Chairman Mercer called the Conference to order at 9.30
o'clock, and announced that the Program Committee had submitted
eight specific questions for discussion, the consideration
of each question to be limited to twenty minutes, and the length
of time of each speaker to five minutes.
The further discussion of the Workers' Compensation Code
was then taken up as follows:
Chairman Mercer: The first question will be whether we
want to cover all employments in this act, or simply the hazardous
employments.
Mr. Dawson (New York): In opening this discussion I
am going to pass the legal question, because if it is necessary to
limit the bill to hazardous employments, there are not two sides to
the question.
It would appear that it ought not to be necessary for us to
repeat all of the baby experiments that have been made in other
countries. In other words, having delayed nearly thirty years
longer than Europe, why should we not begin where the European
countries left off, instead of where they began. It may, however,
be necessary for us to confine ourselves to certain classes of
employment, but I do not think, personally, that those classes
ought to be selected with strict reference to the question of their
being hazardous. For instance, if it should transpire that the
employers of domestic servants and the farmers are bitterly
opposed to any system which will apply to them, it may be
necessary to leave them out, but we ought, if possible, to cover
all manufacturing establishments, all mercantile establishments
and all transportation industries, and generally to proceed on
broad lines.
There is a practical objection to confining this sort of thing
to the really more hazardous employments. It is this: The rates
for employers' liability insurance are already very high in those
industries, and they will probably be doubled or possibly tripled
or even quadrupled. It would be difficult to imagine anything
which would render workmen's compensation more densely unpopular
than to apply the principle exclusively to the more dangerous
manufacturing industries of a particular State. On the
other hand, an increase in the rate payable by a dry goods merchant,
for instance, might not amount to an advance on the payroll
of more than one-half of 1 per cent. or 1 per cent., and, therefore,
might not seriously place the employer at a disadvantage in
competition with employers of other States. That is not true
where the hazards of the occupation are very serious. You then
have the situation that every manufacturer affected may be able to
establish that he cannot carry on his business at all in competition
with these other manufacturers if he is thus burdened.
James A. Lowell (Massachusetts): This matter of how
many trades shall be covered is a pretty serious one for Massachusetts,
because I do not think a scheme in Massachusetts
would work unless we covered practically all the trades. We
have an employers' liability law in Massachusetts now which
excepts agricultural employment, which is a small matter in
Massachusetts, and domestic servants, and I should assume that
those two exceptions would be made in any law which was
passed, and incidentally that has been held to be a proper law.
So I do not apprehend any difficulty on the constitutional part of
it through leaving out those two classes of workers.
But in Massachusetts by far the greater part of the industry
there is in manufacturing, the lighter trades, and, I think, in order
to get a law which would be of much service in Massachusetts,
we would have to cover practically all industries, so we are up
against the proposition there that we cannot do much along the
line that has been followed in New York.
The experience in England under the employers' liability law
has been that the premium on insurance in mines is twice what
it cost under their former laws. In hazardous risks, as Mr.
Dawson has said, the rates are from three to four times higher,
and in those lighter trades it is very much greater than that; it is
six or eight times more than it was under the old laws, and the
chances are that if we adopted a law in Massachusetts with anything
like the scale there is in England, it would be six or seven
or eight times as much for insurance as it is at the present time.
So that is a very practical difficulty which we have to face in
Massachusetts.
As I said before, in order to have a law there that is to be of
any value, you must practically cover all of the trades, and the
only way you can do that, as far as I can see, is that you would
have to have your scale of compensation under the law very low.
I do not think that that would work out badly in Massachusetts,
because most of the injuries which will be found in the factories
will be minor injuries. There are not a great many very serious
injuries in the cotton factories as compared with the mining and
bridge-building industries, but there are a great many small injuries.
If you put on some kind of a scale which would be
relatively quite small, the result, it seems to me, would be that
the workmen, as a whole, would be very much better off than
they are now. As it is now, one man out of every twenty, we
will say, or possibly one out of fifteen, will get a fairly good-sized
amount, and all the other fourteen will not get anything.
Putting it on a moderate scale in the cotton factories would
give everybody something; probably not as much as we would
like to give them, or as we perhaps should give them, but, I believe,
the result would be much better than the present situation.
For that reason on the point we are now discussing, I believe the
thing for Massachusetts to do is to try and get some kind of a
law which will cover practically all industries.
Charles A. Sumner (Missouri): I naturally would like
to see the bill cover all industries, but the legal question arises,
and unless we can get around it, as this tentative bill seems to
succeed in doing, I do not know what we would do down in
Missouri. Missouri is largely an agricultural State, and the
Legislature is in the control very largely of the farmers and the
representatives of the smaller cities in the agricultural districts.
We have the initiative and referendum, however, and it occurred
to me, in listening to the discussion here, that if it were the
opinion of this Conference that it would be better to attempt to
get a bill adopted which would include all trades, that it would be
worth trying in Missouri, where the initiative and referendum
are in existence. I believe that if a proper bill were put to the
people direct, it would very likely get the support of the people
in Missouri, particularly if it was a bill that the best judgment
of this Conference had evolved. I believe, however, that we
would prefer to have the bill include all trades.
Chairman Mercer: Mr. Sumner, the farmers may have a
considerable influence in the Legislature, but so have the other
interests, and legislation is very largely a matter of trade anyway,
when you get into the majorities. Don't you think that would
work itself out all right and take care of the farmers?
Mr. Sumner: As I understand politics in Missouri, the
farmers there are strong partisans, and unless you can get your
bill adopted by one party or the other, as a party measure, which
I think would be very improbable down there, because our parties
are very largely in the control of the corporate interests of the
large cities, they would have something to say about the bills and
the farmers' representatives would simply go with the party.
Still, with the initiative and referendum the people and the labor
unions down there are not relying very much on the Legislature
any more.
Chairman Mercer: If either party, or if both labor and
capital wanted this proposition, then they would vote for it?
Mr. Sumner: Yes.
Chairman Mercer: So if the employers and employes
should agree on what was a proper bill in your State, you would
not have any special difficulty, after all, would you?
Mr. Sumner: No, probably not. I should add that we
have discussed this matter at the City Club in Kansas City, and
the employers are just as much opposed to the present system as
the employes. I was told by a State Senator last week that he
has a bill now drawn up to be introduced at the next session of
the Legislature, but I apprehend that the bill will not be acceptable
to us.
Prof. Seager (New York): It seems to me in this matter
that we are between the devil and the deep sea. If we begin
this legislation by taking in all trades, we have got to scale down
our schedule of compensation. We have got to recognize the
validity of the argument, that you cannot put too heavy a burden
upon competitive industries in one State when they have not
the same burden in other States. That means a low scale of
compensation. That means it would be very hard to get wage-earners
behind our proposal, and for those reasons I anticipate
that the political obstacle to getting a bill passed that contains
an adequate scale of compensation and applies to all industries
is going to be serious in most of the States.
I know it was our opinion in New York that such a bill
could not be passed through the Legislature. The only certainty
of getting a bill through the Legislature was limiting it to extra-hazardous
trades and to trades that were non-competitive. That
policy of course has this disadvantage: There is some doubt as
to whether a classification along those lines will be upheld as
reasonable by the courts, and I confess that we have some anxiety
as to whether the bill we have induced the Legislature to pass will
be held to be constitutional on that account. On the other hand,
along that line it is possible politically to make a beginning, and
I am inclined to think that it would be easier, if we can, to get
the thing started for extra-hazardous industries and then to extend
our definition of hazardous industries and gradually take them all
in as the public is convinced that it is a good policy and a great
improvement over the Employers' Liability Law. That would
be easier, I believe, than to work along the other line of trying to
take in all the trades at the outset. Starting on that line would
involve a very low schedule of compensation and then trying to
advance our schedule of compensation to what we would feel was
adequate.
Chairman Mercer: But how about the desirability of it
in case you feel it could be done?
Prof. Seager: Oh, I assume that we all agree that that is
what we want if we can get it.
Charles McCarthy (Wisconsin): In looking over the
New York Bill, and after hearing the argument of Professor Seager,
I cannot help saying something about this bugaboo of interstate
competition. I have just returned from Germany and England,
where I have been some months examining the workmen's
compensation insurance scheme. You are now discussing the scope
of the bill and I want to tell the delegates here that the idea here
in America that we in Wisconsin cannot start this scheme because
of competition from other States, has a parallel in the
commissions in Europe.
Europe is about as big as the United States and you have
all these countries competing, one with another. You have severe
competition between Germany and England, and you find Germany
not only bearing the burden of accident insurance, of sickness
insurance and invalidity insurance, but the German manufacturer
actually adds out of his own pocket to what he has
been required by law to pay, sometimes to the extent of fifty or
sixty per cent. more, in bringing about many improvements in
the conditions of the workingmen, and I state here that that is
one of the basic conditions of German prosperity. I want to put
that on the record here because I want the manufacturers of
America to send representatives to Europe, and they will find
that what I am saying is true; that the reason why Germany is
driving English-made goods out of the market is because this
very burden that they talk about is an asset and not a liability.
