After a three years’ war, and at the cost of over 200
millions, Britain has secured for her own children the
indisputable possession of the new colonies. In earlier
chapters an attempt has been made to sketch roughly
the historical influences which may help to shape the
future and to describe the actual features of the land
which charm and perplex the beholder. We have
now to face the direct problems into which the situation
can be resolved, and in particular that question of
material wellbeing which is the most insistent, because
the most easily realised, for both statesman and people.
The economic factor in the politics of a country is
always a difficult matter to discuss, for it is made up
of infinite details, some of them purely speculative, all
of them hard to disentangle. If a business man were
to do what he never does, and sit down to analyse
calmly his position, he would have to go far beyond
balance-sheets and statements of profit and loss. He
would be compelled to look into the social and
economic conditions under which he lived; he would
have to estimate rival activities and forecast their
development; the money market, rates of exchange,
the nature of the labour supply, the effect of political
and social movements, even such matters as his own
bodily and mental health, and his standing among
his fellows, would properly make part of the inquiry.
With the private individual the analysis would be
ridiculous, because the component parts are too minute
to realise; but with a nation, where the lines are
broader, some stock-taking of this kind is periodically
desirable. But in spite of, or because of, the complexity
of the inquiry, the human mind is apt to
complicate it needlessly by running after side-issues
and losing sight of the main features of the problem.
The economic position of a country embraces in a sense
almost every detail of human life; but there is no
reason why the mass of detail should be allowed to
get out of focus and obscure the synthesis of the
survey. Provided we remember that the economic
factor is not correctly estimated by looking only at
revenue and expenditure, imports and exports, and
fiscal provisions, we may safely devote our energies to
steering clear of the labyrinth of secondary detail
in which the ordinary statistician would seek to
involve us.
In the following pages it is proposed to confine the
survey to what appear to be the main features of a
complex question. It would be vain to embark on
speculations as to the payable ore in the ground,
market forecasts, suggestions for new industries, and
the many hints towards a reformed fiscal system with
which local and European papers have been crowded.
It is sufficient to note the existence of such questions;
the materials for a true understanding of the South
African economy are not to be found in them. In
particular it is proposed to avoid needless statistics,
which, apart from the fact that they are often inaccurate
and partisan, are the buttress of that
particularist logic which is the foe of true reason.
Two questions may be taken as the general heads of
our inquiry: first, Wherein consists the wealth of the
land, actual and potential? and, secondly, How best
may that wealth be maintained and developed for the
national good?
I.
The cardinal economic fact is the existence of gold—gold
as it is found in no other country, not in casual
pockets and reefs, but in quantities which can for the
most part be accurately mapped out and valued
months and years before it is worked; gold which is
mined not as an adventure, but as an organised and
stable industry. The Main Reef formation extends
for sixty-two miles, from Randfontein to Holfontein,[15]
but three-fourths of the gold mined has been produced
in the central section, which is only some twelve miles
long. In 1886 the district was proclaimed a public
gold-field, and since that day ore worth nearly 100
millions sterling has been extracted. The development
took place in spite of difficulties which vastly increased
the working costs. The dynamite and railway monopolies,
the heavy expense of the transit of machinery
from the coast, the absence of subsidiary local industries
to feed the gold industry, forced the work into
the hands of a small circle of rich firms who could
provide the large capital and face the heavy risks of a
new enterprise. It is clear, therefore, that mining on
the Rand, while a notable enterprise, has necessarily
been a slow one, since the two natural factors, the
amount of gold in the soil and the labour of working
it, have been complicated by many artificial hindrances.
The past is not the true basis for estimating
the future of the industry; the proper premises for a
forecast are the two natural factors—the quantity of
gold in the earth and the normal cost of winning it.
It is the first that concerns us at present.
All estimates must be merely conjectural, and can
be used only with the greatest caution. But in the
multitude of conjectures there may be such a consensus
of opinion as to ensure us a fair certainty that
this or that is the view of those who are best fitted to
judge. Mr Bleloch, in a calculation based on the
report of the most eminent engineers, values the
amount of gold still in the Rand at 2871 millions
sterling, showing a profit to the companies concerned
of over 975 millions. If we put the life of the Rand
at one hundred years, which is a mean between conflicting
estimates, we shall have an average, allowing
for reserve funds, of 8 millions to be paid yearly in
dividends to shareholders. In 1898 twenty-six companies
paid dividends amounting to over 4 millions:
therefore, on Mr Bleloch’s figures, we can promise at
least one hundred years to the Rand of twice the prosperity
of 1898. These figures include the deep levels,
but do not take into account any of the Rand extensions,
in which the Main Reef has been traced for
over 300 miles. It is certain that in the direction
of Heidelberg and Greylingstad gold in payable
quantities exists for not less than seventy miles, and
it is at least probable that a similar extension exists
in the Potchefstroom and Klerksdorp districts in the
west. So much for the peculiar “banket” formation
of the Rand, which must remain the type of stable
gold-mining,—stable, because the element of uncertainty
over any group of properties is reduced to a
minimum, and the high organisation necessary and
the large initial outlay produce a community less
of rivals than of fellow-workers. Quartz reefs and
alluvial deposits are found in many parts of the
country. In Lydenburg and Barberton, where the
earliest gold mines were sunk, several producing
companies are at work; and this type of mining
will develop equally with the Rand under a system
which abolishes monopolies and assists instead of
discouraging enterprise. In the northern districts,
around the Wood Bush and the Zoutpansberg ranges,
there are quartz and alluvial mining, and indications
of “banket” formation, and in the all but
unknown region adjoining Portuguese territory, if
tales be true, there may be gold in quantities still
undreamed of.
No figures are reliable, all estimates are disputed,
but from the very contradictions one fact emerges—that
there is gold enough to give employment to a
greatly increased mining population for at least fifty
years, and to decentralise the industry and create
large industrial belts instead of one industrial city.
Nor is gold the only mineral. From Pretoria to Piet
Retief run coal-beds, many of them of great richness
and good quality, covering an area of more than
10,000 square miles. It has been calculated that
60,000 million tons are available. The quality of the
coal in the undeveloped beds lying to the south of
Middelburg is, in the opinion of experts, equal to the
best British product. Iron-ore is abundant in many
parts, particularly in the coal-bearing regions of the
east. Lead has been worked near Zeerust, and there
are good grounds for believing that copper in large
quantities exists in Waterberg and in the tract
between Pietersburg and the Limpopo. Diamond
pipes are found in several places in the region due
east of Pretoria, where the new Premier Mine seems
to promise a richness not equalled by Kimberley; and
it is probable that places like the Springbok Flats and
the western parts of Christiana are highly diamondiferous.
Sapphires have been found in the west, and
diamonds and spinels are reported from the northern
mountains. Few countries have a soil more amply
mineralised; but the sparse population, mainly
absorbed in the quest of one mineral, has done little
to exploit its wealth. Mining, save for gold and coal,
is still in the Transvaal a thing of the future. The
agricultural and pastoral wealth is dealt with in
another chapter. But we may note an asset, which
is wholly undeveloped, in the cultivation and protection
of the natural wood of the north and east, and
the planting of imported trees. Timber in an inland
mining country is a valuable product, and on the soil
of the high veld new plantations spring up like
mushrooms. Ten feet a-year is the common rate of
growth for gums, and in the warmer tracts it is nearer
twenty. Many indigenous South African trees, which
a few years ago, under an unwise system of timber
concessions, were disappearing from most places save
a few sequestered glens in the north, might under
proper care become a lucrative branch of forestry.
Current estimates, rough and inaccurate as they
must be, are the fruit of a very general conviction,
which on the broadest basis is amply supported by
facts. There is sufficient natural wealth—mineral,
pastoral, and agricultural—to provide a sound industrial
foundation for the new States. It is only on
the details of its exploitation that experts differ.
In any calculation of natural wealth there is another
factor to be noted which controls production and dictates
its method. Whatever the natural riches of a
country may be, climate and situation must be weighed
in their practical estimate. A diamond pipe at the
South Pole and acres of rich soil in Tibet are practically
as valueless as a fine anchorage on the Sahara
coast or a bracing climate in Tierra del Fuego. In
the new colonies we have throughout three-fourths of
their area a climate where white men can labour out of
doors all the year round. The remaining fourth is less
pestilential than many places in Ceylon, Burma, and
the Malay Peninsula, where Europeans live and work.
There are certain very real climatic disadvantages—frequent
thunderstorms, hailstorms in summer when
fruits and crops are ripening, rains concentrated over
a few months, a long, dusty, waterless winter. But
these are difficulties which can be surmounted for the
most part by human ingenuity, and at the worst they
place no absolute bar on enterprise. From the standpoint
of health the climate is nearly perfect, inducing
a vigour and alertness of body and mind which in the
more feverish life of cities may ruin the nerves and
prematurely age a man, but in all wholesome forms of
labour enable work to be done at a maximum pressure
and with the minimum discomfort. In valuing, therefore,
the natural assets of the new colonies, we need
write off nothing for climatic hindrances. The situation
is a more doubtful matter. They pay for their
freedom from the low heats of the coast by the absence
of private outlets for trade and the consequent
difficulties which all people must meet who have to
hire others to do their shipping and carrying. It is
not the difficulty of Missouri or Ohio or other inland
states in one territory, but of separate peoples, with
interests often conflicting, who have to submit to
weary customs and railway arrangements before their
outlet can exist. This is one, perhaps the only,
genuine natural limitation which all schemes of economic
development must take account of.
The country is not new, and therefore in sketching
its natural wealth we do not exhaust the preliminaries
of the question. There are ready-made industrial conditions
to be considered which may modify our estimate
of the initial equipment. Such are the commercial
structures already built up in the great commercial
centre, which for this purpose represents the new
colonies; the nature and future of the labour supply;
the existing markets; the already prepared means of
transit. The gold industry, as was to be expected from
its nature, has fallen into the hands of a few houses.
Eight great financial groups control the wealth of the
Rand: the Eckstein group alone has interests which
might be capitalised at 70 millions; the Consolidated
Gold-fields at about 30 millions. The reason for this
state of affairs is obvious. Gold-mining in the Rand
fashion is a costly business, and altogether beyond the
reach of the small man: claims were bought up by the
financiers who were first in possession, and, since they
were able to hold and develop, the entry of other
financial houses has been blocked. But the great
mining firms do not confine their activity to gold.
They own millions of acres of land throughout the
country, and many valuable building sites in the
towns. Originally, doubtless, land was bought purely
as a mining speculation, but they are not slow, in the
absence of minerals, to make out of it what they can.
These Rand houses are the bugbear of a certain class
of politician. The Rand is closed to the small man, so
runs the cry; a system of trusts is being created; in
a little while the country will be under the iron heel
of a financial ring. It is assumed that the mining
firms will turn their attention to ordinary commerce,
and oust the independent trader and cultivator and
the small manufacturer. Certain trading experiments
by some of the chief houses, and an attempt to grow
food-supplies for their own employees, give a certain
support to the forecast.
If the Trust system in its American form were ever
to become a reality in South Africa, the obvious and
infallible checks against too wide an expansion would
arise there as elsewhere. A trust can only exist in full
strength under its originators. There can be no apostolic
succession in trust management; the second or
the third generation must be on a lower scale, and the
great fabric will crumble. A huge combination can
only be maintained by perpetual energy and ceaseless
labour, and, like the empire of Charlemagne, it will
dwindle under a successor. A trust can be created
but not perpetuated. No group of directors, no paid
manager, can maintain the nicety of judgment and the
sleepless care which alone can preserve from decay an
artificial structure imposed upon an unwilling society.
But in the case of the new colonies there are special
reasons which make this development highly improbable.
A trust flourishes only on highly protected
soil, and Free Trade must long be predominant in the
Transvaal. Again, while there can never be a trust in
gold, the market being unlimited and beyond any
possibility of control, gold-mining must remain the
chief interest for any group of firms who desired to
establish a trust in other commodities. Now gold-mining
is one-third an industry and two-thirds a
scientific inquiry. An ordinary trust is concerned
less with production than with the control of the
markets and the methods of distribution. But all
progress in Rand mining depends on nice and speculative
scientific calculation. To reduce the working
costs by improved appliances, so that ore of a low
grade may become payable, is so vital a matter with
every great firm which is concerned in gold-mining,
that the commercial or trust side, which must be
concerned not with gold but with other forms of production,
is not likely to be given undue prominence.
Human capacity is limited, and no man or body of
men can meet these two very different classes of problems
at the same time. The experiments of mining
firms in other trades have been due far more to the
immense cost of imports and the absence of subsidiary
industries than to a Napoleonic desire for consolidation.
There is room, abundant room, in the Transvaal
for ironworks and factories, for the private trader and
the independent farmer; and the bogey of the great
houses resolves itself in practice into little more than a
stimulating example in progressive business methods.
The foregoing remarks do not, however, touch the
question whether or not the gold industry is to remain
a preserve of a few groups. If it is, there can be little
real objection. The market for gold can never be controlled
like the diamond-market, and there is small
fear of a gold-mining De Beers dictating to the world.
Moreover, the great groups are not static but mobile,
constantly dividing and subdividing, throwing off subsidiary
companies and adding new ones, no more
monopolists than the cotton-spinners of Manchester
or the shipbuilders of Glasgow. The fact remains
that they own most of the mining rights in the country,
and all development must lie very much in their hands.
The owner of the minerals on a farm in Potchefstroom
is at liberty to form a company and work them himself.
But the case will be uncommon, since the bulk
of the mineral rights are already absorbed, and, on
the Rand system of mining, an unknown adventurer
would have difficulty in raising the large initial
capital. It is only in this sense that there is any
meaning in the charge of monopoly. A more real
grievance is that a great house will often buy up claims
throughout the country and leave them unworked till
it suits its pleasure, thereby hindering industrial development.
This, in a sense, is true, but the reason is
to be found mainly in the difficulty of development
under recent conditions,—conditions which, for the
matter of that, would have pressed far more hardly on
the small man than on the rich firms. So far as the
gold industry is concerned, the plaint of the humble
citizen on this score is a little ridiculous. He asks
an impossibility, and in his heart admits the folly of
the request.
It is time that the anti-capitalist parrot-cry were
recognised in its true meaning. On the Rand it is
not the wail of a downtrodden proletariat or of the
industrious small merchant whose occupation is gone.
It is the dishonest agitation of a speculating class
who find their activity limited by the strenuous and
rational policy of the great houses. I would suggest
as a fair parallel the outcry of small and disreputable
publicans in a rising town where it has been found
profitable to open good restaurants and decent hotels.
Without capital the Transvaal is a piece of bare
veld; with capital wrongly applied it is a hunting-ground
for the adventurer and the bogus-promoter.
The gold industry depends on capital, because only
capital combined with intelligence and patience could
have raised it from a speculation to an industry. But
facts are the most eloquent form of apologetics. At
the moment over 30 millions have been spent on
development by producing companies, leaving out of
account the large administrative and office expenses.
How much has been spent in the same way on mines
which have not reached the producing stage it is
impossible to say, but the figure must be very large.
To start an ordinary deep-level mine costs nearly a
million before any profits are made. Surely it is right
to see in an organisation which is prepared to face
such an outlay some qualities of courage and patience.
It is possible that the great houses may find themselves
in conflict with the best public opinion on certain
matters before the day is done; but it is well to recognise
that the very existence of an industrial population
is due to capital wisely and patiently used by the
strong men who were the makers of the country.
Last in our calculation of assets comes the existing
or accessible machinery of exploitation and production—the
labour supply, the means of transit, the available
markets. The first is a complicated matter on which
it is hard to dogmatise. For some months it has been
the most strenuously canvassed of South African
problems. On its solution depends without doubt
not only the future prosperity but the immediate
insolvency of the country. And at the same time,
being bound up more than other economic questions
with far-reaching political interests, its solution has
become less a commercial adjustment than a piece of
national policy. As was to be expected in this kind
of discussion, the true issues have been habitually
obscured. The antithesis is not between labour and
no labour, but in one aspect between the cheap,
unskilled native and the dear, more highly skilled
white; and in another between a limited supply,
which means the curtailment of enterprise, and an
unlimited supply, even of a lower quality, which
would allow full development. Again, the antithesis
is not absolute, as has been often assumed: the true
solution may lie in a compromise, a delicate cutting
of the coat to suit the particular cloths employed in
its making.
It is almost entirely a mining question. In most
other industries the work can be done by white men
with the assistance of a few natives. In agriculture,
as things stand at present, sufficient native labour
can be procured, and under an improved system of
taxation the supply might be largely increased,
within limits. The demand in agriculture should
diminish rather than increase, save in the tropical
and sub-tropical regions, where native labour is
always plentiful. On the high veld a single farmer,
if he ploughs with oxen, wants a boy as a voorlooper
and another to use the whip; but this and similar
work may well be performed in time by his own sons
or by white servants. Railway construction will draw
heavily on the supply, but its requirements are, after
all, limited and small in comparison with the immense
needs of the mines. For in the latter a very large
number of employees is necessary, the bulk of the
work is unskilled, and the conditions under which
it must be performed are frequently such as to deter
the ordinary European. The case is not quite that
of labour in the West Indian plantations with which
it has been compared, but there are many points of
resemblance. The labour, on the current view, must
be cheap; it must exist in large quantities; and the
work is bound in certain respects to be hard and
unpleasant—not perhaps harder than coal-mining
in England, but, taking into account the superior
average of comfort in the new colonies, indubitably
more unattractive to the local workman.
Before the war some 90,000 natives were employed
in the Witwatersrand mines. The average cost was
from 1s. 6d. to 2s. a-day, food and lodging being
provided; but the expense of acquiring the labour
considerably raised the actual price per man. The
old method was by a system of touts, who were
paid as much as £5 a-head for their importation.
The system led to great abuses, chicanery, needless
competition false promises, which often cut off the
supply in a whole territory. To meet the difficulty
the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association was
formed, whose duties were to recruit native labour
and distribute it equitably to the mines within the
association. Its agents were paid by salaries instead
of by results, and the various native locations in the
Transvaal, Swaziland, and Portuguese territory were
exploited by them. But with all its efforts the mines
were inadequately supplied. The 90,000 natives
barely sufficed to maintain the status quo, and there
was no margin for new development. The war
scattered the accumulated supply. The local natives
grew rich in military service, and declined to leave
their kraals. Those imported from a distance returned
to their homes, and the whole work of collection had
to begin again. In October 1902, which may be taken
as a fair date to estimate the condition of things after
the war, only 31,000 natives were at work, one-third
of the former staff. By May 1903, after herculean
efforts, the supply had increased to a little over
41,000.
The problem is, therefore, a very serious one. To
return to the old state of things the present supply
must be doubled; to provide for any adequate progress
it must at the lowest estimate be multiplied by
ten. Any wholesale increase to the mining wealth of
the country must come from the exploital of the deep
level and the low-grade properties. The working costs
per ton of ore run from 17s. 6d. to 30s.; on the Rand
the average is about 27s.[16] But the ordinary low-grade
mines produce ore worth little more than 18s.
to 20s. a-ton. To make their development possible the
working cost must be reduced to 15s.-17s. Improved
machinery may do something, but the first necessity
is cheap labour. But where are the natives to come
from? The efforts of the Native Labour Associations
have not succeeded in showing that the need can be
met from any of the old supply grounds. New taxation
and the spending of their war savings may drive
some of the Transvaal natives to the mines; but as
the total native population of the colony is only about
three quarters of a million, the whole working male
force, which may be taken at one in ten, would not
meet the demand. In addition to this we have the
fact that no taxation would reach more than one-half
of the population, and that of this half three-quarters
is probably unfit for mining work. The total native
population south of the Zambesi is at the present
moment a little over 6 millions. Supposing this
field were worked to the uttermost, we should still
scarcely meet the demands likely to arise within the
next five years for the gold industry alone; and such
exhaustive exploitation is beyond the wildest dream
of any Chamber of Mines.
The case may be stated thus. With all assistance
from local taxation and from the amended organisation
of the Native Labour Association, Africa, south
of the Zambesi, will be unable to afford the unlimited
supply of native labour which is the sine quâ non of
mining progress. It would therefore appear that a
new ground of supply must be sought. By those who
admit this (and as will appear later, there are some
who do not) three solutions have been advocated,
none of which is unattended with difficulties. The
first is to find a recruiting-ground in the vast district
between the Zambesi and the White Nile, a region
more densely populated by the aborigines than any
other part of Africa. This scheme has been urged
by Sir Harry Johnston with all the weight of his
unrivalled experience. The advantages of the solution
are numerous. Those natives live directly
or indirectly under British sway. They are unsophisticated,
and the old rate of wages would mean
undreamed-of wealth to them. Moreover, the experiment
would be of a certain assistance to Central
Africa, for on their return home with their wages
money would be put into circulation, the standard
of living would rise, taxes would be easier to collect,
and Government and governed would mutually profit.
On the other hand, there are very many reasons
against the proposal. Uganda and Nyassaland, to
take the two chief instances, are in need of labour
for their own development, and will strenuously resist
its exportation. Their nascent civilisation will
be dislocated if they are made the hunting-ground
of labour agents. Nor is it clear that the Central
African native is suited for mining purposes, since
both in constitution and the food he lives on he
differs from his southern kinsman, and, in the opinion
of many good authorities, his transplantation to the
high veld would mean a swollen death-rate. Overtures
have also been made to Northern and Southern
Nigeria, but the answer from those territories is
still more hopeless. It is too early to pronounce on
the future of the Central African scheme. A fair
prima facie case can be made out for its success,
and the result of the first experiments has not been
wholly discouraging. But in any case it is certain
that from this source no unlimited or permanent
supply can come. A modicum, perhaps gradually
increasing, may be secured, and in this day of small
things we can be thankful for any increase in native
African labour. But great care is necessary in its
working. There must be no hint of coercion; the
native must be vigilantly looked after from the day
he leaves his kraal to the day he returns at the
end of his twelvemonth’s service,—for the districts
must be nursed, and it is on the report of the first
batches that the success of the enterprise depends.
The transport will cost money, but it is doubtful
if it will work out at more per head than the old
premium for importation.
The second solution has roused a storm of opposition,
and its adoption would mean the overthrow of
the old economics of the mining industry. It is proposed
to use Kaffirs only in the deepest levels and in
work unsuited for white men (for which the present
supply will suffice), and in all other tasks to employ
white labour. The white workman on the Rand
under present conditions will be more than four times
as dear as the native, costing 8s. 6d. as against the
Kaffir’s 2s. a-day. Many arguments to justify the expense
have been brought forward, of which the weakest
is that the white man can do four times the Kaffir’s
work. In many branches of unskilled labour he
can barely compete with him. The real argument
is concerned with the more general aspects of the
problem. In a highly organised industry there is
bound to be a higher maximum efficiency and regularity
from a staff of white employees, who are working
intelligently to better themselves and have certain
political and social interests at stake in their labour.
On political grounds, again, it is most desirable, for
apart from relieving the strain on congested home
districts, it would provide a feeding-ground for South
African development, a material wherewith to colonise
the wilds of the north. The sons of the white
men would go out to farm and mine for themselves;
and in two generations, when the Rand has become a
normal industrial centre, we should have that interchange
of population between town and country which
is one of the buttresses of civilisation.
The white labour movement has roused bitter opposition,
partly from the mining houses, and to some
extent from white workmen on the Rand, who wish to
make a monopoly of their position. Many of the arguments
against the scheme need not detain us. There is
no objection to white and black labour working side by
side, any more than there is an objection on a tropical
fruit-farm to a white man digging an orchard and a
Kaffir carting manure for it, or on board ship to a
white mate and a black cook being part of the same
crew. The white man will have the presence of his
fellows, the chance of advancement, and a higher wage
to support his self-respect, which must be a brittle
article indeed if it requires further strengthening.
Nor is there much justification for the fears of those
who see in white labour the beginning of endless
labour troubles, culminating in the tyranny of the
working man. The situation would be the same as in
any other industrial city—as in Manchester, Sheffield,
or Glasgow, where the bulk of the population are
industrial employees. Strikes and lock-outs will come,
but it is better to have in an English city a free and
vigorous English population, than to bolster up the
chief industry by an exotic labour system. Besides,
there is always the Kaffir as a counterfoil, a very
strong argument to inspire moderation in the labourer’s
demands. White labour remains the ideal, the proper
aim of all right-thinking men; but for the present it
is more or less an impossibility. It simply does not
meet the economic difficulty. Unless the Mines are
content to make the gran rifiuto, curtail production,
and play a waiting game,—a decision, as we
shall see, quite as ruinous to the country as to the
shareholder,—cheap labour under present conditions is
a sheer necessity. One argument on economic grounds
has been brought forward for white labour, which runs
somewhat as follows: Expansion and development
depend upon an unlimited labour-supply; white labour
gives such an unlimited supply,—therefore it would
pay to give four times the present wage and secure
expansion rather than keep to the old scale and stagnate.
Supposing a mining group to have a capital of
ten millions, of which four are sunk in working mines,
three held in reserve, and three invested in good but
undeveloped claims. The present state of things
allows of a dividend of 40 per cent on the first four
millions; white labour would reduce the dividend to
20 per cent. But if white labour allowed the exploital
of the unworked claims, so that a dividend of 20 to 25
per cent could be paid on the other six millions, it
would be good business for the firm. It would, but
it is not the problem before us. The argument
assumes that the new properties are of the same class
as those at present paying dividends, whereas they
are in the main of so low a grade or demand such
an immense initial outlay that, so far from showing
a profit with dear labour, they would be the ruin
of their promoters.
The third proposal is to introduce Chinese[17] labour
under short-time contracts and a rigorous supervision.
Its supporters argue with much reason that the Chinaman
has been found useful as a deep-level miner; that
he is thrifty, intelligent, law-abiding, and tolerably
clean; that, supposing 200,000 Chinamen were employed
in the mines, it would still mean not less than
40,000 white workers, so that white labour would
increase in a liberal ratio; that a proper compound
system and a strict limit to the term of engagement
would secure the country against the economic dangers
which threaten Australia and the United States. It
is not yet certain that this ample supply of Chinese
labour can be obtained, the matter being in process of
investigation; but there is this to be said for the
proposal, that it is the only one which touches directly
the needs of the situation. The others are counsels
of perfection, ends of policy on which all are agreed;
this alone offers an immediate satisfaction to a very
pressing want. The only argument which can be
brought against it is not economic[18] but political,—that
its use would endanger the success of those very aims
on which all are agreed. The Chinese are the born
interlopers of the world. Whatever care we take
there will be a leakage: a Chinese population, more
feared, apparently, for its virtues than its vices, will
grow up in the cities, the small trades will be shut to
Europeans, the whole standard of life for the masses
will be lowered, and the moral and social currency of
the nation debased. The real case, therefore, of the
opponent of Chinese labour, is that it is not possible
to carry out the proposed plan; that we cannot import
men on a fixed contract and deport them at the end of
it; that we cannot build our compound walls so high
as to prevent a leakage into the outer world; that, in
short, the law is too weak to do its duty. There is no
difference between any of the disputants on the danger
of letting the labour loose in the country; but the one
side maintains that with proper precaution this peril
can be averted, the other that it is like the sea when
it has found an entrance into a sea-wall, a little trickle
which inevitably becomes a deluge. It is not a very
convincing contention, though we can respect the
honest political instincts which support it; indeed,
there is a touch of that familiar fallacy, the “thin-end-of-the-wedge”
argument, which opposes an undoubtedly
beneficent reform because of its possible
maleficent extension. The conflict is between an
instant economic need and a potential political danger,
and, with all desire to move cautiously, the wisest
course would seem to be to meet the one, and trust
to the good sense and courage of the people to avert
the other. The problem of alien labour is indeed
becoming a familiar one to many Crown Colonies.
The Colonial Office has been asked to sanction the importation
of Chinamen to Ashanti, and the Rhodesian
Immigration Ordinance of 1901 made the enterprise
legal for Southern Rhodesia.[19] In the Transvaal there
is a unique field for an experiment on sane and politic
lines, and for the creation of a sound administrative
precedent for other colonies to follow. There is a
result, too, which may reasonably be hoped for from
the provision of cheap labour which would be of direct
political value. It would enable some of the smaller
properties throughout the country to be worked at a
profit, and so might in time redeem the gold industry
from the capitalist monopoly, which it must remain
under present conditions, and create a class of small
mine-owners, on the analogy of the small coal-owners
in England.
There is one final argument against imported labour
which demands a short notice, for it has been used
by many serious men who are not given to captious
objections. If we take the original capital of most
mines we shall find that it has been extensively
watered, and that even on the nominal capital there
is a huge appreciation. A mine, to take an extreme
instance, begins with a capital of £50,000 in £1
shares; subsequently the shareholders receive eleven
£5 shares for every £1 share, making the present
nominal capital £2,750,000. The quotation of those
£5 shares is, say, £10⅞, making the total capital
value £5,981,250. A gold output which, under
present conditions, is not sufficient to pay a fair
dividend upon this capitalisation, would be amply
sufficient to pay a dividend on the nominal capital,
and more than sufficient to pay 500 per cent on
the original capital. The question, therefore, of
dividend-paying is out of all relation to the actual
margin of profit on the working of a mine. The
deduction is that the companies have themselves to
blame, and must face a depreciation in their shares;
and the unfortunate investor who has bought £5
shares at £10, believing a return of 4 per cent on
his capital certain, must console himself with the
reflection that every man must pay for his folly.
This argument is final against any ad misericordiam
plea of the companies, but it does not touch the
heart of the question. The working of the large
over-capitalised properties is one thing, and the
development of low-grade properties, on which large
sums have been spent and for which no profits have
yet been earned, is quite another. The old well-established
mines can afford to fight their own
battles, and for the matter of that, in spite of their
heavy expenditure out of capital during the war,
are mostly paying dividends even under present
conditions: the new properties, on which the future
of the country depends, are not, as a rule, over-capitalised,
and, as we have seen, the margin of
profit is so small on each ton of ore, that the
question is reduced to its bare essentials—Is it
possible to mine ore worth twenty shillings at a
cost under a pound? But even as concerns the
richer companies the argument is scarcely valid, for
it leaves out of account that not inconsiderable factor,
the credit of the country. It is so essential that
new capital should be attracted for the twenty
different needs of development, to which any Government
loan can only be a trifling contribution, that
anything which tends to shake the confidence of
the world in the commercial structure of South
Africa is the gravest danger. Is it certain, too,
that that much-abused epithet of “bonâ fide investor”
is not applicable to the men who bought high-priced
securities, not as a speculation, but as a modest
investment?
It is often said by opponents of imported labour
that its introduction will scarcely have taken place
before an agitation will be begun for its withdrawal.
So far from being an argument against the experiment,
this is precisely the strongest which could be
urged in its favour. If the desire of the country
is for white labour, then the Chinaman can be tried
with little danger. The mine-owners will find in
time that work on a time contract by alien labourers
is far from satisfactory, and when other circumstances
permit they will no doubt readily adopt that system
of free competitive labour which only a white industrial
class can create. Had there been any chance
of the experiment being tried with complete popular
approval, then the danger would have been considerable,
for the Chinaman might easily have spread
from mining to all industries and trades; but since
it will be made in spite of an influential opposition,
and will be jealously watched by unfriendly eyes, it
seems inevitable that when it has played its part
it will be willingly dispensed with. By refusing to
accept the experiment we are doing our best to
frustrate all hopes of a white population by cramping
the development of the country at its most
critical time and making a livelihood impossible for
many of the existing white working men. When
mines are shut down because of a lack of underground
labourers, what becomes of the Englishmen
who work above ground? It is a significant fact
that many white miners, who were formerly the
most bitter opponents of imported labour, are now
its strenuous advocates, since they and their class
are beginning to feel the pinch.
But if the importation of Asiatics is undertaken,
it should be on a very clear understanding and with
a very distinct object in view. The thing is far too
dangerous at the best to be made the domain of
unconsidered experiments. The ideal of white labour
in the long-run must be preserved; and we must
take jealous care that by the creation of a foreign
labouring class the way is not barred to that industrialisation
of the native races on which the
future of South Africa so largely depends. A
maximum might be fixed by law—say 300,000
unskilled labourers, which could be increased if
necessary by later enactments; and in so far as the
maximum could not be attained by white and black
labour, Chinese might be imported as a complement.
The complement would, let us hope, rapidly decrease
as new machinery lessened the amount of labour
required, and the native districts of Africa were
more fully exploited. All imported labour would be
subject to rigorous conditions as to compounds, length
of contract, and ultimate repatriation—conditions
which any ordinary police could enforce without
difficulty. At the same time, the Native Labour
Association should be made a Government department.
As a private organisation it is not more
efficient, and it is certainly less respected, than a
Government department would be. What is wanted
in all proper recruiting is the prestige of the Crown.
Natives, who have been often deceived by touts, and
regard the offers of the Labour Association agents
as so many idle words, would be ready enough to
listen to proposals made under the guarantee of the
paramount chief. It is a risky game for a Government
to embark in private business; but the Native
Labour Association is not a business, but a department,
conducted on the lines of a Government
department, but without its prestige. Under the
Crown its organisation would remain intact, but its
status would be raised and its efficiency centupled.
The railway system, immature as it is, has worked
wonders for the country. With few lines, and those
single and narrow gauge, with exorbitant rates of
transit and a frequently ineffective organisation, it
has still above all other factors made development
possible. In former days, when heavy mining
machinery had to be brought by waggons from
Kimberley or Natal or Delagoa Bay, a mine required
to be rich indeed before it could be worked at a profit,
enterprise was costly and perilous, and the result was
the stagnation of all activities save that one where
enterprise was a primal necessity. Under the late
Governments one line ran through the two States,
from Norval’s Pont to Pietersburg, with small branch
lines in the Orange Free State to Winburg and Heilbron,
and in the Transvaal to Springs and Klerksdorp.
The Natal line was continued from Charlestown to
join the trunk line at Elandsfontein, and the Delagoa
Bay line from Komati Poort to Pretoria, with a little
branch to Barberton and the beginnings of a branch to
the Selati gold-fields. The Transvaal had thus three
direct outlets to the coast; the Orange Free State
two, for a branch ran from the Natal line at Ladysmith
to the little eastern town of Harrismith. Two
broad necessities of railway policy therefore awaited
the new Government. The existing system must be
perfected and interconnected, new routes to the coast
created to relieve the present strain, the railways of
adjoining colonies brought into touch with each other,
so as to make one general and consistent South African
system. But more important than the perfecting of
existing arrangements must be the tapping of the rich
and remote districts. Occasionally both needs may be
exemplified in one line, but, roughly speaking, they
are separate branches of railway policy, undertaken on
different grounds and in many cases organised and
financed on different methods. The experience of the
United States, where railways were regarded as the
cause and not the consequence of development, and
pushed boldly into desert places which in a few years,
through their agency, became centres of industry and
population, is a safe guide, within limits, for South
Africa, provided that the wealth to be exploited is
really there, and railway extension does not cripple
other works of equal necessity.
