I had been well acquainted since my youth with
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg. When I was in
active service for the first time in 1877, as Lieutenant
in the Sixth Company of the First Infantry
Guard Regiment, it was quartered once at Hohenfinow,
the home of old Herr von Bethmann, father
of the Chancellor. I was attracted by the pleasant
family circle there, which was presided over by
Frau von Bethmann, a most worthy lady, born of
Swiss nationality, amiable and refined.
Often, as Prince and later as Emperor, I went
to Hohenfinow to visit the old gentleman, and I
was received on every occasion by the young head
of the rural district administration; at that time
neither of us imagined that he would become Imperial
Chancellor under me.
From these visits an intimate relationship sprang
up little by little, which served to increase steadily
my esteem for the diligence, ability, and noble
character of Bethmann, which were much to my
liking. These qualities clung to him throughout
his career.
As Chief President and as Imperial Secretary of
State for the Interior Bethmann gave a good account
of himself, and, while occupying the last-named
post, made his appearance successfully before
the Reichstag.
Co-operation with the Chancellor was easy for
me. With Bethmann I kept up my custom of daily
visits whenever possible, and of discussing fully
with him, while walking in the garden of the
Chancellor's palace, on politics, events of the day,
special bills, and occurrences and of hearing reports
from him. It was also a pleasure for me to
visit the Chancellor's home, since Bethmann's
spouse was the very model of a genuine German
wife, one whose simple distinction earned the
esteem of every visitor, while her winning kindness
of heart spread around her an atmosphere of
cordiality. During the Bethmann régime the custom
of holding small evening receptions, instituted
by Prince Bülow and most enjoyable to me, was
continued, and this enabled me to keep on associating
informally with men of all circles and walks
of life.
In the journeys which the Chancellor had to
make in order to introduce himself, he won esteem
everywhere by his distinguished calm and sincere
methods of expression. Such foreign countries as
were not hostile to us considered him a factor making
for political stability and peace, to the maintenance
and strengthening of which he devoted his
most zealous efforts. This was entirely to my
liking.
In foreign politics he busied himself from the
start with the position of England in relation to
Germany and with the "policy of encirclement" of
King Edward VII, which had made itself felt
more and more since Reval, and was a source
of worry to Bethmann. This was likewise true of
the growing desire for revenge and enmity of
France, and the unreliability of Russia. During
his régime as Chancellor it became clear that Italy
was no longer to be reckoned with militarily; the
work of Barrère in that country made "extra tours"
chronic.
Upon assuming office, Herr von Bethmann found
the situation with regard to France cleared up to
such an extent that the German-French Morocco
Agreement had been signed on February 9, 1909.
By recognizing thereby the political predominance
of France in Morocco Prince Bülow had put the
finishing touch to the German political retreat
from Morocco. The standpoint which had determined
the trip to Tangier and, in addition, the Algeciras
Conference, was thereby definitely abandoned.
The great satisfaction of the French Government
over this victory was expressed in a manner
unwelcome to us by the conferring of the cross
of the Legion of Honor upon Prince Radolin and
Herr von Schoen.
On the same day King Edward VII, with Queen
Alexandra, made his first official visit to the German
Emperor and his wife at their capital city of
Berlin—eight years after his accession to the
throne! Berlin received the exalted gentleman
with rejoicing (!!) and showed no signs of dissatisfaction
at his unfriendly policy.
The King did not look well; he was tired and
aged, and suffered, moreover, from a severe attack
of catarrh. Nevertheless, he accepted the invitation
of the municipal authorities of Berlin to informal
tea at the City Hall. From his description,
which was corroborated by Berlin gentlemen, the
function must have been satisfactory to both
parties.
I informed my uncle of the signing of the German-French
Morocco Agreement and the news
seemed to please him. When I added, "I hope this
agreement will be a stepping stone to a better
understanding between the two countries," the
King nodded his head approvingly and said, "May
that be so!" If the King had co-operated toward
this, my project would probably not have failed.
Nevertheless, the visit of Their English Majesties
engendered a more friendly atmosphere for the
time being, which greeted Herr von Bethmann
upon his assuming office.
During his term of office Herr von Bethmann
had plenty of foreign matters to handle, connected
with the well-known events of 1909-14. Concerning
this period a mass of material has been
published in different quarters, for instance, in the
book, Causes of the World War, by Secretary
of State von Jagow. In the Belgian Documents
the attitude of the German Government in the
various complications is described from a neutral
standpoint. I had based this attitude on the
following:
Caution on the one hand, on the other, support of
our Austro-Hungarian allies whenever there is a plain
threat against their position as a world power, combined
with counsels of moderation in action. Efforts in
the rôle of "honest broker" everywhere, activity as a
go-between wherever peace seems endangered. Firm
assertion of our own interests.
In view of the "encirclement" ambitions of our
opponents, we were in duty bound, for the sake
of self-preservation, to work steadily at the same
time toward building up our army and navy for
purposes of defense, because of the central location
of Germany and her open, unprotected frontiers.
This period of history is also well described in
Stegemann's book, and Helfferich and Friedjung
also depict the prewar days interestingly.
The death of the "encircler," Edward VII—of
whom it was said once, in a report of the Belgian
Embassy at Berlin, that "the peace of Europe was
never in such danger as when the King of England
concerned himself with maintaining it"—called
me to London, where I shared with my close relations,
the members of the English royal family, the
mourning into which the passing of the King had
thrown the dynasty and the nation. The entire
royal family received me at the railway station as
a token of their gratitude for the deference to family
ties shown by my coming.
King George drove with me to Westminster
Hall, where the gorgeously decorated coffin reposed
upon a towering catafalque, guarded by
household troops, troops of the line, and detachments
from the Indian and Colonial contingents,
all in the traditional attitude of mourning—heads
bowed, hands crossed over the butts and hilts of
their reversed arms. The old, gray hall, covered
by its great Gothic wooden ceiling, towered imposingly
over the catafalque, lighted merely by a
few rays of the sun filtering through narrow windows.
One ray flooded the magnificent coffin of
the King, surmounted by the English crown, and
made marvelous play with the colors of the precious
stones adorning it.
Past the catafalque countless throngs of men,
women, and children of all classes and strata in the
nation passed in silence, many with hands folded
to bid a reverent farewell to him who had been so
popular as a ruler. A most impressive picture, in
its marvelous mediæval setting.
I went up to the catafalque, with King George,
placed a cross upon it, and spoke a silent prayer,
after which my right hand and that of my royal
cousin found each other, quite unconsciously on our
part, and met in a firm clasp. This made a deep
impression on those who witnessed it, to such an
extent that, in the evening, one of my relations said
to me: "Your handshake with our King is all over
London: the people are deeply impressed by it, and
take it as a good omen for the future."
"That is the sincerest wish of my heart," I replied.
