LIBERTY. — CHAPTER I. OF THE STATE OF MEN WITHOUT CIVIL SOCIETY. — CHAPTER II OF THE LAW OF NATURE CONCERNING CONTRACTS. — CHAPTER III. OF THE OTHER LAWS OF NATURE. — CHAPTER IV. THAT THE LAW OF NATURE IS A DIVINE LAW.
1. The Introduction. 2. That the beginning of civil society is
from mutual fear. 3. That men by nature are all equal.
4. Whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth. 5. The
discord arising from comparison of wits. 6. From the appetite
many have to the same thing. 7. The definition of right. 8. A
right to the end, gives a right to the means necessary to that
end. 9. By the right of nature, every man is judge of the
means which tend to his own preservation. 10. By nature
all men have equal right to all things. 11. This right which
all men have to all things, is unprofitable. 12. The state of
men without civil society, is a mere state of war: the definitions
of peace and war. 13. War is an adversary to man’s
preservation. 14. It is lawful for any man, by natural right,
to compel another whom he hath gotten in his power, to
give caution of his future obedience. 15. Nature dictates the
seeking after peace.
Introduction.
The faculties of human nature may be reduced
unto four kinds; bodily strength, experience, reason,
passion. Taking the beginning of this following
doctrine from these, we will declare, in
the first place, what manner of inclinations men
who are endued with these faculties bear towards
each other, and whether, and by what faculty
they are born apt for society, and to preserve
2themselves against mutual violence; then proceeding,
we will shew what advice was necessary to be
taken for this business, and what are the conditions
of society, or of human peace; that is to say,
(changing the words only), what are the fundamental
laws of nature.
That the beginning of mutual society is from fear.
2. The greatest part of those men who have
written aught concerning commonwealths, either
suppose, or require us or beg of us to believe, that
man is a creature born fit[1] for society. The Greeks
3call him πολιτικονπολιτικον; and on this foundation
they so build up the doctrine of civil society, as if
for the preservation of peace, and the government
of mankind, there were nothing else necessary than
that men should agree to make certain covenants
and conditions together, which themselves should
then call laws. Which axiom, though received by
most, is yet certainly false; and an error proceeding
from our too slight contemplation of human
nature. For they who shall more narrowly look
into the causes for which men come together, and
delight in each other’s company, shall easily find
that this happens not because naturally it could
happen no otherwise, but by accident. For if by
nature one man should love another, that is, as
man, there could no reason be returned why every
man should not equally love every man, as being
equally man; or why he should rather frequent
those, whose society affords him honour or profit.
We do not therefore by nature seek society for its
own sake, but that we may receive some honour or
profit from it; these we desire primarily, that
secondarily. How, by what advice, men do meet,
will be best known by observing those things which
they do when they are met. For if they meet for
traffic, it is plain every man regards not his fellow,
but his business; if to discharge some office, a
certain market-friendship is begotten, which hath
more of jealousy in it than true love, and whence
factions sometimes may arise, but good will never;
if for pleasure and recreation of mind, every man
is wont to please himself most with those things
which stir up laughter, whence he may, according to
the nature of that which is ridiculous, by comparison
4of another man’s defects and infirmities, pass
the more current in his own opinion. And although
this be sometimes innocent and without offence,
yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted
with the society, as their own vain glory. But for
the most part, in these kinds of meeting we wound
the absent; their whole life, sayings, actions are examined,
judged, condemned. Nay, it is very rare
but some present receive a fling as soon as they part;
so as his reason was not ill, who was wont always
at parting to go out last. And these are indeed
the true delights of society, unto which we are
carried by nature, that is, by those passions which
are incident to all creatures, until either by sad experience
or good precepts it so fall out, which in
many it never happens, that the appetite of present
matters be dulled with the memory of things past:
without which the discourse of most quick and
nimble men on this subject, is but cold and
hungry.
But if it so happen, that being met they pass
their time in relating some stories, and one of them
begins to tell one which concerns himself; instantly
every one of the rest most greedily desires to speak
of himself too; if one relate some wonder, the
rest will tell you miracles, if they have them; if not,
they will feign them. Lastly, that I may say somewhat
of them who pretend to be wiser than others:
if they meet to talk of philosophy, look, how many
men, so many would be esteemed masters, or else
they not only love not their fellows, but even persecute
them with hatred. So clear is it by experience
to all men who a little more narrowly
consider human affairs, that all free congress
5ariseth either from mutual poverty, or from vain
glory, whence the parties met endeavour to carry
with them either some benefit, or to leave behind
them that same εὐδοκιμεῖνεὐδοκιμεῖν, some esteem and honour
with those, with whom they have been conversant.
The same is also collected by reason out of the definitions
themselves of will, good, honour, profitable.
For when we voluntarily contract society, in
all manner of society we look after the object of the
will, that is, that which every one of those who gather
together, propounds to himself for good. Now
whatsoever seems good, is pleasant, and relates
either to the senses, or the mind. But all the mind’s
pleasure is either glory, (or to have a good opinion
of one’s self), or refers to glory in the end;
the rest are sensual, or conducing to sensuality,
which may be all comprehended under the word
conveniences. All society therefore is either for
gain, or for glory; that is, not so much for love of
our fellows, as for the love of ourselves. But no
society can be great or lasting, which begins from
vain glory. Because that glory is like honour; if
all men have it no man hath it, for they consist
in comparison and precellence. Neither doth
the society of others advance any whit the cause of
my glorying in myself; for every man must account
himself, such as he can make himself without
the help of others. But though the benefits
of this life may be much furthered by mutual help;
since yet those may be better attained to by dominion
than by the society of others, I hope no
body will doubt, but that men would much more
greedily be carried by nature, if all fear were removed,
to obtain dominion, than to gain society.
6We must therefore resolve, that the original of all
great and lasting societies consisted not in the
mutual good will men had towards each other, but
in the mutual fear[2] they had of each other.
That men by nature are all equal.
3. The cause of mutual fear consists partly in
the natural equality of men, partly in their mutual
will of hurting: whence it comes to pass, that we
can neither expect from others, nor promise to
ourselves the least security. For if we look on
men full-grown, and consider how brittle the
frame of our human body is, which perishing, all
its strength, vigour, and wisdom itself perisheth
with it; and how easy a matter it is, even for the
weakest man to kill the strongest: there is no
reason why any man, trusting to his own strength,
should conceive himself made by nature above
7others. They are equals, who can do equal things
one against the other; but they who can do the
greatest things, namely, kill, can do equal
things. All men therefore among themselves are
by nature equal; the inequality we now discern,
hath its spring from the civil law.
Whence the will of mischieving each other ariseth.
4. All men in the state of nature have a desire
and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same
cause, neither equally to be condemned. For one
man, according to that natural equality which is
among us, permits as much to others as he assumes
to himself; which is an argument of a temperate
man, and one that rightly values his power.
Another, supposing himself above others, will have
a license to do what he lists, and challenges respect
and honour, as due to him before others;
which is an argument of a fiery spirit. This
man’s will to hurt ariseth from vain glory, and
the false esteem he hath of his own strength; the
other’s from the necessity of defending himself,
his liberty, and his goods, against this man’s violence.
The discord arising from comparison of wits.
5. Furthermore, since the combat of wits is the
fiercest, the greatest discords which are, must necessarily
arise from this contention. For in this
case it is not only odious to contend against, but
also not to consent. For not to approve of what a
man saith, is no less than tacitly to accuse him of
an error in that thing which he speaketh: as in
very many things to dissent, is as much as if you
accounted him a fool whom you dissent from.
Which may appear hence, that there are no wars so
sharply waged as between sects of the same religion,
and factions of the same commonweal, where
8the contestation is either concerning doctrines or
politic prudence. And since all the pleasure and
jollity of the mind consists in this, even to get
some, with whom comparing, it may find somewhat
wherein to triumph and vaunt itself; it is impossible
but men must declare sometimes some mutual
scorn and contempt, either by laughter, or by
words, or by gesture, or some sign or other; than
which there is no greater vexation of mind, and
than from which there cannot possibly arise a
greater desire to do hurt.
From the appetite many have to the same thing.
6. But the most frequent reason why men desire
to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at
the same time have an appetite to the same thing;
which yet very often they can neither enjoy in
common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that
the strongest must have it, and who is strongest
must be decided by the sword.
The definition of right.
7. Among so many dangers therefore, as the
natural lusts of men do daily threaten each other
withal, to have a care of one’s self is so far from
being a matter scornfully to be looked upon, that
one has neither the power nor wish to have
done otherwise. For every man is desirous of what
is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly
the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and
this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less
than that whereby a stone moves downward. It
is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible,
neither against the dictates of true reason, for a
man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend
his body and the members thereof from death
and sorrows. But that which is not contrary
to right reason, that all men account to be done
9justly, and with right. Neither by the word right
is anything else signified, than that liberty which
every man hath to make use of his natural faculties
according to right reason. Therefore the first
foundation of natural right is this, that every man
as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his
life and members.
A right to the end gives also a right to the means.
8. But because it is in vain for a man to have a
right to the end, if the right to the necessary
means be denied him, it follows, that since every
man hath a right to preserve himself, he must also
be allowed a right to use all the means, and do
all the actions, without which he cannot preserve
himself.
By the right of nature, every man is judge of the means which tend to his preservation.
9. Now whether the means which he is about to
use, and the action he is performing, be necessary
to the preservation of his life and members or not,
he himself, by the right of nature, must be judge.
For if it be contrary to right reason that I should
judge of mine own peril, say, that another man is
judge. Why now, because he judgeth of what concerns
me, by the same reason, because we are
equal by nature, will I judge also of things which
do belong to him. Therefore it agrees with right
reason, that is, it is the right of nature that I
judge of his opinion, that is, whether it conduce
to my preservation or not.
By right of nature, all men have equal right to all things.
10. Nature hath given to every one a right to
all; that is, it was lawful for every man, in the
bare state of nature,[3] or before such time as men
10had engaged themselves by any covenants or
bonds, to do what he would, and against whom he
thought fit, and to possess, use, and enjoy all
what he would, or could get. Now because whatsoever
a man would, it therefore seems good to
him because he wills it, and either it really doth,
or at least seems to him to contribute towards his
preservation, (but we have already allowed him to
be judge, in the foregoing article, whether it doth
or not, insomuch as we are to hold all for necessary
whatsoever he shall esteem so), and by the
7th article it appears that by the right of nature
11those things may be done, and must be had, which
necessarily conduce to the protection of life and
members, it follows, that in the state of nature, to
have all, and do all, is lawful for all. And this is
that which is meant by that common saying, nature
hath given all to all. From whence we understand
likewise, that in the state of nature profit is
the measure of right.
The right of all to all is unprofitable.
11. But it was the least benefit for men thus to
have a common right to all things. For the effects
of this right are the same, almost, as if there had
been no right at all. For although any man might
say of every thing, this is mine, yet could he not
enjoy it, by reason of his neighbour, who having
equal right and equal power, would pretend the
same thing to be his.
The state of men without society is a state of war.
12. If now to this natural proclivity of men, to
hurt each other, which they derive from their
passions, but chiefly from a vain esteem of themselves,
you add, the right of all to all, wherewith
one by right invades, the other by right resists, and
whence arise perpetual jealousies and suspicions
on all hands, and how hard a thing it is to provide
against an enemy invading us with an intention
to oppress and ruin, though he come with a small
number, and no great provision; it cannot be denied
but that the natural state of men, before they
entered into society, was a mere war, and that not
simply, but a war of all men against all men. |The definition of war and peace.|For
what is WAR, but that same time in which the
will of contesting by force is fully declared, either
by words or deeds? The time remaining is
termed PEACE.
War is an adversary to man’s preservation.
1213. But it is easily judged how disagreeable a
thing to the preservation either of mankind, or of
each single man, a perpetual war is. But it is perpetual
in its own nature; because in regard of the
equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by
victory. For in this state the conqueror is subject
to so much danger, as it were to be accounted a
miracle, if any, even the most strong, should close
up his life with many years and old age. They
of America are examples hereof, even in this present
age: other nations have been in former ages;
which now indeed are become civil and flourishing,
but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty,
and deprived of all that pleasure and beauty of
life, which peace and society are wont to bring
with them. Whosoever therefore holds, that it
had been best to have continued in that state in
which all things were lawful for all men, he contradicts
himself. For every man by natural necessity
desires that which is good for him: nor is
there any that esteems a war of all against all,
which necessarily adheres to such a state, to be
good for him. And so it happens, that through fear
of each other we think it fit to rid ourselves of this
condition, and to get some fellows; that if there
needs must be war, it may not yet be against all
men, nor without some helps.
That by the right of nature, it is lawful for any man to compel him whom he hath in his power, to give him caution for his future obedience.
14. Fellows are gotten either by constraint, or
by consent; by constraint, when after fight the
conqueror makes the conquered serve him, either
through fear of death, or by laying fetters on him:
by consent, when men enter into society to help
each other, both parties consenting without any
constraint. But the conqueror may by right
13compel the conquered, or the strongest the weaker,
(as a man in health may one that is sick, or he
that is of riper years a child), unless he will choose
to die, to give caution of his future obedience. For
since the right of protecting ourselves according
to our own wills, proceeded from our danger, and
our danger from our equality, it is more consonant
to reason, and more certain for our conservation,
using the present advantage to secure ourselves
by taking caution, than when they shall be
full grown and strong, and got out of our power,
to endeavour to recover that power again by doubtful
fight. And on the other side, nothing can be
thought more absurd, than by discharging whom
you already have weak in your power, to make
him at once both an enemy and a strong one.
From whence we may understand likewise as a corollary
in the natural state of men, that a sure and
irresistible power confers the right of dominion
and ruling over those who cannot resist; insomuch,
as the right of all things that can be done,
adheres essentially and immediately unto this omnipotence
hence arising.
Nature dictates the seeking after peace.
15. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation,
continuing thus in the state of nature, that
is, of war, by reason of that equality of power,
and other human faculties they are endued withal.
Wherefore to seek peace, where there is any hopes
of obtaining it, and where there is none, to enquire
out for auxiliaries of war, is the dictate of right
reason, that is, the law of nature; as shall be
showed in the next chapter.
14
1. That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the
dictate of reason. 2. That the fundamental law of nature, is
to seek peace, where it may be had, and where not, to defend
ourselves. 3. That the first special law of nature, is not to
retain our right to all things. 4. What it is to quit our right:
what to transfer it. 5. That in the transferring of our right,
the will of him that receives it is necessarily required. 6. No
words but those of the present tense, transfer any right.
7. Words of the future, if there be some other tokens to signify
the will, are valid in the translation of right. 8. In matters
of free gift, our right passeth not from us through any
words of the future. 9. The definition of contract and compact.
10. In compacts, our right passeth from us through
words of the future. 11. Compacts of mutual faith, in the
state of nature are of no effect and vain; but not so in civil
government. 12. That no man can make compacts with
beasts, nor yet with God without revelation. 13. Nor yet
make a vow to God. 14. That compacts oblige not beyond
our utmost endeavour. 15. By what means we are freed
from our compacts. 16. That promises extorted through fear
of death, in the state of nature are valid. 17. A later compact
contradicting the former, is invalid. 18. A compact not to
resist him that shall prejudice my body, is invalid. 19. A
compact to accuse one’s self, is invalid. 20. The definition of
swearing. 21. That swearing is to be conceived in that form
which he useth that takes the oath. 22. An oath superadds
nothing to the obligation which is made by compact. 23. An
oath ought not to be pressed, but where the breach of compacts
may be kept private, or cannot be punished but from
God himself.
That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the dictate of reason.
1. All authors agree not concerning the definition
of the natural law, who notwithstanding do very
often make use of this term in their writings. The
method therefore wherein we begin from definitions
and exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper
15to them who leave no place for contrary disputes.
For the rest, if any man say that somewhat is done
against the law of nature, one proves it hence; because
it was done against the general agreement of
all the most wise and learned nations: but this
declares not who shall be the judge of the wisdom
and learning of all nations. Another hence, that it
was done against the general consent of all mankind;
which definition is by no means to be admitted.
For then it were impossible for any but
children and fools, to offend against such a law;
for sure, under the notion of mankind, they comprehend
all men actually endued with reason.
These therefore either do nought against it, or if
they do aught, it is without their own consent, and
therefore ought to be excused. But to receive the
laws of nature from the consents of them who
oftener break than observe them, is in truth unreasonable.
Besides, men condemn the same things
in others, which they approve in themselves;
on the other side, they publicly commend what
they privately condemn; and they deliver their
opinions more by hearsay, than any speculation
of their own; and they accord more through
hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or
some other perturbation of mind, than true reason.
And therefore it comes to pass, that whole bodies
of people often do those things with the greatest
unanimity and earnestness, which those writers most
willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature.
But since all do grant, that is done by right,
which is not done against reason, we ought to judge
those actions only wrong, which are repugnant to
right reason, that is, which contradict some certain
16truth collected by right reasoning from true principles.
But that which is done wrong, we say it is
done against some law. Therefore true reason is
a certain law; which, since it is no less a part
of human nature, than any other faculty or affection
of the mind, is also termed natural. Therefore
the law of nature, that I may define it, is
the dictate of right reason,[4] conversant about
those things which are either to be done or omitted
for the constant preservation of life and members,
as much as in us lies.
That the fundamental law of nature, is to seek peace where it may be had, and, where not, to defend ourselves.
2. But the first and fundamental law of nature
is, that peace is to be sought after, where it may be
found; and where not, there to provide ourselves
for helps of war. For we showed in the last article
of the foregoing chapter, that this precept is
the dictate of right reason; but that the dictates
17of right reason are natural laws, that hath been
newly proved above. But this is the first, because
the rest are derived from this, and they direct the
ways either to peace or self-defence.
The first special law of nature is, that our rights to all things ought not to be retained.
3. But one of the natural laws derived from this
fundamental one is this: that the right of all men
to all things ought not to be retained; but that
some certain rights ought to be transferred or relinquished.
For if every one should retain his
right to all things, it must necessarily follow, that
some by right might invade, and others, by the
same right, might defend themselves against them.
For every man by natural necessity endeavours to
defend his body, and the things which he judgeth
necessary towards the protection of his body. Therefore
war would follow. He therefore acts against
the reason of peace, that is, against the law of
nature, whosoever he be, that doth not part with
his right to all things.
What it is to quit our right: what to convey it.
4. But he is said to part with his right, who
either absolutely renounceth it, or conveys it to
another. He absolutely renounceth it, who by
some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares, that
he is willing that it shall never be lawful for him
to do that again, which before by right he might
have done. But he conveys it to another, who by
some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares to
that other, that he is willing it should be unlawful
for him to resist him, in going about to do somewhat
in the performance whereof he might before
with right have resisted him. But that the conveyance
of right consists merely in not resisting,
is understood by this, that before it was conveyed,
he to whom he conveyed it, had even then also a
18right to all; whence he could not give any new right;
but the resisting right he had before he gave it,
by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy
his rights, is utterly abolished. Whosoever
therefore acquires some right in the natural state
of men, he only procures himself security and freedom
from just molestation in the enjoyment of his
primitive right. As for example, if any man shall
sell or give away a farm, he utterly deprives himself
only from all right to this farm; but he does
not so others also.
The will of the receiver must necessarily be declared, before the right be conveyed.
5. But in the conveyance of right, the will is requisite
not only of him that conveys, but of him
also that accepts it. If either be wanting, the
right remains. For if I would have given what was
mine to one who refused to accept of it, I have
not therefore either simply renounced my right, or
conveyed it to any man. For the cause which moved
me to part with it to this man, was in him only,
not in others too.
Words convey not, except they relate to the time present.
6. But if there be no other token extant of our
will either to quit or convey our right, but only
words; those words must either relate to the present
or time past; for if they be of the future only,
they convey nothing. For example, he that speaks
thus of the time to come, I will give to-morrow,
declares openly that yet he hath not given it. So
that all this day his right remains, and abides to-morrow
too, unless in the interim he actually bestows
it: for what is mine, remains mine till I
have parted with it. But if I shall speak of the
time present, suppose thus; I do give or have
given you this to be received to-morrow: by these
words is signified that I have already given it, and
19that his right to receive it to-morrow is conveyed
to him by me to-day.
Words of the future suffice to convey, if other testimonies of our will be not wanting.
7. Nevertheless, although words alone are not
sufficient tokens to declare the will; if yet to
words relating to the future there shall some
other signs be added, they may become as valid as
if they had been spoken of the present. If therefore,
as by reason of those other signs, it appear that
he that speaks of the future, intends those words
should be effectual toward the perfect transferring
of his right, they ought to be valid. For the conveyance
of right depends not on words, but, as
hath been instanced in the fourth article, on the
declaration of the will.
In matters of free gift, words of the future convey no right.
8. If any man convey some part of his right to
another, and doth not this for some certain benefit
received, or for some compact, a conveyance in
this kind is called a gift or free donation. But in
free donation, those words only oblige us, which signify
the present or the time past; for if they respect
the future, they oblige not as words, for the
reason given in the foregoing article. It must needs
therefore be, that the obligation arise from some
other tokens of the will. But, because whatsoever is
voluntarily done, is done for some good to him that
wills it; there can no other token be assigned of the
will to give it, except some benefit either already
received, or to be acquired. But it is supposed
that no such benefit is acquired, nor any compact
in being; for if so, it would cease to be a free gift.
It remains therefore, that a mutual good turn without
agreement be expected. But no sign can be
given, that he, who used future words toward him
who was in no sort engaged to return a benefit,
20should desire to have his words so understood as
to oblige himself thereby. Nor is it suitable to
reason, that those who are easily inclined to do
well to others, should be obliged by every promise,
testifying their present good affection. And for this
cause, a promiser in this kind must be understood
to have time to deliberate, and power to change
that affection, as well as he to whom he made that
promise, may alter his desert. But he that deliberates,
is so far forth free, nor can be said to have
already given. But if he promise often, and yet
give seldom, he ought to be condemned of levity,
and be called not a donor, but doson.
The definition of contract and covenant.
9. But the act of two, or more, mutually conveying
their rights, is called a contract. But in
every contract, either both parties instantly perform
what they contract for, insomuch as there is
no trust had from either to other; or the one performs,
the other is trusted; or neither perform.
Where both parties perform presently, there the
contract is ended as soon as it is performed. But
where there is credit given, either to one or both,
there the party trusted promiseth after-performance;
and this kind of promise is called a covenant.
In covenants, we pass away our rights by words signifying the future.
10. But the covenant made by the party trusted
with him who hath already performed, although
the promise be made by words pointing at the future,
doth no less transfer the right of future time,
than if it had been made by words signifying the
present or time past. For the other’s performance
is a most manifest sign that he so understood the
speech of him whom he trusted, as that he would
certainly make performance also at the appointed
21time; and by this sign the party trusted knew
himself to be thus understood; which because he
hindered not, was an evident token of his will to
perform. The promises therefore which are made
for some benefit received, which are also covenants,
are tokens of the will; that is, as in the
foregoing section hath been declared, of the last
act of deliberating, whereby the liberty of non-performance
is abolished, and by consequence are obligatory.
For where liberty ceaseth, there beginneth
obligation.
Covenants, in the state of nature, are in vain and of none effect: not so in civil government.
11. But the covenants which are made in contract
of mutual trust, neither party performing out
of hand, if there arise[5] a just suspicion in either
of them, are in the state of nature invalid. For he
that first performs, by reason of the wicked disposition
of the greatest part of men studying their
own advantage either by right or wrong, exposeth
himself to the perverse will of him with whom
he hath contracted. For it suits not with reason,
that any man should perform first, if it be not
likely that the other will make good his promise
after; which, whether it be probable or not, he
that doubts it must be judge of, as hath been
showed in the foregoing chapter in the ninth article.
Thus, I say, things stand in the state of nature.
But in a civil state, when there is a power
which can compel both parties, he that hath contracted
22to perform first, must first perform; because,
that since the other may be compelled, the
cause which made him fear the other’s non-performance,
ceaseth.
That no man can make compacts with beasts; neither with God, without revelation.
12. But from this reason, that in all free gifts
and compacts there is an acceptance of the conveyance
of right required: it follows that no man
can compact with him who doth not declare his
acceptance. And therefore we cannot compact
with beasts, neither can we give or take from them
any manner of right, by reason of their want of
speech and understanding. Neither can any man
covenant with God, or be obliged to him by vow;
except so far forth as it appears to him by Holy
Scriptures, that he hath substituted certain men
who have authority to accept of such-like vows and
covenants, as being in God’s stead.
Nor yet vow to God.
13. Those therefore do vow in vain, who are in
the state of nature, where they are not tied by any
civil law, except, by most certain revelation, the
will of God to accept their vow or pact, be made
known to them. For if what they vow be contrary
to the law of nature, they are not tied by their
vow; for no man is tied to perform an unlawful
act. But if what is vowed, be commanded by some
law of nature, it is not their vow, but the law itself
which ties them. But if he were free, before
his vow, either to do it or not do it, his liberty remains;
because that the openly declared will of the
obliger is requisite to make an obligation by vow;
which, in the case propounded, is supposed not to
be. Now I call him the obliger, to whom any one
is tied; and the obliged, him who is tied.
Compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavours.
2314. Covenants are made of such things only as
fall under our deliberation. For it can be no covenant
without the will of the contractor. But the
will is the last act of him who deliberates; wherefore
they only concern things possible and to come.
No man, therefore, by his compact obligeth himself
to an impossibility. But yet, though we often
covenant to do such things as then seemed possible
when we promised them, which yet afterward appear
to be impossible, are we not therefore freed from
all obligation. The reason whereof is, that he who
promiseth a future, in certainty receives a present
benefit, on condition that he return another for it.
For his will, who performs the present benefit, hath
simply before it for its object a certain good, equally
valuable with the thing promised; but the thing
itself not simply, but with condition if it could be
done. But if it should so happen, that even this
should prove impossible, why then he must perform
as much as he can. Covenants, therefore, oblige us
not to perform just the thing itself covenanted for,
but our utmost endeavour; for this only is, the
things themselves are not in our power.
In what manner we are freed from compacts.
15. We are freed from covenants two ways,
either by performing, or by being forgiven. By
performing, for beyond that we obliged not ourselves.
By being forgiven, because he whom we
obliged ourselves to, by forgiving is conceived to
return us that right which we passed over to him.
For forgiving implies giving, that is, by the fourth
article of this chapter, a conveyance of right to him
to whom the gift is made.
Promises forced from us through fear of death, are valid in the state of nature.
16. It is a usual question, whether compacts
24extorted from us through fear, do oblige or not.
For example, if, to redeem my life from the power
of a robber, I promise to pay him 100l. next day,
and that I will do no act whereby to apprehend
and bring him to justice: whether I am tied to keep
promise or not. But though such a promise must
sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not
to be accounted so because it proceedeth from fear.
For then it would follow, that those promises which
reduced men to a civil life, and by which laws were
made, might likewise be of none effect; (for it proceeds
from fear of mutual slaughter, that one man
submits himself to the dominion of another); and
he should play the fool finely, who should trust his
captive covenanting with the price of his redemption.
It holds universally true, that promises do
oblige, when there is some benefit received, and
when the promise, and the thing promised, be lawful.
But it is lawful, for the redemption of my life, both
to promise and to give what I will of mine own
to any man, even to a thief. We are obliged, therefore,
by promises proceeding from fear, except the
civil law forbid them; by virtue whereof, that which
is promised becomes unlawful.
A latter compact contradicting the former, is invalid.
17. Whosoever shall contract with one to do or
omit somewhat, and shall after covenant the contrary
with another, he maketh not the former, but
the latter contract unlawful. For he hath no longer
right to do or to omit aught, who by former contracts
hath conveyed it to another. Wherefore he
can convey no right by latter contracts, and what
is promised is promised without right. He is therefore
tied only to his first contract, to break which
is unlawful.
A promise not to resist him that prejudices my body is invalid.
2518. No man is obliged by any contracts whatsoever
not to resist him who shall offer to kill, wound,
or any other way hurt his body. For there is in
every man a certain high degree of fear, through
which he apprehends that evil which is done to
him to be the greatest; and therefore by natural
necessity he shuns it all he can, and it is supposed
he can do no otherwise. When a man is arrived
to this degree of fear, we cannot expect but he will
provide for himself either by flight or fight. Since
therefore no man is tied to impossibilities, they
who are threatened either with death, (which is the
greatest evil to nature), or wounds, or some other
bodily hurts, and are not stout enough to bear them,
are not obliged to endure them. Furthermore, he
that is tied by contract is trusted; for faith only
is the bond of contracts; but they who are brought
to punishment, either capital or more gentle, are
fettered or strongly guarded; which is a most certain
sign that they seemed not sufficiently bound
from non-resistance by their contracts. It is one
thing, if I promise thus: if I do it not at the day
appointed, kill me. Another thing, if thus: if I do
it not, though you should offer to kill me, I will
not resist. All men, if need be, contract the first
way, and there is need sometimes. This second
way, none; neither is it ever needful. For in the
mere state of nature, if you have a mind to kill,
that state itself affords you a right; insomuch as
you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust
you will afterwards kill him. But in a civil state,
where the right of life and death and of all corporal
punishment is with the supreme, that same
right of killing cannot be granted to any private
26person. Neither need the supreme himself contract
with any man patiently to yield to his punishment;
but only this, that no man offer to defend
others from him. If in the state of nature, as between
two realms, there should a contract be made
on condition of killing if it were not performed,
we must presuppose another contract of not killing
before the appointed day. Wherefore on that
day, if there be no performance, the right of war
returns, that is a hostile state, in which all things
are lawful, and therefore resistance also. Lastly,
by the contract of not resisting, we are obliged, of
two evils to make choice of that which seems the
greater. For certain death is a greater evil than
fighting. But of two evils it is impossible not to
choose the least. By such a compact, therefore,
we should be tied to impossibilities; which is contrary
to the very nature of compacts.
The compact of self-accusation is invalid.
19. Likewise no man is tied by any compacts
whatsoever to accuse himself, or any other, by
whose damage he is like to procure himself a bitter
life. Wherefore neither is a father obliged to
bear witness against his son, nor a husband against
his wife, nor a son against his father, nor any man
against any one by whose means he hath his subsistence;
for in vain is that testimony which is
presumed to be corrupted from nature. But
although no man be tied to accuse himself by any
compact, yet in a public trial he may by torture
be forced to make answer. But such answers are
no testimony of the fact, but helps for the searching
out of truth; so that whether the party tortured
his answer be true or false, or whether he answer
not at all, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by right.
The definition of an oath.
2720. Swearing is a speech joined to a promise,
whereby the promiser declares his renouncing of
God’s mercy, unless he perform his word. Which
definition is contained in the words themselves,
which have in them the very essence of an oath,
to wit, so God help me, or other equivalent, as
with the Romans, do thou Jupiter so destroy the
deceiver, as I slay this same beast. Neither is this
any let, but that an oath may as well sometimes
be affirmatory as promissory; for he that confirms
his affirmation with an oath, promiseth that he
speaks truth. But though in some places it was
the fashion for subjects to swear by their kings,
that custom took its original hence, that those
kings took upon them divine honour. For oaths
were therefore introduced, that by religion and
consideration of the divine power, men might
have a greater dread of breaking their faiths, than
that wherewith they fear men, from whose eyes
their actions may lie hid.
The swearing must be conceived in that fashion which he uses who takes it.
21. Whence it follows that an oath must be
conceived in that form, which he useth who takes
it; for in vain is any man brought to swear by a
God whom he believes not, and therefore neither
fears him. For though by the light of nature it
may be known that there is a God, yet no man
thinks he is to swear by him in any other fashion,
or by any other name, than what is contained in
the precepts of his own proper, that is (as he who
swears imagines) the true religion.
Swearing adds nothing to the obligation which is by compact.
22. By the definition of an oath, we may understand
that a bare contract obligeth no less, than
that to which we are sworn. For it is the contract
which binds us; the oath relates to the divine
28punishment, which it could not provoke, if the
breach of contract were not in itself unlawful; but
it could not be unlawful, if the contract were not
obligatory. Furthermore, he that renounceth the
mercy of God, obligeth himself not to any punishment;
because it is ever lawful to deprecate the
punishment, howsoever provoked, and to enjoy
God’s pardon if it be granted. The only effect
therefore of an oath is this; to cause men, who are
naturally inclined to break all manner of faith,
through fear of punishment to make the more
conscience of their words and actions.
An oath is not to be pressed, but where the breach of contract can either be kept private, or not be punished but from God alone.
23. To exact an oath where the breach of contract,
if any be made, cannot but be known, and
where the party compacted withal wants not
power to punish, is to do somewhat more than is
necessary unto self-defence, and shews a mind desirous
not so much to benefit itself, as to prejudice
another. For an oath, out of the very form of
swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of
God’s anger, that is to say, of him that is omnipotent,
against those who therefore violate their faith,
because they think that by their own strength they
can escape the punishment of men; and of him
that is omniscient, against those who therefore
usually break their trust, because they hope that
no man shall see them.
29
1. The second law of nature, is to perform contracts. 2. That
trust is to be held with all men without exception. 3. What
injury is. 4. Injury can be done to none but those with whom
we contract. 5. The distinction of justice into that of men,
and that of actions. 6. The distinction of commutative and
distributive justice examined. 7. No injury can be done to
him that is willing. 8. The third law of nature, concerning
ingratitude. 9. The fourth law of nature, that every man
render himself useful. 10. The fifth law, of mercy. 11. The
sixth law, that punishments regard the future only. 12. The
seventh law, against reproach. 13. The eighth law, against
pride. 14. The ninth law, of humility. 15. The tenth, of
equity, or against acceptance of persons. 16. The eleventh,
of things to be had in common. 17. The twelfth, of things
to be divided by lot. 18. The thirteenth, of birthright and
first possession. 19. The fourteenth, of the safeguard of them
who are mediators for peace. 20. The fifteenth, of constituting
an umpire. 21. The sixteenth, that no man is judge
in his own cause. 22. The seventeenth, that umpires must be
without all hope of reward from those whose cause is to be
judged. 23. The eighteenth, of witnesses. 24. The nineteenth,
that there can no contract be made with the umpire.
25. The twentieth, against gluttony, and all such things as
hinder the use of reason. 26. The rule by which we may
presently know, whether what we are doing be against the law
of nature or not. 27. The laws of nature oblige only in the
court of conscience. 28. The laws of nature are sometimes
broke by doing things agreeable to those laws. 29. The
laws of nature are unchangeable. 30. Whosoever endeavours
to fulfil the laws of nature, is a just man. 31. The natural and
moral law are one. 32. How it comes to pass, that what hath
been said of the laws of nature, is not the same with what
philosophers have delivered concerning the virtues. 33. The
law of nature is not properly a law, but as it is delivered in
Holy Writ.
The second law of nature, to perform contracts.
1. Another of the laws of nature is, to perform
contracts, or to keep trust. For it hath been
30showed in the foregoing chapter, that the law of
nature commands every man, as a thing necessary,
to obtain peace, to convey certain rights from
each to other; and that this, as often as it shall
happen to be done, is called a contract. But this
is so far forth only conducible to peace, as we
shall perform ourselves what we contract with
others shall be done or omitted; and in vain
would contacts be made, unless we stood to them.
Because therefore to stand to our covenants, or to
keep faith, is a thing necessary for the obtaining
of peace; it will prove, by the second article of the
second chapter, to be a precept of the natural
law.
That faith is to be kept with all men without exception.
2. Neither is there in this matter any exception
of the persons with whom we contract; as if they
keep no faith with others, or hold that none
ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind
of vice. For he that contracts, in that he doth
contract, denies that action to be in vain; and it is
against reason for a knowing man to do a thing in
vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep
it, in thinking so he affirms the contract to be
made in vain. He therefore who contracts with
one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep
faith, he doth at once think a contract to be a
thing done in vain, and not in vain; which is absurd.
Either therefore we must hold trust with
all men, or else not bargain with them; that is,
either there must be a declared war, or a sure and
faithful peace.
Injury defined.
3. The breaking of a bargain, as also the taking
back of a gift, (which ever consists in some action
or omission), is called an injury. But that action
31or omission is called unjust; insomuch as an injury,
and an unjust action or omission, signify the same
thing, and both are the same with breach of contract
and trust. And it seems the word injury
came to be given to any action or omission, because
they were without right; he that acted or
omitted, having before conveyed his right to some
other. And there is some likeness between that
which in the common course of life we call injury,
and that which in the Schools is usually called
absurd. For even as he who by arguments is
driven to deny the assertion which he first maintained,
is said to be brought to an absurdity; in
like manner, he who through weakness of mind
does or omits that which before he had by contract
promised not to do or omit, commits an injury,
and falls into no less contradiction than he
who in the Schools is reduced to an absurdity.
For by contracting for some future action, he wills
it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done: which
is to will a thing done and not done at the same
time, which is a contradiction. An injury therefore
is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as an
absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.
An injury can only be done to him with whom we contract.
4. From these grounds it follows, that an injury
can be done to no man[6] but him with whom
32we enter covenant, or to whom somewhat is made
over by deed of gift, or to whom somewhat is promised
by way of bargain. And therefore damaging
and injuring are often disjoined. For if a master
command his servant, who hath promised to obey
him, to pay a sum of money, or carry some present
to a third man; the servant, if he do it not,
hath indeed damaged this third party, but he injured
his master only. So also in a civil government,
if any man offend another with whom he
hath made no contract, he damages him to whom
the evil is done; but he injures none but him to
whom the power of government belongs. For if he
who receives the hurt should expostulate the mischief,
he that did it should answer thus: what
art thou to me; why should I rather do according
to your than mine own will, since I do not
hinder but you may do your own, and not my
mind? In which speech, where there hath no
manner of pre-contract passed, I see not, I confess,
what is reprehensible.
The distinction of justice into that of men and actions.
5. These words, just and unjust, as also justice
and injustice, are equivocal; for they signify one
thing when they are attributed to persons, another
when to actions. When they are attributed to
actions, just signifies as much as what is done with
right, and unjust, as what is done with injury. He
who hath done some just thing, is not therefore
33said to be a just person, but guiltless; and he that
hath done some unjust thing, we do not therefore
say he is an unjust, but guilty man. But when
the words are applied to persons, to be just signifies
as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to
study how to do righteousness, or to endeavour in
all things to do that which is just; and to be unjust
is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it
is to be measured not according to my contract,
but some present benefit. So as the justice or injustice
of the mind, the intention, or the man, is
one thing, that of an action or omission another;
and innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust,
and of an unjust man, just. But that man is
to be accounted just, who doth just things because
the law commands it, unjust things only by reason
of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust,
who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment
annexed unto the law, and unrighteousness
by reason of the iniquity of his mind.
The distinction of commutative and distributive justice, examined.
6. The justice of actions is commonly distinguished
into two kinds, commutative and distributive;
the former whereof, they say, consists in
arithmetical, the latter in geometrical proportion;
and that is conversant in exchanging, in buying,
selling, borrowing, lending, location and conduction,
and other acts whatsoever belonging to contractors;
where, if there be an equal return made,
hence, they say, springs a commutative justice: but
this is busied about the dignity and merits of men;
so as if there be rendered to every man κατὰ τὴν
ἀξίαν, more to him who is more worthy, and less to
him that deserves less, and that proportionably;
hence, they say, ariseth distributive justice. I acknowledge
34here some certain distinction of equality:
to wit, that one is an equality simply so
called; as when two things of equal value are compared
together, as a pound of silver with twelve
ounces of the same silver: the other is an equality
secundum quod; as when a thousand pounds is to
be divided to a hundred men, six hundred pounds
are given to sixty men, and four hundred to forty,
where there is no equality between six hundred
and four hundred; but when it happens that there
is the same inequality in the number of them to
whom it is distributed, every one of them shall
take an equal part, whence it is called an equal
distribution. But such like equality is the same
thing with geometrical proportion. But what is
all this to justice? For neither if I sell my goods
for as much as I can get for them, do I injure the
buyer, who sought and desired them of me;
neither if I divide more of what is mine to him
who deserves less, so long as I give the other what
I have agreed for, do I wrong to either. Which
truth our Saviour himself, being God, testifies in
the Gospel. This therefore is no distinction of
justice, but of equality. Yet perhaps it cannot be
denied but that justice is a certain equality, as
consisting in this only; that since we are all equal
by nature, one should not arrogate more right to
himself than he grants to another, unless he have
fairly gotten it by compact. And let this suffice
to be spoken against this distinction of justice,
although now almost generally received by all; lest
any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat
else than the breach of faith or contract, as hath
been defined above.
No injury can be done to him that is willing.
357. It is an old saying, volenti non fit injuria,
the willing man receives no injury; yet the truth
of it may be derived from our principles. For
grant that a man be willing that that should be
done which he conceives to be an injury to him;
why then, that is done by his will, which by contract
was not lawful to be done. But he being willing
that should be done which was not lawful by
contract, the contract itself (by the fifteenth article
of the foregoing chapter) becomes void. The
right therefore of doing it returns; therefore it is
done by right; wherefore it is no injury.
The third law of nature, of ingratitude.
8. The third precept of the natural law is, that
you suffer not him to be the worse for you, who,
out of the confidence he had in you, first did you
a good turn; or that you accept not a gift, but
with a mind to endeavour that the giver shall
have no just occasion to repent him of his gift.
For without this, he should act without reason, that
would confer a benefit where he sees it would be
lost; and by this means all beneficence and trust,
together with all kind of benevolence, would be
taken from among men, neither would there be
aught of mutual assistance among them, nor any
commencement of gaining grace and favour; by
reason whereof the state of war would necessarily
remain, contrary to the fundamental law of nature.
But because the breach of this law is not a
breach of trust or contract, (for we suppose no
contracts to have passed among them), therefore is
it not usually termed an injury; but because good
turns and thanks have a mutual eye to each other,
it is called ingratitude.
The fourth law of nature, that every man render himself useful.
369. The fourth precept of nature is, that every
man render himself useful unto others: which
that we may rightly understand, we must remember
that there is in men a diversity of dispositions
to enter into society, arising from the diversity of
their affections, not unlike that which is found in
stones, brought together in the building, by reason
of the diversity of their matter and figure. For as
a stone, which in regard of its sharp and angular
form takes up more room from other stones than
it fills up itself, neither because of the hardness of
its matter can it well be pressed together, or
easily cut, and would hinder the building from
being fitly compacted, is cast away, as not fit for
use: so a man, for the harshness of his disposition
in retaining superfluities for himself, and
detaining of necessaries from others, and being
incorrigible by reason of the stubbornness of his
affections, is commonly said to be useless and
troublesome unto others. Now, because each one
not by right only, but even by natural necessity, is
supposed with all his main might to intend the
procurement of those things which are necessary
to his own preservation; if any man will contend
on the other side for superfluities, by his default
there will arise a war; because that on him alone
there lay no necessity of contending; he therefore
acts against the fundamental law of nature. Whence
it follows, (which we were to show), that it is a precept
of nature, that every man accommodate himself
to others. But he who breaks this law may be
called useless and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth
inhumanity to this usefulness, as having regard
to this very law.
The fifth law of nature, of mercifulness.
3710. The fifth precept of the law of nature is,
that we must forgive him who repents and asks
pardon for what is past, having first taken caution
for the time to come. The pardon of what is
past, or the remission of an offence, is nothing
else but the granting of peace to him that asketh
it, after he hath warred against us, and now is become
penitent. But peace granted to him that
repents not, that is, to him that retains a hostile
mind, or that gives not caution for the future,
that is, seeks not peace, but opportunity; is not
properly peace, but fear, and therefore is not commanded
by nature. Now to him that will not
pardon the penitent and that gives future caution,
peace itself it seems is not pleasing: which is contrary
to the natural law.
The sixth law, that punishments only regard the future.
11. The sixth precept of the natural law is, that
in revenge and punishments we must have our eye
not at the evil past, but the future good: that
is, it is not lawful to inflict punishment for any
other end, but that the offender may be corrected,
or that others warned by his punishment may become
better. But this is confirmed chiefly from
hence, that each man is bound by the law of nature
to forgive one another, provided he give caution
for the future, as hath been showed in the
foregoing article. Furthermore, because revenge,
if the time past be only considered, is nothing else
but a certain triumph and glory of mind, which
points at no end; for it contemplates only what is
past, but the end is a thing to come; but that
which is directed to no end, is vain: that revenge
therefore which regards not the future, proceeds
from vain glory, and is therefore without reason.
38But to hurt another without reason, introduces a
war, and is contrary to the fundamental law of
nature. It is therefore a precept of the law of
nature, that in revenge we look not backwards,
but forward. Now the breach of this law is commonly
called cruelty.
The seventh law of nature, against slander.
12. But because all signs of hatred and contempt
provoke most of all to brawling and fighting,
insomuch as most men would rather lose their
lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander;
it follows in the seventh place, that it is prescribed
by the law of nature, that no man, either
by deeds or words, countenance or laughter, do
declare himself to hate or scorn another. The
breach of which law is called reproach. But
although nothing be more frequent than the scoffs
and jeers of the powerful against the weak, and
namely, of judges against guilty persons, which
neither relate to the offence of the guilty, nor the
duty of the judges; yet these kind of men do act
against the law of nature, and are to be esteemed
for contumelious.
The eighth law, against pride.
13. The question whether of two men be the
more worthy, belongs not to the natural, but civil
state. For it hath been showed before (Chap. I.
Art. 3) that all men by nature are equal; and
therefore the inequality which now is, suppose
from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come
from the civil law. I know that Aristotle, in his
first book of Politics, affirms as a foundation of
the whole political science, that some men by
nature are made worthy to command, others only
to serve; as if lord and servant were distinguished
not by consent of men, but by an aptness, that is,
39a certain kind of natural knowledge or ignorance.
Which foundation is not only against reason, (as
but now hath been showed), but also against experience.
For neither almost is any man so dull
of understanding as not to judge it better to be
ruled by himself, than to yield himself to the
government of another; neither if the wiser and
stronger do contest, have these always or often
the upper hand of those. Whether therefore men
be equal by nature, the equality is to be acknowledged;
or whether unequal, because they are like
to contest for dominion, it is necessary for the
obtaining of peace, that they be esteemed as
equal; and therefore it is in the eighth place a
precept of the law of nature, that every man be
accounted by nature equal to another; the contrary
to which law is pride.
The ninth law, of humility.
14. As it was necessary to the conservation of
each man that he should part with some of his
rights, so it is no less necessary to the same conservation
that he retain some others, to wit, the
right of bodily protection, of free enjoyment of
air, water, and all necessaries for life. Since
therefore many common rights are retained by
those who enter into a peaceable state, and that
many peculiar ones are also acquired, hence
ariseth this ninth dictate of the natural law, to
wit, that what rights soever any man challenges to
himself, he also grant the same as due to all the
rest; otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged
in the former article. For what is it else
to acknowledge an equality of persons in the
making up of society, but to attribute equal right
and power to those whom no reason would else
40engage to enter into society? But to ascribe
equal things to equals, is the same with giving
things proportional to proportionals. The observation
of this law is called meekness, the violation
πλεονεξὶα; the breakers by the Latins are styled immodici
et immodesti.
The tenth law of equity, or against acceptance of persons.
15. In the tenth place it is commanded by the
law of nature, that every man in dividing right to
others, shew himself equal to either party. By
the foregoing law we are forbidden to assume
more right by nature to ourselves, than we grant
to others. We may take less if we will; for that sometimes
is an argument of modesty. But if at any
time matter of right be to be divided by us unto
others, we are forbidden by this law to favour one
more or less than another. For he that by favouring
one before another observes not this natural
equality, reproaches him whom he thus undervalues:
but it is declared above, that a reproach is
against the laws of nature. The observance of this
precept is called equity; the breach, respect of
persons. The Greeks in one word term it προσωποληψία.
The eleventh law, of things to be had in common.
16. From the foregoing law is collected this
eleventh, those things which cannot be divided,
must be used in common if they can, and if the
quantity of the matter permit, every man as much
as he lists; but if the quantity permit not, then with
limitation, and proportionally to the number of the
users. For otherwise that equality can by no means
be observed, which we have showed in the foregoing
article to be commanded by the law of nature.
The twelfth law, of things to be divided by lot.
17. Also what cannot be divided nor had in
41common, it is provided by the law of nature,
which may be the twelfth precept, that the use of
that thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one
only by lot; and that in the using it by turns, it be
also decided by lot, who shall have the first use
of it. For here also regard is to be had unto
equality: but no other can be found but that of
lot.
The thirteenth law, of birthright and first possession.
18. But all lot is twofold, arbitrary or natural.
Arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of
the contenders, and it consists in mere chance, as
they say, or fortune. Natural is primogeniture,
in Greek κληρονομια, as it were, given by lot; or first
possession. Therefore the things which can
neither be divided nor had in common, must be
granted to the first possessor; as also those things
which belonged to the father are due to the son,
unless the father himself have formerly conveyed
away that right to some other. Let this therefore
stand for the thirteenth law of nature.
The fourteenth law, of the safety of those who are mediators for peace.
19. The fourteenth precept of the law of nature
is, that safety must be assured to the mediators
for peace. For the reason which commands the
end, commands also the means necessary to the
end. But the first dictate of reason is peace; all
the rest are means to obtain it, and without which
peace cannot be had. But neither can peace be
had without mediation, nor mediation without
safety. It is therefore a dictate of reason, that is,
a law of nature, that we must give all security to
the mediators for peace.
The fifteenth law, of appointing an umpire.
20. Furthermore because, although men should
agree to make all these and whatsoever other laws
of nature, and should endeavour to keep them,
42yet doubts and controversies would daily arise
concerning the application of them unto their actions,
to wit, whether what was done were against
the law or not, which we call the question of right;
whence will follow a fight between parties, either-sides
supposing themselves wronged: it is therefore
necessary to the preservation of peace, because
in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be
thought on, that both the disagreeing parties refer
the matter unto some third, and oblige themselves
by mutual compacts to stand to his judgment in
deciding the controversy. And he to whom they
thus refer themselves, is called an arbiter. It is
therefore the fifteenth precept of the natural law,
that both parties disputing concerning the matter
of right, submit themselves unto the opinion and
judgment of some third.
The sixteenth law, that no man be judge in his own cause.
21. But from this ground, that an arbiter or
judge is chosen by the differing parties to determine
the controversy, we gather that the arbiter
must not be one of the parties. For every man is
presumed to seek what is good for himself naturally,
and what is just only for peace sake and
accidentally; and therefore cannot observe that
same equality commanded by the law of nature, so
exactly as a third man would do. It is therefore
in the sixteenth place contained in the law of nature,
that no man must be judge or arbiter in his
own cause.
The seventeenth law, that arbiters must be without all hope of reward from the parties whose cause is to be judged.
22. From the same ground follows in the seventeenth
place, that no man must be judge, who propounds
unto himself any hope of profit or glory
from the victory of either part: for the like reason
sways here, as in the foregoing law.
The eighteenth law, of witnesses.
4323. But when there is some controversy of the
fact itself, to wit, whether that be done or not
which is said to be done, the natural law wills
that the arbiter trust both parties alike, that is,
because they affirm contradictories, that he believe
neither. He must therefore give credit to a third,
or a third and fourth, or more, that he may be
able to give judgment of the fact, as often as by
other signs he cannot come to the knowledge of it.
