When Sumter brought the North to its feet as one
man, as Lowell wrote, the press and general public believed
the war would be brief. The best editorial judgment
in New York had been that the rebellion could be
strangled by a blockade alone. “A half dozen ships of
war stationed at the proper points is all that is wanted,”
said the Times on Feb. 11, 1861. “In a few months’ time
the Southern Confederacy would be completely starved
out.” The Tribune, arguing Jan. 22 for closing the
Southern ports, had predicted that as a consequence “the
South will decline, and finally collapse, in utter humiliation.
And this will not result from bloody wars, but
from the peaceful operation of the laws of trade.” On
the same date the Evening Post remarked that the secession
disease required not cautery or the knife, but a little
judicious regimen. Uncle Sam might crush the seceding
States with ease. “He could devastate every cotton field,
and level every seaboard city in less than a year, if he
were so foolhardy and malignant as they have shown
themselves to be.” It must be remembered that at the
time of all these utterances Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Arkansas had not yet joined the South.
But in his call to arms just after Sumter Bryant allowed
himself to boast that every loyal arm was a match for ten
traitors. A pathetic Evening Post editorial of June 15,
“The Beginning of the End,” following the Confederate
evacuation of Harper’s Ferry, predicted that Jefferson
Davis meant to make a desperate effort at Manassas, for
“his cause is on its last legs, and unless he puts forth a
bold stroke now, it is gone.”
It was because the Tribune was so confident of an easy
victory that it raised the cry, “On to Richmond!” in
June and early July. Simply because it shared the same
confidence, the Evening Post, with greater wisdom,
pleaded for deliberation and care, and carried editorials
with such headings as “Patience!” (July 1). After the
advance began, it thought that Jefferson Davis ought to
be captured within a month (July 17).
When upon this over-confidence fell the shock of the
rout at Bull Run, the Post felt it necessary to hearten the
North by minimizing the defeat. There was no need to
labor the moral that the war was going to be long and
hard, and Bryant was worried lest the public should be
depressed. Frederic Law Olmsted wrote him that “although
it is not best to say it publicly, you should know,
at least, that the retreat was generally of the worst character,
and is already in its results most disastrous.” The
Post harped for some time upon the lesson of the need
for better discipline and officers. But it also tried to maintain
that Manassas was the Sebastopol of the rebels, a
powerful natural position; that “in any fair, open, hand-to-hand
fight, the Union troops are too much for the
seceders”; and even that the moral effect of the battle
would be in the North’s favor. Greeley felt the same
impulse when, under the reaction from his “On to Richmond!”
mischief, he promised that the Tribune would
cease nagging the army, and devote itself to inspiriting the
public.
As soon as they perceived that the war would be bitter,
the editors of the Post took their stand with what the
historian Rhodes calls the radical party of the North;
the party of Secretary Chase, Senators Trumbull and
Sumner, and Gen. Carl Schurz. The paper’s Washington
correspondent early (May 3) divided the Cabinet
into radicals—Welles, Chase, Blair—and conservatives—Seward,
Bates, and Smith. The radicals wanted the
war prosecuted with intense energy, no thought of compromise,
and no particular regard for the feelings of the
border States and Northern Democrats. Always ardent,
sometimes precipitate, they disliked the cautious Seward,
and sometimes lost patience with Lincoln himself. In
the end their policies were usually adopted, but Lincoln’s
wisdom lay in not adopting them prematurely; as Schurz
admitted in 1864, when he wrote a schoolmate that he
had often thought Lincoln wrong, but in the end had
always found him right.
Much of the radicalism of Bryant and Parke Godwin
was quite sound. In the first month the Evening Post
published no fewer than four editorials asking for a
hurried and strict blockade of the South, and prophesying
that it would “put an end to the rebellion more quickly
than any other plan of action.” On July 20 it anticipated
Ericsson by asking for ironclads, recalling that Robert L.
Stevens had begun building a floating armored battery
under an act of Congress passed in 1842, but had never
finished it. The paper thought that “half a dozen thoroughly
shot-proof gunboats, of light draft,” could silence
Forts Sumter, Pulaski, and Jackson, or better still, run
past them and dominate Charleston, Savannah, and New
Orleans. It asked for a national draft on July 9, 1862,
nine months before Congress passed a law for one. Lincoln’s
early policy was to free and protect all Southern
negroes who, having been employed in the military service
of the Confederacy, came within the lines of the Northern
commands, but this did not satisfy Bryant. On Dec. 6,
1861, he asked Congress to confiscate the property of the
rebels, appoint State commissioners of forfeiture to take
charge of it, and as fast as negroes came within Northern
reach, make them freemen.
Bryant was in direct communication with radical officials
in Washington and radical commanders in the field.
He corresponded with Secretary Chase; Gen. James
Wadsworth and Gen. E. A. Hitchcock wrote him startlingly
frank letters; and he heard regularly from Consul-General
Bigelow in Paris. The slowness with which the
war dragged on was deplored by the Evening Post even
as it was deplored by Chase, Schurz, and Sumner. The
paper did not criticize Lincoln with the signal lack of
judgment Greeley often showed, much less with the rancorous
hostility of Bennett’s Herald or the now Democratic
World. But by the middle of September, 1861,
it was censuring him for the reluctance with which he
signed the Confiscation Act, and reminding him that “his
official position is in the lead, and not in the rear.” On
Oct. 11 it published an editorial, “Playing With War,”
in which it criticized the Administration for lukewarmness
and declared that the public wanted active measures;
“the more energetic, the more effective these measures,
the more telling the blow, the more they will
applaud.”
These complaints, the complaints of a large party all
over the North and of an able Congressional group, redoubled
as the first half of 1862 passed with almost no
news from Virginia but that of disasters. On July 8
the Post asked three sharp questions. Why had enlistments
been stopped three or four months earlier—for
Stanton, believing success at hand, had foolishly halted
the recruiting on April 3? Why had the militia of the
loyal States never, since the war began, been reorganized,
drilled, and armed? And why had no great arsenals of
munitions been collected? “We have been sluggish in our
preparations and timid in our execution,” the paper admonished
Washington. “Let us change all this.” Such
complaints were natural and useful in the dark hour
when McClellan’s army recoiled after bloody fighting
from its first advance on Richmond. Bryant also did well
to press his attacks upon corruption in government contracts,
and political favoritism in military appointments.
When this month Congress authorized the use of negroes
in camp service and trench digging, he reasonably found
fault with the Administration for its slowness in acting
upon the authorization.
But Bryant’s “radicalism” was not commendable when
he complained of the delay in emancipating the slaves;
of the prominence of Northern Democrats, not hostile
to slavery, in the army and at Washington; and of the
consideration given border State sentiment. Had Lincoln
acted rashly in the early months of the war, he would
have forced Kentucky and Missouri into the arms of the
South, and he thought (Sept. 22, 1861) that “to lose
Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game.”
Had he made haste to emancipate the slaves, he would
irretrievably have offended powerful elements in the
North and the Border States which were willing to fight
for the Union, but not to fight against slavery. Military
historians have generally condemned Lincoln’s interference
with McClellan’s plans in the early spring of 1862,
an interference into which he was forced by such pressure
as Bryant was exerting. The Evening Post was unjust to
Lincoln when it explained (July 7, 1862) why the people
suspected him of indecision. “He has trusted too much
to his subordinates; he has not been sufficiently peremptory
with them, either with his generals or his Secretaries;
and his whole Administration has been marked by a certain
tone of languor and want of earnestness which has
not corresponded with the wishes of the people.” It was
unjust when it spoke again (July 23) of Lincoln’s “slumbers,”
and of the “drowsy influence of border State
opiates.”
In condemning the military incapacity of the Union
generals in the East the newspaper was upon firmer
ground. McClellan became commander of the Army of
the Potomac immediately after Bull Run, and was made
commander-in-chief of all the armies on Nov. 1, 1861.
As the new year arrived without any movement, Bryant
began grumbling over the idea held by many officers
“that the wisest way of conducting the war is to weary
out the South with delays.” He argued that if the North
did not show more energy, France or England might eventually
interfere. “If we understand the case,” he wrote
caustically on Feb. 6, “Gen. McClellan has infinite claims
upon our gratitude for the discipline which he has given
to the army, but that discipline is still too imperfect to
warrant any movement.” He pointed out that the enemy
was relying upon this inefficiency, and was so confident
of the situation in Virginia that Beauregard had just
been dispatched to reinforce the Confederate army in the
West. A few days later Bryant received a letter which
Gen. Wadsworth wrote him from camp, denouncing McClellan
roundly:
I repeat the conclusion intimated in my last letter. The commander-in-chief
is almost inconceivably incompetent, or he has
his own plans—widely different from those entertained by the
people of the North—of putting down this Rebellion. I have just
read the gloomy reports from Europe, threatening intervention,
etc. In my despair, I write in the faint hope of arousing our
Press to speak out what is in the hearts of ninety-nine one hundredths
of the army, and nine-tenths of the country—the commander-in-chief
is incompetent or disloyal. I have come slowly
to this conclusion. No man greeted his appointment more cordially
than I did. There is not the shadow of any personal feeling
in my conviction. I have nothing personal to complain of. I must
again caution you, that all this is strictly confidential.
