THROUGH the income tax we go directly to the
person upon whom we desire to levy taxation, and
take from him such portion of his earnings or other profits
as we consider to be his just contribution to the revenue.
Through the income tax we can, if we care to do so,
cause each subject of the State to contribute towards the
expenses of government according to his ability.
It is the purpose of this chapter to show that the income
tax could be so amended that, so far from being counted
an obnoxious impost, it would be regarded as a just and
proper instrument of taxation.
It is generally believed that the British Income Tax was
originated by Pitt in 1798. As a matter of fact, however,
the direct taxation of incomes in the United Kingdom
dates back many hundreds of years. For the purposes of
this work, I do not propose to trace the history of the
subject to an earlier date than 1692.
The Property and Income Tax imposed in that year
is commonly known as the "Land-Tax," and this name
has given rise to a great deal of misunderstanding.
In their twenty-eighth report (1885) the Commissioners
of Inland Revenue, in giving a detailed description of the
Land-Tax of 1692, point out that the impost "was in fact
a Property and Income Tax, and moreover that personal
estate was quite as much the object of the charge as land."
So few people are aware of these facts that it may be
well to set out the actual provisions of the Act, as described
by the Commissioners:
It (the Act of 1692) is entitled "An Act for granting to
their Majesties an aid of four shillings in the pound for one year
for carrying on a vigorous war against France"; and the second
section enacts, "That every person, body politic and corporate,
etc., having any estate in ready monies or in any debts owing
to them or having any estate in goods, wares, merchandise, or
other chattels, or personal estate whatsoever within this realm
or without shall pay yield and pay unto their Majesties four
shillings in the pound according to the true yearly value
thereof; that is to say, for every hundred pounds of such
ready money and debts, and for every hundred pounds' worth
of such goods, wares, etc., or other personal estate the sum of
four and twenty shillings."
The third section imposes a duty of four shillings in the pound
upon the profits and salaries of all persons having any office or
employment of profit (except naval and military officers).
And then the fourth section proceeds thus, "And to the end a
further aid and supply for their Majesties' occasions may be raised
by a charge upon all lands, tenements, and hereditaments with as
much equality and indifferency as is possible by an equal
pound rate of four shillings for every twenty shillings of the
true yearly value, be it enacted that all manors, messuages,
lands and tenements, and all quarries, mines, etc., tithes, tolls,
etc., and all hereditaments, of what nature soever they be, shall
be charged with the sum of four shillings for every twenty
shillings of the full yearly value."
The rules for assessments follow the same order, and show
that the charge on personal estate was as much to be attended
to as that on land. Thus the assessors are directed in the first
place to bring in certificates of the names of every person
dwelling within their districts, "and of the substance and
values of them in ready money, goods, chattels, and other
personal estate." Every person is to be rated for personal
estate at the place where he shall reside, and, if not a
householder, at the place where he resides at the execution of
the Act, or if out of the realm, where he was last resident;
"and for the better discovery of personal estates," every householder
is to give an account of his lodgers.
But although the Act of 1692 was the first of those so-called
Land-Tax Acts, it was not until 1697 that the tax was imposed
precisely in the form which has been preserved to the present
day, that is to say, as a fixed sum for the whole kingdom, and
to be raised in quotas specified in the Act for each county,
city or borough therein named. That Act was renewed every
year, with scarcely any difference in its provisions as to the
mode of assessment, and although the amounts charged upon
the counties, etc., varied according to the total sum required
from the kingdom, they were always fixed in due proportions to
the original quotas. The last annual Act, so far as land was
concerned, was passed in 1797.
Now it is a remarkable circumstance that these Acts of 1697
and 1797 appear to mark, more strongly than before, the taxation
of personal estate as the primary object of the law.
After the clauses imposing upon goods, wares, merchandise,
etc., and upon pensions and offices, the fixed charge of four
shillings in the pound towards raising the quotas, that relating
to land appears to treat it as a subsidiary contributor, as it
were, and for the purpose of making up the sum due to the
Exchequer after exhausting the other resources. The words
are: "And to the end the full and entire sums by this Act
charged upon the several counties, etc., may be fully and completely
raised and paid; be it enacted, that all lands, etc.,
shall be charged by a pound rate towards the said several sums
by this Act imposed."
How the duty on personal estate was levied, or what was its
proportion in the quotas, we have no means of knowing. All
that we do know is that in Mr Pitt's time it had dwindled nearly
to nothing; and that the tax annually voted under the name
of land tax had become a land tax in reality. Thus we find
in an assessment for the Tower Division in 1799 that the sum
charged for personal estate was only £227, while the charge
for lands, etc., is £29,964; and in one of the few accounts of
later transactions which remain to us, that for the year 1823,
we are presented with a return of £5,416, 10s. 0d. as the
ludicrous result of a tax at one per cent. on the capital value
of the personalty of Great Britain.
The Commissioners go on to remark that it seems
almost incredible that year after year an Act should have
been passed containing the most minute directions for the
assessment of personal estate, and yet that nothing which
could be called an assessment should have been made.
They suggest that "Perhaps the explanation may be
found in another peculiarity in the administration of this
tax, the tendency to regard it as a fixed charge upon the
subjects on which it was originally levied. That this has
been the case with land, both before and since 1797, is
well known, and if the same rule was applied to personalty
it is easy to conceive that, as the persons originally
charged moved out of the parish, or became destitute, or
otherwise unassessable, their proportion of the tax was
shifted to the land as the readiest means of collecting it."
A certain amount of personalty was still assessed in the
time of Pitt, however, as may be gathered from the
following figures from the roll of the Tower Division.