The eighteenth law of nature therefore enjoins
arbiters and judges of fact, that where firm and
certain signs of the fact appear not, there they
rule their sentence by such witnesses as seem
to be indifferent to both parts.
The nineteenth law, that no contract is to be made with the judge.
24. From the above declared definition of an arbiter
may be furthermore understood, that no contract
or promise must pass between him and the
parties whose judge he is appointed, by virtue
whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour
of either part, nay, or be obliged to judge according
to equity, or to pronounce such sentence
as he shall truly judge to be equal. The judge
is indeed bound to give such sentence as he shall
judge to be equal, by the law of nature recounted
in the 15th article: to the obligation of which
law nothing can be added by way of compact.
Such compact therefore would be in vain. Besides,
if giving wrong judgment he should contend
for the equity of it, except such compact be
of no force, the controversy would remain after
judgment given: which is contrary to the constitution
of an arbiter, who is so chosen, as both parties
have obliged themselves to stand to the judgment
which he should pronounce. The law of nature
44therefore commands the judge to be disengaged,
which is its nineteenth precept.
The twentieth law, against gluttony and such things as hinder the use of reason.
25. Furthermore, forasmuch as the laws of nature
are nought else but the dictates of reason; so
as, unless a man endeavour to preserve the faculty
of right reasoning, he cannot observe the laws of
nature; it is manifest, that he who knowingly or
willingly doth aught whereby the rational faculty
may be destroyed or weakened, he knowingly and
willingly breaks the law of nature. For there is no
difference between a man who performs not his
duty, and him who does such things willingly as
make it impossible for him to do it. But they
destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty, who do
that which disturbs the mind from its natural state;
that which most manifestly happens to drunkards,
and gluttons. We therefore sin, in the twentieth
place, against the law of nature by drunkenness.
The rule by which a man may presently know, whether what he is about to act be against the law of nature or not.
26. Perhaps some man, who sees all these precepts
of nature derived by a certain artifice from
the single dictate of reason advising us to look to
the preservation and safeguard of ourselves, will
say that the deduction of these laws is so hard,
that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly
known, and therefore neither will they prove
obliging: for laws, if they be not known, oblige not,
nay indeed, are not laws. To this I answer, it is
true, that hope, fear, anger, ambition, covetousness,
vain glory, and other perturbations of mind, do hinder
a man, so as he cannot attain to the knowledge
of these laws whilst those passions prevail in him:
but there is no man who is not sometimes in a quiet
mind. At that time therefore there is nothing easier
for him to know, though he be never so rude and
45unlearned, than this only rule, that when he doubts
whether what he is now doing to another may be
done by the law of nature or not, he conceive
himself to be in that other’s stead. Here instantly
those perturbations which persuaded him to the
fact, being now cast into the other scale, dissuade
him as much. And this rule is not only easy, but is
anciently celebrated in these words, quod tibi fieri
non vis, alteri ne feceris: do not that to others,
you would not have done to yourself.
The laws of nature oblige only in the court of conscience.
27. But because most men, by reason of their
perverse desire of present profit, are very unapt to
observe these laws, although acknowledged by
them; if perhaps some, more humble than the
rest, should exercise that equity and usefulness
which reason dictates, the others not practising
the same, surely they would not follow reason in
so doing: nor would they hereby procure themselves
peace, but a more certain quick destruction,
and the keepers of the law become a mere prey to
the breakers of it. It is not therefore to be imagined,
that by nature, that is, by reason, men are
obliged to the exercise of all these laws[7] in that
46state of men wherein they are not practised by
others. We are obliged yet, in the interim, to a
readiness of mind to observe them, whensoever
their observation shall seem to conduce to the end
for which they were ordained. We must therefore
conclude, that the law of nature doth always and
everywhere oblige in the internal court, or that of
conscience; but not always in the external court,
but then only when it may be done with safety.
The laws of nature are sometimes broken by an act agreeable to those laws.
28. But the laws which oblige conscience, may
be broken by an act not only contrary to them, but
also agreeable with them; if so be that he who does
it, be of another opinion. For though the act itself
be answerable to the laws, yet his conscience is
against them.
The laws of nature are immutable and eternal.
29. The laws of nature are immutable and
eternal: what they forbid, can never be lawful;
what they command, can never be unlawful. For
pride, ingratitude, breach of contracts (or injury),
inhumanity, contumely, will never be lawful,
nor the contrary virtues to these ever unlawful,
as we take them for dispositions of the
mind, that is, as they are considered in the court
of conscience, where only they oblige and are
laws. Yet actions may be so diversified by circumstances
and the civil law, that what is done
with equity at one time, is guilty of iniquity at
another; and what suits with reason at one time,
47is contrary to it another. Yet reason is still the
same, and changeth not her end, which is peace
and defence, nor the means to attain them, to
wit, those virtues of the mind which we have declared
above, and which cannot be abrogated by
any custom or law whatsoever.
He who endeavours to fulfil the laws of nature, is just.
30. It is evident by what hath hitherto been
said, how easily the laws of nature are to be observed,
because they require the endeavour only,
(but that must be true and constant); which whoso
shall perform, we may rightly call him just.
For he who tends to this with his whole might,
namely, that his actions be squared according to
the precepts of nature, he shows clearly that he
hath a mind to fulfil all those laws; which is all
we are obliged to by rational nature. Now he that
hath done all he is obliged to, is a just man.
The natural law is the same with the moral.
31. All writers do agree, that the natural law is
the same with the moral. Let us see wherefore
this is true. We must know, therefore, that good
and evil are names given to things to signify the
inclination or aversion of them, by whom they were
given. But the inclinations of men are diverse,
according to their diverse constitutions, customs,
opinions; as we may see in those things we apprehend
by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling;
but much more in those which pertain to the common
actions of life, where what this man commends,
that is to say, calls good, the other undervalues,
as being evil. Nay, very often the same
man at diverse times praises and dispraises the
same thing. Whilst thus they do, necessary it is
there should be discord and strife. They are,
therefore, so long in the state of war, as by reason
48of the diversity of the present appetite, they mete
good and evil by diverse measures. All men easily
acknowledge this state, as long as they are in it, to
be evil, and by consequence that peace is good.
They therefore who could not agree concerning
a present, do agree concerning a future good;
which indeed is a work of reason; for things present
are obvious to the sense, things to come to our
reason only. Reason declaring peace to be good,
it follows by the same reason, that all the necessary
means to peace be good also; and therefore
that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy,
(which we have demonstrated to be necessary to
peace), are good manners or habits, that is, virtues.
The law therefore, in the means to peace, commands
also good manners, or the practice of virtue;
and therefore it is called moral.
Whence it comes to pass, that what hath been said concerning the law, is not the same with what hath been delivered by philosophers concerning the virtues.
32. But because men cannot put off this same
irrational appetite, whereby they greedily prefer
the present good (to which, by strict consequence,
many unforseen evils do adhere) before the future;
it happens, that though all men do agree in the
commendation of the foresaid virtues, yet they disagree
still concerning their nature, to wit, in what
each of them doth consist. For as oft as another’s
good action displeaseth any man, that action hath
the name given of some neighbouring vice; likewise
the bad actions which please them, are ever
intituled to some virtue. Whence it comes to pass
that the same action is praised by these, and called
virtue, and dispraised by those, and termed vice.
Neither is there as yet any remedy found by philosophers
for this matter. For since they could not
observe the goodness of actions to consist in this,
49that it was in order to peace, and the evil in this,
that it related to discord, they built a moral philosophy
wholly estranged from the moral law, and
unconstant to itself. For they would have the nature
of virtues seated in a certain kind of mediocrity
between two extremes, and the vices in the
extremes themselves; which is apparently false.
For to dare is commended, and, under the name of
fortitude is taken for a virtue, although it be an
extreme, if the cause be approved. Also the quantity
of a thing given, whether it be great or little,
or between both, makes not liberality, but the cause
of giving it. Neither is it injustice, if I give any
man more of what is mine own than I owe him.
The laws of nature, therefore, are the sum of moral
philosophy; whereof I have only delivered such
precepts in this place, as appertain to the preservation
of ourselves against those dangers which
arise from discord. But there are other precepts
of rational nature, from whence spring other virtues;
for temperance, also, is a precept of reason,
because intemperance tends to sickness and death.
And so fortitude too, that is, that same faculty of
resisting stoutly in present dangers, and which
are more hardly declined than overcome; because
it is a means tending to the preservation of him
that resists.
The law of nature is not properly a law, but as it is delivered in Holy Scripture.
33. But those which we call the laws of nature,
(since they are nothing else but certain conclusions,
understood by reason, of things to be done and
omitted; but a law, to speak properly and accurately,
is the speech of him who by right commands
somewhat to others to be done or omitted),
are not in propriety of speech laws, as they proceed
50from nature. Yet, as they are delivered by
God in holy Scriptures, as we shall see in the chapter
following, they are most properly called by the
name of laws. For the sacred Scripture is the speech
of God commanding over all things by greatest
right.
1. The natural and moral law is divine. 2. Which is confirmed
in Scripture, in general. 3. Specially, in regard of the fundamental
law of nature in seeking of peace. 4. Also in regard
of the first law of nature in abolishing all things to be had in
common. 5. Also of the second law of nature, concerning faith
to be kept. 6. Also of the third law, of thankfulness. 7. Also of
the fourth law, of rendering ourselves useful. 8. Also of the fifth
law, concerning mercy. 9. Also of the sixth law, that punishment
only looks at the future. 10. Also of the seventh law,
concerning slander. 11. Also of the eighth law, against pride.
12. Also of the ninth law, of equity. 13. Also of the tenth
law, against respect of persons. 14. Also of the eleventh law,
of having those things in common which cannot be divided.
15. Also of the twelfth law, of things to be divided by lot.
16. Also of appointing a judge. 17. Also of the seventeenth
law, that the arbiters must receive no reward for their sentence.
18. Also of the eighteenth law, concerning witnesses.
19. Also of the twentieth law, against drunkenness. 20. Also
in respect of that which hath been said, that the law of nature
is eternal. 21. Also that the laws of nature do pertain to conscience.
22. Also that the laws of nature are easily observed.
23. Lastly, in respect of the rule by which a man may presently
know, whether what he is about to act, be against the
law of nature, or not. 24. The law of Christ is the law of
nature.
The natural and moral law is divine.
1. The same law which is natural and moral, is
also wont to be called divine, nor undeservedly; as
well because reason, which is the law of nature, is
51given by God to every man for the rule of his actions;
as because the precepts of living which are
thence derived, are the same with those which have
been delivered from the divine Majesty for the
laws of his heavenly kingdom, by our Lord Jesus
Christ, and his holy prophets and apostles. What
therefore by reasoning we have understood above
concerning the law of nature, we will endeavour to
confirm the same in this chapter by holy writ.
Which is confirmed in Scripture, in general.
2. But first we will shew those places in which
it is declared, that the divine law is seated in right
reason. Psalm xxxvii. 30, 31: The mouth of the
righteous will be exercised in wisdom, and his
tongue will be talking of judgment: the law
of God is in his heart. Jeremiah xxx. 33: I
will put my law in their inward parts, and write
it in their hearts. Psalm xix. 7: The law of
the Lord is an undefiled law, converting the soul.
Verse 8: The commandment of the Lord is pure,
and giveth light unto the eyes. Deuteron. xxx. 11:
This commandment, which I command thee this
day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far
off, &c. Verse. 14: But the word is very nigh
unto thee in my mouth, and in thine heart, that
thou mayest do it. Psalm cxix. 34: Give me understanding,
and I shall keep thy law. Verse 105:
Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto
my paths. Prov. ix. 10: The knowledge of the
holy is understanding. Christ the law-giver,
himself is called (John i. 1): the word. The same
Christ is called (verse 9): the true light, that
lighteth every man that cometh in the world. All
which are descriptions of right reason, whose
dictates, we have showed before, are the laws of
nature.
Specially in regard of the fundamental law of nature in seeking of peace.
523. But that that which we set down for the fundamental
law of nature, namely, that peace was to
be sought for, is also the sum of the Divine law,
will be manifest by these places. Rom. iii. 17:
Righteousness, which is the sum of the law, is
called the way of peace. Psalm lxxxv. 10:
Righteousness and peace have kissed each other.
Matth. v. 9: Blessed are the peace-makers, for
they shall be called the children of God. And
after St. Paul, in his sixth chapter to the Hebrews,
and the last verse, had called Christ (the legislator
of that law we treat of), an High-priest for ever
after the order of Melchisedec: he adds in the
following chapter, the first verse: This Melchisedec
was king of Salem, priest of the most high
God, &c. (Verse 2): First being by interpretation
king of righteousness, and after that also
king of Salem, which is, king of peace. Whence
it is clear, that Christ, the King, in his kingdom
placeth righteousness and peace together. Psalm
xxxiv. 14: Eschew evil and do good; seek peace
and pursue it. Isaiah ix. 6, 7: Unto us a child is
born, unto us a son is given, and the government
shall be upon his shoulder, and his name shall be
called Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God,
the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace.
Isaiah lii. 7: How beautiful upon the mountains
are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings,
that publisheth peace, that bringeth good tidings
of good, that publisheth salvation, that saith unto
Sion, thy God reigneth! Luke ii. 14: In the
nativity of Christ, the voice of them that praised
God, saying, Glory be to God on high, and in
earth peace, good-will towards men. And Isaiah
53liii. 5: the Gospel is called the chastisement of our
peace. Isaiah lix. 8: Righteousness is called
the way of peace. The way of peace they know
not, and there is no judgment in their goings.
Micah v. 4, 5, speaking of the Messias, he saith
thus: He shall stand and feed in the strength of
the Lord, in the majesty of the name of the Lord
his God, and they shall abide, for now shall he
be great unto the end of the earth; and this man
shall be your peace, &c. Prov. iii. 1, 2: My son,
forget not my law, but let thine heart keep my
commandments; for length of days, and long life,
and peace, shall they add to thee.
Also in regard of the first law of nature, in abolishing all things to be had in common.
4. What appertains to the first law of abolishing
the community of all things, or concerning the introduction
of meum and tuum; we perceive in the
first place, how great an adversary this same community
is to peace, by those words of Abraham to
Lot (Gen. xiii. 8, 9): Let there be no strife, I pray
thee, between thee and me, and between thy herdmen
and my herdmen; for we be brethren. Is not
the whole land before thee? Separate thyself, I
pray thee from me. And all those places of Scripture
by which we are forbidden to trespass upon
our neighbours: as, Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt
not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, &c. do
confirm the law of distinction between mine and
thine; for they suppose the right of all men to all
things to be taken away.
Also of the second law of nature, concerning faith to be kept.
5. The same precepts establish the second law
of nature, of keeping trust. For what doth, Thou
shalt not invade another’s right, import, but this?
Thou shalt not take possession of that, which by
thy contract ceaseth to be thine: but it is expressly
54set down? Psalm xv. 1: to him that asked,
Lord who shall dwell in thy tabernacle? it is
answered (verse 4): He that sweareth unto his
neighbour, and disappointeth him not. And Prov.
vi. 12: My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, if
thou have stricken thy hand with a stranger, thou
art snared with the words of thy mouth.
Also of the third law, of thankfulness.
6. The third law concerning gratitude, is proved
by these places. Deut. xxv. 4: Thou shalt not
muzzle the ox, when he treadeth out the corn:
which St. Paul (1 Cor. ix. 9) interprets to be
spoken of men, not oxen only. Prov. xvii. 13;
Whoso rewardeth evil for good, evil shall not
depart from his house. And Deut. xx. 10, 11:
When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against
it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be,
if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto
thee, then it shall be that all the people that is
found therein, shall be tributaries unto thee, and
they shall serve thee. Prov. iii. 29: Devise not
evil against thy neighbour, seeing he dwelleth
securely by thee.
Also of the fourth law, of rendering ourselves useful.
7. To the fourth law of accommodating ourselves,
these precepts are conformable: Exod.
xxiii. 4, 5: If thou meet thine enemy’s ox, or his
ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back
to him again. If thou see the ass of him that
hateth thee, lying under his burden, and wouldst
forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with
him. Also (verse 9): Thou shalt not oppress a
stranger. Prov. iii. 30: Strive not with a man
without a cause, if he have done thee no harm.
Prov. xv. 18: A wrathful man stirreth up strife;
but he that is slow to anger, appeaseth strife.
55Prov. xviii. 24: There is a friend that sticketh
closer than a brother. The same is confirmed,
Luke x, by the parable of the Samaritan, who
had compassion on the Jew that was wounded by
thieves; and by Christ’s precept (Matth. v. 39):
But I say unto you that ye resist not evil; but
whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek,
turn to him the other also.
Also of the fifth law, concerning mercy.
8. Among infinite other places which prove the
fifth law, these are some: Matth. vi. 14, 15: If you
forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father
will also forgive you: but if you forgive not
men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive
your trespasses. Matth. xviii. 21, 22: Lord
how oft shall my brother sin against me, and I
forgive him? Till seven times? Jesus saith unto
him; I say not till seven times, but till seventy
times seven times; that is, toties quoties.
Also of the sixth law, that punishment only looks at the future.
9. For the confirmation of the sixth law, all those
places are pertinent which command us to shew
mercy, such as Matth. v. 7: Blessed are the merciful,
for they shall obtain mercy. Levit. xix. 18:
Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge
against the children of thy people. But there
are, who not only think this law is not proved by
Scripture, but plainly disproved from hence; that
there is an eternal punishment reserved for the
wicked after death, where there is no place either
for amendment or example. Some resolve this
objection by answering, that God, whom no law
restrains, refers all to his glory, but that man must
not do so; as if God sought his glory, that is to
say, pleased himself in the death of a sinner. It
is more rightly answered, that the institution of
56eternal punishment was before sin, and had regard
to this only, that men might dread to commit sin
for the time to come.
Also of the seventh law, concerning slander.
10. The words of Christ prove this seventh:
(Matth. v. 22): But I say unto you, that whosoever
is angry with his brother without a cause, shall
be in danger of the judgment; and whosoever
shall say unto his brother Racha, shall be in
danger of the council; but whosoever shall say,
thou fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire. Prov. x.
18: He that uttereth a slander, is a fool. Prov.
xiv. 21: He that despiseth his neighbour, sinneth.
Prov. xv. 1: Grievous words stir up anger. Prov. xxii. 10Prov. xxii. 10:
Cast out the scorner, and contention
shall go out, and reproach shall cease.
Also of the eighth, against pride.
11. The eighth law of acknowledging equality
of nature, that is, of humility, is established by
these places: Matth. v. iii: Blessed are the poor
in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
Prov. vi. 16-19: These six things doth the
Lord hate, yea, seven are an abomination unto
him. A proud look, &c. Prov. xvi. 5: Every
one that is proud, is an abomination unto the
Lord; though hand join in hand, he shall not be
unpunished. Prov. xi. 2: When pride cometh,
then cometh shame; but with the lowly is wisdom.
Thus Isaiah xl. 3: (where the coming of the Messias
is shewed forth, for preparation towards his
kingdom): The voice of him that cried in the
wilderness, was this: Prepare ye the way of the
Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for
our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and
every mountain and hill shall be made low: which
doubtless is spoken to men, and not to mountains.
Also of the ninth, of equity.
5712. But that same equity, which we proved in
the ninth place to be a law of nature, which commands
every man to allow the same rights to others
they would be allowed themselves, and which contains
in it all the other laws besides, is the same
which Moses sets down (Levit. xix. 18): Thou shalt
love thy neighbour as thyself. And our Saviour
calls it the sum of the moral law: Matth. xxii.
36-40: Master, which is the great commandment
in the law? Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love
the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with
all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the
first and great commandment; and the second is
like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as
thyself. On these two commandments hang all
the law and the prophets. But to love our neighbour
as ourselves, is nothing else but to grant him
all we desire to have granted to ourselves.
Also the tenth, against respect of persons.
13. By the tenth law respect of persons is forbid;
as also by these places following: Matth.
v. 45: That ye may be children of your Father
which is in heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise
on the evil, and on the good, &c. Coloss. iii. 11:
There is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor
uncircumcision, barbarian or Scythian, bond or
free, but Christ is all, and in all. Acts x. 34:
Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter
of persons. 2 Chron. xix. 7: There is no iniquity
with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons,
nor taking of gifts. Ecclesiasticus xxxv. 12:
The Lord is Judge, and with him is no respect of
persons. Rom. ii. 11: For there is no respect
of persons with God.
Also of the eleventh law, of having those things in common which cannot be divided.
5814. The eleventh law, which commands those
things to be held in common which cannot be divided,
I know not whether there be any express
place in Scripture for it or not; but the practice
appears every where, in the common use of wells,
ways, rivers, sacred things, &c.; for else men could
not live.
Also of the twelfth, of things to be divided by lot.
15. We said in the twelfth place, that it was a
law of nature, that where things could neither be
divided nor possessed in common, they should be
disposed by lot. Which is confirmed, as by the
example of Moses who, by God’s command (Numb.
xxvi. 55), divided the several parts of the land of
promise unto the tribes by lot: so (Acts i. 24)
by the example of the Apostles, who received
Matthias before Justus into their number, by
casting lots, and saying, Thou, Lord, who knowest
the hearts of all men, show whether of these two
thou hast chosen, &c. Prov. xvi. 33: The lot is
cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof
is of the Lord. And, which is the thirteenth law,
the succession was due unto Esau, as being the
first born of Isaac; if himself had not sold it (Gen.
xxv. 33), or that the father had not otherwise appointed.
Also of appointing a judge.
16. St. Paul, writing to the Corinthians (1 Epist.
vi), reprehends the Corinthians of that city for
going to law one with another before infidel
judges, who were their enemies: calling it a
fault, that they would not rather take wrong, and
suffer themselves to be defrauded; for that is
against that law, whereby we are commanded to
be helpful to each other. But if it happen the
controversy be concerning things necessary, what
59is to be done? Therefore the Apostle (verse 5)
speaks thus: I speak to your shame. Is it so,
that there is not one wise man among you, no, not
one that shall be able to judge between his brethren?
He therefore, by those words, confirms
that law of nature which we called the fifteenth,
to wit, where controversies cannot be avoided;
there by the consent of parties to appoint some
arbiter, and him some third man; so as (which is
the sixteenth law) neither of the parties may be
judge in his own cause.
Also of the seventeenth law, that the arbiters must receive no reward for their sentence.
17. But that the judge or arbiter must receive
no reward for his sentence, which is the seventeenth
law appears, Exod. xxiii. 8: Thou shalt
take no gift; for the gift blindeth the wise, and
perverteth the words of the righteous. Ecclesiasticus
xx. 29: Presents and gifts blind the eyes of
the wise. Whence it follows, that he must not be
more obliged to one part than the other; which is
the nineteenth law; and is also confirmed, Deut.
i. 17: Ye shall not respect persons in judgment,
ye shall hear the small as well as the great; and
in all those places which are brought against respect
of persons.
Also of the eighteenth, concerning witnesses.
18. That in the judgment of fact witnesses
must be had, which is the eighteenth law, the
Scripture not only confirms, but requires more
than one. Deut. xvii. 6: At the mouth of two
witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is
worthy of death be put to death. The same is
repeated Deut. xix. 15.
Also of the twentieth law, against drunkenness.
19. Drunkenness, which we have therefore in
the last place numbered among the breaches of the
natural law, because it hinders the use of right
60reason, is also forbid in Sacred Scripture for the
same reason. Prov. xx. 1: Wine is a mocker,
strong drink is raging, whosoever is deceived
thereby is not wise. And Prov. xxxi. 4, 5: It is
not for kings to drink wine, lest they drink and
forget the law, and pervert the judgment of
any of the afflicted. But that we might know that
the malice of this vice consisted not formally in
the quantity of the drink, but in that it destroys
judgment and reason, it follows in the next verse:
Give strong drink to him that is ready to perish,
and wine to those that be heavy of heart. Let
him drink and forget his poverty, and remember
his misery no more. Christ useth the same reason
in prohibiting drunkenness (Luke xxi. 34): Take
heed to yourselves, lest at any time your hearts
be overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness.
Also in respect of that which hath been said, that the law of nature is eternal.
20. That we said in the foregoing chapter, the
law of nature is eternal, is also proved out of Matth.
v. 18: Verily I say unto you, till heaven and
earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise
pass from the law; and Psalm cxix. 160: Every
one of thy righteous judgments endureth for
ever.
Also that the laws of nature do pertain to conscience.
21. We also said, that the laws of nature had
regard chiefly unto conscience; that is, that he is
just, who by all possible endeavour strives to fulfil
them. And although a man should order all his
actions so much as belongs to external obedience
just as the law commands, but not for the law’s
sake, but by reason of some punishment annexed
unto it, or out of vain glory; yet he is unjust.
Both these are proved by the Holy Scriptures.
The first (Isaiah lv. 7): Let the wicked forsake his
61way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let
him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy
upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly
pardon. Ezek. xviii. 31: Cast away from you
all your transgressions whereby you have transgressed,
and make you a new heart and a new
spirit; for why will you die, O House of Israel?
By which, and the like places, we may sufficiently
understand that God will not punish their deeds
whose heart is right. The second, out of Isaiah xxix.
13, 14: The Lord said, forasmuch as this people
draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips
do honour me, but have removed their hearts far
from me, therefore I will proceed, &c. Matth.
v. 20: Except your righteousness shall exceed
the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees,
ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of
heaven. And in the following verses, our Saviour
explains to them how that the commands of God
are broken, not by deeds only, but also by the
will. For the Scribes and Pharisees did in outward
act observe the law most exactly, but for glory’s
sake only; else they would as readily have broken
it. There are innumerable places of Scripture in
which is most manifestly declared, that God accepts
the will for the deed, and that as well in
good as in evil actions.
Also that the laws of nature are easily observed.
22. That the law of nature is easily kept, Christ
himself declares (Matth. xi. 28, 29, 30): Come unto
me, &c. Take my yoke upon you, and learn
of me, &c.; for my yoke is easy, and my burden
light.
Lastly, in respect of the rule by which a man may presently know, whether what he is about to act be against the law of nature, or not.
23. Lastly, the rule by which I said any man
might know, whether what he was doing were
62contrary to the law or not, to wit, what thou
wouldst not be done to, do not that to another; is
almost in the self-same words delivered by our
Saviour (Matth. vii. 12): Therefore all things
whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you,
do you even so to them.
The law of Christ is the law of nature.
24. As the law of nature is all of it divine, so
the law of Christ by conversion (which is wholly
explained in the v. vi. and vii. chapters of St.
Matthew’s Gospel), is all of it also (except that
one commandment, of not marrying her who is put
away for adultery; which Christ brought for explication
of the divine positive law, against the Jews,
who did not rightly interpret the Mosaical law)
the doctrine of nature. I say, the whole law of
Christ is explained in the fore-named chapters, not
the whole doctrine of Christ; for faith is a part of
Christian doctrine, which is not comprehended
under the title of a law. For laws are made and
given in reference to such actions as follow our
will; not in order to our opinions and belief, which
being out of our power, follow not the will.
DOMINION. — CHAPTER V. OF THE CAUSES AND FIRST BEGINNING OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. — CHAPTER VI. OF THE RIGHT OF HIM, WHETHER COUNCIL OR ONE MAN ONLY, WHO HATH THE SUPREME POWER IN THE CITY. — CHAPTER VII OF THE THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACY, ARISTOCRACY, MONARCHY. — CHAPTER VIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF LORDS OVER THEIR SERVANTS. — CHAPTER IX. OF THE RIGHT OF PARENTS OVER THEIR CHILDREN, AND OF HEREDITARY GOVERNMENT. — CHAPTER X. COMPARISON BETWEEN THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO THEIR SEVERAL INCONVENIENCES. — CHAPTER XI. PLACES AND EXAMPLES OF SCRIPTURE OF THE RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT, AGREEABLE TO WHAT HATH BEEN SAID BEFORE. — CHAPTER XII. OF THE INTERNAL CAUSES TENDING TO THE DISSOLUTION OF ANY GOVERNMENT. — CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THEM WHO BEAR RULE. — CHAPTER XIV. OF LAWS AND TRESPASSES.
63
1. That the laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace.
2. That the laws of nature, in the state of nature, are silent.
3. That the security of living according to the laws of nature,
consists in the concord of many persons. 4. That the concord
of many persons is not constant enough for a lasting peace.
5. The reason why the government of certain brute creatures
stands firm in concord only, and why not of men. 6. That not
only consent, but union also, is required to establish the peace
of men. 7. What union is. 8. In union, the right of all men
is conveyed to one. 9. What civil society is. 10. What a
civil person is. 11. What it is to have the supreme power,
and what to be a subject 12. Two kinds of cities, natural,
and by institution.
That the laws of nature suffice not for the conservation of peace.
1. It is of itself manifest that the actions of men
proceed from the will, and the will from hope and
fear, insomuch as when they shall see a greater
good or less evil likely to happen to them by the
breach than observation of the laws, they will
wittingly violate them. The hope therefore which
each man hath of his security and self-preservation,
consists in this, that by force or craft he may
disappoint his neighbour, either openly or by stratagem.
Whence we may understand, that the
natural laws, though well understood, do not instantly
secure any man in their practice; and consequently,
that as long as there is no caution had
from the invasion of others, there remains to every
64man that same primitive right of self-defence by
such means as either he can or will make use of,
that is, a right to all things, or the right of war.
And it is sufficient for the fulfilling of the natural
law, that a man be prepared in mind to embrace
peace when it may be had.
That the laws of nature, in a state of nature, are silent.
2. It is a trite saying, that all laws are silent in
the time of war, and it is a true one, not only if we
speak of the civil, but also of the natural laws, provided
they be referred not to the mind, but to the
actions of men, by chap. iii. art. 27. And we mean
such a war, as is of all men against all men; such
as is the mere state of nature; although in the
war of nation against nation, a certain mean was
wont to be observed. And therefore in old time,
there was a manner of living, and as it were a
certain economy, which they called ληστρικὴν, living
by rapine; which was neither against the law of
nature (things then so standing), nor void of glory
to those who exercised it with valour, not with
cruelty. Their custom was, taking away the rest,
to spare life, and abstain from oxen fit for plough,
and every instrument serviceable to husbandry.
Which yet is not so to be taken, as if they were
bound to do thus by the law of nature; but that
they had regard to their own glory herein, lest by
too much cruelty they might be suspected guilty
of fear.
That the security of living according to the laws of nature, consists in the agreement of many.
3. Since therefore the exercise of the natural
law is necessary for the preservation of peace, and
that for the exercise of the natural law security is
no less necessary; it is worth the considering what
that is which affords such a security. For this
matter nothing else can be imagined, but that
65each man provide himself of such meet helps, as
the invasion of one on the other may be rendered
so dangerous, as either of them may think it better
to refrain than to meddle. But first, it is plain
that the consent of two or three cannot make good
such a security; because that the addition but of
one, or some few on the other side, is sufficient to
make the victory undoubtedly sure, and heartens
the enemy to attack us. It is therefore necessary,
to the end the security sought for may be obtained,
that the number of them who conspire in a mutual
assistance be so great, that the accession of some
few to the enemy’s party may not prove to them
a matter of moment sufficient to assure the victory.
That the agreement of many is not constant enough to preserve a lasting peace.
4. Furthermore, how great soever the number
of them is who meet on self-defence, if yet they
agree not among themselves of some excellent
means whereby to compass this, but every man
after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours,
nothing will be done; because that, divided
in their opinions, they will be a hinderance to
each other; or if they agree well enough to some
one action, through hope of victory, spoil, or revenge,
yet afterward, through diversity of wits
and counsels, or emulation and envy, with which
men naturally contend, they will be so torn and
rent, as they will neither give mutual help nor desire
peace, except they be constrained to it by some
common fear. Whence it follows that the consent
of many, (which consists in this only, as we have
already defined in the foregoing section, that they
direct all their actions to the same end and the
common good), that is to say, that the society proceeding
66from mutual help only, yields not that
security which they seek for, who meet and agree
in the exercise of the above-named laws of nature;
but that somewhat else must be done, that those
who have once consented for the common good to
peace and mutual help, may by fear be restrained
lest afterwards they again dissent, when their
private interest shall appear discrepant from the
common good.
Why the government of some brute creatures stands firm in concord alone, and not so of men.
5. Aristotle reckons among those animals which
he calls politic, not man only, but divers others,
as the ant, the bee, &c.; which, though they be
destitute of reason, by which they may contract
and submit to government, notwithstanding by
consenting, that is to say, ensuing or eschewing
the same things, they so direct their actions to a
common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious
unto any seditions. Yet is not their gathering
together a civil government, and therefore those
animals not to be termed political; because their
government is only a consent, or many wills concurring
in one object, not (as is necessary in civil
government) one will. It is very true, that in
those creatures living only by sense and appetite,
their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no
need of anything more to secure it, and by consequence
to preserve peace among them, than
barely their natural inclination. But among men
the case is otherwise. For, first, among them there
is a contestation of honour and preferment; among
beasts there is none: whence hatred and envy, out
of which arise sedition and war, is among men;
among beasts no such matter. Next, the natural
appetite of bees, and the like creatures, is conformable;
67and they desire the common good, which
among them differs not from their private. But
man scarce esteems anything good, which hath not
somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment, more
than that which others do possess. Thirdly, those
creatures which are void of reason, see no defect,
or think they see none, in the administration of
their commonweals; but in a multitude of men
there are many who, supposing themselves wiser
than others, endeavour to innovate, and divers innovators
innovate divers ways; which is a mere
distraction and civil war. Fourthly, these brute
creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their
voice to signify their affections to each other, yet
want they that same art of words which is necessarily
required to those motions in the mind,
whereby good is represented to it as being better,
and evil as worse than in truth it is. But the
tongue of man is a trumpet of war and sedition:
and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes
by his elegant speeches thundered and lightened,
and confounded whole Greece itself. Fifthly, they
cannot distinguish between injury and harm;
thence it happens that as long as it is well with
them, they blame not their fellows. But those
men are of most trouble to the republic, who have
most leisure to be idle; for they use not to contend
for public places, before they have gotten the
victory over hunger and cold. Last of all, the
consent of those brutal creatures is natural; that
of men by compact only, that is to say, artificial.
It is therefore no matter of wonder, if somewhat
more be needful for men to the end they may live
in peace. Wherefore consent or contracted society,
68without some common power whereby particular
men may be ruled through fear of punishment,
doth not suffice to make up that security,
which is requisite to the exercise of natural justice.
That not only consent, but union also, is required to establish the peace of men.
6. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills
to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace,
and to make a lasting defence, it is requisite that,
in those necessary matters which concern peace and
self-defence, there be but one will of all men. But
this cannot be done, unless every man will so subject
his will to some other one, to wit, either man
or council, that whatsoever his will is in those
things which are necessary to the common peace,
it be received for the wills of all men in general,
and of every one in particular. Now the gathering
together of many men, who deliberate of what is to
be done or not to be done for the common good
of all men, is that which I call a council.
What union is.
7. This submission of the wills of all those men
to the will of one man or one council, is then
made, when each one of them obligeth himself by
contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the
will of that one man or council, to which he hath
submitted himself; that is, that he refuse him not
the use of his wealth and strength against any
others whatsoever; for he is supposed still to retain
a right of defending himself against violence:
and this is called union. But we understand that
to be the will of the council, which is the will of
the major part of those men of whom the council
consists.
In union, the right of all men is transferred to one.
8. But though the will itself be not voluntary,
but only the beginning of voluntary actions; (for
69we will not to will, but to act); and therefore falls
least of all under deliberation and compact; yet he
who submits his will to the will of another, conveys
to that other the right of his strength and
faculties. Insomuch as when the rest have done the
same, he to whom they have submitted, hath so
much power, as by the terror of it he can conform
the wills of particular men unto unity and concord.
What civil society is.
9. Now union thus made, is called a city or civil
society; and also a civil person. For when there is
one will of all men, it is to be esteemed for one
person; and by the word one, it is to be known
and distinguished from all particular men, as having
its own rights and properties. Insomuch as
neither any one citizen, nor all of them together,
(if we except him, whose will stands for the will of
all), is to be accounted a city. A city therefore,
(that we may define it), is one person, whose will,
by the compact of many men, is to be received for
the will of them all; so as he may use all the power
and faculties of each particular person to the
maintenance of peace, and for common defence.
What a civil person is.
10. But although every city be a civil person,
yet every civil person is not a city; for it may
happen that many citizens, by the permission of
the city, may join together in one person, for the
doing of certain things. These now will be civil
persons; as the companies of merchants, and many
other convents. But cities they are not, because
they have not submitted themselves to the will of
the company simply and in all things, but in certain
things only determined by the city, and on
such terms as it is lawful for any one of them to
contend in judgment against the body itself of the
70sodality; which is by no means allowable to a
citizen against the city. Such like societies, therefore,
are civil persons subordinate to the city.
What it is to have the supreme power, what to be subject.
11. In every city, that man or council, to whose
will each particular man hath subjected his will
so as hath been declared, is said to have the
supreme power, or chief command, or dominion.
Which power and right of commanding,
consists in this, that each citizen hath conveyed all
his strength and power to that man or council;
which to have done, because no man can transfer
his power in a natural manner, is nothing else
than to have parted with his right of resisting.
Each citizen, as also every subordinate civil person,
is called the subject of him who hath the
chief command.
Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.
12. By what hath been said, it is sufficiently
showed in what manner and by what degrees
many natural persons, through desire of preserving
themselves and by mutual fear, have grown together
into a civil person, whom we have called a
city. But they who submit themselves to another
for fear, either submit to him whom they fear, or
some other whom they confide in for protection.
They act according to the first manner, who are
vanquished in war, that they may not be slain;
they according to the second, who are not yet
overcome, that they may not be overcome. The
first manner receives its beginning from natural
power, and may be called the natural beginning of
a city; the latter from the council and constitution
of those who meet together, which is a beginning
by institution. Hence it is that there are
two kinds of cities; the one natural, such as the
71paternal and despotical; the other institutive, which
may be also called political. In the first, the lord
acquires to himself such citizens as he will; in the
other, the citizens by their own wills appoint a lord
over themselves, whether he be one man or one
company of men, endued with the command in
chief. But we will speak, in the first place, of a
city political or by institution; and next, of a city
natural.
1. There can no right be attributed to a multitude out of civil
society, nor any action to which they have not under seal consented.
2. The right of the greater number consenting, is the
beginning of a city. 3. That every man retains a right to
protect himself according to his own free will, so long as there
is no sufficient regard had to his security. 4. That a coercive
power is necessary to secure us. 5. What the sword of justice
is. 6. That the sword of justice belongs to him, who hath the
chief command. 7. That the sword of war belongs to him
also. 8. All judicature belongs to him too. 9. The legislative
power is his only. 10. The naming of magistrates and
other officers of the city belongs to him. 11 Also the examination
of all doctrines. 12. Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable.
13. That the command his citizens have granted is
absolute, and what proportion of obedience is due to him.
14. That the laws of the city bind him not. 15. That no man
can challenge a propriety to anything against his will. 16. By
the laws of the city only we come to know what theft, murder,
adultery, and injury is. 17. The opinion of those who would
constitute a city, where there should not be any one endued with
an absolute power. 18. The marks of supreme authority. 19.
If a city be compared with a man, he that hath the supreme
power is in order to the city, as the human soul is in relation
to the man. 20. That the supreme command cannot by right
be dissolved through their consents, by whose compacts it was
first constituted.
There can no right be attributed to a multitude, considered out of civil society; nor any action, to which they have not given their particular consents.
721. We must consider, first of all, what a multitude[8]
of men, gathering themselves of their own free
wills into society, is; namely, that it is not any
73one body, but many men, whereof each one hath
his own will and his peculiar judgment concerning
all things that may be proposed. And though
by particular contracts each single man may have
his own right and propriety, so as one may say
this is mine, the other, that is his; yet will there
not be anything of which the whole multitude, as
a person distinct from a single man, can rightly
say, this is mine, more than another’s. Neither
must we ascribe any action to the multitude, as its
own; but if all or more of them do agree, it will
not be an action, but as many actions as men.
For although in some great sedition, it is commonly
said, that the people of that city have taken
up arms; yet is it true of those only who are in
arms, or who consent to them. For the city, which
is one person, cannot take up arms against itself.
Whatsoever, therefore, is done by the multitude,
must be understood to be done by every one of
those by whom it is made up; and that he, who
being in the multitude, and yet consented not, nor
gave any helps to the things that were done by it,
must be judged to have done nothing. Besides, in
a multitude not yet reduced into one person, in
that manner as hath been said, there remains that
same state of nature in which all things belong to
all men; and there is no place for meum and tuum,
which is called dominion and propriety, by reason
that that security is not yet extant, which we have
declared above to be necessarily requisite for the
practice of the natural laws.
The beginning of a city is the right of the major part agreeing.
2. Next, we must consider that every one of the
multitude, by whose means there may be a beginning
to make up the city, must agree with the
74rest, that in those matters which shall be propounded
by any one in the assembly, that be received
for the will of all, which the major part
shall approve of; for otherwise there will be no
will at all of a multitude of men, whose wills and
votes differ so variously. Now, if any one will
not consent, the rest, notwithstanding, shall among
themselves constitute the city without him. Whence
it will come to pass, that the city retains its primitive
right against the dissenter; that is, the right of
war, as against an enemy.
That every man retains a right of protecting himself according to his own judgment, as long as he is not secured.
3. But because we said in the foregoing chapter,
the sixth article, that there was required to the
security of men, not only their consent, but also
the subjection of their wills in such things as were
necessary to peace and defence; and that in that
union and subjection the nature of a city consisted;
we must discern now in this place, out of those
things which may be propounded, discussed, and
stated in an assembly of men, all whose wills are
contained in the will of the major part, what
things are necessary to peace and common defence.
But first of all, it is necessary to peace,
that a man be so far forth protected against the
violence of others, that he may live securely; that
is, that he may have no just cause to fear others,
so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to
make men altogether safe from mutual harms, so
as they cannot be hurt or injuriously killed, is impossible;
and, therefore, comes not within deliberation.
But care may be had, there be no just cause
of fear; for security is the end wherefore men submit
themselves to others; which if it be not had, no
man is supposed to have submitted himself to
75aught, or to have quitted his right to all things,
before that there was a care had of his security.
That a coercive power is necessary for security.
4. It is not enough to obtain this security, that
every one of those who are now growing up into a
city, do covenant with the rest, either by words or
writing, not to steal, not to kill, and to observe
the like laws; for the pravity of human disposition
is manifest to all, and by experience too well
known how little (removing the punishment) men
are kept to their duties through conscience of their
promises. We must therefore provide for our
security, not by compacts, but by punishments;
and there is then sufficient provision made, when
there are so great punishments appointed for every
injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to have
done it, than not to have done it. For all men, by
a necessity of nature, choose that which to them
appears to be the less evil.
What the sword of justice is.
5. Now, the right of punishing is then understood
to be given to any one, when every man
contracts not to assist him who is to be punished.
But I will call this right, the sword of justice.
But these kind of contracts men observe well
enough, for the most part, till either themselves or
their near friends are to suffer.
That the sword of justice belongs to him who hath the chief command.
6. Because, therefore, for the security of particular
men, and, by consequence, for the common
peace, it is necessary that the right of using the
sword for punishment be transferred to some man
or council; that man or council is necessarily understood
by right to have the supreme power in
the city. For he that by right punisheth at his
own discretion, by right compels all men to all
things which he himself wills; than which a greater
command cannot be imagined.
That the sword of war belongs to him also.
767. But in vain do they worship peace at home,
who cannot defend themselves against foreigners;
neither is it possible for them to protect themselves
against foreigners, whose forces are not united.
And therefore it is necessary for the preservation
of particulars, that there be some one council or
one man, who hath the right to arm, to gather together,
to unite so many citizens, in all dangers
and on all occasions, as shall be needful for common
defence against the certain number and strength
of the enemy; and again, as often as he shall find
it expedient, to make peace with them. We must
understand, therefore, that particular citizens have
conveyed their whole right of war and peace unto
some one man or council; and that this right,
which we may call the sword of war, belongs to
the same man or council, to whom the sword of
justice belongs. For no man can by right compel
citizens to take up arms and be at the expenses of
war, but he who by right can punish him who doth
not obey. Both swords therefore, as well this of
war as that of justice, even by the constitution
itself of a city and essentially do belong to the
chief command.
The power of judicature belongs to him.
8. But because the right of the sword, is nothing
else but to have power by right to use the sword
at his own will, it follows, that the judgment of its
right use pertains to the same party; for if the
power of judging were in one, and the power of
executing in another, nothing would be done. For
in vain would he give judgment, who could not
execute his commands; or, if he executed them by
the power of another, he himself is not said to have
the power of the sword, but that other, to whom
77he is only an officer. All judgment therefore, in
a city, belongs to him who hath the swords; that is,
to him who hath the supreme authority.
The legislative power is his also.
9. Furthermore, since it no less, nay, it much
more conduceth to peace, to prevent brawls from
arising than to appease them being risen; and
that all controversies are bred from hence, that the
opinions of men differ concerning meum and tuum,
just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good
and evil, honest and dishonest, and the like; which
every man esteems according to his own judgment:
it belongs to the same chief power to make some
common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly,
by which every man may know what may be
called his, what another’s, what just, what unjust,
what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil;
that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be
avoided in our common course of life. But those
rules and measures are usually called the civil laws,
or the laws of the city, as being the commands of
him who hath the supreme power in the city. And
the civil laws (that we may define them) are
nothing else but the commands of him who hath
the chief authority in the city, for direction of
the future actions of his citizens.
That the naming of magistrates and officers belongs to him also.
10. Furthermore, since the affairs of the city,
both those of war and peace, cannot possibly be all
administered by one man or one council without
officers and subordinate magistrates; and that it
appertaineth to peace and common defence, that
they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies,
to search into neighbouring councils, prudently
to wage war, and on all hands warily to
attend the benefit of the city, should also rightly
78exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason
that they depend on, and be chosen by him who
hath the chief command both in war and in peace.
The examination of doctrine belongs to him likewise.
11. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions
have their beginning from, and necessarily depend
on the will; and that the will of doing or omitting
aught, depends on the opinion of the good and evil,
of the reward or punishment which a man conceives
he shall receive by the act or omission: so as the
actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each.
Wherefore, by evident and necessary inference, we
may understand that it very much concerns the
interest of peace, that no opinions or doctrines be
delivered to citizens, by which they may imagine
that either by right they may not obey the laws of
the city, that is, the commands of that man or
council to whom the supreme power is committed,
or that it is lawful to resist him, or that a less punishment
remains for him that denies, than for him
that yields obedience. For if one command somewhat
to be done under penalty of natural death,
another forbid it under pain of eternal death, and
both by their own right, it will follow that the
citizens, although innocent, are not only by right
punishable, but that the city itself is altogether dissolved.
For no man can serve two masters; nor is
he less, but rather more a master, whom we believe
we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he
whom we obey for fear of temporal death. It follows
therefore that this one, whether man or
court, to whom the city hath committed the supreme
power, have also this right; that he both
judge what opinions[9] and doctrines are enemies
79unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be
taught.
Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable.
12. Last of all, from this consideration, that
each citizen hath submitted his will to his who
hath the supreme command in the city, so as he
may not employ his strength against him; it follows
80manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by
him who commands, must not be punished. For as
he who hath not power enough, cannot punish him
naturally, so neither can he punish him by right,
who by right hath not sufficient power.
That he hath an absolute dominion granted him by his citizens, and what proportion of obedience is due unto him.
13. It is most manifest by what hath been said,
that in every perfect city, that is, where no citizen
hath right to use his faculties at his own discretion
for the preservation of himself, or where the right
of the private sword is excluded; there is a supreme
power in some one, greater than which cannot by
right be conferred by men, or greater than which
no mortal man can have over himself. But that
power, greater than which cannot by men be conveyed
on a man, we call absolute.[10] For whosoever
81hath so submitted his will to the will of the
city, that he can, unpunished, do any thing, make
laws, judge controversies, set penalties, make use
at his own pleasure of the strength and wealth of
men, and all this by right; truly he hath given him
the greatest dominion that can be granted. This
same may be confirmed by experience, in all the
cities which are or ever have been. For though it
be sometimes in doubt what man or council hath
the chief command, yet ever there is such a command
and always exercised, except in the time of
sedition and civil war; and then there are two chief
commands made out of one. Now, those seditious
persons who dispute against absolute authority, do
82not so much care to destroy it, as to convey it on
others: for removing this power, they together
take away civil society, and a confusion of all
things returns. There is so much obedience joined
to this absolute right of the chief ruler, as is necessarily
required for the government of the city, that
is to say, so much as that right of his may not be
granted in vain. Now this kind of obedience,
although for some reasons it may sometimes by
right be denied, yet because a greater cannot be
performed, we will call it simple. But the obligation
to perform this grows not immediately from
that contract, by which we have conveyed all our
right on the city; but immediately from hence, that
without obedience the city’s right would be frustrate,
and by consequence there would be no
city constituted. For it is one thing if I say, I
give you right to command what you will; another,
if I say, I will do whatsoever you command. And
the command may be such, as I would rather die
than do it. Forasmuch, therefore, as no man can
be bound to will being killed, much less is he tied
to that which to him is worse than death. If
therefore I be commanded to kill myself, I am not
bound to do it. For though I deny to do it, yet the
right of dominion is not frustrated; since others
may be found, who being commanded will not refuse
to do it; neither do I refuse to do that, which
I have contracted to do. In like manner, if the
chief ruler command any man to kill him, he is
not tied to do it; because it cannot be conceived
that he made any such covenant. Nor if he command
to execute a parent, whether he be innocent
or guilty and condemned by the law; since there
83are others who being commanded will do that, and
a son will rather die than live infamous and hated
of all the world. There are many other cases in
which, since the commands are shameful to be
done by some and not by others, obedience may
by right be performed by these, and refused by
those; and this without breach of that absolute
right which was given to the chief ruler. For in no
case is the right taken away from him, of slaying
those who shall refuse to obey him. But they who
thus kill men, although by right given them from
him that hath it, yet if they use that right otherwise
than right reason requires, they sin against
the laws of nature, that is, against God.
That he is not tied to observe the laws of the city.
14. Neither can any man give somewhat to
himself; for he is already supposed to have what
he can give himself. Nor can he be obliged to
himself; for the same party being both the obliged
and the obliger, and the obliger having power to
release the obliged, it were merely in vain for a
man to be obliged to himself; because he can release
himself at his own pleasure, and he that
can do this is already actually free. Whence it is
plain, that the city is not tied to the civil laws; for
the civil laws are the laws of the city, by which,
if she were engaged, she should be engaged to
herself. Neither can the city be obliged to her
citizen; because, if he will, he can free her from
her obligation; and he will, as oft as she wills; for
the will of every citizen is in all things comprehended
in the will of the city; the city therefore
is free when she pleaseth, that is, she is now actually
free. But the will of a council, or one who
hath supreme authority given him, is the will of
84the city: he therefore contains the wills of all
particular citizens. Therefore neither is he bound
to the civil laws; for this is to be bound to himself;
nor to any of his citizens.
That no man can challenge a propriety in aught against him who hath the supreme power.
