A period of inaction succeeded the victory at Vimiero. Burrard
was superseded in his command by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and
the convention of Cintra perfected, by which an army was
restored to France, that, had Sir Arthur Wellesley’s advice been
attended to, must have been eventually destroyed or driven into
such extremity as should have produced an unconditional surrender.
Other articles in this disgraceful treaty recognised a
full exercise of rights of conquest to the French, secured to them
the enormous plunder their rapacity had accumulated, and
granted an amnesty to every traitor who had abandoned his
country, and aided the invaders in effecting its subjugation. No
wonder that this precious convention occasioned in Britain a
universal feeling of disgust. No wonder that blood spilled in
vain, and treasure uselessly wasted, roused popular indignation
to a pitch of excitement which no occurrence in modern history
can parallel.
Within twelve months from the commencement of the war
Britain had sent over to the Spanish armies (besides £2,000,000)
150 pieces of field artillery, 42 thousand rounds of ammunition,
200 thousand muskets, 61 thousand swords, 79 thousand pikes,
23 million ball cartridges, 6 million leaden balls, 15 thousand
barrels of gunpowder, 92 thousand suits of clothing, 356 thousand
sets of accoutrements and pouches, 310 thousand pairs of shoes,
37 thousand pairs of boots, 40 thousand tents, 250 thousand yards
of cloth, 10 thousand sets of camp equipage, 118 thousand yards
of linen, 50 thousand great coats, 50 thousand canteens, 54
thousand haversacks, with a variety of other stores, far too
numerous to be recapitulated.
The particulars of the treaty of Cintra, immediately on
being known in Britain, occasioned the recall of Sir Hew
Dalrymple; while under the plea of ill health, his colleague, Sir
Harry Burrard, resigned and returned home. What a different
result the Portuguese campaign would have exhibited had these
two old gentlemen been left in a district command, and not been
allowed to check a career of victory which opened with such
glorious promise!
Sir Arthur Wellesley had already returned to Britain, and
many officers of all ranks followed his example. The command
of the army devolved on Sir John Moore, a man most deservedly
respected by the country, and popular with his soldiers.
Meanwhile, the general indication of national resistance to
French oppression on the part of the Spaniards, encouraged hopes
that if assisted by Britain, the independence of the Peninsula
might be restored. This was a consideration worthy of a statesman’s
serious regard in both France and Britain—for the thraldom
or independence of Spain was an object of vital importance.
As to what might be expected from the Spaniards themselves in
any attempt made for their own liberation, their invaders and
their allies seemed to have formed an erroneous estimate—the
British over-rating the importance of their exertions in the field,
as much as the French undervalued that patriotic impulse, which
had wakened up the slumbering spirit of the people. The
British cabinet, however, determined to foster this national
feeling, and by munificent supplies and the presence of a British
army, stimulate the Spanish people to assert their lost liberty,
and fling off a yoke no longer tolerable. For this purpose, a
force of twenty thousand men was directed to be assembled at
Valladolid, and a reinforcement of thirteen thousand, under Sir
David Baird, was despatched from Britain to join them; the
whole were to be placed under the orders of Sir John Moore.
Although Sir David’s corps was landed by the middle of
October, the army of Lisbon was not in a condition to move until
the end of the month; and then, under a false belief that the
direct route to Salamanca was impracticable for the passage of
artillery, the batteries and cavalry, with a protecting brigade of
three thousand infantry, were moved by Badajoz and the Escurial,
entailing on them an additional march of upwards of one hundred
and fifty miles. Worse still, a delay in commencing operations
was unavoidable, and that was attended with the worst results.
The whole of Sir John Hope’s corps having been at last
collected, and the cavalry assembled at Villa Vicosa, the order
to move forward was given.
