The crowd-mind is seen at its best and at
its worst in revolution. To many minds,
revolution is so essentially a crowd phenomenon
that the terms revolution and crowd-rule
are almost synonymous. "Hurrah, the
mob rules Russia," cried certain radicals in
the spring of 1917—"Let the people rule
everywhere." Others, more conservative, saw
in every extravagant deed and atrocity alleged
to have happened in Russia only the
thing logically to be expected where the mob
rules. The idea of revolution is itself so commonly
a crowd-idea that the thinking—if
thinking it may be called—of most people on
this subject depends principally upon which
crowd we happen to belong to, the crowd
which sustains the ego-feeling of its members
by the hope of revolution, or the crowd which,
for similar reason, brands everything which
opposes its interests, real or imaginary, as
"anarchy" and "Bolshevism."
If the word "revolution" be taken to
mean fundamental change in mens habits of
thought, and life, and the forms of their relations
to one another, then it may be said that
great "revolutions may be and have been
achieved with a relatively small degree of
crowd-thinking and mob violence." Much of
the normal development of civilization, for
instance, the great scientific advance of the
nineteenth century, the spread of culture, the
creation of artistic values, the rise in the
standard of living, is change of this sort.
Such change is, however, gradual. It is
brought about by countless concrete adaptations,
by thinking always toward realizable
ends. New and often unforeseeable results
are thus reached; but they are reached, as in
all organic growth and in all sound thinking,
by a series of successful adjustments within
the real. True progress is doubtless made up
of changes of this sort. But for the course of
progress to run on uninterrupted and undefeated
we should have to be, both in our
individual and social behavior, the reasonable
beings which certain nineteenth-century utilitarians
mistook us for.
It is the fool thing, the insincere thing, that
more commonly happens in matters social
and political. The adjustment reached is
not often a solution of a social problem worked
out deliberately on the "greatest-happiness"
principle. It is commonly a status quo, or
balance of power among contending crowds,
each inspired by the fiction of its own importance,
by self-idealization, and desire to
rule. It is an unstable equilibrium usually
held in place for the time by a dominant
crowd. This dominant crowd may itself be
composed of quarreling factions, but these
parties, so long as they share enough of the
supremacy to keep up their self-feeling, so
long, in fact, as their members may even be
able to make themselves believe that they, too,
are in the upper set, or so long as they continue
to hope for success in the social game as
now played, unite in repeating the catchwords
which justify their crowd in its supremacy.
The dominant group identifies its
own interests with the general welfare. And
in the sense that some sort of order, or any at
all, is to be preferred to social chaos, there is
an element of truth in this identification.
The fact remains, however, that the dominant
crowd possesses always much of the
crowd-spirit which originally secured for it its
enviable position. Its ideas, like those of all
crowds, are devices for sustaining the self-feeling
of its members, for protecting itself, for
keeping the group together, for justification.
They are only secondarily, if at all, instruments
for dealing with new and perplexing
social situations. It cannot be denied that
a certain set of opinions, prejudices, mannerisms,
ceremonies "go with" the social
position which corresponds to them. They
are the ready-made habits of the "set" or
class. They are badges by which the "gentleman"
is distinguished, the evening clothes of
the psyche, as it were. Many of these crowd-forms
represent true values of living, some of
them are useful in our dealings with reality;
if this were not so, if such spiritual tattooings
or ceremonial forms were wholly harmful, the
crowd which performed them would be at such
a disadvantage that it could not hold its own.
But that considerations of utility—other than
the function which such ceremonialism is
known to have for the unconscious always—do
not directly govern these forms of thought
and behavior is seen in the fact that so many
of them, as Sumner says of "folkways," are
either harmful or useless in dealing with
matters of fact.
The dominant crowd, therefore, in just so
far as it must remain a crowd in order to secure
its own position of supremacy, must strive to
force all social realities into the forms of its
own conflicts and dilemmas. Inevitably the
self-feeling of a great many people, who are
forced by the dominant crowd to conform and
labor with no compensation, is hurt. They
cannot but contrast their own lot with that
of their more fortunate neighbors. Of all
things, people probably resist most the feeling
of inferiority. Any suggestion that the difference
in social position is due to a similar difference
in personal worth or in ability is hotly
resented. The resentment is in no wise
abated by the fact that in some cases this suggestion
may be true. Compensations are at
once created by the unconscious. In mediæval
times "all men were brothers and were equal
before the altars of the Church and in heaven."
Thus distinctions of merit, other than those
which prevailed in the social order, were set
up in the interest of the common man.
As the influence of the Renaissance directed
general attention from the realm of the
spiritual to practical affairs of earth, these
compensations changed from thoughts of the
future world to dreams of the future of this
world. The injured self-feeling dwells upon
the economic or political inequalities which
flow from the dominance of the ruling crowd.
The injustices and acts of exploitation, which
are certainly neither new nor rare occurrences
in human relations, are seized upon as if it
were these things, not the assumption to
superiority, which were the issue at stake.
At the time of the French Revolution
the Third Estate, or Bourgeois, which showed
itself quite as capable of exploiting the poor
as ever were the older aristocrats, saw itself
only as part of the wronged and exploited
"people." The sufferings of the poor, which
it was frequently even then profiting in quite
as heartily, to say the least, as the titled
nobility, were represented as the grievance of
all mankind against the hated nobility. That
the ideas of "liberty, equality, and fraternity"
which these good tradesmen preached may
easily become the sort of compensatory ideas
we have been discussing is shown by the fact
of the genuine astonishment and indignation
of the burghers when later their employees
made use of this same phrase in the struggles
between labor and capital. Sans-culottism
had quite as many psychological motives as
economic behind it.
How pompous, hateful, and snobbish were
those titled folk with their powdered wigs,
carriages, fine clothes, and their exclusive
social gatherings to which honest citizens,
often quite as wealthy as themselves, were not
invited. If the "people"—that is, the burghers
themselves—only had a chance they would
be just as fine ladies and gentlemen as those
who merely inherited their superiority. Down
with the aristocrats! All men were equal and
always had been. There must be fraternity
and the carier ouvert les talents, in other words,
brotherhood and free competition.
I am sure, from all I have ever seen or read
of social revolt and unrest, that this injured
self-feeling, or defense against the sense of
personal inferiority, while not the only motive,
is the most powerful one at work. It crops
out everywhere, in the laymans hatred of the
clergy during the Reformation, in that curious
complex of ideas whereby the uneducated
often look upon a college diploma as something
little short of magical, and defend their
ego against this ridiculously exaggerated mark
of distinction and accompanying feeling of
self-reproach by a slur at "high-brows." Few
people realize how general this feeling is; the
trick of making fun of the educated is one of
the commonest forms of crowd-humor in
America, both in vaudeville and in popular
oratory. I have previously pointed out the
fact that the religious revival in our day is to
a great extent characterized by a popular
resistance to scholars. No one can read Mr.
Sundays sermons and deny this fact. The
City of New York gave the largest majority
in its history to the candidate for the office of
mayor who made opposition to "experts"
the main issue in his campaign. Scores of
times I have heard popular speakers resort to
this trick to gain favor with their audiences,
and I cannot remember ever having known
such sentiments to fail to gain applause—I
am not speaking now of strictly academic
groups, but of general gatherings.
