me to tell it here; but
there is some probability that the revelation of the truth will not
be long delayed. M. Camille Pelletan and other French deputies have
come to Tunis for the special purpose of learning the truth on the
subject; and some startling revelations may be expected when the
debates begin in the Chambers.
Within the next fortnight it is believed that decisive military
operations will have been carried out against Kairwan. Yesterday,
as I have stated already, three French columns started for that
place. The first column, under the command of General Saussier,
to whom the command
in chief is entrusted, has started from Tunis, and advances by way
of the famous Enfida estate. The suggestion made here is, that this
column will accomplish a double purpose; it will not only aid in
the conquest of Kairwan, but will put the French in possession of
that particular piece of property the name of which was mixed up so
prominently with the early history of the Tunisian question. The
second column, under General Logerot, has marched from Zaghouan,
and will make a slight détour to the west, on its way to
the sacred city. The third has the port of Susa as its point of
departure; and it is to advance by means of a temporary railway
which is to be constructed to Kairwan. The distance from Susa to
Kairwan is barely thirty miles, so that there ought to be no
difficulty in the construction of this line. Another column,
intended for the pacification of the country as well as the
conquest of Kairwan, is now moving across the Bey’s territory from
Tebessa. The distance it has to traverse is, however, so great that
it can hardly take part in the operations against the city itself,
unless those operations should be unexpectedly delayed.
No one, of
course, can entertain any doubt as to the result of the operations
against Kairwan. The famous city is doomed. Optimists now can only
pray that its captors will show respect for the feelings not merely
of the Mussulman, but of the whole civilized world. The “loot” of a
place like Kairwan would be a disgrace and a disaster. The world as
it watches this great expedition against Kairwan, undertaken, as I
have shown, upon a scale of such magnitude, ought to bear in mind
the fact that Kairwan itself has been guilty of no offence. It has
offered, and is offering, no resistance to the French army,
although naturally enough the Arabs of Kairwan, like the rest of
the world, fail to see what special reason can be alleged for the
course now being pursued by France in a country with which it does
not pretend to be at war, and which it professes that it has no
desire to annex. No plea of military necessity can therefore be put
in on behalf of the expedition to which the French are now
committed. It is an expedition undertaken for the purpose of giving
the Gambettist Republic a new dose of “glory,” and of putting an
end, if possible, to awkward discussions in the French Chambers. That is the plain
truth about this march upon the sacred city—a march which is
regarded by all the Arabs, I need hardly say, as being in itself an
act of sacrilege. That it will not result in the pacification of
the country is firmly believed by competent military authorities
here. The Arabs, save a few of the more fanatical, will in all
probability escape into the mountainous districts of the interior,
or—and this is an eventuality which it is necessary that English
statesmen should seriously consider—they will make their way across
the frontier into Tripoli, and throw themselves into the arms of
the great Mussulman force already assembled there, where they will
nurse their indignation against the assailants of their brethren in
race and religion.
Tunis, October 25th.—The truth about Tunis has not yet
been told to the world. Part of it has, it is true, been revealed
in the columns of certain of the ultra-Radical journals of Paris;
but, partly because of the quarter in which the revelations have
been made, and partly, also, because of the evident bias of the
writers, those stories have not attracted so much attention as they
might reasonably
have been expected to do. It will not, however, be from any want of
zeal on the part of inquirers after it, if the whole truth
regarding the Tunisian question is not made known to the world at
no distant date. This city is now swarming, I shall not say with
spies, but with investigators of all descriptions, bent upon
learning everything regarding the proceedings of M. Roustan and his
wonderful entourage. We have here, among others, M.
