Difficult problem before the convention.
Washington's solemn appeal.
The Federal Convention did wisely in withholding its debates from the
knowledge of the people. It was felt that discussion would be more
untrammelled, and that its result ought to go before the country as the
collective and unanimous voice of the convention. There was likely to be
wrangling enough among themselves; but should their scheme be unfolded,
bit by bit, before its parts could be viewed in their mutual relations,
popular excitement would become intense, there might be riots, and an
end would be put to that attitude of mental repose so necessary for the
constructive work that was to be done. It was thought best that the
scheme should be put forth as a completed whole, and that for several
years, even, until the new system of government should have had a fair
trial, the traces of the individual theories and preferences concerned
in its formation should not be revealed. For it was generally assumed
that a system of government new in some important respects would be
proposed by the convention, and while the people awaited the result the
wildest speculations and rumours were current. A few hoped, and many
feared, that some scheme of monarchy would be established. Such
surmises found their way across the ocean, and hopes were expressed in
England that, should a king be chosen, it might be a younger son of
George III. It was even hinted, with alarm, that, through gratitude to
our recent allies, we might be persuaded to offer the crown to some
member of the royal family of France. No such thoughts were entertained,
however, by any person present in the convention. Some of the delegates
came with the design of simply amending the articles of confederation by
taking away from the states the power of regulating commerce, and
intrusting this power to Congress. Others felt that if the work were not
done thoroughly now another chance might never be offered; and these men
thought it necessary to abolish the confederation, and establish a
federal republic, in which the general government should act directly
upon the people. The difficult problem was how to frame a plan of this
sort which people could be made to understand and adopt. At the very
outset some of the delegates began to exhibit symptoms of that peculiar
kind of moral cowardice which is wont to afflict free governments, and
of which American history furnishes so many instructive examples. It was
suggested that palliatives and half measures would be far more likely to
find favour with the people than any thorough-going reform, when
Washington suddenly interposed with a brief but immortal speech, which
ought to be blazoned in letters of gold, and posted on the wall of every
American assembly that shall meet to nominate a candidate, or declare a
policy, or pass a law, so long as the weakness of human nature shall
endure. Rising from his president's chair, his tall figure drawn up to
its full height, he exclaimed in tones unwontedly solemn with suppressed
emotion, "It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted.
Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the
people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward
defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the
honest can repair; the event is in the hand of God."
This outburst of noble eloquence carried conviction to every one, and
henceforth we do not hear that any attempt was avowedly made to avoid
the issues as they came up. It was a most wholesome tonic. It braced up
the convention to high resolves, and impressed upon all the delegates
that they were in a situation where faltering or trifling was both
wicked and dangerous. From that moment the mood in which they worked
caught something from the glorious spirit of Washington. There was need
of such high purpose, for two plans were presently laid before the
meeting, which, for a moment, brought out one of the chief elements of
antagonism existing between the states, and which at first seemed
irreconcilable. It was the happy compromise which united and harmonised
these two plans that smoothed the further work of the convention, and
made it possible for a stable and powerful government to be constructed.
The root of all the difficulties.
The first of these plans was known as the Virginia plan. It was agreed
upon in a committee of the delegates of that state, and was brought
forward by Edmund Randolph, governor of Virginia, in the name of the
state, but its chief author was Madison. It struck instantly at the root
of the difficulties under which the country had been staggering ever
since the Declaration of Independence. The federal government had
possessed no means of enforcing obedience to its laws. Its edicts were
without a sanction; and this was because they operated upon states, and
not upon individuals. When an individual defies the law, you can lock
him up in jail, or levy an execution upon his property. The immense
force of the community is arrayed against him, and he is as helpless as
a straw on the billows of the ocean. He cannot raise a militia to
protect himself. But when the law is defied by a state, it is quite
otherwise. You cannot put a state into jail, nor seize its goods; you
can only make war on it, and if you try that expedient you find that the
state is not helpless. Its local pride and prejudices are aroused
against you, and its militia will turn out in full force to uphold the
infraction of law. Against this obstinate and exasperated military force
what superior force can you bring? Under some rare combination of
circumstances you might get the military force of several of the other
states; but ordinarily, when what you are trying to do is simply to
enforce every-day laws, and when you simply represent a distrusted
general government in conflict with a local government, you cannot do
this. The other states will sympathize with the delinquent state; they
will feel that the very same condition of things which leads you to
attack that state to-day will lead you to attack some other state
to-morrow. Hence you cannot get any military help, and you are
powerless.
Such was the case with the Continental Congress. A novel and distrusted
institution, it was called upon to enforce its laws upon
long-established communities, full of sturdy independence and obstinate
local prejudices. It was able to act, though with clumsy slowness, as
long as there was an enemy in the field who was even more dreaded. But
as soon as this enemy had been beaten out of sight it could not act at
all. This had been because it did not represent the American people, but
only the American states. The vital force which moved it was not the
resistless force of a whole people, but only a shadowy semblance of
force, derived from a theoretical consent of thirteen corporate bodies,
which in their corporate capacity could never be compelled to agree
about anything under the sun; and unless compelled they would not agree.
Four years of disturbance in every part of the country, in the course of
which troops had been called out in several states, and civil war had
been narrowly averted at least half a dozen times, had proved this
beyond all cavil. With almost any other people than the Americans civil
war would have come already. With all the vast future interests that
were involved in these quarrels looming up before their keen, sagacious
minds, it was a wonder that they had been kept from coming to blows.
Such self-restraint had been greatly to their credit. It was the blessed
fruit of more than a century of government by free discussion, while yet
these states were colonies, peopled by the very cream of English
freemen who had fought the decisive battle of civil and religious
freedom for mankind in that long crisis when the Invincible Armada was
overwhelmed and the Long Parliament won its triumphs. Such
self-restraint had this people shown in days of trial, under a vicious
government adopted in a time of hurry and sore distress. But late events
had gone far to show that it could not endure.
The words of Randolph's opening speech are worth quoting in this
connection. "The confederation," he said, "was made in the infancy of
the science of constitutions, when the inefficiency of requisitions was
unknown; when no commercial discord had arisen among states; when no
rebellion like that in Massachusetts had broken out; when foreign debts
were not urgent; when the havoc of paper money had not been foreseen;
when treaties had not been violated; and when nothing better could have
been conceded by states jealous of their sovereignty. But it offered no
security against foreign invasion, for Congress could neither prevent
nor conduct a war, nor punish infractions of treaties or of the law of
nations, nor control particular states from provoking war. The federal
government has no constitutional power to check a quarrel between
separate states; nor to suppress a rebellion in any one of them; nor to
establish a productive impost; nor to counteract the commercial
regulations of other nations; nor to defend itself against the
encroachments of the states. From the manner in which it has been
ratified in many of the states, it cannot be claimed to be paramount to
the state constitutions; so that there is a prospect of anarchy from the
inherent laxity of the government. As the remedy, the government to be
established must have for its basis the republican principle."
The Virginia plan; a radical cure.
Having thus tersely stated the whole problem, Randolph went on to
present the Virginia plan. To make the federal government operate
directly upon individuals, one provision was absolutely necessary. It
did not solve the whole problem, but it was an indispensable beginning.
This was the proposal that there should be a national legislature, in
which the American people instead of the American states should be
represented. For the purposes of federal legislation, there must be an
assembly elected directly by the people, and with its members
apportioned according to population. There must be such an assembly as
our present House of Representatives, standing in the same immediate
relation to the people of the whole country as was sustained by the
assembly of each separate state to the people of that state. Without
such direct representation of the whole people in the Federal Congress,
it would be impossible to achieve one secure step toward the radical
reform of the weaknesses and vices of the confederation. It was the only
way in which the vexed question of one nation or thirteen could be made
to yield a satisfactory answer. At the same time it could not be denied
that such a proposal was revolutionary in character. It paved the way
for a national consolidation which might go further than any one could
foresee, and much further than was desirable. The moribund Congress of
the Confederation, with its delegates chosen by the state assemblies,
and casting its vote simply by states, had utterly failed to serve as a
national legislature. There was a good deal of truth in what John Adams
once said of it, that it was more a diplomatic than a legislative body.
It was, indeed, because of this consciously felt diplomatic character
that it was called a Congress, and not a Parliament. In its lack of
coercive power it resembled the international congresses of Europe
rather than the supreme legislature of any country. To substitute
abruptly for such a body a truly national legislature, based not upon
states but upon population, was quietly to inaugurate a revolution of no
less magnitude than that which had lately severed us from Great Britain.
So bold a step, while all-essential in order to complete that
revolution, and make its victorious issue fortunate instead of
disastrous to the American people, was sufficiently revolutionary to
awaken the fears of many members of the Federal Convention. To the
familiar state governments which had so long possessed their love and
allegiance, it was super-adding a new and untried government, which it
was feared would swallow up the states and everywhere extinguish local
independence. Nor can it be said that such fears were unreasonable. Our
federal government has indeed shown a strong tendency to encroach upon
the province of the state governments, especially since our late Civil
War. Too much centralization is our danger to-day, as the weakness of
the federal tie was our danger a century ago. The rule of the
Federalist party was needed in 1789 as the rule of the Republican party
was needed in 1861, to put a curb upon the centrifugal tendencies. But
after Federalism had fairly done its great work, at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, it was well that the administration of our national
affairs should pass into the hands of the party to which Thomas
Jefferson and Samuel Adams belonged, and which Madison, in his calm
statesmanlike wisdom, had come to join. And now that, in our own day,
the disruptive forces have been even more thoroughly and effectually
overcome, it is time for the principles of that party to be reasserted
with fresh emphasis. If the day should ever arrive (which God forbid!)
when the people of the different parts of our country shall allow their
local affairs to be administered by prefects sent from Washington, and
when the self-government of the states shall have been so far lost as
that of the departments of France, or even so far as that of the
counties of England,—on that day the progressive political career of
the American people will have come to an end, and the hopes that have
been built upon it for the future happiness and prosperity of mankind
will be wrecked forever.
I do not think that the historian writing at the present day need fear
any such direful calamity, for the past century has shown most
instructively how, in such a society as ours, the sense of political
dangers slowly makes its way through the whole mass of the people, until
movements at length are made to avert them, and the pendulum swings in
the opposite direction. The history of political parties in the United
States is especially rich in lessons of this sort. Compared with the
statesmen of the Federal Convention, we are at a great advantage in
studying this question of national consolidation; and we have no excuse
for failing to comprehend the attitude of the men who dreaded the
creation of a national legislature as the entering wedge which would by
and by rend asunder the structure of our liberties. The great mind of
Madison was one of the first to entertain distinctly the noble
conception of two kinds of government operating at one and the same time
upon the same individuals, harmonious with each other, but each supreme
in its own sphere. Such is the fundamental conception of our partly
federal, partly national, government, which appears throughout the
Virginia plan as well as in the Constitution which grew out of it. It
was a political conception of a higher order than had ever before been
entertained; it took a great deal of discussion to make it clear to the
minds of the delegates generally; and the struggle over this initial
measure of a national legislature was so bitter as to come near breaking
up the convention.
