New York, June 28, 1915.
Dear X.:
Many thanks for your very interesting
letter of April 27th. The spirit which
animates Germany is indeed a great and
mighty one. It is a spirit of unity and
brotherhood among her people, of willing
sacrifice and heroic striving, coupled with
the passionate conviction and faith that
her cause is just and righteous, that it
must and will win, and that not only is
victory a necessity for national existence,
but that in its train it will bring blessings
to the whole of the universe.
Wherever and whenever in the world's
history such a spirit—born of the stirring
of the profoundest depths of national or
religious feeling—has manifested itself, it
has invariably been attended by a more
or less marked fanaticism among the
people concerned; by a condition of
mind easily comprehensible as a psychological
phenomenon, yet acutely prejudicial
to the ability to preserve an objective
point of view, and to arrive at an impartial
judgment.
It is but natural that in the atmosphere
which surrounds you and under existing
circumstances, a man even of such sober,
clear and independent mentality as yourself
should think and feel in the way
manifested by your letter. Even if it
were in my power, I would not try at
this time to shake your faith and patriotic
determination. Since, however, you ask
me to continue this exchange of opinions,
I will endeavour further to make plain to
you my ideas as to this most deplorable
and accursed war.
The views I am expressing are, I believe,
the views as well of the great majority
of thinking people in America. And I
would remind you that America as a
whole, by reason of the racial composition
of her population, is essentially free
from national prejudice or racial bias.
With her many millions of inhabitants
of German origin, her disposition could
not be anti-German in the ordinary course
of affairs—and indeed never was so before
the war.
With her millions of Jews and her liberal
tendencies she cannot be pro-Russian.
With her historical development in the
course of which her only serious wars
have been fought against Great Britain
(which country, moreover, during certain
critical periods in the Civil War between
North and South, evidenced inclination
to favour the South and thus aroused long
continuing resentment in the Northern
States), and for many other reasons, her
disposition cannot be that of an English
partisan—and was not so before the war.
The predominant sentiment of the
American people in the Boer War was
anti-English; in the Balkan War their
sympathies were pro-Turkish; in the
Italian-Turkish War, anti-Italian; in the
Russo-Japanese War, pro-Japanese, although
it was fully realized that from the
point of view of America's material and
national interests, the strengthening of
Japan was hardly desirable.
It may sound to you very improbable,
yet it is none the less true that America,
of all the great nations, is probably the
one least swayed by eagerness to attain
material advantage for herself through her
international policies. I do not claim that
this arises necessarily from any particular
virtue in her people. It may be rather
the result of her geographical and economic
situation.
America returned to China the indemnity
growing out of the Boxer Rebellion.
To Spain, conquered and helpless,
she paid, entirely of her own free-will,
$20,000,000 for the Philippines. She refused
to annex Cuba. In spite of strong
provocation she abstained from taking
Mexico.
Although not a land as yet of the
highest degree of culture, America is a
land of high and genuine humanitarianism
and of a certain naïve idealism.
I hear your ironic rejoinder, "and out
of pure humanitarianism, you supply arms
to our enemies, and thus prolong the war."
The answer lies in the accentuation of
the last four words, which can only mean
that, but for the American supply of arms,
the Allies, from lack of ammunition,
would speedily be defeated, i. e. America
is to co-operate in preserving for that
country which has most extensively and
actively prepared for war, the full and
lasting advantage of that preparation.
That would put a premium on war preparations—on
an armed and therefore
necessarily precarious peace—since it is
but human nature that, given a difference
which he considers serious enough for
ground for a quarrel, a man armed to the
teeth would be less inclined to settle the
matter peaceably than one who is not so
well prepared for a fight.
Apart from this, the German complaint
about the prolongation of the war through
the American supply of arms is proof in
itself that the refusal of such supplies
would constitute a positive act of partiality
in favour of Germany.
And the great majority of Americans
are convinced that the ruling powers of
Germany and Austria, though not perhaps
the people themselves, are responsible
for the outbreak of the war; that they
have sinned against humanity and justice;
that at least France and England did not
want war; that therefore its advent found
them in a comparatively unprepared state,
and that it would constitute a decided,
serious and unjustifiable action of far-reaching
effect against the Allies if America
were to put an embargo on war munitions—especially
so in view of the fact that as
a direct consequence of the treaty-defying
invasion of Belgium you are in possession
of the Belgian arms factories and iron
mines and of about 75 per cent. of all the
ore-producing capacity of France.
For neutrals to supply war materials to
belligerents is an ancient, unquestioned
right, recognized by international law and
frequently practised by yourselves. To
alter, during the course of a war, a practice
sanctioned by the law of nations and
hitherto always followed, would constitute
a flagrant breach of neutrality, in that it
would necessarily help one side and harm
the other.
The fact that at one time we forbade
the export of arms to Mexico affords no
argument in favour of the German contention,
for there it was not a case of war
between nations, but of civil war. There
was also the danger that such arms might
eventually be used against America herself,
given the possibility that intervention
by us in Mexico might later on become
necessary.
