The militant Protestants were now paramount in Elizabeth’s
Council, and soon made their influence felt, not
only in foreign relations, but in home affairs as well.
They were in favour of an aggressive policy in aid of
Protestantism abroad, and doubtless thought that the
best way to strengthen their hands would be to strike at
Prelacy at home, and to discredit the last vestiges of the
old faith, against the foreign champions of which they
were ready to do national battle.
The appointment of Whitgift to the Archbishopric of
Canterbury had been avowedly made by the Queen
(September 1583) for the purpose of repairing the effects
of Grindal’s leniency, and bringing the Nonconformists
to obedience; “to hold a strait rein, to press the discipline
of his Church, and recover his province to uniformity.”
He had set about his work with a thoroughness
which brought upon him a storm of reproach from
ministers, and greatly embittered the controversies within
the Church.[492] Burghley felt strongly on the question of
uniformity, as involving obedience to the law; but Whitgift’s
methods were too severe even for him, and produced
from him more than one rebuke. He was the referee
of all parties—Puritans, Churchmen, and Catholics
appealed to him as their friend—and he strove to hold
the balance fairly, whilst deprecating extreme views on
each side. Leicester and Knollys were ceaseless in the
attacks upon the prelates, and Whitgift’s violence made
it difficult for Burghley to defend him. In one of his
letters to the Archbishop he says, “I am sorry to trouble
your Grace, but I am more troubled myself, not only
with many private petitions of ministers recommended
by persons of credit as being peaceable persons in their
ministry, but yet more with complaints to your Grace and
colleagues, greatly troubled; but also I am now daily
charged by Councillors and public persons to neglect
my duty in not staying your Grace’s proceedings, so
vehement and general against ministers and preachers,
as the Papists are thereby encouraged, and ill-disposed
subjects animated, and her Majesty’s safety endangered.”
Now that the Puritan party had the upper hand,
Burghley’s proverbial middle course was not strong
enough for his colleagues, and they determined to deal
with Prelacy and Papacy at the same time. The first
thing was to pack the new Parliament, and in this
Leicester laboured unblushingly. Sir Simon D’Ewes’
Journal sets forth the great number of blank proxies sent
to the Earl; and if his letter to the electors of Andover
is typical, this is not to be wondered at. He boldly asks
them to send him “your election in blank, and I will put
in the names.” Another letter from the Privy Council to
Lord Cobham[493] directs him to obtain the nomination of
all the members for the Cinque Ports. Parliament met
at the end of November, and a formal complaint of the
Puritan and Nonconformist ministers was presented to
the House of Commons, which, after reducing the number
of its articles from thirty-four to sixteen, it adopted and laid
before the House of Lords. Whitgift and his colleagues
fought hard, cautiously aided by Burghley and the Queen,
who, when she afterwards dismissed Parliament, roundly
scolded the members for interfering with her religious
prerogative; and the only effect of the complaints was to
enable Burghley to exert pressure upon the prelates to
allay their zeal.
The attack of the militant Protestants against the
Catholics, however, was more effectual, although even
that was somewhat palliated by Lord Burghley’s moderation.
It was evident now that the Catholic League abroad
and its instruments would stick at nothing. Father
Creighton, the priest who had played so prominent a
part in the abortive plans of D’Aubigny, Mendoza, and
the Jesuits, had been captured with some of his brother
seminarists, and the rack had torn from them confirmation
of the desperate plans of which the Throgmorton
conspiracy had given an inkling. Leicester and his party
had aroused Protestant horror of such projects to fever
heat. At his instance an association had been formed,
pledged by oath to defend the Queen’s life or to avenge
it, and to exclude for ever from the throne any person
who might benefit by the Queen’s removal. Mary Stuart
somewhat naturally regarded the last clause as directed
against herself, and endeavoured to take the sting from it
by offering her own qualified adhesion to the association,
which, however, was declined.
When the association was legalised by a bill in Parliament,
the Queen (Elizabeth), under Burghley’s influence,
sent a message to the House, abating some of the
objectionable features, and reconciling it with the rules
of English equity. No penalties were to accrue before
the persons accused had been found guilty by a regular
commission, and Mary and her heirs were excused from
forfeiture, unless Elizabeth were assassinated.
The new bill against Catholics was easily passed, under
feelings such as those prevailing in the House and the
country, and the enactment was regarded as a natural
retort to the promulgation of the Papal bulls in favour
of revolution in England. All native Jesuits and seminarists
found in England after forty days were to be
treated as traitors, and it was felony to shelter or harbour
them. English students or priests abroad were to be
forced to return within six months and take the oath of
supremacy, or incur the penalty for high treason; and
many similar provisions were made, by which the world
could see that the militant Protestants of England had
picked up the gage thrown down by Philip and the
Pope. Henceforward it was to be war to the knife
until one side or the other was vanquished, and Lord
Burghley’s astute policy of balance and compromise was
cast into the background after a quarter of a century of
almost unbroken success.[494]
Almost the only dissenting voice in the House of
Commons against the penal bill was that of Dr. William
Parry, member for Queenborough. In a violent and
abusive speech, he said that the House was so evidently
biassed that it was useless to give it the special reasons
he had for opposing the bill, but would state them to the
Queen alone. This was considered insulting to the House,
and he was committed to the charge of the sergeant-at-arms,
but was released by the Queen and Council the
following day. The events which followed form one of
the unsolved riddles of history. Parry was a man of bad
character, who for years had been one of Burghley’s
many spies upon the English refugees on the Continent.
He appears, however, to have been esteemed more highly
by the Treasurer than such instruments usually are.
When young Anthony Bacon was sent on his travels
to France, his uncle, Burghley, specially instructed him
to cultivate the acquaintance of Dr. Parry. Leicester
complained to the Queen of this, and the Lord Treasurer
undertook that his nephew should not be shaken either
in loyalty or religion by his acquaintanceship with Parry.[495]
After the latter returned to England in 1583 he was
elected member of the Parliament of the following year,
after having persistently but unsuccessfully begged a sinecure
office from Burghley. From his first arrival he had
been full of real or pretended plots for the assassination
of the Queen, which he professed to have discovered on
the Continent. He was, like all men of his profession, an
unprincipled scamp, and made these secret disclosures
the ground for ceaseless demands for reward. He was
disappointed and discontented, as well as vain and boastful,
and overshot the mark. In one of his interviews
with the Queen he produced a somewhat doubtfully
worded letter of approval from the Papal Secretary of
State, Cardinal Como,[496] which, he said, referred to a pretended
project undertaken by him (Parry) for the murder
of the Queen. He talked loosely to Charles Neville and
other Catholics of this plot as a real one, and six weeks
after his escapade in Parliament was arrested and lodged
in jail. At first he would admit nothing, but the fear of
the rack, or some other motive, produced from him a
full and complete confession of a regular plan—once, he
said, nearly executed—for killing Elizabeth; but before
sentence he vehemently retracted, and appealed to the
knowledge of the Queen, Burghley, and Walsingham
that he was innocent. But if they possessed this knowledge
they never revealed it, and Parry died the revolting
death of a traitor, clamouring to the last that Elizabeth
herself was responsible for his sacrifice.