In its original shape the Virginia plan went much further toward
national consolidation than the Constitution as adopted. The reaction
against the evils of the loose-jointed confederation, which Randolph so
ably summed up, was extreme. According to the Virginia plan, the
national legislature was to be composed of two houses, like the
legislatures of the several states. The members of the lower house
should be chosen directly by the people; members of the upper house, or
Senate, should be elected by the lower house out of persons nominated by
the state legislatures. In both the lower and the upper branches of this
national legislature the votes were to be the votes of individuals, and
no longer the votes of states, as in the Continental Congress. Under the
articles of confederation each state had an equal vote, and two thirds
were required for every important measure. Under the proposed
Constitution each state was to have a number of representatives
proportionate either to its wealth or to the number of its free
inhabitants, and a bare majority of votes was to suffice to pass all
measures in the ordinary course of business; and these rules were to
apply both to the lower house and to the Senate. To adopt such a plan
would overthrow the equality of the states altogether. It would give
Virginia, the greatest state, sixteen representatives, where Georgia,
the smallest state, had but one; and besides, as the votes were no
longer to be taken by states, individual members could combine in any
way they pleased, quite irrespective of state lines. It was not strange
that to many delegates in the convention such a beginning should have
seemed revolutionary. This impression was deepened when it was further
proposed not only to clothe this national legislature with original
powers of legislation in all cases to which the several states are
incompetent, but also to allow it to set aside at discretion such state
laws as it might deem unconstitutional. It is interesting to find
Madison, whose Federalism afterward came to be so moderate, now
appearing as the earnest defender of this extreme provision, so
incompatible with state rights. But in Madison's mind at this moment, in
the actual presence of the anarchy of the confederation, the only
alternative which seemed to present itself was that of armed coercion.
"A negative on state laws," he said, "is the mildest expedient that can
be devised for enforcing a national decree. Should no such precaution be
engrafted, the only remedy would be coercion. The negative would render
the use of force unnecessary. This prerogative of the general government
is the great pervading principle that must control the centrifugal
tendency of the states, which, without it, will continually fly out of
their proper orbits, and destroy the order and harmony of the political
system." But these views were not destined to find favour with the
convention, which finally left the matter to be much more satisfactorily
adjusted through the medium of the federal judiciary.
Such were the fundamental provisions of the Virginia plan with regard to
the national legislature. To carry out the laws, it was proposed that
there should be a national executive, to be chosen by the national
legislature for a short term, and ineligible a second time. Whether the
executive power should be invested in a single person or in several was
not specified. As will be seen hereafter, this was regarded as an
extremely delicate point, with which it was thought best not to
embarrass the Virginia plan at the outset. Passing lightly over this, it
was urged that, in order to complete the action of the government upon
individuals, there must be a national judiciary to determine cases
arising under the Constitution, cases in admiralty, and cases in which
different states or their citizens appear as parties. The judges were to
be chosen by the national legislature, to hold office during good
behaviour.
First reception of the Virginia plan.
Such, in its main outlines, was the plan which Randolph laid before the
convention, in the name of the Virginia delegation. An audacious scheme!
exclaimed some of the delegates; it was enough to take your breath away.
If they were going to begin like this, they might as well go home, for
all discussion would be time wasted. They were not sent there to set on
foot a revolution, but to amend and strengthen the articles of
confederation. But this audacious plan simply abolished the
Confederation in order to substitute for it a consolidated national
government. Foremost in urging this objection were Yates and Lansing of
New York, with Luther Martin of Maryland. Dickinson said it was pushing
things altogether too far, and his colleague, George Read, hinted that
the delegation from Delaware might feel obliged to withdraw from the
convention if the election of representatives according to population
should be adopted. By the tact of Madison and Gouverneur Morris this
question was postponed for a few days. After some animated discussion,
the issues became so narrowed and defined that they could be taken up
one by one. It was first decided that the national legislature should
consist of two branches. Then came a warm discussion as to whether the
members of the lower house should be elected directly by the people.
Curiously enough, in a country where the principle of popular election
had long since taken such deep root, where the assemblies of the several
states had been chosen by the people from the very beginning, there was
some doubt as to whether the same principle could safely be applied to
the national House of Representatives. Gerry, with his head full of the
Shays rebellion and the "Know Ye" measures of the neighbouring state,
thought the people could not be trusted. "The people do not want
virtue," said he, "but are the dupes of pretended patriots." Roger
Sherman took a similar view, and was supported by Martin, Rutledge, and
both the Pinckneys; but the sounder opinion prevailed. On this point
Hamilton was at one with Mason, Wilson, and Dickinson. The proposed
assembly, said Mason, was to be, so to speak, our House of Commons, and
ought to know and sympathize with every part of the community. It ought
to have at heart the rights and interests of every class of the people,
and in no other way could this end be so completely attained as by
popular election. "Yes," added Wilson, "without the confidence of the
people no government, least of all a republican government, can long
subsist.... The election of the first branch by the people is not the
corner-stone only, but the foundation of the fabric." "It is essential
to the democratic rights of the community," said Hamilton, "that the
first branch be directly elected by the people." Madison argued
powerfully on the same side, and the question was finally decided in
favour of popular election.
Antagonism between large states and small states.
The New Jersey plan; a feeble palliative.
It was now the 4th of June, when the great question came up which nearly
wrecked the convention before it was settled, after a whole month of
stormy debate. This was the question as to how the states should be
represented in the new Congress. On the Virginia plan, the smaller
states would be virtually swamped. Unless they could have equal votes,
without regard to wealth or population, they would be at the mercy of
the great states. In the division which ensued, the four most populous
states—Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and North
Carolina—favoured the Virginia plan; and they succeeded in carrying
South Carolina with them. Georgia, too, which, though weak at that
moment, possessed considerable room for expansion, voted upon the same
side. On the other hand, the states of Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, and Maryland—which were not only small in area, but were cut
off from further expansion by their geographical situation—were not
inclined to give up their equal vote in either branch of the national
legislature. At this stage of the proceedings the delegation from New
Hampshire had not yet arrived upon the scene. On several occasions the
majority of the Maryland delegation went with the larger states, but
Luther Martin, always opposed to the Virginia plan, usually succeeded in
dividing the vote of the delegation. Of the New York members, Yates and
Lansing, here as always, thwarted Hamilton by voting with the smaller
states. Their policy throughout was one of obstruction. The members from
Connecticut were disposed to be conciliatory; but New Jersey was
obstinate and implacable. She knew what it was to be tyrannized over by
powerful neighbours. The wrongs she had suffered from New York and
Pennsylvania rankled in the minds of her delegates. Accordingly, in the
name of the smaller states, William Paterson laid before the convention
the so-called "New Jersey plan" for the amendment of the articles of
confederation. This scheme admitted a federal legislature, consisting of
a single house, an executive in the form of a council to be chosen by
Congress, and likewise a federal judiciary, with powers less extensive
than those contemplated by the Virginia plan. It gave to Congress the
power to regulate foreign and domestic commerce, to levy duties on
imports, and even to raise internal revenue by means of a Stamp Act. But
with all this apparent liberality on the surface, the New Jersey plan
was vicious at bottom. It did not really give Congress the power to act
immediately upon individuals. The federal legislature which it proposed
was to represent states, and not individuals, and the states were to
vote equally, without regard to wealth or population. If things were to
be left in this shape, there was no security that the powers granted to
Congress could ever be really exercised. Nay, it was almost certain that
they could not be put into operation. It was easy enough on paper to
give Congress the permission to levy duties and regulate commerce, but
such a permission would amount to nothing unless Congress were armed
with the power of enforcing its decrees upon individuals. And it could
in no wise acquire such power unless as the creature of the people, and
not of the states. The New Jersey plan, therefore, furnished no real
remedy for the evils which afflicted the country. It was vigorously
opposed by Hamilton, Madison, Wilson, and King. Hamilton, indeed, took
this occasion to offer a plan of his own, which, in addition to
Madison's scheme of a purely national legislature, contained the
features of a tenure for life or good behaviour, for the executive and
the members of the upper house. But to most of the delegates this scheme
seemed too little removed from a monarchy, and Hamilton's brilliant
speech in its favour, while applauded by many, was supported by none.
The weighty arguments of Wilson, King, and Madison prevailed, and the
New Jersey plan lost its original shape when it was decided that
Congress should consist of two houses. The principle of equal state
representation, however, remained as a stumbling-block. Paterson,
supported by his able colleague Brearley, as well as by Martin and the
two irreconcilables from New York, stoutly maintained that to depart
from this principle would be to exceed the powers of the convention,
which assuredly was not intended to remodel the government from
beginning to end. But Randolph answered, "When the salvation of the
republic is at stake, it would be treason to our trust not to propose
what we find necessary;" and Hamilton pithily reminded the delegates
that as they were there only for the purpose of recommending a scheme
which would have to be submitted to the states for acceptance, they
need not be deterred by any false scruples from using their wits to the
best possible advantage. The debate on the merits of the question was an
angry one. According to the Virginia plan, said Brearly, the three
states of Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania will carry
everything before them. "It was known to him, from facts within New
Jersey, that where large and small counties were united into a district
for electing representatives for the district, the large counties always
carried their point, and consequently the large states would do so....
Was it fair, on the other hand, that Georgia should have an equal vote
with Virginia? He would not say it was. What remedy, then? One only:
that a map of the United States be spread out, that all the existing
boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made into
thirteen equal parts." "Yes," said Paterson, "a confederacy supposes
sovereignty in the members composing it, and sovereignty supposes
equality. If we are to be considered as a nation, all state distinctions
must be abolished, the whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an
equal division is made then there may be fairly an equality of
representation." This argument was repeated with a triumphant air, as
seeming to reduce the Virginia plan to absurdity. Paterson went on to
say that "there was no more reason that a great individual state,
contributing much, should have more votes than a small one, contributing
little, than that a rich individual citizen should have more votes than
an indigent one. If the ratable property of A was to that of B as forty
to one, ought A, for that reason, to have forty times as many votes as
B?... Give the large states an influence in proportion to their
magnitude, and what will be the consequence? Their ambition will be
proportionally increased, and the small states will have everything to
fear. It was once proposed by Galloway [in the first Continental
Congress] that America should be represented in the British Parliament,
and then be bound by its laws. America could not have been entitled to
more than one third of the representatives which would fall to the share
of Great Britain: would American rights and interests have been safe
under an authority thus constituted?" Then, warming with the subject, he
exclaimed, If the great states wish to unite on such a plan, "let them
unite if they please, but let them remember that they have no authority
to compel the others to unite.... Shall I submit the welfare of New
Jersey with five votes in a council where Virginia has sixteen?... I
will never consent to the proposed plan. I will not only oppose it here,
but on my return home will do everything in my power to defeat it there.
Neither my state nor myself will ever submit to tyranny."
Paterson was ably answered by James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, who pointed
out the absurdity of giving 180,000 men in one part of the country as
much weight in the national legislature as 750,000 in another part. It
is unjust, he said. "The gentleman from New Jersey is candid. He
declares his opinions boldly. I commend him for it. I will be equally
candid.... I never will confederate on his principles." The convention
grew nervous and excited over this seemingly irreconcilable antagonism.