Commissions from Germany for the
supply of arms would have been as acceptable
to our factories as were those from
the Allies. It is not America's fault if the
German fleet does not break through the
British cordon and open the way for sea
communication with Germany. The superiority
of the British fleet and the resulting
consequences must have been known to
Germany before she permitted the outbreak
of this horrible war. She has no
more right to make a grievance of these
consequences than the Allies have a right
to complain of Germany's superior preparedness
and the greater perfection of
her instruments of war.
To believe American public opinion
influenced by the profits which come to
this country from the supply of arms, is
to misunderstand completely the American
mode of thought and feeling. Moreover
these profits go to very few pockets, and
public opinion here being anything but
unduly complacent towards large corporations
and capitalists is by no means inclined
to view with favour the gathering in of
these huge profits by a very limited number
of individuals and concerns.
You quote with approval General von
Schlieffen's remark that "in war, after all,
the only thing that matters is those silly
old victories."
You would surely not say that in the
individual's daily struggle for existence or
in competitive industrial strife, "the only
thing that matters" is success. Rather
you would be the first to grant, as you have
always demonstrated in your acts, that
there are certain ethical limitations laid
down by the conscience and the moral
conceptions of humanity, which must be
respected in the struggle for success,
however keen, even though the very
existence of the individual and the
maintenance of wife and child be at
stake.
Schlieffen's utterance, in the meaning
which your quotation gives it, throws
overboard everything that civilization and
the humanitarian progress of centuries
has accomplished towards lessening the
cruelty, the hatred and the suffering
engendered by war, and towards protecting
non-combatants, as far as possible,
from its terrors. It is tantamount to the
doctrine of the fanatical Jesuit: "The
end justifies the means."
And it is something akin to this very
doctrine which Germany has made her
own and applied in her conduct of this
war as she has done in none of her previous
wars. The conviction that everything,
literally everything, which tends to
ensure victory is permitted to her, and
indeed called for, has now evidently assumed
the power of a national obsession. Thus,
the violation of innocent Belgium in defiance
of solemn treaty; the unspeakable
treatment inflicted on her people; the
bombardment, without warning, of open
places (which Germany was the first to
practise); the destruction of great monuments
of art which belonged to all humankind,
as in Rheims, and Louvain; the
Lusitania horror, the strewing of mines
broadcast, the use of poisonous gases
causing death by torture or incurable
disease; the taking of hostages; the
arbitrary imposition of monetary indemnities
and penalties, and so forth.
It is these facts that the non-combatant
nations charge against Germany, and quite
apart from the responsibility for the war,
it is in them that may be found the
main reason why public opinion in
neutral countries has more and more
turned against Germany as the war has
continued.
I say "innocent Belgium," for it is
entirely evident that the Belgian-English
pourparlers, of which Germany discovered
documentary evidence, related merely to
the eventuality of Germany's violating Belgian
neutrality, and therefore in no way
constituted a relinquishment of neutrality
on Belgium's part. In so far as these
pourparlers did not keep strictly within
these limits (manifestly as a result of
excessive zeal on the part of the English
military attaché in question) they were
formally and categorically rejected and disavowed,
by both the Belgian and English
Governments. This is shown by official
papers which have been published. It
cannot be doubted that these proceedings
of disavowal were entirely bona fide, for
they took place at a time and under
circumstances such that no one could possibly
have imagined that the correspondence
evidencing them would ever see the
light of day. Inasmuch as you mention
these Anglo-Belgian pourparlers as among
the reasons justifying Germany's invasion
of Belgium, it is worth pointing out that
this treaty defying invasion was perpetrated
before Germany had discovered the existence
of the documents which evidenced
that such pourparlers had taken place.
Germany's reasoning that she was compelled
to take the initiative in violating
the treaty of neutrality in order to avoid
the imminent danger that England and
France would do so first and thereupon
advance troops against her through Belgium,
is, even if such reasoning were
morally admissible, no valid argument;
for, only a few days before, England and
France had solemnly pledged themselves
in the face of the whole world to respect
Belgium's neutrality.
If, as you believe, England had been
planning for years to attack Germany via
Belgium, would she not then have had in
readiness an invading force somewhere
near adequate for such an undertaking?
Instead she had the mere bagatelle of
75,000 or 100,000 men, which in the first
months of the war actually constituted her
whole available continental fighting force.
To any one of unprejudiced judgment
there remains, therefore, no choice but
the conclusion that Germany's violation
of Belgium did not even have the excuse
of being a measure of self-defence, but,
as the Chancellor in effect admitted in his
first speech on the subject in the Reichstag,
was undertaken simply because "in
war the only thing that matters is those
silly old victories."
Not, as you say, in obedience to England's
command (what power had England
either to command or enforce her commands?),
but from a compelling impulse
of national honour did Belgium oppose
the German breach of neutrality with
force of arms, though it would evidently
have been to her material interest to
comply with Germany's summons or at
any rate to offer merely nominal resistance.
