1. I stated in my first book that my work was to start from
the Social war, the Hannibalian war, and the war for the
possession of Coele-Syria. In the same book I stated my
reasons for devoting my first two books to a sketch of the
period preceding those events. I will now, after a few
prefatory remarks as to the scope of my own work, address
myself to giving a complete account of these wars, the causes
which led to them, and which account for the proportions to
which they attained.
The one aim and object, then, of all that I have undertaken
to write is to show how, when, and why all the
known parts of the world fell under the
dominion of Rome. A summary of
the work from
B.C. 220 to B.C. 168.
Now as this great event
admits of being exactly dated as to its beginning,
duration, and final accomplishment, I think it will
be advantageous to give, by way of preface, a summary statement
of the most important phases in it between the beginning
and the end. For I think I shall thus best secure to the
student an adequate idea of my whole plan, for as the comprehension
of the whole is a help to the understanding of
details, and the knowledge of details of great service to the
clear conception of the whole; believing that the best and
clearest knowledge is that which is obtained from a combination
of these, I will preface my whole history by a brief
summary of its contents.
I have already described its scope and limits. As to its
several parts, the first consists of the above mentioned wars,
while the conclusion or closing scene is the fall of the
Macedonian monarchy. The time included between these
limits is fifty-three years, and never has an equal space embraced
events of such magnitude and importance.B.C. 220-216. In describing
them I shall start from the 140th Olympiad and
shall arrange my exposition in the following order:
2. First I shall indicate the causes of the Punic or
Hannibalian war: and shall have to describe
how the Carthaginians entered Italy; 1. The cause and
course of the
Hannibalian war.
broke up
the Roman power there; made the Romans
tremble for their safety and the very soil of their country;
and contrary to all calculation acquired a good prospect of
surprising Rome itself.
I shall next try to make it clear how in the same period
Philip of Macedon, after finishing his war with 2. Macedonian
treaty with Carthage,
B.C. 216.
the Aetolians, and subsequently settling the
affairs of Greece, entered upon a design of
forming an offensive and defensive alliance with Carthage.
Then I shall tell how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator
first quarrelled and finally went to war with 3. Syrian war,
B.C. 218.
each other for the possession of Coele-Syria.
Next how the Rhodians and Prusias went to war with the
Byzantines, and compelled them to desist from 4. Byzantine war,
B.C. 220.
exacting dues from ships sailing into the Pontus.
At this point I shall pause in my narrative to introduce a
disquisition upon the Roman Constitution, First digression
on the Roman
Constitution.
in
which I shall show that its peculiar character
contributed largely to their success, not only in
reducing all Italy to their authority, and in acquiring a
supremacy over the Iberians and Gauls besides, but also at
last, after their conquest of Carthage, to their conceiving the
idea of universal dominion.
Along with this I shall introduce another Second on Hiero
of Syracuse.
digression on the fall of Hiero of Syracuse.
After these digressions will come the disturbances in
Egypt; how, after the death of King Ptolemy, 5. The attempted
partition of the
dominions of Ptolemy
Epiphanes,
B.C. 204.
Antiochus and Philip entered into a compact
for the partition of the dominions of that
monarch’s infant son. I shall describe their
treacherous dealings, Philip laying hands upon
the islands of the Aegean, and Caria and Samos, Antiochus
upon Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.
3. Next, after a summary recapitulation of the proceedings of
the Carthaginians and Romans in Iberia, Libya, 6. War with
Philip, B.C. 201-197.
and Sicily, I shall, following the changes of
events, shift the scene of my story entirely to
Greece. Here I shall first describe the naval battles of Attalus
and the Rhodians against Philip; and the war between Philip
and Rome, the persons engaged, its circumstances, and result.
Next to this I shall have to record the wrath of the Aetolians,
in consequence of which they invited the aid of
Antiochus, and thereby gave rise to what is 7. Asiatic war,
B.C. 192-191.
called the Asiatic war against Rome and the
Achaean league. Having stated the causes of this war, and
described the crossing of Antiochus into Europe, I shall have
to show first in what manner he was driven from Greece;
secondly, how, being defeated in the war, he was forced to
cede all his territory west of Taurus; and thirdly, how the
Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Gauls, secured
undisputed possession of Asia, and freed all the nations on
the west of Taurus from the fear of barbarian inroads and
the lawless violence of the Gauls.
Next, after reviewing the disasters of the Aetolians and
Cephallenians, I shall pass to the wars waged 8. Gallic wars of
Eumenes and
Prusias.
by Eumenes against Prusias and the Gauls; as
well as that carried on in alliance with Ariarathes
against Pharnaces.
Finally, after speaking of the unity and settlement of the
Peloponnese, and of the growth of the commonwealth
of Rhodes, I shall add a summary of 9. Union of the
Peloponnese.
Antiochus
Epiphanes in
Egypt. Fall of
the Macedonian
monarchy,
B.C. 188-168.
my whole work, concluding by an account
of the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes
against Egypt; of the war against Perseus;
and the destruction of the Macedonian
monarchy. Throughout the whole narrative it
will be shown how the policy adopted by the Romans in one
after another of these cases, as they arose, led to their eventual
conquest of the whole world.
4. And if our judgment of individuals and constitutions,
for praise or blame, could be adequately formed from a simple
consideration of their successes or defeats, I must necessarily
have stopped at this point, and have concluded my history as
soon as I reached these last events in accordance with my
original plan. For at this point the fifty-three years were
coming to an end, and the progress of the Roman power had
arrived at its consummation. And, besides, by this time
the acknowledgment had been extorted from all that the
supremacy of Rome must be accepted, and her commands
obeyed. The plan extended
to embrace
the period from
B.C. 168-146.
But in truth, judgments of either side
founded on the bare facts of success or failure
in the field are by no means final. It has
often happened that what seemed the most
signal successes have, from ill management, brought the
most crushing disasters in their train; while not unfrequently
the most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit,
have been turned to actual advantage. I am bound, therefore,
to add to my statement of facts a discussion on the
subsequent policy of the conquerors, and their administration
of their universal dominion: and again on the
various feelings and opinions entertained by other nations
towards their rulers. And I must also describe the tastes
and aims of the several nations, whether in their private
lives or public policy. The present generation will learn
from this whether they should shun or seek the rule
of Rome; and future generations will be taught whether to
praise and imitate, or to decry it. The usefulness of my
history, whether for the present or the future, will mainly lie
in this. For the end of a policy should not be, in the eyes
either of the actors or their historians, simply to conquer others
and bring all into subjection. Nor does any man of sense
go to war with his neighbours for the mere purpose of
mastering his opponents; nor go to sea for the mere sake of
the voyage; nor engage in professions and trades for the sole
purpose of learning them. In all these cases the objects are
invariably the pleasure, honour, or profit which are the results
of the several employments. Accordingly the object of this
work shall be to ascertain exactly what the position of the several
states was, after the universal conquest by which they fell under
the power of Rome, until the commotions and disturbances
which broke out at a later period. These I designed to
make the starting-point of what may almost be called a new
work, partly because of the greatness and surprising nature of
the events themselves, but chiefly because, in the case of most
of them, I was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases one
of the actors, and in others the chief director.
5. The events I refer to are the wars of Rome against the
Celtiberians and Vaccaei; those of Carthage A new departure;
the breaking-up
of the arrangement
made after
the fall of
Macedonia.
Wars of Carthage
against Massinissa;
and of
Rome against
the Celtiberians,
B.C. 155-150;
and against Carthage
(3d Punic
war, B.C. 149-146).
against Massinissa, king of Libya; and those
of Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Then also
Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia, having been
ejected from his throne by Orophernes through
the agency of King Demetrius, recovered his
ancestral power by the help of Attalus; while
Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after twelve years’
possession of the throne of Syria, was deprived
of it, and of his life at the same time, by a combination
of the other kings against him. Then
it was, too, that the Romans restored to their
country those Greeks who had been charged
with guilt in the matter of the war with Perseus, after formally
acquitting them of the crimes alleged against them. Not
long afterwards the same people turned their hands against
Carthage: at first with the intention of forcing its removal to
some other spot, but finally, for reasons to be afterwards
stated, with the resolution of utterly destroying it. Contemporaneous
with this came the renunciation by the Macedonians
of their friendship to Rome, and by the Lacedaemonians
of their membership of the Achaean league, to
which the disaster that befell all Greece alike owed its beginning
and end.
This is my purpose: but its fulfilment must depend upon
whether Fortune protracts my life to the necessary length. I am
persuaded, however, that, even if the common human destiny
does overtake me, this theme will not be allowed to lie idle
for want of competent men to handle it; for there are many
besides myself who will readily undertake its completion.
But having given the heads of the most remarkable events,
with the object of enabling the reader to grasp the general
scope of my history as well as the arrangement of its several
parts, I must now, remembering my original plan, go back to
the point at which my history starts.
6. Some historians of the Hannibalian war, when they wish
to point out to us the causes of this contest The origin of the
2d Punic war;
between Rome and Carthage, allege first the
siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians, and,
secondly, their breach of treaty by crossing the river called by
the natives the Iber. But though I should call these the
first actions in the war, B.C. 334,
I cannot admit them
to be its causes. One might just as well say
B.C. 192,
that the crossing of Alexander the Great into Asia was the
cause of the Persian war, and the descent of
Antiochus upon Demetrias the cause of his war
with Rome. In neither would it be a probable or true statement.
In the first case, this action of Alexander’s could not be
called the cause of a war, for which both he and his father
Philip in his lifetime had made elaborate preparations: and in
the second case, we know that the Aetolian league had done
the same, with a view to a war with Rome, before Antiochus
came upon the scene. Such definitions are only worthy of men
who cannot distinguish between a first overt act and a cause or
pretext; and who do not perceive that a cause is the first in
a series of events of which such an overt act is the last. I
shall therefore regard the first attempt to put into execution
what had already been determined as a “beginning,” but I
shall look for “causes” in the motives which suggested such
action and the policy which dictated it; for it is by these, and
the calculations to which they give rise, that men are led to
decide upon a particular line of conduct. The soundness of
this method will be proved by the following considerations.
The true causes and origin of the invasion of Persia by Alexander
are patent to everybody. They were, B.C. 401-400,
first, the return march of the Greeks under
Xenophon through the country from the upper Satrapies;
in the course of which, though throughout Asia all the populations
were hostile, not a single barbarian ventured to face
them: B.C. 396-394,
secondly, the invasion of Asia by the
Spartan king Agesilaus, in which, though he was
obliged by troubles in Greece to return in the middle of his
expedition without effecting his object, he yet found no resistance
of any importance or adequacy. It was these circumstances
which convinced Philip of the cowardice and inefficiency
of the Persians; and comparing them with his own high state
of efficiency for war, and that of his Macedonian subjects, and
placing before his eyes the splendour of the rewards to be
gained by such a war, and the popularity which it would bring
him in Greece, he seized on the pretext of avenging the injuries
done by Persia to Greece, and determined with great
eagerness to undertake this war; and was in fact at the time
of his death engaged in making every kind of preparation for it.
Here we have the cause and the pretext of the Persian war.
Alexander’s expedition into Asia was the first action in it.
7. So too of the war of Antiochus with Rome. The cause
was evidently the exasperation of the Aetolians, and of the war
with Antiochus.
who, thinking that they had been slighted in
a number of instances at the end of the war
with Philip, not only called in the aid of Antiochus, but resolved
to go to every extremity in satisfying the anger which
the events of that time had aroused in them. This was the
cause. As for the pretext, it was the liberation of Greece,
which they went from city to city with Antiochus proclaiming,
without regard to reason or truth; while the first act in the
war was the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias.
My object in enlarging upon this distinction is not to attack
the historians in question, but to rectify the ideas of the
studious. A physician can do no good to the sick who does
not know the causes of their ailments; nor can a statesman
do any good who is unable to conceive the manner, cause, and
source of the events with which he has from time to time to deal.
Surely the former could not be expected to institute a suitable
system of treatment for the body; nor the latter to grapple with
the exigencies of the situation, without possessing this knowledge
of its elements. There is nothing, therefore, which we
ought to be more alive to, and to seek for, than the causes of
every event which occurs. For the most important results
are often produced by trifles; and it is invariably easier to
apply remedial measures at the beginning, before things have
got beyond the stage of conception and intention.
8. Now the Roman annalist Fabius asserts that the cause
of the Hannibalian war, besides the injury inflicted
upon Saguntum, The credibility of
Fabius Pictor.
was the encroaching and
ambitious spirit of Hasdrubal. “Having secured
great power in Iberia, he returned to Libya with the design
of destroying the constitution and reducing Carthage to a
despotism. But the leading statesmen, getting timely warning
of his intention, banded themselves together and successfully
opposed him. Suspecting this Hasdrubal retired from Libya,
and thenceforth governed Iberia entirely at his own will without
taking any account whatever of the Carthaginian Senate.
This policy had had in Hannibal from his earliest youth a
zealous supporter and imitator; and when he succeeded to
the command in Iberia he continued it: and accordingly, even
in the case of this war with Rome, was acting on his own
authority and contrary to the wish of the Carthaginians; for
none of the men of note in Carthage approved of his attack
upon Saguntum.” This is the statement of Fabius, who goes
on to say, that “after the capture of that city an embassy
arrived in Carthage from Rome demanding that Hannibal
should be given up on pain of a declaration of war.”
Now what answer could Fabius have given if we had put
the following question to him? “What better chance or
opportunity could the Carthaginians have had of combining
justice and interest? According to your own account they
disliked the proceeding of Hannibal: why did they not submit
to the demands of Rome by surrendering the author of the
injury; and thus get rid of the common enemy of the state
without the odium of doing it themselves, and secure the
safety of their territory by ridding themselves of the threatened
war—all of which they could have effected by merely passing
a decree?” If this question were put, I say, it would admit
of no answer. The fact is that, so far from doing anything of
the sort, they maintained the war in accordance with Hannibal’s
policy for seventeen years; and refused to make terms
until, at the end of a most determined struggle, they found
their own city and persons in imminent danger of destruction.
9. I do not allude to Fabius and his annals from any fear of
their wearing such an air of probability in themselves as to
gain any credit,—for the fact is that his assertions are so contrary
to reason, that it does not need any argument of mine to
help his readers to perceive it,—but I wished to warn those
who take up his books not to be misled by the authority of his
name, but to be guided by facts. For there is a certain class
of readers in whose eyes the personality of the writer is of more
account than what he says. They look to the fact that
Fabius was a contemporary and a member of the Senate, and
assume without more ado that everything he says may be
trusted. My view, however, is that we ought not to hold the
authority of this writer lightly: yet at the same time that we
should not regard it as all-sufficient; but in reading his writings
should test them by a reference to the facts themselves.
This is a digression from my immediate subject, which is
the war between Carthage and Rome. The Hannibalian
or 2nd Punic war.
First cause.
The
cause of this war we must reckon to be the
exasperation of Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, the
father of Hannibal. The result of the war in Sicily had not
broken the spirit of that commander. He regarded himself as
unconquered; for the troops at Eryx which he commanded
were still sound and undismayed: and though he yielded so
far as to make a treaty, it was a concession to the exigencies
of the times brought on by the defeat of the Carthaginians at
sea. But he never relaxed in his determined purpose of revenge;
and, had it not been for the mutiny of the mercenaries
at Carthage, he would at once have sought and made
another occasion for bringing about a war, as far as he was
able to do so: as it was, he was preoccupied by the domestic
war, and had to give his attention entirely to that.
10. When the Romans, at the conclusion of this mercenary
war, proclaimed war with Carthage, the latter at
first was inclined to resist at all hazards, B.C. 238.
Bk. i. ch. 88.
Second cause.
because
the goodness of her cause gave her hopes
of victory,—as I have shown in my former book, without which
it would be impossible to understand adequately either this or
what is to follow. The Romans, however, would not listen to
anything: and the Carthaginians therefore yielded to the force
of circumstances; and though feeling bitterly aggrieved, yet being
quite unable to do anything, evacuated Sardinia, and consented
to pay a sum of twelve hundred talents, in addition to the
former indemnity paid them, on condition of avoiding the
war at that time. This is the second and the most important
cause of the subsequent war. For Hamilcar, having this public
grievance in addition to his private feelings of anger, as soon as
he had secured his country’s safety by reducing the rebellious
mercenaries, set at once about securing the Carthaginian
power in Iberia with the intention of using it as a base of
operations against Rome. Third cause.
So that I record as a
third cause of the war the Carthaginian success
in Iberia: for it was the confidence inspired by their forces there
which encouraged them to embark upon it. It would be easy
to adduce other facts to show that Hamilcar, though he had
been dead ten years at its commencement, largely contributed
to bring about the second Punic war, but what I am about to
say will be sufficient to establish the fact.
11. When, after his final defeat by the Romans, Hannibal
had at last quitted his country and was staying
at the court of Antiochus, Hannibal’s oath.
the warlike attitude
of the Aetolian league induced the Romans to send ambassadors
to Antiochus, that they might be informed of the king’s
intentions. These ambassadors found that Antiochus was inclined
to the Aetolian alliance, and was eager for war with
Rome; B.C. 195.
they accordingly paid great court to
Hannibal with a view of bringing him into
suspicion with the king. And in this they entirely succeeded.
As time went on the king became ever more and more suspicious
of Hannibal, until at length an opportunity occurred
for an explanation of the alienation that had been thus secretly
growing up between them. Hannibal then defended himself
at great length, but without success, until at last he made the
following statement: B.C. 238.
“When my father was
about to go on his Iberian expedition I was
nine years old: and as he was offering the sacrifice to Zeus I
stood near the altar. The sacrifice successfully performed,
my father poured the libation and went through the
usual ritual. He then bade all the other worshippers stand a
little back, and calling me to him asked me affectionately
whether I wished to go with him on his expedition. Upon
my eagerly assenting, and begging with boyish enthusiasm to
be allowed to go, he took me by the right hand and led me up
to the altar, and bade me lay my hand upon the victim and
swear that I would never be friends with Rome. So long,
then, Antiochus, as your policy is one of hostility to Rome,
you may feel quite secure of having in me a most thorough-going
supporter. But if ever you make terms or friendship
with her, then you need not wait for any slander to make you
distrust me and be on your guard against me; for there is
nothing in my power that I would not do against her.”
12. Antiochus listened to this story, and being convinced
that it was told with genuine feeling and sincerity, gave up all
his suspicions. And we, too, must regard this as an unquestionable
proof of the animosity of Hamilcar and of the aim of
his general policy; which, indeed, is also proved by facts.
For he inspired his son-in-law Hasdrubal and his son Hannibal
with a bitterness of resentment against Rome which
nothing could surpass. Hasdrubal, indeed, was prevented by
death from showing the full extent of his purpose; but time
gave Hannibal abundant opportunity to manifest the hatred of
Rome which he had inherited from his father.
The most important thing, then, for statesmen to observe is
the motives of those who lay aside old enmities or form new
friendships; and to ascertain when their consent to treaties is
a mere concession to the necessities of the hour, and when it
is the indication of a real consciousness of defeat. In the former
case they must be on their guard against such people lying in
wait for an opportunity; while in the latter they may unhesitatingly
impose whatever injunctions are necessary, in full
reliance on the genuineness of their feelings whether as subjects
or friends. So much for the causes of the war. I will
now relate the first actions in it.
13. The Carthaginians were highly incensed by their loss
of Sicily, but their resentment was heightened still more, as I
have said, by the transaction as to Sardinia, and by the addition
recently made to their tribute. Accordingly, when the
greater part of Iberia had fallen into their power, they were on
the alert to seize any opportunity that presented itself of retaliating
upon Rome. At the death of Hasdrubal, to whom
they had committed the command in Iberia after the death of
Hamilcar, they waited at first to ascertain Death of Hamilcar,
B.C. 229.
the feelings of the army; but when news came from
thence that the troops had elected Hannibal as
commander-in-chief, a popular assembly was at once held, and
the choice of the army confirmed by a unanimous vote. As
soon as he had taken over the command, Hannibal Death of Hasdrubal,
B.C. 221.
set out to subdue the tribe of the Olcades;
and, having arrived before their most formidable
city Althaea, he pitched his camp under its walls;
and by a series of energetic and formidable assaults succeeded
before long in taking it: by which the rest of the tribe were
overawed into submission to Carthage. Having imposed
a contribution upon the towns, and thus become possessed of a
large sum of money, he went to the New Town to winter.
There, by a liberal treatment of the forces under his command,
giving them an instalment of their pay at once and promising
the rest, he established an excellent feeling towards himself in
the army, as well as great hopes for the future.
14. Next summer he set out on another expedition against
the Vaccaei, in which he took Salmantica by B.C. 220.
Hannibal attacks
the Vaccaei.
assault, but only succeeded in storming Arbucala,
owing to the size of the town and the number
and valour of its inhabitants, after a laborious siege. After this
he suddenly found himself in a position of very great danger
on his return march: being set upon by the Carpesii, the
strongest tribe in those parts, who were joined also by neighbouring
tribes, incited principally by refugees of the Olcades,
but roused also to great wrath by those who escaped from
Salmantica. If the Carthaginians had been compelled to give
these people regular battle, there can be no doubt that they
would have been defeated: but as it was, Hannibal, with
admirable skill and caution, slowly retreated until he had put the
Tagus between himself and the enemy; and thus giving battle
at the crossing of the stream, supported by it and the elephants,
of which he had about forty, he gained, to every one’s surprise,
a complete success. For when the barbarians attempted to
force a crossing at several points of the river at once, the
greater number of them were killed as they left the water by
the elephants, who marched up and down along the brink of
the river and caught them as they were coming out. Many of
them also were killed in the river itself by the cavalry, because
the horses were better able than the men to stand against the
stream, and also because the cavalry were fighting on higher
ground than the infantry which they were attacking. At
length Hannibal turned the tables on the enemy, and, recrossing
the river, attacked and put to flight their whole army, to
the number of more than a hundred thousand men. After
the defeat of this host, no one south of the Iber rashly ventured
to face him except the people of Saguntum. From that town
Hannibal tried his best to keep aloof; because, acting on the
suggestions and advice of his father Hamilcar, he did not wish
to give the Romans an avowed pretext for war until he had
thoroughly secured the rest of the country.
15. But the people of Saguntum kept sending ambassadors
to Rome, partly because they foresaw what was
coming, Saguntum appeals
to Rome.
Winter of B.C.
220-219.and trembled for their own existence,
and partly that the Romans might be kept fully
aware of the growing power of the Carthaginians
in Iberia. For a long time the Romans disregarded
their words: but now they sent out some commissioners to see
what was going on. Just at that time Hannibal had finished
the conquests which he intended for that season, and was
going into winter quarters at the New Town again, which was in
a way the chief glory and capital town of the Carthaginians in
Iberia. He found there the embassy from Rome, granted them
an interview, and listened to the message with which they were
charged. It was a strong injunction to him to leave Saguntum
alone, as being under the protection of Rome; and not to cross
the Iber, in accordance with the agreement come to in the
time of Hasdrubal. To this Hannibal answered with all the
heat of youth, inflamed by martial ardour, Hannibal’s
defiance.
recent success, and his long-standing hatred of
Rome. He charged the Romans with having a short time before,
when on some political disturbances arising in the town they
had been chosen to act as arbitrators, seized the opportunity to
put some of the leading citizens to death; and he declared
that the Carthaginians would not allow the Saguntines to be
thus treacherously dealt with, for it was the traditional policy
of Carthage to protect all persons so wronged. At the same
time he sent home for instructions as to what he was to do
“in view of the fact that the Saguntines were injuring certain
of their subject allies.” And altogether he was in a state of
unreasoning anger and violent exasperation, which prevented
him from availing himself of the real causes for war, and made
him take refuge in pretexts which would not admit of justification,
after the manner of men whose passions master all
considerations of equity. How much better it would have
been to demand of Rome the restoration of Sardinia, and the
remission of the tribute, which she had taken an unfair
opportunity to impose on pain of a declaration of war. As
it was, he said not a word of the real cause, but alleged the
fictitious one of the matter of Saguntum; and so got the credit
of beginning the war, not only in defiance of reason, but still
more in defiance of justice. The Roman ambassadors, finding
that there must undoubtedly be a war, sailed to Carthage to
enter the same protest before the people there. They expected,
however, that they would have to fight not in Italy,
but in Iberia, and that they would have Saguntum as a base of
operations.