The discussion was kept up with much learning and acuteness by Madison,
Ellsworth, and Martin, and history was ransacked for testimony from the
Amphiktyonic Council to Old Sarum, and back again to the Lykian League.
Madison, rightly reading the future, declared that if once the proposed
union should be formed, the real danger would come not from the rivalry
between large and small states, but from the antagonistic interests of
the slave-holding and non-slaveholding states. Hamilton pointed out that
in the state of New York five counties had a majority of the
representatives, and yet the citizens of the other counties were in no
danger of tyranny, as the laws have an equal operation upon all. Rufus
King called attention to the fact that the rights of Scotland were
secure from encroachments, although her representation in Parliament was
necessarily smaller than that of England. But New Jersey and Delaware,
mindful of recent grievances, were not to be argued down or soothed.
Gunning Bedford of Delaware was especially violent. "Pretences to
support ambition," said he, "are never wanting. The cry is, Where is the
danger? and it is insisted that although the powers of the general
government will be increased, yet it will be for the good of the whole;
and although the three great states form nearly a majority of the people
of America, they never will injure the lesser states. Gentlemen, I do
not trust you. If you possess the power, the abuse of it could not be
checked; and what then would prevent you from exercising it to our
destruction?... Sooner than be ruined, there are foreign powers who
will take us by the hand. I say this not to threaten or intimidate, but
that we should reflect seriously before we act." This language called
forth a rebuke from Rufus King. "I am concerned," said he, "for what
fell from the gentleman from Delaware,—take a foreign power by the
hand! I am sorry he mentioned it, and I hope he is able to excuse it to
himself on the score of passion."
The Connecticut compromise.
The situation had become dangerous. "The convention," said Martin, "was
on the verge of dissolution, scarce held together by the strength of a
hair." When things were looking darkest, Oliver Ellsworth and Roger
Sherman suggested a compromise. "Yes," said Franklin, "when a joiner
wishes to fit two boards, he sometimes pares off a bit from both." The
famous Connecticut compromise led the way to the arrangement which was
ultimately adopted, according to which the national principle was to
prevail in the House of Representatives, and the federal principle in
the Senate. But at first the compromise met with little favour. Neither
party was willing to give way. "No compromise for us," said Luther
Martin. "You must give each state an equal suffrage, or our business is
at an end." "Then we are come to a full stop," said Roger Sherman. "I
suppose it was never meant that we should break up without doing
something." When the question as to allowing equality of suffrage to the
states in the Federal Senate was put to vote, the result was a tie.
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland—five
states—voted in the affirmative; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina—five states—voted in the negative;
the vote of Georgia was divided and lost. It was Abraham Baldwin, a
native of Connecticut and lately a tutor in Yale College, a recent
emigrant to Georgia, who thus divided the vote of that state, and
prevented a decision which would in all probability have broken up the
convention. His state was the last to vote, and the house was hushed in
anxious expectation, when this brave and wise young man yielded his
private conviction to what he saw to be the paramount necessity of
keeping the convention together. All honour to his memory!
The moral effect of the tie vote was in favour of the Connecticut
compromise; for no one could doubt that the little states, New Hampshire
and Rhode Island, had they been represented in the division, would have
voted upon that side. The matter was referred to a committee as
impartially constituted as possible, with Elbridge Gerry as chairman;
and On the 5th of July, after a recess of three days, the committee
reported in favour of the compromise. Fresh objections on the part of
the large states were now offered by Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, and
gloom again overhung the convention. Gerry said that, while he did not
fully approve of the compromise, he had nevertheless supported it,
because he felt sure that if nothing were done war and confusion must
ensue, the old confederation being already virtually at an end. George
Mason observed that "it could not be more inconvenient for any
gentleman to remain absent from his private affairs than it was for him;
but he would bury his bones in that city rather than expose his country
to the consequences of a dissolution of the convention." Mason's
subsequent behaviour was hardly in keeping with the promise of this
brave speech, and in Gerry we shall observe like inconsistency. At
present a timely speech from Madison soothed the troubled waters; but it
was only after eleven days of somewhat more tranquil debate that the
compromise was adopted on the 16th of July. Even then it was but
narrowly secured. The ayes were Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, and North Carolina,—five states; the noes were Pennsylvania,
Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia,—four states; Gerry and Strong
against King and Gorham divided the vote of Massachusetts, which was
thus lost. New York, for reasons presently to be stated, was absent. It
is accordingly to Elbridge Gerry and Caleb Strong that posterity are
indebted for here preventing a tie, and thus bringing the vexed question
to a happy issue.
According to the compromise secured with so much difficulty, it was
arranged that in the lower house population was to be represented, and
in the upper house the states, each of which, without regard to size,
was forever to be entitled to two senators. In the lower house there was
to be one representative for every 40,000 inhabitants, but at
Washington's suggestion the number was changed to 30,000, so as to
increase the house, which then seemed likely to be too small in numbers.
Some one suggested that with the growth of population that rate would
make an unwieldy house within a hundred and fifty years from that time,
whereat Gorham of Massachusetts laughed to scorn the idea that any
system of government they could devise in that room could possibly last
a hundred and fifty years. The difficulty has been surmounted by
enlarging from time to time the basis of representation. It now seemed
inadvisable that the senators should be chosen by the lower house out of
persons nominated by the state legislatures; and it was accordingly
decided that they should be not merely nominated, but elected, by the
state legislatures. Thus the Senate was made quite independent of the
lower house. At the same time, the senators were to vote as individuals,
and thus the old practice of voting by states, except in certain
peculiar emergencies, was finally done away with.
It was a decisive victory for Madison's scheme.
Irreconcilables go home.
It is seldom, if ever, that a political compromise leaves things evenly
balanced. Almost every such arrangement, when once set working, weighs
down the scales decidedly to the one side or the other. The Connecticut
compromise was really a decisive victory for Madison and his party,
although it modified the Virginia plan so considerably. They could well
afford to defer to the fears and prejudices of the smaller states in the
structure of the Senate, for by securing a lower house, which
represented the American people, and not the American states, they won
the whole battle in so far as the question of radically reforming the
government was concerned. As soon as the foundation was thus laid for a
government which should act directly upon individuals, it obviously
became necessary to abandon the articles of confederation, and work out
a new constitution in all its details. The plan, as now reported,
omitted the obnoxious adjective "national," and spoke of the federal
legislature and federal courts. But to the men who were still blindly
wedded to the old confederation this soothing change of phraseology did
not conceal their defeat. On the very day that the compromise was
favourably reported by the committee, Yates and Lansing quit the
convention in disgust, and went home to New York. After the departure of
these uncongenial colleagues, Hamilton might have acted with power, had
he not known too well that the sentiment of his state did not support
him. As a mere individual he could do but little, and accordingly he
went home for a while to attend to pressing business, returning just in
time to take part in the closing scenes. His share in the work of
framing the Federal Constitution was very small. About the time that
Hamilton returned, Luther Martin, whose wrath had waxed hotter every
day, as he saw power after power extended to the federal government, at
length gave way and went back to Maryland, vowing that he would have
nothing more to do with such high-handed proceedings.
While the Connecticut compromise thus scattered a few scintillations of
discontent, and relieved the convention of some of its most discordant
elements, its general effect was wonderfully harmonizing. The men who
had opposed the Virginia plan only through their dread of the larger
states were now more than conciliated. The concession of equal
representation in the Senate turned out to have been a master stroke of
diplomacy. As soon as the little states were assured of an equal share
in the control of one of the two central legislative bodies, they
suddenly forgot their scruples about thoroughly overhauling the
government, and none were readier than they to intrust extensive powers
to the new Congress. Paterson of New Jersey, the fiercest opponent of
the Virginia plan, became from that time forth to the end of his life
the most devoted of Federalists.
Other antagonisms; vague dread of the future west.
Antagonism between slave states and free states.
That first step which proverbially gives the most trouble had now been
fairly taken. But other compromises were needed before the work of
construction could properly be carried out. As the antagonism between
great and small states disappeared from the scene, other antagonisms
appeared. It is worth noting that just for a moment there was revealed a
glimmering of jealousy and dread on the part of the eastern states
toward those of which the foundations were laid in the northwestern
territory. Many people in New England feared that their children would
be drawn westward in such numbers as to create immense states beyond the
Ohio; and thus it was foreseen that the relative political weight of New
England in the future would be diminished. To a certain extent this
prediction has been justified by events, but Roger Sherman rightly
maintained that it afforded no just grounds for dread. King and Gerry
introduced a most illiberal and mischievous motion, that the total
number of representatives from new states must never be allowed to
exceed the total number from the original thirteen. Such an arrangement,
which would surely have been enough to create that antagonism between
east and west which it sought to forestall and avoid, was supported by
Massachusetts and Connecticut, with Delaware and Maryland; but it was
defeated by the combination of New Jersey with the four states south of
Maryland. The ground was thus cleared for a very different kind of
sectional antagonism,—that which, as Madison truly said, would prove
the most deep-seated and enduring of all,—the antagonism between north
and south. The first great struggle between the pro-slavery and
anti-slavery parties began in the Federal Convention, and it resulted in
the first two of the long series of compromises by which the
irrepressible conflict was postponed until the north had waxed strong
enough to confront the dreaded spectre of secession, and, summoning all
its energies in one stupendous effort, exorcise it forever. From this
moment down to 1865 we shall continually be made to realize how the
American people had entered into the shadow of the coming Civil War
before they had fairly emerged from that of the Revolution; and as we
pass from scene to scene of the solemn story, we shall learn how to be
forever grateful for the sudden and final clearing of the air wrought by
that frightful storm which men not yet old can still so well remember.
The first compromise related to the distribution of representatives
between north and south. Was representation in the lower house of
Congress to be proportioned to wealth, or to population; and if the
latter, were all the inhabitants, or only all the free inhabitants, to
be counted? It was soon agreed that wealth was difficult to reckon and
population easy to count; and to an extent sufficient for all ordinary
purposes, population might serve as an index of wealth. A state with
500,000 inhabitants would be in most cases richer than one with 400,000.
In those days, when cities were few and small, this was approximately
true. In our day it is not at all true. A state with large commercial
and manufacturing cities is sure to be much richer than a state in which
the population is chiefly rural. The population of Massachusetts is
somewhat smaller than that of Indiana; but her aggregate wealth is more
than double that of Indiana. Disparities like this, which do not trouble
us to-day, would have troubled the Federal Convention. We no longer
think it desirable to give political representation to wealth, or to
anything but persons. We have become thoroughly democratic, but our
great-grandfathers had not. To them it seemed quite essential that
wealth should be represented as well as persons; but they got over the
main difficulty easily, because under the economic conditions of that
time population could serve roughly as an index to wealth, and it was
much easier to count noses than to assess the value of farms and stock.
Were slaves to be reckoned as persons or as chattels?