On the 5th of November, Sir John Moore was at Atalia, on
the 8th he reached Almeida, and on the 11th his advanced guard
crossed the rivulet that divides Spain from Portugal, and entered
Cuidad Rodrigo. At San Martin he slept in the house of the
curé, and occupied the same bed that had the former year been
assigned to Junot and Loison on their respective marches, and on
the 13th he entered Salamanca.
There, disastrous news awaited him—for one of his supporting
armies was already hors de combat. Count Belvidere, having
made an absurd movement on Burgos, was attacked by a superior
force, and his raw levies completely routed; while previously,
Blake’s army had been utterly dispersed, and the magazines at
Reynosa taken. To add to this mass of evil tidings, intelligence
arrived that the fall of Madrid might be confidently expected,
while, instead of his advance into Spain being covered with an
army of seventy thousand men, Moore found himself in an open
town without a gun, without a Spanish picket, with only three
infantry brigades, and the French outposts but three marches
distant.
Madrid fell—the news could not be credited—and it was
asserted that, though the Retiro was taken, the town held
obstinately out. The inaction of the British was generally
censured; the envoy had remonstrated on the subject; and the
army did not conceal their impatience. Influenced by these
considerations, Moore determined to make a diversion on the
capital, and attack Soult, who was at Saldanha, on the Carion.
A forward movement followed—Baird was directed to march from
Astorga, and Romana was informed of the intended operation,
and requested to assist.
The decision of attacking Soult was known to the army and
gave general satisfaction. On the 16th, headquarters were at
Toro, and passing Villapondo and Valderosa, on the 20th Sir John
reached Majorga, and was joined by Baird’s division, making an
united force of twenty-three thousand five hundred infantry, two
thousand four hundred cavalry, and, including a brigade of three-pounders—from
its small calibre perfectly useless—an artillery
of nearly fifty guns. Soult’s corps amounted to sixteen thousand
infantry and twelve hundred dragoons. The great portion of
the former were at Saldanha, and Debelle’s cavalry at Sahagun.
While thus advancing, the brilliant affair between Lord Paget
and the French cavalry shed a passing glory on a series of
operations, whose results were generally so calamitous. We
shall give the affair in the words of the noble colonel of the
10th Hussars, than whom, on that occasion, no one “by daring
deed” more effectually contributed to victory.
The Monastero Melgar Abaxo is distant about three leagues
from Sahagun, in which place a corps of seven hundred French
cavalry were reported to be lodged. As they were at some
distance from the main body of the French army, it was deemed
practicable to cut them off, and Lord Paget determined, at all
events, to make the attempt. He accordingly put himself at the
head of the 10th and 15th Hussars, and in the middle of a cold
wintry night, when the direct route to Salamanca was impracticable,
for the ground was covered with snow, set off for that
purpose.
When they had ridden about two-thirds of the way, Lord
Paget divided his force, and desiring General Slade, with the
10th, to pursue the course of the Cea, and to enter the town by
that side, he himself, followed by the 15th, wheeled off to
approach it by a different route. It was not long before his
lordship’s party fell in with a picket of the enemy; and all, except
one man, were either cut down or made prisoners. But the
escape of one was as injurious, under existing circumstances, as
the escape of the whole; for the alarm was given, and before the
15th could reach the place the enemy were ready to receive them.
It was now broad daylight, and as our troops drew near, the
French were soon formed in what appeared to be an open plain,
at no great distance from the town. The 15th were wheeled into
line in a moment, and as there was no time to be lost, they
followed their leader at a brisk trot, with the intention of
charging; but when they were yet fifty yards from the enemy,
they found that a wide ditch divided them, and that the French
had availed themselves of other inequalities in the ground, of
which, when some way off, they had not been aware.