Wadsworth reiterated this opinion all spring, while
Bryant heard from Gen. John Pope and Gen. Hitchcock
in the same vein. It was not until May 5 that McClellan
fought his first battle, though he had held command since
the preceding July. The Evening Post was full of hope
in the Peninsular campaign that followed, warning McClellan
not to overestimate the enemy’s forces, and that
“hitherto our great fault has been that we have not followed
up our successes.” Its dejection was proportionately
great when in the first days of July the campaign
ended in failure, and McClellan withdrew his army from
the position he had reached immediately in front of Richmond.
The disgust of the radicals with McClellan was
now complete, and the Post was as eloquent as the
Tribune or Times in attacking him. On July 3 it mournfully
remarked that “while the cause cannot perhaps be
defeated even by incompetence,” it could be gravely imperilled.
“We have suffered long enough from inaction
and overcaution. Henceforth we must have action....
If it be asked who is the best man, we can only say that
it is Mr. Lincoln’s business to know, but bitter experience
has taught us that Gen. McClellan is not.” Lincoln was
admonished that he must open his eyes without a moment’s
delay to the exigency, dismiss every slothful or
imbecile leader, infuse energy and unity into his Cabinet,
and recruit new armies. It was now that the Post began
asking for conscription, while it gave a ringing endorsement
to Lincoln’s call for “three hundred thousand more.”
The Herald, incapable of blaming a Democrat like
McClellan, in July attacked Stanton for the army’s failure,
but the Evening Post showed that McClellan himself
had said that he had more than enough troops to
take Richmond. The Chicago Tribune later accused
it of injustice to Lincoln in saying that McClellan should
have been dismissed earlier, since Lincoln could not do
so without offending loyal Democrats. That, rejoined the
Post, is precisely the ground for our objection to McClellan;
he was retained for political, not military,
reasons.
These July days were the days in which Lincoln grew
thin and haggard, Seward was sent upon a circuit of the
North to arouse public men in support of the new enlistment
programme, and Lowell wrote, “I don’t see how
we are to be saved but by a miracle.” Who should succeed
McClellan? Chase and Welles believed that the
best general in view for the eastern command was John
Pope, whose victory at Island No. 10 had given him
national fame; and Bryant and Godwin, who had had
some personal contact with Pope, agreed. He was called
east and given the Army of Virginia. The chief command,
however, went to Halleck, whom the Evening Post
distrusted as much as Welles did, and had already (July
23) described as slower and less enterprising than
McClellan.
To Halleck the Evening Post said that his motto must
be that of the Athenian orator, action—action—action.
The country wanted a Marshal Vorwarts; should its
historians have none to record but General Trenches,
General Strategy, or General Let-Escape? A few days
later (Aug. 19) it published an editorial headed “Onward!
Onward!” “The one essential element in our
military movements now is celerity,” it urged. “Promptness
in filling up the ranks already thinned by the war,
promptness in organizing and sending forward new regiments,
promptness in moving on the enemy.” Bryant
had written Lincoln protesting against the sluggishness
of military operations, and under pressure from other
radicals, early in August the editor visited Washington
to remonstrate. Mayor Opdyke, President Charles King
of Columbia, and many other influential New Yorkers
went at about the same time for the same purpose. Bryant
tells us that he had a long talk with Lincoln, “in
which I expressed myself plainly and without reserve,
though courteously. He bore it well, and I must say that
I left him with a perfect conviction of the excellence of
his intentions and the singleness of his purposes, though
with sorrow for his indecision.” A movement immediately
began in New York to organize the radicals under
a local committee.
In their editorials on military policy Bryant, Parke
Godwin, and Charles Nordhoff were guided by officers
who wrote from the field or whom they met in the city;
and their comments were remarkably sound. At this
moment, for example, the Evening Post sensibly ridiculed
the talk of a rebel army 200,000 strong. It repeatedly
expressed a conviction that never, neither at Manassas,
Yorktown, of Richmond, had the enemy been superior.
“There is excellent reason to believe that the rebels
never had more than 40,000 men at Manassas; it is
a notorious fact that when McClellan arrived on the
Peninsula, there were not 10,000 men at Yorktown. At
Fair Oaks Sumner’s corps and Casey’s division repulsed
the whole rebel army.... A close examination of the
battles before Richmond proves that the rebels never
fought more than 15,000 to 25,000 men there on any one
day.” McClellan, it thought, had been frightened by
idle fears. But when Pope failed more ignominiously
than McClellan, and was soundly drubbed at the second
battle of Bull Run (Aug. 30, 1862), the Evening Post
did not confine itself to military topics. It fell again
into its unjustifiable censure of Lincoln. The President
was honest, devoted, and determined—
and yet the effect of his management has been such that, with
all his personal popularity, in spite of the general confidence in his
good intentions, and in spite of the ability and energy of several
of his advisers, a large part of the nation is utterly discouraged
and despondent. Many intelligent and even wise persons, indeed,
do not scruple to express their suspicions that treachery lurks in
the highest quarters, and that either in the army or in the Cabinet
purposes are entertained which are equivalent to treason.
All this has grown out of the weakness and vacillation of the
Administration, which itself has grown out of Mr. Lincoln’s own
want of decision and purpose. We pretend to no state secrets,
but we have been told, upon what we deem good authority, that
no such thing as a continued, unitary, deliberate Administration
exists; that the President’s brave willingness to take all responsibility
has quite neutralized the idea of a conjoint responsibility;
and that orders of the highest importance are issued and movements
commanded, which Cabinet officers learn of as other people
do, or, what is worse, which the Cabinet officers disapprove and
protest against. Each Cabinet officer, again, controls his own department
pretty much as he pleases, without consultation with the
President or with his coadjutors. (Sept. 15, 1862.)
At this juncture the Times and World were vehemently
demanding a drastic change of Cabinet officers; and in
Washington Congressional sentiment was shaping itself
toward the crisis of December, when a Senatorial caucus
demanded the resignation of the conservative Seward.
The Herald, panic-stricken, was telling McClellan that
he was “master of the situation”—that is, he might be
dictator; and calling upon him “to insist upon the modification
and reconstruction of the Cabinet.” It was not
unnatural for Bryant to give way to his old fear that the
Administration would “fight battles to produce a compromise
instead of a victory.”
As befitted such a warlike journal, the Evening Post
had its own strategic plan, which it first outlined Oct.
5, 1861, and thenceforth expounded every few weeks
until the closing campaigns. Briefly, it held that there
was no important object in the capture of Richmond;
that the indispensable aim was to destroy the Confederate
armies, not to take cities. The Southern capital could
be easily removed to Knoxville, Petersburg, or Montgomery.
Except in so far as was involved in opening the
Mississippi and applying the blockade, it opposed the
“anaconda plan” of Scott and McClellan, the plan of
attacking with a half dozen armies from a half dozen
sides. The rebels, it pointed out, had the advantage of
inside lines and could rapidly shift their forces to defeat
one Federal onslaught after another. The true strategy
was for the Union itself to seize the inside lines. This
could be done by concentrating its heaviest forces in
those great Appalachian valleys which ran south through
Virginia and Tennessee into the heart of the Confederacy.
The population was in large part friendly; the Ohio
River offered a base of supplies; the flanks could be secured
by guarding the passes or gaps; and as the Union
armies moved southward in the Tennessee and Shenandoah
Valleys, they could force the evacuation of the border
States. From the valleys they could fall at will upon
Virginia, upon North Carolina, upon Georgia, upon Mississippi,
and could rend the Confederacy in twain.
But the good and bad sides of the Evening Post’s
radicalism were best exhibited in its eagerness for emancipation.
It was a noble object for which to contend, yet
no one doubts that Lincoln was right in his long hesitation,
and in declaring to Greeley so late as the summer of
1862 that his paramount object was to save the Union,
and not either to save or destroy slavery.
Even in the month of Bull Run the Evening Post,
while rebuking a New England minister who asked for a
national declaration in favor of emancipation, believed
that the conflict, “though not a war directly aimed at the
release of the slave, must indirectly work out the result
in many ways.” When Fremont issued his hasty proclamation
of September, 1861, liberating all slaves in
Missouri, which Lincoln sensibly revoked, the Post called
it “the most popular act of the war,” and was much offended
by the President. By October it was dropping the
uncertainty of tone in which it had spoken of the subject.
Early that month it said that if it became necessary
to extinguish slavery in order to put down the rebellion,
it must be given no mercy; a few days later it demanded
the release of all captured slaves and their
enlistment as cooks, trench-diggers, and other auxiliaries;
while on Sept. 25 it virtually called for emancipation.
The paper believed that it “would change the whole
aspect of the war, bring to our side a host of new allies,
call off the attention of the rebels from their present plan,
and hasten the period of their subjugation.” Bryant
wrote just before Thanksgiving upon the probable great
result of the war; and “that the extinction of slavery
will form a part of it,” he declared, “we have not the
shadow of a doubt.”
During the first half of 1862 a considerable part of
the Post’s criticism of Lincoln sprang from its impatience
over his reluctance to free the slaves. This was the
attitude of Sumner, of Thaddeus Stevens, of Carl Schurz,
of Greeley in the Tribune and nearly all the Tribune’s
great constituency; most of Bryant’s friends took it, and
many, as Lydia Maria Child, wrote requesting editorial
pleas for emancipation. It is an interesting coincidence,
that on the very day, July 22, 1862, that Lincoln read
his emancipation proclamation to the Cabinet, and upon
Seward’s suggestion put it aside, the Evening Post’s leading
editorial was an impassioned plea for such a document.
