Reconnaisance of the Fortress.—Skirmish with the
Enemy.—Rejoicings
of the Garrison at our Supposed Defeat.—Preparation
for a Coup de Main.—Engineer Operations.—Storming
and Taking of the Fortress.
We debouched on the plain in front of the
fort about eight o'clock in the morning, and
advanced upon it in three columns—the Cavalry
on the right, the Artillery in the centre, and
the Infantry on the left. The Commander-in-Chief
determined to reconnoitre the place in
force, and make the enemy show their strength.
On approaching the orchards and walled gardens
before described, we found them occupied
by the enemy, and the 1st Brigade having
been immediately thrown into them, drove the
Affghans out of the enclosures in capital style,
and forced them to take shelter behind the
defences, with a comparatively trifling loss
on our side. Our guns were now brought
to bear upon the fortress, which had kept up
a sharp fire on us from the moment of our
appearance, but owing to our having left our
heavy battering train behind us at Candahar
we did but little or no damage. About eleven
o'clock we drew off, and pitched our camp out
of range of the fire of the foot. On our
skirmishers retiring from the gardens they were
immediately occupied by the enemy, who commenced
cheering our retreating parties, in the
conviction that they had obtained a victory.
Under this impression they instantly sent off
expresses to Cabul, to announce the fact, and
state that if the whole of the surrounding
country could be raised, they had little doubt
of being able to cut us off to a man. The garrison
spent the night in rejoicings, and blue
lights were constantly sent up as signals to
their friends on the neighbouring hills.
Next morning the Shah's camp was threatened
on the left by large bodies of horse and
foot who were driven off by the Cavalry and
some of his Highness's troops; whilst
another force, consisting chiefly of horse, under
the command of one of Dost Mahommed's
sons; and at a short distance from him a
Ghiljie Chief, with about fifteen hundred
Cavalry, who had hung upon our flank all the
way from Khelat-i-Ghiljie, menaced us to the
right. This determined the Commander-in-Chief
to expedite matters, and the engineers
having made a careful inspection of the fortress,
he resolved on carrying it by storm. The
whole of the 22nd was consumed in making
the necessary preparations, the field hospital
being got ready while strong detachments of
Cavalry scoured the country around, in order
to keep the enemy from our lines.
In order to give my readers a correct idea
of the strength of the fortifications, and the
difficulties overcome by the intelligence and
courage of the officers and men of the British
Army, I cannot do better than to copy the
official reports made by the principal Engineer
officers on the subject. They contain a full
detail of the operations up to the moment when
the citadel fell into our possession.
Memorandum of the Engineers' operations
before Ghuznee, in July, 1839, by Captain George
Thompson, Bengal Engineers, Chief Engineer
Army of the Indus.
The accounts of the Fortress of Ghuznee,
received from those who had seen it, were such
as to induce his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief
to leave in Candahar the very small
battering train then with the Army, there being
a scarcity of transport cattle. The place was
described as very weak, and completely commanded
from a range of hills to the north.
When we came before it on the morning of
the 21st of July we were very much surprised
to find a rampart, in good repair, built on a
scarped mound about thirty-five feet high,
flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded
by a faussebraye and wet ditch. The irregular
figure of the "enceinte" gave a good flanking
fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered
the interior from the commanding fire of the
hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In
addition to this, the towers, at the angles, had
been enlarged, screen walls had been built before
the gates, the ditch cleared out and filled
with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork
built on the right bank of the river so as
to command the bed of it.
The garrison was variously stated from three
to four thousand strong, including five hundred
Cavalry, and from subsequent information we
found that it had not been overrated.
On the approach of the army, a fire of artillery
was opened from the body of the place,
and of musketry from the neighbouring gardens.
A detachment of Infantry cleared the
latter, and the former was silenced for a short
time by shrapnells from the Horse Artillery,
but the fire from the new outwork on the bank
of the river was in no way checked. A nearer
view of the works was, however, obtained from
the gardens which had been cleared. This was
not at all satisfactory. The works were evidently
much stronger than we had been led to
expect, and such as our army could not venture
to attack in a regular manner. We had no
battering train, and to besiege Ghuznee in
form, a much larger one would be required
than the army ever possessed. The great command
of the parapets from sixty to seventy
feet, with the wet ditch, were insurmountable
obstacles to an attack, either by mining or
escalading.