Books have been written about this subject and I have had
the honor of reading the advance sheets of the book by Dr.
Frankel and Mr. Dawson, which has not yet been printed, but
these books do not really show why Germany is beating England,
notwithstanding this so-called "burden" upon the shoulders of
the German manufacturer. Germany is passing from an agricultural
country into a great manufacturing country. In doing
so it is necessary for Germany to extend her manufactories out
into the small towns. You all know what that means. Some
of you from Massachusetts have seen the shoe factory leave
Brockton to go out and get some cheaper help somewhere, and
then it comes back to Boston, because in Boston they can get
the skilled and intelligent help which must go into the product
in order to make the community prosperous and to make the
goods of that community sell.
When a German manufacturer goes to a small town he says
to the workman: "You come out to my town and live there.
You will have your accident insurance, your old age pension and
your sickness insurance, and besides that I am going to get a house
for you out there, and a little plot of land, and I am going down
in my pocket and add something to that invalidity insurance, and
I am going to do something for tuberculosis prevention, and I
am going to have a sanitary factory, and when you come out
there you can settle down and marry and raise your children,
and when they grow up I am going to put them into an industrial
school after they have left the public school at the age of fourteen,
and they can go to that industrial school until they are eighteen."
Now all of these things go to make up an intelligent population
in Germany, where the children grow up under the conditions
of sanitation and education, and with the contentment that comes
from the fact that a man knows he can settle down and marry
and have children. The manufacturers in Germany realize that
this is not a burden, but that it is the biggest asset they have in
Germany. I wanted to point that out to you and have the delegates
go back from here with the idea in their minds that there
is more to be said upon this question of interstate competition
than has been brought out as yet.
England is in a desperate condition because Germany is
cutting into the markets of England throughout the world.
England had to adopt her Workmen's Compensation Act, and
she adopted a compensation plan that Mr. Dawson knows is excellent,
and it costs about four times what it does in Germany.
I want to get it on the record that there are no adequate figures
or facts presented as yet as to the difference between the mutual
organizations of Germany and the private insurance organizations
of England. I do not know why that is, but Mr. Mitchell said
yesterday that the private insurance companies similar to those
of England might prevent accidents. I want to warn you before
you go back, that there is the greatest difference in the world
between the mutual organizations in Germany in the safety and
conditions of the workingman's life, as compared with the third
party insurance in England. I have never found in England a
private company having any inspection whatsoever of dangerous
industries. I visited many factories and went into every insurance
company in London and asked them what they did to prevent
accidents, and they were doing practically nothing. I went into
the sawmills in Germany and in England and compared the
safety devices side by side, and I want to tell you that where the
manufacturers in Germany combine under the law as they are
compelled to do, they deal with their men with a hundred times
greater humanity than under the conditions in England.
I am sure of what I am saying and I am going on record.
I want every manufacturer and employer to investigate what I
am saying here. I say that you can get insurance by mutually
organizing and having some provision in your bills for mutual
organization of employers a great deal cheaper and with a
great deal more regard for humane conditions than you can by the
private proposition, unless you compel all insurance companies
by some other statute to make inspections before they place their
risk.
I also want this suggestion to appear on the record. Some
sort of provision should be made so that the private insurance
companies will not knock out the old men on poorer risks. When
they started in England they did knock out some of the old men
in the employments, but now that thing has been settled. It ought
to be put here in statutory form, because when you get the third
party in here between the manufacturers and the employes, you
are getting people who do not put their hearts into the thing.
I know this will be a matter of controversy, but I want to
offer it here. I want to tell you not to fear this bugaboo of
interstate competition. Nobody wants to see the State of Wisconsin
more prosperous than I do, and I am sure that if our
Wisconsin manufacturers go forward and make that investment,
they will put intelligence into the product and add a happiness
to the people that will build up the State. If it were not so
then the principle of tariff would be no good; if it were not so
then China and Japan with cheap labor would have been beating
us to-day; if it were not so slavery would have been the best
thing for this country instead of the worst.
Mr. Dawson: An investigation as to the cost of insurance
in the various countries of Europe will be undertaken by the
United States Bureau of Labor, as requested by this Conference at
its session at Washington.
Chairman Mercer: Gentlemen, is it not true that we have
the best judgment of the great financial interests in this country
to the effect that this interstate competition amounts to very little,
and that that judgment is best evidenced by reason of the fact
that nearly all of the big industries that are doing business both
locally and throughout the United States are adopting a scheme
that voluntarily places a greater burden upon their shoulders than
the law has been providing?
Mr. Ingalls (Wisconsin): We have in Racine a perfect
illustration of that. A very large concern there not only adopted
the accident but the pension system as well, so that we do not
fear anything of that kind.
Doctor Allport: It would seem to me that the question of
whether we should attempt to adopt or recommend a tentative
form of law or code of law in this matter is really a question
of whether we have profited by the historical aspects of this
subject. I think in a measure we are a little too much wedded
to what people are wont to call the philosophy of individualism.
Every State is passing laws of all kinds, and no State has any
particular intention of following another State.
The historical aspect of this matter with reference to interstate
competition and with reference to the selection of certain
trades has already been threshed out abroad, to the satisfaction
of the European governments, trades people and manufacturers,
and it would not be a bad idea perhaps if for two or three minutes
we consider the historical aspects of this subject, as applied to
England and to Germany.
We all know the inception of this thing began in Germany,
but they never formulated it until about 1883. Before that time,
however, Gladstone in 1880 had been forced to make up some kind
of a law for England which was passed in 1880 as the Employers'
Liability Act. That was based on what is now known to be the
crudest and most unsatisfactory of all principles—principles
which are bound to be local and unsatisfactory and which do not
cover the situation, and which give the workmen practically no
remedy except before the court. That is the stage which this
country has reached if it has reached any stage at all. Few of
our States have reached a point where they have anything like
a satisfactory Employers' Liability Act. That is the initial stage
when the child first commences to walk. Germany went far
beyond that. She saw the failure of the Gladstone Act, and
went to the bottom of the matter by deciding to abolish entirely
all matters of liability and put it altogether on another basis.
Upon that basis European-Continental law has been modeled
from that time to this; Germany always in advance but the other
countries following as close as existing laws will permit.
In 1890 Germany adopted practically an absolute act, and
every State on the European continent has now followed the lead
of Germany. The question that has come to us historically and
in an evolutionary manner, is whether we should follow the lead
of European governments in this matter and do as they have
done, adopt the lead of Germany, who ignored entirely the matter
of interstate competition and passed a law placing every trade
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, or whether we should
undertake to work out this matter for ourselves in the crude indefinite
way in which England has worked it out.
In England this matter of interstate competition came up.
England worked for seventeen years under the Gladstone Employers'
Liability Act, but finally Asquith and Chamberlain and
a combination of the Liberal and Conservative parties, got together
and formulated another act in 1897 which they called the first
Workmen's Compensations. That act applied, as we attempt
now to apply it in certain of our States, to certain limited trades
and occupations.
Prior to that time the various counties and organizations
of Great Britain appointed committees which investigated these
matters to decide whether they should pass a law to collect statistics
and decide whether they should adopt a law including all
of these trades or only a portion of them. They decided, in
view of the uncertain character of the legislative elements in
England, that they would apply it to a limited portion only of the
trades, and so they passed the Chamberlain Act of 1896. But
they soon saw not only the benefits that came to all of England
from the application of the principle, but they saw that in order
to satisfy the other workmen who demanded the same thing, that
they must apply it to all of the trades, and so finally they passed
the Asquith Act of 1906, which is now in operation, and applies
practically to all of the trades in Great Britain. They were not
so wedded to this unfortunate philosophy of ours which was the
cause of our constitution, and I suppose which led America first
to separate itself from England and which has dominated American
life ever since—this philosophy of independence, this philosophy
of individualism. If we cannot see the benefits that come
to us from following the European systems, we will have to work
one out ourselves. But in my judgment and in the judgment of
a great many others more competent to speak authoritatively upon
the subject than I am, it would seem as though it was the height
of folly for us to ignore the example of Germany and twenty-two
Continental Governments which have followed the lead of
Germany.
Chairman Mercer: I would like to hear some of the employers
discuss this question. Would the employers feel that
they were treated fairly if we singled out a few of the more
hazardous industries and did not cover all industries in the same
way, in proportion to the number of accidents?
