Proclamation of Andrew Jackson, President of the United States.
Whereas, a convention assembled in the State of South Carolina have passed
an ordinance, by which they declare “That the several acts and parts of
acts of the congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the
imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities,
and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, and
more especially,” two acts for the same purposes passed on the 29th of
May, 1828, and on the 14th of July, 1832, “are unauthorized by the
constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent
thereof, and are null and void, and no law,” nor binding on the citizens
of that State or its officers: and by the said ordinance, it is further
declared to be unlawful for any of the constituted authorities of the
State or of the United States to enforce the payment of the duties imposed
by the said acts within the same State, and that it is the duty of the
Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to give full effect to
the said ordinance:
And Whereas, By the said ordinance, it is further ordained that, in no
case of law or equity decided in the courts of said State, wherein shall
be drawn in question the validity of the said ordinance, or of the acts of
the legislature that may be passed to give it effect, or of the said laws
of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of
the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or
allowed for that purpose, and that any person attempting to take such
appeal shall be punished as for a contempt of court:
And, finally, the said ordinance declares that the people of South
Carolina will maintain the said ordinance at every hazard; and that they
will consider the passage of any act, by congress, abolishing or closing
the ports of the said State, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or
egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act of the
Federal Government to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or
harrass her commerce, or to enforce the said acts otherwise than through
the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistant with the longer
continuance of South Carolina in the Union, and that the people of the
said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further
obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the
people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to organize a
separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and
independent States may of right do.
And Whereas, the said ordinance prescribes to the people of South Carolina
a course of conduct in direct violation of their duty as citizens of the
United States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its
constitution, and having for its object the destruction of the Union—that
Union, which, coeval with our political existence, led our fathers,
without any other ties to unite them than those of patriotism and a common
cause, through a sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence—that
sacred Union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy
constitution, has brought us, by the favor of Heaven, to a state of
prosperity at home, and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever,
equalled in the history of nations. To preserve this bond of our political
existence from destruction, to maintain inviolate this state of national
honor and prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fellow citizens
have reposed in me, I, Andrew Jackson, President of the United States,
have thought proper to issue this my PROCLAMATION, stating my views of the
constitution and laws applicable to the measures adopted by the convention
of South Carolina, and to the reasons they have put forth to sustain them,
declaring the course which duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing
to the understanding and patriotism of the people, warn them of the
consequences that must inevitably result from an observance of the
dictates of the convention.
Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the exercise of those
powers with which I am now, or may hereafter be invested, for preserving
the peace of the Union, and for the execution of the laws. But the
imposing aspect which opposition has assumed in this case, by clothing
itself with State authority, and the deep interest which the people of the
United States must all feel in preventing a resort to stronger measures,
while there is a hope that anything will be yielded to reasoning and
remonstrance, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify, a full
exposition to South Carolina and the nation of the views I entertain of
this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the course
which my sense of duty will require me to pursue.
The ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right of resisting acts
which are plainly unconstitutional, and too oppressive to be endured; but
on the strange position that any one State may not only declare an act of
congress void, but prohibit its execution—that they may do this
consistently with the constitution—that the true construction of that
instrument permits a State to retain its place in the Union, and yet be
bound by no other of its laws than those it may choose to consider as
constitutional. It is true, they add, that to justify this abrogation of a
law, it must be palpably contrary to the constitution; but it is evident,
that, to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled
with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is
to give the power of resisting all laws. For, as by the theory, there is
no appeal, the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad must prevail. If
it should be said that public opinion is a sufficient check against the
abuse of this power, it may be asked why it is not deemed a sufficient
guard against the passage of an unconstitutional act by congress? There
is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes the assumed power
of a State more indefensible, and which does not exist in the other. There
are two appeals from an unconstitutional act passed by congress—one to
the judiciary, the other to the people and the States. There is no appeal
from the State decision in theory, and the practical illustration shows
that the courts are closed against an application to review it, both
judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on
this subject is superfluous, when our social compact, in express terms,
declares that the laws of the United States, its constitution, and
treaties made under it, are the supreme law of the land; and, for greater
caution, adds “that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.” And it may be asserted without fear of refutation, that
no federal government could exist without a similar provision. Look for a
moment to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws
unconstitutional, and has a right to prevent their execution in the port
of Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their
collection in every other port, and no revenue could be collected
anywhere; for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat, that
an unconstitutional law is no law, so long as the question of its legality
is to be decided by the State itself; for every law operating injuriously
upon any local interest will be perhaps thought, and certainly
represented, as unconstitutional, and, as has been shown, there is no
appeal.
If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union would
have been dissolved in its infancy. The excise law in Pennsylvania, the
embargo and non-intercourse law in the eastern States, the carriage tax in
Virginia, were all deemed unconstitutional, and were more equal in their
operation than any of the laws now complained of; but fortunately none of
those States discovered that they had the right now claimed by South
Carolina. The war into which we were forced to support the dignity of the
nation and the rights of our citizens, might have ended in defeat and
disgrace instead of victory and honor, if the States who supposed it a
ruinous and unconstitutional measure, had thought they possessed the right
of nullifying the act by which it was declared, and denying supplies for
its prosecution. Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several
members of the Union, to the legislatures of none did this efficient and
peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest itself. The discovery of this
important feature in our constitution was reserved to the present day. To
the statesmen of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the
citizens of that State will unfortunately fall the evils of reducing it to
practice.
If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it
internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our constitutional
history will also afford abundant proof that it would have been repudiated
with indignation, had it been proposed to form a feature in our
Government.
In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we very early
considered ourselves as connected by common interest with each other.
Leagues were formed for common defence, and, before the declaration of
independence, we were known in our aggregate character as the United
Colonies of America. That decisive and important step was taken jointly.
We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts, and when
the terms of our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a
solemn league of several States, by which they agreed that they would
collectively form one nation for the purpose of conducting some certain
domestic concerns and all foreign relations. In the instrument forming
that Union is found an article which declares that “every State shall
abide by the determinations of congress on all questions which, by that
confederation, should be submitted to them.”
Under the confederation, then, no State could legally annul a decision of
the congress, or refuse to submit to its execution; but no provision was
made to enforce these decisions. Congress made requisitions, but they were
not complied with. The government could not operate on individuals. They
had no judiciary, no means of collecting revenue.
But the defects of the confederation need not be detailed. Under its
operation we could scarcely be called a nation. We had neither prosperity
at home nor consideration abroad. This state of things could not be
endured, and our present happy constitution was formed, but formed in
vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was formed for important objects
that are announced in the preamble made in the name and by the authority
of the people of the United States, whose delegates framed, and whose
conventions approved it. The most important among these objects, that
which is placed first in the rank, on which all others rest, is, “to form
a more perfect Union.” Now, is it possible that even if there were no
express provision giving supremacy to the constitution and laws of the
United States over those of the States—can it be conceived, that an
instrument made for the purpose of “forming a more perfect Union” than
that of the confederation, could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom
of our country as to substitute for that confederation a form of
government dependent for its existence on the local interest, the party
spirit of a State, or of a prevailing faction in a State? Every man of
plain, unsophisticated understanding, who hears the question, will give
such an answer as will preserve the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in
pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is
calculated to destroy it.
I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed
by one State, incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted
expressly by the letter of the constitution, unauthorized by its spirit,
inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive
of the great object for which it was formed.
After this general view of the leading principle, we must examine the
particular application of it which is made in the ordinance.
