Ashanti Politics since 1874—The Secession of Djuabin—Diplomatic
Mistakes—The Conquest of Djuabin—The Importation of Rifles—The
Attempt on Adansi—The Salt Scare—The Mission to Gaman and
Sefwhee—Dissensions in Coomassie—The War Party.
While the “Cameroon” is on the way to Cape Coast Castle a short
résumé of Ashanti politics from the close of the war of 1874 may,
perhaps, be considered not out of place.
After the burning of Coomassie a bloodless revolution took place.
King Quoffi Calcalli, or, as the natives pronounce it, Karri-Karri,
was deposed, and his brother Osai Mensah reigned in his stead. The
dethroned monarch should, in accordance with Ashanti etiquette, have
committed suicide on being degraded from his position; he did not do
so, however, and was permitted to go into retirement in the country,
with a few followers.
About the same time, Asafu Agai, King of Djuabin, the chief feudatory
of the Ashanti kingdom, seceded, taking with him the chiefs of Assuri,
Affidguassi, and Insula, and formed the independent kingdom of Djuabin.
It was foreseen that the Ashantis, a proud and haughty race, would
not submit tamely to the establishment of a rival power on their very
border, especially when that rival had so recently been subject to
them; and, towards the end of 1874, when matters began to assume a
threatening aspect between the Ashantis and the Djuabins, Captain C. C.
Lees was despatched to Coomassie by the Government of the Gold Coast
Colony to preserve peace. Their recent defeat by the British was so
fresh in their memory that the Ashantis were amenable to reason, and
Captain Lees succeeded in persuading both Osai Mensah and Asafu Agai to
swear to refrain from hostilities.
From that moment the Colonial Government withdrew from all active
interference in the affairs of the tribes living beyond the boundaries
of the Colony; and, although for the next four or five years the
Ashantis left no stone unturned to regain their former position and
undo the work done by Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Colonial Government
merely looked on as passive spectators and allowed them to do it.
The policy of the Government of the Gold Coast appears to have been at
this time one of strict non-intervention, but whether dictated by the
Colonial Office or not, I cannot say. In any case it was diametrically
opposed to the policy which had inaugurated the Ashanti war, and was
most detrimental to British interests and influence. Having committed
ourselves to the war of 1873-4, it was impossible to withdraw and
say we would not interfere further. The chief military power of that
portion of Africa had received a severe blow; the Ashanti kingdom
had almost fallen to pieces; and, as the authors of the shock, we
were responsible for the consequences. What would these consequences
be? Either Ashanti would be split up into a number of insignificant
independent chieftainships or regain its ascendancy, or Djuabin would
assume the place lately held by Ashanti. It was evident that one of
these three things would happen if we decided to take no part in
occurrences beyond our frontier.
But which was the consummation that the wire-pullers at the Colonial
Office desired? Surely not the first; for the breaking-up of Ashanti
into two or three tribes, who would be independent of each other,
would lead to constant petty wars, the closing of the roads, and the
paralysation of commerce. Surely not the second; for, if Ashanti
regained her ascendancy, the lives and treasure expended in the war of
1873-4 would be as so much waste. Surely not the third; for, if Djuabin
became the dominant military power, what guarantee had we that she
would not be equally, perhaps more, aggressive than Ashanti had been;
and with what could we keep her in check?
Our policy at this time should clearly have been to play off Djuabin
against Ashanti, to use the one to keep the other in check, just as
might be required; if necessary, to support the one or the other by
force of arms, so that the balance of power, which had happily taken
place, should not be disturbed. Nothing could have been easier than to
do this. If Ashanti should make war upon the Colony we could employ
Djuabin to threaten Coomassie; and if the latter should menace our
possessions we could let loose the Ashantis upon the Djuabin capital.
As for preserving peace between the two rivals, our position on the
sea-board within easy striking distance of each was admirable, and
the two nations were so nearly equal in power and resources that an
intimation from the Colonial Government to either of them which might
seem disposed to provoke hostilities, that any act of aggression would
be considered a declaration of war against England, would effectually
have prevented any outbreak. This grand opportunity was unfortunately
neglected, and the consequences have still to be suffered.