The point of interest here is that these same
people have a most extravagant notion of the
value of the academic training which they
encourage the crowd speaker in ridiculing. I
have made it a practice of talking with a
great many people personally and drawing
them out on this point, and I have found that
this is almost uniformly the case. F. B., a
cigar maker by trade, says, "Oh, if I had only
had sense enough to go on to school when I
had the opportunity!" E. L., a mechanic,
says, "I might have been somebody, if I had
been given any chance to get an education."
R., a sort of jack-of-all-trades, says, "If I
only had N.s education, Id be a millionaire."
B., a farmer with limited intellectual interests,
says, "I tell you, my boys are not going to be
like me; they have got to go to college."
G., a waiter, says, "I dont know much," and
then proceeds to impress me with the latest
bit of academic information which he has
picked up. C., a printer, who has been
moderately successful, says: "Id give ten
thousand dollars right this minute if I knew
Greek; now there is —— and there is ——,
neighbors of mine, theyre highly educated.
When Im with them Im ashamed and feel
like a dub."
When, on such occasions, I repeatedly say
that the average academic student really
learns hardly anything at all of the classic
languages, and cite the small fruits of my own
years of tedious study as an example, the
effect produced is invariably comforting—until
I add that one need not attend a university
seven years or even four to become
educated, but that nearly everyone with
ability to learn and with genuine intellectual
interests may achieve a remarkable degree of
learning. The answer of the perplexed person
is then often an extenuation. "Well, you see,
a busy person or a working man is so tired
after the days work that he has no energy
left for study," or it is, "Wait till the working
class have more leisure, then they, too, can
be cultivated." Passing over this extenuation,
which ignores the fact that some of the
best informed and clearest thinking people
one meets are working people, while the average
university graduate leads anything but
an intellectual life, it can hardly be denied,
I think, that our crowd cult of anti-"highbrowism"
is really a defense mechanism
against an inner feeling of inferiority. Now
the interesting thing about this feeling of
inferiority is the exaggerated notion of the
superiority of the college-trained, which is
entertained chiefly by the uneducated themselves.
What appears here is in fact nothing
other than a cheapening of the idea of superiority.
Personal excellence is something which
anyone may attain; it is not something congenital,
but something to be added on; one
"gets an education," possesses something of
advantage, merely by a few years of conventional
study of books. Anyone might do
that, therefore. "I, too, if I only cared to, or
had been given opportunity, might now be
famous." "The difference between myself and
the worlds greatest genius is not a spiritual
chasm which I could not myself, at least
hypothetically, cross." "It is rather an acquired
character, a mere fruit of special opportunity—which
in a few cases it doubtless may
be—but it is something external; at bottom
we are all equal."
Many facts may be advanced to corroborate
the results of our analysis here. The crowd
always resents the Carlyle, William James,
Nietzsche, Goethe theory of genius. Genius
is not congenital superiority. It is the result
of hard work. The genius is not a unique
personal fact, he is a "representative man."
He says just what his age is thinking. The
inarticulate message of his contemporaries
simply becomes articulate in some one, and
behold a genius. In other words, I suppose,
all Vienna, messenger boys and bootblacks
especially, were suddenly fascinated by Schillers
"Ode to Joy" and went about whistling
improvised musical renderings of the theme
of this poem, till the deaf Beethoven heard
and wrote these whistlings down in the form
of the Ninth Symphony.
According to the crowd, Luther did not
create the Reformation, or Petrarch the Renaissance;
these movements themselves created
their leaders and founders; all that the genius
did was to interpret and faithfully obey the
Peoples will. Ergo, to be a genius one need
only study hard enough to be able to tell the
people what they already think. The superiority
of genius is therefore no different
from that of any educated person; except in
degree of application. Anyone of us might
possess this superiority. In other words, the
"intellectual snobbishness" which the crowd
resents is nothing else than the crowd-mans
own fiction of self-importance, projected upon
those whose imagined superiority he envies.
It is recognized, even exaggerated by the unlearned,
because it is precisely the sort of
superiority which the ignorant man himself,
in his ignorance, imagines that he himself
would display if he "only had the chance,"
and even now possesses unrecognized.
We have made the foregoing detour because
I think it serves to illustrate, in a way, the
psychic processes behind much revolutionary
propaganda and activity. I would not attempt
to minimize the extent of the social
injustice and economic slavery which a dominant
crowd, whether ecclesiastical, feudal, or
capitalistic, is guilty of in its dealings with
its subjects. But every dominant crowd,
certain sections of the "proletariat" as quickly
as any other, will resort to such practices, and
will alike justify them by moral catchwords
the minute its supremacy over other crowds
gives it opportunity. Therefore there is a
certain amount of tautology in denouncing
the "master class" for its monstrous abuses.
That the real point at issue between the
dominant crowd and the under crowd is the
assumed personal superiority of the members
of the former, rather than the economic
"exploitation" which it practices, is shown
by the fact that the French Revolution was
led by wealthy bourgeois, and that the
leading revolutionary element in the working
class to-day consists, not of the "down and
out" victims of capitalist exploitation, but
of the members of the more highly skilled and
better paid trades, also of certain intellectuals
who are not "proletarians" at all.
And now we come to our point: the fiction
of superiority of the dominant crowd, just as
in the case of the assumed personal superiority
of the intellectuals, is resented by the under
crowd because it is secretly recognized by the
under crowd. Of course the dominant crowd,
like all crowds, is obsessed by its feelings of
self-importance, and this feeling is apparently
vindicated by its very social position. But
the fiction is recognized at its full face value,
and therefore resented by the under crowds,
because that is precisely the sort of personal
supremacy to which they also aspire.
One commonly hears it said to-day, by
those who have made the catchwords of
democracy their crowd cult, that the issue in
modern society is between democracy and
capitalism. In a sense this may be true, but
only in a superficial sense; the real issue is
between the personal self as a social entity
and the crowd. Capitalism is, to my mind,
the logical first fruit of so-called democracy.
Capitalism is simply the social supremacy of
the trader-man crowd. For a hundred years
and more commercial ability—that of organizing
industry and selling goods—has been
rewarded out of all proportion to any other
kind of ability, because, in the first place, it
leads to the kind of success which the ordinary
man most readily recognizes and envies—large
houses, fine clothes, automobiles, exclusive
clubs, etc. A Whittier may be ever
so great a poet, and yet sit beside the stove in
the general store of his little country village,
and no one thinks he is so very wonderful.
Some may envy him his fame, but few will
envy and therefore be fascinated by that in
him which they do not understand. But a
multimillionaire in their community is understood;
everyone can see and envy his success;
he is at once both envied and admired.
Moreover, the commercial ability is the sort
which the average man most commonly
thinks he possesses in some degree. While,
therefore, he grumbles at the unjust inequalities
in wealth which exist in modern society,
and denounces the successful business man as
an exploiter and fears his power, the average
man will nevertheless endure all this, much in
the same spirit that a student being initiated
into a fraternity will take the drubbing,
knowing well that his own turn at the fun will
come later. It is not until the members of
the under crowd begin to suspect that their
own dreams of "aping the rich" may never
come true that they begin to entertain revolutionary
ideas. In other words, forced to
abandon the hope of joining the present
dominating crowd, they begin to dream of
supplanting and so dispossessing this crowd
by their own crowd.