Of the first class we have three chief examples.
One—from Machadodorp to Ermelo—is already partially
constructed. The second will run from Springs
east to some point on this line, and so provide a direct
route for the Johannesburg traffic from Delagoa Bay
and avoid the awkward circuit by Pretoria. A further
extension is projected by which the Springs-Ermelo
line will be continued through Swaziland to Delagoa
Bay and a complete alternative through route created.
The third is the extension of the present Klerksdorp
branch to Fourteen Streams, which would provide a
shorter route from the Transvaal to the Cape, an infinitely
shorter route from the Transvaal to Rhodesia,
and would at the same time bring the coal districts of
the country within reach of the diamond industry of
Kimberley. In the second class there is no limit to
the number of possible and desirable railways. The
most important is, perhaps, the grain line, from Bloemfontein
to Johannesburg by Ficksburg, Bethlehem, and
Wilge River, which would bring the great wheat-producing
tracts of the Conquered Territory within easy
reach of the chief market. Next comes the now completed
Rand coal line from Vereeniging to Johannesburg.
Another coal line is projected from Witbank
on the Delagoa Bay line to Springs, which would
bring the produce of the chief Transvaal collieries
directly to the Rand and relieve the congested line
between Elandsfontein and Pretoria. Of equal importance
in the long-run is a line from Krugersdorp
by Rustenburg to some point, such as Lobatsi, on the
Rhodesian railway, which would open up a district
famous for its fruits and tobacco, and give the pastoralists
of Bechuanaland, as well as of the more
distant Rhodesia, a straight line to Johannesburg.
Other lines of the same class are those from Belfast
or Machadodorp to Lydenburg, from Nelspruit to
Pilgrims’ Rest, and from Basutoland to Bloemfontein.
Lastly, and lastly only because of its greater difficulty,
the line should be continued north from Pietersburg
along the Sand River, brought east between the
Spelonken and the Magatoland mountains, past the
little township of Louis Trichard, and then turned
south across the basin of the Klein and the Groot
Letaba to Leydsdorp, where it could join the completed
Selati railway from Komati Poort.
The Railway Extension Conference held at Johannesburg
in March 1903 sanctioned the immediate
construction of most of the lines mentioned above, and
recommended the others as objects to aim at when
sufficient funds were at the disposal of the Government.
As the share of the Guaranteed Loan allocated
for railway extension is only some five millions, and as
the proportion of any railway surplus which can be
devoted to the purpose is, as we shall see later,
strictly limited, it is highly desirable to make use of
private enterprise so far as possible in new constructions,
providing always for an efficient State
oversight and an ultimate expropriation. The Klerksdorp-Fourteen
Streams and the Krugersdorp-Lobatsi
railways have already been arranged for on this
principle, and it is probable that the experiment will
be adopted in many of the smaller development lines.
It is reasonable that a rich company, owning lands
or mines, or requiring for its own purposes some
special railway connection, should, if it desires a new
line, undertake the financing of it. But at the
same time the principle of the ultimate State
ownership of all railways should be strictly adhered
to, for the very good reason that in the railways
we have the chief security for development loans, and
the most productive of all the State assets. In few
countries in the world is the expenditure on construction
and maintenance so small, so that under
present conditions they yield a handsome return on
capital outlay. The Netherlands and the Pretoria-Pietersburg
railways have been acquired from their
former owners, and the incomplete Selati and
Machadodorp-Ermelo lines will shortly follow. If we
take the price paid, with the addition in the latter
case of the outlay necessary for completion, as the
capital value, we shall find that the net receipts, even
after the large reductions in rates which have been
made and must be maintained, show a generous percentage
of profit.[20] It will be explained later what
part this important asset is called upon to play in
the finance of the new colonies. So much for the
main lines; but a system of light railways, constructed
at small expense, is vital to the mineral and
agricultural exploitation of such districts as Bethel,
Lichtenburg, Wolmaranstad, and Waterberg, in the
Transvaal and the southern part of the Orange River
Colony. In a flat upland country, where animal
transport for some years to come will be precarious
and expensive, where the roads are still unsuitable
for steam haulage, and where coal is cheap, perfect
conditions exist for an extensive light-railway development.
Railway extension, then, is one of the first demands
of the country: it is comparatively easy to achieve,
and most of the necessary capital has already been
found for it. But the omnipresent labour difficulty
appears here as elsewhere, not indeed with the magnitude
of the mining problem, but with an equal insistence.
To carry out the programme sketched
above in any reasonable time, say three years, some
40,000 natives will be required. At the present
moment the number employed is scarcely 5000, and
10,000 is the limit which the railways may recruit
in South Africa by an agreement with the Chamber
of Mines. Many natives, such as the Basutos, will
work on railways when they will not go underground;
and the agreed limit is fair enough to
both parties. But the balance cannot be secured
without seriously trespassing upon the supply grounds
of the mines. The Uganda railway was built with
imported labour, and it seems inevitable that the
Central South African railways must follow suit.
The limited funds at their disposal, and the difficulties
in the way of the country’s absorbing at
the moment large numbers of unskilled workmen,
make the employment of white navvies alone impossible.
The railways, indeed, furnish a fine experimenting-ground
for the importation of indentured
foreign labour under a short-time contract and a
condition of repatriation. The number they require
is small: 10,000 will tide them over all immediate
needs; the nature of the work enables a complete
supervision to be exercised; and while it is still
doubtful whether alien labour can be secured for the
mines, experience has shown that for surface railway
work the supply is certain. In the congested districts
of India and China the small cultivator, to whom land
is the object of his life, will gladly leave his home for
one or two years if he can return with the money to
buy a plot of ground; and when the return home is
the cause of the setting out there will be no trouble
in repatriation.
The premier market, now and for many years, must
be the Rand. Its great industrial population and the
higher scale of living make it the natural market for
all native agricultural and pastoral products. So
much so that the farmers in the eastern province
of Cape Colony, in spite of heavy railway rates, found
it profitable to send the bulk of their produce thither.
This is at once the advantage and misfortune of the
country: advantage, in having an accessible market
which it will take years to glut; misfortune, in that
the merits of the market to the country producer
mean costly living to the industrial inhabitants. The
difficulty will no doubt adjust itself; for if, as all
believe, the new colonies take many steps towards
feeding themselves, and in consequence the prices of
necessaries fall, new and nearer markets will arise in
different parts of the country, and a genuinely self-supporting
provincial society will be organised. New
mining centres in the north and east, possibly, too, in
the west, may bring new townships into being; old
and semi-decayed dorps will revive; and that novelty
in the new colonies, towns like Brighton or Cheltenham,
which exist purely for residence, may yet be
found at Warm Baths for winter, or on the shores of
Lake Chrissie for the summer heats. The Rand,
again, will be the chief market for the subsidiary
industries which must arise,—for coal and iron, for
manufactured articles and dressed produce. It is too
early in the day to talk in any serious sense of exports.
The Transvaal, at any rate, will be for long a
consumer rather than a producer among the nations
of the world.
The tremendous cost of living is the subject of the
chief complaints among new-comers to South Africa.
Before the discovery of gold the Transvaal was a cheap
country to dwell in. A bullock which now costs £20
could be bought for £5; and a native, who now draws
£3 or £4 per month in wages, was then very well
content with 5s. Now there is hardly anything which
is not scarcer and dearer in South Africa than in almost
any other part of the globe. The causes of this high
cost are partly natural and partly artificial; but all, I
think, are terminable. The demands of the gold industry,
the long distance from ports, the sparse rural
population, are obvious natural causes, all of which
tend to modification and mutual adjustment. The
artificial causes are three: the cost of ocean freightage,
the high railway rates, and the monopoly in the hands
of a small mercantile class. The first can never be
reduced below a fairly high figure, and in the loud
complaint of “shipping rings,” which is in the mouth
of most traders, there is a little unfairness. It is too
often the cloak which they use to cover their own
extortions. But reductions will certainly be made,
and in any case the chief force of the grievance, so far
as necessaries are concerned, will decline with the
growth of local production. Railway rates have already
suffered a substantial decrease, and will be
further reduced down to a certain point, which for
the present is determined by the fiscal needs of the
country. For railway rates are a form of taxation:
the railways are the chief revenue producer, and to
lower the rates too far would be merely robbing Peter
to pay Paul—a form of relief which would need to
be balanced by some new form of taxation. The chief
efficient cause of the expense of living is undoubtedly
the exorbitant monopoly of local merchants. It is no
exaggeration to say that anything sold at 100 per cent
profit is to the ordinary trader a form of charity:
legitimate business begins for him at 120, or thereabouts.
No class is so clamorous about its interests,
so ready to identify its profits with national wellbeing,
and claim a monopoly of the purer civic emotions.
But no part of the economic situation is so radically
unsound. The Polish Jew and the coolie make a profitable
living throughout the country, not because the
white population have no prejudice against them, but
because they are driven to their stores by the comparative
reasonableness of their prices. This cause, as
I have said, is artificial and terminable. The influx
of a large population will increase the area of competition,
and reduce profits to a normal basis. And
this, again, depends on the prosperity of the mines;
so that we are brought round to the starting-point of
all South African economics. Once this result were
achieved its benefits would react on the mines, for
with the decrease of the cost of living wages would go
down, and what is at present an ideal—an increase in
the area over which white labour can be employed—would
come within the sphere of practical politics.
The economic situation of the two colonies is therefore
composed of a number of perplexing oppositions.
The one certain fact is the great hidden wealth. But
to make those riches actual there must be labour,
and, over and above any question of imported and
indentured workmen, to secure labour there must
be reasonable cheapness in the necessaries of life and
work. Customs tariffs, railway rates, general taxation,
must all be calculated on a modest scale. But,
on the other hand, if the country is to advance to
that civilisation which is its due, money must be
spent freely by the State on productive and unproductive
enterprises; and in addition to such services,
which are the basis of the Guaranteed Loan, there is
the War Debt, 30 millions of dead-weight round the
neck of a struggling people. To pay the interest
on debts and to provide money for day-to-day needs
there must be revenue, and so there comes a point
where direct and indirect charges, whatever the
demands of the situation, simply cannot be reduced
further if the mechanism of Government is to continue
in action. Heroic persons advocate heroic
remedies, such as the cessation of all enterprise in
favour of mining progress, or the renunciation of certain
charges in favour of cheap living. In one sense
all politics are a gamble; but there are limits beyond
which statesmanship cannot go in the way of staking
everything on a chance, and yet hope to justify itself
in the eyes of the world in the event of failure. The
real problem for the statesman is not how to plunge
wildly—it requires little skill to do that—but how
to adjust with nice discrimination. To preserve an
adequate revenue, while at the same time giving
ample play to the forces of production, is, in a word,
the only policy which contains the rudiments of ultimate
success.
II.
The foregoing is a rough survey of the assets with
which the new colonies start on their career. As
in all beginnings, a multitude of questions protrude
themselves. Every politician has his own nostrum,
every interest its own pressing demands. But the
main questions are simple, at least in their outlines,
and it is permissible to disentangle from the web the
chief threads of economic policy. Three postulates
there must be before a solvent and progressive nation
can be founded. In the first place, life must be made
possible,—life on the various scales which a civilised
society demands. In the second place, industries—the
gold industry and the host of subsidiaries which
must follow—should be given free scope for development
by enlightened legislation, and the removal of
burdens from the raw material of progress. Finally,
a sufficient revenue must be secured to meet the vast
reproductive expenditure which the country demands.
To reconcile these three needs, which in practice
often appear contradictory, is the task of the new
Government.
Taking the three axioms as our guide, we have to
consider the two questions in all administration—the
raising of revenue and the apportionment of expenditure.
Our inquiry into revenue must be chiefly
concerned with the Transvaal. The Orange River
Colony is for the present prosperous, and its future
solvency seems assured. With a certain income of
half a million, and an expenditure of a little less, its
fiscal problem is simplicity itself. But the Transvaal
presents the case of a country with great potential
wealth, which must borrow heavily to elicit its prosperity.
Certain revenue-producing charges must be
cut down to make life on a proper scale possible, but
revenue must also be raised to make this life possible.
It is the old story of Egypt—taking out of one pocket
to put into the other, with somewhere behind the
transaction an economic Providence to enhance values
in the exchange. Such a policy is based upon a faith
in the land, which by its productive power provides
a natural sinking fund to wipe off encumbrances.
Loans can be raised at 4 per cent, because the country
repays a hundredfold.
The main items, exclusive of railways, which in the
financial year 1902-3 made up the revenue of the
Transvaal, were customs revenue at upwards of two
millions, mining revenue at half a million, stamp and
transfer duties at £720,000, taxes on trades and professions
and post and telegraphs at a quarter of a
million each, and native revenue at a little over
£300,000. The total revenue was about £4,700,000.
The estimated revenue for 1903-4 has been put at
£4,500,000, made up of customs at £1,800,000,
mining revenue at £750,000, post and telegraphs at
£360,000, taxes on trades and professions at £200,000,
native revenue at £500,000, stamp and transfer duties
at £700,000, and £200,000 for miscellaneous items.
Since the object of the present inquiry is to estimate
the financial position of the country, it is necessary in
the first place to take the various sources of revenue
one by one, and estimate their value and their defects.
Several may at once be omitted. Post and telegraphs
barely pay for their working expenses, and cannot be
counted upon as a source of revenue. Stamp and
transfer duties, stand licences and rent, and the bulk
of the miscellaneous items, are for the present static
figures, or vary within narrow limits, and it is improbable
that they will be altered so as to greatly
increase their present revenue during the next few
years. Revenue questions for the Transvaal are concerned
with two items which far excel all others in
importance—mining revenue and customs. There is
a third, and the largest of the three, railway profits;
but, as will be explained later, this item has been
excluded from the separate budgets of the two
colonies.
The old mining revenue was mainly indirect. A tax
on profits was indeed imposed by the late Government
in February 1899, but war broke out before there was
time to organise its collection. The real burden lay in
the dynamite monopoly, which at its worst increased
the price of explosives by £2 the case, and at its best
by about 30s. The mines required an annual supply
of 300,000 cases, which meant an annual charge,
beyond the cost of material, of £450,000. The
average net profits on the annual production of gold
may be put at £6,000,000, which, with a 5 per cent
profit tax, would return £300,000 a-year. Had the
Boer régime continued, the mining industry would
have contributed in the form of imposts something
between £600,000 and £750,000 per annum (for a
reduction of 10s. in the dynamite charge had been
promised on the eve of the war). From the standpoint
of the mines the whole sum was an impost, but
only the yield from the profit tax would have found its
way into the Exchequer.
The present charges on the mining industry consist
of the prospectors’ and diggers’ licences, the 10 per
cent tax on profits, imposed by Proclamation No. 34
of 1902, and the cost of native passes, which was
formerly paid by the native himself, but is now
borne by the employer. The mining industry will
therefore on its present basis pay from half a million
upwards in profit tax, about £120,000 for native
passes, and about £50,000 in licences. It is difficult
to see how this taxation could be fairly increased.
To add, for example, a charge of 20s. per case to
explosives would be to tax the means of production,—a
fatal heresy,—to keep some of the smaller
mines out of the profit-making class, and in the long-run
to harm the Exchequer itself. The true policy
is not to hamper the earning of profits by excessive
charges, but to enlarge by judicious encouragement
the area over which profits are made. It is of
the first importance that European capital should be
attracted to, and not scared away from, the country.
Under the present system the Government receipts
will advance pari passu with any increase in the
prosperity of the mines, and to secure the ultimate
gain one may well be satisfied to forego a larger
immediate return.
There is a fourth source of revenue from mining
enterprise which may be roughly described as windfalls.
The Government has a moral right, which no one
denies, to profit by new discoveries, and in any case,
as a large landowner, it will be interested as an immediate
participant. The provisions of the old Gold
Law have been so often discussed in print that it is
sufficient here to give the briefest sketch of them.
Legislation by the late Government on precious
minerals began as early as 1858, and continued in a
long series of resolutions and counter-resolutions till
the somewhat confused position of affairs was simplified
and regulated by the famous law, No. 15 of 1898.
The basis of this law is to be found in the principle
that to the owner belonged the ownership of minerals
found under his land, but to the State the right of
regulating their disposal. It attempted to give to
both owner and State a fair share of the proceeds,
while at the same time the prospector and discoverer
received a moderate reward for their enterprise.
There can be no question about the validity of the
three rights; the only dispute is concerned with their
relative proportions. Besides the matter of share,
there is one other question of great importance—how
far it is permissible for an owner to refuse to allow
the exploital of minerals under his land.
I take the last question first. Under the old law
the owner of private property could prospect without
a licence on his own land, and could give authority to
any licensed person. If minerals were found, the State
President, subject to certain compensation, could throw
open the land as a public diggings. State land could
be prospected and proclaimed in exactly the same way.
But if the owner of private land refused to prospect
himself or allow others to prospect, the State could not
interfere to compel the exploital of his minerals. Much
has been said of the right of the public in the shape of
the prospector to go anywhere in his search; but no
such right has ever existed or can exist. The whole
question is one of policy. It is clearly not the interest
of the State to leave the chief source of its wealth unworked;
nor in any real sense is it the interest of the
private owner. But it would be an intolerable burden
to a farmer to be subjected to constant trespass by
any prospector who cared to take out a licence. We
must, however, clearly distinguish between Crown and
private land, so far as the steps towards the discovery
of the minerals are concerned. Crown land, under
strict conditions, should be free to any licensed prospector;
but, as the settlement of Crown land by
agricultural tenants is a vital part of Government
policy, provision must be made for ample compensation
to such a tenant for disturbance caused by prospecting.
Such provision should refer not only to unproclaimed
or hereafter to be proclaimed Crown land, but should
be brought to cover areas such as Barberton, Lydenberg,
and the Wood Bush, which have been long
working gold-fields. If compensation and security is
not provided, some of the most valuable agricultural
and pastoral lands in the country will be incapable of
white settlement, and their only occupants will be the
Kaffir, the coolie, and the bywoner, who have no
interest in creating permanent homes. It is undesirable
to tie up minerals, but it is equally undesirable
to tie up agricultural wealth. People have talked of
proclamation as if it were an inviolable contract between
the Crown and the public, to which no new
conditions could be added. There is neither legal nor
historical justification for this view. It is right for
the Crown, having given permission to the public to
go upon its lands for a particular purpose, to impose
from time to time conditions under which the permission
may be exercised. On private lands the case
is different. No owner of a private farm who is in
beneficial occupation of it (when he is not, the land
should be treated for this purpose as Crown land)
should be compelled to allow prospecting unless he
has already himself prospected or given authority to
others. To enact otherwise would be to make a freehold
title little more than a farce. But in order to
prevent a reactionary or indolent owner from tying up
valuable minerals for an indefinite time, when there
are reasonable grounds for believing that such minerals
exist, the Commissioner of Mines should have the
power to give notice to the owner that he must
prospect or allow others to do so, and, if he still refuses,
to issue to the public a small number of prospecting
licences on the property. When prospecting has taken
place, and, after an investigation by the Government,
minerals are found to exist in payable quantities, the
area, subject to all rights of compensation, should be
proclaimed a public digging.
Under the old law the discoverer, if his discovery
were made at least six miles distant from a locality
already worked, was entitled to mark off six claims
which he could work without payment of licence-moneys.
He had also the ordinary public right of
pegging off not more than fifty claims in the proclaimed
area, and fifty additional claims on payment
of reduced licences. The only real reward to the prospector
for his trouble and expense was the six free
claims—hardly a sufficient inducement to undertake
laborious, and often costly, enterprises. The Gold
Law Commission recommended that the discoverer
should receive one-thirtieth of the proclaimed area,
provided that in no case such one-thirtieth exceeded
thirty claims. This seems a reasonable but not extravagant
honorarium to the pioneer. He would be entitled
to the first selection, and would hold his claims
free of licence-moneys till they reached the producing
stage.
The owner, under the old law, was entitled to
reserve a mynpacht, equal to one-tenth of the proclaimed
area, for which he paid either 10s. per morgen
per annum or 2½ per cent of his gross profits. He
was also entitled to mark off a werf or homestead
area, on which prospecting was forbidden; and on
this, too, he could claim a mynpacht from the State.
He was entitled to a certain number of owner’s claims,
which could not exceed ten. He was entitled, before
proclamation, to grant to other persons a certain
number of claims called vergunnings. Finally, he
was entitled to share equally with the Government in
all licence-moneys on claims, and to receive a share,
varying from one-half to three-fourths, of all licence-moneys
on stands. This system gave the owner
about one-sixth of the whole proclaimed area,—an
extravagant share, and one complicated by the curious
rights into which it was divided. Such unmeaning
complexity must be abolished, and one form of title
—claim licences—substituted. Werf and vergunning
claims should be done away with, and the
owner, as the Commission recommended, be allowed
to peg out one-seventh of the proclaimed area, which
should take the place of werf, mynpacht, vergunnings,
and owner’s claims. The Commission has also recommended
that, while the owner should retain half of
the proceeds of licences, the Crown should have the
right, without consulting him, to remit or reduce the
licence-moneys in what appear to be deserving cases.
The State, under the old law, received all licence-moneys
on claims and stands situated on State lands,
and half the licence-moneys from claims and stands
on private lands. It received also certain payments
from the owners of mynpachts. This in itself should
provide for a considerable revenue. But in addition
the Crown should have the right of sale of claims
in proved districts, where the ground has a certain
value. The former method, in places where pegging
was out of the question, such as along the Main Reef,
was to hold a claims’ lottery, a method which was
neither rational nor lucrative. The sale by auction
of claims in proved districts would bring in a large
additional revenue and do no injustice to the prospector.
But in all places yet unproved the public
should be free to peg out claims and try their
fortune. It is important, also, to revise the present
system of licence-moneys, so as to make the licences
small during the prospecting and non-producing
period, and raise them when mining actually begins.
Under the old law all licences were £1 per claim
per month, a payment which bore heavily upon the
poor prospector who was still labouring to prove his
claim. Prospectors’ licences were issued at 5s. per
month on private land and 2s. 6d. on Government
land. The Commission recommended the abolition
of prospectors’ licences, and the substitution of one
general licence to search for minerals, on which a
stamp duty of 2s. 6d. per month should be charged.
When minerals are found and a public digging has
been proclaimed, licence-moneys of 2s. 6d. per claim
per month should be paid on Government land, and
5s. on private land till the producing stage is reached.
After that date the old licence of £1 would come
into force.
The Transvaal Legislature will shortly be called
upon to consider a new Gold Law based on the report
of the Commission, of which I have sketched the
chief features. Of almost equal importance, in the
light of recent discoveries, is the new Diamond Law,
where substantially the same questions of principle
are involved. Owner, discoverer, and State should
have a fair share of profit—but especially the State.
We are none too well off in the ordinary course
of things to be able to afford to neglect our windfalls.
A serious and permanent increase of revenue
can come only from a gradual increase of producing
activity; but, apart from permanent needs, many
occasions will arise for capital expenditure in reproductive
works which are vital to progress. A
windfall is a development loan without guarantee
or interest or sinking fund to burden the mind of
the Exchequer.
The other direct taxes are so few and unimportant
that they may safely be neglected. But it is necessary
to face the question of adjustment and new
taxation, for the time may come when it may be
expedient to lower many of the existing duties and
to revise thoroughly railway rates, and it is desirable
to have alternative proposals to meet the decline of
revenue which will follow. It may be desirable, for
instance, to abolish wholly the present charge on
dynamite, as it most certainly will be necessary to
lower still further the cost of transit on the railways.
But new taxation must be imposed with the greatest
caution. The present population of the Transvaal
pays in indirect taxes £10 a-head as against £2 at
home; the field for direct taxation is therefore strictly
circumscribed. To certain taxes the road is barred.
A land tax, however light, would bear heavily upon
the impoverished rural districts, and in any case is
impossible under the Terms of Surrender. An income
tax would make life unbearable if the limit of exemption
were low, and if the limit were high the yield
would be inconsiderable. A general profit tax on the
earnings of both companies and individuals may become
feasible in time, but we must first await the
return of normal conditions of life. One way may be
found in increased native taxation, a matter which,
as it is bound up with other questions of native policy,
is discussed in another chapter. But the object of
all new taxation must be to strike at the untaxed
and unproductive elements in society, for reasons
quite as much political as economic. On this ground
two taxes seem just and desirable, though there are
certain obvious difficulties to be surmounted before
they can be levied. The first is a tax upon unoccupied
lands, a quite possible and equitable tax which
would meet with little real opposition. Land companies
in the Transvaal alone possess some 12 million
acres, the bulk of which has been bought for supposed
mineral values. Not 10 per cent of the land is
occupied, and nearly 50 per cent is capable of occupation
of some kind. Quite apart from revenue considerations,
a tax which would compel settlement, or,
failing that, would drive some of the more obstinate
companies to put good land in the market, would be
sound policy. What applies to the companies would
apply to the private landowner who has his half-dozen
farms, and lives in a corner of one of them.
Latifundia bid fair to be among the curses of the
land, unless proper measures are taken to check them
in time; and if this is done, the land troubles of the
Australian colonies and their confiscatory legislation
will be saved to South Africa. The machinery would
be simple. A permanent commission would have to
be established (the judicial committee of the Central
Land Board, provided for in the Settler’s Ordinance,
could do the work). Each owner of unoccupied land
would be summoned before it to state his case. He
might show that three-fourths of his land was at the
moment incapable of occupation, in which case he
would only be assessed on the remainder. The tax
might be an ad valorem tax of 2 or 3 per cent. A
day might be fixed, say eighteen months from assessment,
when the tax would come into operation. In
case owners proved refractory and preferred to pay
the tax, it might be increased on a sliding scale till
settlement became compulsory. There would be no
hardship to company or individual, since only land
for which a white occupier could be found would be
assessable for the purpose. The second tax is of equal
importance but far greater complexity. The most difficult
person to reach in taxation is the holder for the
rise, the speculator who is nothing else, the great
class which toils and spins not and grows fat on the
energy of others. The basis of his activity is the
quotation of shares, and a tax to affect him must be
in relation to such market values. You cannot introduce
a too cumbrous machinery without acting in
restraint of legitimate trade, quite apart from the
fact that most of the business is done with bearer
shares which pass through fifty hands before registration.
But it might be possible—it is a problem
for a revenue expert to decide—to affect this class
indirectly and curtail its activity by a tax on the
profits of companies based on the average quotation
for the preceding year. At the best it would be only
a half measure, for it would be limited to dividend-paying
companies, and the energies of the middleman
are chiefly exercised on companies whose profits are
still wholly speculative. But with all deductions
there seems to be a chance of revenue in such a tax,
and a certain general economic value. The tax, again,
would be limited to new issues, for in the case of old
issues, even when the shares stand at 1000 per cent
premium, a high dividend may represent a very
moderate dividend on the capital of the investor who
bought in when shares were high. If the dividend of
a new issue justified a high quotation, the quotation
would be high in spite of the tax, but the existence
of the tax would tend to keep down the speculative
quotation to some reasonable relation to former dividends.
If dividends declined, and the quotation fell,
the tax would go automatically out of existence. Such
a tax, if possible, would not yield in normal years a
great revenue, but it would have certain salutary and
permanent effects. It would touch companies only in
a high state of prosperity. It would indirectly touch
the man who buys not for dividends but to realise
by taking away in some part the basis of his speculations.
It would exercise a steadying influence upon
the market, and prevent, at least in one class of
security, fictitious rises. But as a means of revenue
its position would be really that of a windfall, for it
would enable the Crown to profit largely out of any
period of great financial excitement. A boom, so
eagerly desired by all but in many of its results so
maleficent, might be delayed by its agency; and if it
came, as no doubt it would in spite of any ingenious
taxation, and share values became blindly inflated
irrespective of past or present dividends, the Government
would perform that rarest of feats, and derive
an honest profit from the vices of the multitude.
The Transvaal, till the other day, was the only
important South African state not included in the
Customs Union. Its customs law was No. 4 of 1894,
amended by Ordinance 22 of 1902. The basis was an
ad valorem tax of 7½ per cent on all goods brought
across the border, with an addition of 20 per cent to
the valuation price for the purpose of the tax in the
case of goods directly imported from over-sea. The
purpose of this provision is obvious, since to goods
bought at the coast the cost of over-sea freightage and
handling is added in reaching the price on which the
tax is assessed. But to this general duty there were
two important exceptions. There was a lengthy free
list, which included, in addition to goods imported for
Government use, all live stock, books, tree, flower,
and vegetable seeds and plants, tools and effects of
immigrant mechanics, fencing material, mining and
agricultural machinery, cement, and unmanufactured
woods. There was also a list on which, in addition to
the general 7½ per cent, special duties were charged.
Beer paid 3s. per gallon, dynamite 9d. per pound,
gunpowder 6d. per pound, spirits from 14s. to £1 per
imperial gallon, manufactured tobacco 3s. per pound,
leaf-tobacco 2s. per pound (when brought from over-sea),
wine from 4s. to 12s. 6d. per gallon. The tariff
was therefore moderately protectionist. Most articles
necessary for the great industries were free; articles
of common use were subject only to the ad valorem
duty; while articles of luxury, and especially all
fermented liquors, were subject to a fair but not
excessive special tax.
The difficulty was that the tariff was not a fair
guide to the real taxation of imports. The Transvaal
has no seacoast; all her imports have to be landed
at the ports of other colonies or states, and carried
to her borders by alien railways. Moreover, all
the seaboard colonies, as well as the Orange River
Colony, were banded together in a Customs Union,
from which she was excluded. A tariff hostility
was therefore smouldering on, which gave acute
annoyance to the Transvaal importer. I will take
two instances of purely predatory imposts. The coast
colonies levied a so-called transit due of 3 per cent on
dutiable articles for the Transvaal, a due which was
the same in principle as the levies which the barons
of the Rhine used to make from the harmless merchants
passing through their borders. Again, in the
case of the Orange River Colony, the only inland
colony in the old Customs Union, the duties were
collected at the coast ports, and a collecting charge
was made, which was simply another form of the
transit due. At one time the charge was as high
as 25 per cent of the duties collected; but on the
petition of the Orange River Colony it was afterwards
reduced to 15 per cent. How far such a rate was
from representing the real cost of collection is shown
by the fact that the Transvaal duties were collected
by the coast colonies from the occupation of Pretoria
to the end of 1901 at a charge of only 2½ per cent.
The Transvaal had thus a tariff in itself reasonable,
but she was embarrassed by her isolation. It was
obviously desirable that she should enter into the
Customs Union, which would then comprise the whole
of South Africa, for if federation is ever to become
a serious policy it is well to begin by throwing down
economic barriers. But economics have an awkward
way of overriding all other considerations, and the
entrance of the Transvaal into the Union could only
be a matter of hard business—give and take on both
sides. The interest of the two parties was on this
matter far apart. The coast colonies are agricultural
and pastoral, and their ports are forwarding depots.
They are frankly protectionist, and their customs have
always been their chief source of revenue. The Transvaal
is industrial, and for the present a free-trader;
she must have cheap food, cheap raw material, cheap
necessaries. While at the moment customs form the
largest item in her revenue, it does not overshadow
all others, and in time it is probable that it will sink
to a second place. The question was, therefore, What
of her present tariff would the Transvaal relinquish to
meet the wishes of the Union, and what compensating
advantages could she expect from her membership?
The Bloemfontein Conference of March 1903 prepared
a Customs Convention, which has since been
ratified by the several states, and the old Customs
Union has been amended and extended to include the
whole of British South Africa. How far has this act
improved the economic position of the Transvaal? In
the first place, there is one solid gain, the abolition of
the transit dues, estimated at between £250,000 and
£300,000 per annum. There is, too, a gain in the
mere fact of union, and the freedom which it gives
from the incessant bickerings of conflicting tariffs.
Since her duties are collected by the coast colonies at
the moderate charge of 5 per cent, a saving may also
be effected by the reduction of the customs establishment
on her borders. The benefit which she has conferred
in return is the opening of her markets without
restraint to the products of British South Africa, an
opening which should amply repay the coast colonies
for the reduction in the protective tariff from over-sea.
The actual tariff charges are in the nature of
an elaborate compromise. To take first the case of
the simple food-stuffs. In 1898, under the old
Transvaal tariff, imported flour paid in duty £26,955,
and imported mealies £16,290. Under the old Union
tariff they would have paid respectively £114,068 and
£69,332—a difference of over 400 per cent. The old
Union rate was 2s. per 100 lb. for grain and 4s. 6d.
per 100 lb. for flour, while the old Transvaal rate was
an ad valorem duty of about 9 per cent. It was
impossible that either party could accept the other’s
rate, so the present solution of 1s. for grain and 2s.
for flour may be taken as a satisfactory compromise,
which an industrial country could support. It must
be further remembered that all food-stuffs produced
elsewhere in South Africa enter free, and that the
cost of bread under the new system will be if anything
reduced. Article XV. of the Convention gives
the Transvaal a further power in times of scarcity to
suspend the duty on food-stuffs altogether, and give
a bonus to imports of the same class produced in the
neighbouring colonies. The ordinary manufactured
article, which in a non-manufacturing country plays
as large a part in the cost of living as bread, is also
reduced for the purchaser. It pays an ad valorem
duty of 10 per cent, which at first sight seems higher
than the old rate of 7½, which with other charges
worked out in practice at about 9. But 2½ per cent
must be deducted on account of the 25 per cent preferential
rate for British goods, and with the abolition
of the transit dues the actual duty will work out at
between 7 and 8 per cent. Raw material and the
necessaries of industry remain much where they were
under the old tariff, which was highly favourable to
them; but the charge on dynamite has been reduced
from 9d. a-pound to 1½d., which is a reduction of over
30s. on the 50-lb. case.
A mere comparison of tariffs does not show the real
cheapening of the necessaries of life; for to get at the
practical effect, the abolition of the transit dues, the
reduction of railway rates, amounting to at least
£300,000 per annum, and the preference rate on
British goods, must all be considered. Under the old
tariff and railway rates every 100 lb. of flour from
Port Elizabeth to the Transvaal paid 9d. to the
Transvaal in duty. The freight was 6s. 2d., so that
it paid altogether in charges 6s. 11d. Under the
Convention the same quantity of flour will pay 2s.
in duty and 3s. 9d. in railway rates, so that, in spite
of the higher duty, the charge is only 5s. 9d.,—a
saving to the Transvaal consumer of 1s. 2d., and a
gain to the Transvaal treasury of 1s. 3d. There
are many instances of a similar kind. Ordinary
groceries will be reduced by about 3 per cent, paraffin
by 1s. 6d. a case, grease by 2s. 6d. per 100 lb., cement
by 2s. 9d. a cask. Tea and coffee, on the other hand,
show a slight increase. In one branch there is a very
marked increase, and an exception to the inter-colonial
free trade, which is the basis of the Convention.