Camille Pelletan, the lieutenant of Dr. Clémenceau, and M. Pelletan
does not even affect to conceal the fact that he is preparing the
materials for a savage indictment, not merely of M. Roustan and the
French Ministry, but of M. Gambetta himself, when the Chambers
meet. That he is satisfied with the success that has attended his
efforts to unravel all the mysteries of the Tunisian question, I
have the best authority for saying; and there can be no doubt that
when he makes his promised statement to the Chamber of Deputies he
will have a tale to tell which must produce a very lively
sensation. It is not only, however, among French Deputies and
Special Correspondents that the inquiries after the
truth are to be
found. Strange as it may seem, at least one other country besides
that immediately concerned in the Tunisian expedition is
interesting itself in what is passing or has passed here. Tunis has
lately witnessed a remarkable influx of mysterious
Germans—gentlemen, for the most part, of a decidedly military
bearing, whose sauerkrautish French would alone suffice to betray
their nationality to the observant. These gentlemen are by no means
obtrusive in their demeanour. They frequent none of the hotels;
they might even seem to be anxious to escape the observation of the
French authorities. They are chiefly to be found in certain small
cafés in the European quarter which do not appear to have been
discovered as yet by the officers of the French army. Here they
are, however, and for what purpose? They are not bent on seeking
pleasure. It is only a mad Englishman who will come to Tunis for
pleasure at a time like the present. They are not engaged in
commercial pursuits; they are not even the correspondents of German
newspapers. All that can be said about them is that they show a
most unwearied assiduity in collecting facts, both
political and
military, with regard to the past and the present of French rule in
Tunis. They also will aid the world, it may be assumed, in arriving
at a full knowledge of the truth regarding one of the most
remarkable episodes in modern history.
And what is that truth? For obvious reasons my pen is restrained
from writing of it. It will be better to wait till the debate in
the French Chambers for the full chronicle of the scandals that
surround this question; yet even now not a little may be said. I
see it still repeated in certain newspapers in England, that after
all the French have only done in Tunis what we did in Afghanistan.
More amazing ignorance of actual facts than that which is shown by
this assertion, it would be difficult to conceive. Granting for the
moment that our policy in Afghanistan was as bad as these papers
believe it to have been, there would still be not even the faintest
similarity between the two cases. I have never seen it hinted that
we entered Afghanistan in order to advance the pecuniary interest
of a coterie of adventurers at Calcutta or London; nor has it ever
been suggested that a fair and frail Helen was closely
connected with the
origin of our expedition to Cabul. It is said here, however, upon
authority which is unimpeachable, that the violent seizure of Tunis
by the French, and all the misery, loss of life, and confusion that
have resulted from that step, can be traced directly to the visit
of a certain Tunisian lady to Paris, and to the acquaintances she
there formed amongst a band of well-known financiers. This lady had
exceptional influence over a very powerful person in Tunis. She had
exercised similar influence over other powerful persons in the
place before she made the acquaintance of this particular
gentleman, and altogether she occupied a very extraordinary and
important place in Tunisian affairs. On the particular visit to
Paris to which I refer, her sympathies were enlisted on behalf of
the speculators in question. She returned to Tunis resolved to
procure for them a most important concession from the Bey—a
concession which would practically have placed the greater part of
the country in pawn to them. By means of the gentleman whose
movements she controlled, she brought the matter under the notice
of the Bey. His Highness, however, refused to grant the concession, pleading the
perfectly accurate reason that he could not do so without violating
his treaty engagements with England and other countries. Thereupon
he was bluntly told that he would live to repent his decision; and
that the concession he had been asked to make voluntarily was
trifling compared to that which would within twelve months be wrung
from him by force. In fact, it was by no means obscurely hinted
that the days of his rule and of Tunisian independence were
numbered. Little more than six months afterwards the “ravages” of
the Kroumirs were discovered; French journalists declared it to be
intolerable that their country should be exposed to insults and
injuries at the hands of a horde of savages; and one of the
gentlemen who had been most urgent in seeking the concession of
which I have spoken from the Bey, himself proposed in the Chamber
of Deputies that an expedition should be undertaken for the purpose
of vindicating the dignity of France, and chastising the
aggressors. From that expedition came, I need hardly say, the
Treaty with M. Roustan, the cession of Bizerta and a considerable
tract of territory, the submission of the Bey’s Government
to that of France,
and now the occupation of Tunis itself and the practical conversion
of the Regency into a French dependency.
