The following speech was the third of the series delivered
by Mr. Gladstone in the course of his Mid-Lothian canvass,
extending from November 24th to December 9th. These
assaults on the policy of Lord Beaconsfield had not a little to
do with the triumph of the Liberals and the return of Gladstone
to power in the following spring.
Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:
In addressing you to-day, as in addressing
like audiences assembled for a like purpose in
other places of the county, I am warmed by
the enthusiastic welcome which you have been
pleased in every quarter and in every form to
accord to me. I am, on the other hand,
daunted when I recollect, first of all, what
large demands I have to make on your patience;
and secondly, how inadequate are my
powers, and how inadequate almost any amount
of time you can grant me, to set forth worthily
the whole of the case which ought to be laid
before you in connection with the coming
election.
To-day, gentlemen, as I know that many
among you are interested in the land, and as
I feel that what is termed “agricultural distress”
is at the present moment a topic too
serious to be omitted from our consideration,
I shall say some words upon the subject of
that agricultural distress, and particularly, because
in connection with it there have arisen in
some quarters of the country proposals, which
have received a countenance far beyond their
deserts, to reverse or to compromise the work
which it took us one whole generation to
achieve, and to revert to the mischievous,
obstructive, and impoverishing system of protection.66
Gentlemen, I speak of agricultural
distress as a matter now undoubtedly serious.
Let none of us withhold our sympathy from
the farmer, the cultivator of the soil, in the
struggle he has to undergo. His struggle is a
struggle of competition with the United States.
But I do not fully explain the case when I say
the United States. It is not with the entire
United States, it is with the Western portion of
these States—that portion remote from the seaboard;
and I wish in the first place, gentlemen,
to state to you all a fact of very great interest
and importance, as it seems to me, relating to
and defining the point at which the competition
of the Western States of America is most
severely felt. I have in my hand a letter
received recently from one well known, and
honorably known, in Scotland—Mr. Lyon Playfair,
who has recently been a traveller in the
United States, and who, as you well know, is
as well qualified as any man upon earth for
accurate and careful investigation.67 The point,
gentlemen, at which the competition of the
Western States of America is most severely felt
is in the Eastern States of America. Whatever
be agricultural distress in Scotland, whatever it
be, where undoubtedly it is more felt, in England,
it is greater by much in the Eastern
States of America. In the States of New
England the soil has been to some extent
exhausted by careless methods of agriculture,
and these, gentlemen, are the greatest of all
the enemies with which the farmer has to
contend.
But the foundation of the statement I make,
that the Eastern States of America are those
that most feel the competition of the West, is
to be found in facts,—in this fact above all,
that not only they are not in America, as we
are here, talking about the shortness of the
annual returns, and in some places having
much said on the subject of rents, and of
temporary remission or of permanent reduction.
That is not the state of things; they have
actually got to this point, that the capital
values of land, as tested by sales in the market,
have undergone an enormous diminution. Now
I will tell you something that actually happened,
on the authority of my friend Mr. Playfair.
I will tell you something that has happened
in one of the New England States,—not,
recollect, in a desert or a remote country,—in
an old cultivated country, and near one of the
towns of these States, a town that has the
honorable name of Wellesley.
Mr. Playfair tells me this: Three weeks ago—that
is to say, about the first of this month,
so you will see my information is tolerably recent,—three
weeks ago a friend of Mr. Playfair
bought a farm near Wellesley for $33 an acre, for
£6 12s. an acre—agricultural land, remember, in
an old settled country. That is the present
condition of agricultural property in the old
States of New England. I think by the simple
recital of that fact I have tolerably well established
my case, for you have not come in England,
and you have not come in Scotland, to the
point at which agricultural land is to be had—not
wild land, but improved and old cultivated
land,—is to be had for the price of £6 12s. an
acre. He mentions that this is by no means a
strange case, an isolated case, that it fairly
represented the average transactions that have
been going on; and he says that in that region
the ordinary price of agricultural land at the
present time is from $20 to $50 an acre, or from
£4 to £10. In New York the soil is better, and
the population is greater; but even in the State
of New York land ranges for agricultural purposes
from $50 to $100, that is to say, from
£10 to £20 an acre.
I think those of you, gentlemen, who are
farmers will perhaps derive some comfort from
perceiving that if the pressure here is heavy the
pressure elsewhere and the pressure nearer to
the seat of this very abundant production is
greater and far greater still.
It is most interesting to consider, however,
what this pressure is. There has been developed
in the astonishing progressive power of
the United States—there has been developed a
faculty of producing corn for the subsistence of
man, with a rapidity and to an extent unknown
in the experience of mankind. There is nothing
like it in history. Do not let us conceal,
gentlemen, from ourselves the fact; I shall not
stand the worse with any of you who are farmers
if I at once avow that this greater and comparatively
immense abundance of the prime
article of subsistence for mankind is a great
blessing vouchsafed by Providence to mankind.
In part I believe that the cheapness has been
increased by special causes. The lands from
which the great abundance of American wheat
comes are very thinly peopled as yet. They
will become more thickly peopled, and as they
become more thickly peopled a larger proportion
of their produce will be wanted for home
consumption and less of it will come to you,
and at a higher price. Again, if we are rightly
informed, the price of American wheat has
been unnaturally reduced by the extraordinary
depression, in recent times, of trade in America,
and especially of the mineral trades, upon which
many railroads are dependent in America, and
with which these railroads are connected in
America in a degree and manner that in this
country we know but little of. With a revival
of trade in America it is to be expected that
the freights of corn will increase, and all other
freights, because the employment of the railroads
will be a great deal more abundant, and
they will not be content to carry corn at nominal
rates. In some respects, therefore, you may
expect a mitigation of the pressure, but in
other respects it is likely to continue.
Nay, the Prime-Minister is reported as having
not long ago said,—and he ought to have the
best information on this subject, nor am I going
to impeach in the main what he stated,—he
gave it to be understood that there was about
to be a development of corn production in
Canada which would entirely throw into the
shade this corn production in the United States.
Well, that certainly was very cold comfort, as
far as the British agriculturist is concerned,
because he did not say—he could not say—that
the corn production of the United States was
to fall off, but there was to be added an enormous
corn production from Manitoba,68 the
great province which forms now a part of the
Canada Dominion. There is no doubt, I believe,
that it is a correct expectation that vast or very
large quantities of corn will proceed from that
province, and therefore we have to look forward
to a state of things in which, for a considerable
time to come, large quantities of wheat will be
forthcoming from America, probably larger
quantities, and perhaps frequently at lower
prices than those at which the corn-producing
and corn-exporting districts of Europe have
commonly been able to supply us. Now that
I believe to be, gentlemen, upon the whole, not
an unfair representation of the state of things.
How are you to meet that state of things?
What are your fair claims? I will tell you. In
my opinion your fair claims are, in the main,
two. One is to be allowed to purchase every
article that you require in the cheapest market,
and have no needless burden laid upon any
thing that comes to you and can assist you in
the cultivation of your land. But that claim
has been conceded and fulfilled.