Each party to the Union is entitled to levy on the
importation of spirits distilled in and from the produce
of places within the Union a duty equal to any
excise duty which it may levy on spirits made within
its own borders. In the Transvaal there is no excise,
for the manufacture of spirits is wholly forbidden. It
is of the most urgent importance to keep fermented
liquors out of reach of the native population, and to
suppress all illicit traffic. The importation of Portuguese
spirits has been stopped by treaty, and it was
clearly impossible for the Transvaal to consent to the
importation of spirits on easier terms from the other
British colonies. The concluding paragraph of Article
XVII., therefore, provides that “where a prohibition
exists in any colony or territory of the Union against
the manufacture of spirits for sale, it shall be lawful
for such colony or territory to levy on spirits produced
within the Union a custom duty not exceeding that
levied on similar spirits produced outside the Union.”
The duty in force is therefore from 15s. to £1 per
imperial gallon in addition to the 10 per cent ad
valorem rate; which, it has been calculated, is an
increase on the former cost of from 4s. to 6s. per
case.
The new Union is therefore almost wholly in the
favour of the new colonies. The cost to the consumer
is lessened, but the revenue does not lose appreciably,
since charges, formerly diverted by the coast colonies,
now go to its coffers. The coast colonies, in an admirable
spirit of statesmanship, have consented to surrender
a part of their revenue in order that the chief
industrial market of South Africa might be open to
their people—an example of that policy of foregoing
certain revenues on a narrow basis for the sake of
a possible revenue in a wider field which is of the
essence of good government. The preference given
to British goods, while still further reducing rates
in favour of a large class of imports, is also a step
towards federation, which does not, as such experiments
are apt to do, militate in any serious way
against local commerce. The one person who might
complain is the farmer of the Transvaal, who sees
his markets thrown open to the old grain-lands of
Cape Colony; but if the long railway journey which
his rivals have to face is not a sufficient handicap
to enable him to hold his own, then we need not
lament his fall. Vital as agricultural progress is, it
cannot hope for protection at the expense of industrial
prosperity.
The normal expenditure of the Transvaal may be
taken roughly at £3,600,000. This figure is exclusive
of debt charges, or any capital outlay on development
which may be met out of revenue. It represents
merely the day-to-day cost of the administrative
machine. As revenue is enlarged the expenditure
will follow suit; but it is unlikely that the proportion
of costs to receipts, which is roughly three to four, will
ever increase. On the contrary, it might be considerably
reduced by a more complete administrative
decentralisation. At present there are a number of
isolated departments—Native Affairs, Lands, Mines—with
local representatives wholly independent of each
other, and responsible only to the heads of their departments.
The resident magistrate, who is really an
administrative official, since the legal work is done by
the assistant magistrate, and who as a rule is not a
lawyer, has a very narrow control over a few subjects
like local government and public health. The system
is wasteful both of money and energy, for the isolated
departments often overlap unconsciously; and since
there is no local check, the tendency is for the head of
a department to increase his local staff and to vie with
other heads in securing large estimates. It also means
that a constant inspection has to be kept up from
headquarters, and each department supports a force of
travelling officials. The Indian precedent might be
followed with advantage, and real heads of districts
established, who would have a control, direct or indirect,
over all administrative work. They should be
responsible for the efficient and economic working of
their district, prepare their local estimates and reports,
and answer for their work only to the Governor and
Council. The great departments would exist as before,
but their local staffs would be much reduced in number,
so far as such staffs were administrative and not intrusted
with expert work. Experts, such as inspectors
of machinery, customs officers, and veterinary surgeons,
would remain directly responsible to their own departments,
though over these also the district administrator
would exercise a general supervision. In this way a
very considerable saving would be effected in salaries,
the unnecessarily large force of travelling inspectors
could be reduced, and the friction which inevitably
attends the working of isolated and independent
officials in any district would be saved by the establishment
of responsible heads,—deputy administrators,
whose business it would be to supervise all district
Government work, and control all local expenditure.
III.
The natural assets of the country and the existing
fiscal system have been roughly sketched in the foregoing
pages. It remains to consider what burden these
two factors in collaboration are called upon to bear.
In view of the peculiar situation of the new colonies,
the necessity of a loan for development is sufficiently
obvious. The country was desolated by war. Large
sums were necessary for compensation to loyalists and
for the repatriation of the Dutch inhabitants. The
backward system of our predecessors had left public
works ill provided for in most places, particularly in
the country districts. If the wealth of the provinces,
mineral and agricultural, was to be exploited, and the
existing industries granted reasonable facilities for
progress, a heavy expenditure was imperative for
railway extension. If the rural parts were to be
developed and their population leavened with our
own countrymen, considerable sums must be expended
on settlement, and on such reproductive schemes as
forestry and irrigation. Finally, certain heavy liabilities
awaited the incoming Government. To buy
out the existing railways and repay certain military
debts and advances from the Imperial Treasury, fully
14 millions were required. The old debt of the Transvaal,
amounting to 2½ millions, which carried 4 per
cent interest, must be paid off, and the capital required
for the repayment made part of a new loan at an
easier rate. The liabilities and needs of the country
stood therefore as follows: An advance by the Imperial
Government to cover the estimated Transvaal
deficit of 1901-2, £1,500,000; the old debt of the
Transvaal, £2,500,000; compensation to loyalists in
Cape Colony and Natal, £2,000,000; the acquisition
of the railways and the repayment of the
existing railway debt, £14,000,000; repatriation[21]
and compensation in the new colonies, £5,000,000;
railway extension, £5,000,000; land settlement,
£3,000,000; various public works, £2,000,000,—a
total of £35,000,000. This is the sum comprised in
the famous Guaranteed Loan.
But this figure, large as it is, does not exhaust our
burden. During the year 1901 and 1902 the question
of the contribution of the new colonies to the imperial
war debt was keenly discussed both in South Africa
and in England. Some fixed the payment likely to
be required at as much as £100,000,000; others argued
that the new colonies were likely to have so many
burdens of their own that they could not be called
upon to contribute at all. Moderate men on both
sides saw that some contribution was equitable, but
asked that it should not be fixed so high as to cripple
development. There were various proposals, such as
the ear-marking of certain sources of revenue and all
windfalls, or the allocating of a certain proportion of
any annual surplus; but such schemes were liable to
the objection from the side of the Imperial Government
that there was no certainty in the contribution,
and from the side of the new colonies that there was
no finality in the liability. The settlement which Mr
Chamberlain announced in his speech at Johannesburg
in January 1903 was, perhaps, the best possible
in the circumstances. The contribution was fixed at
£30,000,000, to be raised in three years by contributions
of £10,000,000 per annum. The first 10
millions at 4 per cent were underwritten without commission
by the great financial houses of the Rand, and
there is no reason to doubt that if they are called to
make good their guarantee, it will prove a profitable
investment. It is difficult to overestimate the merit
of an arrangement which tends to bind the great
houses to a closer interest in the general development
of the country. The War Loan was secured wholly
upon the Transvaal, but there is a contingent liability
on the Orange River Colony to pay a further sum of
£5,000,000 out of the Government share of any
discoveries of precious stones and metals.
We have, therefore, to face a total debt of
£65,000,000, of which 35 millions at 3 per cent are
a charge upon both colonies, and 30 millions at 4
per cent upon the Transvaal alone. It is a heavy
responsibility for a white population of a few
hundreds of thousands, face to face with a labour
problem. That the world at large believes in the
future of the country is shown by the way in
which the Guaranteed Loan was taken up, the first
30 millions having been subscribed more than thirty
times over. On this loan the interest charge, with
1 per cent sinking fund, will amount to an annual
payment of £1,400,000: in three years time the
War Loan, unless (which is probable) it can be issued
at a lower rate than 4 per cent, will mean an annual
charge of £1,200,000, with no sinking fund allowed.
We have therefore in front of us a possible annual
payment of £2,600,000, with a slight increase in the
future when a sinking fund is provided. The payment,
large in itself, was made more difficult by the
circumstances of the two colonies. The larger loan
is secured on both, but while the Orange River Colony
had a fair claim to a considerable part of the proceeds,
it was clearly impossible that she should pay a share
of the charge proportionate to her receipts. If she
shared in the loan only to the extent of the annual
contribution which on her small revenue she could
afford, many important public works both of land
settlement and railway extension would have to be
abandoned. Joined with this general administrative
difficulty, there was a departmental one connected
with the railways. The main line through the Orange
River Colony had acquired, as one of the main feeders
of the Transvaal, a purely fictitious value, and the
Orange River Colony profited greatly by the receipts.
But to have within one system two types of line,
one a through line simply, the other connected
directly with the great centres of production and
consumption, and to have those two types of lines
used as revenue-producing agents for two different
administrations, was to make a consistent railway
policy impossible. The country of the through line,
whose fictitious value produced a very real revenue,
would reclaim against reduction in rates for the
benefit of the other.
Both difficulties have been met by a very ingenious
scheme. The Inter-Colonial Council of the two
colonies, created by Order in Council of 20th May
1903, is significant in many ways, notably as the
first overt step towards federation; but for the
present we may look upon it purely as a financial
expedient. Two important departments, common to
both colonies, were placed wholly under the administration
of the Council—the Central South African
Railways and the South African Constabulary; and
a number of minor common services, such as surveys
and education, were added, and power was given to
the two legislatures to increase the number when
they saw fit. A Railway Committee of Council
forms the permanent controlling authority in all
railway matters. All net profits of the railways
in each year are assigned to Council to form its
revenues. Out of these it has to meet the expenditure
of the Constabulary and the minor common
charges, as well as the annual charge and management
costs of the Guaranteed Loan.[22]
The financial duties of the Council are therefore
twofold. It has the entire administration of the
Loan in its hands, it provides for its apportionment
among the different services, and it undertakes the
payment of its charges. It has also to meet the
administrative expenditure of the common departments
intrusted to it, and for this purpose it receives
the net profits of the chief revenue-producing asset
of the two Governments. The first duty is comparatively
simple. A body composed of official and
unofficial representatives of the two parties to the
Loan can allocate speedily and equitably without the
constant strife and jealousy which would attend the
interference of two different publics. But the second
duty, which is concerned with the annual inter-colonial
budget, constitutes the index or barometer
of the new colony finances. The Budget for 1903-4
shows the following figures: on the revenue side,
£2,350,000 from the net railway receipts; on the
expenditure side, £1,441,000 for the service of the
Guaranteed Loan,[23] £1,520,000 for the Constabulary,
and about £70,000 for minor common services. This
leaves a deficit of about £680,000, which, according to
the term of the Order in Council, will be met by contributions
from the Transvaal and the Orange River
Colony in proportion to their customs receipts—roughly,
£600,000 from the first, and £80,000 from the second.
Let us take the revenue side of the Budget first.
The position of the railways is anomalous. They are
virtually a taxing-machine, and in this respect the
most effective of Government properties. The normal
position of a Government railway should be that
of an institution worked for the public benefit, the
receipts being little in excess of the working costs
plus a moderate interest on the capital involved. In
this railway system the net profits, as we have seen,
are estimated for next year, allowing for the half-million
decrease from the reduction of rates, at
£2,300,000. No doubt it is economically unsound to
levy a tax of such magnitude on what is virtually a
necessity of life and a constituent of production. But
bad economics may be sound statesmanship, if they
are recognised as unsound—a temporary expedient
to obviate a more serious difficulty. Railway profits
are the buttress of inter-colonial finance: without
them there is no satisfactory provision for the debt
charges, and some form of direct taxation, which
would interfere far more effectively with nascent
industries, would be the only resort. The rates have
been already reduced so as to provide, along with
the new customs tariff, for a very real decrease in
the cost of living. They will be still further reduced,
always keeping a limit in view which is calculated
on fiscal needs. To so adjust the rates that industrial
and rural development will not be hindered, and at
the same time to provide an adequate revenue,
presents a very pretty problem in railway finance.
It is the problem in the customs; it is the problem
in direct taxation; it is the essence of the economic
problem of the country. But with all reductions
there is a good chance of railway revenue increasing.
The 5 millions of the Loan which go to development
will in a year or two bear fruit. It is difficult to see
how the net profits can ever fall below £2,100,000,
while it is not unreasonable to hope that in a few
years they may rise to £2,500,000 or £3,000,000.
But while the revenue side is likely to increase,
the expenditure side of the Budget will inevitably
decline. When the full loan is raised the annual
charge will be £1,408,000, a stationary figure till
the loan is redeemed. The Council is a genuine
Caisse de la Dette; its revenues are charged in the
first instance with the loan charges, and the liability
of the separate colonies to make up any deficiency
distributes the weight of the debt equitably among
the parties to it. The danger of a Caisse, that it
tends to check general prosperity by a too arbitrary
appropriation of revenue, is avoided by the very
strict conditions of the Council’s power and the nature
of its constitution. The minor common services will
not increase, and they may very probably decrease,
as such branches as surveys and permits shrink to
normal limits. The large item of 1½ million for the
Constabulary will be lowered in future to about
£1,200,000, which, on the present establishment, must
be regarded as a final figure. We may, therefore,
take £2,500,000 as the average expenditure in two
years’ time, which, if railway receipts increase to a
like figure in the same time, would make the Inter-Colonial
Budget balance.
In the meantime the Transvaal is able to pay any
contribution which may be required from her. But
in two years all or the greater part of the War
Loan will have been raised, and she may have to
face a maximum annual charge of £1,200,000, which
contains no provision for any sinking fund. In
these circumstances, on her present revenue she
could pay nothing towards any inter-colonial deficit:
she might even have to ask for a contribution.
There is every probability that such help could
be given, and an automatic system of adjustment
might be framed by which any inter-colonial
surplus could go to pay the charges or assist in the
creation of a sinking fund for the War Loan. This is
of course on the most unfavourable assumption,—that
the War Loan has to be raised at 4 per cent, that the
present industrial depression continues, and that the
Transvaal gets no increase of revenue from that prosperity
which she has a right to expect. It is far
more probable that the Council will be free to devote
any surplus it may show to the development of the
common services, for which the Loan provision cannot
in the long-run be found adequate.
IV.
It is idle to deny that the present is a period of
financial strain. The new colonies are solvent, but the
margin is narrow. Like everything else in South
Africa, their finances are on a needle-point, and require
strenuous intelligence and constant economy. I have
taken the railway profits and customs receipts as incapable
of falling below their present level; but it is to
be remembered that the past year is not a fair basis
for prophecy, since the country has been in process of
reconstruction, and the heavy importations for the
purpose have swollen receipts in both departments.
If industrial progress is still retarded, both figures will
sink enormously, and the whole system of finance
sketched in the preceding pages will require revision.
If, on the other hand, progress is assured, both figures
will increase largely, since, while this basis is high as
compared with the present situation, it is low compared
with any real prosperity. In this case the
strain will be of short duration. Ce n’est que le
premier pas qui coûte. Industrial development lies
at the root of all things. The Transvaal can only
hope for a large permanent increase of revenue from
the licences and profit tax paid by the mining industry
and from Customs receipts drawn from a wider basis
of population. Unless this increase comes she may be
unable to meet her own war debt, or to contribute
anything to an inter-colonial deficit. Inter-colonial
revenues, too, can only expand from the same cause,
for mining prosperity is at the bottom of railway
profits. The State finances depend upon mining
development, and mining development depends on
labour: this is the true statement of the problem, and
all others are involved in a vicious circle. And this is
as it should be. On the great industry of the country
the chief burden must lie.
There is, of course, the possibility of windfalls.
From the Crown share of gold and diamond properties
very large sums of money may from time to time flow
to the Exchequer. But it is the part of a prudent
finance minister to base his forecasts on the normal
only, and to accept windfalls as gifts of Providence,
to be used for special purposes. It may be necessary
to draw upon this source of income to meet the debt
charges; but, should this misfortune be spared us, then
we have in such windfalls the nucleus of a reserve fund
for development. There is need, as we have seen, of a
capital outlay on development far beyond that provided
for in the Guaranteed Loan. Railway extension alone,
before we have done with it, will need not 5 millions,
but 10, and, in cases where new lines are built by
private companies, we shall have to face sooner or later
a considerable expenditure on expropriation. Public
works, when all the loan moneys have been spent, will
still be badly provided for. It may be necessary, too,
to spend money in expropriating land for public parks,
for game preserves, for public buildings, for new townships,—expenditure
which in the first instance will fall
upon the Government. So, too, with other schemes,—irrigation,
the search for artesian water, the establishment
of colleges and technical schools, and all the
thousand activities of government in a new country,
which will grow quickly and develop early a multitude
of needs. Lastly, land settlement in the two colonies,
if it is to serve the social and political purpose which
is its chief justification, demands more than the 3
millions allotted to it. Such expenditure is in the
fullest sense an investment, since the bulk of it will be
returned in time to the Exchequer with a reasonable
interest. It is proposed that, in so far as repayments
of capital from settlers are concerned, such repayments
should form a special fund, which can go out again
in fresh advances and further purchases of land. In
this way a permanent fund for settlement will be
created, and the project will not be dependent upon
a share of any annual surplus.
The economic problem of the new colonies finds
a parallel in Egyptian reconstruction in more ways
than the analogy of the Caisse de la Dette. There
is the same undeveloped wealth in the country, the
same heavy bondage of debt, the same demand for
reproductive expenditure. To cut down the cost of
living and the restraints on production, and at the
same time to provide money for development and for
the charges of an unproductive debt, is the threefold
South African problem, as it was the Egyptian.
Solvency here, as there, is to be found in an equipoise,
and requires a nice and discriminating statesmanship
rather than any heroic cutting of knots. In most
respects the Egyptian difficulty was far the greater,
for there the cast-iron debt regulations and the
endless European surveillance frustrated at every
turn the efforts of her statesmen. But one danger
was absent. In Egypt patience and diplomacy, faith
in the country and in the work of time, were so
obviously the only cards to play, that, while there
were many temptations to lose heart and abandon
the struggle, there was no inducement to try short
cuts and forsake the true path of policy for those
showy and unconsidered measures which in the rare
event of their success are called heroic. In South
Africa the amateur financier is so abroad in the land
that we may look to find many odd nostrums advocated
to ensure prosperity. The kind of discussion
which arose over the labour difficulty is a guide to
what we may expect in the realm of high finance.
But in both the one and the other the real problem
is plain once the obscuration caused by conflicting
interests is cleared away by a little common-sense.
The great questions of economics in relation to state
growth are always simple. If high finance means
anything it is the power of adding two and two
together. Complicated financial adjustments belong
to a lower plane: the great financier may have no
aptitude in reducing results to a decimal. But there
is this distinction, that whereas in the intricate
calculations of secondary finance the figures are mere
counters, the elaboration of accepted data, in the
higher and simpler finance they are symbols. To the
statesman they are the gauge of prosperity or decline,
and behind them stand the millions of workers, the
miles of crops, the floods and droughts and pestilences,
the rise and fall of industries, the ore in the mine, the
web in the factory, the cattle in the stockyard. The
yield of a land tax is to him not a figure but a
symbol, and in using it he has regard not only to
its formal place in estimates and returns, but to its
political meaning. It is, if you like, the quality
which in other spheres constitutes the distinction
between statesmen and high permanent officials,
between economists and statisticians, between all
leaders and all subordinates. In the finance of a
country which is still in process of reconstruction,
this power, so uncommon and so inestimable, of
getting behind figures to facts, and keeping the
hand on the pulse of national progress, is the only
guarantee of ultimate success. In this light the
prospects of the new colonies give good reason for
hope. The budget of to-day, formally regarded, shows
a delicate equipoise, in which a pessimist might find
material for dark forebodings; but it is only the
symbol of that stress of re-creation which must
precede an ample prosperity.
I.
To the Boer the land was the beginning and end of
all things: a town was only a necessary excrescence, an
industry an uitlander whim. A land policy is therefore
one of the first burdens which attend our heritage.
Happily we are not seriously impeded by the wreckage
of systems which have failed. The Boer Government
had no land legislation, and the few laws, such as the
Occupation Law of 1886, which touched on the question,
were less statutory enactments than administrative
resolutions. The Boer farmer, or his father,
secured his land when the country was unoccupied,
and he had merely to arrange the boundary question
with friendly neighbours. He held it on freehold
title, with no reservation of quit-rent to the Government.
When the existing population had thus been
settled, the balance of unoccupied country fell to the
State; and this was further parcelled out by grants
to poor burghers, doles for war service, establishment
of native reserves, and in the wilder districts by the
system of occupation tenure. But in spite of all
grants a considerable portion remained State territory—over
44,000 square miles in the Transvaal, of which
at least 19,000,000 acres are unsurveyed. In the
Orange River Colony the State lands are smaller, not
exceeding, with all recent purchases, 1,400,000 acres.
The land question in the two colonies is therefore of
the simplest: the best farms, including most of the
rich pockets of alluvial land, are the freehold possession
of a small number of Dutch farmers; the balance
is the more or less encumbered perquisite of the State.
The condition of agriculture in the two colonies was
primitive in the extreme, a truth quite independent of
the question whether such elementary methods were
not the only possible. The first comers were pastoralists
and nothing more, coming as they did from the
great pastoral regions in the north of Cape Colony.
The average farm was laid out for stock, and was
rarely less than 6000 acres. On the old estimate eight
acres was required for each head of horned cattle and
two for each sheep. The Boer was not an advanced
stock-farmer in any sense of the word. He found
certain diseases indigenous to the country which he did
not seriously attempt to cope with. He rarely fenced
his stock-routes and outspans or endeavoured to improve
the carrying capacity of the land by paddocking.
The high veld in winter is burned brown by sun and
wind and nipped by frosts, so that it gives little
sustenance to stock; but the rich vegetation in
summer should have provided, by means of ensilage,
ample feeding for the winter months. This simple
device was never used, and when the grass failed
the Boer trekked with his herds to his low-veld
farm, whence he frequently brought back the seeds of
disease in his animals. In the quality of his stock he
was equally backward. In the Afrikander ox he had
the makings of one of the hardiest and strongest
draught animals in the world. In the Afrikander
pony he had the basis of a wonderful breed of riding-horses,
to whose merits the late war has sufficiently
testified. He never seriously tried to improve one or
the other. Stallions of wretched quality were allowed
to run wild among his mares, and he had no system
of culling to raise the quality of his herds. The
market for his beef and mutton was small and uncritical,
so that the amassing of animals became with
him rather the sign visible of prosperity than a serious
professional enterprise.
At first the Boer did little more than till a garden.
On each farm there was a certain water-supply, and
around the spruit or fountain a pocket of alluvial
land. The ordinary soil, both in the Transvaal and
the Orange River Colony, is, with some remarkable
exceptions, poor and easily worked out; but those
alluvial patches are so rich as to be practically inexhaustible.
The Boer and the Kaffir shared one
gift in common, an infallible eye for good country,
though there was this difference between them that
the Boer chose the heavy river-side lands, while the
Kaffir, who was a shallow cultivator, preferred as a
rule the lighter slopes where he could pick with
ease. In 1885 the Boer farmer did little more than
irrigate his garden; but the increase in the population
of the towns, and the growth of a market for
cereals, fruits, and vegetables, made him extend his
irrigation farther, so that in a few years the whole
of his alluvial pocket was under water. Formerly
he had been a pure pastoralist; now he became
also an agriculturist, and after his fashion a narrow-minded
one, for irrigation, which was his first successful
experiment, was at once exalted by him into
an axiomatic law. The Kaffir, who in his way is
a skilful farmer and an experimentalist on a far
wider scale, believed in dry lands; but the Boer
confined himself to his irrigation and his summer
and winter crops. Two views have been promulgated
on the Boer method. One is, that it is the
true and only type possible in the country, discovered
after long years of intelligent experience. The Boer,
it is said, is unprogressive, because he knows the
limitations under which he works, and all new-comers
who have begun by trying new methods have sooner
or later fallen into line with the old inhabitants.
The supporters of this view point to the scarcity of
English farmers in the land who have made a success
of their farms on any other than the Boer methods.
There seems to be no real justification for this opinion.
The Boer has no settled principles of farming; he
is an experimentalist in practice, whatever he may
be in theory. We have seen that he began as a
pastoralist, advanced to be also a gardener, and is
now a cultivator of lands under irrigation. In some
twenty years, had he been allowed to develop unchecked,
he would doubtless have come round to the
Kaffir view of the dry lands. Fifteen years ago the
country store-keeper stocked only the old single-furrow
wooden plough: to-day on Boer farms you
may see double-furrow steel ploughs, disc ploughs,
disc cultivators, not to speak of such elaborate farm
machinery as aermotors, reapers and binders, steam
chaff-cutters, and in some few cases steam-ploughs.
The more progressive Boers have changed utterly
their methods of orchard-management, and at the
present moment they are reconsidering their methods
of tobacco-growing. The point is important, because
if the Boer has really found out long ago the limitations
of the soil and the only principles of farming,
then so far from deserving the name of unprogressive
he has shown himself eminently wise. But the
theory of Boer stability is a chimera. He changes
every year in his attitude towards the soil,—changes
unwillingly, it may be, but certainly; and though
a few dogmas take a long time to alter, they alter
in the end. It is equally incorrect to argue from
the absence of successful immigrant farmers on progressive
lines. They were few in number, because
in a country where the rural population was mainly
hostile, the new-comers who began by farming ended
as a rule by drifting to the towns. But, to cite
one case, mealies have been grown on dry lands on
the American plan with great profit to the farmer;
and the German tobacco-planters in the north have
shown how profitable fruit and tobacco growing can
become, if conducted on principles rather than on
tradition.
But it is as great a mistake to regard the Boer
farmer as utterly without capacity. He had no need
to bestir himself. He lived simply and supplied his
own modest needs. He saw his farm going up in
price through the general appreciation of land values,
and he sold a bit now and again and increased his
herds; or he might receive a large sum for the option
on the minerals under the soil. He was cheated by
the country store-keeper, and he rarely attempted
to reach distant markets. The old vicious system
of allowing natives to farm on his land in return
for a certain amount of compulsory labour—a system
unchanged by that abortive piece of law-making, the
Plakkerswet—made him unthrifty and improvident.
He had no labour bill to cast up, no financial position
which wanted investigation at each year’s end. Hence
the difficulty of framing any accurate forecast of the
prospects of farming in the new colonies: there are
no statistics to follow, no scale of values for land
or produce. But the Boer had an empirical science
of his own. He knew exactly the capacity of his
irrigated land, though he never thought of formulating
his knowledge. He had many rough and
effective precautions against blight and disease, and
he had a kind of gipsy veterinary skill. He was
not industrious, but I think he must be allowed the
credit of having done his best for the land on his
own principles. He was a great buyer of new farm
machinery, partly perhaps out of curiosity, and on
this point at least his conservatism was not consistent.
Some of his methods were based on common rural
superstitions—for example, he always sowed, if possible,
at the full moon. His habit, too, of seeking
a theological explanation of all misfortunes was
destructive of energy. When the locusts or the
galziekte came he lit his pipe and said it was the
will of God, a visitation which it would be impious
to resist. Hardly, perhaps, the proper attitude for
success in this modern world, but under his peculiar
conditions he never felt its folly. It is impossible to
believe that the Boer has done justice to the country,
but we may readily grant him skill and good sense
in the narrow world in which he dwelt.
The land problem in the new colonies is partly
political and partly economic, and on the solution
of the latter branch of the question the former largely
depends. There are urgent reasons why an English
population should grow up on the land; but unless
this population can make a profitable living it would
be folly to encourage its immigration. On this economic
question it is impossible to dogmatise. Data, as
I have said, are lacking and have never existed. At
the best we can frame some sort of tentative answer—a
hope rather than a promise; and we are justified in
this course because those who attack the policy have
no better argument to offer.
Before the war the ordinary farmer sold his stock
and his produce at fair prices in his country town.
The bulk of it, together with the produce which
the more enterprising farmers sent direct, went to
Johannesburg, where on the whole high prices were
maintained. So good were the prices that the farmers
of the eastern and western provinces of Cape Colony
found it profitable, notwithstanding customs and heavy
railway freights, to make Johannesburg their chief
market. But in spite of all local production, Johannesburg
was not fully supplied. Food-stuffs in large
quantities had to be imported from abroad. In 1898
agricultural produce, raw and manufactured, to the
value of nearly £2,500,000 was imported into the
Transvaal. Arguing on these facts, many have predicted
a rosy future for all branches of South African
farming. What has been imported, they say, can be
grown; the mining industry will advance, and agriculture
will follow with equal steps. But such rudimentary
hopes can scarcely be held to exhaust a
very complicated and delicate problem, to which
some answer must be suggested before any needs
of policy can be thought of. There are two questions
to be met: How far is the land capable of intensive
and sustained production? and, granting the capacity,
what guarantee is there of profitable markets?
The soil of the new colonies, as I have said, is
sharply divided into alluvial pockets and dry lands,—the
former highly cultivated, the latter, except for
Kaffir locations, mainly neglected. But since for one
alluvial acre there are a hundred dry morgen, the
progress of the country may be said to depend upon
the dry lands. It follows that pasturage must remain
the staple form of farming. The bulk of the
dry lands are light and thin in soil, and the natural
humours of the ground have been much exhausted
by the unthrifty habit of veld-burning. But in spite
of all drawbacks it is a country of abundant summer
grass, both sweet veld and sour veld, which is capable
of great improvement by any proper system of
paddocking and depasturing. Large quantities of
veld grass might be cut for winter fodder, and
roots and forage crops could be grown in summer
for the same purpose. Farms, which at present carry
an ox to every eight acres and a sheep to every two,
might be made capable of supporting a vastly greater
stock. But there are certain drawbacks to stock-farming
peculiar to the country, the chief being the
number of diseases indigenous and imported. At
the present moment to bring in valuable stock to
most districts of the new colonies is a dangerous experiment.
Horses die of horse-sickness, sheep of scab
and anthrax, cattle of rinderpest, red-water, and the
immense variety of ziektes from galziekte to gielziekte.
Before the new colonies can advance to the rank of
great pastoral lands which is their right, vigorous
methods must be taken to stamp out diseases wherever
they appear, and to take precautions against
their recurrence. The country must be fenced, stock-routes
and outspans must be established and guarded,
and a stringent Brands Act must be passed to give
security to the stock-owner in a country where stock
is notoriously prone to vanish.[24]
Given good laws, adequately administered, the
Transvaal and the Orange River Colony may well
become countries of large and prosperous stock-farms.
Here, it has been argued, the matter ends. Agriculture
must confine itself in most cases to the growth
of domestic supplies and winter forage. I cannot, after
a careful examination of most parts of the country,
bring myself to accept this view. Much may be done
by irrigation to increase the area of land under water.
Sir W. Willcocks’ Report[25] proposes to give to South
Africa 3,000,000 acres of perennially irrigated land
at a cost of about £30,000,000; but as he argues for
the undertaking on the basis of certain doubtful land
valuations, this large estimate may have to be considerably
modified. Unirrigated land, he says, varies
from 2s. 6d. to £3 per acre: irrigation costs from
£7, 10s. to £15 per acre; and the price of good irrigated
land runs from £20 to £100. On this reasoning
there is room for a handsome profit, but the argument
is based rather on fictitious market values than on the
intrinsic normal producing power of the soil. At the
time when Sir W. Willcocks’ Report was written—the
last year of the war—land values were inflated, and
the prices of produce grown under water were extremely
high. In the average year for which we must
provide little irrigated land will be worth to the
farmer more than from £5 to £10 per acre, and
certain irrigation schemes which, on Sir W. Willcocks’
showing would return a profit, would in reality spell
ruin to their promoters. Irrigation is necessary on a
certain scale for a reason which we shall discuss later;
and in many cases it could be effected at a moderate
cost. But expensive irrigation works for agriculture
alone are, I believe, of doubtful wisdom in almost every
part of the country. What is of infinitely greater importance
is the procuring of water in the dry tracts
by tanks, wells, and, if possible, by artesian bores.
Vast stock districts in Waterberg and Lichtenburg
would have their value quadrupled if a permanent
supply of water, even for stock purposes only, could
be procured. The Australian method of tank-sinking
has already been followed with success in the Springbok
Flats, and it is at least possible that artesian
water may be found. Everywhere the soil contains
water at a low depth, which percolates through the
porous rock, and is brought to a stand by dykes of
harder stone. Hence has arisen the old African fiction
of underground rivers, which is true to the extent that
no man has far to dig before he finds water. It is
rather with such tank- and well-sinking that a water
expert should deal, and with the regulation of the
present ridiculous apportionment of water rights. No
serious work can be done in this department till the
State assumes the right of distributing water, and has
it in its power to prevent the riparian owner from
following an obstructive course to the detriment of
his neighbours. Irrigation in a few cases should be
followed, and a greater portion of land brought under
water in the interests of mixed farming; but it is in
another direction that we must look for the sheet-anchor
of South African agriculture.
The rainfall of the new colonies is generally well
distributed. Copious rains fall from September to
April, and then come the four dry and windy months
of winter. On irrigated lands summer and winter
crops are grown; on dry lands a summer crop only.
But the Boer believed that the crops which he could
grow on dry lands were very limited, and he habitually
grew mealies, potatoes, lucerne, and tobacco under
water. It is, of course, a great advantage to reap two
crops a-year; but if a man can get two crops from
5 acres only and one crop from 500, this one crop, on
ordinary principles of common-sense, should command
his chief attention. Deducting the greater expense
for labour, the one crop is still thirty or forty times as
important as the other two. This is roughly the agricultural
problem of the dry lands. They have never
been really exploited. The Kaffir has picked at the
edges; a few progressive farmers have made good
profits by growing mealies and tobacco dry on the
American plan. But it was much easier to potter
about with a water-furrow than to attempt to plough
the dry and unbroken flats. Dry-land farming is
therefore pioneer farming, and pioneering with a good
hope of success. Granted the markets, there is no
reason why great tracts should not be ploughed from
end to end, and a huge crop of cereals and roots raised
yearly. Steam-ploughing and every labour-saving
device will be necessary, for this is farming on the
grand scale. The outlook is made brighter when we
realise that those despised dry lands are some of the
richest in the country. The famous Standerton black
soil, the environs of Middelburg, part of the Bloemhof
and Klerksdorp districts, and, above all, the Springbok
Flats,[26] where there may be half a million acres
of the richest black soil 12 feet deep, and another half
million acres of excellent red soil—such are a few
instances of lands which await an early development.