A pause was now necessarily made, but one instant served to
put the whole again in motion. The regiment, wheeling to its
left, soon found a convenient place for crossing; and though the
enemy manœuvred actively to hinder the formation, they were
again in line, and advancing to the charge, within five minutes
from the commencement of the check. A few changes of ground
now took place, as each corps strove to gain the flank of the
other, but they were only a few. The British cavalry effected
its object, and then coming down at full speed upon their
opponents, who stood to receive the shock, they overthrew them
in an instant. Many were killed upon the spot, many more
unhorsed, and one hundred and fifty-seven were made prisoners,
including two lieutenant-colonels. On this occasion the British
cavalry amounted only to four hundred men, whilst that of the
French fell not short of seven hundred.
The weather continued bad; the troops were a good deal
knocked up by forced marching, and Sir John halted on the 22nd
and 23rd for supplies, intending by a night march to reach the
Carion, and attack Soult on the morrow. Every account made
the British numerically greater than the enemy, and though the
French had been reinforced, still Moore’s army was stronger by
fully five thousand men.
All dispositions were made for the intended attack. At
eight at night, the army were to move in two columns, and the
right, which was to force the bridge and penetrate to Saldanha,
was actually getting under arms, when couriers arrived “loaded
with heavy tidings.” The French were moving in all directions
to cut the British off; the corps which had been marching south,
was suddenly halted at Talavera; two strong divisions were
moving from Placentia; the Badajoz army was in full march on
Salamanca—and Napoleon himself in the field, determined, as it
was reported, to “sweep the British before him to the ocean.”
This was, in truth, disastrous intelligence. The orders to
advance were countermanded instantly, the troops, who had
already been mustering, were retired to their quarters, and the
object of the expedition seemed virtually ended. The campaign
was indeed a tissue of mistakes—operating with feeble allies,
acting on false information, advancing to-day, retiring to-morrow,
with everything to harass and nothing to excite the soldier, until
at last, the ill-fated and ill-planned expedition terminated in a
ruinous retreat.
In making preparations for a rapid march before an enemy,
that from report was overwhelming if not avoided, the 23rd of
December was consumed, and the general plan for regressive
operations was arranged by instantly retreating on Galicia.
All arrangements being completed, Moore commenced retreating
on the 24th. Hope’s division fell back on Castro Gonzalo,
and Baird’s on Valencia; while cavalry patrols were pushed
forward on the Carion, with orders to retire at nightfall of the
25th, giving the reserve and light infantry, which formed the
rear-guard, a start of some three or four hours in advance. All
was admirably executed—and the columns, unmolested, reached
their respective destinations.
The retreat continued, marked by some occasional affairs
between the cavalry of the advanced and rear guard, which
terminated invariably in favour of the latter. The hussar regiments
behaved most nobly, and on every occasion, regardless of
numbers, or the more discouraging movements of a retreat, they
sought the combat, and always came off the conquerors.
The infantry already began to experience the annoyance of
long marches, severe weather, and a very indifferent commissariate.
To march over cut-up roads, and through an exhausted
country, where no friendly place of strength protects, no well-supplied
magazine refreshes, soon harasses the overloaded soldier.
But that, when accomplished in the dead of winter—in cold and
darkness, sleet and rain—was enough to have subdued the spirit
of any army but a British one, retiring under every privation,
and with seventy thousand veteran troops marching on their
flanks and rear.
The army reached Benevente on the 27th—and the crossing of
the Esla, though exceedingly troublesome, was effected with
inconsiderable loss. The roads were wretched, the weather bad,
and the French pursuit marked by the fiery character of their
emperor. He crossed the Carpenteras, regardless of obstacles that
would have discouraged the boldest—and, in a hurricane of sleet
and hail, passed his army over the Guadarama, by a route
declared impracticable even to a mountain peasant.