All these facts have been hinted at, if they have not been
clearly stated before; but it is well that they should be stated
again. Connected with them are numberless scandals, some of so
flagrant a character that I cannot even hint at their nature. But,
as I have said, the searchers after truth are abroad, and we shall
have a highly spiced dish of Tunisian facts served up in the French
Chambers at no distant date. The Enfida case, which is one of the
side issues connected with the affair, is in itself a very
remarkable instance of the manner in which those who represent
France in this country are trifling with the national honour. A few
months ago, before the great blow had been struck, and when Tunis
was still independent, the French authorities, after much
correspondence, professed themselves anxious to submit Mr. Levy’s
claim to arbitration. England saw then no reason for withdrawing it
from the ordinary tribunals. Suddenly, however, the attitude of
France has undergone a curious change. Now that Tunisian
independence is
completely at an end—now that the Bey is little more than a
prisoner in his own palace—now that the French flag floats above
the Tunisian one on the towers of the Kasbah, and now that French
soldiers and policemen are patrolling the streets of Tunis
itself—now, in fact, that France is omnipotent and can control or
crush any Tunisian institution, M. Roustan has turned round upon
himself, refuses to submit the Enfida dispute to arbitration, and
has actually sent it before one of those local tribunals the
integrity and competency of which he stoutly denied so long as
there was the remotest chance of their acting in an independent
manner. I am glad to say that the English Government seem to be
inclined to insist upon arbitration by some wholly independent
party as the only satisfactory solution of the question, and in
this resolve it may be hoped that the French Government will
eventually acquiesce.
The diplomatic struggles and rivalries of places like Tunis are
proverbial, and there is no need to say that the hottest warfare
has been waged here between the representatives of the different
European powers. I am glad to say that amid the strife Mr.
Reade, the English
representative, has been able to keep himself entirely aloof from
all personal jealousies or local scandals; and that, whilst
maintaining with firmness and dignity the interests and honour of
his country, he has not given offence even to the most arrogant of
his colleagues. On the other hand, M. Roustan is now being
denounced by everybody, and particularly by Frenchmen themselves.
Except in his own immediate circle nobody seems to have a good word
for him, and his early downfall is freely predicted. Among the
offences laid to his charge are the contradictory promises he is
said to have made to many of the prominent actors in this Tunisian
question. He is believed to have intrigued not merely with the Bey,
but with his Prime Minister, the ex-barber’s-apprentice Mustapha,
with Ali Bey, the Bey’s elder, and with Taib Bey his younger,
brother. It follows from all that has happened, and from all that
is now being brought to light, that Frenchmen themselves are most
anxious to secure his removal. The misfortune is, that his removal
will now exercise but small appreciable influence upon the future
of Tunis. It is in the possession of France at this
moment. The noble
Gulf of Tunis, the trade of the country, all its strategical
points, are in the keeping of the French; and though the latter
will have to pay a heavy price in blood, money, and reputation for
the prize they have thus secured, they are not likely to relinquish
it merely because M. Roustan has been exposed and punished.
It is not merely on the side of the French that curious
intrigues are just now in full progress under one’s very eyes. The
Bey, as I have said, is practically a prisoner in his palace at
Goletta, utterly dejected and heartbroken, and so completely devoid
of spirit that he has just conferred—need I say at whose
bidding?—his highest decoration upon the French general commanding
the troops in occupation of Tunis—an occupation which every Arab
resents as an insult to his nationality and his creed. It is not
surprising in these circumstances that rumours should be current
regarding a probable change in the nominal rulership. Ali Bey, the
next brother of the Bey, who is known as the Bey of the Camp,
eagerly puts himself forward as the supplanter of the reigning Bey.
Unfortunately for his chances he is very deaf, and, moreover,
he is more than
suspected of complicity in many of the intrigues of M. Roustan. His
own troops are at this moment in a state of almost open mutiny
against him, and more than once he has been denounced when riding
through his own camp, as a traitor who had sold his country. The
third brother, Taib Bey, lives a retired life at the Marsa, in a
large and beautiful country-house, not far from the residence of
the English Consul. He seems to be a man of considerable shrewdness
and intelligence. Last of all on the list of Pretenders is
Mustapha, whose friends openly declare that he is about to return
to this country as Governor-General—a French Governor-General of
course. I should imagine, however, that his chances are dependent
upon the fortunes of his friend M. Roustan.