I do not know whether there is an object, an
instrument, a tool of any kind, an auxiliary of
any kind, that you want for the business of the
farmer, which you do not buy at this moment
in the cheapest market. But beyond that, you
want to be relieved from every unjust and unnecessary
legislative restraint. I say every
unnecessary legislative restraint, because taxation,
gentlemen, is unfortunately a restraint
upon us all, but we cannot say that it is always
unnecessary, and we cannot say that it is always
unjust. Yesterday I ventured to state—and I
will therefore not now return to the subject—a
number of matters connected with the state of
legislation in which it appears to me to be of
vital importance, both to the agricultural interest
and to the entire community, that the occupiers
and cultivators of the land of this country
should be relieved from restraints under the
operation of which they now suffer considerably.
Beyond those two great heads, gentlemen, what
you have to look to, I believe, is your own
energy, your own energy of thought and action,
and your care not to undertake to pay rents
greater than, in reasonable calculation, you
think you can afford. I am by no means sure,
though I speak subject to the correction of
higher authority,—I am by no means sure that
in Scotland within the last fifteen or twenty
years something of a speculative character has
not entered into rents, and particularly, perhaps,
into the rents of hill farms. I remember hearing
of the augmentations which were taking
place, I believe, all over Scotland—I verified
the fact in a number of counties—about twelve
or fourteen years ago, in the rents of hill farms,
which I confess impressed me with the idea
that the high prices that were then ruling,
and ruling increasingly from year to year, for
meat and wool, were perhaps for once leading
the wary and shrewd Scottish agriculturist
a little beyond the mark in the rents he
undertook to pay. But it is not this only which
may press. It is, more broadly, in a serious
and manful struggle that you are engaged, in
which you will have to exert yourselves to the
uttermost, in which you will have a right to
claim every thing that the legislature can do
for you; and I hope it may perhaps possibly be
my privilege and honor to assist in procuring
for you some of those provisions of necessary
liberation from restraint; but beyond that, it
is your own energies, of thought and action, to
which you will have to trust.
Now, gentlemen, having said thus much, my
next duty is to warn you against quack remedies,
against delusive remedies, against the quack remedies
that there are plenty of people found to
propose, not so much in Scotland as in England;
for, gentlemen, from Mid-Lothian at present
we are speaking to England as well as to Scotland.
Let me give a friendly warning from this
northern quarter to the agriculturist of England
not to be deluded by those who call themselves
his friends in a degree of special and superior
excellence, and who have been too much given
to delude him in other times; not to be deluded
into hoping relief from sources from which it
can never come. Now, gentlemen, there are
three of these remedies. The first of them,
gentlemen, I will not call a quack remedy at
all, but I will speak of it notwithstanding in the
tone of rational and dispassionate discussion.
I am not now so much upon the controversial
portion of the land question—a field which,
Heaven knows, is wide enough—as I am upon
matters of deep and universal interest to us in
our economic and social condition. There are
some gentlemen, and there are persons for
whom I for one have very great respect, who
think that the difficulties of our agriculture may
be got over by a fundamental change in the
land-holding system of this country.
I do not mean, now pray observe, a change
as to the law of entail and settlement, and all
those restraints which, I hope, were tolerably
well disposed of yesterday at Dalkeith69; but I
mean those who think that if you can cut up
the land, or a large part of it, into a multitude
of small properties, that of itself will solve the
difficulty, and start everybody on a career of
prosperity.
Now, gentlemen, to a proposal of that kind,
I, for one, am not going to object upon the
ground that it would be inconsistent with the
privileges of landed proprietors. In my opinion,
if it is known to be for the welfare of the community
at large, the legislature is perfectly
entitled to buy out the landed proprietors. It
is not intended probably to confiscate the property
of a landed proprietor more than the property
of any other man; but the state is perfectly
entitled, if it please, to buy out the landed
proprietors as it may think fit, for the purpose
of dividing the property into small lots. I
don’t wish to recommend it, because I will show
you the doubts that, to my mind, hang about
that proposal; but I admit that in principle no
objection can be taken. Those persons who
possess large portions of the spaces of the
earth are not altogether in the same position as
the possessors of mere personalty; that personalty
does not impose the same limitations upon
the action and industry of man, and upon the
well-being of the community, as does the possession
of land; and, therefore, I freely own
that compulsory expropriation is a thing which
for an adequate public object is in itself admissible
and so far sound in principle.
Now, gentlemen, this idea about small proprietors,
however, is one which very large
bodies and parties in this country treat with
the utmost contempt; and they are accustomed
to point to France, and say: “Look at France.”
In France you have got 5,000,000—I am not
quite sure whether it is 5,000,000 or even more;
I do not wish to be beyond the mark in any
thing—you have 5,000,000 of small proprietors,
and you do not produce in France as many
bushels of wheat per acre as you do in England.
Well, now I am going to point out to you a
very remarkable fact with regard to the condition
of France. I will not say that France
produces—for I believe it does not produce—as
many bushels of wheat per acre as England
does, but I should like to know whether the
wheat of France is produced mainly upon the
small properties of France. I believe that the
wheat of France is produced mainly upon the
large properties of France, and I have not any
doubt that the large properties of England are,
upon the whole, better cultivated, and more
capital is put into the land than in the large
properties of France. But it is fair that justice
should be done to what is called the peasant
proprietary. Peasant proprietary is an excellent
thing, if it can be had, in many points of
view. It interests an enormous number of the
people in the soil of the country, and in the
stability of its institutions and its laws. But
now look at the effect that it has upon the
progressive value of the land—and I am going
to give you a very few figures which I will
endeavor to relieve from all complication, lest
I should unnecessarily weary you. But what
will you think when I tell you that the agricultural
value of France—the taxable income
derived from the land, and therefore the income
of the proprietors of that land—has advanced
during our lifetime far more rapidly than that
of England? When I say England I believe
the same thing is applicable to Scotland, certainly
to Ireland; but I shall take England for
my test, because the difference between England
and Scotland, though great, does not
touch the principle; and, because it so happens
that we have some means of illustration from
former times for England, which are not equally
applicable for all the three kingdoms.
Here is the state of the case. I will not go
back any further than 1851. I might go back
much further; it would only strengthen my case.
But for 1851 I have a statement made by
French official authority of the agricultural income
of France, as well as the income of other
real property, viz., houses. In 1851 the agricultural
income of France was £76,000,000. It
was greater in 1851 than the whole income
from land and houses together had been in
1821. This is a tolerable evidence of progress;
but I will not enter into the detail of it, because
I have no means of dividing the two—the house
income and the land income—for the earlier
year, namely, 1821. In 1851 it was £76,000,000—the
agricultural income; and in 1864 it had
risen from £76,000,000 to £106,000,000. That
is to say, in the space of thirteen years the increase
of agricultural values in France—annual
values—was no less than forty per cent., or three
per cent. per annum. Now, I go to England.
Wishing to be quite accurate, I shall limit myself
to that with respect to which we have positive
figures. In England the agricultural income
in 1813–14 was £37,000,000; in 1842 it
was £42,000,000, and that year is the one I will
take as my starting-point. I have given you
the years 1851 to 1864 in France. I could only
give you those thirteen years with a certainty
that I was not misleading you, and I believe
I have kept within the mark. I believe I might
have put my case more strongly for France.