16. Wherefore the Senate, by way of preparing to undertake
this business, and foreseeing that the war Illyrian war,
B.C. 219.
would be severe and protracted, and at a long
distance from the mother country, determined
to make Illyria safe. For it happened that, just at this time,
Demetrius of Pharos was sacking and subduing to his authority
the cities of Illyria which were subject to Rome, and had
sailed beyond Lissus, in violation of the treaty, with fifty
galleys, and had ravaged many of the Cyclades. For he
had quite forgotten the former kindnesses done him by
Rome, and had conceived a contempt for its power, when
he saw it threatened first by the Gauls and then by Carthage;
and he now rested all his hopes on the royal family of
Macedonia, because he had fought on the side of Antigonus,
and shared with him the dangers of the war against
Cleomenes. These transactions attracted the observation of
the Romans; who, seeing that the royal house of Macedonia
was in a flourishing condition, were very anxious to secure the
country east of Italy, feeling convinced that they would have
ample time to correct the rash folly of the Illyrians, and rebuke
and chastise the ingratitude and temerity of Demetrius. But
they were deceived in their calculations. For Hannibal anticipated
their measures by the capture of Saguntum: the result
of which was that the war took place not in Iberia, but close B.C. 219.
Coss. M. Livius
Salinator L.
Aemilius Paullus.
to Rome itself, and in various parts throughout
all Italy. However, with these ideas fixed in
their minds, the Romans despatched Lucius
Aemilius just before summer to conduct the
Illyrian campaign in the first year of the 140th Olympiad.
17. But Hannibal had started from New Carthage and was
leading his army straight against Saguntum. Hannibal besieges
Saguntum.
This city is situated on the seaward foot of
the mountain chain on which the frontiers of Iberia and
Celtiberia converge, and is about seven stades from the sea.
The district cultivated by its inhabitants is exceedingly
productive, and has a soil superior to any in all Iberia.
Under the walls of this town Hannibal pitched his camp
and set energetically to work on the siege, foreseeing many
advantages that would accrue if he could take it. Of these
the first was that he would thereby disappoint the Romans
in their expectation of making Iberia the seat of war: a
second was that he would thereby strike a general terror,
which would render the already obedient tribes more submissive,
and the still independent ones more cautious of
offending him: but the greatest advantage of all was that
thereby he would be able to push on his advance, without
leaving an enemy on his rear. Besides these advantages, he
calculated that the possession of this city would secure him
abundant supplies for his expedition, and create an enthusiasm
in the troops excited by individual acquisitions of booty;
while he would conciliate the goodwill of those who remained
at Carthage by the spoils which would be sent home. With
these ideas he pressed on the siege with energy: sometimes
setting an example to his soldiers by personally sharing in the
fatigues of throwing up the siege works; and sometimes cheering
on his men and recklessly exposing himself to danger.
After a siege extending to the eighth month, in the course of
which he endured every kind of suffering and Fall of Saguntum.
anxiety, he finally succeeded in taking the town.
An immense booty in money, slaves, and property fell into
his hands, which he disposed of in accordance with his original
design. The money he reserved for the needs of his projected
expedition; the slaves were distributed according to
merit among his men; while the property was at once sent
entire to Carthage. The result answered his expectations: the
army was rendered more eager for action; the home populace
more ready to grant whatever he asked; and he himself was
enabled, by the possession of such abundant means, to carry
out many measures that were of service to his expedition.
18. While this was taking place, Demetrius, discovering
the intentions of Rome, threw a sufficient garrison
into Dimale and victualled it in proportion. Illyrian war,
B.C. 219.
In the other towns he put those who were opposed to him
to death, and placed the chief power in the hands of his own
partisans; and selecting six thousand of the bravest of his
subjects, quartered them in Pharos. When the Consul
arrived in Illyria with his army, he found the enemies of
Rome confident in the strength of Dimale and the elaborate
preparations in it, and encouraged to resistance by their belief in
its impregnability; he determined, therefore, to attack that town
first, in order to strike terror into the enemy. Accordingly,
after addressing an exhortation to the several officers of the
legions, and throwing up siege works at several points, he began
the siege in form. In seven days he took the town by assault,
which so dismayed the enemy, that envoys immediately
appeared from all the towns, surrendering themselves unconditionally
to the protection of Rome. The Consul accepted
their submission: and after imposing such conditions
as appeared suitable to the several cases, he sailed to Pharos
to attack Demetrius himself. Being informed that the city
there was strongly fortified, thronged with excellent soldiers,
and well-furnished with provisions and all other munitions of
war, he began to entertain misgivings that the siege would be
long and difficult; and therefore, with a view to these difficulties,
he adopted on the spur of the moment the following
stratagem. He crossed to the island by night with his whole
army. The greater part of it he disembarked at a spot where
the ground was well-wooded and low; while with only twenty
ships he sailed at daybreak to the harbour nearest the town.
The smallness of the number of the ships moved only the
contempt of Demetrius when he saw them, and he immediately
marched out of the town down to the harbour to oppose the
landing of the enemy.
19. A violent struggle at once began: and, as it went on,
division after division of the troops in the city Capture of Pharos.
came down to support him, until at length the
whole force had poured out to take part in the engagement. The
Romans who had landed in the night arrived at the critical
moment, after a march by an obscure route; and seizing
a strong position on some rising ground between the city and
the harbour, efficiently cut off from the city the troops that had
sallied out. When Demetrius became aware of what had
taken place, he desisted from opposing the disembarkation;
and having rallied his men and addressed the ranks, he put
them in motion, with the resolution of fighting a pitched
battle with the troops on the hill. When the Romans
saw the Illyrian advance being made in good order and with
great spirit, they formed their ranks and charged furiously.
At the same moment the Roman troops which had just
effected their landing, seeing what was going on, charged
the enemy on the rear, who being thus attacked on both
sides, were thrown into great disorder and confusion. The
result was that, finding both his van and his rear in difficulties,
Demetrius fled. Some of his men retreated towards the city;
but most of them escaped by bye-paths into various parts of the
island. Demetrius himself made his way to some galleys which
he kept at anchor at a solitary point on the coast, with a view
to every contingency; and going on board, he sailed away
at nightfall, and arrived unexpectedly at the court of King
Philip, where he passed the remainder of his life:—a man
whose undoubted boldness and courage were unsupported by
either prudence or judgment. His end was of a piece with the
whole tenor of his life; for while endeavouring at the instigation
of Philip to seize Messene, he exposed himself during
the battle with a careless rashness which cost him his life; of
which I shall speak in detail when I come to that period.
The Consul Aemilius having thus taken Pharos at a blow,
levelled the city to the ground; and then having become
master of all Illyria, and having ordered all its affairs as he
thought right, returned towards the end of the summer to
Rome, where he celebrated a triumph amid expressions of
unmixed approval; for people considered that he had managed
this business with great prudence and even greater courage.
20. But when news came to Rome of the fall of Saguntum,
there was indeed no debate on the question of
war, Indignation at
Rome at the fall
of Saguntum.as some historians assert; who even add
the speeches delivered on either side. But
nothing could be more ridiculous. For is it conceivable
that the Romans should have a year before proclaimed
war with the Carthaginians in the event of their entering
the territory of Saguntum, and yet, when the city itself
had been taken, should have debated whether they should
go to war or no? Just as absurd are the wonderful statements
that the senators put on mourning, and that the
fathers introduced their sons above twelve years old into the
Senate House, who, being admitted to the debate, refrained
from divulging any of its secrets even to their nearest relations.
All this is as improbable as it is untrue; unless we are to
believe that Fortune, among its other bounties, granted the
Romans the privilege of being men of the world from their
cradles. I need not waste any more words upon such compositions
as those of Chaereas and Sosilus;165 which, in my
judgment, are more like the gossip of the barber’s shop and the
pavement than history.
The truth is that, when the Romans heard of the disaster
at Saguntum, they at once elected envoys, whom Envoys sent to
Carthage to
demand surrender
of Hannibal.
they despatched in all haste to Carthage with
the offer of two alternatives, one of which appeared
to the Carthaginians to involve disgrace
as well as injury if they accepted it, while the other was the
beginning of a great struggle and of great dangers. For one
of these alternatives was the surrender of Hannibal and
his staff to Rome, the other was war. When the Roman
envoys arrived and declared their message to the Senate, the
choice proposed to them between these alternatives was
listened to by the Carthaginians with indignation. Still they
selected the most capable of their number to state their case,
which was grounded on the following pleas.
21. Passing over the treaty made with Hasdrubal, as not
having ever been made, and, if it had, as not being binding on
them because made without their consent (and on this point
they quoted the precedent of the Romans themselves, who
in the Sicilian war repudiated the terms agreed upon and
accepted by Lutatius, as having been made without their
consent)—passing over this, they pressed with all the
vehemence they could, throughout the discussion, the last
treaty made in the Sicilian war; in which they affirmed that
there was no clause relating to Iberia, but one expressly providing
security for the allies of both parties to the treaty. Now,
they pointed out that the Saguntines at that time were not allies
of Rome, and therefore were not protected by the clause. To
prove their point, they read the treaty more than once aloud.
On this occasion the Roman envoys contented themselves
with the reply that, while Saguntum was intact, the matter in
dispute admitted of pleadings and of a discussion on its merits;
but that, that city having been treacherously seized, they had
only two alternatives,—either to deliver the persons guilty of
the act, and thereby make it clear that they had no share in
their crime, and that it was done without their consent; or, if
they were not willing to do that, and avowed their complicity
in it, to take the consequences.
The question of treaties between Rome and Carthage was
referred to in general terms in the course of this debate: but I
think a more particular examination of it will be useful both to
practical statesmen, who require to know the exact truth of the
matter, in order to avoid mistakes in any critical deliberation;
and to historical students, that they may not be led astray by
the ignorance or partisan bias of historians; but may have
before them a conspectus, acknowledged to be accurate, of the
various compacts which have been made between Rome and
Carthage from the earliest times to our own day.
22. The first treaty between Rome and Carthage was made
in the year of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus
Horatius, Treaties between
Rome and
Carthage.the first Consuls appointed after the
expulsion of the kings, by which men also
the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was consecrated. This was
twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece
by Xerxes. Of this treaty I append a translation, The first treaty,
B.C. 509-508.
as accurate as I could make it,—for the
fact is that the ancient language differs so much from that at
present in use, that the best scholars among the Romans themselves
have great difficulty in interpreting some points in it,
even after much study. The treaty is as follows:—
“There shall be friendship between the Romans and their
allies, and the Carthaginians and their allies, on these conditions:
“Neither the Romans nor their allies are to sail beyond
the Fair Promontory, unless driven by stress of weather or the
fear of enemies. If any one of them be driven ashore he
shall not buy or take aught for himself save what is needful
for the repair of his ship and the service of the gods, and he
shall depart within five days.
“Men landing for traffic shall strike no bargain save in the
presence of a herald or town-clerk. Whatever is sold in the
presence of these, let the price be secured to the seller on the
credit of the state—that is to say, if such sale be in Libya or
Sardinia.
“If any Roman comes to the Carthaginian province in
Sicily he shall enjoy all rights enjoyed by others. The Carthaginians
shall do no injury to the people of Ardea, Antium,
Laurentium, Circeii, Tarracina, nor any other people of the
Latins that are subject to Rome.
“From those townships even which are not subject to
Rome166 they shall hold their hands; and if they take one shall
deliver it unharmed to the Romans. They shall build no fort
in Latium; and if they enter the district in arms, they shall not
stay a night therein.”
23. The “Fair Promontory” here referred to is that which
lies immediately to the north of Carthage; south of which the
Carthaginians stipulated that the Romans should not sail with
ships of war, because, as I imagine, they did not wish them to
be acquainted with the coast near Byzacium, or the lesser
Syrtis, which places they call Emporia, owing to the productiveness
of the district. The treaty then goes on to say
that, if any one of them is driven thither by stress of weather
or fear of an enemy, and stands in need of anything for the
worship of the gods and the repair of his vessel, this and no
more he may take; and all those who have come to anchor
there must necessarily depart within five days. To Carthage,
and all the country on the Carthaginian side of the Fair Promontory
in Libya, to Sardinia, and the Carthaginian province of
Sicily, the treaty allows the Romans to sail for mercantile
purposes; and the Carthaginians engage their public credit
that such persons shall enjoy absolute security.
It is clear from this treaty that the Carthaginians speak of
Sardinia and Libya as belonging to them entirely; but, on the
other hand, make a distinction in the case of Sicily, and only
stipulate for that part of it which is subject to Carthage.
Similarly, the Romans also only stipulate concerning Latium;
the rest of Italy they do not mention, as not being under their
authority.
24. After this treaty there was a second, in which we find
that the Carthaginians have included the Second treaty,
B.C. 306 (?).
Tyrians and the township of Utica in addition
to their former territory; and to the Fair
Promontory Mastia and Tarseium are added, as the points
east of which the Romans are not to make marauding expeditions
or found a city. The treaty is as follows: “There
shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies,
and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and township of Utica, on
these terms: The Romans shall not maraud, nor traffic,
nor found a city east of the Fair Promontory, Mastia,
Tarseium. If the Carthaginians take any city in Latium which
is not subject to Rome, they may keep the prisoners and the
goods, but shall deliver up the town. If the Carthaginians
take any folk, between whom and Rome a peace has been
made in writing, though they be not subject to them, they
shall not bring them into any harbours of the Romans; if such
an one be so brought ashore, and any Roman lay claim to
him,167 he shall be released. In like manner shall the Romans
be bound towards the Carthaginians.
“If a Roman take water or provisions from any district
within the jurisdiction of Carthage, he shall not injure, while
so doing, any between whom and Carthage there is peace
and friendship. Neither shall a Carthaginian in like case. If
any one shall do so, he shall not be punished by private
vengeance, but such action shall be a public misdemeanour.
“In Sardinia and Libya no Roman shall traffic nor found
a city; he shall do no more than take in provisions and refit
his ship. If a storm drive him upon those coasts, he shall
depart within five days.
“In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and in Carthage
he may transact business and sell whatsoever it is lawful
for a citizen to do. In like manner also may a Carthaginian
at Rome.”
Once more in this treaty we may notice that the Carthaginians
emphasise the fact of their entire possession of Libya and
Sardinia, and prohibit any attempt of the Romans to land in
them at all; and on the other hand, in the case of Sicily, they
clearly distinguish their own province in it. So, too, the
Romans, in regard to Latium, stipulate that the Carthaginians
shall do no wrong to Ardea, Antium, Circeii, Tarracina, all of
which are on the seaboard of Latium, to which alone the
treaty refers.
25. A third treaty again was made by Rome at the time of
the invasion of Pyrrhus into Sicily, before the Third treaty,
B.C. 279.
Carthaginians undertook the war for the possession
of Sicily. This treaty contains the same
provisions as the two earlier treaties with these additional
clauses:—
“If they make a treaty of alliance with Pyrrhus, the
Romans or Carthaginians shall make it on such terms as
not to preclude the one giving aid to the other, if that one’s
territory is attacked.
“If one or the other stand in need of help, the Carthaginians
shall supply the ships, whether for transport or war;
but each people shall supply the pay for its own men employed
on them.
“The Carthaginians shall also give aid by sea to the
Romans if need be; but no one shall compel the crews to
disembark against their will.”
Provision was also made for swearing to these treaties. In
the case of the first, the Carthaginians were to swear by the
gods of their ancestors, the Romans by Jupiter Lapis, in
accordance with an ancient custom; in the case of the last
treaty, by Mars and Quirinus.
The form of swearing by Jupiter Lapis was this. The
commissioner for swearing to the treaty took a stone in his
hand, and, having taken the oath in the name of his country,
added these words, “If I abide by this oath may he bless me;
but if I do otherwise in thought or act, may all others be kept
safe each in his own country, under his own laws, in enjoyment
of his own goods, household gods, and tombs,—may I alone
be cast out, even as this stone is now.” And having uttered
these words he throws the stone from his hand.
26. Seeing that such treaties exist and are preserved to
this day, engraved on brass in the treasury of Misstatement of
Philinus.
the Aediles in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus,
the historian Philinus certainly does give us some reason
to be surprised at him. Not at his ignorance of their
existence: for even in our own day those Romans and
Carthaginians, whose age placed them nearest to the times,
and who had the reputation of taking the greatest interest
in public affairs, were unaware of it. But what is surprising
is, that he should have ventured on a statement exactly opposite:
“That there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage, in
virtue of which the Romans were bound to keep away from the
whole of Sicily, the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy; and
that the Romans broke the treaty and their oath when they
first crossed over to Sicily.” Whereas there does not exist,
nor ever has existed, any such written compact at all. Yet
this assertion he makes in so many words in his second book.
I referred to this in the preface of my work, but reserved a
more detailed discussion of it to this place; which was
necessary, because the assertion of Philinus has misled a
considerable number of people on this point. I have nothing
to say if a man chooses to attack the Romans for crossing into
Sicily, on the grounds of their having taken the Mamertines
into alliance at all; or in having thus acted in answer to their
request, after these men’s treachery to Rhegium as well as
Messene: but if any one supposes that in so crossing they
broke oaths or treaties, he is manifestly ignorant of the truth.
27. At the end of the first Punic war another treaty was
made, of which the chief provisions were these: Fourth treaty,
B.C. 241.
“The Carthaginians shall evacuate Sicily and
all islands lying between Italy and Sicily.
“The allies of neither of the parties to the treaty shall be
attacked by the other.
“Neither party shall impose any contribution, nor erect any
public building, nor enlist soldiers in the dominions of the
other, nor make any compact of friendship with the allies of
the other.
“The Carthaginians shall within ten years pay to the
Romans two-thousand two-hundred talents, and a thousand
on the spot; and shall restore all prisoners, without ransom,
to the Romans.”
Afterwards, at the end of the Mercenary war in Africa, the
Romans went so far as to pass a decree for war Fifth treaty,
B.C. 238.
with Carthage, but eventually made a treaty to
the following effect: “The Carthaginians shall
evacuate Sardinia, and pay an additional twelve hundred
talents.”
Finally, in addition to these treaties, came that negotiated
with Hasdrubal in Iberia, in which it was Sixth treaty,
B.C. 228.
stipulated that “the Carthaginians should not
cross the Iber with arms.”
Such were the mutual obligations established between
Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to that of
Hannibal.
28. As we find then that the Roman invasion of Sicily was
not in contravention of their oaths, so we must acknowledge
in the case of the second proclamation of
war, No excuse for the
Roman claim
on Sardinia.in consequence of which the treaty for
the evacuation of Sardinia was made, that
it is impossible to find any reasonable pretext or ground
for the Roman action. The Carthaginians were beyond
question compelled by the necessities of their position, contrary
to all justice, to evacuate Sardinia, and to pay this enormous sum
of money. For as to the allegation of the Romans, that they
had during the Mercenary war been guilty of acts of hostility
to ships sailing from Rome,—that was barred by their own act
in restoring, without ransom, the Carthaginian prisoners, in
gratitude for similar conduct on the part of Carthage to
Romans who had landed on their shores; a transaction which
I have spoken of at length in my previous book.168
These facts established, it remains to decide by a thorough
investigation to which of the two nations the origin of the
Hannibalian war is to be imputed.
29. I have explained the pleas advanced by the Carthaginians;
I must now state what is alleged on the contrary by
the Romans. For though it is true that in this particular interview,
owing to their anger at the fall of Saguntum, they did
not use these arguments, yet they were appealed to on many
occasions, and by many of their citizens. The Roman
Case.First,
they argued that the treaty of Hasdrubal could
not be ignored, as the Carthaginians had the assurance to do:
for it did not contain the clause, which that of Lutatius did,
making its validity conditional on its ratification by the people
of Rome; but Hasdrubal made the agreement absolutely and
authoritatively that “the Carthaginians should not cross the
Iber in arms.”
Next they alleged that the clause in the treaty respecting
Sicily, which by their own admission stipulated that “the allies
of neither party should be attacked by the other,” did not refer
to then existing allies only, as the Carthaginians interpreted it;
for in that case a clause would have been added, disabling either
from making new alliances in addition to those already existing,
or excluding allies, taken subsequently to the making of the
treaty, from its benefits. But since neither of these provisions
was made, it was plain that both the then existing allies, and
all those taken subsequently on either side, were entitled to
reciprocal security. And this was only reasonable. For it
was not likely that they would have made a treaty depriving
them of the power, when opportunity offered, of taking
on such friends or allies as seemed to their interest; nor,
again, if they had taken any such under their protection,
was it to be supposed that they would allow them to be
injured by any persons whatever. But, in fact, the main thing
present in the minds of both parties to the treaty was, that
they should mutually agree to abstain from attacking each
other’s allies, and on no account admit into alliance with
themselves the allies of the other: and it was to subsequent
allies that this particular clause applied, “Neither shall enlist
soldiers, or impose contributions on the provinces or allies of
the other; and all shall be alike secure of attack from the
other side.”
30. These things being so, they argued that it was beyond
controversy that Saguntum had accepted the protection of
Rome, several years before the time of Hannibal. The
strongest proof of this, and one which would not be contested
by the Carthaginians themselves, was that, when political
disturbances broke out at Saguntum, the people chose the
Romans, and not the Carthaginians, as arbitrators to settle the
dispute and restore their constitution, although the latter were
close at hand and were already established in Iberia.
I conclude, then, that if the destruction of Saguntum is to
be regarded as the cause of this war, the Carthaginians
must be acknowledged to be in Mutual
provocation.
the wrong, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, which
secured immunity from attack for the allies of both parties,
and in view of the treaty of Hasdrubal, which disabled
the Carthaginians from passing the Iber with arms.169 If
on the other hand the taking Sardinia from them, and imposing
the heavy money fine which accompanied it, are to
be regarded as the causes, we must certainly acknowledge
that the Carthaginians had good reason for undertaking
the Hannibalian war: for as they had only yielded to the
pressure of circumstances, so they seized a favourable turn in
those circumstances to revenge themselves on their injurers.
31. Some uncritical readers may perhaps say that such
minute discussion on points of this kind is unnecessary. And
if any man were entirely self-sufficing in every event, I might
allow that the accurate knowledge of the past, though a graceful
accomplishment, was perhaps not essential: but as long as
it is not in mere mortals to say this, either in public or private
affairs,—seeing that no man of sense, even if he is prosperous
for the moment, will ever reckon with certainty on the future,—then
I say that such knowledge is essential, and not merely
graceful. For take the three commonest cases. Suppose,
first, a statesman to be attacked either in his own person or in
that of his country: or, secondly, suppose him to be anxious
for a forward policy and to anticipate the attack of an enemy:
or, lastly, suppose him to desire to maintain the status quo.
In all these cases it is history alone that can supply him with
precedents, and teach him how, in the first case, to find supporters
and allies; in the second, to incite co-operation; and
in the third, to give vigour to the conservative forces which
tend to maintain, as he desires, the existing state of things.
In the case of contemporaries, it is difficult to obtain an insight
into their purposes; because, as their words and actions are
dictated by a desire of accommodating themselves to the
necessity of the hour, and of keeping up appearances, the truth
is too often obscured. Whereas the transactions of the past
admit of being tested by naked fact; and accordingly display
without disguise the motives and purposes of the several persons
engaged; and teach us from what sort of people to expect
favour, active kindness, and assistance, or the reverse. They
give us also many opportunities of distinguishing who would
be likely to pity us, feel indignation at our wrongs, and defend
our cause,—a power that contributes very greatly to national
as well as individual security. Neither the writer nor the
reader of history, therefore, should confine his attention to a
bare statement of facts: he must take into account all that
preceded, accompanied, or followed them. For if you take
from history all explanation of cause, principle, and motive,
and of the adaptation of the means to the end, what is left
is a mere panorama without being instructive; and, though
it may please for the moment, has no abiding value.