Lincoln was only waiting for a victory, that his
proclamation might seem to be supported by a military
success. Possibly Bryant learned this from his friend
Chase. At any rate, although the Evening Post was bitterly
grieved by McClellan’s failure to win a decisive
victory at Antietam in September, and wrote angrily that
such drawn battles were “not war but murder; butchery
which fills all right-minded men with horror,” it knew
that emancipation might follow Lee’s retreat from Maryland
soil. Just after the battle Bryant wrote an editorial
(Sept. 17) called, “While the Iron is Hot.” There
are crucial junctures, he said, when great blows must be
struck at great evils. Such a juncture had arrived; “a
proclamation of freedom by martial law would be hailed,
we believe, by an almost universal shout of joy in all the
loyal States, as the death knell of the rebellion.” Just
a week later the Evening Post was rejoicing over the
President’s announcement of his forthcoming proclamation:
It puts us right before Europe; it brings us back to our traditions;
it animates our soldiers with the same spirit which led our
forefathers to victory under Washington; they are fighting today,
as the Revolutionary patriots fought, in the interests of the
human race, for human rights....
There was a lesson for all radicals in the resentment
which, at even that late date, many Northern newspapers
showed over the President’s act. The Journal of Commerce
had “only anticipations of evil from it,” and believed
that an immense majority of Northerners would
view it with profound regret. The Herald predicted that
it would ruin the white laborers of the West by bringing
the negroes north to compete with them. The World
held that it was nugatory—the South would have to be
whipped before it could be given any effect. The Courrier
des Etats Unis had deplored many errors since the republic
“began rolling down the slope which promises to
land it in the abyss,” but it thought this blunder the most
wanton and complete. What would such papers and the
great body of citizens they represented have said six
months earlier?
Another and highly praiseworthy evidence of the “radicalism”
of the Evening Post was its eagerness for a far-reaching
system of taxation, and for having the financial
conduct of the war kept as strictly as possible upon a
sound-money basis. Having been active in obtaining
Chase’s appointment to the Treasury, Bryant felt a special
solicitude for that department. During the latter
half of 1861 he repeatedly urged Congress to tax to the
limit. He believed that the government should be able
to pay for the war by heavy taxes, supplemented by the
sale of long-term bonds, and only as a final resource
should issue Treasury notes payable on demand. It was
a disappointment to the paper that Chase took no early
steps for the development of an appropriate tax system.
A remarkable editorial of Feb. 1, 1862, pictured the
wealth of the nation: the universal possession of property,
the high per capita prosperity, the bursting granaries,
the rich output of precious metals. It recalled the fact
that three times the national debt contracted in great
wars had been wiped out, while in the thirties the treasury
overflowed until men racked their brains with plans for
spending the superfluity. Never was a nation more cheerfully
inclined to accept high taxes; “the general feeling
is one of impatience that Congress is so slow in performing
this necessary duty.”
As early as Jan. 15 the Evening Post had uttered its
first warning against a reliance upon paper money. Naturally,
the passage of the greenback legislation of Feb.
25, 1862, for the issue of $150,000,000 in legal-tender
notes, dismayed it. It believed the law grossly unconstitutional,
and was certain that it would be disastrous in
effect. Secretary Chase wrote to Bryant, on Feb. 4,
arguing for the bill, but in vain. “Your feelings of repugnance
to the legal-tender clause can hardly be greater
than my own,” said Chase; “but I am convinced that, as
a temporary measure, it is indispensably necessary.” He
thought that a minority of the people would not sustain
the notes unless they were made a tender for debt, and
that this minority could control the majority to all practical
intents. But the Evening Post, like all the other
New York journals save two, opposed the bill to the last.
Bryant did not believe that the measure could be temporary,
as Chase put it. In an editorial called “A Deluge
at Hand,” he compared the law to the first breach made
in one of the Holland dikes:
In all the examples which the world has seen, the evil of an
irredeemable paper currency runs its course as certainly as the
smallpox or any other disease. The first effects are of such a
nature that the remedy is never applied; there is no disposition to
apply it. The inflation of the currency pleases a large class of
persons by a rise of prices and an extraordinary activity in business.
People buy to sell at higher prices; property passes rapidly
from hand to hand; fortunes are made; the community is delirious
with speculation. At such a time suppose Mr. Chase to step in
and say: “My friends, this fun has been going on long enough;
you must be tired by this time of speculation. Let us repeal the
legal-tender clause in the Treasury-note bill and return to specie
payments.” What sort of reception would this proposal meet?
His prophecy was fulfilled. Successive issues of legal-tender
notes followed, until the total reached $450,000,000;
prices soared, and the cost of the war was immensely
enhanced; and at one time $39 in gold would buy
$100 in currency. The Evening Post, it may be added,
was the first newspaper to suggest the issue of interest-bearing
banknotes as an expedient for the gradual contraction
of the currency, a measure Congress adopted
in March, 1863.
Meanwhile, the Northern armies failed to make progress.
When in December, 1862, the criminally incompetent
Burnside attacked Lee’s entrenched army at
Fredericksburg, and was flung back with the loss of
nearly 13,000 men, an outburst of anger came from the
whole New York press. “The Late Massacre” was the
heading the Evening Post gave its editorial of Dec. 18,
in which, three days after Burnside fell back, it could not
understand why he was not already removed. “How
long is such intolerable and wicked blundering to continue?
What does the President wait for? We hear that
a great, a horrible crime has been committed; we do not
hear that those guilty of it are under arrest; we do not
hear even that they are to be removed from the places of
trust which they have shown themselves so incapable
to fill.” The Democratic press, led by the Herald, demanded
the reinstatement of McClellan, while the radical
press wanted an entirely new general. Once more, like
the Tribune, Herald, and World, the Evening Post
blamed Lincoln for his generals’ mistakes. “The President
has required too little from his agents; his good
nature has led him to be less strict toward them than
he ought to be, while at the same time his confidence in
himself and his advisers has led him, unfortunately, to
deny himself that general counsel of the nation by which
he might have benefited had he kept up confidential relations
between himself and the people.” Yet it had praised
the choice of Burnside, calling him an energetic, calm,
and judicious leader, who had the prestige of success in
his favor.
As the spring campaign of 1863 opened, the Post reflected
the renewed hopefulness of the North. It was not
pleased by the selection of Hooker to be the new commander,
but it was encouraged by his rapid reorganization
of the army and restoration of fighting discipline. The
new advance had the old result—disaster. On May 7,
lamenting Hooker’s ignominious defeat at Chancellorsville,
the Evening Post condemned his strategy as incomprehensible.
It was quite right in its general verdict,
and in a number of specific criticisms, as when it said that
the disposition of the forces under Sedgwick had been
insane. But we can hardly say as much of its censure
of Hooker and the Administration for an alleged failure
to use the needed reserves. There were 60,000 men
among the Washington defenses, it declared, who might
have been replaced by militia and thrown into the battle.
As a matter of fact, Hooker had failed to employ 35,000
fresh troops right at hand; his army was large enough,
and much too large for his capacity to handle it. It fell
back across the Rappahannock, and the stage was set
for Lee’s descent upon Pennsylvania.
Rhodes states that “by the middle of June (1863) the
movements of Lee in Virginia warned the North of the
approaching invasion” that culminated at Gettysburg.
But the readers of the Evening Post were warned of it by
a column editorial on May 21, two weeks before Lee took
his first preliminary steps. That such a prophecy could
be made shows how conversant with the military situation
the great New York journals were kept by their
war correspondents, their files of Southern newspapers,
and their high official advisers. Bryant wrote that he
believed Jefferson Davis was preparing his last desperate
stroke, in the knowledge that Grant might soon wrest
the whole Mississippi from him, that there would be
more Union cavalry raids like Stoneman’s and Grierson’s,
and that even if the Confederacy beat off another attack
like Hooker’s, it would prove a Pyrrhic victory:
There are unmistakable indications that Davis is quietly withdrawing
troops from the outlying camps along the seacoasts to
reinforce Lee, which movement will be continued, we think, until
that general has a command of 150,000 to 200,000 men. As soon
as it is ready Lee will move, we conjecture, not in the direction
of Washington, but of the Shenandoah Valley, with a view to
crossing the Potomac somewhere between Martinsburg and Cumberland.
It will be easy for him ... to defend his flanks ...
and to maintain also uninterrupted communications with Staunton
and the Central Virginia railway. The valley itself is filled with
rapidly ripening harvests, and once upon the river supplies may
be got from Pennsylvania.
The editorial proposed either the occupation of the
Shenandoah in force, or a new attack on Lee, and advised
the Maryland and Pennsylvania authorities to fortify
their towns and raise fresh bodies of troops.
When the invasion actually began, parts of the North
were frightened, but the Evening Post was almost gleeful.
On June 17, when news came that the first Confederates
were across the Potomac, it expressed the hope
that Lee would push on so that he might be cut off and
destroyed. Ten days later, when the rebels had reached
Carlisle, Pa., it was jubilant: “It is time for the nation
to rise; the great occasion has come, and now, if we had
prepared ourselves for it, and had collected and drilled
reserve forces, we might end the rebellion in a month.”