15. Now because, as hath been shown above,
before the constitution of a city all things belonged
to all men; nor is there that thing which any man
can so call his, as any other may not, by the same
right, claim as his own; for where all things are
common, there can be nothing proper to any man;
it follows, that propriety received its beginning[11]
when cities received their’s, and that that only is
proper to each man, which he can keep by the
laws and the power of the whole city, that is, of
him on whom its chief command is conferred.
Whence we understand, that each particular citizen
hath a propriety to which none of his fellow-citizens
hath right, because they are tied to the
same laws; but he hath no propriety in which the
chief ruler (whose commands are the laws, whose
will contains the will of each man, and who by
every single person is constituted the supreme
judge) hath not a right. But although there be
many things which the city permits to its citizens,
and therefore they may sometimes go to law
against their chief; yet is not that action belonging
85to civil right, but to natural equity.
Neither is it concerning what[12] by right he may
do who hath the supreme power, but what he hath
been willing should be done; and therefore he
shall be judge himself, as though (the equity of
the cause being well understood) he could not
give wrong judgment.
It is known by the civil laws what theft, murder, adultery, and injury are.
16. Theft, murder, adultery, and all injuries,
are forbid by the laws of nature; but what is to
be called theft, what murder, what adultery, what
injury in a citizen, this is not to be determined by
the natural, but by the civil law. For not every
taking away of the thing which another possesseth,
but only another man’s goods, is theft; but what
is our’s, and what another’s, is a question belonging
to the civil law. In like manner, not every
killing of a man is murder, but only that which
the civil law forbids; neither is all encounter with
women adultery, but only that which the civil law
prohibits. Lastly, all breach of promise is an injury,
where the promise itself is lawful; but where
86there is no right to make any compact, there can
be no conveyance of it, and therefore there can no
injury follow, as hath been said in the second
chapter, Article 17. Now what we may contract
for, and what not, depends wholly upon the civil
laws. The city of Lacedæmon therefore rightly
ordered, that those young men who could so take
away certain goods from others as not to be
caught, should go unpunished; for it was nothing
else but to make a law, that what was so acquired
should be their own, and not another’s. Rightly
also is that man everywhere slain, whom we kill in
war or by the necessity of self-defence. So also
that copulation which in one city is matrimony, in
another will be judged adultery. Also those contracts
which make up marriage in one citizen, do
not so in another, although of the same city; because
that he who is forbidden by the city, that is,
by that one man or council whose the supreme
power is, to contract aught, hath no right to make
any contract, and therefore having made any, it is
not valid, and by consequence no marriage. But
his contract which received no prohibition, was
therefore of force, and so was matrimony. Neither
adds it any force to any unlawful contracts, that
they were made by an oath or sacrament;[13] for
87those add nothing to the strengthening of the
contract, as hath been said above, Chap. II. Art. 22.
What therefore theft, what murder, what adultery,
and in general what injury is, must be known by
the civil laws; that is, the commands of him who
hath the supreme authority.
The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where there should not be any one endued with absolute power.
17. This same supreme command and absolute
power, seems so harsh to the greatest part of men,
as they hate the very naming of them; which
happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what
human nature and the civil laws are; and partly
also through their default, who, when they are invested
with so great authority, abuse their power
to their own lust. That they may therefore avoid
this kind of supreme authority, some of them will
have a city well enough constituted, if they who
shall be the citizens’ convening, do agree concerning
certain articles propounded, and in that convent
agitated and approved, and do command
them to be observed, and punishments prescribed
to be inflicted on them who shall break them. To
which purpose, and also to the repelling of a
foreign enemy, they appoint a certain and limited
return, with this condition, that if that suffice not,
they may call a new convention of estates. Who
88sees not in a city thus constituted, that the assembly
who prescribed those things had an absolute
power? If therefore the assembly continue, or
from time to time have a certain day and place of
meeting, that power will be perpetual. But if they
wholly dissolve, either the city dissolves with
them, and so all is returned to the state of war: or
else there is somewhere a power left to punish
those who shall transgress the laws, whosoever or
how many soever they be that have it; which cannot
possibly be without an absolute power. For he
that by right hath this might given, by punishments
to restrain what citizens he pleaseth, hath
such a power as a greater cannot possibly be
given by any citizens.
The notes of supreme authority.
18. It is therefore manifest, that in every city
there is some one man, or council, or court, who
by right hath as great a power over each single
citizen, as each man hath over himself considered
out of that civil state; that is, supreme and absolute,
to be limited only by the strength and forces
of the city itself, and by nothing else in the world.
For if his power were limited, that limitation must
necessarily proceed from some greater power. For
he that prescribes limits, must have a greater
power than he who is confined by them. Now that
confining power is either without limit, or is again
restrained by some other greater than itself; and
so we shall at length arrive to a power, which hath
no other limit but that which is the terminus ultimus
of the forces of all the citizens together. That
same is called the supreme command; and if it be
committed to a council, a supreme council, but if
to one man, the supreme lord of the city. Now
89the notes of supreme command are these: to make
and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace,
to know and judge of all controversies, either by
himself, or by judges appointed by him; to elect
all magistrates, ministers, and counsellors. Lastly,
if there be any man who by right can do some
one action, which is not lawful for any citizen or
citizens to do beside himself, that man hath obtained
the supreme power. For those things
which by right may not be done by any one or
many citizens, the city itself can only do. He
therefore that doth those things, useth the city’s
right; which is the supreme power.
If the city be compared with a man, he who hath the supreme command is in order to the city, as the human soul is to the man.
19. They who compare a city and its citizens
with a man and his members, almost all say, that
he who hath the supreme power in the city is in
relation to the whole city, such as the head is to
the whole man. But it appears by what hath
been already said, that he who is endued with
such a power, whether it be a man or a court,
hath a relation to the city, not as that of the head,
but of the soul to the body. For it is the soul by
which a man hath a will, that is, can either will or
nill; so by him who hath the supreme power, and
no otherwise, the city hath a will, and can either
will or nill. A court of counsellors is rather to
be compared with the head, or one counsellor,
whose only counsel (if of any one alone) the chief
ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment:
for the office of the head is to counsel, as the soul’s
is to command.
That the supreme power cannot by right be dissolved by their consents, by whose compacts it was constituted;
20. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted
by virtue of the compacts which each
single citizen or subject mutually makes with the
90other; but all contracts, as they receive their force
from the contractors, so by their consent they lose
it again and are broken: perhaps some may infer
hence, that by the consent of all the subjects together
the supreme authority may be wholly taken
away. Which inference, if it were true, I cannot
discern what danger would thence by right arise
to the supreme commanders. For since it is supposed
that each one hath obliged himself to each
other; if any one of them shall refuse, whatsoever
the rest shall agree to do, he is bound notwithstanding.
Neither can any man without injury to
me, do that which by contract made with me he
hath obliged himself not to do. But it is not to be
imagined that ever it will happen, that all the subjects
together, not so much as one excepted, will
combine against the supreme power. Wherefore
there is no fear for rulers in chief, that by any
right they can be despoiled of their authority. If,
notwithstanding, it were granted that their right
depended only on that contract which each man
makes with his fellow-citizen, it might very easily
happen that they might be robbed of that dominion
under pretence of right. For subjects being
called either by the command of the city, or seditiously
flocking together, most men think that the
consents of all are contained in the votes of the
greater part; which in truth is false. For it is not
from nature that the consent of the major part
should be received for the consent of all, neither
is it true in tumults; but it proceeds from civil institution:
and is then only true, when that man or
court which hath the supreme power, assembling
his subjects, by reason of the greatness of their
91number allows those that are elected a power of
speaking for those who elected them; and will
have the major part of voices, in such matters as
are by him propounded to be discussed, to be as
effectual as the whole. But we cannot imagine
that he who is chief, ever convened his subjects
with intention that they should dispute his right;
unless weary of the burthen of his charge, he declared
in plain terms that he renounces and
abandons his government. Now, because most
men through ignorance esteem not the consent of
the major part of citizens only, but even of a very
few, provided they be of their opinion, for the
consent of the whole city; it may very well seem
to them, that the supreme authority may by right
be abrogated, so it be done in some great assembly
of citizens by the votes of the greater number.
But though a government be constituted by the
contracts of particular men with particulars, yet
its right depends not on that obligation only;
there is another tie also towards him who commands.
For each citizen compacting with his fellow,
says thus: I convey my right on this party,
upon condition that you pass yours to the same:
by which means, that right which every man had
before to use his faculties to his own advantage,
is now wholly translated on some certain man or
council for the common benefit. Wherefore what
by the mutual contracts each one hath made with
the other, what by the donation of right which
every man is bound to ratify to him that commands,
the government is upheld by a double
obligation from the citizens; first, that which is
due to their fellow-citizens; next, that which they
92owe to their prince. Wherefore no subjects, how
many soever they be, can with any right despoil
him who bears the chief rule of his authority, even
without his own consent.
1. That there are three kinds of government only, democracy,
aristocracy, monarchy. 2. That oligarchy is not a diverse form
of government distinct from aristocracy, nor anarchy any form
at all. 3. That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate
monarchy. 4. That there cannot be a mixed state, fashioned
out of these several species. 5. That democracy, except there
be certain times and places of meeting prefixed, is dissolved.
6. In a democracy the intervals of the times of meeting must
be short, or the administration of government during the interval
committed to some one. 7. In a democracy, particulars
contract with particulars to obey the people: the people is
obliged to no man. 8. By what acts aristocracy is constituted.
9. In an aristocracy the nobles make no compact, neither are
they obliged to any citizen or to the whole people. 10. The
nobles must necessarily have their set meetings. 11. By
what acts monarchy is constituted. 12. Monarchy is by compact
obliged to none for the authority it hath received.
13. Monarchy is ever in the readiest capacity to exercise all
those acts which are requisite to good government 14. What
kind of sin that is, and what sort of men are guilty of it, when
the city performs not its office towards the citizens, nor the
citizens towards the city. 15. A monarch made without limitation
of time hath power to elect his successor. 16. Of
limited monarchs. 17. A monarch, retaining his right of
government, cannot by any promise whatsoever be conceived
to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the
exercise of his authority. 18. How a citizen is freed from
subjection.
There are three kinds of government only; democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.
1. We have already spoken of a city by institution
in its genus; we will now say somewhat of
93its species. As for the difference of cities, it is
taken from the difference of the persons to whom
the supreme power is committed. This power is
committed either to one man, or council, or some
one court consisting of many men. Furthermore,
a council of many men consists either of all the
citizens, insomuch as every man of them hath a
right to vote, and an interest in the ordering of
the greatest affairs, if he will himself; or of a part
only. From whence there arise three sorts of
government; the one, when the power is in a
council where every citizen hath a right to vote;
and it is called a democracy. The other, when it is in
a council, where not all, but some part only have
their suffrages; and we call it an aristocracy. The
third is that, when the supreme authority rests
only in one; and it is styled a monarchy. In the
first, he that governs is called δῆμος, the people;
in the second, the nobles; in the third, the
monarch.
Oligarchy is no state of a city distinct from aristocracy; neither is anarchy any state at all.
2. Now, although ancient writers of politics
have introduced three other kinds of government
opposite to these; to wit, anarchy or confusion to
democracy; oligarchy, that is, the command of
some few, to aristocracy, and tyranny to monarchy;
yet are not these three distinct forms of government,
but three diverse titles given by those who
were either displeased with that present government
or those that bare rule. For men, by giving
names, do usually not only signify the things themselves,
but also their own affections, as love, hatred,
anger, and the like. Whence it happens that
what one man calls a democracy, another calls an
anarchy; what one counts an aristocracy, another
94esteems an oligarchy; and whom one titles a king,
another styles him a tyrant. So as we see, these
names betoken not a diverse kind of government,
but the diverse opinions of the subjects concerning
him who hath the supreme power. For first, who
sees not that anarchy is equally opposite to all the
aforenamed forms? For that word signifies that
there is no government at all, that is, not any city.
But how is it possible that no city should be the
species of a city? Furthermore, what difference
is there between an oligarchy, which signifies the
command of a few or grandees, or an aristocracy,
which is that of the prime or chief heads, more
than that men differ so among themselves, that the
same things seem not good to all men? Whence it
happens that those persons, who by some are looked
on as the best, are by others esteemed to be the
worst of all men.
That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy.
3. But men, by reason of their passions, will
very hardly be persuaded that a kingdom and
tyranny are not diverse kinds of cities; who though
they would rather have the city subject to one
than many, yet do they not believe it to be well
governed unless it accord with their judgments.
But we must discover by reason, and not by passion,
what the difference is between a king and a
tyrant. But first, they differ not in this, that a
tyrant hath the greater power; for greater than
the supreme cannot be granted; nor in this, that
one hath a limited power, the other not; for he
whose authority is limited, is no king, but his subject
that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in
their manner of acquisition; for if in a democratical
or aristocratical government some one citizen
95should, by force, possess himself of the supreme
power, if he gain the consent of all the
citizens, he becomes a legitimate monarch; if not,
he is an enemy, not a tyrant. They differ therefore
in the sole exercise of their command, insomuch
as he is said to be a king who governs well,
and he a tyrant that doth otherwise. The case
therefore is brought to this pass; that a king, legitimately
constituted in his government, if he seem
to his subjects to rule well and to their liking,
they afford him the appellation of a king; if not,
they count him a tyrant. Wherefore we see a
kingdom and tyranny are not diverse forms of
government, but one and the self-same monarch
hath the name of a king given him in point of
honour and reverence to him, and of a tyrant in
way of contumely and reproach. But what we
frequently find in books said against tyrants, took
its original from Greek and Roman writers, whose
government was partly democratical, and partly
aristocratical, and therefore not tyrants only, but
even kings were odious to them.
That there can no mixed state be formed out of these forenamed kinds of government.
4. There are, who indeed do think it necessary
that a supreme command should be somewhere extant
in a city; but if it should be in any one,
either man or council, it would follow, they say, that
all the citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition,
they imagine that there may be a certain form
of government compounded of those three kinds we
have spoken of, yet different from each particular;
which they call a mixed monarchy, or mixed aristocracy,
or mixed democracy, according as any one
of these three sorts shall be more eminent than
the rest. For example, if the naming of magistrates
96and the arbitration of war and peace should belong
to the King, judicature to the Lords, and contribution
of monies to the People, and the power of
making laws to all together, this kind of state
would they call a mixed monarchy forsooth. But
if it were possible that there could be such a state,
it would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject.
For as long as they all agree, each single
citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be:
but if they disagree, the state returns to a civil
war and the right of the private sword; which
certainly is much worse than any subjection whatsoever.
But that there can be no such kind of government,[14]
hath been sufficiently demonstrated in
the foregoing chapter, art. 6-12.
That democracy, except it have certain times and places of meeting prescribed, is dissolved.
5. Let us see a little now, in the constituting of
each form of government what the constitutors do.
Those who met together with intention to erect
a city, were almost in the very act of meeting, a
democracy. For in that they willingly met, they
97are supposed obliged to the observation of what
shall be determined by the major part; which,
while that convent lasts, or is adjourned to some
certain days and places, is a clear democracy. For
that convent, whose will is the will of all the citizens,
hath the supreme authority; and because in
this convent every man is supposed to have a right
to give his voice, it follows that it is a democracy,
by the definition given in the first article of this
chapter. But if they depart and break up the convent,
and appoint no time or place where and
when they shall meet again, the public weal returns
to anarchy and the same state it stood in
before their meeting, that is, to the state of all
men warring against all. The people, therefore,
retains the supreme power, no longer than there is
a certain day and place publicly appointed and
known, to which whosoever will may resort. For
except that be known and determined, they may
either meet at divers times and places, that is, in
factions, or not at all; and then it is no longer
δῆμος, the people, but a dissolute multitude, to
whom we can neither attribute any action or right.
Two things therefore frame a democracy; whereof
one, to wit, the perpetual prescription of convents,
makes δῆμον, the people; the other, which is a
plurality of voices, τὸ κράτος, or the power.
In democracy, the intervals of the times of convening must be short, or the administration of the government committed to some one.
6. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the
people, so as to maintain its supremacy, to have
some certain known times and places of meeting,
unless that either the intervals of the times be of
less distance, than that anything may in the meantime
happen whereby, by reason of the defect of
power, the city may be brought into some danger;
98or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority
be, during the interval, granted to some one
man or council. For unless this be done, there is
not that wary care and heed taken for the defence
and peace of single men, which ought to be; and
therefore it will not deserve the name of a city, because
that in it, for want of security, every man’s
right of defending himself at his own pleasure
returns to him again.
In a democracy, particulars contract with particulars to obey the people: the people is obliged to no man.
7. Democracy is not framed by contract of particular
persons with the people, but by mutual
compacts of single men each with other. But
hence it appears, in the first place, that the persons
contracting must be in being before the contract
itself. But the people is not in being before the constitution
of government, as not being any person,
but a multitude of single persons; wherefore there
could then no contract pass between the people and
the subject. Now, if after that government is
framed, the subject make any contract with the
people, it is in vain; because the people contains
within its will the will of that subject, to whom it
is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at
its own will and pleasure disengage itself, and by
consequence is now actually free. But in the
second place, that single persons do contract each
with other, may be inferred from hence; that in
vain sure would the city have been constituted, if
the citizens had been engaged by no contracts to
do or omit what the city should command to be
done or omitted. Because, therefore, such kind
of compacts must be understood to pass as necessary
to the making up of a city, but none can be
made (as is already shewed) between the subject
99and the people; it follows, that they must be made
between single citizens, namely, that each man
contract to submit his will to the will of the major
part, on condition that the rest also do the like. As
if every one should say thus: I give up my right
unto the people for your sake, on condition that
you also deliver up yours for mine.
By what acts an aristocracy is framed.
8. An aristocracy or council of nobles endowed
with supreme authority, receives its original from
a democracy, which gives up its right unto it.
Where we must understand that certain men distinguished
from others, either by eminence of title,
blood, or some other character, are propounded to
the people, and by plurality of voices are elected;
and being elected, the whole right of the people or
city is conveyed on them, insomuch as whatsoever
the people might do before, the same by right may
this court of elected nobles now do. Which being
done, it is clear that the people, considered as one
person, its supreme authority being already transferred
on these, is no longer now in being.
In an aristocracy the nobles make no contract, nor are they obliged to any citizen, or to the whole people.
9. As in democracy the people, so in an aristocracy
the court of nobles is free from all manner of
obligation. For seeing subjects not contracting
with the people, but by mutual compacts among
themselves, were tied to all that the people did;
hence also they were tied to that act of the people,
in resigning up its right of government into the
hands of nobles. Neither could this court, although
elected by the people, be by it obliged to anything.
For being electedelected, the people is at once dissolved,
as was declared above, and the authority it had as
being a person, utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the
100obligation which was due to the person, must also
vanish, and perish together with it.
The nobles must necessarily have their set meetings.
10. Aristocracy hath these considerations, together
with democracy. First, that without an appointment
of some certain times and places, at
which the court of nobles may meet, it is no longer a
court, or one person, but a dissolute multitude without
any supreme power. Secondly, that the times
of their assembling cannot be disjoined by long intervals
without prejudice to the supreme power,
unless its administration be transferred to some
one man. Now the reasons why this happens, are
the same which we set down in the fifth article.
By what acts a monarchy is framed.
11. As an aristocracy, so also a monarchy is
derived from the power of the people, transferring
its right, that is, its authority on one man. Here
also we must understand, that some one man,
either by name or some other token, is propounded
to be taken notice of above all the rest; and that
by a plurality of voices the whole right of the people
is conveyed on him; insomuch as whatsoever
the people could do before he were elected, the
same in every respect may he by right now do,
being elected. Which being done, the people is
no longer one person, but a rude multitude, as
being only one before by virtue of the supreme
command, whereof they now have made a conveyance
from themselves on this one man.
That the monarch is by compact obliged to none for the authority he hath received.
12. And therefore neither doth the monarch
oblige himself to any for the command he receives.
For he receives it from the people; but as hath
been shewed above, the people, as soon as that act
is done, ceaseth to be a person; but the person
vanishing, obligation to the person vanisheth.
101The subjects therefore are tied to perform obedience
to the monarch, by those compacts only by
which they mutually obliged themselves to the observation
of all that the people should command
them, that is, to obey that monarch, if he were
made by the people.
A monarch is ever in the readier capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to well governing.
13. But a monarchy differs as well from an
aristocracy as a democracy, in this chiefly; that
in those there must be certain set times and places
for deliberation and consultation of affairs, that is,
for the actual exercise of it in all times and places.
For the people or the nobles not being one natural
person, must necessarily have their meetings. The
monarch, who is one by nature, is always in a present
capacity to execute his authority.
What kind of sin that is, and what sort of men are guilty of it, when the city performs not its office to the citizens, nor the citizens towards the city.
14. Because we have declared above, (in art.
7, 9, 12), that they who have gotten the supreme
command, are by no compacts obliged to any man,
it necessarily follows, that they can do no injury
to the subjects. For injury, according to the definition
made in chap. III. art. 3, is nothing else
but a breach of contract; and therefore where no
contracts have part, there can be no injury. Yet
the people, the nobles, and the monarch may diverse
ways transgress against the other laws of
nature, as by cruelty, iniquity, contumely, and
other like vices, which come not under this strict
and exact notion of injury. But if the subject
yield not obedience to the supreme, he will in propriety
of speech be said to be injurious, as well to
his fellow-subjects, because each man hath compacted
with the other to obey; as to his chief
ruler, in resuming that right which he hath given
102him, without his consent. And in a democracy or
aristocracy, if anything be decreed against any law
of nature, the city itself, that is, the civil person
sins not, but those subjects only by whose votes
it was decreed; for sin is a consequence of the natural
express will, not of the political, which is
artificial. For if it were otherwise, they would be
guilty by whom the decree was absolutely disliked.
But in a monarchy, if the monarch make
any decree against the laws of nature, he sins
himself; because in him the civil will and the natural
are all one.
A monarch made without limitation of time, may elect his successors.
15. The people who are about to make a monarch,
may give him the supremacy either simply
without limitation of time, or for a certain season
and time determined. If simply, we must understand
that he who receives it, hath the self-same
power which they had who gave it. On the same
grounds, therefore, that the people by right could
make him a monarchmonarch, may he make another monarch.
Insomuch as the monarch to whom the
command is simply given, receives a right not of
possession only, but of succession also; so as he
may declare whom he pleaseth for his successor.
Of limited monarchs.
16. But if the power be given for a time limited,
we must have regard to somewhat more than the
bare gift only. First, whether the people conveying
its authority, left itself any right to meet at
certain times and places, or not. Next, if it have
reserved this power, whether it were done so as
they might meet before that time were expired,
which they prescribed to the monarch. Thirdly,
whether they were contented to meet only at the
will of that temporary monarch, and not otherwise.
103Suppose now the people had delivered up
its power to some one man for term of life only;
which being done, let us suppose in the first place,
that every man departed from the council without
making any order at all concerning the place, where
after his death they should meet again to make a
new election. In this case, it is manifest by the
fifth article of this chapter, that the people ceaseth
to be a person, and is become a dissolute multitude;
every one whereof hath an equal, to wit, a
natural right to meet with whom he lists at divers
times, and in what places shall best please him;
nay, and if he can, engross the supreme power to
himself, and settle it on his own head. What monarch
soever, therefore, hath a command in such a
condition, he is bound by the law of nature,
set down in chap. III. art. 8, of not returning
evil for good, prudently to provide that by his
death the city suffer not a dissolution; either
by appointing a certain day and place, in which
those subjects of his, who have a mind to it,
may assemble themselves, or else by nominating a
successor; whether of these shall to him seem
most conducible to their common benefit. He
therefore, who on this foresaid manner hath received
his command during life, hath an absolute
power, and may at his discretion dispose of the
succession. In the next place, if we grant that the
people departed not from the election of the temporary
monarch, before they decreed a certain time
and place of meeting after his death; then the
monarch being dead, the authority is confirmed in
the people, not by any new acts of the subjects,
but by virtue of the former right. For all the supreme
104command, as dominion, was in the people;
but the use and exercise of it was only in the
temporary monarch, as in one that takes the benefit,
but hath not the right. But if the people after the
election of a temporary monarch, depart not from
the court before they have appointed certain times
and places to convene during the time prescribed
him; as the dictators in ancient times were made
by the people of Rome; such an one is not to be
accounted a monarch, but the prime officer of the
people. And if it shall seem good, the people may
deprive him of his office even before that time; as
the people of Rome did, when they conferred an
equal power on Minutius, master of the horse, with
Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom before they had
made dictator. The reason whereof is, that it is
not to be imagined, that he, whether man or council,
who hath the readiest and most immediate
power to act, should hold his command on such
terms, as not to be able actually to execute it; for
command is nothing else but a right of commanding,
as oft as nature allows it possible. Lastly, if
the people having declared a temporary monarch,
depart from the court on such terms, as it shall
not be lawful for them to meet without the command
of the monarch, we must understand the
people to be immediately dissolved, and that his
authority, who is thus declared, is absolute; forasmuch
as it is not in the power of all the subjects
to frame the city anew, unless he give consent who
hath now alone the authority. Nor matters it,
that he hath perhaps made any promise to assemble
his subjects on some certain times; since
there remains no person now in being, but at his
105discretion, to whom the promise was made. What
we have spoken of these four cases of a people
electing a temporary monarch, will be more clearly
explained by comparing them with an absolute monarch
who hath no heir-apparent. For the people
is lord of the subject in such a manner, as there
can be no heir but whom itself doth appoint.
Besides, the spaces between the times of the subjects’
meeting, may be fitly compared to those
times wherein the monarch sleeps; for in either
the acts of commanding cease, the power remains.
Furthermore, to dissolve the convent, so as it cannot
meet again, is the death of the people; just as
sleeping, so as he can never wake more, is the death
of a man. As therefore a king who hath no heir,
going to his rest so as never to rise again, that is,
dying, if he commit the exercise of his regal
authority to any one till he awake, does by consequence
give him the succession; the people also
electing a temporary monarch, and not reserving
a power to convene, delivers up to him the whole
dominion of the country. Furthermore, as a king
going to sleep for some season, entrusts the administration
of his kingdom to some other, and
waking takes it again; so the people having elected
a temporary monarch, and withal retaining a right
to meet at a certain day and place, at that day receives
its supremacy again. And as a king who
hath committed the execution of his authority to
another, himself in the meanwhile waking, can recal
this commission again when he pleaseth; so
the people, who during the time prescribed to the
temporary monarch doth by right convene, may if
they please deprive the monarch of his authority.
106Lastly, the king, who commits his authority to
another while himself sleeps, not being able to
wake again till he whom he entrusted give consent,
loses at once both his power and his life; so the
people, who hath given the supreme power to a
temporary monarch in such sort as they cannot
assemble without his command, is absolutely dissolved,
and the power remains with him whom they
have chosen.
A monarch retaining his right of government, cannot, by any promise whatsoever, be conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his authority.
17. If the monarch promise aught to any one
or many subjects together, by consequence whereof
the exercise of his power may suffer prejudice,
that promise or compact, whether made by oath
or without it, is null. For all compact is a conveyance
of right, which by what hath been said in
the fourth article of the second chapter, requires
meet and proper signs of the will in the conveyer.
But he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining
the end, doth also sufficiently declare that he
quits not his right to the means necessary to that
end. Now he who hath promised to part with
somewhat necessary to the supreme power, and
yet retains the power itself, gives sufficient tokens
that he no otherwise promised it, than so far forth
as the power might be retained without it. Whensoever
therefore it shall appear, that what is promised
cannot be performed without prejudice to
the power, the promise must be valued as not
made, that is, of no effect.
By what means a subject is freed from his subjection.
18. We have seen how subjects, nature dictating,
have obliged themselvesthemselves by mutual compacts
to obey the supreme power. We will see now by
what means it comes to pass, that they are released
from these bonds of obedience. And first of all,
107this happens by rejection, namely, if a man cast
off or forsake, but convey not the right of his
command on some other. For what is thus rejected,
is openly exposed to all alike, catch who
catch can; whence again, by the right of nature,
every subject may heed the preservation of himself
according to his own judgment. In the second
place, if the kingdom fall into the power of the
enemy, so as there can no more opposition be
made against them, we must understand that he
who before had the supreme authority, hath now
lost it: for when the subjects have done their full
endeavour to prevent their falling into the enemy’s
hands, they have fulfilled those contracts of obedience
which they made each with other; and
what, being conquered, they promise afterwards to
avoid death, they must with no less endeavour
labour to perform. Thirdly, in a monarchy, (for a
democracy and aristocracy cannot fail), if there be
no successor, all the subjects are discharged from
their obligations; for no man is supposed to be
tied he knows not to whom; for in such a case it
were impossible to perform aught. And by these
three ways, all subjects are restored from their
civil subjection to that liberty which all men have
to all things; to wit, natural and savage; for the
natural state hath the same proportion to the civil,
(I mean, liberty to subjection), which passion hath
to reason, or a beast to a man. Furthermore, each
subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection
by the will of him who hath the supreme power,
namely, if he change his soil; which may be done
two ways, either by permission, as he who gets
108license to dwell in another country; or command,
as he who is banished. In both cases, he is free
from the laws of his former country; because he
is tied to observe those of the latter.
1. What lord and servant signify. 2. The distinction of servants,
into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty, and
slaves, or such as serve being imprisoned or bound in fetters.
3. The obligation of a servant arises from the liberty of body
allowed him by his lord. 4. Servants that are bound, are not
by any compacts tied to their lords. 5. Servants have no
propriety in their goods against their lord. 6. The lord may
sell his servant, or alienate him by testament 7. The lord
cannot injure his servant. 8. He that is lord of the lord, is
lord also of his servants. 9. By what means servants are
freed. 10. Dominion over beasts belongs to the right of
nature.
What lord and servant are.
1. In the two foregoing chapters we have treated
of an institutive or framed government, as being
that which receives its original from the consent
of many, who by contract and faith mutually given
have obliged each other. Now follows what may
be said concerning a natural government; which
may also be called acquired, because it is that
which is gotten by power and natural force. But
we must know in the first place, by what means
the right of dominion may be gotten over the persons
of men. Where such a right is gotten, there
is a kind of a little kingdom; for to be a king, is
nothing else but to have dominion over many persons;
and thus a great family is a kingdom, and a
little kingdom a family. Let us return again to
109the state of nature, and consider men as if but
even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly,
like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all
kind of engagement to each other. There are but
three ways only, whereby one can have a dominion
over the person of another; whereof the first is,
if by mutual contract made between themselves, for
peace and self-defence’s sake, they have willingly
given up themselves to the power and authority of
some man, or council of men; and of this we have
already spoken. The second is, if a man taken
prisoner in the wars, or overcome, or else distrusting
his own forces, to avoid death, promises the
conqueror or the stronger party his service, that
is, to do all whatsoever he shall command him. In
which contract, the good which the vanquished or
inferior in strength doth receive, is the grant of his
life, which by the right of war in the natural state
of men he might have been deprived of; but the
good which he promises, is his service and obedience.
By virtue therefore of this promise, there
is as absolute service and obedience due from the
vanquished to the vanquisher, as possibly can be,
excepting what repugns the divine laws; for he
who is obliged to obey the commands of any man
before he knows what he will command him, is
simply and without any restriction tied to the performance
of all commands whatsoever. Now he
that is thus tied, is called a servant; he to whom
he is tied, a lord. Thirdly, there is a right acquired
over the person of a man by generation;
of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be
spoken in the following chapter.
The distinction of servants, into such as upon trust enjoy their natural liberty, and slaves, or such as serve being imprisoned or fettered.
2. Every one that is taken in the war, and hath
110his life spared him, is not supposed to have contracted
with his lord; for every one is not trusted
with so much of his natural liberty, as to be able,
if he desired it, either to fly away, or quit his service,
or contrive any mischief to his lord. And
these serve indeed, but within prisons or bound
within irons; and therefore they were called not
by the common name of servant only, but by the
peculiar name of slave; even as now at this day,
un serviteur, and un serf, or un esclave have diverse
significations.
The obligation of a servant ariseth from that freedom which is granted him by his lord.
3. The obligation therefore of a servant to his
lord, ariseth not from a simple grant of his life;
but from hence rather, that he keeps him not
bound or imprisoned. For all obligation derives
from contract; but where there is no trust, there
can be no contract, as appears by chap. ii. art. 9;
where a compact is defined to be the promise of
him who is trusted. There is therefore a confidence
and trust which accompanies the benefit of
pardoned life, whereby the lord affords him his
corporal liberty; so that if no obligation nor bonds
of contract had happened, he might not only have
made his escape, but also have killed his lord who
was the preserver of his life.
Servants that are bound, are not obliged to their lord by any contract.
4. Wherefore such kind of servants as are restrained
by imprisonment or bonds, are not comprehended
in that definition of servants given
above; because those serve not for the contract’s
sake, but to the end they may not suffer. And
therefore if they fly, or kill their lord, they offend
not against the laws of nature. For to bind any
man, is a plain sign that the binder supposes him
111that is bound, not to be sufficiently tied by any
other obligation.
Servants have no propriety in their goods against their lord.
5. The lord therefore hath no less dominion
over a servant that is not, than over one that is
bound; for he hath a supreme power over both,
and may say of his servant no less than of another
thing, whether animate or inanimate, this is mine.
Whence it follows, that whatsoever the servant
had before his servitude, that afterwards becomes
the lord’s; and whatsoever he hath gotten, it was
gotten for his lord. For he that can by right
dispose of the person of a man, may surely dispose
of all those things which that person could
dispose of. There is therefore nothing which the
servant may retain as his own against the will of
his lord; yet hath he, by his lord’s distribution, a
propriety and dominion over his own goods: insomuch
as one servant may keep and defend them
against the invasion of his fellow-servant, in the
same manner as hath been shewed before, that a
subject hath nothing properly his own against the
will of the supreme authority, but every subject
hath a propriety against his fellow-subject.
The lord may sell his servant, or alienate him by testament.
6. Since therefore both the servant himself, and
all that belongs to him are his lord’s, and by the
right of nature every man may dispose of his own
in what manner he pleases; the lord may either
sell, lay to pledge, or by testament convey the dominion
he hath over his servant, according to his
own will and pleasure.
The lord cannot be injurious to his servant.
7. Furthermore, what hath before been demonstrated
concerning subjects in an institutive government,
namely, that he who hath the supreme
power can do his subject no injury; is true also
112concerning servants, because they have subjected
their will to the will of the Lord. Wherefore,
whatsoever he doth, it is done with their will; but
no injury can be done to him that willeth it.
He that is lord of the lord, is lord also of his servants.
8. But if it happen that the lord, either by captivity
or voluntary subjection, doth become a servant
or subject to another, that other shall not
only be lord of him, but also of his servants; supreme
lord over these, immediate lord over him.
Now because not the servant only, but also all he
hath, are his lord’s; therefore his servants now
belong to this man, neither can the mediate lord
dispose otherwise of them than shall seem good to
the supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civil
governments the lord have an absolute power over
his servants, that is supposed to be derived from
the right of nature, and not constituted, but
slightly passed over by the civil law.
By what means servants are freed.
9. A servant is by the same manner freed from
his servitude, that a subject in an institutive government
is freed from his subjection. First,
if his lord enfranchise him; for the right which
the servant transferred to his lord over himself,
the same may the lord restore to the servant
again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty
is called manumission; which is just as if a city
should permit a citizen to convey himself under
the jurisdiction of some other city. Secondly, if
the lord cast off his servant from him; which in a
city is banishment; neither differs it from manumission
in effect, but in manner only. For there,
liberty is granted as a favour, here, as a punishment:
in both, the dominion is renounced.
Thirdly, if the servant be taken prisoner, the old
113servitude is abolished by the new; for as all other
things, so servants also are acquired by war, whom
in equity the lord must protect, if he will have
them to be his. Fourthly, the servant is freed for
want of knowledge of a successor, the lord dying
(suppose) without any testament or heir. For no
man is understood to be obliged, unless he know
to whom he is to perform the obligation. Lastly,
the servant that is put in bonds, or by any other
means deprived of his corporal liberty, is freed
from that other obligation of contract. For there
can be no contract where there is no trust, nor
can that faith be broken which is not given. But
the lord who himself serves another, cannot so
free his servants, but that they must still continue
under the power of the supreme; for, as hath
been shewed before, such servants are not his, but
the supreme lord’s.
The dominion over beasts is by the right of nature.
10. We get a right over irrational creatures, in
the same manner that we do over the persons of
men; to wit, by force and natural strength. For
if in the state of nature it is lawful for every one,
by reason of that war which is of all against all, to
subdue and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem
to conduce unto their good; much more will the
same be lawful against brutes; namely, at their own
discretion to reduce those to servitude, which by
art may be tamed and fitted for use, and to persecute
and destroy the rest by a perpetual war as
dangerous and noxious. Our dominion therefore
over beasts, hath its original from the right of nature,
not from divine positive right. For if such
a right had not been before the publishing of the
Sacred Scriptures, no man by right might have
114killed a beast for his food, but he to whom the divine
pleasure was made manifest by holy writ; a
most hard condition for men indeed, whom the
beasts might devour without injury, and yet they
might not destroy them. Forasmuch therefore as
it proceeds from the right of nature, that a beast
may kill a man, it is also by the same right that a
man may slay a beast.
1. Paternal dominion ariseth not from generation. 2. Dominion
over infants belongs to him or her who first hath them in their
power. 3. Dominion over infants is originally the mother’s.
4. The exposed infant is his, from whom he receives his preservation.
5. The child that hath one parent a subject, and
the other a sovereign, belongs to him or her in authority.
6. In such a conjunction of man and woman, as neither hath
command over the other, the children are the mother’s, unless
by compact or civil law it be otherwise determined. 7. Children
are no less subject to their parents, than servants to their
lords and subjects to their princes. 8. Of the honour of parents
and lords. 9. Wherein liberty consists, and the difference
of subjects and servants. 10. There is the same right over
subjects in an hereditary government, which there is in an
institutive government. 11. The question concerning the
right of succession belongs only to monarchy. 12. A monarch
may by his will and testament dispose of his supreme authority:
13. Or give it, or sell it. 14. A monarch dying without testament,
is ever supposed to will that a monarch should succeed
him: 15. And some one of his children: 16. And a male
rather than female: 17. And the eldest rather than the
younger: 18. And his brother, if he want issue, before all
others. 19. In the same manner that men succeed to the
power, do they also succeed to the right of succession.
Paternal dominion ariseth not from generation.
1. Socrates is a man, and therefore a living
115creature, is right reasoning; and that most evident,
because there is nothing needful to the acknowledging
of the truth of the consequence, but
that the word man be understood; because a
living creature is in the definition itself of a man,
and every one makes up the proposition which was
desired, namely this, man is a living creature.
And this, Sophroniscus is Socrates’ father, and
therefore his lord, is perhaps a true inference, but
not evident; because the word lord is not in the
definition of a father: wherefore it is necessary, to
make it more evident, that the connexion of father
and lord be somewhat unfolded. Those that have
hitherto endeavoured to prove the dominion of a
parent over his children, have brought no other
argument than that of generation; as if it were of
itself evident, that what is begotten by me is mine;
just as if a man should think, that because there
is a triangle, it appears presently, without any further
discourse, that its angles are equal to two
right. Besides, since dominion, that is, supreme
power is indivisible, insomuch as no man can serve
two masters; but two persons, male and female,
must concur in the act of generation; it is impossible
that dominion should at all be acquired by
generation only. Wherefore we will, with the more
diligence, in this place inquire into the original
of paternal government.
Dominion over infants belongs to him who first hath them in his power.
2. We must therefore return to the state of nature,
in which, by reason of the equality of nature,
all men of riper years are to be accounted equal.
There by right of nature the conqueror is lord of
the conquered. By the right therefore of nature,
the dominion over the infant first belongs to him
116who first hath him in his power. But it is manifest
that he who is newly born, is in the mother’s
power before any others; insomuch as she may
rightly, and at her own will, either breed him up
or adventure him to fortune.
Dominion over infants is originally the mother’s.
3. If therefore she breed him, because the state
of nature is the state of war, she is supposed to
bring him up on this condition; that being grown
to full age he become not her enemy; which is,
that he obey her. For since by natural necessity
we all desire that which appears good unto us, it
cannot be understood that any man hath on such
terms afforded life to another, that he might both
get strength by his years, and at once become an
enemy. But each man is an enemy to that other,
whom he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in
the state of nature, every woman that bears children,
becomes both a mother and a lord. But what
some say, that in this case the father, by reason of
the pre-eminence of sex, and not the mother becomes
lord, signifies nothing. For both reason
shows the contrary; because the inequality of their
natural forces is not so great, that the man could
get the dominion over the woman without war.
And custom also contradicts not; for women,
namely Amazons, have in former times waged war
against their adversaries, and disposed of their
children at their own wills. And at this day, in
divers places women are invested with the principal
authority; neither do their husbands dispose
of their children, but themselves; which in truth
they do by the right of nature; forasmuch as they
who have the supreme power, are not tied at all
(as hath been shewed) to the civil laws. Add also,
117that in the state of nature it cannot be known who
is the father, but by the testimony of the mother;
the child therefore is his whose the mother
will have it, and therefore her’s. Wherefore original
dominion over children belongs to the mother:
and among men no less than other creatures, the
birth follows the belly.
The exposed infant is his that preserves him.
4. The dominion passes from the mother to
others, divers ways. First, if she quit and forsake
her right by exposing the child. He therefore
that shall bring up the child thus exposed, shall
have the same dominion over it which the mother
had. For that life which the mother had given it,
(not by getting but nourishing it), she now by
exposing takes from it. Wherefore the obligation
also which arose from the benefit of life, is by
this exposition made void. Now the preserved
oweth all to the preserver, whether in regard of his
education as to a mother, or of his service as to a
lord. For although the mother in the state of nature,
where all men have a right to all things, may
recover her son again, namely, by the same right
that anybody else might do it; yet may not the
son rightly transfer himself again unto his mother.
The son of a subject and chief, is his that commands.
5. Secondly, if the mother be taken prisoner,
her son is his that took her; because that he who
hath dominion over the person, hath also dominion
over all belonging to the person; wherefore over
the son also, as hath been shewed in the foregoing
chapter, in the fifth article. Thirdly, if the mother
be a subject under what government soever,
he that hath the supreme authority in that government,
will also have the dominion over him that is
born of her; for he is lord also of the mother, who
118is bound to obey him in all things. Fourthly, if a
woman for society’s sake give herself to a man on
this condition, that he shall bear the sway; he
that receives his being from the contribution of
both parties, is the father’s, in regard of the command
he hath over the mother. But if a woman
bearing rule shall have children by a subject, the
children are the mother’s; for otherwise the woman
can have no children without prejudice to her
authority. And universally, if the society of the
male and female be such an union, as the one
have subjected himself to the other, the children
belong to him or her that commands.
In such a conjunction of male and female, as neither hath the commanding power over the other, the children are the mother’s; except by pact or civil law it be otherwise determined.
6. But in the state of nature, if a man and
woman contract so, as neither is subject to the
command of the other, the children are the mother’s,
for the reasons above given in the third article,
unless by pacts it be otherwise provided.
For the mother may by pact dispose of her right as
she lists; as heretofore hath been done by the
Amazons, who of those children which have been
begotten by their neighbours, have by pact allowed
them the males, and retained females to themselves.
But in a civil government, if there be a
contract of marriage between a man and woman,
the children are the father’s; because in all cities,
to wit, constituted of fathers, not mothers governing
their families, the domestical command belongs
to the man; and such a contract, if it be made according
to the civil laws, is called matrimony. But
if they agree only to lie together, the children are
the father’s or the mother’s variously, according to
the differing civil laws of divers cities.
Children are no less subject to their parents, than servants to their lords, and subjects to their city.
1197. Now because, by the third article, the mother
is originally lord of her children, and from her
the father, or somebody else by derived right; it
is manifest that the children are no less subject to
those by whom they are nourished and brought
up, than servants to their lords, and subjects to
him who bears the supreme rule; and that a parent
cannot be injurious to his son, as long as he is
under his power. A son also is freed from subjection
in the same manner as a subject and servant
are. For emancipation is the same thing with
manumission, and abdication with banishment.
Of the honour due to parents and lords.
8. The enfranchised son or released servant,
do now stand in less fear of their lord and father,
being deprived of his natural and lordly power
over them; and, if regard be had to true and inward
honour, do honour him less than before.
For honour, as hath been said in the section above,
is nothing else but the estimation of another’s
power; and therefore he that hath least power,
hath always least honour. But it is not to be
imagined, that the enfranchiser ever intended so
to match the enfranchised with himself, as that he
should not so much as acknowledge a benefit, but
should so carry himself in all things as if he were
become wholly his equal. It must therefore be ever
understood, that he who is freed from subjection,
whether he be a servant, son, or some colony, doth
promise all those external signs at least, whereby
superiors used to be honoured by their inferiors.
From whence it follows, that the precept of honouring
our parents, belongs to the law of nature,
not only under the title of gratitude, but also of
agreement.
Wherein liberty doth consist; and the difference between subjects and servants.
1209. What then, will some one demand, is the
difference between a son, or between a subject and
a servant? Neither do I know that any writer
hath fully declared what liberty and what slavery
is. Commonly, to do all things according to our own
fancies, and that without punishment, is esteemed
to be liberty; not to be able to do this, is judged
bondage; which in a civil government, and with
the peace of mankind, cannot possibly be done;
because there is no city without a command and a
restraining right. Liberty, that we may define it,
is nothing else but an absence of the lets and hindrances
of motion; as water shut up in a vessel
is therefore not at liberty, because the vessel hinders
it from running out; which, the vessel being
broken, is made free. And every man hath more
or less liberty, as he hath more or less space in
which he employs himself: as he hath more liberty,
who is in a large, than he that is kept in a close
prison. And a man may be free toward one part,
and yet not toward another; as the traveller is
bounded on this and that side with hedges or
stone walls, lest he spoil the vines or corn neighbouring
on the highway. And these kinds of lets
are external and absolute. In which sense all servants
and subjects are free, who are not fettered
and imprisoned. There are others which are arbitrary,
which do not absolutely hinder motion, but
by accident, to wit, by our own choice; as he that
is in a ship, is not so hindered but he may cast
himself into the sea, if he will. And here also the
more ways a man may move himself, the more
liberty he hath. And herein consists civil liberty;
for no man, whether subject, son, or servant, is
121so hindered by the punishments appointed by the
city, the father, or the lord, how cruel soever, but
that he may do all things, and make use of all
means necessary to the preservation of his life and
health. For my part therefore I cannot find what
reason a mere servant hath to make complaints, if
they relate only to want of liberty; unless he
count it a misery to be restrained from hurting
himself, and to receive that life, which by war, or
misfortune, or through his own idleness was forfeited,
together with all manner of sustenance,
and all things necessary to the conservation of
health, on this condition only, that he will be
ruled. For he that is kept in by punishments laid
before him, so as he dares not let loose the reins to
his will in all things, is not oppressed by servitude,
but is governed and sustained. But this privilege
free subjects and sons of a family have above servants
in every government and family where servants
are; that they may both undergo the more
honourable offices of the city or family, and also
enjoy a larger possession of things superfluous.
And herein lies the difference between a free
subject and a servant, that he is free indeed, who
serves his city only; but a servant is he, who also
serves his fellow-subject. All other liberty is an
exemption from the laws of the city, and proper
only to those that bear rule.
There is the same right in an hereditary, which there is in an institutive government.
10. A father with his sons and servants, grown
into a civil person by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction,
is called a family. This family, if through
multiplying of children and acquisition of servants
it becomes numerous, insomuch as without casting
the uncertain die of war it cannot be subdued, will
122be termed an hereditary kingdom. Which though
it differ from an institutive monarchy, being acquired
by force, in the original and manner of its
constitution; yet being constituted, it hath all the
same properties, and the right of authority is everywhere
the same; insomuch as it is not needful to
speak anything of them apart.
The question concerning the right of succession belongs only to monarchy.
11. It hath been spoken, by what right supreme
authorities are constituted. We must now briefly
tell you, by what right they may be continued.
Now the right by which they are continued, is that
which is called the right of succession. Now because
in a democracy the supreme authority is with
the people, as long as there be any subjects in
being, so long it rests with the same person; for
the people hath no successor. In like manner in
an aristocracy, one of the nobles dying, some
other by the rest is substituted in his place; and
therefore except they all die together, which I
suppose will never happen, there is no succession.
The query therefore of the right of succession
takes place only in an absolute monarchy. For
they who exercise the supreme power for a time
only, are themselves no monarchs, but ministers
of state.
A monarch may dispose of the command of his government by testament:
12. But first, if a monarch shall by testament
appoint one to succeed him, the person appointed
shall succeed. For if he be appointed by the
people, he shall have all the right over the city
which the people had, as hath been showed in
chap. VII. art. 11. But the people might choose
him; by the same right therefore may he choose
another. But in an hereditary kingdom, there are
the same rights as in an institutive. Wherefore
123every monarch may by his will make a successor.
Or give it away, or sell it.
13. But what a man may transfer on another
by testament, that by the same right may he, yet
living, give or sell away. To whomsoever therefore
he shall make over the supreme power, whether
by gift or sale, it is rightly made.
A monarch dying without testament, is ever understood to will that a monarch should succeed him:
14. But if living he have not declared his will
concerning his successor by testament nor otherwise,
it is supposed, first, that he would not have
his government reduced to an anarchy or the
state of war, that is, to the destruction of his
subjects; as well because he could not do that
without breach of the laws of nature, whereby he
was obliged to the performance of all things necessarily
conducing to the preservation of peace;
as also because, if that had been his will, it had not
been hard for him to have declared that openly.
Next, because the right passeth according to the
will of the father, we must judge of the successor
according to the signs of his will. It is understood
therefore, that he would have his subjects to be
under a monarchical government, rather than any
other, because he himself in ruling hath before approved
of that state by his example, and hath not
afterward either by any word or deed condemned it.
And some one of his children:
15. Furthermore, because by natural necessity
all men wish them better, from whom they receive
glory and honour, than others; but every man
after death receives honour and glory from his
children, sooner than from the power of any other
men: hence we gather, that a father intends better
for his children than any other person’s. It is
to be understood therefore, that the will of the
124father, dying without testament, was that some of
his children should succeed him. Yet this is to be
understood with this proviso, that there be no
more apparent tokens to the contrary: of which
kind, after many successions, custom may be one.
For he that makes no mention of his succession,
is supposed to consent to the customs of his realm.
And a male rather than female:
16. Among children the males carry the pre-eminence;
in the beginning perhaps, because for
the most part, although not always, they are fitter
for the administration of greater matters, but specially
of wars; but afterwards, when it was grown
a custom, because that custom was not contradicted.
And therefore the will of the father, unless
some other custom or sign do clearly repugn
it, is to be interpreted in favour of them.
And of the males, the eldest rather than the younger:
17. Now because the sons are equal, and the
power cannot be divided, the eldest shall succeed.
For if there be any difference by reason of age,
the eldest is supposed more worthy; for nature
being judge, the most in years (because usually it
is so) is the wisest; but other judge there cannot
be had. But if the brothers must be equally valued,
the succession shall be by lot. But primogeniture
is a natural lot, and by this the eldest is already preferred;
nor is there any that hath power to judge,
whether by this or any other kind of lots the matter
is to be decided. Now the same reason which
contends thus for the first-born son, doth no less
for the first-born daughter.
And his brother, if he want issue, before all others.