Tunis, October 30th.—There is something very amusing in
the manner in which the capture of Kairwan has fallen flat upon the
European community here. How the intelligence may have been
received in Paris I am not of course aware. Perhaps the coup de
théâtre of General Farre and M. Roustan may have been
successful, and the Parisians may have applauded the occupation of the
sacred city as though it were an achievement equal to another
Solferino or Magenta. But here even the dullest of persons sees too
much of what is passing behind the scenes to be deceived. It was
known early last week that Kairwan was to be occupied exactly in
time to allow of the news reaching Paris on Friday evening. The day
before, I received a note from an officer with General Etienne’s
force, dated Tuesday, and telling me that they were in sight of
Kairwan, never having fired a shot during the march. I was
therefore quite prepared for the receipt of the news of the
occupation. On Friday morning, about ten o’clock, the transport
Sarthe steamed into Goletta, bringing the expected
tidings; and two hours afterwards everybody in Tunis was—laughing
at it. The prodigious achievement, which was to crush the
insurrection and strike terror into the hearts of the Arabs in
North Africa, had resolved itself into a simple promenade across
forty miles of sandy desert, and the holy city had been yielded up
without a blow being struck in its defence. It was quite evident
that the Arabs were
too clever to fall into the trap which had been so ostentatiously
laid for them by the French. A battle at Kairwan would, according
to French ideas, have justified the destruction of the city; whilst
it would at the same time have crippled the power of the Arabs. But
the Arabs are as far from subjection as they ever were.
We have a fresh instance of mismanagement in this capture of
Kairwan. The plan of campaign was that the two columns of Susa and
Zaghouan should meet in front of the city on Tuesday last. Somehow
or other, however, they “missed their connexions,” as the Yankees
would say. General Etienne performed his part; General Saussier,
the superior officer, failed in his. Although he encountered but
trifling resistance, his straggling and ill-arranged column could
not arrive at Kairwan on Wednesday night. The funny thing is, that
there is much indignation among the leading officers here against
General Etienne! It is said that it was his first duty to await the
arrival of his superior, and that he has shown “indecent haste” in
fulfilling his
instructions and reaching and occupying Kairwan. General Etienne,
however, is the only man who has shown himself up to his work
during this campaign. The work has not been very heavy, but such as
it is he has done it well. On reaching the city, Colonel de Moulin
was sent forward to communicate with the Governor, one of the Bey’s
servants, and a man of much intelligence. A white flag had
previously been hoisted on the tower of the great Mosque of Okba.
The Governor explained to Colonel de Moulin that he was the loyal
subject of the Bey, and was prepared to receive the French army as
the allies of his Highness. He only begged that the mosques might
be held inviolate, and that the army would be content with passing
through the town, and would not attempt to take up quarters in it.
Colonel de Moulin asked the Governor to come with him to the spot
where General Etienne was awaiting the result of the interview.
This the Governor did. After some conversation the French general
intimated that he must take possession of the Kasbah, or citadel
within the walls, but that in all other respects he would comply
with the Governor’s wishes. The French column was thereupon formed up, and
each battalion being headed by its trumpeters marched into the
sacred city to the sound of shrill martial music. The streets were
crowded with Arabs, arrayed in their burnouses of many colours, and
all watched with interest the passage of the troops. Anger and
indignation were depicted upon every countenance. Very little else
was to be seen that was worthy of notice by the unwelcome guests
for whom the city had opened its gates.
The streets are narrow, tortuous, and ill-paved; the houses of
the prevailing Moorish type; and the great mosques are not
particularly conspicuous so far as their exteriors are concerned.
Within they contain many noble columns and antiquities, and
curios of enormous interest and value. But no one was
allowed to violate these shrines, within which no Christian foot
has yet penetrated. There was general disappointment on the part of
all when, the march through having been finished, the troops were
brought out of the city, at the opposite gate to that by which they
had entered. The detachment occupying the Kasbah was a small one, General Etienne
feeling justified, in the absence of all resistance, in making this
concession to the wishes of the Governor. He had previously given
the latter to understand that he would hold him personally
responsible for the maintenance of order within the walls. The
situation chosen for the camp is good. It is within easy distance
of the city, and has been entrenched—not because there is any fear
of attack from the people of Kairwan themselves, but because of the
possibility of a sudden raid from the neighbouring hills, into
which the insurgent Arabs have fled for refuge.