On June 29, two days before the battle began, it congratulated
Meade on an unsurpassed military opportunity,
and urged three considerations upon him. He should
insist that Washington help and not embarrass him, he
should ask for all the reserves available, “and then, having
given battle in due time, let him avoid the mistake
of McClellan at Antietam, by pursuing the enemy until
he is completely overthrown.” That the chance for
pursuit would come the Post never doubted.
The close of the three days’ struggle at Gettysburg left
Bryant confident that the turning point of the war had
been passed. “There is every reason to hope that the
rebel army of Virginia will never recross the Potomac
as an army,” he said on July 6; but whether Lee
crossed it or not, “the rebellion has received a staggering
blow, from which it would scarcely seem possible for
it to recover.” The next day he insisted that the rebels
be followed at once and destroyed, but in his exultation
he accepted philosophically Meade’s failure to advance.
At this moment of rejoicing over Gettysburg and Vicksburg
the city was horrified and humiliated by the Draft
Riots, a sharp reminder that the home front was only
less important than the battle front. Of this fact the
Evening Post had never lost sight. Bryant’s editorials
always held in view the necessity of sustaining the spirits
of the North. For every “radical” utterance criticizing
the Administration’s faults there were ten exhorting the
people to support its central aims. In the first months
of the war he published two martial lyrics, one addressed
to European enemies who hoped for the ruin of the republic,
and one a plea for enlistment:
Few, few were they whose swords of old
Won the fair land in which we dwell;
But we are many, we who hold
The grim resolve to guard it well.
Strike, for that broad and goodly land,
Blow after blow, till men shall see
That Might and Right move hand in hand,
And glorious must their triumph be!
It was natural for New York city to have a lusty anti-war
press when the struggle for the Union began. It had
been Democratic since Jackson’s time, and remained
Democratic during the Civil War. Its social connections
with the South had always been close, while till 1860 its
merchants and bankers had stronger business ties with the
South than with the West. After the war began many
Southern sympathizers, refugees from the border States,
settled in the city.
But the capture of Fort Sumter turned all that indifference
to the secession movement which William H.
Russell had noted a few weeks earlier into a passionate
enthusiasm of the majority for the Federal cause. At
3 p. m. on April 18, the day the first troops passed
through New York southward, an excited crowd gathered
before the Express office and demanded a display
of the American flag. It surged up Park Row and made
the same demand of the Day Book and Daily News (the
latter Fernando Wood’s organ), and thence poured down
Nassau Street and Broadway to the Journal of Commerce
building, which also hurried out a flag. Already the
Herald had decorated its windows with bunting. The
Monday after Sumter, Bennett had braved popular feeling
with another demand for peace, but now he hurried
to Washington, pledged his support of the Union to
President Lincoln, and saw that beginning with the Herald
for April 17, that policy was adopted.
Unfortunately, the tone of the pro-slavery press continued
so objectionable that on Aug. 22, 1861, the postoffice
forbade mail transportation to the Journal of Commerce,
Day Book, Daily News, Freeman’s Journal, and
Brooklyn Eagle, all five of which had been presented by
a Federal Grand Jury. The Daily News was suppressed
in New Jersey by the Federal Marshal. Gerard Hallock
of the Journal of Commerce, complaining of threats
of violence and an organized movement to cut off his subscribers
and advertising, sold his interest to David Stone
and Wm. C. Prime, and the paper became less offensive.
The Day Book permanently and the Daily News temporarily
ceased publication. The foreign-language press
also failed to show due patriotism, many French citizens
in August signing a petition for the suppression of the
Courrier des États Unis as disloyal, and the Westchester
grand jury presenting the Staats-Zeitung and National-Zeitung
as disseminators of treason. The World, changing
hands, became under the able Manton Marble, who
had recently been an employee of the Post, a leader of the
“copperhead” press.
There is no need to quote from the World, Daily News,
and Journal of Commerce to show how, boldly when they
dared, covertly when they did not, they continued to attack
the Union cause. Their methods were defined by
the Evening Post of May 20, 1863, in a “Recipe for a
Democratic Paper,” which may be briefly summarized:
(1) Magnify all rebel successes and minimize all Federal victories;
if the South loses 18,000 men say 8,000 men, and if the
North loses 11,000 say 21,000.
(2) Calumniate all energetic generals like Sherman, Grant,
and Rosecrans; call worthless leaders like Halleck and Pope the
master generals of the age.
(3) Whenever the Union suffers a reverse, declare that the
nation is weary of this slow war; and ask how long this fratricidal
conflict will be allowed to continue.
(4) Expatiate upon the bankruptcies, high prices, stock jobbers,
gouging profiteers and “shoddy men.”
(5) Abuse Lincoln and the Cabinet in two ways: say they are
weak, timid, vacillating, and incompetent; and that they are
tyrannous, harsh, and despotic.
(6) Protest vehemently against “nigger” brigadiers, and the
atrocity of arming the slaves against their masters.
(7) Don’t advise open resistance to the draft. But clamor
against it in detail; suggest doubts of its constitutionality; denounce
the $300 clause; say that it makes an odious distinction
between rich and poor; and refer learnedly to the military autocracies
of France and Prussia.
The copperhead politicians were as active as the copperhead
press. At their head was Mayor Wood, who
ran for reëlection in the fall of 1861 and was opposed by
Bryant’s friend George Opdyke. Called a blackguard by
the Tribune and a miscreant by the Evening Post, Wood
based his campaign upon denunciation of the abolitionists
and appeals to racial prejudice. In a speech reported by
the Post of Nov. 29 he declared that Lincoln had brought
the nation to the verge of ruin, that the negro-philes
would prosecute the war as long as they could share the
money spent upon it, and that “they will get Irishmen
and Germans to fill up the regiments under the idea that
they will themselves remain at home to divide the plunder.”
Just before election day the Post gave part of its
editorial page to the following bit of drama:
FERNANDO IN A PORTER HOUSE
AN OCCURRENCE UP-TOWN; NOT A FANCY SKETCH
(Scene: A porter house in the 22d ward. Proprietor behind
the counter. Behind him a row of bottles, etc. Enter Fernando
and a voter.)
Fernando: Good morning, my dear friend. Please let me
and my friend have something to drink. (Glasses are set before
them and a decanter. They help themselves. Fernando throws
a double eagle upon the counter, waving away the offer to give
back change.) You will support me, I suppose?
Proprietor (quietly depositing the money in the till): Yes, I
shall support you for the State prison. You have been up for a
place there, I believe.
Fernando (going out and coming back): By the way, you did
not mean what you said just now?
Proprietor: Yes, I did mean just that. You deserve State
prison and would have gone there three years ago if you had not
cheated the law.
Fernando: Will you give me my change?
Proprietor: No, I will not. I want it to show my neighbors
how you tried to influence my vote.
(Exit Fernando, crestfallen)
Opdyke, with the first war enthusiasm behind him,
won the Mayoralty election from the egregious Wood.
But the strength of the Democrats, which in large degree
meant the strength of the anti-war party, was thereafter
triumphant in every election till Grant took Richmond.
The State and Congressional campaign of 1862, coming
during the dark period after the Peninsular campaign
and the drawn battle of Antietam, aroused the Evening Post,
Times and Tribune to great exertions. Horatio
Seymour, the “submissionist” candidate, contested the
Governorship with Gen. James Wadsworth. His
speeches, wrote Bryant, have a direct tendency to discourage
our loyal troops and sustain the hopes of the
South. The Post denied his echo of the World’s and
Herald’s statements that the Administration was a failure.
“It has been a grand and brilliant success. History
will so account it.” Lincoln, predicted the Post, need
only give rein to the Northern determination, and his
name “will stand on the future annals of his country
illustrated by a renown as pure and undying as that of
George Washington.” But Seymour easily won, obtaining
54,283 votes in New York city against 22,523 given
Wadsworth; and the Democrats swept the Congressional
districts, including one in which they had nominated Fernando
Wood.
One factor in this result, said the Evening Post, was
the alarm many had taken at the threat of the draft.
The World played upon this alarm, and both it and the
Herald attacked the emancipation proclamation as a
change in the objects of the war; to which Bryant replied
that the Revolution had begun to assert the rights
of the Colonies within the British Empire, and had
shortly become a war to take them out of it. Bryant
in the spring of 1863 characterized the Express as an
organ “which has called repeatedly upon the mob to oust
the regular government at Washington, and upon the
army to proclaim McClellan its chief at all hazards”;
while the Journal of Commerce, he said, “has always denounced
the war, and even now argues ... that the
allegiance of the citizens is due to the State, and not to
the Federal Government.” Some of the most prominent
men of the city—Tilden, James Brooks, S. F. B.
Morse, August Belmont, David E. Wheeler, and others—met
at Delmonico’s on Feb. 6, 1863, and formed a plan
for circulating copperhead doctrines, or, as they put it,
for “the diffusion of knowledge”; whence the Post nicknamed
them “diffusionists.”
