BY HON. R. H. THOMPSON.
That portion of the present State of Mississippi and that
part of Alabama lying between the Mississippi and Chattahoochee
rivers, and bounded on the south by the thirty-first parallel
of latitude and on the north by a line drawn due east from the
mouth of the Yazoo river, was organized into the Mississippi
Territory in pursuance of an act of Congress, approved April 7,
1798. Afterwards, in 1804, the country lying south of the State
of Tennessee and north of the original Mississippi Territory was
added; and in 1812 that portion of the present States of Alabama
and Mississippi lying south of the thirty-first degree of
latitude was annexed. Mississippi became a state in 1817 and
Alabama was then separated from it. This historic statement at
the outset will explain why several matters pertaining to suffrage
in municipalities not now in the state, are hereafter mentioned.
The organic law of the Territory enacted that the people
thereof should "be entitled to and enjoy all and singular the
rights, privileges and advantages granted to the people of the
territory of the United States, northwest of the river Ohio in
and by the ordinance of the thirteenth day of July in the year
one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, in as full and
ample a manner as the same are possessed and enjoyed by the
people of the said last mentioned Territory," and thus in our
investigation of the subject we are led to examine the ordinance
referred to, and which we find in the statutes entitled, "An ordinance
for the Territory of the United States Northwest of the
River Ohio," to see if it contains any provision relative to suffrage.
We find it, and the words of this celebrated ordinance
are as follows. "So soon as there shall be five thousand free
male inhabitants, of full age, in the district, upon giving proof
thereof to the governor, they shall receive authority, with time
and place, to elect representatives from their counties or townships,
to represent them in the general assembly; provided that
for every five hundred free male inhabitants, there shall be one
representative, and so on progressively with the number of free
male inhabitants, shall the right of representation increase, until
the number of representatives shall amount to twenty-five; after
which the number, and proportion of representatives shall be
regulated by the legislature; Provided that no person be eligible
or qualified to act as a representative, unless he shall have been
a citizen of the United States three years, and be a resident in
the district, or unless he shall have resided in the district three
years, and in either case, shall likewise hold in his own right,
in fee simple, two hundred acres of land within the same; Provided
also, that a freehold of fifty acres of land in the district,
having been a citizen of one of the states, and being resident in
the district, or the like freehold, and two years residence in the
district shall be necessary to qualify a man as an elector of a
representative."
With all due respect to the fathers, nothing in statutory
language could be more awkward; the reading of it, however,
will serve to remind us that the modern legislator cannot claim
originality for his habitual use of the word "provided" as introductory
to amendments, and with which to string his ideas
together.
The last of the three provisos is necessarily a limitation on
the "free male inhabitants, of full age," mentioned at the beginning
of the section, since there is no provision in the ordinance
for the election of any officers save representatives to
the general assembly; all other officers in the scheme of government
here provided were appointive. An analysis of the laws
of 1787, which evidently must be basis of suffrage in a number
of states as well as Mississippi, shows that to entitle a person to
vote under our first suffrage law he must have been (1) Free,
(2) Male, (3) of full age, presumably 21 years, (4) citizen of
the United States and resident of the Territory or a resident for
two years in the Territory and (5) Freeholder of fifty acres of
land in the district.
While this organic law was in force, of course the territorial
legislation was confined, so far as concerns our subject,
to municipal suffrage, but I have thought reference thereto not
without the scope of this paper, since such legislation, perhaps
more than any other, being untrammeled as a general rule by
unyielding constitutional restrictions, throws light upon the
spirit, temper and thoughts of the people on the subject at the
time of the enactment.
Before the amendment of the organic law herein next mentioned
I find but one piece of such legislation; by an act approved
in 1803 the "freeholders, landholders and householders"
of the city of Natchez were authorized by a majority vote to
elect municipal officers, and the act further reads that "for the
better understanding of the meaning of the term householder, it
is hereby declared that any person who shall be in the occupancy
of a room, or rooms, separate and apart to himself, shall be
deemed a householder, and entitled to vote at the annual and
other meetings of the said city: Provided that such occupancy
shall have existed six months next preceding such election." Were
this explanatory enactment omitted it would seem that to entitle
a person to vote he should have been a freeholder and a landholder
and a householder, all three conjointly, but it is apparent
that the legislature did not so intend, since it provided by the
explanation that if he were a householder alone, he would have
been entitled to vote. The explanation, while directed at a
definition of a householder, settles by indirection the only doubt
arising from the text sought to be explained, but unfortunately
the proviso brought with it a greater difficulty than the explanation
had removed, and that was whether other householders
than those directed to be so deemed, were required to have been
such for six months before offering to vote. The phraseology
suggests legislative amendments and indicates a difference of
opinion as to who should be intrusted to vote; but all seem to
have agreed upon permanent residence anchorage to the soil as
an essential qualification, the difference being as to rigidity and
extent to which it should be carried. The most notable thing
about this, the first legislative act of Mississippi conferring the
right of suffrage, is that no distinction is made because of age,
color, or sex. Whether this were by accident or design, and
whether other persons than adult white males really voted thereunder,
does not appear.