That the dominant crowd is just as much to
blame for this state of affairs as the under
crowd, perhaps more so, is shown by the history
of every period preceding a revolutionary
outbreak. I will dwell at some length on this
fact later. My point here is that, first, a revolution,
in the sense that the word means a
violent uprising against the existing order, is
a psychological crowd-phenomenon—and second,
that it takes two crowds to make a
revolution.
Writers, like Le Bon, have ignored the part
which the dominant crowd plays in such
events. They have thought of revolution
only as the behavior of the under crowd.
They have assumed that the crowd and
the people were the same. Their writings
are hardly more than conservative warnings
against the excess and wickedness of the
popular mind once it is aroused. Sumner
says:
Moral traditions are the guides which no one can
afford to neglect. They are in the mores, and they are
lost in every great revolution of the mores. Then the
men are morally lost.
Le Bon says, writing of the French Revolution:
The people may kill, burn, ravage, commit the most
frightful cruelties, glorify its hero to-day and throw him
into the gutter to-morrow; it is all one; the politicians
will not cease to vaunt its virtues, its high wisdom, and
to bow to its every decision.
Now in what does this entity really consist, this
mysterious fetich which revolutionists have revered
for more than a century?
It may be decomposed into two distinct categories.
The first includes the peasants, traders, and workers of
all sorts who need tranquillity and order that they may
exercise their calling. This people forms the majority,
but a majority which never caused a revolution. Living
in laborious silence, it is ignored by historians.
The second category, which plays a capital part in
all national disturbances, consists of a subversive social
residue dominated by a criminal mentality. Degenerates
of alcoholism and poverty, thieves, beggars, destitute
"casuals," indifferent workers without employment—these
constitute the dangerous bulk of the
armies of insurrection.... To this sinister substratum
are due the massacres which stain all revolutions....
To elements recruited from the lowest dregs of the populace
are added by contagion a host of idle and indifferent
persons who are simply drawn into the movement.
They shout because there are men shouting,
and revolt because there is a revolt, without having the
vaguest idea of the cause of the shouting or revolution.
The suggestive power of the environment absolutely
hypnotized them.
This idea, which is held with some variation
by Sumner, Gobineau, Faguet, and Conway,
is, I believe, both unhistorical and unpsychological,
because it is but a half-truth. This
substratum of the population does at the
moment of revolution become a dangerous
mob. Such people are unadjusted to any
social order, and the least deviation from the
routine of daily life throws them off their
balance. The relaxation of authority at the
moment when one group is supplanting another
in position of social control, is to these
people like the two or three days of interregnum
between the pontificates of Julius and
Leo, described by Cellini. Those who need
some one to govern them, and they are many,
find their opportunity in the general disturbance.
They suddenly react to the revolutionary
propaganda which up to this minute
they have not heeded, they are controlled by
revolutionary crowd-ideas in a somnambulistic
manner, and like automatons carry these ideas
precipitately to their deadly conclusion. But
this mob is not the really revolutionary crowd
and in the end it is always put back in its
place by the newly dominant crowd. The
really revolutionary crowd consists of the
group who are near enough the dominant
crowd to be able to envy its "airs" with some
show of justification, and are strong enough
to dare try issue with it for supreme position.
Madame Rolland, it will be remembered,
justified her opposition to aristocrats on the
principle of equality and fraternity, but she
could never forget her resentment at being
made, in the home of a member of this aristocracy,
to eat with the servants.
What Le Bon and others seem to ignore is
that the ruling class may be just as truly a
crowd as the insurrectionary mob, and that
the violent behavior of revolutionary crowds
is simply the logic of crowd-thinking carried
to its swift practical conclusion.
It is generally assumed that a revolution is
a sudden and violent change in the form of
government. From what has been said it
will be seen that this definition is too narrow.
History will bear me out in this. The
Protestant Reformation was certainly a revolution,
as Le Bon has shown, but it affected
more than the government or even the organization
of the Church. The French Revolution
changed the form of the government in
France several times before it was done, passing
through a period of imperial rule and even
a restoration of the monarchy. But the
revolution as such survived. Even though
later a Bourbon or a prince of the House of
Orleans sat on the throne of France, the restored
king or his successor was hardly more
than a figurehead. A new class, the Third
Estate, remained in fact master of France.
There had been a change in the ownership of
the land; power through the control of vested
property rested with the group which in 1789
began its revolt under the leadership of Mirabeau.
A new dictatorship had succeeded the
old. And this is what a revolution is—the
dictatorship of a new crowd. The Russian
revolutionists now candidly admit this fact in
their use of the phrase "the dictatorship of the
proletariat." Of course it is claimed that
this dictatorship is really the dictatorship of
"all the people." But this is simply the old
fiction with which every dominant crowd disguises
seizure of power. Capitalist republicanism
is also the rule of all the people, and
the pope and the king, deriving their authority
from God, are really but "the servants
of all."
As we have seen, the crowd mind as such
wills to dominate. Society is made up of
struggle groups, or organized crowds, each
seeking the opportunity to make its catchwords
realities and to establish itself in the
position of social control. The social order is
always held intact by some particular crowd
which happens to be dominant. A revolution
occurs when a new crowd pushes the old
one out and itself climbs into the saddle.
When the new crowd is only another faction
within the existing dominant crowd, like one
of our established political parties, the succession
will be accomplished without resort to
violence, since both elements of the ruling
crowd recognize the rules of the game. It will
also not result in far-reaching social changes
for the same reason. A true revolution occurs
when the difference between the dominant
crowd and the one which supplants it is so
great as to produce a general social upheaval.
The Reformation, the French Revolution, and
the "Bolshevist" coup detat in Russia, all
were of this nature. A new social leadership
was established and secured by a change in
each case in the personnel of the ownership
of such property as would give the owners the
desired control. In the first case there was a
transfer of property in the church estates,
either to the local congregations, or the state,
or the denomination. In the second case the
property transferred was property in land, and
with the Russian revolutionists landed property
was given to the peasants and vested
capital turned over to the control of industrial
workers.
Those who lay all emphasis on this transfer
of property naturally see only economic
causes in revolutionary movements. Economics,
however, is not a science of impersonal
things. It treats rather of mens relations
to things, and hence to one another. It has
to do with valuations and principles of exchange
and ownership, all of which need
psychological restatement. The transfer of
the ownership of property in times of revolution
to a new class is not an end, it is a means
to a new crowds social dominance. The doctrines,
ideals, and principles believed by the
revolutionary crowd also serve this end of
securing its dominance, as do the social
changes which it effects, once in power.
Revolutions do not occur directly from
abuses of power, for in that case there would
be nothing but revolution all the time, since
every dominant crowd has abused its power.