It cannot be doubted that Parry was an agent provocateur,
and great question arises as to the reality of the
crime for which he was punished. I have found no
trace in the Spanish correspondence of his having been
a tool of Mendoza or Philip, such as exists in the cases
of Throgmorton, Babington, and others; and I consider
that the evidence generally favours the idea that he was
deliberately caught in his own lure, and sacrificed in
order to aggravate the anti-Catholic fervour in the
country, and secure the passage of the penal enactments.
In one particular I dissent from nearly every
historian who has written on the subject. All fingers
point at Lord Burghley as the author of the plan. I
look upon it as being the work of Leicester, Knollys,
and Walsingham. It was they, and not Burghley, who
were anxious to strengthen the fervent Protestant party.
It was they, and not Burghley, who were forcing the
penal enactments through the Parliament they had
packed. The Treasurer could hardly have been blind
to what was going on, but he could not afford to champion
Parry. The latter, a venal scoundrel known to be
in Burghley’s pay, but discontented with his patron, was
doubtless bought by Leicester to play his part in Parliament,
and afterwards to confess the Catholic plot on
the assurance of pardon, with the object of blackening the
Catholics, and perhaps, by implication, Burghley as well.
That Leicester’s friends were at the time seeking to
represent the Lord Treasurer as against the Protestant
cause is clear from several indignant letters written by
Burghley himself. “If they cannot,” he says, “prove all
their lies, let them make use of any one proof wherewith
to prove me guilty of falsehood, injustice, bribery or
dissimulation or double-dealing in Council, either with
her Majesty or with her Councillors. Let them charge
me on any point that I have not dealt as earnestly with
the Queen to aid the afflicted in the Low Countries to
withstand the increasing power of the King of Spain,
the assurance of the King of Scots to be tied to her
Majesty with reward, yea, with the greatest pension that
any other hath. If in any of these I am proved to be
behind or slower than any in a discreet manner, I will
yield myself worthy of perpetual reproach as though I
were guilty of all they use to bluster against me. They
that say in rash and malicious mockery that England is
become Regnum Cecilianum may use their own cankered
humour.” In July of the same year he writes in similar
strain to Sir Thomas Edmunds:[497] “If you knew how
earnest a course I hold with her Majesty, both privately
and openly, for her to retain the King of Scots with
friendship and liberality, yea, and to retain the Master
of Gray and Justice-Clerk, with rewards to continue their
offices, which indeed are well known to me to be very
good, you would think there could be no more shameful
lies made by Satan himself than these be; and finding
myself thus maliciously bitten with the tongues and pens
of courtiers here, if God did not comfort me, I had cause
to fear murdering hands or poisoning points; but God
is my keeper.”
The more or less hollow negotiations for the liberation
of Mary, and for the association of her son with
herself in her sovereign rights, had dragged on intermittently
for years. Burghley himself has set forth the
reasons for the successive failures;[498] in each case the
discovery of some fresh plot in her favour. The serious
set of conspiracies brought to light in 1584 had caused
her removal from the mild custody of Burghley’s friend,
Lord Shrewsbury, to that of the rigid Puritan, Sir Amyas
Paulet, at Tutbury. In her troubles the captive Queen,
like every one else, appealed to Burghley, and especially
in the matter of the reckless accusations of immorality
brought by the Countess of Shrewsbury and her
Cavendish sons against her husband and Mary.[499]
Burghley’s kindness in this matter, and his attempts
to soften the fresh severity of the Queen’s captivity, had
not only persuaded Mary’s agents that he was her friend,[500]
but had given to Leicester and his party an excuse for
spreading rumours to the Treasurer’s detriment. At an
inopportune time, Nau, Mary’s French secretary, had
gone to London with new plans of associated sovereignty;
but almost simultaneously the Master of Gray
had arrived as James’s Ambassador. He was easily
bought by the English Government, as we have seen,
with the full approval of Burghley;[501] and on his return
to Scotland promptly caused the rejection by the Lords
of Nau’s project in favour of Mary. It was never on
the question of securing the Scots by bribery to the
English interest that Burghley was remiss. It was open
war with Spain that he always opposed.
In the meanwhile the toils were closing round the unhappy
Mary. She had now thrown herself entirely into
the arms of Spain; and the Guises were being gradually
but steadily forced into the background by Philip, as
being likely to frustrate his plans, by claiming for their
kinsman, James Stuart, the succession of England after
his mother. Every letter to and from Tutbury was
intercepted by Paulet. Morgan, Charles Paget, Robert
Bruce, and others, in their communications with Mary,
laid bare her hopes and their intrigues.[502] If any doubts
had previously existed as to the intentions of Spain and
the Queen of Scots, they could exist no longer. The
only question for England was how best to withstand
the combination against her. Here, as usual, Burghley
was at issue with the now dominant party of militant
Protestants; and equally, as usual, his opposition was
cautious and indirect. Leicester and his friends were
for open operations against Spain both in the Netherlands
and on the high seas, and for helping Henry III.
to withstand the Guises; whilst the Treasurer preferred
to stand on the defensive, and keep as much money in
hand as possible.[503] Elizabeth rarely required urging to
parsimony, and by appealing to her weakness Burghley
was able for a time to moderate the plans of the other
party.
But events were too strong for him. Mainly by his
influence Leicester had been restrained since 1580 from
subsidising a great expedition against Philip in favour
of the Portuguese Pretender, Don Antonio; but in the
spring of 1585 the treacherous seizure of English ships
in Spain had aroused the English to fury. Drake’s
great expedition of twenty-nine ships was fitted out,
and general reprisals authorised. Never was an expedition
more popular than this, for the English sailors were
aching for a fight with foes they knew they could beat,
and Burghley’s cautions were scouted. Drake’s fleet
sailed in September, doubtful to the last moment whether
the Queen would not be prevailed upon to stay it;[504] and
by sacking Santo Domingo and ravaging Santiago and
Cartagena almost without hindrance, demonstrated the
ineffective clumsiness of Philip’s methods. Leicester
and the war-party were now almost unrestrained; for
the Lord Treasurer made the best of it, and confined
his efforts to minimising the cost of the new policy as
much as possible, and suggesting caution to the Queen.
The Commissioners from the States continued to urge
the Queen to assume the sovereignty of the Netherlands,
and to govern the country, either directly or through a
nominee; but this was a responsibility which neither
she nor Burghley cared to accept. At length, after
much hesitation on the part of the Queen, Sir John
Norris was sent with an English force of 5000 men to
take possession of the strong cautionary places offered
by the Hollanders, and Leicester was designated to
follow as Lieutenant-General of the Queen’s forces (September
1585).
Elizabeth approached the business with fear and
trembling. It was a departure from Burghley’s safe and
tried policy, and was involving her in large expenditure.
She distrusted rebels and popular governments; she did
not like to send away her best troops in a time of danger,
and she railed often and loudly at Leicester and Walsingham
for dragging her into such a pass. Only a day after
Leicester’s appointment she changed her mind and bade
him suspend his preparations. “Her pleasure is,” wrote
Walsingham, “that you proceed no further until you
speak with her. How this cometh about I know not.