There is still another aspect of this problem which
concerns a small group of semi-tropical products—fruits,
tobacco, rubber, coffee, and, possibly, cocoa.
There are tracts which have proved themselves to be
as highly fitted for such crops as any in the world.
They are crops, too, for which the acreage required is
small, and whose value is so high in proportion to bulk
that the freightage does not seriously detract from
profits. Given, again, the market, and there is no
reason why the present yield should not be centupled.
The market—that is the rock on which arguments
divide. The rosy hopes of the market to be furnished
by the Transvaal which some minds entertained during
the war have given place with many to an equally
fantastic pessimism. I do not propose to provide
a tabulated statement of costs and prices. I have
seen such statements arrive by the clearest reasoning
at opposite conclusions. But it is worth while to
consider soberly what are the market prospects in the
future for the farmer of the new colonies. A comparison
of imports gives little assistance. In the year
1902 the raw agricultural produce imported into the
Transvaal, all of which might be locally produced,
was worth over 2 millions sterling; and the imports
of manufactured and partially manufactured produce,
the bulk of which might be produced and manufactured
locally, came close on another million. These
figures may be taken as below normal, since supplies
for the army of occupation are not included, and at
the same time the number of inhabitants in the towns
and natives in the mines were largely below the ordinary
figures. On the other hand, little agriculture
existed, and practically all supplies for the existing
population, such as it was, had to be brought from
the adjoining colonies or from over-seas. On this
basis, therefore, there is a considerable and highly
profitable market for the limited agriculture and pastoral
enterprise of the country. But in framing any
forecast two new factors must be taken into consideration.
If the towns are to develop, the cost of living
must be greatly reduced; which means in the first instance
that all ordinary food-stuffs must be imported
free of duty and at cheap railway rates. Again,
when all the Boer farmers have been resettled on
their lands and a multitude of new-comers occupy
Crown farms, the local agricultural output will be
very largely increased. The farmer, who at the
moment can sell his garden stuff, his crops of potatoes,
mealies, and forage, and his stock at a good
profit, will find himself faced by over-sea produce,
grown wholesale under the most favourable conditions,
and sold at a price with which he cannot compete
and live. This is, I think, a true forecast—for the
small improvident farmer. The man who grows mealies
on a large scale with labour-saving appliances, or who
has a well-managed stock-ranch, will make a profit on
wholesale dealings. In agriculture and pasturage,
as in other activities, Providence is on the side of the
bigger battalions, and the small man who grows on
an expensive scale will be pushed out by the large
man who grows economically. Prophecy is an intricate
task, especially on land questions, but it seems clear
that the only class who will not have to dread to
some extent a change in present conditions, a cheapening
of the means of life, and the influx of a large
agricultural population, will be the wholesale farmers
and pastoralists, who follow the methods of over-sea
producers and enjoy the advantage of living at their
customers’ doors.
But this does not exhaust the question. Is, then,
the small holder of 100 or 200 acres, or the owner of
a mixed farm of 1000 acres, to become extinct in the
land? It depends entirely on themselves. In districts
such as Waterberg, Zoutpansberg, and Barberton,
the holder of 50 acres under water will be able to put
vegetables and fruit on the Rand market a fortnight
before any other grower in the world. His price is
assured beyond doubt; and if he may find little profit
for six months in the year, he is in no worse case than
many prosperous market-gardeners in Kent and Surrey.
It is here that the value of irrigation appears. Such a
small holder, again, may be able to make a profit from
dairying all the year round, provided local creameries
are established, and he goes the proper way about it.
So, too, with mixed farming, of which the essence is
that one product can be set off against another. If
a farmer finds cereals unproductive, he can put part
of his land into pasture; it is unlikely that the price
of meat will fall below a paying point, granted the
expected industrial development. In addition there
are certain crops, such as tobacco, where the profits,
even allowing for a large decline in present prices, are
great, the freightage small, and the market worldwide.
The aim of mixed farming is to provide an
elaborate system of alternate schemes, which between
them will preserve a fairly permanent average of
profit.
The basis of all farming prosperity is the growth of
the mining industry and the creation of new industries.
Any attempt to protect farming by tolls or imposts
is foredoomed to a miserable failure. Sink, if
necessary, farming considerations altogether for the
moment; look only to mining development, if need
be; abolish the old market prices and ruin the old
local producer: it is all good policy, and in the long-run
the true agricultural interest. When the present
fictitious basis is got rid of, the true and lasting
agricultural prosperity may begin. There seems no
reason to doubt that in the future there will be a
sound local market for the large producer, for the
favourably situated small holder, and for the judicious
farmer of mixed land. Nor is there any reason why
in time a considerable export trade should not be
established. As the great produce-exporting countries
of the world grow more populous, South Africa may
yet play its part in feeding Europe. With improved
internal communications, and thousands of miles of
fine pasture land, there is no reason why, a fortnight
nearer Europe than Australia, she should not take her
share of the frozen-meat traffic of the world. In
tobacco, again, to take only one instance, a very considerable
export trade may arise. The soil is well
suited; the rough leaf, grown on the most unscientific
method, is as good as anything produced by Virginia
and Borneo. The large tobacco-growers, or the small
holders attached to a tobacco-factory, may very well
find a profitable outlet for their wares abroad, and
the English manufacturers discover a new producing
ground in a British colony with which to resist the
attacks of transatlantic combines.
The farming prospects in the new colonies, even if
stripped of all fanciful stuff, are sound and hopeful.
There may come bad times for all. The ordinary
market-gardener will for a certainty find himself
poorly off five years hence; and all classes may have
their periods of stress and despair. Such visitations
are part of the primeval curse upon tillers of the soil.
The New Zealand and Australian pastoralists had
sunk very low before the discovery of cold storage
saved the situation. The Ceylon planters, after the
coffee blight, seemed on the brink of ruin, when the
introduction of tea-growing more than restored their
former prosperity. An immunity from farming risks
can no more be guaranteed in the new colonies than
in other countries. The real question is, Can they
offer the settler no greater risks than he has to face
elsewhere, and at least a fair chance of greater prosperity?
On a reasonable survey of the case, I think
it will be found that they can.
With this clearing of the ground we can turn with
an open mind to the political question. The secular
antithesis of town and country is as marked here as
elsewhere, and the political problem varies accordingly.
In the country we have to create in a large measure
from the foundation; we have to meet and nullify the
prevailing apathy, and undertake as a Government
many tasks which would elsewhere be left to private
enterprise. There the wounds of war gape more
widely, and have to be healed by more cunning
simples. People have spoken as if the towns were
the sole factor in the case. Make the towns prosperous
and wholly British, it has been said, and the
land is ours. The towns are the loyal units; as they
advance in prosperity the rural districts will sink out
of account; and rightly, for their wealth is small,
their population hostile, and their future barren.
“Twenty years hence,” wrote in 1896 an observer
as clear-sighted as he was hopeful, “the white population
is likely to be composed in about equal proportions
of urban and rural elements. The urban element
will be mainly mining, gathered at one great centre
on the Witwatersrand, and possibly at some smaller
centres in other districts. The rural element, consisting
of people who live in villages or solitary farmhouses,
will remain comparatively backward, because
little affected by the social forces which work swiftly
and potently upon close-packed industrial communities,
and it may find itself very different in tone,
temper, and tendencies from its urban fellow-citizens.”[27]
So we find one class of mine-owners arguing that any
attempt to settle the country districts is a work of
supererogation, and urging the Government to concentrate
all its efforts on the promotion of their own
industry, declaring that from their prosperity every
blessing will flow forth to the rural parts. It is
impossible to contemplate with equanimity the result
of merely letting things alone. No industrial development
would ever compensate for it, for the unleavened
Dutch rural districts would become centres to collect
and focus and stereotype the old unfaltering dislike.
A hard-and-fast division between town and country
is always to be feared; but when the barrier is
between white men, and is built up of race, wealth,
and civilisation, it can only be a dire calamity. We
cannot rear up for our children a race of helots, and
by our very exclusiveness solidify for all time an
irreconcilable race division. If we preserve such an
enemy within our bounds, and just beyond our gates,
the time may come when a few isolated townships
will represent Britain in South Africa. To prevent
this cleavage, urban and rural development should
advance with equal steps. The two races will be
joined not by any trivial sentimental devices, but by
the partnership of Dutch and British farmers in the
enlightened development of the land.
There is another and a profounder reason for this
introduction of British blood. The day may come
when the South African, splendid as has been his
loyalty and many his sacrifices, may go the way of
most colonists, and lose something of that close touch
with the mother-country which is necessary in the
interests of a federated empire. It is always the
temptation of town-dwellers, with their busy life and
their own engrossing interests, and the tremendous
mixture of alien blood in the country may serve to
hasten this result beyond the ordinary rate of colonial
progress. But the country settler is a different
person. He retains a longer and simpler affection
for the country of his birth. An influx of such a class
would consolidate South African sentiment, and, when
self-government comes, protect imperial interests
better than any constitutional guarantee. This is
the class which has the true stake in the country,
deriving its life from the nurture of the earth, striving
with winds and weather, and slowly absorbing into
the fibre of its being those influences which make for
race and patriotism.
South African agriculture, as the shrewdest
observers have long foreseen, could never be improved
until there arose a political reason for its
improvement. The reason for the experiment has
arrived, and its basis is in existence. In the inheritance
of Crown lands which remains from the mismanaged
estate of the late Government, and in the
long lists of ex-irregulars and others who sought land,
there was the raw material of settlement. It is no
case for flamboyant prophecies. The certain difficulties
are as great as the probable advantages. But
to shrink from those difficulties is to have towns
where British ideas of government, can be realised
and outside vast rural districts, suspicious, unfriendly,
potentially dangerous; to neglect a golden opportunity
of increasing the British element in South
Africa; and to turn the back upon farming, which
must always be the most permanent asset of any
nation. The determinant fact in the case is that the
alternative is so black that all risks must be faced
rather than accept it. With such considerations in
mind, the Government put forth a scheme of settlement,
with the examination of which the remainder
of this chapter is concerned. It is not my business to
write the history of the Crown Colony administration,
and therefore no time need be given to the many
difficulties which faced the scheme, the mistakes
made, and the hopeful results attained in certain
cases. It is the problem itself which demands attention,
and the adequacy or inadequacy of the policy
which has been framed to meet it. Land settlement
is from its very nature a slow business, with
tardy fruits: twenty years hence we may be in a
position to judge by results. But in the meantime
it is possible, when the data are known, to ascertain
whether a policy is on a priori grounds adapted to
meet them.
II.
The Crown lands of the Transvaal, as I have said,
amount to upwards of 29 million acres, the Crown
lands of the Orange River Colony to under 1½ million.
So far as the latter colony is concerned, land settlement
is rather in the nature of estate management.
The lands are too small for any serious political purpose,
nor would the most extended settlement make
much impression upon the solid Dutch rural community.
But in the Transvaal the Crown in several
districts is by far the largest landowner, and in others
it holds the key of the position. Take a Transvaal
map coloured according to ownership, and red is easily
the master colour. A solid block of it occupies the
north-east corner; large islands of it appear in the
western and eastern borders; and the centre is plentifully
dotted. Save in the little known north-east
those lands are generally pasture, and in too many
cases dry and arid bush-veld. In the Standerton
district, and in parts of Rustenburg, Potchefstroom,
and Bloemhof, there are tracts of good irrigated or
irrigable lands; while in Barberton, Lydenburg, Zoutpansberg,
and Marico there are considerable districts
well watered and well suited for tropical and sub-tropical
products. Taken as a whole, however, only
a small portion of the Crown holding is suitable for
early settlement—say 2½ million acres within the
next three years. But there is a wide hinterland for
development, and in settlement, as in empire, a hinterland
is a moral necessity. There must be an open
country to which the sons of farmers, in whom the
love of the life is born, can trek as pioneers, otherwise
there is a futile division into smaller holdings, or a
more futile exodus to the towns. Besides, there
should be room for the townsman—the miner, the
artisan, the trader—to feel that there is somewhere
an open country where he can invest his savings if he
has a mind for a simpler life. As railways spread out
into new districts, land will become agricultural which
is now pasture; and, as the pastoral industry develops
and herds are formed and diseases are mastered, the
ranchman will occupy large tracts of what is now the
unused hunting-veld.
The Government scheme aims at making a beginning
with this settlement—a beginning only, for no
government has ever been able to reconstruct alone, and
the bulk of the work must be done by private enterprise.
If 2000 farmers from England and the colonies
can be settled in the rural parts before the day of
stress arrives, then the work has been fairly started.
A nucleus will have been formed to which the years
will add, an element which will both leaven the slow
and suspicious rustic society and provide a make-weight
against the parochialism of the great towns.
A country party is wanted which can look beyond
the dorp and the mine-head, and view South African
interests broadly and soberly. Such a party must be
common to both town and country, but it cannot be
built up wholly from either. It must, in the first
instance, be a British party; but if this British party
is to become a South African party, it must stand for
interests common to both races and to all classes.
The formation of this leavening element cannot be
left to time and chance, but must be aided by conscious
effort. The land is largely unproved, and full
of dangers to crops and stock. The new-comer must
therefore be treated gently, and helped over the
many stiles which confront him. He will usually be
a man of small means, and his limited capital must
be put to the best use, and eked out with judicious
Government advances. He should have few payments
to make during his early years, when payments will
necessarily come out of capital. Above all, the
acquirement of the full freehold in his land on reasonable
terms, and within a reasonable time, should be
kept constantly before him as an encouragement to
thrift and industry, for the sense of freehold, as the
voortrekkers used to say, “turns sand into gold.”
Much of the Crown lands will never be suitable for
any but the largest stockholders. These it is easy to
deal with as a mere matter of estate-management;
but the political purport of the scheme is concerned
with intensive settlement, with the small holder and
the mixed farmer of moderate means, who can provide
a solid colony of mutually supporting and progressive
Englishmen.
The Transvaal “Settlers’ Ordinance” of 1902 is
based upon the mass of legislation which embodies the
settlement schemes of the Australasian colonies. The
usual method in such experiments has been to begin
in desperate fear of the settler, tying him up with
cast-iron rules, and ruining him in a very few years.
Then the pendulum swings back, and settlement is
made easy and profitable, the old safeguards are
abolished, and the land becomes full of rich squatters
and companies, who fatten on State munificence
through the numerous dummy settlers in their pay.
Finally, after long years a compromise is effected, and
that shy creature, the bonâ-fide settler, is sought for
far and near. By this time it is probable that the
thing has got a bad name, and men whose fathers and
grandfathers lost money under former schemes, are
chary of trusting themselves again to the tender
mercies of a land-owning State. This, or something
like it, has been the experience of the Australasian
colonies. Either land was given out indiscriminately
and a valuable State asset cheaply parted with, or the
conditions of tenure were such as to ruin the small
holder and put everything in the hands of a few rich
syndicates. The land laws of Australia and New
Zealand form, therefore, a most valuable precedent.
We have their experiments before our eyes, and can
learn from their often disastrous experience.
Settlement in New South Wales, to take one instance,
was begun partly as a Treasury expedient
and partly as an election cry. Under the Act of 1867
a settler was allowed to peg off, as on a mining area,
a claim not exceeding 320 acres, without any attempt
at a previous valuation and survey. The result was a
wild rush, where nobody benefited except the blackmailer,
who seized the strategic points of the country,
such as water-holes, and had to be bought out at a
fancy price. It does not surprise one to learn that of
settlers under this scheme not one in twenty remains
to-day. By subsequent Acts the maximum acreage
was increased; but in any case it was an arbitrary
figure, and it was not till 1895 that it was left within
the widest limits to the discretion of the Minister
of Lands. Areas proved too small, since no provision
could be made for the increase of stock and the necessary
fall in prices which attended settlement. In
valuation the extraordinary plan was adopted of giving
a uniform capital value of £1 per acre to all land.
The country being unproved, values were absolutely
unknown, nor was any provision made for revaluation.
The result was that the settler struggled along till he
was ruined and his holding forfeited, when the holding
lapsed to the State, which, being unable to find a new
tenant, was compelled to let it remain vacant, having
accomplished nothing but the needless ruin of the
first man. The “Settlers’ Ordinance” has endeavoured
to avoid laying down any rules which experience
has not tried and tested. The determination of the
size of any holding is left to the land officials, without
defining any area limits. A holding which proves too
small may be increased on appeal, and the boundaries
are at all times made capable of adjustment. Holdings
are first surveyed and valued, then gazetted for application,
and finally publicly allotted, after full inquiry
into the case of each applicant, by a Central Board.
The division and valuation of farms, in the absence of
reliable data, is a work of great nicety and difficulty.
The country contains within its limits many districts
which differ widely in soil, vegetation, and climate.
It is therefore impossible, in deciding on the size of
holdings, to follow any arbitrary rule; and to restrict
survey to a maximum and minimum acreage would be
fatal. The only method is to ascertain from local
evidence the carrying and producing capacity of similar
land, and so frame the boundaries of a farm as to
provide on such figures a reasonably good living for
the class of settler for whom it is intended. The
danger of putting too high a price on land is not less
great. If the current market price is taken it will in
most instances be overvalued, and in any case it is a
method without any justification in reason. The best
solution is probably the plan at present in use.
Schedules have been prepared for the different types
of holding, in which the profits are calculated, using as
a guide the present price of stock and imported produce
at the coast to ensure against the inevitable fall
in prices. Taking such estimated profits as a basis,
the valuation is so fixed as to give the settler, after
all living expenses, annual payments to Government,
probable loss of stock, and depreciation of plant have
been written off, a clear profit of 12 per cent on his
original capital. From this figure some further deductions
may fall to be made for such disadvantages as
unhealthiness of climate and excessive distance from
the conveniences of civilised life. In the absence of
more scientific data this seems to form as fair a basis
in valuation as any man can expect.
But if early Australasian legislation erred in rigour,
it also erred in laxity. The settler was often the
nominee of a syndicate or a large run-holder, and
before the 1895 Act a class of professional selectors
existed. This system of latifundia brought its own
punishment. The run-holder ruined the small selector.
To pay the instalments on his many selections he had
recourse to the banks, which speedily ruined him and
took over his holdings. The banks in their turn
ruined themselves, chiefly through being obliged to
pay instalments on land valued at £1 per acre, of which
the actual value for stock was less than 5s. Again,
the settler was compelled to improve the land at the
rate of so many shillings per acre within a given time.
This led to cheap fictitious improvements by which the
letter of the law was satisfied and the spirit evaded.
The “Settlers’ Ordinance” has certain stringent provisions
to prevent such frustration of the true aims of
settlement. Subletting or transfer of any sort, except
with Government consent, is strictly forbidden till the
tenant has acquired the freehold. Residence for at
least eight months in the year, unless a special dispensation
is granted, is required during the same
period. The settler is compelled to build a satisfactory
house and to fence his holding within a given time.
He is compelled to occupy it solely for his own benefit,
to cultivate according to the rules of good husbandry
(whatever that may mean), and the decision of the
local Land Commissioner is the test by which he is
judged. He is encouraged to improve by the potent
fact that the Government will advance pound for
pound against his improvements. But there are
certain elastic provisions to temper the rigour of such
restrictions. The Commissioner of Lands is given a
very wide dispensing power with regard to most conditions.
Partnerships are allowed; settlers may reside
together in a village community; and the residence
conditions may be temporarily fulfilled by a wife or
child, to allow a settler in hard times to make money
by his labour elsewhere. Special relief is provided
during periods of disease or drought by the cessation
or diminution of the annual payments, and by advances
in excess of the ordinary limits.
The Ordinance has been framed on experimental
lines, leaving much to the discretion of local officials
(subject to an appeal to the Central Board and thence
to the High Court), and hesitating to dogmatise on
details which are still unproved. But in spite of
much which is empirical, one or two root principles
are maintained. One is that a fair chance must be
given to all to acquire the freehold, without which
magic possibility the best men will not come forward.
Another, and perhaps the most important of all, is
that the payments to Government shall be so arranged
as to be scarcely felt during the early years when
they are paid out of capital, and to rise to any considerable
sum only when the holding is producing a
revenue. The two chief forms of tenure are leasehold
and purchase by instalments over a period of thirty
years. The common form of lease is for five years,
with a possible extension for another two, and the
rental may be at any rate (not exceeding 5 per cent)
which the Commissioner of Lands thinks suitable.
This method will enable back-country to be taken
up, to start with, at a nominal rent; and it will
also allow a settler on an unimproved stock-farm to
devote the bulk of his capital to the necessary
stocking and improvements. At the end of the lease,
or without any preliminary lease, the settler can
begin to purchase his holding on the instalments
system. By a payment of £5, 15s. per cent per
annum on the gazetted valuation, principal and
interest (which is calculated at 4 per cent) will be
wiped off in thirty years. But a settler is permitted
any time after ten years from the date of his first
occupation to pay up the balance and acquire the
full freehold. In the case of preliminary leaseholders
who take up a purchase licence, the licence, so far
as the ten years’ period is concerned, is made retrospective
so as to date from the first day of
the lease.
Such is a rough outline of the Government proposals.
They aim only at making a beginning, and
it is to the large private owner and the land company
that we must look for the completion of the work.
South African agriculture can never be a Golconda
like the Canadian wheat-lands of the West. But it
is of inestimable value to the country in providing a
background to the immense temporary mining development—a
permanent asset, which will remain to South
Africa’s credit when the gold-mines of the Rand are
curiosities of history. In itself it is a sound investment,
offering no glittering fortunes but a steady
and reasonable livelihood. No people can afford to
develop solely on industrial lines and remain a nation
in the full sense of the word, for in every commonwealth
there is need of the rural forces of persistence
to counteract the urban forces of change. All settlement
is necessarily a leap in the dark, but, so far
as a proposal can be judged before it is put into
practice, the present scheme offers good chances of
success. There seems little doubt that it will receive
full justice. The war spread the knowledge of the
country to every cranny of the Empire. English and
Scottish farmers’ sons, Australian bushmen, Indian
planters, farmers from New Zealand and Ontario,
having fought for three years on the veld, have
fallen in love with it and are willing to make it their
home. No more splendid chances for settlement have
ever offered; for when the wastrels have been eliminated
there remain many thousands of good men,
from whom a sturdy country stock could be created.
There can be no indiscriminate gifts of land as in
some colonies. The land is too valuable, the political
purpose too delicate and urgent, the need of nice
discrimination in selection and careful fostering thereafter
too imperative, to allow farms to be shaken up
in a lucky-bag and distributed to the first comers.
The best men must be attracted, and assisted with
advice and loans to the measure of success which is
possible. It is the soundest form of political speculation,
if done with sober and clear-sighted purpose.
The young men from home and the colonies, to whom
South Africa is a memory that can never die, turn
naturally towards it in search of a freer life and a
larger prospect. On the model farms which are being
established in each district the proverbial “younger
sons of younger sons” will be given a chance of learning
the requirements of the land, and so starting
work on their own account with intelligence and
economy. Some day—and may we all live to see
it!—there will be little white homesteads among trees,
and country villages and moorland farms; cattle and
sheep on a thousand hills where now only the wild
birds cry; wayside inns where the thirsty traveller
can find refreshment; and country shows where John
Smith and Johannes Smuts will compete amicably for
the King’s premiums. And if any one thinks this
an unfounded hope, let him turn to some such book
as Ogilby’s ‘Itinerarium Angliæ,’ where he will find
that in the closing years of the seventeenth century
the arable and pastoral land in England scarcely
amounted to half the area of the kingdom, and the
most fruitful orchards of Gloucestershire and Warwick
were mere heath and swamp, and, as it seemed to
an acute observer, doomed to remain so.
Settlement, indeed, is but one, though the most
important, of the land problems. An enlightened
agricultural department, working in conjunction with
local societies, can do much to unite the two races
by conferring benefits which are common to both.
The introduction of pedigree stock to grade up the
existing herds is a necessity which any Boer farmer
will admit. So, too, are stringent regulations for the
prevention of disease, experiments in new crops, field
trials of new machinery, and a provision for some form
of agricultural training. Central creameries and
tobacco-factories would work wonders in increasing
the prosperity of certain districts. Something of that
tireless vigilance and alert intelligence which has
made the Agricultural Bureau of the United States
famous, a spirit which brings into agriculture the
procedure and the exact calculation of a great
business house, is necessary to meet the not insuperable
difficulties which now deter the timid, and
to give farming a chance of development commensurate
with its political importance. It is only
another case in which a South African question
stands on a razor-edge, a narrow line separating
ample success from a melancholy failure.
No question is more fraught with difficulties for the
home philosopher than this, but there is none on
which practical men have made up their mind with
such bitter completeness. The root of the trouble is
that England and South Africa talk, and will continue
to talk, in different languages on the matter. The
Englishman, using the speech of conventional politics,
seems to the colonist to talk academic nonsense; while
the South African, speaking the rough and ready
words of the practical man, appears as the champion
of brutality and coercion. The difficulties are so
real that one cannot but regret that they are complicated
by verbal misunderstandings. There is no
real divergence of views on the native question: the
distinction is rather between a seriously held opinion
and a slipshod prejudice. “Exeter Hall” is less
the name of a party than of an attitude, as common
among the robust colonists as ever it was among the
mild pietists of Clapham. It consists in a disinclination
to look simply on facts, to reason soberly, and to
speak accurately,—a tendency to lap a question in
turgid emotion. The man who consigns all native
races to perdition in round terms, and declares that the
only solution of the difficulty is to clear out the Kaffir,
is as truly a votary of Exeter Hall as the gentle old
lady to whom the aborigine is a model of primeval
innocence, whose only joy is the singing of missionary
hymns.
Out of the confusion of interests and issues two
main problems emerge which may form useful guides
in our inquiry. One is economic. What part are the
native races to play in the labour-supply and the production
of South Africa? what is to be their tenure of
land? what is to be their economic destiny in face of
the competition of modern life and the industrial
development of the country? The second is the moral
question, of which the political is one aspect. A
coloured race living side by side with a white people
furnishes one of the gravest of moral cruces. The
existence of a subject race on whatever terms is apt to
lead to the deterioration in moral and mental vigour
of its masters. Perpetual tutelage tends to this
result; full social and civic rights, on the other hand,
lead to political anomalies and, too often, to the lowest
forms of political chicanery. A doctrinaire idealism is
fraught with dire social evils; but an obstinate maintenance
of the “practical man’s” status quo is apt to
bring about that very degeneration which justifies the
doctrinaire. How to reconcile freedom of development
for the native by means of spontaneous labour, education,
and social rights with the degree of compulsion
necessary to bring them into line with social and
industrial needs, or, to put it shortly, how to keep the
white man from deterioration without spoiling the
Kaffir,—this is the kernel of the most insistent of
South African problems.
The native races south of the Zambesi present a
curious problem to the student of primitive societies.
All, or nearly all, of kindred race, they are not autochthonous,
and the date of their arrival in the country
can in most cases be fixed within the last five
centuries. Five centuries do not give a long title
to a country, as savage titles go, but even this period
must be cut down in most cases, since the wars
of the great Zulu kings scattered the other races
about as from a pepper-box, with the result that
few tribes save the Zulus, some of the Cape Colony
Kaffirs, the Swazis, and small peoples like the Barolongs,
can claim an occupation title of more than a
hundred years. This state of affairs, so rare in our
dealings with savage peoples, has, politically, both
merits and defects. The absence of the autochthonous
hold of the soil and of long-settled immovable traditions
of tribal life makes the native more malleable
under the forces of civilisation. It is easier to break
up the tribes and to acclimatise the Kaffir to new
localities and new conditions. But this lack of a
strong, settled, racial life makes it fatally easy for him
to fall a victim to the vices of civilisation, and to come
upon our hands as a derelict creature without faith or
stamina, having lost his old taboos, and being as yet
unable to understand the laws of the white man.
This process of disintegration has been going on for a
century, and the result is a clearly marked division.
We have the tribal natives, who are still more or less
strictly under the rule of a chief, and subject to tribal
laws sanctioned and enforced by the Governments.
The native population of the Transkeian territories in
Cape Colony, such as the Pondos, the Amaxosas, and
the Tembus; Bechuanaland, with the people of
Khama, Bathoen, Sebele, and Linchwe; Basutoland;
Zululand; the northern and eastern parts of the
Transvaal under such chiefs as Magata, ’Mpefu, and
Siwasa; Swaziland; and the Matabele and Mashona
tribes of the vast districts of Northern and Southern
Rhodesia are the main instances of this first class.
The aim of the different Governments has always been
to keep the tribal organisation intact, and, after eliminating
certain tribal laws and customs which are
inconsistent with the ideas of white men, to give their
sanction to the remainder. Basutoland is a Crown
colony; the Transkeian territories are a native
reserve; Bechuanaland is a native protectorate; in
Rhodesia a number of native chiefs control large tracts
of land under the Chartered Company’s administration.
Elsewhere the tribes live in Government
reserves, or in certain cases in locations situated on
private land. Between Pretoria and the Limpopo
there are dozens of small chieftains and chieftainesses,
with tribes varying in numbers from a hundred to
several thousands. The second class, the detribalised
natives, are to be found scattered over the whole
country, notably in the western province of Cape
Colony, and in the vicinity of all South African towns.
They live as a rule in locations under municipal
or Government supervision. In many cases such
locations are far larger than those of a small chief;
but their distinguishing feature is that they are
governed solely by the law of the country or by
municipal regulations framed for the purpose, and owe
no allegiance to any chief or tribal system.
It is obvious that for purposes of policy this distinction
cannot maintain its importance. The rule
of the chief is being rapidly undermined by natural
causes, and no taking thought can bolster it up for
ever. Education, too, and the closer settlement of the
country by white men, are rapidly breaking down
tribal customs and beliefs, which, as a rule, have more
vitality than the isolated sentiment of allegiance. For
us the real distinction is between the natives who can
be kept in large reserves or locations, whether tribal
or otherwise, and the floating native population, which
is every day growing in numbers. Sooner or later
we must face the problem of the overcrowding of all
reserves, and the consequent efflux of homeless and
masterless men. The needs of progress, too, are daily
tending to change the tribal native into the isolated
native attached to some industry or other. Politically
the question is, How far and on what lines the large
reserves and locations can be best maintained, and
what provision can be made for incorporating the
overflow, which exists now and will soon exist in far
greater numbers, on sane and rational lines in the
body politic?
Such being the main requirements of the problem,
it remains to consider the forms in which they present
themselves to the ordinary man. For the working
aspect of a question is generally very different from
the form it takes in an academic analysis. The translation
into the terms of everyday life is conditioned by
many accidental causes, so that to one section of the
community the labour problem is the sole one, to
another the educational, to a third the social. It is
important to realise that all are part of one question,
and that no single one can be truly solved unless
the whole is dealt with. This incompleteness of
view, more than any other cause, has complicated
the native question, and produced spurious antagonisms,
and policies which are apparently rival, but
in reality are complementary.
The first is the grave difficulty which must always
attend the existence of a subject race. Slavery is the
extreme form of the situation, and in it we see the
evils and dangers on a colossal scale. A subject population,
to whom legal rights are denied, tends in the
long-run to degrade the value of human life, and to
depreciate the moral currency,—a result so deadly
for true progress that the consensus of civilised races
has utterly condemned it. The denial of social and
political rights is almost equally dangerous, since,
apart from the risks of perpetual tutelage in a progressive
community, there follows necessarily a depreciation
of those political truths upon which all free
societies are based. Many honest men have clearly
perceived this; but after the fashion of headstrong
honesty, they have confused the issues by an inaccurate
use of words. Legal rights must be granted,
and since the law is the child of the fundamental
principles of human justice, legal equality should follow.
Social and political rights also must be given; but
why social and political equality? The most embittered
employer of native labour does not deny that
the black man should share certain social privileges,
and be made to feel his place in the political organism,
but he rightly denies that rights mean equality of
rights; while his doctrinaire opponent, arguing from
exactly the same premises, claims a foolish equality on
a misunderstanding of words. The essence of social
and political equality must be a standard of education
and moral and intellectual equipment, which can be
roughly attributed to all members of the community
concerned. But in this case there can be no such
common standard. Between the most ignorant white
man and the black man there is fixed for the present
an impassable gulf, not of colour but of mind. The
native is often quick of understanding, industrious,
curiously logical, but he lives and moves in a mental
world incredibly distant from ours. The medium of
his thought, so to speak, is so unique that the results
are out of all relation to ourselves. Mentally he is as
crude and naïve as a child, with a child’s curiosity
and ingenuity, and a child’s practical inconsequence.
Morally he has none of the traditions of self-discipline
and order, which are implicit, though often in a degraded
form, in white people. In a word, he cannot
be depended upon as an individual save under fairly
vigilant restraint; and in the mass he forms an unknown
quantity, compared with which a Paris mob
is a Quaker meeting. With all his merits, this
instability of character and intellectual childishness
make him politically far more impossible than even
the lowest class of Europeans. High property or
educational qualifications for the franchise, or any other
of the expedients of Europe, are logically out of place,
though they were raised to the possession of a fortune
and a university degree; for the mind is still there,
unaltered, though it may be superficially ornamented.
Give the native the full franchise, argues one class of
observer, and he will in time show himself worthy of
it, for in itself it is an education. On a strictly logical
view it would be as reasonable to put a child on
a steam-engine as driver, trusting that the responsibility
of his position would be in itself an education
and would teach him the necessary art.
Social and political equality will seem to most men
familiar with the subject a chimera, but social and
political rights the native must have, and in most
cases has already obtained. But unless such rights
are carefully adjusted the absolute cleavage remains.
We have two races, physically different, socially
incapable of amalgamation: if we make the gulf
final, there is no possibility of a united state; if
we bridge it carelessly, the possibility is still more
distant. We may scruple to grant rights, such as
the political franchise, which are based in the last
resort on a common moral and intellectual standard;
but we can grant rights which are substantive and
educative and capable of judicious extension. The
Glen Grey Act, as we shall see, made a valuable
experiment in securing to the native the social
status which attends individual tenure of land.
Some form of representation might be devised, by
which a chief might have a voice on a district
council, or a representative elected by an industrial
location assist in local government. Such measures,
joined with a rational system of education, will leave
the door open for the extension of rights till such
time as the native has finally shown whether he is
worthy of equality or condemned by nature to rank
for ever as a subject race. There are men, able
men with the courage of their opinions, who see no
hope in the matter, and who would segregate the
natives in a separate territory under British protection.