"LAND-TAX." ABSTRACT OF DUPLICATES
FOR THE TOWER DIVISION
Charge for the year 1693. 4s. Aid. |
Quotas for the respective years 1698 and 1699,
under 9 & 10 and 10 & 11 William III.
3s. Aid. |
Quota for 1702. |
Quota for 1799. |
| Lands, etc. |
Personal Estate. |
Pensions and Offices. |
| £ s. d. |
£ s. d. |
£ s. d. |
£ s. d. |
£ s. d. |
£ s. d. |
| 34,057 5 5 |
25,542 19 0¾ |
34,041 12 10 |
29,964 15 0½ |
227 15 5 |
2,320 2 4½ |
This specimen also shows how the original assessments
of 1692 were preserved until the time when, in 1798, over
one hundred years after, Pitt made provisions for the
redemption of the old tax, and simultaneously introduced
a new Property and Income Tax based upon better
assessments.
Unaware of the real nature of the so-called "Land-Tax"
and as it would also appear, of the present
"Property and Income Tax," it is often suggested by
fiscal reformers that the old Land-Tax of 1692 should be
reimposed upon present land revenues. Those who make
the suggestion do not realize that what they desire has
already been done and is actually in practice at this
moment.
The old "Land-Tax" and the present "Income" Tax
thus compare:—
| The "Land-Tax" of 1692. |
The Present "Property and Income" Tax. |
| Section 2: Every Person ... having
any estate in ready monies or in any
debts owing to them or having any
estate in goods, wares, merchandise
or other chattels, or personal estate
whatsoever ... shall yield and pay
four shillings in the pound according
to the true yearly value thereof. |
Schedule D taxes the profits
of trades and professions
and from various forms of
personal property. |
| Section 3: All persons holding any
public office or employment of profit
(except military and naval officers)
and their clerks, etc., shall pay four
shillings in the pound. |
Schedule E taxes the salaries
of all who hold public
offices or employments,
whether they be officials
or clerks. |
| Section 4: And to the End, a further
aid and supply for their Majesties'
occasions may be raised by a
charge upon all lands, tenements
and hereditaments ... by an equal
pound rate of four shillings ... be
it enacted that all manors, messuages,
lands and tenements, and
all quarries, mines, etc., tithes, tolls,
etc. ... shall be charged with the
sum of four shillings for every
twenty shillings of the full yearly
value. |
Schedule A taxes the income
from "all manors, messuages,
lands and tenements, and all quarries,
mines, etc., tithes, tolls,
etc." |
It is also remarkable that whereas Land and Houses are
placed in Schedule A, the first branch of our Income Tax,
the so-called Land-Tax of 1692 placed lands and houses
in its third category. The Act of 1692, moreover, as we
have seen, made the taxation of personalty its first aim,
and brought in a charge on land, houses and other fixed
property to make up any deficiency.
With our modern Income Tax, fortunately, personalty
does not escape as it seems to have done in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, but it is still true that a great
deal of personal income evades taxation, while it is
impossible for fixed property to elude the assessors.
I have taken the trouble to set out the foregoing details
at some length because the fact that Schedule A of the
Income Tax, like Section 4 of the Act of 1692, is a Land-Tax,
appears to have escaped the attention of many of
those who desire to tax the unearned increment which so
often accrues to the owners of land. At the present
moment, the owners of land contribute 14 pence in the
pound of its annual revenue to Imperial Taxation under
Schedule A. In the case of a small landowner with an
income of £750 a year that may be enough. In the
case of a great landowner with a rent roll of £20,000 a
year it is certainly too little. If, then, we would justly
tax the income of those who derive unearned revenue
from land, we must graduate our income tax. In doing
so, fortunately, we shall not tax merely one form of unearned
increment. The conclusive proof of unearned
income is the possession of a great income. Whether it
arises from rent, or from interest, or from the direct
taxation of labour is a secondary consideration. Whether
its owner has bought broad acres with profits drawn from
the exertions of others, or whether he has bought railway
stock or foreign investments with the proceeds of the sale
of broad acres, we need not inquire. The great income,
the fact that the individual who receives it is one of the
small number of people who enjoy one-third of the entire
income of the country, is sufficient proof of "ability" to
contribute generously to the revenues of what should be
the rich government of a rich State. And it is difficult to
imagine a rich man so wanting in that social instinct
which we call patriotism that, when once his extraordinary
position in relation to his fellows is made clear to him,
he will not consent freely to make such contribution.
The Income Tax, as it now exists, is an instrument of
extraordinary clumsiness and complexity. An intelligent
foreigner, coming freshly to the examination of its curious
provisions, would be driven to the conclusion that a junta
of bureaucrats, intent upon hiding the mysteries of statecraft
from the knowledge of the vulgar, had of set purpose
wrapped its machinery and intention in every device of
obscurement which perverted ingenuity could suggest.
In "Riches and Poverty," edition 1905, I gave an
account of the Income Tax as it then stood. I reproduce
the account in order to make the subsequent alterations
clearer.
Incomes, from whatever source arising, which do not
exceed £160 per annum, are entirely exempt from the tax.
Incomes between £160 and £700 are allowed certain
abatements which are equivalent to a rough graduation of
the tax. The following table shows the nature of the
abatements:—
INCOME TAX ABATEMENTS
| Amount of Annual income. |
Abatement. |
| Between |
£160 |
and |
£400 |
£160 |
| " |
400 |
" |
500 |
150 |
| " |
500 |
" |
600 |
120 |
| " |
600 |
" |
700 |
70 |
The following table shows how the abatements graduate
the Income Tax when the nominal rate of tax is 1s. in
the £.