Holland and Switzerland would have
done the same thing under similar circumstances,
as would any other self-respecting
nation. Moreover, what weight could
Belgium attach to Germany's promise of
immunity in case she yielded, when at
the very moment Germany, by her own
act, was demonstrating but too clearly
how little she considered herself bound by
her promise or indeed by a solemn international
treaty?
What the Germans have accomplished
on the battlefields, as well as within their
own country, is proof of such great
national qualities, that it compels the
tribute of admiration, even from your
enemies. These qualities would indeed
have gone far to justify her claim to
hegemony, had they not been linked
unfortunately—at least among your ruling
classes and intellectual leaders—with ways
of thought and action which are anti-humanitarian,
oppressive and generally
intolerable to the rest of the world.
The theory of "frightfulness" in the
conduct of warfare which Germany now
preaches and practises is no new discovery.
On the contrary it is a very
ancient one—so old, in fact, that long ago
it had come to be discarded and superseded
in European warfare and passed
into the limbo of forgotten things. There,
until resurrected by your countrymen, it
lay for generations, along with much else
which the human race had overcome and
left behind in the progress of culture and
humanity—a progress achieved by strenuous
toil, sacrifices and suffering in the
course of many centuries.
Such words and ideas are met with contempt
and derision by your spokesmen
and termed mere phrases and sentimentality.
If these are mere phrases then the
whole upward struggle of the world for
endless years past has been based upon and
aiming at phrases and sentimentality.
I read recently an article in a German
paper written by one of your professors
of international law, in which he maintained,
evidently quite unconscious of the
incredible monstrosity of his logic, that,
because the Russians in their invasion of
East Prussia had acted like barbarians,
you therefore had the unquestioned right,
as a measure of reprisal, to bombard and
destroy Oxford and Cambridge!
And what have you gained from your
"frightfulness"? Your victories have
been due to quite other qualities. By
your "frightfulness" you have steeled
your enemies to the utmost limit of sacrifice;
you have embittered neutral opinion;
you have disappointed and grieved your
friends and "sown dragons' teeth," the
offspring of which will arise against you
many years even after the conclusion of
peace.
How differently would you be judged
now if you had tempered your mighty
power with mercy and self-restraint; if
with the consciousness and use of superior
strength and ability you had coupled
chivalry and generosity!
You say that Germany is the only great
Power which has kept the peace for forty-four
years, and made no conquest of
territory of any kind by force of arms. It
is pertinent to recall in reference to this
statement, that in the course of these forty-four
years Germany virtually by force has
taken a strategically important piece of
China, waged war against the Hereros and
annexed colonies in Africa and in the
Pacific (receiving in exchange for one of
them the strategically most valuable island
of Heligoland). Yet, speaking generally,
the world is bound to recognize with
gratitude and admiration that from 1871
to 1914 Germany has refrained from using
her enormous military power in attempts
at conquest.
Has she had cause to complain of the
results of this wise and far-seeing policy?
During that comparatively short period
of time she had grown more powerful than
any other country. In the well-being of
her people, in her wealth and prestige she
had advanced and flourished as no other
nation. Her industries, her merchant
marine had brought her conquest and
triumph unequalled in the world's economic
history, which find a parallel only
in the wonderful military achievements of
the Napoleonic era.
Without firing a gun she had turned
Holland and Belgium practically into German
dependencies. She had achieved predominance
in Turkey and established a
firm footing in Asia Minor. Her influence
in South America and Asia was increasing
by leaps and bounds. Even in the
British colonies the victorious efficiency
of the German commercial conquerors was
making itself felt more and more.
And as to this newly discovered naval
militarism of England which, you say, "is
seeking to force England's will upon the
whole world by the force of her mighty
fleet," what has it ever done to bar the
way to your commerce? Absolutely
nothing. A few days ago I read a letter
of an American traveller, from which I
quote the following extracts:
"Not many years ago I sat on the club veranda
at Singapore and counted twenty-five funnels of a
single German steamer line. From Singapore I
went to North Borneo; there was but one line, a
German, and that line carried the British mail.
Later I went to Siam from Singapore. It was on a
steamer of this same German line, carrying British
mail. There was no other. Thence I went to
Hongkong by the same excellent German line.
Later I went to Australia—it was by one of this
same line. To Java and the Eastern Archipelago,
to Penang—it was always this vast German company,
doing not only all the German, but the
British mail service as well. The German traders,
with whom I mixed freely, marvelled at the infantile
generosity with which Great Britain opened all her
ports to German enterprise, although long-headed
people shook their heads at the thought of German
skippers having a better acquaintance with British
waters than their own people.
"Nowhere in the British colonial world have I
found the slightest evidence of commercial monopoly
and certainly no favouring of Englishmen at
the expense of Germans. Even in India the German
commercial traveller has roamed at will and driven
Englishmen out of business under the very noses of
the Calcutta Council.