It is an interesting fact that revolution generally
occurs after the abuses of which the revolutionists
complain have been in great measure
stopped—that is, after the ruling crowd has
begun to make efforts at reform. The Reformation
occurred in the pontificate of Leo X.
If it had been the result of intolerable abuse
alone, it would have happened in the time of
Alexander VI, Borgia. The French Revolution
fell upon the mild head of Louis XVI,
though the wrongs which it tried to right
mostly happened in the reign of his predecessor.
In most cases the abuses, the existence
of which a revolutionary crowd uses for propaganda
purposes, are in turn repeated in new
form by itself after it becomes dominant.
The Reformers in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries resorted to much the same
kind of persecution from which they had themselves
earlier suffered. The Constituent Assembly,
though it had demanded liberty, soon
set up a more outrageous tyranny through its
own committees than any that the Louies
had dreamed of. Bolshevists in capitalist
countries are the greatest advocates of free
speech; in Russia they are the authors of a
very effective press-censorship.
No, it is hardly the abuses which men
suffer from their ruling crowds which cause
insurrection. People have borne the most terrible
outrages and suffered in silence for centuries.
Russia itself is a good example of this.
A revolution occurs when the dominant crowd
begins to weaken. I think we find proof of
this in the psychology of revolutionary propaganda.
A general revolution is not made in a
day, each such cataclysm is preceded by a
long period of unrest and propaganda of opposition
to the existing order and its beneficiaries.
The Roman Republic began going to pieces
about a hundred years before the battle of
Actium. The social unrest which followed
the Punic Wars and led to the revolt of the
brothers Gracchi was never wholly checked
during the century which followed. The
dominant party had scarcely rid itself of these
troublesome "demagogues" than revolt broke
out among the slave population of Sicily.
This was followed by the revolt of the Italian
peasants, then again by the insurrection of
Spartacus, and this in turn by the civil war
between Marius and Sulla, the conspiracy of
Catiline, the brief triumph of Julius Cæsar
over the Senate, the revenge of the latter in
the assassination of Cæsar, and the years of
turmoil during the Second Triumvirate.
It is doubtful if there was at any time a
very clear or widespread consciousness of the
issues which successively arose during that
unhappy century. It would seem that first
one counter-crowd and then another, representing
various elements of the populace, tried
issue with the ruling crowd. The one factor
which remained constant through all this was
the progressive disintegration of the dominant
party. The supremacy of the Patres Conscripti
et Equites became in fact a social
anachronism the day that Tiberius Gracchus
demanded the expropriation of the landed
aristocracy. The ideas whereby the dominant
crowd sought to justify its pre-emptions began
to lose their functional value. Only the undisguised
use of brute force was left. Such
ideas ceased to convince. Men of unusual
independence of mind, or men with ambitious
motives, who had grown up within the dominant
crowd, began to throw off the spell of its
control-ideas, and, by leaving it, to weaken it
further from within. No sooner was this
weakness detected by other groups than every
sort of grievance and partisan interest became
a moral justification for efforts to supplant
the rulers. The attempt of the dominant
crowd to retain its hold by repeating
its traditional justification-platitudes, unchanged,
but with greater emphasis, may
be seen in the orations of Cicero. It would be
well if some one besides high-school students
and their Latin teachers were to take up the
study of Cicero; the social and psychological
situation which this orator and writer
of moral essays reveals has some suggestive
similarities to things which are happening
to-day.
The century and more of unrest which preceded
both the Reformation and the French
Revolution is in each instance a long story.
But in both there is the same gradual loss of
prestige on the part of the dominant crowd;
the same inability of this crowd to change
with the changes of time; to find new sanctions
for itself when the old ones were no
longer believed; the same unadaptability, the
same intellectual and moral bankruptcy, therefore,
the same gradual disintegration from
within; the same resort to sentimentalism
and ineffective use of force, the same circle
of hungry counter-crowds waiting around
with their tongues hanging out, ready to
pounce upon that before which they had previously
groveled, and to justify their ravenousness
as devotion to principle; the same
growing fearlessness, beginning as perfectly
loyal desire to reform certain abuses incidental
to the existing order, and advancing, with
every sign of disillusionment or weakness, to
moral indignation, open attack upon fundamental
control ideas, bitter hostility, augmented
by the repressive measures taken by
the dominant crowd to conserve a status quo
which no longer gained assent in the minds of
a growing counter-crowd; finally force, and a
new dominant crowd more successful now in
justifying old tyrannies by principles not yet
successfully challenged.
In the light of these historical analogies the
record of events during the last seventy-five
years in western Europe and America is
rather discomforting reading, and I fear the
student of social psychology will find little to
reassure him in the pitiable lack of intellectual
leadership, the tendency to muddle through,
the unteachableness and general want of
statesmanlike vision displayed by our present
dominant crowds. If a considerable number
of people of all classes, those who desire change
as well as those who oppose it, could free their
thinking from the mechanisms of the crowd-mind,
it might be possible to find the working
solution of some of our pressing social problems
and save our communities from the
dreadful experience of another revolution.
Our hope lies in the socially minded person
who is sufficiently in touch with reality to be
also a non-crowd man.
Anyone who is acquainted with the state of
the public mind at present, knows that a
priori arguments against revolution as such
are not convincing, except to those who are
already convinced on other ground. The
dominant crowd in each historical epoch
gained its original supremacy by means of
revolution. One can hardly make effective
use of the commonplace antirevolutionary
propaganda of defense of a certain order
which has among its most ardent supporters
people who are proud to call themselves sons
and daughters of the Revolution. Skeptics at
once raise the question whether, according to
such abstract social ethics, revolutionists become
respectable only after they are successful
or have been a long time dead. In fact, the
tendency to resort to such reasoning is one
among many symptoms that the conservative
mind has permitted itself to become quite as
much a crowd-phenomenon as has the radical
mind.
The correct approach here is psychological
and pragmatic. There is an increasingly
critical social situation, demanding far-reaching
reconstructive change; only the most
hopeless crowd-man would presume to deny
this fact. The future all depends upon the
mental processes with which we attempt to
meet this situation. Nothing but useless
misery can result from dividing crowd against
crowd. Crowd-thinking, as I have said, does
not solve problems. It only creates ideal
compensations and defense devices for our
inner conflicts. Conservative crowd-behavior
has always done quite as much as anything
else to precipitate a revolutionary outbreak.
Radical crowd-behavior does not resolve the
situation, it only inverts it. Any real solution
lies wholly outside present crowd-dilemmas.
What the social situation demands
most is a different kind of thinking, a new
education, an increasing number of people who
understand themselves and are intellectually
and morally independent of the tyranny of
crowd-ideas.
From what has been said above, it follows
that revolutionary propaganda is not directly
the cause of insurrection. Such propaganda
is itself an effect of the unconscious reaction
between a waning and a crescent crowd. It
is a symptom of the fact that a large number
of people have ceased to believe in or assent
to the continued dominance of the present
controlling crowd and are looking to another.