18. But if he have no children, then the command
shall pass to his brothers and sisters; for
the same reason that the children should have succeeded,
if he had had them. For those that are
125nearest to us in nature, are supposed to be nearest
in benevolence. And to his brothers sooner
than his sisters, and to the elder sooner than the
younger; for the reason is the same for these, that
it was for the children.
In the same manner that men succeed to the power, do they also succeed to the right of succession.
19. Furthermore, by the same reason that men
succeed to the power, do they also succeed to the
right of succession. For if the first-born die before
the father, it will be judged that he transferred his
right of succession unto his children; unless the
father have otherwise decreed it. And therefore
the nephews will have a fairer pretence to the succession,
than the uncles. I say all these things will
be thus, if the custom of the place (which the
father by not contradicting will be judged to have
consented to) do not hinder them.
126
1. A comparison of the natural state with the civil. 2. The conveniences
and inconveniences of the ruler and his subjects are
alike. 3. The praise of monarchy. 4. The government under
one, cannot be said to be unreasonable in this respect, namely,
because one hath more power than all the rest. 5. A rejection
of their opinion, who say, that a lord with his servants cannot
make a city. 6. Exactions are more grievous under a popular
state, than a monarchy. 7. Innocent subjects are less exposed
to penalties under a monarch, than under the people. 8. The
liberty of single subjects is not less under a monarch, than
under a people. 9. It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that
they are not all admitted to public deliberations. 10. Civil
deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies,
by reason of the unskilfulness of the most part of men: 11. In
regard of eloquence: 12. In regard of faction: 13. In regard
of the unstableness of the laws: 14. In regard of the want
of secrecy. 15. That these inconveniences adhere to democracy,
forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the
esteem of wit. 16. The inconveniences of a city arising from
a king that is a child. 17. The power of generals is an evident
sign of the excellence of monarchy. 18. The best state of
a city is that, where the subjects are the ruler’s inheritance.
19. The nearer aristocracy draws to monarchy, the better it is;
the further it keeps from it, the worse.
A comparing the state of nature with the civil.
1. What democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy
are, hath already been spoken; but which of them
tends most to the preservation of the subjects’
peace and procuring their advantages, we must
see by comparing them together. But first let us
set forth the advantages and disadvantages of a
city in general; lest some perhaps should think it
better, that every man be left to live at his own
will, than to constitute any society at all. Every
man indeed out of the state of civil government
127hath a most entire, but unfruitful liberty; because
that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all
at his own will, must also by reason of the same
liberty in others suffer all at another’s will. But
in a constituted city, every subject retains to himself
as much freedom as suffices him to live well
and quietly; and there is so much taken away
from others, as may make them not to be feared.
Out of this state, every man hath such a right to
all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it, each one
securely enjoys his limited right. Out of it, any
man may rightly spoil or kill another; in it, none
but one. Out of it, we are protected by our own
forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it, no
man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all
men are. Lastly, out of it, there is a dominion of
passions, war, fear, poverty, slovenliness, solitude,
barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in it, the dominion
of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society,
elegancy, sciences, and benevolence.
The gains and losses of the ruler and his subjects are alike.
2. Aristotle, in his seventh book and fourteenth
chapter of his Politics, saith, that there are two
sorts of governments; whereof the one relates to
the benefit of the ruler, the other to that of the
subjects. As if where subjects are severely dealt
with, there were one, and where more mildly,
there were another form of government. Which
opinion may by no means be subscribed to; for all
the profits and disprofits arising from government
are the same, and common both to the ruler and
the subject. The damages which befall some particular
subjects through misfortune, folly, negligence,
sloth, or his own luxury, may very well be
severed from those which concern the ruler. But
128those relate not to the government itself, being
such as may happen in any form of government
whatsoever. If these same happen from the first
institution of the city, they will then be truly called
the inconveniences of government; but they will
be common to the ruler with his subjects, as their
benefits are common. But the first and greatest
benefit, peace and defence, is to both; for both he
that commands, and he who is commanded, to the
end that he may defend his life makes use at once
of all the forces of his fellow-subjects. And in
the greatest inconvenience that can befall a city,
namely, the slaughter of subjects arising from anarchy,
both the commander and the parties commanded
are equally concerned. Next, if the ruler
levy such a sum of vast moneys from his subjects,
as they are not able to maintain themselves and
their families, nor conserve their bodily strength
and vigor, the disadvantage is as much his as theirs,
who, with never so great a stock or measure of
riches, is not able to keep his authority or his
riches without the bodies of his subjects. But if he
raise no more than is sufficient for the due administration
of his power, that is a benefit equally to
himself and his subjects, tending to a common
peace and defence. Nor is it imaginable which
way public treasures can be a grievance to private
subjects, if they be not so exhausted as to be wholly
deprived from all possibility to acquire, even by
their industry, necessaries to sustain the strength
of their bodies and minds. For even thus the
grievance would concern the ruler; nor would it
arise from the ill-institution or ordination of the
government, because in all manner of governments
129subjects may be oppressed; but from the ill-administration
of a well-established government.
The praise of monarchy.
3. Now that monarchy, of the foresaid forms of
democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, hath the
pre-eminence, will best appear by comparing the
conveniences and inconveniences arising in each
one of them. Those arguments therefore, that the
whole universe is governed by one God; that the
ancients preferred the monarchical state before
all others, ascribing the rule of the gods to one
Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs and of
nations, the decrees of princes were held for laws;
that paternal government, instituted by God himself
in the creation, was monarchical; that other governments
were compacted by the artifice of men[15]
out of the ashes of monarchy, after it had been
ruined with seditions; and that the people of God
were under the jurisdiction of kings: although,
I say, these do hold forth monarchy as the more
eminent to us, yet because they do it by examples
and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will
pass them over.
The government of one cannot be said to be evil in this respect, namely, because one hath more power than all the rest.
1304. Some there are, who are discontented with
the government under one, for no other reason but
because it is under one; as if it were an unreasonable
thing, that one man among so many should so
far excel in power, as to be able at his own pleasure
to dispose of all the rest. These men, sure,
if they could, would withdraw themselves from
under the dominion of one God. But this exception
against one is suggested by envy, while they
see one man in possession of what all desire. For
the same cause, they would judge it to be as unreasonable
if a few commanded, unless they themselves
either were, or hoped to be of the number.
For if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have
not an equal right, surely an aristocracy must be
unreasonable also. But because we have showed
that the state of equality is the state of war, and
that therefore inequality was introduced by a general
consent; this inequality, whereby he whom we
have voluntarily given more to, enjoys more, is no
longer to be accounted an unreasonable thing.
The inconveniences therefore which attend the dominion
of one man, attend his person, not his unity.
Let us therefore see whether brings with it the
greater grievances to the subject, the command of
one man, or of many.
Rejection of their opinion, who say that a lord with his servants cannot make a city.
5. But first we must remove their opinion, who
deny that to be any city at all, which is compacted
of never so great a number of servants under a
common lord. In the ninth article of the fifth
chapter, a city is defined to be one person made
out of many men, whose will by their own contracts
is to be esteemed as the wills of them all;
insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties
131of each single person for the public peace and
safety. And by the same article of the same chapter,
one person is that, when the wills of many are
contained in the will of one. But the will of each
servant is contained in the will of his lord; as hath
been declared in the fifth article of the eighth
chapter; so as he may employ all their forces and
faculties according to his own will and pleasure.
It follows therefore that that must needs be a city,
which is constituted by a lord and many servants.
Neither can any reason be brought to contradict
this, which doth not equally combat against a city
constituted by a father and his sons. For to a
lord who hath no children, servants are in the nature
of sons; for they are both his honour and
safeguard; neither are servants more subject to
their lords, then children to their parents, as hath
been manifested above in the fifth article of the
eighth chapter.
The exactions are more grievous under command of the people, than under the monarch.
6. Among other grievances of supreme authority
one is, that the ruler, beside those monies
necessary for public charges, as the maintaining of
public ministers, building, and defending of castles,
waging wars, honourably sustaining his own household,
may also, if he will, exact others through his
lust, whereby to enrich his sons, kindred, favourites,
and flatterers too. I confess this is a
grievance, but of the number of those which accompany
all kinds of government, but are more
tolerable in a monarchy than in a democracy. For
though the monarch would enrich them, they cannot
be many, because belonging but to one. But
in a democracy, look how many demagogues, that
is, how many powerful orators there are with the
132people, (which ever are many, and daily new ones
growing), so many children, kinsmen, friends, and
flatterers are to be rewarded. For every of them
desire not only to make their families as potent, as
illustrious in wealth, as may be, but also to oblige
others to them by benefits, for the better strengthening
of themselves. A monarch may in great
part satisfy his officers and friends, because they
are not many, without any cost to his subjects; I
mean without robbing them of any of those treasures
given in for the maintenance of war and
peace. In a democracy, where many are to be
satisfied, and always new ones, this cannot be done
without the subject’s oppression. Though a monarch
may promote unworthy persons, yet oft
times he will not do it; but in a democracy, all the
popular men are therefore supposed to do it, because
it is necessary; for else the power of them
who did it, would so increase, as it would not
only become dreadful to those others, but even to
the whole city also.
Innocent subjects are less obnoxious to punishment under a monarch, than under the people.
7. Another grievance is, that same perpetual
fear of death, which every man must necessarily be
in while he considers with himself, that the ruler
hath power not only to appoint what punishments
he lists on any transgressions, but that he may
also in his wrath and sensuality slaughter his innocent
subjects, and those who never offended
against the laws. And truly this is a very great
grievance in any form of government, wheresoever
it happens; for it is therefore a grievance, because
it is, not because it may be done. But it is the
fault of the ruler, not of the government. For all
the acts of Nero are not essential to monarchy;
133yet subjects are less often undeservedly condemned
under one ruler, than under the people. For
kings are only severe against those who either
trouble them with impertinent counsels, or oppose
them with reproachful words, or control their
wills; but they are the cause that that excess of
power which one subject might have above another,
becomes harmless. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula
reigning, no men can undeservedly suffer
but such as are known to him, namely, courtiers,
and such as are remarkable for some eminent
charge; and not all neither, but they only who
are possessed of what he desires to enjoy. For
they that are offensive and contumelious, are deservedly
punished. Whosoever therefore in a monarchy
will lead a retired life, let him be what he
will that reigns, he is out of danger. For the ambitious
only suffer; the rest are protected from the
injuries of the more potent. But in a popular
dominion, there may be as many Neros as there
are orators who soothe the people. For each one
of them can do as much as the people, and they
mutually give way to each other’s appetite, as it
were by this secret pact, spare me to-day and
I’ll spare thee to-morrow, while they exempt those
from punishment, who to satisfy their lust and private
hatred have undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects.
Furthermore, there is a certain limit in
private power, which if it exceed, it may prove
pernicious to the realm; and by reason whereof
it is necessary sometimes for monarchs to have
a care, that the common weal do thence receive
no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted
in the multitude of riches, they lessened it
134by diminishing their heaps; but if it were in popular
applause, the powerful party, without any other
crime laid to his charge, was taken from among
them. The same was usually practised in democracies.
For the Athenians inflicted a punishment
of ten years’ banishment on those that were powerful,
merely because of their powers, without the
guilt of any other crime. And those who by
liberal gifts did seek the favour of the common
people, were put to death at Rome, as men ambitious
of a kingdom. In this democracy and monarchy
were even; yet differed they much in fame.
Because fame derives from the people; and what
is done by many, is commended by many. And
therefore what the monarch does, is said to be
done out of envy to their virtues; which if it were
done by the people, would be accounted policy.
Single persons have no less liberty under a monarch, than under the people.
8. There are some, who therefore imagine monarchy
to be more grievous then democracy, because
there is less liberty in that, than in this. If
by liberty they mean an exemption from that subjection
which is due to the laws, that is, the commands
of the people; neither in democracy, nor
in any other state of government whatsoever, is
there any such kind of liberty. If they suppose
liberty to consist in this, that there be few laws,
few prohibitions, and those too such, that except
they were forbidden, there could be no peace;
then I deny that there is more liberty in democracy
than monarchy; for the one as truly consisteth
with such a liberty, as the other. For although
the word liberty may in large and ample letters be
written over the gates of any city whatsoever, yet
is it not meant the subject’s, but the city’s liberty;
135neither can that word with better right be inscribed
on a city which is governed by the people, than
that which is ruled by a monarch. But when private
men or subjects demand liberty, under the
name of liberty they ask not for liberty, but dominion;
which yet for want of understanding they
little consider. For if every man would grant the
same liberty to another, which he desires for himself,
as is commanded by the law of nature; that
same natural state would return again, in which
all men may by right do all things; which if they
knew, they would abhor, as being worse than all
kinds of civil subjection whatsoever. But if any
man desire to have his single freedom, the rest being
bound, what does he else demand but to have
the dominion? For whoso is freed from all bonds,
is lord over all those that still continue bound.
Subjects therefore have no greater liberty in a
popular, than in a monarchical state. That which
deceives them, is the equal participation of command
and public places. For where the authority
is in the people, single subjects do so far forth
share in it, as they are parts of the people ruling;
and they equally partake in public offices, so far
forth as they have equal voices in choosing magistrates
and public ministers. And this is that which
Aristotle aimed at, himself also through the custom
of that time miscalling dominion liberty. (Polit.
lib. vi. cap. 2.) In a popular state there is liberty
by supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar,
as if no man were free out of this state.
From whence, by the way, we may collect, that
those subjects who in a monarchy deplore their
lost liberty, do only stomach this, that they are
not received to the steerage of the commonweal.
It is no disadvantage to the subjects, that they are not all admitted to the public deliberations.
1369. But perhaps for this very reason, some will
say that a popular state is much to be preferred
before a monarchical; because that where all men
have a hand in public businesses, there all have an
opportunity to shew their wisdom, knowledge, and
eloquence, in deliberating matters of the greatest
difficulty and moment; which by reason of that
desire of praise which is bred in human nature, is
to them who excel in such-like faculties, and seem
to themselves to exceed others, the most delightful
of all things. But in a monarchy, this same way
to obtain praise and honour is shut up to the
greatest part of subjects; and what is a grievance
if this be none? I will tell you: to see his opinion,
whom we scorn, preferred before ours; to have
our wisdom undervalued before our own faces; by
an uncertain trial of a little vain glory, to undergo
most certain enmities (for this cannot be avoided,
whether we have the better or the worse); to hate
and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of
opinions; to lay open our secret councils and advices
to all, to no purpose and without any benefit;
to neglect the affairs of our own family: these, I
say, are grievances. But to be absent from a trial
of wits, although those trials are pleasant to the
eloquent, is not therefore a grievance to them;
unless we will say, that it is a grievance to valiant
men to be restrained from fighting, because they
delight in it.
Civil deliberations are unadvisedly committed to many, by reason of the unskilfulness of most men:
10. Besides, there are many reasons, why deliberations
are less successful in great assemblies than
in lesser councils. Whereof one is, that to advise
rightly of all things conducing to the preservation
of a commonweal, we must not only understand
137matters at home, but foreign affairs too. At home,
by what goods the country is nourished and defended,
and whence they are fetched; what places
are fit to make garrisons of; by what means soldiers
are best to be raised and maintained; what
manner of affections the subjects bear towards
their prince or governors of their country; and
many the like. Abroad, what the power of each
neighbouring country is, and wherein it consists;
what advantage or disadvantage we may receive
from them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward,
and how affected to each other among
themselves; and what counsel daily passeth among
them. Now, because very few in a great assembly
of men understand these things, being for the most
part unskilful, that I say not incapable of them,
what can that same number of advisers with their
impertinent opinions contribute to good counsels,
other than mere lets and impediments?
By reason of their eloquence:
11. Another reason why a great assembly is
not so fit for consultation is, because every one
who delivers his opinion holds it necessary to
make a long-continued speech; and to gain the
more esteem from his auditors, he polishes and
adorns it with the best and smoothest language.
Now the nature of eloquence is to make good and
evil, profitable and unprofitable, honest and dishonest,
appear to be more or less than indeed they
are; and to make that seem just which is unjust,
according as it shall best suit with his end that
speaketh: for this is to persuade. And though
they reason, yet take they not their rise from true
principles, but from vulgar received opinions,
which for the most part are erroneous. Neither
138endeavour they so much to fit their speech to the
nature of the things they speak of, as to the passions
of their minds to whom they speak; whence
it happens, that opinions are delivered not by right
reason, but by a certain violence of mind. Nor
is this fault in the man, but in the nature itself of
eloquence, whose end, as all the masters of rhetoric
teach us, is not truth (except by chance), but
victory; and whose property is not to inform, but
to allure.
By reason of faction:
12. The third reason why men advise less successfully
in a great convent is, because that thence
arise factions in a commonweal; and out of factions,
seditions and civil war. For when equal
orators do combat with contrary opinions and
speeches, the conquered hates the conqueror and
all those that were of his side, as holding his
council and wisdom in scorn, and studies all
means to make the advice of his adversaries prejudicial
to the state: for thus he hopes to see the
glory taken from him, and restored unto himself.
Furthermore, where the votes are not so unequal,
but that the conquered have hopes, by the accession
of some few of their own opinion, at another
sitting to make the stronger party, the chief heads
do call the rest together; they advise a part how
they may abrogate the former judgment given;
they appoint to be the first and earliest at the next
convent; they determine what, and in what order
each man shall speak, that the same business may
again be brought to agitation; that so what was
confirmed before by the number of their then present
adversaries, the same may now in some measure
become of no effect to them, being negligently
139absent. And this same kind of industry and diligence
which they use to make a people, is commonly
called a faction. But when a faction is
inferior in votes, and superior, or not much inferior
in power, then what they cannot obtain by
craft and language, they attempt by force of arms;
and so it comes to a civil war. But some will say,
these things do not necessarily, nor often happen.
He may as well say, that the chief parties are not
necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that the
greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.
By reason of the unsettledness of the laws:
13. It follows hence, that when the legislative
power resides in such convents as these, the laws
must needs be inconstant; and change, not according
to the alteration of the state of affairs,
nor according to the changeableness of men’s
minds, but as the major part, now of this, then of
that faction, do convene. Insomuch as the laws
do float here and there, as it were upon the
waters.
For want of secrecy.
14. In the fourth place, the counsels of great
assemblies have this inconvenience; that whereas
it is oft of great consequence that they should be
kept secret, they are for the most part discovered
to the enemy before they can be brought to any
effect; and their power and will is as soon known
abroad, as to the people itself commanding at
home.
These inconveniences do adhere to democracy, forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with an opinion of wit.
15. These inconveniences, which are found in
the deliberations of great assemblies, do so far
forth evince monarchy to be better than democracy,
as in democracy affairs of great consequence
are oftener trusted to be discussed by such
140like committees, than in a monarchy. Neither can
it easily be done otherwise. For there is no reason
why every man should not naturally mind his
own private, than the public business, but that
here he sees a means to declare his eloquence,
whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious
and wise, and returning home to his
friends, to his parents, to his wife and children,
rejoice and triumph in the applause of his dexterous
behaviour. As of old, all the delight Marcus
Coriolanus had in his warlike actions, was to see
his praises so well pleasing to his mother. But if
the people in a democracy would bestow the
power of deliberating in matters of war and
peace, either on one, or some very few, being content
with the nomination of magistrates and public
ministers, that is to say, with the authority
without the ministration; then it must be confessed,
that in this particular democracy and
monarchy would be equal.
The inconveniences of government proceeding from a king who is a child.
16. Neither do the conveniences or inconveniences
which are found to be more in one kind
of government than another, arise from hence,
namely, because the government itself, or the administration
of its affairs, are better committed to
one than many; or on the other side, to many
than to some few. For government is the power,
the administration of it is the act. Now the
power in all kinds of government is equal; the
acts only differ, that is to say, the actions and
motions of a commonweal, as they flow from the
deliberations of many or few, of skilful or impertinent
men. Whence we understand, that the conveniences
or inconveniences of any government
141depend not on him in whom the authority resides,
but on his officers; and therefore nothing hinders
but that the commonweal may be well governed,
although the monarch be a woman, or youth, or
infant, provided that they be fit for affairs who
are endued with the public offices and charges.
And that which is said, woe to the land whose
king is a child, doth not signify the condition of
a monarchy to be inferior to a popular state; but
contrariwise, that by accident it is the grievance
of a kingdom, that the king being a child, it often
happens, that many by ambition and power intruding
themselves into public councils, the government
comes to be administered in a democratical
manner; and that thence arise those infelicities,
which for the most part accompany the dominion
of the people.
The power of generals is an argument of the excellency of monarchy.
17. But it is a manifest sign that the most absolute
monarchy is the best state of government,
that not only kings, but even those cities which
are subject to the people or to nobles, give the
whole command of war to one only; and that so
absolute, as nothing can be more. Wherein, by
the way, this must be noted also; that no king can
give a general greater authority over his army,
than he himself by right may exercise over all his
subjects. Monarchy therefore is the best of all
governments in the camps. But what else are many
commonwealths, than so many camps strengthened
with arms and men against each other; whose
state, because not restrained by any common
power, howsoever an uncertain peace, like a short
truce, may pass between them, is to be accounted
for the state of nature; which is the state of war.
The best state of a commonweal, is that where the subjects are the ruler’s inheritance.
14218. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation
of ourselves to be subject to some man
or council, we cannot on better condition be subject
to any, than one whose interest depends upon
our safety and welfare; and this then comes to
pass, when we are the inheritance of the ruler.
For every man of his own accord endeavours the
preservation of his inheritance. But the lands
and monies of the subjects are not only the prince’s
treasure, but their bodies and wildy minds. Which
will be easily granted by those, who consider at
how great rates the dominion of lesser countries is
valued; and how much easier it is for men to procure
money, than money men. Nor do we readily
meet with any example that shows us when any
subject, without any default of his own, hath by
his prince been despoiled of his life or goods,
through the sole licentiousness of his authority.
Aristocracy is so much better, by how much it approaches nearer to monarchy; the worse, by how much it is more distant from it.
19. Hitherto we have compared a monarchical
with a popular state; we have said nothing of
aristocracy. We may conclude of this, by what
hath been said of those, that that which is hereditary,
and content with the election of magistrates;
which transmits its deliberations to some few, and
those most able; which simply imitates the government
of monarchs most, and the people least of
all; is for the subjects both better and more lasting
than the rest.
143
1. The beginning of institutive government from the consent of
the people. 2. Judicature and wars depend on the will of supreme
commanders. 3. That they who have the chief authority,
are by right unpunishable. 4. That without a supreme
power there is no government, but anarchy. 5. That from
servants and sons there is a simple obedience due to their lords
and parents. 6. Absolute authority proved by most evident
places, as well of the New as the Old Testament.
The beginning of institutive government from the consent of the people.
1. We have, in the sixth chapter and the second article,
so derived the original of institutive or
political government from the consent of the multitude,
that it appears they must either all consent,
or be esteemed as enemies. Such was the beginning
of God’s government over the Jews instituted
by Moses, (Exod. xix. 5-8): If ye will obey my
voice indeed, &c. Ye shall be unto me a kingdom
of priests, &c. And Moses came and called the
elders of the people, &c. And all the people answered,
and said: All that the Lord hath spoken
we will do. Such also was the beginning of Moses’s
power under God, or his vicegerency, (Exod. xx.
18-19): And all the people saw the thunderings
and lightenings, and the noise of the trumpet, &c.
And they said unto Moses, speak thou unto us, and
we will hear. The like beginning also had Saul’s
kingdom, (1 Sam. xii. 12, 13): When ye saw that
Nahash king of the children of Ammon came out
against you, ye said unto me, nay, but a king shall
reign over us, when the Lord your God was your
144king. Now therefore behold the king whom ye have
chosen, and whom ye have desired. But the major
part only consenting, and not all; for there were
certain sons of Belial, who said, (1 Sam. x. 27),
How shall this man save us? And they despised
him; those who did not consent, were put
to death as enemies. And the people said unto
Samuel (1 Sam. xi. 12): Who is he that said,
shall Saul reign over us? Bring the men, that
we may put them to death.
The power of judicature, and determination of wars, depend on the will of the supreme officer.
2. In the same sixth chapter, the sixth and
seventh articles, I have showed that all judgment
and wars depend upon the will and pleasure of
him who bears the supreme authority; that is to
say, in a monarchy, on a monarch or king; and
this is confirmed by the people’s own judgment.
1 Sam. viii. 20; We also will be like all the nations,
and our king shall judge us, and go out
before us, and fight our battles. And what pertains
to judgments, and all other matters whereof there
is any controversy, whether they be good or evil,
is confirmed by the testimony of King Solomon,
(1 Kings iii. 9): Give therefore thy servant an
understanding heart to judge thy people, that
I may discern between good and evil. And that
of Absolom, (2 Sam. xv. 3): There is no man
deputed of the king to hear thee.
They who have the supreme authority are by right unpunishable.
3. That kings may not be punished by their
subjects, as hath been showed above in the sixth
chapter and the twelfth article, King David also
confirms; who, though Saul sought to slay him,
did notwithstanding refrain his hand from killing
him, and forbade Abishai, saying, (1 Sam. xxvi. 9):
Destroy him not; for who can stretch forth his
145hand against the Lords anointed, and be innocent?
And when he had cut off the skirt of
his garment, (1 Sam. xxiv. 6): The Lord forbid,
saith he, that I should do this thing unto my
master the Lord’s anointed, to stretch forth mine
hand against him. And (2 Sam. i. 15) commanded
the Amalekite, who for his sake had slain Saul, to
be put to death.
That without a supreme power there is no government, but confusion.
4. That which is said in the seventeenth chapter
of Judges, at the sixth verse: In those days there
was no king in Israel, but every man did that
which was right in his own eyes: as though where
there were not a monarchy, there were an anarchy
or confusion of all things: may be brought as a
testimony to prove the excellency of monarchy
above all other forms of government; unless that
by the word king may perhaps be understood not
one man only, but also a court; provided that in
it there reside a supreme power. Which if it be
taken in this sense, yet hence it may follow, that
without a supreme and absolute power (which we
have endeavoured to prove in the sixth chapter)
there will be a liberty for every man to do what
he hath a mind, or whatsoever shall seem right to
himself; which cannot stand with the preservation
of mankind. And therefore in all government
whatsoever, there is ever a supreme power understood
to be somewhere existent.
That servants and sons owe their lords and parents simple obedience.
5. We have, in chap. VIII. art. 7 and 8, said
that servants must yield a simple obedience to
their lords, and in chap IX. art. 7, that sons
owe the same obedience to their parents. Saint
Paul says the same thing concerning servants
(Coloss. iii. 22): Servants obey in all things your
146masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service,
as men-pleasers, but in singleness of
heart, fearing God. Concerning sons (Colos.
iii. 20): Children obey your parents in all things,
for this is well-pleasing unto the Lord. Now as
we by simple obedience understand all things
which are not contrary to the laws of God; so
in those cited places of St. Paul, after the word
all things, we must suppose, excepting those
which are contrary to the laws of God.
The absolute power of princes proved by most evident testimonies of the Scripture, as well New as Old.
6. But that I may not thus by piecemeal prove
the right of princes, I will now instance those
testimonies which altogether establish the whole
power; namely, that there is an absolute and
simple obedience due to them from their subjects.
And first out of the New Testament: Matth.
xxiii. 2, 3: The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’
seat; all therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe,
that observe and do. Whatsoever they
bid you (says Christ) observe, that is to say, obey
simply. Why? Because they sit in Moses’ seat;
namely, the civil magistrate’s, not Aaron, the
priest’s. Rom. xiii. 1, 2: Let every soul be subject
to the higher powers; for there is no power
but of God; the powers that be are ordained
of God; whosoever therefore resisteth the power,
resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that
resist, shall receive to themselves damnation.
Now because the powers that were in St. Paul’s
time, were ordained of God, and all kings did at
that time require an absolute entire obedience
from their subjects, it follows that such a power
was ordained of God. 1 Peter ii. 13-15: Submit
yourselves unto every ordinance of man for the
147Lord’s sake, whether it be to the king as supreme,
or unto governors as unto them that are
sent by him for the punishment of wicked doers,
and for the praise of them that do well; for
so is the will of God.God. Again St. Paul to Titus,
(chap. iii. 1): Put them in mind to be subject to
principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, &c.
What principalities? Was it not to the principalities
of those times, which required an absolute
obedience? Furthermore, that we may come to
the example of Christ himself, to whom the kingdom
of the Jews belonged by hereditary right
derived from David himself; he, when he lived in
the manner of a subject, both paid tribute unto
Cæsar, and pronounced it to be due to him, Matth.
xxii. 21: Give unto Cæsar (saith he) the things
which are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things which
are God’s. When it pleased him to show himself a
king, he required entire obedience, Matth. xxi. 2, 3:
Go (said he) into the village over against you, and
straight-way ye shall find an ass tied, and a colt
with her; loose them, and bring them unto me;
and if any man say aught unto you, ye shall
say the Lord hath need of them. This he did
therefore by the right of being lord, or a king of
the Jews. But to take away a subject’s goods on
this pretence only, because the Lord hath need of
them, is an absolute power. The most evident
places in the Old Testament are these: Deut. v. 27:
Go thou near, and hear all that the Lord our God
shall say; and speak thou unto us all that the
Lord our God shall speak unto thee, and we will
hear it, and do it. But under the word all, is
contained absolute obedience. Again to Joshua
148(Joshua i. 16-18): And they answered Joshua,
saying, all that thou commandest us, we will do;
and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will go;
according as we hearkened unto Moses in all
things, so will we hearken unto thee; only the
Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with
Moses; whosoever he be that doth rebel against
thy commandment, and will not hearken unto thy
words in all that thou commandest him, he shall
be put to death. And the parable of the bramble
(Judges ix. 14, 15): Then said all the trees unto
the bramble, Come thou and reign over us. And
the bramble said unto the trees, If in truth ye
anoint me king over you, then come and put your
trust in my shadow; and if not, let fire come out
of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon.
The sense of which words is, that we must acquiesce
to their sayings, whom we have truly constituted
to be kings over us, unless we would choose
rather to be consumed by the fire of a civil war.
But the regal authority is more particularly described
by God himself, in 1 Sam. viii. 9, &c.: Show
them the right of the king that shall reign over
them, &c. This shall be the right of the king
that shall reign over you; he will take your sons,
and appoint them for himself, for his chariots,
and to be his horsemen, and some shall run before
his chariots, &c. And he will take your daughters
to be confectionaries, &c. And he will take
your vineyards, and give them to his servants, &c.
Is not this power absolute? And yet it is by God
himself styled the king’s right. Neither was any
man among the Jews, no not the high-priest himself,
exempted from this obedience. For when the
149king, namely, Solomon, said to Abiathar the priest
(1 Kings ii. 26, 27): Get thee to Anathoth unto
thine own fields; for thou art worthy of death; but
I will not at this time put thee to death, because
thou barest the ark of the Lord God before
David my father, and because thou hast been afflicted
in all wherein my father was afflicted. So
Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being priest
unto the Lord; it cannot by any argument be
proved, that this act of his displeased the Lord;
neither read we, that either Solomon was reproved,
or that his person at that time was any whit less
acceptable to God.
1. That the judging of good and evil belongs to private persons is
a seditious opinion. 2. That subjects do sin by obeying their
princes is a seditious opinion. 3. That tyrannicide is lawful is
a seditious opinion. 4. That those who have the supreme power
are subject to the civil laws is a seditious opinion. 5. That the
supreme power may be divided is a seditious opinion. 6. That
faith and sanctity are not acquired by study and reason, but
always supernaturally infused and inspired, is a seditious
opinion. 7. That each subject hath a propriety or absolute
dominion of his own goods is a seditious opinion. 8. Not to
understand the difference between the people and the multitude,
prepares toward sedition. 9. Too great a tax of money, though
never so just and necessary, prepares toward sedition. 10. Ambition
disposeth us to sedition. 11. So doth the hope of success.
12. Eloquence alone without wisdom, is the only faculty needful
to raise seditions. 13. How the folly of the common people,
and the elocution of ambitious men, concur to the destruction
of a common-weal.
That the judgment of good and evil belongs to private persons, is a seditious opinion.
1. Hitherto hath been spoken, by what causes
150and pacts commonweals are constituted, and what
the rights of princes are over their subjects. Now
we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes
which dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions.
Now as in the motion of natural bodies three
things are to be considered, namely, internal disposition,
that they be susceptible of the motion to
be produced; the external agent, whereby a certain
and determined motion may in act be produced;
and the action itself: so also in a commonweal
where the subjects begin to raise tumults,
three things present themselves to our regard;
first, the doctrines and the passions contrary to
peace, wherewith the minds of men are fitted and
disposed; next, their quality and condition who
solicit, assemble, and direct them, already thus
disposed, to take up arms and quit their allegiance;
lastly, the manner how this is done, or
the faction itself. But one and the first which
disposeth them to sedition, is this, that the knowledge
of good and evil belongs to each single
man. In the state of nature indeed, where every
man lives by equal right, and has not by any
mutual pacts submitted to the command of others,
we have granted this to be true; nay, proved it
in chap. I. art. 9. But in the civil state it is false.
For it was shown (chap. VI. art. 9) that the civil
laws were the rules of good and evil, just and
unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what
the legislator commands, must be held for good,
and what he forbids for evil. And the legislator
is ever that person who hath the supreme
power in the commonweal, that is to say, the monarch
in a monarchy. We have confirmed the same
truth in chap. XI. art. 2, out of the words of Solomon.
151For if private men may pursue that as good
and shun that as evil, which appears to them to be
so, to what end serve those words of his: Give
therefore unto thy servant an understanding
heart, to judge thy people, that I may discern between
good and evil? Since therefore it belongs
to kings to discern between good and evil, wicked
are those, though usual, sayings, that he only is a
king who does righteously, and that kings must
not be obeyed unless they command us just
things; and many other such like. Before there
was any government, just and unjust had no
being, their nature only being relative to some
command: and every action in its own nature is
indifferent; that it becomes just or unjust, proceeds
from the right of the magistrate. Legitimate
kings therefore make the things they command
just, by commanding them, and those which
they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them. But private
men, while they assume to themselves the
knowledge of good and evil, desire to be even as
kings; which cannot be with the safety of the
commonweal. The most ancient of all God’s commands
is, (Gen. ii. 17): Thou shalt not eat of the
tree of knowledge of good and evil: and the most
ancient of all diabolical temptations, (Gen. iii. 5):
Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil; and
God’s expostulation with man, (verse 11): Who
told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten
of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou
shouldst not eat? As if he had said, how comest
thou to judge that nakedness, wherein it seemed
good to me to create thee, to be shameful, except
thou have arrogated to thyself the knowledge of
good and evil.
That subjects do sin in obeying their princes, is a seditious opinion.
1522. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience,
is a sin; for he who doth so, contemns
the law. But we must distinguish. That is my
sin indeed, which committing I do believe to be
my sin; but what I believe to be another man’s
sin, I may sometimes do that without any sin of
mine. For if I be commanded to do that which
is a sin in him who commands me, if I do it, and
he that commands me be by right lord over me,
I sin not. For if I wage war at the commandment
of my prince, conceiving the war to be unjustly
undertaken, I do not therefore do unjustly; but
rather if I refuse to do it, arrogating to myself the
knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains
only to my prince. They who observe not this
distinction, will fall into a necessity of sinning, as
oft as anything is commanded them which either
is, or seems to be unlawful to them: for if they
obey, they sin against their conscience; and if
they obey not, against right. If they sin against
their conscience, they declare that they fear not
the pains of the world to come; if they sin against
right, they do, as much as in them lies, abolish human
society and the civil life of the present world.
Their opinion therefore who teach, that subjects
sin when they obey their prince’s commands which
to them seem unjust, is both erroneous, and to be
reckoned among those which are contrary to civil
obedience; and it depends upon that original error
which we have observed above, in the foregoing
article. For by our taking upon us to judge of
good and evil, we are the occasion that as well our
obedience, as disobedience, becomes sin unto us.
That tyrannicide is lawful, is a seditious opinion.
3. The third seditious doctrine springs from the
153same root, that tyrannicide is lawful; nay, at this
day it is by many divines, and of old it was by all the
philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch,
and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek
and Roman anarchies, held not only lawful, but
even worthy of the greatest praise. And under
the title of tyrants, they mean not only monarchs,
but all those who bear the chief rule in any government
whatsoever; for not Pisistratus only at
Athens, but those Thirty also who succeeded him,
and ruled together, were all called tyrants. But
he whom men require to be put to death as being
a tyrant, commands either by right or without
right. If without right, he is an enemy, and by
right to be put to death; but then this must not
be called the killing a tyrant, but an enemy. If
by right, then the divine interrogation takes place:
Who hath told thee that he was a tyrant? Hast
thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee
that thou shouldst not eat? For why dost thou
call him a tyrant, whom God hath made a king,
except that thou, being a private person, usurpest
to thyself the knowledge of good and evil? But
how pernicious this opinion is to all governments,
but especially to that which is monarchical, we
may hence discern; namely, that by it every king,
whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned
by the judgment, and slain by the hand
of every murderous villain.
That even they who have the supreme power are subject to the civil laws, is a seditious opinion.
4. The fourth opinion adversary to civil society,
is their’s who hold, that they who bear rule are
subject also to the civil laws. Which hath been
sufficiently proved before not to be true, in chap VI.
art. 14, from this argument: that a city can
154neither be bound to itself, nor to any subject; not
to itself, because no man can be obliged except it
be to another; not to any subject, because the
single wills of the subjects are contained in the
will of the city; insomuch that if the city will be
free from all such obligation, the subjects will so
too; and by consequence she is so. But that which
holds true in a city, that must be supposed to be
true in a man, or an assembly of men who have
the supreme authority; for they make a city,
which hath no being but by their supreme power.
Now that this opinion cannot consist with the very
being of government, is evident from hence; that
by it the knowledge of what is good and evil, that
is to say, the definition of what is, and what is not
against the laws, would return to each single person.
Obedience therefore will cease, as oft as
anything seems to be commanded contrary to the
civil laws, and together with it all coercive jurisdiction;
which cannot possibly be without the
destruction of the very essence of government.
Yet this error hath great props, Aristotle and
others; who, by reason of human infirmity, suppose
the supreme power to be committed with
most security to the laws only. But they seem to
have looked very shallowly into the nature of
government, who thought that the constraining
power, the interpretation of laws, and the making
of laws, all which are powers necessarily belonging
to government, should be left wholly to the
laws themselves. Now although particular subjects
may sometimes contend in judgment, and go
to law with the supreme magistrate; yet this is
only then, when the question is not what the magistrate
155may, but what by a certain rule he hath
declared he would do. As, when by any law the
judges sit upon the life of a subject, the question is
not whether the magistrate could by his absolute
right deprive him of his life; but whether by that
law his will was that he should be deprived of it.
But his will was, he should, if he brake the law;
else his will was, he should not. This therefore,
that a subject may have an action of law against
his supreme magistrate, is not strength of argument
sufficient to prove, that he is tied to his own
laws. On the contrary, it is evident that he is not
tied to his own laws; because no man is bound to
himself. Laws therefore are set for Titius and
Caius, not for the ruler. However, by the ambition
of lawyers it is so ordered, that the laws to
unskilful men seem not to depend on the authority
of the magistrate, but their prudence.
That the supreme power may be divided, is a seditious opinion.
5. In the fifth place, that the supreme authority
may be divided, is a most fatal opinion to all commonweals.
But diverse men divide it diverse ways.
For some divide it, so as to grant a supremacy to
the civil power in matters pertaining to peace and
the benefits of this life; but in things concerning
the salvation of the soul they transfer it on others.
Now, because justice is of all things most necessary
to salvation, it happens that subjects measuring
justice, not as they ought, by the civil laws,
but by the precepts and doctrines of them who, in
regard of the magistrate, are either private men or
strangers, through a superstitious fear dare not perform
the obedience due to their princes; through
fear falling into that which they most feared. Now
what can be more pernicious to any state, than
156that men should, by the apprehension of everlasting
torments, be deterred from obeying their
princes, that is to say, the laws; or from being
just? There are also some, who divide the supreme
authority so as to allow the power of war and
peace unto one whom they call a monarch; but the
right of raising money they give to some others,
and not to him. But because monies are the
sinews of war and peace, they who thus divide the
authority, do either really not divide it at all, but
place it wholly in them in whose power the money
is, but give the name of it to another: or if they
do really divide it, they dissolve the government.
For neither upon necessity can war be waged, nor
can the public peace be preserved without money.
That faith and holiness are not acquired by study and reason, but are ever supernaturally infused and inspired, is a seditious opinion.
6. It is a common doctrine, that faith and
holiness are not acquired by study and natural
reason, but are always supernaturally infused
and inspired into men. Which, if it were true, I
understand not why we should be commanded to
give an account of our faith; or why any man,
who is truly a Christian, should not be a prophet;
or lastly, why every man should not judge what is
fit for him to do, what to avoid, rather out of his
own inspiration, than by the precepts of his superiors
or right reason. A return therefore must be
made to the private knowledge of good and evil;
which cannot be granted without the ruin of all
governments. This opinion hath spread itself so
largely through the whole Christian world, that
the number of apostates from natural reason is
almost become infinite. And it sprang from sick-brained
men, who having gotten good store of holy
words by frequent reading of the Scriptures, made
157such a connexion of them usually in their preaching,
that their sermons, signifying just nothing,
yet to unlearned men seemed most divine. For he
whose nonsense appears to be a divine speech,
must necessarily seem to be inspired from above.
That single subjects have any propriety or absolute dominion over their own goods, is a seditious opinion.
7. The seventh doctrine opposite to government,
is this; that each subject hath an absolute dominion
over the goods he is in possession of: that
is to say, such a propriety as excludes not only
the right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects
to the same goods, but also of the magistrate himself.
Which is not true; for they who have a lord
over them, have themselves no lordship, as hath
been proved chap. viii. art. 5. Now the magistrate
is lord of all his subjects, by the constitution of
government. Before the yoke of civil society was
undertaken, no man had any proper right; all
things were common to all men. Tell me therefore,
how gottest thou this propriety but from the magistrate?
How got the magistrate it, but that
every man transferred his right on him? And
thou therefore hast also given up thy right to him.
Thy dominion therefore, and propriety, is just so
much as he will, and shall last so long as he
pleases; even as in a family, each son hath such
proper goods, and so long lasting, as seems good
to the father. But the greatest part of men who
profess civil prudence, reason otherwise. We are
equal, say they, by nature; there is no reason why
any man should by better right take my goods
from me, than I his from him. We know that
money sometimes is needful for the defence and
maintenance of the public; but let them who require
it, show us the present necessity, and they
158shall receive it. They who talk thus know not,
that what they would have, is already done from
the beginning, in the very constitution of government;
and therefore speaking as in a dissolute
multitude and yet not fashioned government, they
destroy the frame.
Not to know the difference between a people and a multitude, prepares to sedition.
8. In the last place, it is a great hindrance to
civil government, especially monarchical, that men
distinguish not enough between a people and a
multitude. The people is somewhat that is one,
having one will, and to whom one action may be
attributed; none of these can properly be said of
a multitude. The people rules in all governments.
For even in monarchies the people commands;
for the people wills by the will of one man; but
the multitude are citizens, that is to say, subjects.
In a democracy and aristocracy, the citizens are the
multitude, but the court is the people. And in a
monarchy, the subjects are the multitude, and
(however it seem a paradox) the king is the people.
The common sort of men, and others who little
consider these truths, do always speak of a great
number of men as of the people, that is to say, the
city. They say, that the city hath rebelled against
the king (which is impossible), and that the people
will and nill what murmuring and discontented
subjects would have or would not have; under pretence
of the people stirring up the citizens against
the city, that is to say, the multitude against the
people. And these are almost all the opinions,
wherewith subjects being tainted do easily tumult.
And forasmuch as in all manner of government
majesty is to be preserved by him or them, who
have the supreme authority; the crimen læsæ majestatis
naturally cleaves to these opinions.
Too great a tax of money, though never so just and necessary, disposeth men to sedition.
1599. There is nothing more afflicts the mind of
man than poverty, or the want of those things
which are necessary for the preservation of life
and honour. And though there be no man but
knows, that riches are gotten with industry, and
kept by frugality, yet all the poor commonly lay
the blame on the evil government, excusing their
own sloth and luxury; as if their private goods
forsooth were wasted by public exactions. But
men must consider, that they who have no patrimony,
must not only labour that they may live,
but fight too that they may labour. Every one
of the Jews, who in Esdras’ time built the walls
of Jerusalem, did the work with one hand, and
held the sword in the other. In all government,
we must conceive that the hand which holds the
sword, is the king or supreme council, which is no
less to be sustained and nourished by the subjects’
care and industry, than that wherewith each man
procures himself a private fortune; and that customs
and tributes are nothing else but their reward
who watch in arms for us, that the labours and
endeavours of single men may not be molested by
the incursion of enemies; and that their complaint,
who impute their poverty to public persons, is not
more just, than if they should say that they are
become in want by paying of their debts. But the
most part of men consider nothing of these things.
For they suffer the same thing with them who
have a disease they call an incubus; which springing
from gluttony, it makes men believe they are
invaded, oppressed, and stifled with a great weight.
Now it is a thing manifest of itself, that they who
seem to themselves to be burthened with the whole
160load of the commonweal, are prone to be seditious;
and that they are affected with change, who are
distasted at the present state of things.
Ambition disposeth men to sedition:
10. Another noxious disease of the mind is
theirs, who having little employment, want honour
and dignity. All men naturally strive for honour
and preferment; but chiefly they, who are least
troubled with caring for necessary things. For
these men are invited by their vacancy, sometimes
to disputation among themselves concerning the
commonweal, sometimes to an easy reading of
histories, politics, orations, poems, and other pleasant
books; and it happens that hence they think
themselves sufficiently furnished both with wit and
learning, to administer matters of the greatest
consequence. Now because all men are not what
they appear to themselves; and if they were, yet
all (by reason of the multitude) could not be received
to public offices; it is necessary that many
must be passed by. These therefore conceiving
themselves affronted, can desire nothing more,
partly out of envy to those who were preferred
before them, partly out of hope to overwhelm
them, than ill-success to the public consultations.
And therefore it is no marvel, if with greedy appetites
they seek for occasions of innovations.
So doth hope of success.
11. The hope of overcoming is also to be numbered
among other seditious inclinations. For let
there be as many men as you will, infected with
opinions repugnant to peace and civil government;
let there be as many as there can, never so much
wounded and torn with affronts and calumnies by
them who are in authority; yet if there be no
hope of having the better of them, or it appear not
161sufficient, there will no sedition follow; every man
will dissemble his thoughts, and rather content
himself with the present burthen than hazard a
heavier weight. There are four things necessarily
requisite to this hope. Numbers, instruments,
mutual trust, and commanders. To resist public
magistrates without a great number, is not sedition,
but desperation. By instruments of war, I
mean all manner of arms, munition, and other necessary
provision: without which number can do
nothing. Nor arms neither, without mutual trust.
Nor all these, without union under some commander,
whom of their own accord they are content to
obey; not as being engaged by their submission
to his command; (for we have already in this very
chapter, supposed these kind of men not to understand
being obliged beyond that which seems right
and good in their own eyes); but for some opinion
they have of his virtue, or military skill, or resemblance
of humours. If these four be near at hand
to men grieved with the present state, and measuring
the justice of their actions by their own judgments;
there will be nothing wanting to sedition
and confusion of the realm, but one to stir up and
quicken them.
Eloquence alone without wisdom is the only faculty needful to raise seditions.
12. Sallust’s character of Cataline, than whom
there never was a greater artist in raising seditions,
is this: that he had great eloquence, and
little wisdom. He separates wisdom from eloquence;
attributing this as necessary to a man
born for commotions; adjudging that as an instructress
of peace and quietness. Now eloquence
is twofold. The one is an elegant and clear expression
of the conceptions of the mind; and
162riseth partly from the contemplation of the things
themselves, partly from an understanding of words
taken in their own proper and definite signification.
The other is a commotion of the passions
of the mind, such as are hope, fear, anger, pity;
and derives from a metaphorical use of words
fitted to the passions. That forms a speech from
true principles; this from opinions already received,
what nature soever they are of. The art
of that is logic, of this rhetoric; the end of that
is truth, of this victory. Each hath its use; that in
deliberations, this in exhortations; for that is never
disjoined from wisdom, but this almost ever. But
that this kind of powerful eloquence, separated
from the true knowledge of things, that is to say,
from wisdom, is the true character of them who
solicit and stir up the people to innovations, may
easily be gathered out of the work itself which
they have to do. For they could not poison the
people with those absurd opinions contrary to
peace and civil society, unless they held them
themselves; which sure is an ignorance greater
than can well befall any wise man. For he that
knows not whence the laws derive their power,
which are the rules of just and unjust, honest and
dishonest, good and evil; what makes and preserves
peace among men, what destroys it; what
is his, and what another’s; lastly, what he would
have done to himself, that he may do the like to
others: is surely to be accounted but meanly wise.
But that they can turn their auditors out of fools
into madmen; that they can make things to them
who are ill-affected, seem worse, to them who are
well-affected, seem evil; that they can enlarge
163their hopes, lessen their dangers beyond reason:
this they have from that sort of eloquence, not
which explains things as they are, but from that
other, which by moving their minds, makes all
things to appear to be such as they in their minds,
prepared before, had already conceived them.
How the folly of the common people, and the eloquence of ambitious men, concur to the dissolution of a commonweal.
13. Many men, who are themselves very well
affected to civil society, do through want of knowledge
co-operate to the disposing of subjects’
minds to sedition, whilst they teach young men a
doctrine conformable to the said opinions in their
schools, and all the people in their pulpits. Now
they who desire to bring this disposition into act,
place their whole endeavour in this: first, that
they may join the ill-affected together into faction
and conspiracy; next, that themselves may have
the greatest stroke in the faction. They gather
them into faction, while they make themselves the
relators and interpreters of the counsels and actions
of single men, and nominate the persons and
places to assemble and deliberate of such things
whereby the present government may be reformed,
according as it shall seem best to their interests.
Now to the end that they themselves may have the
chief rule in the faction, the faction must be kept
in a faction; that is to say, they must have their
secret meetings apart with a few, where they may
order what shall afterward be propounded in a
general meeting, and by whom, and on what subject,
and in what order each of them shall speak,
and how they may draw the powerfullest and most
popular men of the faction to their side. And
thus when they have gotten a faction big enough,
in which they may rule by their eloquence, they
164move it to take upon it the managing of affairs.
And thus they sometimes oppress the commonwealth,
namely, where there is no other faction to
oppose them; but for the most part they rend it,
and introduce a civil war. For folly and eloquence
concur in the subversion of government, in the
same manner (as the fable hath it) as heretofore
the daughters of Pelias, king of Thessaly, conspired
with Medea against their father. They
going to restore the decrepit old man to his youth
again, by the counsel of Medea they cut him into
pieces, and set him in the fire to boil; in vain expecting
when he would live again. So the common
people, through their folly, like the daughters
of Pelias, desiring to renew the ancient government,
being drawn away by the eloquence of ambitious
men, as it were by the witchcraft of Medea;
divided into faction they consume it rather by
those flames, than they reform it.