By an Act of Congress, approved Jan. 9th, 1808, the organic
law so far as it related to Mississippi Territory, was
amended so as to provide that every free white male person in
the Mississippi Territory, above the age of 21 years, having been
a citizen of the United States, and resident in the said territory
one year next preceding an election of representatives, and who
has a legal or equitable title to a tract of land by virtue of any
act of Congress, or who may become the purchaser of any tract
of land from the United States of the quantity of fifty acres, or
who may hold in his own right a town lot of the value of one
hundred dollars within the said territory, shall be entitled to
vote for representatives to the general assembly of said territory.
The change just made in the suffrage laws of the territory
can best be appreciated by the use of parallel columns.
| Act of July 13th, 1787. | Act of Jan. 9, 1808. |
| A person to vote hereunder must be | A person to vote hereunder must be |
| (1) Free, | (1) Free, |
| (2) Male, | (2) Male, |
| (3) Of the age of twenty-one years. | (3) Of the age of twenty-one years. |
| (4) A citizen of the United States | (4) A citizen of the United |
| and a resident of the Territory, | States and resident of the territory |
| or a resident for two years in | one year next preceding an |
| the Territory, and | election at which he offers to vote, |
| (5) A freeholder of fifty acres of | (5) The holder of a legal or |
| land in the district. | equitable title to a tract of |
| | land, by virtue of any act of |
| | Congress, or who may become |
| | the purchaser of any tract of |
| | land from the United States of |
| | the quantity of fifty acres, or |
| | who may own a town lot of |
| | the value of one hundred dollars |
| | within the territory and |
| | (6) White. |
This act of Congress, passed in 1808, first introduced the
color line.
In 1811 four municipalities were organized by acts of the
territorial legislature, Woodville, Port Gibson, Huntsville and
St. Stevens; the latter two are now in Alabama. In the first one
named the right to vote was conferred on the freeholders and
householders within the town, and in the second the right was
conferred on the landowners, freeholders and householders
within said town, but in each case the grant was followed by a
separate section of the act in these words: "All free male inhabitants,
subject to taxation, who shall be in the occupancy of a
room or rooms separate and apart to himself, shall be deemed
a householder, within the meaning of this act, and shall be entitled
to vote at the town elections." Clearly this section was
intended to enlarge the scope of those who were authorized to
vote and it could not rightfully be construed as narrowing it.
This being true, the freeholder and householders, other than
those mentioned in the quoted section, were empowered to vote
without reference to sex and all without regard to age or color.
In the charter of Huntsville the suffrage was conferred on "all
free white male inhabitants of said town above the age of twenty
one years," and in the case of St. Stevens the right to vote was
given to "the citizens of said town," but this was amended in
1815 so as to limit the right to "landholders, freeholders and
householders."
In January, 1814, the territorial legislature treated the
town of Mobile as an existing municipality, the section of the
country surrounding it, acquired from West Florida, was added
to the territory in 1812, and restricted suffrage to the "landholders,
freeholders and householders within the town," and
followed this with a section in the very language of the one
quoted above from the charters of Woodville and Port Gibson,
but this was amended in 1816 so as to limit suffrage as written
in the following section, viz: "No person shall vote at any election
for president and commissioners, assessor and collector for
the said town, unless he be twenty-one years of age, and shall
have been a freeholder in said town, or the tenant of a house or
separate roof at least six months previous to any election and
shall have paid a county, territorial or corporation tax, nor unless
he be a citizen of the United States, or shall have resided
within that part of West Florida now in the possession of the
United States, at the time of the change of government in that
province." The next legislation pertinent was the act of Congress,
approved April 25th, 1814, amending the organic law of
the territory. This provided "Each and every free white male
person, being a citizen of the United States, who shall have attained
the age of twenty-one years, and who shall also have
resided one year in said territory previous to any general
election, and be at the time of any such election a resident
thereof, shall be entitled to vote for members of the house of
representatives, and a delegate to Congress for the territory
aforesaid." The only effect of this act was to dispense with the
property qualification previously prescribed and to substitute
in its place the payment of a county or territorial tax. In 1815
an election was authorized for the purpose of locating the county
seat of Jackson County by act providing simply that such persons
as were authorized to vote for representatives might cast
their ballots thereat, but in 1816 a like act for Adams County
was passed providing "every free male white person, being a
citizen of the county of Adams who shall have arrived at the
age of twenty-one years and resided in the said county twelve
months previous to the said election, shall be admitted to vote
thereat and none other." This brings us to the end of territorial
legislation and from it we learn that ownership of or anchorage
to the soil was a prominent conception of the times; all else as
a necessary qualification for voting, even age, color and sex,
seems to have been subordinate, or accidental or exceptional.
There was certainly no prejudice then in the good old days because
of color; the color idea came from without, from Congress.