When the Draft Act was enforced throughout the
North just after Gettysburg, disorders occurred in widely
scattered centers; and it was inevitable that they should
be gravest in New York. Not merely did the city contain
many half disloyal Americans of native birth. It
was full of a class of Irishmen who had proved especially
responsive to the demagogues opposing the war. Clashes
between the Irish and negroes had been common for a
decade. In August, 1862, a mob in Brooklyn attacked
a factory in which blacks were working, and tried to set
it afire with the negroes inside. Similar riots, the Post
remarked, had disgraced several Western cities. “In
every case Irish laborers have been incited to take part
in these lawless attempts; and the cunning ringleaders
and originators of these mutinies, who are not Irishmen,
have thus sought to kill two birds with one stone—to excite
a strong popular prejudice against the Irish, while
they used them to wreak their spite against the blacks.”
The copperhead press in the early July days preceding
the first drawing of draft numbers was filled with abuse
of conscription. The Herald, to be sure, which professed
neutrality between the “niggerhead” press (the Evening
Post, Times, and Tribune) and the copperhead papers,
advocated the draft as a means of hastening Union victory,
though it abused Lincoln as a nincompoop. But the
World spoke of Lincoln’s “wanton exercise of arbitrary
powers,” and predicted that if the war was carried on
to enforce the emancipation proclamation a million men,
not three hundred thousand, would have to be conscripted.
“A measure,” it said of the Draft act, “which could not
have been ventured upon in England even in those dark
days when the press-gang filled the English ships of war
with slaves ... was thrust into the statute books, as
one might say, almost by force.” The Daily News applauded
the speeches at a city peace meeting on July 9,
where one orator had declared: “The Administration
now feels itself in want of more men to replace those it
has slaughtered, and to aid it in upholding its despotism,
and for this purpose has ordered the conscription.”
On July 11, 1863, the draft began, and on the 13th,
Monday, when an effort was made to renew it, the rioting
commenced. The first disturbances occurred at the draft
headquarters on the corner of Third Avenue and Forty-sixth
Street, which were sacked about noon; the disorders
grew much worse on Tuesday, and were not entirely suppressed
until Thursday. The story of the four days of
bloodshed need not be rehearsed in detail, but the Evening
Post files afford certain new lights upon it. The historian
Rhodes, in his account, draws upon the files of the Tribune,
Times, World, Herald, and Post as sources, but
only upon the issues of the week of the riot. Ten days
later (July 23) an 8,000 word history of the riot appeared
in the Evening Post, a close-knit, graphic narrative,
apparently written by Charles Nordhoff, who had
been an eye-witness of much of it.
Nordhoff makes it clear that the mob was against not
merely the draft, but the war. “Seymour’s our man”;
“Seymour’s for us”; “Yis, and Wood too”; “It’s Davis
and Seymour and Wood,” were expressions heard at
every turn. “Cheers for Jeff Davis were as common as
brickbats.” Above all, Nordhoff was convinced that the
mob had intelligent leaders outside of its own ranks.
The nucleus of the mob was a gang of about fifty rough
fellows who at nine o’clock in the morning began prowling
along the East River wharves in the Grand Street neighborhood,
picking up recruits. As the crowd grew in size
it entered foundries and factories for more men. “It is
absolutely certain that there was no planning or directing
head among the acting ringleaders. No one could follow
or watch them without seeing that they were instigated;
though by whom it was impossible to tell. They were
men themselves incapable of self-direction; men of the
lowest order and of the most brutal passions—and at that
doubly infuriated by rum.” Immediately the destruction
of the Third Avenue draft headquarters was complete,
the mob split into three parts, which at once sought three
important objectives, a fact which Nordhoff regarded as
proving outside leadership.
One of the three mobs destroyed the Armory on Second
Avenue at Twenty-First Street—this was on Monday
at four p. m.; a second simultaneously demolished the
draft office at Broadway and Twenty-ninth Street; and
a third, the largest, sacked and burnt the Colored Orphan
Asylum on Fifth Avenue. Meanwhile, small groups had
begun hunting down negroes and clubbing them to death.
Nordhoff describes a scene during the burning of the
Colored Orphan Asylum:
Opposite the Reservoir stood a knot of gentlemen, strangers to
each other. Said one of them, a timid, clerical-looking man:
“What are we coming to? Is this to go on? Whose family
and dwelling is safe?”
“How long is this to last?” asked another—who might have
been a merchant.
“I will tell you how long,” replied a third, who looked like a
Tammany alderman, but as respectably dressed as either of the
others, and buttoning up his coat to his chin defiantly: “Just as
long as you enact unjust laws.”
The rioting, Nordhoff believed, might have been ended
the first day by determined military forces. While ruffians
at the Orphan Asylum were crying, “Kill the little
devils!” a steady attack by a small armed force would
have routed them. “The rioters evidently expected such
an attack, and at one time, frightened by a squabble on
their outskirts between a few firemen and a gang abusing
a bystander, actually took to their heels, but returned to
their work with cries of derision.” The first charge was
made by the police just after 4 p. m. at the La Farge
Hotel, and the rioters ran like sheep, leaving about thirty
dead or wounded. Nordhoff’s observation that the pillaging
was done mainly by women and boys, who took two
hours to carry 300 iron bedsteads from the Orphan Asylum,
was borne out by a news item printed by the Post
during the riots:
HOW A HOUSE IS SACKED
Having witnessed the proceedings of the rioters on several
occasions ... we describe them for the benefit of our readers.
On yesterday afternoon about six o’clock they visited the residence
of a gentleman in Twenty-ninth Street. A few stragglers
appeared on the scene, consisting mainly of women and children.
Two or three men then demanded and gained admittance, while
their number was largely increased on the outside. One elderly
gentleman was found who had liberty to leave. Then commenced
indiscriminate plunder. This was carried on mostly by old men,
women and children, while the “men of muscle” stood guard.
Every article was appropriated, the carriers often bending under
their burden. Women and children, hatless and shoeless, marched
off having in their possession the most costly of fabrics, some of
them broken and unfit for use.
To this wanton destruction of private property the neighbors
and the many visitors drawn to the spot were silent spectators. A
word of remonstrance cost a life. Two gentlemen, we are informed,
paid the penalty yesterday for expressing their righteous
indignation....
An hour later, in another visit, we saw the crowd engaged in
breaking the sashes and carrying off the fragments of woodwork.
Nordhoff gave high praise to the city police and the
United States troops, but thought the State militia miserably
ineffective, and the firemen often allies of the mob.
He ascertained that the rioters’ casualties were much
higher than the public believed, and estimated that 400
to 500 lives were lost. “A continuous stream of funerals
flows across the East River, and graves are dug privately
within the knowledge of the police here and there.”
Just how much basis there was for the Evening Post’s
view that the mob was not spontaneous, but instigated
by disloyalist leaders of brains, it is impossible to say.
On the second day “a distinguished and sagacious Democrat,”
Bryant wrote editorially, visited the office to warn
him that the riots “had a firmer basis and a more fixed
object than we imagined.” But it is certain that the
copperhead press seemed to cheer on the mob even while
it denounced it. Thus the World on Tuesday spoke of
the rioters as possessed “with a burning sense of wrong
toward the government,” and though it appealed to them
to stop, asked: “Does any man wonder that poor men
refuse to be forced into a war mismanaged almost into
hopelessness, perverted almost into partisanship?” The
Evening Post was particularly incensed by the Herald’s
references to the riots as a “popular” outbreak, and that
of the Daily News to “the people fired on by United
States soldiers.” Not the people, it said; “a small band
of cutthroats, pickpockets, and robbers.” It wanted the
miscreants given an abundance of grape and canister without
delay, and declared that an officer who had used
blank cartridges ought to be shot. To this the Herald
made its usual impudent kind of rejoinder. Aren’t the
members of the mob people, it asked? They have arms,
legs, and five senses; “their intelligence is low, but it is
at least equal to that of the editors of the niggerhead
organs.”
News of the complete victory at Vicksburg, arriving in
New York at the same time that it became evident Meade
was not vigorously following up his repulse of Lee at
Gettysburg, brought home to the East the superiority
of Grant as a commander. That superiority the Evening
Post had begun to recognize as early as Feb. 14, 1862,
when it had contrasted his capture of Fort Donelson, in
a sea of mud, using men half trained and half supplied,
with McClellan’s inaction in Virginia. “A capable, clear-headed
general,” it said, who knew that where there is a
will there is a way. After Corinth the paper hailed
Grant (Oct. 8, 1862) as the one general “able not only
to shake the tree, but to pick up the fruit.” When by a
brilliantly bold campaign he invested Vicksburg, it used
precisely the comparison that John Fiske used years later
in his history of the Mississippi Valley in the Civil War:
“The dispatches from the Southwest read like the bulletins
of the young conqueror of Italy when he first
awakened the world to the fact that a new and unprecedented
military genius had sprung upon the stage.”
Sober history doubts whether Lincoln actually said that
if he knew what whisky Grant used he would send other
generals a barrel; but the Evening Post almost said it.
Just after the surrender of Vicksburg it published (July
8) a defense of Grant from the charge that he drank
heavily. It recalled the many evidences of his single-mindedness,
alertness, and decision, and the fact that he
had gained more victories and prisoners than any other
commander. “If any one after this,” it concluded, “still
believes that Grant is a drunkard, we advise him to persuade
the Government to place none but drunkards in
important commands.”