It therefore became necessary to examine
closely the whole contour of the place, to discover
if any other mode of attack could be
adopted. The engineers, with an escort, went
round the works, approaching as near as they
could find cover. The garrison were on the
alert, and kept up a hot and well regulated fire
upon the officers whenever they were obliged
to show themselves. However, by keeping
the Infantry beyond musket range, and the
Cavalry at a still greater distance, only one
man was killed, and another wounded; the
former being hit by men sent out of the place
to drive off the reconnoitring party.
The fortifications were found equally strong,
all round, the only tangible point observed
being the Cabul gateway, which offered the
following advantages for a coup-de-main. The
road to the Gate was clear, the bridge over the
ditch unbroken, there were good positions for
the Artillery within three hundred yards of
the walls on both sides of the road, and we had
information that the Gateway was not built
up, a reinforcement from Cabul being expected.
The result of this reconnaisance was a report
to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief,
that if he decided upon the immediate attack
on Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of proceeding,
and the only one which held out a prospect
of success was a dash at the Cabul gateway,
blowing the gate open by bags of powder.
His Excellency decided upon the attempt,
the camp was moved that evening to the Cabul
road, and the next morning, the 22nd, Sir John
Keane in person reconnoitred the proposed point
of attack, approved of the plan, and gave orders
for its execution. Preparations were made
accordingly, positions for the artillery were
carefully examined, which excited the jealousy
of the garrison, who opened a smart fire upon
the party.
It was arranged that an explosion party, consisting
of three officers of Engineers, Captain
Peat, Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, three
Serjeants, and eighteen men of the Sappers in
working dresses, carrying 300℔s. of powder in
twelve sand bags, with a hose seventy-two feet
long, should be ready to move down to the
gateway at daybreak.
At midnight the first battery left camp,
followed by the other four, at intervals of half
an hour. Those to the right of the road were
conducted to their positions by Lieutenant
Stuart, those to the left by Lieutenant Anderson.
The ground for the guns was prepared
by the Sappers and Pioneers, taking advantage
of the irregularities of the ground to the right,
and of some old garden walls to the left.
The Artillery was all in position, and ready
by 3 A. M. of the 23rd, and shortly after, at
the first dawn, the party under Captain Peat
moved down to the gateway, accompanied by
six men of her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry,
without their belts, and supported by a detachment
of the same regiment, which extended to
the right and left of the road; when they
arrived at the ditch, taking advantage of what
cover they could find, and endeavouring to keep
down the fire from the ramparts, which became
heavy on the approach of the party, though it
had been remarkably slack during the previous
operations; blue lights were shown, which rendered
surrounding objects distinctly visible,
but luckily they were buried on the top of the
parapet instead of being thrown into the passage
below.
The explosion party marched steadily on,
headed by Lieutenant Durand; the powder
was placed, the hose laid, the train fired, and
the carrying party had retired to tolerable cover
in less than two minutes. The Artillery opened
when the blue lights appeared, and the musketry
from the covering party at the same time.
So quickly was the operation performed, and
so little was the enemy aware of the nature of
it, that not a man of the party was hurt.
As soon as the explosion took place, Captain
Peat, although hurt by the concussion, his
anxiety preventing him from keeping sufficiently
under cover, ran up to the gate, accompanied
by a small party of her Majesty's 13th
Light Infantry, and ascertained that it was
completely destroyed. There was some delay
in getting a bugler to sound at the advance, the
signal agreed on for the assaulting column to
push on, and this was the only mistake in the
operation.