The constitution under which Mississippi came into the
Union as a state was adopted on the 15th August, 1817, and by
the first section of Article three thereof, the following provision
is made: "Every free white male person of the age of twenty-one
years or upwards, who shall be a citizen of the United States
and shall have resided in this state one year, next preceding an
election, and the last six months within the county, city or town
in which he offers to vote and shall be enrolled in the militia
thereof except exempted by law from military service; or having
the aforesaid qualifications of citizenship and residence, shall
have paid a state or county tax, shall be deemed a qualified
elector; but no elector shall be entitled to vote, except in the
county, city or town (entitled to separate representation) in
which he may reside at the time of election."
An analysis of this section shows that in order for a person
to be a qualified state and county voter thereunder he must have
been,
(1) Free,
(2) White,
(3) Male,
(4) Twenty-one years of age or upward,
(5) A citizen of the United States,
(6) A resident of the state for at least one year,
(7) A resident of the county, city or town at least six months,
(8) Enrolled in the militia unless exempt therefrom, or he
must have had the "aforesaid qualifications of citizenship and
residence" and have paid a state or county tax.
What our forefathers meant by alternate qualifications is
hard at this day to find out. A literal construction would have
authorized a free white male person having the qualifications of
citizenship and residence to have voted irrespective of age, but
there is no record of infants having exercised the right, nor is
there in our books a judicial interpretation of the constitutional
provision. It is notable, too, in respect to this section of the
fundamental law that crimes did not disfranchise under the
terms of the constitution itself and that the murderer, the thief
et id omne genus are relegated to the legislature so far as voting
was concerned by the 5th section of the sixth article which provides,
"laws shall be made to exclude from office, and from
suffrage, those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury,
forgery or other high crimes or misdemeanors." We find,
however, that the legislature in 1822 undertook to perform its
duty in this regard by providing that "no person shall vote at
any election whatever in this state who shall have been convicted
by the verdict of a jury, and the final judgment or sentence of a
court of competent jurisdiction, of bribery, perjury, forgery, or
other high crime or misdemeanor, unless the person so convicted
shall receive a full pardon for such offense."
On the subject of pardons and its effect on the right of suffrage
it may be stated here that the doctrine in this state until
the adoption of the constitution of 1890 was in favor of the
restoration of the right to vote; the constitution just named having
made provision for a legislative restoration of the right to
vote leaves the matter now an open question as concerns executive
pardons.
It is worthy of note that by legislative act, approved February
10th, 1821, elections in this state were held viva voce, but
this act remained in force only until June 13th, 1822, the date
of the act repealing it, since which time they have been by
ballot; since 1869 the constitutions have required them to be so.
In truth there is no record of an election held viva voce under
the law of 1821, though the election held on the 1st Monday of
August, 1821, under Sec. 6, Art. 3 of the first constitution must
have been so held. Of course the laws passed under the constitution
of 1817 on the subject of state and county elections conformed
their provisions, defining who should have the right of
franchise to the terms fundamental law on the subject and, as
we have seen, the legislature excluded criminals from the right
to vote, but the lawmakers of that day by no means confined
themselves to the constitutional qualifications when they came to
prescribe who should be entitled to vote in municipal elections;
for instance, we see that "citizens of the town" were made
voters in Shieldsborough (Now Bay St. Louis) in 1818, in Greenville
(Jefferson county) in 1819, and in Holmesville in 1820;
and "citizens of one month's residence" were allowed to vote on
the subject of the location of the Madison County court house by
act approved 1829, and "free white male citizens of the town
above the age of twenty-one years" were made voters by act incorporating
Pearlington, passed in 1822, and in the same year
"free citizens resident in the town" were made voters in Columbus.
In 1821 "free white male inhabitants, resident of the
town, twenty-one years of age and upwards" were authorized to
vote in Monticello, and in 1831 in Warrenton; and in 1824 such
residents of the county were authorized to vote on the location of
the county seat of Warren County.
By act of 1821 "every free white male person, twenty-one
years old or upwards, an inhabitant of the town for six months
and who had been assessed and paid a town tax within a year,"
were allowed to vote in municipal election at Port Gibson, and
so too were the owners of land in that town, if the land had been
assessed and taxes paid on it, whether the owner resided in the
corporate limits or elsewhere; and I am advised the law of that
town so remained until after the war; the idea has been adopted
by several municipalities of the state in later days. By the early
charters of Vicksburg, approved 1825, and Rodney, approved
1828, suffrage was conferred on "landholders, householders,
freeholders and such as shall have paid a town tax, being inhabitants
and residents for three months in the town."
In 1830 "freeholders and householders" were made voters
in Shieldsborough (now Bay St. Louis) and Raymond, and in
1825 "freeholders and householders," whether resident or not,
were given the right to vote in the town of Washington, and in
1831 the right to elect a constable was given "actual citizens of
Vicksburg, over twenty-one years of age," and in 1830 the "freeholders
and householders" of the town of Washington were required
to be males in order to vote after that date, and the only
qualification of voters in the town of Liberty, according to the
act of 1819, were that they should be "free white males, resident
citizens of the town," and this is true under the first charter of
Warrenton, approved in 1820. In all these instances the constitution
of 1817 was not regarded as establishing a rule to be applied
to municipal suffrage. By several acts passed while this
constitution was operative the constitutional rule was, however,
adopted in defining who should vote in municipal elections.