This bold operation, worthy of the conqueror of Italy, was
followed up by an immediate advance. On the 26th the main
body of the British continued retreating on Astorga—the bridge
across the Esla was destroyed—and the night of the 27th passed
over in tolerable quiet. In the morning, however, the French
were seen actively employed. Five hundred cavalry of the guard
tried for the ford above the ruined bridge, found it, and passed
over. The pickets forming the rear-guard at once confronted
them, and, led on by Colonel Otway, charged repeatedly, and
checked the leading squadron. General Stuart put himself at
the head of the pickets, while Lord Anglesea rode back to bring
up the 10th. Charges were made on both sides; the pickets
gave ground, the French advanced, but the 10th were speedily at
hand, and came forward. The pickets rallied, they cheered and
cut boldly in at speed, the French were overthrown and driven
across the river, with the loss of their Colonel (Le Fevre), and
seventy officers and men.
This brilliant encounter had the results that boldness wins.
The French kept a respectful distance, and thus, the column was
enabled to gain Astorga without further molestation.
But the danger was momentarily increasing. From prisoners
taken in the cavalry affair on the Esla, it was ascertained that,
on the preceding evening, the headquarters of Napoleon’s own
corps were but sixteen miles from the bivouacs of the British,
and to reach Villa Franca before the French was imperatively
necessary. On that event how much depended—for on the
possession of that road, in a great degree, would rest the safety or
destruction of the British, as it opens through a defile into a
country that for miles renders cavalry movements impracticable,
and entirely protects the flanks of a retiring army.
It is astonishing how quickly a retreat in bad weather destroys
the morale of the best army. The British divisions had marched
from Sabugal on the 24th in the highest order; on the 30th, on
reaching Astorga, their disorganisation had commenced; they
seemed a mob flying from a victorious enemy, and General Moore
himself exhibited a despondency that was apparent to all around
him.
That he was an officer of great distinction everyone acknowledged
during his life, and posterity will never deny it; but it was
too manifest that a fear of responsibility, a dread of doing that
which was wrong, of running himself and his troops into difficulties
from which they might not be able to extricate themselves,
were a great deal too active to permit either his talents or his
judgment properly to exert their influence. Sir John Moore
had earned the highest reputation as a general of division; he
was aware of this, and perhaps felt no inclination to risk it; at
all events he was clearly incapable of despising partial obstacles
in the pursuit of some great ultimate advantage; in one word, he
was not a Wellington. Of this no more convincing proof need
be given than the fact that, even at the moment when the
preparations for the brief advance were going on, his whole heart
and soul seemed turned towards the Portuguese frontier.
Romana had unfortunately given up the Leon route, and
marching on Astorga, encumbering the roads with the ruins of
his baggage, and worse still, filling the villages he passed through
with crowds of ragged followers unable to get on—some from
absolute decrepitude and want, and more from being attacked by
fever of the worst type.
The retreat was renewed next morning, and the marching
continued with such constancy that, by abandoning the sick and
wounded, wasting the ammunition, and destroying the stores, the
British outstripped pursuit, and on the 3rd of January found
themselves in comparative safety. The cavalry, as usual, distinguished
themselves; and at Cacabelos, where the rear-guard
was overtaken, behaving with their customary esprit, they
repelled the advance of the French hussars, and prevented the
light troops from being surrounded and cut off. Indeed the
escape of the rifles was wonderful. They were retreating through
the town, and part of the rear-guard had already crossed the
bridge, when the French cavalry came suddenly on in overwhelming
force, and galloping into the rear companies of the
95th, succeeded in making some prisoners.
The rifles instantly broke into skirmishing order, and commenced
retiring up the hill, when a body of voltigeurs rushed to
the support of the cavalry, and the affair became serious. The
95th, however, had now thrown themselves into the vineyards
behind the town, and kept up a rapid and well-directed fire. The
French attempted to get in their rear, and charged boldly up the
road, led on by General Colbert. But the fusilade from the vineyard
was maintained with such precision that the French were
driven back, leaving a number of dead on the field, among whom
their brave and daring leader was included.