Years later the Evening Post related that while Grant
lay before Vicksburg, a letter from a prominent Westerner
assured the editors that the general and his staff
had once gone from Springfield to Cairo in the car of
the president of the Illinois Central, and that almost the
whole party had got drunk, Grant worst of all. By a
coincidence, while this letter was under discussion President
Osborne of the Illinois Central entered the office.
He characterized it as a malignant falsehood. “Grant
and his staff did go down to Cairo in the President’s car,”
he said; “I took them down myself, and selected that
car because it had conveniences for working, eating, and
sleeping on the way. We had dinner in the car, at which
wine was served to such as desired it. I asked Grant
what he would drink; he answered, a cup of tea, and this
I made for him myself. Nobody was drunk on the car,
and to my certain knowledge Grant tasted no liquid but
tea and water.”
After Grant was made commander-in-chief in March,
1864, and took charge in the East, the Evening Post
was confident that victory was at hand. This faith increased
during the summer. Bryant wrote Bigelow on
June 15 that the North ought certainly to bring the war
to an end within the year, at least so far as concerned all
great military operations. On Sept. 3, just after Grant
had asked for 100,000 additional men, he said editorially
that if he were given them, peace might be won by Thanksgiving.
The next day, when news had come that Sherman
had captured Atlanta, the paper renewed the prophecy
of an early triumph, changing the date, however, to
Christmas. It no longer grumbled over military nervousness
and dilatoriness. It was disturbed by the state of
the currency, which was making the public debt twice what
it should have been; but its chief fear was that the men
at the North in favor of a premature peace would rob the
Union of the fruits of its bloody struggle.
As early as December, 1862, and January, 1863,
Greeley had begun in the Tribune a movement for ending
the war by foreign mediation between North and South.
The following month Napoleon III actually made an
offer of mediation, which Lincoln immediately refused.
Advance news of it had been sent Bryant by Bigelow,
and the Post was ready to speak vigorously against it.
Greeley in July, 1864, again tried to initiate peace negotiations,
and asked Lincoln to arrange a conference at
Niagara with two Confederate “ambassadors” who were
reported to be there, telling him that “our bleeding,
bankrupt, almost dying country longs for peace, shudders
at the prospect of fresh conscriptions, of further devastations,
and of new rivers of human blood.” The attitude
of the Evening Post was contemptuous. “No,” wrote
Bryant as Greeley bought his ticket to Niagara, “the most
effective peace meetings yet held are those which Grant
assembled in front of Vicksburg, which Meade conducted
on the Pennsylvania plains, which Rosecrans now presides
over near Tullahoma; their thundering cannons are
the most eloquent orators, and the bullet which wings
its way to the enemy ranks the true olive branch.”
There was some fear for the moment that the Times
would join the Tribune in its readiness for peace without
victory. Bryant wrote his wife on Sept. 7, 1864, that he
had a good deal of political news which he could not put
in his letter. “I wrote a protest against treating with the
Rebel Government, which you will have seen in the paper....
I was told from the best authority that Mr. Lincoln
was considering whether he should not appoint commissioners
for the purpose, and I afterwards heard that
Raymond of the Times had been in Washington to persuade
Mr. Lincoln to take the step, and was willing himself
to be one of the commissioners.” Bryant’s 1,500
word editorial, “No Negotiations With the Rebel Government,”
anticipated the arguments of Lincoln’s message
to Congress in December opposing any parley.
At this moment the Democratic party was carrying on
its campaign for the Presidency upon a platform which
declared the war a failure, and asserted that an armistice
should be sought at the first practicable opportunity. It
is true that McClellan, the party’s candidate, had repudiated
these planks. But when he did so, Fernando
Wood had wanted at once to repudiate McClellan, saying
that the platform was sound, and that the Democrats
should call their Chicago Convention together again to
seek a man who would stand upon it. The Daily News,
edited by his brother Benjamin Wood, similarly upheld
the platform. So did the World, which went to shocking
lengths in attacking Lincoln; not content with calling his
Administration ignorant and incompetent, it cast imputations
upon his personal honesty, while in a phrase that
became temporarily famous it remarked that the White
House was “full of infamy.” According to the World,
the war could and should be stopped instantly. The
South was ready to reënter the Union if only Lincoln
would cancel his outrageous emancipation proclamation.
“Are unknown thousands of wives yet to become widows,
and unknown tens of thousands of children to become
orphans, that Mr. Lincoln’s positive violations of solemn
pledges may be assumed by the people as their own?”
Manton Marble argued throughout the campaign for an
armistice, a convention of all the States, and an effort to
conclude peace upon the basis of union and slavery.
Emancipation, he asserted, meant “industrial disorganization,
social chaos, negro equality, and the nameless horrors
of a civil war.”
In this election the Evening Post maintained a straight
course. Early in the year Bryant had inclined to doubt,
as did Beecher, Greeley, Thaddeus Stevens, George W.
Julian, and a majority of Congress, whether Lincoln’s renomination
would be wise. This was a reflection in part
of his impatient “radicalism,” in part of his attachment
to Chase; and on March 25, 1864, he made one of many
prominent Union men who wrote the Republican Executive
Committee suggesting a postponement of the Convention
until September. But no hint of this doubt entered
the columns of the Evening Post. It never spoke
of any other possible nomination than Lincoln’s. Indeed,
every one soon saw that the choice was inevitable, and
Bryant cast whatever hesitation he felt, which was not
much, behind him. “It was done in obedience to the
public voice,” he wrote Bigelow June 15, “a powerful
vis a tergo pushed on the politicians whether willing or
unwilling. I do not, for my part, doubt of his reëlection.”
By this time the Evening Post was ready to admit
that the President had made fewer errors and seen more
clearly than it had supposed. It wrote (Sept. 20):
He has gained wisdom by experience. Every year has seen
our cause more successful; every year has seen abler generals, more
skillful leaders, called to the head; every year has seen fewer errors,
greater ability, greater energy, in the administration of affairs.
The timid McClellan has been superseded by Grant, the do-nothing
Buell by Sherman; wherever a man has shown conspicuous
merit he has been called forward; political and military
rivalries have been as far as possible banished from the field and
from the national councils.... While Mr. Lincoln stays in
power, this healthy and beneficial state of things will continue....
Throughout the campaign Parke Godwin did much
public speaking. During October the Post published a
weekly campaign newspaper addressed particularly to
laboring men, which had an enormous circulation at
one cent a copy; the edition the first week was 50,000.
In its local result the election justified the labors of the
copperhead press, for McClellan carried New York city
by a vote double Lincoln’s—78,746 to 36,673. But the
national result showed how totally unrepresentative this
anti-war press was of any extensive Northern sentiment.
It proved that Bryant had been right in declaring in the
Post of March 16, 1863, when Greeley and the Tribune
actually said the nation should give up if the campaign
then beginning failed:
It certainly is remarkable how unable the newspapers of the
country, even those of the largest circulation, have been to divert
the public mind from a fixed determination to put down the
rebellion by every possible means, and to allow no pause in the
war until the integrity of the Union is assured. One class of
journals has labored to show that the war for the Union is hopeless;
the people have never believed them. One class has called
for a revolutionary leader; the call has only excited a little astonishment,
the people being satisfied to prosecute the war under the
legal and constitutional authorities.
The last effort at a premature armistice, that made
by the venerable Francis P. Blair, culminating in the
Hampton Roads conference between Lincoln and Vice-President
A. H. Stephens, was treated by the Evening
Post like previous efforts. Blair was an old friend, but
under the caption, “Fools’ Errands,” Bryant wrote (Jan.
10, 1865) that his gratuitous diplomacy might do much
harm. “No, our best peacemakers yet are Grant, Sheridan,
Thomas, Sherman, and Farragut, and the black-mouthed
bulldogs by which they enforce their pretensions
over more than half of what was once an ‘impregnable’
part of rebeldom.” The final peace, the peace made by
the black-mouthed bulldogs, was greeted by the Post
three months later in fervent terms:
GLORY TO THE LORD OF HOSTS
The great day, so long and anxiously awaited, for which we
have struggled through four years of bloody war, which has so
often ... dawned only to go down in clouds of gloom; the day
of the virtual overthrow of the rebellion, of the triumph of constitutional
order and of universal liberty,—of the success of the
nation against its parts, and of a humane and beneficent civilization
over a relic of barbarism that had been blindly allowed to
remain as a blot on its scutcheon—the day of PEACE has finally
come....
Glory, then to the Lord of Hosts, who hath given us this final
victory! Thanks, heartfelt and eternal, to the brave and noble
men by land and sea, officers and soldiers, who by their labors,
their courage and sufferings, their blood and their lives, have won
it for us. And a gratitude no less deep and earnest to that majestic,
devoted, and glorious American people, who through all these years
of trial have kept true to their faith in themselves and their
institutions....
Throughout the Civil War the news pages were in
charge of one of the most picturesque and able men ever
employed by the paper, Charles Nordhoff. It was a
trying position. O. W. Holmes wrote an essay in 1861
called “Bread and Newspapers,” in which he described
the state of mind in which the North lived, waiting but
from one edition to another. The Civil War was the
heroic age of American press enterprise, and while the
Evening Post conducted a less extensive war establishment
than the Herald, Tribune, or Times—the Herald
spent $500,000 on its correspondence—Nordhoff saw
that it maintained a creditable position. He stepped into
the office just after Bigelow’s departure, in 1861. Along
with Bigelow the Post had just lost William M. Thayer.