Thus in 1821, in respect to the town of Washington the language
is "persons entitled to vote for members of the general assembly,"
and the same language is used in the charter of Clinton,
passed in 1830, and to the same language is added the words,
"and who shall have resided in the town three months" in the
charters of Meadville and Brandon passed in 1830 and 1831
respectively. In the amendment to the charter of Liberty, passed
in 1828, suffrage is limited to "inhabitants of the town under
the restrictions prescribed by the constitution of the state," and
the same language substantially is to be found in the act incorporating
Gallatin approved in 1829.
"The qualified electors" of Jackson county voted on the
subject of the location of their court house under the provisions
of an act passed in December, 1830. The "free white male inhabitants,
residing within the town entitled to vote for members
of the general assembly" were made the electors of the city of
Jackson by the first act of incorporation passed in 1823, and by
legislative grant approved in 1830 incorporating Manchester
(now Yazoo City) the "inhabitants entitled to vote according
to the constitution and laws of the state" were given the right
to participate in municipal elections, and the same language is
used in the charter of Athens, approved in the same year.
An analysis of all this will show that under the constitution
of 1817 "color" was not a qualification or a disqualification
in eight of the towns of the state legislated upon, viz:
Shieldsborough (now Bay St. Louis), Greenville (Jefferson
County), Holmesville, Columbus, Vicksburg, Rodney, Raymond
and Washington. Of course slaves were not freeholders or citizens,
but free men of color were frequently freeholders and before
the Dred Scott decision were regarded by many as citizens.
It will be noted, too, that sex was not made a qualification or a
disqualification for voting in seven of the towns whose charters
were passed or amended during the period in which the first
state constitution was operative, viz: those, except Washington,
just enumerated. There is no evidence, however, that women
ever voted in any of these towns, and all that can be learned on
the subject leads to the belief that they not only never did but
the right seems never to have been claimed for or by them. Free
persons of color, however, as I learn, did claim the right in some
of these towns and it was generally conceded by those of the
white men whose interest was on the side of the claimant's political
preference, but was generally denied by the opposition, and
it is doubtful if a negro ever voted in any of them until after
the war. On the whole it is not so clear but that the failure to
exclude women and free persons of color in the early legislation
on the subject of voting in municipalities was but the result of
legislative awkwardness and a want of exactness in statutory
exclusion and inclusion.
The exact period in Mississippi legal history extends from
1832 to 1869, and embraces the period during which the constitution
adopted in 1832 remained in force. This, the second state
constitution, was adopted October 26, 1832; its provisions on the
subject of suffrage are as follows: "Every free white male person
of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, who shall be a
citizen of the United States, and shall have resided in this state
one year next preceding an election, and the last four months
within the county, city or town in which he offers to vote, shall
be deemed a qualified elector." * * * * * "Every
person shall be disqualified from holding an office or place of
honor or profit under the authority of this state, who shall be
convicted of having given or offered any bribe to procure his
election. Laws shall be made to exclude from office and from
suffrage those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury,
forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors." * *
The second of the sections above quoted was acted upon by the
law-making power March 2, 1833, and the following piece of
legislation then became operative:
"No person shall vote at any election whatever in this state,
who shall have been convicted by the verdict of a jury and the
final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, of bribery,
perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, unless
the person so convicted shall have received a full pardon for
such offense."
It will be noted that the conviction must have been by the
verdict of a jury and the judgment of the court both conjunctively.
What was the effect if the criminal plead guilty does
not seem to have been considered. Of course the general legislation
of the state on the subject of state and county elections,
conformed to the constitution, and we are again led to examine
the acts incorporating municipalities within the period, and
providing who should be voters therein, in order to obtain light
on the thought of the times relative to our subject.
A great many cities and towns were incorporated during
this period; in a large majority of charters it was simply provided
that the "qualified voters" should exercise the right of
suffrage, thus recognizing the constitutional rule. In many instances
additional qualifications to those named in the constitution
were imposed, thus, residence for a specified time within
the corporate limits was required in 1833 for Columbus, Amsterdam,
Manchester (now Yazoo City), Jackson, Sartartia, Liberty,
Woodville, and in 1836 for Plymouth. But by no means did the
legislatures of the period conceive that they were bound to require
all the constitutional qualifications as essential for municipal
suffrage. A favorite idea was to authorize "every free white
male inhabitant of the town" who had resided therein for a
specified time, to vote in municipal elections. This was the case
in Raymond, by act passed in 1833; Salem, Starkville and Sharon,
1837; Cotton Gin Port, Farmington and Philadelphia, 1838;
Cooksville and Emory in 1839; Hernando, 1840; Gainesville,
1846; Shongole and Camargo, 1850; Sarepta, Hermans, Eastport
and Benela, 1852; Columbus and Aberdeen, 1854 (in the
latter, however, non-resident freeholders were allowed to vote
by the act); Bonner, 1860; Wesson, Beauregard, Hickory and
Hazlehurst, 1865; Lodi, Batesville and Sardis, 1866; Crystal
Springs and Winona, 1867. In addition to the ordinary qualifications
the payment of a town tax was required for Grand Gulf,
1833; Vicksburg, 1833 and 1839; Rodney, 1844; Yazoo City,
1846; Natchez, 1865. During this period, too, a few municipal
charters pursued the language which was so frequently used at
an earlier day—"freeholders, landowners and householders."