Sir John was also threatened with attack at Villa Franca. A
strong column of infantry appeared on the heights, in full march
on that division which was in position on the opposite hill. The
artillery opened, and an engagement appeared inevitable. But
checked by the cannonade, the forward movement of the French
was arrested; and Sir John, anxious to reach the better position
of Lugo, continued his retreat, and prudently avoided coming to
a general action, where the ground had no military advantage to
induce him to risk a combat. The main body marched to
Herrieras, the reserve to Villa Franca, and the rear-guard moved
at ten o’clock, and reached its bivouac at midnight.
The cavalry, no longer serviceable in a country rough, hilly,
and wooded, with numerous enclosures around vineyards and
plantations of mulberry trees, were sent on to Lugo; the infantry
and artillery marching for the same place. During the whole
day and night that distressing movement was executed, and forty
miles were passed over roads on every side broken up, and in
places, knee-deep. The men dropped down by whole sections
on the wayside and died—some with curses, some with the voice
of prayer in their mouths—while women and children, of whom
an immense number had injudiciously been allowed to accompany
the army, shared a similar fate.
Horrible scenes momentarily occurred—children frozen in
their mothers’ arms, women taken in labour, and, of course,
perishing with their ill-fated progeny. Some were trying by the
madness of intoxication to stimulate their worn-out frames to
fresh exertion—or, when totally exhausted, to stupefy the agonies
of the slow but certain death that cold and hunger must inevitably
produce before another sun dawned. It was awful to
observe the different modes, when abandoned to die, in which the
miserable wretches met their fate. Some lay down in sullen
composure—others vented their despair in oaths, and groans,
and curses—and not a few in heart-rending prayers to heaven
that the duration of their sufferings might be abridged.
From an early period of the retreat, the discipline of the
troops was shaken by rapid movements and an absence of
regular supplies. Hence, the men were obliged to shift as they
best could, and this laxity in discipline gradually increasing,
ended in frequent scenes of drunkenness, rioting, and robbery.
Every town and village was sacked in search of food, the wine
stores plundered, and the casks, in mere wantonness, broken and
spilled. Nothing could check the licentious spirit of the troops;
and when a man was hanged at Benivedre, even that sad example
had not the least effect, for many of the marauders were detected
in the act of plundering within sight of the fatal tree.
During this distressing movement, the French had pressed the
British rear-guard closely, and a constant scene of skirmishing
ensued. Though invariably checked by the light troops, still the
army was hourly becoming less effective, every league reducing it
both in numbers and resources. Quantities of arms and necessaries
were abandoned or destroyed, and two bullock carts loaded
with dollars were thrown over a precipice into the bed of a
mountain torrent. All these things proved how desperately
reduced that once fine and well-appointed army had become.
Indeed its appearance was rather that of a procession of maimed
invalids with a caravan of sick soldiers, than an army operating
in front of a determined enemy, and expecting momentarily to
come to action.
It was a matter of surprise to all, that the French leader did
not force on an engagement; but, on the contrary, Soult followed
this half-ruined army with a caution that appeared unaccountable
and unnecessary. Still the moment of attack could not be
distant; and it was certain that the Marshal only waited for
some embarrassment in the march, to throw his leading divisions
on the retreating brigades of Britain, and force on a decisive
battle.
This event was particularly to be dreaded while passing the
bridge and village of Constantino. A long and difficult mountain
road leads to the summit of a bold height, down which it winds
again by a gradual descent till it meets the bridge. The occupation
of this height, before the columns had passed the river,
would expose them to a heavy fire. Sir John Moore determined
to check the French pursuit, and hold the hill, until the rear of
the main division had cleared the bridge and village. His dispositions
were quickly made; the 28th regiment with the rifle
corps were drawn up beside the river, and the 20th, 52nd, and
91st on a hill immediately in their rear, flanked by the horse
artillery.
The French attacked with their usual spirit. The cavalry
and tirailleurs advanced against the bridge; but the fire from the
British riflemen, assisted by the guns on the height, drove them
back with loss. A second and a third attack, made with equal
boldness, ended in a similar result, and darkness put a stop to the
fighting. The French withdrew their light troops, the British
continued their retreat, and before morning broke the rear-guard
joined the army, now bivouacked in position, or cantoned in and
around the town of Lugo.