In 1842, then, the agricultural income of
England was £42,000,000; in 1876 it was £52,000,000—that
is to say, while the agricultural
income of France increased forty per cent. in
thirteen years, the agricultural income of England
increased twenty per cent. in thirty-four
years. The increase in France was three per
cent. per annum; the increase in England was
about one half or three fifths per cent. per annum.
Now, gentlemen, I wish this justice to
be done to a system where peasant proprietary
prevails. It is of great importance. And will
you allow me, you who are Scotch agriculturists,
to assure you that I speak to you not only with
the respect which is due from a candidate to a
constituency, but with the deference which is
due from a man knowing very little of agricultural
matters to those who know a great deal?
And there is one point at which the considerations
that I have been opening up, and this rapid
increase of the value of the soil in France, bear
upon our discussions. Let me try to explain it.
I believe myself that the operation of economic
laws is what in the main dictates the distribution
of landed property in this country. I
doubt if those economic laws will allow it to remain
cut up into a multitude of small properties
like the small properties of France. As to
small holdings, I am one of those who attach
the utmost value to them. I say that in the
Lothians—I say that in the portion of the
country where almost beyond any other large
holdings prevail—in some parts of which large
holdings exclusively are to be found—I attach
the utmost value to them. But it is not on
that point I am going to dwell, for we have no
time for what is unnecessary. What I do wish
very respectfully to submit to you, gentlemen,
is this. When you see this vast increase of the
agricultural value of France, you know at once it
is perfectly certain that it has not been upon the
large properties of France, which, if any thing,
are inferior in cultivation to the large properties
of England. It has been upon those very
peasant-properties which some people are so
ready to decry. What do the peasant-properties
mean? They mean what, in France, is
called the small cultivation—that is to say, cultivation
of superior articles, pursued upon a
small scale—cultivation of flowers, cultivation
of trees and shrubs, cultivation of fruits of every
kind, and all that, in fact, which rises above the
ordinary character of farming produce, and
rather approaches the produce of the gardener.
Gentlemen, I cannot help having this belief,
that, among other means of meeting the difficulties
in which we may be placed, our destiny
is that a great deal more attention will have to
be given than heretofore by the agriculturalists
of England, and perhaps even by the agriculturalists
of Scotland, to the production of fruits,
of vegetables, of flowers, of all that variety of
objects which are sure to find a market in a
rich and wealthy country like this, but which
have hitherto been consigned almost exclusively
to garden production. You know that in
Scotland, in Aberdeenshire—and I am told also
in Perthshire—a great example of this kind has
been set in the cultivation of strawberries—the
cultivation of strawberries is carried on over
hundreds of acres at once. I am ashamed,
gentlemen, to go further into this matter, as if
I was attempting to instruct you. I am sure
you will take my hint as a respectful hint—I
am sure you will take it as a friendly hint. I do
not believe that the large properties of this
country, generally or universally, can or will be
broken up into small ones. I do not believe
that the land of this country will be owned, as
a general rule, by those who cultivate it. I
believe we shall continue to have, as we have
had, a class of landlords and a class of cultivators,
but I most earnestly desire to see—not
only to see the relations of those classes to
one another harmonious and sound, their interests
never brought into conflict; but I desire to
see both flourishing and prospering, and the
soil of my country producing, as far as may be,
under the influence of capital and skill, every
variety of product which may give an abundant
livelihood to those who live upon it. I say,
therefore, gentlemen, and I say it with all
respect, I hope for a good deal from the small
culture, the culture in use among the small
proprietors of France; but I do not look to a
fundamental change in the distribution of
landed property in this country as a remedy for
agricultural distress.
But I go on to another remedy which is proposed,
and I do it with a great deal less of respect;
nay, I now come to the region of what
I have presumed to call quack remedies. There
is a quack remedy which is called Reciprocity,
and this quack remedy is under the special protection
of quack doctors, and among the quack
doctors, I am sorry to say, there appear to be
some in very high station indeed; and if I am
rightly informed, no less a person than her
Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
has been moving about the country, and indicating
a very considerable expectation that possibly
by reciprocity agricultural distress will be
relieved.70 Let me test, gentlemen, the efficacy
of this quack remedy for your, in some places,
agricultural pressure, and generally distress—the
pressure that has been upon you, the struggle in
which you are engaged. Pray watch its operation;
pray note what is said by the advocates of
reciprocity. They always say, We are the soundest
and best free-traders. We recommend
reciprocity because it is the truly effectual
method of bringing about free trade. At
present America imposes enormous duties upon
our cotton goods and upon our iron goods.
Put reciprocity into play, and America will become
a free-trading country. Very well, gentlemen,
how would that operate upon you agriculturists
in particular? Why, it would operate
thus: If your condition is to be regretted in
certain particulars, and capable of amendment,
I beg you to cast an eye of sympathy upon the
condition of the American agriculturist. It
has been very well said, and very truly said,—though
it is a smart antithesis,—the American
agriculturist has got to buy every thing that he
wants at prices which are fixed in Washington
by the legislation of America, but he has got to
sell every thing that he produces at prices which
are fixed in Liverpool—fixed by the free competition
of the world. How would you like
that, gentlemen—to have protective prices to
pay for every thing that you use—for your
manures, for your animals, for your implements,
for all your farming stock, and at the same time
to have to sell what you produce in the free
and open market of the world? But bring
reciprocity into play, and then, if reciprocity
doctors are right, the Americans will remove all
their protective duties, and the American
farmer, instead of producing, as he does now,
under the disadvantage, and the heavy disadvantage,
of having to pay protective prices for
every thing that constitutes his farming stock,
will have all his tools, and implements, and
manures, and every thing else purchased in the
free, open market of the world at free-trade
prices. So he will be able to produce his corn
to compete with you even cheaper than he
does now. So much for reciprocity considered
as a cure for distress. I am not going to consider
it now in any other point of view.
But, gentlemen, there are another set of men
who are bolder still, and who are not for reciprocity;
who are not content with that milder
form of quackery, but who recommend a reversion,
pure and simple, to what I may fairly call,
I think, the exploded doctrine of protection.
And upon this, gentlemen, I think it necessary,
if you will allow me, to say to you a few words,
because it is a very serious matter, and it is all
the more serious because her Majesty’s government—I
do not scruple to say—are coquetting
with this subject in a way which is not right.
They are tampering with it; they are playing
with it. A protective speech was made in the
House of Commons, in a debate last year by
Mr. Chaplin, on the part of what is called “the
agricultural interest.” Mr. Chaplin did not use
the word protection, but what he did say was
this: he said he demanded that the malt tax
should be abolished, and the revenue supplied
by a tax upon foreign barley or some other foreign
commodity. Well, if he has a measure of
that kind in his pocket, I don’t ask him to affix
the word protection to it. I can do that for
myself. Not a word of rebuke, gentlemen, was
uttered to the doctrines of Mr. Chaplin. He
was complimented upon the ability of his speech
and the well-chosen terms of his motion. Some
of the members of her Majesty’s government—the
minor members of her Majesty’s government—the
humbler luminaries of that great
constellation—have been going about the country
and telling their farming constituents that
they think the time has come when a return to
protection might very wisely be tried. But,
gentlemen, what delusions have been practised
upon the unfortunate British farmer! When
we go back for twenty years, what is now called
the Tory party was never heard of as the Tory
party. It was always heard of as the party
of protection. As long as the chiefs of the
protective party were not in office, as long as
they were irresponsible, they recommended
themselves to the good-will of the farmer as
protectionists, and said they would set him up
and put his interests on a firm foundation
through protection. We brought them into
office in the year 1852. I gave with pleasure a
vote that assisted to bring them into office. I
thought bringing them into office was the only
way of putting their professions to the test.