This was the case in the acts for Shieldsborough (now Bay St.
Louis), 1838 and 1850; Pass Christian and Biloxi, 1838, and
Rodney, 1844. In a few instances every adult resident person
was allowed to vote, without reference to race, color, sex or anything
else if the laws were administered as they are written.
This was the case in Macon, 1836; Paulding, 1837, and Raleigh,
1838, and in Brandon, by act of 1833, resident persons were not
excluded by law because of infancy. For liberality of sentiment
on the subject of universal suffrage, Brandon's charter of 1833
is without an equal, but whether this liberality of expression proceeded
from a liberality of feeling or from ignorance in the forms
of expression doth not appear. Registration of voters was first
required in this state by act passed in 1839, and it applied to
municipal elections at Vicksburg only; in 1861 a similar provision
was enacted for Canton, and in 1865 for Natchez. Of late
years a municipal registration is quite common, as we shall see
hereafter.
By the second section of article seventh, constitution of 1869,
the following qualifications of voters were prescribed; in order
to be a voter a person must have been,
1. Male,
2. Inhabitant of the state; idiots, insane persons and Indians
not taxed excepted,
3. Citizen of the United States, or naturalized,
4. Twenty-one years old or upwards,
5. Resident of the state six months and in county one month,
6. Duly registered.
And by section two, article twelfth thereof, the legislature
was required to pass laws to exclude from suffrage "those who
shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery or other
high crime or misdemeanor."
The public laws of the state, on the subject of state and
county elections, of course conformed to the constitutional provisions;
the section thereof found in the code of 1871 on the subject
of criminals excluded from the right to register and vote
"persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery or infamous
crime;" that of 1880 denied suffrage to persons convicted of
bribery, perjury, forgery, grand larceny or any felony.
Under this constitution (1869) of course the negroes were
voters. Much has been said of late years to the effect that the
grant of the right to vote on the negroes by the fifteenth amendment
to the constitution of the United States was a mistake;
perhaps the adoption of that amendment was an error in statecraft;
certainly it proved a party mistake to the Republican
party. But every thoughtful and candid man will doubt the
proposition that the grant of suffrage to the negro was a mistake
when viewed from the standpoint of the negro's welfare. Would
his rights as a citizen have been as soon respected had he remained
deprived of political power? Of course this is a question
that can never be settled. We can only speculate upon it.
The provisions of this constitution, like that of the preceding
ones, were construed by the legislature as applying only to
state and county elections; hence we find that in municipal matters
the provisions of the acts of the legislature passed under it
defining who should vote in city, town and village elections are
variant. It is sufficient to extract from the numerous municipal
charters any governing principle. It is apparent, however, that
the tendency was, perhaps from convenience of expression, to
adopt the constitutional rule, simply adding that the voter should
be a resident of the municipality. In a few instances persons
having "permanent business" in the town were permitted to
vote at municipal elections even though their citizenship and residence
were elsewhere.
This was the case in Bolton, 1871; Quitman, 1880; Laurel,
1886; Scooba, 1886; and non-resident freeholders of the town
were permitted to vote in Senatobia in 1882 and Tunica, 1888.
In a majority of cases the provision was that the voter should
be a qualified elector of the state, or state and county, and that
he should have resided within the municipal limits a specified
time. This time varied greatly, from ten days, the shortest, to
two years. Of the various acts of legislation on this subject I
find thirteen in which the length of residence was required to be
only ten days; one in which the time is fifteen days; eight fixing
twenty days; forty-five prescribing one month; nine fixing two
months; fifteen naming three months; nine prescribing four
months; one fixing five months; twenty-one naming six months;
three fixing one year, and four prescribing two years. The
municipalities in which one year's residence was required are
Pass Christian (a seashore resort), the purpose evidently being
to exclude summer visitors, 1882; Rosedale, 1890; and Durant,
1890. Those in which two years' residence was prescribed are
Eureka Springs, 1880; Seven Pines, 1882; Pass Christian, 1890;
and Jackson, 1890. The principal purpose in each, except the
summer resort, was to exclude the transient negro voter.
During this period it was not unusual for the legislature to
provide that there should be a separate registration of municipal
voters. This was the case with Natchez, 1870; Columbus, 1884;
Senatobia, 1884; Macon, 1884; Yazoo City, 1884; Ellisville, 1884;
Bolton, 1886; Bay St. Louis, 1886; Brooksville, 1886; Fulton,
1886; Pass Christian, 1886; Scooba, 1886; Biloxi, 1888; Terry,
1888; Potts Camp, 1888; Tunica, 1888; Water Valley, 1888;
Rosedale, 1890; Clarksdale, 1890; Jackson, 1890; Durant, 1890
Indianola, 1890.
The prepayment of a municipal tax was in several instances
made a requisite qualification: This was the case as to a street
tax in Brookhaven, 1884; Greenville, 1884 and 1886; Vicksburg,
1886; Vaiden, 1886; and as to street tax and poll tax, Jackson,
1890; Durant, 1890.