165
1. The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise.
2. The safety of the people is the supreme law. 3. It
behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many, not
the peculiar interest of this or that man. 4. That by safety is
understood all manner of conveniences. 5. A query, whether it
be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects’
souls, as they shall judge best according to their own
consciences. 6. Wherein the safety of the people consists.
7. That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people.
8. That to have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and moneys in readiness,
in time of peace, is also necessary for the defence of the
people. 9. A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines,
is necessary for the preserving of peace. 10. Equal distributions
of public offices conduces much to the preservation of
peace. 11. It is natural equity, that monies be taxed according
to what every man spends, not what he possesses. 12. It
conduceth to the preservation of peace, to keep down ambitious
men. 13. And to break factions. 14. Laws whereby
thriving arts are cherished and great costs restrained, conduce
to the enriching of the subject. 15. That more ought not to
be defined by the laws, than the benefit of the prince and his
subjects requires. 16. That greater punishments must not be
inflicted, than are prescribed by the laws. 13. Subjects must
have right done them against corrupt judges.
The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise.
1. By what hath hitherto been said, the duties of
citizens and subjects in any kind of government
whatsoever, and the power of the supreme ruler
over them are apparent. But we have as yet said
nothing of the duties of rulers, and how they
ought to behave themselves towards their subjects.
We must then distinguish between the right and
the exercise of supreme authority; for they can
be divided. As for example, when he who hath
the right, either cannot or will not be present in
166judging trespasses, or deliberating of affairs. For
kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot
order their affairs; sometimes also, though they
can do it themselves, yet they judge it fitter, being
satisfied in the choice of their officers and counsellors,
to exercise their power by them. Now where
the right and exercise are severed, there the
government of the commonweal is like the ordinary
government of the world; in which God, the
mover of all things, produceth natural effects by
the means of secondary causes. But where he to
whom the right of ruling doth belong, is himself
present in all judicatures, consultations, and public
actions, there the administration is such, as if God,
beyond the ordinary course of nature, should immediately
apply himself unto all matters. We will
therefore in this chapter summarily and briefly
speak somewhat concerning their duties, who exercise
authority, whether by their own or other’s
right. Nor is it my purpose to descend into those
things, which being diverse from others, some
princes may do, for this is to be left to the political
practices of each commonweal.
The safety of the people is the supreme law.
2. Now all the duties of rulers are contained in
this one sentence, the safety of the people is the
supreme law. For although they who among men
obtain the chiefest dominion, cannot be subject to
laws properly so called, that is to say, to the
will of men, because to be chief and subject, are
contradictories; yet is it their duty in all things,
as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience
unto right reason, which is the natural, moral, and
divine law. But because dominions were constituted
for peace’s sake, and peace was sought after
167for safety’s sake; he, who being placed in authority,
shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of
the people, will act against the reasons of peace,
that is to say, against the laws of nature. Now as
the safety of the people dictates a law by which
princes know their duty, so doth it also teach
them an art how to procure themselves a benefit;
for the power of the citizens is the power of the
city, that is to say, his that bears the chief rule in
any state.
It is the duty of princes to respect the common benefit of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man.
3. By the people in this place we understand,
not one civil person, namely, the city itself which
governs, but the multitude of subjects which are
governed. For the city was not instituted for its
own, but for the subjects’ sake: and yet a particular
care is not required of this or that man. For
the ruler (as such) provides no otherwise for the
safety of his people, than by his laws, which are
universal; and therefore he hath fully discharged
himself, if he have thoroughly endeavoured by
wholesome constitutions to establish the welfare of
the most part, and made it as lasting as may be;
and that no man suffer ill, but by his own default,
or by some chance which could not be prevented.
But it sometimes conduces to the safety of the
most part, that wicked men do suffer.
By safety is understood all manner of benefits.
4. But by safety must be understood, not the
sole preservation of life in what condition soever,
but in order to its happiness. For to this end did
men freely assemble themselves and institute a
government, that they might, as much as their
human condition would afford, live delightfully.
They therefore who had undertaken the administration
of power in such a kind of government,
168would sin against the law of nature, (because
against their trust, who had committed that power
unto them), if they should not study, as much as
by good laws could be effected, to furnish their
subjects abundantly, not only with the good things
belonging to life, but also with those which advance
to delectation. They who have acquired
dominion by arms, do all desire that their subjects
may be strong in body and mind, that they may
serve them the better. Wherefore if they should
not endeavour to provide them, not only with such
things whereby they may live, but also with such
whereby they may grow strong and lusty, they
would act against their own scope and end.
Query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects’ souls, as they shall judge best in their own consciences.
5. And first of all, princes do believe that it
mainly concerns eternal salvation, what opinions
are held of the Deity, and what manner of worship
he is to be adored with. Which being supposed, it
may be demanded whether chief rulers, and whosoever
they be, whether one or more, who exercise
supreme authority, sin not against the law of nature,
if they cause not such a doctrine and worship
to be taught and practised, or permit a contrary to
be taught and practised, as they believe necessarily
conduceth to the eternal salvation of their subjects.
It is manifest that they act against their
conscience; and that they will, as much as in
them lies, the eternal perdition of their subjects.
For if they willed it not, I see no reason why they
should suffer (when being supreme they cannot be
compelled) such things to be taught and done, for
which they believe them to be in a damnable
state. But we will leave this difficulty in suspense.
Wherein the safety of the people consists.
1696. The benefits of subjects, respecting this life
only, may be distributed into four kinds. 1. That
they be defended against foreign enemies. 2. That
peace be preserved at home. 3. That they be enriched,
as much as may consist with public security.
4. That they enjoy a harmless liberty. For supreme
commanders can confer no more to their
civil happiness, than that being preserved from
foreign and civil wars, they may quietly enjoy that
wealth which they have purchased by their own
industry.
That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people.
7. There are two things necessary for the people’s
defence; to be warned and to be forearmed.
For the state of commonwealths considered in
themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile.
Neither if they cease from fighting, is it therefore
to be called peace; but rather a breathing time, in
which one enemy observing the motion and countenance
of the other, values his security not according
to the pacts, but the forces and counsels
of his adversary. And this by natural right, as
hath been showed in chap. II. art. 11, from this,
that contracts are invalid in the state of nature,
as oft as any just fear doth intervene. It is therefore
necessary to the defence of the city, first,
that there be some who may, as near as may be,
search into and discover the counsels and motions
of all those who may prejudice it. For discoverers
to ministers of state, are like the beams of the
sun to the human soul. And we may more truly
say in vision political, than natural, that the sensible
and intelligible species of outward things, not
well considered by others, are by the air transported
to the soul; that is to say, to them who
170have the supreme authority: and therefore are
they no less necessary to the preservation of the
state, than the rays of the light are to the conservation
of man. Or if they be compared to spider’s
webs, which, extended on all sides by the finest
threads, do warn them, keeping in their small holes,
of all outward motions; they who bear rule, can
no more know what is necessary to be commanded
for the defence of their subjects without spies, than
those spiders can, when they shall go forth, and
whither they shall repair, without the motion of
those threads.
To have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and money in readiness in time of peace, is necessary for the people’s defence.
8. Furthermore, it is necessarily requisite to the
people’s defence, that they be forearmed. Now
to be forearmed is to be furnished with soldiers,
arms, ships, forts, and monies, before the danger
be instant; for the lifting of soldiers and taking
up of arms after a blow is given, is too late at
least, if not impossible. In like manner, not to
raise forts and appoint garrisons in convenient
places before the frontiers are invaded, is to be
like those country swains, (as Demosthenes said),
who ignorant of the art of fencing, with their
bucklers guarded those parts of the body where
they first felt the smart of the strokes. But they
who think it then seasonable enough to raise
monies for the maintenance of soldiers and other
charges of war, when the danger begins to show
itself, they consider not, surely, how difficult a
matter it is to wring suddenly out of close-fisted
men so vast a proportion of monies. For almost
all men, what they once reckon in the number of
their goods, do judge themselves to have such a
right and propriety in it, as they conceive themselves
171to be injured whensoever they are forced to
employ but the least part of it for the public good.
Now a sufficient stock of monies to defend the
country with arms, will not soon be raised out of
the treasure of imposts and customs. We must
therefore, for fear of war, in time of peace hoard
up good sums, if we intend the safety of the commonweal.
Since therefore it necessarily belongs
to rulers, for the subjects’ safety to discover the
enemy’s counsel, to keep garrisons, and to have
money in continual readiness; and that princes
are, by the law of nature, bound to use their whole
endeavour in procuring the welfare of their subjects:
it follows, that it is not only lawful for them
to send out spies, to maintain soldiers, to build
forts, and to require monies for these purposes;
but also not to do thus is unlawful. To which
also may be added, whatsoever shall seem to conduce
to the lessening of the power of foreigners
whom they suspect, whether by slight or force.
For rulers are bound according to their power to
prevent the evils they suspect; lest peradventure
they may happen through their negligence.
A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines, is necessary for the preserving of peace.
9. But many things are required to the conservation
of inward peace; because many things concur
(as hath been showed in the foregoing chapter)
to its perturbation. We have there showed, that
some things there are, which dispose the minds of
men to sedition, others which move and quicken
them so disposed. Among those which dispose
them, we have reckoned in the first place certain
perverse doctrines. It is therefore the duty of
those who have the chief authority, to root those
out of the minds of men, not by commanding, but
172by teaching; not by the terror of penalties, but by
the perspicuity of reasons. The laws whereby this
evil may be withstood, are not to be made against
the persons erring, but against the errors themselves.
Those errors which, in the foregoing chapter,
we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet
of the commonweal, have crept into the minds of
ignorant men, partly from the pulpit, partly from
the daily discourses of men, who, by reason of
little employment otherwise, do find leisure enough
to study; and they got into these men’s minds by
the teachers of their youth in public schools.
Wherefore also, on the other side, if any man
would introduce sound doctrine, he must begin
from the academies. There the true and truly
demonstrated foundations of civil doctrine are to
be laid; wherewith young men, being once endued,
they may afterward, both in private and
public, instruct the vulgar. And this they will do
so much the more cheerfully and powerfully, by
how much themselves shall be more certainly convinced
of the truth of those things they profess
and teach. For seeing at this day men receive
propositions, though false, and no more intelligible
than if a man should join together a company of
terms drawn by chance out of an urn, by reason
of the frequent use of hearing them; how much
more would they for the same reason entertain
true doctrines, suitable to their own understandings
and the nature of things? I therefore conceive
it to be the duty of supreme officers, to
cause the true elements of civil doctrine to be
written, and to command them to be taught in all
the colleges of their several dominions.
Equal distribution of public burthens conduceth much to the preservation of peace.
17310. In the next place we showed, that grief of
mind arising from want did dispose the subjects to
sedition; which want, although derived from their
own luxury and sloth, yet they impute it to those
who govern the realm, as though they were
drained and oppressed by public pensions. Notwithstanding,
it may sometimes happen that this
complaint may be just; namely, when the burthens
of the realm are unequally imposed on the subjects;
for that which to all together is but a light
weight, if many withdraw themselves it will be
very heavy, nay, even intolerable to the rest:
neither are men wont so much to grieve at the
burthen itself, as at the inequality. With much
earnestness therefore men strive to be freed from
taxes; and in this conflict the less happy, as being
overcome, do envy the more fortunate. To remove
therefore all just complaint, it is the interest
of the public quiet, and by consequence it concerns
the duty of the magistrate, to see that the public
burthens be equally borne. Furthermore, since
what is brought by the subjects to public use, is
nothing else but the price of their bought peace,
it is good reason that they who equally share in
the peace, should also pay an equal part, either by
contributing their monies or their labours to the
commonweal. Now it is the law of nature, (by
art. 15, chap. III), that every man in distributing
right to others, do carry himself equal to all.
Wherefore rulers are, by the natural law, obliged
to lay the burthens of the commonweal equally on
their subjects.
It is natural equity, that monies be taxed according to what every man spends, not to what he possesseth.
11. Now in this place we understand an equality,
not of money, but of burthen; that is to say, an
174equality of reason between the burthens and the
benefits. For although all equally enjoy peace,
yet the benefits springing from thence are not
equal to all; for some get greater possessions,
others less; and again, some consume less, others
more. It may therefore be demanded, whether
subjects ought to contribute to the public according
to the rate of what they gain, or of what they
spend: that is to say, whether the persons must be
taxed, so as to pay contribution according to their
wealth; or the goods themselves, that every man
contribute according to what he spends. But if
we consider, where monies are raised according to
wealth, there they who have made equal gain, have
not equal possessions, because that one preserves
what he hath got by frugality, another wastes it
by luxury, and therefore equally rejoicing in the
benefit of peace, they do not equally sustain the
burthens of the commonweal: and on the other
side, where the goods themselves are taxed, there
every man, while he spends his private goods, in
the very act of consuming them he undiscernably
pays part due to the commonweal, according to,
not what he hath, but what by the benefit of the
realm he hath had: it is no more to be doubted,
but that the former way of commanding monies is
against equity, and therefore against the duty of
rulers; the latter is agreeable to reason, and the
exercise of their authority.
It conduces to the preservation of peace, to depress the ambitious.
12. In the third place we said, that that trouble
of mind which riseth from ambition, was offensive
to public peace. For there are some, who seeming
to themselves to be wiser than others, and more
sufficient for the managing of affairs than they
175who at present do govern, when they can no
otherwise declare how profitable their virtue would
prove to the commonweal, they show it by harming
it. But because ambition and greediness of honours
cannot be rooted out of the minds of men, it is not
the duty of rulers to endeavour it; but by constant
application of rewards and punishments they may
so order it, that men may know that the way to
honour is not by contempt of the present government,
nor by factions and the popular air, but by
the contraries. They are good men who observe
the decrees, the laws, and rights of their fathers.
If with a constant order we saw these adorned
with honours, but the factious punished and had
in contempt by those who bear command, there
would be more ambition to obey than withstand.
Notwithstanding, it so happens sometimes, that as
we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much
fierceness, so a stiff-necked subject must be flattered
for fear of his power; but as that happens
when the rider, so this when the commander is in
danger of falling. But we speak here of those
whose authority and power is entire. Their duty,
I say, it is to cherish obedient subjects, and to depress
the factious all they can; nor can the public
power be otherwise preserved, nor the subjects’
quiet without it.
And to dissolve factions.
13. But if it be the duty of princes to restrain
the factious, much more does it concern them to
dissolve and dissipate the factions themselves.
Now I call a faction, a multitude of subjects gathered
together either by mutual contracts among
themselves, or by the power of some one, without
his or their authority who bear the supreme rule.
176A faction, therefore, is as it were a city in a city:
for as by an union of men in the state of nature, a
city receives its being, so by a new union of subjects
there ariseth a faction. According to this
definition, a multitude of subjects who have bound
themselves simply to obey any foreign prince or
subject, or have made any pacts or leagues of
mutual defence between themselves against all
men, not excepting those who have the supreme
power in the city, is a faction. Also favour with
the vulgar, if it be so great that by it an army
may be raised, except public caution be given
either by hostages or some other pledges, contains
faction in it. The same may be said of private
wealth, if it exceed; because all things obey
money. Forasmuch therefore as it is true, that
the state of cities among themselves is natural and
hostile, those princes who permit factions, do as
much as if they received an enemy within their
walls: which is contrary to the subjects’ safety,
and therefore also against the law of nature.
Laws whereby gaining arts are cherished and great expenses restrained, do conduce much to the enriching of the subject.
14. There are two things necessary to the enriching
of the subjects, labour and thrift; there
is also a third which helps, to wit, the natural increase
of the earth and water; and there is a
fourth too, namely, the militia, which sometimes
augments, but more frequently lessens the subjects’
stock. The two first only are necessary. For a
city constituted in an island of the sea, no greater
than will serve for dwelling, may grow rich without
sowing or fishing, by merchandize and handicrafts
only; but there is no doubt, if they have a
territory, that they may be richer with the same
number, or equally rich being a greater number.
177But the fourth, namely, the militia, was of old
reckoned in the number of the gaining arts, under
the notion of booting or taking prey; and it was
by mankind, dispersed by families before the constitution
of civil societies, accounted just and
honourable. For preying is nothing else but a war
waged with small forces. And great commonweals,
namely, that of Rome and Athens, by the spoils of
war, foreign tribute, and the territories they have
purchased by their arms, have sometimes so improved
the commonwealth, that they have not
only not required any public monies from the
poorer sort of subjects, but have also divided to
each of them both monies and lands. But this
kind of increase of riches is not to be brought
into rule and fashion. For the militia, in order to
profit, is like a die; wherewith many lose their
estates, but few improve them. Since therefore
there are three things only, the fruits of the earth
and water, labour, and thrift, which are expedient
for the enriching of subjects, the duty of commanders
in chief shall be conversant only about those
three. For the first those laws will be useful, which
countenance the arts that improve the increase of
the earth and water; such as are husbandry and
fishing. For the second all laws against idleness, and
such as quicken industry, are profitable; as such
whereby the art of navigation, by help whereof
the commodities of the whole world, bought almost
by labour only, are brought into one city; and the
mechanics, under which I comprehend all the arts
of the most excellent workmen; and the mathematical
sciences, the fountains of navigatory and
mechanic employments, are held in due esteem
178and honour. For the third those laws are useful,
whereby all inordinate expense, as well in meats
as in clothes, and universally in all things which are
consumed with usage, is forbidden. Now because
such laws are beneficial to the ends above specified,
it belongs also to the office of supreme magistrates
to establish them.
That more ought not to be determined by the laws, than the benefit of prince and subjects require.
15. The liberty of subjects consists not in being
exempt from the laws of the city, or that they
who have the supreme power cannot make what
laws they have a mind to. But because all the
motions and actions of subjects are never circumscribed
by laws, nor can be, by reason of their
variety; it is necessary that there be infinite cases
which are neither commanded nor prohibited, but
every man may either do or not do them as he lists
himself. In these, each man is said to enjoy his
liberty; and in this sense liberty is to be understood
in this place, namely, for that part of natural
right which is granted and left to subjects by the
civil laws. As water inclosed on all hands with
banks, stands still and corrupts; having no bounds,
it spreads too largely, and the more passages it
finds the more freely it takes its current; so subjects,
if they might do nothing without the commands
of the law, would grow dull and unwieldy;
if all, they would be dispersed; and the more is
left undetermined by the laws, the more liberty
they enjoy. Both extremes are faulty; for laws
were not invented to take away, but to direct
men’s actions; even as nature ordained the banks,
not to stay, but to guide the course of the stream.
The measure of this liberty is to be taken from the
subjects’ and the city’s good. Wherefore, in the
179first place, it is against the charge of those who
command and have the authority of making laws,
that there should be more laws than necessarily
serve for good of the magistrate and his subjects.
For since men are wont commonly to debate what
to do or not to do, by natural reason rather than
any knowledge of the laws, where there are more
laws than can easily be remembered, and whereby
such things are forbidden as reason of itself prohibits
not of necessity, they must through ignorance,
without the least evil intention, fall within
the compass of laws, as gins laid to entrap their
harmless liberty; which supreme commanders are
bound to preserve for their subjects by the laws of
nature.
That greater punishments must not be inflicted, than are prescribed by the laws.
16. It is a great part of that liberty, which is
harmless to civil government and necessary for each
subject to live happily, that there be no penalties
dreaded but what they may both foresee and look
for; and this is done, where there are either no
punishments at all defined by the laws, or greater
not required than are defined. Where there are
none defined, there he that hath first broken the
law, expects an indefinite or arbitrary punishment;
and his fear is supposed boundless, because it relates
to an unbounded evil. Now the law of nature
commands them who are not subject to any civil
laws, by what we have said in chap. III. art. 11,
and therefore supreme commanders, that in taking
revenge and punishing they must not so much regard
the past evil as the future good; and they
sin, if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary
punishment than the public benefit. But
where the punishment is defined; either by a
180law prescribed, as when it is set down in plain
words that he that shall do thus or thus, shall
suffer so and so; or by practice, as when the
penalty, not by any law prescribed, but arbitrary
from the beginning, is afterward determined by
the punishment of the first delinquent; (for natural
equity commands that equal transgressors be
equally punished); there to impose a greater penalty
than is defined by the law, is against the law
of nature. For the end of punishment is not to
compel the will of man, but to fashion it, and to
make it such as he would have it who hath set the
penalty. And deliberation is nothing else but a
weighing, as it were in scales, the conveniences
and inconveniences of the fact we are attempting;
where that which is more weighty, doth necessarily
according to its inclination prevail with us.
If therefore the legislator doth set a less penalty
on a crime, than will make our fear more considerable
with us than our lust, that excess of lust
above the fear of punishment, whereby sin is committed,
is to be attributed to the legislator, that is
to say, to the supreme; and therefore if he inflict a
greater punishment than himself hath determined
in his laws, he punisheth that in another in which
he sinned himself.
Subjects must have right restored to them against corrupt judges.
17. It pertains therefore to the harmless and
necessary liberty of subjects, that every man may
without fear enjoy the rights which are allowed him
by the laws. For it is in vain to have our own
distinguished by the laws from another’s, if by
wrong judgment, robbery, or theft, they may be
again confounded. But it falls out so, that these do
happen where judges are corrupted. For the fear
181whereby men are deterred from doing evil, ariseth
not from hence, namely, because penalties are set,
but because they are executed. For we esteem
the future by what is past, seldom expecting what
seldom happens. If therefore judges corrupted
either by gifts, favour, or even by pity itself, do
often forbear the execution of the penalties due by
the law, and by that means put wicked men in
hope to pass unpunished: honest subjects encompassed
with murderers, thieves, and knaves, will
not have the liberty to converse freely with each
other, nor scarce to stir abroad without hazard;
nay, the city itself is dissolved, and every man’s
right of protecting himself at his own will returns
to him. The law of nature therefore gives this
precept to supreme commanders, that they not
only do righteousness themselves, but that they
also by penalties cause the judges, by them appointed,
to do the same; that is to say, that they
hearken to the complaints of their subjects; and
as oft as need requires, make choice of some extraordinary
judges, who may hear the matter debated
concerning the ordinary ones.
182
1. How law differs from counsel. 2. How from covenant.
3. How from right. 4. Division of laws into divine and human:
the divine into natural and positive; and the natural
into the laws of single men and of nations. 5. The division of
human, that is to say, of civil laws into sacred and secular.
6. Into distributive and vindicative. 7. That distributive and
vindicative are not species, but parts of the laws. 8. All law
is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it. 9. The precepts
of the decalogue of honouring parents, of murder, adultery,
theft, false witness, are civil laws. 10. It is impossible to
command aught by the civil law contrary to the law of nature.
11. It is essential to a law, both that itself and also the lawgiver
be known. 12. Whence the lawgiver comes to be known.
13. Publishing and interpretation are necessary to the knowledge
of a law. 14. The division of the civil law into written
and unwritten. 15. The natural laws are not written laws;
neither are the wise sentences of lawyers nor custom laws
of themselves, but by the consent of the supreme power.
16. What the word sin, most largely taken, signifies. 17. The
definition of sin. 18. The difference between a sin of infirmity
and malice. 19. Under what kind of sin atheism is contained.
20. What treason is. 21. That by treason not the
civil, but the natural laws are broken. 22. And that therefore
it is to be punished not by the right of dominion, but by the
right of war. 23. That obedience is not rightly distinguished
into active and passive.
How law differs from counsel.
1. They who less seriously consider the force of
words, do sometimes confound law with counsel,
sometimes with covenant, sometimes with right.
They confound law with counsel, who think that
it is the duty of monarchs not only to give ear to
their counsellors, but also to obey them; as though
it were in vain to take counsel, unless it were also
followed. We must fetch the distinction between
counsel and law, from the difference between
183counsel and command. Now counsel is a precept,
in which the reason of my obeying it is taken
from the thing itself which is advised; but command
is a precept, in which the cause of my obedience
depends on the will of the commander. For
it is not properly said, thus I will and thus I command,
except the will stand for a reason. Now
when obedience is yielded to the laws, not for the
thing itself, but by reason of the adviser’s will, the
law is not a counsel, but a command, and is defined
thus: law is the command of that person, whether
man or court, whose precept contains in it the
reason of obedience: as the precepts of God in regard
of men, of magistrates in respect of their
subjects, and universally of all the powerful in respect
of them who cannot resist, may be termed
their laws. Law and counsel therefore differ
many ways. Law belongs to him who hath
power over them whom he adviseth; counsel
to them who have no power. To follow what is
prescribed by law, is duty; what by counsel, is
free-will. Counsel is directed to his end, that receives
it; law, to his that gives it. Counsel is
given to none but the willing; law even to the
unwilling. To conclude, the right of the counsellor
is made void by the will of him to whom he
gives counsel; the right of the law-giver is not
abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a law
imposed.
How it differs from a covenant.
2. They confound law and covenant, who conceive
the laws to be nothing else but certain
ὁμολογήματα, or forms of living determined by the
common consent of men. Among whom is Aristotle,
who defines law on this manner; Νόμός ἐστι
184λόγος ὡρισμένος καθ’ ὁμολογίαν κοινὴν πόλεως, μγνύων
πῶς δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστα: that is to say, law is a speech,
limited according to the common consent of the
city, declaring every thing that we ought to do.
Which definition is not simply of law, but of the
civil law. For it is manifest that the divine laws
sprang not from the consent of men, nor yet the
laws of nature. For if they had their original
from the consent of men, they might also by the
same consent be abrogated; but they are unchangeable.
But indeed, that is no right definition
of a civil law. For in that place, a city is taken
either for one civil person, having one will; or for
a multitude of men, who have each of them the
liberty of their private wills. If for one person,
those words common consent are ill-placed here;
for one person hath no common consent. Neither
ought he to have said, declaring what was needful
to be done, but commanding; for what the city
declares, it commands its subjects. He therefore
by a city understood a multitude of men, declaring
by common consent (imagine it a writing confirmed
by votes) some certain forms of living.
But these are nothing else but some mutual contracts,
which oblige not any man (and therefore
are no laws) before that a supreme power being
constituted, which can compel, have sufficient
remedy against the rest, who otherwise are not
likely to keep them. Laws therefore, according
to this definition of Aristotle, are nothing else but
naked and weak contracts; which then at length,
when there is one who by right doth exercise the
supreme power, shall either become laws or no
laws at his will and pleasure. Wherefore he confounds
185contracts with laws, which he ought not to
have done; for contract is a promise, law a command.
In contracts we say, I will do this; in
laws, do this. Contracts oblige us;[16] laws tie us
fast, being obliged. A contract obligeth of itself;
the law holds the party obliged by virtue of the
universal contract of yielding obedience. Therefore
in contract, it is first determined what is to
be done, before we are obliged to do it; but in
law, we are first obliged to perform, and what is to
be done is determined afterwards. Aristotle therefore
ought to have defined a civil law thus: a
civil law is a speech limited by the will of the
city, commanding everything behoveful to be
done. Which is the same with that we have given
above, in chap. VI. art. 9: to wit, that the civil
laws are the command of him, whether man or
court of men, who is endued with supreme power
in the city, concerning the future actions of his
subjects.
How it differs from right.
3. They confound laws with right, who continue
still to do what is permitted by divine right,
notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civil law.
That which is prohibited by the divine law, cannot
be permitted by the civil; neither can that
which is commanded by the divine law, be prohibited
by the civil. Notwithstanding, that which
186is permitted by the divine right, that is to say,
that which may be done by divine right, doth no
whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden
by the civil laws; for inferior laws may restrain
the liberty allowed by the superior, although they
cannot enlarge them. Now natural liberty is a
right not constituted, but allowed by the laws.
For the laws being removed, our liberty is absolute.
This is first restrained by the natural and
divine laws; the residue is bounded by the civil
law; and what remains, may again be restrained
by the constitutions of particular towns and societies.
There is great difference therefore between
law and right. For law is a fetter, right is freedom;
and they differ like contraries.
The division of laws into divine and human; and of the divine into natural and positive; and of the natural into those laws of single men, and those of nations.
4. All law may be divided, first according to the
diversity of its authors into divine and human.
The divine, according to the two ways whereby
God hath made known his will unto men, is twofold;
natural or moral, and positive. Natural is
that which God hath declared to all men by his
eternal word born with them, to wit, their natural
reason; and this is that law, which in this whole
book I have endeavoured to unfold. Positive is
that, which God hath revealed to us by the word
of prophecy, wherein he hath spoken unto men as
a man. Such are the laws which he gave to the
Jews concerning their government and divine
worship; and they may be termed the divine
civil laws, because they were peculiar to the civil
government of the Jews, his peculiar people.
Again, the natural law may be divided into that
of men, which alone hath obtained the title of the
law of nature; and that of cities, which may be
187called that of nations, but vulgarly it is termed
the right of nations. The precepts of both are
alike. But because cities once instituted do put
on the personal proprieties of men, that law, which
speaking of the duty of single men we call natural,
being applied to whole cities and nations,
is called the right of nations. And the same
elements of natural law and right, which have
hitherto been spoken of, being transferred to whole
cities and nations, may be taken for the elements
of the laws and right of nations.
The division of human, that is to say, civil laws into secular and sacred.
5. All human law is civil. For the state of
men considered out of civil society, is hostile; in
which, because one is not subject to another, there
are no other laws beside the dictates of natural
reason, which is the divine law. But in civil
government the city only, that is to say, that man
or court to whom the supreme power of the city
is committed, is the legislator; and the laws of the
city are civil. The civil laws may be divided,
according to the diversity of their subject matter,
into sacred or secular. Sacred are those which
pertain to religion, that is to say, to the ceremonies
and worship of God: to wit, what persons,
things, places, are to be consecrated, and in what
fashion; what opinions concerning the Deity are
to be taught publicly; and with what words and
in what order supplications are to be made; and
the like; and are not determined by any divine
positive law. For the civil sacred laws are the
human laws (which are also called ecclesiastical)
concerning things sacred; but the secular, under
a general notion, are usually called the civil laws.
Into distributive and vindicative.
6. Again, the civil law (according to the two
188offices of the legislator, whereof one is to judge,
the other to constrain men to acquiesce to his
judgments) hath two parts; the one distributive,
the other vindicative or penal. By the distributive
it is, that every man hath his proper rights;
that is to say, it sets forth rules for all things,
whereby we may know what is properly our’s,
what another man’s; so as others may not hinder
us from the free use and enjoyment of our own,
and we may not interrupt others in the quiet possession
of their’s; and what is lawful for every
man to do or omit, and what is not lawful.
Vindicative is that, whereby it is defined what
punishment shall be inflicted on them who break
the law.
Distributive and vindicative are not two species of the laws.
7. Now distributive and vindicative are not two
several species of the laws, but two parts of the
same law. For if the law should say no more,
but (for example) whatsoever you take with your
net in the sea, be it yours, it is in vain. For
although another should take that away from you
which you have caught, it hinders not but that it
still remains yours. For in the state of nature
where all things are common to all, yours and
others are all one; insomuch as what the law defines
to be yours, was yours even before the law,
and after the law ceases not to be yours, although
in another man’s possession. Wherefore the law
doth nothing, unless it be understood to be so
yours, as all other men be forbidden to interrupt
your free use and secure enjoyment of it at all
times, according to your own will and pleasure.
For this is that which is required to a propriety of
goods; not that a man may be able to use them,
189but to use them alone; which is done by prohibiting
others to be an hinderance to him. But in vain
do they also prohibit any men, who do not withal
strike a fear of punishment into them. In vain
therefore is the law, unless it contain both parts,
that which forbids injuries to be done, and that
which punisheth the doers of them. The first of
them, which is called distributive, is prohibitory,
and speaks to all; the second, which is styled
vindicative or penary, is mandatory, and only
speaks to public ministers.
All law is supposed to have a penalty annexed to it.
8. From hence also we may understand, that
every civil law hath a penalty annexed to it,
either explicitly or implicitly. For where the
penalty is not defined, neither by any writing, nor
by example of any who hath suffered the punishment
of the transgressed law, there the penalty is
understood to be arbitrary; namely, to depend on
the will of the legislator, that is to say, of the supreme
commander. For in vain is that law, which
may be broken without punishment.
The precepts of the Decalogue of honouring parents, of murder, adultery, theft, false witnesses, are the civil laws.
9. Now because it comes from the civil laws,
both that every man have his proper right and
distinguished from another’s, and also that he is
forbidden to invade another’s rights; it follows
that these precepts: Thou shalt not refuse to give
the honour defined by the laws, unto thy parents:
Thou shalt not kill the man, whom the laws forbid
thee to kill: Thou shalt avoid all copulation forbidden
by the laws: Thou shalt not take away
another’s goods, against the lords will: Thou
shalt not frustrate the laws and judgments by
false testimony: are civil laws. The natural
laws command the same things, but implicitly.
190For the law of nature (as hath been said in chap.
III. art. 2) commands us to keep contracts; and
therefore also to perform obedience, when we
have covenanted obedience, and to abstain from
another’s goods, when it is determined by the
civil law what belongs to another. But all subjects
(by chap. VI. art. 13) do covenant to obey his
commands who hath the supreme power, that is to
say, the civil laws, in the very constitution of
government, even before it is possible to break
them. For the law of nature did oblige in the
state of nature; where first, because nature hath
given all things to all men, nothing did properly
belong to another, and therefore it was not possible
to invade another’s right; next, where all
things were common, and therefore all carnal
copulations lawful; thirdly, where was the state
of war, and therefore lawful to kill; fourthly,
where all things were determined by every man’s
own judgment, and therefore paternal respects
also; lastly, where there were no public judgments,
and therefore no use of bearing witness,
either true or false.
It is not possible to command aught by the civil law, contrary to the laws of nature.
10. Seeing therefore our obligation to observe
those laws is more ancient than the promulgation
of the laws themselves, as being contained in the
very constitution of the city; by the virtue of the
natural law which forbids breach of covenant, the
law of nature commands us to keep all the civil
laws. For where we are tied to obedience before
we know what will be commanded us, there we
are universally tied to obey in all things. Whence
it follows, that no civil law whatsoever, which
tends not to a reproach of the Deity, (in respect
191of whom cities themselves have no right of their
own, and cannot be said to make laws), can possibly
be against the law of nature. For though the
law of nature forbid theft, adultery, &c; yet if the
civil law command us to invade anything, that invasion
is not theft, adultery, &c. For when the
Lacedæmonians of old permitted their youths, by
a certain law, to take away other men’s goods,
they commanded that these goods should not be
accounted other men’s, but their own who took
them; and therefore such surreptions were no
thefts. In like manner, copulations of heathen
sexes, according to their laws, were lawful marriages.
It is essential to a law, that both it and the legislator be known.
11. It is necessary to the essence of a law, that
the subjects be acquainted with two things: first,
what man or court hath the supreme power, that
is to say, the right of making laws; secondly,
what the law itself says. For he that neither
knew either to whom or what he is tied to, cannot
obey; and by consequence is in such a condition
as if he were not tied at all. I say not that it is
necessary to the essence of a law, that either one
or the other be perpetually known, but only that
it be once known. And if the subject afterward
forget either the right he hath who made the law,
or the law itself, that makes him no less tied to
obey; since he might have remembered it, had he
a will to obey.
Whence the legislator is known.
12. The knowledge of the legislator depends
on the subject himself; for the right of making
laws could not be conferred on any man without
his own consent and covenant, either expressed or
supposed; expressed, when from the beginning the
192citizens do themselves constitute a form of governing
the city, or when by promise they submit themselves
to the dominion of any one; or supposed at
least, as when they make use of the benefit of the
realm and laws for their protection and conservation
against others. For to whose dominion we
require our fellow subjects to yield obedience for
our good, his dominion we acknowledge to be
legitimate by that very request. And therefore
ignorance of the power of making laws, can never
be a sufficient excuse; for every man knows what
he hath done himself.
Promulgation and interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a law.
13. The knowledge of the laws depends on the
legislator; who must publish them; for otherwise
they are not laws. For law is the command of the
law-maker, and his command is the declaration of
his will; it is not therefore a law, except the will
of the law-maker be declared, which is done by
promulgation. Now in promulgation two things
must be manifest; whereof one is, that he or they
who publish a law, either have a right themselves
to make laws, or that they do it by authority derived
from him or them who have it; the other is
the sense of the law itself. Now, that the first,
namely, published laws, proceed from him who
hath the supreme command, cannot be manifest
(speaking exactly and philosophically) to any, but
them who have received them from the mouth of
the commander. The rest believe; but the reasons
of their belief are so many, that it is scarce
possible they should not believe. And truly in a
democratical city, where every one may be present
at the making of laws if he will, he that shall be
absent, must believe those that were present. But
193in monarchies and aristocracies, because it is
granted but to few to be present, and openly to
hear the commands of the monarch or the nobles,
it was necessary to bestow a power on those few
of publishing them to the rest. And thus we believe
those to be the edicts and decrees of princes,
which are propounded to us for such, either by the
writings or voices of them whose office it is to
publish them. But yet, when we have these causes
of belief; that we have seen the prince or supreme
counsel constantly use such counsellors, secretaries,
publishers, and seals, and the like arguments
for the declaring of his will; that he never
took any authority from them; that they have
been punished, who not giving credit to such like
promulgations have transgressed the law; not
only he who thus believing shall obey the edicts
and decrees set forth by them, is everywhere
excused, but he that not believing shall not
yield obedience, is punished. For the constant
permission of these things is a manifest sign
enough and evident declaration of the commander’s
will; provided there be nothing contained in
the law, edict, or decree, derogatory from his supreme
power. For it is not to be imagined that
he would have aught taken from his power by any
of his officers, as long as he retains a will to
govern. Now the sense of the law, when there is
any doubt made of it, is to be taken from them to
whom the supreme authority hath committed the
knowledge of causes or judgments; for to judge,
is nothing else than by interpretation to apply the
laws to particular cases. Now we may know who
they are that have this office granted them, in the
194same manner as we know who they be that have
authority given them to publish laws.
The civil law divided into written and unwritten.
14. Again the civil law, according to its two-fold
manner of publishing, is of two sorts, written
and unwritten. By written, I understand that
which wants a voice, or some other sign of the
will of the legislator, that it may become a law.
For all kind of laws are of the same age with
mankind, both in nature and time; and therefore
of more antiquity than the invention of letters,
and the art of writing. Wherefore not a writing,
but a voice is necessary for a written law; this
alone is requisite to the being, that to the remembrance
of a law. For we read, that before letters
were found out for the help of memory, that laws,
contracted into metre, were wont to be sung.
The unwritten, is that which wants no other publishing
than the voice of nature or natural reason;
such are the laws of nature. For the natural law,
although it be distinguished from the civil, forasmuch
as it commands the will; yet so far forth as
it relates to our actions, it is civil. For example,
this same, thou shalt not covet, which only appertains
to the mind, is a natural law only; but this,
thou shalt not invade, is both natural and civil.
For seeing it is impossible to prescribe such universal
rules, whereby all future contentions, which
perhaps are infinite, may be determined; it is to
be understood that in all cases not mentioned by
the written laws, the law of natural equity is to
be followed, which commands us to distribute
equally to equals; and this by the virtue of the
civil law, which also punisheth those who knowingly
and willingly do actually transgress the laws
of nature.
That the natural laws are not written laws, neither are the sentences of lawyers or customs laws of themselves, but by the consent of the supreme power.
19515. These things being understood, it appears,
first, that the laws of nature, although they were
described in the books of some philosophers, are
not for that reason to be termed written laws:
and that the writings of the interpreters of the
laws, were no laws, for want of the supreme authority;
nor yet those orations of the wise, that
is to say, judges, but so far forth as by the consent
of the supreme power they part into custom;
and that then they are to be received among the
written laws, not for the custom’s sake, (which by
its own force doth not constitute a law), but for
the will of the supreme commander; which appears
in this, that he hath suffered his sentence,
whether equal or unequal, to pass into custom.
What the word sin, taken in its largest sense, signifies.
16. Sin, in its largest signification, comprehends
every deed, word, and thought against right reason.
For every man, by reasoning, seeks out the
means to the end which he propounds to himself.
If therefore he reason right, that is to say, beginning
from most evident principles he makes a discourse
out of consequences continually necessary,
he will proceed in a most direct way. Otherwise
he will go astray, that is to say, he will either do,
say, or endeavour somewhat against his proper
end; which when he hath done, he will indeed in
reasoning be said to have erred, but in action and
will to have sinned. For sin follows error, just as
the will doth the understanding. And this is the
most general acception of the word; under which is
contained every imprudent action, whether against
the law, as to overthrow another man’s house, or not
against the law, as to build his own upon the sand.
17. But when we speak of the laws, the word
196sin is taken in a more strict sense, and signifies
not every thing done against right reason, but that
only which is blameable; and therefore it is called
malum culpæ, the evil of fault. But yet if anything
be culpable, it is not presently to be termed
a sin or fault; but only if it be blameable with
reason. We must therefore enquire what it is to
be blameable with reason, what against reason.
Such is the nature of man, that every one calls
that good which he desires, and evil which he
eschews. And therefore through the diversity of
our affections it happens, that one counts that good,
which another counts evil; and the same man
what now he esteemed for good, he immediately
after looks on as evil: and the same thing which
he calls good in himself, he terms evil in another.
For we all measure good and evil by the pleasure
or pain we either feel at present, or expect hereafter.
Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies,
because they increase their honours, goods,
and power; and of equals, by reason of that strife
of honours which is among them; both seem and
are irksome, and therefore evil to all; and men
use to repute those evil, that is to say, to lay some
fault to their charge, from whom they receive evil;
it is impossible to be determined by the consent of
single men, whom the same things do not please
and displease, what actions are, and what not to
be blamed. They may agree indeed in some certain
general things, as that theft, adultery, and
the like are sins; as if they should say that all
men account those things evil, to which theythey have
given names which are usually taken in an evil
sense. But we demand not whether theft be a sin,
but what is to be termed theft; and so concerning
197others, in like manner. Forasmuch therefore as
in so great a diversity of censurers, what is by reason
blameable is not to be measured by the reason
of one man more than another, because of the
equality of human nature; and there are no other
reasons in being, but only those of particular men,
and that of the city: it follows, that the city is to
determine what with reason is culpable. So as a
fault, that is to say, a sin, is that which a man
does, omits, says, or wills, against the reason of
the city, that is, contrary to the laws.
The difference between a sin of infirmity and malice.
18. But a man may do somewhat against the
laws through human infirmity, although he desire
to fulfil them; and yet his action, as being against
the laws, is rightly blamed, and called a sin. But
there are some who neglect the laws; and as oft
as any hope of gain and impunity doth appear to
them, no conscience of contracts and betrothed
faith can withhold them from their violation. Not
only the deeds, but even the minds of these men
are against the laws. They who sin only through
infirmity, are good men even when they sin; but
these, even when they do not sin, are wicked.
For though both the action and the mind be repugnant
to the laws, yet those repugnances are
distinguished by different appellations. For the
irregularity of the action is called ἀδίκημαἀδίκημα, unjust
deed; that of the mind ἀδικὶα and κακὶα, injustice
and malice; that is the infirmity of a disturbed
soul, this the pravity of a sober mind.
Under what kind of sin atheism is contained.
19. But seeing there is no sin which is not
against some law, and that there is no law which
is not the command of him who hath the supreme
power, and that no man hath a supreme power
which is not bestowed on him by our own consent;
198in what manner will he be said to sin, who
either denies that there is a God, or that he governs
the world, or casts any other reproach upon him?
For he will say: that he never submitted his will
to God’s will, not conceiving him so much as to
have any being: and granting that his opinion
were erroneous, and therefore also a sin, yet
were it to be numbered among those of imprudence
or ignorance, which by right cannot be
punished. This speech seems so far forth to be
admitted, that though this kind of sin be the
greatest and most hurtful, yet is it to be referred
to sins of imprudence;[17] but that it should be
199excused by imprudence or ignorance, is absurd.
For the atheist is punished either immediately by
God himself, or by kings constituted under God;
not as a subject is punished by a king, because he
keeps not the laws; but as one enemy by another,
because he would not accept of the laws; that is
to say, by the right of war, as the giants warring
against God. For whosoever are not subject either
to some common lord, or one to another, are enemies
among themselves.
What the sin of treason is.
20. Seeing that from the virtue of the covenant,
whereby each subject is tied to the other to perform
absolute and universal obedience (such as is
defined above, chap. VI. art. 13) to the city, that
is to say, to the sovereign power, whether that be
one man or council, there is an obligation derived
to observe each one of the civil laws; so that that
covenant contains in itself all the laws at once;
it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce
the general covenant of obedience, doth at once
renounce all the laws. Which trespass is so much
worse than any other one sin, by how much to sin
always, is worse than to sin once. And this is
that sin which is called treason; and it is a word
or deed whereby the citizen or subject declares,
that he will no longer obey that man or court to
whom the supreme power of the city is entrusted.
And the subject declares this same will of his by
deed, when he either doth or endeavours to do
violence to the sovereign’s person, or to them who
execute his commands. Of which sort are traitors,
200regicides, and such as take up arms against the
city, or during a war fly to the enemy’s side. And
they show the same will in word, who flatly deny
that themselves or other subjects are tied to any
such kind of obedience, either in the whole, as he
who should say that we must not obey him (keeping
the obedience which we owe to God entire)
simply, absolutely, and universally; or in part, as
he who should say, that he had no right to wage
war at his own will, to make peace, enlist soldiers,
levy monies, elect magistrates and public
ministers, enact laws, decide controversies, set
penalties, or do aught else without which the
state cannot stand. And these and the like
words and deeds are treason by the natural,
not the civil law. But it may so happen, that
some action, which before the civil law was made,
was not treason, yet will become such if it be
done afterwards. As if it be declared by the law,
that it shall be accounted for a sign of renouncing
public obedience, that is to say, for treason, if any
man shall coin monies, or forge the privy-seal; he
that after that declaration shall do this, will be no
less guilty of treason than the other. Yet he sins
less, because he breaks not all the laws at once,
but one law only. For the law by calling that
treason which by nature is not so, doth indeed by
right set a more odious name, and perhaps a more
grievous punishment on the guilty persons; but
it makes not the sin itself more grievous.
Treason breaks not the civil, but the natural law.
21. But that sin, which by the law of nature is
treason, is a transgression of the natural, not the
civil law. For since our obligation to civil obedience,
by virtue whereof the civil laws are valid,
is before all civil law, and the sin of treason is
201naturally nothing else but the breach of that obligation;
it follows, that by the sin of treason that
law is broken which preceded the civil law, to wit,
the natural, which forbids us to violate covenants
and betrothed faith. But if some sovereign prince
should set forth a law on this manner, thou shalt
not rebel, he would effect just nothing. For except
subjects were before obliged to obedience,
that is to say, not to rebel, all law is of no force.
Now the obligation which obligeth to what we
were before obliged to, is superfluous.
And therefore is punished not by the right of sovereignty, but by the right of war.
22. Hence it follows, that rebels, traitors, and
all others convicted of treason, are punished not
by civil, but natural right; that is to say, not as
civil subjects, but as enemies to the government;
not by the right of sovereignty and dominion, but
by the right of war.
Obedience not rightly distinguished into active and passive.
23. There are some who think that those acts
which are done against the law, when the punishment
is determined by the law itself, are expiated,
if the punished willingly undergo the punishment;
and that they are not guilty before God of breaking
the natural law, (although by breaking the civil
laws, we break the natural too, which command us
to keep the civil), who have suffered the punishment
which the law required; as if by the law
the fact were not prohibited, but a punishment
were set instead of a price, whereby a license
might be bought of doing what the law forbids.
By the same reason they might infer too, that no
transgression of the law were a sin; but that
every man might enjoy the liberty which he hath
bought by his own peril. But we must know, that
the words of the law may be understood in a two-fold
sense. The one as containing two parts, (as
202hath been declared above in art. 7), namely, that
of absolutely prohibiting, as, thou shalt not do
this; and revenging, as, he that doth this, shall
be punished. The other, as containing a condition,
for example, thou shalt not do this thing, unless
thou wilt suffer punishment; and thus the law
forbids not simply, but conditionally. If it be understood
in the first sense, he that doth it sins,
because he doth what the law forbids to be done;
if in the second, he sins not, because he cannot be
said to do what is forbidden him, that performs
the condition. For in the first sense, all men are
forbidden to do it; in the second, they only who
keep themselves from the punishment. In the
first sense, the vindicative part of the law obligeth
not the guilty, but the magistrate to require
punishment; in the second, he himself that owes
the punishment, is obliged to exact it; to the payment
whereof, if it be capital or otherwise grievous,
he cannot be obliged. But in what sense the law
is to be taken, depends on the will of him who
hath the sovereignty. When therefore there is
any doubt of the meaning of the law, since we are
sure they sin not who do it not, it will be sin if
we do it, howsoever the law may afterward be
explained. For to do that which a man doubts
whether it be a sin or not, when he hath freedom
to forbear it, is a contempt of the laws; and
therefore by chap. III. art. 28, a sin against the
law of nature. Vain therefore is that same distinction
of obedience into active and passive; as
if that could be expiated by penalties constituted
by human decrees, which is a sin against the law
of nature, which is the law of God; or as though
they sinned not, who sin at their own peril.
RELIGION — CHAPTER XV. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE. — CHAPTER XVI. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD UNDER THE OLD COVENANT. — CHAPTER XVII. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY THE NEW COVENANT. — CHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR OUR ENTRANCE INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN.
203
1. The proposition of the following contents. 2. Over whom God
is said to rule by nature. 3. The word of God threefold;
reason, revelation, prophecy. 4. The kingdom of God twofold;
natural, and prophetic. 5. The right whereby God reigns,
is seated in his omnipotence. 6. The same proved from
Scripture. 7. The obligation of yielding obedience to God,
proceeds from human infirmity. 8. The laws of God in his
natural kingdom, are those which are recited above in chapters
II. III. 9. What honour and worship is. 10. Worship
consists either in attributes or in actions. 11. And there is
one sort natural, another arbitrary. 12. One commanded,
another voluntary. 13. What the end or scope of worship
is. 14. What the natural laws are concerning God’s attributes.
15. What the actions are whereby naturally we do give worship.
16. In God’s natural kingdom, the city may appoint
what worship of God it pleaseth. 17. God ruling by nature
only, the city, that is to say, that man or court who under God
hath the sovereign authority of the city, is the interpreter of
all the laws. 18. Certain doubts removed. 19. What sin is
in the natural kingdom of God; and what treason against the
Divine Majesty.
The proposition of the following contents.
1. We have already in the foregoing chapters,
proved both by reason and testimonies of holy
writ, that the estate of nature, that is to say, of
absolute liberty, such as is theirs who neither
govern nor are governed, is an anarchy or hostile
state; that the precepts whereby to avoid this
state, are the laws of nature; that there can be
no civil government without a sovereign; and that
204they who have gotten this sovereign command,
must be obeyed simply, that is to say, in all things
which repugn not the commandments of God.
There is this one thing only wanting to the complete
understanding of all civil duty, and that is,
to know which are the laws and commandments of
God. For else we cannot tell whether that which
the civil power commands us, be against the laws
of God, or not; whence it must necessarily happen,
that either by too much obedience to the civil
authority we become stubborn against the divine
Majesty; or for fear of sinning against God we
run into disobedience against the civil power.
To avoid both these rocks, it is necessary to know
the divine laws. Now because the knowledge of
the laws depends on the knowledge of the kingdom,
we must in what follows speak somewhat
concerning the kingdom of God.