As I rode through London behind the coffin of
my uncle I was a witness of the tremendous and
impressive demonstration of grief on the part of
the vast multitude—estimated at several millions—on
streets, balconies, and roofs, every one of
whom was clad in black, every man of whom stood
with bared head, among all of whom reigned perfect
order and absolute stillness. Upon this somber,
solemn background the files of British soldiers
stood out all the more gorgeously. In splendid
array marched the battalions of the English
Guards: Grenadiers, Scots Guards, Coldstreams,
Irish Guards—in their perfectly-fitting coats,
white leather facings, and heavy bearskin headgear;
all picked troops of superb appearance and
admirable martial bearing, a joy to any man with
the heart of a soldier. And all the troops lining
the path of the funeral cortège stood in the attitude
of mourning already described.
During my stay I resided, at the special desire
of King George, in Buckingham Palace. The
widow of the dead King, Queen Alexandra, received
me with moving and charming kindness,
and talked much with me about bygone days; my
recollections stretched back to my childhood, since
I, while still a little boy, had been present at the
wedding of my dead uncle.
The King gave a banquet to the many princely
guests and their suites, as well as for the representatives
of foreign nations, at which M. Pichon was
also present. He was introduced to me and, in
conversation with him, I told him of the wishes
which the Imperial Chancellor had communicated
to me regarding our interests in Morocco and some
other political matters, which M. Pichon readily
agreed to carry out. All other combinations connected
in various quarters with this talk, belong in
the domain of fancy.
Although the period between 1909 and 1914 demanded
extraordinary attention to foreign events,
interior development was, nevertheless, promoted
zealously, and efforts made to meet the demands
of commerce, transportation, agriculture, and industry,
which were growing rapidly. Unfortunately
endeavors in this direction were made much
more difficult by the discord among political parties.
The Chancellor wished to accomplish everything
possible of accomplishment. But his inclination
to get to the bottom of problems and his desire
to deal only with what was, from his meticulous
critical standpoint, thoroughly matured, tended,
in the course of time, to hamper progress. It was
difficult to bring him to make decisions before he
was thoroughly convinced of their being absolutely
free from objection. This made working with him
tiresome and aroused in those not close to him the
impression of vacillation, whereas, in reality, it
was merely overconscientiousness carried too far.
In addition, the Chancellor eventually developed
a strong and growing inclination toward
domination; in discussions this tended to make him
obstinate and caused him to lay down the law to
those thinking otherwise as dogmatically as a
school teacher. This brought him many enemies
and often made things hard for me. A boyhood
friend of the Chancellor, to whom I spoke once
about this, replied, with a smile, that it had been so
with him even in school; there Herr von Bethmann
had constantly taught and school-mastered his fellow
students, of whom my informant was one, so
that finally his classmates had nicknamed him "the
governess." He added that this trait was a misfortune
for Bethmann, but that it had so grown
into his very being that he would never be able to
get rid of it.
An example of this is Bethmann's relationship
to Herr von Kiderlen, whom he desired to have as
Secretary of State, despite my emphatic objections.
Herr von Kiderlen was an able worker and a man
of strong character, who always sought to assert
his independence. He had been about one year in
office when Herr von Bethmann came to me one
day, complained of Kiderlen's obstinacy and insubordination,
and asked me to appeal to his conscience.
I declined, with the observation that the
Chancellor had chosen Kiderlen against my wishes
and must now manage to get along with him; that
the maintenance of discipline at the Foreign Office
was a duty devolving upon the Chancellor, in
which I had no desire to interfere.
Meanwhile, Bethmann's inadequacy to the post
of Chancellor became evident. Deep down in his
heart he was a pacifist and was obsessed with the
aberration of coming to an understanding with
England. I can perfectly well understand that a
man of pacifist inclinations should act thus in the
hope of avoiding a war thereby. His object was
entirely in accord with my policy. The ways and
means whereby Bethmann sought to achieve it
were, in my opinion, unsuitable. Nevertheless, I
backed his endeavors. But I certainly did not
believe that real success would result. It became
ever more apparent, while he was Chancellor, that
he was remote from political realities. Yet he
always knew everything better than anybody else.
Owing to this overestimation of his own powers he
stuck unswervingly to his ideas, even when things
all turned out differently from what he had
expected.
His reports were always admirably prepared,
brilliant in form, and, hence, impressive and attractive.
And in this there was an element of
danger. In his opinion there was always but one
solution, the one which he proposed! The apparent
solidity and thoroughness of his reports and
suggestions, the illuminating treatment of the matters
reported upon from every angle, the references
to experts, to foreign and native statesmen and diplomats,
etc., easily led to the impression that solely
the Bethmann solution was worthy of consideration.
In spite of these thorough preparations, he
made mistake after mistake.
Thus he had an actual share in our misfortune.
When I returned from my Norwegian trip in 1914
he did not place his resignation in my hands, to be
sure, but he admitted that his political calculations
had gone wrong. Nevertheless, I left him in office,
even after his Reichstag speech and the English
declaration of war of August 4, 1914, because I
considered it most serious to change the highest
official in the Empire at the most critical moment
in German history. The unanimous attitude
of the nation in the face of the challenge
from the Entente might have been impaired by
such action.
Moreover, both the Chancellor and the chief
of the Civil Cabinet maintained that they had the
working classes behind them. I was loath to deprive
the working classes, which behaved in an
exemplary manner in 1914, of the statesman whom,
I had been told, they trusted.
The theory, constantly repeated to me in 1914
by the chief of the Civil Cabinet and the representative
of the Foreign Office, that only Bethmann
had the support of the working classes, was finally
supplemented further by reports to me that the
Chancellor enjoyed the confidence in foreign
countries which was necessary to the conclusion of
peace. Thus it came about that Bethmann always
stayed in office, until, finally, the Crown Prince
made the well-known investigation among the
party leaders which showed that the above-mentioned
theory was mistaken. This mistake was
made all the clearer to me when I read, at the
time of Bethmann's dismissal—to which other factors
also contributed—the most unfavorable opinions
of him, especially in the Social Democratic
and Democratic press.
I do not wish to blame Bethmann with these
frank remarks, nor to exonerate others; but, when
such important matters are discussed, personal
considerations must be ignored. I never doubted
the nobility of Bethmann's sentiments.
May I be allowed to say a few words here concerning
the reform in the Prussian franchise, since
the handling of this by Herr von Bethmann is
characteristic of his policy of vacillation. During
the winter of 1914-15, when, following the brilliant
summer campaign, the hard, severe winter
trench-fighting had brought military movements
to a standstill, the extraordinary achievements of
all the troops and the spirit which I had found
among officers and men, both at the front and in
the hospitals, made such a profound impression on
me that I resolved to provide, for the tried, magnificent
"Nation in Arms," something in the political
domain, when it returned home, which should
prove that I recognized what it had done and
wished to give the nation joy.
I often touched upon this theme in conversations
and suggested reforms in the Prussian franchise;
the man, said I, who returned home, after a struggle
like this, with the Iron Cross—perhaps of both
classes—must no longer be "classified" at the polls.