In but one instance during the period, 1869 to 1890, do we
find the "householders and freeholders" made voters, the case of
Greenwood Springs, 1871, though, as we have seen, this was a
favorite idea in the early days of the state. In 1882 the spirit
of liberality was given full scope by the act providing that "all
persons residing within the town limits" should have the right
to vote in Columbia; again we will make the suggestion of a
skeptic and express doubt whether the girl babies exercised the
right.
The provisions of the new constitution of Mississippi on the
subject of suffrage are as follows:
ARTICLE 12.
FRANCHISE.
Section 240. All elections by the people shall be by ballot.
Section 241. Every male inhabitant of this state, except
idiots, insane persons, and Indians not taxed, who is a citizen of
the United States, twenty-one years old and upwards, who has
resided in this state two years, and one year in the election district,
or in the incorporated city or town in which he offers to
vote, and who is duly registered as provided in this article, and
who has never been convicted of bribery, burglary, theft, arson,
obtaining money or goods under false pretenses, perjury, forgery,
embezzlement, or bigamy, and who has paid, on or before
the first of February of the year in which he shall offer to vote,
all taxes which may have been legally required of him, and which
he has had an opportunity of paying according to law for the
two preceding years, and who shall produce to the officers holding
the election satisfactory evidence that he has paid said taxes,
is declared to be a qualified elector; but any minister of the gospel
in charge of an organized church shall be entitled to vote
after six months' residence in the election district, if otherwise
qualified.
Section 244. On and after the first day of January, A. D.
1892, every elector shall, in addition to the foregoing qualifications,
be able to read any section of the constitution of this state;
or he shall be able to understand the same when read to him, or
give a reasonable interpretation thereof. A new registration
shall be made before the next ensuing election after January the
first, A. D. 1892.
The qualifications at the present time, therefore, of an elector
are:
1. Male,
2. Inhabitant of the state, excluding idiots, insane persons
and Indians not taxed,
3. Citizen of the United States,
4. Twenty-one years old or upwards,
5. Resident of the state for two years,
6. Resident for one year in the election district, or city or
town, except ministers of the gospel who may vote on six months'
residence,
7. Duly registered,
8. Never convicted of bribery and other enumerated
crimes,
9. Has paid two years' taxes,
10. Able to read any section of the constitution of the state;
or able to understand the same when read to him, or give a reasonable
interpretation thereof.
It will be noted that these constitutional qualifications, unlike
the provisions of former fundamental laws, are by the section
above quoted made to apply to electors in municipal elections;
the legislature, however, is authorized to prescribe additional
qualifications. And it has prescribed as such additional
qualifications, by the section on that subject in the chapter of the
new Code on Municipalities, that the voter must have resided
within the corporate limits for one year next before he offers to
register and he must not be in default for taxes due the municipality
for the two preceding years.
Much has been said about this constitution, both for and
against it; especially has the "understanding clause," the tenth
qualification as enumerated above, been severely criticised. Thus
we find in the American Law Review of January-February,
1892, the following: "It is quite apparent that this clause was
never intended to be carried out faithfully. It will be so administered
as to exclude the negro voters, hardly one of whom
will be eligible under it, and so as not to exclude the ignorant
white voter. The last qualification, the ability to give a reasonable
interpretation of any clause of the constitution of the state,
would exclude nearly all the lawyers and judges in the state.
In this manner the people of Mississippi endeavor to solve the
appalling problem of carrying on civil government with a mass
of voters easily corrupted and so stolid and ignorant as not to
be able to understand the first principles of their political
institutions."
And we find in the Atlantic Monthly, December, 1892, the
following statement in reference to it:
"That it may, and probably will, be put into operation so as
to preclude the negro from voting, while his equally ignorant
white neighbor is allowed the privilege, appears from the fact
that the inability to read does not constitute an absolute basis of
exclusion; for the inspectors may allow a person to vote who
can understand or give a reasonable interpretation of a section
of the constitution when read to him. It is apparent that an
inspector may very easily reject as unreasonable an interpretation
from a colored man, and accept one no whit better from a
white man. Such discrimination in practice would be very hard
to discover."
And Mr. John F. Dillon, one of the most distinguished of
American lawyers, in his address as President of the American
Bar Association, at Saratoga, August, 1892, speaking of this
section of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, says:
"It has been supposed that this clause was a concession
made in the interest of illiterate whites; but whether this be so
or not, a general and indiscriminate requirement that all voters
shall be able to read and write is, in my judgment, not contrary
to the fundamental principles of American government, but in
accordance with the principles on which such government must
securely rest, namely, the intelligence and virtue of the people."
I have heard attributed to a distinguished United States
Senator, who would have been glad to have come to a different
conclusion, that this constitution demonstrated that Anglo-Saxon
ingenuity could accomplish anything; that the provisions
of it on the subject of the suffrage was a practical repeal of the
fifteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, and
yet the result was effected in such a way that its legality could
not be successfully denied.