"In the Imperial German colonies, on the other
hand, competing English traders have been treated
to a systematic course of petty official restrictions
so vexatious that finally they have given up the
attempt to do business under German conditions.
When I was in German New Guinea this official
persecution went so far that a British trading
steamer was even forbidden to get water in order
to force it to abandon trade with the natives of that
neighbourhood.
"Some British colonies, it is true, do now discriminate
in favour of the mother country, but the
colonies who do that are self-governing and therefore
beyond the mother country's control in economic
matters, like Canada. But in so-called Crown
colonies like Hongkong, the German trader has the
same advantage as any other."
England has not abused her power at sea,
at least since the eighteenth century, any
more than you, previous to this present
war, have abused your power on land.
Not only has she not stood in the way of
your development, but on the contrary
she has given you fair and free access to
her markets, with unparalleled liberality.
That England should now make every
endeavour to carry on a strict sea blockade
against Germany and should do so in a
manner which takes account of the existing
circumstances and novel instruments
of naval warfare, is, in the opinion of our
leading lawyers, her perfect right, as far
at least as it is a matter only between her
and Germany. In the same way the
North, during the four years of the American
Civil War, did all in her power compatible
with the law of nations to prevent,
both directly and indirectly, export and
import traffic through Southern harbours.
It is true that dissatisfaction has been
caused in this country by the interference
of England with American commerce. In
fact such dissatisfaction is on the increase
and is likely to lead in the early future to
a vigorous protest on the part of our
Government. But the objections to England's
practice in no wise depend on any
idea of questioning the right under international
law of a complete and effective
blockade.
To call this perfectly natural and legitimate
and frequently practised measure of
warfare "a war of starvation" against
women and children is a good deal of
an exaggeration. Though inconvenienced,
you are very far from the danger of
starvation. Indeed, all your spokesmen
not only admit this fact but defiantly
proclaim it.
That against that blockade as well as
for the destruction of English commerce
you are making use of your amazingly
perfected submarines appears to me entirely
justified, so long as in that use you
keep within the limits of legitimate warfare.
Nor do I deny that England, in certain
respects, has arbitrarily and it seems rather
fatuously interfered with the rights of
neutrals; that she has employed against
you some irritating measures of petty and
apparently purposeless chicanery and given
you cause for resentment by certain vindictive
and perhaps unfair provisions and
procedures enacted at the very start of
the war against German firms and German
interests within English jurisdiction.
It must also, I believe, be admitted that
you were justified in looking upon some
of the boastful edicts of Winston Churchill,
with reference to the conduct of English
merchant vessels, as provocations which
gave you legitimate ground for retaliation
within recognized limitations.
But that Germany should have used
these provocations and this phrase of
"starvation warfare" as a basis for reprisals
which actually do constitute warfare
against women and children, is a blow in the
face to the world's conscience.
Against England's infringements of the
strict limits of neutral rights and against
the subjecting of neutrals to certain unjust,
irritating and rather senseless annoyances,
America has not failed to protest.
She has in several cases received satisfaction
and acceptable assurances. She
should, and, I have no doubt, she will
insist firmly on her rights in the cases still
under discussion. But—and that makes
the vast difference between the English
and German infractions of the rights of
neutrals—in no single case have such acts
on the part of England involved the sacrifice
of a human life.
You say that Germany is not responsible
for the war. It is nevertheless a fact
that it was Germany who first declared
war. Perhaps it would have come even
if not declared by Germany, but in
that "perhaps" lies a fearful burden of
responsibility.
You speak of the vast "Austro-German
inferiority" in fighting men, as compared
to France and Russia, which you had to
counteract by rapidity and initiative of
proceeding.
First, this inferiority of your 120 millions
to the Franco-Russian 200 millions (the
English, at that time, could not have
entered into your reckoning) is not such a
"vast" one, even on paper, when one
considers how many millions of the Russians
could not for many months be
included in the reckoning, in consequence
of the huge distances separating them
from the scene of action.
Secondly, you had the enormous advantage
of strategic railroads, which the
Russians lacked.
Thirdly, you and the Austrians occupying
contiguous territory and holding the
inner lines were able to move your troops
from East to West, and vice versa, as
occasion demanded, while the Russians
and French were separated and had to
fight on the outer lines; and—
Fourthly, every one knows that in
modern warfare far less depends on the
number of men than on preparation,
leadership and ammunition. And that in
these respects the Russians certainly, and
at the outset also the French, laboured
under a "vast inferiority" is not open to
question.
It cannot be admitted therefore that the
fact of the Russian mobilization made it a
necessity for you to precipitate war, especially
on the very day when Austria, who
was in a far more exposed position than
you, declared herself ready at last, notwithstanding
the Russian mobilization, to
enter into direct diplomatic discussion with
Russia.