At this juncture a memorial was submitted to me
by Herr von Loebell which proposed a reform in
the Prussian franchise on similar grounds. The
concise, clear, and convincing treatment of the subject
pleased me so much that I had a number of
gentlemen read the memorial, which took up, in
its original form, only general points of view,
without going into detail, and I was pleased to see
that it found approval with all whom I questioned
concerning it.
I had my thanks expressed to Herr von Loebell
through the chief of the Cabinet, von Valentini,
and caused Loebell to work out the matter in detail
and make suggestions. This was done in the
spring of 1915. The memorial was very thorough
and dealt with a number of possibilities for the
franchise, without advising any one system. It
was approved by me, and sent by the chief of the
Cabinet to the Chancellor, with the command
that it be discussed, in the course of the year,
by the Ministers, and that their vote on it—possibly,
also, some suggestions from them—be laid
before me. The franchise law, of course, was
not to be proposed until after the conclusion
of peace.
Immediately after that I went to Pless. The
battle of Gorlice-Tarnow, with its smashing victory
over the enemy, brought on the Galician-Polish
campaign, leading to the reconquest of
Lemberg, Przemysl and the capture of Warsaw,
Ivangorod, Modlin, Brest-Litovsk, etc., and completely
engaged my attention.
The Lusitania case, too, cast its shadow over
events, and Italy severed her alliance with us. So
it is not to be wondered at if the franchise memorial
was pushed into the background.
The next winter, and the summer of 1916, likewise,
with their fighting on all fronts, the terrible
battle of the Somme, and the brilliant Rumanian
autumn and winter campaign, took me to all sorts
of places on the western and eastern fronts, even
as far as Nisch—where the first memorable meeting
with the Bulgarian Tsar took place—and to
Orsova, so that I had no opportunity to take up
the matter of franchise reform with the care that
its importance demanded.
In the spring of 1917 I asked the Chancellor to
draw up an announcement of the reform, to be
made to the nation at Easter, since I assumed that
the Ministers had long since discussed it. The
Chancellor drew up the text of the proclamation
at Hamburg, in agreement with the chief of the
Cabinet and myself; he proposed that the method
of voting be left open for the time being, since he
was not yet quite sure about this. The Easter
proclamation appeared; it was based, like previous
treatments of the matter, on the idea that the reform
was not to be introduced until after the conclusion
of peace, because most of the voters were
away facing the enemy.
Party and press did what they could to postpone
the accomplishment of my purpose by recriminations
and strife, by bringing up the question of the
Prussian Reichstag franchise, and by the demand
for the introduction of the franchise bill while the
war was still in progress. Thus the question embarked
upon its well-known and not very pleasant
course, which dragged itself out on account of the
interminable negotiations in the Landtag. It was
not until after the retirement of Herr von Bethmann
that I learned through Loebell that the memorial
of 1915 had never been submitted to the
Ministers, but had lain untouched for a year and a
half in a desk drawer; that the Chancellor, influenced
by the desires expressed in the country, had
dropped the various systems proposed and concentrated
upon the general (Reichstag) franchise, of
the eventual introduction of which he was, doubtless,
inwardly convinced.
In any event, the original basic idea was thoroughly
bungled by Bethmann's dilatoriness and
the strife among the parties. What I wanted was
to present a gift of honor, of my own free will, on
its triumphal return home, to my victorious army,
to my "Nation in Arms," my brave Prussians, with
whom I had stood before the enemy.
One of the results of Bethmann's marked inclination
toward control was that the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs was, under him, a mere
helper, so much so that the Foreign Office was
almost affiliated with the office of the Chancellor,
a state of affairs that made itself felt most especially
in the use made of the press department. Bethmann
likewise asserted his independence decidedly
in his relations with me. Basing himself upon the
fact that, constitutionally, the Chancellor alone is
responsible for foreign policy, he ruled as he
pleased. The Foreign Office was allowed to tell
me only what the Chancellor wished, so that it
happened sometimes that I was not informed concerning
important occurrences.
The fact that this was possible is to be laid at
the door of the Constitution of the Empire. And
this is the right place for saying a word concerning
the relations between the Emperor and the
Chancellor. In what follows I do not refer to my
relationship to Herr von Bethmann, but, quite
impersonally, to the difficulties in the relationship
of the German Emperor to the Imperial
Chancellors, which are caused by the Imperial
Constitution.
I wish to call attention to the following points:
1. According to the Constitution of the Empire,
the Chancellor is the director and representative
of the foreign policy of the Empire, for which
he assumes full responsibility; he has this policy
carried out by the Foreign Office, which is subordinated
to him, after he has reported on it to the
Emperor.
2. The Emperor has influence on foreign policy
only in so far as the Chancellor grants it to him.
3. The Emperor can bring his influence to
bear through discussions, information, suggestion,
proposals, reports, and impressions received by him
on his travels, which then take rank as a supplement
to the political reports of the ambassadors or
ministers to the countries which he has personally
visited.
4. The Chancellor may act pursuant to such
action by the Emperor, and may make it the basis
of his decisions, whenever he is in agreement with
the Emperor's point of view. Otherwise he is supposed
to maintain his own point of view and carry
it out (Kruger dispatch).
5. According to the Constitution, the Emperor
has no means of compelling the Chancellor or the
Foreign Office to accept his views. He cannot
cause the Chancellor to adopt a policy for which
the latter feels that he cannot assume responsibility.
Should the Emperor stick to his view, the
Chancellor can offer his resignation or demand that
he be relieved of his post.
6. On the other hand, the Emperor has no constitutional
means of hindering the Chancellor or
the Foreign Office from carrying out a policy
which he thinks doubtful or mistaken. All he can
do, if the Chancellor insists, is to make a change in
the Chancellorship.
7. Every change of Chancellors, however, is
a serious matter, deeply affecting the life of the
nation, and hence, at a time of political complications
and high tension, an extremely serious
step, an ultima ratio (last resort) which is all the
more daring in that the number of men qualified
to fill this abnormally difficult post is very
small.
The position of the Imperial Chancellor, which
was based on the towering personality of Prince
Bismarck, had assumed a serious preponderance
through the constantly growing number of posts
under the Empire, over all of which the Chancellor
was placed as chief and responsible head.
If this is borne in mind, it is absolutely impossible
that anybody should still hold the Emperor
alone responsible for everything, as was done
formerly, especially toward the end of the war
and after the war, by critical know-it-alls and
carping revolutionists, both at home and in the
Entente countries. That, quite apart from everything
personal, is a proof of complete ignorance
of the earlier Constitution of the German
Empire.
The visit of the Tsar to Potsdam in November,
1910, went off to the satisfaction of all concerned,
and was utilized by the Chancellor and Herr von
Kiderlen to get into touch with the newly appointed
Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, whom the
Tsar had brought with him. Apparently, the Russian
ruler enjoyed himself among us, and he took
an active part in the hunt arranged in his honor,
at which he proved himself an enthusiastic huntsman.