The preamble rests its justification on those grounds: It assumes, as a
fact, that the obnoxious laws, although they purport to be laws for
raising revenue, were in reality intended for the protection of
manufactures, which purpose it asserts to be unconstitutional; that the
operation of these laws is unequal; that the amount raised by them is
greater than is required by the wants of the government; and, finally,
that the proceeds are to be applied to objects unauthorized by the
constitution. These are the only causes alleged to justify an open
opposition to the laws of the country, and a threat of seceding from the
Union, if any attempt should be made to enforce them. The first virtually
acknowledges that the law in question was passed under a power expressly
given by the constitution to lay and collect imposts; but its
constitutionality is drawn in question from the motives of those who
passed it. However apparent this purpose may be in the present case,
nothing can be more dangerous than to admit the position that an
unconstitutional purpose, entertained by the members who assent to a law
enacted under a constitutional power, shall make the law void: for how is
that purpose to be ascertained? Who is to make the scrutiny? How often may
bad purposes be falsely imputed—in how many cases are they concealed by
false professions—in how many is no declaration of motive made? Admit
this doctrine, and you give to the States an uncontrolled right to decide,
and every law may be annulled under this pretext. If, therefore, the
absurd and dangerous doctrine should be admitted, that a State may annul
an unconstitutional law, or one that it deems such, it will not apply to
the present case.
The next objection is, that the laws in question operate unequally. This
objection may be made with truth to every law that has been or can be
passed. The wisdom of man never yet contrived a system of taxation that
would operate with perfect equality. If the unequal operation of a law
makes it unconstitutional, and if all laws of that description may be
abrogated by any State for that cause, then indeed is the Federal
Constitution unworthy of the slightest effort for its preservation. We
have hitherto relied on it as the perpetual bond of our Union. We have
received it as the work of the assembled wisdom of the nation. We have
trusted to it as to the sheet anchor of our safety in the stormy times of
conflict with a foreign or domestic foe. We have looked to it with sacred
awe as the palladium of our liberties, and with all the solemnities of
religion have pledged to each other our lives and fortunes here, and our
hopes of happiness hereafter, in its defence and support. Were we
mistaken, my countrymen, in attaching this importance to the Constitution
of our country? Was our devotion paid to the wretched, inefficient,
clumsy, contrivance which this new doctrine would make it? Did we pledge
ourselves to the support of an airy nothing—a bubble that must be blown
away by the first breath of disaffection? Was this self-destroying,
visionary theory, the work of the profound statesmen, the exalted
patriots, to whom the task of constitutional reform was entrusted? Did the
name of Washington sanction, did the States deliberately ratify such an
anomaly in the history of fundamental legislation? No. We were not
mistaken. The letter of this great instrument is free from this radical
fault; its language directly contradicts the imputation; its spirit—its
evident intent, contradicts it. No, we did not err! Our Constitution does
not contain the absurdity of giving power to make laws, and another power
to resist them. The sages whose memory will always be reverenced, have
given us a practical, and, as they hoped, a permanent constitutional
compact. The Father of his Country did not affix his revered name to so
palpable an absurdity. Nor did the States, when they severally ratified
it, do so under the impression that a veto on the laws of the United
States was reserved to them, or that they could exercise it by
implication. Search the debates in all their Conventions, examine the
speeches of the most zealous opposers of federal authority, look at the
amendments that were proposed—they are all silent—not a syllable
uttered, not a vote given, not a motion made, to correct the explicit
supremacy given to the laws of the Union over those of the States, or to
show that implication, as is now contended, could defeat it. No, we have
not erred! The Constitution is still the object of our reverence, the bond
of our Union, our defence in danger, the source of our prosperity in
peace; it shall descend as we have received it, uncorrupted by sophistical
construction, to our posterity, and the sacrifices of local interest, of
State prejudices, of personal animosities, that were made to bring it into
existence, will again be patriotically offered for its support.
The two remaining objections made by the ordinance to these laws, are that
the sums intended to be raised by them are greater than are required, and
that the proceeds will be unconstitutionally employed.
The Constitution has given, expressly, to Congress the right of raising
revenue, and of determining the sum the public exigencies will require.
The States have no control over the exercise of this right other than that
which results from the power of changing the representatives who abuse it,
and thus procure redress. Congress may, undoubtedly, abuse this
discretionary power; but the same may be said of others with which they
are vested. Yet the discretion must exist somewhere. The Constitution has
given it to the representatives of all the people, checked by the
representatives of the States, and by the Executive power. The South
Carolina construction gives it to the Legislature or the Convention of a
single State, where neither the people of the different States, nor the
States in their separate capacity, nor the Chief Magistrate elected by the
people, have any representation. Which is the most discreet disposition of
the power? I do not ask you, fellow citizens, which is the constitutional
disposition—that instrument speaks a language not to be misunderstood.
But if you were assembled in general Convention, which would you think the
safest depository of this discretionary power in the last resort? Would
you add a clause giving it to each of the States, or would you sanction
the wise provisions already made by your Constitution? If this should be
the result of your deliberations when providing for the future, are you,
can you be ready, to risk all that we hold dear, to establish, for a
temporary and a local purpose, that which you must acknowledge to be
destructive, and even absurd, as a general provision? Carry out the
consequences of this right vested in the different States, and you must
perceive that the crisis your conduct presents at this day would recur
whenever any law of the United States displeased any of the States, and
that we should soon cease to be a nation.
The ordinance, with the same knowledge of the future that characterizes a
former objection, tells you that the proceeds of the tax will be
unconstitutionally applied. If this could be ascertained with certainty,
the objection would, with more propriety, be reserved for the law so
applying the proceeds, but surely cannot be urged against the laws levying
the duty.
These are the allegations contained in the ordinance. Examine them
seriously, my fellow-citizens; judge for yourselves. I appeal to you to
determine whether they are so clear, so convincing, as to leave no doubt
of their correctness; and even if you should come to this conclusion, how
far they justify the reckless, destructive course which you are directed
to pursue. Review these objections, and the conclusions drawn from them,
once more. What are they? Every law, then, for raising revenue, according
to the South Carolina ordinance, may be rightfully annulled, unless it be
so framed as no law ever will or can be framed. Congress have a right to
pass laws for raising a revenue, and each State has a right to oppose
their execution—two rights directly opposed to each other; and yet is
this absurdity supposed to be contained in an instrument drawn for the
express purpose of avoiding collisions between the States and the general
government, by an assembly of the most enlightened statesmen and purest
patriots ever embodied for a similar purpose.
In vain have these sages declared that congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; in vain have they
provided that they shall have power to pass laws, which shall be necessary
and proper to carry those powers into execution; that those laws and that
constitution shall be the “supreme law of the land, and that the judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” In vain have the people of
the several States solemnly sanctioned these provisions, made them their
paramount law, and individually sworn to support them whenever they were
called on to execute any office. Vain provisions! ineffectual
restrictions! vile profanation of oaths! miserable mockery of legislation!
if the bare majority of the voters in any one State may, on a real or
supposed knowledge of the intent with which a law has been passed, declare
themselves free from its operation—say here it gives too little, there
too much, and operates unequally—here it suffers articles to be free that
ought to be taxed—there it taxes those that ought to be free—in this
case the proceeds are intended to be applied to purposes which we do not
approve—in that the amount raised is more than is wanted. Congress, it is
true, are invested by the constitution with the right of deciding these
questions according to their sound discretion; congress is composed of the
representatives of all the States, and of all the people of all the
States; but we, part of the people of one State, to whom the constitution
has given no power on the subject, from whom it has expressly taken it
away—we, who have solemnly agreed that this constitution shall be our
law—we, most of whom have sworn to support it—we now abrogate this law,
and swear and force others to swear that it shall not be obeyed; and we do
this, not because congress have no right to pass such laws—this we do not
allege—but because they have passed them with improper views. They are
unconstitutional from the motives of those who passed them, which we can
never with certainty know; from their unequal operation, although it is
impossible, from the nature of things, that they should be equal; and from
the disposition which we presume may be made of their proceeds, although
that disposition has not been declared. This is the plain meaning of the
ordinance, in relation to laws which it abrogates for alleged
unconstitutionality. But it does not stop there. It repeals, in express
terms, an important part of the constitution itself, and of laws passed to
give it effect, which have never been alleged to be unconstitutional. The
constitution declares that the judicial powers of the United States extend
to cases arising under the laws of the United States; and that such laws,
the constitution, and treaties, shall be paramount to the State
constitutions and laws. The judiciary act prescribes the mode by which the
case may be brought before a court of the United States by appeal, when a
State tribunal shall decide against this provision of the constitution.