But now there was in all the southern states, and in most of the
northern, a peculiar species of collective existence, which might be
described either as wealth or as population. As human beings the slaves
might be described as population, but in the eye of the law they were
chattels. In the northern states slavery was rapidly disappearing, and
the property in negroes was so small as to be hardly worth considering;
while south of Mason and Dixon's line this peculiar kind of property was
the chief wealth of the states. But clearly, in apportioning
representation, in sharing political power in the federal assembly, the
same rule should have been applied impartially to all the states. At
this point, Pierce Butler and Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina
insisted that slaves were part of the population, and as such must be
counted in ascertaining the basis of representation. A fierce and
complicated dispute ensued. The South Carolina proposal suggested a
uniform rule, but it was one that would scarcely alter the political
weight of the north, while it would vastly increase the weight of the
south; and it would increase it most in just the quarter where slavery
was most deeply rooted. The power of South Carolina, as a member of the
Union, would be doubled by such a measure. Hence the northern delegates
maintained that slaves, as chattels, ought no more to be reckoned as
part of the population than houses or ships. "Has a man in Virginia,"
exclaimed Paterson, "a number of votes in proportion to the number of
his slaves? And if negroes are not represented in the states to which
they belong, why should they be represented in the general
government?... If a meeting of the people were to take place in a slave
state, would the slaves vote? They would not. Why then should they be
represented in a federal government?" "I can never agree," said
Gouverneur Morris, "to give such encouragement to the slave-trade as
would be given by allowing the southern states a representation for
their negroes.... I would sooner submit myself to a tax for paying for
all the negroes in the United States than saddle posterity with such a
constitution."
The three fifths compromise; a genuine English solution, if
ever there was one.
The attitude taken by Virginia was that of peace-maker. On the one hand,
such men as Washington, Madison, and Mason, who were earnestly hoping to
see their own state soon freed from the curse of slavery, could not fail
to perceive that if Virginia were to gain an increase of political
weight from the existence of that institution, the difficulty of getting
the state legislature to abolish it would be enhanced. But on the other
hand, they saw that South Carolina was inexorable, and that her refusal
to adopt the Constitution for this reason would certainly carry Georgia
with her, and probably North Carolina, also. Even had South Carolina
alone been involved, it was not simply a question of forming a Union
which should either include her or leave her out in the cold. The case
was much more complicated than that. It was really doubtful if, without
the cordial assistance of South Carolina, a Union could be formed at
all. A Federal Constitution had not only to be framed, but it had to be
presented to the thirteen states for adoption. It was by no means clear
that enough states would ratify it to enable the experiment of the new
government to go into operation. New York and Rhode Island were known to
be bitterly opposed to it; Massachusetts could not be counted on as
sure; to add South Carolina to this list would be to endanger
everything. The event justified this caution. We shall hereafter see
that it was absolutely necessary to satisfy South Carolina, and that but
for her ratification, coming just at the moment when it did, the work of
the Federal Convention would probably have been done in vain. It was a
clear perception of the wonderful complication of interests involved in
the final appeal to the people that induced the Virginia statesmen to
take the lead in a compromise. Four years before, in 1783, when Congress
was endeavouring to apportion the quotas of revenue to be required of
the several states, a similar dispute had arisen. If taxation were to be
distributed according to population, it made a great difference whether
slaves were to be counted as population or not. If slaves were to be
counted, the southern states would have to pay more than their equitable
share into the federal treasury; if slaves were not to be counted, it
was argued at the north that they would be paying less than their
equitable share. Consequently, at that time the north had been inclined
to maintain that the slaves were population, while the south had
preferred to regard them as chattels. Thus we see that in politics, as
well as in algebra, it makes all the difference in the world whether you
start with plus or with minus. On that occasion Madison had offered
a successful compromise, in which a slave figured as three fifths of a
freeman; and Rutledge of South Carolina, who was now present in the
convention, had supported the measure. Madison now proposed the same
method of getting over the difficulty about representation, and his
compromise was adopted. It was agreed that in counting population,
whether for direct taxation or for representation in the lower house of
Congress, five slaves should be reckoned as three individuals.
In other words, it was the best solution attainable under the
circumstances.
All this was thoroughly illogical, of course; it left the question
whether slaves are population or chattels for theorizers to wrangle
over, and for future events to decide. It was easy for James Wilson to
show that there was neither rhyme nor reason in it: but he subscribed to
it, nevertheless, just as the northern abolitionists, Rufus King and
Gouverneur Morris, joined with Washington and Madison, and with the
pro-slavery Pinckneys, in subscribing to it, because they all believed
that without such a compromise the Constitution would not be adopted;
and in this there can be little doubt that they were right. The evil
consequences were unquestionably very serious indeed. Henceforth, so
long as slavery lasted, the vote of a southerner counted for more than
the vote of a northerner; and just where negroes were most numerous the
power of their masters became greatest. In South Carolina there soon
came to be more blacks than whites, and the application of the rule
therefore went far toward doubling the vote of South Carolina in the
House of Representatives and in the electoral college. Every five
slaveholders down there were equal in political weight to not less than
eight farmers or merchants in the north; and thus this troublesome state
acquired a power of working mischief out of all proportion to her real
size. At a later date the operation of the rule in Mississippi was
similar; and in general it was just the most backward and barbarous
parts of the Union that were thus favoured at the expense of the most
civilized parts. Admitting all this, however, it remains undeniable that
the Constitution saved us from anarchy; and there can be little doubt
that slavery and every other remnant of barbarism in American society
would have thriven far more lustily under a state of chronic anarchy
than was possible under the Constitution. Four years of concentrated
warfare, animated by an intense and lofty moral purpose, could not hurt
the character or mar the fortunes of the people, like a century of
aimless and miscellaneous squabbling over a host of petty local
interests. The War of Secession was a terrible ordeal to pass through;
but when one tries to picture what might have happened in this fair land
without the work of the Federal Convention, the imagination stands
aghast.
Compromise between New England and South Carolina as to the
foreign slave-trade.
The second great compromise between northern and southern interests
related to the abolition of the foreign slave-trade and the power of the
federal government over commerce. All the states except South Carolina
and Georgia wished to stop the importation of slaves; but the physical
conditions of rice and indigo culture exhausted the negroes so fast
that these two states felt that their industries would be dried up at
the very source if the importation of fresh negroes were to be stopped.
Cotesworth Pinckney accordingly declared that South Carolina would
consider a vote to abolish the slave-trade as simply a polite way of
telling her that she was not wanted in the Union. On the other hand, the
three New England states present in the convention had made up their
minds that it would not do to allow the several states any longer to
regulate commerce each according to its own whim. It was of vital
importance that this power should be taken from the states and lodged in
Congress; otherwise, the Union would soon be rent in pieces by
commercial disputes. The policy of New York had thoroughly impressed
this lesson upon all the neighbouring states. But none of the southern
states were in favour of granting this power unreservedly to Congress.
If a navigation act could be passed by a simple majority in Congress, it
was feared that the New Englanders would get all the carrying trade into
their own hands, and then charge ruinous freights for carrying rice,
indigo, and tobacco to the north and to Europe. On this point,
accordingly, the southern delegates acted as a unit in insisting that
Congress should not be empowered to pass navigation acts, except by a
two thirds vote of both houses. This would have tied the hands of the
federal government most unfortunately; and the New Englanders,
enlightened by their own interests, saw it to be so. Here were the
materials ready for a compromise, or, as the stout abolitionist,
Gouverneur Morris, truly called it, a "bargain" between New England and
the far south. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut consented
to the prolonging of the foreign slave-trade for twenty years, or until
1808; and in return South Carolina and Georgia consented to the clause
empowering Congress to pass navigation acts and otherwise regulate
commerce by a simple majority of votes. At the same time, as a
concession to rice and indigo, the New Englanders agreed that Congress
should be forever prohibited from taxing exports; and thus one remnant
of mediæval political economy was neatly swept away.
This last compromise seems to make the adhesion of Virginia
doubtful.
This compromise was carried against the sturdy opposition of Virginia.
The language of George Mason of Virginia is worth quoting, for it was
such as Theodore Parker might have used. He called the slave-trade "this
infernal traffic." "Slavery," said he, "discourages arts and
manufactures. The poor despise labour when performed by slaves. They
prevent the immigration of whites, who really strengthen and enrich a
country. They produce the most pernicious effect on manners. Every
master of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They bring the judgment of
Heaven on a country. As nations cannot be rewarded or punished in the
next world, they must be in this. By an inevitable chain of causes and
effects, Providence punishes national sins by national calamities." But
these prophetic words were powerless against the combination of New
England with the far south. One thing was now made certain,—that the
vast influence of Rutledge and the Pinckneys would be thrown
unreservedly in behalf of the new Constitution. "I will confess," said
Cotesworth Pinckney, "that I had prejudices against the eastern states
before I came here, but I have found them as liberal and candid as any
men whatever." But this compromise, which finally secured South Carolina
and Georgia, made Virginia for the moment doubtful; for Mason and
Randolph were so disgusted at the absolute power over commerce conceded
to Congress that, when the Constitution was finished and engrossed on
paper, they refused to sign it.
It is difficult to read this or any other episode in our history whereby
negro slavery was extended and fostered without burning indignation. But
this is not the proper mood for the historian, whose aim is to interpret
men's actions by the circumstances of their time, in order to judge
their motives correctly. In 1787 slavery was the cloud like unto a man's
hand which portended a deluge, but those who could truly read the signs
were few. From north to south, slavery had been slowly dying out for
nearly fifty years. It had become extinct in Massachusetts, it was
nearly so in all the other northern states, and it had just been forever
prohibited in the national domain. In Maryland and Virginia there was a
strong and growing party in favour of abolition. The movement had even
gathered strength in North Carolina. Only the rice-swamps of the far
south remained wedded to their idols. It was quite generally believed
that slavery was destined speedily to expire, to give place to a better
system of labour, without any great danger or disturbance; and this
opinion was distinctly set forth by many delegates in the convention.[7]
Even Charles Pinckney went so far as to express a hope that South
Carolina, if not too much meddled with, would by and by voluntarily rank
herself among the emancipating states; but his older cousin declared
himself bound in candour to acknowledge that there was very little
likelihood indeed of so desirable an event. Not even these South
Carolinians ventured to defend slavery on principle. This belief in the
moribund condition of slavery prevented the convention from realizing
the actual effect of the concessions which were made. Scarcely any
cotton was grown at that time, and none was sent to England. The
industrial revolution about to be wrought by the inventions of Arkwright
and Hargreaves, Cartwright and Watt and Whitney, could not be foreseen.
Nor could it be foreseen that presently, when there should thus arise a
great demand for slaves from Virginia as a breeding-ground, the
abolitionist party in that state would disappear, leaving her to join
in the odious struggle for introducing slavery into the national domain.
Though these things were so soon to happen, the wisest man in 1787 could
not foresee them. The convention hoped that twenty years would see not
only the end of the foreign slave-trade, but the restriction and
diminution of slavery itself. It was in such a mood that they completed
the compromise by recommending a tariff of ten dollars a head upon all
negroes imported, while at the same time a clause was added for insuring
the recovery of fugitive slaves, quite similar to the clause in the
ordinance for the government of the northwestern territory.
The foundations of the Constitution were thus laid in
compromise.