INCOME TAX. EFFECT OF THE ABATEMENTS
ON INCOME TAX AT 1s.
| Income. |
Abatement Allowed. |
Income after Abatement. |
Actual Rate of Taxation when the Tax is 1s. in the £. |
| £ |
£ |
£ |
Pence in the £ |
| 180 |
160 |
20 |
1.33 |
| 240 |
160 |
80 |
4.00 |
| 300 |
160 |
140 |
5.60 |
| 400 |
160 |
240 |
7.20 |
| 440 |
150 |
290 |
7.90 |
| 500 |
150 |
350 |
8.40 |
| 540 |
120 |
420 |
9.33 |
| 600 |
120 |
480 |
9.60 |
| 640 |
70 |
570 |
10.68 |
| 700 |
70 |
630 |
10.80 |
| 740 |
nil |
740 |
12.00 |
Thus, when the Income Tax is at 1s., an income of £180
pays less than 1½d. in the £, an income of £300 pays less
than 6d. an income of £500 pays less than 8½d., and an
income of £700 pays less than 11d.
I now give an explanation of the various Schedules
under which the tax is collected. The abatements, it
should be understood, refer to all the Schedules.
Schedule A, sometimes called Property Tax or Landlords'
Tax, is assessed upon the rents received by the
owners of lands, houses, etc. It is directly assessed upon
occupiers, who, if they are tenants, deduct the tax from
their next payment of rent. Thus it is a Land and House
Tax which the landowner or houseowner cannot possibly
escape.
It should also be explained that the term "Lands," as
used in connexion with Schedule A, refers to Agricultural
lands, and the farm-houses and farm buildings, etc., thereon.
The term "Houses" refers to houses, business premises,
etc., together with the gardens, pleasure grounds or yards
upon which they stand.
Owners of agricultural lands are allowed to deduct for
repairs one-eighth of the rent. Owners of houses and
other buildings are allowed to deduct for repairs one-sixth
of the rent.
Schedule B covers profits from the occupation of lands,
and taxes the incomes of farmers, nurserymen, and market
gardeners.
Farmers' profits (unless farmers elect to be dealt with
under Schedule D) are assumed to be one-third of the
annual rent of their farms. Thus a farmer paying a rent
of £480 or less is not subject to income tax, as one-third
of £480 is £160, and incomes of £160 or less are not
taxable. Nurserymen and market gardeners, however, are
taxed on their profits in the same way as in the case of
other business men.
The chief point to which I direct attention is that very
few farmers pay income tax at all.
The arbitrary assessment of farmers at one-third the
rent of their farms is an absurdity. A farmer paying a
rental of £480 is usually a well-to-do man, but he escapes
income tax because his income is assessed as £160. A
farmer who pays a rental of £600 and who in an average
year probably makes at least £400 a year, is, on the one-third
basis, assessed at £200. The income tax of farmers
is for the most part paid for them by the industrial classes,
who are taxed pro tanto to relieve agriculture.
Schedule C deals with profits from British, Indian,
Colonial and Foreign Government Securities. So far as
possible these profits are taxed "at the source." Thus the
Bank of England, in paying Consols dividend, deducts
income tax, and leaves the fundholder to claim repayment
afterwards if his income should be less than £160 per
annum.
We now come to that important branch of the tax
known as Schedule D.
The profits included in this Schedule consist of those
from trade and industry, from professions, from all employments
or vocations except public offices, from oversea
investments which are not Government securities, and
from interest on loans secured on the Public Rates, etc.
In the case of income from trade, assessments are made
upon the average profits of the past three years. Let us
suppose that a merchant in the period, 1893-1902, made
the following profits: 1893, £1,100; 1894, £900;
1895, £1,200; 1896, £1,300; 1897, £1,400; 1898,
£1,400; 1899, £1,500; 1900, £1,600; 1901, £1,200;
1902, £1,200; 1903, £1,500; 1904, £1,600. The
table on page 301 shows how the profits are assessed
under Schedule D.
Thus, while between 1893 and 1904, the income was in
two years above £1,500, the assessment never rose above
£1,500. The result, it will be seen, is to deprive the
State of the advantage of the maximum income.
It follows that the assessments under Schedule D, from
this cause alone, are always something less than the actual
income of the persons assessed.
ILLUSTRATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
AVERAGING UNDER SCHEDULE D
| Profits. |
Assessment. |
| Year. |
Amount. |
Year of Assessment. |
Amount of Assessment. |
Remarks. |
|
£ |
|
£ |
|
| 1893 |
1,100 |
|
|
|
| 1894 |
900 |
|
|
|
| 1895 |
1,200 |
|
|
|
| 1896 |
1,300 |
1896 |
1,066 |
Average of £1,100, £900 and £1,200. |
| 1897 |
1,400 |
1897 |
1,133 |
Average of £900, £1,200 and £1,300. |
| 1898 |
1,400 |
1898 |
1,300 |
Average of £1,200, £1,300 and £1,400. |
| 1899 |
1,500 |
1899 |
1,366 |
Average of £1,300, £1,400 and £1,500. |
| 1900 |
1,600 |
1900 |
1,433 |
Average of £1,400, £1,400 and £1,500. |
| 1901 |
1,200 |
1901 |
1,500 |
Average of £1,400, £1,500 and £1,600. |
| 1902 |
1,200 |
1902 |
1,433 |
Average of £1,500, £1,600 and £1,200. |
| 1903 |
1,500 |
1903 |
1,333 |
Average of £1,600, £1,200 and £1,200. |
| 1904 |
1,600 |
1904 |
1,300 |
Average of £1,200, £1,200 and £1,500. |
|
|
1905 |
1,433 |
Average of £1,200, £1,500 and £1,600. |
We next come to Schedule E, which covers the salaries
of all Government officials, and of the employees of Limited
Liability Companies, County Councils, etc. For obvious
reasons this branch of the tax is very easily assessed.