The matter is to be kept secret. These changes here
may work some such changes in the Low Countries as
may prove irreparable. God give her Majesty another
mind, … or it will work both hers and her best affected
subjects’ ruin.”[505] To this Leicester wrote one letter of
submission to be shown to the Queen, and the other for
Walsingham’s own eye, full of indignation. “This,” he
says, “is the strangest dealing in the world.… What
must be thought of such an alteration? I am weary of
life and all.”
Elizabeth had, however, gone too far now to retire,
and Leicester’s journey went forward. But it is plain to
see that whilst he was making his preparations to act as
sovereign on his own account, the Queen, influenced by
Burghley, was drafting his instructions in a way that
strictly limited his power for harm, and minimised her
responsibility towards Spain. Leicester was directed to
“let the States understand that whereby their Commissioners
made offer unto her Majesty, first of the sovereignty
of those countries, which for sundry respects she
did not accept; secondly, under her protection to be
governed absolutely by such as her Majesty would appoint
and send over as her Lieutenant. That her Majesty,
although she would not take so much upon her as to
command them in such absolute sort, yet unless they
should show themselves forward to use the advice of her
Majesty … she would think her favours unworthily
bestowed upon them.”
This must have been gall and wormwood for Leicester,
for in his own notes he lays down as his guiding
principles, “First, that he have as much authoryte as the
Prince of Orange had; or any other Captain-General
hath had heretofore: second, that there be as much
allowance by the States for the said Governor as the
Prince had, with all offices apportenaunt.”[506] He had
infinite trouble in getting money from the Queen, and
went so far as to offer to pledge his own lands to her as
security; but at last, in December, all was ready, and
Leicester foolishly went to Holland with his vague ambitions,
leaving Burghley in possession at home. It is
plain from his beseeching letter of farewell to the Lord
Treasurer that he recognised the danger. He prays him
earnestly not to have any change made in the plans
agreed upon, and to provide sufficient resources for the
sake of the cause involved and for the Queen’s honour.
“Hir Majesty, I se, my lord, often tymes doth fall into
myslyke of this cause, and sondry opinions yt may brede
in hir withal, but I trust in the Lord, seeing hir Highness
hath thus far resolved, and gone also to this far executyon
as she hath, and that myne and other menne’s poor lives
are adventured for hir sake, that she will fortify and
mainteyn her own action to the full performance that
she hath agreed on.”[507] Burghley was very ill at the
time, unable to rise from his couch, but in answer to the
Earl’s appeal he assured him that he would consider
himself “accursed in the sight of God” if he did not
strive earnestly to promote the success of the expedition.
The Lord Treasurer was, of course, sincere in his
desire to prevent the collapse of the Protestant cause in
the Netherlands, for he had never ceased for years to
insist that the quietude of England mainly depended
upon it. Where he differed from Leicester was in his
determination, if possible, to avoid such action as
would lead to an open breach with Spain. Before
even Leicester landed at Flushing he had begun to
quarrel with the Dutchmen, and in a fortnight was
intriguing to obtain an offer of the sovereignty of the
States for himself. The offer was made, and modestly
refused at first; but on further pressure Leicester accepted
the sovereignty, as he had intended to do from
the first (January 1586). The rage of Elizabeth knew no
bounds. This would make her infamous, she said, to all
the world. Leicester was timid at the consequences of
the step he had taken, and made matters worse by delaying
for weeks to write explanations to the angry Queen.
Walsingham and Hatton did their best, but very ineffectually,
to appease her. Burghley in a letter to Leicester
(7th February) assured him that he too had done so, and
that he himself approved of his action, and hoped to
“move her Majesty to alter her hard opinion.” As we
have seen, Burghley’s opposition was seldom direct, and
it may be accepted as probable that he mildly deprecated
the Queen’s anger against her favourite; but a remark in
a letter (17th February) from Davison, who was sent by
Leicester to explain and extenuate his act to the Queen,[508]
seems to show that the Lord Treasurer’s advocacy had
not been so earnest as he would have had Leicester to
believe.
The Queen had ordered Heneage to go to Holland
post-haste, to command Leicester openly to abandon his
new title; but from the 7th February till the 14th, whilst
Heneage’s harsh instructions were being drafted, Burghley
was diplomatically absent from court, and the pleading
of Walsingham and Hatton had no softening effect upon
the Queen. On the 13th February, Davison at length
arrived with Leicester’s excuses. The Queen railed and
stormed until he was reduced to tears. She refused at
first to receive Leicester’s letter or to delay Heneage’s
departure. Burghley arrived the next day, and Davison
writes on the 17th that he “had successfully exerted himself
to convince the Lord Treasurer that the measures adopted
were necessary, and that his Lordship had urged the
Queen on the subject.”
The only effect of Burghley’s persuasion, however,
was to obtain for Heneage discretion to withhold, if he
considered necessary, the Queen’s letter to the States,
and to save Leicester from the degradation of a public
renunciation. Burghley had thus done his best to preserve
Leicester’s friendship and gratitude; but, after all,
it was his policy, and not that of Leicester, that was
triumphant. Heneage was a friend of the Earl’s, and on
his arrival in Holland delayed action; but the Queen
was not to be appeased. She had, she said, been
slighted, and her commission exceeded, and would send
no money till her instructions were fulfilled. Confusion
and danger naturally resulted, and Leicester’s friends
redoubled their efforts to save him. Burghley himself
assured Leicester (31st March) that he had threatened to
resign his office unless she changed her course. “I used
boldly such language in this matter, as I found her
doubtful whether to charge me with presumption, which
partly she did, or with some astonishment of my round
speech, which truly was no other than my conscience
did move me, even in amaritudine anima. And then her
Majesty began to be more calm than before, and, as I
conceived, readier to qualify her displeasure.”[509]
When the Queen saw that Heneage and Leicester
were construing her leniency into acquiescence of the
Earl’s action, she blazed out again; and when Burghley
begged her to allow Heneage to return and explain the
circumstances, “she grew so passionate in the matter
that she forbade me to argue more;” and herself wrote
a letter to Heneage containing these words: “Do as
you are bidden, and leave your considerations for your
own affairs; for in some things you had clear commandment,
which you did not do, and in others none, which
you did.” At the urgent prayer of the States, however,
representing the danger to the cause which a public
deposition of Leicester would bring about, the Queen
finally allowed matters to rest until they could devise
some harmless way out of the difficulty.
Throughout the whole business Burghley almost
ostentatiously acted the part of Leicester’s friend. It
was a safe course for him to take, for the Queen was
so angry that he could keep the good-will of Leicester
and the Protestants, and yet be certain of the ultimate
failure of his opponent. As soon as the States understood
Leicester’s position, and had realised his incompetence,
they were only too anxious to be rid of him;
and throughout his inglorious government Burghley
could well speak in his favour, for it must have been
evident that the Earl was working his own ruin, and that
his position was untenable. One curious feature in the
matter is that both Burghley and Walsingham hinted to
Leicester that the Queen was being influenced by some
one underhand. “Surely,” writes the Secretary, “there
is some treachery amongst ourselves, for I cannot think
she would do this out of her own head;” and the gossip
of the court pointed at Ralegh, who wrote to Leicester[510]
vigorously protesting against the calumny.