32. Another mistake is to look upon my history as difficult
to obtain or master, because of the number and size of the
books. Compare it in these particulars with the various
writings of the episodical historians. Is it not much easier to
purchase and read my forty books, which are as it were all in
one piece, and so to follow with a comprehensive glance the
events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the time of Pyrrhus to
the fall of Carthage, and those in the rest of the world from
the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta, continuously, to the battle
between the Achaeans and Romans at the Isthmus? To say
nothing of the fact that the compositions of these historians
are many times as numerous as mine, it is impossible for their
readers to get any certain information from them: first,
because most of them differ in their account of the same
transactions; and secondly, because they omit contemporary
history,—the comparative review of which would put a very
different complexion upon events to that derived from isolated
treatment,—and are unable to touch upon the most decisive
events at all. For, indeed, the most important parts of history
are those which treat the events which follow or accompany
a certain course of conduct, and pre-eminently so those
which treat of causes. For instance, we see that the war with
Antiochus took its rise from that with Philip; that with Philip
from the Hannibalian; and the Hannibalian from the Sicilian
war: and though between these wars there were numerous
events of various character, they all converged upon the same
consummation. Such a comprehensive view may be obtained
from universal history, but not from the histories of particular
wars, such as those with Perseus or Philip; unless we fondly
imagine that, by reading the accounts contained in them of
the pitched battles, we gain a knowledge of the conduct
and plan of the whole war. This of course is not the
case; and in the present instance I hope that there will be
as wide a difference between my history and such episodical
compositions, as between real learning and mere listening.
33. To resume the story of the Carthaginians and the Roman
deputies.170 To the arguments of the former the Answer of Fabius.
See Livy, 21, 18.
ambassadors made no answer, except that the
senior among them, in the presence of the assembly, pointed
to the folds of his toga and said that in them he carried
peace and war, and that he would bring out and leave with
them whichever they bade him. The Carthaginian Suffete171
bade him bring out whichever of the two he chose: and upon
the Roman saying that it should be war, a majority of the senators
cried out in answer that they accepted it. It was on these terms
that the Senate and the Roman ambassadors parted.
Meanwhile Hannibal, upon going into winter quarters at
New Carthage, first of all dismissed the Iberians
to their various cities, with the view of their being
prepared and vigorous for the next campaign. Winter of 219-218
B.C. Hannibal’s
arrangements
for the
coming campaign.
Secondly, he instructed his brother Hasdrubal
in the management of his government in Iberia,
and of the preparations to be made against
Rome, in case he himself should be separated from him.
Thirdly, he took precautions for the security of Libya, by
selecting with prudent skill certain soldiers from the home
army to come over to Iberia, and certain from the Iberian
army to go to Libya; by which interchange he secured cordial
feeling of confidence between the two armies. The Iberians
sent to Libya were the Thersitae, the Mastiani, as well as
the Oretes and Olcades, mustering together twelve hundred
cavalry and thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot.
Besides these there were eight hundred and seventy slingers
from the Balearic Isles, whose name, as that of the islands
they inhabit, is derived from the word ballein, “to throw,”
because of their peculiar skill with the sling. Most of these
troops he ordered to be stationed at Metagonia in Libya, and
the rest in Carthage itself. And from the cities in the district
of Metagonia he sent four thousand foot also into Carthage, to
serve at once as hostages for the fidelity of their country, and as
an additional guard for the city. With his brother Hasdrubal
in Iberia he left fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes, and five
triremes, thirty-two of the quinqueremes being furnished with
crews, and all five of the triremes; also cavalry consisting of
four hundred and fifty Libyophenicians and Libyans, three
hundred Lergetae, eighteen hundred Numidians of the Massolian,
Massaesylian, Maccoeian, and Maurian tribes, who dwell
by the ocean; with eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty
Libyans, three hundred Ligures, five hundred of the Balearic
Islanders, and twenty-one elephants.
The accuracy of this enumeration of Hannibal’s Iberian
establishment need excite no surprise, though The inscription
recording these
facts.
it is such as a commander himself would have
some difficulty in displaying; nor ought I to
be condemned at once of imitating the specious falsehoods
of historians: for the fact is that I myself found on Lacinium172
a bronze tablet, which Hannibal had caused to be inscribed
with these particulars when he was in Italy; and holding it
to be an entirely trustworthy authority for such facts, I did
not hesitate to follow it.
34. Though Hannibal had taken every precaution for the
security of Libya and Iberia, he yet waited for the messengers
whom he expected to arrive from the Celts. He had thoroughly
acquainted himself with the fertility and populousness of the
districts at the foot of the Alps and in the valley of the
Padus, as well as with the warlike courage of the men;
but most important of all, with their hostile feelings to Rome
derived from the previous war, which I described in my last
book, with the express purpose of enabling my readers to
follow my narrative. He therefore reckoned very much on
the chance of their co-operation; and was careful to send
messages to the chiefs of the Celts, whether dwelling actually
on the Alps or on the Italian side of them, with unlimited
promises; because he believed that he would be able to confine
the war against Rome to Italy, if he could make his way
through the intervening difficulties to these parts, and avail
himself of the active alliance of the Celts. When his messengers
returned with a report that the Celts were ready to help
him and all eagerness for his approach; and that the passage
of the Alps, though laborious and difficult, was not, however,
impossible, he collected his forces from their winter quarters
at the approach of spring. Just before receiving this report
he had learnt the circumstances attending the Roman embassy
at Carthage. Encouraged by the assurance thus given him,
that he would be supported by the popular sentiment at home,
he no longer disguised from his army that the object of the
forthcoming campaign was Rome; and tried to inspire them
with courage for the undertaking. He explained to them how
the Romans had demanded the surrender of himself and all
the officers of the army: and pointed out the fertility of the
country to which they were going, and the goodwill and
active alliance which the Celts were prepared to offer them.
When the crowd of soldiers showed an enthusiastic readiness
to accompany him, he dismissed the assembly, after
thanking them, and naming the day on which he intended
to march.
35. These measures satisfactorily accomplished while he was
in winter quarters, and the security of Libya B.C. 218.
Hannibal breaks
up his winter
quarters and
starts for Italy.
and Iberia being sufficiently provided for; when
the appointed day arrived, Hannibal got his army
in motion, which consisted of ninety thousand
infantry and about twelve thousand cavalry.
After crossing the Iber, he set about subduing the tribes of
the Ilurgetes and Bargusii, as well as the Aerenosii and Andosini,
as far as the Pyrenees. When he had reduced all this
country under his power, and taken certain towns by storm,
which he did with unexpected rapidity, though not without
severe fighting and serious loss; he left Hanno in chief command
of all the district north of the Iber, and with absolute
authority over the Burgusii, who were the people that gave
him most uneasiness on account of their friendly feeling towards
Rome. He then detached from his army ten thousand
foot and a thousand horse for the service of Hanno,—to whom
also he entrusted the heavy baggage of the troops that were to
accompany himself,—and the same number to go to their own
land. The object of this last measure was twofold: he thereby
left a certain number of well-affected persons behind him; and
also held out to the others a hope of returning home, both to
those Iberians who were to accompany him on his march, and
to those also who for the present were to remain at home, so
that there might be a general alacrity to join him if he were
ever in want of a reinforcement. He then set his remaining
troops in motion unencumbered by heavy baggage, fifty thousand
infantry and nine thousand cavalry, and led them through
the Pyrenees to the passage of the river Rhone. The army
was not so much numerous, as highly efficient, and in an extraordinary
state of physical training from their continuous
battles with the Iberians.
36. But as a knowledge of topography is necessary for the
right understanding of my narrative, Geography of
Hannibal’s march.I must state
the places from which Hannibal started, through
which he marched, and into which he descended when he
arrived in Italy. Nor must I, like some historians, content
myself with mentioning the mere names of places and rivers,
under the idea that that is quite sufficient to give a clear knowledge.
My opinion is that, in the case of well-known places,
the mention of names is of great assistance, but that, in the
case of unknown countries, names are no better than unintelligible
and unmeaning sounds: for the understanding
having nothing to go upon, and being unable by referring to
something known to translate the words into thought, the narrative
becomes confused and vague, and conveys no clear idea.
A plan therefore must be discovered, whereby it shall be
possible, while speaking of unknown countries, to convey real
and intelligible notions.
The first, most important, and most general conception is
that of the division of the heaven into four quarters, which all
of us that are capable of a general idea at all know as east,
west, south, and north. The next is to arrange the several
parts of the globe according to these points, and always
to refer in thought any place mentioned to one or other
of them. We shall thus get an intelligible and familiar
conception of places which we do not know or have never
seen.
37. This principle established as universally applicable to
the world, the next point will be to make the General view of
the geography of
the world.
geography of our own part of it intelligible by a
corresponding division.
It falls, then, into three divisions, each distinguished by a
particular name,—Asia, Libya, Europe.173 The boundaries are
respectively the Don, the Nile, and the Straits of the Pillars of
Hercules. Asia lies between the Don and the Nile, and lies
under that portion of the heaven which is between the north-east
and the south. Libya lies between the Nile and the Pillars
of Hercules, and falls beneath the south portion of the heaven,
extending to the south-west without a break, till it reaches the
point of the equinoctial sunset, which corresponds with the
Pillars of Hercules. These two divisions of the earth, therefore,
regarded in a general point of view, occupy all that part
which is south of the Mediterranean from east to west.
Europe with respect to both of these lies to the north facing
them, and extending continuously from east to west. Its most
important and extensive part lies under the northern sky
between the river Don and the Narbo, which is only a short
distance west of Marseilles and the mouths by which the Rhone
discharges itself into the Sardinian Sea. From Narbo is the
district occupied by the Celts as far as the Pyrenees, stretching
continuously from the Mediterranean to the Mare Externum.
The rest of Europe south of the Pyrenees, to the point where
it approaches the Pillars of Hercules, is bounded on one side
by the Mediterranean, on the other by the Mare Externum;
and that part of it which is washed by the Mediterranean as
far as the Pillars of Hercules is called Iberia, while the part
which lies along the Outer or Great Sea has no general name,
because it has but recently been discovered, and is inhabited
entirely by barbarous tribes, who are very numerous, and of
whom I will speak in more detail hereafter.
38. But as no one up to our time has been able to settle
in regard to those parts of Asia and Libya, where they approach
each other in the neighbourhood of Ethiopia, whether the
continent is continuous to the south, The extreme north
and south unknown.or is
surrounded by the sea, so it is in regard to the
part between Narbo and the Don: none of
us as yet knows anything of the northern extent of this
district, and anything we can ever know must be the result
of future exploration; and those who rashly venture by word
of mouth or written statements to describe this district must
be looked upon as ignorant or romancing.
My object in these observations was to prevent my narrative
being entirely vague to those who were unacquainted
with the localities. I hoped that, by keeping these broad
distinctions in mind, they would have some definite standard
to which to refer every mention of a place, starting from the
primary one of the division of the sky into four quarters. For,
as in the case of physical sight, we instinctively turn our faces to
any object pointed at; so in the case of the mind, our thoughts
ought to turn naturally to localities as they are mentioned
from time to time.
It is time now to return to the story we have in hand.
39. At this period the Carthaginians were masters of the
whole Mediterranean coast of Libya from the Altars of
Philaenus,174 opposite the Great Syrtis, to the Pillars of Hercules,
a seaboard of over sixteen thousand stades. They had also
crossed the strait of the Pillars of Hercules, and got possession
of the whole seaboard of Iberia on the Mediterranean as far as
the Pyrenees, which separate the Iberes from the Celts—that
is, for a distance of about eight thousand stades: for it is
three thousand from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which
Hannibal started for Italy; two thousand six hundred from
thence to the Iber; and from that river to The length of the
march from
Carthagena to the
Po, 1125 Roman
miles.
Emporium again sixteen hundred; from which
town, I may add, to the passage of the Rhone
is a distance of about sixteen hundred stades;
for all these distances have now been carefully
measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every
eighth stade.175 After crossing the river there was a march up
stream along its bank of fourteen hundred stades, before reaching
the foot of the pass over the Alps into Italy. The pass
itself was about twelve hundred stades, which being crossed
would bring him into the plains of the Padus in Italy. So
that the whole length of his march from New Carthage was about
nine thousand stades, or 1125 Roman miles. Of the country
he had thus to traverse he had already passed almost half in
mere distance, but in the difficulties the greater part of his
task was still before him.
40. While Hannibal was thus engaged in effecting a passage
over the Pyrenees, where he was greatly alarmed Coss. P.
Cornelius Scipio
and Tib.
Sempronius
Longus.
B.C. 218.
The Consuls are
sent, one to
Spain, and the
other to Africa.
at the extraordinary strength of the positions
occupied by the Celts; the Romans, having
heard the result of the embassy to Carthage,
and that Hannibal had crossed the Iber earlier
than they expected, at the head of an army, voted
to send Publius Cornelius Scipio with his legions
into Iberia, and Tiberius Sempronius Longus
into Libya. And while the Consuls were engaged
in hastening on the enrolment of their legions and other
military preparations, the people were active in bringing to
completion the colonies which they had already voted to send
into Gaul. They accordingly caused the fortification of these
towns to be energetically pushed on, and ordered the colonists
to be in residence within thirty days: six thousand having been
assigned to each colony. One of these colonies was on the
south bank of the Padus, and was called Placentia; Placentia and
Cremona.
the other on the north bank, called
Cremona. But no sooner had these colonies
been formed, than the Boian Gauls, who had long been
lying in wait to throw off their loyalty to Rome, but had
up to that time lacked an opportunity, encouraged by the
news that reached them of Hannibal’s approach, revolted;
thus abandoning the hostages which they had given at the end
of the war described in my last book. The ill-feeling still
remaining towards Rome enabled them to induce the Insubres
to join in the revolt; and the united tribes swept over the
territory recently allotted by the Romans, and following close
upon the track of the flying colonists, laid siege to the Roman
colony of Mutina, in which the fugitives had taken refuge.
Among them were the triumviri or three commissioners who
had been sent out to allot the lands, of whom one—Gaius
Lutatius—was an ex-consul, the other two ex-praetors. Outrage by Boii
and Insubres.
These
men having demanded a parley with the
enemy, the Boii consented: but treacherously
seized them upon their leaving the town,
hoping by their means to recover their own hostages. The
praetor Lucius Manlius was on guard in the district with an
army, and as soon as he heard what had happened, he advanced
with all speed to the relief of Mutina. But the Boii, having got
intelligence of his approach, prepared an ambuscade; and as
soon as his army had entered a certain wood, they rushed out
upon it from every side and killed a large number of his men.
The survivors at first fled with precipitation: but having gained
some higher ground, they rallied sufficiently to enable them
with much difficulty to effect an honourable retreat. Even so,
the Boii followed close upon their heels, and besieged them
in a place called the village of Tannes.176 When the news
arrived at Rome, that the fourth legion was surrounded and
closely besieged by the Boii, the people in all haste despatched
the legions which had been voted to the Consul Publius, to
their relief, under the command of a Praetor, and ordered the
Consul to enrol two more legions for himself from the allies.
41. Such was the state of Celtic affairs from the beginning
to the arrival of Hannibal; thus completing the course of events
which I have already had occasion to describe.
Meanwhile the Consuls, having completed the necessary
preparations for their respective missions, set sail at the beginning Tiberius
Sempronius
prepares to
attack Carthage.
of summer—Publius to Iberia, with sixty
ships, and Tiberius Sempronius to Libya, with a
hundred and sixty quinqueremes. The latter
thought by means of this great fleet to strike
terror into the enemy; and made vast preparations at Lilybaeum,
collecting fresh troops wherever he could get them, as
though with the view of at once blockading Carthage itself.
Publius Cornelius coasted along Liguria, and crossing in
five days from Pisae to Marseilles, dropped Publius Scipio
lands near
Marseilles.
anchor at the most eastern mouth of the Rhone,
called the Mouth of Marseilles,177 and began
disembarking his troops. For though he heard that Hannibal
was already crossing the Pyrenees, he felt sure that he was
still a long way off, owing to the difficulty of his line of country,
and the number of the intervening Celtic tribes. But long
before he was expected, Hannibal had arrived at the crossing
of the Rhone, keeping the Sardinian Sea on his right as he
marched, and having made his way through the Celts partly
by bribes and partly by force. Being informed that the
enemy were at hand, Publius was at first incredulous of the
fact, because of the rapidity of the advance; but wishing to
know the exact state of the case,—while staying behind himself
to refresh his troops after their voyage, and to consult with
the Tribunes as to the best ground on which to give the
enemy battle,—he sent out a reconnoitring party, consisting
of three hundred of his bravest horse; joining with them as
guides and supports some Celts, who chanced to be serving
as mercenaries at the time in Marseilles.
42. Meanwhile Hannibal had reached the river and was
trying to get across it where the stream was
single, Hannibal reaches
the Rhone.at a distance of four days’ march
from the sea. He did all he could to
make the natives living by the river friendly to him, and
purchased from them all their canoes of hollow trunks, and
wherries, of which there were a large number, owing to the
extensive sea traffic of the inhabitants of the Rhone valley.
He got from them also the timber suited to the construction
of these canoes; and so in two days had an innumerable
supply of transports, every soldier seeking to be independent
of his neighbour, and to have the means of crossing in his own
hands. But now a large multitude of barbarians collected on
the other side of the stream to hinder the passage of the Carthaginians.
When Hannibal saw them, he came to the conclusion
that it would be impossible either to force a passage in
the face of so large a body of the enemy, or to remain where
he was, for fear of being attacked on all sides at once: and
he accordingly, on the third night, sent forward a detachment
of his army with native guides, under the command of Hanno,
the son of the Suffete178 Bomilcar. A detachment
crosses higher up
the river.This force
marched up stream along the bank for two
hundred stades, until they arrived at a certain
spot where the stream is divided by an eyot, and there
halted. They found enough wood close at hand to enable
them, by nailing or tying it together, to construct within a
short time a large number of rafts good enough for temporary
use; and on these they crossed in safety, without any one trying
to stop them. Then, seizing upon a strong position, they kept
quiet for the rest of the day: partly to refresh themselves after
their fatigues, and at the same time to complete their preparations
for the service awaiting them, as they had been ordered
to do. Hannibal was preparing to proceed much in the
same way with the forces left behind with himself; but his
chief difficulty was in getting the elephants across, of which he
had thirty-seven.
43. When the fifth night came, however, the division
which had crossed first started before daybreak The crossing
begun.
to march down the opposite bank of
the river and attack the barbarians; while
Hannibal, having his men in readiness, began to attempt the
passage of the river. He had filled the wherries with the heavy-armed
cavalry, and the canoes with the most active of his foot;
and he now arranged that the wherries should cross higher up
the stream, and the canoes below them, that the violence of
the current might be broken by the former, and the canoes
cross more safely. The plan for the horses was that they
should swim at the stern of the wherries, one man on each
side of the stern guiding three or four with leading reins: so
that a considerable number of horses were brought over at
once with the first detachment. When they saw what the
enemy meant to do, the barbarians, without forming their
ranks, poured out of their entrenchments in scattered groups,
feeling no doubt of being able to stop the crossing of the
Carthaginians with ease. As soon as Hannibal saw by the
smoke, which was the signal agreed upon, that the advanced
detachment on the other side was approaching, he ordered
all to go on board, and the men in charge of the transports to
push out against the stream. This was promptly done: and
then began a most anxious and exciting scene. Cheer after
cheer rose from the men who were working the boats, as they
struggled to outstrip each other, and exerted themselves to the
utmost to overcome the force of the current. On the edge of
either bank stood the two armies: the one sharing in the struggles
of their comrades by sympathy, and shouting encouragement
to them as they went; while the barbarians in front of them
yelled their war-cries and challenged them to battle. While
this was going on the barbarians had abandoned their tents,
which the Carthaginians on that side of the river suddenly
and unexpectedly seized. Some of them proceeded to set fire
to the camp, while the greater number went to attack the men
who were standing ready to resist the passage. Surprised by
this unlooked-for event, some of the barbarians rushed off to
save their tents, while others prepared to resist the attack of
the enemy, and were now actually engaged. Seeing that
everything was going as he had intended, Hannibal at once
formed the first division as it disembarked: and after addressing
some encouraging words to it, closed with the barbarians, who,
having no time to form their ranks, and being taken by surprise,
were quickly repulsed and put to flight.
44. Being thus master of the passage of the river, and
victorious over those who opposed him, Completedthe
first care of the Carthaginian leader was
to bring his whole army across. This being expeditiously
accomplished, he pitched his camp for that night by the
river-side, and on the morrow, when he was told that the
Roman fleet was anchored off the mouths of the river,
he detached five hundred Numidian horsemen to reconnoitre
the enemy and find out their position, their numbers, and what
they were going to do; and at the same time selected suitable
men to manage the passage of the elephants. These arrangements
made, he summoned a meeting of his army and introduced
Magilus and the other chiefs who had come to him
from the valley of the Padus, and caused them to
declare to the whole army, Message from
friendly Gauls.
by means of an interpreter,
the resolutions passed by their tribes.
The points which were the strongest encouragement to the army
were, first, the actual appearance of envoys inviting them to come,
and promising to take part in the war with Rome; secondly,
the confidence inspired by their promise of guiding them by a
route where they would be abundantly supplied with necessaries,
and which would lead them with speed and safety into Italy;
and, lastly, the fertility and vast extent of the country to which
they were going, and the friendly feelings of the men with whose
assistance they were about to fight the armies of Rome.
Such was the substance of the speeches of the Celts.
When they had withdrawn, Hannibal himself rose, and after
reminding the soldiers of what they had already achieved,
and pointing out that, though they had under his counsel and
advice engaged in many perilous and dangerous enterprises,
they had never failed in one, he bade them “not lose
courage now that the most serious part of their undertaking
was accomplished. The Rhone was crossed: they had seen
with their own eyes the display of goodwill and zeal of their
allies. Let this convince them that they should leave the rest
to him with confidence; and while obeying his orders show
themselves men of courage and worthy of their former deeds.”
These words being received with shouts of approval, and other
manifestations of great enthusiasm, on the part of the soldiers,
Hannibal dismissed the assembly with words of praise to the
men and a prayer to the gods on their behalf; after giving
out an order that they should refresh themselves, and make
all their preparations with despatch, as the advance must
begin on the morrow.
45. When the assembly had been dismissed, the reconnoitring
party of Numidians returned in headlong
flight, Skirmish between
reconnoitring
parties.after losing more than half their
numbers. Not far from the camp they had
fallen in with a party of Roman horse, who had been
sent out by Publius on the same errand; and an engagement
took place with such fury on either side, that the Romans and
Celts lost a hundred and forty men, and the Numidians more
than two hundred. After this skirmish, the Romans pursued
them up to the Carthaginian entrenchments: and having surveyed
it, they hastened back to announce to the Consul the
presence of the enemy. As soon as they arrived at the Roman
camp with this intelligence, Publius put his baggage on board
ship, and marched his men up the bank of the river, with the
earnest desire of forcing the enemy to give him battle.
But at sunrise on the day after the assembly, Hannibal
having stationed his whole cavalry on the rear, in the direction
of the sea, so as to cover the advance, ordered his infantry to
leave the entrenchment and begin their march; while he himself
waited behind for the elephants, and the men who had not
yet crossed the river.
46. The mode of getting the elephants across was as
follows. They made a number of rafts
strongly compacted, The passage of
the elephants.
which they lashed firmly
two and two together, so as to form combined
a breadth of about fifty feet, and brought them close under
the bank at the place of crossing. To the outer edge of
these they lashed some others and made them join exactly;
so that the whole raft thus constructed stretched out some
way into the channel, while the edges towards the stream were
made fast to the land with ropes tied to trees which grew along
the brink, to secure the raft keeping its place and not drifting
down the river. These combined rafts stretching about
two hundred feet across the stream, they joined two other very
large ones to the outer edges, fastened very firmly together, but
connected with the others by ropes which admitted of being
easily cut. To these they fastened several towing lines, that
the wherries might prevent the rafts drifting down stream, and
might drag them forcibly against the current and so get the
elephants across on them. Then they threw a great deal of
earth upon all the rafts, until they had raised the surface to the
level of the bank, and made it look like the path on the land
leading down to the passage. The elephants were accustomed
to obey their Indian riders until they came to water, but could
never be induced to step into water: they therefore led them
upon this earth, putting two females in front whom the others
obediently followed. When they had set foot on the rafts
that were farthest out in the stream, the ropes were cut which
fastened these to the other rafts, the towing lines were pulled
taut by the wherries, and the elephants, with the rafts on
which they stood, were quickly towed away from the mound of
earth. When this happened, the animals were terror-stricken;
and at first turned round and round, and rushed first to one
part of the raft and then to another, but finding themselves
completely surrounded by the water, they were too frightened
to do anything, and were obliged to stay where they were.