John Mitchell (New York): I think we must approach
this subject as a practical proposition. I want to make this
observation: If these bills include domestic and agricultural
labor, we are not going to pass the bill. If we are going to work
out a practical proposition with the hope of passing our bills, it
seems to me we must exclude agricultural laborers and those
employed in domestic service. I do not believe the farmers will
favor this legislation if it affects them, and I think that the number
of accidents occurring on farms is not sufficient to make their
inclusion necessary for the success of the bill.
My judgment is that we should start with men working in
dangerous employments, and then perhaps with a few years' experience
under a bill of that kind, we may decide to include the
agricultural industry. The industries which need it most are the
ones in which there are the greatest number of accidents.
Chairman Mercer: What is the harm of reporting the bill
complete to the Legislature, and then when it gets in there as
a practical proposition, let them pass it, and if they can not,
let them cut out such industries as they have to?
Mr. Mitchell: The difficulty is, if the farmers are apparently
justified, the men who represent the agricultural districts
will vote against it, and the legislator who represents a manufacturing
district and who personally might not feel hostile to the
legislation, will vote against it, because he does not want to put
the burden on the farmers.
Chairman Mercer: Supposing some fellow offers an
amendment striking out these industries which you would leave
out in the first place, can they not pass the bill just the same?
Mr. Mitchell: Yes, but I am getting at the best way to
approach it.
Mr. Harper (Illinois): The experience in Illinois on Commission
bills has been that it is vastly better to have no opposition
at all, and to eliminate all possibility of amendment if
it is possible. In other words, if the Commission submits a bill
to the Illinois Legislature, they are inclined to take it as it stands,
especially if both sides interested in the matter are on the Commission,
because they say, "Well, this matter has been agreed to
and we have no special interest in it. If it is all right we will
pass it." Hence, if we put something in that requires amendment,
it is liable to stir up discord and dissension; and my personal
opinion would be that it would be wise to avoid that if
possible.
On the subject of classification I think it would be wise to
make a classification based upon the hazardous trades; not the
non-competitive trades, but the hazardous trades, and make it
inclusive and as broad as possible. Include in the hazardous
trades the non-competitive trades, as they have done in New
York, but do not start with any one especially, because our courts
here have gone further on class legislation than anything else,
and I think it would be dangerous for us here to include merely
non-competitive trades and call them hazardous or extra-hazardous.
In my judgment it would be much better to call them extra-hazardous
and include in that list the non-competitive industries.
Edwin R. Wright (Illinois): I wanted to suggest that
it would of course be desirable to take in every occupation, but
if we take in the farm labor and servants of Illinois, we cannot
possibly secure the passage of this bill. If we burden our bill
with too many classifications and too many occupations, the moment
we get to Springfield, interested parties, the farmers to start
with, would ask to have the farm labor stricken out, and when
you once start the snowball rolling down the hill, you would
strike the meat out of the bill and lose the confidence of the
Legislature, and the moment you do that you lose the bill as a
whole. It would not make any difference if nine-tenths of the
bill were correct, you would have overshot the mark one-tenth and
you would lose the entire bill because they would cut it all to
pieces.
We have a great many dangerous occupations in this State.
A great many men are killed or seriously injured on railroads
every day. Five men are either killed or injured in mines of
Illinois every day, and the proportion keeps right up through the
trades, so that it is pretty hard to say where the danger starts or
stops, but must classify the different trades in this State if we
hope to get anything at all.
In comparing conditions here with conditions in foreign countries,
you will have to take this question into consideration: In
foreign countries, as I understand the situation, they raise the
workers there, and if we raised the workers in this State we would
soon arrive at the conclusion they have arrived at in England and
Germany. Here we import the workmen ready-made and grown-up.
We do not grow them in this country, and most of the men
who are killed are foreign born, or a large percentage of them.
If we fail in securing the compensation law, and it has got to
take its regular course, we can get the same results through a
different channel. Stop bringing in the men who are grown up,
and raise them here, and you won't have the workers to kill, but
you will have to conserve the workers in this State and in this
nation. Out of 220 firms reporting in Illinois, there are over 200
accidents a month.
Mr. Ingalls (Wisconsin): The idea in this plan is to include
the railroads and public service transportation company employes
as a whole. Now, is it not wise to consider for a moment
the distinction between those two classes of occupation? All
the gentlemen here will agree perhaps that so far as railways are
concerned, and public service corporations of that character, there
isn't any question but what the Legislature or Congress can pass
a compulsory compensation law. You do not have to classify
either at all; any transportation company which gets its right
to exist and to operate from the Legislature or Congress can be
controlled by the Legislature or Congress with reference to compensation
for its injured employes. That industry can positively
be handled in that way.
Congress has introduced and passed a resolution for the
appointment of a Commission, which will consider that very
subject. Those measures are to be made uniform; the State could
readily agree upon a plan along that line, and it seems to me that
with the subject handled with that idea in view you can pass,
under our constitution, a compulsory compensation law for all
railway employes. And those engaged in interstate commerce
could be handled by Congress and thus make a uniform system.
As to what occupations should be considered, none of us has
considered in Wisconsin, so far as our committee is concerned,
that we necessarily ought to include farm laborers or domestic
servants. Of course our plan here is different and the discussion
seems to relate to what classification we shall have under an absolute
system, which is quite a different question from that in
Wisconsin. I can readily see how the farmers and employers
of domestic servants would be inclined to oppose a measure as
strong and radical as to include all such employes. I agree with
the other speakers that in presenting that matter to the Legislature
you ought to present it as you think it will be sustained by the
Legislature rather than to ask for things that you know yourselves
you probably would not be able to get. In fact, I think
it might be well to keep in mind, in discussing the occupations,
what you can do positively and what there is a great deal of
doubt about being able to do, on the theory of an absolute compulsory
system.
Mr. Ranney: When the International Harvester Company
organized their industrial insurance plan they omitted all employes
except those working in their mines, in their plant, and
on their railroads. We have some 2500 men in our sales department
and experts working out on farms who are not included
in that plan, because we felt that going beyond the industries was
rather a dangerous proposition. Hence, we included about
35,000 employes and excluded about 2500.
Mr. Blaine (Wisconsin): I think that if there is any justification
for this sort of legislation it is found in the fact that the
industry or trade should bear the burden and not the workmen.
I have contended also from the beginning that farm laborers
and domestic servants should not be included. Farmers as they
conduct their occupation in this country to-day do not have any
control whatever over the price or distribution of their products,
and hence they have no opportunity whatever to transfer the cost
of industrial accidents to the consumer. They are not organized.
If they were organized into a vast Society of Equity in every
State of the Union I doubt not but what they could control and
dictate who should pay the cost of this new burden, if it is going
to be an additional burden.
The other industries are organized. They cover vast areas
of territory, and they know how to transfer the cost of production.
The hazard, too, is greater in our industries than in our farming
communities. I think, however, that under the Wisconsin plan we
have taken care of the farmer, and I apprehend no danger whatever
from that source, because he need not come under the plan
unless he wants to. He will be independent of it.
Reuben McKitrick (Wisconsin): In an article written by
Professor Farnam, statistics are given as to the comparative
number of accidents in farming and agricultural pursuits and in
the industries, and while I cannot state the figures in absolute
terms at this moment, the percentage given is higher for laborers
upon the farms than upon the railroads, for instance.
That statement is borne out also in the accident rates for
farm laborers as compared with the rates for men in general
manufacturing industries throughout the State. The accident
rates are higher for the farm laborers, and so if you are going
to work on a basis of establishing a classification on account of
the hazardous employment, it seems to me the farmer would
have to be included.
(In closing the discussion on Question 1, the following resolution
was offered by Doctor Allport, but not voted upon, the unanimous
consent to its adoption, required under the By-Laws, not
being granted:
"Resolved, That it is the sense of this Conference, that
State Compensation Laws should be framed to cover all hazardous
manufacturing industries, and that any manufacturing industry
in which accidents occur shall be declared classified as hazardous.
That this classification shall not include farm or domestic labor."
Upon John Mitchell's motion, Commissioner Charles P. Neill,
Mr. H. V. Mercer, Dr. John B. Andrews, Mr. M. M. Dawson,
Dr. Lee K. Frankel and Dr. William H. Tolman were authorized
to represent the Conference at the International Congress
of Social Insurance to be held in September, at The Hague, and
to extend on behalf of the association an invitation to the International
Congress to meet in the United States in 1912.)
Chairman Mercer: The second question is: Do you want
the liability in whatever industries you cover to be an absolute
liability; or do you want to make a law that will permit a contract
to be made by the employer and employe?
If nobody wants to be heard on that we will pass to the next
question, because that is largely a constitutional question of
what you can do, and you all want to accomplish the same results,
as far as you can.
The third question is: Whether, in your judgment, we should
have a double or a single liability, if we could get what we
want. Do you want to repeal the common law and statutory
remedies or do you want to add the compensation act and leave
the others as they stand?