There were, however, wheels within wheels in Elizabeth’s
court. Two of her Councillors were Spanish spies,
Ralegh was Burghley’s partisan, the Conservative party
in favour of friendship with the House of Burgundy was
not dead, and, notwithstanding all that has been written,
it may be fairly assumed that the decadence of Leicester
and the militant Protestant party during the Earl’s absence
in Holland did not take place without some secret
prompting from Lord Burghley.
In the meanwhile the plans for the invasion of England
were gradually maturing in Philip’s slow mind.
The raid of Drake’s fleet upon his colonies, and Leicester’s
assumption of the sovereignty of the Netherlands,
had at last convinced Philip, after nearly thirty years of
hesitancy, that England must be coerced into Catholicism,
or Spain must descend from its high estate. So
long as the elevation of Mary Stuart meant a Guisan
domination of England, with shifty James as his mother’s
heir, it had not suited Philip to squander his much
needed resources upon the overthrow of Elizabeth;
but by this time Guise was pledged to vast ambitions
in France, which could only be realised by Philip’s
help. The Jesuits and English Catholics had persuaded
the Spaniard that he would be welcomed in England,
whilst a Scot or a Frenchman would be resisted to the
death. Most of Mary’s agents, too, had been bribed to
the same side, and Mendoza in Paris was her prime
adviser and mainstay. Various attempts were made by
the Scottish Catholics and Guise’s friends to manage
the subjugation of England over the Scottish Border;
but though Philip affected to listen to their approaches,
and used them as a diversion, his plan was already
fixed—England must be won by Spaniards in Mary’s
name, and be held thenceforward in Spanish hands.
Mary was ready to agree to anything, and at the prompting
of Philip’s agents she disinherited her son (June 1586)
in favour of the King of Spain. Morgan, Paget, and
others had at last succeeded in reopening communication
with Mary, who had now lost all hope of release
except by force. A close alliance between England
and James VI. had been agreed to: she knew that no
help would come from her son or his Government;
and her many letters to Charles Paget, to Mendoza,
and to Philip himself, leave no doubt whatever that
she was fully cognisant of the plans for the overthrow,
and perhaps murder, of Elizabeth, in order that she,
Mary, might be raised by Spanish pikes to the English
throne.[511]
In May 1586 the priest Ballard had seen Mendoza
in Paris, and had sought the countenance of Spain for
the assassination of Elizabeth; and in August the matter
had so far progressed as to enable Gifford to give to
Mendoza full particulars of the vile plan. There was,
according to his account, hardly a Catholic or schismatic
gentleman in England who was not in favour
of the plot; and though Philip always distrusted a conspiracy
known to many, he promised armed help from
Flanders if the Queen were killed. Mendoza, when he
saw Gifford, recommended that Don Antonio, Burghley,
Walsingham, Hunsdon, Knollys, and Beale should be
killed; but the King wrote on the margin of the letter,
“It does not matter so much about Cecil, although he
is a great heretic, but he is very old, and it was he who
advised the understandings with the Prince of Parma,
and he has done no harm. It would be advisable to do
as he [i.e. Mendoza] says with the others.”[512]
The folly of Babington and his friends almost passes
belief. They seem to have been prodigal of their confidences,
and to have had no apprehension of treachery.
Babington’s own letter to Mary setting forth in full all
the plans in favour of “his dear sovereign” (6th July)
was handed immediately by the false agent Gifford to
Walsingham. No move was made by Walsingham,
except to send the clever clerk Phillips to Chartley to
decipher all intercepted letters on the spot, and so to
avoid delay in their delivery, which might arouse the
suspicion of the conspirators. Surrounded by spies
and traitors, but in fancied security, the unhappy Queen
involved herself daily deeper in the traps laid for her;
approved of Babington’s wild plans, and made provision
for her own release, whilst Walsingham watched and
waited. When the proofs were incontestable, and all
in the Secretary’s hands, the blow fell. On the 4th
August Ballard was arrested, Babington and the intended
murderer Savage a day or so afterwards, and
Mary Stuart’s doom was sealed. She was hurried off
temporarily to Tixhall; Nau and Curll were placed
under arrest, the Queen’s papers seized, and her rooms
closely examined. Amias Paulet was a faithful jailer,
and he did his work well. “Amyas, my most faithful,
careful servant,” wrote Elizabeth, “God reward thee
treblefold for the most troublesome charge so well
discharged. If you knew, my Amyas, how kindly, besides
most dutifully, my grateful heart accepts and
prizes your spotless endeavours and faultless actions,
your wise orders and safe regard, performed in so dangerous
and crafty a charge, it would ease your travail
and rejoice your heart.… Let your wicked murderess
know how with hearty sorrow her vile deserts compel
these orders, and bid her from me ask God’s forgiveness
for her treacherous dealing.” Elizabeth and her
ministers rightly appreciated the great peril which she
had escaped, and from the first it was recognised by
most of them that Mary had forfeited all claim to consideration
at their hands.[513]
It is usually assumed by a certain class of writers
that Mary was unjustly hounded to her death, mainly
by the personal enmity of Lord Burghley. Nothing, in
reality, is more distant from the truth. A most dangerous
conspiracy against the government and religion of England
had been discovered, in which she was a prime
mover. Her accomplices rightly suffered the penalty of
their crime,[514] and it was due to justice and to the safety
of the country that the mainspring of the conspiracy
should be disabled for further harm. But still the
matter was a delicate and dangerous one, for Catholics
were numerous in England, and the great Catholic confederacy
abroad was ready to take any advantage which
a false step on the part of Elizabeth might give them.
As we have seen, moreover, the feelings of the Queen
of England herself with regard to the sacredness of
anointed sovereigns was strong, and no more difficult
problem had ever faced the Government than how to
dispose of their troublesome guest in a way that should
in future safeguard England from her machinations,
whilst respecting the many susceptibilities involved. As
usual in moments of difficulty, Elizabeth turned to her
aged minister,[515] and as a result of a long private conference
with him the question was submitted to the
Privy Council. The Catholic members advocated only
a further stringency in Mary’s imprisonment. Leicester
was in favour of solving the difficulty by the aid of
poison,[516] whilst Burghley, followed by Walsingham and
others, proposed a regular judicial inquiry, which was
now legally possible by virtue of the Act of Association
passed by Parliament in the previous year. A commission
was consequently issued on the 6th October for
the trial of Mary, containing the names of forty-six of
the principal peers and judges, and all the Councillors,
but only after some bickering between the Queen and
Burghley with regard to the style to be given to Mary
and other details.[517]
Before this point had been reached, however, measures
had been taken to test the feeling of foreign powers
on the subject. Diplomatic relations had ceased between
Spain and England; but as soon as the Babington conspiracy
was discovered, Walsingham impressed upon
Chateauneuf, the French Ambassador, that the Spaniards
were at the bottom of it, and that it was directed almost
as much against the King of France as against Elizabeth
herself. The Ambassador himself was a strong Guisan,[518]
and personally was an object of odium and suspicion to
the excited Londoners; but his master’s hatred of the
Guises and dread of their objects was growing daily, and
when Madame de Montpensier prayed Henry to intercede
for the protection of Mary, she obtained but a cold
answer;[519] and no official step by the French was taken in
her favour at the time, except as a matter of justice Elizabeth
was requested that she might have the assistance of
counsel. It was clear, therefore, that Henry III. would
not go to war for the sake of his sister-in-law.