The chief objection to this policy is that it
is impossible. The native is in our midst, and we
must face the facts. We have a chance to solve
a burning question which no other nation has had,
since, as in the United States, the matter has either
been complicated by initial slavery, or, as also in
the States, a thoughtless plunge has been made
into European doctrines of liberty, equality, and
fraternity. If we patiently and skilfully bring to
bear upon the black man the solvent and formative
influences of civilisation, one of two things must
happen. Either the native will prove himself worthy
of an equal share in the body politic; or, the experiment
having been honestly tried, he will sink
back to his old place and gradually go the way of
the Red Indian and the Hottentot. For it is
inevitable that civilisation, if wisely applied, must
either raise him or choke him,—raise him to the
rank of equal citizenship, or, by its hostility to his
ineradicable qualities, prove a burden too heavy to
support.
The second is the ever-recurring problem of labour.
In an earlier chapter the economic aspect of the
question has been discussed; for the present we
have to face that aspect which is connected with
a native policy. The Kaffir is fundamentally an
agriculturist, and when his lands are well situated
he reaps enough for his simple existence with a
minimum of labour. If he is rich enough to have
several wives, they do the necessary picking and
hoeing, and their lord and master sits in the shade
of his hut and eats the bread of idleness. This was
well enough in the old hunting and fighting days,
when the male folk lived a strenuous life in the
pursuit of game and the slaughter of their neighbours.
But with civilisation close to their gates,
the old system means a degraded somnolent life
for the man, and the continuance of a real, though
not necessarily unpleasant, form of slavery for the
woman. And this in a country which is crying
aloud for labour and development! To be sure, the
foregoing is not a complete picture of all Kaffir life,
but it is true of the larger reserves and the wealthier
kraals. To most men it is an offence that the native,
who is saved by British power from insecurity of
life and limb, should be allowed to remain, by the
happy accident of nature, an idler dependent only
on the kindness of mother earth, multiplying his
kind at an alarming rate, and untouched by the
industrial struggle where his sinews are so sorely
needed. The Kaffir owes his existence to the white
man; in return he should be compelled to labour
for hire and take his proper place in a world which
has no room for his vegetating habits. He holds
his land by our favour, he is protected from extinction
by our arms, he enjoys the benefits of our laws;
and he must pay for it all, not only in taxes but
by a particular tax, a certain quantity of labour.
This mode of argument sounds so serenely reasonable
that one is apt to miss the very dangerous
political doctrine which underlies it. Stated shortly,
it runs thus. Compulsory labour without payment
is to be reprobated like all forms of corvée, but if
we pay what we regard as a fair price and make
the compulsion indirect, then we get rid of such an
objection. This doctrine involves two principles which
seem to me to be subversive of all social order, and
in particular of that civilisation which they profess
to support. The Kaffir would be placed outside the
play of economic forces. His wages would be arbitrarily
established on an artificial basis, unalterable
save at the will of his white masters. In the second
place, compulsion by high taxation is not indirect
compulsion, but one of the most direct forms of
coercion known to history. To constrain a man
indirectly is to use unseen forces and half-understood
conditions which, being unrealised, do not
impair his consciousness of liberty; but this is not
the method which is proposed. A white man, it is
argued, suffers want if he does not work. Well and
good,—so does the Kaffir; but the work which he
does, unless he is rich enough to have it vicariously
performed, is different in kind from the work which
others want him to do, and hence the trouble arises.
To force a man, black or white, to enter on labour
for which he is disinclined, is to rank him with
beasts of burden, and prevent him, as an industrial
creature, from ever attaining the conscious freedom
which labour bestows. The old truth, so often misapplied,
that a man who does not work shall not
eat, is a statement of economic conditions to which
those who quote it in this connection would seek
to do violence.
But such truisms do not exhaust the question. It
is not the Kaffir who chiefly matters, for in his
present stage of development he might be as well
off one way as another; it is the white man’s interests
which must decide. If the whole of Kaffirdom
were sunk in a state of feminine slavery and
male indolence, violence might be done to political
axioms with some show of reason; but the Kaffir
is emerging from his savagery and has shown in
more ways than one a capacity for industrial development.
But, taking the Kaffir on the lowest plane,
what is to be the effect on the white population of
South Africa if forced labour is to stereotype for
ever a lower race, to which the free selection of
labour, the first requisite of progress, is denied?
“The safety of the commonwealth,” wrote John
Mackenzie, “absolutely demands that no hatches be
battened down over the heads of any part of the
community.” At the back of all the many excellent
cases which have been made out for compulsory
labour by high taxation, there lie the immediate
needs of the great gold industry—needs which it is
now clear can never be met in South Africa alone by
any native legislation. An instant industrial demand
is apt to blind many good men for the moment to
those wider truths, which on other occasions they
are ready enough to assent to. The case has been
further prejudiced for most people by the bad arguments
used on the native side, and the intolerable
cant with which obvious truths have been sicklied
over. We need not concern ourselves with the so-called
degradation of Kaffir manhood implied in
compulsory labour, for such self-conscious manhood
does not exist; but we are very deeply concerned
with the degradation of white manhood, which will
inevitably follow any of the facile solutions which
are cried in the market-place. If by violent methods
economic laws are checked in their play, a subject
race in a low state of civilisation is checked on the
only side on which development can be reasonably
looked for. The harder and lower forms of toil will
fall into Kaffir hands for good; the white population
will become an aristocracy based on a kind of slave
labour; and with the abolition of an honest hierarchy
of work, degeneration will set in with terrible swiftness.
It is a pleasing dream this, of a community of
cultivated white men above the needs of squalid or
menial toil, but on such a dream no free nation was
ever built. The old tribal system is crumbling, and
in a hundred years or less we shall see the Kaffirs
abroad in the land, closely knit to all industries
and touching social and political life at countless
points. If they are a portion, however small, of
the civic organism, there is hope for the future; but
if they are a thing apart, denied the commonest of
all rights, and remaining in their present crude and
stagnant condition, they will be a menace, political
and moral, which no one can contemplate with
equanimity. There are, indeed, only two entirely
logical policies towards the native. Either remove
him, bag and baggage, to some Central African
reserve and leave him to fight his wars and live as
he lived before the days of Tchaka, or bring him into
close and organic relation with those forces of a high
civilisation which must inevitably mend or end him.
There is a third chief aspect in which the native
problem presents itself to the ordinary man. The
Kaffir, south of the Zambesi, already outnumbers the
white man by fully five to one, and he increases with
at least twice the rapidity. Most native reserves and
locations are overcrowded, the Kaffir is being driven
on to private land as an unauthorised squatter, and
the floating population in and around the towns is
daily increasing. What is to be the end of this
fecundity? Living on little, subject apparently to
none of the natural or prudential checks on over-population,
there seems a real danger of black ultimately
swamping white by mere gross quantity. In any
case there will soon be a grave economic crisis, for,
unless prompt measures are adopted, a large loose
vagabondage will grow up all over the land. It is
to be noted that this danger is the converse of the
two problems we have already discussed. They referred
to the stereotyping of the Kaffir races as a
settled agricultural people out of line with industrial
progress; this concerns the inevitable break-up of
the old agricultural condition by mere excess of
population and the difficulty of dealing with the
overflow. This complementary character which the
problems assume is one of the most hopeful features
of the case. Natural forces are bringing the Kaffir to
our hands. The débâcle of his old life is turning him
upon the world to be formed and constrained at our
pleasure. The field is clear for experiment, and it
behoves us to make up our minds clearly on the forms
which the experiment must take.
To recapitulate the results of the preceding pages.
The central problem is how to bring the native races
under the play of civilising forces, so that they
may either approve themselves as capable of incorporation
in the body politic, or show themselves
eternally incapable, in which case history would lead
us to believe that they will gradually disappear. To
effect this vital experiment, no rigid economic or
social barrier should be placed between them and the
white inhabitants. Since the old tribal organisation
is breaking up, the ground is being rapidly prepared
for the trial. It is our business, therefore, to consider
how best the system of tribes and reserves can
be maintained, so long as there is in it the stuff of
life, and what new elements can be introduced which
will make its fall more safe and gradual; and, in the
second place, to devise ways and means for dealing
with the rapidly increasing loose native population,
for replacing the former tribal traditions with some
rudiments of civilised law, and for leaving an open
door for such development as may be within their
capacity. It will be convenient to look at ways and
means under three heads. There is, first, the general
question of taxation, which is common to all. There
is, secondly, the problem of the larger reserves, and
the maintenance, so far as is desirable, of the old
rural life, with the kindred questions of land tenure,
of local government, of surplus population, and of
labour. And, finally, there is the problem of the class
which in the last resort is destined to be most numerous,
the wholly non-tribal and unattached natives,
whose mode of life must be created afresh and controlled
by Government. This is the most difficult
problem, since such natives are peculiarly exposed to
the solvents of white civilisation, and everything depends
upon the method in which the solvents are used.
The native is, for the most part, under special
taxes. In certain parts of Cape Colony and Natal
the fiscal system is in practice the same for black and
white, but for the purposes of this inquiry the native
who has adopted the white man’s life may be disregarded.
In Cape Colony the hut tax is 10s. per
annum, whether the hut is situated on private or
Crown lands, and on locations within municipalities a
similar municipal tax is paid. In Natal the hut tax
is 14s., in Basutoland £1, in Rhodesia 10s., and in the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony 10s. under the
old régime. In Natal, the Orange River Colony, the
Transvaal, and Rhodesia, there was also a native pass
law, under which certain sums were charged on travelling
passes, varying from 6d. in the Orange River
Colony to 2s. per month in the mining areas of the
Transvaal. It is unnecessary to go into the numerous
details of native taxation, which within narrow
limits are constantly varied, but it is worth while to
look at two instances which may be taken as the extreme
types of such taxation, the Transvaal under the
former Government and the districts of Cape Colony
subject to the Glen Grey Act. In the Transvaal the
natives for the most part are tribal, and the system
of taxation was based on tribal considerations; but
the bulk of the revenue under the Pass Law came
from the large fluctuating population of natives at
work on the mines. Under the old Government the
ordinary native paid 10s. as hut tax, £2 as capitation
fee, with sundry other charges for passes, &c., which
brought the whole amount which might be levied up
to fully £4. The tax was loosely collected, but on the
whole the taxation per head was reasonably high.
One of the first acts of the new administration was
to consolidate all native taxes in one general poll
tax of £2, with a further charge of £2 per wife for
natives who had more than one. The pass fee was
also charged upon the employer in districts where it
fell to be levied. The net result, therefore, is that for
a native, who is the husband of not more than one
wife, the sum payable yearly is about £3, made up
of the poll tax and the registration fee. A native
may have to pay more than the old Government
exacted, but if he pleases he can pay less. In the
districts under the Glen Grey Act individual ownership
of land is encouraged, and the native who has
attained to such tenure is practically in the position
of a white citizen—that is, he pays no hut tax or poll
tax, and his contributions to revenue consist in the
payment of such rates as his district council or the
Transkeian General Council may levy. For the
native who holds no land either on quit-rent or freehold
title, there is a labour tax of 10s. per annum,
which he can avoid by showing that he has been at
work outside the district for a period of three months
during the previous year, and from which he can gain
complete exemption by showing that at some time he
has worked for a total period of three years. Such
a tax is not a compulsory labour tax, but should
rather be regarded as a modification of the hut tax,
which can be remitted as a bonus on outside labour.
The contrast between the two forms of taxation is
obvious, the one being a special and peculiar type,
the other a modification of the general fiscal system
of the colony. It is to the latter type that all
systems of native taxation must tend to approximate.
There are certain obvious objections to the hut tax,
of which the chief is that it leads to overcrowding
and bad sanitation, and prevents young men from
building huts of their own; and perhaps it would
be well if, following the new Transvaal precedent,
all native taxes were consolidated into one comprehensive
poll tax. But, speaking generally, natives
are not heavily taxed[28] having regard to their wage-earning
capacity, though hitherto the Customs have
been unduly hard upon their simple commodities.
In the Transvaal, for example, there is little doubt
that the native population could bear for revenue
purposes in most years a poll tax of £3 per head.
This might be reduced in case of natives in industrial
employment, in consideration of the fact that such
natives contribute otherwise to revenue through the
Pass Law. It is one of the ironies of this South
African problem that increased and reasonable taxation
for revenue purposes will continue to be identified
in many minds with compulsory labour through
high taxation. The two things are as wide apart as
the poles. The native, in return for protection and
good government, is required to pay a certain sum per
annum calculated solely on fiscal needs and his earning
capacity. That is the only basis of native taxation;
but when the sum has been fixed, it may be expedient
as a matter of policy to reduce the tax in the case of
natives working under an employer, partly because
such natives contribute to the Exchequer in another
way, and partly as a bonus to encourage outside
labour. But the general form of taxation might
well be altered, slowly and cautiously, as the time
ripened. The hut tax might be gradually transmuted
into a form of rent which, as in the Glen Grey
districts, could be lowered as a bonus on outside
labour, and the extension of local government might
provide for the rating of locations and reserves on
some system common to all districts. Taxation may
have an educative force, and to ask from the native
a contribution for something of which the purpose is
apparent and the justification obvious, is to bestow on
him a kind of freedom. It is the first step to taxation
with representation to provide that taxation should
be accompanied by understanding.
The second question is that of existing reserves and
the possibility and method of their maintenance. In
the case of many the problem is still simple. Basutoland,
the chief tribes of the Bechuanaland Protectorate
and Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland, Zululand, the races
of the north and north-eastern Transvaal, and a considerable
part of the Transkeian territories, will find
for many years protected tribal government suitable
to their needs. Tribal customs and laws, in so far as
they are not contra bonos mores, are recognised by the
protecting Governments, and given effect to by any
white courts which may have jurisdiction in the district.
The old modes of land tenure, the succession
to the chieftainship, the tribal religion, if any exists,
should be given the sanction of the sovereign Power
till such time as they crumble from their own baselessness.
The disintegrating forces are many and
potent. Taxation will compel the acquisition of
wealth other than in kind, and will therefore
strengthen existing trade, and, if gradually modified
in character till it approach a rating system,
will replace the tribe by the district as a local unit.
The growth of population will compel a certain overflow,
which must either be accommodated on new
land under special conditions, or must go to swell
the general industrial community. Education, the
greatest of all disintegrators, is loosening slowly the
old ties, and is increasing the wants of the native
by enlarging his mental horizon. Outside labour,
whether undertaken from love of novelty or from
sheer economic pressure, leaves its indelible mark
on the labourer. The Kaffir who has worked for
two years in Kimberley or Johannesburg may seem
to have returned completely to his old stagnant life,
but there is a new element at work in him and his
kindred, a new curiosity, a weakening of his regard
for his traditional system. Agriculture itself, which
has hitherto been the mainstay of his conservatism, is
rapidly becoming a force of revolution. Formerly no
self-respecting native would engage in cultivation,
leaving such tasks to his women; but a native who
would not touch pick or hoe is ready enough to work
a plough, if he is so fortunate as to possess one. The
growth of wealth and a spirit of enterprise among the
tribes leads to improved tillage, and once the native
is content to labour himself in the fields, his old scheme
of society is already crumbling.
But, in addition to natural solvents, there is one
which we might well apply in our own interest
against the time when the tribal system shall have
finally disappeared. Any form of political franchise,
however safeguarded, is in my opinion illogical and
dangerous. It is inequitable to create barriers which
are themselves artificial, but it is both inequitable
and impolitic to disregard natural barriers when the
basis of our politics is a presumed natural equality.
But it may be possible to admit the Kaffir to a share
in self-government without giving any adherence to
the doctrine involved in a grant of a national franchise.
Local government is still in its infancy all over South
Africa, but the common type is some form of urban
or district council. The questions which such councils
discuss do not involve high considerations of statescraft,
but simple practical matters, such as roads and
bridges, sanitary restrictions, precautions against stock
diseases, and market rules. Supposing that in any
district there exists a tribe or a location sufficiently
progressive and orderly, I see no real difficulty in
bringing the chief or induna sooner or later directly
or indirectly into the local council. It is a matter on
which it is idle to dogmatise, being one of the many
questions on which South Africa must say the last
word, and being further dependent on the status
of the natives in each district; but on a nominated
or elective council a native, or a white member with
natives in his constituency, might do valuable work in
assisting with matters in which natives were largely
concerned. A native who cannot reasonably be asked
to decide on questions such as fiscal reform or military
organisation, may be very well fitted to advise, as
a large stock-holder, on precautionary measures
against rinderpest. If such a step is ever taken—and
the present exclusive attitude of South Africa
is rather a sign of the growing solidarity of the
community than an index of a permanent conviction—an
advance of enormous import will have been
made in that branch of native education in which we
are almost powerless to move directly, namely, his
training as a responsible citizen.
As the tribal system breaks down from whatever
cause, the tribesmen must do one of three things—either
settle on the land on new conditions, or live
permanently in the service of employers, or swell the
loose population of town and country. The second
course does not concern us, being a matter for the
private law of master and servant. But in each
of the other courses the State is profoundly interested.
For the sake of the future it is necessary to have
the existing reserves thoroughly examined, for, since
the fluctuations of native populations are very great,
many are too small for their present occupants and a
few are too spacious. Majajie’s location in Zoutpansberg,
and one or two of the reserves on the western
border of the Transvaal, may be quoted as instances
of tribes which have shrunk from the original number
on which the grant of land was based. In such cases
the land might reasonably be curtailed, since it is still
Crown land held in trust for the natives’ use, and not
private land purchased by the chiefs themselves. But
it is more usual to find locations far too narrow, and
the result in many parts is that a certain number of
natives who have been compelled to leave their old
reserves are farming private lands on precarious and
burdensome terms, or are squatting on Crown lands
with no legal tenure at all. A law of the late
Transvaal Government (No. 21 of 1895) made it
illegal to have more than five native households on
one private farm; but this law, like many others
which conflicted with the interests of the governing
class, was quietly allowed to become a dead letter.
There are men to-day who have a hundred and more
native families on a farm, paying often exorbitant
rents either in money or in forced labour, and liable
to be turned adrift at a moment’s notice. The old
Boer system was to allow natives to squat on land in
return for six months’ labour; but this mode of payment
is never satisfactory with a Kaffir, who soon
forgets the tenure on which he holds his land, regards
it as his own, and makes every attempt to evade his
tenant’s service. The whole position is unsatisfactory,
the master being cumbered with unwilling and often
worthless labour, the tenant subject to a capricious
rent and a permanent possibility of eviction. In the
interests of both white and black it is desirable to
end this anomaly. Some form of the Squatters’ Law
might be re-enacted and enforced, a farmer being
allowed a reasonable number of native families, who
give work for wages and pay a fair rent for their land.
The balance might well be accommodated as tenants on
such portions of Crown land as are suitable for Kaffirs
and incapable of successful white settlement. Such
lands exist in the parts where the native population is
densest, as in the northern and eastern districts of
the Transvaal. The situation affords an opportunity
for the Government policy towards outside labour.
If the rent per holding were fixed at some figure like
£10 (which is less than many natives pay to private
owners) it might be reduced to £5, if a certain proportion
of the males of a household went out to labour
for a part of the year in the towns or in some rural
employment other than farming. Such a policy would
give immediate relief to the really serious congestion
in many districts, would establish a better system of
native tenure, and would pave the way for a closer
connection between the industrial native and the
country kraal.
The wholly detribalised native is a more important
problem, because he represents the type of what the
Kaffir will in some remote future become—a man who
has forgotten his race traditions, and has become an
unpopular attaché of the white community. Towards
other natives our policy must be only to maintain an
amended status quo, but for him we must make an
effort at construction. It is no business of mine to
frame policies, but only to sketch, roughly and imperfectly,
the conditions of the problem which the constructive
statesman (and South Africa will long have
need of constructive statesmen) must face. Individual
tenure of land—and by this is not necessarily meant
freehold, even under the Glen Grey restrictions as to
alienation, for a long lease may be more politic and
equally attractive[29]—and the spread of education and
commerce will work to the same effect in the rural
districts as industrial employment in the towns. But
for the present the towns furnish the gravest problem—how
to make adequate provision for the increasing
native population, which is neither living permanently
in the households of white masters nor working in
the mines under a time contract. It is desirable to
have locations for natives, as it is fitting to provide
bazaars for Asiatics, since the native should be concentrated
both for administrative and educational
purposes. Those municipal locations, which already
exist in many towns, will have to be taken vigorously
in hand. Something must replace the biscuit-tin
shanties where the native, ignorant of sanitation,
lives, under more wretched conditions, what is practically
the life of a country kraal, and with the reform
of their habitations a new attraction to industry will
exist for the better class of Kaffir. It is a common
mistake to class all natives together, a mistake which
a little knowledge of South African ethnology and
history would prevent. Many have highly developed
instincts of cleanliness, and much race pride, and will
not endure to be huddled in squalid locations with
the refuse of inferior tribes. Given decent dwelling-places,
education on rational lines, and after a time,
perhaps, a share in municipal government, might lay
the foundation of a civic life and an industrial usefulness
far more lasting than can be expected from
casual labourers brought from distant homes for a
few months’ work, and carried back again.
South Africa has in her day possessed one man who
desired to look at things as they are, a murky and
distorted genius at times, but at his best inspired
with something of a prophet’s insight. The fruit of
Mr Rhodes’ native administration was the Glen Grey
Act, which still remains the only attempt at a constructive
native policy. It is hard enough to govern,
but sometimes, looking to the iron necessities in the
womb of time, it is wise to essay a harder task, and
build. We must keep open our communications with
the future, and begin by recognising the fundamental
truths, which are apt to get a little dimmed by the
dust of the political arena. The first is that the
native is psychologically a child, and must be treated
as such; that is, he is in need of a stricter discipline
and a more paternal government than the white man.
South Africa has already recognised this by the
remarkable consensus of opinion which she has shown
in the prohibition of the sale of intoxicants to coloured
people. He is as incapable of complete liberty as
he is undeserving of an unintelligent censure. The
second is that he is with us, a permanent factor which
must be reckoned with, in spite of the advocates of a
crude Bismarckian policy; and because his fortunes
are irrevocably linked to ours, it is only provident to
take care that the partnership does not tend to our
moral and political disadvantage. For there is always
in the distance a grim alternative of over-population
resulting in pauperism and anarchy, or a hard despotism
producing the moral effects which the conscience
of the world has long ago in slave systems diagnosed
and condemned. There are three forces already at
work which, if judiciously fostered, will achieve the
experiment which South Africa is bound to make, and
either raise the Kaffir to some form of decent citizenship,
or prove to all time that he is incapable of true
progress. Since we are destroying the old life, with
its moral and social codes and its checks upon economic
disaster, we are bound to provide an honest substitute.
The forces referred to are those of a modified self-government,
of labour, and of an enlightened education.
The first is an experiment which must be
undertaken very carefully, unless our case is to be
prejudiced from the outset. I have given reasons for
the view that a political franchise for the native is
logically unjustifiable; but on district councils and
within municipal areas the native, wherever he is
living under conditions of tolerable decency and
comfort, might well play a part in his own control.
It may be doomed to failure or it may be the
beginning of political education, but it is an experiment
we can scarcely fail to make. In labour, short
of a crude compulsion, every means must be used to
bring the Kaffir within the industrial circle. We shall
be assisted in our task by many secret forces, but it
should be our business so to frame our future native
legislation as to place a bonus on labour outside the
kraal. The matter is so intimately bound up with
the wellbeing of the whole population that there is
less fear of neglect than of undue and capricious
haste.
A word remains to be said on native education. In
this province there is much need of effective Government
control, since in the past the energies of
educationalists have tended to flow in mistaken
channels or be dissipated over too wide an area.
The native is apt to learn in a kind of parrot
fashion, and this aptitude has misled many who have
devoted their lives to his interests. But in the
present state of his culture what we are used to
call the “humanities” have little educational importance.
At the best the result is to turn out native
pastors and schoolmasters in undue numbers, unfortunate
men who have no proper professional field
and no footing in the society to which their education
might entitle them. It is a truth which the wiser
sort of missionaries all over the world are now recognising
in connection with the propagation of Christianity—that
the ground must be slowly prepared
before the materialist savage mind can be familiarised
with the truths of a spiritual religion. Otherwise
the result is a glib confession of faith which ends in
scandal. The case is the same with what we call
“secondary education.” The teaching of natives, if
it is to produce any practical good, should, to begin
with, be confined to the elements and to technical
instruction. The native mind is very ready to learn
anything which can be taught by concrete instances,
and most forms of manual dexterity, even some of the
more highly skilled, come as easily to him as to the
white man. When the boys are taught everywhere
carpentry and ironwork and the rudiments of trade,
and the girls sewing and basket-making and domestic
employments, a far more potent influence will have
been introduced than the Latin grammar or the
primer of history. The wisest missionary I have
ever met had a station which was a kind of ideal
city for order and industry, with carpenters’ and
blacksmiths’ shops, a model farm, basket-making,
orchards, and dairies. “By these means,” he said,
“I am teaching my children the elements of religion,
which are honesty, cleanliness, and discipline.” “And
dogma?” I asked. “Ah,” he said, “as to dogma,
I think we must be content for the present with a
few stories and hymns.”
It is a delicate matter to indulge in platitudes about a
city. For a city is an organism more self-conscious
than a state, and a personality less robust than an
individual. Comments which, if made on a nation,
would be ignored, and on an individual would be
tolerated, awaken angry reprisals when directed to a
municipal area. The business is still more delicate
when the city concerned is not yet quite sure of
herself. Johannesburg is a city, though she has no
cathedral to support the conventional definition, or
royal warrant to give her dignitaries precedence;
but she is a city still on trial, sensitive, ambitious,
profoundly ignorant of her own mind. Her past
has been short and checkered. She has done many
things badly and many things well; she has been
the target for universal abuse, and still with one
political party fills the honourable post of whipping-boy
in chief to the Empire. Small wonder if her
people are a little dazed—proud of themselves,
hopeful of her future, but far from clear what this
future is to be.
At first sight she has nothing to commend her.
The traveller who drags his stiff limbs from the Cape
mail sees before him a dusty road, some tin-roofed
shanties, with a few large new jerry buildings humped
above them: a number of straggling dusty pines and
gums, a bit of bare hillside in the distance, and a few
attenuated mine chimneys. Everything is new, raw,
and fortuitous, as uncivilised and certainly as ugly as
the desert ridge on which an old Bezuidenhout planted
his homestead. The chief streets do not efface the
first impression. Some buildings are good, but the
general effect is mean. The place looks as if it had
sprung up, like some Western township, in a night,
and as if the original builders had been in such a
desperate hurry to get done with it that they could
not stop to see that one house kept line with its
neighbours. It is a common South African defect,
but there is here no mise-en-scène to relieve the ugliness.
Looking at Pretoria from the hills one sees a
forest of trees, with white towers and walls rising
above the green. The walls may be lath and plaster,
but the general effect is as pretty as the eye could
wish. For Johannesburg there is no such salvation.
Looked at from one of her many hills, the meanness
and irregularity are painfully clear. She has far more
trees than Pretoria, but she is so long and sprawling
that the bare ribs have pushed aside their covering.
An extended brickfield is the first impression: a prosperous
powder-factory is the last.
Yet in her way she has many singular beauties.
Doubtless in time to come she will be so great that
she will contain more cities than one in her precincts,
and there may well be a residential quarter as fine
as any in Europe. The Rand is a long shallow
basin with hilly rims, within which lie the mines and
the working city. The southern rim shelves away
into featureless veld, but the northern sinks sharply
on a plain, across forty miles of which rise the gaunt
lines of the Magaliesberg. What fashionable suburb
has a vista of forty miles of wild country, with a
mountain wall on the horizon? Below on the flats
there are many miles of pine woods, valleys and
streams and homesteads, and the Pretoria road making
a bold trail over a hill. In winter the horizon is lit
with veld-fires; in summer and spring there are the
wild sunsets of the veld and soft mulberry gloamings.
The slope behind shuts out the town and the mine
chimneys, and yet the whole place is not three miles
from Market Square. Whatever happens, nothing
can harm the lucky dwellers on the ridge. Though
the city creep ten miles into the plain beneath, there
is still ample prospect; and not all the fumes from all
the industries on earth can spoil the sharp vigour of
the winds blowing clean from the wilds.
But the place has not yet found itself. The city
proper is still for the future; for the present we have
a people. What the real conception, current in England,
of this people may be it is not easy to tell, the
whole matter having been transferred to party politics,
and presented, plain or coloured, to partisan spectators.
So we are given every possible picture, from
that of Semitic adventurers nourishing the fires of life
on champagne, to that of a respectable and thoroughly
domesticated people, morbidly awake to every sentiment
of Empire. “Judasburg,” “the New Jerusalem,”
“the Golden City,” and a variety of other pet names,
show that to the ordinary man, both in and out of
parties, there is something bizarre and exotic about
the place. And yet no conception could be more
radically false. Johannesburg is first and foremost a
colonial city, an ordinary colonial city save for certain
qualities to be specified later. You will see more Jews
in it than in Montreal or Aberdeen, but not more than
in Paris; and any smart London restaurant will show
as large a Semitic proportion as a Johannesburg club.
For a “Golden City” it is not even conspicuously
vulgar. For one fellow in large checks, diamonds,
and a pink satin tie, you will meet fifty quietly
dressed, well-mannered gentlemen. A man may still
be a beggar to-day and rich to-morrow, but less commonly
and in a different sense. The old mining-camp,
California-cum-Ballarat character of the gold industry
on the Rand has utterly passed away. Gold-mining
has ceased to be a speculation, and has become a vast
and complicated industry, employing at high salaries
the first engineering talent of the world. The prominent
mine-owner is frequently a man of education,
almost invariably a man of high ability. In few
places can you find men of such mental vigour, so
eagerly receptive of new ideas, so keenly awake to
every change of the financial and political worlds of
Europe. The blackguard alien exists, to be sure, but
he is rarely felt, and the hand of the law is heavy
upon him. That Johannesburg is made up wholly of
adventurers and Whitechapel Jews is the first piece
of cant to clear the mind of.
The second is the old slander that the people
think of nothing but the market, are cowardly and
selfish, indifferent to patriotism and honour. It says
little for Englishmen that they could believe this
falsehood of a place where the greater part of the
inhabitants are English. The war meant dismal
sufferings for the artisan class, who had to live in
expensive coast lodgings or comfortless camps; and it
is to the credit of Johannesburg that she stood nobly
by her refugees. The old Reform movement was not
a fortunate enterprise, but there was no lack of courage
in it; and even those who may grudge the attribute
can scarcely deny it to the same men at Elandslaagte
and Ladysmith. There have been various sorts of
irregular regiments—many good, some bad, one or two
the very scum of the earth; but no irregular soldiers
showed, from first to last, a more cool and persistent
courage than the men who for years had sought to
achieve by persuasion an end which required a more
summary argument. The truth is that the Johannesburger
has suffered by being contrasted, as the typical
townsman, with the Boer, as the typical countryman.
Dislike the particular countryman as we may, we have
at the back of our minds a feeling that somehow, in
George Eliot’s phrase, an unintelligible dialect is a
guarantee for ingenuousness, and that slouching
shoulders indicate an upright disposition. It is
Johannesburg’s misfortune that this anomalous contrast
should be forced on us. It is as if a sixteenth-century
peasant, without enterprise, without culture,
wholly un-modern and un-political, believing stoutly
in a sombre God, were living side by side with a
race of intellectuels, scientists, and successful merchants.
Whatever reason or, as in this case, patriotism may
say, most men have a sneaking fondness for the
peasant.
In every community which is worth consideration
we find two forces present in some degree—the
force of social persistence and the force of social
movement. Critics of Johannesburg would have us
believe that the second only is to be found, and in
its crudest form: the truth is that, considering the
history of the place and its novelty, the first is
remarkably strong. The point is worth labouring at
the risk of tediousness. It must be some little while
before a mining city shakes off the character of a
mining camp. Men will long choose to live uncomfortably
in hotels and boarding-houses, looking for
their reward on their home-coming, discomfort none
the less unpleasant because it is tempered with unmeaning
luxury. To its inhabitants the place is no
continuing city,—only a camp for the adventurer, who,
when he has made the most of it, returns to enjoy the
fruits of his labour in his own place. And then, after
many years, there suddenly comes a day when a man
here and a man there realise that they have lost the
desire to return: they like the place, settle down, and
found a home. Whenever there is any fair proportion
of this class in a mining city, then we have a force of
social persistence. The tendency is found in every
class of society. At one time the miner from Wales
or Cornwall saved his earnings and returned home;
now he has his wife out and settles for good. There
is also a large commercial class, traders and small
manufacturers, who belong as thoroughly to the place
as the South African born. And with the more
educated classes the same thing is true. The price of
building sites in the suburbs and the many pretty
houses which have arisen show that even for this class,
which was most nomadic in its habits, domesticity has
become a fact.
This, then, is the cardinal achievement of Johannesburg,
an unparalleled achievement in so short a career.
She has in a few years changed herself from a camp
to a city, acquired a middle class and a decent artisan
class,—both slow and difficult growths,—and shown a
knack of absorbing any species of alien immigrant and
putting them on the way to respectable citizenship.
She has but to point to this solid achievement as a
final answer to the foolish calumnies of her enemies.
The mines are her staple industry, but the mines, so
far as she is concerned, are an industry and not a
speculation; and she is creating a dozen other industries
of quite a different character, and may well
create a hundred more. She has become a municipality,
with all the traits, good and bad, of a nourishing
municipality at home. She has become colonial,
too,—as colonial, though in a different way, as Melbourne
or Wellington. Formerly she was a mixture
of every European capital plus a little of the Dutch
dorp: now she is English in essence, the most English
of all South African towns.