The assaulting column, consisting of four
European Regiments (her Majesty's 2nd regiment,
Bengal European regiment, her Majesty's
13th Light Infantry, and her Majesty's 17th
regiment) commanded by Brigadier Sale, the
advance under Lieutenant Colonel Dennie,
accompanied by Lieutenant Sturt, Engineers,
moved steadily through the gateway, through a
passage inside the gateway, in a domed building,
in which the opening on one side rendered
everything very obscure, and making it difficult
to find the outlet into the town. They
met with little opposition; but the party of
the enemy seeing a peak in the column, owing
to the difficulty in scrambling over the rubbish
in the gateway, made a rush, sword in hand,
and cut down a good many men, wounding
the Brigadier and several other officers.
These swordsmen were repulsed, and there was
no more regular opposition; the surprise and
alarm of the Governor and Sirdars being so
great when they saw the column occupying the
open space inside the gate, and firing upon
them, that they fled, accompanied by their
men, even the garrison of the Citadel following
their example. Parties of the Affghans took
refuge in the houses, firing on the column as
it made its way through the streets, and a good
deal of desultory fighting took place in consequence,
by which some loss was sustained. The
Citadel was occupied as soon as daylight showed
that it had been abandoned by the enemy, and
the whole of the works were in our possession
before 5 A. M.
We lost seventeen men, six European and
eleven Natives killed—eighteen officers, and
one hundred and seventeen Europeans, and
thirty Natives wounded—total one hundred
and eighty-two. Of the Affghans more than
five hundred and fourteen were killed in the
town, that number of bodies having been
buried, and about one thousand outside by the
Cavalry, one thousand six hundred prisoners
were taken, but I have no means of estimating
the number of wounded.
There were nine guns of different calibres
found in the place, a large quantity of good
powder, considerable stores of shot, lead, &c.,
&c., and a large supply of attar and other
provisions.
GEO. THOMSON, Capt. Engrs.
Chief Engineer Army of the Indus.
The following report by Captain Peat, of
the Bombay Civil Engineers, gives a more
detailed account of the operations for blowing
up the gate, which, it will be seen, were attended
with difficulties of no ordinary nature.
"During the reconnaissance the wall pieces
were particularly troublesome. This weapon is
almost unknown in our service, but it is a very
efficient one, especially in the defence of works,
and its use should not be neglected. Every
fortified post should be supplied with a proportion
of them, and a certain number of men in
every regiment practised in firing them.
The charge recommended by Colonel Pasley,
for blowing open gates is from sixty to one
hundred and twenty pounds, and this is, doubtless,
sufficient in ordinary cases; but in this
instance we were apprehensive that the enemy
might have taken alarm at our being so much
on that side of the place, and in consequence,
partially or wholly, built up the gateway. It
was afterwards found that some attempts of the
kind had been made by propping up the gate
with beams.
The charge was so heavy, that it not only
destroyed the gate, but brought down a considerable
portion of the roof of the square
building in which it was placed, which proved a
very considerable obstacle to the assaulting
column, and the concussion acted as far as the
tower, under which an officer's party of her
Majesty's 13th regiment were standing at the
time, but without occasioning any casualties.
In cases of this nature it is of course the first
object to guard against any chance of failure;
and it is impossible, even now, to say how much
the charge might have been reduced with
safety.
The enemy appeared so much on the alert,
and the faussebraye was so much in advance of
the gate that we never contemplated being able
to effect our object by surprise. The only
question was, whether it ought to be done by
day or night. It was argued in favor of the
former, that the Artillery would be able to
make so much more correct practice that the
defences would be in a considerable degree
destroyed, and the fire so completely kept under
as to enable the explosion party to advance with
but little loss, and with the advantage of being
able to see exactly what they were about.
Captain Thompson, however, adhered to the
latter, and we were afterwards convinced it
was the most judicious plan; for although the
fire of the Artillery was necessarily more
general than it would have been in daylight,
still it was so well directed as to take up a good
deal of the attention of the besieged, and draw
upon their batteries a portion of the fire, which
in daylight would have been thrown down upon
the explosion party and assaulting columns.