John Flora (Illinois): As a member of the Chicago Federation
of Labor, and knowing the views of that organization,
I want to say that it is the unanimous desire of that portion
of the workmen of the State of Illinois that we first have in the
State of Illinois a law repealing the common law defenses of
the assumption of risks, contributory negligence and the fellow-servant
act. We hold, as a body of workmen, that no compensation
law, I do not care how good you make it, will be worth
the paper it is written on unless those defenses of the employer
are taken away from him. Then we do not care whether it is
elective or compulsory. If you take away the defenses of the
employer along those lines, you can make an elective law, and
he is compelled to accept it in order to escape the results of the
statutory law.
Chairman Mercer: Are you willing to repeal all the common
law, not only the defenses, but the right to recover if the
compensation plan covers the whole field?
Mr. Flora: I am not at liberty to state that at the present
time. I am careful in making my remarks, because I would first
want to consult my constituents on any questions of that kind.
I do know this, however, that the working people of Chicago
do not want to give up the right of going under the law as it
stands to-day and as they have it in England. We want the
right, if we do not like the compensation, to go to court. As
a matter of fact, I think it is rather a foolish idea that is entertained.
If we can get a compensation law in this State as
good, for instance, as the one that Wisconsin recommends, personally,
I am going to write in my dying request that my wife
shall not be fool enough to go to common law, but to take the
compensation, because, I think, she will come out better in
the end.
I am gathering statistics in Cook County as to the accidents
that have resulted in death, and I find in every case where they
have gone to court they have received a great deal less than if
they had settled with their employers. The largest amounts that
have been recovered, after taking out the costs of a court procedure,
have been less than what they would have received if
they had settled with their employers in 150 cases that I have
so far investigated. Therefore, I think, the idea that the working
people have—that they want access to the courts under the
law—is more of a bugaboo than anything else, and that after
a good compensation law is passed we will have a great deal
of trouble in our organization in trying to teach the people to
take the compensation and stay out of the courts.
Chairman Mercer: Is it not true that the laboring men
think now that they ought to have both systems left open to
them, because they are afraid they are being handed a "gold
brick" by the compensation plan, if their right to recovery under
the common law is taken away from them?
Mr. Flora: Yes; if you have had many dealings with working
people you will know that they are always afraid of a "gold
brick."
Dr. McCarthy (Wisconsin): Do you not believe that after
a discussion with the working people they will realize the situation
and understand it better? I know in talking with the labor
representatives up in Wisconsin for the last two or three years
before the Legislature, that they are gradually beginning to
understand what a compensation act is. I think the sentiment
is changing among our labor people in Wisconsin, and I believe
this winter they are going to accept the compensation act without
asking for their common law rights.
John Mitchell: I do not believe there should be any hesitancy
in answering that question. The fact of the matter is that
the working people want the right to sue in order to make the
employers careful. We all know, of course, that under any compensation
that is proposed here they are simply averaging up
the compensation. That is to say, a man who is probably entitled
to anything at all under any law we now have, gets something;
and the man who is entitled to a great deal does not get
so much.
Dr. McCarthy: Do you think it will make the employer
more careful?
Mr. Mitchell: Of course I do. I believe that if it cost an
employer $20,000 to kill a man he would be careful. If it is
expensive for an employer to kill men, he will protect them, but the
great difficulty in this country is that it is not expensive to kill
men. It is the judgment, I think, of nearly every one who has
investigated this matter, that human life is entirely too cheap;
it is not expensive enough for the employers who injure their
workmen.
Dr. McCarthy: The employers only pay one rate, any way.
It falls on the insurance companies. Why should the employers
be more careful?
Mr. Mitchell: Because their insurance rates are fixed
by the number of accidents or the number of recoveries. I dare
say in England the number of accidents is not as high as it is
here. In fact, a representative of an English insurance company
told me the other day that the British Government pays
30 cents per capita for mine inspection, and their total expenditure
amounts to $6,000,000 annually. I dare say that while our
population is double the population of Great Britain, that we do
not pay in the whole United States $2,000,000 dollars a year in
either factory or mining inspection, where as a little nation of
40,000,000 people is spending $6,000,000 annually. That is one
reason, I think, why the accident rate is so much lower in England
than it is in the United States.
Mr. Parks (Massachusetts): I have heard a great deal
about this double liability plan where the workman, failing to
win his suit at common law, would be entitled to compensation
under the compensation act. I believe in Mr. Mitchell's idea
in regard to that, and I believe that is the idea of the majority of
the workmen. The cry in Massachusetts is that they want something
different from the present employers' liability act. I am
not so enthusiastic a laboring man as to think that we are going
to get the employers' liability act so amended that we will take
all of that grievance away from the act. In fact, if we got all
of the defenses taken away from the employer there would be no
need of a compensation act.
We have had that bill before the Massachusetts Legislature
for a number of years, and we have not heard any great talk
about workmen demanding this or that right under the employers'
liability act. They have been asking for something to take the
place of the employers' liability act. They want a workman's
compensation act. I do not want to see this thing come up from
the workmen themselves, because I think it is going to stop this
workmen's compensation movement. If they continually rise and
say that the workmen demand this and demand that it will mean
that the workmen will get nothing. I have had considerable
experience in the Massachusetts Legislature in agitating labor
legislation, and, if I do say it, I think Massachusetts in recent
years has put more remedial labor legislation on the statute books
than probably any other State in the Union, with the possible
exception of New York. I give way to New York, because
we like to follow New York, but I cannot say that
of the other States of the nation. Personally, I would like
to see the workmen get all they possibly can get, but we cannot
impose too many restrictions on the employers, and if we recommend
in the different States the taking away of practically
all the defenses of the employer under the employers' liability
act, and at the same time recommend the workmen's compensation
act, the whole thing will fall through and we will get
nothing. I believe we ought to go easy and get something that we
can put through.
I am a believer in fixing up everything before you put the
bill into the Legislature, and have some kind of an understanding
between the contending parties, so that when your hearing comes
up both sides are pretty nearly agreed on the same plan. Take
away all opposition before you have your hearing, because the
minute you start opposition you begin the death of the bill. It is
a slow illness, but it means death. If we can bring about something
that will not be too radical, that will not be too harsh on
the employers, we will get something for the workmen.
I believe, as Mr. Mitchell said, that the workman ought to
have his right under the common law, but failing in that he
should not be allowed to go to the compensation act. I do not
believe in that; it is a nice thing, and I would like to see the
workmen have it, but it is not fair to the other side.
Mr. Blaine (Wisconsin): On this question of double liability
I would suggest that the farmer under the Wisconsin
plan will study this law and will learn the benefits of it, and
either through mutual insurance companies, as they have mutual
fire insurance companies to-day, or something of that sort, he will,
no doubt, come under the law and be glad to do so, because
it will be a positive benefit to him. The double liability is somewhat
debatable. Under our plan we take away certain defenses. If
we take away those defenses from the employer, and leave the
employe the right to sue at common law, and also the right to
compensation under the act in the event of failure to win his
suit, I think we are doing something unfair toward the employer
and something that the employe does not want. I do not believe
that in Wisconsin the Federation of Labor would demand that
sort of a measure. In fact, I am led to believe that they are
now prepared to meet the committee upon a very reasonable
ground as to the double compensation, and I do believe that
while our bill provides that the right of election shall take place
at the time of employment, that we will be able to meet the committee
on the fair proposition that the right of election shall take
place at the time of the accident, but that that right shall apply
to accidents happening by reason of the negligence of the employer
or through his failure to supply the proper safety appliances for
his machines.
Mr. Flora (Illinois): Of what value would a compensation
law be to the workman in the State of Illinois particularly, where
we have no employers' liability law, if the gate were left open
for the insurance company or the mutual benefit company, or if
the employer could bring in the old common law doctrine of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and so forth? What
would prevent the employer or the insurance company, if we did
not repeal those laws, from bringing those in and keeping the
workingman out of his compensation under a compensation law?
I would like to know what protection the working people would
have in that case.
I find also that too many labor representatives are too much
imbued with the idea of protecting the other side. I believe
in letting the other fellow take care of his own side. He is big
enough to do it.
Mr. Parks (Massachusetts): If they had a workman's compensation
act in Illinois the workmen would draw whatever the
compensation act said they should draw.
Mr. Flora: Cannot they bring in the law of contributory
negligence?
Mr. Parks: No; not under the workmen's compensation
act; you are entitled to so much, if an injury occurs, without
regard to the liability.
As to Mr. Flora's statement that there are too many labor
representatives who want to look out for the other side, I find
that you get more for the workmen by showing a little consideration
for the other side than by being radical.