It was the three great compromises here described that laid the
foundations of our Federal Constitution. The first compromise, by
conceding equal representation to the states in the Senate, enlisted the
small states in favour of the new scheme, and by establishing a national
system of representation in the lower house, prepared the way for a
government that could endure. This was Madison's great victory, secured
by the aid of Sherman and Ellsworth, without which nothing could have
been effected. The second compromise, at the cost of giving
disproportionate weight to the slave states, gained their support for
the more perfect union that was about to be formed. The third
compromise, at the cost of postponing for twenty years the abolition of
the foreign slave-trade, secured absolute free-trade between the states,
with the surrender of all control over commerce into the hands of the
federal government. After these steps had been taken, the most difficult
and dangerous part of the road had been travelled; the remainder, though
extremely important, was accomplished far more easily. It was mainly the
task of building on the foundations already laid.
Powers granted to the federal government.
In the grants to the federal government of powers hitherto reserved to
the several states, the diversity of opinion among the members of the
convention was but slight compared to the profound antagonism which had
been allayed by the three initial compromises. It was admitted, as a
matter of course, that the federal government alone could coin money,
fix the standard of weights and measures, establish post-offices and
post-roads, and grant patents and copyrights. To it alone was naturally
intrusted the whole business of war and of international relations. It
could define and punish felonies committed on the high seas; it could
maintain a navy and issue letters of marque and reprisal; it could
support an army and provide for calling forth the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasions.
But in relation to this question of the army and the militia there was
some characteristic discussion. It was at first proposed that Congress
should have the power "to subdue a rebellion in any state on the
application of its legislature." The Shays rebellion was then fresh in
the memory of all the delegates, and their arguments simply reflected
the impression which that unpleasant affair had left upon them. Charles
Pinckney, Gouverneur Morris, and John Langdon wished to have the power
given to Congress unconditionally, without waiting for an application
from the legislature. But Gerry, who had been on the ground, spoke
sturdily against such a needless infraction of state rights. He was
utterly opposed, he said, to "letting loose the myrmidons of the United
States on a state without its own consent. The states will be the best
judges in such cases. More blood would have been spilt in Massachusetts
in the late insurrection if the general authority had intermeddled."
Ellsworth suggested that Congress should use its discretion only in
cases where the legislature of the state could not meet; but Randolph
forcibly replied that if Congress is to judge whether a state
legislature can or cannot meet, the difficulty is in no wise surmounted.
Gerry's view at last prevailed, and in accordance therewith it was
decided that the federal power should guarantee to every state a
republican form of government, and should protect each of them against
invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (if
the legislature could not be convened), it should protect them against
domestic violence. This arrangement did not fully provide against such
an emergency as that of rival and hostile executives in the same state,
as under the so-called "carpet-bag" governments which followed after the
War of Secession, but it was doubtless as sound a provision as any
general constitution could make.
The federal government was further empowered to borrow money on the
credit of the United States; and it was declared that all debts
contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this
constitution should be as valid against the United States under this
constitution as under the confederation. There was to be no repudiation
or readjustment of debts on the ground of inability to pay. Congress was
further empowered to establish a uniform rule of naturalization and a
uniform law of bankruptcy. But it was prohibited from passing bills of
attainder or ex post facto laws, or suspending the writ of habeas
corpus, except under the stress of rebellion or invasion. It was
provided that all duties, imposts, or excises should be uniform
throughout the United States. The federal government could not give
preference to one state over another in its commercial regulations. It
could not tax exports. It could not draw money from the treasury save by
due process of appropriation, and all bills relating to the raising of
revenue must originate in the lower house, which directly represented
the people. Congress was empowered to admit new states into the Union,
but it was not allowed to interfere with the territorial areas of states
already existing without the express consent of the local legislatures.
To insure the independence of the federal government, it was provided
that senators and representatives should be paid out of the federal
treasury, and not by their respective states, as had been the case under
the confederation. Except for such offences as treason, felony, or
breach of the peace, they should be "privileged from arrest during their
attendance, at the session of their respective houses, and in going to
or returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either
house" they were not to be "questioned in any other place." It was
further provided that a territory not exceeding ten miles square should
be ceded to the United States, and set apart as the site of a federal
city, in which the general government should ever after hold its
meetings, erect its buildings, and exercise exclusive jurisdiction.
During the past four years the Continental Congress had skipped about
from Philadelphia to Princeton, to Annapolis, to Trenton, to New York,
until it had become a laughing-stock, and the newspapers were full of
squibs about it. Verily, said one facetious editor, the Lord shall make
this government like unto a wheel, and keep it rolling back and forth
betwixt Dan and Beersheba, and grant it no rest this side of Jordan.
This inconvenience was now to be remedied. Congress was hereafter to
have a federal police force at its disposal, and was never more to be
reduced to the humiliation of a fruitless appeal to the protecting arm
of a state government, as at Philadelphia in the summer of 1783.
Furthermore, the Continental Congress had of late years commanded so
little respect, and had offered so few temptations to able men in quest
of political distinction, that its meetings were often attended by no
more than eight or ten members. It was actually on the point of dying a
natural death through sheer lack of public interest in it. To prevent
any possible continuance of such a disgraceful state of things, it was
agreed that the Federal Congress should be "authorized to compel the
attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties
as each house may provide." Had the political life of the country
continued to go on as under the confederation, it is very doubtful
whether such a provision as this would have remedied the evil. But the
new Federal Congress, drawing its life directly from the people, was
destined to afford far greater opportunities for a political career than
were afforded by the feeble body of delegates which preceded it; and a
penal clause, compelling members to attend its meetings, was hardly
needed under the new circumstances which arose.
Powers denied to the states.
Emphatic condemnation of paper money.
While the powers of the federal government were thus carefully defined,
at the same time several powers were expressly denied to the states. No
state was allowed, without explicit authority from Congress, to lay any
tonnage or custom-house duties, "keep troops or ships of war in time of
peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a
foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent danger as will not admit of delays." The following clause
provided against a recurrence of some of the worst evils which had been
felt under the "league of friendship:" "No state shall enter into any
treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and
reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and
silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder,
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or
grant any title of nobility." Henceforth there was to be no repetition
of such disgraceful scenes as had lately been witnessed in Rhode
Island. So far as the state legislatures were concerned, paper money was
to be ruled out forever. But how was it with the federal government? By
the articles of confederation the United States were allowed to issue
bills of credit, and make them a tender in payment of debts. In the
Federal Convention the committee of detail suggested that this
permission might remain under the new constitution; but the suggestion
was almost unanimously condemned. All the ablest men in the convention
spoke emphatically against it. Gouverneur Morris urged that the federal
government, no less than the state governments, should be expressly
prohibited from issuing bills of credit, or in any wise making its
promissory notes a legal tender. He went over the history of the past
ten years; he called attention to the obstinacy with which the wretched
device had been resorted to again and again, after its evils had been
thrust before everybody's eyes; and he proved himself a true prophet
when he said that if the United States should ever again have a great
war to conduct, people would have forgotten all about these things, and
would call for fresh issues of inconvertible paper, with similar
disastrous results. Now was the time to stop it once for all. "Yes,"
echoed Roger Sherman, "this is the favourable crisis for crushing paper
money." "This is the time," said his colleague, Ellsworth, "to shut and
bar the door against paper money, which can in no case be necessary.
Give the government credit, and other resources will offer. The power
may do harm, never good." There was no way, he added, in which powerful
friends could so soon be gained for the new constitution as by
withholding this power from the government. James Wilson took the same
view. "It will have the most salutary influence on the credit of the
United States," said he, "to remove the possibility of paper money."
"Rather than grant the power to Congress," said John Langdon, "I would
reject the whole plan." "The words which grant this power," said George
Read of Delaware, "if not struck out, will be as alarming as the mark of
the Beast, in the Apocalypse." On none of the subjects that came up for
discussion during that summer was the convention more nearly unanimous
than in its condemnation of paper money. The only delegate who ventured
to speak in its favour was Mercer of Maryland. What Hamilton would have
said, if he had been present that day, we may judge from his vigorous
words published some time before. The power to emit an inconvertible
paper as a sign of value ought never hereafter to be used; for in its
very nature, said he, it is "pregnant with abuses, and liable to be made
the engine of imposition and fraud, holding out temptations equally
pernicious to the integrity of government and to the morals of the
people." Paterson called it "sanctifying iniquity by law." The same
views were entertained by Washington and Madison. There were a few
delegates, however, who thought it unsafe to fetter Congress absolutely.
To use Luther Martin's expression, they did not set themselves up to be
"wise beyond every event." George Mason said he "had a mortal hatred to
paper money, yet, as he could not foresee all emergencies, he was
unwilling to tie the hands of the legislature. The late war," he
thought, "could not have been carried on had such a prohibition
existed." Randolph spoke to the same effect. It was finally decided, by
the vote of nine states against New Jersey and Maryland, that the power
to issue inconvertible paper should not be granted to the federal
government. An express prohibition, such as had been adopted for the
separate states, was thought unnecessary. It was supposed that it was
enough to withhold the power, since the federal government would not
venture to exercise it unless expressly permitted in the Constitution.
"Thus," says Madison, in his narrative of the proceedings, "the pretext
for a paper currency, and particularly for making the bills a tender,
either for public or private debts, was cut off." Nothing could be more
clearly expressed than this. As Mr. Justice Field observes, in his able
dissenting opinion in the recent case of Juilliard vs. Greenman, "if
there be anything in the history of the Constitution which can be
established with moral certainty, it is that the framers of that
instrument intended to prohibit the issue of legal-tender notes both by
the general government and by the states, and thus prevent interference
with the contracts of private parties." Such has been the opinion of our
ablest constitutional jurists, Marshall, Webster, Story, Curtis, and
Nelson. There can be little doubt that, according to all sound
principles of interpretation, the Legal Tender Act of 1862 was passed in
flagrant violation of the Constitution. Could Ellsworth and Morris,
Langdon and Madison, have foreseen the possibility of such extraordinary
judgments as have lately emanated from the Supreme Court of the United
States, they would doubtless have insisted upon the express prohibition,
instead of leaving it to posterity to root out the plague, as it will
apparently some time have to do, by the cumbrous process of an amendment
to the Constitution.
The work of the convention, as thus far considered, related to the
legislative department of the new government. While these discussions
were going on, much attention had been paid, from time to time, to the
characteristics of the proposed federal executive. The debates on this
question, though long kept up, were far less acrimonious than the
debates on representation and the power of Congress over trade, because
here there was no obvious clashing of local interests. But for this very
reason the convention had no longer so clear a chart to steer by. On the
question of the slave-trade, the Pinckneys knew accurately just what
South Carolina wanted, how much it would do to claim, and how far it
would be necessary to yield. As to the regulation of commerce by a bare
majority of votes in Congress, King and Sherman on the one hand, Mason
and Randolph on the other, were able to pursue a thoroughly definite
course of action in behalf of what were supposed to be the special
interests of New England or of Virginia. Consequently, the debates kept
close to the point; the controversy was keen, and sometimes, as we have
seen, angry.
Debates as to the federal executive.
It was very different with the question as to the federal executive.
