No one doubts today that all Vertebrates,
from the Fish to Man, possess more or less
intelligence—namely, the power of forming
memory associations and of learning by experience.
But when we come to the study of
Invertebrates (e. g., Insects, Spiders, Mollusks,
Worms), we meet with much divergence of
opinion among the authorities. Many competent
investigators have been led to the conviction
that the capacity to learn by experience,
to form memory associations, leading to intelligent
adjustment of behavior to environment,
resides only in those animals which possess a
true cerebrum and central nervous system,
such as is found only in the Vertebrates. Below
these forms, they conclude, lie only “instinctive
reactions” to stimuli—“purposeful
action without consciousness of purpose”
(Hartmann). With increasing complexity of
the nervous system, arises the neural mechanism
for memory association, the basis of intelligence;
and to “inherited habit” (instinct) is
added deliberate (intelligent) purposeful adaptation
of conduct to a consciously desired end,
the underlying motive being avoidance of pain
and the attainment of pleasure, or satisfaction.
A simple illustration of the modification of
mere instinct by associative memory, plus
pleasurable or painful effects, is afforded by
Lloyd Morgan’s experiments with chicks.
As is well known, no sooner is a young
chick hatched than it begins—by instinct—to
peck at all sorts of objects of about a certain
size, whether they are edible or not. If, however,
one of these objects happens to be a
caterpillar of nauseous taste, upon meeting a
similar caterpillar a second time the chick appears
to remember its first painful experience,
and refrains from pecking at it, and may even
scrape its bill on the ground as if to wipe off
the bad-tasting substance, so vividly is it recalled.
This is an example of associative memory
and “learning by experience,” avoiding the
repetition of acts previously attended by pain
or displeasure. “What distinguishes intelligence
from instinct is,” says Professor Holmes,
“that in the latter the connections between
acts are based upon hereditary organization,
whereas in the former they are established
through experience.... We have in this modification
of instincts through the pleasurable or
painful effects they produce the beginning of
intelligence.”
Such notable psychologists as Mach, Loeb,
Holmes, Thorndyke, Morgan, Whitman, Baldwin,
and many others accept as a criterion of
intelligence in animals this capacity for memory
association, constituting what the metaphysicians
call consciousness.
For most modern psychologists, an interruption
of consciousness is merely an interruption
of the activity of associative memory. They
speak of the extent of associative memory in
the animal kingdom instead of the extent of
consciousness among animals.[1]
If an animal possesses the mechanism for
associative memory, then it possesses, unquestionably,
the mechanism for intelligence. Just
what this necessary mechanism is, and in what
group of animals it appears in its simplest
form, is at present a debatable question—not
to say an unsolved problem.
On the positive side, we may assume that if
an animal can “learn by experience”—associate
the memory of a previous experience with
a present situation, and profit by this association—it
possesses intelligence.
On the other hand, failure on the part of an
experimenter to train an animal to react in a
desired way does not afford proof of the absence
of intelligence—of associative memory.
It may only prove that wrong methods have
been employed by the experimenter.
Some authorities have found evidences of
intelligent reaction to stimuli, not only in such
Invertebrates as the Crab, Crayfish and Horseshoe
Crab, but also in the Octopus, Starfish
and even among the lowly group familiarly
known as “Worms.”
Binet went farther and wrote a learned work
on “The Psychic Life of Micro-organisms,” in
which considerable intelligence was attributed
to Infusorians. But that was thirty years or
more ago.
While no competent writer would assert
today that psychic life is entirely absent in
the Protozoa (one-celled animals), it is now
generally conceded that no adequate proof of
intelligent response to stimuli among unicellular
animals has so far been forthcoming.[2]
In the opinion of the late Dr. Jacques Loeb,
the claim of a number of investigators that
associative memory and therefore of intelligence
as here defined, is possessed by even
such multicellular forms as Worms, Starfish,
Sea Urchins, Actinians, Medusae and Hydroids,
is unwarranted by the experimental data.
“Claims for the existence of such memory in
these groups of animals,” remarks Loeb, “have
frequently been made, but such claims are
either plain romance or due to a confusion of
reversible physiological processes with the irreversible
phenomena of associative memory.
The less a scientist is accustomed to rigid
quantitative experiments, the more ready he
is to confound the reversible after effects of
a stimulus—e. g., the effects due to an increase
in hydrogen ion concentration—with
indications of associative memory. Learning
is only possible where there exists a specific
organ of associative memory, the physical
mechanism of which is still unknown.”
Loeb admitted that associative memory “exists
in most mammals,” also in birds. In the
lower Vertebrates this capacity, he thought,
was only occasionally found: “Tree-frogs, for
example, can be trained, upon hearing a sound,
to go to a certain place for food. In other
Frogs, Rana esculenta, for instance, no reaction
is as yet known which proves the existence
of associative memory. Some Fishes evidently
possess memory; in Sharks, however,
its existence is doubtful. With regard to
Invertebrates, the question is difficult to determine.
The statements of enthusiasts who
discover consciousness and resemblance to
man on every side should not be too readily
accepted.”