There is always a tendency among conservative
crowds to hasten their own downfall
by the manner in which they deal with revolutionary
propaganda. The seriousness of
the new issue is denied; the crowd seeks to
draw attention back to the old issue which it
fought and won years ago in the hour of its
ascendancy. The fact that the old charms
and shibboleths no longer work, that they do
not now apply, that the growing counter-crowd
is able to psychoanalyze them, discover
the hidden motives which they disguise, and
laugh at them, is stoutly denied. The fiction
is maintained to the effect that present unrest
is wholly uncalled-for, that everything is all
right, that the agitators who "make people
discontented" are alien and foreign and need
only be silenced with a time-worn phrase, or,
that failing, shut up by force or deported, and
all will be well.
I do not doubt that before the Reformation
and the French Revolution there were ecclesiastics
and nobles aplenty who were quite
sure that the masses would never have known
they were miserable if meddling disturbers
had not taken the trouble to tell them so.
Even an honest critical understanding of the
demands of the opposing crowd is discouraged,
possibly because it is rightly felt that the
critical habit of mind is as destructive of one
crowd-complex as the other and the old crowd
prefers to remain intact and die in the last
ditch rather than risk dissolution, even with
the promise of averting a revolution. Hence
the Romans were willing to believe that the
Christians worshiped the head of an ass. The
mediæval Catholics, even at Leos court,
failed to grasp the meaning of the outbreak
in north Germany. Thousands saw in the
Reformation only the alleged fact that the
monk Luther wanted to marry a wife. To-day
one looks almost in vain among business men,
editors, and politicians for a more intelligent
understanding of socialism. A crowd goes
down to its death fighting bogies, and actually
running upon the sword of its real enemy, because
a crowd, once its constellation of ideas
is formed, never learns anything.
The crowd-group contains in itself, in the
very nature of crowd-thinking, the germs
which sooner or later lay it low. When a
crowd first becomes dominant, it carries into
a place of power a number of heterogeneous
elements which have, up to this time, been
united in a great counter-crowd because of
their common dissatisfaction with the old
order. Gradually the special interests of
these several groups become separated. The
struggle for place is continued as a factional
fight within the newly ruling crowd. This
factional struggle greatly complicates every
revolutionary movement. We witness this
in the murderously hostile partisan conflicts
which broke out in the revolutionary Assemblies
in France. It is seen again in the
Reformation, which had hardly established
itself when the movement was rent by intense
sectarian rivalries of all sorts. The same is
true of Russia since the fall of the Tsar, and
of Mexico ever since the overthrow of the
Diaz regime. If these factional struggles go
so far as to result in schism—that is, in a conscious
repudiation by one or more factions of
the revolutionary creed which had formerly
united them all, there is disintegration and
in all probability a return to the old ruling
crowd.
This reaction may also be made possible by
a refusal of one faction to recognize the others
as integral parts of the newly triumphant
crowd. If the new crowd after its victory can
hold itself together, the revolution is established.
It then becomes the task of the
leading faction in the newly dominant crowd
to grab the lions share of the spoils for itself,
give the other factions only so much prestige
as will keep alive in their minds the belief
that they, too, share in the new victory for
"humanity" and hold the new social order
together, while at the same time justifying its
own leadership by the compulsive power of
the idea which they all alike believe. This
belief, as we have seen, is the sine qua non
of the continued existence of any crowd. A
dominant crowd survives so long as its belief
is held uncritically and repeated and acted
upon automatically both by the members of
the crowd and its victims. When the factions
which have been put at a disadvantage
by the leading faction renounce the belief, or
awake to the fact that they "have been
cheated," disintegration begins.
Between the crowds professed belief and
the things which it puts into practice there is
a great chasm. Yet the fiction is uniformly
maintained that the things done are the correct
and faithful application of the great principles
to which the crowd is devoted. We
saw in our study of crowd-ideas in general
that such ideas are not working programs,
but are screens which disguise and apparently
justify the real unconscious motive of crowd-behavior.
The crowd secures its control, first,
by proclaiming in the most abstract form
certain generally accepted principles, such as
freedom, righteousness, brotherly love—as
though these universal "truths" were its own
invention and exclusive monopoly. Next,
certain logical deductions are made from these
principles which, when carried to their logical
conclusions regardless of fact or the effect produced,
make the thing which the crowd really
wants and does appear to be a vindication of
the first principles. It is these inferences
which go to make up the conscious thinking or
belief of the crowd. Thus in the revolutionary
convention in France all agree to the principles
of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.
Fidelity to these principles would to a non-crowd
mean that the believer should not try
to dictate to his fellows what they must
believe and choose, that he would exercise
good will in his dealings with them and show
them the same respect which he wished them
to have for himself. But the crowd does not
understand principles in this manner. Do all
agree to the great slogan of the revolution?
Well, then, fidelity to Liberty, Equality, and
Fraternity demands that the enemies of these
principles and the crowds definition of them
be overthrown. The Mountain is the truly
faithful party, hence to the guillotine with the
Gironde. This chasm between crowd faith
and crowd practice is well illustrated in the
case of those Southern patriots in America
who were ready to fight and die for the rights
of man as expressed in the Declaration of
Independence, but refused to apply the principle
of the inalienable rights of all men to
their own black slaves. Or, again in the
case of nineteenth-century capitalism, liberty
must be given to all alike. Liberty means
equal opportunity. Equal opportunity means
free competition in business. Free competition
exists only where there is an "incentive";
hence the investor must be encouraged and
his gains protected by law. Therefore anti-capitalistic
doctrines must be suppressed as
subversive of our free institutions. Immigrants
to whom for a generation we have extended
the hospitality of our slums and labor
camps, and the opportunity of freely competing
with our well-intrenched corporations,
must be made to feel their ingratitude if
they are so misguided as to conclude, from the
fact that hundreds of leading radicals have
been made to serve jail sentences, while after
thirty years of enforcing the antitrust law
not a single person has ever been sent to
prison, that possibly this is not a free land.
Or again—one convicts himself of being
a crowd-man who shows partiality among
crowds—the principle of democracy is generally
accepted. Then there should be industrial
democracy as well as political—hence the
"Dictatorship of the Proletariat"—for the
workers are "the people." Parliamentary
assemblies elected by all the people do not
necessarily represent labor. Organized labor,
therefore, though a minority of the whole,
should establish "industrial democracy" by
force. So, according to Bolshevist crowd-logic,
democracy means the rule of a minority
by means of force.
Now it is this fictitious, paranoiac, crowd-logic
which one must be able to dispel before
he can extricate himself from the clutches of
his crowd. If he subjects the whole fabric
of abstractions to critical analysis, revalues
it, puts himself above it, assumes a pragmatic
attitude toward whatever truths it
contains, dares to test these truths by their
results in experience and to use them for desired
ends; if, in short, he scrutinizes his own
disguised impulses, brings them to consciousness
as what they are, and refuses to be deceived
as to their real import, even when they
appear dressed in such sheeps clothing as absolutes
and first principles, he becomes a non-crowd
man, a social being in the best sense.
Those, however, who continue to give assent
to the crowds first principles, who still accept
its habit of a priori reasoning, merely substituting
for its accepted deductions others of
their own which in turn serve to conceal and
justify their own unconscious desires, will
turn from the old crowd only to be gobbled
up by a new and counter-crowd. Such people
have not really changed. They denounce the
old crowd on the ground that "it has not
lived up to its principles." It is a significant
fact that a crowds rule is generally challenged
in the name of the very abstract ideas of which
it has long posed as the champion.