Upon this point the discussions were guided rather by general
speculations as to what would be most likely to work well, and
accordingly they wandered far and wide. Some of the delegates seemed to
think we should sooner or later come to adopt a hereditary monarchy, and
that the chief thing to be done was to postpone the event as long as
possible. Many wild ideas were broached: such, for example, as a
triple-headed executive, to represent the eastern, middle, and southern
states, somewhat as associated Roman emperors at times administered
affairs in the different portions of an undivided empire. The Virginia
plan had not stated whether its proposed executive was to be single or
plural, because the Virginia delegates could not agree. Madison wished
it to be single, to insure greater efficiency, but to Randolph and Mason
a tyranny seemed to lurk in such an arrangement. When James Wilson and
Charles Pinckney suggested that the executive power should be intrusted
into the hands of one man, a profound silence fell upon the convention.
No one spoke for several minutes, until Washington, from the chair,
asked if he should put the question. Franklin then got up, and said it
was an interesting subject, and he should like to hear what the members
had to say; and so the ball was set rolling. Rutledge said there was no
need of their being so shy. A man might frankly express his opinions,
and afterwards change them if he saw good reason for so doing. For his
part, he was in favour of vesting the executive power in a single
person, to secure efficiency of administration and concentration of
responsibility; but he would not give him the power to declare war and
make peace. Sherman then made the far-reaching suggestion, that the
executive magistracy was really "nothing more than an institution for
carrying the will of the legislature into effect; that the person or
persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the legislature
only, which was the depository of the supreme will of the society. As
they were the best judges of the business which ought to be done by the
executive department, ... he wished the number might not be fixed, but
that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more, as
experience might dictate." It would greatly have astonished the
convention had they been told that this suggestion of Sherman's was a
move in the very same line of development which the British government
had been following for more than half a century; yet such, as we shall
presently see, was the case. Had this point been understood then as we
understand it now, the proceedings of the convention could not have
failed to be profoundly affected by it. As it was, the suggestion did
not receive due attention, and the stream of discussion was turned into
a very different channel. Wilson argued powerfully in favour of a single
chief magistrate, and this view finally prevailed.
There should be a president, but how should he be elected.
After it had been decided that there should be one man set in so high a
position, there was endless discussion as to whether he should be
elected by the people or by Congress, and whether he should serve for
one, or two, or three, or four, or ten, or fifteen years. "Better call
it twenty," said Rufus King, sarcastically; "it is the average reign of
princes." Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris would have had him chosen for
life, subject to removal for misbehaviour; but the preference for a
short term of service was soon manifest. As to the method of election,
opinions oscillated back and forth for several weeks. Wilson said "he
was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place,
being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say,
however, at least, that in theory he was for an election by the people.
Experience, particularly in New York and Massachusetts, showed that an
election of the first magistrate by the people at large was both a
convenient and a successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases
must be persons whose merits have general notoriety." Mason, Rutledge,
and Strong agreed with Sherman that the executive should be chosen by
the legislature; but Washington, Madison, Gerry, and Gouverneur Morris
strongly disapproved of this. Morris argued that an election by the
national legislature would be the work of intrigue and corruption, like
the election of the king of Poland by a diet of nobles; but Mason
declared, on the other hand, that "to refer the choice of a proper
character for a chief magistrate to the people would be as unnatural as
to refer a trial of colours to a blind man." A decision was first
reached against an election by Congress, because it was thought that if
the chief magistrate should prove himself thoroughly competent he ought
to be reëligible; but if reëligible he would be exposed to the
temptation of truckling to the most powerful party or cabal in Congress,
in order to secure his reëlection. It did not occur to any one to
suggest that under ordinary circumstances the executive ought to follow
the policy of the most powerful party in Congress, and that he might at
the same time preserve all needful independence by being clothed with
the power of dissolving Congress and making an appeal to the people in a
new election. It is interesting to consider what might have come of such
a suggestion, following upon the heels of that made by Roger Sherman. As
we shall presently see, it would have immeasurably simplified the
machinery of our government, besides making the executive what it ought
to be, the arm of the legislature, instead of a separate and coördinate
power. Upon this point the minds of nearly all the members were so far
under the sway of an incorrect theory that such an idea occurred to none
of them. It was decided that the chief magistrate ought to be
reëligible, and therefore should not be elected by Congress.
Suggestion of an electoral college.
An immediate choice by the people, however, did not meet with general
favour. To obviate the difficulty, Ellsworth and King suggested the
device of an electoral college, in which the electors should be chosen
by the state legislatures, and should hold a meeting at the federal city
for the sole purpose of deciding upon a chief magistrate. It was then
objected that it would be difficult to find competent men who would be
willing to undertake a long journey simply for such a purpose. The
objection was felt to be a very grave one, and so the convention
returned to the plan of an election by Congress, and again confronted
the difficulty of the chief magistrate's intriguing to secure his
reëlection. Wilson thought to do away with this difficulty by
introducing the element of blind chance, as in some of the states of
ancient Greece, and choosing the executive by a board of electors taken
from Congress by lot; but the suggestion found little support. Dickinson
thought it would be well if the people of each state were to choose its
best citizen,—in modern parlance, its "favourite son;" then out of
these thirteen names a chief magistrate might be chosen, either by
Congress or by a special board of electors. At length, on the 26th of
July, at the motion of Mason, the convention resolved that there should
be a national executive, to consist of a single person, to be chosen by
the national legislature for the term of seven years, and to be
ineligible for a second term. He was to be styled President of the
United States of America.
This decision remained until the very end of August, when the whole
question was reopened by a motion of Rutledge that the two houses of
Congress, in electing the president, should proceed by "joint ballot."
The object of this motion was to prevent either house from exerting a
negative on the choice of the other. It was carried in spite of the
opposition of some of the smaller states, which might hope to exercise a
greater relative influence upon the choice of presidents, if the Senate
were to vote separately. At this point the fears of Gouverneur Morris,
that an election by Congress would result in boundless intrigue, were
revived; and in a powerful speech he persuaded the convention to return
to the device of the electoral college, which might be made equal in
number and similar in composition to the two houses of Congress sitting
together. It need not be required of the electors, after all, that they
should make a long journey to the seat of the federal government. They
might meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two
persons, one of whom must be an inhabitant of a different state. By this
provision it was hoped to diminish the chances for extreme sectional
partiality. A list of these votes might be sent under seal to the
presiding officer of the Senate, to be counted. Should no candidate turn
out to have a majority of the votes, the Senate might choose a president
from the five highest candidates on the list. The candidate having the
next highest number of votes might be declared vice-president, and
preserve the visible continuity of the government in case of the death
of the president during his term of office. By these changes the method
of electing the president, as finally decided upon, was nearly
completed. But Mason, Randolph, Gerry, King, and Wilson were not
satisfied with the provision that the Senate might choose the president
in case of a failure of choice on the part of the electoral college:
they preferred to give this power to the House of Representatives. It
was thought that the Senate would be likely to prove an aristocratic
body, somewhat removed from the people in its sympathies, and there was
a dread of intrusting to it too many important functions. Mason thought
that the sway of an aristocracy would be worse than an absolute
monarchy; and if the Senate might every now and then elect the
president, there would be a risk that the dignity of his office might
degenerate, until he should become a mere creature of the Senate. On the
other hand, the small states, in order to have an equal voice with the
large ones, in such an emergency as the failure of choice by the
electoral college, wished to keep the eventual choice in the hands of
the Senate. Among the delegates from the small states, only Langdon and
Dickinson at first supported the change, and only New Hampshire voted
for it. At length Sherman proposed a compromise, which was carried. It
was agreed that the eventual choice should be given to the House of
Representatives, and not to the Senate, but that in exercising this
function the vote in the House of Representatives should be taken by
states. Thus the humours of the delegates from the small states, and of
those who dreaded the accumulation of powers into the hands of an
oligarchy, were alike gratified. This arrangement was finally adopted by
the votes of ten states against Delaware.
But in spite of all the minute and anxious care that was taken in
guarding this point, the contingency of an election being thus thrown
into the hands of the national legislature was not regarded as likely
often to occur. In point of fact, it has hitherto happened only twice in
the century, in the elections of 1800 and of 1824. It was recognized
that the work would ordinarily be done through the machinery of the
electoral college, and that thus the fear of intrigue between the
president and Congress, as it had originally been felt by the
convention, might be set aside. To make assurance doubly sure, it was
provided that "no person shall be appointed an elector who is a member
of the legislature of the United States, or who holds any office of
profit or trust under the United States." It then appeared that the
arguments which had been alleged against the eligibility of the
president for a second term had lost their force; and he was accordingly
made reëligible, while his term of service was reduced from seven years
to four.
How to count the votes.
The scheme had thus arrived substantially at its present shape, except
that the counting of the electoral vote still remained in the hands of
the Senate. On the 6th of September this provision was altered, and it
was decided that "the president of the Senate shall, in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, open all the certificates,
and the votes shall then be counted." The object of this provision was
to take the office of counting away from the Senate alone, and give it
to Congress as a whole; and while doing so, to guard against the failure
of an election through the disagreement of the two houses. The method of
counting was not prescribed, for it was thought that it might safely be
left to joint rules established by the two houses of Congress
themselves, after analogies supplied by the experience of the several
state legislatures. The case of double returns, sent in by rival
governments in the same state, was not contemplated by the convention;
and thus the door was left open for a danger considerably greater than
many of those over which the delegates were agitated. It may safely be
said, however, that not even the wildest license of interpretation can
find any support for the ridiculous doctrine suggested by some persons
blinded by political passion in 1877, that the business of counting the
votes and deciding upon the validity of returns belongs to the president
of the Senate. No such idea was for a moment entertained by the
convention. Any such idea is completely negatived by their action of the
6th of September. The express purpose of the final arrangement made on
that day was to admit the House of Representatives to active
participation in the office of determining who should have been elected
president. It was expressly declared that this work was too important to
be left to the Senate alone. What, then, would the convention have said
to the preposterous notion that this work might safely be left to the
presiding officer of the Senate? The convention were keenly alive to any
imaginable grant of authority that might enable the Senate to grow into
an oligarchy. What would they have said to the proposal to create a
monocrat ad hoc, an official permanently endowed by virtue of his
office with the function of king-maker?
The convention foresaw imaginary dangers, but not the real
ones.
In this connection it is worth our while to observe that in no respect
has the actual working of the Constitution departed so far from the
intentions of its framers as in the case of their provisions concerning
the executive. Against a host of possible dangers they guarded most
elaborately, but the dangers and inconveniences against which we have
actually had to contend they did not foresee. It will be observed that
Wilson's proposal for a direct election of the president by the people
found little favour in the convention. The schemes that were seriously
considered oscillated back and forth between an election by the national
legislature and an election by a special college of electors. The
electors might be chosen by a popular vote, or by the state
legislatures, or in any such wise as each state might see fit to
determine for itself. In point of fact, electors were chosen by the
legislature in New Jersey till 1816; in Connecticut till 1820; in New
York, Delaware, and Vermont, and with one exception in Georgia, till
1824; in South Carolina till 1868. Massachusetts adopted various plans,
and did not finally settle down to an election by the people until 1828.