Mr. Ranney (Illinois): In answer to Mr. Flora's question,
I attended the National Manufacturers' Association meeting
in New York and talked with about fifty or seventy-five large
employers of labor, and there was not one of them that was in
favor of a fair employers' liability law. But what they want to
know is definitely what this is going to cost them. If they have
got to be liable for every accident, they have got to know not
only the expense under the compensation act, but the additional
expense under an action at common law, which is an unknown
quantity. I know that large employers in general are in favor of
a fair compensation act, but I do not think they are in favor of
double liability, because they will never know where they are.
The laboring man quite properly wants to have a fair compensation
act and wants a fair amount, but if he elects to go to common
law, he should take that chance. Otherwise he will get a fair
compensation without any legal action whatever.
Mr. Ingalls: Would a liberal rate be more preferable to
the employers than a double liability?
Mr. Ranney: I think it would.
Mr. Ingalls: Of course, if you can fix the rates all right
it might go a long way toward covering the proposition.
Mr. Ranney: I am not speaking for any employer, but
I think that if a bill is adopted that is fair to both parties, that
the employer should have some protection on that side. I am
simply voicing what Mr. Mitchell said yesterday, that he was not
in favor of the English act, which gives double liability.
Mr. Mitchell: I am not in favor of double liability, but
I am in favor of the alternative.
Mr. Ranney: I do not think the employers would have any
objection to an alternative, but they would not be in favor of a
double liability where they might have to fight the case in court
and then in the event of their winning the suit the workman
could come in under the compensation act and get compensation.
That does not seem to me to be fair.
Dr. McCarthy: Do you want the election before or after
the accident?
Mr. Mitchell: After.
Dr. McCarthy: If the employers' liability acts that have
been passed were any good, or could be amended in any way
to stop litigation, we would not be here. England tried for nearly
a hundred years to modify the employers' liability act. The
only thing we are here for is to knock out the everlasting cost
of litigation, and the most perfect act that we can get will be
the one that will knock out this expensive litigation. If a man
is entitled to elect after he gets hurt there is going to be an
awful confused state of affairs and the tendency, I believe, will
be to increase litigation, because the temptation will be constantly
before that man through the attorneys coming to him to go into
litigation.
Mr. Mitchell: In England there are less suits under the
English employers' liability law than there were three or four
years ago, and every year shows a less number. On the other
hand, there are a great number under the compensation act.
That demonstrates that in England, even with the double liability,
the men are not suing under the employers' liability law.
Dr. Allport (Illinois): I can give you the figures on the
employers' liability law and workmen's compensation act for
1908, and that may perhaps enlighten the Conference in regard
to the exact status of the act at this time. Out of 2065 deaths
in trade accidents in 1908, only 524 out of those cases were
made the basis of proceedings, or not much more than one-fourth
of them, in the county courts, and only 12 suits were brought
for damages under the employers' liability law. In other words,
only 12 of those 524 suits took advantage of the old Gladstone
act to bring a suit for damages under the double liability.
Prof. F. S. Deibler: I think a great many of the suits that
come up in England are suits to determine whether the accidents
occurred in due course of employment.
Chairman Mercer: I have a letter from Mr. Gillette that
does not exactly come under this heading, but I think you may be
glad to hear it at this time. It reads as follows:
Minneapolis, Minn., June 9, 1910.
Mr. H. V. Mercer, City.
Dear Sir: Our study abroad developed a few things that stand
out so clearly that I should like to have you know them before you go
to Chicago. They are matters that ought to be carefully safeguarded
in legislation of this kind.
First, the cost. Even after the act is most carefully drawn and
the compensations are restricted to the utmost, the cost is bound, in my
opinion, to be two or three times as great as under the present system.
This means, of course, that the compensations must not exceed one-half
wages in any event, and the death benefits must be limited as well as
compensations for total disability. The payments to children must be
graded according to the number, with an outside limit and there must be
a waiting period without compensation at any rate not less than two
weeks, and I think thirty days before benefits begin, and these benefits
must not be retroactive in case the disability extends beyond the two
weeks or the thirty days. In other words, every economy must be
inserted and even then I believe the cost will be increased from two to
two and one-half times.
Then the doctor question wants to be carefully considered. France
is having a serious time over the doctor question. It is the curse of
their system, and they are also experiencing great difficulty with the
matter in Germany and England. If the English law had been left the
way Mr. Chamberlain intended it, so that an independent doctor could have
been called in at the request of either instead of both parties, it would
have saved them all kinds of trouble.
Then there is another matter that ought to be carefully considered,
and that is the matter of discrimination against agent or employe physically
imperfect. The situation in England to-day is beginning to force a
physical examination of employes. Mr. Holmes of the Hosiery Workers'
Federation stated to me that in his opinion there were 150,000 English
workmen who could not obtain employment by reason of excessive age or
physical imperfections.
They are having a lot of difficulty in Germany over various questions
arising out of their law. Over 17 per cent. of the claims get into
litigation. This looks rather discouraging to us. Of course this arises
largely from the fact that this litigation costs the workmen nothing.
I should like to write a few hundred pages on this subject, but I
haven't time.
You might be interested to know that while in England the risks
are practically all insured in private companies, the cost to the employer
is less in England than it is in Germany, France or Austria. In France
about 25 per cent. of the risks are not insured, and of the remainder about
60 per cent. are carried in private insurance, and 40 per cent. in mutual
companies. The conditions and character of the workmen are so different
over there from those existing in America that it is pretty hard to estimate
the comparative costs if one of the foreign acts was transmitted to this
country. Beside that the rates of wages are very much lower, although
of course the benefits, being based on the wage rate, are nearly in
proportion.
The above estimate of cost of two and one-half times our existing
cost is based on a contribution of 20 per cent. by the workmen. It looks
as if the thing would have to resolve itself into a matter of some form
of mutual insurance, both employer and employe contributing to the cost,
or with a waiting period or else a longer waiting period, and a fund
provided by the employers to take care of the accidents, the employes
providing a fund to take care of sickness and temporary disabilities during
the waiting period.
I am now having my notes written up, and will soon have a table
of the comparative costs in England, Germany, Belgium, Austria and
France, and possibly Denmark and Sweden.
Yours very truly,
George M. Gillette.
Chairman Mercer: I have not heard yet from Mr. McEwen.
He is the labor commissioner, and I was in hopes that we
would have a letter from him as well as this letter from Mr.
Gillette.
The next question is the proposition of compensation; that
is, whether you will have a limited sum or a pension plan, or
what you will have.
William H. Moulton (Michigan): In the iron and copper
mining region of Michigan for a great many years we have had a
plan of payments to which the men and the employers have contributed
equally. These payments have been made monthly to
the men during disability, and in any event they should not be
made at any longer intervals than once a month. These sums
have continued for a year, and in case of death, a death benefit
has been paid from this fund.
The mining companies are very much interested in this
compensation law. This is evidenced by the voluntary action
of the harvester company and the United States Steel and some
of our other independent companies. The Cleveland-Cliffs Iron
Company, which I represent, have been contributing in this way
for a great many years at all of our mines. We employ now
perhaps 3000 or 4000 men, and another thing which is of advantage
to them is this: We found it was a common custom when
a man was killed in a mine for the men to stop work until the
day of the funeral, no matter whether our boats were lying
idle waiting for cargoes or not. I think you will all agree with
me that we generally get what we pay for, and if we expect a
man to do something for us we expect to pay for it. Our proposition
to the men was this: They stopped work out of sympathy
for this man who had been killed. We suggested to them
that it would be more an act of sympathy to follow out this
plan, that they should continue at work until the day of the
funeral and we would pay them for all the time they worked, and
then if they took a half-day off for the funeral we would pay them
for that half-day just as though they worked, but that this
amount of money should be a contribution from them to the
family of the man who had been killed. The last amount that
I remember that was paid in that way was $298 which that family
received in addition to the benefit fund. Our company also is paying
to the widow and orphans the sum of $12 a month to the
widow and $1 a month for each additional child under the age
of 16 years, for a period of five years or until the widow remarries.
This is done with the idea that by the time the children
have reached the age of 21 they can support the family.
We also endeavor to reduce accidents by frequent inspections
of our mines and monthly reports, and periodical inspections also,
and in case of any serious accident we have a committee who
visits the scene of that accident, carefully inquires into the cause
of it and makes a recommendation for the benefit of that mine
and of all our other mines.
I am sure I am voicing the opinion of all the Lake Superior
region of the iron and copper mines when I say that we are
heartily in favor of some plan of compensation for the workmen
of our country which shall be a liberal one.
Mr. Dawson (New York): Nearly every bill which has so
far been framed has proceeded on the basis that it is necessary
to limit the length of time for which the benefit is to be paid.
That is to say, even though a workman has become totally and permanently
disabled, the benefit is to be paid for three or four years,
and then is to stop. This overcaution grows out of two things;
one of them is that we are almost entirely thinking of this as a
compensation scheme which the individual employer is going to
pay for. It may be that our laws will be passed in that form;
but, even if they are passed in that form, experience in every
country in the world has demonstrated that almost all employers
will be insured, and the loss will be paid by companies which
can just as well continue payment so long as it is necessary for
it to be continued, and charge premiums and set up reserves
accordingly.