The ordinance declares that there shall be no appeal, makes the State law
paramount to the constitution and laws of the United States, forces judges
and jurors to swear that they will disregard their provisions, and even
makes it penal in a suitor to attempt relief by appeal. It further
declares, that it shall not be lawful for the authorities of the United
States, or of that State, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the
revenue laws within its limits.
Here is a law of the United States, not even pretended to be
unconstitutional, repealed by the authority of a small majority of the
voters of a single State. Here is a provision of the constitution, which
is solemnly abrogated by the same authority.
On such expositions and reasonings, the ordinance grounds not only an
assertion of the right to annul the laws, of which it complains, but to
enforce it by a threat of seceding from the Union, if any attempt is made
to execute them.
This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the constitution, which
they say is a compact between sovereign States, who have preserved their
whole sovereignty, and therefore are subject to no superior; that because
they made the compact, they can break it, when, in their opinion, it has
been departed from by the other States. Fallacious as this course of
reasoning is, it enlists State pride, and finds advocates in the honest
prejudices of those, who have not studied the nature of our government
sufficiently to see the radical error, on which it rests.
The people of the United States formed the constitution, acting through
the State legislatures in making the compact, to meet and discuss its
provisions, and acting in separate conventions, when they ratified those
provisions; but the terms used in its construction, show it to be a
government, in which the people of all the States collectively are
represented. We are one people in the choice of president and vice
president. Here the States have no other agency, than to direct the mode
in which the votes shall be given. The candidates having a majority of all
the votes are chosen. The electors of a majority of States may have given
their votes for one candidate, and yet another may be chosen. The people,
then, and not the States, are represented in the executive branch.
In the house of representatives there is this difference, that the people
of one State do not, as in the case of president and vice president, all
vote for the same officers. The people of all the States do not vote for
all the members, each State electing only its own representatives. But
this creates no material distinction. When chosen, they are all
representatives of the United States, not representatives of the
particular State from whence they come. They are paid by the United
States, not by the State; nor are they accountable to it for any act done
in the performance of their legislative functions; and however they may in
practice, as it is their duty to do, consult and prefer the interests of
their particular constituents, when they come in conflict with any other
partial or local interest, yet it is their first and highest duty, as a
representative of the United States, to promote the general good.
The constitution of the United States, then, forms a government, not a
league; and whether it be formed by compact between the States, or in any
other manner, its character is the same. It is a government, in which all
the people are represented, which operates directly on the people
individually, not upon the States; they retained all the power they did
not grant. But each State having expressly parted with so many powers, as
to constitute jointly with the other States a single nation, cannot from
that period possess any right to secede, because such secession does not
break a league, but destroys the unity of a nation; and any injury to that
unity is not only a breach, which would result from the contravention of a
compact, but it is an offence against the whole Union. To say that any
State may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to say that the United
States are not a nation; because it would be a solecism to contend, that
any part of a nation might dissolve its connection with the other parts,
to their injury or ruin, without committing any offence. Secession, like
any other revolutionary act, may be morally justified by the extremity of
oppression; but to call it a constitutional right, is confounding the
meaning of terms; and can only be done through gross error, or to deceive
those, who are willing to assert a right, but would pause before they made
a revolution, or incur the penalties consequent on a failure.
Because the Union was formed by compact, it is said the parties to that
compact may, when they feel themselves aggrieved, depart from it; but it
is precisely because it is a compact, that they cannot. A compact is an
agreement, or binding obligation. It may, by its terms, have a sanction or
penalty for its breach, or it may not. If it contains no sanction, it may
be broken with no other consequence than moral guilt; if it have a
sanction, then the breach incurs the designated or implied penalty. A
league between independent nations generally has no sanction, other than a
moral one; or, if it should contain a penalty, as there is no common
superior, it cannot be enforced. A government, on the contrary, always
has a saction, express or implied; and in our case, it is both necessarily
implied, and expressly given. An attempt by force of arms to destroy a
government, is an offence, by whatever means the constitutional compact
may have been formed; and such government has the right, by the law of
self-defence, to pass acts for punishing the offender, unless that right
is modified, restrained, or resumed by the constitutional act. In our
system, although it is modified in the case of treason, yet authority is
expressly given to pass all laws necessary to carry its powers into
effect, and under this grant provision has been made for punishing acts,
which obstruct the due administration of the laws.
It would seem superfluous to add anything to show the nature of that
Union, which connects us; but as erroneous opinions on this subject are
the foundation of doctrines the most destructive to our peace, I must give
some further development to my views on this subject. No one,
fellow-citizens, has a higher reverence for the reserved rights of the
States, than the magistrate, who now addresses you. No one would make
greater personal sacrifices, or official exertions to defend them from
violation; but equal care must be taken to prevent, on their part, an
improper interference with, or resumption of the rights they have vested
in the nation. The line has not been so distinctly drawn, as to avoid
doubts in some cases of the exercise of power. Men of the best intentions,
and soundest views, may differ in their construction of some parts of the
constitution; but there are others, on which dispassionate reflection can
leave no doubt. Of this nature appears to be the assumed right of
secession. It rests, as we have seen, on the alleged undivided sovereignty
of the States, and on their having formed, in this sovereign capacity, a
compact, which is called the constitution, from which, because they made
it, they have the right to secede. Both of these positions are erroneous,
and some of the arguments to prove them so have been anticipated.
The States severally have not retained their entire sovereignty. It has
been shown, that, in becoming parts of a nation, not members of a league,
they surrendered many of their essential parts of sovereignty. The right
to make treaties, declare war, levy taxes, exercise exclusive judicial
and legislative powers, were all of them functions of sovereign power. The
States, then, for all these purposes, were no longer sovereign. The
allegiance of their citizens was transferred, in the first instance, to
the government of the United States; they became American citizens, and
owed obedience to the constitution of the United States, and to laws made
in conformity with the powers it vested in congress. This last position
has not been, and cannot be denied. How, then, can that State be said to
be sovereign and independent whose citizens owe obedience to laws not made
by it, and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws when they
come in conflict with those passed by another? What shows conclusively
that the States cannot be said to have reserved an undivided sovereignty,
is, that they expressly ceded the right to punish treason, not treason
against their separate power, but treason against the United States.
Treason is an offence against sovereignty, and sovereignty must reside
with the power to punish it. But the reserved rights of the States are not
less sacred because they have, for their common interest, made the general
government the depository of these powers.
The unity of our political character (as has been shown for another
purpose) commenced with its very existence. Under the royal government we
had no separate character: our opposition to its oppressions began as
united colonies. We were the United States under the confederation,
and the name was perpetuated, and the Union rendered more perfect by the
federal constitution. In none of these stages did we consider ourselves in
any other light than as forming one nation. Treaties and alliances were
made in the name of all. Troops were raised for the joint defence. How,
then, with all these proofs, that under all changes of our position we
had, for designated purposes and with defined powers, created national
governments; how is it, that the most perfect of those several modes of
union should now be considered as a mere league, that may be dissolved at
pleasure? It is from an abuse of terms. “Compact” is used as synonymous
with “league,” although the true term is not employed, because it would
at once show the fallacy of the reasoning. It would not do to say, that
our constitution was only a league; but it is labored to prove it a
compact, (which in one sense it is,) and then to argue, that, as a league
is a compact, every compact between nations must of course be a league,
and that from such an engagement every sovereign power has a right to
recede. But it has been shown, that in this sense the States are not
sovereign, and that even if they were, and the national constitution had
been formed by compact, there would be no right in any one State to
exonerate itself from its obligations.