We must now add, that equal caution should
be used in regard to those authors who contend
that intelligence does not exist among
Invertebrates, but only “instinctive reactions
to stimuli.” To describe an act as “instinctive,”
moreover, does not explain much. G.
Bohn asks: “What is instinct?” and answers:
“A word.”
Mr. Garrett P. Serviss recently received a
letter from a citizen of Philadelphia from
which I quote the following paragraph:
“You speak of the intelligence of the
Spider. Understanding and reasoning go hand
in hand with intelligence; there is no intelligence
without reasoning or understanding,
hence it can be applied to Man. How do you
apply it to the Spider? So, as regarding the
Bee and the Ant, would you not think that
their intelligence is simply ‘instinct,’ peculiar
to their species for self-preservation?”
Mr. Serviss replied (in part) as follows:
“I see no reason for denying intelligence to
animals ranking below Man in the scale. Both
the lower animals and the human species possess
what are called instincts, which are said
to act spontaneously, without the aid of reasoning.
No animal, indeed, possesses a greater
number of instincts than Man.
“But if the distinction between instinct and
intelligence is to be based on the employment
of conscious reasoning or intelligence, this
faculty cannot be denied to the lower animals,
because I believe that many of them do exercise
a power of reasoning, i. e., of drawing
conclusions from observation.
“Natural history books are full of instances
of exhibitions of intelligence by Dogs, Cats,
Elephants, Horses and many other creatures.
It is true that some naturalists insist that all
of the apparently intentional and reasoned acts
of such creatures are merely manifestations
of instinct, or unconscious responses to external
stimuli, but all naturalists are not of
that opinion.”
No, they are not.
Prof. S. J. Holmes says: “Psychologists
nowadays with comparatively few exceptions
agree in regarding intelligence not as a faculty
standing in sharp contrast to instinct, as was
formerly taught, but as one resting on a foundation
of instinct, and gradually growing out
of behavior of the purely instinctive type. The
term intelligence is used here in the wider
sense as embracing all those forms of profiting
by experience through the formation of
associations. It therefore includes psychic activity
ranging from simple associative memory
to complex trains of reasoning.”
Paley, in his “Natural Theology,” defines instinct
as “a propensity prior to experience and
independent of instruction”; while Spencer
(“Principles of Psychology”) states that instinct
is a “compound reflex action,” which is
terse, if not explanatory.
Hartmann’s “purposeful action without consciousness
of the purpose” is a contradiction
in terms. “Purpose” implies consciousness of
end in view. One cannot readily believe that
when an Orang-utan builds its platform or
“nest” in the boughs of a tree in the jungle it
does not purpose (intend) to rest and sleep
on it; or that when a Beaver cuts down a tree
in such wise that it invariably falls in the
direction of its need it does not know that it
is constructing a hut to live in that will meet
the requirements of the situation in a running
stream.
Dr. Wm. T. Hornaday, in his authoritative
recent work, “The Minds and Manners of Wild
Animals,” (1922) says:
“Instinct is the knowledge or impulse which
animals or men derive from their ancestors by
inheritance, and which they obey, either consciously
or subconsciously[3] in working out
their own preservation, increase and betterment.
Instinct often functions as a sixth
sense.”
Again: “While avoiding the folly of idealism,
we also must shun the ways of the narrow
mind, and the eyes that refuse to see the
truth. Wild animals are not superhuman demigods
of wisdom; but neither are they idiots,
unable to reason from cause to effect along
the simple lines that vitally affect their existence....
Some animals have more intelligence
than some men; and some have far better
morals.”
Nevertheless, it is still “correct” to say:
“Man alone possesses reason.” Fundamentalists,
and even many scientists, find this phrase
acceptable. The “Age of Reason” began with
the appearance of Man on earth, according to
orthodox views. “Instinctive behavior” explains—for
many scientists—all acts even of
such highly organized creatures as Ants, Bees
and Wasps. Below this come “tropisms”—obligatory
movements made by the organism as
a whole in response to the varied stimuli of
its environment.
Then we have the category of “purely reflex”
actions of the organism—the definite but
unconscious reaction of the organism to stimulation
of certain nerve-cells.
In the higher microscopic organisms it is
admitted that any one of several reactions to
a given stimulus might occur, the organism
“trying” (unconsciously) one reaction after
another, on the hit or miss, or “trial and
error” method. Man, of course, learns by some
faculty other than “trial and error”—maybe.
Finally, and lowest in the scale of animal
evolution, we come to the Amœba, a unicellular
organism apparently lacking even in a rudimentary
nervous system. But this microscopic
speck of carnivorous protoplasm seeks and
pursues its zigzagging prey!
While there is no proof that psychic life
begins only with pluricellular animals, thus
denying any sort of consciousness of purpose
to even the highest groups (Ciliata) among
unicellular organisms (Protozoa), it must be
admitted that no conclusive evidence of the
presence of mind in these lowly organisms has
yet been presented. I shall therefore turn at
once to the Metazoa (many-celled animals) for
examples of the intelligence of Invertebrates;
beginning with the lowest in which manifestations
of mind are said to appear, namely, the
Earthworm.