The result of the conferences between the
two statesmen seemed to promise well for the
future; both, after they had felt each other out,
harbored the hope of favorable relations between
the two countries.
During my spring visit to Corfu, the Melissori
troubles began, which riveted Greek attention
upon themselves. Corfu was well informed of the
constant smuggling of arms from Italy by way of
Valona into Albania, and there was a feeling in
Greek circles that machinations from across the
Adriatic, as well as from Montenegro, were not
without responsibility for what was happening.
It was also felt that the new Turkish Government
had not been wise in its handling of the Albanians,
who were very sensitive and suspicious; the former
Sultan Abdul-Hamid had realized this very well
and understood admirably how to get along with
the Albanians and to keep them quiet. Nevertheless,
there was no fear that more serious complications
would ensue.
At the beginning of 1911 I received a most cordial
invitation from King George of England to
be present at the unveiling of the statue of Queen
Victoria, the grandmother of both of us. Therefore
I went in the middle of May to London with
the Empress and our daughter. The reception on
the part of the English royal family and the people
of London was cordial.
The unveiling festivities were well arranged and
very magnificent. The big, round space in front
of Buckingham Palace was surrounded by grandstands,
which were filled to overflowing by invited
guests. In front of them were files of soldiers of
all arms and all regiments of the British army, in
full parade uniform, the cavalry and artillery being
on foot. All the banners of the troops were
arrayed at the foot of the statue.
The royal family, with their guests and their
suites, was grouped around the statue. King
George made a dedication speech which had a
good effect, in which he made mention also of the
German Imperial couple.
Then, amid salutes and greetings, the statue was
unveiled; the Queen, in marble, seated upon a
throne, became visible, surmounted by a golden
figure of victory. It was an impressive moment.
Afterward the troops marched past, the Guards in
the van, then the Highlanders—who, with their
gayly colored, becoming costume, gave an especially
picturesque touch to the military spectacle—then
the rest of the soldiers. The march past
was carried out on the circular space, with all the
troops constantly wheeling: the outer wings had
to step out, the inner to hold back—a most difficult
task for troops. The evolution was carried
out brilliantly; not one man made a mistake. The
Duke of Connaught, who had made all the military
arrangements, deservedly won unanimous
applause.
The remainder of our stay in England was devoted
to excursions; we also enjoyed the hospitality
of noble English families, at whose homes
there was an opportunity to hold intercourse with
many members of English nobility.
Special enjoyment in the domain of art was provided
by the King to his guests by a theatrical performance
at Drury Lane Theater. A well-known
English play, "Money," was performed, by a company
especially assembled for the occasion, consisting
of the leading actors and actresses of
London. As a surprise, a curtain fell between the
acts, painted especially for the occasion by a lady,
which depicted King George and me, life size, on
horseback, riding toward each other and saluting
militarily. The picture was executed with much
dash and was enthusiastically acclaimed by the
audience.
The performance of the actors and actresses in
"Money" was veritably masterly, since all concerned
played their rôles, even the smallest, to perfection.
In fact, it was a classic performance.
Another day I attended, at the Olympia track,
the sports of the British army and navy, which included
admirable individual feats on foot and
horseback, as well as evolutions by bodies of troops
in close formation.
In describing the unveiling of the statue, as well
as the funeral of King Edward VII, I have concerned
myself purposely with the externals and
pomp that are characteristic of such occasions in
England. They show that, in a land under parliamentary
rule, a so-called democratic land, more
importance is attached to well-nigh mediæval
magnificence than in the young German Empire.
The French actions in Morocco, which were no
longer such as could be reconciled with the Algeciras
Agreement, had once more engaged the
attention of the diplomats. For this reason the
Chancellor had requested me to find out, as soon
as opportunity should arise, what King George
thought about the situation.
I asked him if he thought that the French
methods were still in accordance with the Algeciras
Agreement. The King remarked that the
agreement, to tell the truth, no longer was in force,
and that the best thing to do would be to forget it;
that the French, fundamentally, were doing nothing
different in Morocco from what the English
had previously done in Egypt; that, therefore,
England would place no obstacles in the path of
the French, but would let them alone; that the
thing to do was to recognize the "fait accompli" of
the occupation of Morocco and make arrangements,
for commercial protection, with France.
To the very end the visit went off well, and the
inhabitants of London, of all social strata, expressed
their good will every time the guests of
their King showed themselves.
Thus the German Imperial couple was enabled
to return home with the best of impressions.
When I informed the Chancellor of these, he expressed
great satisfaction. From the remarks of
King George he drew the inference that England
considered the Algeciras Agreement no longer
valid and would not place any obstacles in the
way of the French occupation of Morocco.
From this the policy followed by him and the
Foreign Office arose which led to the Agadir case,
the last and equally unsuccessful attempt to maintain
our influence in Morocco. The situation became
more serious during the Kiel regatta week.
The Foreign Office informed me of its intention to
send the Panther to Agadir. I gave expression to
strong misgivings as to this step, but had to drop
them in view of the urgent representations of the
Foreign Office.
In the first half of 1912 came the sending of Sir
Ernest Cassel with a verbal note in which England
offered to remain neutral in case of an "unprovoked"
attack upon Germany, provided Germany
agreed to limit her naval construction program
and to drop her new Naval bill, the latter
being darkly hinted at. Owing to our favorable
answer to this Lord Haldane was intrusted with
the negotiations and sent to Berlin. The negotiations
finally fell through, owing to the constantly
more uncompromising attitude of England (Sir
E. Grey), who finally disavowed Lord Haldane
and withdrew his own verbal note, because Grey
was afraid to offend the French by a German-English
agreement and jeopardize the Anglo-French-Russian
understanding.
Here are the details of the case:
On the morning of January 29, 1912, Herr Ballin
had himself announced to me at the palace in
Berlin and asked for an audience. I assumed that
it was a case of a belated birthday greeting, therefore
I was not a little astonished when Ballin, after
a short speech of congratulation, said that he had
come as an emissary of Sir Ernest Cassel, who had
just arrived in Berlin on a special mission and
wished to be received.
I asked whether it was a political matter, and
why, if so, the meeting had not been arranged
through the English ambassador. Ballin's answer
was to the effect that, from hints dropped by Cassel,
he knew the matter to be of great importance,
and the explanation for Cassel's acting without the
intervention of the ambassador was because the
earnest desire had been expressed in London that
the official diplomatic representatives, both the
English and the German, should not be apprised
of the affair.
I declared that I was ready to receive Cassel
at once, but added that, should his mission have to
do with political questions, I should immediately
summon the Chancellor, since I was a constitutional
monarch and not in a position to deal with
the representative of a foreign power alone without
the Chancellor.
Ballin fetched Cassel, who handed me a document
which, he stated, had been prepared with the
"approval and knowledge of the English Government."