After Captain Lees’s mission to Coomassie and Djuabin the subtle
Ashantis remained quiet until about July 1875, satisfying themselves
with storing up supplies of salt, powder, and lead, and re-organizing
their army, to the chief command of which Awooah, the brother of the
late general, Amanquatia, succeeded. King Mensah also placed on record
how keenly he felt the injustice of the British in not calling upon the
king of Djuabin to pay a fair proportion of the war indemnity which had
been inflicted on the entire kingdom by Sir Garnet Wolseley, the whole
of which Ashanti, though reduced to half her former area, had now to
pay.
In July, King Mensah addressed a letter to the European merchants of
Cape Coast Castle, complaining of the action of the king of Djuabin,
that he was kidnapping Ashantis living on the Djuabin frontier, and
closing the roads to trade. This letter was duly forwarded to the
Government, but only elicited from the Governor the reply “that he
would act with reference to the affairs of the interior as seemed to
him advisable.”
There can be no doubt but that the head of the king of Djuabin was
turned by his sudden accession to power; he sent insulting messages to
Mensah, invited the tribes within the protectorate to come and share
the spoils of Coomassie with him; and by the middle of August 1875 the
excitement on each side had become so intense that no mere negotiation
or mediation could have averted war, whatever it might have effected if
it had been employed at an earlier period.
Matters were further complicated by the mission to Coomassie of a
Monsieur Bonnat, who was desirous of opening trade with Salagha, a
large and populous Mohammedan town, said to be eight days’ journey to
the north-east of Coomassie. M. Bonnat visited the Ashanti capital in
company with Prince Ansah, the uncle of the king, and appears to have
mixed himself up a great deal with native politics. From Coomassie he
went to Djuabin, where he very naturally was regarded with suspicion,
on account of the circumstances under which he had visited Coomassie.
M. Bonnat was accompanied by a number of Ashantis as carriers and
servants, and some sixty of these were murdered by the Djuabins. In
extenuation of this outrage King Asafu Agai afterwards said the murder
was ordered by the Keratchi fetish, which is the great fetish of
Djuabin and of several other tribes of the interior.
War was now inevitable, but Osai Mensah was so afraid that Great
Britain would interpose that he still delayed. Towards the end of
September a fresh casus belli occurred. The inhabitants of five
villages on the borders of Djuabin notified to King Mensah their desire
to secede from the kingdom of Djuabin and to be incorporated with that
of Ashanti. Mensah accordingly sent some of his officers to these
villages, where they were attacked by the Djuabins. In the skirmish
which ensued the Djuabins were forced to retire, and the inhabitants of
the five villages migrated into Ashanti.
When the news of this affair reached Cape Coast Castle the Government
at last awoke to the fact that something ought to be done. They
accordingly despatched an army surgeon, who was temporarily in their
employ, with instructions, first, to proceed to Eastern Akim, and warn
the king of that territory, who had been tampered with by the Djuabins,
that he was not to take part in the probable hostilities; and,
secondly, to proceed from Akim to Djuabin and Coomassie, and forbid the
war, reminding the two kings of the oaths they had sworn to Captain
Lees.
This officer left Accra on October 23rd, 1875, but his mission had been
kept so little secret that his intended departure had been known for
some time; and, a week before he left Accra, both Djuabin and Ashanti
messengers had started from Cape Coast Castle to carry the intelligence
to their respective masters, and to inform them that if they wanted
to fight they must do so at once, “for the white man was coming to
palaver.”
The Colonial envoy reached Kibbie in Eastern Akim on October 29th, and
next day Djuabin messengers reached him with the intelligence that the
Ashantis had invaded their country in two divisions, one of which was
encamped within a few miles of the capital. On October 31st the town
of Djuabin was attacked by the Ashantis, the conflict raged during the
next two days, and on November 3rd the Djuabins were put to flight in
every direction.