So obvious are the reasons, which forbid this secession, that it is
necessary only to allude to them. The Union was formed for the benefit of
all. It was produced by mutual sacrifices of interests and opinions. Can
those sacrifices be recalled? Can the States, who magnanimously
surrendered their title to the territories of the west, recall the grant?
Will the inhabitants of the inland States agree to pay the duties, that
may be imposed without their assent, by those on the Atlantic or the Gulf,
for their own benefit? Shall there be a free port in one State, and
onerous duties in another? No one believes, that any right exists, in a
single State, to involve the others in these and countless other evils,
contrary to the engagements solemnly made. Every one must see, that the
other States, in self-defence, must oppose it at all hazards.
These are the alternatives, that are presented by the convention: A repeal
of all the acts for raising revenue, leaving the government without the
means of support; or an acquiescence in the dissolution of our Union by
the secession of one of its members. When the first was proposed, it was
known, that it could not be listened to for a moment. It was known, if
force was applied to oppose the execution of the laws, that it must be
repelled by force; that congress could not, without involving itself in
disgrace, and the country in ruin, accede to the proposition; and yet, if
this is not done on a given day, or if any attempt is made to execute the
laws, the State is, by the ordinance, declared to be out of the Union. The
majority of a convention assembled for the purpose have dictated these
terms, or rather this rejection of all terms, in the name of the people
of South Carolina. It is true, that the governor of the State speaks of
the submission of their grievances to a convention of all the States,
which, he says, they “sincerely and anxiously seek and desire.” Yet this
obvious and constitutional mode of obtaining the sense of the other
States, on the construction of the federal compact, and amending it if
necessary, has never been attempted by those, who have urged the State on
to this destructive measure. The State might have proposed the call for a
general convention to the other States; and congress, if a sufficient
number of them concurred, must have called it. But the first magistrate of
South Carolina, when he expressed a hope, that, “on a review by congress
and the functionaries of the general government of the merits of the
controversy,” such a convention will be accorded to them, must have known,
that neither congress, nor any functionary of the general government, has
authority to call such a convention, unless it be demanded by two-thirds
of the States. This suggestion, then, is another instance of the reckless
inattention to the provisions of the constitution, with which this crisis
has been madly hurried on; or of the attempt to persuade the people, that
a constitutional remedy had been sought and refused. If the legislature of
South Carolina “anxiously desire” a general convention to consider their
complaints, why have they not made application for it, in the way the
constitution points out? The assertion, that they “earnestly seek” it, is
completely negatived by the omission.
This, then, is the position in which we stand. A small majority of the
citizens of one State in the Union have elected delegates to a State
Convention; that Convention has ordained that all the revenue laws of the
United States must be repealed, or that they are no longer a member of
this Union. The Governor of that State has recommended to the Legislature
the raising of an army to carry the secession into effect, and that he may
be empowered to give clearances to vessels in the name of the State. No
act of violent opposition to the laws has yet been committed, but such a
state of things is hourly apprehended; and it is the intent of this
instrument to proclaim, not only that the duty imposed on me by the
Constitution “to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” shall be
performed to the extent of the powers already vested in me by law, or of
such others as the wisdom of Congress shall devise and entrust to me for
that purpose, but to warn the citizens of South Carolina who have been
deluded into an opposition to the laws, of the danger they will incur by
obedience to the illegal and disorganizing ordinance of the Convention; to
exhort those who have refused to support it to persevere in their
determination to uphold the Constitution and laws of their country; and to
point out to all the perilous situation into which the good people of that
State have been led, and that the course they are urged to pursue is one
of ruin and disgrace to the very State whose rights they affect to
support.
Fellow citizens of my native State, let me not only admonish you, as the
First Magistrate of our common country, not to incur the penalty of its
laws, but use the influence that a father would over his children whom he
saw rushing to certain ruin. In that paternal language, with that paternal
feeling, let me tell you, my countrymen, that you are deluded by men who
are either deceived themselves, or wish to deceive you. Mark under what
pretences you have been led on to the brink of insurrection and treason,
on which you stand! First, a diminution of the value of your staple
commodity, lowered by over production in other quarters, and the
consequent diminution in the value of your lands, were the sole effect of
the tariff laws.
The effect of those laws was confessedly injurious, but the evil was
greatly exaggerated by the unfounded theory you were taught to believe,
that its burthens were in proportion to your exports, not to your
consumption of imported articles. Your pride was roused by the assertion
that a submission to those laws was a state of vassalage, and that
resistance to them was equal, in patriotic merit, to the opposition our
fathers offered to the oppressive laws of Great Britain. You were told
that this opposition might be peaceably—might be constitutionally made;
that you might enjoy all the advantages of the Union, and bear none of its
burthens. Eloquent appeals to your passions, to your State pride, to your
native courage, to your sense of real injury, were used to prepare you for
the period when the mask, which concealed the hideous features of
disunion, should be taken off. It fell, and you were made to look with
complacency on objects which, not long since, you would have regarded with
horror. Look back to the arts which have brought you to this state—look
forward to the consequences to which it must inevitably lead! Look back to
what was first told you as an inducement to enter into this dangerous
course. The great political truth was repeated to you, that you had the
revolutionary right of resisting all laws that were palpably
unconstitutional and intolerably oppressive; it was added that the right
to nullify a law rested on the same principle, but that it was a peaceable
remedy! This character which was given to it, made you receive, with too
much confidence, the assertions that were made of the unconstitutionality
of the law and its oppressive effects. Mark, my fellow citizens, that, by
the admission of your leaders, the unconstitutionality must be palpable,
or it will not justify either resistance or nullification! What is the
meaning of the word palpable, in the sense in which it is here used?
that which is apparent to every one; that which no man of ordinary
intellect will fail to perceive. Is the unconstitutionality of these laws
of that description? Let those among your leaders who once approved and
advocated the principle of protective duties, answer the question; and let
them choose whether they will be considered as incapable, then, of
perceiving that which must have been apparent to every man of common
understanding, or as imposing upon your confidence, and endeavoring to
mislead you now. In either case, they are unsafe guides in the perilous
path they urge you to tread. Ponder well on this circumstance, and you
will know how to appreciate the exaggerated language they address to you.
They are not champions of liberty emulating the fame of our revolutionary
fathers; nor are you an oppressed people, contending, as they repeat to
you, against worse than colonial vassalage.
You are free members of a flourishing and happy Union. There is no settled
design to oppress you. You have indeed felt the unequal operation of laws
which may have been unwisely, not unconstitutionally passed; but that
inequality must necessily be removed. At the very moment when you were
madly urged on to the unfortunate course you have begun, a change in
public opinion had commenced. The nearly approaching payment of the public
debt, and the consequent necessity of a diminution of duties, had already
produced a considerable reduction, and that, too, on some articles of
general consumption in your State. The importance of this change was
underrated, and you were authoritatively told that no further alleviation
of your burthens were to be expected at the very time when the condition
of the country imperiously demanded such a modification of the duties as
should reduce them to a just and equitable scale. But, as if apprehensive
of the effect of this change in allaying your discontents, you were
precipitated into the fearful state in which you now find yourselves.