Such is the story of the occupation of Kairwan by General
Etienne; and it will be seen at once how tame a story it is. But
though there has been nothing brilliant in this mean achievement,
and though the struggle with the Arabs has been hardly advanced a
single step by the occupation of this city, it has a degree of
importance. The excitement and resentment among the Arab population
of the Regency has been greatly intensified by an outrage upon a
shrine which they have long regarded as sacred. Here in Tunis, the Arabs
openly declare that the insult thus put upon their faith must be
avenged in blood; and outside the city walls the populace is
seething with rage. The hope which apparently prevails is that the
Sultan may come to their assistance even now, and that with the aid
of his troops they may avenge themselves upon the invader. It is to
put an end to this hope that the Bey has been induced, or
compelled, to issue a proclamation to his people. This
proclamation, which appears on all the walls in the Arab quarter,
states that the Sultan has sent his troops to Tripoli merely to
preserve order, and that they are now about to be withdrawn. Still,
the very fact that it should have been thought necessary to issue
such a notice, shows how strongly the French are impressed with a
sense of the danger which threatens them on that side. Nor is their
anxiety groundless. Advices from Tripoli show that the excitement
among the Mussulman population there is intense, and is being
fomented by the action of fanatical preachers, who are passing from
place to place, stirring up popular hatred against the infidel. Many hundreds
of Tripolitans, including a large number of Turkish soldiers, have
crossed the frontier, and are joining the Tunisian Arabs in these
mountain fastnesses, in which they are preparing for the guerilla
operations they evidently contemplate. It is, therefore, in that
direction that the Tunisian question will probably next appear in a
serious form.
Malta, Nov. 5th.—The rains were beginning to set in
over Tunis when I left the Regency, and with the commencement of
the rainy season the best authorities were agreed in believing that
the fighting would cease. The Arabs have spent several months,
during which no work could be done upon the land, in assailing
their hated enemy, and they have inflicted upon him not only severe
losses, but the necessity of taking the most costly and extensive
measures for maintaining his hold upon the country. Now that the
time is come when the natives must either attend to their fields or
allow the next harvest to be entirely lost, those who know them
best feel convinced of the course they will take. They will leave
the mountains and come down to the plains, not to fight, but to work. A
few months hence, when the harvest has been secured, there will
probably be another insurrectionary movement, which will break out
sporadically in all manner of unexpected places, and cause fresh
trouble and expense to the French. For the present, however, there
will be something like peace, save where General Saussier pursues
his favourite occupation of having some unfortunate Bedouin hanged,
simply to encourage the others. The moment seems, therefore, a
favourable one for attempting some review of the situation as a
whole.
Whatever may be thought about the morality of the transactions
which have placed the French in command of Tunis—and I have spoken
already with quite sufficient plainness on that point—the English
public must make up their minds to one thing—that is, that France
will not quit her hold of the prize she has now got within her
grasp. I have spoken to many Frenchmen of influence and position
who have visited Tunis during the past month for the purpose of
learning the truth about the Tunisian question. There is not one of
them who does not admit that the series of transactions which have ended
by placing the tricolor on the Kasbah of the capital and the walls
of Kairwan reflect dishonour upon the national name; there is not
one who is not prepared to insist upon the exposure and punishment
of M. Roustan and his entourage. But I have not met a
single Frenchman who has expressed his willingness to retire from
the country now that he sees France in actual possession of it.
“What! give up Tunis now, after all the lives and the money we have
spent in getting hold of it! Give it up after the tremendous price
in honour we have paid to secure it! Never!” This is the French
view of the matter; and even the Englishman who has been educated
by recent transactions in Afghanistan and South Africa, must admit
that there is some force in the prevailing French sentiment upon
the subject. But whether that sentiment be just or not, let us at
least not shut our eyes to the plain fact which stares us in the
face—the fact that, whether M. Roustan is retained or dismissed,
whether his conduct is denounced or applauded, nobody believes that
France will retire from Tunis. There she is, and there she will
stay, if for no other reason than because she has now such extensive
financial interests in the country, that the clique of capitalists
and jobbers who secretly control her foreign policy cannot afford
to let those interests be sacrificed. But what must be the probable
consequences of her retaining the prize she has succeeded in
seizing by an act of international brigandage?
So far as other powers are concerned, there can be no doubt that
Italy is the heaviest sufferer for the moment. The interests of
Italy in Tunis far surpass those of any other country. Italian has
hitherto been the European language used there in all commercial
transactions; Italian capital has been most largely invested in the
native industries; and the vast majority of the Christian
population have hitherto claimed the protection of the Italian
Consul-General. The Italians themselves will not deny that they
have for a long time entertained a desire to do that which France
has now done. They were the keen and eager rivals of Frenchmen in
all the various enterprises designed for the development of Tunis.