I read the short note through and was not
a little surprised to see that I was holding in my
hand a formal offer of neutrality in case Germany
became involved in future warlike complications,
conditioned upon certain limitations in the carrying
out of our program of naval construction,
which were to be the subject of mutual conferences
and agreements. Walking with Ballin into
the next room, I handed over the document for
him to read. After he had done so both of us exclaimed
in the same breath: "A verbal note!"
It was plainly apparent that this "verbal note"
was aimed at the forthcoming addition to our
Naval law and designed in some way to delay or
frustrate it. No matter how the matter was interpreted,
I found myself confronted with a peculiar
situation, which also amazed Ballin. It reminded
me of the situation at Cronberg-Friedrichshof in
1905, when I was obliged to decline the demand,
made to me personally by the English Under Secretary,
Hardinge, that we should forego our naval
construction.
Now, an intimate business friend of Edward
VII appears, without previous announcement
through official diplomatic channels, before the
German Emperor with a "verbal note" inspired
by the English Government, with explicit instructions
to evade all the diplomatic officials of both
countries. He hands over an offer from the English
Government to maintain neutrality in future
warlike complications provided certain agreements
regarding limitation of naval construction
are made. And this is done by England, the
mother of "Constitutionalism"! When I pointed
this out to Ballin, he exclaimed: "Holy Constitutionalism!
What has become of you? That is
'personal politics' with a vengeance!"
I agreed with Ballin to send at once for Herr
von Bethmann, in order that he might learn what
was transpiring and decide what to do in this
peculiar situation.
Bethmann was called up on the telephone and
soon appeared. At first the situation aroused in
him likewise a certain degree of astonishment; it
was interesting to watch the play of expression on
his face as he was told about the matter. The
Chancellor suggested that Grand Admiral von
Tirpitz also be summoned, for the proper dispatching
of the business, and recommended that
an answer be drawn up in English, in the same
manner and form as the note delivered by Cassel,
and that it be handed to Sir Ernest, who wished to
return home that night. (English was chosen because
there was fear of obscurity and misunderstanding
if the note were translated in London.)
The Chancellor asked me to draw up the note, since
I knew English best. After some objection I had
to make up my mind to be myself the writer of
the answer.
And now the following scene took place:
I sat at the writing table in the adjutant's room;
the other gentlemen stood around me. I would
read a sentence from the note aloud and sketch out
an answer, which was, in turn, read aloud. Then
criticisms were made from right and left: one
thought the sentence too complaisant, another too
abrupt; it was thereupon remodeled, recast, improved,
and polished. The Chancellor particularly
subjected my grammar and style to much torture,
owing to his habit of probing things philosophically,
to his methods of profound thoroughness,
which caused him to be most particular with every
word, in order that it, having been studied from
every angle, should later on afford nobody cause
for criticism.
After hours of work the note was finally finished
and, having been passed a couple of times from
hand to hand and then read aloud by me half a
dozen times more, it was signed.
When our group broke up, the Chancellor asked
Sir Ernest who was to be expected from England
to conduct the negotiations. Cassel replied that it
would certainly be a Minister, which one he did
not know—perhaps Mr. Winston Churchill, Minister
of the Navy, since the question was a naval
one. Then the Chancellor arranged further with
him that the unofficial method should be retained
and that Ballin should undertake to transmit all
the news regarding the matter which should emanate
from England.
Sir Ernest expressed his lively gratitude for his
cordial reception and his satisfaction at the tenor
of our reply. Later Ballin informed me from his
hotel that Cassel had expressed himself as completely
satisfied over the successful outcome of his
mission, and that he would report to his Government
the good impression made upon him.
When I thereupon conferred on the matter with
Admiral von Tirpitz we both agreed that the
Naval bill was in danger and, therefore, that we
must be very careful.
In perfect secrecy the material was collected
which Admiral von Tirpitz was to present at the
negotiations; it consisted of a short historical
sketch of the development of the fleet and of the
increasingly difficult tasks devolving upon it; the
Naval law and its aims, nature, enactment, and extension;
finally, the contemplated Naval bill, its
meaning and the method of putting it through.
The Chancellor asked that the main negotiations
should be conducted at the palace in my presence.
In addition, I agreed with Admiral von Tirpitz
that he should speak English, as far as possible,
and that I, in case of difficult technical expressions,
would interpret.
Until England made known the name of the
negotiator, our time was spent in suppositions, and
Ballin informed us of combinations in connection
with which a number of names, even that of Grey,
came up.
At last the news arrived, through Ballin, that
Haldane—the Minister of War, previously a lawyer—had
been intrusted with the conduct of the
negotiations and would soon arrive. General
amazement! Just imagine, "mutatis mutandis,"
that Germany had sent her Minister of War (at
that time von Heeringen) to London, instead of
Admiral von Tirpitz, for the discussion of a naval
matter!
When this point was discussed with Bethmann
and Tirpitz a number of suppositions were advanced;
the Chancellor said that Haldane was
known in England as a student of Goethe and as a
man versed in German philosophy and knowing
the German language, so that his choice was a
piece of politeness toward us. Tirpitz observed
that Haldane had formerly spent some time in
Berlin and worked with General von Einem at the
War Ministry, and hence knew the state of affairs
in Germany. I suggested that all that was very
well, but that the choice of Haldane showed that
England looked upon the question as purely political,
since he knew only superficially about naval
affairs; that the whole thing was probably directed
against Germany's naval policy in general and the
new Naval bill in particular; that it would be
well, therefore, not to forget this, in order that the
whole thing might not develop into a foreign
assault upon our right of self-determination as to
the strength of our defensive measures.
Haldane arrived and was received as an Imperial
guest. Ballin, who accompanied him,
solved the riddle of Haldane's choice on the basis
of information received by him from England.
He said that when Cassel had got back to London,
reported on his reception, and handed over
the German reply, the impression made was so
favorable that no further doubt was entertained
there as to the satisfactory course of the negotiations
and their conclusion in the form of an agreement;
that, thereupon a keen dispute had arisen
among the Ministers, especially between Churchill
and Grey, as to who should go to Berlin and affix
his name to this great historical document, in case
the object should be achieved of making Germany
completely give up the further development of
her fleet; that Churchill thought himself the right
man for the job, since he was at the head of the
navy. But Grey and Asquith would not let their
colleague reap the glory, and, for this reason, Grey
stood for a while in the foreground—another
proof that it was politics rather than the number
of ships which was to play the leading rôle.
After a while, however, it was decided that it
was more fitting to Grey's personal and official importance
to appear only at the termination of the
negotiations, to affix his name to the agreement,
and—as it was put in the information transmitted
from England to Ballin—"to get his dinner from
the Emperor and to come in for his part of the
festivities and fireworks"—which, in good German,
means to enjoy the "Bengal light
illumination."