I have urged you to look back to the means that were used to hurry you on
to the position you have now assumed, and forward to the consequences it
will produce. Something more is necessary. Contemplate the condition of
that country of which you still form an important part. Consider its
government uniting in one bond of common interest and general protection
so many different States—giving to all their inhabitants the proud title
of American citizens, protecting their commerce, securing their literature
and their arts; facilitating their intercommunication; defending their
frontiers; and making their name respected in the remotest parts of the
earth. Consider the extent of its territory; its increasing and happy
population; its advance in arts, which render life agreeable; and the
sciences, which elevate the mind! See education spreading the lights of
religion, morality, and general information into every cottage in this
wide extent of our Territories and States? Behold it as the asylum where
the wretched and the oppressed find a refuge and support! Look on this
picture of happiness and honor, and say—we, too, are citizens of
America! Carolina is one of these proud States—her arms have
defended—her best blood has cemented this happy Union! And then add, if
you can, without horror and remorse, this happy Union we will dissolve;
this picture of peace and prosperity we will deface; this free
intercourse we will interrupt; these fertile fields we will deluge with
blood; the protection of that glorious flag we renounce; the very name of
Americans we discard. And for what, mistaken men—for what do you throw
away these inestimable blessings? for what would you exchange your share
in the advantages and honor of the Union? For the dream of separate
independence—a dream interrupted by bloody conflicts with your neighbors,
and a vile dependence on a foreign power. If your leaders could succeed in
establishing a separation, what would be your situation? Are you united at
home—are you free from the apprehension of civil discord, with all its
fearful consequences? Do our neighboring republics, every day suffering
some new revolution, or contending with some new insurrection—do they
excite your envy? But the dictates of a high duty obliges me solemnly to
announce that you cannot succeed. The laws of the United States must be
executed. I have no discretionary power on the subject—my duty is
emphatically pronounced in the Constitution. Those who told you that you
might peaceably prevent their execution, deceived you—they could not have
been deceived themselves. They know that a forcible opposition could alone
prevent the execution of the laws, and they know that such opposition must
be repelled. Their object is disunion; but be not deceived by names;
disunion, by armed force, is treason. Are you really ready to incur its
guilt? If you are, on the heads of the instigators of the act be the
dreadful consequences—on their heads be the dishonor, but on yours may
fall the punishment; on your unhappy State will inevitably fall all the
evils of the conflict you force upon the government of your country. It
cannot accede to the mad project of disunion, of which you would be the
first victims—its First Magistrate cannot, if he would, avoid the
performance of his duty; the consequences must be fearful for you,
distressing to your fellow citizens here, and to the friends of good
government throughout the world. Its enemies have beheld our prosperity
with a vexation they could not conceal—it was a standing refutation of
their slavish doctrines, and they will point to our discord with the
triumph of malignant joy. It is yet in your power to disappoint them.
There is yet time to show that the descendants of the Pinckneys, the
Sumters, the Rutledges, and of the thousand other names which adorn the
pages of your revolutionary history, will not abandon that Union, to
support which so many of them fought, and bled, and died.
I adjure you, as you honor their memory—as you love the cause of freedom,
to which they dedicated their lives—as you prize the peace of your
country, the lives of its best citizens, and your own fair fame, to
retrace your steps. Snatch from the archives of your State the
disorganizing edict of its Convention—bid its members to re-assemble, and
promulgate the decided expressions of your will to remain in the path
which alone can conduct you to safety, prosperity, and honor. Tell them
that, compared to disunion, all other evils are light, because that brings
with it an accumulation of all. Declare that you will never take the field
unless the star spangled banner of your country shall float over you; that
you will not be stigmatized when dead, and dishonored and scorned while
you live, as the authors of the first attack on the Constitution of your
country. Its destroyers you cannot be. You may disturb its peace—you may
interrupt the course of its prosperity—you may cloud its reputation for
stability, but its tranquility will be restored, its prosperity will
return, and the stain upon its national character will be transferred, and
remain an eternal blot on the memory of those who caused the disorder.
Fellow citizens of the United States! The threat of unhallowed
disunion—the names of those once respected, by whom it is uttered—the
array of military force to support it—denote the approach of a crisis in
our affairs, on which the continuance of our unexampled prosperity, our
political existence, and perhaps that of all free governments, may depend.
The conjuncture demanded a free, a full, and explicit enunciation, not
only of my intentions, but of my principles of action; and the claim was
asserted of a right by a State to annul the laws of the Union, and even to
secede from it at pleasure, a frank exposition of my opinions in relation
to the origin and form of our government, and the construction I give to
the instrument by which it was created, seemed to be proper. Having the
fullest confidence in the justness of the legal and constitutional opinion
of my duties, which has been expressed, I rely, with equal confidence, on
your undivided support in my determination to execute the laws—to
preserve the Union by all constitutional means—to arrest, if possible, by
moderate but firm measures, the necessity of a recourse to force; and, if
it be the will of Heaven, that the recurrence of its primeval curse on man
for the shedding of a brother’s blood should fall upon our land, that it
be not called down by any offensive act on the part of the United States.
Fellow-citizens! the momentous case is before you. On your undivided
support of your government depends the decision of the great question it
involves, whether your sacred Union will be preserved, and the blessings
it secures to us as one people, shall be perpetuated. No one can doubt
that the unanimity with which that decision will be expressed, will be
such as to inspire new confidence in republican institutions, and that the
prudence, the wisdom, and the courage which it will bring to their
defence, will transmit them unimpaired and invigorated to our children.
May the great Ruler of Nations grant that the signal blessings with which
he has favored ours, may not, by the madness of party or personal
ambition, be disregarded and lost; and may His wise providence bring those
who have produced this crisis to see their folly, before they feel the
misery of civil strife, and inspire a returning veneration for that Union,
which, if we may dare to penetrate his designs, he has chosen as the only
means of attaining the high destinies to which we may reasonably aspire.
In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States to be
hereunto affixed, having signed the same with my hand.
Done at the city of Washington, this 10th day of December, in the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, and of the
independence of the United States the fifty-seventh.
ANDREW JACKSON.
By the President:
EDW. LIVINGSTON, Secretary of State.
Comment upon the imperishable document just quoted is entirely
unnecessary. It speaks for itself in thundering tones that strikes terror
to the traitor’s heart. Mark the clear and lucid reasoning,[3] the kind,
paternal advice, the bold and manly warning that pervades this production,
of the true, noble, honored patriot of the Hermitage.
For the purpose of contrasting the administration of Andrew Jackson,
during the convulsion of 1832-’33, with that of James Buchanan, during our
present similar condition, we will give a brief summary of the course
pursued by the former:
On the 24th day of November, previous to the issuing of President
Jackson’s proclamation, South Carolina had, through her convention,
effectually declared herself out of the Union, by an ordinance that was to
take effect on the first day of February, 1833. The President, being
apprehensive of trouble in collecting the duties imposed by congress in
the various ports of South Carolina, and more especially at Charleston,
dispatched, through his secretary of the treasury, Louis McLean,
confidential orders of the most strict and positive character, to the
collectors at the several ports of entry.
He writes to James K. Prinkle, Esq., collector at Charleston, ordering him
to use the utmost firmness and vigilence in seeing the laws promptly
executed in every particular. He ordered the revenue cutter Alert to
proceed to Charleston, and, in writing to Mr. Prinkle, he says, you will,
moreover, cause the officers of the cutter (showing that there were others
at hand), under your direction, to board all vessels departing from the
port of Charleston, and in case any shall be found without having been
regularly entered and cleared in the manner required by law, to seize and
detain the same, to be prosecuted according to law. The number of
assistants and employees were greatly increased, and every precaution
taken to prevent a surprise. But as time rolled around South Carolina, not
having penetrated the purposes of President Jackson sufficiently to
understand his position, felt confident in her final success, and was
defiant in her attitude. She began to collect her army that was to defeat
the government of the United States. She had appealed to her sister States
to aid her in sustaining her position. Dissatisfaction had already began
to show itself in various other sections of the country. The President
beheld the dangers and felt the responsibility resting upon him, and on
the 10th day of December he issued his Proclamation, declaring his
unalterable purpose to enforce the laws and collect the duties, and above
all to stand by the Constitution and the Union to the last, and warning
those who were precipitating their country into a civil war to beware of
the consequences and fearful responsibility they would incur by a
continuance in their reckless course.