It is necessary also to remind the reader that a second
form of income-tax is at present levied. I refer to the
Inhabited House Duty, which is payable by all householders
(in Great Britain only—not in Ireland) who live in
houses of an annual value of £20 and upwards. The rates
are graduated as follows:—
|
Above £20. Rate in the £. |
Above £40. Rate in the £. |
Above £60. Rate in the £. |
| Private dwelling-houses |
3d. |
6d. |
9d. |
Business premises used residentially |
2d. |
4d. |
6d. |
Houses used solely for purposes of trade, and in which
no occupier resides, are not subject to the tax.
In the last financial year of which we have record
(1907-8) the duty yielded £1,900,000.
The present Inhabited House Duty dates from 1851
when it was levied, to replace the stupid window-duty, by
Sir Charles Wood. It can only be described as a clumsy
income tax, and it bears very harshly upon poor Londoners,
compelled by their circumstances to pay heavy rents to be
near their work. To the heavy rent the State adds a
second most unjust Income Tax.
In the above words the Income Taxes of 1905 were
faithfully described in their essential details. In the years
that have elapsed various reforms have been made.
In the Finance Act of 1907 the principle of differentiation
as between earned and unearned incomes was introduced.
Mr Asquith embodied the principle in the following
words (Finance Act, 1907, clause 19, section 1):
"Any individual who claims and proves, in manner provided
by this section, that his total income from all sources does not
exceed two thousand pounds, and that any part of that income is
earned income, shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of this
section, to such relief from income tax as will reduce the amount
payable on the earned income to the amount which would be
payable if the tax were charged on that income at the rate of
ninepence."
As the nominal rate of tax was 1s., earned incomes
thus enjoyed a substantial reduction. The abatement
system, described on page 297, continued to apply to both
earned and unearned incomes, so that two very roughly
graduated scales of taxation came into existence, which
are illustrated on page 304.
The number of tax-payers who understood what had
been done for them may be described as negligible.
Without working out such a table as that on p. 304, the
income tax payer remained in ignorance of what treatment
had been meted out to him. The moral effect of
a considerable reform was almost completely lost.
In the famous Finance Act of 1909, which did not
pass into law, owing to the action of the House of
Lords, until the present year (1910), Mr Lloyd George,
succeeding Mr Asquith as Chancellor of the Exchequer,
made alterations in the Income Tax as excellent in
principle and as obscure in operation as that just described.
He raised the nominal rate of taxation to fourteen pence
in the £, and left the rate for earned incomes at ninepence,
thus increasing the differentiation between earned and
unearned incomes. He also introduced a new step in
differentiation by enacting that earned incomes exceeding
£2,000 a year but not exceeding £3,000 a year should
pay twelve pence instead of fourteen pence in the £.
THE EFFECT OF MR ASQUITH'S DIFFERENTIATION
OF THE INCOME TAX, 1907
| Income. |
Abatement allowed. |
Income Tax on Earned Income. |
| Tax payable. |
Nominal Tax. |
Virtual Tax. |
| £ |
£ |
£ |
s. |
d. |
Pence in £ |
Pence in £ |
| 160 |
160 |
|
— |
|
Exempt |
— |
| 200 |
160 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
9 |
1.8 |
| 300 |
160 |
5 |
5 |
0 |
9 |
4.2 |
| 400 |
160 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
5.4 |
| 500 |
150 |
13 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
6.3 |
| 700 |
70 |
23 |
12 |
6 |
9 |
8.1 |
| 800 |
Nil |
30 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
9.0 |
| 1,000 |
" |
37 |
10 |
0 |
9 |
9.0 |
| 2,000 |
" |
75 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
9.0 |
| Income. |
Abatement allowed. |
Income Tax on Unearned Income. |
| Tax payable. |
Nominal Tax. |
Virtual Tax. |
| £ |
£ |
£ |
s. |
d. |
Pence in £ |
Pence in £ |
| 160 |
160 |
|
— |
|
Exempt |
— |
| 200 |
160 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2.4 |
| 300 |
160 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
5.6 |
| 400 |
160 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
7.2 |
| 500 |
150 |
17 |
10 |
0 |
12 |
8.4 |
| 700 |
70 |
31 |
10 |
0 |
12 |
10.8 |
| 800 |
Nil |
40 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
12.0 |
| 1,000 |
" |
50 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
12.0 |
| 2,000 |
" |
100 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
12.0 |
In order to give further effect to the principle of
graduating the Income Tax, Mr Lloyd George at the
same time imposed a Supplementary Income Tax, or
Super-Tax, upon persons whose incomes exceeded £5,000
a year.