It is my personal opinion that we ought not to frame our
laws on the basis that employers as a class are actually going to
pay these compensations directly. We should frame them with
a view to their being insured, and that, therefore, this will not be
an intolerable burden upon any individual employer unless he
makes a fool of himself by neglecting to insure.
The second reason is ignorance as to the cost. The additional
cost when benefits are paid to the disabled as long as disability
continues is extremely small. Relatively few persons who
have been totally and permanently disabled are living after five
years, but the need is greater than ever for those who are. In
point of fact, it will add very little to the total cost to give the
benefit throughout their disability. You may argue, on the other
side, that because there are a few of them, we can as well cut
them off; but a scheme that starts out to cure this evil—this
economic flaw in our business system, and that, notwithstanding,
turns loose a permanently disabled man after five years because
he happens to be so unfortunate as still to live—is fundamentally
shortsighted and should not be tolerated. I, therefore, earnestly
urge those Commissions which have not yet prepared their bills,
to make the benefit payable during the entire period of disability.
Mr. McCarthy (Wisconsin): On certain minor injuries,
would you say that was true?
Mr. Dawson: Not so true. My impression about minor
injuries is that a careful study of the Austrian practice will be
of great value. These benefits are not paid as an annuity at all
unless the person is injured at least to the extent of 20 per cent.
of his earning power. Smaller impairments are compensated
by lump sums.
Again, in the matter of widows and orphans there is a whole
lot of feeling that you must cut them off at the end of three or
four or five years. There is no occasion for that, and every
reason why it should not be done. The additional cost of paying
during widowhood and minority is not heavy; and you should
again, in my judgment, take into account that you are expecting
this business to be insured and should encourage its being insured,
and encourage the employer to run the risk himself. Of
course, in a very large plant, it is quite possible for an employer
to insure himself, because he can have an average experience to
judge from, but I am not referring to the exceptional case.
James A. Lowell (Massachusetts): The practical difficulty
which strikes me is this: In Massachusetts, and everywhere else,
for that matter, we have a financial situation to face. I would say,
and every man here would say, that it would be much better to
have a pension for a person who needs to be pensioned; but we
are brought up at once in the very beginning, and this thing
comes right up and hits us in the face: How much is it going to
cost? It is very well to say, as Mr. Dawson has said, that it
won't cost much. Perhaps it won't, but the question is how
much. It may be just the turning point in Massachusetts as to
whether we can do it as a practical financial measure—to have a
lump sum or a pension. I, personally, should be very much in
favor of a pension. But there must be some way of ascertaining
how much this pension is going to be. It appeals to me that
as a practical measure in the beginning of this thing, that although
we should like to be able to say to the man who is injured for
life: "We will give you so much a month for the rest of your
life"; that we cannot do it right off, because we do not know
whether he will live five years or whether he will live twenty-five
years. The difference between the amount which you will pay if
he lives twenty-five and the amount you will pay if he lives five
years may be just the difference between a possible scheme and
an impossible scheme.
The employer's trouble about this thing is the uncertainty.
The amount of it is not so great an objection. It is not that the
employer would say, "Well, if I have to pay $5000 for such-and-such
a case I cannot do it. I can pay $2000, but I cannot pay
$5000." The trouble is he does not know whether he is to pay
$2000 or $15,000. That is the difficulty. It strikes me in starting
your system here you have got to find something that is
certain. If there is to be a pension you have got to put a limit
of time on it so that it may be definite.
If we were to pass a law for Massachusetts to-morrow, and
contained in that law were those various pensions, we should not
know anywhere near how we were coming out; and, I understand,
and I will stand corrected on this if I am wrong, that they
have not figured those accurately in either Germany or Austria
or in England. The amount of the pensions which had to be
paid was much greater than was calculated. If they had known
at the start they were to pay this greater amount it would not
have made so much difference because they could have arranged
it, but they did not know it and, therefore, they are getting a
higher amount put upon them than they thought they would,
which is very unfortunate for a great many reasons.
Mr. Dawson: There are reliable tables by means of which
adequate premiums and reserves for annuities to the disabled and
to widows and orphans can be computed.
Dr. Allport: I have a copy here of the workmen's compensation
act of 1906, the English act, and I think it might not be
a bad idea to read you the provision in the English act covering
this matter. Of course, the English act started out just as our
act must start out if we start out on the basis of compensation. It
must be based on a certain proportion of the wage of the individual.
When we come to consider the matter of disability, the
point that comes up is whether we shall pay a man for a total or
permanent disability in a lump sum or whether we shall limit the
time in which the payments shall be made. It seems to me as
though that is purely an actuarial matter, and that it is something
which will adjust itself if any law goes into effect. No
employer in England carries his own insurance; it is all carried
by some form of insurance, and so the insurance companies will
have to work this matter out for themselves, and they are going to
be able to do it. The better class of insurance companies have
prospered under that class of insurance. The provision in the
English law is, briefly, this: It provides for the payment of compensation
for disability as long as the disability lasts, and in case
of death it provides for payment to the children until they reach a
workable age, and for the widow until she marries again. Then
there is this provision:
"Where any weekly payment has been continued for not less
than six months, the liability therefor may, on application by or
on behalf of the employer, be redeemed by the payment of a
lump sum of such an amount as, where the incapacity is permanent,
would, if invested in the purchase of an immediate life
annuity from the National Debt Commissioners through the post-office
savings bank, purchase an annuity for the workman equal
to 75 per cent. of the annual value of the weekly payment, and
as in any other case may be settled by arbitration under this act,
and such lump sum may be ordered by the committee or arbitrator
or judge of the county court to be invested or otherwise
applied for the benefit of the person entitled thereto."
These cases are put into the hands of the court and paid
by the court and not by the attorneys, and it is left optional as
to whether he will take a lump sum or an annuity.
Dr. McCarthy: Some of the county judges over there
with whom I talked told me that they were doing everything
possible to keep the lump sums from being paid, because they
believe that is a bad practice. There is no agitation over there
that I could find in either Germany or England for limiting the
time that a man should receive compensation. They understand
over there that it has got to fall upon somebody in the
end, and you must remember that in Germany and in England,
to a large extent, this is done to keep away from the necessity of
caring for the poor, and all that sort of thing. You go to any
insurance company over there and say, "I have so many people
working in my factory under such conditions; what are your
rates?" and they will give you the rates and take care of an injured
man for the rest of his life.
Chairman Mercer: It has seemed to me sometimes that it
might be a good plan to provide for a lump sum settlement, subject
to the approval of a court, in case a firm wanted to go out of
business, or something of that kind. A corporation might want
to dissolve, or the time of its charter might expire, and in that
case what is it going to do?
Mr. Dawson: It would go to an insurance company and
purchase an annuity to cover it.
Chairman Mercer: Suppose it is a big company that had
been carrying its own risks?
Dr. McCarthy: That is an actuarial matter. If it is a
mutual company in Germany, there has to be a reserve kept by
those companies to provide for the possibility of their going out
of business.
Chairman Mercer: It seems to me we might now go to the
question of whether we will administer our compensation law
through the courts or through boards of arbitration. In New
York I notice that they recommend staying under the courts in
their present bill.
Prof. Seager: The characteristics of the two bills that have
passed in New York were explained yesterday, and I will try to
avoid repeating what was said at that time. When it comes to
the details of the plan that the New York Commission recommended,
and which the Legislature has adopted, the reasons why
we did this rather than that are almost trivial, because they were
always practical reasons of expediency. We have a Commission
of fourteen members, and eight of them were members of the
Legislature; one of them was a farmer; several of them were
lawyers, and two of them were employers, so they represented
in a very broad way the different interests of the State. It would
have been quite impossible to get that Commission to agree on
a plan that would include the farmers. It was difficult to get the
employers to agree on our plan.
Taking up the details, however, we were very much impressed
by the aspect of the case that Mr. Lowell spoke of a few
minutes ago; that is, the uncertainty as to what it would cost
and the opposition that developed against the measure because
of that uncertainty. For that reason we felt that we ought to
make the probable cost as definite as we could, and that meant
requiring lump sum payments rather than continuous payments,
limiting the period during which the continuous payments should
be made in case of disability, and in other points making the
measure precise and definite, when, from the point of view of
the social interests of the community, it ought to be more vague
and indefinite, that it might be adapted to the requirements of
each special case. It was on those grounds of expediency, remembering
all the time that this was the first step, that if the
Legislature of New York passed these bills it would be the first
State in this country to go in for any kind of workmen's compensation,
and that every country which has adopted this policy
has found it necessary to amend and modify as the result of
experience, that the schedule which we finally agreed upon took
the form that it did; that is, limiting the compensation in case
of disability to not more than $10 a week, and to continue in
case of a permanent disability for not more than eight years.