But South Carolina had gone too far to be silenced by any ordinary means.
She continued her preparations, still hoping that she could spread
disaffection into other portions of the country sufficient to frighten the
government into granting her demands, and many of the true friends of the
Union trembled for its safety, so wide-spread was the sympathy South
Carolina had enlisted. Many members of Congress were ready with their
measures of pacification, each anxious to become the instrument of
settling the difficulty, and perhaps immortalize his name. The horrors of
civil war were as freely discussed as at the present day. Numerous were
those who were ready and willing to sacrifice everything, even the dignity
of the nation, to avert the dreadful calamity. But where was the brave
Jackson? He was at the helm of the great ship of State, and although the
storm was raging, and the billows threatening to engulf her or dash her to
fragments on the inhospitable shore of anarchy, yet the brave old hero,
with the Constitution for his guide and the God of liberty for his
counselor, bid defiance to the mutineers who were threateningly assembled
around him.
On the 16th day of December he sent a special message to Congress asking
for additional legislation for the purpose of meeting the exigency, he
reminding them of their sworn duty to protect the Constitution from every
encroachment, and appealed to their patriotism, and urged them, as true
Americans, to stand firmly by their country. Congress promptly responded
to the call, and the President thus prepared continued the collection of
customs uninterruptedly, and preserved the honor and dignity of the
nation.
South Carolina, after much blustering and threatening, quieted down, and
it is to be hoped that many of the leaders of the rebellion lived to see
the folly of their acts and the wisdom of the President.
But let us look for a moment at the course James Buchanan has pursued. It
is now over a year since men occupying high places in the government began
to publicly avow their determination to destroy this government and
involve all in one common ruin. Public speeches and the press of the
country have all proclaimed the determination of certain partain parties
to break up this Union. Conventions have been held and resolutions passed
declaring certain States out of the Union. Arsenals have been seized,
forts have been taken by bodies of armed men, public property confiscated,
and an unarmed steamer, bearing the flag of the nation, has been fired
into for attempting to comply with government orders—collectors of
customs are arrested and tried for treason for performing their duty. The
free navigation of the Mississippi is prevented; American citizens are
driven out of several of the States while peaceably attending to their
legitimate business, and some of the more unfortunate have suffered
tarring and feathering, whipping, scourging and even death at the hands of
those acting under authority, or at least within the knowledge of the
authorities of the several States; and yet, after all the enumerated
outrages, sufficient to disgrace even the half-civilized nation of
Morocco, not one word of unqualified rebuke has James Buchanan uttered
against those committing these outrages, not only against our government
but the very name of humanity. Surrounded by treason in his own
cabinet,[4] he has looked quietly on while his Secretary of War supplied
the insurgents with government arms. Open and defiant traitors have been
his daily counselors, while his imbecile, undecided course gives no one
confidence in his future policy. Treason is now openly and boldly
perpetrated throughout at least one-third of the entire country without
the least restraint from any source whatever.
If there is to be found within the pages of history where the government
of a great, powerful and prosperous nation suffered treason to spread over
one-third of the entire country, coupled with the open and revolting acts
of violence that have characterized this rebellion, without the first
attempt to check its destructive progress, it is not within the range of
my knowledge.
Although the grounds for argument to show that this government was
established by the people collectively of the whole country, (and not by
the several States, as claimed by some,) and that it can only be
rightfully altered or abolished by a constitutional majority of the same
power that established it, would seem to have been entirely gone over,
nevertheless we propose to introduce the additional evidence of that
noble, honored statesman, and able constitutional expounder, Daniel
Webster.
On the 21st day of January, 1830, Mr. Hayne delivered in the Senate of the
United States a very able speech advocating the right of the various
States to nullify the laws of Congress in certain contingencies, or what
might be more properly called the South Carolina doctrine, embracing the
right to nullify the laws of Congress, or declare herself out of the Union
at pleasure. His speech was considered a complete succces by the
advocates of his sentiments, and was thought by them an unanswerable
vindication of those principles, and when Mr. Webster undertook the task
of replying to Mr. Hayne, he was met with jeers by the friends of
nullication; but as the volume of his reasoning began to unfold itself,
all eyes were attentively turned toward the speaker. After proceeding to
state the grounds upon which was founded the pretended right to nullify
the acts of Congress, Mr. Webster said:
“This leads us to inquire into the origin of this government and the
source of its power. Whose agent is it? Is it the creature of the
State legislatures, or the creature of the people? If the government
of the United States be the agent of the State governments, then they
may control it, provided they can agree in the manner of controlling
it; if it is the agent of the people, then the people alone can
control it, restrain it, modify or reform it. It is observable enough,
that the doctrine for which the honorable gentleman contends leads him
to the necessity of maintaining, not only that this general government
is the creature of the States, but that it is the creature of each of
the States severally; so that each may assert the power, for itself,
of determining whether it acts within the limits of its authority. It
is the servant of four and twenty masters, of different wills and
purposes; and yet bound to obey all. This absurdity (for it seems no
less) arises from a misconception as to the origin of this government,
and its true character. It is, sir, the people’s constitution, the
people’s government; made for the people; made by the people; and
answerable to the people. The people of the United States have
declared that this constitution shall be the supreme law. We must
either admit the proposition, or dispute their authority. The States
are unquestionably sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not
affected by this supreme law. The State legislatures, as political
bodies, however sovereign, are yet not sovereign over the people. So
far as the people have given power to the general government, so far
the grant is unquestionably good, and the government holds of the
people, and not of the State governments. We are all agents of the
same supreme power, the people. The general government and the State
governments derive their authority from the same source. Neither can,
in relation to the other, be called primary; though one is definite
and restricted, and the other general and residuary.
“The national government possesses those powers which it can be shown
the people have conferred on it, and no more. All the rest belongs to
the State governments, or to the people themselves. So far as the
people have restrained State sovereignty by the expression of their
will, in the constitution of the United States, so far, it must be
admitted, State sovereignty is effectually controlled. I do not
contend that it is, or ought to be, controlled further. The sentiment
to which I have referred propounds that State sovereignty is only to
be controlled by its own ‘feelings of justice;’ that is to say, it is
not to be controlled at all; for one who is to follow his feelings, is
under no legal control. Now, however men may think this ought to be,
the fact is, that the people of the United States have chosen to
impose control on State sovereignties. The constitution has ordered
the matter differently from what this opinion announces. To make war,
for instance, is an exercise of sovereignty; but the constitution
declares that no State shall make war. To coin money is another
exercise of sovereign power; but no State is at liberty to coin money.
Again, the constitution says, that no sovereign State shall be so
sovereign as to make a treaty. These prohibitions, it must be
confessed, are a control on the State sovereignty of South Carolina,
as well as of the other States, which does not arise ‘from feelings of
honorable justice.’ Such an opinion, therefore, is in defiance of the
plainest provisions of the constitution.”
Mr. Webster proceeded to investigate the South Carolina doctrine as it was
then termed; he referred to the resolutions of Pennsylvania and Kentucky
declaring the tariff laws constitutional, while in South Carolina the same
laws were declared to be a palpable, deliberate usurpation of power by
Congress; and in speaking of the absurdity of allowing each State to
decide in such cases, he said:
“If there be no power to settle such questions, independent of either
of the States, is not the whole Union a rope of sand? Are we not
thrown back again precisely upon the old confederation?
“It is too plain to be argued. Four and twenty interpreters of
constitutional law, each with a power to decide for itself, and none
with authority to bind anybody else, and this constitutional law the
only bond of their union! What is such a state of things but a mere
connection during pleasure, or, to use the praseology of the times,
during feeling? And that feeling, too, not the feeling of the people
who established the constitution, but the feeling of the State
governments.”