The future of the chief municipality of South Africa
cannot be without interest, for most problems will
concern her first, and receive from her their colour
and character, and, possibly, their answer. She must
continue to represent one of the two foremost interests,
and though it is idle to distinguish political
interests by their importance when both are vital, yet
we can admit that Johannesburg has for the moment
more obvious difficulties in her problems, and that her
answer will be more stormily contested. So far her
development has been continuous. The difficulties
which she met with from the Kruger régime were a
blessing in disguise, being of the kind to put her on
her mettle. But the present stage in her history is
more critical. Formerly the question was whether
she was to remain a foreign cesspool or rise to the
status of an English city. Now it is whether she will
go the way of many colonial cities, and become vigorous,
dogmatic, proud, remotely English in sentiment,
consistently material in her outlook, and narrow with
the intense narrowness of those to whom politics mean
local interests spiced with rhetoric; or, as she is
already richer, more enlightened, and more famous
than her older sisters, will advance on a higher plane,
and become in the true sense an imperial city, with a
closer kinship and a more liberal culture. The question
is a subtle and delicate one, as all questions of
spiritual development must be. A year ago much
depended on the attitude of England. Johannesburg
had suffered heavily in the war. Time and patience
were needed to repair the breaches in her fortunes,
and to permit her to advance, as she must advance, if
the Transvaal is to become a nation. She was rightly
jealous of her reputation and future prosperity. If
taxation was to be crudely imposed, if her just complaints
were to be met with the old nonsense about a
capitalists’ war, if she was to be penalised for her
most creditable industry, then there was a good prospect
of a serious estrangement. There was no issue
on the facts. She never denied her liability, and she
was willing to pay cheerfully if a little common tact
were shown in the handling. A man who may have
his hand in his pocket to repay a debt will withdraw
it if his creditor tries to collect the money with a
bludgeon. Happily the crisis has passed. A scheme
of war contribution was arranged which, while still
bearing heavily, almost too heavily, on the country in
its present transition stage, is yet a small sum if contrasted
with the lowest estimate of her assets. But
much still depends on the attitude of England. A
little sympathy, a little friendliness, a modest diminution
of newspaper taunts, some indication that the
home country sees and appreciates the difficulties of
its daughter, and is content to trust her judgment:
it is not much to ask, but its refusal will never be
forgotten or forgiven. For Johannesburg in this connection
represents the country on its most sensitive
side, and acts as a barometer of national feeling.
In this imperfect world there can be no development
without attendant disorders. A dead body is
never troublesome, but a growing child is prone to
exasperate. A young city which is perfectly reasonable
and docile deserves to be regarded with deep
mistrust, for it is likely to continue in a kind of
youthful sensibility till it disappears. Ferment is a
sign of life, and the very crudeness of the ideals
which cause the ferment is a hopeful proof of vigour.
Municipalities since the beginning of time have been
the home of aspirations after self-government, however
ill-suited they may have been to rule themselves.
At this moment the Transvaal is a Crown colony,
which is to say that a mode of government devised
for subject races is being applied for a time to a
free and restless British population. The justification
is complete, but we need not be shocked when we
find Johannesburg chafing at her fetters. The less
so when we reflect that in one aspect she is a
colonial city, full of the exaggerated independence
of the self-made. The fastidiousness which comes
from culture and tradition, the humour which springs
from unshaken confidence, must necessarily be absent
in a municipality which is still diffident, still largely
uneducated. Politics must begin with the schwärmerisch
and the vapid,—“that vague barren pathos,
that useless effervescence of enthusiasm, which plunges
with the spirit of a martyr into an ocean of generalities.”
Embryo cities are drunk with words, with
half-formed aspirations and vague ideals; wherefore
the result must be sound and fury and little meaning
till by painful stages they find themselves and see
things as they are. So far this unrest has taken
two forms—a continuous and somewhat unintelligent
criticism of the Administration, and an attempt by
means of numerous associations to give voice to
popular demands in the absence of representative
institutions; and the beginnings of a labour party.
The first is as natural as day and night. Many grave
matters, chiefly financial, are being decided above
Johannesburg’s head, and it is reasonable that she
should wish to state her own case. This is her
strong point: the weakness of her position is that
it is also a criticism of a reconstruction which is
still in process, still in that stage when the facts are
far more clearly perceived by the man on the watch-tower
than by the crowd in the streets below. A
pawn in a game is not the best authority on the
moves which lead to success. Patience may be a
distasteful counsel, but why should she disquiet
herself when all things in the end must be in her
hands? “The people,” to paraphrase a saying of
Heine, “have time enough, they are immortal; administrators
only must pass away.” But we cannot
complain of this critical activity, however misplaced.
It is a sign of life, and is itself the beginnings of
political education. The second form of agitation is
less reasonable and more dangerous, though perhaps
less dangerous here than anywhere else in the world.
There must exist on the Rand, in mines, railways,
and subsidiary industries, a large white industrial
population; and the imported agitator will endeavour
to organise it in accordance with his interests.
There is little theoretical justification for the movement.
There are no castes and tyrannies to fight
against in a country which is so new and self-created.
The great financial houses will not develop
into Trusts on the American model; and even
if they did, the result would have small effect on
the working man, either as labourer or consumer.
There are dozens of false pretexts. The working
man of the Rand may try, as he has tried in
Australia, to stereotype his monopoly and prevent
the influx of new labour; or he may use the necessary
discomforts of a transition stage as a lever to
raise his wages; or the idle and incompetent may
grumble vaguely against a capitalism which has been
built up by their abler brothers. The pretexts are
light as air. He lives in a free society, and within
limits can secure his comfort and independence beyond
a chance of encroachment. But unhappily it does
not require a justification in reason to bring the
labour agitator into being. That type, so well
known in Australia, has already appeared, the unreasoning
obstructionist, who, armed with a few
platitudes and an entire absence of foresight, preaches
his crude gospel to a class which is already vaguely
unsettled by the intricacies of the economic problem.
There is almost certain to be an attempt to organise
labour on Australian lines, and to create a party like
the Sand Lot agitators in San Francisco, in order to
do violence to the true economic interests of the land
on behalf of a prejudice or a theory. Yet I cannot
think that there is more in the prospect than a
temporary inconvenience. No labour party can be
really formidable unless it is based on profound discontents
and radical grievances; and the annoyances
of the Johannesburg proletariat are, as compared with
those of Europe, like crumpled rose-leaves to thorns.
There is too strong a force of social persistence in
the city to suffer it ever to become the prey of a
well-organised gang of revolutionaries; and if such
a force exists, the experience of Victoria in its
great railway strike of 1903 would seem to show
that in the long-run no labour war can succeed
which tends to a wholesale disorganisation of social
and industrial life.
But if Johannesburg shows a certain unrest, she also
reveals a curious solidarity—the strength of narrowness
and exclusion, which is partly natural and due to
the struggle for self-conscious existence, and partly
accidental and based on a profound disappointment.
Her citizens believed that the end of the war would
begin a golden age of unprecedented prosperity. Money
was to flow into her coffers, her population to grow by
many thousands each year, and she herself was to
stand out before an envious world as a type of virtue
rewarded. She miscalculated the future, and the facts
left her aghast. Conservative estimates, a few years
back, put the value of the gold output in 1902 at
between 20 and 30 millions: the actual figures during
the first year of peace show little over 10 millions—a
reduction on the output of 1898. Hence the almost
hysterical concentration of interest on the one great
industry. Men who in other matters are remarkable
for their breadth of view, are to be found declaring
that everything must be made subordinate to mining
development,—not in the sense in which the saying is
true, that the prosperity of the country depends in
the first instance on the mines, but in the quite indefensible
sense that any consideration of other
things, even when there is no conflict between them
and the mining interest, is a misapplication of energy
which should go to the greater problem. It is fair
to argue against a programme of public works which
might draw native labour from the mines, because,
unless we cherish the goose, there will be no golden
eggs to pay for our programmes. But to condemn
schemes of settlement which are no more a hindrance
to the gold industry than to the planetary system, is
to show a nervous blindness to graver questions, which
is the ugliest product of the present strain and confusion.
This trait, however, cannot be permanent;
and we may look to see the gold industry in time,
when its own crisis is past, become that enlightened
force in politics which the ability of its leaders and
the weight of its organisation entitle it to be. For
the other form of narrowness, which consists in the
limitation of citizenship, there is ample justification
in present circumstances. A new city must begin
by drawing in her skirts and showing herself,
perhaps unwarrantably, jealous and sensitive. More
especially a city which has hitherto been rather
a fortuitous gathering of races than a compact
community, is right in straining after such compactness,
even at the cost of a little injustice.
The only danger lies in the perpetuation of this
attitude when its justification has gone.
The fault of Johannesburg, to sum up, lies for the
moment in a certain narrow hardness of view: her
hope is in the possession of rich elements unknown in
most new cities; while her greatest danger lies in the
fact that she cannot yet honestly claim those elements
as her own. She is apt to judge a question from a
lower point of view than the question demands—to
take up a parochial standpoint in municipal affairs, a
municipal standpoint in national affairs, a national
standpoint in imperial questions. In spite of her
many splendid loyalties, she will find it hard to avoid
the assertive contra mundum attitude which seems
inseparable from flourishing colonial cities—a dogmatism
natural, but unfortunate. On the other hand,
her history and her present status give her a chance
beyond other new cities. She starts on her civic
career already rich, enterprising, the magnet for the
first scientific talent of the world. A fortunate development
might give her a cultivated class, true
political instincts, and the self-restraint which springs
from a high civilisation, without at the same time
impairing that energy which she owes to her colonial
parentage. The danger is that her ablest element
may continue alien, treating the city as a caravanserai,
and returning to Europe as soon as its ambition is
satisfied. So far the intellect has not been with the
men who have made the place their home, but, subject
to a few remarkable exceptions, with the men who
have never concealed their impatience to get away.
If she fails to make this class her citizens, then, whatever
her prosperity, as a city she will remain mediocre.
Nothing can deprive her of her position as the foremost
market; but if she is to be also the real capital
of South Africa, she must absorb the men who are now
her resident aliens. There are signs, indeed, that the
process has begun in all seriousness. As she becomes
a more pleasant dwelling-place, many who find in the
future of the country the main interest of their lives
will find in Johannesburg the best field of labour for
the end they desire. And the growth of such a
leisured class, who take part in public life for its own
sake and for no commercial interests, will not only
import into municipal politics a broader view and a
healthier spirit, but will do much to secure that community
of interest between town and country by
which alone a united South Africa can be created.
The constitutional requirements of a country are
never determined solely by its political needs. Some
account must be taken of its prior history, for theories
of government are apt to sink deep into the mind
of a people and to become unconsciously a part of its
political outlook. No form of education is less conscious
or more abiding in its effects. It may even happen
that the fabric which such theories created has been
deliberately overthrown with the popular consent, but
none the less the theories are still there in some form
or other to obtrude themselves in future experiments.
It is always worth while, therefore, in any reconstruction
to look at the ideas of government which held
sway before, whether in the shape of a professed creed
or in the practical form of institutions. The constitutional
history of South Africa is not long, and it is
not complex. In Natal and Cape Colony we possess
two specimens of ordinary self-governing colonies.
Natal, which began life as a Crown colony, subject
to the Governor of the Cape, was granted substantive
independence by charter in 1856, and in 1893 was given
representative government. It possesses a nominated
legislative council of nine members, and an elective
legislative assembly of thirty-nine members, elected
on an easy franchise. Cape Colony also began as a
Crown colony, and followed nearly the same path.
Her legislative council was created in 1850, and by an
ordinance of this legislature in 1872, ratified by an Act
of the Imperial Parliament, she obtained full representative
institutions. Her council and her house of
assembly are each elected and on the same franchise.
In these two colonies we have, therefore, types
of colonial autonomy—that is to say, an unfettered
executive and freedom to legislate subject to the consent
of the Governor and the Crown in Council, a
limitation which is daily becoming more of a pious
fiction. In Southern Rhodesia we have a specimen of
that very modern experiment, government by a commercial
company. It is a provisional form, and has
been made to approximate as far as is reasonably
possible to a Crown colony. The executive power is
in the hands of the company’s officials, subject to an
indirect control by the Imperial Resident Commissioner,
the High Commissioner, and ultimately by the
Crown. There is a legislative council, partly nominated
by the company and partly elected, and all legislation
is contingent upon the sanction of the imperial authorities.
Lastly, there are the native states, the Crown
colony of Basutoland, and the protectorates of Bechuanaland,
North-West Rhodesia, and Swaziland, all of
which are directly or indirectly under the authority of
the High Commissioner. So far there is no constitutional
novelty—Crown colonies advancing to an
ordinary type of self-government, or remaining, provisionally
or permanently, under full imperial control.
There remain the late Governments of the Republics,
which to the student of constitutional forms
show certain interesting peculiarities.[30] These constitutions
were framed by men who had no tradition[31]
to fall back upon, if we exclude the Mosaic law, and
no theories to give effect to—men who would have preferred
to do without government, had it been possible,
but who, once the need became apparent, brought to
the work much shrewdness and good sense. The Natal
emigrants in 1838 had established a Volksraad, but
the chief feature in their scheme was the submission
of all important matters to a primary public assembly,
a Homeric gathering of warriors. By the time the
Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions were signed
and the two republics became independent, the people
were scattered over a wide expanse of country, and
some form of representation was inevitable. At the
same time, it had become necessary to provide for a
military organisation coextensive with the civil. In
the Transvaal transient republics had arisen and departed,
like the changes in a kaleidoscope. Around
both states there was a native population, actively
hostile and potentially dangerous. Some central military
and civil authority was needed to keep the
country from anarchy. But if the farmers were
without political theories, they had a very vigorous
sense of personal independence; so the doctrinal basis
of the new constitution lay in the axiom that one
burgher in the State is as good as another, and that
the people are the final repository of power. In this at
least they were democratic, though from other traits
of democracy they have ever held aloof.
The Constitutie of the Orange Free State was rigid—that
is, it could be altered only by methods different
from those of ordinary legislation: in the Transvaal
Grondwet, on the other hand, there was no provision
for change at all, and reforms, when necessary, were
made in the ordinary legislative manner. The Constitutie
created one supreme legislature, the Volksraad,
elected by the qualified white population. The President
was elected by the whole people, though the
Volksraad, like the Roman consuls, reserved the power
to make nominations, which were generally accepted.
The Volksraad had not only supreme legislative power,
but, while formally independent of the President and
the executive, it could reverse any executive Act,
except the exercise of the President’s right of pardon
and the declaration of martial law. It was limited
only by its own charter, which forbade it to restrict
the right of public meeting and petition (one of the
few Bill of Rights elements in this constitution),
and bound it to promote and support the Dutch
Reformed Church. The Transvaal Grondwet began by
making the Dutch Reformed Church an established
national Church (a provision repealed later), and declaring
that “the people will not tolerate any equality
between coloured and white inhabitants in Church or
State.” No man was eligible for a seat in the Volksraad
unless he was a member of a Protestant Church.[32]
In the Transvaal, as in the Orange Free State, the
Volksraad was the supreme legislative authority, but
when any law was proposed the people were given the
opportunity of expressing their opinion in a mild form
of the referendum. The President was elected by
the whole people and acted as chief of the executive,
though responsible to the Volksraad, which could dismiss
him or cancel his appointments. He could sit
and speak in the Volksraad, but had no vote. The
chief military authority was the Commandant General,
who was elected by all the burghers, and under him
there was a long hierarchy of district commandants
and field-cornets. The local administrative officer for
civil matters was the landdrost or district magistrate.
It is unnecessary to consider the Second Volksraad,
which was an ineffective advisory body elected on a
wider franchise, a mere sop to the Cerberus whose
hundred tongues were clamouring for representation.
But there was one curious development of considerable
historic interest. In cases of urgency the Volksraad
could pass laws without reference to the people at
large, but such an enactment was called a resolution
(besluit) as contrasted with a law (wet), and was
supposed to have only a provisional force. But the
habit grew of calling most matters “specially urgent,”
and allowing the old popular referendum to fall into
desuetude.
The common feature of both constitutions was
the immense nominal powers of the legislatures.
Nominally they had the right to make all appointments,
to veto the President’s action, and to say
the last word in all questions of revenue and expenditure.
But certain facts wrought against this
legislative supremacy. The members came from
districts widely apart, and there was no serious
attempt to form groups or parties; the President
could sit and speak in the Volksraad, and he might
be elected as often as he could persuade the people
to elect him. The way was paved for the tyranny
of a strong man. In the Orange Free State, that
country of mild prosperity and simple problems, the
system worked admirably; but in the Transvaal,
when burning questions arose, the republican methods
for all serious purposes broke down, and were replaced
by a dictatorship. There remain, however, certain
doctrines from the old régime which will have to be
reckoned with under the new. The supremacy of the
legislature is not one, for no Boer cared much for the
dogma, and Mr Kruger ruled on the simple maxim,
“L’état c’est moi.” But the democratic principle of
equality among citizens is one cherished belief, and
another is the absolute disqualification of all coloured
races.[33] The Boer is not a parliamentarian in the
ordinary sense, and he did not grieve when his
Volksraad was slighted and made impotent; but he
likes his representative to go to Pretoria, as a sort
of tribute to his importance, and, if he is to vote,
he demands to vote on an equal basis with all. He
was attached to his local administration with its
landdrost system, and any change which bore no relation
to the old plan might begin by confusing and
end by souring him.
We have therefore to face two existing constitutional
traditions—among the British from the Cape or Natal
or over-seas, the old love of colonial self-government;
among the Boers, at least in the Transvaal, a kind of
ingenuous republican independence, quite consistent
with a patient tolerance of absolutism, but not so easy
to adapt to the gradations of our representative system.
Hence in many ways the Boer is far more likely
to remain patient for years under a Crown colony
Government than the English or colonial new-comer.
He does not particularly want to vote or interfere in
administration, so long as he has no personal grievance;
but it might annoy him to see the franchise denied to
him and given to his cousin who was a little richer or
better educated, when he remembered the old Grondwet
doctrines of equality, and it would certainly exasperate
him to learn that any native had been
granted a civic status beyond him.
Such being the constitutional history, we may turn
to the present. The term Crown colony is used so
loosely that very few of its many critics could define
the peculiar features of this form of government.
“One of the greatest of all evils,” wrote Lord
Durham in the famous Report which has become
the charter of colonial policy, “arising from this
system of irresponsible government, was the mystery
in which the motives and actual purposes of their
rulers were hid from the colonists themselves. The
most important business of government was carried
on, not in open discussions or public acts, but in
a secret correspondence between the Governor and
the Secretary of State.” This feature, more than
any other, tends to dissatisfaction. The Crown
colony system is necessarily a secret one. The
newspapers, till blue-books are issued, are informed
only as much or as little as the authorities may
think good for them; and the natural critics of all
administration have the somewhat barren pleasure of
finding fault with a policy after it has become a fact.
There is no safety-valve for the escape of grievances,
no official channel even for sound local advice. It is
not to be wondered at, therefore, if it seems an intolerable
burden to men full of anxiety about the methods
by which they are governed.
The Crown colony system is not new to Africa. It
existed for years in the Cape and Natal; it still exists
in its most rigid form over native states, and at its
worst it does not spurn public opinion in the fashion
of the Kruger régime—it simply neglects it. The
name is really a misnomer, for it is no part of the
English colonial system. The American Revolution is
sometimes described as the revolt of an English people
from Crown colony government, but in those days the
thing was not in existence. It is fundamentally the
method invented to govern a race which is incapable
of free representative institutions, or to tide over a
temporary difficulty. The Governor is absolute, subject
to the conditions of his appointment and the
instructions accompanying his letters-patent. He
may be assisted by a council, but it is his privilege,
on reasons shown, to override his council. He is the
sole local fountain of executive and legislative power.
But if he is absolute in one sense, he is strictly tied in
another. The methods of his administration are subject
to certain regulations issued by the Colonial
Office. The Secretary of State must approve his
appointments, and all important administrative acts,
as well as all legislation. Further, in serious questions
the Home Government exercises a general oversight
of policy before the event, and the Governor in
such matters is merely the mouthpiece of the Cabinet.
It is in itself a rational system, and works well under
certain conditions. In a serious crisis, when large
imperial issues are involved, and when local policy is
but a branch of a wider policy, it is highly important
that this day-to-day supervision should exist; and in
a case where speed is essential, Crown colony methods,
though slow enough in all conscience, are rapidity
itself compared with the cumbrous machinery of
representative government.
The necessity of treating the Transvaal and the
Orange River Colony temporarily as Crown colonies
was beyond argument. Reconstruction began in the
midst of war, when the material of self-government
was wanting. It goes on amidst unsettled and dimly
understood conditions, where certain facts of policy
stand out in a strong light and all else is shadow.
It involves many financial transactions in which the
Home Government is deeply interested; and it is
natural that a close administrative connection should
be thought desirable. It comes at the end of a costly
war, and it is right that England should have a direct
say in securing herself against its repetition. The
racial problem is still too delicate to submit to the
arbitrament of popular bodies; and if it were settled
out of hand there might remain an abiding cause of
discontent. The time is not ripe for self-government,
the country has not yet found herself, having but
barely awakened from the torpor of war and begun to
set her house in order. Again, there are factors to be
borne in mind in re-creating the new colonies which
extend far beyond their borders. It is impossible
to imagine that due consideration could be given to
them by the ablest elective body in the world, called
together in the present ferment. Above all, what is
to be done must be done quickly. The wants of the
hour are too urgent for delays. There must be some
authority, trusted by the British Cabinet, capable of
determining the needs of the situation, and giving
summary effect to his decision.
On this all thinking men in the new colonies are
agreed. I do not suppose that any of the more
serious critics of the expedient would be prepared to
propose and defend an alternative. But irritation
remains when reason has done its best, and it is not
hard to see the causes. One is the natural disinclination
of Englishmen to be ruled from above, a repulsion
which they feel even when arguing in its favour.
Another is the secrecy of Crown colony government,
to which I have already referred. It is painful to find
matters of vital importance to yourself decided without
your knowledge, even when you have the fullest
confidence in the deciding power. There is also,
perhaps, a little distrust still left in South Africa of
the British Government,—not of particular Ministers,
but of the vague entity behind them—a distrust
which has had in the past such ample justification
that it is hard to blame it. The colonial mind, too, is
averse to English officialdom, even when represented
by the several highly competent men who have shared
in the present administration. Red-tape, which in its
place is most necessary and desirable, seems to lurk in
the offices of men who are in reality trying hard to
deal with facts in the simplest way. A certain
amount of formal officialdom is necessary in all
government. There must be people to keep an office
in order, to make a fetich of etiquette, to insist on a
stereotyped procedure, and to see the world dimly
through a mist of “previous papers.” It is a useful,
but not very valuable, type of man, and we cannot
wonder that a South African, who imagines that
such a one has, what he rarely has, an influence in
grave decisions, should view with distrust the form
of government which permits him. It is a mistake,
but one based on an honest instinct.
Self-government is the goal to which all things
hasten, and critics of the present administration check
their complaints at the thought of that beneficent
day. Meanwhile it is our business to set things in
order so that the chosen of the people, when they
enter into their inheritance, may find it swept and
garnished. Representative institutions should not
spring full grown from an Order in Council, like
Athene from the brain of Zeus: if they do, there
is apt to be a painful crudeness about their early
history. The way should be prepared by gentle
means, for, after all, it is a country in which the
bulk of the residents have had no experience of
governing themselves. The experiment has so far
been tried in two ways. The municipalities represent
the highest level of intelligence and political
training; in municipal affairs, therefore, it is safe to
begin at once with representation. The first town
councils were for all practical purposes Government
departments, nominated by Government and assisted
on their difficult career by Government supervision.
But a nominated town council is an anomaly even
within a Crown colony, since a town council is not
concerned with high politics but only with the administration
of the area in which its citizens choose
to dwell, and any owner of property has a right to a
voice in determining the ways in which his property
shall be safeguarded. The basis of any municipal
franchise is the payment of rates, which imply the
ownership of property; and questions of race, loyalty,
even of education, have no logical place in what is
simply a practical union for the protection of proprietary
interests and the care of the amenities of
civilised life. The question of elective municipalities
is therefore a simple one, and as soon as a municipal
law could be put together, the system was inaugurated.
This is not the place to examine the type of municipal
franchise adopted in the Transvaal, which is a
skilful compendium of various colonial precedents.
But on one matter, the coloured and alien vote, there
was manifested a vigorous tendency to conservatism
and exclusion. As I have said, this is a province
where racial distinctions have no logical place. If a
black man is a ratepayer he has the citizen’s right to
vote. Nor can we on purely rational grounds confine
this franchise to British subjects. But the country
thought differently. As the municipal was her only
form of representation, political considerations crept
in unawares, and the result, while logically indefensible,
has a certain practical justification. For in
a time of reconstruction a community is apt rather
to narrow than enlarge its boundaries, feeling above
all things the need of a compact front against the
unknown. In time, no doubt, the true theory of
municipal franchise will reassert itself, and if, when
the time comes, a constructive policy towards the
subject races has also come into being, the delay will
have been not in vain.
A more important step towards self-government
was the creation of nominated legislative councils for
both colonies, which held their first meetings in the
early part of 1903. In the Transvaal there were
sixteen official members representing the different
Government departments, and fourteen non-official
members selected from representative Englishmen and
Boers in the country. In the Orange River Colony
there were six official members and four non-official.
Some of the new measures which concerned more
deeply the people of the colonies were kept back on
purpose for the opinion of the new councils. Such
were the new gold and diamond laws, the municipal
franchise law, and the ordinances governing the disposal
of town lands. So far the expedient has
promised well; an outlet has been created for public
opinion, though for the present such opinion cannot
carry with it practical force; and the procedure of
Government has ceased to be a state secret, and is
patent to any one who has the curiosity or the
patience to attend the council’s debates. It is interesting
to observe how the unofficial members already
appear in a quasi-representative capacity, and are
beginning to attach themselves to particular districts,
for which, so far as airing grievances and obtaining
information go, they perform most of the duties of
an elected member. There is no reason why such
members should not be elected instead of nominated,
and in this way provide a trial for the form of franchise
on which autonomy is to be based. There are
many obvious difficulties in any franchise for the new
colonies, and it would be well for such difficulties
to be realised and faced while the whole matter is
still mainly academic, and errors are not yet attended
with practical disaster.
The franchise for the new colonies is the constitutional
problem which is of the most immediate
importance. It will not be wise to delay the era
of self-government long, for between the most elastic
Crown colony and the narrowest free colony there
is an inseparable gulf, and though it may be said
justly that with an elective legislature the colonies
have something very like freedom, the one thing
needful will still be lacking. It is not enough to
put the oars into their hands; we must cut the
painter before they are truly free. There is one
postulate in all franchise discussions which is likely
to be vigorously attacked. The franchise must be
based in the first instance upon the principle of
giving adequate representation to all districts and
every interest; but, once this has been recognised, the
second principle appears—of providing for the supremacy
of the British population. That saying of Dogberry’s,
“An two men ride of a horse, one must ride
behind,” is a primary law not only of equitation but
of politics in the treatment of a conquered country.
For conquered it is, and there is little use disguising
it: we have not been fighting for the love of it or for
fine sentiment, but to conquer the land and give our
people the mastery. The last word in all matters
must rest with us—that is, with the people of British
blood and British sympathies. Both men must be
on the horse, or, apart from parable, each race must
have fair and ample representation. To deny this
would be to sin against sound policy. But not
to take measures to see that our own race has
the casting vote is to be guilty of the commonest
folly. “An two men ride of a horse, one must ride
behind.”
Whoever denies this principle may spare himself the
trouble of reading further, for it is proposed to treat
it as axiomatic. The first type of franchise need not
be permanent: a day may come when it will be needless
to consider the distinction of Dutch and British.
But as it was right and politic on the conclusion of
war to disarm our opponents, so it is right and politic
in the first franchise to put no weapon of offence
into their hands. The primary adjustment of the
franchise and the primary distribution of seats must
be made with this clear end in view—to secure a
working majority for the British people. It is obvious
that the words “British population” are vague, and
include many odd forms of nationality, but the thing
itself is simple, the class whose interests and sentiment
are on the British side, who seek progress on
British lines. It does not follow that the majority of
the Dutch will go into opposition, but it is ordinary
prudence to keep on the safe side. Such a policy
involves no distrust of the Dutch population, but is
the common duty of those who for a certain period
must, as conquerors, take the initiative in administration,
and, as bearing the responsibility, preserve
an adequate means of control.
The terms of the franchise are a more difficult
matter. In Cape Colony citizenship and a low
property qualification are the chief conditions. In
Southern Rhodesia, whose franchise law is an especially
clear and sensible code, an oath of loyalty is
accepted in lieu of technical citizenship, and an
easy educational test is demanded—the ability of
a voter to sign his name and write his address and
occupation. In Natal there is a sharp distinction
drawn between Europeans and all others. To them
the only tests are citizenship, and the ownership or
occupation of property of a certain value, or the
receipt of a certain amount of income. The native
is practically disqualified by a law denying the
franchise to any person subject to special courts or
special laws, and though a means of escape is provided,
the conditions are too complex even for more
intelligent minds than the native. It is an ingenious
but not wholly satisfactory device. Asiatics are
excluded by the law which denies votes to natives,
or descendants in the male line of natives, of any
country which does not enjoy the blessings of representative
government; and though in their case also
there is a way of escape, it is almost equally difficult.
The root distinction between types of franchise lies
in the method employed to exclude an undesirable
class, whether a direct one, by disqualifying in so
many words, or an indirect, by setting one standard of
qualification for all, to which, as a matter of fact, the
undesirable class cannot attain. The balance of argument
is, on the whole, on the side of the second
method, which has been adopted in Cape Colony and
Rhodesia, though, perhaps, with too low a standard.
But the first method, if followed more frankly than in
Natal, has something to be said for it. There is no
reason why the better class of Indians should not vote,
if their race is considered fit to mix on equal terms
with English society elsewhere; but to my mind
there is a very good reason why the native should
not vote—at least, not for the present. The easy
way of securing this result is the old method of the
Transvaal Grondwet, which said shortly, “There shall
be no equality between black and white.” It is the
way, too, which, under the Conditions of Surrender,
would have to be adopted in any trial franchise put
into force before self-government. I am not sure
whether it is not the most philosophic as well as the
simplest way, for it denies the native the franchise not
for a lack of property or educational qualification, but
for radical mental dissimilarity. In any case it is a
matter which must be left for the people of the
colony to settle for themselves. But for all others,
while the property basis of the franchise should be
low, there are grounds for thinking that a reasonably
high educational test should be added. The
lower type of European and the back-veld Dutchman
have in their present state no equitable right
to the decision, which the franchise gives, on matters
which they are unable to come within a measurable
distance of understanding. The fact that the fool
may have a vote at home is no reason for exalting
him to the same level in a country which is not
handicapped by a constitutional history. Some form
of British citizenship, obtainable by a short and
simple method, must also be demanded if the land
is to remain a British colony.
Once the franchise has been determined there remains
the division of constituencies. The axiom has
already been explained which appears to govern this
question. But in the absence of anything approaching
correct census returns it is difficult to suggest,
even tentatively, a distribution of seats. The fairest
way to secure the representation of all interests seems
to be to divide constituencies into three types. First,
there are the large towns, which for the present, to
take the Transvaal, may be limited to Johannesburg
and Pretoria. These would be given members according
to their population. Second, come groups of country
burghs, such groups as the Northern Burghs, with
Nylstroom, Warm Baths, Piet Potgieter’s Rust, and
Pietersburg; and the Eastern Burghs, with Middelburg
and Belfast, Lydenburg and Barberton. Here,
too, members would be allotted according to population,
though the number of voters required to form a
constituency should be fewer. Lastly, there would
be the country districts, substantially the present
fourteen magisterial divisions, and there the numbers
of a constituency would be still smaller. That it is
fair to differentiate in favour of the counties against
the burghs, and in favour of the burghs against the
large towns, will appear on a brief consideration. The
interests of the different constituencies in a city, at
least in a new city, are practically identical. In the
country burghs the interests vary, but still within
narrow limits. In the counties, on the other hand,
there is often a very wide variation. The dwellers in
Barberton have wholly different problems and grievances
from the dwellers in Bloemhof or Standerton.
But while this principle is right, the former axiom
must be kept in mind, that, provided fair representation
is granted to all, the constituencies must be so
arranged as to ensure British predominance. Certain
counties will, I believe, be on the whole British in time—Bloemhof,
Marico, Zoutpansberg, possibly Waterberg,
possibly Lydenburg, undoubtedly Barberton.
The burghs, too, will yield on the whole a British
voting population. In all likelihood, therefore, our
purpose will be secured by the division of constituencies
which I have suggested, even allowing for a
differentiation in favour of the rural districts. Figures
are still impossible in the absence of a census,
but on the roughest estimate there may be in the
Transvaal at the present moment a Boer population
of 100,000, with a voting proportion of 30,000, and
a British population of perhaps 150,000, with a voting
proportion of 50,000 or upwards. In the Orange
River Colony before the war the voters’ roll showed
just over 17,000, and if we put the vote on an enlarged
franchise at 20,000, we may be near the mark.
The position of the latter colony will not change
greatly in the next decade, but the Transvaal may
easily in a few years show a million inhabitants and
more. With a population thus constantly increasing
and liable to great local fluctuations, redistribution
may soon become a vexed question and a source of
political chicanery. It would be well if the endless
friction which attends redistribution courts and commissions
could be saved by some automatic system
under which sudden local inequalities could be speedily
and finally adjusted.
The greatest constitutional calamity which could
befall South Africa would be for the Dutch in the
new colonies to go as a race into opposition. I have
said that they are not born parliamentarians, and
that, to begin with at least, they will be a little
strange to the forms and methods of English representative
government. But they are a strong and
serious people, and if they desire, as a race, to form
an opposition, they will learn the tactics of a parliament
as readily as their kinsmen have done in the
Cape. It will be difficult to form out of so practical
and stable a folk such an opposition as the Nationalist
party in Ireland; but if they have real grievances
to fight for, it is conceivable that the Dutch people
might be organised into as solid a voting machine as
the Irish peasantry under the control of the Land
League and the Church. Attempts will doubtless be
made to bring this about. Certain institutions will
spare no pains to secure so promising a recruit in
their policy of emphasising every feature in the South
African situation which tends to disunion. On the
other hand, certain of the natural leaders of the
Dutch people, who have acquired the spurious race-hatred
which intriguers and adventurers have built up
during the past twenty years, in a desperately discreet
and orthodox manner may work to the same
end. But fortunately there are signs that the party
division, when it comes, will be lateral and not
vertical. It is a phenomenon often observed in a long
war, that a day of apathy sets in, differences arise
in a party, and one section begins to dislike the other
far more than it hates the common enemy. This
phenomenon, which in war spells disaster, is salutary
enough in civil politics. In both races there are signs
of divisions, and on each side there is a party unconsciously
drawing nearer to their old opponents. The
majority of the Dutch have little rancour, except
against each other; to many the Bond is as much an
object of suspicion as, let us say, Mr Chamberlain.