But either they were less bold or were more scrupulous than
their competitors.
At all events they had no M. Roustan to take the lead on their
behalf, and thus, when the moment for action arrived, they were
left hopelessly behind. It is impossible to exaggerate the rage and
bitterness which now fill them against the French. If the two
nations were actually at this moment at war with each other, the
feeling could not be more hostile. Nor need we be surprised at
this. The loss of the Italians in actual money in consequence of
this transfer of Tunis to France is a very heavy one. The French,
it must be understood, are not doing things by halves. They are
already boasting that they will soon drive the last Italian
capitalist out of Tunis, that the Goletta Railway (the purchase of
which by an Italian company was the incident which fired the train
of subsequent events) will soon be in their hands, and that before
long they will be financially and commercially supreme.
All this the Italians see for themselves, and they are
overwhelmed with chagrin at the spectacle. But they feel also that
their prestige, and even their military position, has
received a most serious blow. With the French at Bizerta and
Goletta they maintain that they are unexpectedly outflanked.
Various schemes have been put forward in Italy in order to secure
some compensation for the injury thus inflicted upon the country. I
find that in the important coast towns the favourite idea of the
Italian residents is that Tripoli should be seized, in order to
counterbalance the French acquisition of Tunis. But at Tripoli
itself that idea finds no favour, even among the Italians; and the
reason for this it is not difficult to discover. Neither from a
financial, a military, nor a political point of view is Italy
strong enough to secure Tripoli. Those who are on the spot are well
aware of this, and they are most anxious to counteract the
Chauvinist ideas of their fellow-countrymen at a distance. Let me
add, that France herself would be worsted in any attack upon
Tripoli. She may have the money and the men, but she lacks the
power necessary to enable her to defy, not merely the Tripolitan
Arabs, but the forces of united Europe. For the Italians to thrust
themselves into the wasp’s nest from which the insurrectionary
movement in Tunis originated, would be an act of supreme folly. To
say nothing of the course which England would be bound
to take in such a
case—to say nothing of any resistance which might be offered by the
regular Turkish army—the Arabs of Tripoli are themselves formidable
enough to make any attack upon them by a State like Italy, a most
dangerous if not a hopeless undertaking. They are far more
fanatical than their co-religionists in Tunis; they are rich and
brave; and at this moment they are eager to throw themselves across
the border in order to revive the insurrectionary movement in the
Regency. The attempt of any Christian power to interfere with them
on their own territory would be the signal for the outbreak of a
“Holy War,” compared with which that which has been waged in Tunis
would be utterly insignificant.
Let me state, in proof of what I say as to the spirit which
animates these Tripolitan Arabs, that I have ascertained during my
trip down the coast that a subscription is actually being raised in
Tripoli among the wealthier Moors for the equipment of a local
militia, which may be ready to take its part in that war of race
and religion for which every Tripolitan longs so earnestly. Italy
must therefore give up the idea of Tripoli as an utterly hopeless one. It is difficult
to see in what other direction she can obtain the compensation she
covets. Nothing, for example, can counterbalance the French
occupation of Bizerta, that noble harbour which may justly be
styled the pride of North Africa—a harbour which, if improved, at a
comparatively small expenditure, may be made equal to the
requirements of the greatest naval power in the world. It has been
suggested that Italy, which now holds Pantellaria, might convert
that island into a naval and military position of value. No doubt,
looked at simply upon the map Pantellaria seems to be in an
admirable strategical position. It appears to guard the Malta
channel and to cover the Tunisian coast. But I have been to
Pantellaria, and I find it destitute of anything in the shape of a
harbour. It can never vie either with Goletta or Bizerta as a naval
station; and to make it even a position of moderate strength would
demand that which Italy cannot afford—the expenditure of an almost
unlimited amount of money.
It does not seem, therefore, that the Italians can obtain any
adequate compensation for the loss of influence they have
sustained through
the action of the French. They must just submit, as other nations
have had to do before them, to the aggressions of the strong. But
the temper in which they have accepted that which they conceive to
be the loss and humiliation to which they have been subjected does
not bode well for the future peace of Europe.