And it was by repeating this contrivance of joining a pair of
rafts to the others, that eventually the greater part of the
elephants were got across. Some of them, however, in the
middle of the crossing, threw themselves in their terror into
the river: but though their Indian riders were drowned, the
animals themselves got safe to land, saved by the strength and
great length of their probosces; for by raising these above the
water, they were enabled to breathe through them, and blow out
any water that got into them, while for the most part they got
through the river on their feet.
47. The elephants having been thus got across, Hannibal
formed them and the cavalry into a rear-guard, and marched
up the river bank away from the sea in an easterly direction, as
though making for the central district of Europe.
The Rhone rises to the north-west of the Adriatic Gulf on
the northern slopes of the Alps,179 and flowing westward, eventually
discharges itself into the Sardinian Sea. It flows for the
most part through a deep valley, to the north of which lives the
Celtic tribe of the Ardyes; while its southern side is entirely
walled in by the northern slopes of the Alps, the ridges of
which, beginning at Marseilles and extending to the head of
the Adriatic, separate it from the valley of the Padus, of which
I have already had occasion to speak at length. It was these
mountains that Hannibal now crossed from the Rhone valley
into Italy.
Some historians of this passage of the Alps, in their desire
to produce a striking effect by their descriptions of the wonders
of this country, have fallen into two errors which are more
alien than anything else to the spirit of history,—perversion of
fact and inconsistency. Introducing Hannibal as a prodigy of
strategic skill and boldness, they yet represent him as acting
with the most conspicuous indiscretion; and then, finding
themselves involved in an inextricable maze of falsehood, they
try to cut the knot by the introduction of gods and heroes
into what is meant to be genuine history. They begin by
saying that the Alps are so precipitous and inaccessible that, so
far from horses and troops, accompanied too by elephants,
being able to cross them, it would be very difficult for even
active men on foot to do so: and similarly they tell us that
the desolation of this district is so complete, that, had not some
god or hero met Hannibal’s forces and showed them the way,
they would have been hopelessly lost and perished to a man.
Such stories involve both the errors I have mentioned,—they
are both false and inconsistent.
48. For could a more irrational proceeding on the part of a
general be imagined than that of Hannibal, if, when in command
of so numerous an army, on whom the success of his
expedition entirely depended, he allowed himself to remain in
ignorance of the roads, the lie of the country, the route to be
taken, and the people to which it led, and above all as to the
practicability of what he was undertaking to do? They, in
fact, represent Hannibal, when at the height of his expectation
of success, doing what those would hardly do who have utterly
failed and have been reduced to despair,—that is, to entrust
themselves and their forces to an unknown country. And so,
too, what they say about the desolation of the district, and its
precipitous and inaccessible character, only serves to bring their
untrustworthiness into clearer light. For first, they pass over
the fact that the Celts of the Rhone valley had on several
occasions before Hannibal came, and that in very recent times,
crossed the Alps with large forces, and fought battles with the
Romans in alliance with the Celts of the valley of the Padus, as
I have already stated. And secondly, they are unaware of the
fact that a very numerous tribe of people inhabit the Alps.
Accordingly in their ignorance of these facts they take refuge
in the assertion that a hero showed Hannibal the way. They
are, in fact, in the same case as tragedians, who, beginning
with an improbable and impossible plot, are obliged to bring
in a deus ex machina to solve the difficulty and end the play.
The absurd premises of these historians naturally require some
such supernatural agency to help them out of the difficulty:
an absurd beginning could only have an absurd ending. For
of course Hannibal did not act as these writers say he did;
but, on the contrary, conducted his plans with the utmost prudence.
He had thoroughly informed himself of the fertility of
the country into which he designed to descend, and of the
hostile feelings of its inhabitants towards Rome, and for his
journey through the difficult district which intervened he
employed native guides and pioneers, whose interests were
bound up with his own. I speak with confidence on these
points, because I have questioned persons actually engaged on
the facts, and have inspected the country, and gone over the
Alpine pass myself, in order to inform myself of the truth and
see with my own eyes.
49. Three days after Hannibal had resumed his march, the
Consul Publius arrived at the passage of the
river. Scipio finds that
Hannibal has
escaped him.He was in the highest degree astonished
to find the enemy gone: for he had persuaded
himself that they would never venture to take this route into
Italy, on account of the numbers and fickleness of the barbarians
who inhabited the country. But seeing that they had
done so, he hurried back to his ships and at once embarked
his forces. He then despatched his brother Gnaeus to conduct
the campaign in Iberia, while he himself turned back again
to Italy by sea, being anxious to anticipate the enemy by
marching through Etruria to the foot of the pass of the Alps.
Meanwhile, after four days’ march from the passage of the
Rhone, Hannibal arrived at the place called
the Island, Hannibal’s
march to the foot
of the Alps.a district thickly inhabited and
exceedingly productive of corn. Its name is
derived from its natural features: for the Rhone and Isara
flowing on either side of it make the apex of a triangle where
they meet, very nearly of the same size and shape as the delta
of the Nile, except that the base of the latter is formed by the
sea into which its various streams are discharged, while in the
case of the former this base is formed by mountains difficult
to approach or climb, and, so to speak, almost inaccessible.
When Hannibal arrived in this district he found two brothers
engaged in a dispute for the royal power, and confronting each
other with their armies. The elder sought his alliance and
invited his assistance in gaining the crown: and the advantage
which such a circumstance might prove to him at that
juncture of his affairs being manifest, he consented; and
having joined him in his attack upon his brother, and aided in
expelling him, he obtained valuable support from the victorious
chieftain. For this prince not only liberally supplied his army
with provisions, but exchanged all their old and damaged
weapons for new ones, and thus at a very opportune time
thoroughly restored the efficiency of the troops: he also gave
most of the men new clothes and boots, which proved of great
advantage during their passage of the mountains. But his
most essential service was that, the Carthaginians being greatly
alarmed at the prospect of marching through the territory of
the Allobroges, he acted with his army as their rear-guard, and
secured them a safe passage as far as the foot of the pass.
50. Having in ten days’ march accomplished a distance
of eight hundred stades along the river bank, The ascent.
Hannibal began the ascent of the Alps,180 and
immediately found himself involved in the most serious
dangers. For as long as the Carthaginians were on the
plains, the various chiefs of the Allobroges refrained from
attacking them from fear of their cavalry, as well as of the
Gauls who were escorting them. But when these last departed
back again to their own lands, and Hannibal began to enter the
mountainous region, the chiefs of the Allobroges collected
large numbers of their tribe and occupied the points of vantage
in advance, on the route by which Hannibal’s troops were
constrained to make their ascent. If they had only kept their
design secret, the Carthaginian army would have been entirely
destroyed: as it was, their plans became known, and though
they did much damage to Hannibal’s army, they suffered as
much themselves. For when that general learnt that the
natives were occupying the points of vantage, he halted and
pitched his camp at the foot of the pass, and sent forward
some of his Gallic guides to reconnoitre the enemy and discover
their plan of operations. The order was obeyed: and
he ascertained that it was the enemy’s practice to keep under
arms, and guard these posts carefully, during the day, but at
night to retire to some town in the neighbourhood. Hannibal
accordingly adapted his measures to this strategy of the enemy.
He marched forward in broad daylight, and as soon as he
came to the mountainous part of the road, pitched his camp
only a little way from the enemy. At nightfall he gave orders
for the watch-fires to be lit; and leaving the main body of his
troops in the camp, and selecting the most suitable of his men,
he had them armed lightly, and led them through the narrow
parts of the road during the night, and seized on the spots
which had been previously occupied by the enemy: they having,
according to their regular custom, abandoned them for the
nearest town.
51. When day broke the natives saw what had taken place,
and at first desisted from their attempts; The Gauls harass
the army.
but presently the sight of the immense string
of beasts of burden, and of the cavalry, slowly
and painfully making the ascent, tempted them to attack
the advancing line. Accordingly they fell upon it at many
points at once; and the Carthaginians sustained severe
losses, not so much at the hands of the enemy, as from the
dangerous nature of the ground, which proved especially fatal
to the horses and beasts of burden. For as the ascent was
not only narrow and rough, but flanked also with precipices,
at every movement which tended to throw the line into disorder,
large numbers of the beasts of burden were hurled down
the precipices with their loads on their backs. And what
added more than anything else to this sort of confusion were
the wounded horses; for, maddened by their wounds, they
either turned round and ran into the advancing beasts of
burden, or, rushing furiously forward, dashed aside everything
that came in their way on the narrow path, and so threw the
whole line into disorder. Hannibal saw what was taking
place, and knowing that, even if they escaped this attack, they
could never survive the loss of all their baggage, he took with
him the men who had seized the strongholds during the night
and went to the relief of the advancing line. Having the
advantage of charging the enemy from the higher ground he
inflicted a severe loss upon them, but suffered also as severe
a one in his own army; for the commotion in the line now
grew worse, and in both directions at once—thanks to the
shouting and struggling of these combatants: and it was not
until he had killed the greater number of the Allobroges, and
forced the rest to fly to their own land, that the remainder of
the beasts of burden and the horses got slowly, and with difficulty,
over the dangerous ground. Hannibal himself rallied
as many as he could after the fight, and assaulted the town
from which the enemy had sallied; and finding it almost
deserted, because its inhabitants had been all tempted out
by the hope of booty, he got possession of it: from which he
obtained many advantages for the future as well as for the
present. The immediate gain consisted of a large number of
horses and beasts of burden, and men taken with them; and
for future use he got a supply of corn and cattle sufficient for
two or three days: but the most important result of all was the
terror inspired in the next tribes, which prevented any one of
those who lived near the ascent from lightly venturing to meddle
with him again.
52. Here he pitched a camp and remained a day, and
started again. For the next three days Treachery of the
Gauls.
he accomplished a certain amount of his
journey without accident. But on the fourth
he again found himself in serious danger. For the dwellers
along his route, having concerted a plan of treachery, met
him with branches and garlands, which among nearly all
the natives are signs of friendship, as the herald’s staff is
among the Greeks. Hannibal was cautious about accepting
such assurances, and took great pains to discover what their
real intention and purpose were. The Gauls however professed
to be fully aware of the capture of the town, and the destruction
of those who had attempted to do him wrong; and explained
that those events had induced them to come, because they
wished neither to inflict nor receive any damage; and finally
promised to give him hostages. For a long while Hannibal
hesitated and refused to trust their speeches. But at length
coming to the conclusion that, if he accepted what was offered,
he would perhaps render the men before him less mischievous
and implacable; but that, if he rejected them, he must expect
undisguised hostility from them, he acceded to their request,
and feigned to accept their offer of friendship. The barbarians
handed over the hostages, supplied him liberally with
cattle, and in fact put themselves unreservedly into his hands;
so that for a time Hannibal’s suspicions were allayed, and he
employed them as guides for the next difficulty that had to be
passed. They guided the army for two days: and then these
tribes collected their numbers, and keeping close up with the
Carthaginians, attacked them just as they were passing through
a certain difficult and precipitous gorge.
53. Hannibal’s army would now have certainly been utterly
destroyed, had it not been for the fact that his Severe losses.
fears were still on the alert, and that, having a
prescience of what was to come, he had placed his baggage and
cavalry in the van and his hoplites in the rear. These latter
covered his line, and were able to stem the attack of the enemy,
and accordingly the disaster was less than it would otherwise
have been. As it was, however, a large number of beasts of
burden and horses perished; for the advantage of the higher
ground being with the enemy, the Gauls moved along the
slopes parallel with the army below, and by rolling down
boulders, or throwing stones, reduced the troops to a state of
the utmost confusion and danger; so that Hannibal with half
his force was obliged to pass the night near a certain white rock,181
which afforded them protection, separated from his horses and
baggage which he was covering; until after a whole night’s
struggle they slowly and with difficulty emerged from the gorge.
Next morning the enemy had disappeared: and Hannibal,
having effected a junction with his cavalry and baggage, led
his men towards the head of the pass, without falling in
again with any important muster of the natives, Arrives at the
summit.
though he was harassed by some of them
from time to time; who seized favourable
opportunities, now on his van and now on his rear, of
carrying off some of his baggage. His best protection
was his elephants; on whatever parts of the line they
were placed the enemy never ventured to approach, being
terrified at the unwonted appearance of the animals. The
ninth day’s march brought him to the head of the pass:
and there he encamped for two days, partly to rest his men
and partly to allow stragglers to come up. Whilst they were
there, many of the horses who had taken fright and run away,
and many of the beasts of burden that had got rid of their
loads, unexpectedly appeared: they had followed the tracks of
the army and now joined the camp.
54. But by this time, it being nearly the period of the
setting of the Pleiads, the snow was beginning 9th November.
to be thick on the heights; and seeing his men
in low spirits, owing both to the fatigue they had gone through,
and that which still lay before them, Hannibal called them
together and tried to cheer them by dwelling on the one possible
topic of consolation in his power, namely the view of Italy:
which lay stretched out in both directions below those mountains,
giving the Alps the appearance of a citadel to the whole
of Italy. By pointing therefore to the plains of the Padus, and
reminding them of the friendly welcome which awaited them
from the Gauls who lived there, and at the same time indicating
the direction of Rome itself, he did somewhat to raise the
drooping spirits of his men.
Next day he began the descent, in which he no longer
met with any enemies, except some few secret
pillagers; The descent.but from the dangerous ground and
the snow he lost almost as many men as on the
ascent. For the path down was narrow and precipitous,
and the snow made it impossible for the men to
see where they were treading, while to step aside from the
path, or to stumble, meant being hurled down the precipices.
The troops however bore up against the fatigue, having now
grown accustomed to such hardships; but when they came to
a place where the path was too narrow for the elephants or
beasts of burden to pass,—and which, narrowed before by
landslips extending about a stade and a half, had recently
been made more so by another landslip,—then once more
despondency and consternation fell upon the troops. Hannibal’s
first idea was to avoid this mauvais pas by a detour, but
this route too being made impossible by a snow-storm, he
abandoned the idea.
55. The effect of the storm was peculiar and extraordinary.
For the present fall of snow coming A break in the
road.
upon the top of that which was there before,
and had remained from the last winter, it was
found that the former, being fresh, was soft and offered no
resistance to the foot; but when the feet reached the lower
frozen snow, they could no longer make any impression upon
it, but the men found both their feet slipping from under
them, as though they were on hard ground with a layer
of mud on the top. And a still more serious difficulty
followed: for not being able to get a foothold on the lower
snow, when they fell and tried to get themselves up by their
hands and knees, the men found themselves plunging downwards
quicker and quicker, along with everything they laid hold
of, the ground being a very steep decline. The beasts, however,
when they fell did break through this lower snow as they
struggled to rise, and having done so were obliged to remain
there with their loads, as though they were frozen to it, both
from the weight of these loads and the hardness of the old snow.
Giving up, therefore, all hope of making this detour, he encamped
upon the ridge after clearing away the snow upon it.
He then set large parties of his men to work, and, with infinite
toil, began constructing a road on the face of the precipice.
One day’s work sufficed to make a path practicable for beasts
of burden and horses; and he accordingly took them across
at once, and having pitched his camp at a spot below the snow
line, he let them go in search of pasture; while he told off the
Numidians in detachments to proceed with the making of the
road; and after three days’ difficult and painful labour he got
his elephants across, though in a miserable condition from
hunger. For the tops of the Alps, and the parts immediately
below them, are completely treeless and bare of vegetation,
because the snow lies there summer and winter; but about
half-way down the slopes on both sides they produce trees and
shrubs, and are, in fact, fit for human habitation.
56. So Hannibal mustered his forces and continued the
descent; and on the third day after passing He reaches the
plains.
the precipitous path just described he reached
the plains. From the beginning of his march
he had lost many men by the hands of the enemy, and
in crossing rivers, and many more on the precipices and
dangerous passes of the Alps; and not only men in this
last way, but horses and beasts of burden in still greater
numbers. The whole march from New Carthage had occupied
five months, the actual passage of the Alps fifteen days; and he
now boldly entered the valley of the Padus, and the territory of
the Insubres, with such of his army as survived, consisting of
twelve thousand Libyans and eight thousand Iberians, and
not more than six thousand cavalry in all, as he himself
distinctly states on the column erected on the promontory of
Lacinium to record the numbers.
At the same time, as I have before stated, Publius having left
his legions under the command of his brother Gnaeus, with
orders to prosecute the Iberian campaign and offer an energetic
resistance to Hasdrubal, landed at Pisae with a small body of
men. Thence he marched through Etruria, and taking over
the army of the Praetors which was guarding the country against
the Boii, he arrived in the valley of the Padus; and, pitching
his camp there, waited for the enemy with an eager desire to
give him battle.
57. Having thus brought the generals of the two nations
and the war itself into Italy, before beginning Digression on the
limits of history.
the campaign, I wish to say a few words about
what I conceive to be germane or not to
my history.
I can conceive some readers complaining that, while
devoting a great deal of space to Libya and Iberia, I have said
little or nothing about the strait of the Pillars of Hercules, the
Mare Externum, or the British Isles, and the manufacture of
tin in them, or even of the silver and gold mines in Iberia itself,
of which historians give long and contradictory accounts. It was
not, let me say, because I thought these subjects out of place in
history that I passed them over; but because, in the first place,
I did not wish to be diffuse, or distract the attention of students
from the main current of my narrative; and, in the next place,
because I was determined not to treat of them in scattered
notices or casual allusions, but to assign them a distinct time
and place, and at these, to the best of my ability, to give a trustworthy
account of them. On the same principle I must
deprecate any feeling of surprise if, in the succeeding portions
of my history, I pass over other similar topics, which might
seem naturally in place, for the same reasons. Those who ask
for dissertations in history on every possible subject, are somewhat
like greedy guests at a banquet, who, by tasting every
dish on the table, fail to really enjoy any one of them at the
time, or to digest and feel any benefit from them afterwards.
Such omnivorous readers get no real pleasure in the present,
and no adequate instruction for the future.
58. There can be no clearer proof, than is afforded by these
particular instances, that this department of historical writing
stands above all others in need of study and correction. For
as all, or at least the greater number of writers, have endeavoured
to describe the peculiar features and positions of the countries
on the confines of the known world, and in doing so have,
in most cases, made egregious mistakes, it is impossible to
pass over their errors without some attempt at refutation; and
that not in scattered observations or casual remarks, but
deliberately and formally. But such confutation should not
take the form of accusation or invective. While correcting
their mistakes we should praise the writers, feeling sure that,
had they lived to the present age, they would have altered and
corrected many of their statements. The fact is that, in past
ages, we know of very few Greeks who undertook to investigate
these remote regions, owing to the insuperable difficulties of the
attempt. The dangers at sea were then more than can easily be
calculated, and those on land more numerous still. And even
if one did reach these countries on the confines of the world,
whether compulsorily or voluntarily, the difficulties in the way
of a personal inspection were only begun: for some of the
regions were utterly barbarous, others uninhabited; and a still
greater obstacle in way of gaining information as to what he
saw was his ignorance of the language of the country. And
even if he learnt this, a still greater difficulty was to preserve
a strict moderation in his account of what he had seen, and
despising all attempts to glorify himself by traveller’s tales of
wonder, to report for our benefit the truth and nothing but the
truth.
59. All these impediments made a true account of these
regions in past times difficult, if not impossible. Nor ought we
to criticise severely the omissions or mistakes of these writers:
rather they deserve our praise and admiration for having in
such an age gained information as to these places, which
distinctly advanced knowledge. In our own age, however,
the Asiatic districts have been opened up both by sea and
land owing to the empire of Alexander, and the other places
owing to the supremacy of Rome. Men too of practical
experience in affairs, being released from the cares of martial or
political ambition, have thereby had excellent opportunities for
research and inquiry into these localities; and therefore it will
be but right for us to have a better and truer knowledge of
what was formerly unknown. And this I shall endeavour to
establish, when I find a fitting opportunity in the course of my
history. I shall be especially anxious to give the curious a
full knowledge on these points, because it was with that express
object that I confronted the dangers and fatigues of my travels
in Libya, Iberia, and Gaul, as well as of the sea which washes
the western coasts of these countries; that I might correct the
imperfect knowledge of former writers, and make the Greeks
acquainted with these parts of the known world.
After this digression, I must go back to the pitched
battles between the Romans and Carthaginians in Italy.
60. After arriving in Italy with the number of troops
which I have already stated, Rest and recovery.
Hannibal pitched
his camp at the very foot of the Alps, and
was occupied, to begin with, in refreshing his men. For
not only had his whole army suffered terribly from the
difficulties of transit in the ascent, and still more in the
descent of the Alps, but it was also in evil case from the
shortness of provisions, and the inevitable neglect of all
proper attention to physical necessities. Many had quite
abandoned all care for their health under the influence of
starvation and continuous fatigue; for it had proved impossible
to carry a full supply of food for so many thousands over such
mountains, and what they did bring was in great part lost along
with the beasts that carried it. So that whereas, when
Hannibal crossed the Rhone, he had thirty-eight thousand
infantry, and more than eight thousand cavalry, he lost nearly
half in the pass, as I have shown above; while the survivors
had by these long continued sufferings become almost savage
in look and general appearance. Hannibal therefore bent his
whole energies to the restoration of the spirits and bodies of
his men, and of their horses also. When his army had thus
sufficiently recovered, finding the Taurini, Taking of Turin.
who
live immediately under the Alps, at war with
the Insubres and inclined to be suspicious of the Carthaginians,
Hannibal first invited them to terms of friendship
and alliance; and, on their refusal, invested their chief city
and carried it after a three day’s siege. Having put to the
sword all who had opposed him, he struck such terror into the
minds of the neighbouring tribes, that they all gave in their
submission out of hand. The other Celts inhabiting these
plains were also eager to join the Carthaginians, according to
their original purpose; but the Roman legions had by this time
advanced too far, and had intercepted the greater part of them:
they were therefore unable to stir, and in some cases were even
obliged to serve in the Roman ranks. This determined
Hannibal not to delay his advance any longer, but to strike
some blow which might encourage those natives who were
desirous of sharing his enterprise.
61. When he heard, while engaged on this design, that Publius
had already crossed the Padus with his army, Approach of
Scipio.
and was at no great distance, he was at first inclined
to disbelieve the fact, reflecting that it was
not many days since he had left him near the passage of the
Rhone, and that the voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was a
long and difficult one. He was told, moreover, that from the
Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps through Italian soil was a long
march, without good military roads. But when messenger after
messenger confirmed the intelligence with increased positiveness,
he was filled with amazement and admiration at the
Consul’s plan of campaign, and promptness in carrying it out.
The feelings of Publius were much the same: for he had not
expected that Hannibal would even attempt the passage of the
Alps with forces of different races, or, if he did attempt it,
that he could escape utter destruction. Entertaining such ideas
he was immensely astonished at his courage and adventurous
daring, when he heard that he had not only got safe across,
but was actually besieging certain towns in Italy. Similar
feelings were entertained at Rome when the news arrived
there. For scarcely had the last rumour about the taking of
Saguntum by the Carthaginians ceased to attract attention, and
scarcely had the measures adopted in view of that event been
taken,—namely the despatch of one Consul to Libya to besiege
Carthage, and of the other to Iberia to meet Hannibal there,—than
news came that Hannibal had arrived in Italy with his
army, and was already besieging certain towns in it. Thrown
into great alarm by this unexpected turn of affairs, the Roman
government sent at once to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, telling him
of the presence of the enemy in Italy, Tiberius Sempronius
recalled.
and
ordering him to abandon the original design
of his expedition, and to make all haste home
to reinforce the defences of the country. Tiberius at once
collected the men of the fleet and sent them off, with orders
to go home by sea; while he caused the Tribunes to administer
an oath to the men of the legions that they would all
appear at a fixed day at Ariminum by bedtime. Ariminum
is a town on the Adriatic, situated at the southern boundary
of the valley of the Padus. In every direction there was stir
and excitement: and the news being a complete surprise to
everybody, there was everywhere a great and irrepressible
anxiety as to the future.