If Germany had waited but three days
after that declaration by her ally, before
delivering her ultimatum to Russia, either
the war would have been avoided altogether,
or Russia would have had to face
the world as the aggressor, with all the
forces of what Bismarck termed "imponderabilia"
against her. And it would
be an insult to Germany's efficiency to
question that she could have found measures
short of rushing into war, to meet
and offset for another few days the menace
of Russian mobilization—apart from the
fact that there is some reason to suspect
that this Russian mobilization on the German
frontier was deliberately provoked
by certain Machiavellian manœuvres in
Berlin.
On the 30th and 31st of July, respectively,
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed as
follows to the English ambassador in
Berlin for transmission to the Imperial
Chancellor:
"... You should speak to the Chancellor in the
above sense, and add most earnestly that one way
of maintaining good relations with England and
Germany is that they should continue to work
together to preserve the peace of Europe. If we
succeed in this object, the mutual relations of
Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto
improved and strengthened. For that object his
Majesty's Government will work in that way with
all sincerity and good will....
"And I will say this: If the peace of Europe
can be preserved, and the present crisis safely
passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some
arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by
which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile
policy would be pursued against her or her allies by
France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately.
I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I
could, through the last Balkan crisis and, Germany
having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly
improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian
to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this
present crisis, so much more acute than any that
Europe has gone through for generations, be safely
passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which
will follow may make possible some more definite
rapprochement between the Powers than has been
possible hitherto....
"I said to the German Ambassador this morning
that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal
put forward which made it clear that Germany and
Austria were striving to preserve European peace,
and that Russia and France would be unreasonable
if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg
and Paris, and go to the length of saying that if Russia
and France would not accept it, his Majesty's Government
would have nothing more to do with the consequences;
otherwise, I told the German Ambassador
that if France became involved we should be
drawn in."
Is this the language of one seeking a
quarrel? Why did not Germany act upon
the suggestions put forth so urgently, ringing
so manifestly true and bearing so
evidently the stamp of good faith? Why
was the calamity of war thrust upon the
world in such hot haste, that you did not
even previously inform, far less consult,
your then allies, the Italians, in spite of
the provisions of the Triple Alliance?
Is it not proved by declarations of
Giolitti—certainly no enemy to Germany—before
the Italian Parliament some six
months back, that Austria wanted to make
war upon Servia as much as two years ago,
that is to say, long before the assassination of
the Austrian heir-apparent afforded the
pretext for an ultimatum which spelled war?
I know sufficient of the sentiment prevailing
in England and France before the
war, as well as of the tendencies of the
political leaders and other leading men in
those countries, to be absolutely positive
that, apart from a few individuals given
to noise-making, but not possessing weight
or real influence, the people and the
Governments of France and England were
very far indeed from wanting war.
On the other hand, I agree with you in
believing that the Pan-Slavist party in
Russia did plan to bring on war. However,
they did not want it yet and it is
altogether doubtful whether they would
have succeeded in their design had they
been met by a firm, wise and conciliatory
policy on the part of Germany and
Austria.
These opponents (the Russians), by
themselves, as results thus far have shown,
and as seemed evident in advance to
sober observers, you need never to have
considered as your peers in a military
sense.
Rather than take the awful responsibility
of initiating war, and thus uniting
England, France and Russia whole-heartedly
against you, you could well
have afforded, in calm confidence in your
superior efficiency and preparation, to take
the lesser risk of letting the Russians
come on whenever, in fatuous arrogance,
they might have believed themselves
strong enough to tackle you and Austria.
In an offensive war, undertaken by
Russia, France would have joined, if at
all, only half-heartedly, and with her public
opinion strongly divided. No English
Government, however jingo-militarist,
could have obtained the sanction of Parliament
to take part in such a war. Your
ally, Italy, would in that case not have forsaken
you. Public opinion and the moral
support of the neutral nations would have
been strongly with you. You would assuredly,
under such circumstances, have given
the Russians a bad beating, and the world
in general would have rejoiced exceedingly
at the aggressor's discomfiture.
That the large majority of the people
of Germany did not want war, I do not
doubt, although (as was not the case in
England and France) there has been in
existence in your country for years a
rather alarmingly active and influential
party whose open aim was war, and
particularly a reckoning with England.
Many of your intellectuals, and particularly
many of the teachers of your
youth, had come to preach the deification
of sheer might. They proclaimed with
fanatical arrogance the doctrine that the
German nation being the chosen people,
superior to all others, was therefore not
only permitted, but, indeed, called upon,
to impose the blessings of its civilization
and "Kultur" upon other countries, by
force if necessary, and to help itself to
such of their possessions as it deemed
necessary for the fulfilment of its destiny.
I believe it is not too much to say
that that doctrine and the spirit which
bred it are very much akin, in their intolerance,
self-righteous assumption of a
world-improving mission, lack of understanding
of and contemptuous disallowance
for the differing view-points, qualities and
methods of others, to the doctrines and
the spirit that lay at the bottom of the
religious wars throughout the long and
evil years when Catholics and Protestants
killed one another and wrought appalling
bloodshed, destruction and ruin, for the
purpose of conferring upon their respective
countries the blessings of "the true
religion."