They came into office, and before they had
been six months in office they had thrown protection
to the winds. And that is the way in
which the British farmer’s expectations are
treated by those who claim for themselves in
the special sense the designation of his friends.
It is exactly the same with the malt tax.
Gentlemen, what is done with the malt tax?
The malt tax is held by them to be a great
grievance on the British farmer. Whenever a
Liberal government is in office, from time to
time they have a great muster from all parts of
the country to vote for the abolition of the
malt tax. But when a Tory government comes
into office, the abolition of the malt tax is totally
forgotten; and we have now had six years
of a Tory government without a word said, as
far as I can recollect,—and my friend in the
chair could correct me if I were wrong,—without
a motion made, or a vote taken, on the
subject of the malt tax. The malt tax, great
and important as it is, is small in reference to
protection. Gentlemen, it is a very serious
matter indeed if we ought to go back to protection,
because how did we come out of protection
to free trade? We came out of it by a
struggle which in its crisis threatened to convulse
the country, which occupied Parliaments,
upon which elections turned, which took up
twenty years of our legislative life, which broke
up parties. In a word, it effected a change so
serious, that if, after the manner in which we
effected that change, it be right that we should
go back upon our steps, then all I can say is,
that we must lose that which has ever been one
of the most honorable distinctions of British
legislation in the general estimation of the
world,—that British legislation, if it moves
slowly, always moves in one direction—that we
never go back upon our steps.
But are we such children that, after spending
twenty years—as I may say from 1840 to 1860—in
breaking down the huge fabric of protection,
in 1879 we are seriously to set about building
it up again? If that be right, gentlemen,
let it be done, but it will involve on our part a
most humiliating confession. In my opinion it
is not right. Protection, however, let me point
out, now is asked for in two forms, and I am
next going to quote Lord Beaconsfield for the
purpose of expressing my concurrence with
him.
Mostly, I am bound to say, as far as my
knowledge goes, protection has not been asked
for by the agricultural interest, certainly not by
the farmers of Scotland.
It has been asked for by certain injudicious
cliques and classes of persons connected with
other industries—connected with some manufacturing
industries. They want to have duties
laid upon manufactures.
But here Lord Beaconsfield said—and I cordially
agree with him—that he would be no
party to the institution of a system in which
protection was to be given to manufactures,
and to be refused to agriculture.
That one-sided protection I deem to be totally
intolerable, and I reject it even at the
threshold as unworthy of a word of examination
or discussion.
But let us go on to two-sided protection, and
see whether that is any better—that is to say,
protection in the shape of duties on manufactures,
and protection in the shape of duties upon
corn, duties upon meat, duties upon butter and
cheese and eggs, and every thing that can be
produced from the land. Now, gentlemen, in
order to see whether we can here find a remedy
for our difficulties, I prefer to speculation and
mere abstract argument the method of reverting
to experience. Experience will give us very distinct
lessons upon this matter. We have the
power, gentlemen, of going back to the time
when protection was in full and unchecked
force, and of examining the effect which it produced
upon the wealth of the country. How,
will you say, do I mean to test that wealth? I
mean to test that wealth by the exports of the
country, and I will tell you why, because your
prosperity depends upon the wealth of your customers—that
is to say, upon their capacity to
buy what you produce. And who are your customers?
Your customers are the industrial
population of the country, who produce what
we export and send all over the world. Consequently,
when exports increase, your customers
are doing a large business, are growing wealthy,
are putting money in their pockets, and are able
to take that money out of their pockets in
order to fill their stomachs with what you produce.
When, on the contrary, exports do not
increase, your customers are poor, your prices
go down, as you have felt within the last few
years, in the price of meat, for example, and in
other things, and your condition is proportionally
depressed. Now, gentlemen, down to the
year 1842 no profane hand had been laid upon
the august fabric of protection. For recollect
that the farmers’ friends always told us that it
was a very august fabric, and that if you pulled
it down it would involve the ruin of the country.
That, you remember, was the commonplace
of every Tory speech delivered from a
country hustings to a farming constituency.
But before 1842 another agency had come into
force, which gave new life in a very considerable
degree to the industry of the country, and that
was the agency of railways, of improved communication,
which shortened distance and cheapened
transit, and effected in that way an enormous
economical gain and addition to the
wealth of the country. Therefore, in order to
see what we owe to our friend protection, I
won’t allow that friend to take credit for
what was done by railways in improving the
wealth of the country. I will go to the time
when I may say there were virtually no railways—that
is the time before 1830. Now, gentlemen,
here are the official facts which I shall lay
before you in the simplest form, and, remember,
using round numbers. I do that because, although
round numbers cannot be absolutely accurate,
they are easy for the memory to take
in, and they involve no material error, no falsification
of the case. In the year 1800, gentlemen,
the exports of British produce were thirty-nine
and a half millions sterling in value. The
population at that time,—no, I won’t speak of
the exact figure of the population, because I
have not got it for the three kingdoms.71 In the
years 1826 to 1830,—that is, after a medium period
of eight-and-twenty years,—the average of
our exports for those five years, which had been
thirty-nine and a half millions in 1800, was thirty-seven
millions. It is fair to admit that in 1800
the currency was somewhat less sound, and
therefore I am quite willing to admit that the
thirty-seven millions probably meant as much
in value as the thirty-nine and a half millions;
but substantially, gentlemen, the trade of the
country was stationary, practically stationary,
under protection. The condition of the people
grew, if possible, rather worse than better. The
wealth of the country was nearly stationary.
But now I show you what protection produced;
that it made no addition, it gave no onward
movement to the profits of those who are
your customers. But on these profits you depend;
because, under all circumstances, gentlemen,
this I think, nobody will dispute,—a
considerable portion of what the Englishman
or the Scotchman produces will, some way
or other, find its way down his throat.
What has been the case, gentlemen, since we
cast off the superstition of protection, since we
discarded the imposture of protection? I will
tell you what happened between 1830, when
there were no railways, and 1842, when no
change, no important change, had been made
as to protection, but when the railway system
was in operation, hardly in Scotland, but in
England to a very great extent, to a very considerable
extent upon the main lines of communication.
The exports which in 1830 had
been somewhere about £37,000,000, between
1840 and 1842 showed an average amount of
£50,000,000. That seems due, gentlemen, to
the agency of railways; and I wish you to bear
in mind the increasing benefit now derived from
that agency, in order that I may not claim any
undue credit for freedom of trade. From 1842,
gentlemen, onward, the successive stages of
free trade began; in 1842, in 1845, in 1846, in
1853, and again in 1860, the large measures
were carried which have completely reformed
your customs tariff, and reduced it from a taxation
of twelve hundred articles to a taxation
of, I think, less than twelve.