For instance, there is liberty. Every crowd
demands it when it is seeking power; no
crowd permits it when it is in power. A crowd
which is struggling for supremacy is really
trying to free itself and as many people as
possible from the control of another crowd.
Naturally, the struggle for power appears to
consciousness as a struggle for liberty as such.
The controlling crowd is correctly seen to be
a tyrant and oppressor. What the opposition
crowd does not recognize is its own wish to
oppress, hidden under its struggle for power.
We have had occasion to note the intolerance
of the crowd-mind as such. A revolutionary
crowd, with all its lofty idealism about
liberty, is commonly just as intolerant as a
reactionary crowd. It must be so in order to
remain a crowd. Once it is triumphant it
may exert its pressure in a different direction,
but the pinch is there just the same. Like its
predecessor, it must resort to measures of
restraint, possibly even a "reign of terror,"
in order that the new-won "liberty"—which
is to say, its own place at the head of the
procession—may be preserved. The denial of
freedom appears therefore as its triumph, and
for a time people are deceived. They think
they are free because everyone is talking about
liberty.
Eventually some one makes the discovery
that people do not become free just by repeating
the magic word "liberty." A disappointed
faction of the newly emancipated humanity
begins to demand its "rights." The
crowd hears its own catchwords quoted
against itself. It proceeds to prove that
freedom exists by denouncing the disturbers
and silencing them, if necessary, by force.
The once radical crowd has now become reactionary.
Its dream of world emancipation is
seen to be a hoax. Lovers of freedom now
yoke themselves in a new rebel crowd so that
oppressed humanity may be liberated from
the liberators. Again, the will to power is
clothed in the dream symbols of an emancipated
society, and so on around and around
the circle, until people learn that with crowds
freedom is impossible. For men to attain to
mastery of themselves is as abhorrent to one
crowd as to another. The crowd merely
wants freedom to be a crowd—that is, to set
up its own tyranny in the place of that which
offends the self-feeling of its members.
The social idealism of revolutionary crowds
is very significant for our view of the crowd-mind.
There are certain forms of revolutionary
belief which are repeated again and again
with such uniformity that it would seem the
unconscious of the race changes very little
from age to age. The wish-fancy which
motivates revolutionary activity always appears
to consciousness as the dream of an
ideal society, a world set free; the reign of
brotherly love, peace, and justice. The folly
and wickedness of man is to cease. There will
be no more incentive for men to do evil. The
lion and the lamb shall lie down together.
Old extortions and tyrannies are to be left
behind. There is to be a new beginning,
poverty is to be abolished, Gods will is to be
done in earth, or men are at last to live according
to reason, and the inalienable rights of all
are to be secured; or the co-operative commonwealth
is to be established, with no more
profit-seeking and each working gladly for
the good of all. In other words, the mind of
revolutionary crowds is essentially eschatological,
or Messianic. The crowd always imagines
its own social dominance is a millennium.
And this trait is common to revolutionary
crowds in all historical periods.
We have here the psychological explanation
of the Messianic faith which is set forth with
tremendous vividness in Biblical literature.
The revolutionary import of the social teaching
of both the Hebrew and Christian religions
is so plain that I do not see how any honest
and well-informed person can even attempt to
deny it. The telling effectiveness with which
this element in religious teaching may be
used by clever radicals to convict the apologists
of the present social order by the words
out of their own mouths is evident in much of
the socialist propaganda to-day. The tendency
of the will to revolt, to express itself in
accepted religious symbols, is a thing to be
expected if the unconscious plays the important
part in crowd-behavior that we have
contended that it does.
The eighth-century Hebrew prophet mingles
his denunciations of those who join house to
house and field to field, who turn aside the
way of the meek, and sit in Samaria in the
corner of a couch and on the silken cushions
of a bed, who have turned justice to wormwood
and cast down righteousness to the
earth, etc., etc.,—reserving his choicest woes
of course for the foreign oppressors of "my
people"—with promises of "the day of the
Lord" with all that such a day implies, not
only of triumph of the oppressed over their
enemies, but of universal happiness.
Similarly the same complex of ideas appears
in the writings which deal with the Hebrew
"Captivity" in the sixth century B.C., with
the revolt of the Maccabeans, and again in
the impotent hatred against the Romans
about the time of the origin of Christianity.
The New Testament dwells upon some
phase of this theme on nearly every page.
Blessed are ye poor, and woe unto you who
are rich, you who laugh now. The Messiah
has come and with him the Kingdom of the
Heavens, but at present the kingdom is revealed
only to the believing few, who are in
the world, but not of it. However, the Lord
is soon to return; in fact, this generation shall
not pass away until all these things be accomplished.
After a period of great trial and
suffering there is to be a new world, and a
new and holy Jerusalem, coming down from
the skies and establishing itself in place of the
old. All the wicked, chiefly those who oppress
the poor, shall be cast into a lake of fire.
There shall be great rejoicing, and weeping
and darkness and death shall be no more.
The above sketch of the Messianic hope is
so brief as to be hardly more than a caricature,
but it will serve to make my point clear,
that Messianism is a revolutionary crowd
phenomenon. This subject has been presented
in great detail by religious writers in
recent years, so that there is hardly a member
of the reading public who is not more or less
familiar with the "social gospel." My point
is that all revolutionary propaganda is "social
gospel." Even when revolutionists profess
an antireligious creed, as did the Deists of
the eighteenth century, and as do many
modern socialists with their "materialist interpretation
of history," nevertheless the element
of irreligion extends only to the superficial
trappings of the revolutionary crowd-faith,
and even here is not consistent. At
bottom the revolutionists dream of a new
world is religious.
I am using the word "religious" in this
connection in its popular sense, meaning no
more than that the revolutionary crowd rationalizes
its dream of a new world-order in
imagery which repeats over and over again
the essentials of the Biblical "day of the
Lord," or "kingdom of heaven" to be
established in earth. This notion of cosmic
regeneration is very evident in the various
"utopian" socialist theories. The Fourierists
and St. Simonists of the early part of the
nineteenth century were extremely Messianic.
So-called "scientific socialists" are now inclined
to ridicule such idealistic speculation,
but one has only to scratch beneath the surface
of present-day socialist propaganda to
find under its materialist jargon the same old
dream of the ages. A great world-change is
to come suddenly. With the triumph of the
workers there will be no more poverty or
ignorance, no longer any incentive to men to
do evil to one another. The famous "Manifesto"
is filled with such ideas. Bourgeois
society is doomed and about to fall. Forces
of social evolution inevitably point to the
world-wide supremacy of the working class,
under whose mild sway the laborer is to be
given the full product of his toil, the exploitation
of children is to cease, true liberty will
be achieved, prostitution, which is somehow
a bourgeois institution, is to be abolished,
everyone will be educated, production increased
till there is enough for all, the cities
shall no more lord it over the rural communities,
all alike will perform useful labor, waste
places of the earth will become cultivated
lands and the fertility of the soil will be increased
in accordance with a common plan,
the state, an instrument of bourgeois exploitation,
will cease to exist; in fact, the whole
wicked past is to be left behind, for as
The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture
with traditional property relations, no wonder
that its development involves the most radical rupture
with traditional ideas.