I turn now to the position of England, and to the effects upon
our own country of the French action in Tunis. In the first place,
it cannot be doubted that down to the beginning of the present year
the political position of England in Tunis was incomparably better
than that of any other power. This was partly, it must be admitted,
due to the exceptionally favourable way in which we were
represented at the Court of the Bey. Mr. Reade has not only
personal qualities and a vast experience which combine to make him
a peculiarly able and powerful representative of his country in a
State like Tunis, but he is the owner of that which in this part of
the world may be called a really great name. His father, Sir Thomas
Reade, who lies buried in the little English cemetery at Tunis, was
for many years the most powerful and popular personage in the country. He was
known by all the Arabs not as “the English Consul,” but as “the
Consul.” Mr. Reade himself was born in Tunis, and his return to it
to fill the place once occupied by his father was hailed with
universal delight by the Tunisians themselves.
But since the signature of the May treaty he has occupied an
entirely different position. Up to that time he was regarded as the
representative of the nation which was the disinterested friend of
Tunis; and from the Bey downwards the people of the country
consulted him and trusted him. Since then, however, it has been
seen that England either will not or cannot interfere to save the
Regency from the clutches of the French; and as a natural and
inevitable consequence, Mr. Reade is no longer regarded as a
powerful mediator on behalf of Tunis. In one word, our political
influence in the country, once all-powerful, has now been
completely destroyed, as the result of the French aggression. That
our commercial influence will suffer can hardly be doubted. At
present England supplies Tunis with the greater part of the
European goods she consumes. Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, and London stock her
bazaars, and everywhere in the shops familiar English names meet
the eye. But this cannot last under the existing state of things.
The French are pushing their way with the keenest anxiety to drive
us out of the market, and they are not slow to turn political
events to their own advantage and to our detriment. We must
therefore lose considerably from what has taken place in Tunis;
whilst the position of our Maltese fellow-subjects, who have
hitherto led prosperous lives there, must necessarily be changed
very much for the worse.
There is, however, one point on which England suffers no
material injury from French aggression in Tunis. So long as she
continues to hold Malta she can afford to leave France to do as she
pleases at Bizerta and Goletta. Neither of those ports can ever
really compare in military strength with our grand harbour of
Valetta; while the position of Malta, in the very centre of the
Mediterranean, gives it strategical advantages of which no North
African port can boast. I say nothing of what has been done by the
Englishmen of past generations to increase the military and political value of Malta,
though as one stands on the Barecca and surveys the splendid lines
of fortification protecting the impregnable harbours in which our
ironclads float in security, one cannot but feel grateful to the
men who not only won this place for us, but who have guarded it
since so well. Italy may feel that she has been outflanked by the
seizure of Tunis; England, from the white heights of Malta, can
watch the proceedings of the French with complete equanimity.
It remains for me to say a few words as to the effect of this
Tunisian aggression upon France herself. Every man who is
acquainted with the facts must feel that France will have to pay an
enormous price for the “conquest” of M. Roustan—a price not to be
measured in blood, money, or honour alone. She is already
experiencing some of the results of the policy into which she has
been lured. The exposure of military weakness and incompetence
which has been made during the course of the campaign—a campaign
which has been jealously watched on the spot by German
observers—has done much to destroy the prestige and
influence she was rapidly acquiring at Berlin. Prince Bismarck may
now make his mind easy. The war of revenge is postponed
indefinitely. But, on the other hand, Italy is not only estranged,
but outraged. People in England have little idea how intense is the
feeling of anger burning in the breasts of the Italians at this
moment. You must go to Italy in order to learn the truth upon this
point. The old sentiment of friendship which showed itself so
strongly in 1870, no longer exists, and the Italians are longing
for a chance of punishing France for what she has done in Tunis.
The Arabs, again, are for ever estranged from their conquerors.
They cannot hold their own against them. They have no arms capable
of competing with those of France; nor have they military
knowledge. But it is safe to predict that for years to come, under
the new state of things, both in Algeria and Tunis there will be a
constant waste of French life and money—a waste which might have
been avoided but for the intrigues of M. Roustan. And at any moment
France may find herself confronted by a deadly peril. She may have
to choose between a dangerous rebuff in Tunis itself, and an attack
upon Tripoli—an attack which would bring her into collision not
only with Turkey, but with England, Italy, and Austria. Such are
the Dead Sea apples borne by the tree she is now watering with her
blood in Tunis.
THE END.
PRINTED BY GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, LIMITED,
ST. JOHN’S SQUARE.