Now, under the system of protection, the export
trade of the country, the wealth and the
power of the manufacturing and producing
classes to purchase your agricultural products,
did not increase at all. In the time when railways
began to be in operation, but before free
trade, the exports of the country increased, as
I have shown you, by £13,000,000 in somewhere
about thirteen years—that is to say,
taking it roughly, at the rate of £1,000,000 a
year.
But since 1842, and down to the present time,
we have had, along with railways, always increasing
their benefits,—we have had the successive
adoption of free-trade measures; and what
has been the state of the export business of the
country? It has risen in this degree, that that
which from 1840 to 1842 averaged £50,000,000,
from 1873 to 1878 averaged £218,000,000. Instead
of increasing, as it had done between 1830
and 1842, when railways only were at work, at
the rate of £1,000,000 a year—instead of remaining
stagnant as it did when the country
was under protection pure and simple, with no
augmentation of the export trade to enlarge the
means of those who buy your products, the
total growth in a period of thirty-five years was
no less than £168,000,000, or, taking it roughly,
a growth in the export trade of the country to
the extent of between £4,000,000 and £5,000,000
a year. But, gentlemen, you know the fact.
You know very well, that while restriction was
in force, you did not get the prices that you
have been getting for the last twenty years.
The price of wheat has been much the same as
it had been before. The price of oats is a better
price than was to be had on the average
of protective times. But the price, with the
exception of wheat, of almost every agricultural
commodity, the price of wool, the price of meat,
the price of cheese, the price of every thing that
the soil produces, has been largely increased in
a market free and open to the world; because,
while the artificial advantage which you got
through protection, as it was supposed to be an
advantage, was removed, you were brought
into that free and open market, and the energy
of free trade so enlarged the buying capacity of
your customers, that they were willing and able
to give you, and did give you, a great deal more
for your meat, your wool, and your products in
general, than you would ever have got under the
system of protection. Gentlemen, if that be
true—and it cannot, I believe, be impeached or
impugned—if that be true, I don’t think I need
further discuss the matter, especially when so
many other matters have to be discussed.
I will therefore ask you again to cross the
seas with me. I see that the time is flying onward,
and, gentlemen, it is very hard upon you
to be so much vexed upon the subject of policy
abroad. You think generally, and I think, that
your domestic affairs are quite enough to call
for all your attention. There was a saying of
an ancient Greek orator, who, unfortunately,
very much undervalued what we generally call
the better portion of the community—namely,
women; he made a very disrespectful observation,
which I am going to quote, not for the
purpose of concurring with it, but for the purpose
of an illustration.
Pericles, the great Athenian statesman, said
with regard to women, their greatest merit was
to be never heard of.
Now, what Pericles untruly said of women, I
am very much disposed to say of foreign affairs—their
great merit would be to be never heard
of. Unfortunately, instead of being never
heard of, they are always heard of, and you
hear almost of nothing else; and I can’t promise
you, gentlemen, that you will be relieved
from this everlasting din, because the consequences
of an unwise meddling with foreign affairs
are consequences that will for some time
necessarily continue to trouble you, and that
will find their way to your pockets in the shape
of increased taxation.
Gentlemen, with that apology I ask you
again to go with me beyond the seas. And as
I wish to do full justice, I will tell you what I
think to be the right principles of foreign policy;
and then, as far as your patience and my
strength will permit, I will, at any rate for a
short time, illustrate those right principles by
some of the departures from them that have
taken place of late years. I first give you, gentlemen,
what I think the right principles of
foreign policy.
The first thing is to foster the strength of
the empire by just legislation and economy at
home, thereby producing two of the great elements
of national power—namely, wealth,
which is a physical element, and union and contentment,
which are moral elements,—and to
reserve the strength of the empire, to reserve
the expenditure of that strength, for great and
worthy occasions abroad. Here is my first
principle of foreign policy: good government
at home.
My second principle of foreign policy is this:
that its aim ought to be to preserve to the
nations of the world—and especially, were it
but for shame, when we recollect the sacred
name we bear as Christians, especially to the
Christian nations of the world—the blessings
of peace. That is my second principle.
My third principle is this: Even, gentlemen,
when you do a good thing, you may do it in so
bad a way that you may entirely spoil the
beneficial effect; and if we were to make ourselves
the apostles of peace in the sense of conveying
to the minds of other nations that we
thought ourselves more entitled to an opinion
on that subject than they are, or to deny their
rights—well, very likely we should destroy the
whole value of our doctrines. In my opinion
the third sound principle is this: to strive to
cultivate and maintain, aye, to the very uttermost,
what is called the concert of Europe; to
keep the powers of Europe in union together.
And why? Because by keeping all in union
together you neutralize, and fetter, and bind
up the selfish aims of each. I am not here to
flatter either England or any of them. They
have selfish aims, as, unfortunately, we in late
years have too sadly shown that we too have
had selfish aims; but their common action is
fatal to selfish aims. Common action means
common objects; and the only objects for
which you can unite together the powers of
Europe are objects connected with the common
good of them all. That, gentlemen, is my
third principle of foreign policy.
My fourth principle is: that you should
avoid needless and entangling engagements.
You may boast about them, you may brag
about them, you may say you are procuring
consideration for the country. You may say
that an Englishman can now hold up his head
among the nations. You may say that he is
now not in the hands of a Liberal ministry,
who thought of nothing but pounds, shillings,
and pence. But what does all this come to,
gentlemen? It comes to this, that you are increasing
your engagements without increasing
your strength; and if you increase engagements
without increasing strength, you diminish
strength, you abolish strength; you really
reduce the empire and do not increase it. You
render it less capable of performing its duties;
you render it an inheritance less precious to
hand on to future generations.
My fifth principle is this, gentlemen: to acknowledge
the equal rights of all nations. You
may sympathize with one nation more than another.
Nay, you must sympathize in certain
circumstances with one nation more than another.
You sympathize most with those nations,
as a rule, with which you have the closest
connection in language, in blood, and in religion,
or whose circumstances at the time seem
to give the strongest claim to sympathy. But
in point of right all are equal, and you have no
right to set up a system under which one of
them is to be placed under moral suspicion or
espionage, or to be made the constant subject
of invective. If you do that, but especially if
you claim for yourself a superiority, a pharisaical
superiority over the whole of them, then I
say you may talk about your patriotism if you
please, but you are a misjudging friend of your
country, and in undermining the basis of the esteem
and respect of other people for your
country you are in reality inflicting the severest
injury upon it. I have now given you, gentlemen,
five principles of foreign policy. Let me
give you a sixth, and then I have done.
And that sixth is: that in my opinion foreign
policy, subject to all the limitations that I have
described, the foreign policy of England should
always be inspired by the love of freedom.