As it had been decided that Churchill was not to
get this in any event, it was necessary to choose
somebody for the negotiations who was close to
Asquith and Grey and who, possessing their complete
confidence, was willing to conduct the negotiations
as far as the beginning of the "fireworks";
one who, moreover, was already known at Berlin
and not a stranger in Germany. Churchill, to be
sure, qualified in this, for he had been present a
few times at the Imperial maneuvers in Silesia
and Württemberg as a guest of the Emperor. Ballin
guaranteed the reliability of his London source
of information.
Before the negotiations began I once more
pointed out to Secretary of State von Tirpitz that
Haldane, in spite of being just then Minister of
War, probably had prepared himself for his task,
and had surely received careful instructions from
the English Admiralty, in which the spirit of
Fisher was paramount. In his Handbook for
English Naval Officers, Fisher had stated, among
other precepts well worthy of being remembered,
one which is characteristic of the Admiral, his department
and its spirit, which runs, word for word,
as follows: "If you tell a lie, stick to it."
Moreover, I said to Tirpitz, we must not forget
what an amazing adaptability the Anglo-Saxons
had, which fitted them for occupying positions
which had no relation to their previous life and
training. Furthermore, the interest in England in
the navy was generally so intense that almost every
educated man was an expert up to a certain point
on naval questions.
In the course of the negotiations Haldane proved
himself admirably well informed and a skillful,
tenacious debater, and his brilliant qualities as a
lawyer came to the fore. The conversation lasted
several hours, and brought about a general clarifying,
as well as a preliminary agreement as to postponement
of time limits of ship construction, etc.
The details concerning it are deposited in documents
at the Imperial Naval Office. Tirpitz was
splendid.
After some more conferences—at which, likewise,
Ballin was present—Haldane returned to
England. Ballin informed me that Haldane had
expressed himself to him as entirely satisfied with
the outcome of his mission, and had stated that in
about a week or two the first draft of the agreement
could be sent to us.
Time passed—the date set for the introduction
of the Naval bill approached. Tirpitz suggested,
in case the agreement were concluded previously,
that the Naval bill be altered accordingly; otherwise,
that it be introduced without alteration.
At last we received, not the draft of the agreement,
but a document asking all sorts of questions
and expressing a desire for all sorts of data, a
reply to which required many consultations and
much reflection. Little by little the suspicion
grew in me that the English were not in earnest
with regard to the agreement, since question followed
question and details were sought which had
nothing directly to do with the agreement. England
withdrew more and more from her promises,
and no draft of the agreement came to hand.
In Berlin a big agitation set in against the Naval
bill, Tirpitz and myself on the part of the Foreign
Office, and from other quarters, both qualified and
unqualified. The Chancellor also, who hoped to
achieve the agreement and affix his name to a document
which would free Germany from "encirclement"
and bring her into a regular and better relationship
with England, came out in favor of
dropping the Naval bill. But that would simply
have meant allowing a foreign power enormous
influence in matters of German national defense
and jeopardizing thereby the national right of self-determination
and our readiness for battle in case
of a war being forced upon us. Had we allowed
this it would have amounted to our consenting to
permit England, Germany's principal foe, to grant
us whatever she wished, after consulting her own
interests, without receiving ourselves the guaranty
of any equivalent concession.
In this confused state of affairs differences of
opinion and violent disputes arose, which, especially
in those circles which really knew little
about the navy, were conducted with much violence
and not always in a practical manner. Admiral
von Tirpitz, all through that winter, which
was so hard a one for him and me, fought his fight
like a genuine, patriotic officer, realizing the situation
and seeing through his opponents with clear
vision and supporting me with complete conviction
to the limit of his ability. All the Government
officials agreed that no foreign country
could be allowed any voice in helping decide what
we had or had not to do toward insuring our
protection.
The hope of bringing about the agreement grew
ever fainter; England continually showed lessening
interest and kept eliminating important parts
of her original verbal note. And so it came about
that Admiral von Tirpitz and I realized that the
whole proposal was merely a "maneuver."
The fight over the German Naval bill grew
steadily hotter. I happened at this time to meet
at Cuxhaven Doctor von Burchard, President of
the Hamburg Senate, whom I respected greatly,
as he was the very model of an aristocratic citizen
of a Hanseatic city, and who had often been consulted
by me in political matters. I described to
him the entire course of the affair and the disputes
in Berlin as to the introduction or nonintroduction
of the bill, and asked him then to tell me, with
his usual complete frankness, what he thought the
right thing to do in the interest of the national
welfare, since I greatly desired to hear an objective
opinion, uninfluenced by the rival camps of
Berlin.
Doctor Burchard replied in his clear, keen,
pointed, convincing manner that it was my duty
toward the people and the fatherland to stick to
the bill; that whosoever spoke against its introduction
was committing a sin against them; that whatever
we thought necessary to our defense must be
unconditionally brought into being; that, above
all else, we must never permit a foreign country
to have the presumption to interfere with us; that
the English offer was a feint to make us drop the
Naval bill; that this must, in no circumstances, be
allowed; that the German nation would not understand
why its right of self-determination had been
sacrificed; that the bill must unquestionably be introduced;
that he would work in its favor in the
Federal Council (as indeed he did in a brilliant,
compelling speech) and also otherwise press its
acceptance in Berlin; that the English would naturally
resort to abuse, but that this made no difference,
since they had been doing so for a long time;
that they certainly would not get into a war for
such a cause; that Admiral von Tirpitz was merely
doing his duty and fulfilling his obligations, and
that I should support him in every way; that the
Chancellor must give up opposing the measure,
otherwise he would run the risk of finally forfeiting
public esteem on account of being "pro-English."
Thus spoke the representative of the great commercial
city, which was threatened before all
others in case of war with England. The genuine
Hanseatic spirit inspired his words.
Strangely enough, this opinion of Doctor
Burchard concerning the English offer has recently
been corroborated to me in Holland by a
Dutchman who heard from Englishmen at that
time the English point of view. I and Tirpitz
guessed right—the offer of neutrality, in case naval
expansion was curbed, was a political maneuver.
Soon news also came from Ballin that the matter
was not going well in England: that, according
to information received, a dispute had arisen about
the agreement; that there was dissatisfaction with
Haldane, who, it was said, had let himself be
cheated by Tirpitz! This was plain evidence of
the indignation felt because Tirpitz had not
walked into the trap and simply let the bill drop,
and that Haldane had been unable to serve up the
bill to the English Cabinet on a platter at tea time.
It is useless to say that there was any "cheating" on
Germany's part, but the reproach leveled at Haldane
justifies the suspicion that his instructions
were that he should seek to "cheat" the Germans.
Since his fellow countrymen thought that the reverse
was true, one can but thank Admiral von
Tirpitz most sincerely for having correctly
asserted the German standpoint to the benefit of
our fatherland.
Toward the end of March the fight about the
bill took on such violence that finally the Chancellor,
on the 22d, asked me for his dismissal as I
stepped out of the vault in the Charlottenburg
Park. After long consultation and after I had
told him Doctor Burchard's view, the Chancellor
withdrew his request.