In fine,
In place of the old bourgeois society with its classes
and class antagonisms we shall have an association in
which the free development of each is the condition for
the free development of all.
Le Bon says of the French Revolution:
The principles of the Revolution speedily inspired
a wave of mystic enthusiasm analogous to those provoked
by the various religious beliefs which had preceded
it. All they did was to change the orientation
of a mental ancestry which the centuries had solidified.
So there is nothing astonishing in the savage zeal of
the men of the Convention. Their mystic mentality
was the same as that of the Protestants at the time of
the Reformation. The principal heroes of the Terror—Couthon,
Saint Just, Robespierre, etc.—were apostles.
Like Polyeuctes destroying the altars of the false gods
to propagate his faith, they dreamed of converting the
globe.... The mystic spirit of the leaders of the Revolution
was betrayed in the least details of their public
life. Robespierre, convinced that he was supported
by the Almighty, assured his hearers in a speech that
the Supreme Being had "decreed the Republic since
the beginning of time."
A recent writer, after showing that the
Russian revolution has failed to put the
Marxian principles into actual operation, says
of Lenin and his associates:
They have caught a formula of glittering words;
they have learned the verbal cadences which move the
masses to ecstasy; they have learned to paint a vision
of heaven that shall outflare in the minds of their
followers the shabby realities of a Bolshevik earth.
They are master phraseocrats, and in Russia they have
reared an empire on phraseocracy.
The alarmists who shriek of Russia would do well
to turn their thoughts from Russias socialistic menace.
The peril of Russia is not to our industries, but
to our states. The menace of the Bolsheviki is not an
economic one, it is a political menace. It is the menace
of fanatic armies, drunken with phrases and sweeping
forward under Lenin like a Muscovite scourge. It
is the menace of intoxicated proletarians, goaded by
invented visions to seek to conquer the world.
In Nicolai Lenin the Socialist, we have naught to
fear. In Nicolai Lenin the political chief of Russias
millions, we may well find a menace, for his figure looms
over the world. His Bolshevik abracadabra has seduced
the workers of every race. His stealthy propaganda
has shattered the morale of every army in the
world. His dreams are winging to Napoleonic flights,
and well he may dream of destiny; for in an age when
we bow to phrases, it is Lenin who is the master
phraseocrat of the world.
Passing over the question of Lenins personal
ambitions, and whether our own crowd-stupidity,
panic, and wrong-headed Allied
diplomacy may not have been contributing
causes of the menace of Bolshevism, it
can hardly be denied that Bolshevism, like
all other revolutionary crowd-movements, is
swayed by a painted vision of heaven which
outflares the miseries of earth. Every revolutionary
crowd of every description is a pilgrimage
set out to regain our lost Paradise.
Now it is this dream of paradise, or ideal
society, which deserves analytical study.
Why does it always appear the minute a
crowd is sufficiently powerful to dream of
world-power? It will readily be conceded
that this dream has some function in creating
certain really desirable social values. But
such values cannot be the psychogenesis of
the dream. If the dream were ever realized,
I think William James was correct in saying
that we should find it to be but a "sheeps
heaven and lubberland of joy," and that life
in it would be so "mawkish and dishwatery"
that we should gladly return to this world of
struggle and challenge, or anywhere else, if
only to escape the deadly inanity.
We have already noted the fact that this
dream has the function of justifying the crowd
in its revolt and will to rule. But this is by
no means all. The social idealism has well
been called a dream, for that is just what it is,
the daydream of the ages. It is like belief
in fairies, or the Cinderella myth. It is the
Jack-and-the-beanstalk philosophy. The
dream has exactly the same function as the
Absolute, and the ideal world-systems of the
paranoiac; it is an imaginary refuge from the
real. Like all other dreams, it is the realization
of a wish. I have long been impressed
with the static character of this dream; not
only is it much the same in all ages, but it is
always regarded as the great culmination beyond
which the imagination cannot stretch.
Even those who hold the evolutionary view of
reality and know well that life is continuous
change, and that progress cannot be fixed in
any passing moment, however sweet, are
generally unable to imagine progress going on
after the establishment of the ideal society and
leaving it behind.
Revolutionary propaganda habitually stops,
like the nineteenth-century love story, with
a general statement, "and so they lived
happily ever after." It is really the end, not
the beginning or middle of the story. It is
the divine event toward which the whole
creation moves, and having reached it, stops.
Evolution having been wound up to run to
just this end, time and change and effort may
now be discontinued. There is nothing further
to do. In other words, the ideal is lifted
clear out of time and all historical connections.
As in other dreams, the empirically
known sequence of events is ignored. Whole
centuries of progress and struggle and piecemeal
experience are telescoped into one imaginary
symbolic moment. The moment now
stands for the whole process, or rather it is
substituted for the process. We have taken
refuge from the real into the ideal. The
"Kingdom of Heaven," "Paradise," "The
Return to Man in the State of Nature,"
"Back to Primitive New Testament Christianity,"
"The Age of Reason," "Utopia," the
"Revolution," the "Co-operative Commonwealth,"
all mean psychologically the same
thing. And that thing is not at all a scientific
social program, but a symbol of an easier and
better world where desires are realized by
magic, and everyones check drawn upon the
bank of existence is cashed. Social idealism
of revolutionary crowds is a mechanism of
compensation and escape for suppressed desires.
Is there any easier way of denying the true
nature and significance of our objective world
than by persuading ourselves that that world
is even now doomed, and is bound suddenly
to be transformed into the land of our hearts
desire? Is it not to be expected that people
would soon learn how to give those desires
greater unction, and to encourage one another
in holding to the fictions by which those desires
could find their compensation and escape,
by resorting to precisely the crowd-devices
which we have been discussing?
The Messianists of Bible times expected
the great transformation and world cataclysm
to come by means of a divine miracle. Those
who are affected by the wave of premillennialism
which is now running through certain
evangelical Christian communions are experiencing
a revival of this faith with much of its
primitive terminology.
Evolutionary social revolutionists expect
the great day to come as the culmination of
a process of economic evolution. This is
what is meant by "evolutionary and revolutionary
socialism." The wish-fancy is here
rationalized as a doctrine of evolution by
revolution. Thus the difference between the
social revolutionist and the Second Adventist
is much smaller than either of them
suspects. As Freud would doubtless say, the
difference extends only to the "secondary
elaboration of the manifest dream formation"—the
latent dream thought is the same in
both cases. The Adventist expresses the
wish in the terminology of a prescientific age,
while the social revolutionist makes use of
modern scientific jargon. Each alike finds
escape from reality in the contemplation of a
new-world system. The faith of each is a
scheme of redemption—that is, of "compensation."
Each contemplates the sudden,
cataclysmic destruction of the "present evil
world," and its replacement by a new order
in which the meek shall inherit the earth.