The concentration of so many troops at this wretched place
produced a scene of hurry and confusion with which the distant
cannonade at the bridge of Constantino seemed in perfect
keeping.
On one side was to be seen the soldier of every rank who had
secured a habitation to shelter him, but whom duty or inclination
occasioned to wander through the crowds of people, and deeply
mudded streets of the town; on the other, the disconsolate person
that made his appearance after the Alcalde’s ingenuity had been
stretched to the uttermost in procuring quarters for the troops
already arrived, and whose personal friends had been subjected
to the unusual order for admitting strangers. The pitiableness
of his case was either to be discovered by a resigned and woeful
visage, or by certain ebullitions of temper, destined to waste
themselves in the desert air. Next were to be seen the conductors
of baggage, toiling through the streets, their laden mules
almost sinking under the weight of ill-arranged burdens swinging
from side to side, while the persons in whose charge they had
followed the divisions appeared undecided which to execrate most,
the roads, the mules, the Spaniards, or the weather. These were
succeeded by the dull, heavy sound of the passing artillery; then
came the Spanish fugitives from the desolating line of the armies.
Detachments with sick or lamed horses scrambled through the
mud, while, at intervals, the report of a horse-pistol knelled the
termination to the sufferings of an animal that a few days previously,
full of life and high in blood, had borne its rider not
against, but over, the ranks of Gallic chivalry. The effect of
this scene was rendered more striking by the distant report of
cannon and musketry, and more gloomy by torrents of rain, and
a degree of cold worthy of a Polish winter.
Preparations were made for a battle, and Sir John Moore
seemed determined to retreat no further. Notwithstanding the
British were suffering from cold, and wet, and hunger, they fell
into their position with alacrity. The Minho protected their
right, and a ravine separated them from the French, who, already
in force, occupied the heights, and were evidently preparing for
an immediate effort.
On the 6th January the French deployed upon the heights,
and the British stood to their arms. Some hours passed; each
line looked at the other, as if waiting for its opening movement.
The day passed, and at night the hostile armies occupied the same
bivouacs on which their brigades had rested the preceding
evening.
The 7th came; with the first dawn, as if to make up for its
previous inactivity, the French guns opened. Their battery was
but weak, and the fire of the British artillery silenced it. A
pause ensued, the day wore on, the evening was closing, when a
column of considerable strength, covered by a cloud of tirailleurs,
steadily mounted the hill, driving in the pickets and a wing of the
76th. The 51st was instantly moved to its assistance, musketry
was interchanged, a bayonet rush succeeded, the French were
driven down the hill, and operations terminated.
Darkness came on, a wild and stormy night, a lonely hill, no
fire, no food—such was the bivouac of Lugo; such the wretched
and cheerless situation of the harassed but unconquerable
islanders.
As the morning of the 8th dawned, the British formed line,
and prepared coolly for the expected encounter; but it passed
over, and the enemy made no hostile movement. The troops
had been ordered to bivouac as they best could, and in a short
time a number of rude huts were erected to defend them from
the inclemency of the coming night. But it was not intended to
remain longer before Lugo. When darkness hid their retreat,
the British filed off silently by the rear. Through a frightful
storm of hail and wind, their march was bravely executed; and
leaving Lugo and Valmela behind them, they halted at Betanzos
on the 10th.
Here the exhausted soldiery were halted from sheer necessity.
They were literally marched to a stand still, and, although the
rain fell in torrents, they lay down upon the soaked earth, and
in that comfortless situation remained until at evening the ranks
were again formed, and the retreat continued on Corunna, where
Sir John had now decided on embarking the ruins of his army.