Liberal press organs and calm-thinking
men in Germany frequently before the
war expressed their disapproval of, and
misgivings at such preachings and the
tendencies and agitation of the jingo party,
though naturally you now all stand
together and have put aside for the time
being the party differences and conflicting
opinions and points of view which prevailed
prior to the war.
I agree with you in believing, notwithstanding
the machinations of the war
party, that the Kaiser and the Chancellor,
up to a certain fatal moment, when they
yielded their judgments to others, meant,
bona fide, to preserve peace. I am quite
persuaded as well that the mass of the
German people did not want war and are
entirely honest in their practically unanimous
belief that Germany is not responsible
for the war, although, unfortunately, the
facts prove the contrary.
It is conceivable that you might have
been justified in coming forward boldly
and straightforwardly and saying to the
Triple Entente:
"We are 70 millions strong. We have
demonstrated to the world our capabilities
in every department of human endeavour
and human achievement. We require (or,
at least, our people believe, rightly or
wrongly, that we require) wider territorial
scope for our growth than we possess in
our own country and in our colonies.
We require, too, an assurance of greater
security as to the conditions of our
national existence and our economic
development.
"You have pre-empted the best part
of the world. It is far more than you
require. Either see that an appropriate
provision is made for us, or, failing that,
give us a free hand to conclude mutually
agreeable arrangements with Belgium,
Portugal or Holland with respect to their
over-sea possessions.
"You will then find us ready to conclude
an understanding with you, in order to
ensure peace and to make an end, at least,
to these continually recurring alarms of
war, which are wearing out the nerves
and the purse of the whole world. To
this end let us call a conference. Meanwhile,
no one is to increase the armaments
they at present possess, let alone mobilize.
But if you are not willing to give us a fair
show peaceably, then we warn you to look
out for trouble."
In my opinion, such a warning would
not have had to be translated into action,
for in due course things were bound to
come your way by the very force of cause
and effect. With a little skill and tact
and insight (which traits, as you will
probably admit, have hardly been outstanding
features of German diplomacy
since Bismarck), together with a little
patience, everything you could reasonably
ask would have been yours in the course
of the next ten or fifteen years.
But if the Triple Entente had met a
request in the nature of the foregoing
with a non possumus, or had made no
reasonably acceptable offer, and you, after
final warning, had resorted to the arbitrament
of war, your case would have worn
a very different aspect from the present
one. Many unprejudiced men amongst
neutral people would have looked upon
your view-points and conduct as not devoid
of justification, instead of turning away
with disgust from the sophistries of your
writers, who seek to demonstrate that
you poor innocent lambs were fallen upon
in order to be dragged to the slaughterhouse.
As a matter of fact, however, it is my
belief that such a declaration delivered
by you to the Triple Entente, firm and
determined in spirit and meaning, but
friendly and persuasive in language,
would have led not to war, but to a lasting
understanding.
To sum up:
1. Until ten years ago, England's relations
with you were good—indeed more
than good, as is shown, for instance,
by the cession of Heligoland. If, as you
assert, hate and envy and ill-will, because
of Germany's phenomenal development,
and of her increasing strength and push as
a competitor in the markets of the world,
had been the moving force in shaping
England's attitude towards you, the
motive for hostile conduct would have
existed at that time just as at present.
As a matter of fact, England's sentiment
towards Germany changed only
with your aggressive programme of naval
construction, and as a consequence of
the manifestation in word, in writing and
in deed, of certain alarming and menacing
tendencies, to which, it is true, more
significance and importance probably were
attached abroad than in Germany itself—more,
perhaps, than they deserved.
That programme England came to consider,
naturally, as directed mainly against herself
and as a serious menace to her most vital
interests and to the conditions of her
very existence.
Would not Germany have become
uneasy had Russia suddenly announced
a policy of concentrating an enormous
fleet in the Baltic? (The parallel, though,
is far from perfect, in that for you, sea
power is not nearly as vital an element as
it is and must be for England.)
Your naval policy, together with the
arguments which the German Government's
spokesmen adduced for it, and
the above-mentioned manifestations and
agitations, caused very serious and lasting
apprehensions in England. They
gradually drove her to the Entente with
France, and through it, unfortunately
perhaps, but necessarily, also with Russia—not
as an offensive, but as a defensive
measure.
Let me say, in parenthesis, that in
the interest of England and France and
of the peace of the world, I have always
felt inclined to doubt the wisdom of this
grouping, however comprehensible and
natural it was under the circumstances.
Likewise, I have always doubted the
wisdom of the creation of your enormous
fleet—a view which was shared by some
of your best political thinkers and which
appears to have been justified by results.
2. The genesis of the war lay in the
fixed idea by which Austria was possessed,
since her foreign Minister Aehrenthal succeeded
in reaping easy and questionable
but profitable laurels some years ago, that
she could and ought to adopt a "dashing"
policy. There is nothing more dangerous
than the foolish and reckless daring of
feebleness, when, as happens at times, it
is suddenly seized with a mania for heroics.