There should be a sympathy with freedom, a
desire to give it scope, founded not upon visionary
ideas, but upon the long experience of
many generations within the shores of this
happy isle, that in freedom you lay the firmest
foundations both of loyalty and order; the
firmest foundations for the development of
individual character, and the best provision
for the happiness of the nation at large. In
the foreign policy of this country the name
of Canning ever will be honored. The name
of Russell ever will be honored. The name of
Palmerston ever will be honored by those who
recollect the erection of the kingdom of Belgium,
and the union of the disjoined provinces
of Italy. It is that sympathy, not a sympathy
with disorder, but, on the contrary, founded
upon the deepest and most profound love of
order,—it is that sympathy which in my opinion
ought to be the very atmosphere in which
a foreign secretary of England ought to live
and to move.
Gentlemen, it is impossible for me to do
more to-day than to attempt very slight illustrations
of those principles. But in uttering
those principles, I have put myself in a position
in which no one is entitled to tell me—you will
hear me out in what I say—that I simply object
to the acts of others, and lay down no rules
of action myself, I am not only prepared to
show what are the rules of action which in my
judgment are the right rules, but I am prepared
to apply them, nor will I shrink from their application.
I will take, gentlemen, the name
which, most of all others, is associated with
suspicion, and with alarm, and with hatred in
the minds of many Englishmen. I will take
the name of Russia, and at once I will tell you
what I think about Russia, and how I am prepared
as a member of Parliament to proceed in
any thing that respects Russia. You have
heard me, gentlemen, denounced sometimes, I
believe, as a Russian spy, sometimes as a Russian
agent, sometimes as perhaps a Russian
fool, which is not so bad, but still not very desirable.
But, gentlemen, when you come to
evidence, the worst thing that I have ever seen
quoted out of any speech or writing of mine
about Russia is that I did one day say, or I believe
I wrote, these terrible words: I recommended
Englishmen to imitate Russia in her
good deeds. Was not that a terrible proposition?
I cannot recede from it. I think we
ought to imitate Russia in her good deeds, and
if the good deeds be few, I am sorry for it, but
I am not the less disposed on that account to
imitate them when they come. I will now tell
you what I think just about Russia.
I make it one of my charges against the foreign
policy of her Majesty’s government, that,
while they have completely estranged from this
country—let us not conceal the fact—the feelings
of a nation of eighty millions, for that is
the number of the subjects of the Russian
empire,—while they have contrived completely
to estrange the feelings of that nation, they
have aggrandized the power of Russia. They
have aggrandized the power of Russia in two
ways, which I will state with perfect distinctness.
They have augmented her territory.
Before the European powers met at Berlin,
Lord Salisbury met with Count Schouvaloff,
and Lord Salisbury agreed that, unless he could
convince Russia by his arguments in the open
Congress of Berlin, he would support the restoration
to the despotic power of Russia of that
country north of the Danube which at the moment
constituted a portion of the free state of
Roumania. Why, gentlemen, what had been
done by the Liberal government, which forsooth,
attended to nothing but pounds, shillings,
and pence? The Liberal government
had driven Russia back from the Danube.
Russia, which was a Danubian power before
the Crimean War, lost this position on the
Danube by the Crimean War; and the Tory
government, which has been incensing and inflaming
you against Russia, yet nevertheless, by
binding itself beforehand to support, when the
judgment was taken, the restoration of that
country to Russia,72 has aggrandized the power
of Russia.
It further aggrandized the power of Russia
in Armenia; but I would not dwell upon that
matter if it were not for a very strange circumstance.
You know that an Armenian province
was given to Russia after the war, but about
that I own to you I have very much less feeling
of objection. I have objected from the first,
vehemently, and in every form, to the granting
of territory on the Danube to Russia, and
carrying back the population of a certain country
from a free state to a despotic state; but
with regard to the transfer of a certain portion
of the Armenian people from the government
of Turkey to the government of Russia. I
must own that I contemplate that transfer with
much greater equanimity. I have no fear myself
of the territorial extensions of Russia, in
Asia, no fear of them whatever. I think the
fears are no better than old women’s fears.
And I don’t wish to encourage her aggressive
tendencies in Asia, or anywhere else. But I
admit it may be, and probably is, the case that
there is some benefit attending upon the transfer
of a portion of Armenia from Turkey to
Russia.
But here is a very strange fact. You know
that that portion of Armenia includes the
port of Batoum. Lord Salisbury has lately
stated to the country that, by the Treaty of
Berlin, the port of Batoum is to be only a
commercial port. If the Treaty of Berlin
stated that it was to be only a commercial port,
which, of course, could not be made an arsenal,
that fact would be very important. But happily,
gentlemen, although treaties are concealed
from us nowadays as long and as often
as is possible, the Treaty of Berlin is an open instrument.
We can consult it for ourselves;
and when we consult the Treaty of Berlin, we
find it states that Batoum shall be essentially a
commercial port, but not that it shall be only a
commercial port. Why, gentlemen, Leith is
essentially a commercial port, but there is
nothing to prevent the people of this country,
if in their wisdom or their folly they should
think fit, from constituting Leith as a great
naval arsenal or fortification; and there is
nothing to prevent the Emperor of Russia,
while leaving to Batoum a character that
shall be essentially commercial, from joining
with that another character that is not in the
slightest degree excluded by the treaty, and
making it as much as he pleases a port of military
defence. Therefore, I challenge the assertion
of Lord Salisbury; and as Lord Salisbury is
fond of writing letters to the Times to bring
the Duke of Argyll to book, he perhaps will
be kind enough to write another letter to the
Times, and tell in what clause of the Treaty of
Berlin he finds it written that the port of Batoum
shall be only a commercial port. For the
present, I simply leave it on record that he has
misrepresented the Treaty of Berlin.
With respect to Russia, I take two views of
the position of Russia. The position of Russia
in Central Asia I believe to be one that has, in
the main, been forced upon her against her will.
She has been compelled—and this is the impartial
opinion of the world,—she has been
compelled to extend her frontier southward in
Central Asia by causes in some degree analogous
to, but certainly more stringent and imperative
than, the causes which have commonly
led us to extend, in a far more important manner,
our frontier in India; and I think it, gentlemen,
much to the credit of the late government,
much to the honor of Lord Clarendon
and Lord Granville, that, when we were in
office, we made a covenant with Russia, in
which Russia bound herself to exercise no influence
or interference whatever in Afghanistan,
we, on the other hand, making known our
desire that Afghanistan should continue free
and independent. Both the powers acted with
uniform strictness and fidelity upon this engagement
until the day when we were removed
from office. But Russia, gentlemen, has another
position—her position in respect to Turkey;
and here it is that I have complained of
the government for aggrandizing the power of
Russia; it is on this point that I most complain.