To both alike the great event is destined, in
the fullness of time, to come as a thief in the
night. In the one case it is to come as the
fulfillment of prophecy; in the other the
promise is underwritten and guaranteed by
impersonal forces of "economic evolution."
This determinism is in the one case what
Bergson calls "radical finalism," and in the
other "radical mechanism." But whether
the universe exists but to reel off a divine
plan conceived before all worlds, or be but
the mechanical swinging of the shuttle of
cause and effect, what difference is there if
the point arrived at is the same? In both
cases this point was fixed before the beginning
of time, and the meaning of the universe is
just that and nothing else, since that is what
it all comes to in the end.
Whether the hand which turns the crank
of the world-machine be called that of God or
merely "Evolution," it is only a verbal difference;
it is in both cases "a power not ourselves
which makes for righteousness." And
the righteousness? Why, it is just the righteousness
of our own crowd—in other words,
the crowds bill of rights painted in the sky
by our own wish-fancy, and dancing over our
heads like an aurora borealis. It is the history
of all crowds that this dazzling pillar of
fire in the Arctic night is hailed as the "rosy-fingered
dawn" of the Day of the Lord.
Or, to change the figure somewhat, the
faithful crowd has but to follow its fiery cloud
to the promised land which flows with milk
and honey; then march for an appointed
time about the walls of the wicked bourgeois
Jericho, playing its propaganda tune until the
walls fall down by magic and the world is
ours. No revolution is possible without a
miracle and a brass band.
I have no desire to discourage those who have
gone to work at the real tasks of social reconstruction—certainly
no wish to make this study
an apology for the existing social order. In the
face of the ugly facts which on every hand
stand as indictments of what is called "capitalism,"
it is doubtful if anyone could defend
the present system without recourse to a
certain amount of cynicism or cant. The
widespread social unrest which has enlisted
in its service so much of the intellectual
spirit of this generation surely could never
have come about without provocation more
real than the work of a mere handful of
"mischief-making agitators." The challenge
to modern society is not wholly of crowd
origin.
But it is one thing to face seriously the
manifold problems of reconstruction of our
social relations, and it is quite another thing
to persuade oneself that all these entangled
problems have but one imaginary neck which
is waiting to be cut with a single stroke of
the sword of revolution in the hands of "the
people." Hundreds of times I have heard
radicals, while discussing certain evils of
present society, say, "All these things are but
symptoms, effects; to get rid of them you
must remove the cause." That cause is
always, in substance, the present economic
system.
If this argument means that, instead of
thinking of the various phases of social behavior
as isolated from one another, we should
conceive of them as so interrelated as to form
something like a more or less causally connected
organic whole, I agree. But if it means
something else—and it frequently does—the
argument is based upon a logical fallacy.
The word "system" is not a causal term; it
is purely descriptive. The facts referred to,
whatever connections we may discover among
them, are not the effects of a mysterious
"system" behind the facts of human behavior;
the facts themselves, taken together,
are the system.
The confusion of causal and descriptive
ideas is a habit common to both the intellectualist
philosopher and the crowd-minded.
It enables people to turn their gaze from the
empirical Many to the fictitious One, from the
real to the imaginary. The idea of a system
behind, over, outside, and something different
from the related facts which the term "system"
is properly used to describe, whether
that system be a world-system, a logical
system, or a social system, whether it be
capitalism or socialism, "system" so conceived
is a favorite crowd-spook. It is the
same logical fallacy as if one spoke of the temperature
of this May day as the effect of the
climate, when all know that the term climate
is simply (to paraphrase James) the term by
which we characterize the temperature,
weather, etc., which we experience on this and
other days. We have already seen to what
use the crowd-mind puts all such generalizations.
A popular revolutionary philosophy of history
pictures the procession of the ages as
made up of a pageant of spook-social systems,
each distinct from the others and coming in
its appointed time. But social systems do
not follow in a row, like elephants in a circus
parade—each huge beast with its trunk coiled
about the end of his predecessors tail. The
greater part of this "evolutionary and revolutionary"
pageantry is simply dream-stuff.
Those who try to march into Utopia in such
an imaginary parade are not even trying to
reconstruct society; they are sociological
somnambulists.
The crowd-mind clings to such pageantry
because, as we saw in another connection, the
crowd desires to believe that evolution guarantees
its own future supremacy. It then
becomes unnecessary to solve concrete problems.
One need only possess an official program
of the order of the parade. In other
words, the crowd must persuade itself that
only one solution of the social problem is
possible, and that one inevitable—its own.
Such thinking wholly misconceives the nature
of the social problem. Like all the practical
dilemmas of life, this problem, assuming
it to be in any sense a single problem, is real
just because more than one solution is possible.
The task here is like that of choosing
a career. Whole series of partially foreseen
possibilities are contingent upon certain definite
choices. Aside from our choosing, many
sorts of futures may be equally possible.
Our intervention at this or that definite point
is an act by which we will one series of possibilities
rather than another into reality.
But the act of intervention is never performed
once for all. Each intervention leads only to
new dilemmas, among which we must again
choose and intervene. It is mainly in order
to escape from the necessity of facing this
terrifying series of unforeseeable dilemmas that
the crowd-man walketh in a vain show.
In pointing out the futility of present-day
revolutionary crowd-thinking, I am only striving
to direct, in however small a degree, our
thought and energies into channels which
lead toward desired results. It is not by
trombones that we are to redeem society, nor
is the old order going to tumble down like the
walls of Jericho, and a complete new start be
given. Civilization cannot be wiped out and
begun all over again. It constitutes the
environment within which our reconstructive
thinking must, by tedious effort, make certain
definite modifications. Each such modification
is a problem in itself, to be dealt with,
not by belief in miracle, but by what Dewey
calls "creative intelligence." Each such modification
must be achieved by taking all the
known facts, which are relevant, into account.
As such it is a new adaptation, and
the result of a series of such adaptations may
be as great and radical a social transformation
as one may have the courage to set as the goal
of a definite policy of social effort. But there
is a world of difference between social thinking
of this kind, where faith is a working hypothesis,
and that which ignores the concrete
problems that must be solved to reach the
desired goal, and, after the manner of crowds,
dreams of entering fairyland, or of pulling
a new world en bloc down out of the blue,
by the magic of substituting new tyrannies
for old.
Revolutionary crowd-thinking is not "creative
intelligence." It is hocus-pocus, a sort
of social magic formula like the "mutabor"
in the Arabian Nights; it is an Aladdins-lamp
philosophy. And here we may sum up this
part of our argument. The idea of the revolution
is to the crowd a symbol, the function
of which is compensation for the burdens of
the struggle for existence, for the feeling of
social inferiority, and for desires suppressed
by civilization. It is an imaginary escape
from hard reality, a new-world system in
which the ego seeks refuge, a defense mechanism
under the compulsive influence of which
crowds behave like somnambulistic individuals.
It is the apotheosis of the under crowd
itself and the transcendental expression and
justification of its will to rule. It is made up
of just those broad generalizations which are
of use in keeping that crowd together. It
gives the new crowd unction in its fight with
the old, since it was precisely these same
dream-thoughts which the old crowd wrote on
its banners in the day when it, too, was blowing
trumpets outside the walls of Jericho.