Mary was removed to Fotheringay for trial on the 6th
October, and on the following day Paulet and Mildmay
delivered to her Elizabeth’s letter, informing her of the
charges against her, and the tribunal to which she was to
be submitted. She indignantly refused to acknowledge
Elizabeth’s right to place her, an anointed sovereign,
upon her trial; but she denied all knowledge and complicity
in the murder plot. This was the safest attitude
she could have assumed, although the proofs against her
already in the hands of Elizabeth were overwhelming;[520]
and the arguments of Burghley and Lord Chancellor
Bromley failed to alter Mary’s determination. This was
embarrassing, and in the face of it Elizabeth wrote to
Burghley[521] instructing him that, although the examination
might proceed, no judgment was to be delivered until she
had conferred with him. At the same time she wrote to
Mary a letter of mingled threats and hope, with the
object of changing her attitude towards the tribunal.
This, added to the persuasions of Hatton, succeeded in
the object,[522] and Mary, unfortunately for her, retreated
from her unassailable position.
On the 14th, two days afterwards, the tribunal sat in
the great hall of Fotheringay Castle, and Mary, almost
crippled with rheumatism, painfully hobbled to her place,
supported by her Steward, Sir Andrew Melvil. On the
right of the Lord Chancellor sat Lord Burghley. That
the proceedings against Mary, in which he had from the
first taken an active part, were in his opinion necessary
for the safety of England, is clear from his many letters
upon the subject; but it is equally evident that if he
could decently have avoided personal identification with
them he would have been better pleased. His letters to
Popham, the Attorney-General, show that he wished to be
absent from the trial; but as he wrote at the time to Sir
Edward Stafford, the English Ambassador in France, “I
was never more toiled than I have been of late, and yet
am, with services that here do multiply daily; and whosoever
scapeth I am never spared. God give me grace.”
Much of the obloquy that has been unjustly cast upon
him in the matter of Mary Stuart arises from his inveterate
habit of putting everything in writing, which other
men did not do. For instance, the draft of the whole case,
or, as he puts it, “the indignities and wrongs done and
offered by the Queen of Scots to the Queen,” is in his
handwriting,[523] and the letters to the Queen detailing the
progress of events at Fotheringay are sent from him,
whilst Elizabeth’s instructions through Davison are all
addressed to Walsingham and Burghley. But it must
be remembered that he was the Queen’s most trusted
and experienced Councillor, and the existence of records
written by or to him does not show that he was more
eager than the rest for the sacrifice of the Scottish
Queen.
Mary defended herself with consummate ability before
a tribunal almost entirely prejudiced against her. She
was deprived of legal aid, without her papers, and in ill
health; and, according to modern notions, the procedure
against her was unjust in the extreme. Once she turned
upon Walsingham and denounced him as the contriver
of her ruin, but soon regained her composure; and in
her argument with Burghley, with respect to the avowals
of Babington and her Secretaries, reached a point of
touching eloquence which might have moved the hearts,
though it did not convince the intellects, of her august
judges.[524] But her condemnation was a foregone conclusion;
and although the sentence was not pronounced
until the return of the Commission to Westminster
(October 25), Mary left the hall of Fotheringay practically
a condemned felon on the 15th.
But it was one thing to condemn and another thing
to execute. Here Elizabeth’s scruples again assailed
her. The two Houses of Parliament addressed her on
the 12th November, begging that for the sake of the
realm and her own safety the sentence might be carried
into effect. At no point of her career was the profound
duplicity of Elizabeth more resorted to than now. She
had evidently determined that Mary must die, which is
of itself not surprising; but she was equally determined
that, if she could help it, no blame should personally
attach to her for having disregarded the privileges of a
crowned head. After much pretended sorrow and repudiation
of any desire for revenge, but at the same time
setting forth a careful recapitulation of Mary’s offences,
she complained of Parliament for passing the Act which
made it necessary for her to pronounce sentence of death
on a kinswoman, and said she must take time for prayer
and contemplation before she could give an answer to the
petition. A few days afterwards she besought the Houses
to consider again whether some other course could not
be adopted instead of executing Mary, but she was
assured by them that there was “no other sound and
assured means” than that which they had formerly recommended
(18th November). Her next address to the
Houses was still more hypocritical. After infinite talk
of her mercy, her goodness, and her hatred of bloodshed,
even for her own safety, she ended enigmatically:
“Therefore if I should say I would not do what you
request, it might be peradventure more than I thought,
and to say I would do it might perhaps breed peril of
what you labour to preserve, being more than in your
own wisdoms and discretions would seem convenient.”[525]
Several days before this, Mary’s sentence had been
communicated to her by Lord Buckhurst and Beale.
She was dignified and courageous, rejoiced that she was
to die, as she said, for the Catholic faith, and again
affirmed that she had taken no part in the plot for the
murder of Elizabeth, which was doubtless true so far as
active participation or direction was concerned. Her
letters written immediately afterwards to Mendoza[526] and
the Duke of Guise[527] are conceived in the same spirit,
and appear to entertain no expectation of mercy. The
Spaniards, however, were more hopeful, and ascribed to
Burghley a deep scheme for selling Mary’s life to France,
in exchange for concessions to English interests.
The arrangements for the invasion of England by a
great fleet from Spain were now so far advanced as to be
impossible of concealment, and the English Government
were actively adopting measures of defence and reprisal.
Under the transparent pretext of aiding Don Antonio,
English armed ships were hounding Spanish commerce
from the seas and harrying Spanish settlements; the
English troops under Leicester, and the Scots under the
Master of Gray, were fighting Spaniards in Holland,
and the English militant Protestant party had now supplanted
Burghley’s policy on all sides. But still the
cautious old statesman patiently worked in his own way
to minimise the dangers with which his political opponents
had already surrounded the Queen. There were
two things only that he could do, namely, once more to
endeavour to disarm Spain by making a show of friendship,
and to sow discord between France and Spain;
and both these things he did. One of Ralegh’s privateers
had captured Philip’s governor of Patagonia, the famous
explorer and navigator, Sarmiento; and almost simultaneously
with the passing of Mary’s sentence, Ralegh was
invited to bring his prisoner to Cecil House for a private
conference. Sarmiento was flattered and made much of,
and received his free release on condition of his taking to
Spain messages from Burghley and Ralegh suggesting a
friendly arrangement between the countries. Ralegh,
indeed, went so far as to offer—whether sincerely or not
does not affect the question—two of his ships for Philip’s
service, and for many weeks sympathetic messages found
their way secretly from the Lord Treasurer and Sir
Walter to Spain and Flanders.[528]
At the same time Sir Henry Wotton was sent to Paris
with certified copies of Mary’s will in favour of Philip,
and of her correspondence with Mendoza. “He is
instructed to point out how much she depended upon
your Majesty, and how shy she was of France.”[529] This was
exactly the course most likely to alienate Henry III. from
Spain and his sister-in-law; and although he tardily sent
Pomponne de Bellièvre to remonstrate with Elizabeth, the
Spaniards and Guisans, at all events, never believed in the
sincerity of his protests.[530] Mendoza writes: “Elizabeth
has given orders that directly Bellièvre arrives in England
the rumour is to be spread that the Queen of Scots is
killed, in order to discover how he takes it. Bellièvre,
however, is forewarned of it, and has his instructions what
to say when he hears it. It is a plan of Cecil’s arising
out of a desire (as I wrote to your Majesty) to sell to the
French on the best terms they can what they do not
dream of carrying out. The English and French will
have no difficulty in agreeing on the point, because the
King and his mother are very well pleased that the Queen
of Scots should be kept alive, though a prisoner, in order
to prevent the succession of your Majesty to the English
throne; whilst the English see plainly that the many
advantages accruing to them from keeping the Queen of
Scots a prisoner would change into as many dangers if
they made away with her.”[531]
On the 6th December public proclamation of Mary’s
sentence was made in London amidst signs of extravagant
rejoicing on the part of the populace. The next
day Bellièvre delivered a long speech to the Queen, in
which he made no attempt to deny Mary’s guilt, but
appealed to Elizabeth’s magnanimity, and proposed
guarantees from France to insure Mary’s future harmlessness.