When, some time afterward, I paid a visit to
Herr von Bethmann in his garden, I found him
quite overcome and holding in his hand a message
from London. It contained the entire disavowal
of the verbal note delivered by Cassel, the withdrawal
of the offer of neutrality, as well as of
every other offer, and at the end the advice that I
dismiss Herr von Bethmann from the Imperial
Chancellorship, since he enjoyed to a marked degree
the confidence of the British Government!
Tears of anger shone in the eyes of the Chancellor,
thus badly deceived in his hopes; the praise accorded
to him by a foreign government with which
Germany and he had just had such painful experiences
hurt him deeply. For the second time he
offered me his resignation; I did not accept it, but
sought to console him. I then ordered that the
ambassador in London be asked how he could have
accepted and forwarded such a message under any
conditions.
Now the Chancellor was in favor of the bill, but
it was honorably proposed with the limitation
which it had been decided to impose upon it in
case of the conclusion of the agreement. In England,
on the other hand, the full naval construction
program was carried out.
This "Haldane episode" is characteristic of
England's policy. This whole maneuver, conceived
on a large scale, was engineered for the sole
purpose of hampering the development of the German
fleet, while, simultaneously, in America,
which had an almost negligible merchant fleet; in
France, whose navy was superior in numbers to
the German; in Italy, in Russia, which also had
ships built abroad—vast construction programs
were carried out without eliciting one word of protest
from England. And Germany, wedged in between
France and Russia, certainly had to be at
least prepared to defend herself on the water
against those nations.
For this our naval construction program was absolutely
necessary; it was never aimed against the
English fleet, four or five times as strong as ours,
and assuring England's superiority and security,
to equal the strength of which no sensible man in
Germany ever dreamed. We needed our fleet for
coast defense and the protection of our commerce;
for this purpose the lesser means of defense, like
U-boats, torpedo boats, and mines, were not sufficient.
In addition the coast batteries on the Baltic
were so antiquated and miserably equipped that
they would have been razed within forty-eight
hours by the massed fire of the heavy guns of modern
battleships. Thus, our Baltic coast was practically
defenseless. To protect it the fleet was
necessary.
The Skagerrak (Jutland) battle has proved
what the fleet meant and what it was worth. That
battle would have meant annihilation for England
if the Reichstag had not refused up to 1900 all
proposals for strengthening the navy. Those
twelve lost years were destined never to be
retrieved.
Before we take our leave of Haldane I wish to
touch upon another episode in his activities. In
1906 he came, with the permission of the German
Government, to Berlin, to inform himself concerning
the Prussian defense conditions, recruiting,
General Staff, etc. He busied himself at the Ministry
of War, where the Minister, General von
Einem, personally gave him information. After
about two or three weeks' work there he returned,
well satisfied, to England.
When, after the outbreak of the World War, the
"pro-German" Haldane, the friend of Goethe, was
boycotted and treated with such hostility that he
could no longer show himself in public, he had a
defense written of his term of office as Minister
of War by the well-known littérateur and journalist,
Mr. Begbie, entitled Vindication of Great
Britain. Therein his services toward forming a
regular General Staff and preparing the British
army for the World War are placed in a bright
light and emphasis is laid on the skill with which
he utilized the permission obtained from the
Prussian War Ministry in order to learn in
Germany about military matters and to reorganize
the British army and General Staff, to the
minutest detail and on the German model, for
the coming war against the erstwhile German
hosts.
Here we see the sly, adroit lawyer, who, sheltered
under the hospitality of a foreign country,
studies its military arrangements in order to forge
weapons against it out of the material and knowledge
thus acquired. Quite characteristically the
book is dedicated to King Edward VII, whose
intimate, emissary, and tool Haldane was. In
those days Berlin saw in Haldane's mission a
"rapprochement" with England, toward which
Germans were always bending their efforts;
in reality, however, it was a "reconnoitering
expedition" under the very roof of the German
cousin. England showed her gratitude by
the World War, which Haldane helped to
prepare; in this case Haldane "cheated" the
Germans!
That is the history of the Haldane mission.
Later it was summarily maintained by all sorts of
ignorant dabblers in politics, belonging to the
press and the general public, that the promising
"rapprochement" with England through Haldane
had been wrecked by the obstinacy of the Emperor
and Admiral von Tirpitz and by their clinging to
the Naval bill against the wishes of all "sensible
counselors!"
At that time [in 1912] the question of the establishment
of an independent Albanian state and the
choice by the Powers of a head for it, was brought
to my attention also. A number of candidates
lusting for a crown had already presented themselves
before the tribunal of the Powers, without
getting themselves accepted; a number of candidates,
considered by the Powers, were declined by
the Albanians. I looked upon the matter in itself
with indifference, and was of the opinion that—as
in the case of every "creation of a nation"—the
greatest possible attention should be paid to historical
development, also to geographical peculiarities
and the customs of the inhabitants.
In this peculiar land there has never been any
united nation under one ruler and one dynasty.
In valleys, encircled and cut off by high mountain
ranges, the Albanian tribes live separated to a considerable
degree from one another. Their political
system is not unlike the clan system of the Scotch.
Christians and Mohammedans are represented in
equal numbers.
The custom of "vendetta" is an ancient one, sanctified
by tradition, which is no less true of robbery
and cattle stealing. Agriculture is still in a backward
stage of development, farming is in its infancy,
the implements used therein date from
before the flood.
The head man of the clan dispenses justice in the
open, under the village tree, as it used to be done
once upon a time among the ancient Germans.
Every man is armed and most are excellent shots.
Whenever the head man of the clan turns up while
on a horseback tour through his territory in some
hamlet, the inhabitants expect a blessing from him
in the form of jingling coins, which sometimes are
scattered about by him from the saddle. This, of
course, is particularly customary at the outset of
a new Government's term, and great is the dissatisfaction
when it does not happen.
Up to the time of the Balkan War many Albanians
entered the Turkish service, where they
rose to high importance, being greatly prized on
account of their diligence and keen intelligence,
as well as their tenacious energy. They supplied
the Turkish administration with a large number of
officials, also with a certain percentage in the diplomatic
corps and the army. The young Albanian
nobles were proud to serve in a splendid company
of palace guards of the Sultan, which scarcely had
an equal for size, martial appearance, and manly
beauty. These were partly relatives of the Sultan,
since the latter used to have noble Albanian women
of the principal clans in his harem in order that
he—protected by blood brotherhood—might be
safe from the "vendettas" of the clans, and, also,
that he might find out everything that might serve
to influence the feelings of the Albanian chieftains.
The desires of the Albanians which reached him
by this road—for instance, as to supplies of arms
and ammunition, school houses, building of highways,
etc.—were thereupon granted in an inconspicuous
manner. Thus the Sultan was enabled
to keep the usually turbulent Albanians quiet and
loyal by means of "family ties."
