GOVERNMENT—LAWS,
&c.
The History of the Fashionable
World is a sort of undertaking, which, to be accurately executed,
would require abundantly more leisure and diligence than I could
afford to bestow upon it: and I very much doubt, whether, after
all, one reader out of a hundred would be at the pains of
perusing it. The fact is, that the members of this
community are not sufficiently substantial to form historical
pictures. Their employments are not of a nature to make
their memory an object with mankind. Hence, though they
make a splendid appearance in a ball-room, they appear to little
advantage in a record; and, like the dancing figures in a
magic-lantern, they seem to have answered the end of their being,
when they have afforded an evening’s amusement. For
these and other reasons which might be assigned, I shall content
myself with giving a brief account of their Polity and Laws;
referring those of my readers who are desirous of further
information upon their history, to Novels and Romances, and to
such Chronicles of antiquity, as have preserved the memorials of
obsolete and superannuated manners.
It is a task of no ordinary difficulty to convey any tolerable
idea of this people, in their aggregate or national
capacity. Consisting, as they do, of various and detached
societies, they are yet considered to possess a sort of federal
relation among each other; and to unite into an imaginary whole,
under the collective denomination of the Fashionable World.
It is under this aggregate character that they take their rank in
society; and the appellation which denotes their community, is
recognised by the tradesmen who advertise for their custom, and
the politicians who discourse of their affairs. A very
handsome proportion of the daily newspapers is devoted to their
service; and intelligence from their drawing-rooms is reported
with as much regularity as that which is derived from the first
cabinets in Europe. Indeed, the minuteness with which their
routs and dances, their dresses and dainties, the expressions they utter,
the company they keep, and the excesses they commit, are
detailed, is at once an evidence that these people are considered
to have a corporate existence; and that no little consequence is
attached to their proceedings. I wish, with all my heart,
that they thought a little more of this; they would then scarcely
run into such extravagancies, as make them, on too many
occasions, objects of ridicule to one part of society, and
dangerous examples to the other.
Their Population is more fluctuating and uncertain than
that of any people upon the face of the earth. There are
among them certain tribes, or families, distinguished by
different descendable titles, who are said to claim a sort
of prescriptive right to the name of Fashionables. In these
the federal appellation continues hereditary; and it is an axiom
among the body, that people of Quality (for this is the
term by which they designate the titled gentry) can never be out
of Fashion.
This is, it must be observed, their own representation
of the matter; and I am inclined to suspect that there is no
little management at the bottom of it. There is something,
no doubt, very splendid in the idea of including all the families
of rank within the limits of Fashion; and it is a mark of no
contemptible policy, to have constructed an axiom which so
effectually cuts off their retreat. But surely, it would be but decent
to allow the gentry of the realm to have a voice in the
business. There have been times, in which many of
our Nobles would have thought themselves dishonoured by being
presumed of course to sustain a Fashionable character. I
cannot but think, that if the modern nobility were fairly
consulted, several of them would still be found to
entertain the same opinion; and that persons of the first
distinction in the country would be among that number.
However that be, these dignified families are, according to
Fashionable computation, almost the only standing members of the
community; and, if these be excepted, all the rest of their body
is mutable in the extreme.
There
is a perpetual reciprocation of numbers between them and the
society in which they reside. Scarcely an hour passes
without some interchange. The gossip of every day announces
that some have migrated from the region of Fashion, and that
others have made their appearance within it for the first
time. The causes which produce these variations, and the
reasons by which they are defended, are in some instances too
mysterious, and in others too frivolous, to become subjects of
recital. In general it may be affirmed, that though persons
become Fashionable with the concurrence of their will,
they cease to be such against it. For, if a few
accidental converts to plain sense and sober piety be excepted,
the greater part of those who retire have been superseded;
and resign their places, only because they cannot any longer
retain them. However that be, the fluctuation thus
occasioned in the numbers and characters of those who compose
this Fashionable Community, diversifies its complexion daily; and
renders a precise account of its population and totality utterly
impossible.
The form of government subsisting among this people, so far as
it can be traced out, is Oligarchical, and the spirit of it is
absolute and despotical. The few in whose hands the supreme
authority resides, do not consist of any regular or definite
number, nor are they confined to any particular sex. In
general, they are composed of persons out of both sexes, who,
while they exercise a separate influence in things relating
to the sexes respectively, possess also a common jurisdiction in
matters of universal concern.
The governing few are not invested with their authority by any
formalities of law; nor do they obtain their station by any
specific qualifications. The magistracy which they hold,
appears to be neither hereditary nor elective, but
contingent. The term of their continuance in power is also
as indefinite and capricious, as the right by which they acquire
it. One thing, however, is certain, that as a moral
reputation has no influence in recommending them to the stations
they fill, so the forfeiture of it in no degree weakens the
stability, or abridges the duration of their power. That a
government of this independent description should exist in the
heart of the British empire, an imperium in imperio, will
appear scarcely credible to my reader. He may, however,
rely upon it, that the fact is as I have stated it; and if he
should express his wonder, that such contempt of the sovereign
authority as it eventually leads to, has not been properly
resisted, he will only do what thousands have done before
him.