It would also, even in daylight, have been
difficult, with our Light Artillery, to have kept
down the fire so completely but that a few
matchlock men might have kept their position
near the gateway; and in that narrow space a
smart fire from a few pieces might have obliged
the party to retire. The obscurity of the night,
to say nothing of the confusion which it must
occasion among undisciplined troops, is certainly
the best protection to a body of men engaged
in an enterprise of this nature. Blue lights
certainly render objects distinctly visible, but
their light is glaring and uncertain, especially to
men firing through loopholes.
The party consisted of eighteen officers,
twenty-eight sergeants, seven buglers, and two
hundred and seventy-six rank and file.
It was made of this strength, not only to keep
up a heavy fire upon the parapets, and thereby
divert attention from the party at the gateway,
but also because we were not aware whether
the faussebraye was occupied or not, and as it
extends so much in advance as to take the gate
completely in reverse, it would have been
necessary, had a fire opened from it, to have
carried it by assault before the party with the
bags could have advanced. The party with
Lieutenant Durand was accompanied by six
men of the 13th, without their belts, the better
to secure them from observation, to protect
them from any sortie that might be made from
the postern of the faussebraye on the right,
or even from the gate itself, while another
party under an officer, Lieutenant Jennings,
accompanied me as far as the tower so as to
check any attempts that might have been
made from the faussebraye on the left, and at
the same time keeping up a fire on such of the
enemy as showed their heads above the parapet;
of this party one man was killed and a few
wounded.
Nothing could have been more gallant than
the conduct of Lieutenants Durand and McLeod,
and the men under their command; or
more efficient than the manner in which they
executed their duty.
The powder being in sand bags of a very
coarse open texture, a long hose and port fire
was thought to be the safest method of firing
it. The end of the hose fortunately just
reached the small postern. The casualties,
however, during this operation were much fewer
than was expected, being in all one private
killed, two sergeants, and twenty-three rank
and file wounded.
The heaviest fire was certainly outside the
bridge, for the enemy near the gateway being
marked, whenever they attempted to shew their
heads above the parapet, were obliged to confine
themselves to the loop-holes, the range
from which is very uncertain and limited
against men moving about. A high loop-holed
wall, although imposing in appearance, is a
profile but ill adapted to resist attacks of this
nature.
The enemy were perfectly aware that we
were in the gateway, but appeared to have no
idea of the nature of our operations. Had they
been so they might easily have rendered it
impossible to place the powder bags, by
throwing over blue lights, of which they had a
large quantity in store. The powder pots and
other fire works so much used by the natives of
Hindoostan would certainly have rendered the
confined space leading to the gate much too hot
for such an operation; but the ignorance of
the besieged was known and calculated upon,
the result shows how justly.
Their attempts at resistance were confined
to the fire from the loopholes and throwing
over large pieces of earth, some of which
appeared to be intended to knock off the port
fire.
I on this occasion received an excellent lesson
on the necessity of not allowing preconceived
opinions to lead to any carelessness, in accurately
ascertaining the result of any operation
of this nature. The gateway appeared, from
what I had seen from the hills to the north, to
lead straight into the town, and on running in
to examine it after the explosion I was so much
impressed with this idea and so much convinced
of the probability of the gateway having been
blocked up during the day, that I was led to
believe that it had actually been done, from
seeing, in front of the gate that had been
destroyed, the outline of an arch filled up with
brick masonry. The true entrance turned to
the right and would have been discovered by
advancing a few paces, and that in perfect
safety, for the interior was secure from all fire.
Lieutenant Durand on first going up saw from
through the chinks of the gate that there was
a light and a guard immediately
behind it, and
from that circumstance was convinced that no
interior obstacles of importance existed.
My mistake therefore was luckily immediately
corrected without any bad consequence
resulting.
A party of sappers with felling axes, and
commanded by Lieutenant Wemyss, and two
scaling ladders in charge of Lieutenant Pigan,
accompanied the assaulting column.
Of ten Engineer Officers engaged in this
attack, only one, Lieutenant Marriot, was
slightly wounded. Captain Thompson however
had a very narrow escape, having been thrown
down by a rush of some swordsmen into the
gateway, and nearly sabred while upon the
ground."