With this knowledge of the state of affairs as
a foundation, I sought to bring my influence to
bear toward having a Mohammedan Prince
chosen, if possible—perhaps an Egyptian Prince—not
forgetting that he should have a well-lined
purse, which is an absolute necessity in Albania.
My advice was not heeded by the "Areopagus of
the Powers," whose members were not bothering
themselves with the interests of the Albanians, but
seeking, first of all, for pretexts and opportunities
for fishing in the troubled Albanian waters in such
a way as to benefit their own countries.
Therefore, I was not at all pleased when the
choice fell upon Prince William of Wied. I
esteemed him as a distinguished, knightly man of
lofty sentiments, but considered him unfitted for
the post. The Prince knew altogether too little
about Balkan affairs to be able to undertake this
thorny task with hope of success. It was particularly
unpleasant to me that a German Prince
should make a fool of himself there, since it was
apparent from the start that the Entente would
place all sorts of obstacles in his path. Upon being
questioned by the Prince, I told my cousin all my
doubts, laying stress upon the difficulties awaiting
him, and advised him urgently to decline. I could
not command him, since the Prince of Wied, as
head of the family, had the final word in the
matter.
After the Prince's acceptance of the candidacy
offered him by the Powers, I received him in the
presence of the Chancellor. A certain irresolution
in the bearing of the Prince, who contemplated
his new task with anything but enthusiasm,
strengthened the resolve in me and the Chancellor
to try hard once more to dissuade the young candidate
from ascending the recently invented Albanian
"throne." But in vain. The ambitious,
mystically excited wife of the Prince saw in Albania
the fulfillment of her wishes. And "ce que
femme veut, Dieu le veut" ("what woman wishes,
God wishes").
Carmen Sylva [the Queen of Rumania] also
worked toward having him accept; she went so far,
in fact, as to publish an article in the newspapers
beginning "Fairyland Wants Its Prince."
So even the best meant warnings were useless. I
had also strongly advised the Prince not to go to
Albania before the settlement of the financial
question, since the reasons which had led me to
suggest the selection of a rich ruler now came to
the fore. The Prince was not very wealthy and
the Powers had to supply him with a "donation,"
concerning the amount of which, and the method
of paying it by installments, an unpleasant quarrel
arose. At last a part payment was made.
Danger lurked for the Prince and his eventual
Government in the person of Essad Pasha, an unreliable,
intriguing, greedy soldier of fortune, who
himself had designs on the Albanian throne and
held sway over a certain number of armed adherents.
From the start he was an opponent of
the new Prince and he plotted secretly with Italy,
which was not favorably inclined toward the
Prince of Wied. Now, it would have been quite
natural and a matter of course if the new ruler
had taken with him in his suite men from Germany
whom he knew and who were faithful to
him. But he did not. An Englishman and an
Italian were attached to his person as "secretaries"
and they had nothing better to do than to work
against his interests, to give him bad advice and
to intrigue against him.
During the time that the Prince of Wied was
making his preparations the excellently written
pamphlet of an Austrian General Staff officer,
dealing with his travels in Albania, appeared.
The officer described, in a lively and clear style,
the geographical and climatic drawbacks, the
population and customs, the general poverty and
backwardness of the land.
He pointed out that a future ruler of the land
must in no circumstances reside on the coast, but
must show himself to the inhabitants and travel
about in the country. Owing to the primitive
means of transportation, he went on, the lord of
the land must sit all day on horseback and ride
through his domain, having at his saddle bow the
famous "bag of sequins" mentioned in all Oriental
tales and legends, in order to sway public opinion
in his favor in the places visited by the expected
shower of gold. The ruler must be sure, the author
continued, to bind some of the clans of the region
closely to himself, so as to have at his beck and call
an armed force for asserting his will and overcoming
any opponents wishing to rebel, since this was
the only way to maintain his power, in view of the
utter lack of "troops" or an "army" in the European
sense of the word.
This meant that the ruler of Albania must lead
at first a nomadic, horseback life, and, in addition,
provide himself with a wandering camp, with tents
and other accessories and the necessary horses.
Plenty of men adapted to this sort of life might
have been found in his squadron of the Third
Guard Uhlan Regiment, since many of his Uhlans,
who were very fond of the Prince, had declared
that they were ready to accompany him as volunteers.
Surely, they would have served him better
and been more useful to him than what he did in
preparing to take over the overlordship of Albania,
without knowledge of the country.
I advised my cousin urgently to study this
pamphlet and to follow its recommendations, especially
with regard to his residence, which should
be fixed at some point as far as possible from the
warships of the Powers, in order that he might not
be forced to act under their pressure and arouse
suspicion among the Albanians that their ruler
needed these ships for protection against his subjects.
Did the Prince ever read the pamphlet?
In any event, the course adopted by him subsequently
was contrary to its advice and the advice
given him by me.
The Prince and his wife journeyed to Albania,
and things turned out as I had foreseen. According
to reports describing the arrival of the sovereign
couple, the Princess, although she was a
German, addressed the assembled Albanians from
her balcony in French, since they understood no
German! The "court" remained at Durazzo under
the guns of the foreign ships. The Prince did not
travel on horseback through the land, nor did he
scatter gold sequins about—not even from his balcony
on the day of his arrival—nor did he push
Essad out of the way. So the adventure ended as
one might imagine.
I have gone into some detail in describing my
opinion and attitude toward the question of the
choice of the ruler of Albania because, from every
possible quarter, false rumors have been circulated
for the purpose of imputing to me motives which
were utterly foreign to me. In this matter, also, I
gave honest advice when questioned, based on
sound knowledge of mankind.
The year 1912 also witnessed the meeting with
the Tsar at Baltisch-Port, whither I repaired on
board my yacht at the invitation of Nicholas II.
Our two yachts anchored side by side, so that visiting
from ship to ship was easy. The Tsar, his
children, and his entire entourage vied with one
another in evidences of good will and hospitality.
The Russian and German escorting squadrons
were inspected, turn and turn about, by the Tsar
and myself together, and we took our meals either
at the Tsar's table or mine.
We spent one morning on land near Baltisch-Port.
The Eighty-fifth "Viborg" Infantry Regiment,
whose commander I was, had been drawn up
in a field and was inspected first in parade formation,
then in company and battalion exercises,
which were carried out in as satisfactory a manner
as was the parade with which the evolutions were
brought to a close.
The regiment, composed of four battalions,
made an excellent impression. It was in field
equipment—brown-gray blouses and caps—and
the latter, worn jauntily cocked over one ear by all,
gave to the sun-browned, martial faces of the
strong young soldiers a bold air which brought
joy to the heart of every soldier who gazed upon
them.
In the course of the brilliant and uncommonly
amiable reception which I met with on this occasion
I received no hint of the Balkan alliance, concluded
a short time before.
It was my last visit in Russia before the outbreak
of the war.