In death cases not more in the aggregate than four years' wages,
and not to exceed in any case $3000. That schedule has the
advantage of being definite and of being one which enables the
insurance actuary without much difficulty to name a rate, and,
needless to say, we got such rates from the insurance company's
representatives before we finally decided on that schedule.
As to the administrative features of our bills, our difficulty
was to devise a plan which would do away with litigation and
at the same time be constitutional. We all of us recognized
the merits of some scheme of arbitration as preferable to court
procedure, and yet the more we looked into it, and the more we
studied the complexities of our system in New York, the more
we were impressed with the necessity of creating an entirely new
system of jurisprudence, if we were going to have in that State a
scheme of arbitration comparable to the English scheme of arbitration.
For that reason we left that to future amendment of the
bill, and left the judicial procedure very much as it is under the
employers' liability law, believing that under a law requiring
definite compensation, both employer and employe, for their own
interests, would keep away from litigation, and would enter into
voluntary arrangements for arbitration that would not require a
resort to the courts. Resort to the courts may be taken by either
side under these bills as before, but it is our confident belief that
it will not be taken, and that this plan will very greatly reduce the
litigation, and at the same time greatly increase the number of
reasons these bills took the form which they have taken.
Mr. Harper (Illinois): Do you provide that in case any
question arises under the compensation plan, suit may be brought
and the merits tried in an action at law?
Prof. Seager: Yes.
Mr. Harper: And you also provide, I believe, that no jury
trial shall be permitted?
Prof. Seager: No; such a provision was in the original bill,
but was stricken out of the act. I am sorry that I am not a
lawyer, and, therefore, cannot explain the point definitely, but
the other provision was simply to make it possible to bring suit and
recover a lump sum in case there was any default in the periodic
payments required in cases of disability. That is, in case of
default in the payments under this provision the employe or the
dependent entitled to payment can immediately bring suit and collect
a lump sum in damages.
Senator Sanborn (Wisconsin): We have appreciated in
Wisconsin all these troubles and oppositions you have been discussing
here, and have been trying to find some way that we
can put a law into operation in Wisconsin so that we can have
some basis for improvement hereafter, realizing at the outset
we were going to meet the opposition of the manufacturers if
they did not know exactly what it would cost. If we were going
to get their hearty support the rates would have to be so low
that they would know it was not going to cost them any more
than at the present time. On the other hand, we realized that
the laboring man does not want to give up anything he has got,
but wants more. That he is entitled to more than he is receiving
under the law everybody, I think, will concede. The question
was, how were we going to accomplish that and get for the laboring
man all that he would get under the law.
We realized that practically 60 per cent. of every dollar that
was paid out by the employers for industrial accidents under the
present system was wasted and did not go to the laboring man,
and if we could bring about a system which would prevent anywhere
near that great amount of waste, and turn that money over
to the laboring man who was injured, we felt that we would be
taking one great step in advance, and we are trying now to get a
system by which that can be done. In fact, we want to do away
entirely with court proceedings, if possible.
The first step we propose to take in this regard is to change
the law generally in our State, so that the manufacturer will
feel that he must have relief. In order to reach that result we
are going to make them all liable for the negligence of the fellow-servants
and strike out the assumption of risk. We have practically
agreed on that, and that leaves the only defense remaining
for the employer, that of contributory negligence. That will
reach a great many cases, and leave it so that the manufacturer
will feel that he must have some relief.
Our whole plan is optional. No employer and no employe
is obliged to come under it, but if a manufacturer or an employer
of labor wants to come under it, all he has to do is to file a
declaration with the commissioner of labor, and he is under it.
He is not under it definitely, because he can get out at the end
of any year by serving notice sixty days in advance of his desire
so to do.
Then, as far as the laborer is concerned, the plan is that as
a part of his contract of employment he waives his right to
anything else except the compensation, and this law will fix his
compensation. Then we follow that up by arbitration to settle
all the disputes that may arise. The only question that can arise
for the court to pass on is whether the arbitrators have exceeded
their jurisdiction under the law, but all questions of fact are
to be settled by the Board of Arbitration. If we had some
criterion to follow, something that we could point to definitely as
to just what would be the result to the employer and the laboring
man, we would feel differently. But we feel that we can put
this system into operation, and we feel further that the manufacturers
and the laboring men in their present spirit will operate
under it until we can arrive at something definite. We are endeavoring
to make our schedule just as large as it can be made.
Our schedule is indefinite and will undoubtedly be increased over
what it is in the bill. In other words, we propose to do just as
the railroads have always done, to put onto the traffic for the
benefit of the laboring man every dollar it will bear, and get that
money to the man who is injured with as little expense as is
possible. That is what we are aiming to do, and we know of no
other way to do it except by putting it under a voluntary system,
so as to get away from the constitutional conditions that you
meet everywhere. Under a compulsory system you cannot do
that, but under an elective system you can.
As to the expediency, we feel that our people will try it, and
if it does not work it will not take any act of the Legislature to
annul it. We can accomplish some results, and the time will
come when we can have some figures perhaps to give conferences
like this in their effort to ascertain what is best as the policy to
be followed. We started out first with an insurance scheme
connected with it, but we abandoned that and made up our
minds to make it just as simple as we could, and to let the employer
of labor have the widest possible scope to protect himself.
If he does it through mutual insurance companies, well and good;
if he does it through the other insurance companies, well and good;
the idea being to hamper him as little as possible in that respect.
All we want is to make it absolutely sure that when a man is
injured he will receive his pay. That has been one of the troublesome
questions; we have tried to make a provision, which is still
tentative, by which the employe's claim shall be an absolute lien
upon all the property of the employer.
Prof. Seager: We have not previously provided for the expenses
of this Conference or for the expenses of the next Conference
we may hold. With that thought in view, I would like
to move that the members of the Commissions and committees
represented at this Conference be requested to use their best efforts
to secure an appropriation from the funds of such Commissions
and committees of $50 from each Commission and committee
toward the expenses of our Conference.
Chairman Mercer: Without any formal motion that will
be taken as the sense of the meeting.
Mr. Dawson: I move that when we adjourn, we adjourn to
meet in St. Louis, and that the time be fixed between Christmas
and New Year. The reason I make this suggestion is that there
are to be other meetings at that time in St. Louis—the American
Economic Association and the American Association for Labor
Legislation, and also because by that time all the bills of these
various Commissions will be ready, and we can have a final
interchange of views before they go to their various Legislatures.
I will add to that motion also that the Executive Committee be
given power to change the date and place of the meeting if they
deem it advisable.
(The motion being seconded was adopted by a vivâ voce
vote.)
Dr. Allport: It appears in the matter of making provisions
of the kind we have been discussing that their constitutionality
would depend on two aspects: First, that we take the
view as suggested by Mr. Mercer, that it lies within the police
power of the State to regulate this matter and so constitute all
these employments as dangerous employments, or whether we
shall put into the law something which looks like a joker. The
particular point I have reference to is this: The specifications in
Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Wisconsin tentative bill relative to
waiver of the matters we have been discussing; that is, assumed
risk and contributory negligence, fellow-servants, etc. The second
bill recommended makes this provision: "The provisions of
this act shall apply to any person, firm or corporation transacting
business in this State who shall have elected to accept and operate
under such provisions."
That implies an election to accept the provisions of the act.
In Section 4, however, is this provision: "Every person, firm
or corporation engaged in business in this State that has an
employe in his or its service shall be presumed to have accepted
the provisions of this act. Every employe, as a part of his contract
of hiring, shall be deemed to have accepted the provisions
of this act unless at the time of such hiring he contracts in writing
to the contrary, in which case the employer shall not be liable
under the provisions of this act. Every employe whose contract
of hiring is in force at the time his employer elects to provide
compensation under this act, shall be deemed to have accepted the
provisions thereof unless he files a notice in writing to the
contrary with his employer within thirty days thereafter."
I am not a lawyer myself, and I do not know what that
means, but I would like to know from somebody who is posted in
constitutional law as to whether that method of circumventing
the usual provisions of the law is strictly in accordance with the
rulings under our constitution. That is, whether a law can
specify that we shall have the right of election under the law,
making the provisions of the law specific, and then in the following
section specify that unless they shall elect to the contrary
they shall be supposed to be acting under the provisions of this
law. That is the way in which Wisconsin has gone behind the
constitutional part of the law.
Senator Sanborn: The Legislature can always say what
the fact is presumed to be, and the presumption is that every
manufacturer will elect to accept this law. Whether they have
or not is a presumption of fact, and we do not have to prove that.
In other words, as a matter of course, we presume that every
man has elected, but we do not have to say that he has elected.