The Queen repeated bitterly her grievances
against Mary, and replied that the life of Mary was incompatible
with her own safety; and Lord Burghley, in
a subsequent interview with the Frenchman, repeated
more emphatically the same idea. Shortly afterwards,
at the renewed request of Bellièvre and Chateauneuf,
Elizabeth ungraciously consented to grant a respite of
twelve days to Mary to enable the Ambassadors to communicate
with their master. But Henry III. himself was
now in a hopeless condition. “Such is the confusion of
the court, the vacillation of the King, and the jealousy,
hatred, and suspicion of the courtiers, that decisions are
adopted and abandoned at random.… The King is
trying to draw closer to the Queen of England, which is
the principal object of Bellièvre’s mission.”[532] The only
reply, therefore, sent to Bellièvre and Chateauneuf from
France was a pedantic and wordy appeal to Elizabeth’s
mercy, which must have convinced her that she need
fear nothing from the French.[533]
Notwithstanding the first movement of indignation
on the part of James also, it soon became clear that
selfish reasons would confine his action to protest. This
is not altogether to be wondered at. He had been informed
that Mary had disinherited him, and told De
Courcelles, the French Ambassador, that he knew “she
had no more good-will towards him than towards the
Queen of England.” The Master of Gray, at his side, too,
was the humble servant of England, and the traitor,
Archibald Douglas, represented him in the English
court. On pressure from France, however, James sent
Sir William Keith, another English partisan, to intercede
for his mother, or at least to induce Elizabeth to delay
the execution until a fitting embassy from him might be
sent. Elizabeth hectored and stormed at James’s threatening
letters; but when she became calmer she granted the
twelve days’ respite already referred to. The Master of
Gray and Sir Robert Melvil subsequently arrived at the
English court and were equally unsuccessful.[534] Melvil
undoubtedly did his best, and Elizabeth threatened his
life in consequence; but the Master of Gray’s advocacy
went no further than he knew would please the English
Government.
It is certain that Elizabeth herself had decided that
Mary should die, if the execution could be carried out
without uniting France and Spain against her, and
especially if she herself could manage to escape personal
opprobrium. Of Lord Burghley’s personal opinion on the
matter it is extremely difficult to judge. He is generally
represented by historians as being the prime enemy and
persecutor of the unhappy woman, which he certainly was
not. He was a cautious man and took his stand behind
legal forms; but the slightest slackness on his part was
represented by Leicester and his friends as a desire to
curry favour with Mary. He, the Howards, Crofts, and
the other conservatives were, as usual, desirous of
staving off the rupture with Spain, but dared not appear
for a moment to favour so unpopular a cause as that of
Mary. The truth of this view is partly shown by the
revelations of Sir Edward Stafford, the English Ambassador
in Paris, a great friend of Burghley’s and a paid
agent of Spain. Stafford told Charles Arundell in January
that Burghley had written that Bellièvre had not acted
so cleverly as they had expected, and if that he (Burghley)
had not prompted him he would have done worse still.
“He was advised to ask for private audience without
Chateauneuf, and was closeted with the Queen, who was
accompanied by only four persons. What passed at the
interview was consequently not known; but that he
(Cecil) could assure him (Stafford) that the Queen of
Scotland’s life would be spared, although she would
be kept so close that she would not be able to carry
on her plots as hitherto. This is what I have always
assured your Majesty was desired by the Queen of
England, as well as the King of France. Cecil also
says that, although he has constantly shown himself
openly against the Queen of Scots, Leicester and Walsingham,
his enemies, had tried to set the Queen against
him by saying that he was more devoted to the Queen
of Scotland than any one. But she (Elizabeth) had
seen certain papers in her (Mary’s) coffers that told
greatly against Leicester, and the Queen had told the
latter and Walsingham that they were a pair of knaves,
and she saw plainly now that, owing to her not having
taken the advice of certain good and loyal subjects of
hers, she was in peril of losing her throne and her life,
by burdening herself with a war which she was unable
to carry on. She said if she had done her duty as
Queen she would have had them both hanged.”[535]
By this and several similar pronouncements it would
appear that Burghley, true to his invariable method,
was still by indirect and cautious steps endeavouring to
lead the Queen back to the moderate path from which
Leicester, Walsingham, and the militant Protestants had
diverted her; and that, very far from being the mortal
enemy of Mary, he would probably have saved her if
he could have done it with perfect harmlessness to himself,
and have insured the future security of the Queen
and Government. But whilst the Queen was very slowly
being influenced by the Catholics and Conservatives near
her, events were precipitated and Mary paid the last
penalty. There is no space in this work to tell in
detail the obscure and much debated story of the issue
of the warrant for Mary’s execution;[536] but a summary
glance at Burghley’s share in it cannot be excluded in
any biography of the statesman. Soon after the proclamation
of the sentence (6th December 1586) Elizabeth
herself directed Burghley to draft the warrant for the
execution. He did so, and sent for Secretary Davison—Walsingham
being absent from illness—and informed
him that as he, Burghley, was returning to London,
the court then being at Richmond, he would leave the
draft with Davison that it might be engrossed and
presented to the Queen for signature. When Davison
laid the document before the Queen she told him to
keep it back for the present. Six weeks passed without
anything more being done, and Leicester in the interval
complained to Davison, in Burghley’s presence, of his
remissness in not again laying the document before the
Queen.
The Master of Gray left London at the end of
January, and on the 1st February Lord Admiral Howard
told the Queen that there was much disquieting talk in
the country with regard to attempts to be made for the
rescue of Mary, &c.[537] Elizabeth then requested Howard
to send for Davison and direct him to lay the warrant
before her for signature. The Secretary accordingly
carried the warrant to the Queen, who was full of
smiles and amiability, and asked him what he had there.
Davison told her, and she signed the warrant, explaining
to him whilst doing so, that she had hitherto delayed
it for the sake of her own reputation. Then, with a
joke, she handed the signed warrant back to him, and,
according to Davison, bade him carry it at once to the
Lord Chancellor, have it sealed with the great seal as
privately as possible, and send it away to the Commissioners,
so that she should hear no more about it.