The old nebulous Pan-Afrikander dreams were in no
way popular with the Transvaal Boer, who would
have been nearly as much annoyed at being harassed
with an Afrikander federation as at being annexed
to Natal. Besides, he is not a good party man, being
too sincere an individualist. Intrigue of the carpet-bag
and secret-league variety he will never shine in,
and he does not desire to, though apt enough at a
kind of rustic diplomacy. There is, further, a party
ready made for him. He is frankly anti-Johannesburg,
a pure agrarian. Already the anomalous labour
party of the Rand are making overtures to him, and
with loud declamations on his merits strive to attract
his sympathies. On certain matters he may join
them, but it will be an odd union, and not a long one.
Town and country will never long remain in conjunction,
and there are few items, indeed, of a labour
programme to which he would subscribe.
It is difficult to draw with any confidence the
political horoscope of the new colonies. Certain
eternal antitheses will exist,—Capital and Labour,
Rand and Veld, Progress and the staunchest of
staunch Conservatisms,—but none of them seem
likely to coalesce so as to form any permanent division
of parties. It is as easy to imagine Rand capitalists
and country Dutch united on certain questions as
Boer and Labour. Possibly the old distinction of
Liberal and Tory in some form or other will appear
in the end. It is said that the colonies are aggressively
Liberal; but these are different from other
colonies, and the groundwork of Conservatism already
exists. We have a plutocracy and a landed aristocracy.
We have also in the legal element a class,
in its South African form, peculiarly tenacious of
the letter of the law. We have an established kirk
in all but name, and a racial tradition of resistance
to novelty. With the growth of a rich and leisured
population, and of social grades and conventions,
there will come a time when politics may well be
divided between those who are satisfied with things
as they are, and those who hunger for things as
they cannot be—with, of course, a sprinkling of
plain men who do their work without theories. We
shall have the doctrinaire idealist, doubtless, to experiment
on the labour and native questions; and
in place of having politics based on interests, we
may have them based in name and reality on creeds
and dogmas, which is what English constitutionalism
desires. All such developments are just and normal,
and in any one the land may find political stability.
There is one contingency alone which must be
regarded with the greatest dread—the growth of
a South African party, which is South African because
anti-British. The war raised colonial loyalty
to a height; but such loyalty is like a rocket, which
may speedily expire in the void in a blaze of brightness,
or may kindle a steady flame if the material
be there. We must remember that we have in the
Dutch a large population to which the British tie
means nothing; a large and important class, in the
cosmopolitan financiers, who may be covertly hostile
to British interests; and even in some of the most
sterling and public-spirited citizens men who, if the
Dutch Government had allowed them, would have
surrendered their nationality and become citizens of
the republics. South African loyalty, splendid as it
is, is rather fidelity to British traditions than to
that overt link which constitutes empire. You will,
indeed, hear the true theory of colonial policy well
stated and strongly defended; but it must not be
forgotten that in South Africa it is still somewhat
of an exotic plant, and wants careful tending before
it can come to maturity. Unadvised action on our
part may nip the growth, and give a chance for
a party which might declare, to adopt the words of
the old loyalists of Lower Canada, that it was
determined to be South African even at the cost
of ceasing to be British. A too long or too straitly
ordered tutelage might do it, or a harsh dictation
on some local question of vital interest, or the continuance
of the old calumnies about the Rand, the
old vulgar sneer at the colonial-born. It is well to
remember that while the land is a Crown colony it
is one only in name, and that all the tact and discretion
which we use in dealing with self-governing
colonies should be used in this case also.
Such a party may arise, but there is no reason in
the nature of things for its existence. South African
and British are not opposites. As I understand the
theory of colonial government, England stands towards
her colonies as a parent who starts his sons in the
world, wishing them all prosperity; and though in
after-years he may exercise the parental right of
giving advice, he will not attempt to coerce the
action of those who have come to years of maturity.
The tie is strongest when it is not of the letter but
of the spirit. At the same time it is well to preserve
certain outward and visible signs of descent,—well
for the fatherland, better for the colonies, who
draw from that fatherland their social and political
traditions and their spiritual sustenance. At the
moment South Africa is in a transition stage. Her
public opinion is scarcely formed on any subject;
she is full of vague aspirations, uneasy yearnings,
and half-fledged hopes. She will develop either into
the staunchest of allies in any imperial federation,
or the most recalcitrant and isolated of colonies.
She has enough and to spare of good men who
desire nothing more than that the African nation,
when it comes, should be a British people, and if
she is trusted whole-heartedly, she will not betray
the trust. She will even accept advice and reproof
in proper cases, for, unless we drive her to ingratitude,
she is not ungrateful for the blood and treasure
which Britain has spent on her making. But she
is like a young well-bred colt, whose mouth may be
easily spoiled by over-bitting, and whose temper will
be ruined by the bad hands or too hasty temper of
its trainer.
Two important constitutional questions remain.
One is the great policy of Federation, which looms
as a background behind all sporadic constitutional
forms. The second concerns that part of the imperial
forces which is to be stationed in South
Africa—a matter which is not only an army question
but one deeply affecting colonial interests. To
these the two succeeding chapters are devoted.
No South African problem is more long-descended
than the question of Federation. It was a dream of
Sir George Grey’s in the mid-century, and it was a
central feature in the policy of Sir Bartle Frere—that
policy which, after twenty years of obscuration, is at
last seen in its true and beneficent light. Nor was it
held only by English governors. Local statesmen in
Cape Colony saw in it a panacea for the endless
frontier difficulties which tried their patience and
their talents. The ultra-independent colonist, in
whose ears “Africa for the Afrikanders” was beginning
to ring, seized upon it as a lever towards a more
complete autonomy. Men like Mr Rhodes, to whom
Africa was an empire and its people one potential
nation, looked on it as the first step towards this
larger destiny. Every student of political history
for the last fifty years, considering the physical situation
of the different states and the absence of any
final dividing line between them, confidently anticipated
for South Africa, and under more favourable
conditions, the development which Australia has
already reached. But the movement shipwrecked
on the northern republics. Old grievances and
jealousies set the Transvaal and the Orange Free
State in arms against the prospect, and, since the
essence of federation is full mutual consent, the project
failed at the first hint of serious opposition. Now
all things are changed. The social and constitutional
difficulties which would obviously arise from the
inclusion of independent or all but independent
states in a federation of colonies have disappeared
with the independent states themselves. Now at
last all South Africa save the Portuguese and German
seaboards is under one flag.
The chief barriers have gone, but the need for
federation is as insistent as ever. A common flag
is a strong tie, but it does not in practice prevent
many local jealousies and petty oppositions. Disunion
is only justifiable among colonies of equal standing
when there is some insuperable physical barrier
between them or some radical disparity of interests.
Providence is so clearly on the side of the larger
social battalions, that an isolated state, though
within a colonial system, is at a disadvantage even in
matters concerning its own interests. The nationalism
which rejoices in local distinctions, however
recent in origin, is admirable enough in its way,
and ought to be preserved; therefore the complete
merging of several units in one is always to be
regretted, even when justified by grave needs. The
new state will never or not for a long time acquire
the consistency and proud self-consciousness of the
destroyed units. But federation shows another and
a better way. The parts are maintained in full
national existence, but in so far as their interests
transcend their own boundaries they are united in
one larger state. There is another advantage, often
pointed out by American writers on the subject,
which concerns a country like South Africa, whose
boundaries cannot yet be said to be finally delimited.
North of the Zambesi there is a vast vague region,
partly under the High Commissioner, partly included
in British Central Africa, which in time will become
separate colonies, with interests wholly different from
the states of the south. To add a new tract and
a novel population to a state is always a difficult
matter, for the existing régime may be most unsuited
for such extension. But it is easy to include a new
colony in a federation. In Mr Bryce’s words, federation
“permits an expansion, whose extension and
whose rate and manner of progress cannot be foreseen,
to proceed with more variety of methods, more
adaptation of laws and administration to the circumstances
of each part of the territory, and altogether
in a more truly natural and spontaneous way than
can be expected under a centralised government.
Thus the special needs of a new régime are met by
the inhabitants in the way they find best; its special
evils are met by special remedies, perhaps more drastic
than an old country demands, perhaps more lax than
an old country would tolerate; while at the same
time the spirit of self-reliance among those who
build up these new communities is stimulated and
respected.”[34]
The need for federation in the case of South Africa
is made greater by the fact that there are one or two
burning questions common to all her states which
cannot be satisfactorily settled save by joint action.
Foremost stands the native problem. If there is not
some sort of geographical continuity of policy in the
treatment of natives, all our efforts will be unavailing.
The natives of South Africa may be regarded, among
other things, as a great industrial reserve; and if the
policy outlined in another chapter is to be followed,
different labour laws and different methods of taxation
may work incalculable harm. If extravagant
inducements to work are held out in the Transvaal,
it will not be long before the labour market is ruined
elsewhere. If an improvident system of taxation
exists in Natal, it may unsettle and discontent other
native populations, since it is highly probable that in
the future natives will be less tied to localities, and
will move through the whole country in search of
work. The mining authorities have long recognised
the necessity of a single policy, as is shown by such
institutions as the Chamber of Mines and the Native
Labour Association; and it would be odd if in political
questions, where the need is equally urgent, the same
truth should be neglected. In connection with natives
the control of the sale of intoxicants is another matter
of South African importance. It is a matter on which
South Africa is now practically at one; but there are
limits to the prescience of local legislation and local
officials, and it may easily happen that an inadequate
law inadequately administered in one colony may
undo most of the good that an energetic administration
is attempting in another. If identity of policy,
again, is indispensable in relation to the subject races,
the same identity is most desirable in those inter-racial
questions between white men which will long
have their place in South African politics. An unwise
treatment of the Dutch population in the Cape will
infallibly react on the new colonies. Any one who
knows the way in which Cape precedents in this
connection are quoted in the Transvaal, just as
Transvaal precedents were quoted before the war
in the Cape, will recognise the difficulty which the
present disunion creates. In educational matters,
such as the proportion of time devoted to the teaching
of the Dutch language, while every colony must
necessarily decide for itself, there is great need of
one controlling authority to supervise and direct.
There is, again, the question of permit law and the
exclusion of undesirables, and the kindred matter
of the position of the imperial forces. A lax permit
law in one colony nullifies all the strictness of its
neighbours. Army questions—whatever the future
position of the South African force—will always have
an intercolonial significance, for the different troops
are under one commander-in-chief, they will meet for
training and manœuvres, and they are part of one
general scheme of imperial defence. In some questions
an attempt at co-operation has already been made,—in
railway conferences and customs unions,—but it
is obviously a clumsy method which proceeds from
conference agreements to ratification by the several
legislatures; and many important and difficult questions
will go on arising from day to day which
will be decided in quite different ways by local
authorities, to the confusion of all and the increase
of unnecessary distinctions. Lastly, there are a number
of lesser matters, of which veterinary and game
regulations may be taken as the type, whose treatment,
to be satisfactory, must be governed by a
common principle and in the hands of a common
executive.
Such are a few of the practical reasons for federation.
There is a deeper reason based on the future
of our colonial system. South Africa at the present
moment is deeply cleft by gulfs of race, fiscal policy,
imperial attachment. There will always be within
her bounds a party, not perhaps a very important
or very intelligent party, made up of those to whom
the British tie is galling and the tradition of kinship
mere foolishness. If the present particularism is
allowed to remain unreformed, it may easily happen
that in this colony or that some turn of the political
wheel may give such a party an authoritative voice,
and the result may be the beginning of endless
misunderstandings, and in the end the creation of
an impassable gulf. It is because South Africa as
a whole is so unswerving in her loyalty that it is
wise to create some united authority representing the
whole land, and looking at this great question from
a high standpoint, which can provide against the
parochialism of a party and the accidental caprice of
a state. This feeling is strong among the English
inhabitants of the new colonies, and is, I believe,
destined to grow in width and strength throughout
the country, when the fever of reconstruction is at
an end and South Africa has leisure to meditate on
her political future.
If we examine present conditions we can discern,
to borrow the common metaphor of writers on federation,
both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. To
begin with, the constitutional framework exists. The
head of a federation is already at hand in the High
Commissioner, in whom is vested the government of
all South Africa apart from the self-governing colonies.
It was the custom formerly to combine this office with
the governorship of the Cape: for the moment it is
joined with the governorship of the Transvaal and
the Orange River Colony. With the present narrow
definition of the High Commissioner’s duties, it is
right that this should be so; but there is no constitutional
reason why he should not be a separate
official. It has never been a popular office with self-governing
colonies, who dislike the idea that the
governorship should have in one of its aspects powers
over which the colony has no control; but this objection
could not arise to the head of a federal
government. By the letters patent of 1900 the
High Commissioner is invested with the control of
the South African Constabulary in the new colonies
and the administration of the Central South African
railways, and he is empowered to call together conferences
of the self-governing colonies for the discussion
of common problems. Here is already existing
the administrative machinery of a federation.
The rock on which many federal enterprises have
split is the election of the supreme head, and in most
systems it is the weakest point. But South Africa
is saved this part of the problem. She has a supreme
federal office, which has existed for more than twenty
years, and with the slightest alteration of functions
the High Commissionership could be transformed into
a Federal Viceroyalty.
South Africa, again, is for all practical purposes a
geographical whole. The vast tableland which makes
up nine-tenths of it has almost everywhere uniform
climatic conditions, and the strips of coast land have
among themselves a comparatively uniform character,
so that two types may be said to exhaust its geographical
and climatic features. There is no distinction so
radical as between the Atlantic states and Texas or
between Nebraska and the Pacific seaboard. This
physical harmony prevents any natural cleavages,
such as impassable mountain-ranges or large navigable
rivers; and it imposes upon the inhabitants uniformity
in modes of travel, and in the simpler conditions of
life. If we look at the people of the several states we
find a common nationality—or rather a common admixture
of nationalities. The English proportion may
be much higher in Natal and the eastern province of
Cape Colony, the Dutch in the western province and
the Orange River Colony; but everywhere there is
the same divided race, and in consequence kindred
political problems. There is, further, one supreme
Imperial Government for all, one constitutional tradition
to provide, as it were, a background to local
politics and a basis for federation. There are common
dangers from invasion, against which all the colonies
are protected by one navy. Subject to minor local
differences, there is a common structure observable in
the constitutions of the several self-governing colonies
to which the Transvaal and Orange River Colony will
no doubt in time approximate. Many of the most
vital problems are the same for the whole of South
Africa,—the control and the civilisation of the natives,
the amalgamation of the two white races, the conservation
of water, the protection against pests and
stock diseases. Two of the most important administrative
departments have already a common
basis, if they are still far from complete union.
All South African railway systems, now that the old
Beira line has been relaid, have the same gauge, their
rolling stock is interchangeable, officials pass readily
from one system to another, and by means of railway
conferences attempts have been made to arrive at a
common understanding on railway policy. Finally, all
South Africa is now united in one Customs Union.
But if the centripetal elements,[35] which make for
federation, are numerous and potent, disjunctive and
centrifugal forces also exist, though they create no
difficulties which a patient statesmanship could not
surmount. The obvious historical and racial differences
between the colonies may be neglected, for,
though on one side a force of separation, they are
in another and more important aspect an agency for
union, since they create a problem which in some form
or other every colony has to meet. The primary disruptive
force is economic. The interests, the material
interests, of the population of each colony are widely
different. In Cape Colony, on the whole, the farming
interest predominates, though there, again, there is
an internal distinction between the aims of the vine-growing
and agricultural south-west and the pastoral
north and east. Natal, so far as it is not a huge forwarding
agency, is also based on agriculture. The
Orange River Colony, though it has a respectable
mining interest, is, and will doubtless remain, pre-eminently
a pastoral state. The development of
Rhodesia is not yet quite apparent, but it is probable
that it will end by having a mining and a
farming interest of about equal strength. But the
Transvaal is overwhelmingly industrial both in population
and prospects. In time, no doubt, Transvaal
agriculture will play an important part, but the main
asset of the colony must long be found in her mines,
and the subsidiary industries created by them, which
will be left as a legacy when the reefs are worked out
to the last pennyweight. That is to say, in South
Africa there are three colonies where the predominant
interest is agricultural,—one in which the mining and
farming interests are likely to be evenly matched, and
one, the richest and therefore not the least important,
in which the mining interest casts all others into the
shade. It is obvious that economic policy will vary
greatly in each, even in those general matters which
would naturally fall under the survey of a federal
government. The bias of the agricultural colonies is
towards protection; the absolute necessity of Rhodesia
and the Transvaal is free trade or a near approach to
it. The industrial population of the Rand must have
food at a reasonable price, else the labour bill will
wipe off the profits of the mines, and to secure this
cheap food, taking into consideration the long railway
freights, entry at the coast free of duty is desired.
So too with the raw material of mining: any taxation
of such imports is directly inimical to the prosperity
of South Africa’s foremost industry. On the other
hand, the coast farmers have good grounds to complain.
They look to the Rand for their market, and
unless they are to be secured from the competition
of lands like the Argentine, where food-stuffs can be
grown almost as a waste product, they will grumble
against any rebate of coast duties.
The deadlock might be final were it not for the
geographical position of the Transvaal. Had she a
port of her own she might well decline any federation,
and continue to import on her own terms, leaving the
other colonies to make the best of it. But, as things
stand, she has to bring in most of her imports through
ports in the coast colonies, and for a large part of the
distance over their lines of railway. Were this, again,
a full statement of the case, the Transvaal might be
at the mercy of the other colonies, and be compelled
to accept their terms or starve. But fortunately the
Transvaal, while not in a position to dictate absolutely,
has a card of her own by which she can
command reasonable treatment. She can import by
the much shorter line from Delagoa Bay, and she is
contemplating the construction of an alternative line
to the same port. These two lines, when completed,
will make her virtually independent of the coast
colonies, provided—a provision which there seems
no reason to doubt—a good understanding is maintained
with Portugal. Clearly some modus vivendi
must be arrived at if there is not to be an endless
friction, which can only result in inconvenience to the
interior colony and great financial loss to the coast.[36]
This chief centrifugal force, divergence of economic
interests, becomes, therefore, in practice a powerful
centripetal force, the chief lever of federation. Some
kind of harmony must be attained; the only question
is whether this agreement is to be partial and temporary
or thorough and final. Federation, while on
its practical side a familiar policy to all classes in
South Africa, is still in its political aspect a little
strange to men’s minds, smacking somewhat of constitutional
doctrinairedom. When we are dealing
with self-governing colonies, there can be no question
of imposing it as a mandate from above: to be
effective and permanent it must come from within,
a proposal based on a national conviction. There
was, indeed, a time in the last year of the war
when Cape Colony lay in the throes of disruption,
and her wisest citizens were weary of the vagaries of
her politics; when Natal was acquiescent, and when
the new colonies were still a battlefield. It seemed
to many that then a federation might have been
imposed with the consent of most thinking men.
But the moment passed; local politics were restored
to their old activity, and the opportunity for imperial
interference was gone. A federal movement must
therefore advance slowly and circumspectly, and be
content with small beginnings, lest any hint of
coercion should drive the units still farther apart.
There is no argument so convincing as success,
and a satisfactory federation in miniature would go
far to prepare the way for the larger scheme. Fortunately
we have one sphere where experiments towards
federation can be given a fair trial. The Transvaal
and the Orange River Colony are under one governor
and the same system of government. Though they
have many points of difference, they have also many
common problems which are even now dealt with by
one central authority. The South African Constabulary
in the two colonies is one force under one
Inspector-General. The Central South African railways,
which control the whole railway system, are
under one Railway Commissioner and one General
Manager. Education is under one Director of Education.
In addition to this departmental union, the two
colonies are subject to one common debt, the Guaranteed
Loan. The War Debt lies for the present
wholly on the Transvaal;[37] but the loan for reconstruction
is devoted to purposes common to both,
and they are jointly and severally liable for its interest
and redemption. If the Orange River Colony
were to pay its fair share of the interest—having
regard to the capital expenditure apportioned to it—it
would be bankrupt to-morrow. It must either
pay a great deal less than its due, or some arrangement
must be arrived at by which there is no fixed
apportionment of either interest or capital, but the
whole debt is administered jointly, and charged
upon certain common properties.
The method adopted has been fully explained in
another chapter. Here it will be sufficient to point
out the federal consequences of the arrangement. If
the railways, the South African Constabulary, and all
common services are to be charged to one common
budget, and subjected to a common administration,
then some kind of common council must be established
with a share of both legislative and executive powers.
It would be necessary to give this council, or some
committee of it, the final decision in railway administration,
to grant it power to operate upon railway
profits, and to make grants for the services of the
loan, and for other services placed under its authority,
without reference to the councils of the separate
colonies. Such powers have not been unknown in
constitutional history, and Austro-Hungary furnishes
an instructive precedent. There we find a common
executive, not responsible to either of the two Parliaments,
for such common interests as foreign affairs,
the army, and imperial finance. On most matters
connected with these common interests the separate
Parliaments legislate; but the voting of money for
common purposes and the control of the common
executive is placed in the hands of the famous
Delegations, which are appointed by the two Parliaments.
The position is, therefore, that there is a
common Ministry for Finance, War, and Foreign
Affairs, controlled by the Delegations, and working
on funds voted and appropriated by the Delegations.
This power of appropriation without ratification by
the separate colonies is the essence of the new council,
which is thus, to continue the parallel, a compound of
the Delegations and the Common Ministry of Austro-Hungary.
Certain funds are ear-marked for its use,
and its deficits, if any, will be met by contributions,
in certain fixed proportions, from the treasuries of the
two colonies; while its surplus, if it is ever fortunate
enough to have one, will be divided, in whole or in
part, between the two colonies, going as a matter of
fact to assist in meeting the charges of the War Debt.
It has an administrative control over all existing
common services, and any other which may be subsequently
put under its charge by the local legislatures.
Such a council obviously falls far short of a true
federation. It is primarily a financial expedient to
provide a simple and effective machinery for administering
somewhat complicated finances. But it is a
step, and a considerable step, in the right direction.
Its executive functions are concerned with truly
federal matters; and its powers of acting alone in
questions of administration, and of voting and appropriating
funds without reference to the separate
legislatures, is a recognition of the central doctrine
of federation. Indeed at the present moment the
two new colonies have a de facto federal government.
The grant to the new council of legislative powers on
matters of common interest, and the corresponding
limitation of the powers of the separate legislatures,
would establish a complete de jure federation. There
is no reason why this goal should not soon be reached.
The two colonies are bound together by many ties,—above
all, by that most stringent bond, a common
debt. For three years they have been administered
by one governor. Though there may be symptoms of
local jealousy in both, there can be no real popular
objection, as there is no logical reason, against their
federation.
But while the new colonies present a simple problem,
the extension of the policy to the self-governing
colonies requires delicate and cautious handling. If
the limited federation be a success, it will have the
power of a good example, especially since there are
many throughout South Africa to seize and emphasise
the lesson. Meantime other agencies are at work for
union. The Bloemfontein Conference of March 1903,
which, in addition to settling a customs’ tariff and
recommending a preferential policy for British goods,
passed resolutions on certain questions, such as native
affairs, of wide South African interest, is the type of
that informal advisory union which may well come
into being at once. The appointment, further, of a
South African committee to investigate some of the
more vexed and obscure details of native policy, is
another step in the same direction. The new colonies,
which contain the chief motive force for South Africa’s
future, must give the lead. They hold in their hands
the guide-ropes, for federation may be said to depend
upon the development of two problems—the racial and
the economic; and both reach their typical form in
the new colonies. In these questions are involved the
chief grounds of separation and the chief impulses
towards union, and according as the new colonies
settle them within their own bounds will arise the
need and desire for a more comprehensive settlement.
The type of federation which South Africa may
adopt will, no doubt, vary considerably from most
historical precedents. It should in certain respects
be more rigid, since, apart from a few outstanding
troubles, there are no permanent differences between
the parts. In certain respects, too, it should be more
elastic, for a federated South Africa would be not only
a substantive state, but a member of a greater system,
and some of the old free colonial traditions which
pertain to that system should be left to the federated
units. It is a vain task at this stage to attempt the
outlines of a scheme, since the foundations are not yet
fully apparent. Needs which are now in embryo will
be factors to be reckoned with when the time is ripe,
and perhaps some of the forces which seem to us
to-day to dominate all else will have disappeared or
decreased in strength. There is a wealth of historical
precedent for South African statesmen to follow; for,
apart from the United States and sundry European
parallels, there are two types of federation within the
colonial system—the Dominion of Canada and the
recently created Australian Commonwealth. Between
them these two cases provide a most complete parallel
for South Africa. In Canada there was a distinction
of races not less marked than Dutch and English.
There was, further, an imperfectly explored hinterland
which the colonists looked to bring by degrees under
the same constitution. In Australia there were grave
intercolonial disputes on railways and customs and a
wide divergence of economic interests. A keen
jealousy was felt by the smaller for the larger states,
and the scheme of federation had to be delicately
framed to adjust state pride with federal requirements.
On the whole, the difficulties which the framers of
the federal constitution had to face in Canada and
Australia were greater than we find in South Africa:
in the United States, immeasurably greater. But
often the probability of federation stands in inverse
ratio to the ease with which it can be effected, and the
very simplicity of this South African problem may
delay its settlement. There are, however, forces which
must between them hasten the end. One is the
economic disparity, at least as great as in Australia
and greater than in Canada, which makes itself felt so
constantly in the daily life of the inland colonies, that
they may find themselves compelled to push the matter
in spite of the apathy of the coast. The other is the
very real national sentiment which is growing to
maturity in the country. The war has welded the
English inhabitants into something approaching a
nation. Having suffered so deeply, they are the less
prone to local jealousies and the more attached to the
ideal of imperial unity.
A scheme of South African federation, as has been
said, will have to differ materially from any of the
existing types. Though details are premature, certain
principles may be accepted as essential. The first
concerns the subjects relegated to the Federal Government.
In the United States these are, roughly,
foreign affairs, the army and navy, federal courts of
justice, commerce, currency, the post office, certain
general branches of commercial law, such as copyrights
and patents, an oversight of the separate states to
protect the inhabitants against any infringement of
the fundamental rights granted by the constitution,
and taxation for federal purposes. Several of these
functions are needless in a federation of English
colonies. Foreign affairs and army and navy questions
assume a different form from what they present
in a wholly separate community; and since there is no
Grondwet known to English constitutional law, there
is no need for an oversight of the separate states in
case of its infringement. That is already provided for
by the ultimate right of the British Crown to annul
legislation which may conflict with the chartered
rights or limitations of a colony. But there are
certain powers, not referred to in the American
scheme, which are essential to a modern system.
Railways, telephones, and telegraphs should come
under the purview of the national Government, as also
all customs tariffs and all bounties which may be
granted on production. Powers must be given to the
national Government to take over the existing debts
of the separate states, and in times of financial distress
to come to their assistance. On judicial and legal
questions—the nature of the federal courts, the
mechanism of appeal, the branches of law which are
suitable for federal jurisdiction—it is impossible to
speak; as it is premature to attempt an outline of the
constitution of the federal Government, the form of its
legislation, the functions of its executive. Such questions
require long and careful consideration on the
part of the South African colonies, and may happily
take their colour, when the time arrives, from some
accepted scheme of imperial federation. Two points
only may be noted as even now obvious desiderata of
policy. In Canada the state governors are appointed
by the federal Ministry; in Australia they are nominated
by the Crown in the same way as the Governor-General.
Experience has shown that the Australian
method is the superior one, since it allows a state
governor and his ministers to communicate directly
with the imperial Government, and so preserve a
formal independence which is at once harmless and
grateful to state pride. It is impossible to doubt that
the Australian precedent should be followed in South
Africa. The second point concerns the method of
effecting federation. The Canadian scheme was based
on resolutions drafted by a conference of delegates
at Quebec. They were approved by the legislatures
of the provinces, embodied in a bill drafted by a committee
of Canadian statesmen, and passed by the
imperial Government. Federation was thus, as in the
United States, the work of conferences and legislatures
alone. Australia, recognising that this was a question
which deeply concerned the population of the colonies,
followed a better plan. The federal constitution, after
passing through a long period of conferences and
examinations by state legislatures, was submitted to
a direct popular vote, and a certain majority was prescribed
for it in each state. Such a federation, secured
by the consent of a whole people, has a stability
against future attacks and captious emendation which
belongs to no scheme sanctioned only by a legislative
body. For though popular representation is in
theory a representation for all things, yet a matter
so vital in its application and so far-reaching in its
issues deserves to be made the subject of a special
mandate.
I have said that foreign affairs and army and navy
questions do not, under the ordinary practice of the
colonial system, have much connection with colonial
governments, and therefore may be left out of most
federal proposals. But though the technical last word
may never lie with the Federal Government, yet a
South African federation would have genuine foreign
interests, and would keep a watchful eye on the
movements of the colonising Powers of Europe. Had
there been a federation, there would have been no
German acquisition of Damaraland, nor would we
have found imperial authorities refusing the offer of
Lourenço Marques for a trifling sum. No colonist can
ever quite forgive those memorable blunders, which
prevented British South Africa from having that
geographical unity from the Zambesi to the Cape
which its interests demand. Thirty years ago it would
have been easy for Britain to proclaim a Monroe doctrine
for South Africa—for that matter of it, for East
Africa also. The opportunity has passed, but a strong
national Government could still exercise great influence
on foreign affairs, and prevent encroachment
upon Portuguese territories by that Power which
twenty years ago saw in Africa material for a new
German Empire and has never forgotten its grandiose
dreams, as well as keep an eye upon that dangerous
mushroom growth, the Congo Free State, and check
its glaring offences against civilisation. Army and
navy questions belong, in their broadest sense, to
schemes of imperial federation, a discussion of which
here would be out of place; but since there is already
in South Africa a large military force under one commander-in-chief,
certain army questions arise which
may find their proper answer only in federation, but
which even now require a provisional settlement.
According as we treat the matter, it may become a
unifying or a violently disjunctive force, a step towards
federation or a movement towards a wider disintegration.
The bearing of the army question on South
African policy is the subject of another chapter.
The foremost political lesson of the late war was the
solidarity of military spirit throughout the Empire.
But this cohesion is only in spirit, and the actual
position of colonial forces is that of isolated units,
connected in no system, and subject to no central
direction. For a student of military law, or that
branch of it which concerns the relation of military
forces to the civil power, a survey of the British
colonies has much curious interest. Speaking generally,
since 1868 there have been no imperial forces
in any self-governing colony, since we have acted
on the principle that when a colony became autonomous
the defence of its borders, except by sea, must
be left to its own government. Colonial troops are,
therefore, militia and volunteer, who take different
forms according to the needs of the colony. In
some the militia, or a part of it, is to all intents
a regular force, performing garrison duty and acting
as a school of instruction for the other auxiliary
forces. In Canada, for example, there were in 1902 a
troop of cavalry, a troop of mounted rifles, two batteries
of field artillery, two companies of garrison
artillery, and a battalion of infantry, in which the men
were enlisted for three years’ continuous service. In
New South Wales, to take one state of the Australian
Commonwealth, provision was made for a permanent
force, which included a half-squadron of cavalry, three
companies of garrison artillery and one field battery,
a company of infantry and various supplementary
services, with men enlisted for five years. In New
Zealand the enlistment for the permanent force, which
consists of artillery and submarine miners, is for eight
years, three of which may be passed in the reserve.
Next comes the militia proper on the home model,
where the men are partially paid and are subject to a
certain amount of annual training. Lastly there is
a wide volunteer organisation, stretching from fully organised
companies of infantry and mounted rifles down
to small local rifle clubs. In certain colonies where
there is an aboriginal or unsettled population, such as
Canada, Cape Colony, and Natal, there is also a permanently
embodied police force, which may rank with
the permanent militia as a sort of colonial regulars.
All such forces are under the full control of the
Colonial Governments, whether, as in the Australian
Commonwealth and Canada, under the Federal
Ministry of Defence, or, as in Cape Colony, under the
department of the Prime Minister. An imperial officer
may be lent, as in Canada and Australia to-day, for the
command of the colonial force, but as soon as he enters
upon his command he becomes a servant of the Colonial
Government. To that Government alone belongs the
power of raising new forces, of changing the status of
existing troops, of ordering their distribution, of regulating
their rates of pay, and of lending them for service
beyond the colony. A strong general officer commanding
may have great influence in all such decisions, but
technically he is merely an adviser who receives his
orders from the local authorities.
This is one chief type of the organisation of our
over-sea imperial force. The other is furnished by
India. There we have a native Indian army, and
a large number of imperial troops, all of whom are
under the authority of the commander-in-chief in
India, who in turn is under the control of the
Indian Government. When imperial troops are
stationed in any other part of the Empire they are
commanded by an officer who is directly subject to
the War Office; but in India, as soon as a battalion
lands it takes the status of the local forces and
passes under the authority of the local government.
The War Office retains certain powers, but for all
practical purposes the Indian command is wholly
decentralised.
South Africa affords the spectacle of a confusion
of the two types. It is made up partly of Crown
colonies and dependencies and partly of self-governing
states. At this moment it is occupied by imperial
troops whose numbers, for the purpose of this argument,
may be put at 30,000. Such troops are
stationed in Cape Colony and Natal as well as in
the new colonies, and the command has been unified
and vested in one commander-in-chief, who is subject
only to the War Office and has no responsibility
to the local governments. We have, therefore, the
anomalous case of an autonomous colony occupied by
imperial troops, a policy which is out of line with
English practice. When self-government is given to
the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, the
South African general will command what will be
neither more nor less than an alien army of occupation.
At the same time, wholly apart from the
regular forces, there are police troops in Natal, Cape
Colony, the new colonies, and Rhodesia; and a large
number of volunteer regiments, who are directly
under the control of the local governments. The
South African military organisation is thus split
in two by a deep gulf, and unless some method of
union is found, we shall be confronted with a system
alien to the tradition of our colonial policy and in
itself clumsy and unworkable. But this question is
intimately bound up with others—the desirability
of the retention of imperial troops, the organisation
of such troops in relation to the imperial army,
indeed the whole question of that branch of imperial
federation which is concerned with the defence
of the Empire. It involves certain problems of
military reform which are violently contested by
good authorities. In this chapter it is proposed, as
far as possible, to consider the matter of the South
African army solely from the standpoint of South
African politics, referring to the military aspect
only in so far as may be necessary at points where
South African politics are merged in wider schemes
of imperial unity.
The first question concerns the policy of keeping
imperial troops in South Africa at all. The size of
the force depends, of course, on the duties which
it is intended to perform, but for the retention of
some troops there seems to be every justification.