The envoy at once proceeded to Djuabin, which town he found in the
hands of the Ashantis. Foreseeing that the prestige of this victory
would do much to restore Ashanti to her former position, and cancel
the beneficial results of the war of 1873-4, he wrote to the Governor
at Cape Coast Castle recommending that Djuabin should be occupied by
a British force. This proposal was not entertained. Indeed, it would
have been injudicious in the extreme, with the handful of troops at
the disposal of the Government, to endeavour to snatch the fruits of
victory from a warlike people in their hour of triumph. Action of this
kind should have been taken earlier, but the opportunity had been
allowed to pass, and it was now too late.
The Djuabins, being short of munitions of war, could make but little
headway against their opponents. The importation of arms and gunpowder
was then prohibited on the Gold Coast, which embargo, while it did
not affect the Ashantis, who could obtain what they required through
the French port of Assinee, entirely prevented the Djuabins from
replenishing their stock. A large supply of powder was, however,
successfully smuggled up the Volta river by Djuabin agents and sent
into Eastern Akim. A force of Constabulary was stationed there at the
time, partly to disarm the fugitive Djuabins and prevent the Ashantis
pursuing them into the protectorate, and partly to prevent the Akims
aiding the Djuabins. The officer in command of this force somehow got
wind of the smuggled powder. To an ordinary mind it would have appeared
that, as the Djuabins were, in a measure, fighting our battles, this
would have been a good opportunity for a display of that official
blindness which is so frequently conspicuous at other times. The
Constabulary officer thought otherwise; the powder was intercepted on
the Djuabin frontier; and the Djuabins, being unable to continue the
struggle, flocked by thousands into the protectorate. The Ashantis knew
better than to follow the fugitives into our territory, and satisfied
themselves with establishing their authority in Djuabin more firmly
than ever. Some months later the Government discovered that Asafu
Agai was meditating an attempt for the recovery of his throne; he was
arrested with a promptness that is seldom displayed on the Gold Coast,
and transported to Lagos.
The results of the victorious campaign were soon discernible in the
altered tone of Osai Mensah. The surgeon who had proceeded to Djuabin
went thence to Coomassie, where he was treated with but scant courtesy
and could effect nothing. Next by his behaviour, and the threatening
attitude of his people to the officer sent to Coomassie for the
instalment of the war indemnity then due, he, as I have related in
Chapter III., so intimidated the Colonial Government that the question
of the payment of that indemnity was allowed to drop, and has never
since been revived. Thus in less than two years from the burning of
Coomassie the Ashanti diplomacy had met with such success that Mensah
had recovered the whole of the Djuabin territory, repudiated the
payment of the war indemnity, re-established the prestige and power
of the Ashanti name, and outwitted the Colonial Government upon every
point.
In 1876 and 1877 the Ashantis occupied themselves with the internal
administration of their newly-acquired territory, and in the purchase
of breech-loading rifles, which they obtained principally through
Assinee, though a considerable number were smuggled, viâ Danoe, the
Quittah lagoon, and the Volta river, into Djuabin.
In 1878 the Colonial Government at last grasped the fact that the
interdiction on the importation of arms and gunpowder only crippled the
revenue of the Colony and the power of the protected tribes, without
materially affecting those for whom it was specially designed, and
consequently withdrew it. No sooner was the prohibition at an end than
the Ashantis, with an absence of disguise that was either the height of
impudence or the most consummate diplomacy, imported Snider rifles at
Cape Coast itself. On one occasion, towards the end of December 1878,
a batch of some three hundred arrived, consigned to Prince Ansah at
Cape Coast, and were duly received by Ashanti carriers who had been
waiting for them. As they were being transported to Prahou, the Fantis
of Dunquah, who seemed to be of opinion that it was not politic to
allow the Ashantis to possess such weapons, intercepted the convoy and
brought back the rifles to the District-Commissioner at Cape Coast.
To their surprise they were only reprimanded for their pains, and the
Ashantis, protected by an escort, were conducted with their purchases
in safety to Prahou.