Elizabeth afterwards, however, swore that she had
given him no such instructions. As he was leaving, Elizabeth
directed him to call on Walsingham, who was
confined to his house by illness, and to tell him what
had been done. She then spoke bitterly of Amias
Paulet for not having made the warrant unnecessary,
and hinted to Davison that he might write to Paulet
again suggesting the poisoning of Mary. This Davison
demurred at doing, as he knew that it would be fruitless,
and he did not relish the task, but promised to mention
it to Walsingham. The Secretary’s story is that he went
straight to Lord Burghley and showed him and Leicester
the warrant, repeating the Queen’s directions. He then
proceeded to Walsingham House; and the result of his
visit is seen in a memorandum (dated the next day, 2nd
February) in Walsingham’s hand, annotated by Lord
Burghley, laying down the steps to be taken for immediately
carrying the warrant into effect.[538] The fullest
details, even for the burial, are set forth, and at the end
it is directed that “the Lords and court are to give out
that there will be no execution.”
Thus far Davison’s statement has been followed; but
there is at Hatfield (part iii., No. 472) a rough draft in
Lord Burghley’s handwriting, which, in view of the
date upon it, 2nd February, throws rather a new light
upon the matter, and proves that, unknown to Davison,
Lord Burghley and the rest of the Council were accomplices
of the Queen in her intention of subsequently
repudiating her orders and ruining her Secretary, and
that the tragi-comedy was not played by Elizabeth
alone, but by her grave Councillors as well. The draft
document is in the name of the Council, and sets forth
the reasons that had moved them to despatch the warrant
without further consulting the Queen; “and yet we are
now at this time most sorry to understand that your Majesty
is so greatly grieved with this kind of proceeding, and do
most humbly beseech your Majesty,” &c. This, be it remembered,
is dated the 2nd February, before the warrant
had been sent off or the Queen even knew it had been
sealed.
Early in the morning of the 2nd the Queen sent
Killigrew to Davison, directing him not to go to the
Lord Chancellor until he had seen her. When he
entered her presence she asked him, to his surprise,
whether he had had the warrant sealed, and he informed
her that he had. Why so much haste? she
asked; to which he replied that she had told him to use
despatch. He then inquired if she wished the warrant
executed. Yes, she said; but she did not like the form
of it, for it threw all the responsibility upon her, and
again suggested poison as the best way out of her
difficulty.
All this made Davison suspicious, and he went to
Hatton and told him that he feared the intention was
subsequently to disavow him. He would, he said, take
no more responsibility, but would go at once to Lord
Burghley. This he did, and the latter summoned the
Privy Council for next day; whilst he, Burghley, busied
himself in drafting the letters to the Commissioners, the
Earls of Kent and Shrewsbury. The next morning
(3rd February) the Council met in Lord Burghley’s
room, and the Lord Treasurer laid the whole matter
before them, repeating Davison’s story, and recommending
that the warrant should be despatched without
further reference to the Queen. This was agreed
to, and the instructions and warrant were sent the same
night (Friday, 3rd February) to the Commissioners,
Burghley himself handing the document to Beale to
carry down into the country.
The next morning when Davison entered the Queen’s
room at Greenwich she was chatting with Ralegh, and
told the Secretary that she had dreamed the previous
night that the Queen of Scots was executed, which made
her very angry. It was a good thing, she said, that
Davison was not near her at the time. This frightened
Davison, and he asked her whether she really did not
wish the warrant executed. With an oath she said she
did, but again repeated what she had said the previous
day about the responsibility, and “another way of doing
it.” A day or so afterwards, Davison informed the
Queen that Paulet had indignantly refused Walsingham’s
suggestion to poison Mary, whereupon she broke
into complaints of the “daintiness of these precise
fellows,” and violently denounced people who professed
to love and defend her, but threw all responsibility
upon her.
On the 8th February the tragedy of Fotheringay was
consummated, and in the afternoon of the 9th young
Talbot brought the news to London. Lord Burghley
at once summoned Davison, and after consulting with
Hatton and others, it was decided not to tell the Queen
suddenly. When she learnt it later in the day the well-prepared
blow fell upon Davison. The Queen pretended
to be infuriated, swore that she had never
intended to have the warrant divulged, and whilst
blaming all the Councillors,[539] threw most of the onus
upon Davison. The Council advised him to retire from
court, and he was soon afterwards cast into the Tower
and degraded from his office. After a long and tedious
trial and a painful imprisonment, he was condemned
to a fine sufficient to ruin him, and thenceforward lived
in poverty and obscurity. The Earl of Essex fought
manfully in his favour whilst he lived, but Lord Burghley
and the rest of the Councillors were too strong for him,
and the man they had ruined was never allowed to raise
his head again.[540]
That Burghley and the other principal Councillors
were parties to the plot, and that the Queen’s anger
with them was assumed, is also seen by a memorandum
in Burghley’s handwriting at Hatfield,[541] dated 17th February,
headed “The State of the Cause as it ought to be
conceived and reported concerning the Execution done
upon the Queen of Scots,” in which the Queen’s version
is adopted, and all the blame thrown upon Davison and
the Council. Even before this was written the affair
was so reported to Burghley’s friend Stafford in Paris,
in order that this version might be spread on the Continent.
Charles Arundell, in conveying the news from
Stafford to Mendoza, says that Burghley was absent
through illness,[542] and that the execution was carried
through by Davison, “who is a terrible heretic,” and
the rest of Mary’s enemies. This is perhaps the blackest
stain that rests upon Burghley’s name. We have seen
before that he was not generous or magnanimous in his
treatment of others when his own interests were at stake;
and the sacrifice of Davison would probably appear to
him a very small price to pay for helping Elizabeth out
of a difficult position, and maintaining his own favour.
Although we have seen that the Lord Treasurer from
motives of policy had been forced to take a prominent
part in the condemnation and execution of Mary, it cannot
be supposed that the position of affairs at the time
was agreeable to him. The wars in Flanders, the persecution
of English Protestants in Spain, the reprisals of
Drake and the privateers, and the Catholic plots in the
interests of Mary had aroused a strong Protestant war
feeling in the country. Leicester and his friends had
the popular voice on their side, and Burghley and the
Conservatives could only very cautiously and tentatively
endeavour to stay the impetus with which the country
was rushing towards a national war with the strongest
power in Christendom. The great Armada was in full
preparation, and the ports of Italy, Flanders, Spain, and
Portugal rang with the sound of arms. Don Antonio
once more was welcomed in England, to be used as a
stalking-horse, this being Lord Burghley’s last hope of
levying war without national responsibility.
But though there was much talk about Don Antonio,
and Spanish spies in England continued to report that
the great fleet under Drake was to be employed in his
interests, its real object was to render impossible, at
least for that year, the junction of Philip’s naval forces in
Lisbon. Thanks to the efforts of Burghley and his party,
an elaborate pretence was kept up of the expedition
being a private one; but it was really controlled and
organised by government officers, and the second in
command, Borough, was a Queen’s admiral, sent avowedly
to place a check upon Drake, and to prevent him
from going too far in his open attack upon Spain.