Over whom God is said to reign:
2. The Lord is king, the earth may be glad
thereof; saith the psalmist, (Psalm xcvii. 1). And
again the same psalmist, (Psalm xcix. 1): The Lord
is king, be the people never so impatient; he sitteth
between the cherubims, be the earth never so
unquiet; to wit, whether men will or not, God is
the king over all the earth; nor is he moved from
his throne, if there be any who deny either his
existence or his providence. Now although God
govern all men so by his power, that none can do
anything which he would not have done: yet this,
to speak properly and accurately, is not to reign.
For he is said to reign, who rules not by acting,
but speaking, that is to say, by precepts and
threatenings. And therefore we count not inanimate
nor irrational bodies for subjects in the kingdom
205of God, although they be subordinate to the
divine power; because they understand not the
commands and threats of God: nor yet the
atheists, because they believe not that there is a
God; nor yet those who believing there is a God,
do not yet believe that he rules these inferior
things: for even these, although they be governed
by the power of God, yet do they not acknowledge
any of his commands, nor stand in awe of his
threats. Those only therefore are supposed to belong
to God’s kingdom, who acknowledge him to
be the governor of all things, and that he hath
given his commands to men, and appointed punishments
for the transgressors. The rest we must
not call subjects, but enemies of God.
The word of God threefold; reason, revelation, prophesy.
3. But none are said to govern by commands,
but they who openly declare them to those who
are governed by them. For the commands of the
rulers, are the laws of the ruled; but laws they
are not, if not perspicuously published, insomuch
as all excuse of ignorance may be taken away.
Men indeed publish their laws by word or voice;
neither can they make their will universally known
any other way. But God’s laws are declared after
a threefold manner: first, by the tacit dictates of
right reason; next, by immediate revelation,
which is supposed to be done either by a supernatural
voice, or by a vision or dream, or divine
inspiration; thirdly, by the voice of one man,
whom God recommends to the rest, as worthy of
belief, by the working of true miracles. Now he
whose voice God thus makes use of to signify his
will unto others, is called a prophet. These three
manners may be termed the threefold word of
206God, to wit, the rational word, the sensible word,
and the word of prophecy. To which answer the
three manners whereby we are said to hear God;
right reasoning, sense, and faith. God’s sensible
word hath come but to few; neither hath God
spoken to men by revelation, except particularly
to some, and to diverse diversely; neither have
any laws of his kingdom been published on this
manner unto any people.
The kingdom of God two-fold: natural, and prophetic.
4. And according to the difference which is between
the rational word and the word of prophecy,
we attribute a two-fold kingdom unto God:
natural, in which he reigns by the dictates of
right reason; and which is universal over all who
acknowledge the divine power, by reason of that
rational nature which is common to all: and prophetical,
in which he rules also by the word of
prophecy; which is peculiar, because he hath not
given positive laws to all men, but to his peculiar
people and some certain men elected by him.
The right whereby God governs, is seated in his omnipotence.
5. God in his natural kingdom hath a right to
rule, and to punish those who break his laws, from
his sole irresistible power. For all right over
others is either from nature, or from contract.
How the right of governing springs from contract,
we have already showed in chap. VI. And the
same right is derived from nature, in this very
thing, that it is not by nature taken away. For
when by nature all men had a right over all things,
every man had a right of ruling over all as ancient
as nature itself. But the reason why this was
abolished among men, was no other but mutual
fear, as hath been declared above in chap. II. art. 3;
reason, namely, dictating that they must forego
207that right for the preservation of mankind; because
the equality of men among themselves, according
to their strength and natural powers, was
necessarily accompanied with war; and with war
joins the destruction of mankind. Now if any
man had so far exceeded the rest in power, that
all of them with joined forces could not have resisted
him, there had been no cause why he
should part with that right, which nature had
given him. The right therefore of dominion over
all the rest would have remained with him, by
reason of that excess of power whereby he could
have preserved both himself and them. They
therefore whose power cannot be resisted, and by
consequence God Almighty derives his right of
sovereignty from the power itself. And as oft as
God punisheth or slays a sinner, although he
therefore punish him because he sinned, yet may
we not say that he could not justly have punished
or killed him although he had not sinned. Neither,
if the will of God in punishing may perhaps have
regard to some sin antecedent, doth it therefore
follow, that the right of afflicting and killing depends
not on divine power, but on men’s sins.
The same proved from Scripture.
6. That question made famous by the disputations
of the ancients: why evil things befal the
good, and good things the evil: is the same with
this of ours; by what right God dispenseth good
and evil things unto men; and with its difficulty
it not only staggers the faith of the vulgar concerning
the divine Providence, but also philosophers,
and which is more, even of holy men.
Psalm lxxiii. 1, 2, 3: Truly God is good to Israel,
even to such as are of a clean heart; but as for
208me, my feet were almost gone, my steps had well
nigh slipped. And why? I was grieved at the
wicked; I do also see the ungodly in such prosperity.
And how bitterly did Job expostulate
with God, that being just he should yet be afflicted
with so many calamities! God himself with open
voice resolved this difficulty in the case of Job,
and hath confirmed his right by arguments drawn
not from Job’s sin, but from his own power. For
Job and his friends had argued so among themselves;
that they would needs make him guilty,
because he was punished; and he would reprove
their accusation by arguments fetched from his
own innocence. But God, when he had heard both
him and them, refutes his expostulation, not by
condemning him of injustice or any sin, but by
declaring his own power, (Job xxxviii. 4): Where
wast thou (says he) when I laid the foundation of
the earth, &c. And for his friends, God pronounces
himself angry against them (Job. xlii. 7):
Because they had not spoken of him the thing
that is right, like his servant Job. Agreeable to
this is that speech of our Saviour’s in the man’s
case who was born blind: when his disciples
asking him whether he or his parents had sinned,
that he was born blind, he answered, (John ix. 3):
Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents;
but that the works of God should be manifest in
him. For though it be said, (Rom. v. 12), that
death entered into the world by sin: it follows
not but that God by his right might have made
men subject to diseases and death, although they
had never sinned; even as he hath made the other
animals mortal and sickly, although they cannot
sin.
The obligation of yielding obedience unto God, proceeds from human infirmity.
2097. Now if God have the right of sovereignty
from his power, it is manifest that the obligation
of yielding him obedience lies on men by reason of
their weakness.[18] For that obligation which rises
from contract, of which we have spoken in chap. II.
can have no place here; where the right of ruling,
no covenant passing between, rises only from
nature. But there are two species of natural
obligation. One, when liberty is taken away by
corporal impediments, according to which we say
that heaven and earth, and all creatures, do obey
the common laws of their creation. The other,
when it is taken away by hope or fear, according to
which the weaker, despairing of his own power to
resist, cannot but yield to the stronger. From
this last kind of obligation, that is to say, from
fear or conscience of our own weakness in respect
of the divine power, it comes to pass that we are
obliged to obey God in his natural kingdom; reason
dictating to all, acknowledging the divine
power and providence, that there is no kicking
against the pricks.
The laws of God in his natural kingdom, are those which are above set down in chaps. II. III.
8. Because the word of God, ruling by nature
only, is supposed to be nothing else but right
reason, and the laws of kings can be known by
210their word only; it is manifest that the laws of
God, ruling by nature alone, are only the natural
laws; namely, those which we have set down in
chaps. II. and III. and deduced from the dictates
of reason, humility, equity, justice, mercy; and
other moral virtues befriending peace, which pertain
to the discharge of the duties of men one
toward the other; and those which right reason
shall dictate besides, concerning the honour and
worship of the Divine Majesty. We need not repeat
what those natural laws or moral virtues
are; but we must see what honours and what divine
worship, that is to say, what sacred laws the
same natural reason doth dictate.
What honour and worship are.
9. Honour to speak properly, is nothing else
but an opinion of another’s power joined with
goodness; and to honour a man, is the same with
highly esteeming him: and so honour is not in
the party honoured, but in the honourer. Now
three passions do necessarily follow honour thus
placed in opinion; love, which refers to goodness;
hope and fear, which regard power. And from
these arise all outward actions, wherewith the
powerful are appeased and become propitious;
and which are the effects, and therefore also the
natural signs of honour itself. But the word honour
is transferred also to those outward effects
of honour; in which sense, we are said to honour
him, of whose power we testify ourselves, either
in word or deed, to have a very great respect;
insomuch as honour is the same with worship.
Now worship is an outward act, the sign of inward
honour; and whom we endeavour by our
homage to appease if they be angry, or howsoever
211to make them favourable to us, we are said to
worship.
Worship consists either in attributes, or in actions.
10. All signs of the mind are either words or
deeds; and therefore all worship consists either
in words or deeds. Now both the one and the
other are referred to three kinds; whereof the first
is praise, or public declaration of goodness; the
second a public declaration of present power,
which is to magnify, μεγάλυνειν; the third is a
public declaration of happiness, or of power secure
also for the future, which is called μακαρισμὸς.
I say that all kinds of honour may be discerned,
not in words only, but in deeds too. But we then
praise and celebrate in words, when we do it by
way of proposition, or dogmatically, that is to say,
by attributes or titles; which may be termed praising
and celebrating categorically and plainly; as
when we declare him whom we honour to be liberal,
strong, wise. And then in deeds, when it is
done by consequence or by hypothesis or supposition;
as by thanksgiving, which supposeth goodness;
or by obedience, which supposeth power;
or by congratulation, which supposeth happiness.
And there is one sort natural, and another arbitrary.
11. Now whether we desire to praise a man in
words or deeds, we shall find some things which
signify honour with all men: such as among attributes,
are the general words of virtues and
powers, which cannot be taken in ill sense; as
good, fair, strong, just, and the like: and among
actions, obedience, thanksgiving, prayers, and
others of that kind, by which an acknowledgment
of virtue and power is ever understood. Others,
which signify honour but with some, and scorn
with others, or else neither; such as in attributes,
212are those words, which, according to the diversity
of opinions, are diversely referred to virtues or
vices, to honest or dishonest things. As that a
man slew his enemy, that he fled, that he is a philosopher,
or an orator, and the like; which with
some are had in honour, with others in contempt.
In deeds, such as depend on the custom of the
place, or prescriptions of civil laws; as in saluting
to be bareheaded, to put off the shoes, to bend
the body, to petition for anything standing, prostrate,
kneeling, forms of ceremony, and the like.
Now that worship which is always and by all men
accounted honourable, may be called natural; the
other, which follows places and customs, arbitrary.
One commanded, another voluntary.
12. Furthermore, worship may be enjoined, to
wit, by the command of him that is worshipped,
and it may be voluntary, namely, such as seems
good to the worshipper. If it be enjoined, the actions
expressing it do not signify honour, as they
signify actions, but as they are enjoined: for they
signify obedience immediately, obedience power;
insomuch as worship enjoined consists in obedience.
Voluntary is honourable only in the
nature of the actions; which if they do signify
honour to the beholders, it is worship, if not, it is
reproach. Again, worship may be either public
or private. But public, respecting each single
worshipper, may not be voluntary; respecting the
city, it may. For seeing that which is done voluntarily,
depends on the will of the doer, there would
not one worship be given, but as many worships as
worshippers; except the will of all men were united
by the command of one. But private worship
213may be voluntary, if it be done secretly; for what is
done openly, is restrained either by laws or through
modesty; which is contrary to the nature of a
voluntary action.
What the end or aim of worship is.
13. Now that we may know what the scope and
end of worshipping others is, we must consider
the cause why men delight in worship. And we
must grant what we have showed elsewhere; that
joy consists in this, that a man contemplates virtue,
strength, science, beauty, friends, or any power
whatsoever, as being, or as though it were his
own; and it is nothing else but a glory or triumph
of the mind, conceiving itself honoured, that is to
say, loved and feared, that is to say, having the
services and assistances of men in readiness. Now
because men believe him to be powerful, whom
they see honoured, that is to say, esteemed powerful
by others; it falls out that honour is increased
by worship; and by the opinion of power true
power is acquired. His end therefore, who either
commands or suffers himself to be worshipped, is,
that by this means he may acquire as many as he
can, either through love or fear, to be obedient
unto him.
What the natural laws are concerning God’s attributes.
14. But that we may understand what manner
of worship of God natural reason doth assign us,
let us begin from his attributes. Where first, it is
manifest that existence is to be allowed him; for
there can be no will to honour him, who, we think,
hath no being. Next, those philosophers who
said, that God was the world or the world’s soul,
that is to say, a part of it, spake unworthily of
God; for they attribute nothing to him, but wholly
deny his being. For by the word God we understand
214the world’s cause. But in saying that the
world is God, they say that it hath no cause, that
is as much as there is no God. In like manner,
they who maintain the world not to be created,
but eternal; because there can be no cause of an
eternal thing, in denying the world to have a
cause, they deny also that there is a God. They
also have a wretched apprehension of God, who
imputing idleness to him, do take from him the
government of the world and of mankind. For
say, they should acknowledge him omnipotent; yet
if he mind not these inferior things, that same
thread-bare sentence will take place with them:
quod supra nos, nihil ad nos; what is above us,
doth not concern us. And seeing there is nothing
for which they should either love or fear him, truly
he will be to them as though he were not at all.
Moreover, in attributes which signify greatness
or power, those which signify some finite or limited
thing, are not signs at all of an honouring mind.
For we honour not God worthily, if we ascribe
less power or greatness to him than possibly
we can. But every finite thing is less than we
can; for most easily we may always assign and
attribute more to a finite thing. No shape therefore
must be assigned to God, for all shape is
finite; nor must he be said to be conceived or
comprehended by imagination, or any other faculty
of our soul; for whatsoever we conceive is finite.
And although this word infinite signify a conception
of the mind, yet it follows not that we have
any conception of an infinite thing. For when we
say that a thing is infinite, we signify nothing
really, but the impotency in our own mind; as if
we should say, we know not whether or where it
215is limited. Neither speak they honourably enough
of God, who say we have an idea of him in our
mind: for an idea is our conception; but conception
we have none, except of a finite thing.
Nor they, who say that he hath parts, or that he
is some certain entire thing; which are also attributes
of finite things. Nor that he is in any
place; for nothing can be said to be in a place,
but what hath bounds and limits of its greatness
on all sides. Nor that he is moved or is at rest;
for either of them suppose a being in some place.
Nor that there are many Gods; because not many
infinites. Furthermore, concerning attributes of
happiness, those are unworthy of God which signify
sorrow; (unless they be taken not for any
passion, but, by a metonomy, for the effect); such
as repentance, anger, pity. Or want; as appetite,
hope, concupiscence, and that love which is
also called lust; for they are signs of poverty;
since it cannot be understood that a man should
desire, hope, and wish for aught, but what he
wants and stands in need of. Or any passive
faculty; for suffering belongs to a limited power,
and which depends upon another. When we
therefore attribute a will to God, it is not to be
conceived like unto ours, which is called a rational
desire; (for if God desires, he wants, which for
any man to say, is a contumely); but we must
suppose some resemblance which we cannot conceive.
In like manner when we attribute sight
and other acts of the sense to him, or knowledge,
or understanding, which in us are nothing else
but a tumult of the mind, raised from outward
objects pressing the organs; we must not think
216that any such thing befalls the Deity; for it is a
sign of power depending upon some other, which
is not the most blessed thing. He therefore who
would not ascribe any other titles to God than
what reason commands, must use such as are
either negative, as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible,
&c.; or superlative, as most good, most
great, most powerful, &c.; or indefinite, as good,
just, strong, creator, king, and the like; in such
sense, as not desiring to declare what he is; (which
were to circumscribe him within the narrow limits
of our phantasy); but to confess his own admiration
and obedience, which is the property of humility
and of a mind yielding all the honour it
possibly can do. For reason dictates one name
alone which doth signify the nature of God, that
is, existent, or simply, that he is; and one in order
to, and in relation to us, namely God, under
which is contained both King, and Lord, and
Father.
What those actions are, whereby naturally we do give worship.
15. Concerning the outward actions wherewith
God is to be worshipped, as also concerning his
titles; it is a most general command of reason,
that they be signs of a mind yielding honour.
Under which are contained in the first place,
prayers.
“Qui fingit sacros auro vel marmore vultus,
Non facit ille deos; qui rogat, ille facit.”
For prayers are the signs of hope; and hope
is an acknowledgment of the divine power or
goodness.
In the second place, thanksgiving; which is a
sign of the same affection, but that prayers go
before the benefit, and thanks follow it.
217In the third, gifts, that is to say, oblations and
sacrifices; for these are thanksgivings.
In the fourth, not to swear by any other. For
a man’s oath is an imprecation of his wrath
against him if he deceive, who both knows
whether he do or not, and can punish him if he
do, though he be never so powerful; which only
belongs to God. For if there were any man from
whom his subjects’ malice could not lie hid, and
whom no human power could resist, plighted faith
would suffice without swearing; which broken,
might be punished by that man. And for this
very reason there would be no need of an oath.
In the fifth place, to speak warily of God; for
that is a sign of fear, and fear is an acknowledgment
of power. It follows from this precept, that
we may not take the name of God in vain, or use
it rashly; for either are inconsiderate. That we
must not swear, where there is no need; for that
is in vain. But need there is none, unless it be
between cities, to avoid or take away contention
by force, which necessarily must arise where there
is no faith kept in promises: or in a city, for the
better certainty of judicature. Also, that we must
not dispute of the divine nature; for it is supposed
that all things in the natural kingdom of
God are inquired into by reason only, that is to
say, out of the principles of natural science. But
we are so far off by these to attain to the knowledge
of the nature of God, that we cannot so
much as reach to the full understanding of all the
qualities of our own bodies, or of any other creatures.
Wherefore there comes nothing from these
disputes, but a rash imposition of names to the
218divine Majesty according to the small measure of
our conceptions. It follows also, (which belongs
to the right of God’s kingdom), that their speech
is inconsiderate and rash, who say, that this or
that doth not stand with divine justice. For even
men count it an affront that their children should
dispute their right, or measure their justice otherwise
than by the rule of their commands.
In the sixth, whatsoever is offered up in prayers,
thanksgivings, and sacrifices, must in its
kind be the best and most betokening honour;
namely, prayers must not be rash, or light, or
vulgar, but beautiful, and well composed. For
though it were absurd in the heathen to worship
God in an image, yet was it not against reason
to use poetry and music in their churches.
Also oblations must be clean, and presents
sumptuous; and such as are significative either of
submission or gratitude, or commemorative of
benefits received. For all these proceed from a
desire of honouring.
In the seventh, that God must be worshipped
not privately only, but openly and publicly in the
sight of all men; because that worship is so much
more acceptable, by how much it begets honour and
esteem in others; as hath been declared before in
art. 13. Unless others therefore see it, that which
is most pleasing in our worship vanisheth.
In the last place, that we use our best endeavour
to keep the laws of nature. For the undervaluing
of our master’s command, exceeds all other affronts
whatsoever; as on the other side, obedience is
more acceptable than all other sacrifices.
And these are principally the natural laws concerning
219the worship of God; those, I mean, which
reason dictates to every man. But to whole cities,
every one whereof is one person, the same natural
reason further commands an uniformity of public
worship. For the actions done by particular persons,
according to their private reasons, are not
the city’s actions; and therefore not the city’s
worship. But what is done by the city, is understood
to be done by the command of him or them
who have the sovereignty; wherefore also together
with the consent of all the subjects, that is to say,
uniformly.
In the natural kingdom of God, the city may appoint what worship it pleaseth.
16. The natural laws set down in the foregoing
article concerning the divine worship, only command
the giving of natural signs of honour. But
we must consider that there are two kinds of
signs; the one natural; the other done upon
agreement, or by express or tacit composition.
Now because in every language the use of words
and names come by appointment, it may also by
appointment be altered; for that which depends
on and derives its force from the will of men, can
by the will of the same men agreeing be changed
again or abolished. Such names therefore as are
attributed to God by the appointment of men, can
by the same appointment be taken away. Now
what can be done by the appointment of men,
that the city may do. The city therefore by right,
that is to say, they who have the power of the
whole city, shall judge what names or appellations
are more, what less honourable for God; that is
to say, what doctrines are to be held and professed
concerning the nature of God and his operations.
Now actions do signify not by men’s appointment,
220but naturally; even as the effects are signs of their
causes. Whereof some are always signs of scorn
to them before whom they are committed; as
those whereby the body’s uncleanness is discovered,
and whatsoever men are ashamed to do
before those whom they respect. Others are
always signs of honour, as to draw near and discourse
decently and humbly, to give way or to
yield in any matter of private benefit. In these
actions the city can alter nothing. But there are
infinite others, which, as much as belongs to honour
or reproach, are indifferent. Now these, by the
institution of the city, may both be made signs of
honour, and being made so, do in very deed become
so. From whence we may understand, that we
must obey the city in whatsoever it shall command
to be used for a sign of honouring God, that is to
say, for worship; provided it can be instituted
for a sign of honour; because that is a sign of
honour, which by the city’s command is used for
such.
God ruling by nature only, the city, that is to say, that man or court which under God hath the sovereignty, is the interpreter of all the laws.
17. We have already declared which were the
laws of God, as well sacred as secular, in his government
by the way of nature only. Now because
there is no man but may be deceived in
reasoning, and that it so falls out that men are of
different opinions concerning the most actions; it
may be demanded further, whom God would have
to be the interpreter of right reason, that is to
say, of his laws. And as for the secular laws, (I
mean those which concern justice and the carriage
of men towards men), by what hath been said before
of the constitution of a city, we have demonstratively
showed it agreeable to reason, that all
221judicature belongs to the city; and that judicature
is nothing else but an interpretation of the
laws; and by consequence, that every where cities,
that is to say, those who have the sovereign power,
are the interpreters of the laws. As for the sacred
laws, we must consider what hath been before
demonstrated in chap. V. art. 13, that every subject
hath transferred as much right as he could on
him or them who had the supreme authority. But
he could have transferred his right of judging the
manner how God is to be honoured; and therefore
also he hath done it. That he could, it appears
hence; that the manner of honouring God before
the constitution of a city, was to be fetched from
every man’s private reason. But every man can
subject his private reason to the reason of the
whole city. Moreover, if each man should follow
his own reason in the worshipping of God, in so
great a diversity of worshippers one would be apt
to judge another’s worship uncomely, or impious;
neither would the one seem to the other to honour
God. Even that therefore which were most consonant
to reason, would not be a worship; because
that the nature of worship consists in this,
that it be the sign of inward honour. But there
is no sign, but whereby somewhat becomes known
to others; and therefore is there no sign of
honour, but what seems so to others. Again, that
is a true sign, which by the consent of men becomes
a sign; therefore also that is honourable,
which by the consent of men, that is to say, by
the command of the city, becomes a sign of
honour. It is not therefore against the will of
God, declared by the way of reason only, to give
222him such signs of honour as the city shall command.
Wherefore subjects can transfer their
right of judging the manner of God’s worship, on
him or them who have the sovereign power. Nay,
they must do it; for else all manner of absurd
opinions concerning the nature of God, and all ridiculous
ceremonies which have been used by any
nations, will be seen at once in the same city.
Whence it will fall out, that every man will believe
that all the rest do offer God an affront; so that it
cannot be truly said of any, that he worships God;
for no man worships God, that is to say, honours
him outwardly, but he who doth those things,
whereby he appears to others for to honour him.
It may therefore be concluded, that the interpretation
of all laws, as well sacred as secular, (God
ruling by the way of nature only), depends on the
authority of the city, that is to say, that man or
counsel to whom the sovereign power is committed;
and that whatsoever God commands, he commands
by his voice. And on the other side, that
whatsoever is commanded by them, both concerning
the manner of honouring God, and concerning
secular affairs, is commanded by God himself.
Certain doubts removed.
18. Against this, some man may demand, first,
whether it doth not follow that the city must be
obeyed, if it command us directly to affront God,
or forbid us to worship him? I say, it does not
follow, neither must we obey. For to affront, or
not to worship at all, cannot by any man be understood
for a manner of worshipping. Neither also
had any one, before the constitution of a city, of
those who acknowledge God to rule, a right to deny
him the honour which was then due unto him;
223nor could he therefore transfer a right on the city
of commanding any such things. Next, if it be
demanded whether the city must be obeyed, if it
command somewhat to be said or done, which is
not a disgrace to God directly, but from whence
by reasoning disgraceful consequences may be derived;
as for example, if it were commanded to
worship God in an image, before those who account
that honourable: truly it is to be done.[19] For
worship is instituted in sign of honour; but to
worship him thus, is a sign of honour, and increaseth
God’s honour among those who do so account
of it. Or if it be commanded to call God by a
name, which we know not what it signifies, or how
it can agree with this word God; that also must
be done. For what we do for honour’s sake, (and
we know no better), if it be taken for a sign of
honour, it is a sign of honour; and therefore if we
224refuse to do it, we refuse the enlarging of God’s
honour. The same judgment must be had of all
the attributes and actions about the merely rational
worship of God, which may be controverted
and disputed. For though this kind of commands
may be sometimes contrary to right reason,
and therefore sins in them who command them;
yet are they not against right reason, nor sins in
subjects; whose right reason, in points of controversy,
is that which submits itself to the reason of
the city. Lastly, if that man or counsel who hath
the supreme power, command himself to be worshipped
with the same attributes and actions,
wherewith God is to be worshipped; the question
is, whether we must obey? There are many
things, which may be commonly attributed both to
God and men; for even men may be praised and
magnified. And there are many actions, whereby
God and men may be worshipped. But the significations
of the attributes and actions are only to
be regarded. Those attributes therefore, whereby
we signify ourselves to be of an opinion, that there
is any man endued with a sovereignty independent
from God, or that he is immortal, or of infinite
power, and the like; though commanded by
princes, yet must they be abstained from. As
also from those actions signifying the same; as
prayer to the absent; to ask those things which
God alone can give, as rain and fair weather; to
offer him what God can only accept, as oblations,
holocausts; or to give a worship, than which a
greater cannot be given, as sacrifice. For these
things seem to tend to this end, that God may not
be thought to rule; contrary to what was supposed
225from the beginning. But genuflection, prostration,
or any other act of the body whatsoever, may
be lawfully used even in civil worship; for they
may signify an acknowledgment of the civil power
only. For divine worship is distinguished from
civil, not by the motion, placing, habit, or gesture
of the body, but by the declaration of our opinion
of him whom we do worship. As if we cast down
ourselves before any man, with intention of declaring
by that sign that we esteem him as God, it
is divine worship; if we do the same thing as a
sign of our acknowledgment of the civil power, it
is civil worship. Neither is the divine worship
distinguished from civil, by any action usually understood
by the words λατρεία and δουλεία; whereof
the former marking out the duty of servants, the
latter their destiny, they are words of the same
action in degree.
What is sin in the natural kingdom of God, and what treason against the divine majesty.
19. From what hath been said may be gathered,
that God reigning by the way of natural reason
only, subjects do sin, first if they break the moral
laws; which are unfolded in chapters II. and III.
Secondly, if they break the laws or commands of
the city, in those things which pertain to justice.
Thirdly, if they worship not God κατὰ τὰ νόμικα
Fourthly, if they confess not before men, both in
words and deeds, that there is one God most good,
most great, most blessed, the Supreme King of
the world and of all worldly kings; that is to say,
if they do not worship God. This fourth sin in the
natural kingdom of God, by what hath been said
in the foregoing chapter in art. 2, is the sin of
treason against the Divine Majesty. For it is a
denying of the Divine Power, or atheism. For sins
226proceed here, just as if we should suppose some
man to be the sovereign king, who being himself
absent, should rule by his viceroy. Against whom
sure they would transgress, who should not obey
his viceroy in all things; except he usurped the
kingdom to himself, or would give it to some
other. But they who should so absolutely obey
him, as not to admit of this exception, might be
said to be guilty of treason.
1. Superstition possessing foreign nations, God instituted true
religion by the means of Abraham. 2. By the covenant between
God and Adam, all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands
of superiors. 3. The manner of the covenant between
God and Abraham. 4. In that covenant is contained an acknowledgment
of God, not simply, but of him who appeared
unto Abraham. 5. The laws unto which Abraham was tied,
were no other beside those of nature, and the law of circumcision.
6. Abraham was the interpreter of the word of God,
and of all laws among those that belonged to him. 7. Abraham’s
subjects could not sin by obeying him. 8. God’s covenant
with the Hebrews on Mount Sinai. 9. From thence
God’s government took the name of a kingdom. 10. What
laws were by God given to the Jews. 11. What the word of
God is, and how to be known. 12. What was held the written
word of God among the Jews. 13. The power of interpreting
the word of God, and the supreme civil power, were united in
Moses while he lived. 14. They were also united in the high-priest,
during the life of Joshua. 15. They were united too
in the high-priest until king Saul’s time. 16. They were also
united in the kings until the captivity. 17. They were so in
the high-priests after the captivity. 18. Denial of the Divine
Providence, and idolatry, were the only treasons against the
Divine Majesty among the Jews; in all things else they ought
to obey their princes.
Superstition possessing foreign nations, God instituted the true religion by the means of Abraham.
2271. Mankind, from conscience of its own weakness
and admiration of natural events, hath this;
that most men believe God to be the invisible
maker of all invisible things; whom they also fear,
conceiving that they have not a sufficient protection
in themselves. But the imperfect use they
had of their reason, the violence of their passions
did so cloud them, that they could not rightly
worship him. Now the fear of invisible things,
when it is severed from right reason, is superstition.
It was therefore almost impossible for men,
without the special assistance of God, to avoid
both rocks of atheism and superstition. For this
proceeds from fear without right reason; that, from
an opinion of right reason without fear. Idolatry
therefore did easily fasten upon the greatest part
of men; and almost all nations did worship God
in images and resemblances of finite things; and
they worshipped spirits or vain visions, perhaps
out of fear calling them devils. But it pleased the
Divine Majesty, as we read it written in the sacred
history, out of all mankind to call forth Abraham,
by whose means he might bring men to the true
worship of him; and to reveal himself supernaturally
to him, and to make that most famous covenant
with him and his seed, which is called the
old covenant or testament. He therefore is the
head of true religion; he was the first that after
the deluge taught, that there was one God, the
Creator of the universe. And from him the kingdom
of God by way of covenants, takes its beginning.
Joseph. Antiq. Jews, lib. I.. cap. 7.
By the covenant between God and Adam, all dispute is forbidden
concerningconcerning the commands of superiors.
2. In the beginning of the world God reigned
indeed, not only naturally, but also by way of
228covenant, over Adam and Eve; so as it seems he
would have no obedience yielded to him, beside
that which natural reason should dictate, but by
the way of covenant, that is to say, by the consent
of men themselves. Now because this covenant
was presently made void, nor ever after renewed,
the original of God’s kingdom (which we treat of
in this place) is not to be taken thence. Yet this
is to be noted by the way; that by that precept of
not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil, (whether the judicature of good and evil,
or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden),
God did require a most simple obedience
to his commands, without dispute whether that
were good or evil which was commanded. For
the fruit of the tree, if the command be wanting,
hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating
of it could be morally evil, that is to say, a sin.
The manner of the covenant between God and Abraham.
3. Now the covenant between God and Abraham
was made in this manner, (Gen. xvii. 7, 8): I will
establish my covenant between me and thee, and
thy seed after thee in their generations, for an
everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and
to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee
and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou
art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an
everlasting possession; and I will be their God.
Now it was necessary to institute some sign, whereby
Abraham and his seed should retain the memory
of this covenant; wherefore circumcision
was added to the covenant, but yet as a sign only,
(verse 10, 11): This is my covenant which ye shall
keep between me and thee, and thy seed after
thee; every man-child among you shall be circumcised,
229and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your
foreskin; and it shall be a token of the covenant
between me and you. It is therefore covenanted,
that Abraham shall acknowledge God to be his
God and the God of his seed, that is to say, that
he shall submit himself to be governed by him;
and that God shall give unto Abraham the inheritance
of that land wherein he then dwelt but as
a pilgrim; and that Abraham, for a memorial sign
of this covenant, should take care to see himself
and his male seed circumcised.
In that covenant is contained an acknowledgment of God, not simply, but of him who appeared unto Abraham.
4. But seeing that Abraham, even before the
covenant, acknowledged God to be the Creator
and King of the world; (for he never doubted
either of the being or the providence of God);
how comes it not to be superfluous, that God
would purchase to himself with a price and by
contract an obedience which was due to him by
nature; namely, by promising Abraham the land
of Canaan, upon condition that he would receive
him for his God; when by the right of nature he
was already so? By those words therefore, to be
a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee, we
understand not that Abraham satisfied this covenant
by a bare acknowledgment of the power and
dominion which God had naturally over men, that
is to say, by acknowledging God indefinitely, which
belongs to natural reason; but he must definitely
acknowledge him, who said unto him, (Gen. xii. 1, 2):
Get thee out of thy country; &c. (Gen. xiii. 14):
Lift up thine eyes, &c.: who appeared unto him,
(Gen. xviii. 1, 2), in the shape of three celestial men;
and (Gen. xv. 1), in a vision; and (verse 13), in a
dream, which is matter of faith. In what shape
230God appeared unto Abraham, by what kind of
sound he spake to him, is not expressed. Yet it
is plain that Abraham believed that voice to be
the voice of God and a true revelation, and would
have all his to worship him, who had so spoken
unto him, for God the Creator of the world; and
that his faith was grounded on this, not that he
believed God to have a being or that he was true
in his promises, that which all men believe, but
that he doubted not him to be God, whose voice
and promises he had heard, and that the God of
Abraham signified not simply God, but that God
which appeared unto him; even as the worship,
which Abraham owed unto God in that notion,
was not the worship of reason, but of religion
and faith, and that which not reason, but God had
supernaturally revealed.
The laws to which Abraham was tied were no other, but those of nature and that of circumcision.
5. But we read of no laws given by God to
Abraham, or by Abraham to his family, either
then or after, secular or sacred; excepting the
commandment of circumcision, which is contained
in the covenant itself. Whence it is manifest, that
there were no other laws or worship, which Abraham
was obliged to, but the laws of nature, rational
worship, and circumcision.
Abraham among his own was the interpreter of the word of God and of all laws.
6. Now Abraham was the interpreter of all
laws, as well sacred as secular, among those that
belonged to him; not merely naturally, as using
the laws of nature only, but even by the form of
the covenant itself; in which obedience is promised
by Abraham, not for himself only, but for
his seed also; which had been in vain, except his
children had been tied to obey his commands. And
how can that be understood, which God says
231(Gen. xviii. 18, 19): All the nations of the earth
shall be blessed in him; for I know him, that he
will command his children and his household after
him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord to
do justice and judgment: unless his children and
his household were supposed to be obliged to yield
obedience unto his commands?
Abraham’s subjects could not sin in obeying him.
7. Hence it follows, that Abraham’s subjects
could not sin in obeying him, provided that Abraham
commanded them not to deny God’s existence
or providence, or to do somewhat expressly contrary
to the honour of God. In all other things,
the word of God was to be fetched from his lips
only, as being the interpreter of all the laws and
words of God. For Abraham alone could teach
them who was the God of Abraham, and in what
manner he was to be worshipped. And they who
after Abraham’s death were subject to the sovereignty
of Isaac or Jacob, did by the same reason
obey them in all things without sin, as long as
they acknowledged and professed the God of
Abraham to be their God. For they had submitted
themselves to God simply, before they did it
to Abraham, and to Abraham before they did it to
the God of Abraham: again, to the God of Abraham,
before they did it to Isaac. In Abraham’s
subjects therefore, to deny God was the only treason
against the divine Majesty; but in their posterity,
it was also treason to deny the God of Abraham,
that is to say, to worship God otherwise than
was instituted by Abraham, to wit, in images
made with hands,[20] as other nations did; which
232for that reason were called idolaters. And hitherto,
subjects might easily enough discern what was to
be observed, what avoided in the commands of
their princes.
God’s covenant with the Hebrews at Mount Sinai.
8. To go on now, following the guidance of the
holy Scripture; the same covenant was renewed
(Gen. xxvi. 3, 4) with Isaac; and (Gen. xxviii. 13, 14)
with Jacob; where God styles himself not simply
God, whom nature doth dictate him to be, but distinctly
the God of Abraham and Isaac. Afterward
being about to renew the same covenant by
Moses with the whole people of Israel, (Exod. iii. 6):
I am, saith he, the God of thy Father, the God of
Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.
Afterward, when that people, not only the
freest, but also the greatest enemy to human subjection,
by reason of the fresh memory of their
Egyptian bondage, abode in the wilderness near
mount Sinai, that ancient covenant was propounded
to them all to be renewed in this manner (Exod. xix.
5, 6): Therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed,
and keep my covenant, (to wit, that covenant which
was made with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob); then
shall ye be a peculiar treasure unto me, above all
people; for all the earth is mine, and ye shall be
to me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation.
And all the people answered together, and said,
(verse 8) All that the Lord hath spoken, will we
do.
From thence God’s government was called a kingdom.
2339. In this covenant, among other things, we
must consider well the appellation of kingdom, not
used before. For although God, both by nature
and by covenant made with Abraham, was their
king, yet owed they him an obedience and worship
only natural, as being his subjects; and religious,
such as Abraham instituted, as being the subjects
of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, their natural princes.
For they had received no word of God beside the
natural word of right reason; neither had any
covenant passed between God and them, otherwise
than as their wills were included in the will of
Abraham, as their prince. But now by the covenant
made at Mount Sinai, the consent of each man
being had, there becomes an institutive kingdom
of God over them. That kingdom of God, so renowned
in Scriptures and writings of divines, took
its beginning from this time; and hither tends
that which God said to Samuel, when the Israelites
asked a king (1 Sam. viii. 7): They have not rejected
thee, but they have rejected me, that I should
not reign over them; and that which Samuel told
the Israelites (1 Sam. xii. 12): Ye said unto me,
nay, but a king shall reign over us, when the Lord
your God was your king; and that which is said,
Jer. xxxi. 31: I will make a new covenant, &c.
although I was an husband unto them; and the
doctrine also of Judas Galilæus, where mention is
made in Josephus’ Antiq. of the Jews, (Book xviii.
chap. 2), in these words: But Judas Galilæus was
the first author of this fourth way of those who
followed the study of wisdom. These agree in all
the rest with the Pharisees, excepting that they
burn with a most constant desire of liberty; believing
234God alone to be held for their Lord and
prince; and will sooner endure even the most
exquisite kinds of torments, together with their
kinsfolks and dearest friends, than call any mortal
man their Lord.
What laws were by God given to the Jews.
10. The right of the kingdom being thus constituted
by way of covenant, let us see in the next
place, what laws God propounded to them. Now
those are known to all, to wit, the decalogue, and
those other, as well judicial as ceremonial laws,
which we find from the twentieth chapter of Exodus
to the end of Deuteronomy and the death of
Moses. Now of those laws, delivered in general
by the hand of Moses, some there are which oblige
naturally, being made by God, as the God of
nature, and had their force even before Abraham’s
time. Others there are which oblige by virtue of
the covenant made with Abraham, being made by
God as the God of Abraham, which had their force
even before Moses’s time, by reason of the former
covenant. But there are others which oblige by
virtue of that covenant only, which was made last
with the people themselves; being made by God,
as being the peculiar king of the Israelites. Of
the first sort are all the precepts of the decalogue
which pertain unto manners; such as, honour thy
parents, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit
adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear
false witness, thou shalt not covet; for they are
the laws of nature. Also the precept of not taking
God’s name in vain; for it is a part of natural
worship, as hath been declared in the foregoing
chapter (art. 15). In like manner the second commandment,
of not worshipping by way of any
235image made by themselves; for this also is a part
of natural religion, as hath been showed in the
same article. Of the second sort is the first commandment
of the decalogue, of not having any
other Gods; for in that consists the essence of the
covenant made with Abraham, by which God requires
nothing else, but that he should be his God,
and the God of his seed. Also the precept of
keeping holy the Sabbath; for the sanctification
of the seventh day is instituted in memorial of the
six days’ creation, as appears out of these words
(Exod. xxxi. 16-17): It is a perpetual covenant,
(meaning the Sabbath), and a sign between me and
the children of Israel for ever; for in six days
the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the
seventh day he rested, and was refreshed. Of the
third kind are the politic, judicial, and ceremonial
laws; which only belonged to the Jews. The
laws of the first and second sort written in tables
of stone, to wit, the decalogue, was kept in the
ark itself. The rest written in the volume of the
whole law, were laid up in the side of the ark,
(Deut. xxxi. 26). For these, retaining the faith of
Abraham, might be changed; those could not.
What the word of God is, and how to be known.
11. All God’s laws are God’s word; but all
God’s word is not his law. I am the Lord thy
God which brought thee out of the land of Egypt,
is the word of God; it is no law. Neither is all
that, which for the better declaring of God’s word
is pronounced or written together with it, instantly
to be taken for God’s word. For, Thus saith the
Lord, is not the voice of God, but of the preacher
or prophet. All that, and only that, is the word
of God, which a true prophet hath declared God
236to have spoken. Now the writings of the prophets,
comprehending as well those things which
God, as which the prophet himself speaks, are
therefore called the word of God, because they contain
the word of God. Now because all that, and that
alone, is the word of God, which is recommended to
us for such by a true prophet, it cannot be known
what God’s word is, before we know who is the
true prophet; nor can we believe God’s word,
before we believe the prophet. Moses was believed
by the people of Israel for two things; his miracles
and his faith. For how great and most evident
miracles soever he had wrought, yet would
they not have trusted him, at least he was not to
have been trusted, if he had called them out of
Egypt to any other worship than the worship of the
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob their fathers.
For it had been contrary to the covenant made by
themselves with God. In like manner two things
there are; to wit, supernatural prediction of
things to come, which is a mighty miracle; and
faith in the God of Abraham, their deliverer out
of Egypt; which God proposed to all the Jews to
be kept for marks of a true prophet. He that
wants either of these, is no prophet; nor is it to
be received for God’s word, which he obtrudes for
such. If faith be wanting, he is rejected in these
words, (Deut. xiii. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5): If there arise
among you a prophet or a dreamer of dreams,
and giveth thee a sign, or a wonder; and the
sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he
spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other
gods, &c. that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams
shall be put to death. If prediction of events be
237wanting, he is condemned by these, (Deut. xviii.
21, 22): And if thou say in thine heart, how
shall we know the word which the Lord hath not
spoken? When a prophet speaketh in the name
of the Lord, if the thing follow not nor come to
pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not
spoken; but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously.
Now, that that is the word of God which
is published for such by a true prophet; and that
he was held to be a true prophet among the Jews,
whose faith was true, and to whose predictions the
events answered; is without controversy. But
what it is, to follow other gods, and whether the
events which are affirmed to answer their predictions,
do truly answer them or not, may admit
many controversies; especially in predictions which
obscurely and enigmatically foretel the event; such
as the predictions of almost all the prophets are;
as who saw not God apparently, like unto Moses,
but in dark speeches, and in figures. (Numb. xii. 8).
But of these we cannot judge, otherwise than by
the way of natural reason; because that judgment
depends on the prophet’s interpretation, and
on its proportion with the event.
What was held for the written word of God among the Jews.
12. The Jews did hold the book of the whole
law, which was called Deuteronomy, for the written
word of God; and that only (forasmuch as can be
collected out of sacred history) until the captivity.
For this book was delivered by Moses himself to
the priests, to be kept and laid up in the side of
the ark of the covenant, and to be copied out by
the kings; and the same a long time after, by the
authority of king Josiah (2 Kings xxiii. 2), acknowledged
again for the word of God. But it is not
238manifest, when the rest of the books of the Old
Testament were first received into canon. But
what concerns the prophets, Isaiah and the rest,
since they foretold no other things than what were
to come to pass, either in or after the captivity,
their writings could not at that time be held for
prophetic; by reason of the law cited above (Deut.
xviii. 21, 22), whereby the Israelites were commanded
not to account any man for a true prophet,
but him whose prophecies were answered by the
events. And hence peradventure it is, that the
Jews esteemed the writings of those whom they
slew when they prophesied, for prophetic afterward;
that is to say, for the word of God.
The power of interpreting the word of God, and the supreme civil power, were united in Moses while he lived.
13. It being known what laws there were under
the old covenant, and what word of God received
from the beginning; we must furthermore consider,
with whom the authority of judging, whether
the writings of the prophets arising afterward
were to be received for the word of God; that is tois to
say, whether the events did answer their predictions
or not; and with whom also the authority
of interpreting the laws already received, and the
written word of God, did reside: which thing is
to be traced through all the times and several
changes of the commonwealth of Israel. But it is
manifest that this power, during the life of Moses,
was entirely in himself. For if he had not been the
interpreter of the laws and word, that office must
have belonged either to every private person, or
to a congregation or synagogue of many, or to
the high-priest or to other prophets. First, that
that office belonged not to private men, or any
congregation made of them, appears hence; that
239they were not admitted, nay, they were prohibited
with most heavy threats, to hear God speak, otherwise
than by the means of Moses. For it is written,
(Exod. xix. 24, 25): Let not the priests and the
people break through, to come up unto the Lord,
lest he break forth upon them. So Moses went
down unto the people, and spake unto them. It is
further manifestly and expressly declared, upon
occasion given by the rebellion of Corah, Dathan,
and Abiram, and the two hundred and fifty princes
of the assembly, that neither private men nor the
congregation should pretend that God had spoken
by them, and by consequence that they had the
right of interpreting God’s word. For they contending,
that God spake no less by them than by
Moses, argue thus, (Numbers xvi. 3): Ye take
too much upon you, seeing all the congregation
are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is
among them. Wherefore then lift ye up yourselves
above the congregation of the Lord? But
how God determined this controversy, is easily
understood by verses 33 and 35 of the same chapter,
where Corah, Dathan, and Abiram went down
alive into the pit, &c. And there came out fire
from the Lord, and consumed the two hundred
and fifty men that offered incense. Secondly, that
Aaron the high-priest had not this authority, is
manifest by the like controversy between him (together
with his sister Miriam) and Moses. For
the question was, whether God spake by Moses
only, or by them also; that is to say, whether
Moses alone, or whether they also were interpreters
of the word of God. For thus they said,
(Numb. xii. 2): Hath the Lord indeed spoken
240only by Moses? Hath he not also spoken by us?
But God reproved them; and made a distinction
between Moses and other prophets, saying, (verse
6, 7, 8): If there be a prophet among you, I the
Lord will make myself known unto him in a vision,
and will speak unto him in a dream: my servant
Moses is not so, &c. For with him will I speak
mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in dark
speeches, and the similitude of the Lord shall he
behold. Wherefore then were ye not afraid to
speak against my servant Moses? Lastly, that
the interpretation of the word of God as long as
Moses lived, belonged not to any other prophets
whatsoever, is collected out of that place which we
now cited, concerning his eminency above all
others; and out of natural reason, for as much as
it belongs to the same prophet, who brings the
commands of God, to unfold them too; but there
was then no other word of God, beside that which
was declared by Moses. And out of this also, that
there was no other prophet extant at that time,
who prophesied to the people, excepting the seventy
elders who prophesied by the spirit of Moses.
And even that Joshua, who was then Moses’
servant, his successor afterward, believed to be
injuriously done, till he knew it was by Moses’
consent; which thing is manifest by text of Scripture,
(Numb. xi. 25): And the Lord came down
in a cloud, &c. and took of the spirit that was
upon Moses, and gave it unto the seventy elders.
Now after it was told that they prophesied, Joshua
said unto Moses, Forbid them, my lord. But
Moses answered: Why enviest thou for my sake?
Seeing therefore Moses alone was the messenger
241of God’s word, and that the authority of interpreting
it pertained neither to private men, nor to the
synagogue, nor to the high-priest, nor to other
prophets; it remains that Moses alone was the
interpreter of Gods word, who also had the supreme
power in civil matters; and that the conventions
of Corah with the rest of his complices
against Moses and Aaron, and of Aaron with his
sister against Moses, were raised, not for the salvation
of their souls, but by reason of their ambition
and desire of dominion over the people.
They were also united in the high-priest, during the life of Joshua.
14. In Joshua’s time the interpretation of the
laws, and of the word of God, belonged to Eleazar
the high-priest; who was also, under God, their
absolute king. Which is collected, first of all, out
of the covenant itself; in which the commonwealth
of Israel is called a priestly kingdom, or,
as it is recited in 1 Peter ii. 9, a royal priesthood.
Which could in no wise be said, unless by
the institution and covenant of the people, the
regal power were understood to belong to the
high-priest. Neither doth this repugn what hath
been said before, where Moses, and not Aaron,
had the kingdom under God. Since it is necessary,
when one man institutes the form of a future
commonwealth, that one should govern the
kingdom which he institutes during his life, (whether
it be monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy);
and have all that power for the present, which he
is bestowing on others for the future. Now, that
Eleazar the priest had not only the priesthood,
but also the sovereignty, is expressly set down in
Joshua’s call to the administration. For thus it is
written (Numb, xxvii. 18, 19, 20, 21): Take thee
242Joshua the son of Nun, a man in whom is the
Spirit, and lay thine hand upon him, and set him
before Eleazar the priest, and before all the
congregation, and give him a charge in their
sight; and thou shalt put some of thine honour
upon him, that all the congregation of the children
of Israel may be obedient; and he shall
stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask
counsel for him after the judgment of Urim,
before the Lord; at his word shall they go out,
and at his word shall they come in, and all the
children of Israel with him, even all the congregation.
Where to ask counsel of God for whatsoever
is to be done, that is, to interpret God’s
word, and in the name of God to command in all
matters, belongs to Eleazar; and to go out and
to come in at his word, that is to say, to obey,
belongs both to Joshua and to all the people. It
is to be observed also, that that speech, part of
thy glory, clearly denotes that Joshua had not a
power equal with that which Moses had. In the
meantime it is manifest, that even in Joshua’s time
the supreme power and authority of interpreting
the word of God, were both in one person.
They were also united in the high-priest, until king Saul’s time.
15. After Joshua’s death follow the times of the
Judges until king Saul; in which it is manifest
that the right of the kingdom instituted by God,
remained with the high-priest. For the kingdom
was by covenant priestly, that is to say,
God’s government by priests. And such ought it
to have been, until that form, with God’s consent,
were changed by the people themselves; which
was not done before that requiring a king God
consented unto them, and said unto Samuel (1 Sam.
243viii. 7): Hearken unto the voice of the people in
all that they say unto thee; for they have not rejected
thee, but they have rejected me, that I
should not reign over them. The supreme civil
power was therefore rightly due by God’s own institution
to the high-priest; but actually that
power was in the prophets, to whom (being raised
by God in an extraordinary manner) the Israelites,
a people greedy of prophets, submitted themselves
to be protected and judged, by reason of
the great esteem they had of prophecies. The
reason of this thing was, because that though
penalties were set and judges appointed in the institution
of God’s priestly kingdom; yet, the right
of inflicting punishment depended wholly on private
judgment; and it belonged to a dissolute
multitude and each single person to punish or not
to punish, according as their private zeal should
stir them up. And therefore Moses by his own
command punished no man with death; but when
any man was to be put to death, one or many
stirred up the multitude against him or them, by
divine authority, and saying, Thus saith the Lord.