But to return:—The laws by which the government of
Fashion is administered, like the common law of England, are
unwritten; and derive their force, as that does, from usage and
prescription. The only code of any note among this people,
is that which they distinguish by the collective appellation of the LAW of
HONOUR. This extraordinary code has been defined to
be—“a system of rules constructed by people of
Fashion, and calculated to facilitate their intercourse with one
another.” [29] Now if this definition be a just
one, (and I presume it is, from the high authority by which it is
given,) it will afford us no indifferent help, towards unfolding
the mysteries of Fashionable jurisprudence.
It seems, then, that the Law of Honour, by which people
of Fashion are said to be governed, is wholly and exclusively
designed to make them acceptable to each other. Now, not to
mention other things, persons in a Fashionable sphere cannot be
strictly
agreeable to each other, unless they are well dressed; nor can
that intercourse which they chiefly value, be pleasantly
maintained, without splendid equipages, choice wines, and
sumptuous entertainments. As, therefore, the necessity of
the case requires such accommodations, the Law of Honour,
to say the least, does not look very nicely into the means by
which they may have been procured. Hence it follows, by the
fairest inference, that a man of Fashion is not at all the less
respectable in his own circle, merely because he is what the rest
of the world calls unjust. For, whatever may be the law
elsewhere, a man of Fashion can owe nothing to his inferiors: and
his character will therefore suffer no stain, though he should
have broken his word a thousand times with the reptile that made his
clothes, built his carriage, or furnished his table.
This law is also distinguished by many other features of
toleration, which well account for the respect and influence that
it possesses in the Fashionable World. By a spirit of
accommodation, of which there is no other example, it overlooks,
if it does not even encourage, a variety of actions, which in the
mouth of a moralist would be absolute vices; and which, to say
the truth, are scarcely deserving of a much better name.
Thus, a man may debauch his tenant’s daughter, seduce the
wife of his friend, and be faithless, and even brutal to his own,
and yet be esteemed a man of honour, (which is the same as a man of
Fashion,) and have a right to make any man fight him who says he
is not. In like manner, a man may blaspheme God, and
encourage his children and servants to do the same; he may
neglect the interests, and squander the property, of his family;
he may be a tyrant in his house, and a bully in the streets; he
may lie a-bed all day, and drink and game all night; and yet be a
most dutiful subject of the Law of Honour, and a shining
character in the society of Fashion.
There is, I own, much convenience in all this, and some
consistency. Persons who live only for this world, should
have a proportionable latitude allowed them for the employment of
their animal propensities; and the law which provides for the
regulation of their conduct, should have a special reference to
this consideration. Supposing, therefore, that people of
Fashion ought to exist, they must have such a law as that which
they possess. So that, taking the Law of Honour in this
connexion, I cannot but think it a master-piece of political
contrivance.
At the same time, I cannot agree with those who have been led
to consider this table of Fashionable jurisprudence as deserving
a place in the temple of Morality. Into this error a
celebrated writer appears to have fallen, in his Treatise of
Moral Philosophy. For, having defined morality to be
“that science which teaches men their duty, and the reasons
of it,” he proceeds to cite the Law of Honour as one
of the three rules by which men are governed. That
respectable writer has, indeed, admitted that this law is
defective, because it does not provide for the duties to
God and to inferiors; he has also proclaimed that it is
bad, by stating, that it allows of fornication, adultery,
drunkenness, prodigality, duelling, &c. Still, however,
he has rather left us to infer, that it ought wholly to be
rejected, than absolutely told us so. By classing it with
the law of the land and the Scriptures, he has (undesignedly no
doubt) prevented its utter condemnation; and afforded ground for
considering it as a moral rule, to which men owe a qualified
obedience.
Having
specified the sort of practices which the Law of Honour
allows, I shall take some brief notice of the duties which it
exacts. The principal of these, and that upon which its
tone and spirit are most peremptory, is the resentment of
injuries. Now it must be observed, that the term
injury, in the use of people of Fashion, is of a very wide
and comprehensive signification. It not only means such an
act of outrage as amounts to a manifest and palpable wrong, but
extends to every dubious point of conduct, from which a
Fashionable sophist could find scope to infer an injurious
intention. Thus a sister seduced, and then abandoned, and a
word or a look not satisfactorily explained, are all equally
injuries; and constitute, in the spirit of this code,
so many obligations to the most lively and implacable
resentment. It may be, that the offended person is of a
peaceable disposition, and would rather endure a moderate injury
than revenge it; or he may have too much respect for the laws of
the parent state, to require or accept redress in any other than
the legal way; or he may know, that the offending party is a man
disposed to seek a quarrel, and that he desires nothing so much
as to provoke the innocent person, whom he has purposely
insulted, to claim satisfaction; or, lastly, it may be, that the
supposed injury is founded wholly on mistake, and that the
reputed aggressor will not believe or own himself to have
offended, and will therefore make no atonement. In all
these cases, personal resentment might as well be waved;
but this the Law of Honour positively forbids: and he who should
conscientiously decline to pursue a personal quarrel, upon these,
or even higher motives, might be a better father, a better
husband, a better subject, and a better Christian, for so doing;
but he would certainly be a worse man of honour.