62. The two armies being now within a short distance of
each other, Hannibal and Publius both thought Gallic prisoners.
it necessary to address their men in terms
suitable to the occasion.
The manner in which Hannibal tried to encourage his army
was this. He mustered the men, and caused some youthful
prisoners whom he had caught when they were attempting
to hinder his march on the Alpine passes, to be brought
forward. They had been subjected to great severities
with this very object, loaded with heavy chains, half-starved,
and their bodies a mass of bruises from scourging. Hannibal
caused these men to be placed in the middle of the
army, and some suits of Gallic armour, such as are worn by
their kings when they fight in single combat, to be exhibited;
in addition to these he placed there some horses, and brought
in some valuable military cloaks. He then asked these young
prisoners, which of them were willing to fight with each other
on condition of the conqueror taking these prizes, and the
vanquished escaping all his present miseries by death. Upon
their all answering with a loud shout that they were desirous
of fighting in these single combats, he bade them draw lots;
and the pair, on whom the first lot fell, to put on the armour
and fight with each other. As soon as the young men heard
these orders, they lifted up their hands, and each prayed the
gods that he might be one of those to draw the lot. And
when the lots were drawn, those on whom they fell were overjoyed,
and the others in despair. When the fight was finished,
too, the surviving captives congratulated the one who had
fallen no less than the victor, as having been freed from many
terrible sufferings, while they themselves still remained to endure
them. And in this feeling the Carthaginian soldiers were
much disposed to join, all pitying the survivors and congratulating
the fallen champion.
63. Having by this example made the impression he desired
upon the minds of his troops, Hannibal’s
speech.
Hannibal
then came forward himself and said, “that he
had exhibited these captives in order that they
might see in the person of others a vivid representation of
what they had to expect themselves, and might so lay their plans
all the better in view of the actual state of affairs. Fortune
had summoned them to a life and death contest very like that
of the two captives, and in which the prize of victory was the
same. For they must either conquer, or die, or fall alive into
the hands of their enemies; and the prize of victory would not
be mere horses and military cloaks, but the most enviable position
in the world if they became masters of the wealth of Rome:
or if they fell in battle their reward would be to end their
life fighting to their last breath for the noblest object, in the
heat of the struggle, and with no sense of pain; while if they
were beaten, or from desire of life were base enough to fly, or
tried to prolong that life by any means except victory, every
sort of misery and misfortune would be their lot: for it was
impossible that any one of them could be so irrational or
senseless, when he remembered the length of the journey he
had performed from his native land, and the number of
enemies that lay between him and it, and the size of the
rivers he had crossed, as to cherish the hope of being able
to reach his home by flight. They should therefore cast away
such vain hopes, and regard their position as being exactly
that of the combatants whom they had but now been watching.
For, as in their case, all congratulated the dead as much as the
victor, and commiserated the survivors; so they should think
of the alternatives before themselves, and should, one and all,
come upon the field of battle resolved, if possible, to conquer,
and, if not, to die. Life with defeat was a hope that must
by no means whatever be entertained. If they reasoned
and resolved thus, victory and safety would certainly attend
them: for it never happened that men who came to such
a resolution, whether of deliberate purpose or from being
driven to bay, were disappointed in their hope of beating their
opponents in the field. And when it chanced, as was the
case with the Romans, that the enemy had in most cases a
hope of quite an opposite character, from the near neighbourhood
of their native country making flight an obvious means
of safety, then it was clear that the courage which came of
despair would carry the day.”
When he saw that the example and the words he had
spoken had gone home to the minds of the rank and file, and
that the spirit and enthusiasm which he aimed at inspiring
were created, he dismissed them for the present with commendations,
and gave orders for an advance at daybreak on
the next morning.
64. About the same day Publius Scipio, having now
crossed the Padus, and being resolved to make Scipio crosses
the Ticinus.
a farther advance across the Ticinus, ordered
those who were skilled in such works to construct
a bridge across this latter river; and then summoned
a meeting of the remainder of his army and addressed them:
dwelling principally on the reputation of their country and of
the ancestors’ achievements. But he referred particularly to
their present position, saying, “that they ought to entertain no
doubt of victory, though they had never as yet had any experience
of the enemy; and should regard it as a piece of
extravagant presumption of the Carthaginians to venture to face
Romans, by whom they had been so often beaten, and to
whom they had for so many years paid tribute and been all
but slaves. And when in addition to this they at present
knew thus much of their mettle,—that they dared not face
them, what was the fair inference to be drawn for the future?
Their cavalry, in a chance encounter on the Rhone with those
of Rome, had, so far from coming off well, lost a large number
of men, and had fled with disgrace to their own camp; and the
general and his army, as soon as they knew of the approach
of his legions, had beat a retreat, which was exceedingly like a
flight, and, contrary to their original purpose, had in their
terror taken the road over the Alps. And it was evident that
Hannibal had destroyed the greater part of his army; and that
what he had left was feeble and unfit for service, from the
hardships they had undergone: in the same way he had
lost the majority of his horses, and made the rest useless from
the length and difficult nature of the journey. They had, therefore,
only to show themselves to the enemy.” But, above all,
he pointed out that “his own presence at their head ought to
be special encouragement to them: for that he would not have
left his fleet and Spanish campaign, on which he had been sent,
and have come to them in such haste, if he had not seen on
consideration that his doing so was necessary for his country’s
safety, and that a certain victory was secured to him by it.”
The weight and influence of the speaker, as well as their
belief in his words, roused great enthusiasm among the men;
which Scipio acknowledged, and then dismissed them with the
additional injunction that they should hold themselves in readiness
to obey any order sent round to them.
65. Next day both generals led their troops along the river
Padus, on the bank nearest the Alps, Skirmish of
cavalry near the
Ticinus, Nov.
B.C. 219.
the Romans
having the stream on their left, the Carthaginians
on their right; and having ascertained on
the second day, by means of scouts, that they
were near each other, they both halted and remained encamped
for that day: but on the next, both taking their cavalry, and
Publius his sharp-shooters also, they hurried across the plain
to reconnoitre each other’s forces. As soon as they came
within distance, and saw the dust rising from the side of their
opponents, they drew up their lines for battle at once. Publius
put his sharp-shooters and Gallic horsemen in front, and
bringing the others into line, advanced at a slow pace.
Hannibal placed his cavalry that rode with bridles, and was
most to be depended on, in his front, and led them straight
against the enemy; having put the Numidian cavalry on either
wing to take the enemy on the flanks. The two generals and
the cavalry were in such hot haste to engage, that they closed
with each other before the sharp-shooters had an opportunity
of discharging their javelines at all. Before they could do so,
they left their ground, and retreated to the rear of their own
cavalry, making their way between the squadrons, terrified at
the approaching charge, and afraid of being trampled to death
by the horses which were galloping down upon them. The
cavalry charged each other front to front, and for a long time
maintained an equal contest; and a great many men dismounting
on the actual field, there was a mixed fight of horse and
foot. The Numidian horse, however, having outflanked the
Romans, charged them on the rear: and so the sharp-shooters,
who had fled from the cavalry charge at the beginning,
were now trampled to death by the numbers and furious
onslaught of the Numidians; while the front ranks originally
engaged with the Carthaginians, after losing many of
their men and inflicting a still greater loss on the enemy,
finding themselves charged on the rear by the Numidians,
broke into flight: most of them scattering in every direction,
while some of them kept closely massed round the Consul.
66. Publius then broke up his camp, and marched through the
plains to the bridge over the Padus, in haste to get Scipio retires to
Placentia on the
right bank of
the Po.
his legions across before the enemy came up. He
saw that the level country where he was then was
favourable to the enemy with his superiority in
cavalry. He was himself disabled by a wound;182 and he
decided that it was necessary to shift his quarters to a place of
safety. For a time Hannibal imagined that Scipio would give
him battle with his infantry also: but when he saw that he had
abandoned his camp, he went in pursuit of him as far as the
bridge over the Ticinus; but finding that the Hannibal crosses
the Po higher up
and follows
Scipio to Placentia.
greater part of the timbers of this bridge had been
torn away, while the men who guarded the bridge
were left still on his side of the river, he took
them prisoners to the number of about six hundred,
and being informed that the main army was far on its
way, he wheeled round and again ascended the Padus in search
of a spot in it which admitted of being easily bridged. After
two days’ march he halted and constructed a bridge over the
river by means of boats. He committed the task of bringing
over the army to Hasdrubal;183 while he himself crossed at once,
and busied himself in receiving the ambassadors who arrived
from the neighbouring districts. For no sooner had he
gained the advantage in the cavalry engagement, than all the
Celts in the vicinity hastened to fulfil their original engagement
by avowing themselves his friends, supplying him with
provisions, and joining the Carthaginian forces. After giving
these men a cordial reception, and getting his own army across
the Padus, he began to march back again down stream, with an
earnest desire of giving the enemy battle. Publius, too, had
crossed the river and was now encamped under the walls of the
Roman colony Placentia. There he made no sign of any
intention to move; for he was engaged in trying to heal his own
wound and those of his men, and considered that he had a
secure base of operations where he was. A two days’ march
from the place where he had crossed the Padus brought
Hannibal to the neighbourhood of the enemy; and on the
third day he drew out his army for battle in full view of his
opponents: but as no one came out to attack, he pitched his
camp about fifty stades from them.
67. But the Celtic contingent of the Roman army, seeing
that Hannibal’s prospects looked the brighter of
the two, Treachery of the
Gauls serving in
the army of
Scipio.
concerted their plans for a fixed time,
and waited in their several tents for the moment
of carrying them out. When the men within the
rampart of the camp had taken their supper and were gone to
bed, the Celts let more than half the night pass, and just about
the time of the morning watch armed themselves and fell upon
the Romans who were quartered nearest to them; killed a
considerable number, and wounded not a few; and, finally,
cutting off the heads of the slain, departed with them to join
the Carthaginians, to the number of two thousand infantry and
nearly two hundred cavalry. They were received with great satisfaction
by Hannibal; who, after addressing them encouragingly,
and promising them all suitable rewards, sent them to their
several cities, to declare to their compatriots what they had done,
and to urge them to make alliance with him: for he knew that
they would now all feel compelled to take part with him, when
they learnt the treachery of which their fellow-countrymen had
been guilty to the Romans. Just at the same time the Boii
came in, and handed over to him the three Agrarian Commissioners,
sent from Rome to divide the lands; whom, as I have
already related, they had seized by a sudden act of treachery
at the beginning of the war. Hannibal gratefully acknowledged
their good intention, and made a formal alliance with those
who came: but he handed them back their prisoners, bidding
them keep them safe, in order to get back their own hostages
from Rome, as they intended at first.
Publius regarded this treachery as of most serious importance;
and feeling sure that the Celts in the Scipio changes
his position at
Placentia to one
on the Trebia.
neighbourhood had long been ill-disposed, and
would, after this event, all incline to the Carthaginians,
he made up his mind that some precaution
for the future was necessary. The next night, therefore,
just before the morning watch, he broke up his camp and
marched for the river Trebia, and the high ground near it,
feeling confidence in the protection which the strength of the
position and the neighbourhood of his allies would give him.
68. When Hannibal was informed of Scipio’s change of
quarters, he sent the Numidian horse in pursuit
at once, Hannibal follows
him.
and the rest soon afterwards, following
close behind with his main army. The Numidians,
finding the Roman camp empty, stopped to set fire to it:
which proved of great service to the Romans; for if they had
pushed on and caught up the Roman baggage, a large number
of the rear-guard would have certainly been killed by the
cavalry in the open plains. But as it was, the greater part of
them got across the River Trebia in time; while those who
were after all too far in the rear to escape, were either killed or
made prisoners by the Carthaginians.
Scipio, however, having crossed the Trebia occupied the
first high ground; and having strengthened Scipio’s position
on the slopes of
Apennines, near
the source of
the Trebia.
his
camp with trench and palisade, waited the
arrival of his colleague, Tiberius Sempronius,
and his army; and was taking the greatest pains
to cure his wound, because he was exceedingly
anxious to take part in the coming engagement. Hannibal
pitched his camp about forty stades from him. While the
numerous Celts inhabiting the plains, excited by the good
prospects of the Carthaginians, supplied his army with provisions
in great abundance, and were eager to take their share with
Hannibal in every military operation or battle.
When news of the cavalry engagement reached Rome, the
disappointment of their confident expectations caused a feeling
of consternation in the minds of the people. Not but that
plenty of pretexts were found to prove to their own satisfaction
that the affair was not a defeat. Some laid the blame on the
Consul’s rashness, and others on the treacherous lukewarmness
of the Celts, which they concluded from their recent revolt
must have been shown by them on the field. But, after all,
as the infantry was still unimpaired, they made up their minds
that the general result was still as hopeful as ever. Accordingly,
when Tiberius and his legions arrived at Rome, and
marched through the city, they believed that his mere appearance
at the seat of war would settle the matter.
His men met Tiberius at Ariminum, according to their
oath, and he at once led them forward in all Tiberius Sempronius
joins
Scipio.
haste to join Publius Scipio. The junction
effected, and a camp pitched by the side of his
colleague, he was naturally obliged to refresh his men after
their forty days’ continuous march between Ariminum and
Lilybaeum: but he went on with all preparations for a battle;
and was continually in conference with Scipio, asking questions
as to what had happened in the past, and discussing with him
the measures to be taken in the present.
69. Meanwhile Hannibal got possession of Clastidium, by
the treachery of a certain Brundisian, Fall of Clastidium.
Hannibal’s policy
towards the
Italians.
to whom
it had been entrusted by the Romans. Having
become master of the garrison and the stores of
corn he used the latter for his present needs;
but took the men whom he had captured with him, without
doing them any harm, being desirous of showing by an example
the policy he meant to pursue; that those whose present
position towards Rome was merely the result of circumstances
should not be terrified, and give up hope of being spared by
him. The man who betrayed Clastidium to him he treated
with extraordinary honour, by way of tempting all men in
similar situations of authority to share the prospects of the
Carthaginians. But afterwards, finding that certain Celts who
lived in the fork of the Padus and the Trebia, while pretending
to have made terms with him, were sending messages to the
Romans at the same time, believing that they would thus
secure themselves from being harmed by either side, he sent
two thousand infantry with some Celtic and Numidian cavalry
with orders to devastate their territory. This order being
executed, and a great booty obtained, the Celts appeared at the
Roman camp beseeching their aid. Tiberius had been all
along looking out for an opportunity of striking a blow: A skirmish
favourable to
the Romans.
and
once seized on this pretext for sending out
a party, consisting of the greater part of his
cavalry; and a thousand sharp-shooters of his
infantry along with them; who having speedily come up
with the enemy on the other side of the Trebia, and engaged
them in a sharp struggle for the possession of the booty,
forced the Celts and Numidians to beat a retreat to their own
camp. Those who were on duty in front of the Carthaginian
camp quickly perceived what was going on, and brought some
reserves to support the retreating cavalry; then the Romans
in their turn were routed, and had to retreat to their camp.
At this Tiberius sent out all his cavalry and sharp-shooters;
whereupon the Celts again gave way, and sought the protection
of their own camp. The Carthaginian general being unprepared
for a general engagement, and thinking it a sound
rule not to enter upon one on every casual opportunity, or
except in accordance with a settled design, acted, it must be
confessed, on this occasion with admirable generalship. He
checked their flight when his men were near the camp, and
forced them to halt and face about; but he sent out his
aides and buglers to recall the rest, and prevented them from
pursuing and engaging the enemy any more. So the Romans
after a short halt went back, having killed a large number of
the enemy, and lost very few themselves.
70. Excited and overjoyed at this success Tiberius was
all eagerness for a general engagement. Now, it was in his
power to administer the war for the present as he chose, Sempronius
resolves to give
battle.
owing to the ill-health of Publius Scipio;
yet wishing to have his colleague’s opinion
in support of his own, he consulted him on
this subject. Publius however took quite an opposite view
of the situation. He thought his legions would be all the
better for a winter under arms; and that the fidelity of the
fickle Celts would never stand the test of want of success
and enforced inactivity on the part of the Carthaginians: they
would be certain, he thought, to turn against them once more.
Besides, when he had recovered from his wound, he hoped to
be able to do good service to his country himself. With these
arguments he tried to dissuade Tiberius from his design. The
latter felt that every one of these arguments were true and
sound; but, urged on by ambition and a blind confidence in
his fortune, he was eager to have the credit of the decisive
action to himself, before Scipio should be able to be present
at the battle, or the next Consuls arrive to take over the
command; for the time for that to take place was now
approaching. As therefore he selected the time for the engagement
from personal considerations, rather than with a view
to the actual circumstances of the case, he was bound to make
a signal failure.
Hannibal took much the same view of the case as Scipio,
and was therefore, unlike him, eager for a battle; because, in
the first place, he wished to avail himself of the enthusiasm of
the Celts before it had at all gone off: in the second place, he
wished to engage the Roman legions while the soldiers in
them were raw recruits without practice in war: and, in
the third place, because he wished to fight the battle while
Scipio was still unfit for service: but most of all because he
wanted to be doing something and not to let the time slip by
fruitlessly; for when a general leads his troops into a foreign
country, and attempts what looks like a desperate undertaking,
the one chance for him is to keep the hopes of his allies alive
by continually striking some fresh blow.
Such were Hannibal’s feelings when he knew of the
intended attack of Tiberius.
71. Now he had some time before remarked a certain
piece of ground which was flat and treeless, Hannibal prepares
an ambuscade.
and yet well suited for an ambush, because
there was a stream in it with a high overhanging
bank thickly covered with thorns and brambles.
Here he determined to entrap the enemy. The place was
admirably adapted for putting them off their guard; because
the Romans were always suspicious of woods, from the fact
of the Celts invariably choosing such places for their ambuscades,
but felt no fear at all of places that were level and without
trees: not knowing that for the concealment and safety of an
ambush such places are much better than woods; because
the men can command from them a distant view of all that
is going on: while nearly all places have sufficient cover to
make concealment possible,—a stream with an overhanging
bank, reeds, or ferns, or some sort of bramble-bushes,—which
are good enough to hide not infantry only, but sometimes even
cavalry, if the simple precaution is taken of laying conspicuous
arms flat upon the ground and hiding helmets under shields.
Hannibal had confided his idea to his brother Mago and to his
council, who had all approved of the plan. Accordingly, when
the army had supped, he summoned this young man to his
tent, who was full of youthful enthusiasm, and had been
trained from boyhood in the art of war, and put under his
command a hundred cavalry and the same number of infantry.
These men he had himself earlier in the day selected as the
most powerful of the whole army, and had ordered to come to
his tent after supper. Having addressed and inspired them
with the spirit suitable to the occasion, he bade each of them
select ten of the bravest men of their own company, and to
come with them to a particular spot in the camp. The order
having been obeyed, he despatched the whole party, numbering
a thousand cavalry and as many infantry, with guides, to the
place selected for the ambuscade; and gave his brother
directions as to the time at which he was to make the attempt.
At daybreak he himself mustered the Numidian cavalry, who
were conspicuous for their powers of endurance; and after
addressing them, and promising them rewards if they behaved
with gallantry, he ordered them to ride up to the enemy’s lines,
and then quickly cross the river, and by throwing showers of
darts at them tempt them to come out: his object being to
get at the enemy before they had had their breakfast, or made
any preparations for the day. The other officers of the army
also he summoned, and gave them similar instructions for the
battle, ordering all their men to get breakfast and to see to
their arms and horses.
72. As soon as Tiberius saw the Numidian horse approaching,
he immediately sent out his cavalry by itself Battle of the
Trebia,
December B.C.
218.
with orders to engage the enemy, and keep them
in play, while he despatched after them six
thousand foot armed with javelins, and got the
rest of the army in motion, with the idea that their appearance
would decide the affair: for his superiority in numbers, and
his success in the cavalry skirmish of the day before, had filled
him with confidence. But it was now mid-winter and the day
was snowy and excessively cold, and men and horses were
marching out almost entirely without having tasted food; and
accordingly, though the troops were at first in high spirits, yet
when they had crossed the Trebia, swollen by the floods which
the rain of the previous night had brought down from the high
ground above the camp, wading breast deep through the
stream, they were in a wretched state from the cold and want
of food as the day wore on. While the Carthaginians
on the contrary had eaten and Hannibal’s forces.
drunk in their tents, and got their horses ready, and were all
anointing and arming themselves round the fires. Hannibal
waited for the right moment to strike, and as soon as he saw
that the Romans had crossed the Trebia, throwing out eight
thousand spearmen and slingers to cover his advance, he led out
his whole army. When he had advanced about eight stades from
the camp, he drew up his infantry, consisting of about twenty
thousand Iberians, Celts, and Libyans, in one long line, while
he divided his cavalry and placed half on each wing, amounting
in all to more than ten thousand, counting the Celtic allies;
his elephants also he divided between the two wings, where they
occupied the front rank. Meanwhile Tiberius The Roman
forces.
had recalled his cavalry because he saw that they
could do nothing with the enemy. For the
Numidians when attacked retreated without difficulty, scattering
in every direction, and then faced about again and charged,
which is the peculiar feature of their mode of warfare. But
he drew up his infantry in the regular Roman order, consisting
of sixteen thousand citizens and twenty thousand allies; for
that is the complete number of a Roman army in an important
campaign, when the two Consuls are compelled by
circumstances to combine forces.184 He then placed the cavalry
on either wing, numbering four thousand, and advanced against
the enemy in gallant style, in regular order, and at a deliberate
pace.
73. When the two forces came within distance, the light-armed
troops in front of the two armies The Roman
cavalry retreat.
closed with each other. In this part of the
battle the Romans were in many respects
at a disadvantage, while the Carthaginians had everything in
their favour. For the Roman spearmen had been on hard
service ever since daybreak, and had expended most of their
weapons in the engagement with the Numidians, while those
weapons which were left had become useless from being long
wet. Nor were the cavalry, or indeed the whole army, any
better off in these respects. The case of the Carthaginians
was exactly the reverse: they had come on the field perfectly
sound and fresh, and were ready and eager for every service
required of them. As soon, therefore, as their advanced guard
had retired again within their lines, and the heavy-armed soldiers
were engaged, the cavalry on the two wings of the Carthaginian
army at once charged the enemy with all the effect of
superiority in numbers, and in the condition both of men
and horses secured by their freshness when they started. The
Roman cavalry on the contrary retreated: and the flanks of
the line being thus left unprotected, the Carthaginian spearmen
and the main body of the Numidians, passing their own
advanced guard, charged the Roman flanks: and, by the
damage which they did them, prevented them from keeping
up the fight with the troops on their front. The heavy-armed
soldiers, however, who were in the front rank of both armies,
and in the centre of that, maintained an obstinate and equal
fight for a considerable time.
74. Just then the Numidians, who had been lying in
ambush, left their hiding-place, Both Roman
wings defeated.and by a
sudden charge on the centre of the Roman
rear produced great confusion and alarm
throughout the army. Finally both the Roman wings, being
hard pressed in front by the elephants, and on both flanks by
the light-armed troops of the enemy, gave way, and in their
flight were forced upon the river behind them. After this,
while the centre of the Roman rear was losing heavily, and
suffering severely from the attack of the Numidian ambuscade,
their front, thus driven to bay, defeated the Celts and a division
of Africans, and, after killing a large number of them, succeeded
in cutting their way through the Carthaginian line. Then
seeing that their wings had been forced off their ground, they
gave up all hope of relieving them or getting back to their
camp, partly because of the number of the enemy’s cavalry,
and partly because they were hindered by the river and the
pelting storm of rain which was pouring down upon their
heads. They therefore closed their ranks, The Roman centre
fights its way to
Placentia.
and made their way safely to Placentia,
to the number of ten thousand. Of the
rest of the army the greater number were killed by the
elephants and cavalry on the bank of the Trebia; while those
of the infantry who escaped, and the greater part of the cavalry,
managed to rejoin the ten thousand mentioned above, and
arrived with them at Placentia. Meanwhile the Carthaginian
army pursued the enemy as far as the Trebia; but being prevented
by the storm from going farther, returned to their camp.