Now this was conformable to the nature of God’s
peculiar kingdom. For there God reigns indeed,
where his laws are obeyed not for fear of men, but
for fear of himself. And truly, if men were such
as they should be, this were an excellent state of
civil government; but as men are, there is a coercive
power (in which I comprehend both right and
might) necessary to rule them. And therefore
also God, from the beginning, prescribed laws by
Moses for the future kings (Deut. xvii. 14-20). And
Moses foretold this in his last words to the people,
244saying (Deut. xxxi. 29): I know that after my
death ye will utterly corrupt yourselves, and turn
aside from the way that I have commanded you,
&c. When therefore according to this prediction
there arose another generation (Judges ii. 10-11) who
knew not the Lord, nor yet the works which he had
done for Israel, the children of Israel did evil in
the sight of the Lord, and served Balaam; to
wit, they cast off God’s government, that is to say,
that of the priest, by whom God ruled; and afterward,
when they were overcome by their enemies
and oppressed with bondage, they looked for God’s
will, not at the hands of the priest any more, but
of the prophets. These therefore actually judged
Israel; but their obedience was rightly due to the
high-priest. Although therefore the priestly kingdom,
after the death of Moses and Joshua, was
without power; yet was it not without right.
Now that the interpretation of God’s word did
belong to the same high-priest, is manifest by
this; that God, after the tabernacle and the ark
of the covenant was consecrated, spake no more
in Mount Sinai, but in the tabernacle of the covenant,
from the propitiatory which was between
the cherubims, whither it was not lawful for any to
approach except the high-priest. If therefore regard
be had to the right of the kingdom, the
supreme civil power and the authority of interpreting
God’s word were joined in the high-priest.
If we consider the fact, they were united in the
prophets who judged Israel. For as judges, they
had the civil authority; as prophets, they interpreted
God’s word. And thus every way hitherto
these two powers continued inseparable.
They were united in the kings, until the captivity.
24516. Kings being once constituted, it is no doubt
but the civil authority belonged to them. For the
kingdom of God by the way of priesthood (God
consenting to the request of the Israelites) was
ended; which Hierom also marks, speaking of the
books of Samuel. Samuel, says he, Eli being dead
and Saul slain, declares the old law abolished.
Furthermore, the oaths of the new priesthood and
new sovereignty in Zadok and David, do testify
that the right, whereby the kings did rule, was
founded in the very concession of the people. The
priest could rightly do whatsoever every man
could rightly do himself; for the Israelites granted
him a right to judge of all things, and to wage
war for all men; in which two are contained all
right whatsoever can be conceived from man to
man. Our king say they (1 Sam. viii. 20) shall
judge us, and go out before us, and fight our
battles. Judicature therefore belonged to the
kings. But to judge is nothing else, than by interpreting
to apply the laws to the facts. To
them therefore belonged the interpretation of laws
too. And because there was no other written
word of God acknowledged beside the law of
Moses, until the captivity; the authority of interpreting
God’s word did also belong to the kings.
Nay, forasmuch as the word of God must be taken
for a law, if there had been another written word
beside the Mosaical law, seeing the interpretation
of laws belonged to the kings, the interpretation
of it must also have belonged to them. When the
book of Deuteronomy, in which the whole Mosaical
law was contained, being a long time lost was
found again; the priests indeed asked counsel of
246God concerning that book, but not by their own
authority, but by the commandment of Josiah;
and not immediately neither, but by the means of
Holda the prophetess. Whence it appears that
the authority of admitting books for the word of
God, belonged not to the priest. Neither yet follows
it, that that authority belonged to the prophetess;
because others did judge of the prophets,
whether they were to be held for true or not. For
to what end did God give signs and tokens to all
the people, whereby the true prophets might be
discerned from the false; namely, the event of
predictions, and conformity with the religion established
by Moses; if they might not use those
marks? The authority therefore of admitting
books for the word of God, belonged to the king;
and thus that book of the law was approved, and
received again by the authority of king Josiah; as
appears by the second book of the Kings, chap,
xxii. xxiii.: where it is reported that he gathered
together all the several degrees of his kingdom,
the elders, priests, prophets, and all the people;
and he read in their ears all the words of the
covenant; that is to say, he caused that covenant
to be acknowledged for the Mosaical covenant;
that is to say, for the word of God; and to be
again received and confirmed by the Israelites.
The civil power therefore, and the power of discerning
God’s word from the words of men, and
of interpreting God’s word even in the days of the
kings, was wholly belonging to themselves. Prophets
were sent not with authority, but in the
form and by the right of proclaimers and preachers,
of whom the hearers did judge. And if perhaps
247these were punished who did not listen to
them plainly, teaching easy things; it doth not
thence follow, that the kings were obliged to follow
all things which they, in God’s name, did declare
were to be followed. For though Josiah, the
good king of Judah, were slain because he obeyed
not the word of the Lord from the mouth of
Necho king of Egypt; that is to say, because he
rejected good counsel though it seemed to come
from an enemy; yet no man I hope will say that
Josiah was, by any bond either of divine or human
laws, obliged to believe Pharaoh Necho king of
Egypt, because he said that God had spoken to
him. But what some man may object against
kings, that for want of learning they are seldom
able enough to interpret those books of antiquity,
in the which God’s word is contained; and that
for this cause, it is not reasonable that this office
should depend on their authority; he may object
as much against the priests and all mortal men;
for they may err. And although priests were better
instructed in nature and arts than other men,
yet kings are able enough to appoint such interpreters
under them; and so, though kings did not
themselves interpret the word of God, yet the
office of interpreting them might depend on their
authority. And they who therefore refuse to yield
up this authority to kings, because they cannot
practice the office itself, do as much as if they
should say, that the authority of teaching geometry
must not depend upon kings, except they
themselves were geometricians. We read that
kings have prayed for the people; that they have
blessed the people; that they have consecrated the
248temple; that they have commanded the priests;
that they have removed priests from their office;
that they have constituted others. Sacrifices indeed
they have not offered; for that was hereditary
to Aaron and his sons. But it is manifest, as in
Moses’ lifetime, so throughout all ages, from king
Saul to the captivity of Babylon, that the priesthood
was not a maistry, but a ministry.
The same were united in the priests, after the captivity.
17. After their return from Babylonian bondage,
the covenant being renewed and signed, the
priestly kingdom was restored to the same manner
it was in from the death of Joshua to the beginning
of the kings; excepting that it is not expressly
set down, that the returned Jews did give
up the right of sovereignty either to Esdras, by
whose direction they ordered their state, or to any
other beside God himself. That reformation seems
rather to be nothing else, than the bare promises
and vows of every man, to observe those things
which were written in the book of the law. Notwithstanding,
(perhaps not by the people’s intention),
by virtue of the covenant which they then
renewed, (for the covenant was the same with that
which was made at Mount Sinai), that same state
was a priestly kingdom; that is to say, the supreme
civil authority and the sacred were united
in the priests. Now, howsoever through the
ambition of those who strove for the priesthood,
and by the interposition of foreign princes, it was
so troubled till our Saviour Jesus Christ’s time,
that it cannot be understood out of the histories
of those times, where that authority resided; yet
it is plain, that in those times the power of interpreting
God’s word was not severed from the
supreme civil power.
Among the Jews, the denial of the Divine providence and idolatry, were the only treasons against the Divine Majesty: in all other things they ought to obey their princes.
24918. Out of all this, we may easily know how the
Jews, in all times from Abraham unto Christ, were
to behave themselves in the commands of their
princes. For as in kingdoms merely human, men
must obey a subordinate magistrate in all things,
excepting when his commands contain in them
some treason; so in the kingdom of God, the
Jews were bound to obey their princes, Abraham,
Isaac, Jacob, Moses, the priest, the king, every
one during their time in all things, except when
their commands did contain some treason against
the Divine Majesty. Now treason against the Divine
Majesty was, first, the denial of divine providence;
for this was to deny God to be a king by
nature: next, idolatry, or the worship not of
other, (for there is but one God), but of strange
Gods; that is to say, a worship though of one
God, yet under other titles, attributes, and rites,
than what were established by Abraham and
Moses; for this was to deny the God of Abraham
to be their king by covenant made with
Abraham and themselves. In all other things
they were to obey. And if a king or priest,
having the sovereign authority, had commanded
somewhat else to be done which was against the
laws, that had been his sin, and not his subject’s;
whose duty it is, not to dispute, but to obey the
commands of his superiors.
250
1. The prophecies concerning Christ’s dignity. 2. The prophecies
concerning his humility and passion. 3. That Jesus
was that Christ. 4. That the kingdom of God by the new
covenant, was not the kingdom of Christ, as Christ, but as
God. 5. That the kingdom by the new covenant is heavenly,
and shall begin from the day of judgment. 6. That the government
of Christ in this world was not a sovereignty, but
counsel, or a government by the way of doctrine and persuasion.
7. What the promises of the new covenant are, on both
parts. 8. That no laws are added by Christ, beside the institution
of the sacraments. 9. Repent ye, be baptized, keep
the commandments, and the like forms of speech, are not
laws. 10. It pertains to the civil authority, to define what
the sin of injustice is. 11. It pertains to the civil authority,
to define what conduces to the peace and defence of the city.
12. It pertains to the civil authority, to judge (when need requires)
what definitions and what inferences are true. 13. It
belongs to the office of Christ, to teach morally, not by the
way of speculation, but as a law; to forgive sins, and to teach
all things whereof there is no science, properly so called. 14. A
distinction of things temporal from spiritual. 15. In how many
several sorts the word of God may be taken. 16. That all
which is contained in Holy Scripture, belongs not to the canon
of Christian faith. 17. That the word of a lawful interpreter
of Holy Scriptures, is the word of God. 18. That the authority
of interpreting Scriptures, is the same with that of determining
controversies of faith. 19. Divers significations of a
Church. 20. What a Church is, to which we attribute rights,
actions, and the like personal capacities. 21. A Christian city
is the same with a Christian Church. 22. Many cities do not
constitute one Church. 23. Who are ecclesiastical persons.
24. That the election of ecclesiastical persons belongs to the
Church, their consecration to pastors. 25. That the power of
remitting the sins of the penitent, and retaining those of the
impenitent, belongs to the pastors; but that of judging concerning
repentance belongs to the Church. 26. What excommunication
is, and on whom it cannot pass. 27. That the
interpretation of Scripture depends on the authority of the
city. 28. That a Christian city ought to interpret Scriptures
by ecclesiastical pastors.
The prophecies concerning Christ’s dignity.
2511. There are many clear prophecies extant in
the Old Testament concerning our Saviour Jesus
Christ, who was to restore the kingdom of God
by a new covenant; partly foretelling his regal
dignity, partly his humility and passion. Among
others concerning his dignity, these. God, blessing
Abraham, makes him a promise of his son Isaac;
and adds (Gen. xvii. 16): And kings of people
shall be of him. Jacob blessing his son Judah
(Gen. xlix. 10): The sceptre, quoth he, shall not
depart from Judah. God to Moses (Deut. xviii. 18):
A prophet, saith he, will I raise them up from
among their brethren, like unto thee, and will put
my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto
them all that I shall command him; and it shall
come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto
my words, which he shall speak in my name, I will
require it of him. Isaiah (Isai. vii. 14): The Lord
himself shall give thee a sign; Behold a virgin
shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his
name Emmanuel. The same prophet (Isaiah ix. 6):
Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and
the government shall be upon his shoulders; and
his name shall be called wonderful, counsellor, the
mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of
Peace. And again (Isaiah xi. 1-5): There shall
come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a
branch shall grow out of his roots; the spirit of
the Lord shall rest upon him, &c.; He shall not
judge after the sight of his eyes, neither reprove
after the hearing of his ears; but with righteousness
shall he judge the poor, &c.; And he shall
smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with
the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked.
252Furthermore in the same Isaiah (chapters li. to
lxii.), there is almost nothing else contained but a
description of the coming and the works of Christ.
Jeremiah (Jerem. xxxi. 31): Behold the days come,
saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant
with the house of Israel, and with the house of
Judah. And Baruch (Bar. iii. 35-37): This is our
God, &c. Afterward did he show himself upon
earth, and conversed with men. Ezekiel (Ezek.
xxxiv. 23-25): I will set up one shepherd over them,
and he shall feed them; even my servant David.
And I will make with them a covenant of peace,
&c. Daniel (Dan. vii. 13-14): I saw in the night
visions; and behold one like the Son of Man
came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the
ancient of days; and they brought him near before
him; and there was given him dominion, and
glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and
languages should serve him; his dominion is an
everlasting dominion, &c. Haggai (Haggai ii. 6-7):
Yet once it is a little while, and I will shake the
heaven, and the earth, and the sea, and the dry
land; and I will shake all nations; and the desire
of all nations shall come. Zachariah, under
the type of Joshua the high-priest (Zach. iii. 8):
I will bring forth my servant the branch, &c. And
again (Zach. vi. 12): Behold the man whose name
is the Branch. And again (Zach. ix. 9): Rejoice
greatly O daughter of Zion, shout O daughter of
Jerusalem; behold thy king cometh to thee; he
is just, having salvation. The Jews moved by
these and other prophecies, expected Christ their
king to be sent from God; who should redeem
them, and furthermore bear rule over all nations.
253Yea, this prophecy had spread over the whole
Roman empire; which Vespasian too, though
falsely, interpreted in favour of his own enterprises;
that out of Judea should come he that
should have dominion.
The prophecies of Christ’s humility and passion.
2. Now the prophecies of Christ’s humility and
passion, amongst others are these: (Isaiah liii. 4):
He hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows;
yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and
afflicted; and by and by (verse 7): He was oppressed,
he was afflicted, yet he opened not his
mouth; he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter,
and as a sheep before her shearer is dumb, so
opened he not his mouth, &c. And again (verse 8):
He was cut out of the land of the living; for the
transgression of my people was he stricken, &c.
(Verse 12): Therefore I will divide him a portion
with the great, and he shall divide the spoil
with the strong; because he hath poured out his
soul unto death, and he was numbered with the
transgressors, and he bare the sin of many, and
made intercession for the transgressors. And that
of Zachariah (Zach. ix. 9): He is lowly, riding upon
an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass.
That Jesus was the Christ.
3. In the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, Jesus our
Saviour, a Galilean, began to preach; the son, as
was supposed, of Joseph; declaring to the people
of the Jews, that the kingdom of God expected by
them was now come, and that himself was a king,
that is to say, the Christ; explaining the law,
choosing twelve apostles and seventy disciples,
after the number of the princes of the tribes, and
seventy elders (according to the pattern of Moses)
to the ministry; teaching the way of salvation by
254himself and them; purging the temple, doing
great signs, and fulfilling all those things which
the prophets had foretold of Christ to come. That
this man, hated of the Pharisees, whose false doctrine
and hypocritical sanctity he had reproved;
and by their means, of the people accused of unlawful
seeking for the kingdom, and crucified;
was the true Christ and king promised by God,
and sent from his Father to renew the new covenant
between them and God; both the evangelists
do show, describing his genealogy, nativity, life,
doctrine, death, and resurrection; and by comparing
the things which he did with those which
were foretold of him, all Christians do consent to.
That the kingdom of God by the new covenant, was not the kingdom of Christ, as Christ, but as God.
4. Now from this, that Christ was sent from
God his Father to make a covenant between him
and the people, it is manifest, that though Christ
were equal to his Father according to his nature,
yet was he inferior according to the right of the
kingdom. For this office, to speak properly, was
not that of a king, but of a viceroy; such as
Moses’ government was; for the kingdom was
not his, but his Father’s. Which Christ himself
signified when he was baptized as a subject, and
openly professed when he taught his disciples to
pray, Our Father, thy kingdom come, &c.: and
when he said (Matth. xxvi. 29): I will not drink
of the blood of the grape, until that day when I
shall drink it new with you in the kingdom of my
Father. And St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 22-24): As in
Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive;
but every man in his own order; Christ the first
fruits; afterward they that are Christ’s, who believed
255in his coming; then cometh the end when
he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God
even his Father. The same notwithstanding is
also called the kingdom of Christ: for both the
mother of the sons of Zebedee petitioned Christ,
saying (Matth. xx. 21): Grant that these my two
sons may sit, the one on thy right hand, the other
on thy left, in thy kingdom: and the thief on
the cross (Luke xxiii. 42): Lord remember me
when thou comest into thy kingdom: and St. Paul
(Ephes. v. 5): For this know ye, that no whoremonger,
&c. shall enter into the kingdom of God,
and of Christ: and elsewhere (2 Tim. iv. 1): I
charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus
Christ, who shall judge the quick and dead at his
appearing, and his kingdom, &c.: (verse 18):
And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil
work, and will preserve me unto his heavenly kingdom.
Nor is it to be marveled at, that the same
kingdom is attributed to them both; since both
the Father and the Son are the same God; and
the new covenant concerning God’s kingdom, is
not propounded in the name of the Father; but
in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the
Holy Ghost, as of one God.
That the kingdom of God by the new covenant is heavenly, and begins from the day of judgment.
5. But the kingdom of God, for restitution
whereof Christ was sent from God his Father,
takes not its beginning before his second coming;
to wit, from the day of judgment, when he shall
come in majesty accompanied with his angel. For
it is promised the apostles, that in the kingdom of
God they shall judge the twelve tribes of Israel,
(Matth. xix. 28): Ye which have followed me in the
regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the
256throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve
thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel: which
is not to be done till the day of judgment. Christ
therefore is not yet in the throne of his majesty;
nor is that time, when Christ was conversant here
in the world, called a kingdom, but a regeneration;
that is to say, a renovation or restitution of
the kingdom of God, and a calling of them who
were hereafter to be received into his kingdom.
And where it is said (Matth. xxv. 31-32): When the
Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the
holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the
throne of his glory, and before him shall be
gathered all nations; and he shall separate them
one from another, as a shepherd divideth his
sheep from the goats: we may manifestly gather
that there will be no local separation of God’s subjects
from his enemies, but that they shall live
mixed together until Christ’s second coming.
Which is also confirmed by the comparison of the
kingdom of heaven with wheat mingled with
darnell, and with a net containing all sorts of
fish. But a multitude of men, enemies and subjects,
living promiscuously together, cannot properly
be termed a kingdom. Besides, the apostles,
when they asked our Saviour, whether he
would at that time when he ascended into heaven,
restore the kingdom unto Israel; did openly testify,
that they then, when Christ ascended, thought
the kingdom of God not to be yet come. Furthermore,
the words of Christ, My kingdom is not of
this world: and, I will not drink, &c. till the
kingdom of God come: and, God hath not sent
his Son into the world, to judge the world, but
257that the world through him might be saved: and,
If any man hear my words, and keep them not, I
judge him not; for I came not to judge the world,
but to save the world: and, Man, who made me
a judge or divider between you? and the very
appellation of the kingdom of heaven testifies
as much. The same thing is gathered out of
the words of the prophet Jeremiah, speaking of
the kingdom of God by the new covenant (Jer.
xxxi. 34): They shall teach no more every man
his neighbour; saying, Know the Lord. For
they shall all know me, from the least of them to
the greatest of them, saith the Lord: which cannot
be understood of a kingdom in this world.
The kingdom of God therefore, for the restoring
whereof Christ came into the world; of which
the prophets did prophecy, and of which praying
we say, Thy kingdom come; if it is to have subjects
locally separated from enemies, if judicature,
if majesty, according as hath been foretold; shall
begin from that time, wherein God shall separate
the sheep from the goats; wherein the apostles
shall judge the twelve tribes of Israel; wherein
Christ shall come in majesty and glory; wherein
lastly, all men shall so know God, that they shall
not need to be taught; that is to say, at Christ’s
second coming, or the day of judgment. But if
the kingdom of God were now already restored,
no reason could be rendered why Christ, having
completed the work for which he was sent, should
come again; or why we should pray, Thy kingdom
come.
The government of Christ in this world was not a sovereignty, but counsel, or a government by way of doctrine and persuasion.
6. Now, although the kingdom of God by
Christ to be established with a new covenant, were
258heavenly; we must not therefore think, that they,
who believing in Christ would make that covenant,
were not so to be governed here on the earth too,
as that they should persevere in their faith and
obedience promised by that covenant. For in
vain had the kingdom of heaven been promised, if
we were not to have been led into it; but none
can be led, but those who are directed in the way.
Moses, when he had instituted the priestly kingdom,
himself though he were no priest, yet ruled
and conducted the people all the time of their
peregrination, until their entrance into the promised
land. In the same manner is it our Saviour’s
office, (whom God in this thing would have like
unto Moses), as he was sent from his Father, so to
govern the future subjects of his heavenly kingdom
in this life, that they might attain to and enter into
that; although the kingdom were not properly his,
but his Father’s. But the government whereby
Christ rules the faithful ones in this life, is not
properly a kingdom or dominion, but a pastoral
charge, or the right of teaching; that is to say,
God the Father gave him not a power to judge of
meum and tuum, as he doth to the kings of the
earth; nor a coercive power, nor legislative; but
of showing to the world, and teaching them the
way and knowledge of salvation; that is to say,
of preaching and declaring what they were to do,
who would enter into the kingdom of heaven.
That Christ had received no power from his
Father to judge in questions of meum and tuum,
that is to say, in all questions of right among
those who believed not, those words above cited do
sufficiently declare: Man, who made me a judge
259or divider between you? And it is confirmed by
reason. For seeing Christ was sent to make a
covenant between God and men; and no man is
obliged to perform obedience before the contract
be made; if he should have judged of questions of
right, no man had been tied to obey his sentence.
But that the discerning of right was not committed
to Christ in this world, neither among the
faithful nor among infidels, is apparent in this;
that that right without all controversy belongs to
princes, as long as it is not by God himself derogated
from their authority. But it is not derogated
before the day of judgment; as appears by
the words of St. Paul, speaking of the day of
judgment (1 Cor. xv. 24): Then cometh the end,
when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to
God even the Father, when he shall have put down
all rule, and all authority, and power. Secondly,
the words of our Saviour reproving James and
John, when they had said (Luke ix. 54): Wilt thou
that we call for fire from heaven, that it may consume
them? (namely the Samaritans, who had denied
to receive him going up to Jerusalem): and
replying (verse 56), The Son of man is not come to
destroy souls, but to save them; and those words:
Behold I send you as sheep among wolves; Shake
off the dust of your feet; and the like; and those
words, God sent not his Son into the world, to judge
the world, but that the world through him might
be saved; and those: If any man hear my words,
and keep them not, I judge him not; for I came
not to judge the world, &c.: do all show, that he
had no power given him to condemn or punish
any man. We read indeed, that the Father
260judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment
to the Son; but since that both may, and must be
understood of the day of future judgment, it doth
not at all repugn what hath been said before.
Lastly, that he was not sent to make new laws, and
that therefore by his office and mission he was no
legislator properly so called, nor Moses neither,
but a bringer and publisher of his Father’s laws,
(for God only, and neither Moses nor Christ, was
a king by covenant), is collected hence; that he
said, I came not to destroy, (to wit, the laws before
given from God by Moses, which he presently
interprets), but to fulfil; and, He that shall
break one of the least of these commandments,
and shall teach men so, he shall be called least
in the kingdom of heaven. Christ therefore had
not a royal or sovereign power committed to him
from his Father in this world, but councillary and
doctrinal only; which himself signifies, as well
then when he calls his apostles not hunters, but
fishers of men; as when he compares the kingdom
of God to a grain of mustard-seed, and to a little
leaven hid in meal.
What the promises of the new covenant are on both parts.
7. God promised unto Abraham, first, a numerous
seed, the possession of the land of Canaan,
and a blessing upon all nations in his seed, on this
condition; that he and his seed should serve him:
next, unto the seed of Abraham according to the
flesh, a priestly kingdom, a government most
free, in which they were to be subject to no human
power, on this condition; that they should
serve the God of Abraham on that fashion which
Moses should teach: lastly, both to them and to
all nations, a heavenly and eternal kingdom, on
261condition that they should serve the God of Abraham
on that manner which Christ should teach.
For by the new, that is to say, the Christian covenant,
it is covenanted on men’s part, to serve the
God of Abraham on that manner which Jesus
should teach: on God’s part, to pardon their sins,
and bring them into his celestial kingdom. We
have already spoken of the quality of the heavenly
kingdom, above in art. 5; but it is usually called,
sometimes the kingdom of heaven, sometimes the
kingdom of glory, sometimes the life eternal.
What is required on men’s part, namely, to serve
God as Christ should teach, contains two things;
obedience to be performed to God, (for this is to
serve God); and faith in Jesus, to wit, that we believe
Jesus to be that Christ who was promised by
God; for that only is the cause why his doctrine
is to be followed, rather than any other’s. Now
in holy Scriptures, repentance is often put instead
of obedience; because Christ teacheth everywhere,
that with God the will is taken for the deed; but
repentance is an infallible sign of an obedient
mind. These things being understood, it will
most evidently appear out of many places of sacred
Scripture, that those are the conditions of
the Christian covenant which we have named; to
wit, giving remission of sins and eternal life on
God’s part; and repenting and believing in Jesus
Christ, on men’s part. First, the words, (Mark
i. 15): The kingdom of God is at hand; Repent
ye and believe the gospel, contain the whole covenant.
In like manner those (Luke xxiv. 46-47):
Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to
suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day;
262and that repentance and remission of sins should
be preached in his name among all nations, beginning
at Jerusalem. And those (Acts iii. 19): Repent
and be converted, that your sins may be
blotted out when the times of refreshing shall
come, &c. And sometimes one part is expressly
propounded, and the other understood, as here
(John iii. 36): He that believeth in the Son, hath
everlasting life; He that believeth not the Son,
shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth
on him: where faith is expressed, repentance not
mentioned; and in Christ’s preaching (Matth.
iv. 17): Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at
hand: where repentance is expressed, faith is understood.
But the parts of this new contract are
most manifestly and formally set down there,
where a certain ruler, bargaining as it were for
the kingdom of God, asketh our Saviour (Luke
xviii. 18): Good Master, what shall I do to inherit
eternal life? But Christ first propounds
one part of the price, namely, observation of the
commandments, or obedience; which when he
answered that he had kept, he adjoins the other,
saying (verse 22): Yet lackest thou one thing;
Sell all that thou hast, and distribute to the poor,
and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and
come, follow me. This was matter of faith. He
therefore not giving sufficient credit to Christ
and his heavenly treasures, went away sorrowful.
The same covenant is contained in these words
(Mark xvi. 16): He that believeth and is baptized,
shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be
damned: where faith is expressed, repentance is
supposed in those that are baptized. And in these
263words (John iii. 5): Except a man be born again
of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into
the kingdom of heaven: where, to be born of water,
is the same with regeneration, that is to say, conversion
to Christ. Now that baptism is required
in the two places cited just before, and in divers
others, we must understand, that what circumcision
was to the old covenant, that baptism is to
the new. Seeing therefore that was not of the
essence, but served for a memorial of the old covenant,
as a ceremony or sign, (and was omitted in
the wilderness); in like manner this also is used,
not as pertaining to the essence, but in memory
and for a sign of the new covenant which we make
with God. And provided the will be not wanting,
the act through necessity may be omitted; but
repentance and faith, which are of the essence of
the covenant, are always required.
There are no laws added by Christ, beside the institution of the sacraments.
8. In the kingdom of God after this life, there
will be no laws; partly, because there is no room
for laws, where there is none for sins; partly,
because laws were given us from God, not to direct
us in heaven, but unto heaven. Let us now
therefore inquire what laws Christ established not
himself; for he would not take upon him any
legislative authority, as hath been declared above
in art. 6; but propounded to us for his Father’s.
We have a place in Scripture, where he contracts
all the laws of God published till that time, into two
precepts. (Matth. xxii. 37, 38, 39, 40): Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, with
all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is
the greatest and first commandment. And the
second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour
264as thyself. On these two commandments
hang all the law and the prophets. The first of
these was given before by Moses in the same words
(Deut. vi. 5); and the second even before Moses;
for it is the natural law, having its beginning with
rational nature itself: and both together is the
sum of all laws. For all the laws of divine natural
worship, are contained in these words, Thou shalt
love God; and all the laws of divine worship due
by the old covenant, in these words, Thou shalt
love thy God, that is to say, God, as being the peculiar
King of Abraham and his seed; and all the
laws natural and civil, in these words, Thou shalt
love thy neighbour as thyself. For he that loves
God and his neighbour, hath a mind to obey all
laws, both divine and human. But God requires
no more than a mind to obey. We have another
place where Christ interprets the laws, namely, the
fifth, sixth, and seventh entire chapters of St.
Matthew’s Gospel. But all those laws are set down
either in the decalogue or in the moral law, or are
contained in the faith of Abraham; as that law
of not putting away a wife is contained in the
faith of Abraham. For that same, two shall be
one flesh, was not delivered, either by Christ first,
or by Moses, but by Abraham, who first preached
the creation of the world. The laws therefore
which Christ contracts in one place, and explains
in another, are no other than those to which all
mortal men are obliged, who acknowledge the God
of Abraham. Beside these, we read not of any
law given by Christ, beside the institution of the
sacraments of baptism and the eucharist.
That these and the like forms, repent, be baptized, keep the commandments, are not laws.
9. What may be said then of these kind of precepts,
265Repent, Be baptized, Keep the Commandments,
Believe the Gospel, Come unto me, Sell all
that thou hast, Give to the poor, Follow me; and
the like? We must say that they are not laws,
but a calling of us to the faith: such as is that of
Isaiah (lv. 1): Come; buy wine and milk without
money and without price. Neither if they come
not, do they therefore sin against any law, but
against prudence only; neither shall their infidelity
be punished, but their former sins. Wherefore
St. John saith of the unbeliever, The wrath
of God abideth on him; he saith not, The wrath
of God shall come upon him. And, He that believeth
not, is already judged; he saith not, shall
be judged, but is already judged. Nay, it cannot
be well conceived, that remission of sins should be
a benefit arising from faith, unless we understand
also on the other side, that the punishment of sins
is an hurt proceeding from infidelity.
It belongs to the civil authority, to define what the sin of injustice is.
10. From hence, that our Saviour hath prescribed
no distributive laws to the subjects of
princes, and citizens of cities; that is to say, hath
given no rules whereby a subject may know and
discern what is his own, what another man’s, nor
by what forms, words, or circumstances a thing
must be given, delivered, invaded, possessed, that
it may be known by right to belong to the receiver,
invader, or possessor: we must necessarily
understand that each single subject (not only
with unbelievers, among whom Christ himself
denied himself to be a judge and distributor, but
even with Christians) must take those rules from
his city, that is to say, from that man or council
which hath the supreme power. It follows therefore,
266that by those laws; Thou shalt not kill,
Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not
steal, Honour thy father and mother; nothing
else was commanded, but that subjects, and citizens,
should absolutely obey their princes in all
questions concerning meum and tuum, their own
and others’ right. For by that precept, Thou shalt
not kill, all slaughter is not prohibited; for he
that said, Thou shalt not kill, said also, (Exod.
xxxv. 2): Whosoever doth work upon the sabbath,
shall be put to death. No, nor yet all slaughter,
the cause not being heard; for he said, (Exod.
xxxii. 27): Slay every man his brother, and every
man his companion, and every man his neighbour.
(Verse 28): And there fell of the people about
three thousand men. Nor yet all slaughter of an
innocent person; for Jephtha vowed (Judges xi.
31): Whosoever cometh forth, &c. I will offer
him up for a burnt offering unto the Lord; and
his vow was accepted of God. What then is forbidden?
Only this: that no man kill another,
who hath not a right to kill him; that is to say,
that no man kill, unless it belong to him to do so.
The law of Christ therefore concerning killing,
and consequently all manner of hurt done to any
man, and what penalties are to be set, commands
us to obey the city only. In like manner, by that
precept, Thou shalt not commit adultery, all manner
of copulation is not forbidden; but only that
of lying with another man’s wife. But the judgment,
which is another man’s wife, belongs to the
city; and is to be determined by the rules which
the city prescribes. This precept therefore commands
both male and female to keep that faith
267entire, which they have mutually given according
to the statutes of the city. So also by the precept,
thou shalt not steal, all manner of invasion or
secret surreption is not forbidden; but of another
man’s only. The subject therefore is commanded
this only, that he invade not nor take away aught
which the city prohibits to be invaded or taken
away; and universally, not to call anything murder,
adultery, or theft, but what is done contrary
to the civil laws. Lastly, seeing Christ hath commanded
us to honour our parents, and hath not
prescribed with what rites, what appellations, and
what manner of obedience they are to be honoured;
it is to be supposed that they are to be honoured
with the will indeed, and inwardly, as kings and
lords over their children, but outwardly, not beyond
the city’s permission, which shall assign to
every man, as all things else, so also his honour.
But since the nature of justice consists in this, that
every man have his own given him; it is manifest,
that it also belongs to a Christian city to determine
what is justice, what injustice, or a sin against
justice. Now what belongs to a city, that must be
judged to belong to him or them who have the
sovereign power of the city.
It belongs to civil authority, to define what conduces to the peace and safety of the city.
11. Moreover, because our Saviour hath not
showed subjects any other laws for the government
of a city, beside those of nature, that is to
say, beside the command of obedience; no subject
can privately determine who is a public friend,
who an enemy, when war, when peace, when
truce is to be made, nor yet what subjects, what
authority and of what men, are commodious or
prejudicial to the safety of the commonweal.
268These and all like matters therefore are to be
learned, if need be, from the city, that is to say,
from the sovereign powers.
It belongs to the civil authority, to judge, when need requires, what definitions and what inferences are true.
12. Furthermore, all these things, to build castles,
houses, temples; to move, carry, take away
mighty weights; to send securely over seas; to
contrive engines, serving for all manner of uses;
to be well acquainted with the face of the whole
world, the courses of the stars, the seasons of the
year, the accounts of the times, and the nature of
all things; to understand perfectly all natural and
civil rights; and all manner of sciences, which,
comprehended under the title of philosophy, are
necessary partly to live, partly to live well; I say,
the understanding of these (because Christ hath
not delivered it) is to be learnt from reasoning;
that is to say, by making necessary consequences,
having first taken the beginning from experience.
But men’s reasonings are sometimes right, sometimes
wrong; and consequently, that which is
concluded and held for a truth, is sometimes
truth, sometimes error. Now errors, even about
these philosophical points, do sometimes public
hurt, and give occasions of great seditions and injuries.
It is needful therefore, as oft as any controversy
ariseth in these matters contrary to
public good and common peace, that there be
somebody to judge of the reasoning, that is to say,
whether that which is inferred, be rightly inferred
or not; that so the controversy may be ended.
But there are no rules given by Christ to this purpose,
neither came he into the world to teach
logic. It remains therefore that the judges of
such controversies, be the same with those whom
269God by nature had instituted before, namely, those
who in each city are constituted by the sovereign.
Moreover, if a controversy be raised of the accurate
and proper signification, that is, the definition
of those names or appellations which are commonly
used; insomuch as it is needful for the
peace of the city, or the distribution of right, to be
determined; the determination will belong to the
city. For men, by reasoning, do search out such
kind of definitions in their observation of diverse
conceptions, for the signification whereof those
appellations were used at diverse times and for diverse
causes. But the decision of the question,
whether a man do reason rightly, belongs to the
city. For example, if a woman bring forth a child
of an unwonted shape, and the law forbid to kill
a man; the question is, whether the child be a
man. It is demanded therefore, what a man is.
No man doubts but the city shall judge it, and that
without taking an account of Aristotle’s definition,
that man is a rational creature. And these things,
namely, right, policy, and natural sciences, are
subjects concerning which Christ denies that it
belongs to his office to give any precepts, or teach
any thing beside this only; that in all controversies
about them, every single subject should obey
the laws and determinations of his city. Yet must
we remember this, that the same Christ, as God,
could not only have taught, but also commanded
what he would.
It belongs to the office of Christ, to teach morality, not as a speculation, but as a law; to forgive sins, and to teach all things whereof there is no science properly so called.
13. The sum of our Saviour’s office was, to teach
the way and all the means of salvation and eternal
life. But justice and civil obedience, and observation
of all the natural laws, is one of the means to
270salvation. Now these may be taught two ways;
one, as theorems, by the way of natural reason, by
drawing right and the natural laws from human
principles and contracts; and this doctrine thus
delivered, is subject to the censure of civil powers.
The other, as laws, by divine authority, in showing
the will of God to be such; and thus to teach, belongs
only to him to whom the will of God is
supernaturally known, that is to say, to Christ.
Secondly, it belonged to the office of Christ to
forgive sins to the penitent; for that was necessary
for the salvation of men who had already sinned.
Neither could it be done by any other. For
remission of sins follows not repentance naturally,
as a debt; but it depends, as a free gift, on the
will of God supernaturally to be revealed. Thirdly,
it belongs to the office of Christ to teach all those
commandments of God, whether concerning his
worship, or those points of faith which cannot be
understood by natural reason, but only by revelation;
of which nature are those, that he was the
Christ; that his kingdom was not terrestrial, but
celestial; that there are rewards and punishments
after this life; that the soul is immortal; that
there should be such, and so many sacraments;
and the like.
A distinction of things temporal from spiritual.
14. From what hath been said in the foregoing
chapter, it is not hard to distinguish between
things spiritual and temporal. For since by
spiritual, those things are understood, which have
their foundation on the authority and office of
Christ, and, unless Christ had taught them, could
not have been known; and all other things are
temporal; it follows, that the definition and determination
271of what is just and unjust, the cognizance
of all controversies about the means of peace and
public defence, and the examination of doctrines
and books in all manner of rational science, depends
upon the temporal right; but those which
are mysteries of faith, depending on Christ’s word
and authority only, their judgments belong to
spiritual right. But it is reason’s inquisition,
and pertains to temporal right to define what is
spiritual, and what temporal; because our Saviour
hath not made that distinction. For although
St. Paul in many places distinguish between spiritual
things and carnal things; and call (Rom.
viii. 5: 1 Cor. xii. 8-10) those things spiritual, which
are of the spirit, to wit, the word of wisdom, the
word of knowledge, faith, the gift of healing, the
working of miracles, prophecy, divers kind of
tongues, interpretation of tongues; all supernaturally
inspired by the Holy Ghost, and such as
the carnal man understands not, but he only who
hath known the mind of Christ (2 Cor. ii. 14-16);
and those things carnal, which belong to worldly
wealth (Rom. xv. 27); and the men carnal men
(1 Cor. iii. 1-3): yet hath he not defined, nor given
us any rules whereby we may know what proceeds
from natural reason, what from supernatural inspiration.
The word of God many ways taken.
15. Seeing therefore it is plain that our Saviour
hath committed to, or rather not taken away from
princes, and those who in each city have obtained
the sovereignty, the supreme authority of judging
and determining all manner of controversies about
temporal matters; we must see henceforth to
whom he hath left the same authority in matters
272spiritual. Which because it cannot be known,
except it be out of the word of God and the tradition
of the Church, we must enquire in the next
place what the word of God is, what to interpret
it, what a Church is, and what the will and command
of the Church. To omit that the word of
God is in Scripture taken sometimes for the Son
of God, it is used three manner of ways. First,
most properly for that which God hath spoken.
Thus, whatsoever God spake unto Abraham, the
patriarchs, Moses, and the prophets, our Saviour
to his disciples, or any others; is the word of God.
Secondly, whatsoever hath been uttered by men
on the motion or by command of the Holy Ghost;
in which sense we acknowledge the Scriptures to
be the word of God. Thirdly, in the New Testament
indeed, the word of God most frequently
signifies the doctrine of the gospel, or the word
concerning God, or the word of the kingdom of
God by Christ. As where it is said (Matth. iv. 23)
that Christ preached the gospel of the kingdom:
where the apostles are said to preach the word of
God (Acts xiii. 46): where the word of God is
called the word of life (Acts v. 20): of the word
of the gospel (Acts xv. 7): the word ofword of faith (Rom.
x. 8): the word of truth, that is to say, (adding an
interpretation) the gospel of salvation, (Eph. i. 13):
and where it is called the word of the apostles;
for St. Paul says (2 Thess. iii. 14): If any man
obey not our word, &c. Which places cannot be
otherwise meant than of the doctrine evangelical.
In like manner, where the word of God is said
to be sown, to increase, and to be multiplied (Acts
xii. 24: and xiii. 49): it is very hard to conceive
273this to be spoken of the voice of God or of his
apostles; but of their doctrine, easy. And in
this third acception is all that doctrine of the
Christian faith, which at this day is preached in
pulpits and contained in the books of divines, the
word of God.
All things contained in the Scripture, belong not to the canon of Christian faith.
16. Now the sacred Scripture is entirely the
word of God in this second acception, as being
that which we acknowledge to be inspired from
God; and innumerable places of it, in the first.
And seeing the greatest part of it is conversant
either in the prediction of the kingdom of heaven,
or in prefigurations before the incarnation of
Christ, or in evangelization and explication after;
the sacred Scripture is also the word of God, and
therefore the canon and rule of all evangelical
doctrine, in this third signification; where the
word of God is taken for the word concerning
God, that is to say, for the gospel. But because
in the same Scriptures we read many things political,
historical, moral, physical, and others which
nothing at all concern the mysteries of our faith;
those places, although they contain true doctrine,
and are the canon of such kind of doctrines, yet
can they not be the canon of the mysteries of
Christian religion.
The word of a lawful interpreter of Scriptures, is the word of God.
17. And truly, it is not the dead voice or letter
of the word of God, which is the canon of Christian
doctrine; but a true and genuine determination.
For the mind is not governed by Scriptures,
unless they be understood. There is need therefore
of an interpreter to make the Scriptures
canon, and hence follows one of these two things;
that either the word of the interpreter is the word
274of God, or that the canon of Christian doctrine is
not the word of God. The last of these must necessarily
be false; for the rule of that doctrine
which cannot be known by any human reason, but
by divine revelation only, cannot be less than
divine; for whom we acknowledge not to be able
to discern whether some doctrine be true or not, it
is impossible to account his opinion for a rule in
the same doctrine. The first therefore is true, that
the word of an interpreter of Scriptures is the
word of God.
The authority
of interpreting
Scriptures, is the
same with that
of determining
controversies of
faith.
18. Now that interpreter whose determination
hath the honour to be held for the word of God, is
not every one that translates the Scriptures out of
the Hebrew and Greek tongue, to his Latin auditors
in Latin, to his French in French, and to
other nations in their mother tongue; for this is
not to interpret. For such is the nature of speech
in general, that although it deserve the chief place
among those signs whereby we declare our conceptions
to others, yet cannot it perform that
office alone without the help of many circumstances.
For the living voice hath its interpreters
present, to wit, time, place, countenance, gesture,
the counsel of the speaker, and himself unfolding
his own meaning in other words as oft as need is.
To recall these aids of interpretation, so much desired
in the writings of old time, is neither the
part of an ordinary wit, nor yet of the quaintest,
without great learning and very much skill in
antiquity. It sufficeth not therefore for interpretation
of Scriptures, that a man understand the
language wherein they speak. Neither is every
one an authentic interpreter of Scriptures, who
275writes comments upon them. For men may err;
they may also either bend them to serve their own
ambition; or even resisting, draw them into bondage
by their forestallings; whence it will follow,
that an erroneous sentence must be held for the
word of God. But although this might not happen,
yet as soon as these commentators are departed,
their commentaries will need explications;
and in process of time, those explications expositions;
those expositions new commentaries, without
any end. So as there cannot, in any written
interpretation whatsoever, be a canon or rule of
Christian doctrine, whereby the controversies of religion
may be determined. It remains, that there
must be some canonical interpreter, whose legitimate
office it is to end controversies begun, by explaining
the word of God in the judgments themselves;
and whose authority therefore must be no
less obeyed, than theirs who first recommended
the Scripture itself to us for a canon of faith; and
that one and the same person be an interpreter of
Scripture, and a supreme judge of all manner of
doctrines.
Divers significations of a Church.
19. What concerns the word ecclesia, or Church,
originally it signifies the same thing that concio or
a congregation does in Latin; even as ecclesiastes
or churchman, the same that concionator or
preacher, that is to say, he who speaks to the congregation.
In which sense we read in the Acts
of the Apostles, of a Church confused, and of a
lawful Church (Acts xix, 32-39): that, taken for a
concourse of people meeting in way of tumult;
this, for a convocated assembly. But in holy writ
by a Church of Christians, is sometimes understood
276the assembly, and sometimes the Christians themselves,
although not actually assembled, if they be
permitted to enter into the congregation and to
communicate with them. For example, Tell it to
the Church, (Matth. xviii. 17), is meant of a Church
assembled; for otherwise it is impossible to tell
any thing to the Church. But He laid waste
the Church, (Acts viii. 3), is understood of a
Church not assembled. Sometimes a Church is
taken for those who are baptized, or for the professors
of the Christian faith, whether they be
Christians inwardly or feignedly; as when we
read of somewhat said or written to the Church,
or said, or decreed, or done by the Church.
Sometimes for the elect only, as when it is called
holy and without blemish (Ephes. v. 27). But the
elect, as they are militant, are not properly called
a Church; for they know not how to assemble;
but they are a future Church, namely, in that day
when severed from the reprobate they shall be
triumphant. Again, a Church may be sometimes
taken for all Christians collectively; as when
Christ is called the head of his Church (Ephes. v.
23); and the head of his body the Church (Coloss.
i. 18). Sometimes for its parts; as the Church
of Ephesus, the Church which is in his house, the
seven Churches, &c. Lastly, a Church, as it is taken
for a company actually assembled, according to the
divers ends of their meeting, signifies sometimes
those who are met together to deliberate and judge;
in which sense it is also called a council and a
synod; sometimes those who meet together in the
house of prayer to worship God, in which signification
it is taken in the 1 Cor. xiv. 4, 5, 23, 28, &c.
What a Church is, to whom we attribute rights, actions, and the like appellations proper to a person.
27720. Now a Church, which hath personal rights
and proper actions attributed to it, and of which
that same must necessarily be understood, Tell it
to the Church, and he that obeys not the Church,
and all such like forms of speech, is to be defined
so as by that word may be understood a multitude
of men, who have made a new covenant with God
in Christ, that is to say, a multitude of them who
have taken upon them the sacrament of baptism;
which multitude may both lawfully be called together
by some one into one place, and, he so calling
them, are bound to be present either in person
or by others. For a multitude of men, if they
cannot meet in assembly when need requires, is
not to be called a person. For a Church can
neither speak, nor discern, nor hear, but as it is a
congregation. Whatsoever is spoken by particular
men, (to wit, as many opinions almost as heads),
that is the speech of one man, not of the Church.
Furthermore, if an assembly be made, and it be
unlawful, it shall be considered as null. Not any
one of these therefore who are present in a tumult,
shall be tied to the decree of the rest; but specially
if he dissent. And therefore neither can such a
Church make any decree; for then a multitude is
said to decree somewhat, when every man is obliged
by the decree of the major part. We must therefore
grant to the definition of a Church, to which
we attribute things belonging to a person, not only
a possibility of assembling, but also of doing it lawfully.
Besides, although there be some one who may
lawfully call the rest together; yet if they who are
called, may lawfully not appear; which may happen
among men who are not subject one to another;
278that same Church is not one person. For by what
right they, who being called to a certain time and
place do meet together, are one Church; by the
same, others flocking to another place appointed
by them, are another Church. And every number
of men of one opinion is a Church; and by consequence,
there will be as many Churches as there are
divers opinions; that is to say, the same multitude
of men will at once prove to be one, and many
Churches. Wherefore a Church is not one, except
there be a certain and known, that is to say, a
lawful power, by means whereof every man may
be obliged to be present in the congregation, either
himself in person, or by proxy; and that becomes
one, and is capable of personal functions, by the
union of a lawful power of convocating synods and
assemblies of Christians; not by uniformity of doctrine;
and otherwise it is a multitude, and persons
in the plural, howsoever agreeing in opinions.
A Christian city is the same with a Christian Church.
21. It follows what hath been already said by
necessary connexion, that a city of Christian men
and a Church is altogether the same thing, of the
same men, termed by two names, for two causes.
For the matter of a city and a Church is one, to
wit, the same Christian men. And the form, which
consists in a lawful power of assembling them, is
the same too; for it is manifest that every subject
is obliged to come thither, whither he is summoned
by his city. Now that which is called a city, as it
is made up of men, the same, as it consists of Christians,
is styled a Church.
Many cities do not constitute one Church.
22. This too is very coherent with the same
points: if there be many Christian cities, they
are not altogether personally one Church. They
279may indeed by mutual consent become one Church,
but no otherwise than as they must also become
one city. For they cannot assemble but at some
certain time, and to some place appointed. But
persons, places, and times, belong to civil right;
neither can any subject or stranger lawfully set
his foot on any place, but by the permission of the
city, which is lord of the place. But the things
which cannot lawfully be done but by the permission
of the city, those, if they be lawfully done, are
done by the city’s authority. The universal Church
is indeed one mystical body, whereof Christ is the
head; but in the same manner that all men together,
acknowledging God for the ruler of the
world, are one kingdom and one city; which notwithstanding
is neither one person, nor hath it
one common action or determination. Furthermore,
where it is said that Christ is the head of
his body the Church, it manifestly appears that
that was spoken by the Apostle of the elect; who,
as long as they are in this world, are a Church
only in potentia; but shall not actually be so
before they be separated from the reprobate, and
gathered together among themselves in the day of
judgment. The Church of Rome of old was very
great, but she went not beyond the bounds of her
empire, and therefore neither was she universal;
unless it were in that sense, wherein it was also
said of the city of Rome, Orbem jam totum victor
Romanus habebat; when as yet he had not the
twentieth part of it. But after that the civil empire
was divided into parts, the single cities thence
arising were so many Churches: and that power
which the Church of Rome had over them, might
280perhaps wholly depend on the authority of those
Churches, who having cast off the emperors, were
yet content to admit the doctors of Rome.
Who are clergymen.
23. They may be called churchmen, who exercise
a public office in the Church. But of offices,
there was one a ministery, another a maistery.
The offices of the ministers, was to serve tables, to
take care of the temporal goods of the Church,
and to distribute, at that time when all propriety
of riches being abolished they were fed in common,
to each man his portion. The maisters, according
to their order, were called some apostles, some
bishops, some presbyters, that is to say, elders;
yet not so, as that by the name of presbyter, the
age, but the office might be distinguished. For
Timothy was a presbyter, although a young man.
But because for the most part the elders were received
into the maistership, the word, denoting
age, was used to signify the office. The same
maisters, according to the diversity of their employments,
were called some of them apostles,
some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors or
teachers. And the apostolical work indeed was
universal; the prophetical, to declare their own
revelations in the Church; the evangelical, to
preach or to be publishers of the gospel among the
infidels; that of the pastors, to teach, confirm,
and rule the minds of those who already believed.
The election of churchmen belongs to the Church; their consecration to the pastors.
24. In the election of churchmen two things are
to be considered; the election of the persons, and
their consecration or institution, which also is called
ordination. The first twelve apostles Christ himself
both elected and ordained. After Christ’s ascension,
Matthias was elected in the room of Judas the
281traitor; the Church, which at that time consisted
of a congregation of about one hundred and twenty
men, choosing two men: and they appointed two,
Joseph and Matthias: but God himself by lot
approving of Matthias. And St. Paul calls these
twelve the first and great apostles; also the apostles
of the circumcision. Afterward were added
two other apostles, Paul and Barnabas; ordained
indeed by the doctors and prophets of the Church
of Antioch (which was a particular Church) by
the imposition of hands; but elected by the command
of the Holy Ghost. That they were both
apostles, is manifest in Acts xiii. 2, 3. That they
received their apostleship from hence, namely, because
they were separated, by command of the
spirit, for the work of God from the rest of the
prophets and doctors of the Church of Antioch,
St. Paul himself shows; who calls himself, for distinction
sake (Rom. i. 1), an apostle separated
unto the Gospel of God. But if it be demanded
further, by what authority it came to pass, that
that was received for the command of the Holy
Ghost, which those prophets and doctors did say
proceeded from him; it must necessarily be answered,
by the authority of the Church of Antioch.