This young man, after a brilliant ten years partly in New
York, partly as the only correspondent with the Walker
filibustering expedition in Nicaragua, and partly in Washington,
had quarreled with Isaac Henderson, while at the
same time his health failed; and he was glad to be appointed
consul at Alexandria. Nordhoff’s chief assistant
in gathering news became Augustus Maverick, a veteran
newspaper man previously with the Times.
Nordhoff, though only thirty years old in 1831, had
already passed through enough adventure to fill an active
lifetime. He was born in Prussia, where his father was
a wealthy liberal who had served in Blucher’s army and
had later set up a school at Erwitte. Compelled for
political reasons to leave, the elder Nordhoff gathered together
all his funds, about $50,000, and reached America
in 1834. The family went to the Mississippi Valley, and
for a time lived an anomalous life, eating in the wilderness
from rich silver and drinking imported German
mineral water. The boy was left an orphan at the age
of nine, and was reared by the Rev. Wilhelm Nast of the
Methodist Church in Cincinnati. Revolting against the
rigid ecclesiastical discipline to which he was subjected,
believing that his health was suffering from indoors work,
and longing for the adventures at sea of which he had
read in Marryat and Cooper, in 1844 he ran away.
Hundreds of thousands of American boys in the last
half century have read the three books in which Nordhoff
graphically relates his experiences aboard men of war,
merchant ships, a whaler, and a cod-fishing boat. The
story of how he went to sea is an interesting illustration
of his pluck and persistence. He had $25, two extra
shirts, and an extra pair of socks when he left Cincinnati,
and his money took him to Baltimore. At every vessel
to which he applied he was met by the same rebuff: “Ship
you, you little scamp? Not I; we won’t carry runaway
boys. Clear out!” Undaunted, he went on to Philadelphia,
and found a place on the Sun as printer’s devil,
at $2–4 a week and his board. He confided his ambition
to no one, but every Saturday afternoon he was down
among the shipping, looking for a place. Finally he heard
that the Frigate Columbus, 74 guns, was about to sail
under Commodore Biddle for the Far East, and sought
a berth—again in vain. Still undiscouraged, he induced
the editor of the Sun, to whose home he daily took a
bundle of proofs, to introduce him to Commodore Elliot.
The editor’s note ran, “Please give him a talking to,” and
the gruff officer scolded the boy roundly for wanting to
ruin his life, described the dissolute, brutalizing existence
of most sailors, and flatly refused him a place. But Nordhoff
returned daily until the Commodore yielded.
The boy soon realized that the sailor’s life had little
of the romance that Cooper gave it, but he showed both
his grit and shrewdness when with a distinct literary
intention he made the most of it. He went around the
world in the Columbus, and was discharged at Norfolk
in 1848; for several years he worked in the merchant
marine, visiting Europe, Asia, South America, Australia,
and the South Sea islands; sailing from Sag Harbor in a
whaler which cruised in the Indian Ocean, he deserted at
the Seychelles, and for a time supported himself as a
boatman in Mauritius; and he finished his eight years at
sea by a brief period with the Cape Cod fishermen. All
the while he was busy collecting material for his books,
losing no opportunity to share new sights and experiences,
and pumping his mates for their stories. He wrote his
three volumes to give a common-sense picture of a life
which he believed had been unduly romanticized; and
his pictures of flogging in the navy, of dysentery and
cholera aboard a frigate, of the degradation of the naval
discipline, of the danger and hardship met on a merchant
craft, and of the intolerable monotony of whale-hunting
carry out the purpose. It was good preliminary training
for a reporter and editor. In 1853 he entered journalism,
first on the Philadelphia Register and later on the
Indianapolis Sentinel, meanwhile writing the sea books,
which gave him such a reputation that in 1853 George W.
Curtis recommended him to Harper’s as an editorial
worker.
Bigelow in the closing days of 1860 made an arrangement
with Brantz Meyer, a Baltimore writer of some
reputation, to go South for $50 a week and his expenses
to do special reporting. He wrote R. B. Rhett, editor
of the Charleston Mercury, asking whether it would be
safe for Meyer to attend the secession convention in
Charleston, and Rhett assured him that “no agent or
representative of the Evening Post would be safe in coming
here”; “he would certainly be tarred and feathered
and made to leave the State, as the mildest possible treatment”;
“he would come with his life in his hand, and
would probably be hung.” Nevertheless, the Post did
have unsigned correspondence from Charleston and other
Southern cities during the days the secession movement
was ripening. When war began, Nordhoff hurriedly
whipped a corps of special writers into shape. He requested
Henry M. Alden, later editor of Harper’s to go
to the Virginia front, but Alden’s health was too precarious
to permit him to face the hardships which other
young literary men like E. C. Stedman were undertaking.
William C. Church, a rising young journalist, who later
established the Army and Navy Journal and the Galaxy,
was obtained. Philip Ripley made another of the staff,
and Walter F. Williams was soon sending admirable
letters from the field.
Repeatedly during the war the Post scored notable
“beats.” Church was with the joint military and naval
expedition under Sherman and Dupont that captured Port
Royal, and sent the Evening Post the first account published
at the North. The best picture of the battle of
Pittsburgh Landing in any newspaper was one contributed
the Post by a member of Halleck’s staff. The most
graphic running account of Sherman’s march to the sea
was also that furnished the paper by Major George Nichols,
who was on Sherman’s staff, and who later reworked
his letters—in which it has been well said the style is
photographic, with a touch of national music in the sentences—into
a book. When John Wilkes Booth was
killed in the burning Virginia barn by Sergeant Boston
Corbett, Nordhoff obtained Corbett’s exclusive story of
the event—an absorbing three-quarters column of close
print. It need not be said that the Paris correspondence
which E. L. Godkin, later editor, furnished in 1862, offered
the shrewdest and clearest view of French opinion
published in any American newspaper. There was a
large group of occasional correspondents at various
points along the wide fighting line. The Evening Post
profited, in a way that it was quite impossible for the
Herald to do, from the kindness of loyal Union men of
prominence who came into contact with great events or
figures, and without thought of remuneration wrote to
Bryant. A long and highly interesting article embodying
personal reminiscences of Lincoln, for example, was contributed
a few weeks after the assassination by R. C.
McCormick, then well known in New York political circles.
There were frequent bits like the following from a
New Yorker who had seen Grant at City Point (Aug. 5,
1864):
“General,” I remarked, “the people of New York now feel that
there is one at the head of our armies in whom they can repose
the fullest confidence.”
“Yes,” he interrupted, “there is a man in the West in whom
they can repose the utmost confidence, General Sherman. He is
an able, upright, honorable, unambitious man. We lost another
one of like character a few days ago, General McPherson.”
One reporter for the Post, a young Vermonter named
S. S. Boyce, became intimate with the United States Marshal
in New York, and distinguished himself by important
detective service against disloyalists. The Marshal once
handed him a letter taken upon a captured blockade runner,
mailed from New York and giving the Southern authorities
the time of the sailing of the Newbern expedition.
It carried no New York address, but within a
fortnight Boyce had tracked down the writer of the
letter, and some months later witnessed his hanging.
Many traditions long survived in the office of Nordhoff’s
energy, courage, shrewdness, and impassivity in
moments of excitement. He was a man of the world, and
his sense for news was amazing. Expected to contribute
to the editorial page as well as manage the news staff, he
would seat himself at his desk and write with unresting
hand, meanwhile puffing a black cigar so furiously that
he could hardly see his sheet through the smoke. A
bluff seamanlike quality was always distinguishable about
him; he walked with a sailor’s roll, and used nautical
terms with unconscious frequency. His executive ability,
geniality, fearlessness, and intense hatred of anything
equivocal or underhanded, made the staff love him. Mr.
J. Ranken Towse, who knew him after the war, says that
“he had a comprehensive grasp of essential knowledge, a
great store of common sense, a rare faculty of penetrating
insight, and a huge scorn for prevarication or double-dealing.
A mistake due to ignorance or carelessness he
could and often did overlook, but anything in the nature
of a shuffling excuse roused him to flaming ire. He was
impetuous and irascible, but naturally generous and tender-hearted.”
During the Draft Riots Nordhoff connected a hose with
the steam-boiler in the basement and gave public notice
that any assailant would meet a scalding reception. He
had not only the Evening Post property to protect, but a
score of wounded soldiers in a temporary hospital fitted
up on an upper floor. The strain under which he lived
in the war days was intense, and he used to spend the
summer nights on a small sailboat which he kept on the
Brooklyn waterfront, for he could sleep more soundly
drifting about the bay than on shore. Yet he managed to
find time to contribute to the newspaper’s atmosphere of
literary sociability. Paul Du Chaillu had become his
friend when, as a worker at Harper’s, he helped put some
of Du Chaillu’s books into good English, and a story
survives of how Du Chaillu and Nordhoff once took possession
of the restaurant stove across the street from the
Evening Post, and taught the cook to broil bananas—the
first bananas ever eaten cooked in the city. Nordhoff’s
impress was visible everywhere in the paper of those
years, and its marked prosperity was in large degree
traceable to his energy. The local reporting was better
than ever before, and we are tempted to discern his own
hand in the frequent human-interest paragraphs, of which
one may be given as a specimen:
AN INCIDENT IN THE CARS
In a car on a railroad which runs into New York, a few mornings
ago, a scene occurred which will not soon be forgotten by the
witnesses of it. A person dressed as a gentleman, speaking to a
friend across the car, said: “Well, I hope the war may last six
months longer. In the last six months I’ve made a hundred thousand
dollars—six months more and I shall have enough.”