The policy of her Majesty’s government was
a policy of repelling and repudiating the Slavonic
populations of Turkey-in-Europe, and of
declining to make England the advocate for
their interests. Nay, more, she became in their
view the advocate of the interests opposed to
theirs. Indeed, she was rather the decided
advocate of Turkey; and now Turkey is full of
loud complaints—and complaints, I must say,
not unjust—that we allured her on to her ruin;
that we gave the Turks a right to believe that
we should support them; that our ambassadors,
Sir Henry Elliot and Sir Austin Layard, both
of them said we had most vital interests in
maintaining Turkey as it was, and consequently
the Turks thought if we had vital interests, we
should certainly defend them; and they were
thereby lured on into that ruinous, cruel, and
destructive war with Russia. But by our conduct
to the Slavonic populations we alienated
those populations from us. We made our
name odious among them. They had every
disposition to sympathize with us, every disposition
to confide in us. They are, as a people,
desirous of freedom, desirous of self-government,
with no aggressive views, but hating the
idea of being absorbed in a huge despotic
empire like Russia. But when they found that
we, and the other powers of Europe under our
unfortunate guidance, declined to become in
any manner their champions in defence of the
rights of life, of property, and of female honor,—when
they found that there was no call which
could find its way to the heart of England
through its government, or to the hearts of
other powers, and that Russia alone was disposed
to fight for them, why naturally they
said, Russia is our friend. We have done
every thing, gentlemen, in our power to drive
these populations into the arms of Russia. If
Russia has aggressive dispositions in the direction
of Turkey—and I think it probable that
she may have them,—it is we who have laid the
ground upon which Russia may make her
march to the south,—we who have taught the
Bulgarians, the Servians, the Roumanians, the
Montenegrins, that there is one power in Europe,
and only one, which is ready to support
in act and by the sword her professions of sympathy
with the oppressed populations of Turkey.73
That power is Russia, and how can you
blame these people if, in such circumstances,
they are disposed to say, Russia is our friend?
But why did we make them say it? Simply
because of the policy of the government, not
because of the wishes of the people of this
country. Gentlemen, this is the most dangerous
form of aggrandizing Russia. If Russia is
aggressive anywhere, if Russia is formidable
anywhere, it is by movements toward the
south, it is by schemes for acquiring command
of the Straits or of Constantinople; and there
is no way by which you can possibly so much
assist her in giving reality to these designs, as
by inducing and disposing the populations of
these provinces, who are now in virtual possession
of them, to look upon Russia as their
champion and their friend, to look upon England
as their disguised, perhaps, but yet real
and effective enemy.
Why, now, gentlemen, I have said that I
think it not unreasonable either to believe, or
at any rate to admit it to be possible, that
Russia has aggressive designs in the east of
Europe. I do not mean immediate aggressive
designs. I do not believe that the Emperor of
Russia is a man of aggressive schemes or policy.
It is that, looking to that question in the long
run, looking at what has happened, and what
may happen in ten or twenty years, in one
generation, in two generations, it is highly
probable that in some circumstances Russia
may develop aggressive tendencies toward the
south.
Perhaps you will say I am here guilty of
the same injustice to Russia that I have been
deprecating, because I say that we ought not
to adopt the method of condemning anybody
without cause, and setting up exceptional principles
in proscription of a particular nation.
Gentlemen, I will explain to you in a moment
the principle upon which I act, and the grounds
upon which I form my judgment. They are
simply these grounds: I look at the position of
Russia, the geographical position of Russia
relatively to Turkey. I look at the comparative
strength of the two empires; I look at the importance
of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus
as an exit and a channel for the military and
commercial marine of Russia to the Mediterranean;
and what I say to myself is this: If
the United Kingdom were in the same position
relatively to Turkey which Russia holds upon
the map of the globe, I feel quite sure that we
should be very apt indeed both to entertain and
to execute aggressive designs upon Turkey.
Gentlemen, I will go further, and will frankly
own to you that I believe if we, instead of
happily inhabiting this island, had been in the
possession of the Russian territory, and in the
circumstances of the Russian people, we should
most likely have eaten up Turkey long ago.
And consequently, in saying that Russia ought
to be vigilantly watched in that quarter, I am
only applying to her the rule which in parallel
circumstances I feel convinced ought to be
applied, and would be justly applied, to judgments
upon our own country.
Gentlemen, there is only one other point on
which I must still say a few words to you,
although there are a great many upon which I
have a great many words yet to say somewhere
or other.
Of all the principles, gentlemen, of foreign
policy which I have enumerated, that to which
I attach the greatest value is the principle of
the equality of nations; because, without recognizing
that principle, there is no such thing as
public right, and without public international
right there is no instrument available for settling
the transactions of mankind except material
force. Consequently the principle of equality
among nations lies, in my opinion, at the very
basis and root of a Christian civilization, and
when that principle is compromised or abandoned,
with it must depart our hopes of tranquillity
and of progress for mankind.
I am sorry to say, gentlemen, that I feel it
my absolute duty to make this charge against
the foreign policy under which we have lived
for the last two years, since the resignation of
Lord Derby.74 It has been a foreign policy, in
my opinion, wholly, or to a perilous extent,
unregardful of public right, and it has been
founded upon the basis of a false, I think an
arrogant and a dangerous, assumption, although
I do not question its being made conscientiously
and for what was believed the advantage of the
country,—an untrue, arrogant, and dangerous
assumption that we are entitled to assume for
ourselves some dignity, which we should also
be entitled to withhold from others, and to
claim on our own part authority to do things
which we would not permit to be done by
others. For example, when Russia was going
to the Congress at Berlin, we said: “Your
Treaty of San Stefano is of no value. It is an
act between you and Turkey; but the concerns
of Turkey by the Treaty of Paris are the concerns
of Europe at large. We insist upon it
that the whole of your Treaty of San Stefano
shall be submitted to the Congress at Berlin,
that they may judge how far to open it in each
and every one of its points, because the concerns
of Turkey are the common concerns of
the powers of Europe acting in concert.”
Having asserted that principle to the world,
what did we do? These two things, gentlemen:
secretly, without the knowledge of Parliament,
without even the forms of official
procedure, Lord Salisbury met Count Schouvaloff
in London, and agreed with him upon
the terms on which the two powers together
should be bound in honor to one another to act
upon all the most important points when they
came before the Congress at Berlin. Having
alleged against Russia that she should not be
allowed to settle Turkish affairs with Turkey,
because they were but two powers, and these
affairs were the common affairs of Europe, and
of European interest, we then got Count Schouvaloff
into a private room, and on the part of
England and Russia, they being but two powers,
we settled a large number of the most important
of these affairs in utter contempt and
derogation of the very principle for which the
government had been contending for months
before, for which they had asked Parliament to
grant a sum of £6,000,000, for which they had
spent that £6,000,000 in needless and mischievous
armaments.75 That which we would not allow
Russia to do with Turkey, because we pleaded
the rights of Europe, we ourselves did with
Russia, in contempt of the rights of Europe.
Nor was that all, gentlemen. That act was
done, I think, on one of the last days of May,
in the year 1878, and the document was published,
made known to the world, made known
to the Congress at Berlin, to its infinite astonishment,
unless I am very greatly misinformed.
But that was not all. Nearly at the same
time we performed the same operation in another
quarter. We objected to a treaty between
Russia and Turkey as having no authority,
though that treaty was made in the light of
day—namely, to the Treaty of San Stefano; and
what did we do? We went not in the light of
day, but in the darkness of the night,—not in
the knowledge and cognizance of other powers,
all of whom would have had the faculty and
means of watching all along, and of preparing
and taking their own objections and shaping
their own policy,—not in the light of day, but in
the darkness of the night, we sent the ambassador
of England in Constantinople to the
minister of Turkey, and there he framed, even
while the Congress of Berlin was sitting to determine
these matters of common interest, he
framed that which is too famous, shall I say, or
rather too notorious, as the Anglo-Turkish
Convention.