Being now the happy possessors of a considerable number of
breech-loaders, the Ashantis conceived the plan of forming a corps
of Houssas, who would instruct the Ashanti army in the use of the
new weapon. To induce trained men of this race to desert from the
Gold Coast Constabulary, Mensah offered pay at double the rate paid
by the Colonial Government, free rations, and some local privileges.
The percentage of desertions from the Constabulary, always alarmingly
high, at once increased: and these deserters assumed the new rôle of
musketry instructors to the Ashanti army. As they knew almost nothing
themselves, they could not impart much information to their pupils. A
German, who had been wandering about the interior for some time, made
himself useful in the formation of this corps d’élite, and brought
down Houssas from Salagha for the King.
There was nothing new in this endeavour to induce Houssas in British
pay to betray their trust. About September 1875, when M. Bonnat visited
Djuabin, he found some of the men of the Gold Coast Constabulary
armed, and dressed in the uniform of the force, in the service of
the King of that territory, and Asafu Agai had endeavoured by means
of them to prevent M. Bonnat returning to Coomassie. The causes that
led to the numerous desertions were not difficult to find. The Houssa
Constabulary was and is a purely mercenary body, ready to sell their
services to the highest bidder. In the days when Capt., now Sir John,
Glover, R.N., organised the nucleus of this force at Lagos, a man
enlisted for life service; he looked upon the Government henceforward
as a paternal power, which he would serve as long as his health and
strength admitted, and which, when he became old, would grant him an
annuity or gratuity on retirement. They were satisfied with this state
of things and were loyal to the backbone. In 1876, when the Houssa
Constabulary was being reorganized, by a most short-sighted policy
the term of enlistment was limited to three years. Now short service,
however excellent it may be with Europeans and in countries where
it is desirable to form rapidly a large reserve, is undoubtedly a
mistake with semi-civilized or barbarous peoples. The Houssas now saw
themselves liable to be cast adrift after three years’ service; their
engagement was no longer a life engagement, there was no gratuity or
annuity to be earned by long and faithful service; and so, if a man
had an opportunity of bettering his condition, there was nothing to
be lost by his at once taking advantage of it. At the termination of
his three years he would be discharged without any pension; why then
should he not desert and accept the higher rate of pay offered by King
Mensah? If the latter did not require his services longer than the
Colonial Government would have done, he would still be a gainer; and
the probability was that he would be retained for life. Being bound by
no consideration for their oath of fealty, they argued in this way, and
deserted.
In the spring of 1879, the Ashantis, having perfected their military
arrangements, began to look about for some further accession of
territory. At this time, a Mr. Huydekuper, one of those semi-educated
and unscrupulous negroes with which the English system of Mission
Schools has afflicted the Gold Coast Colony, was at Coomassie. He had
been, I believe, a clerk in a Government office, and was in high favour
with, and a confidential adviser of, King Mensah. This man, using
his knowledge of official forms, drew up fictitious despatches, and,
accompanied by Mr. Nielson (the German who had rendered himself useful
in the formation of the Ashanti corps of Houssas), and a retinue of
court-criers and officials from the Ashanti court, proceeded to Gaman,
a kingdom which lies to the north-west of Ashanti, on a diplomatic
mission. This mission was arranged under the superintendence of Prince
Ansah, and its object was nothing less than to inform the king of
Gaman, in the name of the Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, “that
the Queen of England had given the whole country from Kerinkando,
near Assinee, to Dahomey, to the king of Ashanti, and that the king
of Gaman was to swear to be subject to the king of Ashanti.” Before
reaching Buntuku, the capital of Gaman, Mr. Nielson died of fever, and
the mainspring of the mission, so to speak, was lost. Nevertheless
Mr. Huydekuper proceeded and delivered his message, producing his
manufactured despatches in support of his statement. He stated that the
Queen of England had given Ashanti dominion over all inland tribes,
and that he was ordered to administer to the king of Gaman an oath of
allegiance to King Mensah.