The truth is, without reference to the designs of its authors,
that we have under it in the state, to all intents and purposes,
an educational qualification pure and simple. More negroes, the
American Law Review and the Atlantic Monthly to the contrary
notwithstanding, have registered under the alternate or
understanding clause than white men. Only 2,672 illiterate,
both white and black, had up to 1893 registered under it. I have
not seen the figures since. The negroes who have taken advantage
of it exceed the white men who have done so in a majority
of the counties of the state.
It seems that the illiterate white man shrinks from an application
to be registered under the "understanding clause;" a
refusal to advertise his incapacity, while the negroes as a rule
have but little to lose; but another truth is that with scarcely an
exception the negroes are thoroughly content with the constitution,
and are satisfied to be measured for registration and voting
by its standards. The writer, as a member of the convention
which adopted the constitution, voted against the "understanding
clause," but now that he has seen its practical workings he
is prepared to say that the convention did the very best thing
that it could have done under the circumstances surrounding it.
This "understanding clause" is not without a parallel in
the constitutions of other states; as was pointed out by Senator
George of this state in the United States Senate, it is no more
difficult of honest administration than are the provisions of the
constitutions of other states: for example, the constitution of
Vermont of 1777 provided that an elector "should be of quiet,
peaceable behavior," and the constitution of Connecticut requires
at this day that the voter shall sustain "a good moral
character," and numerous other like instances that might be
mentioned.
The constitutional provision that a person shall not register
as a voter within four months of an election is believed to be a
wise measure; the ignorant, the indifferent and the sordid voter
fails to register; political excitement never exists to any considerable
extent so long before the election; there is no such thing
as hiring men to register, for those who can be hired, cannot be
trusted for so long a time to vote in the promised or expected
way. It is believed that the provision is worthy of adoption
everywhere.
The legislation of Mississippi under the constitution of 1890
conforms to that instrument.
By sections 3624 to 3640 of the code (1892) ample provision
is made for appeals from adverse rulings of registration officers,
and the humblest citizen of the land, the humblest negro,
if you please, can invoke the courts of the country, even the
Supreme Court, for protection in case he be improperly denied
the right to register and vote, and he is also provided with ample
remedy before the courts in every case where the right is
improperly granted to others. These Code sections are as follows:
3624. Appeal by person denied registration.—Any person denied
the right to register as a voter may appeal from the decision of the
registrar to the Board of election commissioners by filing with the registrar,
on the same day of such denial or within five days thereafter,
a written application for appeal.
3625. Appeal by other than person denied.—Any elector of the
county may likewise appeal from the decision of the registrar allowing
any other person to be registered as a voter; but before the same can
be heard the party appealing shall give notice to the person whose
registration is appealed from, in writing, stating the grounds of the
appeal; which notice shall be served by the sheriff or constable, as
process in other courts is required to be served; and the officer may
demand and receive for such service, from the person requesting the
same the sum of one dollar.
3626. Appeal heard de novo.—All cases on appeals shall be heard
by the boards of election commissioners de novo, and oral evidence
may be heard by them; and they are authorized to administer oaths to
witnesses before them; and they have the power to subpœna witnesses,
and to compel their attendance; to send for persons and papers; to require
the sheriff and constables to attend them and execute their process.
The decisions of the commissioners in all cases shall be final as
to questions of fact, but as to matters of law they may be revised by
the circuit and supreme courts. The registrar shall obey the orders
of the commissioners in directing a person to be registered, or a name
to be stricken from the registration books.
3637. Appeal from the decision of the Commissioners.—Any elector
aggrieved by the decision of the commissioners, shall have the right
to file a bill of exceptions thereto, to be approved and signed by the
commissioners, embodying the evidence in the case and the findings
of the commissioners, within two days after the rendition of the decision,
and may thereupon appeal to the circuit court upon the execution
of a bond, with two or more sufficient sureties, to be approved by the
commissioners, in the sum of one hundred dollars, payable to the state,
and conditioned to pay all costs in case the appeal shall not be successfully
prosecuted; and in case the decision of the commissioners be
affirmed, judgment shall be entered on the bond for all costs.
3638. Duty of Commissioners in case of appeal to Circuit Court.—It
shall be the duty of the commissioners, in case of appeal from their
decision, to return the bill of exceptions and the appeal bond into the
circuit court of the county within five days after the filing of the same
with them; and the circuit courts shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine such appeals.
3629. Proceedings in the Circuit Court.—Should the judgment of
the circuit court be in favor of the right of an elector to be registered,
the court shall so order, and shall, by its judgment, direct the registrar
of the county forthwith to register him. Costs shall not, in any
case, be adjudged the commissioners or the registrar.
3630. Costs; compensation, etc.—The election commissioners shall
not award costs in proceedings before them; but the circuit and supreme
courts shall allow costs, as in other cases. The sheriffs, when
required to attend before the commissioners at their meetings, shall be
paid two dollars a day, to be allowed by the board of supervisors.
Having now considered and presented the evolution of suffrage
in this state and given by way of recital and incidentally
at least, its present status, we come to consider the objects upon
which the suffrage may be exercised, and this can be easily stated
by the general averment that all legislative and executive officers
are elected by the suffragists; the executive officers of the
state are not elected necessarily by a plurality or a majority vote.