The Super-Tax is nominally 6d. in the £, but in
practice it is always less. For the Super-Tax of 6d.
is payable only upon that part of the income which
exceeds £3,000 a year. That, reflection will show, creates
a graduated Super-Tax, thus:
THE LLOYD GEORGE SUPER-TAX
AS IT
REALLY IS
| Income. |
Abatement on Income. |
Income really Taxed. |
Tax Payable. |
Nominal Rate of Supertax. |
Virtual Rate of Supertax. |
| £ |
£ |
£ |
£ |
s. |
d. |
Pence in £ |
Pence in £ |
| 5,000 |
Exempt |
— |
|
— |
|
— |
— |
| 5,001 |
3,000 |
2,001 |
50 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
2.4 |
| 10,000 |
3,000 |
7,000 |
175 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
4.2 |
| 50,000 |
3,000 |
47,000 |
1,175 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
5.6 |
| 100,000 |
3,000 |
97,000 |
2,425 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
5.8 |
It will be seen that it is a great gain under this system
to have £5,000 a year rather than £5,001. The extra
£1 of income costs the tax-payer £50, 0s. 6d. Thus a
premium is placed by the State upon false declarations,
for if a Government is so unfair as to tax £1 of income
£50, 0s. 6d, who can blame a tax-payer who retorts in
kind?
It will be seen that it is impossible for the alleged 6d.
Super-Tax to reach 6d. It can at the highest reach
5.9 pence.
But while the Super-Tax is so unfortunate in
method it is excellent in principle, and largely
carries into effect the suggestions made in "Riches
and Poverty," edition 1905. It effects a rough graduation
in the taxation of incomes over £5,000 a year,
and extends the gamut of the Income Tax scale from
zero at £160 a year to 19.8 pence in the £ at £100,000
a year.
I am now able to show the total effect of all the
obscure provisions which it has been my misfortune to
attempt to describe in plain language. The table on
page 307 gives a faithful picture of the Income Tax, as
graduated and differentiated by all the reforms made
down to 1910. The table is the expression of the
following provisions, existing in 1910, which I recapitulate
for its better elucidation.
Incomes not exceeding £160 a year pay no tax. Small
and moderate incomes are relieved from taxation by being
only taxed in part, i.e. "abatements" are allowed according
to the size of the income. Over £700 a year there are no
abatements. Unearned incomes are taxed at the nominal
rate of fourteen pence in the pound. Earned incomes not
exceeding £2,000 a year are taxed ninepence in the pound.
Earned incomes over £2,000 a year, but not over £3,000
a year, are taxed one shilling in the pound. Finally comes
what is called the "Super-Tax." Incomes, whether earned
or unearned, over £5,000 a year are taxed an extra sixpence
in the pound on such part of the income as exceeds
£3,000.
The table on p. 307 shows, as the mere relation
of the complicated provisions does not show, both
the virtues and the faults of Mr Lloyd George's
Income Tax. There is graduation, but it is effected so
clumsily that it positively bristles with anomalies.
Consider, for example, the gross anomaly of making a
man with £3,000 a year pay only £150, while a man
with £3,100 a year must pay £180. Or, again, of
asking from the £5,000 man a £291 tax, and demanding
£350 from the £5,100 man. Perhaps the worst feature
in the scale, however, is the fact that unearned incomes
from £701 to £5,000 pay the same rate.
EFFECT OF THE INCOME TAX IN 1910
| Income. |
Abatement allowed. |
Earned Incomes. |
| Tax payable. |
Nominal Rate. |
Virtual Rate. |
| £ |
£ |
£ |
s. |
d. |
Pence in £ |
Pence in £ |
| 160 |
160 |
|
— |
|
Exempt |
— |
| 200 |
160 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
9 |
1.8 |
| 300 |
160 |
5 |
5 |
0 |
9 |
4.2 |
| 400 |
160 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
5.4 |
| 500 |
150 |
13 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
6.3 |
| 700 |
70 |
23 |
12 |
6 |
9 |
8.1 |
| 800 |
Nil |
30 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
9.0 |
| 1,000 |
" |
37 |
10 |
0 |
9 |
9.0 |
| 2,000 |
" |
75 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
9.0 |
| 2,100 |
" |
105 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
12.0 |
| 3,000 |
" |
150 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
12.0 |
| 3,100 |
" |
180 |
16 |
8 |
14 |
14.0 |
| 5,000 |
" |
291 |
13 |
4 |
14 |
14.0 |
| 5,100 |
" |
350 |
0 |
0 |
14 + 6 |
16.5 |
| 10,000 |
" |
758 |
6 |
8 |
14 + 6 |
18.2 |
| 50,000 |
" |
4,091 |
13 |
4 |
14 + 6 |
19.6 |
| 100,000 |
" |
8,258 |
6 |
8 |
14 + 6 |
19.8 |
| Income. |
Abatement allowed. |
Unearned Incomes. |
| Tax payable. |
Nominal Rate. |
Virtual Rate. |
| £ |
£ |
£ |
s. |
d. |
Pence in £ |
Pence in £ |
| 160 |
160 |
|
— |
|
Exempt |
— |
| 200 |
160 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
14 |
2.8 |
| 300 |
160 |
8 |
3 |
4 |
14 |
6.5 |
| 400 |
160 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
8.4 |
| 500 |
150 |
19 |
8 |
4 |
14 |
9.8 |
| 700 |
70 |
36 |
15 |
0 |
14 |
12.6 |
| 800 |
Nil |
46 |
13 |
4 |
14 |
14.0 |
| 1,000 |
" |
58 |
6 |
8 |
14 |
14.0 |
| 2,000 |
" |
116 |
13 |
4 |
14 |
14.0 |
| 2,100 |
" |
122 |
10 |
0 |
14 |
14.0 |
| 3,000 |
" |
175 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
14.0 |
| 3,100 |
" |
180 |
16 |
8 |
14 |
14.0 |
| 5,000 |
" |
291 |
13 |
4 |
14 |
14.0 |
| 5,100 |
" |
350 |
0 |
0 |
14 + 6 |
16.5 |
| 10,000 |
" |
758 |
6 |
8 |
14 + 6 |
18.2 |
| 50,000 |
" |
4,091 |
13 |
4 |
14 + 6 |
19.6 |
| 100,000 |
" |
8,258 |
6 |
8 |
14 + 6 |
19.8 |
Now let us consider the reform of the Income Tax.