Few people believe that there is much likelihood of
another outbreak, but after a war of the magnitude
of that which we have recently gone through it
would seem scarcely provident to leave the peace
of the country solely to the care of the police. In
a country, again, where British prestige is a plant
of recent growth, it is well to provide the moral
support of regular battalions. If useful for no other
purpose, they serve as a memento of war, a constant
reminder of the existence of an imperial power behind
all local administration. We have also to face the
fact that we have committed ourselves to some kind
of occupation force by undertaking a large preliminary
expenditure on cantonments, which will be money
wasted if the scheme is dropped. For this purpose
we have spent between two and three millions, and
unless we are to be held guilty of causeless extravagance,
we must abide by the plan to which this
outlay has committed us.
The original scheme was for a garrison force. For
this purpose 30,000 men are too many if our forecast
be correct, and far too few if it be wrong. Half the
number would be ample for any peace establishment,
and we may be perfectly certain that as soon as self-government
is declared in the new colonies there
would be many attempts to cut down the number or
do away with the force altogether. Alien garrison
troops will be always unpopular, and, as has been said,
they are foreign to British policy with regard to
autonomous colonies. A force on the garrison basis
would find itself with little to do, the general commanding
would be exposed to the jealousy of the
colonial troops, and involved in constant difficulties
with the colonial governments, and, save in the unlikely
event of a rebellion, would have no very obvious
justification for the existence of his command.
If South Africa is to remain a station for any considerable
number of imperial troops, some mode of
co-operation must be discovered with the local governments.
This co-operation would be possible between
the colonial administration and a garrison force; but
it would be infinitely more satisfactory if the whole
status of the imperial troops were changed. For a
garrison establishment makes it difficult, if not impossible,
not only to bring the general commanding
into touch with the governments, but to bring the
local troops into line with the regular, and both unions
must be accomplished before any satisfactory settlement
can be given to the problem. The simplest
solution was to treat the South African force, not as a
garrison, but as part of the regular army on the home
establishment, sent there for the purpose of training,
and liable to be utilised at any moment for active
service in any part of the Empire. There are certain
objections to the scheme, plausible enough though not
insuperable, from the military standpoint; but for the
present we may limit our argument to those points
which concern South Africa, and those difficulties
which spring from the nature of the country—difficulties
which are far more real to the soldiers who are
directly concerned than the wider question of the
present scheme of military organisation.
The advantages are sufficiently obvious. There are
few finer manœuvring grounds in the world than the
great Central South African tableland. There is
sufficient cover to make scouting possible and not
enough to make it easy, and the intense clearness of
the air and its singular acoustic properties will train
a man’s senses to a perfection unknown in other
armies and impossible to acquire in the restricted
areas of a populous country. The soldier will have
to face the rudiments of war in a far more difficult
country than he is likely to be used in. He will learn
to shoot, or rather to judge ranges correctly under
unwonted conditions, which is rarer and more vital
than mere accurate marksmanship. He will learn
the real roughness of campaigning in long manœuvres;
and from the same cause regiments will acquire that
elasticity and cohesion which come from constant
working together. If we except enteric, caused by
bad sanitation, which has been the curse of the war,
but is not a speciality of the country, the veld is
almost exempt from diseases. Life there will not only
train the senses and the intelligence, but will give
health and physical stamina. A year of such training
will make a man of the young recruit from the slums
of an English city. Physique is the final determinant
in war, and with our present system of recruiting and
training there is no guarantee for its existence. Lastly,
our soldiers trained on the veld will become natural
horse masters, which few even of the cavalry are at
present. They will learn that care of their horses
which every Boer has as a birthright, that simple
veterinary skill and common-sense whose lack has cost
us so many millions. South Africa is a natural horse-breeding
country, and in co-operation with Government
stud-farms a breed of remounts could be got
which would unite the merits of the Afrikander pony
with the weight and bone required for army work.
Instead of having to ransack foreign countries for our
horses, we should breed all we wanted for ourselves
under the eye of our imperial officers, and breed them
too in a place which is the best centre in the Empire
for distribution to any possible seat of war.
The objections to the scheme are partly of sentiment
and partly of technical difficulties. South
African service, it is said, is at present unpopular.
Our army has recently concluded a long and arduous
war, fought under conditions of extreme discomfort.
Small wonder if troops who have been kicking their
heels for eighteen months in remote blockhouses
should have little good to say of the pleasures of the
life. For the officers there have been dismal quarters,
a cheerless dusty country, heavy expenses, little sport,
and no society; and the lot of the men, though
relatively less hard, has been equally comfortless.
The proper answer to such a contention is to ignore
it. It is the objection of the non-professional officer,
and cannot be entertained. The forces in South
Africa are sent there for training, not for garrison
life, and if the place is a good training-ground, the
question of congenial society and interesting recreation
has nothing to do with the matter.[38] But there
is no reason why South African life for the future
should be unattractive. An English society is rapidly
arising, English sports are becoming popular, the
cantonments can easily be made comfortable homes,
and there are a thousand ways, such as the allotting
to each soldier who desires it a small patch of land to
cultivate, in which the men can be made to feel an
interest in the country. For the officers there is a
sporting hinterland as fine and as accessible as the
Pamirs to the Indian sportsman. Living is undoubtedly
more costly, and there will have to be
special allowances for South African service; but with
a proper canteen system, such as existed during the
war, the cost of luxuries might be kept low enough
for all. There is a future, too, for the reservist which
he cannot look for at home. Even as an unskilled
workman he can command wages which are unknown
in England; and the men who, at the end of their
three years’ service, would join the South African
reserve, would be young enough to begin civil life in
whatever walk they might choose.
The chief technical difficulties, exclusive of sea-transport,
which is outside our review, are the extra
cost, the difficulty of recruiting, and the delays in
bringing reservists from home in case of active service.
The last will be met in a little while by the creation
of a South African reserve; but in the meantime
there are many ways in which it might be surmounted.
Battalions might be brought up to fighting
strength by the inclusion of men from local forces.
It would be an easy matter to introduce into the
terms of enlistment of the South African Constabulary
a condition of foreign service, and to keep from 1000
to 2000 men in readiness. It would be possible also
to enlist 1000 men of the Transvaal volunteer force
for special foreign service, paying to each man a bonus
of £12 per annum. The real solution of this difficulty
is bound up, as we shall see later, with the whole
theory of a colonial army; but even on the present
system it is easy to provide a working expedient.
The question of extra cost—for each man would
require an extra 6d. per day, or £9, 2s. 6d. per
annum—is answered by pointing out that such a
force being on the home establishment would do
away with the necessity of linked battalions, and
would effect a saving of twenty-four battalions and
six regiments of cavalry, so that even if the extra
cost were 50 per cent, the total saving would far
outbalance it.[39] The recruiting difficulty is unlikely
to be a serious one. We may lose to the army a
little of the loose fringe of half-grown boys from the
towns,—stuff which, as history has shown, can be
transformed into excellent fighting men, but which
at the same time does not represent the last word
either in moral or physical qualities. But many of
the best of our young men, whose thoughts turn
naturally to the colonies, would gladly seize the
chance of three years’ service there, in which they
would gain experience of the new lands, and be able
to judge, when their turn came for entering reserves,
which line of life promised most. No Emigration
Bureau or Settlement Board would be so effective
an agency in bringing the right class to the country.
But, further, such a system would throw open to us
the vast recruiting-grounds of our colonies. It is
difficult for one who has not been brought face to face
with it to realise the military enthusiasm which the
war has kindled not only among the more inflammable,
but among the coolest and shrewdest of our younger
colonists. They know—none better—the joints in
our armour; but they have paid generous tribute to
the solidarity of spirit, the gallantry of our leaders,
the unbreakable constancy of our men. A few fanciful
war correspondents have done a gross injustice to our
colonial soldiers by painting them as a race of capable
braggarts, who laughed at our incompetence in a
game which they understood so vastly better. It
is safe to say that in the better class there was no
hint of such a spirit; and the way in which irregular
horse, with fine records of service, have traced the
source of victory in the last resort to the stamina
of the British infantry, does credit both to their
judgment and their chivalry. They have become
keen critics of any organisation, looking at war not
only with the eyes of fighting men but of professional
soldiers. All the details of the profession are of interest
to them, and an imperial force in South Africa
could draw largely both for officers and men upon
the local population. The benefit of such a result,
both to the colonies and to ourselves, is difficult to
over-estimate. A common profession would do much
to smooth away the petty differences which are always
apt to widen out gulfs. The army would
become a vast nursery of the true imperial spirit,
and a school to perpetuate the best of our English
traditions; and would itself gain incalculably by the
infusion of new and virile blood, and the weakening
of prejudices, both of class and education, which at
present are a grave menace to its efficiency.
If the imperial Government accept the retention of
a South African Army Corps as part of the home
establishment, it is worth while considering how best
this new departure in army policy can be used to
further the interests of South Africa herself, and
those wider imperial interests which are daily taking
concrete shape and casting their shadow over local
politics. Leaving for a moment the question of imperial
forces, we find in South Africa a local military
activity which, though less completely organised than
in some of the older colonies, is yet well worth our
reckoning with. The war brought into being a large
number of irregular corps, most of which have now
disappeared. In Cape Colony the permanent force
is the Cape Mounted Rifles, which has an average
strength of 1000 men, enlisted for five years, and
sworn to “act as a police force throughout the
colony, and also as a military force for the defence
of the colony.” Since the war the town guards
and district mounted troops, the former limited to
10,000 and the latter to 5000 men, have been
placed on a permanent footing. They are loosely
organised volunteer forces, enlisted for no fixed
period, and bound to serve in the one case in
the neighbourhood of the towns, and in the other
within their own districts. There are also a number
of ordinary volunteer corps, composed chiefly of
mounted infantry, and field and garrison artillery,
and a number of mounted rifle clubs for local defence.
All types of corps included, there are probably not
less than 20,000 men undergoing some kind of
military training and pledged to some form of service
in Cape Colony alone. Natal presents a very similar
picture. Her regulars are the Natal Police Force,
with a strength, including the Zululand Police, of
between 500 and 600 men, enlisted for three years,
and including both mounted and foot divisions.
There is a considerable volunteer force, with artillery,
infantry, and mounted rifles, two companies of naval
volunteers, and a number of rifle clubs with a strength
of over 2000. We may put the defensive strength of
Natal, which, considering her size, is remarkable, at
a little under 5000 men. The British South African
Police, which is stationed in Southern Rhodesia, has
a strength of a little over 500, and the Southern
Rhodesia Constabulary and volunteers increase the
forces of that district to nearly 2000 men. In the
new colonies the chief force is the South African
Constabulary, with a nominal strength of 6000 men,
of which two-thirds are stationed in the Transvaal.
It is an expensive force, each man costing on an
average £250 per annum; but there is reason to
believe that the figure may soon be reduced to £200,
or even less. In the Transvaal a volunteer force
has been organised of nine regiments. No ultimate
strength has been fixed, but 10,000 may be taken as
a fair estimate. In April 1903 the force numbered
fully 3000, and as the country becomes more populous
there is little reason to doubt that the maximum will
be reached.[40]
There is thus a force of over 40,000 men engaged
in local defence throughout South Africa, and of this
the 8000 police are for all practical purposes regular
troops. At the present moment the command of this
force is split up among the different colonial governments
and is wholly dissociated from any connection
with the command of the imperial regulars. We have
seen that the situation is full of grave difficulties for
the regulars themselves, since there is no place in
colonial policy for an alien garrison force. But the
strongest argument in the present system lies not
in the difficulties which it involves but in the advantages
which it forgoes. We have in South Africa a
population which, to use Napier’s famous distinction,
is not only bellicose but martial, with a natural aptitude
for soldiering and a keen interest in all details
of military organisation. Until the regular command
is brought into line with the local forces this genius
will expend itself on casual volunteering, and when
we next call for colonial aid we shall have the same
haphazard units, instead of colonial regiments drilled
and manœuvred on one system and forming a part of
some regular division. The arguments for a federation
of the whole South African command are difficult
to meet, and there is little danger of opposition
from the local governments. The danger lies in the
fact that it would necessarily involve some reconstruction
of our whole military system, and military
conservatism is slow to depart from the traditions of
the elders.
If imperial defence means anything it must include
the provision in every great colonial unit, in Canada,
Australia, South Africa,—particularly in South Africa,—of
a force on the lines of the Indian army, with
an elastic organisation, embracing both imperial regulars
and local troops. Granted the sanction of the
imperial Government, there is no special difficulty in
the machinery required to create it. If South Africa
were federated it would be simplicity itself. All that
would be wanted would be to bring the general officer
commanding the imperial troops, since his command
has been unified, into relation with the Federal Ministry
of Defence, and unite in his person the functions
which Sir Neville Lyttelton now exercises in South
Africa and those which at present belong to Lord
Dundonald in Canada. But, pending federation, we
must have recourse to one of those intercolonial
representative bodies which form the thin end of
the federal wedge. The general commanding would
be given the command of local forces by an act
of the local legislature, subject in all questions of
policy, finance, and organisation to the authority of
an intercolonial committee of defence.[41] Each colony
would elect two or more representatives, on the lines
of the present Intercolonial Council of the Transvaal
and Orange River Colony; the council thus formed
would be empowered by the legislatures which elect
it to decide what share of the cost was to be borne by
the separate colonies, to arrange for combined manœuvres,
to supervise appointments, and, in case of
local wars, to decide what force should be sent to the
front, and in the event of an imperial war, to say
what local forces should be lent for service. The
general commanding would be responsible to the War
Office for moving imperial troops, subject to its
direction, and for the internal discipline and organisation
of the imperial divisions. There would, thus,
be clearly defined limits of authority for both the
imperial and local Governments, and at the same
time every inducement to co-operation. In so far as
he was in command of the whole of the South African
forces, the general commanding would be subject in
South African matters to the defence committee;
while, in so far as he was in command of imperial
troops, he would take his orders on imperial questions,
such as a foreign war, from the Home Government.
The present officers in command of colonial police and
volunteers would, of course, come under his authority
precisely on the same basis as officers of regulars.
The advantages of such a scheme are many, both
from the standpoint of policy and of military efficiency.
It would please the colonies, who would have
an army of their own, drilled on regular lines and
affiliated to the imperial army, and at the same time
would feel that they had a share in the control of the
forces and the military policy of the Empire. It
would ensure the efficiency of local troops, and would
prepare them for co-operation with the regulars,—not
the clumsy partnership of troops tagged on to
a division which cannot use them, but the true co-operation
which follows on absorption in a larger unit
with which they have been trained. It would provide
an easy means for the transfer of colonial officers to
imperial regiments, and would act as a magnet for
colonial recruiting. In the case of local wars, as I
have said, the whole force would be ready to take
the field under the orders of the general commanding.
In the case of a foreign war the imperial Government
would direct the distribution of the regulars, and it
would be for the committee of defence to say what
local troops should be lent for foreign service.[42]
Beyond this, the only duties of the War Office
would lie in the selection of staff officers and the
general commanding—a matter in which the concurrence
of the colonial governments might be obtained
as a matter of courtesy. On the financial side
it is probable that the scheme would considerably
lessen the burden of defence. The only way in which
the colonies can ever be expected to contribute to the
cost of imperial defence is by providing armies and
navies of their own. To pay for that which does not
directly concern you is a form of tax, and so hostile
to the letter and spirit of our colonial traditions.
But if local governments are given a direct interest
in an imperial army in which their own troops are
subsumed, and whose policy they largely control, I
do not think they will be ungenerous. There is no
reason why they should not meet the cost of the
general and his staff, and contribute part, if not the
whole, of the extra pay which the regular troops
in the South African command must receive, and the
bonus to the volunteer corps which are held ready
for foreign service. Such payments, once the federation
were effected, would no doubt come as a spontaneous
offer. Decentralisation and centralisation are,
by way of becoming catchwords, repeated without
understanding to justify the most diverse schemes.
But every true policy must include both, since in
certain matters it is well to decentralise, and in
others unification is imperative. Such a scheme as
has been sketched combines the sporadic colonial
forces in one effective unit of organisation, and at
the same time relieves the tension at imperial headquarters
by relegating detailed administration to the
local authorities, who are best fitted to supervise.
The military is, as a rule, the most difficult aspect
of a federation, but in our circumstances it is likely
to be the simplest. We have a federal nucleus in
the imperial command, and a strong impulse in the
fact that the local volunteer and police forces have
already served side by side with regulars in the field,
and are inspired with a military spirit which may
soon disappear unless fostered and utilised. A federation
of local forces exists in Canada and in the
Australian Commonwealth; a union of the imperial
forces exists in South Africa. The problem is to
federate the local forces in advance of a political
federation, and to unite them with the imperial
command in a system which, though a new departure
in military policy, contains no detail which has not
been somewhere or other already conceded. If the
scheme in itself is worth anything, the practical
difficulties are small. It is unlikely that the colonial
governments will offer any opposition; and so far as
South African interests are concerned, the foundations
would be laid of a true federation. From the point
of view of imperial politics the step would have an
even greater significance, for a type would be created
of a new army organisation which would provide
for a federated imperial defence; and the precedent
having once been created, the other colonies would
readily follow suit.
The problems discussed in the foregoing chapters
have been concerned chiefly with the new colonies,
for it is to them that we must look for the motive
force to expedite union. They must long continue to
be the most important factor in British South Africa,
partly from their accidental position as the late theatre
of war, and more especially from their wealth, the
intricacy of their politics, the high level of ability
among their inhabitants, the splendid chances of their
future, and the delicacy of their present status. Union,
if it comes, will come chiefly because of them; and in
any union they will play a great, if not a dominant,
part. Whither they pipe, South Africa must ultimately
follow. But this is not because there can be
any differentiation in value between the states, since
all are self-subsistent and independent, but because in
the new colonies the problems which chiefly concern
South Africa’s future are already naked to the eye
and focussed for observation. The Transvaal will be
important because within it the fight which concerns
the whole future of the African colony will be fought
to a finish. It will add to the problem some features
which concern only itself, but the general lines it
shares with its neighbours. The economic strife, the
amalgamation of races, the native question, the movement
towards federation, with all its many aspects,
and, last but not least, the intellectual and political
development of its citizens,—this is the problem of the
Transvaal, and in the gravest sense it is the problem
of South Africa’s future.
In the preceding pages the separate questions have
been briefly considered. But here we may note one
truth which attaches to them all—the settlement of
no single one is easy. Each will defy a supine statesmanship,
and in each failure will be attended with
serious disaster. Patience and a lithe intelligence
can alone ensure success, and it is doubtful if that
happy Providence which has now and then taken
charge of our drifting and muddling will interfere
in this province to save us from the consequences of
folly. Every question stands on a needle-point.
Mining development—if the wealth of the country is
to be properly exploited—must continue as it has
begun, utilising the highest engineering talent, and
straining every nerve to extend the area over which
profits can be made. The labour question requires
tact and patience, prescience of future interests, a
recognition of the needs of the complex organism
of which it is but one aspect. The native question
shows the same narrow margin between success and
failure, and demands a degree of forethought and
statesmanship which would be an exorbitant requirement
were it not so vital a part of the social and
economic future. Agriculture and settlement can
only be made valuable by a close study of facts, and
an intelligence which can correctly estimate data and
bring to bear on them the latest results of experimental
science. Finally, in its financial aspects the
problem has a near resemblance to the most complicated
of recent economic tasks, the re-settlement of
Egypt. Burdened with a heavy debt, the country is
speculating on its future and living on its capital.
For the next few years it will in all likelihood
achieve solvency; but the margin may be small,
and the result may be secured only by the retention
of certain revenue-producing charges at an unnatural
figure. A considerable part of the debt will be applied
to services which will make a good return in time, but
for a little while revenue may barely cover disbursements.
In finance, above all other provinces, there is
need of a severe economy, coupled with a clear recognition
of the country’s needs and a judicious courage.
It is a gamble, if you like, but with sleepless and
ubiquitous watchfulness the odds are greatly in our
favour. The very forces which fight against us, the
complexity of economic and social interests, will
become our servants, if properly understood, and will
solidify and preserve our work, as the house fashioned
of granite will stand when the building of sandstone
will crumble. The shaping force of intelligence
remains the one thing needful. Of high and just
intentions there can be little doubt, but in the new
South Africa we are more likely to be perplexed by
the fool than the knave. Will the result, as Cromwell
asked long ago, be “answerable to the simplicity
and honesty of the design”? Neither to the one
nor the other, but to that rarer endowment, political
wisdom.
So much for administrative problems. A country
whose future is staked upon the intelligence of its
Government and its people is an exhilarating spectacle
to the better type of man. England has succeeded
before on the same postulates and in harder circumstances.
But there are certain subtler aspects of
development, where the same high qualities are necessary,
but where the end to be striven for is less clear.
There is the fusion of the two races, an ideal if not a
practical necessity. As has been said, a political union
already exists after a fashion. There seems little
reason to fear any future disruption, for on the
material side Dutch interests are ours, and all are
vitally concerned in the common prosperity. Administrative
efficiency will make the Boer acquiesce
in any form of government. But that which Lord
Durham thought far more formidable, “a struggle not
of principles but of races,” may continue for long in
other departments than politics, unless we use extraordinary
caution in our methods. The very advance
of civilisation may militate against us by vivifying
historical memories and rekindling a clearer flame of
racial resentment. The Dutch have their own ideals,
different from ours, but not incompatible with complete
political union. Any attempt to do violence to their
ideals, or any hasty and unconsidered imposition of
unsuitable English forms, will throw back that work of
spiritual incorporation which is the highest destiny of
the country. They have a strong Church and a strong
creed, certain educational ideas and social institutions
which must long remain powers in the land. And let
us remember that any South African civilisation must
grow up on the soil, and must borrow much from the
Dutch race, else it is no true growth but a frail exotic.
It will borrow English principles but not English institutions,
since, while principles are grafts from human
needs, institutions are the incrusted mosses of time
which do not bear transplanting. It is idle to talk
of universities such as Oxford, or public schools like
Winchester, and any attempt to tend such alien plants
will be a waste of money and time. South Africa will
create her own nurseries, and on very different lines.
If we are burdened in our work with false parallels we
shall fail, for nothing in the new country can survive
which is not based on a clear-sighted survey of things
as they are, and a renunciation of old formulas. Let
us recognise that we cannot fuse the races by destroying
the sacred places of one of them, but only by
giving to the future generations some common heritage.
“If you unscotch us,” wrote Sir Walter Scott to
Croker, “you will find us damned mischievous Englishmen,”
and it will be a very mischievous Dutchman
who is coerced into unsuitable English ways and
taught sentiments of which he has no understanding.
When a people arise who have a common culture
bequeathed from their fathers, and who look back
upon Ladysmith and Colenso, the Great Trek and the
Peninsular War, as incidents in a common pedigree,
then we shall have fusion indeed, a union in spirit and
in truth. Nothing which has in it the stuff of life can
ever die, and there is something of this vitality in the
Dutch tradition. Our own is stronger, wider, resting
on greater historical foundations, and therefore it will
more readily attract and absorb the lesser. But the
lesser will live, transformed, indeed, but none the less
a real part of the spiritual heritage of a nation where
there will be no racial cleavage. The consummation is
not yet, and, maybe, will be long delayed. It will not
be in our time; perhaps our sons may see it; certainly,
I think, our grandchildren will be very near it.
Such a development cannot be artificially hastened,
and all that we can do is to see that no barriers of our
own making are allowed to intervene. Meantime we
have a de facto political union to make the most of.
What manner of men are the citizens of this new
nation to be? They will have the vigour which
belongs to colonial parentage, the freshness of outlook
and freedom from old shibboleths. But they
should have more. They start as no colony has
ever started, with the echoes of a great war still
in their ears, with a highly developed industry and
the chances of great wealth, and with a population
showing as high a level of intelligence as any in
the world. The nature of their problem will compel
them to remain intellectually active, and as the eyes
of the world are on them they will have few temptations
to lethargy. They may take foolish steps and
be beguiled into rash experiments, but I do not think
they will stagnate. And for this people so much alive
there is the chance of an indigenous culture, born
of the old, when they have leisure to make it theirs,
and the freshening influences of their new land and
their strenuous life. South Africa cannot help herself.
She must play a large part in imperial politics;
her views on economic questions will be listened to
by all the world; a political future, good or bad,
she must accept and make the most of. But behind
it all there is the prospect of that intimate self-development,
that progress in thought, in the arts,
in the amenities of life, which, like righteousness,
exalteth a nation. The finest of all experiments is
to unite an older civilisation with the natural freshness
of a virgin soil, and she, alone among the colonies
which have ever been founded, has the power to make
it. Not only is it a new land, but it is Africa,
a corner of that mysterious continent to which the
eyes of dreamers and adventurers have always turned.
The boundaries of the unknown are shrinking daily,
and where our forefathers marked only lions and
behemoths on the map, we set down a hundred
names and a dozen trading stations. The winds
which blow from the hills of the north tell no
longer of mystic interior kingdoms and uncounted
treasures. We know most things nowadays, and
have given our knowledge the prosaic form of joint-stock
companies. But the proverb still justifies itself.[43]
Africa is still a home of the incalculable, not wholly
explored or explorable, still a hinterland to which
the youth of the south can push forward in search
of fortune, and from which that breath of romance,
which is the life of the English race, can inspire
thinkers and song-makers. Girdled on three sides
by the ocean, and on the fourth looking north to
the inland seas and the eternal snows of Ruwenzori—I
can imagine no nobler cradle for a race. I have
said that a structure built with difficulty is the most
lasting. Her complex problems will knit together
the sinews of intelligence and national character,
and the great commonplaces of policy, so eternally
true, so inexorable in their application, will become
part of her creed, not from lip-service but from the
sweat and toil of practical work. If to these she
can add other commonplaces, still older and more
abiding, of civic duty, of the intellectual life, of
moral purpose, she will present to history that most
rare and formidable of combinations, intellect and
vitality, will and reason, culture guiding and inspiring
an unhesitating gift for action.
There is already a school of political thought in
South Africa, a small school, and thus far so ill-defined
that it has no common programme to put
before a world which barely recognises its existence.
It owes its inspiration to Mr Rhodes, but its founder
left it no legacy of doctrine beyond a certain instinct
for great things, a fire of imagination, and a brooding
energy. Its members are very practical men,
landowners, mine-owners, rich, capable, with nothing
of the ideologue in their air, the last people one
would naturally go to for ambitions which could not
be easily reduced to pounds sterling. But they are
of the school: at heart they are pioneers, the cyclopean
architects of new lands. It is one of South
Africa’s paradoxes that there should exist among
successful and matter-of-fact men of business a
hungry fidelity to ideals for which we look in vain
among the doctrinaires who do them facile homage.
And they are also very practical in their aims. Mr
Rhodes never desired a paper empire or that vague
thing called territorial prestige. What filled his
imagination was the thought of new nations of our
blood living a free and wholesome life and turning
the wilderness into a habitable place. He strove
not for profit but for citizens, for a breathing-space,
a playground, for the future. The faults of his
methods and the imperfections of his aims, which
are so curiously our own English faults and imperfections,
may have hindered the realisation of his
dreams, but they did not impair that legacy of
daimonic force which he left to his countrymen.
You may find it in South Africa to-day, and if you
rightly understand it and feel its hidden movements
you will be aghast at your own parochialism. It is
slow and patient, knowing that “the counsels to
which Time hath not been called Time will not
ratify.” But with Time on its side it is confident,
and it will not easily be thwarted.
Excursions in colonial psychology are rarely illuminating,
lacking as a rule both sympathy and knowledge;
but on one trait there is a singular unanimity. The
two chief obstacles to imperial unity, so runs a saying,
are the bumptious colonial and the supercilious Englishman.
I readily grant the latter, but is the first
fairly described? A colonist is naturally prone to
self-assertion in certain walks of life. If he creates
an industry alone and from the start in the teeth
of hardships, having had to begin from the very beginning,
he is apt to lose perspective and unduly
magnify his work. If he owns a bakery, it is the
finest in the world, at any rate in the British Empire.
He compares his doings with his neighbours’ within
his limited horizon, and he is scarcely to be blamed if
he brags a little. His bravado is only ridiculous when
taken out of its surroundings, and at the worst is more
a mannerism than an affection of mind. But on the
intellectual side he is, in my judgment, conspicuously
humble, a groper after the viewless things whose
omnipotence he feels dimly. To the home-bred man
history is a commonplace to be taken for granted; to
the colonist who has shaped a workaday life from the
wilds, it is a vast mother of mystery. Traditions,
customs, standards staled to us by the vain emphasis
of generations, rise before him as revelations and
shrines of immortal wisdom. What to us is rhetoric
is to him the finest poetry; and for this reason in
politics he is prone to follow imaginative schemes,
without testing them by his native caution. Our
somewhat weary intellectual world is a temple which
he is ready to approach with uncovered head. It is
not mere innocence, but rather, I think, that freshness
of outlook and optimism which he gathers from his
new land and his contact with the beginnings of
things. Truth and beauty remain the same: it is
only the symbols and the mirrors which grow dim
with time; and to the man who is sufficiently near to
understand the symbols, and sufficiently aloof to see
no flaw or tawdriness, there is a double share of happiness.
The superficial assurance, the “bumptiousness”
of the saying, is surely a small matter if behind it
there is this true modesty of spirit.
A national life presumes union, but South African
federation is simply a step to a larger goal. It may
be objected that in the foregoing chapters the cardinal
problem is treated as less the fusion of the two races
than the development of South Africa on certain lines
within our colonial system. Such has been the intention
of the book. The Dutch have accepted the new
régime; they will fight, if they fight, on constitutional
lines under our ægis and within our Empire, and in a
sense it may be said that racial union on the political
side already exists. But the further political development
of the country, as self-consciousness is slowly
gained—that, indeed, is a matter on which hang great
issues, good or bad, for the English people. Because the
furnace has been so hot, the metal will emerge pure or
it will not emerge at all. A new colony, or rather a
new nation, will have been created, or another will have
been added to the catalogue of our infrequent failures,
and the loose territorial mass known as South Africa
will become the prey of any wandering demagogue or
aspiring foreign Power. Our late opponents will take
their revenge, if they seek it, not by reviving the
impossible creed of Dutch supremacy, but by retarding
South Africa from what is her highest destiny and her
worthiest line of development. Her future, if she will
accept it, is to be a pioneer in imperial federation: a
pioneer, because she has felt more than any other
colony the evils of disintegration, the vices of the old
colonial system, the insecurity of government from
above, and at the same time is in a position to realise
the weakness of that independence which is also isolation.
This is not the place to enter upon so vast a
question. To many it is the greatest of modern political
dreams. Without it imperialism becomes empty
rhetoric and braggadocio, a tissue of dessicated phrases,
worthy of the worst accusations with which its enemies
have assailed it. Without it our Empire is neither
secure from aggression nor politically sound nor commercially
solvent. Within it alone can any true scheme
of common defence be realised. Moreover, it is the
glamour needed to give to colonial politics that wider
imaginative outlook which England enjoys in virtue of
a long descent. Colonial politics tend to become at
times narrow and provincial; in a federation they would
gain that larger view and ampler pride which a man
feels who, believing himself to be humbly born, learns
for the first time that he is the scion of a famous house.
Their kinship, instead of the long-remembered sentiment
of a descendant, would become the intimate
loyalty of a colleague. And home politics also would
lose the provincialism, equally vicious, if historically
more interesting, which lies somewhere near the root
of our gravest errors, and in relinquishing a facile
imperialism find an empire which needs no rhetoric
to enhance its splendour.
But before South Africa can become an ally in
federation she must make her peace with herself. If
it is difficult to exaggerate the need for untiring intelligence
in the making of this peace, it is even harder
to over-estimate the profound significance which her
success or failure in the task of self-realisation has for
the prestige of our race. Our colonial methods are
on trial in a sphere where all the world can watch.
And while our aim is a colony, the means must be
different from those which we have hitherto used in
our expansion. A nascent colony was neglected till
it asserted itself and appeared already mature on the
political horizon. But in the growth of this colony
England must play a direct part, since for good or for
ill her destinies are linked with it, and supineness and
a foolish interference will equally bring disaster. There
is one parallel, not indeed in political conditions, but
in the qualities required for the shaping of the country.
If we can show in South Africa that spirit of sleepless
intelligence which has created British India, then there
is nothing to fear. For, as I understand history, India
was made by Englishmen who brought to the task
three qualities above others. The first was a wide
toleration for local customs and religions—a desire to
leave the national life intact, and to mould it slowly
by those forces of enlightenment in which sincerely, if
undogmatically, they believed. The second was the
extension of rigorous justice and full civil rights to
every subject, a policy which in the long-run is the
only means of bringing a subject race into the life of
the State. Last, and most vital of all, they showed in
their work a complete efficiency, proving themselves
better statesmen, financiers, jurists, soldiers, than any
class they had superseded. This efficiency is the key-note
of the South African problem, so far as concerns
British interests. If the imperial Power shows itself
inspired with energy, acumen, a clear-eyed perception
of truth as well as with its traditional honesty of purpose,
South Africa will gladly follow where it may
lead. But she will be quick to criticise formalism and
intolerant of a fumbling incapacity.
Sed nondum est finis. We stand at the beginning
of a new path, and it is impossible to tell whither it
may lead, what dark fords and stony places it may
pass through, and in what sandy desert or green champaign
it may end. Political prophecy is an idle occupation.
American observers on the eve of the French
Revolution saw England on the verge of anarchy and
France a contented country under a beloved king.
Even so acute a writer as de Tocqueville assumed
that America would continue an agricultural country
without manufactures, and that the fortunes of her
citizens would be small. If philosophers may err, it
is well for a humble writer to be modest in his conclusions.
In the past pages an effort has been made
neither to minimise the difficulties nor to over-estimate
the chances of South African prosperity. “Whosoever,”
said Ralegh, “in writing a modern history shall
follow truth too near the heels, it may haply strike
out his teeth.” I can ask for no better fate than to
see all my forecasts falsified, the dangers proved to
have no existence, the chances shown a thousandfold
more roseate. But whatever may be the destiny of
this or that observation, there can be no dispute, I
think, upon the gravity of the problem and the profound
importance of its wise settlement. And when
all is said that can be said it is permissible to import
into our view a little of that ancestral optimism which
has hitherto kept our hearts high in our checkered
history, for optimism, when buttressed by intelligence,
is but another name for courage. There is an optimism
more merciless than any pessimism, which, seeing
clearly all the perils and discouragements, the hollowness
of smooth conventional counsels and the dreary
list of past errors, can yet pluck up heart to believe
that there is no work too hard for the English race
when its purpose is firm and its intelligence awakened.
With this belief we may well look forward to a day
when the old unhappy things will have become far
off and forgotten, and South Africa, at peace with herself,
will be the leader in a new and pregnant imperial
policy; and the words of the poet of another empire
will be true in a nobler and ampler sense of ours,
“They who drink of the Rhone and the Orontes are
all one nation.”