They regarded the result of the battle with great exultation, as
a complete success; for the loss of the Iberians and Africans
had been light, the heaviest having fallen on the Celts. But
from the rain and the snow which followed it, they suffered
so severely, that all the elephants except one died, and a large
number of men and horses perished from the cold.
75. Fully aware of the nature of his disaster, but wishing
to conceal its extent as well as he could from the people at
home, Tiberius sent messengers to announce that a battle had
taken place, but that the storm had deprived them of the
victory. For the moment this news was believed at Rome;
but when soon afterwards it became known that the Carthaginians
were in possession of the Roman camp, and that all the
Celts had joined them: while their own troops had abandoned
their camp, and, after retiring from the field of battle, were all
collected in the neighbouring cities; and were besides being
supplied with necessary provisions by sea up the Padus, the
Roman people became only too certain of what had really
happened in the battle. Winter of B.C.
118-117.
Great exertions
at Rome to meet
the danger.
It was a most unexpected
reverse, and it forced them at once
to urge on with energy the remaining preparations
for the war. They reinforced those
positions which lay in the way of the enemy’s
advance; sent legions to Sardinia and Sicily, as well as
garrisons to Tarentum, and other places of strategical importance;
and, moreover, fitted out a fleet of sixty quinqueremes.
The Consuls designate, Gnaeus Servilius and
Gaius Flaminius, were collecting the allies and enrolling the
citizen legions, and sending supplies to Ariminum and Etruria,
with a view of going to the seat of war by those two routes.
They sent also to king Hiero asking for reinforcements, who
sent them five hundred Cretan archers and a thousand
peltasts. In fact they pushed on their preparations in every
direction with energy. For the Roman people are most
formidable, collectively and individually, when they have real
reason for alarm.
76. While these events were happening in Italy, Gnaeus
Cornelius Scipio, who had been left by his Gnaeus Scipio
in Spain.
brother Publius in command of the fleet, setting
sail from the mouth of the Rhone, came to
land with his whole squadron at a place in Iberia called
Emporium. Starting from this town, he made descents
upon the coast, landing and besieging those who refused
to submit to him along the seaboard as far as the
Iber; and treating with every mark of kindness those who
acceded to his demands, and taking all the precautions
he could for their safety. When he had garrisoned those
towns on the coast that submitted, he led his whole army
inland, having by this time a not inconsiderable contingent of
Iberian allies; and took possession of the towns on his line of
march, some by negotiation and some by force of arms. The
Carthaginian troops which Hannibal had left in that district
under the command of Hanno, lay entrenched to resist him
under the walls of a town called Cissa.
Defeating this army in a pitched battle, Gnaeus not only
got possession of a rich booty, for the whole baggage of the
army invading Italy had been left under its charge, but secured
the friendly alliance of all the Iberian tribes north of the Iber,
and took both Hanno, the general of the Carthaginians, and
Andobales, the general of the Iberians, prisoners. The latter
was despot of central Iberia, and had always been especially
inclined to the side of Carthage.
Immediately he learnt what had happened, Hasdrubal
crossed the Iber to bring aid. There he ascertained that the
Roman troops left in charge of the fleet had abandoned all
precautions, and were trading on the success of the land forces
to pass their time in ease. He therefore took with him eight
thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry of his own army,
and finding the men of the fleet scattered about the country,
he killed a great many of them and forced the rest to fly for
refuge to their ships. He then retired across the Iber again,
and employed himself in fortifying and garrisoning the posts
south of the river, taking up his winter quarters at New
Carthage. When Gnaeus rejoined his fleet, he punished the
authors of the disaster according to the Roman custom; and
then collected his land and sea forces together in Tarraco, and
there took up his winter quarters; and by dividing the booty
equally between his soldiers, inspired them at once with
affection towards himself and eagerness for future service.
Such was the course of the Iberian campaign.
77. At the beginning of the following spring, Gaius Flaminius
marched his army through Etruria, B.C. 217.and
pitched his camp at Arretium; while his colleague
Gnaeus Servilius on the other hand went to Ariminum,
to await the advance of the enemy in that direction.
Passing the winter in the Celtic territory, Hannibal kept
his Roman prisoners in close confinement, Hannibal conciliates
the
Italians.
supplying them very sparingly with food;
while he treated their allies with great
kindness from the first, and finally called them together and
addressed them, alleging, “that he had not come to fight
against them, but against Rome in their behalf; and that,
therefore, if they were wise, they would attach themselves to
him: because he had come to restore freedom to the Italians,
and to assist them to recover their cities and territory which
they had severally lost to Rome.” With these words he
dismissed them without ransom to their own homes: wishing
by this policy to attract the inhabitants of Italy to his cause,
and to alienate their affections from Rome, and to awaken the
resentment of all those who considered themselves to have suffered
by the loss of harbours or cities under the Roman rule.
78. While he was in these winter quarters also he practised
a ruse truly Punic. Being apprehensive that from the fickleness
of their character, and the newness of the tie between
himself and them, the Celts might lay plots against his life, he
caused a number of wigs to be made for him, suited in
appearance to men of various ages; and these he constantly
varied, changing at the same time his clothes also to
harmonise with the particular wig which he wore. He thus
made it hard to recognise him, not only for those who
met him suddenly, but even for his intimates. But seeing that
the Celts were discontented at the lengthened continuance of
the war within their borders, and were in a state of restless hurry
to invade the enemy’s territory,—on the pretence of hatred for
Rome, but in reality from love of booty,—he determined to
break up his camp as soon as possible, and satisfy the desires
of his army. Accordingly as soon as the change of season set
in, by questioning those who were reputed to know the
country best, he ascertained that the other roads leading into
Etruria were long and well known to the enemy, but that the one
which led through the marshes was short, and would bring
them upon Flaminius as a surprise.185 This was what suited his
peculiar genius, and he therefore decided to take this route.
But when the report was spread in his army that the general
was going to lead them through some marshes, every soldier
felt alarmed at the idea of the quagmires and deep sloughs
which they would find on this march.
79. But after a careful inquiry as to what part of the road
was firm or boggy, Hannibal broke up his camp
and marched out. Hannibal starts
for Etruria.
Spring of B.C.
217.He placed the Libyans and
Iberians and all his best soldiers in the van,
and the baggage within their lines, that there
might be plenty of provisions for their immediate needs.
Provisions for the future he entirely neglected. Because
he calculated that on reaching the enemy’s territory, if he were
beaten he should not require them, and if he were victorious he
would find abundance in the open country. Behind this
vanguard he placed the Celts, and in the rear of all the
cavalry. He entrusted the command of the rear-guard to his
brother Mago, that he might see to the security of all, and
especially to guard against the cowardice and impatience of
hard labour which characterised the Celts; in order that, if the
difficulty of the route should induce them to turn back, he
might intercept them by means of the cavalry and force them
to proceed. In point of fact, the Iberians and Libyans,
having great powers of endurance and being habituated to such
fatigues, and also because when they marched through them
the marshes186 were fresh and untrodden, accomplished their
march with a moderate amount of distress: but the Celts
advanced with great difficulty, because the marshes were now
disturbed and trodden into a deep morass: and being quite
unaccustomed to such painful labours, they bore the fatigue
with anger and impatience; but were hindered from turning
back by the cavalry in their rear. All however suffered
grievously, especially from the impossibility of getting
sleep on a continuous march of four days and three nights
through a route which was under water: but none suffered
so much, or lost so many men, as the Celts. Most of his
beasts of burden also slipping in the mud fell and perished,
and could then only do the men one service: they sat upon
their dead bodies, and piling up baggage upon them so as to
stand out above the water, they managed to get a snatch of
sleep187 for a short portion of the night. Another misfortune
was that a considerable number of the horses lost their hoofs
by the prolonged march through bog. Hannibal himself was
with difficulty and much suffering got across riding on the only
elephant left alive, enduring great agony from a severe attack
of ophthalmia, by which he eventually lost the sight of one
eye, because the time and the difficulties of the situation did
not admit of his waiting or applying any treatment to it.
80. Having crossed the marshes in this unexpected
manner, Hannibal found Flaminius in Etruria
encamped under the walls of Arretium. Hannibal in the
valley of the
Arno.
For the
present he pitched his camp close to the marshes,
to refresh his army, and to investigate the plans of his enemies
and the lie of the country in his front. And being informed that
the country before him abounded in wealth, and that Flaminius
was a mere mob-orator and demagogue, with no ability for
the actual conduct of military affairs, and was moreover
unreasonably confident in his resources; he calculated that, if
he passed his camp and made a descent into the district
beyond, partly for fear of popular reproach and partly from a
personal feeling of irritation, Flaminius would be unable to
endure to watch passively the devastation of the country, and
would spontaneously follow him wherever he went; and being
eager to secure the credit of a victory for himself, without
waiting for the arrival of his colleague, would give him many
opportunities for an attack.
81. And in making these calculations Hannibal showed his
consummate prudence and strategical ability. Hannibal
correctly judges
the character of
Flaminius.
For it is mere blind ignorance to believe that
there can be anything of more vital importance
to a general than the knowledge of his
opponent’s character and disposition. As in combats between
individuals or ranks, he who would conquer must observe
carefully how it is possible to attain his object, and what part
of his enemy appears unguarded or insufficiently armed,—so
must a commander of an army look out for the weak place,
not in the body, but in the mind of the leader of the hostile
force. For it has often happened before now that from mere
idleness and lack of energy, men have let not only the welfare
of the state, but even their private fortunes fall to ruin: some
are so addicted to wine that they cannot sleep without
bemusing their intellects with drink; and others so infatuated in
their pursuit of sensual pleasures, that they have not only been
the ruin of their cities and fortunes, but have forfeited life itself
with disgrace. In the case of individuals, however, cowardice
and sloth bring shame only on themselves; but when it is
a commander-in-chief that is concerned, the disaster affects all
alike and is of the most fatal consequence. It not only
infects the men under him with an inactivity like his own; but
it often brings absolute dangers of the most serious description
upon those who trust such a general. For rashness, temerity,
and uncalculating impetuosity, as well as foolish ambition and
vanity, give an easy victory to the enemy. And are the source
of numerous dangers to one’s friends: for a man who is the
prey of such weaknesses falls the easiest victim to every
stratagem, ambush or ruse. The general then who can gain
a clear idea of his opponent’s weaknesses, and direct his attack
on the point where he is most open to it, will very soon be
the victor in the campaign. For as a ship, if you deprive it
of its steerer, falls with all its crew into the hands of the
enemy; so, in the case of an army in war, if you outwit or
out-manœuvre its general, the whole will often fall into your
hands.
82. Nor was Hannibal mistaken in his calculations in
regard to Flaminius. For no sooner had he Flaminius is
drawn out of
camp.
left the neighbourhood of Faesulae, and,
advancing a short way beyond the Roman
camp, made a raid upon the neighbouring country, than
Flaminius became excited, and enraged at the idea that he was
despised by the enemy: and as the devastation of the country
went on, and he saw from the smoke that rose in every
direction that the work of destruction was proceeding, he could
not patiently endure the sight. Some of his officers advised
that they should not follow the enemy at once nor engage
him, but should act on the defensive, in view of his great
superiority in cavalry; and especially that they should wait for
the other Consul, and not give battle until the two armies were
combined. But Flaminius, far from listening to their advice,
was indignant at those who offered it; and bade them consider
what the people at home would say at the country being laid
waste almost up to the walls of Rome itself, while they
remained encamped in Etruria on the enemy’s rear. Finally,
with these words, he set his army in motion, without any settled
plan of time or place; but bent only on falling in with the
enemy, as though certain victory awaited him. For he had
managed to inspire the people with such confident expectations,
that the unarmed citizens who followed his camp in hope of
booty, bringing chains and fetters and all such gear, were more
numerous than the soldiers themselves.
Meanwhile Hannibal was advancing on his way to Rome
through Etruria, keeping the city of Cortona and its hills on
his left, and the Thrasymene lake on his right; and as he
marched, he burned and wasted the country with a view of
rousing the wrath of the enemy and tempting him to come out.
And when he saw Flaminius get well within distance, and
observed that the ground he then occupied was suited to his
purpose, he bent his whole energies on preparing for a general
engagement.
83. The route which he was following led through a low
valley enclosed on both sides by long lines of
lofty hills. The ambuscade
at Lake Thrasymene.Of its two ends, that in front was
blocked by an abrupt and inaccessible hill, and
that on the rear by the lake, between which and the foot of
the cliff there is only a very narrow defile leading into this
valley. Making his way to the end of the valley along the
bank of the lake, Hannibal posted himself with the Spanish
and Libyan troops on the hill immediately in front of him as
he marched, and pitched a camp on it; but sent his Balearic
slingers and light-armed troops by a détour, and stationed
them in extended order under the cover of the hills to the
right of the valley; and by a similar détour placed the Gauls
and cavalry under the cover of hills to the left, causing them
also to extend their line so far as to cover the entrance of the
defile running between the cliff and lake into the valley.188
Having made these preparations during the night, and
having thus enclosed the valley with ambuscades, Hannibal
remained quiet. In pursuit of him came Flaminius, in hot
haste to close with the enemy. It was late in the evening before
he pitched his camp on the border of the lake; and at daybreak
next morning, just before the morning watch, he led his front
maniples forward along the borders of the lake into the valley
with a view of engaging the enemy.
84. The day was exceedingly misty: and as soon as the
greater part of the Roman line was in the valley, The battle,
22d June.
and the leading maniples were getting close to
him, Hannibal gave the signal for attack; and at the same time
sent orders to the troops lying in ambush on the hills to do
the same, and thus delivered an assault upon the enemy at
every point at once. Flaminius was taken completely by
surprise: the mist was so thick, and the enemy were charging
down from the upper ground at so many points at once, that
not only were the Centurions and Tribunes unable to relieve
any part of the line that was in difficulties, but were not even
able to get any clear idea of what was going on: for they were
attacked simultaneously on front, rear, and both flanks. The
result was that most of them were cut down in the order of
march, without being able to defend themselves: exactly as
though they had been actually given up to slaughter by
the folly of their leader. Flaminius himself, in a state
of the utmost distress and despair, was attacked and killed
by a company of Celts. As many as fifteen thousand
Romans fell in the valley, who could neither yield nor defend
themselves, being habituated to regard it as their supreme
duty not to fly or quit their ranks. But those who were
caught in the defile between the lake and the cliff perished in
a shameful, or rather a most miserable, manner: for being
thrust into the lake, some in their frantic terror endeavoured
to swim with their armour on, and presently sank and were
drowned; while the greater number, wading as far as they could
into the lake, remained there with their heads above water;
and when the cavalry rode in after them, and certain death
stared them in the face, they raised their hands and begged
for quarter, offering to surrender, and using every imaginary
appeal for mercy; but were finally despatched by the
enemy, or, in some cases, begged the favour of the fatal
blow from their friends, or inflicted it on themselves. A
number of men, however, amounting perhaps to six thousand,
who were in the valley, defeated the enemy immediately in
front of them; but though they might have done much to
retrieve the fortune of the day, they were unable to go to the
relief of their comrades, or get to the rear of their opponents,
because they could not see what was going on. They accordingly
pushed on continually to the front, always expecting to
find themselves engaged with some of the enemy: until they
discovered that, without noticing it, they were issuing upon
the higher ground. But when they were on the crest of
the hills, the mist broke and they saw clearly the disaster
which had befallen them; and being no longer able to do any
good, since the enemy was victorious all along the line, and in
complete possession of the ground, they closed their ranks and
made for a certain Etrurian village. After the battle Maharbal
was sent by Hannibal with the Iberians and light-armed troops
to besiege the village; and seeing themselves surrounded by a
complication of dangers, they laid down their arms and surrendered
on condition of their lives being spared. Such was
the end of the final engagement between the Romans and
Carthaginians in Etruria.
85. When the prisoners who had surrendered on terms
were with the other prisoners brought to
Hannibal, Hannibal’s
treatment of
prisoners.
he had them all collected together
to the number of more than fifteen thousand,
and began by saying that Maharbal had no authority
to grant them their lives without consulting him. He then
launched out into an invective against Rome: and when he had
finished that, he distributed all the prisoners who were Romans
among the companies of his army to be held in safe keeping;
but allowed all the allies to depart without ransom to their own
country, with the same remark as he had made before, that
“he was not come to fight against Italians, but in behalf of
Italians against Rome.” He then gave his army time to refresh
themselves after their fatigue, and buried those of highest rank
who had fallen in his army, amounting to about thirty; the
total number of his loss being fifteen hundred, most of whom
were Celts. He then began considering, in conjunction with
his brother and friends, where and how he should continue his
attack, for he now felt confident of ultimate success.
When the news of this disaster reached Rome, the chief
men of the state could not, Dismay at Rome.in view of the
gravity of the blow, conceal its extent or
soften it down, but were forced to assemble the people
and tell them the truth. When the Praetor, therefore,
from the Rostra said, “We have been beaten in a great
battle,” there was such a consternation, that those who had
been present at the battle as well as at this meeting, felt the
disaster to be graver than when they were on the field of
battle itself. And this feeling of the people was not to be
wondered at. For many years they had been unaccustomed
to the word or the fact of defeat, and they could not now
endure reverse with patience or dignity. The Senate, however,
rose to the occasion, and held protracted debates and consultations
as to the future, anxiously considering what it was
the duty of all classes to do, and how they were to do it.
86. About the same time as the battle of Thrasymene,
the Consul Gnaeus Servilius, Servilius’s
advanced guard
cut to pieces.who had been
stationed on duty at Ariminum,—which
is on the coast of the Adriatic, where the
plains of Cis-Alpine Gaul join the rest of Italy, not far from
the mouths of the Padus,—having heard that Hannibal had
entered Etruria and was encamped near Flaminius, designed
to join the latter with his whole army. But finding himself
hampered by the difficulty of transporting so heavy a force, he
sent Gaius Centenius forward in haste with four thousand
horse, intending that he should be there before himself in case
of need. But Hannibal, getting early intelligence after the
battle of Thrasymene of this reinforcement of the enemy, sent
Maharbal with his light-armed troops, and a detachment of
cavalry, who falling in with Gaius, killed nearly half his men
at the first encounter; and having pursued the remainder to a
certain hill, on the very next day took them all prisoners.
The news of the battle of Thrasymene was three days’ old at
Rome, and the sorrow caused by it was, so to speak, at its
hottest, when this further disaster was announced. The consternation
caused by it was no longer confined to the people.
The Senate now fully shared in it; and it was resolved that the
usual annual arrangements for the election of magistrates
should be suspended, and a more radical remedy be sought
for the present dangers; for they came to the conclusion that
their affairs were in such a state, as to require a commander
with absolute powers.
Feeling now entirely confident of success, Hannibal rejected
the idea of approaching Rome for the present; but traversed
the country plundering it without resistance, Hannibal’s
advance after the
battle.and
directing his march towards the coast of the
Adriatic. Having passed through Umbria and
Picenum, he came upon the coast after a ten days’ march
with such enormous booty, that the army could neither
drive nor carry all the wealth which they had taken, and
after killing a large number of people on his road. For
the order was given, usual in the storming of cities, to kill
all adults who came in their way: an order which Hannibal was
prompted to give now by his deep-seated hatred of Rome.189
87. Pitching his camp on the shore of the Adriatic, in a
district extraordinarily rich in every kind of produce, he took
great pains to refresh his men and restore their health, and no
less so that of the horses. For the cold and squalor of a
winter spent in Gallia Cis-Alpina without the protection of a
roof, and then the painful march through the marshes, had
brought upon most of the horses, and the men as well, an
attack of scurvy and all its consequences. Having therefore
now got possession of a rich country, he got his horses into
condition again, and restored the bodies and spirits of his
soldiers; and made the Libyans change their own for Roman
arms selected for the purpose, which he could easily do from
being possessed of so many sets stripped from the bodies of the
enemy. He now sent messengers, too, to Carthage by sea, to
report what had taken place, for this was the first time he had
reached the sea since he entered Italy. The Carthaginians
were greatly rejoiced at the news: and took measures with
enthusiasm for forwarding supplies to their armies, both in
Iberia and Italy.
Meanwhile the Romans had appointed Quintus Fabius
Dictator,190 a man distinguished no less for his wisdom than his
high birth; as is still commemorated by the fact that the
members of his family are even now called
Maximi, Q. Fabius Maximus
Dictator.
that is “Greatest,” in honour of his
successful achievements. A Dictator differs
from the Consuls in this, that each Consul is followed by twelve
lictors, the Dictator by twenty-four. Again, the Consuls have
frequently to refer to the Senate to enable them to carry out
their proposed plans, but the Dictator is absolute, and when
he is appointed all other magistrates in Rome are at once
deprived of power, except the Tribunes of the People.191 I shall,
however, take another opportunity of speaking in more detail
about these officers. With the Dictator they appointed Marcus
Minucius master of the horse; this is an officer under the
Dictator, and takes his place when engaged elsewhere.
88. Though Hannibal shifted his quarters from time to
time for short distances in one direction or another, he remained
in the neighbourhood of the Adriatic; and by bathing his
horses with old wine, of which he had a great store, cured
them of the scab and got them into condition again. By a
similar treatment he cured his men of their wounds, and got
the others into a sound state of health and spirits for the
service before them. After traversing with fire and sword
the territories of Praetutia,192 Hadriana, Marrucina, and Frentana,
he started on his road to Iapygia. This district is divided
among three peoples, each with a district name, Daunii, Peucetii,
and Messapii. Hannibal first invaded the territory of the
Daunii, beginning from Luceria, a Roman colony, and laid the
country waste. He next encamped near Vibo, and overran the
territory of Arpi, and plundered all Daunia without resistance.
Meanwhile Fabius, after offering the usual sacrifice to the
gods upon his appointment, started with his Fabius takes the
command.
master of the horse and four legions which
had been enrolled for the purpose; and
having effected a junction near Daunia with the troops that
had come to the rescue from Ariminum, he relieved Gnaeus
of his command on shore and sent him with an escort to
Rome, with orders to be ready with help for any emergency,
in case the Carthaginians made any movement by sea. Fabius
himself, with his master of the horse, took over the command of
the whole army and pitched his camp opposite the Carthaginians,
near a place called Aecae,193 about six miles from the enemy.
89. When Hannibal learnt that Fabius had arrived, he
determined to terrify the enemy by promptly attacking. Cunctator.He
therefore led out his army, approached the
Roman camp, and there drew up his men
in order of battle; but when he had waited some time,
and nobody came out to attack him, he drew off and
retired to his own camp. For Fabius, having made up
his mind to incur no danger and not to risk a battle, but to
make the safety of his men his first and greatest object, kept
resolutely to this purpose. At first he was despised for it, and
gave rise to scandalous insinuations that he was an utter
coward and dared not face an engagement: but in course of
time he compelled everybody to confess and allow that it was
impossible for any one to have acted, in the existing circumstances,
with greater discretion and prudence. And it was not
long before facts testified to the wisdom of his policy. Nor
was it wonderful that it was so. For the forces of his
opponents had been trained from their earliest youth without
intermission in war; had a general who had grown up with
them and from childhood had been instructed in the arts of
the camp; had won many battles in Iberia, and twice running
had beaten the Romans and their allies: and, what was more
than all, had thoroughly made up their minds that their one
hope of safety was in victory. In every respect the circumstances
of the Roman army were the exact opposite of these;
and therefore, their manifest inferiority making it impossible
for Fabius to offer the enemy battle, he fell back upon those
resources in which the Romans had the advantage of the
enemy; clung to them; and conducted the war by their means:
and they were—an inexhaustible supply of provisions and of
men.
90. He, then, during the following months, kept his army
continually hovering in the neighbourhood of the enemy, his
superior knowledge of the country enabling him to occupy
beforehand all the posts of vantage; and having supplies in
abundance on his rear, he never allowed his soldiers to go on
foraging expeditions, or get separated, on any pretence, from the
camp; but keeping them continually massed together and in
close union, he watched for favourable opportunities of time
and place; and by this method of proceeding captured and
killed a large number of the enemy, who in their contempt of
him straggled from their camp in search of plunder. His
object in these manœuvres was twofold,—to gradually diminish
the limited numbers of the enemy: and to strengthen and renew
by such successes in detail the spirits of his own men,
which had been depressed, to begin with, by the general defeat
of their armies. But nothing would induce him to agree to
give his enemy a set battle. Minucius
discontented.