In the first place it is suggested that the Inhabited
House Duty should be entirely abolished. As has been
already pointed out, it is a clumsy second Income Tax and
its incidence is most unequal. It is not paid in Ireland,
and too much of it falls upon poor clerks and tradesmen
in London and other big towns. It is urged here that if
we properly reform the Income Tax it should not be
necessary to levy a second one under another name.
It must be frankly recognized that, in principle, the
Income Tax reforms urged in "Riches and Poverty,"
edition 1905, have been largely conceded. Method is so
important in this connexion, however, that it is necessary
to insist that the Income Tax still needs serious revision.
Why is it that so much misplaced ingenuity has been
applied to our Income Tax law by successive Chancellors
of the Exchequer? Why these alleged rates of Income
Tax, which on inquiry prove to be nominal, and the
enactment of a clumsy Super-Tax to amend a sufficiently
clumsy Income Tax? Why should it be necessary to
arrive at a "sort of" graduation by a series of provisions,
which few men, inside or outside the legislature, pretend
to understand?
The explanation is that we have not a complete Census
of Incomes. The point is of the first importance. The
establishment, within the limits of a very small possible
margin of error, of the number of British Income Tax
payers in 1903, which I effected by a careful examination
of so far uncorrelated facts in "Riches and Poverty,"
edition 1905, brought to light the then unsuspected fact
that about 750,000 out of about 1,000,000 Income Tax
payers actually declared their individual aggregate incomes
from all sources for the purposes of Income Tax.
These declarations, as already explained, were made by
the smaller Income Tax payers in order to avail themselves
of the abatement system, the abatements being granted
only to those persons with incomes not exceeding £700
a year who made declarations. In effect, those of this
class who do not declare are heavily fined.
The number of the declarants was further increased in
1907 by Mr Asquith's differentiation of the Income Tax.
Mr Asquith enacted, as we have seen, that persons
who earned their incomes, and whose incomes did not
exceed £2,000 a year, should enjoy a lower rate of
taxation if they declared their incomes.
This led to declarations by a fresh batch of Income Tax
payers, and it became possible for Somerset House to collect
and publish a new set of most valuable statistics. Unfortunately,
the precise facts of the case have neither been
collected nor published, important as the knowledge of
them is if we are to tax wisely and justly. Nevertheless,
there is little doubt that the new batch of declarations
between £700 and £2,000 a year raised, or will soon
raise, the proportion of Income Tax payers making personal
declarations to over nine out of eleven of the whole
body.
The question immediately suggests itself: Why
should not the balance of two out of eleven, or thereabouts,
be compelled to fall into line with the majority?
This balance consists, of course, of the well-to-do and
rich, chiefly those who derive their incomes from property.
These persons are not taxed directly at all. The State
relies upon what is called "taxing at the source." That
is, dividends are taxed at the company's offices before
they are distributed, and rents are taxed through the
occupier, the occupiers being left to recover the Schedule A
tax from the landlords and houselords.
This reliance upon an indirect form of "direct" taxation
leads, of course, to much income escaping tax, for rich
people, it will be seen, have not to make a return of their
incomes, but are in the happy position of letting the State
catch them when it can. No other country levying an
Income Tax does this thing; yet we perversely maintain
that there is no system so effective as ours. Happily,
the Finance Act of 1909 (passed in 1910) still further
increases the number of those who are to declare.
First, as to earned incomes, as noted above, Mr Lloyd
George enacted that earned incomes over £2,000 but not
over £3,000 are to continue to pay one shilling in the £,
and that those over £3,000 are to pay fourteen pence.
It follows that a new batch of declarations will be forthcoming
from those, or most of those, between £2,000 and
£3,000, in order to get the shilling rate.
Again, a Super-Tax is to be levied upon all those
whose incomes exceed £5,000 a year, of whom there are
not less than 14,000 or 15,000. This Super-Tax is to
be collected by Special Commissioners. How will these
Special Commissioners know to whom to apply?
Obviously they have not a list of the fortunate 15,000.
They will doubtless go to work by sending a form asking
for a return of total income to all people who appear to be
very rich.
All the inhabitants of big houses, and, indeed, all the
obviously rich, will receive a declaration form to fill up.
And, of course, in order to catch the 15,000 the Commissioners
will have to send notices to many times that
number of people, for it is really exceedingly difficult to
decide by appearance or reputation whether a man has
£2,500 or £5,000 a year. The Budget provides that
every person sent a form must fill it up, whether or not
he has £5,000 a year. Consequently, at the very top of
the scale, the Income Tax Commissioners will come into
possession of personal declarations relating to 50,000 or
more of our moneyed citizens.
And yet we shall not arrive at complete declarations
from all Income Tax payers. Nearly all persons who earn
their incomes will declare, but as to unearned incomes
there is a big hiatus.
Small unearned incomes up to £700 a year will be
mostly declared in order to get the abatements.
Very big unearned incomes must be declared, as we
have seen, through the demands for Super-Tax.
But, between £700 a year and £5,000 a year, the unearned
scale is ungraduated, and, save for the people with less than
£5,000 a year, asked in error to declare by the Super-Tax
Commissioners, there will be no personal declarations.