Now there were several reasons why the Federal Convention was afraid to
trust the choice of the president directly to the people. One was that
very old objection, the fear of the machinations of demagogues, since
people were supposed to be so easily fooled. As already observed, the
democratic sentiment in the convention was such as we should now call
weak. Another reason shows vividly how wide the world seemed in those
days of slow coaches and mail-bags carried on horseback. It was feared
that people would not have sufficient data wherewith to judge of the
merits of public men in states remote from their own. The electors, as
eminent men exceptionally well informed, and screened from the sophisms
of demagogues, might hold little conventions and select the best
possible candidates, using in every case their own unfettered judgment.
In this connection the words of Hamilton are worth quoting. In the
sixty-eighth number of the "Federalist" he says: "The mode of
appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States is almost the
only part of the system which has escaped without severe censure, or
which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents.
The most plausible of these who has appeared in print has even deigned
to admit that the election of the president is well guarded.... It was
desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of
the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided.... It was
equally desirable that the immediate election should be made by men
capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting
under circumstances favourable to deliberation and to a judicious
combination of all the reasons and inducements that were proper to
govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their
fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess
the information and discernment requisite to so complicated an
investigation.... It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little
opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least
to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate who was to have so
important an agency in the administration of the government."
Actual working of the electoral scheme.
Such was the theory as set forth by a thinker endowed with rare ability
to follow out in imagination the results of any course of political
action. It is needless to say that the actual working of the scheme has
been very different from what was expected. In our very first great
struggle of parties, in 1800, the electors divided upon party lines,
with little heed to the "complicated investigation" for which they were
supposed to be chosen. Quite naturally, for the work of electing a
candidate presupposes a state of mind very different from that of serene
deliberation. In 1800 the electors acted simply as automata recording
the victory of their party, and so it has been ever since. In our own
time presidents and vice-presidents are nominated, not without elaborate
intrigue, by special conventions quite unknown to the Constitution; the
people cast their votes for the two or three pairs of candidates thus
presented, and the electoral college simply registers the results. The
system is thus fully exposed to all the dangers which our forefathers
dreaded from the frequent election of a chief magistrate by the people.
Owing to the great good-sense and good-nature of the American people,
the system does not work so badly as might be expected. It has, indeed,
worked immeasurably better than any one would have ventured to predict.
It is nevertheless open to grave objections. It compels a change of
administration at stated astronomical periods, whether any change of
policy is called for or not; it stirs up the whole country every fourth
year with a furious excitement that is often largely factitious; and
twice within the century, in 1801 and again in 1877, it has brought us
to the verge of the most foolish and hopeless species of civil war, in
view of that thoroughly monarchical kind of accident, a disputed
succession.[8]
The convention supposed itself to be copying from the British
Constitution.
The most curious and instructive point concerning the peculiar executive
devised for the United States by the Federal Convention is the fact that
the delegates proceeded upon a thoroughly false theory of what they were
doing. As already observed, in this part of its discussions the
convention had not the clearly outlined chart of local interests to
steer by. It indulged in general speculations and looked about for
precedents; and there was one precedent which American statesmen then
always had before their eyes, whether they were distinctly aware of it
or not. In creating an executive department, the members of the
convention were really trying to copy the only constitution of which
they had any direct experience, and which most of them agreed in
thinking the most efficient working constitution in existence,—as
indeed it was. They were trying to copy the British Constitution,
modifying it to suit their republican ideas: but curiously enough, what
they copied in creating the office of president was not the real English
executive or prime minister, but the fictitious English executive, the
sovereign. And this was associated in their minds with another profound
misconception, which influenced all this part of their work. They
thought that to keep the legislative and executive offices distinct and
separate was the very palladium of liberty; and they all took it for
granted, without a moment's question, that the British Constitution did
this thing. England, they thought, is governed by King, Lords, and
Commons, and the supreme power is nicely divided between the three, so
that neither one can get the whole of it, and that is the safeguard of
English liberty. So they arranged President, Senate, and Representatives
to correspond, and sedulously sought to divide supreme power between the
three, so that they might operate as checks upon each other. If either
one should ever succeed in acquiring the whole sovereignty, then they
thought there would be an end of American liberty.
Influence of Montesquieu and Blackstone.
Now in the earlier part of the work of the Federal Convention, in
dealing with the legislative department, the delegates were on firm
ground, because they were dealing with things of which they knew
something by experience; but in all this careful separation of the
executive power from the legislative they went wide of the mark, because
they were following a theory which did not truly describe things as they
really existed. And that was because the English Constitution was, and
still is, covered up with a thick husk of legal fictions which long ago
ceased to have any vitality. Blackstone, the great authority of the
eighteenth century, set forth this theory of the division of power
between King, Lords, and Commons with clearness and force, and nobody
then understood English history minutely or thoroughly enough to see its
fallaciousness. Montesquieu also, the ablest and most elegant political
writer of the age, with whose works most of the statesmen in the Federal
Convention were familiar, gave a similar description of the English
Constitution, and generalized from it as the ideal constitution for a
free people. But Montesquieu and Blackstone, in their treatment of this
point, had their eyes upon the legal fictions, and were blind to the
real machinery which was working under them. They gave elegant
expression to what the late Mr. Bagehot called the "literary theory" of
the English Constitution. But the real thing differed essentially from
the "literary theory" even in their day. In our own time the divergence
has become so conspicuous that it would not now be possible for
well-informed writers to make the mistake of Montesquieu and Blackstone.
In our time it has come to be perfectly obvious that so far from the
English Constitution separating the executive power from the
legislative, this is precisely what it does not do. In Great Britain the
supreme power is all lodged in a single body, the House of Commons. The
sovereign has come to be purely a legal fiction, and the House of Lords
maintains itself only by submitting to the Commons. The House of Commons
is absolutely supreme, and, as we shall presently see, it really both
appoints and dismisses the executive. The English executive, or chief
magistrate, is ordinarily the first lord of the treasury, and is
commonly styled the prime minister. He is chairman of the most
important committee of the House of Commons, and his cabinet consists of
the chairmen of other committees.
What our government would be if it were really like that of
Great Britain.
To make this perfectly clear, let us see what our machinery of
government would be, if it were really like the English. The presence or
absence of the crowned head makes no essential difference; it is only a
kind of ornamental cupola. Suppose for a moment the presidency
abolished, or reduced to the political nullity of the crown in England;
and postpone for a moment the consideration of the Senate. Suppose that
in our House of Representatives the committee of ways and means had two
chairmen,—an upper chairman who looks after all sorts of business, and
a lower chairman who attends especially to the finances. This upper
chairman, we will say, corresponds to the first lord of the treasury,
while the lower one corresponds to the chancellor of the exchequer.
Sometimes, when the upper chairman is a great financier, and capable of
enormous labour, he will fill both places at once, as Mr. Gladstone was
lately first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer. The
chairmen of the other committees on foreign, military, and naval affairs
will answer to the English secretaries of state for foreign affairs and
for war, the first lord of the admiralty, and so on. This group of
chairmen, headed by the upper chairman of the ways and means, will then
answer to the English cabinet, with its prime minister. To complete the
parallel, let us suppose that, after a new House of Representatives is
elected, it chooses this prime minister, and he appoints the other
chairmen who are to make up his cabinet. Suppose, too, that he initiates
all legislation, and executes all laws, and stays in office three weeks
or thirty years, or as long as he can get a majority of the house to
vote for his measures. If he loses his majority, he can either resign or
dissolve the house, and order a new election, thus appealing directly to
the people. If the new house gives him a majority, he stays in office;
if it shows a majority against him, he steps down into the house, and
becomes, perhaps, the leader of the opposition.
Now if this were the form of our government, it would correspond in all
essential features to that of England. The likeness is liable to be
obscured by the fact that in England it is the queen who is supposed to
appoint the prime minister; but that is simply a part of the antiquated
"literary theory" of the English Constitution. In reality the queen only
acts as mistress of the ceremonies. Whatever she may wish, the prime
minister must be the man who can command the best working majority in
the house. This is not only tested by the first vote that is taken, but
it is almost invariably known beforehand so well that if the queen
offers the place to the wrong man he refuses to take it. Should he be so
foolish as to take it, he is sure to be overthrown at the first test
vote, and then the right man comes in. Thus in 1880 the queen's manifest
preference for Lord Granville or Lord Hartington made no sort of
difference. Mr. Gladstone was as much chosen by the House of Commons as
if the members had sat in their seats and balloted for him. If the crown
were to be abolished to-morrow, and the house were henceforth, on the
resignation of a prime minister, to elect a new one to serve as long as
he could command a majority, it would not be doing essentially otherwise
than it does now. The house then dismisses its minister when it rejects
one of his important measures. But while thus appointed and dismissed by
the house, he is in no wise its slave; for by the power of dissolution
he has the right to appeal to the country, and let the general election
decide the issue. The obvious advantages of this system are that it
makes anything like a deadlock between the legislature and the executive
impossible; and it insures a concentration of responsibility. The prime
minister's bills cannot be disregarded, like the president's messages;
and thus, too, the house is kept in hand, and cannot degenerate into a
debating club.[9]
In the British government, the executive department is not
separated from the legislative.
A system so delicate and subtle, yet so strong and efficient, as this
could no more have been invented by the wisest of statesmen than a
chemist could make albumen by taking its elements and mixing them
together. In its practical working it is a much simpler system than
ours, and still its principal features are not such as would be likely
to occur to men who had not had some actual experience of them. It is
the peculiar outgrowth of English history. As we can now see, its chief
characteristic is its not separating the executive power from the
legislative. As a member of Parliament, the prime minister introduces
the legislation which he is himself expected to carry into effect. Nor
does the English system even keep the judiciary entirely separate, for
the lord chancellor not only presides over the House of Lords, but sits
in the cabinet as the prime minister's legal adviser. It is somewhat as
if the chief justice of the United States were ex officio president of
the Senate and attorney-general; though here the resemblance is somewhat
superficial. Our Senate, although it does not represent landed
aristocracy or the church, but the federal character of our government,
has still a superficial resemblance to the House of Lords. It passes on
all bills that come up from the lower house, and can originate bills on
most matters, but not for raising revenue. Its function as a high court
of impeachment, with the chief justice for its presiding officer, was
directly copied from the House of Lords. But here the resemblance ends.
The House of Lords has no such veto upon the House of Commons as our
Senate has upon the House of Representatives. Between our upper and
lower houses a serious deadlock is possible; but the House of Lords can
only reject a bill until it sees that the House of Commons is determined
to have it carried. It can only enter a protest. If it is obstinate and
tries to do more, the House of Commons, through its prime minister, can
create enough new peers to change the vote,—a power so formidable in
its effects upon the social position of the peerage that it does not
need to be used. The knowledge that it exists is enough to bring the
House of Lords to terms.
Circumstances which obscured the true aspect of the case a
century ago.