In fact, as I gleaned from a letter received
here within a few days of the outbreak
of the war and originating from a
particularly authoritative source in Vienna,
Austria entirely failed to realize the portentous
significance and the inevitable
consequences of her unheard-of ultimatum
to Serbia.
She believed that she would be left
undisturbed to play the conqueror at
the expense of that poor little country.
Unfortunately, Germany did not see fit
to put a stop to that extremely dangerous
playing with fire. On the contrary,
the German Ambassador in Vienna seems
to have encouraged it, actively and
deliberately.
3. When finally the crisis had come,
with all its terrible meaning, Austria's
nerves, at the very last moment, began
to give way. She wavered in the face of
a world catastrophe.
But your Junkers and other jingoes
neither wavered nor hesitated. They saw
in their grasp the opportunity for which
they had been plotting these many years
and they were not minded to let it escape
them. They considered the moment
peculiarly propitious because of the internal
preoccupations of England and
France.
And they succeeded in sweeping the
German Government off its feet as well
as the sober and sensible thinking majority
of the German people. They succeeded
in rushing your Government and people
into the belief that the Russian mobilization
signified a menace dangerous to Germany's
very existence, and that every
day of delay in meeting that danger might
mean disastrous consequences.
This was not the first time that an
attempt had been made by that party
to bring the Kaiser and his people suddenly
face to face with a situation which
they meant should spell war—a war which
they felt certain would end in a quick
and decisive German victory. Of at least
one flagrant example of such manœuvring
I have personal knowledge.
That the jingo party, against what I
believe to have been the tendencies of
the Kaiser's and the Chancellor's policies,
thus succeeded at last in their fateful
and atrocious design—although the manifest
interests and, doubtless, the inclination
of the masses of your people were for
the maintenance of peace—is explainable
only by the Germans' amazing lack of
understanding for the deeper qualities,
sentiments, ideals, modes of thought and
characteristics of other nations as distinguished
from their outward peculiarities,
methods and habits.
This lack of understanding, doubly
amazing in a people so intelligent and
instructed and so successful in its commercial
dealings with the rest of the world,
is strikingly exemplified in your complete
misjudgment as to the cohesive power
of the British Empire and as to the loyalty
of its component parts and subject races;
by your gross underestimate of France
and by your general miscalculation as to how
the peoples challenged by you would react
to the supreme test of war.
That Austria and Russia, through their
mobilizations and other measures originating
from a mixture of bluff and fear,
managed to get each other into an utterly
unreasoning state of nerves, is entirely
comprehensible. They did not trust each
other, and above all, they did not trust
themselves, their own strength and
preparedness.
But Germany, in the knowledge of her
powerful moral and military superiority,
and of her incomparable war machine,
perfect and ready in every detail, could
have, and should have dominated the
confusion and danger of the situation with
the sang-froid and self-confidence born of
strength, instead of allowing herself to
be swept along by the sinister currents
leading to an ocean of blood.
And if Germany, with trembling Europe
hanging on her words, had proclaimed
boldly "There shall be peace," and thus
by her veto had saved the world from the
curse of this war, she would not only have
done a splendidly meritorious deed, unequalled
in the world's history, which
would have brought her immortal fame
and would have been greeted by the joyous
acclaim of all peoples, but she would have
gained by that very act the uncontested
leadership amongst the nations. From
their gratitude for being freed from the
nightmare of war's menace, she would
readily have obtained (as intimated by
Sir Edward Grey in his telegram) compliance
with any reasonable demand she
might have put forward for the extension
of the scope of her development and
influence.
4. Once the Entente existed it seems
to me so obvious that England in an
aggressive war waged by Germany and
Austria against France and Russia was
bound to throw in her lot with the latter
country, that I was quite unable, at the
time, to understand Germany's outburst
of surprise and fury against England.
Alliance or Entente, call it what you
will—had England backed out in that
crisis it would have been a miserable
breach of faith on her part, by which she
would have forfeited her place in the
world's respect and which would have been
bitterly resented by her former friends
and left her completely isolated henceforth.
Moreover, apart from all moral obligations
and the compelling force of political
considerations, she could have felt all the
less tempted to enter into a separate
agreement with Germany at that critical
juncture and remain neutral, as the latter
at that very moment had demonstrated
that she did not consider herself bound
by any treaty, when military interests
seemed to her to make the breach of such
treaty advisable. In the face of Germany's
violation of Belgian neutrality, how
could England have felt assured that, if
an arrangement between the two countries
had been effected, it would be respected
by Germany, in case at any given moment
it might appear to the German Government
to be requisite from the point of
view of military necessity, or even mere
advantage, to ignore such agreement?
You call it a hideous crime and eternal
shame that the English "called to their
aid" against you the Japanese and the
Indians.
As far as Japanese military aid is concerned,
it has been practically limited to
action in China, and thus has not to any
material degree influenced the European
war.