Gentlemen, it is said, and said truly, that
truth beats fiction; that what happens in
fact from time to time is of a character so
daring, so strange, that if the novelist were
to imagine it and put it upon his pages, the
whole world would reject it from its improbability.
And that is the case of the Anglo-Turkish
Convention. For who would have
believed it possible that we should assert before
the world the principle that Europe only could
deal with the affairs of the Turkish empire,
and should ask Parliament for six millions to
support us in asserting that principle, should
send ministers to Berlin who declared that unless
that principle was acted upon they would
go to war with the material that Parliament had
placed in their hands, and should at the same
time be concluding a separate agreement with
Turkey, under which those matters of European
jurisdiction were coolly transferred to English
jurisdiction; and the whole matter was sealed
with the worthless bribe of the possession and
administration of the island of Cyprus!76 I said,
gentlemen, the worthless bribe of the island of
Cyprus, and that is the truth. It is worthless
for our purposes—not worthless in itself; an
island of resources, an island of natural capabilities,
provided they are allowed to develop
themselves in the course of circumstances, without
violent and unprincipled methods of action.
But Cyprus was not thought to be worthless
by those who accepted it as a bribe. On the
contrary, you were told that it was to secure the
road to India; you were told that it was to be the
site of an arsenal very cheaply made, and more
valuable than Malta; you were told that it was
to revive trade. And a multitude of companies
were formed, and sent agents and capital
to Cyprus, and some of them, I fear, grievously
burned their fingers there. I am not going to
dwell upon that now. What I have in view is
not the particular merits of Cyprus, but the
illustration that I have given you in the case of
the agreement of Lord Salisbury with Count
Schouvaloff, and in the case of the Anglo-Turkish
Convention, of the manner in which
we have asserted for ourselves a principle that
we had denied to others—namely, the principle
of overriding the European authority of the
Treaty of Paris, and taking the matters which
that treaty gave to Europe into our own separate
jurisdiction.
Now, gentlemen, I am sorry to find that that
which I call the pharisaical assertion of our
own superiority has found its way alike into
the practice, and seemingly into the theories of
the government. I am not going to assert
any thing which is not known, but the Prime-Minister
has said that there is one day in the
year—namely, the 9th of November, Lord
Mayor’s Day—on which the language of sense
and truth is to be heard amidst the surrounding
din of idle rumors generated and fledged in the
brains of irresponsible scribes. I do not agree,
gentlemen, in that panegyric upon the 9th of
November. I am much more apt to compare
the ninth of November—certainly a well-known
day in the year—but as to some of the speeches
that have lately been made upon it, I am very
much disposed to compare it with another day
in the year, well known to British tradition,
and that other day in the year is the first of
April. But, gentlemen, on that day the Prime-Minister,
speaking out,—I do not question for a
moment his own sincere opinion,—made what I
think one of the most unhappy and ominous
allusions ever made by a minister of this
country. He quoted certain words, easily rendered
as “Empire and Liberty”—words (he
said) of a Roman statesman, words descriptive
of the state of Rome—and he quoted them as
words which were capable of legitimate application
to the position and circumstances of
England.77 I join issue with the Prime-Minister
upon that subject, and I affirm that nothing
can be more fundamentally unsound, more
practically ruinous, than the establishment of
Roman analogies for the guidance of British
policy. What, gentlemen, was Rome? Rome
was indeed an imperial state, you may tell me,—I
know not, I cannot read the counsels of
Providence,—a state having a mission to subdue
the world, but a state whose very basis it was
to deny the equal rights, to proscribe the independent
existence of other nations. That,
gentlemen, was the Roman idea. It has been
partially and not ill described in three lines of a
translation from Virgil by our great poet Dryden,
which runs as follows:
“O Rome! ’tis thine alone with awful sway
To rule mankind, and make the world obey,
Disposing peace and war thine own majestic way.”
We are told to fall back upon this example.
No doubt the word “Empire” was qualified
with the word “Liberty.” But what did the
two words “Liberty” and “Empire” mean in
a Roman mouth? They meant simply this:
“Liberty for ourselves, Empire over the rest of
mankind.”
I do not think, gentlemen, that this ministry,
or any other ministry, is going to place us in
the position of Rome. What I object to is the
revival of the idea. I care not how feebly, I
care not even how, from a philosophic or historical
point of view, how ridiculous the attempt
at this revival may be. I say it indicates an intention—I
say it indicates a frame of mind, and
the frame of mind, unfortunately, I find, has
been consistent with the policy of which I have
given you some illustrations—the policy of
denying to others the rights that we claim
ourselves. No doubt, gentlemen, Rome may
have had its work to do, and Rome did its
work. But modern times have brought a different
state of things. Modern times have established
a sisterhood of nations, equal, independent,
each of them built up under that legitimate
defence which public law affords to
every nation, living within its own borders, and
seeking to perform its own affairs; but if one
thing more than another has been detestable to
Europe, it has been the appearance upon the
stage from time to time of men who, even in
the times of the Christian civilization, have
been thought to aim at universal dominion. It
was this aggressive disposition on the part of
Louis XIV., King of France, that led your
forefathers, gentlemen, freely to spend their
blood and treasure in a cause not immediately
their own, and to struggle against the method
of policy which, having Paris for its centre,
seemed to aim at an universal monarchy.78
It was the very same thing, a century and a
half later, which was the charge launched, and
justly launched, against Napoleon, that under
his dominion France was not content even with
her extended limits, but Germany, and Italy,
and Spain, apparently without any limit to
this pestilent and pernicious process, were to
be brought under the dominion or influence
of France, and national equality was to be
trampled under foot, and national rights denied.
For that reason, England in the struggle
almost exhausted herself, greatly impoverished
her people, brought upon herself, and Scotland
too, the consequences of a debt that nearly
crushed their energies, and poured forth their
best blood without limit, in order to resist and
put down these intolerable pretensions.
Gentlemen, it is but in a pale and weak and
almost despicable miniature that such ideas are
now set up, but you will observe that the poison
lies—that the poison and the mischief lie—in
the principle and not the scale.
It is the opposite principle which, I say, has
been compromised by the action of the ministry,
and which I call upon you, and upon any
who choose to hear my views, to vindicate
when the day of our election comes; I mean
the sound and the sacred principle that Christendom
is formed of a band of nations who are
united to one another in the bonds of right;
that they are without distinction of great and
small; there is an absolute equality between
them,—the same sacredness defends the narrow
limits of Belgium as attaches to the
extended frontiers of Russia, or Germany, or
France. I hold that he who by act or word
brings that principle into peril or disparagement,
however honest his intentions may be,
places himself in the position of one inflicting—I
won’t say intending to inflict—I ascribe
nothing of the sort—but inflicting injury upon
his own country, and endangering the peace
and all the most fundamental interests of Christian
society.