These features of the English Constitution are so prominent since the
reform of Parliament in 1832 as to be generally recognized. They have
been gradually becoming its essential features ever since the Revolution
of 1688. Before that time the crown had really been the executive, and
there had really been a separation between the executive and legislative
branches of the government, which on several occasions, and notably in
the middle of the seventeenth century, had led to armed strife. What the
Revolution of 1688 really decided was that henceforth in England the
executive was to be the mighty arm of the legislature, and not a
separate and rival power. It ended whatever of reality there was in the
old system of King, Lords, and Commons, and by the time of Sir Robert
Walpole the system of cabinet government had become fairly established;
but men still continued to use the phrases and formulas bequeathed from
former ages, so that the meaning of the changes going on under their
very eyes was obscured. There was also a great historical incident,
after Walpole's time, which served further to obscure the meaning of
these changes, especially to Americans. From 1760 to 1784, by means of
the rotten borough system of elections and the peculiar attitude of
political parties, the king contrived to make his will felt in the
House of Commons to such an extent that it became possible to speak of
the personal government of George III. The work of the Revolution of
1688 was not really completed till the election of 1784 which made Pitt
the ruler of England, and its fruits cannot be said to have been fully
secured till 1832. Now as our Revolutionary War was brought on by the
attempts of George III. to establish his personal government, and as it
was actually he rather than Lord North who ruled England during that
war, it was not strange that Americans, even of the highest education,
should have failed to discover the transformation which the past century
had wrought in the framework of the English government. Nay, more,
during this century the king had seemed even more of a real institution
to the Americans than to the British. He had seemed to them the only
link which bound the different parts of the empire together. Throughout
the struggles which culminated in the War of Independence, it had been
the favourite American theory that while the colonial assemblies and the
British Parliament were sovereign each in its own sphere, all alike owed
allegiance to the king as visible head of the empire. To people who had
been in the habit of setting forth and defending such a theory, it was
impossible that the crown should seem so much a legal fiction as it had
really come to be in England. It is very instructive to note that while
the members of the Federal Convention thoroughly understood the
antiquated theory of the English Constitution as set forth by
Blackstone, they drew very few illustrations from the modern working of
Parliament, with which they had not had sufficient opportunities of
becoming familiar. In particular they seemed quite unconscious of the
vast significance of a dissolution of Parliament, although a dissolution
had occurred only three years before under such circumstances as to work
a revolution in British politics without a breath of disturbance. The
only sort of dissolution with which they were familiar was that in which
Dunmore or Bernard used to send the colonial assemblies home about their
business whenever they grew too refractory. Had the significance of a
dissolution, in the British sense, been understood by the convention,
the pregnant suggestion of Roger Sherman, above mentioned, could not
have failed to give a different turn to the whole series of debates on
the executive branch of the government. Had our Constitution been framed
a few years later, this point would have had a better chance of being
understood. As it was, in trying to modify the English system so as to
adapt it to our own uses, it was the archaic monarchical feature, and
not the modern ministerial feature, upon which we seized. The president,
in our system, irremovable by the national legislature, does not answer
to the modern prime minister, but to the old-fashioned king, with powers
for mischief curtailed by election for short terms.
The American cabinet is analogous not to the British cabinet,
but to the privy council.
The close parallelism between the office of president and that of king
in the minds of the framers of the Constitution was instructively shown
in the debates on the advisableness of restraining the president's
action by a privy council. Gerry and Sherman urged that there was need
of such a council, in order to keep watch over the president. It was
suggested that the privy council should consist of "the president of the
Senate, the speaker of the House of Representatives, the chief justice
of the supreme court, and the principal officer in each of five
departments as they shall from time to time be established; their duty
shall be to advise him in matters which he shall lay before them, but
their advice shall not conclude him, or affect his responsibility." The
plan for such a council found favour with Franklin, Madison, Wilson,
Dickinson, and Mason, but did not satisfy the convention. When it was
voted down Mason used strong language. "In rejecting a council to the
president," said he, "we are about to try an experiment on which the
most despotic government has never ventured; the Grand Seignior himself
has his Divan." It was this failure to provide a council which led the
convention to give to the Senate a share in some of the executive
functions of the president, such as the making of treaties, the
appointment of ambassadors, consuls, judges of the supreme court, and
other officers of the United States whose appointment was not otherwise
provided for. As it was objected to the office of vice-president that he
seemed to have nothing provided for him to do, he was disposed of by
making him president of the Senate. No cabinet was created by the
Constitution, but since then the heads of various executive departments,
appointed by the president, have come to constitute what is called his
cabinet. Since, however, the members of it do not belong to Congress,
and can neither initiate nor guide legislation, they really constitute a
privy council rather than a cabinet in the modern sense, thus furnishing
another illustration of the analogy between the president and the
archaic sovereign.
The federal judiciary.
Concerning the structure of the federal judiciary little need be said
here. It was framed with very little disagreement among the delegates.
The work was chiefly done in committee by Ellsworth, Wilson, Randolph,
and Rutledge, and the result did not differ essentially from the scheme
laid down in the Virginia plan. It was indeed the indispensable
completion of the work which was begun by the creation of a national
House of Representatives. To make a federal government immediately
operative upon individual citizens, it must of course be armed with
federal courts to try and federal officers to execute judgment in all
cases in which individual citizens were amenable to the national law.
But for this system of United States courts extended throughout the
states and supreme within its own sphere, the federal constitution could
never have been put into practical working order. In another respect the
federal judiciary was the most remarkable and original of all the
creations of that wonderful convention. It was charged with the duty of
interpreting, in accordance with the general principles of common law,
the Federal Constitution itself. This is the most noble as it is the
most distinctive feature in the government of the United States. It
constitutes a difference between the American and British systems more
fundamental than the separation of the executive from the legislative
department. In Great Britain the unwritten constitution is administered
by the omnipotent House of Commons; whatever statute is enacted by
Parliament must stand until some future Parliament may see fit to repeal
it. But an act passed by both houses of Congress, and signed by the
president, may still be set aside as unconstitutional by the supreme
court of the United States in its judgments upon individual cases
brought before it. It was thus that the practical working of our Federal
Constitution during the first thirty years of the nineteenth century was
swayed to so great an extent by the profound and luminous decisions of
Chief Justice Marshall, that he must be assigned a foremost place among
the founders of our Federal Union. This intrusting to the judiciary the
whole interpretation of the fundamental instrument of government is the
most peculiarly American feature of the work done by the convention, and
to the stability of such a federation as ours, covering as it does the
greater part of a huge continent, it was absolutely indispensable.
Thus, at length, was realized the sublime conception of a nation in
which every citizen lives under two complete and well-rounded systems of
laws,—the state law and the federal law,—each with its legislature,
its executive, and its judiciary moving one within the other,
noiselessly and without friction. It was one of the longest reaches of
constructive statesmanship ever known in the world. There never was
anything quite like it before, and in Europe it needs much explanation
to-day even for educated statesmen who have never seen its workings. Yet
to Americans it has become so much a matter of course that they, too,
sometimes need to be told how much it signifies. In 1787 it was the
substitution of law for violence between states that were partly
sovereign. In some future still grander convention we trust the same
thing will be done between states that have been wholly sovereign,
whereby peace may gain and violence be diminished over other lands than
this which has set the example.
Great as was the work which the Federal Convention had now accomplished,
none of the members supposed it to be complete. After some discussion,
it was decided that Congress might at any time, by a two thirds vote in
both houses, propose amendments to the constitution, or on the
application of the legislatures of two thirds of the states might call a
convention for proposing amendments; and such amendments should become
part of the constitution as soon as ratified by three fourths of the
states, either through their legislatures or through special conventions
summoned for the purpose. The design of this elaborate arrangement was
to guard against hasty or ill-considered changes in the fundamental
instrument of government; and its effectiveness has been such that an
amendment has come to be impossible save as the result of intense
conviction on the part of a vast majority of the whole American people.
Finally it was decided that the Federal Constitution, as now completed,
should be presented to the Continental Congress, and then referred to
special conventions in all the states for ratification; and that when
nine states, or two thirds of the whole number, should have ratified, it
should at once go into operation as between such ratifying states.
Signing the Constitution.
When the great document was at last drafted by Gouverneur Morris, and
was all ready for the signatures, the aged Franklin produced a paper,
which was read for him, as his voice was weak. Some parts of this
Constitution, he said, he did not approve, but he was astonished to find
it so nearly perfect. Whatever opinion he had of its errors he would
sacrifice to the public good, and he hoped that every member of the
convention who still had objections would on this occasion doubt a
little of his own infallibility, and for the sake of unanimity put his
name to this instrument. Hamilton added his plea. A few members, he
said, by refusing to sign, might do infinite mischief. No man's ideas
could be more remote from the plan than his were known to be; but was it
possible for a true patriot to deliberate between anarchy and
convulsion, on the one side, and the chance of good to be expected from
this plan, on the other? From these appeals, as well as from
Washington's solemn warning at the outset, we see how distinctly it was
realized that the country was on the verge of civil war. Most of the
members felt so, but to some the new government seemed far too strong,
and there were three who dreaded despotism even more than anarchy.
Mason, Randolph, and Gerry refused to sign, though Randolph sought to
qualify his refusal by explaining that he could not yet make up his
mind whether to oppose or defend the Constitution, when it should be
laid before the people of Virginia. He wished to reserve to himself full
liberty of action in the matter. That Mason and Gerry, valuable as their
services had been in the making of the Constitution, would now go home
and vigorously oppose it, there was no doubt. Of the delegates who were
present on the last day of the convention, all but these three signed
the Constitution. In the signatures the twelve states which had taken
part in the work were all represented, Hamilton signing alone for New
York.
Thus after four months of anxious toil, through the whole of a scorching
Philadelphia summer, after earnest but sometimes bitter discussion, in
which more than once the meeting had seemed on the point of breaking up,
a colossal work had at last been accomplished, the results of which were
most powerfully to affect the whole future career of the human race so
long as it shall dwell upon the earth. In spite of the high-wrought
intensity of feeling which had been now and then displayed, grave
decorum had ruled the proceedings; and now, though few were really
satisfied, the approach to unanimity was remarkable. When all was over,
it is said that many of the members seemed awe-struck. Washington sat
with head bowed in solemn meditation. The scene was ended by a
characteristic bit of homely pleasantry from Franklin. Thirty-three
years ago, in the days of George II., before the first mutterings of the
Revolution had been heard, and when the French dominion in America was
still untouched, before the banishment of the Acadians or the rout of
Braddock, while Washington was still surveying lands in the wilderness,
while Madison was playing in the nursery and Hamilton was not yet born,
Franklin had endeavoured to bring together the thirteen colonies in a
federal union. Of the famous Albany plan of 1754, the first complete
outline of a federal constitution for America that ever was made, he was
the principal if not the sole author. When he signed his name to the
Declaration of Independence in this very room, his years had rounded the
full period of threescore and ten. Eleven years more had passed, and he
had been spared to see the noble aim of his life accomplished. There was
still, no doubt, a chance of failure, but hope now reigned in the old
man's breast. On the back of the president's quaint black armchair there
was emblazoned a half-sun, brilliant with its gilded rays. As the
meeting was breaking up and Washington arose, Franklin pointed to the
chair, and made it the text for prophecy. "As I have been sitting here
all these weeks," said he, "I have often wondered whether yonder sun is
rising or setting. But now I know that it is a rising sun!"