For the prophets and doctors must be examined by
the Church, before they be admitted. For St. John
(1 Epist. iv. 1) saith: Believe not every spirit; but try
the spirits, whether they are of God; because many
false prophets are gone out into the world. But
by what Church, but that to which that epistle was
written? In like manner St. Paul (Gal. ii. 14)
reproves the Churches of Galatia, because they
Judaized; although they seemed to do so by the
282authority of Peter. For when he had told them, that
he had reprehended Peter himself in these words:
If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of
Gentiles, and not as do the Jews; why compellest
thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews: not long
after he questions them, saying (Gal. iii. 2): This
only would I learn of you: received ye the Spirit
by the works of the law, or by the hearing of
faith? Where it is evident, that it was Judaism
which he reprehended the Galatians for, notwithstanding
that the apostle Peter compelled them to
Judaize. Seeing therefore it belonged to the
Church, and not to Peter, and therefore also not
to any man, to determine what doctors they should
follow; it also pertained to the authority of the
Church of Antioch, to elect their prophets and doctors.
Now, because the Holy Ghost separated to
himself the apostles Paul and Barnabas by the imposition
of hands from doctors thus elected, it is
manifest, that imposition of hands and consecration
of the prime doctors in each Church, belongs
to the doctors of the same Church. But bishops,
who were also called presbyters, although all presbyters
were not bishops, were ordained sometimes
by apostles; for Paul and Barnabas, when they had
taught in Derbe, Lystra, and Iconium, ordained
elders in every Church (Acts xiv. 23): sometimes
by other bishops; for Titus was by Paul left in
Crete, that he should ordain elders in every city
(Tit. i. 5). And Timothy was advised (1 Tim. iv. 14)
Not to neglect the gift that was in him, which was
given him by prophecy with the laying on of the
hands of the presbytery. And he had rules given
him concerning the election of presbyters. But
283that cannot be understood otherwise, than of the ordination
of those who were elected by the Church;
for no man can constitute a doctor in the Church,
but by the Church’s permission. For the duty of
the apostles themselves was not to command, but to
teach. And although they who were recommended
by the apostles or presbyters, were not rejected,
for the esteem that was had of the recommenders;
yet seeing they could not be elected without the
will of the Church, they were also supposed elected
by the authority of the Church. In like manner
ministers, who are called deacons, were ordained
by the apostles; yet elected by the Church. For
when the seven deacons were to be elected and
ordained, the apostles elected them not: but, look
ye out, say they (Acts vi. 3, 5, 6), among you,
brethren, seven men of honest report, &c.: and
they chose Stephen, &c.: and they set them before
the apostles. It is apparent therefore by the custom
of the primitive Church under the apostles, that
the ordination or consecration of all churchmen,
which is done by prayer and imposition of hands,
belonged to the apostles and doctors; but the
election of those who were to be consecrated, to
the Church.
The power of remitting sins to the penitent, and retaining those of the impenitent, belongs to the pastors; but judgment of the repentance, to the Church.
25. Concerning the power of binding and loosing,
that is to say, of remitting and retaining of
sins; there is no doubt but it was given by Christ
to the pastors then yet for to come, in the same
manner as it was to the present apostles. Now
the apostles had all the power of remitting of sins
given them, which Christ himself had. As the
Father hath sent me, says Christ, (John xx. 21), so
send I you; and he adds (verse 23verse 23): Whose soever
284sins ye remit, they are remitted; and whose soever
sins ye retain, they are retained. But what binding
and loosing, or remitting and retaining of sins,
is, admits of some scruple. For first, to retain his
sins, who being baptized into remission of sins, is
truly penitent, seems to be against the very covenant
itself of the New Testament; and therefore
could not be done by Christ himself, much less by
his pastors. And to remit the impenitent, seems
to be against the will of God the Father, from
whom Christ was sent to convert the world and to
reduce men unto obedience. Furthermore, if each
pastor had an authority granted him to remit and
retain sins in this manner, all awe of princes and
civil magistrates, together with all kind of civil
government would be utterly destroyed. For
Christ hath said it, nay even nature itself dictates,
that we should not fear them who slay the body,
but cannot kill the soul; but rather fear him, who
can cast both soul and body into hell (Matth.
x. 28). Neither is any man so mad, as not to
choose to yield obedience rather to them who can
remit and retain their sins, than to the powerfulest
kings. Nor yet on the other side is it to be
imagined, that remission of sins is nothing else
but an exemption from ecclesiastical punishments.
For what evil hath excommunication in it, beside
the eternal pains which are consequent to it? Or
what benefit is to be received into the Church, if
there were salvation out of it? We must therefore
hold, that pastors have power truly and absolutely
to forgive sins; but to the penitent: and to
retain them; but of the impenitent. But while
men think that to repent, is nothing else, but that
285every one condemn his actions and change those
counsels which to himself seem sinful and blameable;
there is an opinion risen, that there may be
repentance before any confession of sins to men,
and that repentance is not an effect, but a cause of
confession. And thence the difficulty of those, who
say that the sins of the penitent are already forgiven
in baptism, and theirstheirs who repent not, cannot
be forgiven at all, is against Scripture, and
contrary to the words of Christ, whose soever
sins ye remit, &c. We must therefore, to resolve
this difficulty, know in the first place, that a true
acknowledgment of sin is repentance. For he
that knows he hath sinned, knows he hath erred;
but to will an error, is impossible; therefore he
that knows he hath sinned, wishes he had not done
it; which is to repent. Further, where it may be
doubtful whether that which is done be a sin or
not, we must consider, that repentance doth not
precede confession of sins, but is subsequent to it:
for there is no repentance but of sins acknowledged.
The penitent therefore must both acknowledge
the fact, and know it to be a sin, that
is to say, against the law. If a man therefore
think, that what he hath done is not against the
law, it is impossible he should repent of it. Before
repentance therefore, it is necessary there be
an application of the facts unto the law. But it is
in vain to apply the facts unto the law without an
interpreter: for not the words of the law, but the
sentence of the law-giver is the rule of men’s actions.
But surely either one man, or some men
are the interpreters of the law; for every man is
not judge of his own fact, whether it be a sin or
286not. Wherefore the fact, of which we doubt
whether it be a sin or not, must be unfolded before
some man or men; and the doing of this is
confession. Now when the interpreter of the law
hath judged the fact to be a sin, if the sinner submit
to his judgment and resolve with himself not
to do so any more, it is repentance; and thus,
either it is not true repentance, or else it is not
antecedent, but subsequent to confession. These
things being thus explained, it is not hard to understand
what kind of power that of binding and
loosing is. For seeing in remission of sins there
are two things considerable; one, the judgment or
condemnation whereby the fact is judged to be a
sin; the other, when the party condemned does
acquiesce and obey the sentence, that is to say, repents,
the remission of the sin; or, if he repent
not, the retention: the first of these, that is to say,
the judging whether it be a sin or not, belongs to
the interpreter of the law, that is, the sovereign
judge; the second, namely, remission or retention
of the sin, to the pastor; and it is that, concerning
which the power of binding and loosing is conversant.
And that this was the true meaning of our
Saviour Christ in the institution of the same power,
is apparent in Matth. xviii. 15-18, thus. He there
speaking to his disciples, says: If thy brother sin
against thee, go and tell him his fault between him
and thee alone. Where we must observe by the
way, that if thy brother sin against thee, is the
same with, if he do thee injury; and therefore
Christ spake of those matters which belonged to
the civil tribunal. He adds; if he hear thee not,
(that is to say, if he deny that he hath done it, or
287if having confessed the fact, he denies it to be unjustly
done), take with thee yet one or two; and if
he refuse to hear them, tell it to the Church. But
why to the Church, except that she might judge
whether it were a sin or not? But if he refuse to
hear the Church; that is, if he do not submit to
the Church’s sentence, but shall maintain that to
be no sin, which she judges to be a sin; that is to
say, if he repent not; (for certain it is, that no man
repents himself of the action which he conceives
not to be a sin); he saith not, Tell it to the apostles;
that we might know that the definitive sentence
in the question, whether it were a sin or not,
was not left unto them; but to the Church. But
let him be unto thee, says he, as an heathen, or publican;
that is, as one out of the Church, as one that
is not baptized, that is to say, as one whose sins are
retained. For all Christians were baptized into remission
of sins. But because it might have been
demanded, who it was that had so great a power,
as that of withholding the benefit of baptism from
the impenitent; Christ shows that the same persons,
to whom he had given authority to baptize
the penitent into the remission of sins, and to
make them of heathen men Christians, had also
authority to retain their sins who by the Church
should be adjudged to be impenitent, and to make
them of Christian men heathens: and therefore
presently subjoins: Verily I say unto you, whose
soever sins ye shall bind upon earth, they shall be
bound also in heaven; and whose soever sins ye
shall loose upon earth, they shall be loosed also in
heaven. Whence we may understand, that the
power of binding and loosing, or of remitting and
288retaining of sins, which is called in another place
the power of the keys, is not different from the
power given in another place in these words
(Matth. xxviii. 19): Go, and teach all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of
the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. And even as the
pastors cannot refuse to baptize him whom the
Church judges worthy, so neither can they retain
his sins whom the Church holds fitting to be absolved,
nor yet remit his sins whom the Church
pronounceth disobedient. And it is the Church’s
part to judge of the sin, the pastor’s to cast out or
to receive into the Church those that are judged.
Thus St. Paul to the Church of Corinth (1 Cor. v. 12):
Do not ye judge, saith he, of those that are within?
Yet he himself pronounced the sentence of excommunication
against the incestuous person. I indeed,
saith he (verse 3), as absent in body, but present in
Spirit, &c.
What excommunication is, and on whom it cannot pass.
26. The act of retaining sins is that which is
called by the Church excommunication, and by St.
Paul delivering over to Satan. The word excommunication
sounding the same with ἀποσυάγωγον
poiein], casting out of the synagogue, seems to be
borrowed from the Mosaical law; wherein they
who were by the priest adjudged leprous, were
commanded (Levit. xiii. 46) to be kept apart out of
the camp, until by the judgment of the priest
they were again pronounced clean, and by certain
rites, among which the washing of the body was
one, were purified. From hence in process of time
it become a custom of the Jews, not to receive
those who passed from Gentilism to Judaism, supposing
them to be unclean, unless they were first
washed; and those who dissented from the doctrine
289of the synagogue, they cast out of the synagogue.
By resemblance of this custom, those that came to
Christianity, whether they were Jews or Gentiles,
were not received into the Church without baptism;
and those that dissented from the Church,
were deprived of the Church’s communion. Now,
they were therefore said to be delivered over to
Satan, because all that was out of the Church, was
comprehended within his kingdom. The end of
this kind of discipline was, that being destitute for
a time of the grace and spiritual privileges of the
Church, they might be humbled to salvation; but
the effect in regard of secular matters, that being
excommunicated, they should not only be prohibited
all congregations or churches, and the participation
of the mysteries, but as being contagious
they should be avoided by all other Christians, even
more than heathen. For the apostle allowed to accompany
with heathen; but with these, not so much
as to eat (1 Cor. v. 10-11). Seeing then the effect
of excommunication is such, it is manifest, in the
first place, that a Christian city cannot be excommunicated.
For a Christian city is a Christian
Church, (as hath been declared above, in art. 21),
and of the same extension; but a Church cannot be
excommunicated. For either she must excommunicate
herself, which is impossible; or she must be
excommunicated by some other Church; and this,
either universal or particular. But seeing an universal
Church is no person, (as hath been proved
in art. 22), and therefore neither acts nor does
any thing, it cannot excommunicate any man; and
a particular Church by excommunicating another
Church, doth nothing. For where there is not one
290common congregation, there cannot be any excommunication.
Neither if some one Church (suppose
that of Jerusalem), should have excommunicated
another, (suppose that of Rome), would it any
more have excommunicated this, than herself: for
he that deprives another of his communion, deprives
himself also of the communion of that other.
Secondly, no man can excommunicate the subjects
of any absolute government all at once, or forbid
them the use of their temples or their public worship
of God. For they cannot be excommunicated
by a Church, which themselves do constitute. For
if they could, there would not only not remain a
Church, but not so much as a commonweal, and
they would be dissolved of themselves; and this
were not to be excommunicated or prohibited. But
if they be excommunicated by some other Church,
that Church is to esteem them as heathen. But no
Christian Church, by the doctrine of Christ, can
forbid the heathen to gather together and communicate
among themselves, as it shall seem good to
their cities; especially if they meet to worship
Christ, although it be done in a singular custom
and manner: therefore also not the excommunicated,
who are to be dealt with as heathen. Thirdly,
a prince who hath the sovereign power, cannot be
excommunicated. For by the doctrine of Christ,
neither one nor many subjects together can interdict
their prince any public or private places, or
deny him entrance into any assembly whatsoever,
or prohibit him the doing of what he will with his
own jurisdiction. For it is treason among all cities,
for any one or many subjects jointly to arrogate to
themselves any authority over the whole city. But
291they who arrogate to themselves an authority over
him who hath the supreme power of the city, do
arrogate the same authority over the city itself.
Besides, a sovereign prince, if he be a Christian,
hath this further advantage; that the city whose
will is contained in his, is that very thing which we
call a Church. The Church therefore excommunicates
no man, but whom it excommunicates by the
authority of the prince. But the prince excommunicates
not himself; his subjects therefore cannot
do it. It may be indeed, that an assembly of rebellious
citizens or traitors may pronounce the
sentence of excommunication against their prince;
but not by right. Much less can one prince be
excommunicated by another; for this would prove
not an excommunication, but a provocation to war
by the way of affront. For since that is not one
Church, which is made up of citizens belonging to
two absolute cities, for want of power of lawfully
assembling them, (as hath been declared before, in
art. 22); they who are of one Church are not
bound to obey another, and therefore cannot be
excommunicated for their disobedience. Now,
what some may say, that princes, seeing they are
members of the universal Church, may also by the
authority of the universal Church be excommunicated,
signifies nothing: because the universal Church,
(as hath been showed in art. 22), is not one person,
of whom it may be said that she acted, decreed,
determined, excommunicated, absolved, and the like
personal attributes; neither hath she any governor
upon earth, at whose command she may assemble
and deliberate. For to be guide of the
universal Church, and to have the power of assembling
292her, is the same thing as to be governor and
lord over all the Christians in the world; which is
granted to none, but God only.
The interpretation of Scripture depends on the authority of the city.
27. It hath been showed above in art. 18, that the
authority of interpreting the Holy Scriptures consisted
not in this, that the interpreter might without
punishment expound and explicate his sentence and
opinion taken thence unto others, either by writing
or by his own voice; but that others have not a right
to do or teach aught contrary to his sentence; insomuch
as the interpretation we speak of, is the same
with the power of defining in all manner of controversies
to be determined by sacred Scriptures.
Now we must show that that power belongs to
each Church; and depends on his or their authority
who have the supreme command, provided that they
be Christians. For if it depend not on the civil authority,
it must either depend on the opinion of each
private subject, or some foreign authority. But
among other reasons, the inconveniences that must
follow private opinions, cannot suffer its dependance
on them. Of which this is the chief; that not only
all civil obedience would be taken away (contrary
to Christ’s precept); but all human society and
peace would be dissolved (contrary to the laws of
nature). For seeing every man is his own interpreter
of Scripture, that is to say, since every man
makes himself judge of what is pleasing and displeasing
unto God; they cannot obey their princes,
before that they have judged whether their commands
be conformable to the word of God, or not.
And thus either they obey not, or they obey for
their own opinion’s sake; that is to say, they obey
themselves, not their sovereign; civil obedience
293therefore is lost. Again, when every man follows
his own opinion, it is necessary that the controversies
which rise among them, should become innumerable
and indeterminable; whence there will
breed among men, who by their own natural inclinations
do account all dissensions an affront, first hatred,
then brawls and wars; and thus all manner of
peace and society would vanish. We have furthermore
for an example, that which God under the
old law required to be observed concerning the
book of the law; namely, that it should be transcribed
and publicly used; and he would have it
to be the canon of divine doctrine, but the controversies
about it not to be determined by private
persons, but only by the priests. Lastly, it is our
Saviour’s precept, that if there be any matter of
offence between private persons, they should hear
the Church. Wherefore it is the Church’s duty to
define controversies; it therefore belongs not to
private men, but to the Church to interpret Scriptures.
But that we may know that the authority of
interpreting God’s Word, that is to say, of determining
all questions concerning God and religion,
belongs not to any foreign person whatsoever; we
must consider, first, what weight such a power
has in the minds of the citizens, and their actions.
For no man can be ignorant that the voluntary
actions of men, by a natural necessity, do follow
those opinions which they have concerning good
and evil, reward and punishment. Whence it happens,
that necessarily they would choose rather to
obey those, by whose judgment they believe that
they shall be eternally happy or miserable. Now,
by whose judgment it is appointed what doctrines
294are necessary to salvation, by their judgment do
men expect their eternal bliss or perdition; they
will therefore yield them obedience in all things.
Which being thus, most manifest it is, that those
subjects, who believe themselves bound to acquiesce
to a foreign authority in those doctrines which are
necessary to salvation, do not per se constitute a
city, but are the subjects of that foreign power.
Nor therefore, although some sovereign prince
should by writing grant such an authority to any
other, yet so as he would be understood to have
retained the civil power in his own hands, shall
such a writing be valid, or transfer aught necessary
for the retaining or good administration of
his command. For by chap. II. art. 4, no man is
said to transfer his right, unless he give some
proper sign, declaring his will to transfer it.
But he who hath openly declared his will to keep
his sovereignty, cannot have given a sufficient sign
of transferring the means necessary for the keeping
it. This kind of writing therefore will not be a
sign of will, but of ignorance in the contractors.
We must consider next, how absurd it is for a city
or sovereign to commit the ruling of his subjects’
consciences to an enemy; for they are, as hath
been showed above in chap. V. art. 6, in an hostile
state, whosoever have not joined themselves into
the unity of one person. Nor contradicts it this
truth, that they do not always fight: for truces are
made between enemies. It is sufficient for an hostile
mind, that there is suspicion; that the frontiers
of cities, kingdoms, empires, strengthened with
garrisons, do with a fighting posture and countenance,
though they strike not, yet as enemies mutually
295behold each other. Lastly, how unequal is
it to demand that, which by the very reason of your
demand you confess to be the right of another. I
am the interpreter of Scriptures to you, who are
the subject of another state. Why? By what
covenants passed between you and me? By divine
authority. Whence known? Out of holy Scripture:
behold the book, read it. In vain, unless I
may also interpret the same for myself. That interpretation
therefore doth by right belong to me,
and the rest of my private fellow-subjects; which
we both deny. It remains therefore that in all
Christian Churches, that is to say, in all Christian
cities, the interpretation of sacred Scripture, that
is to say, the right of determining all controversies,
depends on and derives from the authority of that
man or council, which hath the sovereign power of
the city.
A Christian city must interpret Scriptures by clergymen.
28. Now because there are two kinds of controversies:
the one about spiritual matters, that is to
say, questions of faith, the truth whereof cannot
be searched into by natural reason; such are the
questions concerning the nature and office of
Christ, of rewards and punishments to come, of
the sacraments, of outward worship, and the like:
the other, about questions of human science, whose
truth is sought out by natural reason and syllogisms,
drawn from the covenants of men, and
definitions, that is to say, significations received
by use and common consent of words; such as
are all questions of right and philosophy; for example,
when in matter of right it is questioned,
whether there be a promise and covenant, or not,
that is nothing else but to demand whether such
words, spoken in such a manner, be by common
296use and consent of the subjects a promise or covenant;
which if they be so called, then it is true
that a contract is made; if not, then it is false:
that truth therefore depends on the compacts and
consents of men. In like manner, when it is demanded
in philosophy, whether the same thing
may entirely be in divers places at once; the determination
of the question depends on the knowledge
of the common consent of men, about the
signification of the word entire. For if men,
when they say a thing is entirely somewhere, do
signify by common consent that they understand
nothing of the same to be elsewhere; it is false
that the same thing is in divers places at once.
That truth therefore depends on the consents of
men, and by the same reason, in all other questions
concerning right and philosophy. And they
who do judge that anything can be determined,
contrary to this common consent of men concerning
the appellations of things, out of obscure
places of Scripture; do also judge that the use of
speech, and at once all human society, is to be
taken away. For he who hath sold a whole
field, will say he meant one whole ridge; and will
retain the rest as unsold. Nay, they take away
reason itself; which is nothing else but a searching
out of the truth made by such consent. This
kind of questions, therefore, need not be determined
by the city by way of interpretation of
Scriptures; for they belong not to God’s Word,
in that sense wherein the Word of God is taken
for the Word concerning God; that is to say, for
the doctrine of the gospel. Neither is he who
hath the sovereign power in the Church, obliged
297to employ any ecclesiastical doctors for the judging
of any such kind of matters as these. But for
the deciding of questions of faith, that is to say,
concerning God, which transcend human capacity,
we stand in need of a divine blessing, (that we
may not be deceived at least in necessary points),
to be derived from Christ himself by the imposition
of hands. For, seeing to the end we may
attain to eternal salvation we are obliged to a
supernatural doctrine, and which therefore it is
impossible for us to understand; to be left so
destitute as that we can be deceived in necessary
points, is repugnant to equity. This infallibility
our Saviour Christ promised (in those things
which are necessary to salvation) to his apostles
until the day of judgment; that is to say, to the
apostles, and pastors succeeding the apostles, who
were to be consecrated by the imposition of hands.
He therefore, who hath the sovereign power in the
city, is obliged as a Christian, where there is any
question concerning the mysteries of faith, to interpret
the Holy Scriptures by clergymen lawfully
ordained. And thus in Christian cities, the judgment
both of spiritual and temporal matters belongs
unto the civil authority. And that man or
council who hath the supreme power, is head both
of the city and of the Church; for a Church and a
Christian city is but one thing.
298
1. The difficulty propounded concerning the repugnancy of
obeying God and men, is to be removed by the distinctions
between the points necessary and not necessary to salvation.
2. All things necessary to salvation, are contained in faith and
obedience. 3. What kind of obedience that is, which is required
of us. 4. What faith is, and how distinguished from profession,
from science, from opinion. 5. What it is to believe in
Christ. 6. That that article alone, that Jesus is the Christ, is
necessary to salvation; is proved from the scope of the evangelists.
7. From the preachings of the apostles. 8. From
the easiness of Christian religion. 9. From this also, that it is
the foundation of faith. 10. From the most evident words of
Christ and his apostles. 11. In that article is contained the
faith of the Old Testament. 12. How faith and obedience
concur to salvation. 13. In a Christian city, there is no contradiction
between the commands of God and of the city.
14. The doctrines which this day are controverted about religion,
do for the most part relate to the right of dominion.
The difficulty propounded concerning the repugnance of obeying God and men, is to be removed by the distinction between the points necessary, and not necessary to salvation.
1. It was ever granted, that all authority in secular
matters derived from him who had the sovereign
power, whether he were one man or an
assembly of men. That the same in spiritual
matters depended on the authority of the Church,
is manifest by the lastly foregoing proofs; and besides
by this, that all Christian cities are Churches
endued with this kind of authority. From whence
a man, though but dull of apprehension, may collect,
that in a Christian city, that is to say, in a
city whose sovereignty belongs to a Christian
prince or council, all power, as well spiritual as
secular, is united under Christ, and therefore it is
to be obeyed in all things. But on the other side,
299because we must rather obey God than men, there
is a difficulty risen, how obedience may safely
be yielded to them, if at any time somewhat
should be commanded by them to be done which
Christ hath prohibited. The reason of this difficulty
is, that seeing God no longer speaks to us by
Christ and his prophets in open voice, but by the
holy Scriptures, which by divers men are diversely
understood; they know indeed what princes and
a congregated Church do command; but whether
that which they do command, be contrary to the
word of God or not, this they know not; but with
a wavering obedience between the punishments of
temporal and spiritual death, as it were sailing between
Scylla and Charybdis, they often run themselves
upon both. But they who rightly distinguish
between the things necessary to salvation,
and those which are not necessary, can have none
of this kind of doubt. For if the command of the
prince or city be such, that he can obey it without
hazard of his eternal salvation, it is unjust not to
obey them; and the apostle’s precepts take place
(Col. iii. 20-22): Children obey your parents in all
things: servants in all things obey your masters
according to the flesh. And the command of Christ
(Matth. xxiii. 2-3): The Scribes and Pharisees sit
in Moses’ chair; all things therefore whatsoever
they command you, that observe and do. On the
contrary, if they command us to do those things
which are punished with eternal death, it were
madness not rather to choose to die a natural
death, than by obeying to die eternally: and then
comes in that which Christ says (Matth. x. 28):
Fear not them who kill the body, but cannot kill
300the soul. We must see, therefore, what all those
things are, which are necessary to salvation.
All things necessary to salvation, are contained in faith and obedience.
2. Now all things necessary to salvation are
comprehended in two virtues, faith and obedience.
The latter of these, if it could be perfect, would
alone suffice to preserve us from damnation; but
because we have all of us been long since guilty of
disobedience against God in Adam, and besides we
ourselves have since actually sinned, obedience is
not sufficient without remission of sins. But this,
together with our entrance into the kingdom of
heaven, is the reward of faith; nothing else is requisite
to salvation. For the kingdom of heaven
is shut to none but sinners, that is to say, those
who have not performed due obedience to the
laws; and not to those neither, if they believe the
necessary articles of the Christian faith. Now, if
we shall know in what points obedience doth consist,
and which are the necessary articles of the
Christian faith; it will at once be manifest what
we must do, and what abstain from, at the command
of cities and of princes.
What kind of obedience that is, which is required of us.
3. But by obedience in this place is signified not
the fact, but the will and desire wherewith we
purpose, and endeavour as much as we can, to
obey for the future. In which sense the word
obedience is equivalent to repentance; for the
virtue of repentance consists not in the sorrow
which accompanies the remembrance of sin; but in
our conversion into the way, and full purpose to sin
no more; without which that sorrow is said to be
the sorrow not of a penitent, but a desperate person.
But because they who love God cannot but
desire to obey the divine law, and they who love
301their neighbours cannot but desire to obey the
moral law; which consists (as hath been showed
above in chap. III.) in the prohibition of pride, ingratitude,
contumely, inhumanity, cruelty, injury,
and the like offences, whereby our neighbours are
prejudiced; therefore also love, or charity, is equivalent
to the word obedience. Justice, also, which is
a constant will of giving to every man his due, is
equivalent with it. But that faith and repentance
are sufficient for salvation, is manifest by the covenant
itself of baptism. For they who were by
Peter converted on the day of Pentecost, demanding
him, what they should do: he answered (Acts
ii. 38): Repent and be baptized every one of you,
in the name of Jesus, for the remission of your
sins. There was nothing therefore to be done for
the obtaining of baptism, that is to say, for to enter
into the kingdom of God, but to repent and
believe in the name of Jesus; for the kingdom of
heaven is promised by the covenant which is made
in baptism. Furthermore, by the words of Christ,
answering the lawyer who asked him what he
should do to inherit eternal life (Luke xviii. 20):
Thou knowest the commandments: Thou shalt not
kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, &c.: which
refer to obedience; and (Mark x. 21): Sell all
that thou hast, and come and follow me: which
relates to faith. And by that which is said: The
just shall live by faith; not every man, but the
just; for justice is the same disposition of will
which repentance and obedience are. And by the
words of St. Mark (i. 15): The time is fulfilled, and
the kingdom of God is at hand; repent ye, and believe
the gospel; by which words is not obscurely
302signified, that there is no need of other virtues for
our entrance into the kingdom of God, excepting
those of repentance and faith. The obedience
therefore which is necessarily required to salvation,
is nothing else but the will or endeavour to
obey; that is to say, of doing according to the
laws of God; that is, the moral laws, which are
the same to all men, and the civil laws; that is to
say, the commands of sovereigns in temporal matters,
and the ecclesiastical laws in spiritual. Which
two kinds of laws are divers in divers cities and
Churches, and are known by their promulgation
and public sentences.
What faith is, and how distinguished from profession, from science, and from opinion.
4. That we may understand what the Christian
faith is, we must define faith in general; and
distinguish it from those other acts of the mind,
wherewith commonly it is confounded. The object
of faith universally taken, namely, for that
which is believed, is evermore a proposition, that
is to say, a speech affirmative or negative, which
we grant to be true. But because propositions are
granted for divers causes, it falls out that these
kind of concessions are diversely called. But we
grant propositions sometimes, which notwithstanding
we receive not into our minds; and this either
for a time, to wit, so long, till by consideration of
the consequences we have well examined the truth
of them, which we call supposing; or also simply,
as through fear of the laws, which is to profess,
or confess by outward tokens; or for a voluntary
compliance sake, which men use out of civility to
those whom they respect, and for love of peace to
others, which is absolute yielding. Now the propositions
which we receive for truth, we always
303grant for some reasons of our own; and these are
derived either from the proposition itself, or from
the person propounding. They are derived from
the proposition itself, by calling to mind what
things those words, which make up the proposition,
do by common consent usually signify. If
so, then the assent which we give, is called knowledge
or science. But if we cannot remember
what is certainly understood by those words, but
sometimes one thing, sometimes another seem to
be apprehended by us, then we are said to think.
For example, if it be propounded that two and
three make five; and by calling to mind, that the
order of numeral words is so appointed by the
common consent of them who are of the same language
with us, (as it were, by a certain contract
necessary for human society), that five shall be the
name of so many unities as are contained in two
and three taken together, a man assent that this
is therefore true, because two and three together
are the same with five: this assent shall be called
knowledge. And to know this truth is nothing
else, but to acknowledge that it is made by ourselves.
For by whose will and rules of speaking
the number || is called two, ||| is called three, and
||||| is called five; by their will also it comes
to pass that this proposition is true, two and
three taken together make five. In like manner
if we remember what it is that is called theft, and
what injury; we shall understand by the words
themselves, whether it be true that theft is an injury,
or not. Truth is the same with a true proposition;
but the proposition is true in which the
word consequent, which by logicians is called the
304predicate, embraceth the word antecedent in its
amplitude, which they call the subject. And to
know truth, is the same thing as to remember that
it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of
the words. Neither was it rashly nor unadvisedly
said by Plato of old, that knowledge was memory.
But it happens sometimes, that words although they
have a certain and defined signification by constitution,
yet by vulgar use either to adorn or deceive,
they are so wrested from their own significations,
that to remember the conceptions for which they
were first imposed on things, is very hard, and not
to be mastered but by a sharp judgment and very
great diligence. It happens too that there are
many words, which have no proper, determined,
and everywhere the same signification; and are
understood not by their own, but by virtue of
other signs used together with them. Thirdly,
there are some words of things unconceivable. Of
those things, therefore, whereof they are the words,
there is no conception; and therefore in vain do
we seek for the truth of those propositions, which
they make out of the words themselves. In these
cases, while by considering the definitions of words
we search out the truth of some proposition, according
to the hope we have of finding it, we think
it sometimes true, and sometimes false; either of
which apart is called thinking, and also believing;
both together, doubting. But when our reasons,
for which we assent to some proposition, derive
not from the proposition itself, but from the person
propounding, whom we esteem so learned that
he is not deceived, and we see no reason why he
should deceive us; our assent, because it grows
305not from any confidence of our own, but from
another man’s knowledge, is called faith. And
by the confidence of whom we do believe, we are
said to trust them, or to trust in them. By what
hath been said, the difference appears, first, between
faith and profession; for that is always
joined with inward assent; this not always. That
is an inward persuasion of the mind, this an outward
obedience. Next, between faith and opinion;
for this depends on our own reason, that on the
good esteem we have of another. Lastly, between
faith and knowledge; for this deliberately takes
a proposition broken and chewed; that swallows it
down whole and entire. The explication of words,
whereby the matter enquired after is propounded,
is conducible to knowledge; nay, the only way to
know, is by definition. But this is prejudicial to
faith; for those things which exceed human capacity,
and are propounded to be believed, are never
more evident by explication, but, on the contrary,
more obscure and harder to be credited. And the
same thing befalls a man, who endeavours to demonstrate
the mysteries of faith by natural reason,
which happens to a sick man, who will needs chew
before he will swallow his wholesome but bitter
pills; whence it comes to pass, that he presently
brings them up again; which perhaps would otherwise,
if he had taken them well down, have proved
his remedy.
What it is to believe in Christ.
5. We have seen therefore what it is to believe.
But what is it to believe in Christ? Or what proposition
is that, which is the object of our faith in
Christ? For when we say, I believe in Christ, we
signify indeed whom, but not what we believe.
306Now, to believe in Christ is nothing else but to
believe that Jesus is the Christ, namely, he who according
to the prophecies of Moses and the prophets
of Israel, was to come into this world to institute
the kingdom of God. And this sufficiently appears
out of the words of Christ himself to Martha
(John xi. 25-27): I am, saith he, the resurrection
and the life; he that believeth in me, though he
were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth
and believeth in me, shall never die. Believest
thou this? She saith unto him, yea, Lord, I believe
that thou art the Christ the Son of God,
which should come into the world. In which
words, we see that the question, believest thou in
me, is expounded by the answer, thou art the Christ.
To believe in Christ therefore is nothing else but to
believe Jesus himself, saying that he is the Christ.
That that article alone, that Jesus is the Christ, is necessary to salvation, is proved out of the scope of the evangelists.
6. Faith and obedience both necessarily concurring
to salvation, what kind of obedience that
same is, and to whom due, hath been showed
above in art. 3. But now we must enquire what
articles of faith are requisite. And I say, that to
a Christian[21] there is no other article of faith requisite
307as necessary to salvation, but only this,
that Jesus is the Christ. But we must distinguish,
as we have already done before in art. 4,
between faith and profession. A profession,
therefore, of more articles, if they be commanded,
may be necessary; for it is a part of our obedience
due to the laws. But we enquire not now what
obedience, but what faith is necessary to salvation.
And this is proved, first, out of the scope of the
308Evangelists, which was, by the description of our
Saviour’s life, to establish this one article: and we
shall know that such was the scope and counsel of
the Evangelists, if we observe but the history itself.
St. Matthew (chap. i.), beginning at his genealogy,
shows that Jesus was of the lineage of David, born
of a virgin: chap, ii., that he was adored by the
wise men as king of the Jews; that Herod for the
same cause sought to slay him: chap. iii., iv., that
his kingdom was preached both by John the Baptist
and himself: chapters v. vi. vii., that he taught
the laws, not as the Scribes, but as one having authority:
chapters viii. ix., that he cured diseases
miraculously: chap. x., that he sent his apostles,
the preachers of his kingdom, throughout all the
parts of Judea to proclaim his kingdom: chap. xi.,
that he commanded the messengers, sent from John
to enquire whether he were the Christ or not, to
tell him what they had seen, namely, the miracles
which were only compatible with Christ: chap. xii.,
that he proved and declared his kingdom to the
Pharisees and others by arguments, parables, and
signs; and the following chapters to xxi., that he
maintained himself to be the Christ against the
Pharisees: chap. xxi., that he was saluted with
the title of king, when he entered into Jerusalem:
chaps. xxii., xxiii., xxiv., xxv., that he forewarned
others of false Christs; and that he showed in
parables what manner of kingdom his should be:
chaps. xxvi. xxvii., that he was taken and accused
for this reason, because he said he was a king; and
that a title was written on his cross, this is Jesus
the king of the Jews: lastly, chap. xxviii., that
after his resurrection, he told his apostles that all
309power was given unto him both in heaven and in
earth. All which tends to this end; that we should
believe Jesus to be the Christ. Such therefore was
the scope of St. Matthew in describing his gospel.
But such as his was, such also was the rest of the
Evangelists; which St. John sets down expressly in
the end of his gospel (John xx. 31): These things,
saith he, are written, that ye may know that Jesus
is the Christ, the Son of the living God.
By the apostles’ sermons.
7. Secondly, this is proved by the preaching of
the apostles. For they were the proclaimers of his
kingdom; neither did Christ send them to preach
aught but the kingdom of God (Luke ix. 2: Acts
x. 42). And what they did after Christ’s ascension,
may be understood by the accusation which
was brought against them (Acts xvii. 6-7): They
drew Jason, saith St. Luke, and certain brethren
unto the rulers of the city, crying, these are the
men that have turned the world upside down, and
are come hither also, whom Jason hath received;
and these all do contrary to the decrees of Cæsar,
saying that there is another king, one Jesus. It
appears also, what the subject of the apostle’s sermon
was, out of these words (Acts xvii. 2-3):
Opening and alleging out of the Scriptures (to
wit, of the Old Testament) that Christ must needs
have suffered and risen again from the dead; and
that this Jesus is the Christ.
By the easiness of Christian religion.
8. Thirdly, by the places, in which the easiness
of those things, which are required by Christ to the
attaining of salvation, is declared. For if an internal
assent of the mind were necessarily required
to the truth of all and each proposition, which this
day is controverted about the Christian faith, or by
310divers churches is diversely defined; there would
be nothing more difficult than the Christian religion.
And how then would that be true (Matth.
xi. 30): My yoke is easy and my burden light;
and that (Matth. xviii. 6): little ones do believe in
him; and that (1 Cor. i. 21): it pleased God by
the foolishness of preaching, to save those that believe?
Or how was the thief hanging on the cross
sufficiently instructed to salvation, the confession
of whose faith was contained in these words: Lord,
remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom?
Or how could St. Paul himself, from an enemy, so
soon become a doctor of Christians?
By this, that it is the foundation of faith.
9. Fourthly, by this, that that article is the foundation
of faith; neither rests it on any other foundation.
Matth. xxiv. 23, 24: If any man shall say
unto you, Lo here is Christ, or he is there; believe
it not. For there shall arise false Christs
and false prophets, and shall show great signs
and wonders, &c. Whence it follows, that for the
faith’s sake which we have in this article, we must
not believe any signs and wonders. Gal. i. 8:
Although we or an angel from heaven, saith the
apostle, should preach to you any other gospel,
than what we have preached; let him be accursed.
By reason of this article, therefore, we might not
trust the very apostles and angels themselves, and
therefore, I conceive, not the Church neither, if
they should teach the contrary. 1 John iv. 1-2:
Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits
whether they are of God; because many false
prophets are gone out into the world. Hereby
know ye the spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth
Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of
311God, &c. That article therefore is the measure of
the spirits, whereby the authority of the doctors is
either received, or rejected. It cannot be denied,
indeed, but that all who at this day are Christians,
did learn from the doctors that it was Jesus, who did
all those things whereby he might be acknowledged
to be the Christ. Yet it follows not, that
the same persons believed that article for the doctor’s
or the Church’s, but for Jesus’ own sake.
For that article was before the Christian Church,
(Matth. xvi. 18), although all the rest were after
it; and the Church was founded upon it, not it
upon the Church. Besides, this article, that Jesus
is the Christ, is so fundamental, that all the rest
are by St. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 11-15) said to be built
upon it: For other foundation can no man lay,
than that which is laid; which is Jesus Christ;
that is to say, that Jesus is the Christ. Now if
any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver,
precious stones, wood, hay, stubble; every man’s
work shall be made manifest; if any man’s work
abide, which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive
a reward; if any man’s work shall be burnt,
he shall suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved.
From whence it plainly appears, that by foundation
is understood this article, that Jesus is the
Christ: for gold, and silver, precious stones, wood,
hay, stubble, whereby the doctrines are signified,
are not built upon the person of Christ: and also,
that false doctrines may be raised upon this foundation;
yet not so as they must necessarily be
damned who teach them.
By the plain words of Christ and his apostles.
10. Lastly, that this article alone is needful to
be inwardly believed, may be most evidently proved
312out of many places of holy Scripture, let who will
be the interpreter. John v. 39: Search the Scriptures;
for in them ye think ye have eternal life;
and they are they which testify of me. But
Christ meant the Scriptures of the Old Testament
only; for the New was then not yet written.
Now, there is no other testimony concerning
Christ in the Old TestamentTestament, but that an eternal
king was to come in such a place, that he was to
be born of such parents, that he was to teach and
do such things whereby, as by certain signs, he
was to be known. All which testify this one
thing; that Jesus who was so born, and did teach
and do such things, was the Christ. Other faith
then was not required to attain eternal life, besides
this article, John xi. 26: Whosoever liveth and
believeth in me, shall never die. But to believe
in Jesus, as is there expressed, is the same with
believing that Jesus was the Christ. He therefore
that believes that, shall never die; and by consequence,
that article alone is necessary to salvation.
John xx. 31: These are written, that ye might believe
that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God;
and that believing, ye might have life through his
name. Wherefore he that believes thus, shall have
eternal life; and therefore needs no other faith.
1 John iv. 2: Every spirit, that confesseth that
Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God. And
1 John v. 1: Whosoever believeth that Jesus is
the Christ, is born of God. And verse 5: Who is
he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth
that Jesus is the Son of God? If therefore there
be no need to believe anything else, to the end a
man may be of God, born of God, and overcome
313the world, than that Jesus is the Christ; that one
article then is sufficient to salvation. Acts viii.
36-37: See, here is water; what doth hinder me
to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou believest
with all thine heart, thou mayest. And
he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ
is the Son of God. If then this article being believed
with the whole heart, that is to say, with inward
faith, was sufficient for baptism; it is also
sufficient for salvation. Besides these places, there
are innumerable others, which do clearly and expressly
affirm the same thing. Nay, wheresoever
we read that our Saviour commended the faith of
any one, or that he said, thy faith hath saved thee,
or that he healed any one for his faith’s sake;
there the proposition believed was no other but
this, Jesus is the Christ, either directly or consequently.
In this article is contained the faith of the Old Testament.
11. But because no man can believe Jesus to be
the Christ, who, when he knows that by Christ is
understood that same king, who was promised from
God by Moses and the prophets for to be the king
and Saviour of the world, doth not also believe Moses
and the prophets; neither can he believe these,
who believes not that God is, and that he governs
the world; it is necessary, that the faith of God
and of the Old Testament be contained in this
faith of the New. Seeing therefore that atheism,
and the denial of the Divine Providence, were the
only treason against the Divine Majesty in the
kingdom of God by nature; but idolatry also in
the kingdom of God by the old covenant; now in
this kingdom, wherein God rules by way of a new
covenant, apostacy is also added, or the renunciation
314of this article once received, that Jesus is the
Christ. Truly other doctrines, provided they have
their determination from a lawful Church, are not
to be contradicted; for that is the sin of disobedience.
But it hath been fully declared before, that
they are not needful to be believed with an inward
faith.
How faith and obedience do concur to salvation.
12. Faith and obedience have divers parts in accomplishing
the salvation of a Christian; for this
contributes the power or capacity, that the act;
and either is said to justify in its kind. For Christ
forgives not the sins of all men, but of the penitent
or the obedient, that is to say, the just. I
say not the guiltless, but the just; for justice is a
will of obeying the laws, and may be consistent
with a sinner; and with Christ, the will to obey is
obedience. For not every man, but the just shall
live by faith. Obedience therefore justifies, because
it maketh just; in the same manner as
temperance maketh temperate, prudence prudent,
chastity chaste; namely, essentially; and puts a
man in such a state, as makes him capable of pardon.
Again, Christ hath not promised forgiveness
of sins to all just men; but only those of them
who believe him to be the Christ. Faith therefore
justifies in such a sense as a judge may be said to
justify, who absolves, namely, by the sentence
which actually saves a man; and in this acception
of justification (for it is an equivocal term) faith
alone justifies; but in the other, obedience only.
But neither obedience alone, nor faith alone, do
save us; but both together.
In a Christian city there is no contrariety between the command of God, and of the city.
13. By what hath been said hitherto, it will be
easy to discern what the duty of Christian subjects
315is towards their sovereigns; who, as long as they
profess themselves Christians, cannot command
their subjects to deny Christ, or to offer him any
contumely: for if they should command this, they
would profess themselves to be no Christians. For
seeing we have showed, both by natural reason and
out of holy Scriptures, that subjects ought in all
things to obey their princes and governors, excepting
those which are contrary to the command
of God; and that the commands of God, in a
Christian city, concerning temporal affairs, that
is to say, those which are to be discussed by human
reason, are the laws and sentence of the city,
delivered from those who have received authority
from the city to make laws and judge of controversies;
but concerning spiritual matters, that is
to say, those which are to be defined by the holy
Scripture, are the laws and sentences of the city,
that is to say, the Church, (for a Christian city and
a Church, as hath been showed in the foregoing
chapter, art. 10, are the same thing), delivered by
pastors lawfully ordained, and who have to that
end authority given them by the city; it manifestly
follows, that in a Christian commonweal
obedience is due to the sovereign in all things, as
well spiritual as temporal. And that the same
obedience, even from a Christian subject, is due in
all temporal matters to those princes who are no
Christians, is without any controversy; but in matters
spiritual, that is to say, those things which
concern God’s worship, some Christian Church is to
be followed. For it is an hypothesis of the Christian
faith, that God speaks not in things supernatural
but by the way of Christian interpreters
316of holy Scriptures. But what? Must we resist
princes, when we cannot obey them? Truly, no;
for this is contrary to our civil covenant. What
must we do then? Go to Christ by martyrdom;
which if it seem to any man to be a hard saying,
most certain it is that he believes not with his
whole heart, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of
the living God; for he would then desire to be
dissolved, and to be with Christ; but he would by a
feigned Christian faith elude that obedience, which
he hath contracted to yield unto the city.
The doctrines which this day are controverted about religion, do for the most part belong to the right of dominion.
14. But some men perhaps will wonder, if (excepting
this one article, that Jesus is the Christ,
which only is necessary to salvation in relation to
internal faith) all the rest belong to obedience;
which may be performed, although a man do not
inwardly believe, so he do but desire to believe,
and make an outward profession, as oft as need requires,
of whatsoever is propounded by the Church;
how it comes about that there are so many tenets,
which are all held so to concern our faith, that except
a man do inwardly believe them, he cannot
enter into the kingdom of heaven. But if he consider
that, in most controversies, the contention is
about human sovereignty; in some, matter of gain
and profit; in others, the glory of wits: he will
surely wonder the less. The question about the
propriety of the Church, is a question about the
right of sovereignty. For it being known what a
Church is, it is known at once to whom the rule
over ChristiansChristians doth belong. For if every Christian
city be that Church, which Christ himself hath commanded
every Christian, subject to that city, to
hear; then every subject is bound to obey his city,
317that is to say, him or them who have the supreme
power, not only in temporal, but also in spiritual
matters. But if every Christian city be not that
Church, then is there some other Church more
universal, which must be obeyed. All Christians
therefore must obey that Church, just as they
would obey Christ, if he came upon earth. It will
therefore rule either by the way of monarchy,
or by some assembly. This question then concerns
the right of ruling. To the same end belongs
the question concerning infallibility. For
whosoever were truly and internally believed by
all mankind, that he could not err, would be sure
of all dominion, as well temporal as spiritual, over
all mankind, unless himself would refuse it. For
if he say that he must be obeyed in temporals, because
it is supposed he cannot err, that right of
dominion is immediately granted him. Hither
also tends the privilege of interpreting Scriptures.
For he to whom it belongs to interpret the controversies
arising from the divers interpretations
of Scriptures, hath authority also simply and absolutely
to determine all manner of controversies
whatsoever. But he who hath this, hath also the
command over all men who acknowledge the
Scriptures to be the word of God. To this end
drive all the disputes about the power of remitting
and retaining sins; or the authority of excommunication.
For every man, if he be in his wits, will
in all things yield that man an absolute obedience,
by virtue of whose sentence he believes himself to
be either saved or damned. Hither also tends the
power of instituting societies. For they depend
on him by whom they subsist, who hath as many
318subjects as monks, although living in an enemy’s
city. To this end also refers the question concerning
the judge of lawful matrimony. For he
to whom that judicature belongs, to him also pertains
the knowledge of all those cases which concern
the inheritance and succession of all the
goods and rights, not of private men only, but also
of sovereign princes. And hither also in some
respect tends the virgin life of ecclesiastical persons;
for unmarried men have less coherence than
others with civil society. And besides, it is an inconvenience
not to be slighted, that princes must
either necessarily forego the priesthood, which is
a great bond of civil obedience; or have no hereditary
kingdom. To this end also tends the canonization
of saints, which the heathen called
apotheosis. For he that can allure foreign subjects
with so great a reward, may bring those who are
greedy of such glory, to dare and do anything.
For what was it but an honourable name with posterity,
which the Decii and other Romans sought
after; and a thousand others, who cast themselves
upon incredible perils? The controversies about
purgatory, and indulgences, are matter of gain.
The questions of free-will, justification, and the
manner of receiving Christ in the sacrament, are
philosophical. There are also questions concerning
some rites not introduced, but left in the
Church not sufficiently purged from Gentilism.
But we need reckon no more. All the world
knows that such is the nature of men, that dissenting
in questions which concern their power, or
profit, or pre-eminence of wit, they slander and
curse each other. It is not therefore to be wondered
319at, if almost all tenets, after men grew hot
with disputings, are held forth by some or other
to be necessary to salvation and for our entrance
into the kingdom of heaven. Insomuch as they
who hold them not, are not only condemned as
guilty of disobedience; which in truth they are,
after the Church hath once defined them; but of
infidelity: which I have declared above to be
wrong, out of many evident places of Scripture.
To which I add this one of Saint Paul’s (Rom. xiv.
3, 5): Let not him that eateth, despise him that
eateth not, and let not him that eateth not, judge
him that eateth; for God hath received him. One
man esteemeth one day above another, another
esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be
fully persuaded in his own mind.
Internal references to specific articles in this text are linked
for easy of navigation. More general references to entire chapters
have not been linked.
In the summary of Chapter XIII, the last article is misnumbered
as ‘13’, rather than ‘17.’ On p. 221, a reference to article
13 in Chapter V almost certainly should have been to the 12th
article of that chapter.
Other errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and
are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.
| 3.1 |
ζῶον πολιτικ[ο/ό]ν |
Replaced. |
| 5.5 |
that same [ἐυ/εὐ]δοκιμεῖν |
Replaced. |
| 56.14 |
Prov. xxii. 10[)]: |
Removed. |
| 99.31 |
For being e[r/l]ected, the people is at once dissolved |
Replaced. |
| 102.20 |
make him a mona[a/r]ch |
Replaced. |
| 106.31 |
have obliged themsel[u/v]es |
Replaced. |
| 147.5 |
the will of God[.] |
Added. |
| 196.3 |
The defin[in]ition of sin. |
Removed. |
| 196.32 |
to which th[a/e]y have given |
Replaced. |
| 197.28 |
ἀδ[ι/ί]κημα |
Stress added. |
| 228.3 |
concern[-/ing] the commands |
Added. |
| 238.20 |
that is[ to] say |
Added. |
| 272.25 |
the word[ of] faith |
Added. |
| 283.34 |
(verse 2[2/3]) |
Replaced. |
| 285.7 |
and their[’]s who repent not |
Removed. |
| 312.8 |
in the Old Test[i/a]ment |
Replaced. |
| 316.31 |
the rule over Christ[ai/ia]ns |
Transposed. |