It is worthy of remark, that these reputed injuries are
sometimes so minute and transitory, or so remote and obscure,
that, if every thing depended upon the aggressor and the
aggrieved, they would either remain wholly undiscovered, or, at
least, be speedily forgotten. But each of these
consequences is not unfrequently defeated by the officious
industry of some kind-hearted being, who, though he loves his
friend too well to let him be insulted, can govern his feelings
well enough to stand by and see him murdered. This is,
certainly, a refinement upon the theory of friendship, which may
be fairly set down among the most extraordinary achievements of
the Law of Honour. Indeed, this bloody code has many
such refinements. For, proceeding, as it does, upon
principles of its own invention, it must necessarily clash with
many antecedent obligations. These, however, it contrives,
by the help of a little sophistry, so to supersede, that neither
affinity nor attachment may impede the progress of honourable
revenge: and hence we see, in compliance with its rigid edicts,
the warmest friends sacrifice to resentment with as little
reserve as the bitterest enemies; and that, perhaps, to settle a
tavern dispute, or to avenge a play-house quarrel!
Having said so much of the principal duty enjoined by the Law
of Honour, I shall offer a few observations upon the sort of
punishment which it inflicts. I trust I shall be excused,
if, in treating this part of my subject, I employ the term
punishment in a sense not strictly similar to that in
which it is ordinarily used. The fact is, that this
singular law makes the parties both judges in their own cause,
and executioners of their own sentence. The universal award
against every convicted offender is, that he shall fight a duel
with the offended party. So that, if that may be set down as
punishment, which is ultimate in a controversy, and which is
exacted as a satisfaction to the law; death, or exposure to it,
is the lowest punishment which honour inflicts upon the least
offender; and the highest which it enforces upon the
greatest.
And this is, I confess, a political incongruity, which I have
not a little difficulty in reconciling with the good sense of
many who have undertaken to defend it. The law of England
has often been blamed (and I think with justice) as unreasonably
sanguinary. In answer to this charge it has been said,
that, though nearly two hundred offences of almost as many
degrees of guilt, are made equally punishable with death; yet
justice is administered with so much discretion and mercy, that the
penalty is inflicted only on a few. Feeble as this excuse
is, for a law that deals in blood, it would be well for the law
of Honour if it admitted of such a palliation. But the
truth is, that in the latter case there is nothing to abate the
demand for blood—the prosecution of every difference is
both summary and vindictive: there is no tribunal to enquire into
the original matter of the quarrel; no judicature to determine
the real merits of the controversy: if the judgment be erroneous,
there is no court of equity to reverse the verdict; if rigorous,
there is no arm of mercy to withdraw the victim from
suffering.
It must be evident from this view which has been presented of
the law, that, as an injury may be created by the most
trivial incident, so punishment may be inflicted with the most
preposterous and unequal retribution. I cannot better
illustrate the frivolous foundation upon which an injury may be
erected, than by adverting to an occurrence of very recent date,
and of sufficient notoriety in the Fashionable World. Two
men of Fashion, incensed against each other by an accidental
quarrel between their respective dogs, dropped, in their warmth,
certain expressions which rendered them amenable to the bloody
code: duel was declared indispensable: and in less than twelve
hours, one of the two was dispatched into eternity, and the other
narrowly escaped the same fate. [42]
The
inequality of the retribution is, indeed, an inevitable
consequence of that article of the code which compels men of
Fashion, without distinction, to decide their differences by
fighting a duel. It results from this promiscuous
injunction, that the peaceable man must fight the quarrelsome;
that the heir of a noble family must meet the ruined
esquire; and that the man who has never drawn a trigger in his
life, must encounter the Fashionable ruffian, who has all his
life been doing little else. This inequality is further
manifest, from the different circumstances and connexions of life
under which the combatants may be found. The son of many
hopes may be matched against the worthless prodigal; the virtuous
parent against the unprincipled seducer; and the man of industry,
usefulness, and beneficence, against the miscreant who only lives
to pamper his lusts, and to corrupt his fellow-creatures.
Nothing has here been said of the indiscriminate manner in which
judgment is executed. The innocent and the guilty must both
be involved in the same awful contingency; each must put his
life to hazard: and the probability is, that, if one of the two
should fall, it will be the man whose conduct least entitled him
to punishment, and whose life was most worth preserving.
I forbear to enter further into the system of Fashionable
government, or to meddle with the inferior points of
legislation. What has been said of the Law of Honour, will
apply, with little variation, to every other institution of minor
concern. To facilitate polite intercourse, and to exclude,
as much as may be, duties to God and inferiors, is a considerable
object in every regulation; and it is but justice to this people
to say, that, in this respect, they are at once consistent and
successful.