We have a sort of an electoral scheme, which is created by the
constitution in the following words:
Section 140.—The governor of the state shall be chosen in the
following manner: On the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November
of A. D. 1895, and on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of
November in every fourth year thereafter, until the day shall be
changed by law, an election shall be held in the several counties and
districts created for the election of members of the house of representatives
in this state, for governor, and the person receiving in any county
or such legislative district the highest number of votes cast therein, for
said office, shall be holden to have received as many votes as such
county or district is entitled to members in the house of representatives
which last named votes are hereby designated "electoral votes." In
all cases where a representative is apportioned to two or more counties
or districts, the electoral vote, based on such representative, shall be
equally divided among such counties or districts. The returns of said
election shall be certified by the election commissioners, or a majority
of them, of the several counties, and transmitted, sealed, to the seat of
government, directed to the secretary of state, and shall be by him
safely kept and delivered to the speaker of the house of representatives
at the next ensuing session of the legislature within one day
after he shall have been elected. The speaker, shall on the next Tuesday
after he shall have received said returns, open and publish them
in the presence of the house of representatives, and said house shall
ascertain and count the vote of each county and legislative district and
decide any contest that may be made concerning the same, and said
decision shall be made by a majority of the whole number of members
of the house of representatives concurring therein, by a viva voce vote,
which shall be recorded in its journal; Provided, In case the two highest
candidates have an equal number of votes in any county or legislative
district, the electoral vote of such county or legislative district
shall be considered as equally divided between them. The person
found to have received a majority of all the elective votes, and also a
majority of the popular vote, shall be declared elected.
Section 141. If no person shall receive such majorities, then the
house of representatives shall proceed to choose a governor from the
two persons who shall have received the highest number of popular
votes. The election shall be by viva voce, which shall be recorded in
the journal, in such manner as to show for whom each member voted.
Section 142. In case of an election of governor or any state officer
by the house of representatives, no member of that house shall be eligible
to receive any appointment from the governor or other state officer
so elected during the term for which he shall be elected.
Section 143. All other state officers shall be elected at the same
time and in the same manner as provided for election of governor.
The legislature is prohibited from electing officers to a very
great extent by the following section of the constitution:
Section 99. The legislature shall not elect any other than its own
officers, state librarian and United States Senators; but this section
shall not prohibit the legislature from appointing presidential electors.
All the judges of the state, except justices of the peace, are
appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent
of the senate. Mississippi was, it may be mentioned parenthetically,
the first state to provide for an elective judiciary; this
was done in her constitution of 1832; but she is now as far away
from that mode of selection as she can well be, her present constitution
providing for their appointment and her people generally,
it is believed, are thoroughly satisfied with the present
status of the matter. There are two instances in which the electors
vote directly upon the subject of the enforcement of laws;
and without an affirmative vote in their favor the statutes are
not enforced. These are, first the Local Option law, by which the
qualified electors of a county, if a majority vote against the sale,
may prohibit the licensing of dram-shops in the county, and under
which a large majority of the counties of the state have secured
absolute statutory prohibition of the liquor traffic; and,
second, the fence and stock law, by which is determined the question
of whether the owners of live stock shall keep them confined,
and thus allow of the production of crops on unenclosed
lands. This resolves itself into a question of "fences" or "no
fences," and it is left to a vote in the counties, or parts of counties
can vote upon it. This question is left to "the resident freeholders
and leaseholders for a term of three years or more" of
the territory so voting. It will be noticed that neither sex nor
age is mentioned, and in truth women and infants do actually
vote in the state, on this interesting and to those involved, most
serious question.
The Supreme Court of the state has settled beyond cavil
that the statute is constitutional and valid. This "fence" or
"no fence" election is possibly an exception to the general rule
of the state that a plurality vote elects or carries. I say, possibly
is an exception, because of ambiguity in the statute, construed
as I think it may be seen by some minds, it will require
two thirds of the vote cast to put the "no fence" law in force.
All elections in Mississippi since 1821 have been by ballot,
and this is now the constitutional rule; we have here the Australian
or secret ballot system very much as it is found in a number
of states of the Union, and it accomplishes in its practical operation
the primary objects of the system; first, the absolute prevention
of bribery, for no man will bribe a voter if the only evidence
of the delivery of the contracted-for vote be the word of
the bribe taker, and, second, the prevention of intimidation of
voters, which is practically impossible.
The absence from the voting place since the introduction of
the system of the ticket broker and professional bummer is
notable.
It was the intention of the writer when this article was begun
to present his views on many of the questions suggested and
germain to the general subject, but this paper has now grown so
long that he will have to be content with a presentation of a mere
historical narrative of matters pertaining to suffrage in this
state. He consoles himself with the reflection that perhaps such
a contribution may be more valuable to the true and earnest
student of the subject than would be any discourse that he might
write which in its nature was sought to be made philosophical, or
which was merely speculative. If the facts are presented, if the
history be made accessible, the student who is interested enough
to read will draw the proper conclusions.