Drake’s instructions were “to prevent or withstand any
enterprise as might be attempted against her Highness’s
dominions, and especially by preventing the concentration
of Philip’s squadrons;” and he was to distress the
ships as much as possible, both in the havens themselves
and on the high seas. Drake arrived in Plymouth from
the Thames on the 23rd March, and in a week of incessant
energy had everything ready. The secret of his
intentions was well kept, and Mendoza’s many spies
could only tardily report the loose gossip of the streets.
Sir Edward Stafford assured his Spanish paymaster that
no living soul but the Queen and the Lord Treasurer
knew what the design was to be.
Leicester was now at Buxton (April 1587), shortly to
start on another visit to Flanders, and in his absence
Burghley’s influence, both Ralegh and Hatton being on
his side, as well as Crofts and the Catholics, overshadowed
that of Walsingham and Knollys. Drake seems to have
feared the consequence of this, and hurried his departure
from Plymouth (2nd April). He was only just in time,
for as soon as he had gone a courier came in hot haste with
orders from the Council, which now meant Burghley,
strictly limiting Drake’s action:[543] “You shall forbear to
enter forcibly into any of the said King’s ports or havens,
or to offer any violence to any of his towns or shipping
within harbour, or to do any act of hostility on land.”
This was exactly what Drake had foreseen. The
ship sent after him with the orders failed to reach him,
and the great seaman went on his way. But, as usual
with Drake, the official drag on the wheel had to be
overcome. Off Cape St. Vincent, Borough recited to the
Admiral the conditions under which the Queen’s ships
accompanied him, evidently expecting that he would not
confine his operations to preventing the concentration
of the Spanish squadrons. But Drake was on his own
element now, and sailed straight to Cadiz, as some people
had shrewdly expected he meant to do from the first.[544]
Borough warned him not to exceed the Queen’s orders,
and was placed under arrest for his pains; and unopposed,
Drake sailed into Cadiz harbour, to the dismay of the
astounded Spaniards. He plundered, burned, and sank
all the ships in port, destroyed the stores, and then
quietly sailed out again unmolested. He did damage to
the extent of a million ducats (though Philip wrote that
he felt the insolence of the act more than the material
damage), and if he had cared to disobey the Queen’s
orders further he might have stopped the Armada for
good by burning the ships in Lisbon, for they had
neither guns nor men on board to protect them. But
he knew now that the peace party in the Council were
busy arranging with Parma’s envoy for the meeting of
a conference, and doubtless thought he had gone far
enough in his brilliant disobedience.
The indispensable Andrea de Looe had arrived in
London from the Prince of Parma immediately after
Drake sailed, and was soon deep in negotiation with
Burghley with the object of arranging a meeting of
Peace Commissioners. When he had returned to Brussels
with the proposals, news came of Drake’s daring raid.
De Looe then wrote a long letter to Burghley (11th July),
pointing out how much the cause of peace was injured
by such acts of aggression. Burghley’s answer[545] (28th
July) perfectly defines his position towards Drake’s
action. After professing the Queen’s desire for peace,
and readiness to send her Commissioners to Flanders if
the Duke of Parma will suspend hostilities (before the
Sluys), he says: “True it is, and I avow it upon my
faith, her Majesty did send a ship expressly with a message
by letters charging him (Drake) not to show any
act of hostility before he went to Cadiz, which messenger,
by contrary winds, could never come to the place where
he was, but was constrained to come home, and hearing
of Sir Fras. Drake’s actions, her Majesty commanded
the party that returned to be punished, but he acquitted
himself by oath of himself and all his company. And so
unwitting, yea unwilling, to her Majesty those actions
were committed by Sir Fras. Drake, for the which her
Majesty is greatly offended with him; and now also for
bringing home of a rich ship that came out of the East
Indies.”[546] And then, as some counterbalance to these
enormities, Lord Burghley sets forth once more the
various grievances of England against Spain.
Whilst the elaborate and frequently insincere negotiations
for peace were being laboriously pursued for many
months, Lord Burghley’s other standing policy was not
neglected, namely, that of causing jealousy between France
and Spain. Henry III. was now in mortal fear of Guise,
and was ready to listen to English and Huguenot suggestions
that Philip’s conquest of England would be followed
by a Guisan dynasty under Spanish patronage in France.
All the French influence at the Vatican was exercised to
procure the conversion of James Stuart and the opposition
of Spanish aims, and before the end of the year Lord
Burghley had the satisfaction of seeing that Henry III.
and his clever mother in no case would aid Philip to
subjugate England.
Elizabeth, in the meanwhile, was assailed by doubts
and fears, and periodical fits of penuriousness in the
midst of her danger, which drove her Councillors to
despair. Stafford told Mendoza that “Cecil writes that
the Queen is so peevish and discontented that it was
feared she would not live long. Her temper is so bad
that no Councillor dares to mention business to her, and
when even he (Cecil) did so, she had told him that she
had been strong enough to lift him out of the dirt, and
was able to cast him down again. He (Cecil) was of
opinion that the Councillors might be divided into three
classes—those who wished to come to terms with Spain,
those who desired a close friendship with France, and
those who wanted to stand aloof from both, whilst enriching
themselves with plunder. He (Cecil) was neither a
Spaniard nor a Frenchman, but wished the Queen to be
friendly with both powers. King Henry, under whom
the country was powerful and tranquil, thought he was
doing a great thing when he was able to make war with
France when he had an alliance with Spain; and now
it happened that the French were as desirous of being
friendly as the English were, and he urges the Ambassador
to hasten the conclusion of an agreement.”[547]
But whilst he was writing amiably for the French, he
took care, on the other hand, to make the most of the
peace negotiations with Spain, and thus to cause Henry
to be the more anxious for England’s friendship. The
old statesman was thus cautiously and slowly going on
his traditional way, hopeless though he must have been
of the final result as regarded keeping peace with Spain.
The long-continued preparations of the Armada were
rapidly approaching completion; the Pope had been
cajoled into promising funds unwillingly to aid Philip’s
aims; the English Catholic refugees were eagerly awaiting
the harvest of their efforts; the great, cumbrous
machine for crushing England was already in motion,
and no efforts of diplomacy could stop it.
But yet Burghley did his best. The war and plunder
party, as usual, checked him at every turn; but early
and late, through constant pain and sickness, family
trouble[548] and public disappointment, he struggled on in
the way he had marked out for himself so many years
before—to divide England’s possible enemies, and
keep the peace with Spain so long as was humanly
possible. The Queen was full of qualms and misgivings;
swaying now to one side, now to another, and abusing
in turn both the party of peace and the advocates of
war. “The Queen has been scolding the Lord Treasurer
greatly for the last few days, for having neglected to
disburse money for the fleet,” wrote a Spanish spy in
November; and a few days afterwards, when she was
alarmed at the delay in Parma’s reply, she flew into
a tremendous rage with Burghley, “upon whom she
heaped a thousand insults,” for having induced her to
negotiate for peace whilst the enemy completed his
preparations. “She told the Treasurer he was old and
doting; to which he replied that he knew he was old,
and would gladly retire to a church to pray for her.”
But the old minister gave the Queen as good as she
brought, and in vigorous words pointed out in detail
that her present dangers arose entirely from her neglect
of his advice and the imprudence of his opponents in
the Council.[549] But the next day came Parma’s answer,
and the Queen was all smiles again towards Burghley
and the peacemakers.