Fortunately for the wearied troops, the French, deceived by
the fires left burning when the British commenced their night
march from Lugo, did not discover the movement until daylight,
and thus twelve hours were gained on the pursuers. This lost
time could not be recovered; and although the whole of the
10th January was passed in Betanzos, to allow stragglers to rejoin
their regiments, no serious attempt was made to embarrass the
remainder of the march, and the leading division reached Corunna
at noon of the 11th, while the reserve occupied the adjoining
villages, and the remaining brigades took up their quarters in the
suburbs.
Corunna afforded a very indifferent position to offer battle on.
There was one, but its extent made it untenable by an army so
weak in number as the British. After a close examination, the
rising ground above the village of Elvina, a mile in front of the
town, was the place selected by the general; the position was
accordingly marked out, and the brigades moved to their allotted
posts.
A ridge commanded the Betanzos road and formed the left of
the line, and on this General Hope’s division was placed. Sir
David Baird’s was next in station, and occupied a succession of
knolls that swept inwards, and inclined to a valley beyond the
Vigo road. Over the low grounds the rifle corps were extended,
appuied upon Frazer’s division, which, placed in echelon, covered
the principal approach to Corunna. Paget’s division was in
reserve behind Hope’s, and occupied a village half a mile in the
rear.
The enemy appeared beyond the Mero while these dispositions
were being made; but, with the exception of a partial cannonade,
no hostile demonstration occurred. On the 14th, the artillery
had ceased on both sides, an unusual quiet ensued, and nothing
seemed likely to produce any immediate excitement, when the
explosion of four thousand barrels of gunpowder burst upon the
astonished ear. It is impossible to describe the effect. The
unexpected and tremendous crash seemed for the moment to have
deprived every person of reason and recollection; “the soldiers
flew to their arms, nor was it until a tremendous column of
smoke, ascending from the heights in front, marked from whence
the astounding shock proceeded, that reason resumed its sway.
It is impossible ever to forget the sublime appearance of the dark
dense cloud of smoke that ascended, shooting up gradually like
a gigantic tower into the clear blue sky. It appeared fettered
in one enormous mass; nor did a particle of dust or vapour,
obscuring its form, seem to escape as it rolled upwards in majestic
circles.”
On the 15th the fleet hove in sight, and immediate preparations
were made to effect an embarkation of the army. The
women and children, with the sick and wounded, were directly
carried on board; a large portion of the artillery and stores was
sent afterwards; and the cavalry, after destroying the few horses
that still remained, were embarked. None but the infantry, and
of these such only as were effective, were now left; and the belief
was general, that they too, would be permitted to retire from
their position unmolested.
Everything on the 16th continued quiet. The boats pulled
from the shipping to the beach, and orders were issued for the
divisions to move down, and prepare for immediate embarkation;
Sir John Moore was on horseback to visit the outposts, for the
last time, before they should be withdrawn, when an officer came
up hastily, and announced that the French were under arms.
The intelligence was correct; for an instant fusilade commenced
between their tirailleurs and the British pickets, as their light
troops pushed forward, covering the advance of four compact
columns. Two directed their march upon the right, one moved
upon the centre, while the fourth threatened the left of the
British line.
The right, consisting of the 4th, 42nd, and 50th, supported by
the guards, were fiercely attacked, and the reserve ordered to
sustain it. The French threw out a cloud of skirmishers,
supported by the fire of eleven pieces of artillery, and, driving the
advanced posts before them, came forward with their customary
boldness. On deploying partially, their line extended considerably
beyond the extreme right of the British, but this was disregarded,
and instead of waiting the attack, the regiments
gallantly advanced to meet it. The 4th suddenly refusing its
right wing, showed a double front, and unawed by a superior
enemy, undaunted by a heavy and well-directed cannonade, the
manœuvre of this splendid regiment was executed with all the
coolness and precision of a parade.
For a time the irregularity of ground intersected by numerous
enclosures, kept the combatants apart; but these were speedily
surmounted, and the French assault was made and repelled, and
the village of Elvina, which had for a few minutes been in
possession of the enemy, was recovered by the 50th with the
bayonet.