This intelligence, coming, as the Gamans at first believed, from a
fully-accredited ambassador of the Government, created the greatest
consternation among that section of the tribe which was hostile to
the Ashantis. The news spread like wild-fire to the Safwhees, a tribe
inhabiting the country to the west of Ashanti and to the south of
Gaman, and from them to the Denkeras. But for the death of Mr. Nielson
it is impossible to say what authority the Ashantis would not have
succeeded in gaining over these tribes.
While this little comedy was being enacted in the north, the Ashantis
endeavoured to coerce the people of Adansi, which kingdom was formerly
the smallest feudatory state of Ashanti, into returning to their old
allegiance. A portion of the Adansis were anxious to do this, but
the king, not being by any means desirous of resigning his late-won
independence, sent messengers to the Colonial Government at Accra.
Fortunately for the maintenance of British authority on the Gold Coast,
Capt. C. C. Lees, the officer who had succeeded in averting hostilities
between Ashanti and Djuabin in 1874, was administering the Government
of the Colony. Being the exponent of the true and only effective policy
in West Africa, he took up the threads of diplomacy where they had
been dropped by the non-intervening Governor in 1875, and despatched
the acting Colonial Secretary to Adansi with full powers. The mission
was entirely successful, and the Ashantis returned to Coomassie
baffled for once. So wedded, however, were the Colonial Office to their
policy of non-intervention, that, although this was the first success
after several years of diplomatic failures, they found fault with the
Acting-Governor for what he had done. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in his
despatch said—“the action which you took was of a character which
might possibly have placed the Local Government, and ultimately the
Imperial Government, in some embarrassment, should the Ashantis decline
to comply with the demands made upon them [1] ... Adansi is not within
the protectorate, and the question of requiring the observance of the
third article of the Treaty of Fommanagh [2] is one of external policy,
on which the Government of the Gold Coast should refrain, unless in
case of urgent necessity, from definite action until Her Majesty’s
Government had decided whether the action proposed was proper and
opportune, having regard to the general interests of the empire. I have
to request that in future you will bear this caution in mind, and that
you will take no further steps in the matter now under consideration
without the previous sanction of Her Majesty’s Government.”
Fortunately, before the receipt of this letter, Capt. Lees had taken
further energetic action, which, had it been delayed until permission
had been obtained from England, would have been too late.
Immediately after this success on the part of the Government, Ashantis
appeared simultaneously at all the ports on the Gold Coast, and
purchased salt in immense quantities. Those who were best qualified to
judge of native questions considered that this was one of the worst
signs of the times. No salt is produced in the interior of this portion
of Africa, and in some parts of the inland plateaus it is worth almost
its weight in gold; being a necessary of life it must be had, and large
quantities are exported to the Gold Coast from Europe. Ordinarily, in
peaceable times, the Ashantis buy it as they require it, individually;
when, therefore, there seemed to be a sudden national movement for the
purchase of that commodity, it appeared as if the Ashantis feared that
the supply was about to be cut off, and were storing it up against
that contingency. As the supply could only be cut off by the Colonial
sea-board being closed against them, this action on their part seemed
to show that they premeditated coming into collision with the coast
tribes, that is, ultimately with the British; and when their late
purchases of arms and manœuvre in the north were called to mind this
became still more probable. In 1881 it transpired that an invasion of
Adansi was under consideration at this time, and was only postponed on
account of the Colonial mission to Gaman.
While all this was going on, in April 1879 a mixed embassy of Gamans
and Sefwhees arrived at Cape Coast. These envoys had been sent by
the kings of their respective states to ascertain what truth lay
in the statements which had been made by Mr. Huydekuper. As soon
as they learned that that individual was an impostor, the Gaman
ambassadors stated that their king had made him a prisoner; while
the representatives of both tribes asserted that their countrymen
were unanimous in desiring to maintain their independence, and that
both peoples alike bore a deadly hatred to everything appertaining to
Ashanti. They asked that an officer might return to Gaman with them, as
otherwise they might not be believed in what they had to say about Mr.
Huydekuper; and the Government, following up its more recent and more
enlightened policy, acquiesced.