In referring to remarks made by Mr. Hayne, concerning what Mr. Hillhouse
should have said about not being bound to obey an unconstitutional law,
Mr. Webster says:
“He quotes that distinguished senator as saying, that in his judgment
the embargo law was unconstitutional, and that, therefore, in his
opinion, the people were not bound to obey it.
“That, sir, is perfectly constitutional language. As unconstitutional
law is not binding; but then it does not rest with a resolution or a
law of a State legislature to decide whether an act of congress be or
be not constitutional. An unconstitutional act of congress would not
bind the people of this District although they have no legislature to
interfere in their behalf; and, on the other hand, a constitutional
law of congress does bind the citizens of every State, although all
their legislatures should undertake to annul it, by act or resolution.
The venerable Connecticut senator is a constitutional lawyer, of sound
principles and enlarged knowledge; a statesman practiced and
experienced, bred in the company of Washington, and holding just views
upon the nature of our governments. He believed the embargo
unconstitutional, and so did others; but what then? Who did he suppose
was to decide that question? The State legislature? Certainly not. No
such sentiment ever escaped his lips.”
Mr. Webster went on to ask from whence this supposed right of the States
came? Where did they get the power to interfere with the laws of the
Union? He contended that the notion was founded in a misapprehension of
the origin of this government and of the foundation on which it stands. I
hold, said he, this to be a popular government, erected by the people,
those who administer it responsible to the people, and itself capable of
being amended and modified just as the people may choose it should be.
“It is as popular, just as truly emenating from the people, as the
State governments. It is created for one purpose; the State
governments for another. It has its own powers; they have theirs.
There is no more authority with them to arrest the operation of a law
of congress, than with congress to arrest the operation of their laws.
We are here to administer a constitution emenating immediately from
the people, and trusted by them to our administration. It is not the
creature of the State governments. It is of no moment to the argument
that certain acts of the State legislatures are necessary to fill our
seats in this body. That is not one of their original State powers, a
part of the sovereignty of the State. It is a duty which the people,
by the constitution itself, have imposed on the State legislatures,
and which they might have left to be performed elsewhere, if they had
seen fit. So they have left the choice of president with electors; but
all this does not affect the proposition that this whole
government—president, senate and house of representatives—is a
popular government. It leaves it still all its popular character. The
governor of a State (in some of the States) is chosen not directly by
the people for the purpose of performing, among other duties, that of
electing a governor. Is the government of the State on that account
not a popular government? This government, sir, is the independent
offspring of the popular will. It is not the creature of State
legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people
brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported
it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary
restraints on State sovereignties. The States cannot now make war;
they cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself,
separate regulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot
coin money. If this constitution, sir, be the creature of State
legislatures, it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange
control over the volition of its creators.”
Mr. Webster then proceeded to show that when the people erected this
government they gave it a Constitution, and in that Constitution they
enumerated the powers which they bestowed on it. That they had made it a
limited government, and defined its authority and restrained it to the
exercise of such powers as were granted, and all others were reserved to
the States or the people. But they did not stop there, being aware that no
Constitution could be so plainly written but what there would be a
difference of opinion on the construction of some points, consequently
they (the people) in order to avoid a recurrence of the difficulties
experienced under the old confederacy and render the laws of Congress
effective and binding upon all parties without applying to State
authority, thus rendering the government complete within itself, declared
the Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance
thereof, should be the supreme law of the land. In referring to the
tribunal in which to decide questions arising under the Constitution, Mr.
Webster said:
“But, sir, the people have wisely provided, in the constitution
itself, a proper, suitable mode and tribunal for settling questions of
constitutional law. There are, in the constitution, grants of powers
to congress, and restrictions on those powers. There are also
prohibitions on the States. Some authority must therefore necessarily
exist, having the ultimate jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the
interpretation of these grants, restrictions, and prohibitions. The
constitution has itself pointed out, ordained, and established that
authority. How has it accomplished this great and essential end? By
declaring, sir, that ‘the constitution and the laws of the United
States, made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the
land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding.’
“This, sir, was the first great step. By this, the supremacy of the
constitution and laws of the United States is declared. The people so
will it. No State law is to be valid which comes in conflict with the
constitution or any law of the United States. But who shall decide
this question of interference? To whom lies the last appeal? This,
sir, the constitution itself decides also, by declaring ‘that the
judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the
constitution and laws of the United States.’ These two provisions,
sir, cover the whole ground. They are, in truth, the keystone of the
arch. With these it is a government; without them it is a confederacy.
In pursuance of these clear and express provisions, congress
established, at its very first session, in the judicial act, a mode
for carrying them into full effect, and for bringing all questions of
constitutional power to the final decision of the supreme court. It
then, sir, became a government. It then had the means of
self-protection; and but for this, it would, in all probability, have
been now among things which are passed. Having constituted the
government, and declared its powers, the people have further said,
that since somebody must decide on the extent of these powers, the
government shall itself decide—subject always like other popular
governments, to its responsibility to the people. And now, sir, I
repeat, how is it that a State legislature acquires any right to
interfere? Who, or what, gives them the right to say to the people,
‘We, who are your agents and servants for one purpose, will undertake
to decide, that your other agents and servants, appointed by you for
another purpose, have transcended the authority you gave them?’ The
reply would be, I think, not impertinent, ‘Who made you a judge over
another’s servants. To their own masters they stand or fall.’”
He then went on to show that a State could not make treason against the
United States legal, and, says he, when I maintain these sentiments, I am
but asserting the rights of the people; I state what they have declared
and insisted on as their right to declare it. They have chosen to repose
this power in the general government, and I think it my duty to support it
like other Constitutional powers.
In referring to the importance of having but one tribunal, whose decisions
should be final—Sir, said he:
“If we look to the general nature of the case, could any thing have
been more preposterous than to have made a government for the whole
Union, and yet left its powers subject, not to one interpretation, but
to thirteen or twenty-four interpretations? Instead of one tribunal,
established by all, responsible to all, with power to decide for all,
shall constitutional questions be left to four and twenty popular
bodies, each at liberty to decide for itself, and none bound to
respect the decisions of others; and each at liberty, too, to give a
new construction, on every new election of its own members? Would any
thing, with such a principle in it, or rather with such a destitution
of all principle, be fit to be called a government? No, sir. It should
not be denominated a constitution. It should be called, rather, a
collection of topics for everlasting controversy; heads of debate for
a disputatious people. It would not be a government. It would not be
adequate to any practical good, nor fit for any people to live under.”
Mr. Hayne, already overborne with the overwhelming and unanswerable
arguments, was yet destined to receive the most cutting rebuke from his
vanquisher. Mr. Webster said:
“And now, Mr. President, let me run the honorable gentleman’s doctrine
a little into its practical application. Let us look at his probable
modus operandi. If a thing can be done, an ingenious man can tell
how it is to be done. Now, I wish to be informed how this State
interference is to be put in practice. We will take the existing case
of the tariff law. South Carolina is said to have made up her opinion
upon it. If we do not repeal it, (as probably we shall not,) she will
then apply to the case the remedy of her doctrine. She will, we must
suppose, pass a law of her legislature, declaring the several acts of
congress, usually called the tariff laws, null and void, so far as
they respect South Carolina, or the citizens thereof. So far, all is a
paper transaction, and easy enough. But the collector at Charleston is
collecting the duties imposed by these tariff laws—he, therefore,
must be stopped. The collector will sieze the goods if the tariff
duties are not paid. The State authorities will undertake their
rescue: the marshal, with his posse, will come to the collector’s aid;
and here the contest begins. The militia of the State will be called
out to sustain the nullifying act. They will march, sir, under a very
gallant leader; for I believe the honorable member himself commands
the militia of that part of the State. He will raise the nullifying
act on his standard, and spread it out as his banner. It will have a
preamble, bearing that the tariff laws are palpable, deliberate, and
dangerous violations of the constitution. He will proceed, with his
banner flying, to the custom house in Charleston—
“all the while
Sonorous metal blowing martial sounds.”