And with regard to the relatively inconsiderable
number of Indians that England
brought over, the simple fact is that these
few brigades or divisions form part of the
small standing army that she possessed—the
very smallness of which is further
proof of how little she had contemplated
war. In her critical situation, and with
her great lack of trained troops, she called
in these detachments, which were commanded
by English officers.
I feel certain that an unprejudiced
judgment can see neither crime nor
shame in that act. If there were, you
would be no less subject to reproach for
accepting the military aid of Turks and
Arabs.
5. When a country in so short a time
has made such unexampled progress as
Germany, and through her own capacity
and the favour of fate has achieved so
much of wealth, power and well-being for
her people, she can well afford to indulge
in the luxury of modesty and a conciliatory
disposition.
A nation thus blessed ought to thank
God that all is going so well with her, and
should recognize that such brilliant success
is bound to produce a certain amount of
irritation and jealousy, just as it does
in the case of an eminently successful
individual.
While rejoicing in her achievement, she
ought carefully to refrain from boasting
or flaunting her superiority in the face of
the world.
While unceasingly continuing to strive
and build up, she ought to do so tactfully
and with all possible consideration for her
less successful neighbours.
She should know how to restrain herself
and wisely to keep her ambitions within
bounds; to live and let live; to regard,
without jealousy or envy, possessions
which are the heritage of others less
efficient than herself; and to leave it to
time, slowly but surely, to do its work in
rewarding merit and punishing inefficiency
and sloth.
Have you thought and acted thus?
Have you not, on the contrary, in the
justified consciousness of your greater
efficiency and more strenuous effort,
allowed the fact of the great inherited advantages
possessed by others to become a
thorn in the flesh, and an ever-rankling
bitter grievance, which dimmed your
contentment and soured the joy at your
achievements?
Have you not estranged and affronted
and antagonized other nations—not by
success in open competition with them,
which I grant was far from pleasing them,
but to which in the end they had come to
accommodate themselves as to an unavoidable
evil—but by the manner and matter
of your writing, speaking and acting?
Have you not made such nations your
enemies by thrusting before them aims and
visions of the future, calculated to arouse
in them most serious alarm and apprehension,
and thus eventually caused them to
unite against you—not, as you think,
through envy or hate, but through the
much more powerful motives of self-preservation,
and of fear of your aims and
intentions?
In this letter, which, I am sorry to say,
has assumed formidable proportions, I
have tried, next to expressing my own convictions,
to represent to you, as I see them,
what are at this time the predominant and
controlling views and sentiments among
the American people. I have met with
much the same ideas among the great
majority of neutrals with whom I have
discussed the subject—neutrals from many
countries whom I have met here in the
last six months.
If I have expressed myself freely, in
some respects even bluntly, I hope you
will make allowance for the honest and
deep anger and grief that move me when
I see how, through a needless war wantonly
started, Germany and England-France,
the three countries of Europe whom the
world most needs, the three races from
whom humanity has most to expect, are
engaged in tearing one another to pieces
in senseless fury.
I have welcomed with hope certain
signs in the last few weeks which seem
to indicate that more moderate, fairer
and calmer sentiments, a more correct
understanding, and more far-sighted views
are beginning to get a foothold in certain
circles in Germany.
You have so incontestably vindicated
the prowess of your arms, and so impressively
demonstrated the power, courage,
self-sacrificing patriotism and high ability
of your nation, that no possible suspicion
can attach to you of yielding under compulsion,
should you rise to the moral
heroism of taking the first step towards
dispelling the dreadful misery which
weighs upon Europe through this appalling
war.
What is done, is done. The guilt will
be adjudged by history. Eleven months
ago it was you who spoke the fateful word
that meant war. Will it now be you to
first speak the redeeming word that shall
bring hope of peace?
Whether such a word from you—a word,
not of victorious peace, but of righteous
peace, a word of human feeling and of
political moderation, of conciliation, aye,
and of atonement where due—would now
be listened to by your opponents, in view
of their bitterness at your actions and
their mistrust of your intentions, and
would actually bring peace, I do not
know.
But of this I am sure: that such a step
would be welcomed with gratitude, gladness
and sympathy by all at least of the
non-combatant nations, and that it would
be set down as a moral asset for you in
the ledger both of history and of contemporary
opinion. Nor can I doubt
that, even regarded merely from the point
of view of politics, it would be wise, well-judged
and timely.
Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) Otto H. Kahn.
Note.—To this letter a short note merely of acknowledgment
was received, containing the intimation
that, in view of the wide divergence of views between
the writer and the recipient, no useful purpose could
be served by continuing the correspondence.
Printed in Great Britain by Richard Clay & Sons, Limited,
BRUNSWICK ST., STAMFORD ST., S.E. 1, AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.
Other than the corrections listed below, printer's inconsistencies in
spelling, punctuation, hyphenation, and ligature usage have been retained:
"publc" corrected to "public" (page 13)
"neans" corrected to "means" (page 35)