Surely this ought not to be. If the poor are to declare
and the very rich are to declare, why should not the middle
incomes be declared? Why should the State continue to
rely, in respect of the considerable amount of income concerned,
upon taxation at the source? The question
becomes the more urgent when we reflect that the fresh
batch of declarations brought in by Mr Asquith's differentiation
scheme of 1907, noted above, brought to light many
millions of "new" income (see p. 14). Every new revelation
of existing income, of course, lowers taxation pro tanto.
Perhaps the final argument for universal personal
declaration of income is furnished by the following enactment
of the Budget of 1907:
Finance Act (1907), Section 21.
"Every employer, when required to do so by notice
from an assessor, shall, within the time limited by the
notice, prepare and deliver to the assessor a return of the
names and places of residence of any persons employed by
him."
We thus go behind the backs of small tax-payers to
their employers, and compel the divulgence of incomes
which are usually the total incomes of the employed.
Yet the employer who, by our direction, hands his employee
over to the tax-collector, is not compelled by us
to declare his own total income, unless (1) he has no
other income than his Schedule D income, or (2) he is a
payer of Super-Tax.
Given a Census of Incomes it would become possible
to arrive at a practical and just Income Tax.
We could set up a plain graduated scale of taxation,
differentiated up to a certain point as between earned
and unearned incomes, making it quite clear to the tax-payer
what is demanded from him and revealing to him
the justice or injustice of our methods by enabling
him to compare his rate of taxation with that of those
richer or poorer than himself.
We need not abandon taxation "at the source." We
could levy on property incomes at the source a certain
rate of tax, say 1s. in the £. Then when the total income
was declared, the tax-payer would point out upon what
items, if any, 1s. in the £ had been deducted at the source
and pay the balance of the tax.
Let us take a hypothetical case—that of a barrister
earning £2,000 a year, and deriving a further £1,000 from
rents and a further £300 from Consols. The total income,
£3,300, let us suppose taxed under the graduation
scheme at 14d. in the £. The Income Tax on the £1,000
of rents would be paid by his tenants and deducted from
the rents paid him, while the Bank of England would
deduct 1s. in the £ from the interest on the Consols.
Declaring his total income at £3,300 he would pay the
balance due, thus:—
| Total Declared Income. |
|
£ |
s. |
d. |
|
£3,300 at 14d. |
|
192 |
10 |
0 |
Taxed at the source:— |
|
|
(1) Schedule A. 1s. in the £ on £1,000 of rent, deducted by tenants |
£50 |
|
(2) Schedule C. 1s. in the £ on £300 of interest deducted by Bank of England |
£15 |
|
|
65 |
0 |
0 |
Balance of Tax Payable— |
£127 |
10 |
0 |
If, upon the introduction of such a system, local assessors
were empowered to ask every householder assessed for local
rates at £20 a year and upwards to declare his income in the
place where he resides, there would undoubtedly be a great
increase in the Income Tax assessments. A great part of
the evasion of Income Tax results from persons being taxed
at their places of business, where there is often little
evidence of means. In a man's own neighbourhood it is
difficult grossly to understate income.
For several years I put down in the House of Commons
the following suggested amendment to the Finance Bill:
Every person upon whom notice is served in manner prescribed
by section forty-eight of The Income Tax Act, 1842 (which
section relates to the delivery of notices by assessors), requiring
him to make a return of his income chargeable to duty under any
and every schedule of the Income Tax, shall make a return, in
the form required by the notice, which shall show the amount of
his aggregate income from all sources, whether he is or is not
chargeable with duty, and upon what part or parts of such
aggregate income, if any, Income Tax has already been paid
under the Income Tax Acts by deduction at the source, and in
default shall be liable to a penalty under section fifty-five of The
Income Tax Act, 1842.
On one occasion some twenty Members of Parliament
consented to put down this amendment with me, but
every attempt to obtain its enactment has failed. Until
it is obtained there can be no just graduation of the
Income Tax, and tax-payers who declare their incomes
under the existing law will continue to pay too much
because others pay too little.
Some smaller matters claim our attention.
A minor but not unimportant reform, for which we have
to thank Mr Lloyd George, is the concession made to
small Income Tax payers who have young children, a
concession which the present writer believes he was the
first to urge in the House of Commons. The Finance
Bill of 1909 (Sect. 68) provided that Income Tax payers
with incomes not exceeding £500 should be entitled to
exemption from taxation to the amount of £10 for each
child under the age of 16 years. The effect of this
provision is far-reaching. A clerk with £200 a year and
three young children gets the £160 abatement and £30
abatement in respect of his children. His taxable income
is thus reduced to £10 and his payment of Income Tax
to 7s. 6d.
On the same ground, respect for the principle of ability
to pay, the Income Tax law should provide for special
abatements in case of the illness of salary earners, special
misfortunes, the support of poor relatives, etc. It is found
possible to work such provisions in Prussia; it ought to
be found possible to do so here.
The importance of a thorough revision of the Income
Tax law is growing. The view urged here is that the
citizen's subscription to the National Club should not
only be justly proportioned to his means, but presented
to him intelligibly, and collected without waste or undue
interference with business.
The phenomenon of an annual Budget debate has
come to be regarded as a necessary Parliamentary evil,
but is there any justification for it?
When the nation has decided, through its representatives,
for good reasons or for bad reasons, that a certain sum of
money must be raised for public purposes, it is not the
function of the Chancellor of the Exchequer qua Chancellor
of the Exchequer to decide whether the purposes are good
or bad, or whether the sum is too large or too small. As
a member of the Government, the Finance Minister has,
of course, a voice in deciding what sums should be spent
and upon what purposes, but, as Chancellor of the Exchequer,
his duty is not to reason why but to find the
money. In the finding of the money, ought there to
be, year by year, a long and painful discussion as to how
it should be done?