Mr. John Smith was the officer selected by the Colonial Government
to proceed to Gaman. Of that country nothing was then known beyond
the fact that it had been engaged in several wars with Ashanti in the
last decade of the eighteenth century. Sir John Dalrymple Hay, indeed,
in his “Ashanti and the Gold Coast,” speaks (pp. 28 and 29) of “the
plains of Massa,” “the Gaman cavalry,” and “the Mahometan soldiery of
Gaman”; and that people was popularly believed to be an offshoot of the
Houssa tribes and to possess Houssa characteristics. It was reserved
for Mr. Smith to explode all these theories, and to make it known that
the Gaman territory was covered with forest, like that of Ashanti, and
that the people were fetish-worshippers, differing in no important
particulars from the tribes in their neighbourhood.
Mr. Smith left Cape Coast on May 15th, 1879, and reached Jooquah, the
seat of Quasi Kaye, king of Denkera, on the 16th. He left Jooquah
on the 18th, with the king’s son, an ocrah, and a sword-bearer, and
arrived at Becquai, the first Sefwhee town of importance, on June
6th. He remained at Becquai two days, and reached Yorso, the capital
of Sefwhee, on June 10th. Here the Governor’s message, to the effect
that Mr. Huydekuper’s statements were false, was delivered, after Mr.
Smith had been detained twelve days waiting for the chiefs to assemble.
In the course of conversation the king told him that the events of
1874 had decided him and his chiefs to give up their friendship with
the Ashantis and to ally themselves with the British; but that when
Mr. Huydekuper’s message to King Ajiman of Gaman became current his
two principal chiefs had wished to return to their former friendly
relations with Ashanti. The king wished to take an oath of allegiance
to the British Government, but this was declined.
On June 21st Mr. Smith left Yorso, and, travelling through incessant
rain and by flooded and almost impassable bush-paths, reached the
village of Appemanim, about twelve miles from Buntuku, the capital of
Gaman, on July 21st. Here a messenger from Buntuku met him, desiring
him to wait until the king had prepared for his reception. On the 24th,
having received no further information, he started for the capital, and
met on the road a messenger from the king requesting him to remain a
few days longer at Appemanin, as the king was not quite ready. He took
no notice of this message, and, continuing on his way, reached Buntuku
the same day.
King Ajiman promised to summon his chiefs and hold a meeting within two
days, but, what with one excuse and another, eight days elapsed before
any meeting was convened, and then it was held so late in the afternoon
that, before the chiefs had gone through the preliminary hand-shaking
ceremonies, the rain came down in torrents and dispersed them. While
thus delayed, however, Mr. Smith acquired the following information:—
1. That Mr. Huydekuper had left Buntuku immediately after the Gaman
messengers had started for Cape Coast, and was not, nor had been at any
time, a prisoner.
2. That the messengers sent to Cape Coast did not represent the entire
Gaman nation, as they had stated, but merely King Ajiman, Princess
Akosuah Ayansuah, the chief of Saiquah and chief Quabina Fofea of
Tackiman; and that the majority of the chiefs had declined to send
messengers, as they did not wish to break with Ashanti.
3. That the Gaman chiefs were dissatisfied with King Ajiman, and wished
to depose him and elect his half-brother Prince Korkobo to the stool.
4. That Prince Korkobo, who was strongly in favour of an Ashanti
alliance, was then at Banna, in Ashanti, with Mr. Huydekuper; and had
but recently plundered and burned some villages belonging to King
Ajiman.
Mr. Smith found in Buntuku an Ashanti captain, Opoku by name, who,
having come to demand the surrender of chief Quabina Fofea of Tackiman,
was living on the most friendly terms with the chiefs of the Korkobo
faction, and domineering over King Ajiman himself. From this it will
be seen how little reliance can be placed upon the statements of West
African ambassadors.
King Ajiman informed Mr. Smith that the chiefs would assemble on
August 7th, but, on proceeding to the place of meeting on the appointed
day, the latter found only the king himself there with the chiefs of
Tackiman and Saiquah, and one other. The king said the other chiefs
would appear shortly, and Mr. Smith waited. After waiting two hours he
was told that one chief was drunk and could not come, that another had
a sore leg which incapacitated him from attending, and that a third was
making fetish. He left the place of meeting, telling the king that if
he were again trifled with he would at once return to the coast.