A lady sat behind the speaker, and ... when he was done she
tapped him on the shoulder and said to him: “Sir, I had two
sons—one was killed at Fredericksburg; the other was killed at
Murfreesboro.”
She was silent a moment and so were all around who heard her.
Then, overcome by her indignation, she suddenly slapped the
speculator, first on one cheek and then on the other, and before
he could say a word, the passengers sitting near, who had witnessed
the whole affair, seized him and pushed him hurriedly out
of the car, as not fit to ride with decent people.
The Government censorship of news early became a
painful and difficult question to all journals. Repeatedly
during the war Northern papers allowed news to leak to
the enemy which should have been kept strictly secret, and
the Evening Post early recognized this danger. When
Gen. McClellan in August, 1861, drew up his gentlemen’s
agreement with the press, the Post hoped that all editors
would acquiesce in it, and attacked the Baltimore secession
newspapers for giving the South important news. Two
months later it blamed the Herald and Commercial Advertiser
for twice having given prominence to articles
they should have suppressed. Sherman as early as the
summer of 1862 raged violently at the press in his private
letters for writing some generals up and others down,
and the Post had already (Feb. 27) commented upon
the same abuse. The Herald in March, 1862, prematurely
published the news of Banks’s passage of the Potomac,
to the great indignation of the Post, which had
suppressed it the day before. But Nordhoff himself
erred in September, when his publication of some “contraband”
facts about the strength of the forces at Newbern
brought a protest from Gen. Foster. No other mistake
of the sort was made, and this one did not compare
with the blunders of other New York journals. Early
in 1863 a Herald correspondent, having foolishly printed
the substance of some confidential orders, was convicted
and sentenced to six months hard labor in the Quartermaster’s
Department. In November, 1864, the Times
brought an angry protest from Grant by stating Sherman’s
exact strength and his programme in the coming
march to the sea. The Tribune early the next year, informing
its readers that Sherman was heading for Goldsboro,
enabled Gen. Hardee on the Confederate side to
fight a heavy battle which Sherman had hoped to avoid;
and the hero of the great march later refused to speak
to Greeley.
But the Evening Post repeatedly protested against the
undue severity of the censorship, just as it protested
against improper interferences with personal liberty in
other spheres. It complained that the rules laid down
by Stanton and the field commanders were often capricious,
and that by holding up harmless news they bred
harmful rumors.
Thus on Sept. 1, 1862, New York was highly excited
all afternoon by a canard that Pope had been pushed
back to Alexandria and was being beaten by the Confederates
within sight of Washington. Why? asked the
Evening Post next day. It was because Stanton wanted
all the correspondents kept away from the front, and the
public was at the mercy of every rogue or coward who
started a false report. The terrible disaster of Fredericksburg
was concealed by the censorship in the most inexcusable
way. The battle was fought on Saturday, the
13th of December. On the 14th and 15th there was no
news; on the 16th the Post carried the bare statement that
the army had recrossed the Rappahannock, which it optimistically
interpreted as meaning that the heavy rains
had swollen the river and imperilled the communications.
On the 17th it knew that Burnside’s forces had been flung
back with terrible slaughter four days before, and it
joined the chorus of the New York press in denouncing
the official secrecy. The first authentic news of this battle
was sent the Tribune by a future owner of the Evening
Post, Henry Villard, who obtained it by an heroic all-night
ride, and bringing it to Washington, evaded Stanton’s
order by sending it north by railway messenger.
Similar secrecy attended the early stages of the battle
of Chancellorsville, causing needless agony of mind at
the North and profiting only the stock-jobbers. Just before
Gettysburg rumors were afloat of a heavy blow to
Hooker. C. C. Carleton, said the Post, tried to wire his
Boston paper, “Do not accept sensation dispatches,” but
the telegraph censor brusquely canceled this sensible message.
The Philadelphia editors and correspondents long
surpassed all others in the picturesqueness of their lies,
and the Post called attention to some of their masterpieces—e.g.,
their circumstantial story of the capture of
Richmond by Gen. Keyes in 1862—as made possible by
the censor’s concealment of the real facts. Nordhoff
complained that some of the paper’s dispatches filed in
the morning at 10:30 did not reach New York till 5 p. m.,
simply because the censor was out of his office or negligent.
The worst count in the indictment, however, was
that some great bankers got news of the battles by cipher,
and used it in speculation while the people remained
ignorant of the actual events.
With the Civil War came the first plentiful use of
headlines in the Evening Post, usually placed on page
three, where the telegraphic news was used. In those
days verbs in headlines were conspicuous chiefly by their
absence; but the writer knew his business. When the
bombardment of Sumter began he summarized the whole
significance of the event in his first two words: “CIVIL
WAR—BOMBARDMENT OF FORT SUMTER—A
DAY’S FIGHTING.” After Bull Run he tried to
save the feelings of New Yorkers by tactful phrasing:
“RETROGRADE MOVEMENT OF OUR ARMY!—GEN.
McDOWELL FALLING BACK ON
WASHINGTON—OUR LOSS 2,500 to 3,000.” And
the two most important headlines of the whole war were
admirable in their simple fitness. It would be impossible
to improve upon the first three words used on April 15,
“AN APPALLING CALAMITY—ASSASSINATION
OF THE PRESIDENT—MR. LINCOLN
SHOT IN FORD’S THEATRE IN WASHINGTON”;
or upon the first three of April 10, “THE
GLORIOUS CONSUMMATION—THE REBELLION
ENDED—SURRENDER OF LEE.”
Throughout the war the Evening Post was as distinguished
for one feature—its poetry—as the Herald was
for its admirable maps. Every writer of verse took inspiration
from the conflict, and sent it to the only newspaper
conducted by a great poet. A few days after Sumter
surrendered, the editors declared that if poetry could
win the war, they already had enough to do it. Four
years later, on April 13, 1865, they remarked that “we
have received verses in celebration of the late victories
enough to fill four or five columns of our paper.”
Among the first war poems published by the Evening
Post were two of genuine distinction, R. H. Stoddard’s
stirring call to war, “Men of the North and West,” and
Christopher Cranch’s stanzas, “The Burial of Our Flag”:
O who are they that troop along, and whither do they go?
Why move they thus with measured tread, while funeral trumpets blow?—
Why gather round that open grave in mockery of woe?
They stand together on the brink—they shovel in the clod—
But what is that they bury deep?—Why trample they the sod?
Why hurry they so fast away without a prayer to God?
It was no corpse of friend or foe. I saw a flag uprolled—
The golden stars, the gleaming stripes were gathered fold on fold,
And lowered into the hollow grave to rot beneath the mould.
Then up they hoisted all around, on towers, and hills, and crags,
The emblem of their traitorous schemes—their base disunion flags.
That very night there blew a wind that tore them all to rags!
And one that flaunted bravest by the storm was swept away,
And hurled upon the grave in which our country’s banner lay—
Where, soaked with rain and stained with mud, they found it the next day.
From out the North a Power comes forth—a patient power too long—
The spirit of the great free air—a tempest swift and strong;
The living burial of our flag—he will not brook that wrong.
The stars of heaven shall gild her still—her stripes like rainbows gleam;
Her billowy folds, like surging clouds, o’er North and South shall stream.
She is not dead, she lifts her head, she takes the morning’s beam!
* * * * *
Much verse came from writers of the rank of Alice
and Phœbe Cary, who published nearly all their war
poems in the Post. Mrs. R. H. Stoddard, still remembered
as a novelist, wrote unfinished but sincere and touching
poetry. Miles O’Reilly, whom Walt Whitman found
the most popular writer of war verse among the troops,
contributed repeatedly. Thomas Wentworth Higginson,
leading his black troops in South Carolina, and recalling
Bryant’s “Song of Marion’s Men,” sent his graceful
“Song from the Camp.” Park Benjamin wrote much in
the early years of the war, and before its close Helen
Hunt Jackson began to appear in the Evening Post’s
pages. One of the most stirring songs of the conflict,
“We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand
more,” originally appeared in the Evening Post of
July 16, 1862. Unsigned, many supposed it was the
editor’s. At a large Boston meeting the next night,
Josiah Quincy read it as “the latest poem written by
Mr. Wm. C. Bryant.” Its actual author was John S.
Gibbons, who for a time was financial editor of the Post,
and wrote two volumes on banking.
Bryant himself published two hymns in the journal,
“The Earth Is Full of Thy Riches” (1863) and “Thou
Hast Put All Things Under His Feet” (1865). But
the finest poetical contribution which he ever made to it
was his “Death of Lincoln”:
O slow to smite, and swift to spare,
Gentle and merciful and just!
which first saw the light in the Evening Post of April
20, 1865.