We have also become accustomed to regarding the
Budget as a great and glorious secret, to be carefully
guarded until the Chancellor of the Exchequer makes his
annual speech. Does the tradition of secrecy rest upon
necessity? For my part, I call the necessity in question.
I affirm that our annual Budget need present no difficulties;
that it is not inherently a difficult thing to
accomplish; and that the conception of a Budget as a
great secret, to be carefully hidden until Budget Day, is an
altogether childish conception. There is some excuse for
reserving a child's Christmas presents until he wakes up
and finds the gifts of Santa Claus in his stocking on the
morning of December 25th, but there is no excuse whatever
for the ridiculous secrecy with which tradition shrouds the
annual Budget statement.
I do not deny that secrecy has been necessary in
connexion with such Budgets as have been put on
record in the past. Of what have these Budgets consisted?
Year by year, a number of clumsy, inefficient
and indefensible taxes have been tinkered by successive
guardians of the national purse. Tea taxes, coffee taxes,
beer taxes, sugar taxes, alleged income taxes, double
inheritance duties, have had bits carved off them, or bits
attached to them, without rhyme or reason. Year after
year, Mincing Lane has been in throes of excitement as to
whether there was to be a penny on tea, or a penny off
tea. Cunning gentlemen have rushed in tea to evade a
suspected inclination to tax that article further, or sugar
brokers have been excited at the prospect of making
something, or losing something, over a little less or a
little more on sugar. We are a grave and respectful
people, or assuredly we should laugh at this annual
exhibition of mingled greed and incompetency. If as
much intelligence were put into the making of boots,
none of us would be able to walk.
The subject is made additionally interesting by the
fact that all along men have known perfectly well how
taxes ought to be levied. It is 130 years since Adam
Smith wrote his first maxim of taxation, which I have
already quoted:
"The subjects of every State ought to contribute
towards the support of the government as nearly as
possible in proportion to their respective abilities;
that is, in proportion to the revenue which they
respectively enjoy under the protection of the
State."
As long ago as 1848 John Stuart Mill wrote ("Principles
of Political Economy," Book V. Chapter 2):
"As, in a case of voluntary subscription for a purpose
in which all are interested, all are thought to have done
their part fairly when each has contributed according to
his means, that is, has made an equal sacrifice for the
common object; in like manner should this be the principle
of compulsory contributions: and it is superfluous to
look for a more ingenious or recondite ground to rest
the principle upon.... To take a thousand a year
from the possessor of ten thousand would not deprive
him of anything really conducive either to the support
or to the comfort of existence: and if such would be the
effect of taking five pounds from one whose income is
fifty, the sacrifice required from the last is not only
greater than, but entirely incommensurable with, that
imposed upon the first. The mode of adjusting these
inequalities of pressure, which seems to be the most
equitable, is that recommended by Bentham, of leaving
a certain minimum of income, sufficient to provide the
necessaries of life, untaxed.... The exemption in favour
of the smaller incomes should not, I think, be stretched
further than to the amount of income needful for life,
health, and immunity from bodily pain."
In passing, this quotation may be commended to those
who regard the exemption of very small incomes from
taxation as a tenet of modern Socialism. Here we have
it propounded in 1848 by John Stuart Mill, who got it
from Jeremy Bentham.
It is in spite of such admired utterances as these that
we have still, in the year 1910, such outrages upon
common sense as taxes upon sugar, taxes upon petrol,
taxes upon cocoa, taxes upon business contracts, taxes
upon marriage certificates, and a great party in the State is
at this hour ardently desirous of adding to the number of
such stupidities by thousands or even tens of thousands.
When we inquire for the reason for the existence of
such unbusinesslike and costly stupidities, we find a
simple explanation. It has been held in the past universally,
and is held in the present by many, that the
Government has no business to inquire into the incomes
of the people it governs. Lacking knowledge of incomes,
it has been obviously impossible for Governments to
tax people according to their ability to bear taxation.
Consequently, Chancellors of the Exchequer have had to
devise all sorts of trumpery and costly expedients to get
by indirect means what should have been got honestly
and directly.
In short, the first condition of fair budgeting is a
Census of Incomes. Given that, we are able to throw
away all the lumber of indirect taxation and of inefficient
taxation. And it should be observed that fair budgeting
means simple budgeting—budgeting admitting of no
annual argument. The annual budget wrangle is the
effect of our devious methods of taxation.
Given universal declarations of income, and an end
could speedily be made of our present array of taxes.
We could decide upon some minimum of income which
should be totally exempt from taxation on the ground
that it represented the smallest sum upon which a family
can be sustained in health and decency. Above that
margin, we could arrange a graduated scale of taxation
which should present to each citizen a fair bill for public
expenses. That bill could be made payable in two or
even four instalments, to make the payment an easy
matter for the tax-payer. This arrangement once made,
any increase of taxation would simply call for a proportionate
increase from each tax-payer. Argument
would not lie in the province of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, for the matter would be finally settled.
Argument would begin and end with the decision of
Parliament to spend certain moneys; that would not be a
Budget argument, but an argument upon public policy in
expenditure. And the plainer the bill for taxes, the more
closely expenditure would be scanned.
My remarks, of course, must not be taken to condemn
taxes upon alcohol or taxes upon inheritances. And
beyond lies the question of the acquisition of monopolies
by the State, and the consequent reduction of taxation
by reason of the State carrying on revenue-producing
undertakings.