Finally, on August 8th, a palaver was held and the Governor’s message
delivered to the assembled chiefs. No enthusiasm of any kind was
displayed. The king promised to hand over Mr. Huydekuper to Mr. Smith
in thirteen days, and, in answer to a question from that gentleman,
said publicly that he had full confidence in the fidelity of his chiefs.
Two days after this meeting King Ajiman paid Mr. Smith a private visit,
during which he said that he had told a falsehood when he had affirmed
that he had confidence in the fidelity of his chiefs, and endeavoured
to excuse it by saying that he dared not put them to shame at a public
meeting. He added that all his chiefs, with the exception of one, were
against him, and begged Mr. Smith to hold another meeting and compel
them to take an oath of allegiance to him.
On August 15th the meeting was held. The chiefs said that they had
many grievances against their king; among others, that he had received
several chiefs into the Gaman alliance without consulting them,
and that he had received from such chiefs “alliance money” without
apportioning a share to them, as was customary. On being asked to take
an oath of allegiance to Ajiman, they replied that they would consider
about it, and let Mr. Smith know as soon as possible.
On August 21st the chiefs re-assembled. As this was the day on which
the king had promised to hand over Mr. Huydekuper Mr. Smith asked for
him. The king replied that that individual was not in the town, but
that he would send again for him. Mr. Smith then told him that he need
not try to keep up the deception any longer, since he had known, from
the day of his arrival in Buntuku, that Mr. Huydekuper had never been a
prisoner, and that it was not now in the king’s power to make him one.
The chiefs declared that they could not come to any decision about the
oath of allegiance, because one of their number was absent.
On the 23rd another palaver was held at which the chiefs openly
declared that King Ajiman was their enemy, and refused to take any oath
of allegiance to him. Mr. Smith returned to his house, and in a few
minutes the king followed him. He declared that he would not remain in
Buntuku after Mr. Smith had left, and begged to be allowed to accompany
him to the coast for protection; however, after some trouble, Mr. Smith
succeeded in persuading him to remain and assert his position.
On August 24th Mr. Smith left Buntuku for Dadiasu, a village some
twenty miles from the capital, and was accompanied to that place
by the king, one chief, one captain, and the chiefs of Saiquah and
Tackiman—in fact all the king’s adherents. On the 31st, messengers
reached Mr. Smith at Awhetiaso, forty-five miles from Buntuku,
imploring him, in the name of the king, to return, as Prince Korkobo
had entered Buntuku the day after he had left, and was now trying to
oust the king from the throne, or rather from the stool. Mr. Smith
declined to interfere and proceeded on his journey to the coast.
This mission, though entirely unsuccessful in its aim, clearly
established the fact that, in the event of hostilities with Ashanti,
the Government could not rely upon any assistance from the Gamans.
The Sefwhees, it is true, were more of one mind in the matter, yet it
seemed almost certain, considering their close connection with, and
proximity to, Gaman, that the inaction of the one would paralyse all
movement on the part of the other.
In the latter part of the year 1879 and in 1880 Ashanti was convulsed
by internal dissensions. King Mensah was, and is, an unpopular monarch.
He is much more tyrannical and bloodthirsty than was his predecessor,
and, in defiance of the terms of the treaty of 1874, the number of
human sacrifices has largely increased during his reign. The sorest
point of all, however, with his subjects was that he despoiled them of
their gold on the shallowest pretexts, and imposed exorbitant fines
for the most trivial offences. People began to talk of the good old
times when Quoffi Calcalli was king, and that wily ex-monarch, who had
outlived the contempt with which he had at first been regarded for
outraging Ashanti prejudices by continuing to live when disgraced,
commenced to intrigue with the people of Kokofuah, the most thickly
populated district in Ashanti, and the one which supplies the largest
contingent for the army. In the meantime Mensah was not idle. He turned
his Houssa corps into a body-guard, and ensured its fidelity by gifts
and promises of future favour; he gathered round him his ocrahs and
retainers, and with this force, armed principally with breech-loading
rifles, he easily managed to stifle disaffection and maintain his
position.