This policy however
was by no means approved of by his master
of the horse, Marcus. He joined in the general
verdict, and decried Fabius in every one’s hearing, as conducting
his command in a cowardly and unenterprising spirit; and
was himself eager to venture upon a decisive engagement.
Meanwhile the Carthaginians, after wasting these districts,
crossed the Apennines; and descending upon
Samnium, Hannibal in
Samnium and
Apulia.
which was rich and had been free
from war for many years past, found themselves
in possession of such an abundance of provisions, that
they could get rid of them neither by use nor waste. They
overran also the territory of Beneventum, which was a Roman
colony; and took the town of Venusia, which was unwalled
and richly furnished with every kind of property. All
this time the Romans were following on his rear, keeping
one or two days’ march behind him, but never venturing to
approach or engage the enemy. Accordingly, when Hannibal
saw that Fabius plainly meant to decline a battle, but yet would
not abandon the country altogether, he formed the bold resolution
of penetrating to the plains round Capua; and actually
did so as far as Falernum, convinced that thereby he should
do one of two things,—force the enemy to give him battle, or
make it evident to all that the victory was his, and that the
Romans had abandoned the country to him. This he hoped
would strike terror into the various cities, and cause them to
be eager to revolt from Rome. For up to that time, though
the Romans had been beaten in two battles, not a single city
in Italy had revolted to the Carthaginians; but all maintained
their fidelity, although some of them were suffering severely;—a
fact which may show us the awe and respect which the
Republic had inspired in its allies.
91. Hannibal, however, had not adopted this plan without
good reason. For the plains about Capua are the best in
Italy for fertility and beauty and proximity to the sea, and for
the commercial harbours, into which merchants run who are
sailing to Italy from nearly all parts of the world. They contain,
moreover, the most famous and beautiful cities of Italy.
On its seaboard are Sinuessa, Cumae, Puteoli, Naples, and
Nuceria; and inland to the north there are Cales and Teanum,
to the east and south [Caudium194] and Nola. In the centre
of these plains lies the richest of all the cities, that of Capua.
No tale in all mythology wears a greater appearance of probability
than that which is told of these, which, like others
remarkable for their beauty, are called the Phlegraean plains;
for surely none are more likely for beauty and fertility to have
been contended for by gods. In addition to these advantages,
they are strongly protected by nature and difficult of approach;
for one side is protected by the sea, and the rest by a long
and high chain of mountains, through which there are but
three passes from the interior, narrow and difficult, one from
Samnium [a second from Latium195] and a third from Hirpini.
So that if the Carthaginians succeeded in fixing their quarters
in these plains, they would have the advantage of a kind
of theatre, in which to display the terrors of their power before
the gaze of all Italy; and would make a spectacle also of the
cowardice of their enemies in shrinking from giving them
battle, while they themselves would be proved beyond dispute
to be masters of the country.
92. With this view Hannibal crossed from Samnium by
the pass of the hill called Eribianus,196 and
encamped on the bank of the river Vulturnus, Hannibal
descends into the
Falernian plain.
which almost divides these plains in half.
His camp was on the side of the river towards Rome, but
he overran the whole plain with foraging parties. Though
utterly aghast at the audacity of the enemy’s proceedings,
Fabius stuck all the more firmly to the policy upon which he
had determined. But his colleague Minucius, and all the
centurions and tribunes of the army, thinking that they had
caught the enemy in an excellent trap, were of opinion that
they should make all haste into the plains, and not allow the
most splendid part of the country to be devastated. Until
they reached the spot, Fabius hurried on, and feigned to share
their eager and adventurous spirit; and, when he was near the
ager Falernus, he showed himself on the mountain skirts and
kept in a line with the enemy, that he might not be thought by
the allies to abandon the country: but he would not let his army
descend into the plain, being still unwilling to risk a general
engagement, partly for the same reasons as before, and partly
because the enemy were conspicuously superior in cavalry.
After trying to provoke his enemies, and collecting an
unlimited amount of booty by laying waste
the whole plain, Fabius lies in wait.Hannibal began taking
measures for removing: wishing not to waste his booty,
but to stow it in some safe place, which he might
also make his winter quarters; that the army might not
only be well off for the present, but might have abundant
supplies all through the winter. Fabius, learning that he
meditated returning the same way as he came, and seeing that
the pass was a narrow one, and extremely well suited for an
attack by ambush, placed about four thousand men at the exact
spot that he would have to pass; while he, with the main body
of his troops, encamped on a hill which commanded the
entrance of the pass.
93. Fabius hoped when the Carthaginians came thither,
and encamped on the plain immediately under the foot
of the hill, that he would be able to snatch away their
plunder without any risk to himself; and, most of all, might
even put an end to the whole war by means of Hannibal eludes
him.
the excellent situation for an attack in which
he now was. He was accordingly wholly intent
on forming plans for this purpose, anxiously considering in
what direction and in what manner he should avail himself
of the advantages of the ground, and which of his men were
to be the first to attack the enemy. Whilst his enemies were
making these preparations for the next day, Hannibal, guessing
the truth, took care to give them no time or leisure for executing
their design; but summoning Hasdrubal, the captain
of his pioneers, ordered him, with all speed, to make as
many fagots of dry wood of all sorts as possible, and selecting
two thousand of the strongest of the working oxen from the
booty, to collect them outside the camp. When this was done,
he summoned the pioneers, and pointed out to them a certain
ridge lying between the camp and the gorge by which he meant
to march. To this ridge they were to drive the oxen, when
the order was given, as actively and energetically as they could,
until they came to the top. Having given these instructions,
he bade them take their supper and go to rest betimes. Towards
the end of the third watch of the night he led the pioneers out of
the camp, and ordered them to tie the fagots to the horns of the
oxen. The men being numerous, this did not take long to do;
and he then ordered them to set the fagots all alight, and to
drive the oxen off and force them to mount the ridge; and
placing his light-armed troops behind them he ordered them
to assist the drivers up to a certain distance: but, as soon as
the beasts had got well started, to take open order and pass
them at the double, and, with as much noise as possible, make
for the top of the ridge; that, if they found any of the enemy
there, they might close with and attack them at once. At the
same time he himself led the main army towards the narrow
gorge of the pass,—his heavy-armed men in front, next to them
the cavalry, then the booty, and the Iberians and Celts bringing
up the rear.
94. The Romans who were guarding the gorge, no sooner
saw these fiery fagots advancing to the heights, than, quitting the
narrow part of the pass, they made for the ridge to meet the
enemy. But when they got near the oxen, they were puzzled by
the lights, imagining them to be something more dangerous than
they really were; and when the Carthaginian light-armed troops
came on to the ground, after some slight skirmishing between
the two parties, upon the oxen rushing in among them, they
separated and took up their positions on different heights and
waited for daybreak, not being able to comprehend what was
taking place.
Partly because he was at a loss to understand what
was happening, and, in the words of the
poet, Hannibal gets
through the pass.
Autumn, B.C. 217.“some deep design suspecting;”197 and
partly that, in accordance with his original
plan, he was determined not to risk a general engagement,
Fabius remained quietly within his camp: while Hannibal,
finding everything going as he designed, led his army and
booty in safety through the gorge, the men who had been set
to guard the narrow road having abandoned their post. At
daybreak, seeing the two troops fronting each other on the
heights, he sent some Iberian companies to the light-armed
troops, who engaged the Romans, and, killing a thousand of
them, easily relieved his own light-armed troops and brought
them down to the main body.
Having thus effected his departure from the Falernian plain,
Hannibal thenceforth busied himself in looking out for a place in
which to winter, and in making the necessary preparations, after
having inspired the utmost alarm and uncertainty in the cities
and inhabitants of Italy. Fabius goes to
Rome, leaving
the command to
M. Minucius.Though Fabius meanwhile
was in great disrepute among the common
people, for having let his enemy escape from
such a trap, he nevertheless refused to abandon
his policy; and being shortly afterwards obliged to go to Rome
to perform certain sacrifices, he handed over the command of
his legions to his master of the horse, with many parting
injunctions, not to be so anxious to inflict a blow upon the
enemy, as to avoid receiving one himself. Marcus, however,
paid no heed to the advice, and, even while Fabius was speaking,
had wholly resolved to risk a general engagement.
95. While these things were going on in Italy, Hasdrubal,
who was in command in Iberia, having during the winter repaired
the thirty ships left him by his brother, Spain,
B.C. 217.
and manned ten additional ones, got a fleet of
forty decked vessels to sea, at the beginning of the summer,
from New Carthage, under the command of Hamilcar; and at
the same time collected his land forces, and led them out of
their winter quarters. The fleet coasted up the country, and
the troops marched along the shore towards the Iber. Suspecting
their design, Gnaeus Scipio was for issuing from his
winter quarters and meeting them both by land and sea. But
hearing of the number of their troops, and the great scale on
which their preparations had been made, he gave up the idea
of meeting them by land; and manning thirty-five ships, and
taking on board the best men he could get from his land
forces to serve as marines, he put to sea, and arrived on the
second day near the mouth of the Iber. Here he came to
anchor, at a distance of about ten miles from the enemy, and
sent two swift-sailing Massilian vessels to reconnoitre. For the
sailors of Marseilles were the first in every service of difficulty
and danger, and ready at the shortest notice to do whatever
was required of them; and, in fact, Marseilles has distinguished
itself above all other places, before and since, in fidelity to
Rome, and never more so than in the Hannibalian war. The
ships sent to reconnoitre having reported that the enemy’s
fleet was lying off the mouth of the Iber, Scipio put to sea
with all speed, wishing to surprise them.
96. But being informed in good time by his look-out
men that the enemy were bearing down upon
him, Roman success
at sea.Hasdrubal drew up his troops on the
beach, and ordered his crews to go on
board; and, when the Romans hove in sight, gave the signal
for the attack, determined to fight the enemy at sea. But,
after engaging, the Carthaginians made but a short struggle for
victory, and very soon gave way. For the support of the
troops on the beach did less service in encouraging them to
attack, than harm in offering them a safe place of retreat.
Accordingly, after losing two ships with their crews, and the
oars and marines of four others, they gave way and made for
the land; and when the Romans pressed on with spirit in pursuit,
they ran their ships ashore, and leaping from the vessels
fled for refuge to the troops. The Romans came boldly close
to land, towed off such of the vessels as could be got afloat,
and sailed away in great exultation at having beaten the enemy
at the first blow, secured the mastery of the sea, and taken
twenty-five of the enemy’s ships.
In Iberia therefore, after this victory, the Roman prospects
had begun to brighten. But when news of this reverse arrived
at Carthage, the Carthaginians at once despatched a fleet of
seventy ships, judging it to be essential to their whole design
that they should command the sea. These ships touched
first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy, the commanders
believing that they should find Hannibal there. But the
Romans at once put to sea to attack them from Rome itself,
with a fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes; and
hearing of this expedition against them, the Carthaginians
sailed back to Sardinia, and thence returned to Carthage.
Gnaeus Servilius, who was in command of this Roman fleet,
followed the Carthaginians for a certain distance, believing
that he should fall in with them; but, finding that he was far
behind, he gave up the attempt. He first put in at Lilybaeum,
and afterwards sailed to the Libyan island of Cercina; and after
receiving a sum of money from the inhabitants on condition of
not laying waste the country, he departed. On his return voyage
he took the island of Cossyrus, and having put a garrison into its
small capital, returned to Lilybaeum. There he placed the fleet,
and shortly afterwards went off himself to join the land army.
97. When the Senate heard of Gnaeus Scipio’s naval success,
believing it to be advantageous or rather
essential not to relax their hold on Iberia, Publius Scipio,
whose imperium
is prolonged after
his Consulship of
the previous year,
with Spain assigned
as his province,
is sent to
join his brother
there with 20
ships: early in
B.C. 217.
but
to press on the war there against Carthage with
redoubled vigour, they prepared a fleet of twenty
ships, and put them under the command of
Publius Scipio; and in accordance with arrangements
already made, despatched him with all
speed to join his brother Gnaeus, and carry on
the Iberian campaign in conjunction with him.
Their great anxiety was lest the Carthaginians
should get the upper hand in Iberia, and thus possessing
themselves of abundant supplies and recruits, should get a
more complete mastery of the sea, and assist the invasion of
Italy, by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Regarding
therefore the Iberian war as of the utmost importance, they
sent these ships and Publius Scipio to that country; who,
when he arrived in Iberia, effected a junction with his brother
and did most substantial service to the State. For up to that
time the Romans had not ventured to cross the Iber; but had
thought themselves fortunate if they could secure the friendship
and allies of the tribes up to that river. They now however
did cross it, and for the first time had the courage to
attempt a movement on the other side: their designs being
greatly favoured also by an accidental circumstance.
When the two brothers, after overawing the Iberian tribes
that lived near the passage of the Iber, had arrived before the
city of Saguntum, they pitched their camp about forty stades
from it, near the temple of Aphrodite, selecting the position as
offering at once security from the attacks of the enemy, and a
means of getting supplies by sea: for their fleet was coasting
down parallel with them.
98. Here an event occurred which produced a decisive
change in their favour. When Hannibal was about to start
for Italy, Treason of
Abilyx.
from the Iberian towns whose loyalty
he suspected he took the sons of their leading
men as hostages, and placed them all in
Saguntum, because of the strength of that town and his confidence
in the fidelity of those who were left in charge
of it. Now there was a certain Iberian there named Abilyx,
who enjoyed the highest character and reputation with his
countrymen, and was believed to be especially well disposed and
loyal to the Carthaginians. Seeing how affairs were going, and
believing that the fortune of the Romans was in the ascendant,
he formed in his own mind a scheme, worthy of an Iberian
and barbarian, for giving up the hostages. Convinced that
he might obtain a high place in the favour of Rome, if he
gave a proof of his fidelity at a critical moment, he made up
his mind to turn traitor to Carthage and put the hostages in
the hands of the Romans. He began his machinations by
addressing himself to Bostar, the Carthaginian general who had
been despatched by Hasdrubal to prevent the Romans from
crossing the river, but, not venturing to do this, had retreated,
and was now encamped in the region of Saguntum next the sea.
To this man, who was of a guileless and gentle character, and
quite disposed to trust him, Abilyx now introduced the subject
of the hostages. He argued that “the Romans having now
crossed the Iber, the Carthaginians could no longer hold Iberia
by terror, but stood now in need of the good feeling of their
subjects: seeing then that the Romans had actually approached
Saguntum and were besieging it, and that the city was in
danger,—if he were to take the hostages and restore them to
their parents and cities, he would not only frustrate the
ambitious scheme of the Romans, who wished above all
things by getting possession of the hostages to have the credit
of doing this; but would also rouse a feeling of goodwill
towards Carthage in all the cities, for having taken thought for
the future and provided for the safety of the hostages. He
would, too, much enhance the favour by personally managing
this business: for if he restored these boys to their homes, he
would provoke the gratitude, not only of their parents, but of
the people at large also, by giving a striking instance of the
magnanimous policy of Carthage towards her allies. He
might even expect large rewards for himself from the families
that recovered their children; for all those, who thus unexpectedly
got into their hands the dearest objects of their
affection, would vie with each other in heaping favours on the
author of such a service.” By these and similar arguments
he persuaded Bostar to fall in with his proposals.
99. Abilyx then went away, after arranging a fixed day on
which he would appear with everything necessary for conveying
the boys. At night he made his way to the Roman lines, and,
having fallen in with some Iberians serving in the Roman
army, was by them conducted to the generals; to whom he
discoursed at great length on the revulsion of feeling of
the Iberians in their favour, which would be caused if they
got possession of the hostages: and finally offered to put the
boys in their hands. Publius Scipio received the proposal
with extreme eagerness: and, promising him large rewards, he
agreed with him on a day, hour, and place at which a party
were to be waiting to receive him. After returning home, Abilyx
next went with a band of chosen friends to Bostar; and, after
receiving the boys, left the camp at night, as though he wished
not to be seen by the Roman camp as he passed it, and came
at the appointed time to the place arranged, and there handed
over all the boys to the Roman officers. Publius treated
Abilyx with special honour, and employed him in restoring the
boys to their native cities, along with certain of his own
friends. He accordingly went from city to city, giving
them a visible proof by the restoration of the boys of the
Roman mildness and magnanimity, in contrast to the Carthaginian
suspiciousness and harshness; and bidding them
also observe that he had found it necessary to change sides,
he induced many Iberians to join the Roman alliance. Bostar
was thought, in thus surrendering the hostages to the enemy, to
have behaved more like a child than became a man of his age,
and was in serious danger of his life. For the present, however,
as it was getting late in the season, both sides began
dispersing into winter quarters; the Romans having made an
important step towards success in the matter of the boys.
100. Such was the position of affairs in Iberia. To
return to Hannibal, whom we left having just
effected the passage from the Falernian plain. Hannibal takes
Geronium.
Hearing from his scouts that there was abundance
of corn in the district round Luceria and Geronium,
and that Geronium was an excellent place to store it in, he
determined to make his winter quarters there; and accordingly
marched thither by way of Mount Liburnum. And having come
to Geronium, which is about two hundred stades from Luceria,
he first endeavoured to win over the inhabitants by promises,
offering them pledges of his good faith; but when no one
would listen to him, he determined to lay siege to the town.
Having taken it without much delay, he put the inhabitants
to the sword; but preserved most of the houses and walls,
because he wished to use them as granaries for his winter
camp: and having encamped his army in front of it, he fortified
his position with trench and palisade. Having finished these
labours, he sent out two-thirds of the army to collect corn, with
orders to bring home every day, each division for the use of its
own men, as much as the regular heads of this department
would usually supply: while with the remaining third of his
army he kept watch over his camp, and occupied certain places
with a view of protecting the foraging parties in case they were
attacked. The district being mostly very accessible and flat,
and the harvesting party being almost innumerable, and the
season moreover being at the very best stage for such operations,
the amount of corn collected every day was very great.
101. When Minucius took over the command from
Fabius, he at first kept along the line of
hills, Minucius obtains
a slight success.
Autumn B.C. 217.feeling certain that he would sooner or
later fall in with the Carthaginians; but when
he heard that Hannibal had already taken Geronium,
and was collecting the corn of the country, and had pitched
his camp in front of the town, he changed the direction of his
march, and descended from the top of the hills by way of a
ridge leading down into the plains. Arriving at the height
which lies in the territory of Larinum, and is called Calena, he
encamped round its foot, being eager on any terms whatever to
engage the enemy. When Hannibal saw the enemy approaching,
he sent a third of his army foraging for corn, but took the
other two-thirds with him, and, advancing sixteen stades from
Geronium towards the enemy, pitched a camp upon a piece of
rising ground, with a view at once of overawing his opponents,
and affording safety to his foraging parties: and there being
another elevation between him and the two armies, which was
near, and conveniently placed for an attack upon the enemy’s
lines, he sent out about two thousand light-armed troops in
the night and seized it. At daybreak when Minucius saw
these men, he took his own light-armed troops and assaulted
the hill. After a gallant skirmish the Romans prevailed; and
subsequently their whole camp was transferred to this place.
For a certain time Hannibal kept his men for the most part
within their lines, because the camps were so close to each
other; but, after the lapse of some days, he was obliged to
divide them into two parties, one for pasturing the animals, and
one for gathering corn: being very anxious to carry out his
design of avoiding the destruction of his booty, and of collecting
as much corn as possible, that his men might have abundant
food during the winter, and his horses and beasts of burden as
much so; for the chief hope of his army rested on his
cavalry.
102. It was then that Minucius, seeing the great part of
the enemy scattered about the country on
these services, Carthaginian
foragers cut off.
selected the exact hour of
the day when they would be away to lead
out his army. Having come close to the Carthaginian
lines he drew out his heavy-armed troops there; and then,
dividing his cavalry and light-armed into detachments, sent
them in search of the foragers, ordering them to give no
quarter. This put Hannibal into a great difficulty: for he
was not strong enough to accept battle with the enemy drawn
up outside his lines, or to relieve those of his men who were
scattered about the country. The Romans meanwhile who
had been sent to take the foragers found a great number of
them scattered about, and killed them; while the troops drawn
up in front of the camp grew so contemptuous of the enemy,
that they even began to pull down their palisade, and all but
assaulted the Carthaginians. Hannibal was in a very dangerous
position: but in spite of the storm that had suddenly fallen
on him, he held his ground, repulsing the enemy when they
approached and defending, though with difficulty, the rampart;
until Hasdrubal came to his relief with about four thousand of
the foraging parties, who had fled for refuge from the country
and collected within the lines near Geronium. This encouraged
Hannibal to make a sally: and having got into order
of battle a short distance from the camp, he just managed with
difficulty to avert the threatened danger. After killing large
numbers of the enemy in the struggle at the camp, and still
more in the open country, Minucius for the present retired,
but with great hopes for the future; and on the morrow, the
Carthaginians having abandoned their lines on the hill, he
went up and occupied their position. For Hannibal being
alarmed lest the Romans should go by night and find the
camp at Geronium undefended, and become masters of his
baggage and stores, determined to retire thither himself and
again fix his quarters there. After this the Carthaginians were
more timid and cautious in their manner of foraging; while the
Romans on the other hand acted with greater boldness and
recklessness.
103. An exaggerated account of this success reached Rome,
and caused excessive exultation: first, Minucius invested
with co-equal
powers with
Fabius.because
in their gloomy prospects some sort of change
for the better had at last shown itself; and,
secondly, because the people could now believe
that the ill success and want of nerve, which had hitherto
attended the legions, had not arisen from the cowardice of the
men, but the timidity of their leader. Wherefore everybody
began finding fault with and depreciating Fabius, as failing to
seize his opportunities with spirit; while they extolled Minucius
to such a degree for what had happened, that a thing was done
for which there was no precedent. They gave him absolute
power as well as Fabius, believing that he would quickly put an
end to the campaign; and so there were two Dictators made for
carrying on the same war, which had never happened at Rome
before. When Minucius was informed of his popularity with the
people, and of the office bestowed upon him by the citizens, he
felt doubly incited to run all risks and act with daring boldness
against the enemy. Fabius rejoined the army with sentiments
not in the least changed by what had happened, but rather fixed
still more immovably on his original policy. Seeing, however,
that Minucius was puffed up with pride, and inclined to offer
him a jealous opposition at every turn, and was wholly bent
on risking an engagement, he offered him the choice of two
alternatives: either to command the whole army on alternate
days with him; or that they should separate their two armies,
and each command their respective part in their own way.
Minucius joyfully accepting the second alternative, they divided
the men and encamped separately about twelve stades apart.
104. Partly from observing what was taking place, and
partly from the information of prisoners, Hannibal draws
on Minucius.Hannibal
knew of the mutual jealousy of the two
generals, and the impetuosity and ambition of
Minucius. Looking upon what was happening in the
enemy’s camp as rather in his favour than otherwise, he
set himself to deal with Minucius; being anxious to put an
end to his bold methods and check in time his adventurous
spirit. There being then an elevation between his camp and
that of Minucius, which might prove dangerous to either, he
resolved to occupy it; and, knowing full well that, elated by his
previous success, Minucius would be certain to move out at once
to oppose his design, he concerted the following plan. The
country round the hill being bare of trees, but having much
broken ground and hollows of every description, he despatched
some men during the night, in bodies of two and three hundred,
to occupy the most favourable positions, numbering in all
five hundred horse and five thousand light-armed and other
infantry: and in order that they might not be observed in the
morning by the enemy’s foraging parties, he seized the hill at
daybreak with his light-armed troops. When Marcus saw what
was taking place, he looked upon it as an excellent opportunity;
and immediately despatched his light-armed troops, with
orders to engage the enemy and contest the possession of the
position; after these he sent his cavalry, and close behind
them he led his heavy-armed troops in person, as on the former
occasion, intending to repeat exactly the same manœuvres.