The action was now general along the line. The 42nd, and
a battalion of the Guards, by a brilliant charge, drove back the
French; and, failing to force, Soult endeavoured to turn the
British right, and accordingly marched a column in its rear.
That the reserve attacked, and repulsed it with heavy loss. In
every point Soult’s attacks failed—and, altering his dispositions,
he took ground considerably to the right.
While the 42nd were lowering their bayonets, and Sir John
Moore was encouraging the charge, a round shot knocked him
from his horse, shattering his left arm at the shoulder—while
immediately before, Sir David Baird had been wounded and
removed. But the fall of their generals produced no serious
results. Corunna was not a battle of manœuvre, but a field of
determined resistance. The officers commanding the different
battalions fought their regiments gallantly; the dispositions for
the engagement were simple and understood; the attempts upon
the left and centre were repulsed; and the French, beaten on
every point, fell back as night came on.
Thus ended the conflict of Corunna; and when every disadvantage
is taken into consideration under which the British
fought, its results were glorious, and the courage and coolness
displayed throughout most honourable to the troops employed.
The numbers engaged were certainly in favour of the French.
Without its light brigade, which had retreated and embarked at
Vigo, the British divisions scarcely reached to fifteen thousand;
while Soult was reinforced in the morning, and mustered from
eighteen to twenty thousand men. The loss on both sides was
severe; that of the British amounting to eight hundred killed
and wounded, while the French admitted theirs to be at least
double that number.
Yet it was but a melancholy triumph. The sad reverses of
the retreat, the abandonment of the country, and the death of a
brave and beloved commander, clouded the hour of conquest, and
threw a depressing gloom around, that seemed fitter to mark a
defeat than attend a well-won victory. No further attempt was
made by the enemy; the brigades were removed after dark, the
embarkation continued, and on the afternoon of the 17th, the
whole fleet was under weigh, steering for Britain with a leading
wind.
The severity of a wound like Sir John Moore’s precluded, from
the first moment it was received, all hope of his surviving beyond
an hour or two. The arm was torn nearly from the shoulder,
and the collar-bone partially carried away; but notwithstanding
the desperate hemorrhage that ensued, the sufferer preserved
his recollection, and remained in mental possession to the
last.
He was carried from the field in a blanket by six soldiers, who
evinced their sympathy by tears; and when a spring waggon
came up, and it was proposed that Sir John should be transferred
to it, the poor fellows respectfully objected, “as they would keep
step, and carry him more easily.” Their wishes were attended
to, and the dying general was conveyed slowly to his quarters in
the town, occasionally stopping the bearers to look back upon the
field, whenever an increasing fire arrested his attention. All
hope was over; he lingered for a little, talking feebly, but
collectedly, to those around, and dividing his last thoughts
apparently, between his country and his kindred. The kindliness
of his disposition was in death remarkable. Turning to an
aide-de-camp, he desired to be remembered to his sister, and,
feebly pressing Colonel Anderson’s hand, his head dropped back,
and he died without a struggle.
As a wish had been expressed by the departed, that he
should be laid in the field on which he fell, the rampart of the
citadel was happily chosen for his “resting place.” A working
party of the 9th turned up the earth—and at midnight, wrapped
in a cloak and blanket, his uncoffined remains were interred by
the officers of his staff; the burial-service was read by torch-light,
earth fell on kindred clay, the grave was filled, and, in the poet’s
words, “They left him alone with his glory.”
In every private relation, Sir John Moore’s character was
perfect, and his professional career had always been distinguished.
Of no man had higher hopes been formed, and hence, probably,
more was expected by his country than either his means or his
talents could effect. By one party he was unjustly censured, by
another injudiciously praised; and in this ferment of opinion it is
difficult to say whether his military reputation was most
endangered by the obloquy of his enemies or the over-praise of
his friends.