There was yet another cause of dissension in Coomassie. Not a few of
the chiefs, at the head of whom was Opokoo, chief of Becquai, and
Awooah, chief of Bantami and general of the Ashanti army, were anxious
to declare war against Adansi. They had re-conquered Djuabin, their
chief feudatory, and had nothing to fear on that side. On their western
or north-western border too there was now nothing to fear, for although
King Ajiman of Gaman had contrived to regain a portion of his kingdom,
and had fought several undecisive skirmishes with the Korkobo faction,
still the latter was quite powerful enough to neutralise any hostile
movement on the part of the former against Ashanti. Further, these
chiefs knew that they could drive the handful of Adansis across the
Prah without any trouble, and they considered that to do this would
wipe out the disgrace of the defeats of 1874.
In fact the only thing which at this time prevented the actual invasion
of Adansi was the belief held by King Mensah and his chiefs that any
act of aggression against Adansi would be equivalent to war with Great
Britain; and they were led to this belief by the action taken by Capt.
Lees in the spring of 1879, and with which the then Secretary of State
for the Colonies had found fault. Notwithstanding this belief, the war
party in Coomassie were desirous of invading Adansi, and were quite
willing to take the risk of another war with England. Opposed to the
war party were the king, the queen-mother, and the court party. Mensah
remembered that he owed his present position to the downfall of Quoffi
Calcalli, who had lost the throne in his conflict with the British;
and, being advised by Prince Ansah at Cape Coast, he knew perfectly
well that should hostilities break out between Ashanti and Great
Britain his own ruin would be the result.
Although Mensah was not prepared to face the Colonial Government in the
field, yet he was as desirous as any of his chiefs to recover Adansi,
which would do so much to re-establish Ashanti in her former position
of supremacy, and so he pursued the traditional policy of the country.
The new Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, Mr. Ussher, sent presents
to the king on taking up his appointment, and the latter seized the
opportunity to send messengers down to Accra, nominally to thank
Governor. Ussher for his presents, but secretly to ascertain the views
and position of the Government with regard to Adansi. These messengers
were duly received and dismissed by the Governor and returned to Cape
Coast, where they remained, collecting information and watching events
on the coast, explaining their delay in returning to their own country
by a number of frivolous excuses.
It appears that about this time Mensah also sent a second mission to
Gaman, for in October or November, 1880, Gaman messengers came to the
Lieutenant-Governor, Mr. Griffith, who had administered the Government
since the death of Mr. Ussher, at Accra, saying that the King of
Ashanti had sent a message to the Ajiman section of the Gamans to the
effect that he, Mensah, had paid a sum of money to the Queen of England
in order that the Gaman country should be placed under his rule, and
that, the Queen having consented to it, the Gamans were now his people.
While all this was going on, the war party in Coomassie had fast been
gaining the upper hand. The bellicose chiefs spoke of Quoffi Calcalli
as a man who, whatever might have been his other shortcomings, was,
at all events, not afraid of the white men, and recommenced their
intrigues with that individual. Matters became so serious that, in
December 1880, Mr. Buhl, the Secretary of the Basle Mission Society,
reported to the Lieutenant-Governor that there were rumours in Ashanti
that the country was going to war; and, in the same month, Chief Taboo
of Adansi informed the District Commissioner at Cape Coast that Chief
Opokoo of Becquai had publicly sworn before the king at Coomassie that
he would force Adansi to become again subject to Ashanti. Confusion
began to reign in Coomassie, and the struggle for supremacy between
the court and the war party was fast approaching a crisis, when the
events which led to the sending of the golden axe to Cape Coast in
January 1881 occurred.
[1] Demands that they should return to their own country.
[2] The Treaty of Fommanagh was the one signed by Sir Garnet
Wolseley after the burning of Coomassie. The third article provided for
the independence of Adansi.