105. As the day broke, and the thoughts and eyes of all
were engrossed in observing the combatants on the hill, the
Romans had no suspicion of the troops lying in ambush. But
as Hannibal kept pouring in reinforcements for his men on the
hill, and followed close behind them himself with his cavalry
and main body, it was not long before the cavalry also of both
sides were engaged. The result was that the Roman light-armed
troops, finding themselves hard pressed by the numbers
of the cavalry, caused great confusion among the heavy-armed
troops by retreating into their lines; and the signal being
given at the same time to those who were in ambush, these
latter suddenly showed themselves and charged: whereby not
only the Roman light-armed troops, but their whole army, were
in the greatest danger. At that moment Fabius, seeing what
was taking place, Fabius comes to
the rescue.and being alarmed lest
they should sustain a complete defeat, led
out his forces with all speed and came to
the relief of his imperilled comrades. At his approach the
Romans quickly recovered their courage; and though their
lines were entirely broken up, they rallied again round their
standards, and retired under cover of the army of Fabius, with
a severe loss in the light-armed division, and a still heavier
one in the ranks of the legions, and that too of the bravest
men. Alarmed at the freshness and perfect order of the relieving
army, Hannibal retired from the pursuit and ceased
fighting. To those who were actually engaged it was quite
clear that an utter defeat had been brought about by the
rashness of Minucius, and that their safety on this and previous
occasions had been secured by the caution of Fabius;
while those at home had a clear and indisputable demonstration
of the difference between the rashness and bravado of a
soldier, and the far-seeing prudence and cool calculation of a
general. Taught by experience the Romans joined camps
once more, and for the future listened to Fabius and obeyed
his orders: while the Carthaginians dug a trench across the
space between the knoll and their own lines, and threw up
a palisade round the crest of the captured hill; and, having
placed a guard upon it, proceeded thenceforth with their preparations
for the winter unmolested.
106. The Consular elections being now come, the Romans
elected Lucius Aemilius and Gaius Terentius. B.C. 216.
Coss. G. Terentius
Varro and
L. Aemilius
Paulus.
On their appointment the Dictators laid down
their offices, and the Consuls of the previous
year, Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus—who
had been appointed after the death of
Flaminius,—were invested with proconsular authority by
Aemilius; and, taking the command at the seat of war, administered
the affairs of the army independently. Meanwhile
Aemilius, in consultation with the Senate, set at once to work
to levy new soldiers, to fill up the numbers of the legions
required for the campaign, and despatched them to headquarters;
enjoining at the same time upon Servilius that he
should by no means hazard a general engagement, but contrive
detailed skirmishes, as sharp and as frequent as he could,
for the sake of practising the raw recruits, and giving them
courage for a pitched battle: for they held the opinion that
their former defeats were owing, as much as anything else, to
the fact that they were employing troops newly levied and
entirely untrained. The Senate also sent the Praetor Lucius
Postumius into Gaul, to affect a diversion there, and induce the
Celts who were with Hannibal to return home. They also took
measures for recalling the fleet that had wintered at Lilybaeum,
and for sending to the commanders in Iberia such supplies as
were necessary for the service. Thus the Consul and Senate
were busied with these and other preparations for the campaign;
and Servilius, having received his instructions from the Consuls,
carried them out in every particular. The details of this
part of the campaign, therefore, I shall omit to record; for
nothing of importance or worth remembering occurred, partly
in consequence of these instructions, and partly from circumstances;
but there were a considerable number of skirmishes
and petty engagements, in which the Roman commanders
gained a high reputation for courage and prudence.
107. Thus through all that winter and spring the two
armies remained encamped facing each other. Autumn,
B.C. 216.
But when the season for the new harvest
was come, Hannibal began to move from the
camp at Geronium; and making up his mind that it would
be to his advantage to force the enemy by any possible
means to give him battle, he occupied the citadel of a town
called Cannae, into which the corn and other supplies from
the district round Canusium were collected by the Romans,
and conveyed thence to the camp as occasion required.
The town itself, indeed, had been reduced to ruins the year
before: but the capture of its citadel and the material of war
contained in it, caused great commotion in the Roman army;
for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it
that distressed them, but the fact also that it commanded the
surrounding district. They therefore sent frequent messages
to Rome asking for instructions: for if they approached the
enemy they would not be able to avoid an engagement, in view
of the fact that the country was being plundered, and the allies all
in a state of excitement. The Senate order
a battle.The Senate passed
a resolution that they should give the enemy
battle: they, however, bade Gnaeus Servilius
wait, and despatched the Consuls to the seat of war. It was
to Aemilius that all eyes turned, and on him the most confident
hopes were fixed; for his life had been a noble one, and
he was thought to have managed the recent Illyrian war with
advantage to the State. The Senate determined to bring eight
legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome
before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies.
For the Romans, as I have stated before,198 habitually enrol
four legions each year, each consisting of about four thousand
foot and two hundred horse; and when any unusual necessity
arises, they raise the number of foot to five thousand and of
the horse to three hundred. Of allies, the number in each
legion is the same as that of the citizens, but of the horse three
times as great. Of the four legions thus composed, they
assign two to each of the Consuls for whatever service is going
on. Most of their wars are decided by one Consul and two
legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all
four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so
great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they
resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.
108. With earnest words of exhortation, therefore, to
Aemilius, putting before him the gravity in
every point of view of the result of the battle, The Consuls
Aemilius Paulus,
and Terentius
Varro go to the
seat of war.
they despatched him with instructions to seek
a favourable opportunity to fight a decisive
battle with a courage worthy of Rome. Having
arrived at the camp and united their forces, they made known
the will of the Senate to the soldiers, and Aemilius exhorted
them to do their duty in terms which evidently came from his
heart. He addressed himself especially to explain and excuse
the reverses which they had lately experienced; for it was on
this point particularly that the soldiers were depressed and stood
in need of encouragement. Speech of
Aemilius.
“The causes,” he argued, “of
their defeats in former battles were many, and
could not be reduced to one or two. But those
causes were at an end; and no excuse existed
now, if they only showed themselves to be men of courage, for
not conquering their enemies. Up to that time both Consuls had
never been engaged together, or employed thoroughly trained
soldiers: the combatants on the contrary had been raw levies,
entirely unexperienced in danger; and what was most important
of all, they had been so entirely ignorant of their opponents,
that they had been brought into the field, and engaged in a
pitched battle with an enemy that they had never once set eyes
on. Those who had been defeated on the Trebia were drawn
up on the field at daybreak, on the very next morning after
their arrival from Sicily; while those who had fought in Etruria,
not only had never seen the enemy before, but did not do so
even during the very battle itself, owing to the unfortunate
state of the atmosphere.
109. But now the conditions were quite different. For in
the first place both Consuls were with the army: and were not
only prepared to share the danger themselves, but had also
induced the Consuls of the previous year to remain and take
part in the struggle. While the men had not only seen the arms,
order, and numbers of the enemy, but had been engaged in
almost daily fights with them for the last two years. The conditions
therefore under which the two former battles were fought
being quite different, it was but natural that the result of the
coming struggle should be different too. For it would be strange
or rather impossible that those who in various skirmishes, where
the numbers of either side were equal, had for the most part
come off victorious, should, when drawn up all together, and
nearly double of the enemy in number, be defeated.”
“Wherefore, men of the army,” he continued, “seeing that
we have every advantage on our side for securing a victory,
there is only one thing necessary—your determination, your
zeal! And I do not think I need say more to you on that
point. To men serving others for pay, or to those who fight as
allies on behalf of others, who have no greater danger to expect
than meets them on the field, and for whom the issues at stake
are of little importance,—such men may need words of exhortation.
But men who, like you, are fighting not for others, but
themselves,—for country, wives, and children; and for whom
the issue is of far more momentous consequence than the mere
danger of the hour, need only to be reminded: require no
exhortation. For who is there among you who would not wish
if possible to be victorious; and next, if that may not be, to
die with arms in his hands, rather than to live and see the outrage
and death of those dear objects which I have named?
Wherefore, men of the army, apart from any words of mine,
place before your eyes the momentous difference to you
between victory and defeat, and all their consequences. Enter
upon this battle with the full conviction, that in it your country
is not risking a certain number of legions, but her bare existence.
For she has nothing to add to such an army as this,
to give her victory, if the day now goes against us. All she
has of confidence and strength rests on you; all her hopes of
safety are in your hands. Do not frustrate those hopes:
but pay back to your country the gratitude you owe her; and
make it clear to all the world that the former reverses occurred,
not because the Romans are worse men than the Carthaginians,
but from the lack of experience on the part of those who were
then fighting, and through a combination of adverse circumstances.”
With such words Aemilius dismissed the troops.
110. Next morning the two Consuls broke up their camp,
and advanced to where they heard that the enemy
were entrenched. The Roman army
approaches
Cannae.On the second day they
arrived within sight of them, and pitched their
camp at about fifty stades’ distance. But when Aemilius observed
that the ground was flat and bare for some distance
round, he said that they must not engage there with an enemy
superior to them in cavalry; but that they must rather try to
draw him off, and lead him to ground on which the battle would
be more in the hands of the infantry. But Gaius Terentius being,
from inexperience, of a contrary opinion, there was a dispute
and misunderstanding between the leaders, which of all things
is the most dangerous. It is the custom, when the two Consuls
are present, that they should take the chief command
on alternate days; Terentius Varro
orders an advance.
and the next day
happening to be the turn of Terentius, he
ordered an advance with a view of approaching the enemy,
in spite of the protests and active opposition of his colleague.
Hannibal set his light-armed troops and cavalry in motion to meet
him, and charging the Romans while they were
still marching, The Romans are
successful.took them by surprise and caused
a great confusion in their ranks. The Romans
repulsed the first charge by putting some of their heavy-armed
in front; and then sending forward their light-armed and
cavalry, began to get the best of the fight all along the
line: the Carthaginians having no reserves of any importance,
while certain companies of the legionaries were mixed with the
Roman light-armed, and helped to sustain the battle. Nightfall
for the present put an end to a struggle which had not
at all answered to the hopes of the Carthaginians. But next
day Aemilius, not thinking it right to engage, and yet being
unable any longer to lead off his army, encamped with two-thirds
of it on the banks of the Aufidus, the only river which
flows right through the Apennines,—that chain of mountains
which forms the watershed of all the Italian rivers, which flow
either west to the Tuscan sea, or east to the Hadriatic. This
chain is, I say, pierced by the Aufidus, which rises on the side
of Italy nearest the Tuscan Sea, and is discharged into the
Hadriatic. For the other third of his army he caused a camp
to be made across the river, to the east of the ford, about
ten stades from his own lines, and a little more from those of
the enemy; that these men, being on the other side of the river,
might protect his own foraging parties, and threaten those of
the enemy.
111. Then Hannibal, seeing that his circumstances called
for a battle with the enemy, Hannibal harangues
his troops.being anxious
lest his troops should be depressed by
their previous reverse, and believing that
it was an occasion which required some encouraging
words, summoned a general meeting of his soldiers. When
they were assembled, he bid them all look round upon the
country, and asked them, “What better fortune they could
have asked from the gods, if they had had the choice, than to
fight in such ground as they saw there, with the vast superiority
of cavalry on their side?” And when all signified their
acquiescence in such an evident truth, he added: “First, then,
give thanks to the gods: for they have brought the enemy into
this country, because they designed the victory for us. And,
next to me, for having compelled the enemy to fight,—for
they cannot avoid it any longer,—and to fight in a place so
full of advantages for us. But I do not think it becoming in
me now to use many words in exhorting you to be brave and
forward in this battle. When you had had no experience of
fighting the Romans this was necessary, and I did then suggest
many arguments and examples to you. But now seeing that
you have undeniably beaten the Romans in three successive
battles of such magnitude, what arguments could have greater
influence with you in confirming your courage than the actual
facts? Now, by your previous battles you have got possession
of the country and all its wealth; in accordance with my
promises: for I have been absolutely true in everything I have
ever said to you. But the present contest is for the cities and
the wealth in them: and if you win it, all Italy will at once be
in your power; and freed from your present hard toils, and
masters of the wealth of Rome, you will by this battle become
the leaders and lords of the world. This, then, is a time for
deeds, not words: for by God’s blessing I am persuaded that I
shall carry out my promises to you forthwith.” His words were
received with approving shouts, which he acknowledged with
gratitude for their zeal; and having dismissed the assembly,
he at once formed a camp on the same bank of the river as
that on which was the larger camp of the Romans.
112. Next day he gave orders that all should employ themselves
in making preparations and getting themselves into a fit
state of body. Hannibal irritates
the enemy.On the day after that he drew out his men
along the bank of the river, and showed that he was eager to
give the enemy battle. But Aemilius, dissatisfied with his
position, and seeing that the Carthaginians
would soon be obliged to shift their quarters
for the sake of supplies, kept quiet in his
camps, strengthening both with extra guards. After waiting
a considerable time, when no one came out to attack him,
Hannibal put the rest of the army into camp again, but
sent out his Numidian horse to attack the enemy’s water
parties from the lesser camp. These horsemen riding right
up to the lines and preventing the watering, Gaius Terentius
became more than ever inflamed with the desire of fighting,
and the soldiers were eager for a battle, and chafed at the
delay. For there is nothing more intolerable to mankind than
suspense; when a thing is once decided, men can but endure
whatever out of the catalogue of evils it is their misfortune to
undergo.
But when the news arrived at Rome that the two armies
were face to face, and that skirmishes Anxiety at
Rome.
between advanced parties of both sides were
daily taking place, the city was in a state of
high excitement and uneasiness; the people dreading the
result owing to the disasters which had now befallen
them on more than one occasion; and foreseeing and anticipating
in their imaginations what would happen if they were
utterly defeated. All the oracles preserved at Rome were in
everybody’s mouth; and every temple and house was full of
prodigies and miracles: in consequence of which the city
was one scene of vows, sacrifices, supplicatory processions,
and prayers. For the Romans in times of danger take extraordinary
pains to appease gods and men, and look upon no
ceremony of that kind in such times as unbecoming or
beneath their dignity.
113. When he took over the command on the following
day, as soon as the sun was above the horizon, Dispositions for
the battle of
Cannae.
Gaius Terentius got the army in motion from
both the camps. Those from the larger camp
he drew up in order of battle, as soon as he had got
them across the river, and bringing up those of the smaller
camp he placed them all in the same line, selecting the south
as the aspect of the whole. The Roman horse he stationed
on the right wing along the river, and their foot next them in
the same line, placing the maniples, however, closer together
than usual, and making the depth of each maniple several
times greater than its front. The cavalry of the allies
he stationed on the left wing, and the light-armed troops he
placed slightly in advance of the whole army, which amounted
with its allies to eighty thousand infantry and a little more
than six thousand horse. At the same time Hannibal brought
his Balearic slingers and spearmen across the river, and
stationed them in advance of his main body; which he led
out of their camp, and, getting them across the river at two
spots, drew them up opposite the enemy. On his left wing,
close to the river, he stationed the Iberian and Celtic horse
opposite the Roman cavalry; and next to them half the Libyan
heavy-armed foot; and next to them the Iberian and Celtic
foot; next, the other half of the Libyans, and, on the right
wing, the Numidian horse. Having now got them all into
line he advanced with the central companies of the Iberians
and Celts; and so arranged the other companies next these in
regular gradations, that the whole line became crescent-shaped,
diminishing in depth towards its extremities: his object being
to have his Libyans as a reserve in the battle, and to commence
the action with his Iberians and Celts.
114. The armour of the Libyans was Roman, for Hannibal
had armed them with a selection of the spoils taken in previous
battles. The shield of the Iberians and Celts was about the
same size, but their swords were quite different. For that of the
Roman can thrust with as deadly effects as it can cut, while
the Gallic sword can only cut, and that requires some room.
And the companies coming alternately,—the naked Celts, and
the Iberians with their short linen tunics bordered with purple
stripes, the whole appearance of the line was strange and terrifying.
The whole strength of the Carthaginian cavalry was
ten thousand, but that of their foot was not more than forty
thousand, including the Celts. Aemilius commanded on the
Roman right, Gaius Terentius on the left, Marcus Atilius and
Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls of the previous year, on the
centre. The left of the Carthaginians was commanded by
Hasdrubal, the right by Hanno, the centre by Hannibal in
person, attended by his brother Mago. And as the Roman
line faced the south, as I said before, and the Carthaginian
the north, the rays of the rising sun did not inconvenience
either of them.
115. The battle was begun by an engagement between
the advanced guard of the two armies; The Battle, 2d
August, B.C. 216.
and
at first the affair between these light-armed
troops was indecisive. But as soon as the
Iberian and Celtic cavalry got at the Romans, the battle
began in earnest, and in the true barbaric fashion: for there
was none of the usual formal advance and retreat; but when
they once got to close quarters, they grappled man to man,
and, dismounting from their horses, fought on foot. But
when the Carthaginians had got the upper hand in this encounter
and killed most of their opponents on the ground,—
because the Romans all maintained the fight with spirit and
determination,—and began chasing the remainder along the
river, The Romans
outflanked by
the cavalry.slaying as they went and giving no quarter; then the
legionaries took the place of the light-armed and closed
with the enemy. For a short time the Iberian and Celtic
lines stood their ground and fought gallantly; but, presently
overpowered by the weight of the heavy-armed lines, they
gave way and retired to the rear, thus breaking up the
crescent. The Roman maniples followed with spirit, and
easily cut their way through the enemy’s line; since the Celts
had been drawn up in a thin line, while the Romans had
closed up from the wings towards the centre and the point
of danger. For the two wings did not come into action at
the same time as the centre: but the centre was first engaged,
because the Gauls, having been stationed on the arc
of the crescent, had come into contact with the enemy long
before the wings, the convex of the crescent being towards the
enemy. The Romans, however, going in
pursuit of these troops, and hastily closing
in towards the centre and the part of the
enemy which was giving ground, advanced so far, that the
Libyan heavy-armed troops on either wing got on their flanks.
Those on the right, facing to the left, charged from the right
upon the Roman flank; while those who were on the left wing
faced to the right, and, dressing by the left, charged their
right flank,199 the exigency of the moment suggesting to them
what they ought to do. Thus it came about, as Hannibal
had planned, that the Romans were caught between two
hostile lines of Libyans—thanks to their impetuous pursuit of
the Celts. Still they fought, though no longer in line, yet
singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who
charged them on the flanks.
116. Though he had been from the first on the right wing,
and had taken part in the cavalry engagement, Lucius Aemilius
still survived. Determined to act up to his own exhortatory
speech, and seeing that the decision of the battle rested
mainly on the legionaries, riding up to the centre of the line
he led the charge himself, and personally grappled with the
enemy, at the same time cheering on and exhorting his soldiers
to the charge. Hannibal, on the other side, did the same, for
he too had taken his place on the centre from the commencement.
The Numidian horse on the Carthaginian right were
meanwhile charging the cavalry on the Roman left; and though,
from the peculiar nature of their mode of fighting, they neither
inflicted nor received much harm, they yet rendered the
enemy’s horse useless by keeping them occupied, and charging
them first on one side and then on another. But when
Hasdrubal, after all but annihilating the cavalry by the river,
came from the left to the support of the Numidians, the Roman
allied cavalry, seeing his charge approaching, broke and fled.
At that point Hasdrubal appears to have acted with great skill
and discretion. Seeing the Numidians to be strong in numbers,
and more effective and formidable to troops that had once
been forced from their ground, he left the pursuit to them;
while he himself hastened to the part of the field where the
infantry were engaged, and brought his men up to support the
Libyans. Then, by charging the Roman legions on the rear,
and harassing them by hurling squadron after squadron upon
them at many points at once, he raised the spirits of the
Libyans, and dismayed and depressed those of the Romans. Fall of Aemilius
Paulus.
It was at this point that Lucius Aemilius fell,
in the thick of the fight, covered with wounds:
a man who did his duty to his country at
that last hour of his life, as he had throughout its previous
years, if any man ever did.200 As long as the Romans could
keep an unbroken front, to turn first in one direction and then
in another to meet the assaults of the enemy, they held out;
but the outer files of the circle continually falling, and the
circle becoming more and more contracted, they at last were
all killed on the field, and among them Marcus Atilius and
Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls of the previous year, who had
shown themselves brave men and worthy of Rome in the battle.
While this struggle and carnage were going on, the Numidian
horse were pursuing the fugitives, most of whom they cut down
or hurled from their horses; but some few escaped into Venusia,
among whom was Gaius Terentius, the Consul, who thus sought
a flight, as disgraceful to himself, as his conduct in office had
been disastrous to his country.
117. Such was the end of the battle of Cannae, in which
both sides fought with the most conspicuous gallantry, the
conquered no less than the conquerors. This is proved by the
fact that, out of six thousand horse, only seventy escaped with
Gaius Terentius to Venusia, and about three hundred of the
allied cavalry to various towns in the neighbourhood. Of
the infantry ten thousand were taken prisoners in fair fight, but
were not actually engaged in the battle: of those who were
actually engaged only about three thousand perhaps escaped
to the towns of the surrounding district, all the rest died
nobly, to the number of seventy thousand, the Carthaginians
being on this occasion, as on previous ones, mainly indebted
for their victory to their superiority in cavalry: a lesson to
posterity that in actual war it is better to have half the
number of infantry, and the superiority in cavalry, than to
engage your enemy with an equality in both. On the side of
Hannibal there fell four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred
Iberians and Libyans, and about two hundred horse.
The ten thousand Romans who were captured had not,
as I said, been engaged in the actual battle; Losses of the
Romans.
and the reason was this. Lucius Aemilius
left ten thousand infantry in his camp that,
in case Hannibal should disregard the safety of his own
camp, and take his whole army on to the field, they might
seize the opportunity, while the battle was going on, of
forcing their way in and capturing the enemy’s baggage; or if,
on the other hand, Hannibal should, in view of this contingency,
leave a guard in his camp, the number of the enemy in
the field might thereby be diminished. These men were
captured in the following circumstances. Hannibal, as a
matter of fact, did leave a sufficient guard in his camp; and
as soon as the battle began, the Romans, according to their
instructions, assaulted and tried to take those thus left by
Hannibal. At first they held their own: but just as they were
beginning to waver, Hannibal, who was by this time gaining
a victory all along the line, came to their relief, and routing the
Romans, shut them up in their own camp; killed two thousand
of them; and took all the rest prisoners. In like manner the
Numidian horse brought in all those who had taken refuge in
the various strongholds about the district, amounting to two
thousand of the routed cavalry.
118. The result of this battle, such as I have described it,
had the consequences which both sides expected. The results of the
battle. Defection
of the allies.
For the Carthaginians by their victory
were thenceforth masters of nearly the whole
of the Italian coast which is called Magna Graecia. Thus the
Tarentines immediately submitted; and the Arpani and some
of the Campanian states invited Hannibal to come to them;
and the rest were with one consent turning their eyes to the
Carthaginians: who, accordingly, began now to have high
hopes of being able to carry even Rome itself by assault.
On their side the Romans, after this disaster, despaired of
retaining their supremacy over the Italians, and were in the
greatest alarm, believing their own lives and the existence of
their city to be in danger, and every moment expecting that
Hannibal would be upon them. Fall of Lucius
Postumius in Gaul.
See supra, ch.
106.
For, as though Fortune were
in league with the disasters that had already
befallen them to fill up the measure of their ruin,
it happened that only a few days afterwards,
while the city was still in this panic, the Praetor
who had been sent to Gaul fell unexpectedly into an ambush
and perished, and his army was utterly annihilated by the Celts.
In spite of all, however, the Senate left no means untried to
save the State. It exhorted the people to fresh exertions,
strengthened the city with guards, and deliberated on the
crisis in a brave and manly spirit. And subsequent events
made this manifest. For though the Romans were on that
occasion indisputably beaten in the field, and had lost reputation
for military prowess; by the peculiar excellence of their
political constitution, and the prudence of their counsels, they
not only recovered their supremacy over Italy, by eventually
conquering the Carthaginians, but before very long became
masters of the whole world.
I shall, therefore, end this book at this point, having now
recounted the events in Iberia and Italy, B.C. 216.
embraced
by the 140th Olympiad. When I have
arrived at the same period in my history of Greece during this
Olympiad, I shall then fulfil my promise of devoting a book
to a formal account of the Roman constitution itself; for I
think that a description of it will not only be germane to the
matter of my history, but will also be of great help to practical
statesmen, as well as students, either in reforming or establishing
other constitutions.