Arrived at the custom house, he will tell the collector that he must
collect no more duties under any of the tariff laws. This he will be
somewhat puzzled to say, by the way, with a grave countenance,
considering what hand South Carolina herself had in that of 1816. But,
sir, the collector would, probably, not desist at his bidding. Here
would ensue a pause; for they say, that a certain stillness precedes
the tempest. Before this military array should fall on custom house,
collector, clerks, and all, it is very probable some of those
composing it would request of their gallant commander-in-chief to be
informed a little upon the point of law; for they have doubtless a
just respect for his opinions as a lawyer, as well as for his bravery
as a soldier. They know he has read Blackstone and the constitution,
as well as Turenne and Vauban. They would ask him, therefore,
something concerning their rights in this matter. They would inquire
whether it was not somewhat dangerous to resist a law of the United
States. What would be the nature of their offence, they would wish to
learn, if they, by military force and array, resisted the execution
in Carolina of a law of the United States, and it should turn out,
after all, that the law was constitutional. He would answer, of
course, treason. No lawyer could give any other reason. John Fries,[5]
he would tell them, had learned that some years ago. How, then, they
would ask, do you propose to defend us? We are not afraid of bullets,
but treason has a way of taking people off that we do not much relish.
How do you propose to defend us? ‘Look at my floating banner,’ he
would reply; ‘see there the nullifying law!’ Is it your opinion,
gallant commander, they would then say, that if we should be indicted
for treason, that some floating banner of yours would make a good plea
in bar? ‘South Carolina is a sovereign State,’ he would reply. That is
true; but would the judge admit our plea? ‘These tariff laws,’ he
would repeat, ‘are unconstitutional, palpably, deliberately,
dangerously.’ That all may be so; but if the tribunals should not
happen to be of that opinion, shall we swing for it? We are ready to
die for our country, but it is rather an awkward business, this dying
without touching the ground. After all, this is a sort of hemp-tax,
worse than any part of the tariff.
“Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma like
that of another great general. He would have a knot before him which
he could not untie. He must cut it with his sword. He must say to his
followers, defend yourselves with your bayonets; and this is
war—civil war.”
Mr. Webster continued to show that to resist by force the execution of a
law of the United States was treason, and that the Courts of the United
States could take no notice of a State law to authorize persons to commit
that grave crime. Said he, the common saying that a State cannot commit
treason herself, is nothing to the purpose. Can it authorize others to do
so? If John Fries[5] had produced an act of Pennsylvania annulling the
law of Congress, would it have helped his case? Talk about it as we will,
these doctrines go the whole length of revolution. They are incompatible
with any peaceable administration of the government. They lead directly to
disunion and civil commotion, and therefore it is, that at the
commencement, when they are first found to be maintained by respectable
men, and in a tangible form, that I enter my protest against them all. Mr
Webster proceeded to show that the people of the United States have not
chosen the State authorities as their guardians against encroachments from
the general government. Said he:
“Sir, the people have not trusted their safety, in regard to the
general constitution, to these hands. They have required other
security, and taken other bonds. They have chosen to trust themselves,
first to the plain words of the instrument, and to such construction
as the government, itself, in doubtful cases, should put on its own
powers, under their oaths of office, and subject to their
responsibility to them; just as the people of a State trust their own
State governments with a similar power. Secondly, they have reposed
their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, and in their own
power to remove their own servants and agents, whenever they see
cause. Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the judicial power, which,
in order that it might be trustworthy, they have made as respectable,
as disinterested, and as independent as practicable. Fourthly, they
have seen fit to rely, in case of necessity, or high expediency, on
their known and admitted power to alter or amend the constitution,
peaceably and quietly, whenever experience shall point out defects or
imperfections. And finally, the people of the United States have at
no time, in no way, directly or indirectly, authorized any State
legislature to construe or interpret their instrument of government;
much less to interfere, by their own power, to arrest its course and
operation.
“If, sir, the people in these respects had done otherwise than they
have done their constitution could neither have been preserved nor
would it have been worth preserving. And if its plain provisions shall
now be disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it
will become as feeble and helpless a being as enemies, whether early
or more recent, could possibly desire. It will exist, in every State,
but as a poor dependent on State permission. It must borrow leave to
be, and will be no longer than State pleasure, or State discretion
sees fit to grant the indulgence and to prolong its poor existence.
“But, sir, although there are fears, there are hopes also. The people
have preserved this their own chosen Constitution for forty years, and
seen their happiness, prosperity and renown grow with its growth, and
strengthen with its strength. They are now generally strongly attached
to it. Overthrown by direct assault, it cannot be; evaded, undermined,
nullified it will not be, if we and those who succeed us here, as
agents and representatives of the people shall conscientiously and
vigilantly discharge the two great branches of our public trust
faithfully to preserve and wisely to administer it.”
We believe that after perusing the evidence already advanced, every
reasonable, unprejudiced person must come to the conclusion that the
fathers of our country established the government of the United States
with the full understanding and intent that it should be supreme, so far
as its delegated authority extended. That it was a unit and capable of
sustaining itself by force, if necessary. Mr. Madison’s views are
repeatedly expressed on this point, explaining the advantages of
conferring sufficient powers upon the general government to enable it to
suppress internal violence and insurrection, thus providing against the
civil commotion that had overthrown other republics of a weaker and less
binding obligation on the part of the members composing them. See pages
24, 25 and 26 of this book. The papers here referred to are the more
important on account of being written while the question of adoption or
rejection of the Constitution was being discussed before the people.
Again, on pages 30 to 32, the defects and imperfections of the old
confederation in relation to the principles of legislation for the States
in their collective capacities, showing more fully that the intention was
to create a government for the people of the United States that should
be binding on all persons, or combination of persons, for all time to
come. And again, on page 34, is another quotation from the joint
production of Madison, Jay and Hamilton, showing that the government was
expected to reach individuals without the aid, and independent of, State
authority. And still another quotation, on pages 35 and 36, goes to show
that there was a full understanding that the people were conferring
certain powers upon the general government, and of course taking them from
the States for the purpose of forming one great, inseparable and
indissoluble nation. There is not a particle of evidence to prove that the
people contemplated reserving or recognizing any State distinction or
State sovereignty, so far as the powers of the general government were
concerned; but the whole drift of evidence goes to show that they were
conscious of the necessity of uniting themselves under one grand
government, making themselves one people, reserving only to the States or
themselves such powers as were thought necessary to regulate their local
affairs, leaving the States in nearly the same relation to the general
government that a city municipality is to the government of the State in
which it is located; but all must owe obedience to the government of the
United States.
But this is not all the evidence we have on this subject. As we review the
history of the government, we find that Washington, Jackson, Webster,
Clay, and in fact nearly every statesman of any prominence in our
political history have either by their acts or words committed themselves
to this same policy. The proclamation of General Jackson, and the extracts
given of Mr. Webster’s arguments, are the key-stone to the arch; they are
both conclusive in themselves, and comment by me would be but a weak
advocate of their masterly and unanswerable arguments, hence I close the
subject, conscious of having proven to the satisfaction of myself at
least, and, I trust, to some of my doubting Democratic friends and
weak-hearted Republican brethren, that we at least have a government,
established by our forefathers, constituting us one nation, one people,
with one common country and destiny. Whether we shall be found brave
enough to defend it and perpetuate it is a question which the God of
nations only knows, and time alone will reveal to man.