Chairman Mercer: It seems to me, gentlemen, in the
course of these proceedings, that the first thing to be done is to
prevent accidents. The second proposition is to compensate the
injured for those accidents which you do not prevent. You
cannot prevent by penal legislation; you cannot prevent by the
assumption of damages of an uncertain quantity, because those
things have already been tried and have failed. You can prevent
accidents better, I think, by placing a certain, simple and rapid
liability upon the industry which both sides shall partially bear,
and which will compel both sides to understand that there is a
financial risk upon them that will increase their cost absolutely if
any accidents occur. I do not think any large proportion of
that should be placed upon the laboring man, perhaps not over
15 or 20 per cent.
The laboring man, however, is in a better position to determine
whether or not a man is faking; he has his own channels
of reaching him. He is in a better position to see that the machinery
is protected, and to see that the rules are enforced in the
factory, and he is the man who is in a position to see that a fair
settlement is made if he has a financial interest in it, and not to
say in an off-hand way, "Oh, well, the man has been hurt, give him
$50." Besides that, when he has such a proposition as that and
feels that it is not a subject of charity, but a business proposition,
and a matter in which he has a right to help in the administration
of it, he wants to administer it quickly and rapidly. It appears
that the European countries which have adopted some
such scheme as this have found it to be the most satisfactory.
No man will believe that he will be injured in an accident. The
moment a man starts in on the proposition of whether he himself
is going to be injured, he becomes an unfit subject to ask for
employment. He is not in a position to go to the employer and
say, "You must guard that wheel," or "protect this machine."
But if a situation is devised where one man can go to the other
and say: "You are the employer and you must stand five-sixths
of the cost of an accident, and we one-sixth, and you must protect
these men; here is a man over here that will not live up
to the rules, fire him. Here is a man that does not know his
business. Do not let him work in this place. We have an interest
in this matter. It is costing us money if he injures somebody,
and we want these men protected." You can see what a
different situation arises.
The employer must take the word of the laboring man for
that, because the laboring man is where he can see and know,
and the employer is not in a similar position. The result of that
is to increase the confidence in the laboring man, to increase the
precautions taken to prevent accidents, and to increase the mutual
respect and good feeling between the two men, if you place them
both where they have a mutual and certain liability.
As to what is a dangerous employment, as to whether or not
you should cover some or all, I have no doubt that there is not
a man in this country, a farmer, a mechanic, a laboring man, a
doctor, a lawyer or any other professional man, but what is perfectly
willing to have and desires to have a fair compensation law
if he can know just what it is going to cost him, and just what
his insurance will cost him, in order to avoid the present uncertainties
and evils that flow from existing conditions. The case
of domestic servants has been mentioned here. One of our
judges in the federal court in our State had a servant break her
leg on his back porch last year. He took her to the hospital
and took care of her, but would not he rather have been paying
three dollars a year for insurance for all the risks that might
come to her in that industry? Would not you rather do that
yourself? And besides that, from the humane standpoint, would
not you rather that the poor girl should be placed in a position
where she certainly will receive compensation in case of an accident
which perhaps she or any one else could not have avoided,
than to have her go on and lose her wages or else you pay them
to her?
Then you say you must not go to the farmer. I say to you
that I believe that the farmers in this country would welcome
such a proposition if they understood it. There is not a man,
an employer or a laboring man, who, when you place the proposition
before him in any such form as we are discussing it here,
would sanction it off-hand. But there is not a man in this
country that I have ever seen who has studied this question for
any length of time, intelligently and carefully, but what believes
that the more nearly you can get every industry into one certain,
definite and simple liability the better off you are.
Look at it as a business proposition—and it is a business
proposition—it is an insurance risk and it ought to be left in
such a way that the liability is direct. The first thing the business
man undertakes to consider on this proposition is what will it
cost me; can I afford it? Every time you put on a double liability,
every time you leave a thing uncertain, you increase the risks
to him and the cost to him in his business, and he so understands
it, and that is something which you should give consideration.
I do not believe there is a labor representative here, I do not
believe there is a laborer in this country, who entirely understands
the matter, who is mature in his judgment upon it and who has
studied it and understands the whole situation, but who would
be willing that you should repeal all of the statutory provisions
now existing, repeal all of the common law, if you give him
something which he knows is not a gold brick. If you simply
say you must have this liability, it is not a question of contract,
because that still leaves an uncertainty; but if you say, "You will
be paid in accordance with a certain percentage of your wages
if you have an accident in your business," everybody will then
know just exactly where they stand on the proposition, because
it is only a question of actuarial calculation to determine what the
compensation is, and I think everybody would be willing to accept
a law drafted in that form. It will cost the business men more,
but the laborer is going to get more out of it, and it is good business
for the business men. You cannot tell me, gentlemen, that
all of the large financial institutions and corporations of this
country that have voluntarily adopted this scheme in the last three
years would have done so, if they had not come deliberately to
the conclusion that, taking into consideration the humanitarian
features of the case, and the mutual relations that exist between
the employer and employe, that this is a step which naturally and
logically will be profitably adopted in this country, and one of
the most hopeful signs in the present economic situation is that
labor and capital are dealing together on matters of that sort,
and doing away with the strife and friction that has heretofore
prevailed between them.
With respect to the theory that should be followed in this
legislation, we must understand that both employer and employe
must be willing to stand some restrictions. Neither has more
interest in its remote consequences than has the State. We
cannot keep up the old system and add a new without leaving all
the uncertainties and adding the burdens of certainty. We would
leave the burdens of cost, the weight of a large part of the injustice,
a considerable amount of the delay and most of the
prejudicial feelings that now prevail with respect to the worst
accidents and their final determination. There is no doubt but
that it would be the worst cases where the remedy through the
courts would be used in the present system.
Penalties as such, criminal or civil in nature, ought not to
be considered in this legislation where it does not rest upon the
basis of fault; penalties never tend to good mutual feelings as
between the parties. It is no time to stir up strife when both
parties are willing to negotiate fairly upon this question. It is
no time to heap unusual obligations when the employer and the
State are willing to make a fair compulsory system. Neither is
it any time to deprive the laborer of fair compensation; but it is
the time to place a liability on a fair basis, comparable to the
risk and the situation in other countries, and allow a simple, safe,
quick remedy that is absolutely certain.
To be certain, we must remove any idea of recovery as a
penalty; we must prohibit the bar of recovery by any fault of the
employe. Cases in which the employe would directly and voluntarily
be at fault are so few that they would cost the employer
and the public much less than the defense of the trials
if we should undertake to introduce an element of fault as a
defense. The theory of workers' compensation is to get away
from fault, and it ought to be barred upon that side as well as the
other.
The bill under consideration in this program was meant to be
a bill that would accomplish the purposes when more elaborately
worked out that we all feel should be had. The title is made
broader than an ordinary legislative act, so as to allow a system
of law that would repeal all other laws on the question, and substitute
this remedy for those which exist and add it where there
is none. We, therefore use the term "code" in order to cover a
system of law. See Johnson vs. Harrison, 47 Minn., 575; Central
of Georgia Railway Company vs. State, 104 Ga., 31, Section
1.
We have defined dangerous employment in this act with a
view of covering every occupation which has accidents. This
will give every person the opportunity to guard against the obligations
that arise from injuries occurring in and growing out
of the conduct of a business.
It is for the Legislature first to determine whether or not
this is a proper classification, and if there be reasonable basis
for declaring the employment to be dangerous, the courts will
follow the judgment of the Legislature, even though their own
judgment might not accord with that of the Legislature. See
Lochner vs. N. Y., 198 U. S., 45; Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.
S., 365.
This definition of dangerous employment is studiously meant
to be a broad one. It is not dependent upon classification of
industries on the basis of manufacture, mining, railroading or
other segregated employment. Its purpose is to so define dangerous
employment that every employment which is, in fact, dangerous
will be so defined exactly in proportion to the dangers
that actually occur. Being a dangerous employment for each
accident which it has, and not dangerous unless it has those
accidents, the definition is especially equitable in two aspects. It
induces those operating the same sort of employment to keep
their accidents down; it makes those who have accidents liable
exactly in proportion to the accidents which they have in fact.
We have not used the term "accident" in the law because
of the uncertain meaning of that term throughout the state and
federal courts of this country. We find that this term in some
instances has been construed in the popular sense; in some instances
it has been construed to mean that which has happened
without the fault or intent of any one. We fear great litigation
as to what it would mean if the term "accident" should
be used. The terms arising out of, and in the course of, such
employment have been sufficiently defined by the English courts
under their act that they will need no further definition here than
the words themselves would indicate.
Section 2:
It is the intention of this act to make the employer liable
to pay compensation, and it would be the purpose probably to
make the employe liable to stand a small amount of the carrying
charges as specified in this act when worked out. Some argument
has been produced in this convention to the effect that it
would be difficult to hold the employer in case he had no fault,
but fault is not necessarily the basis of liability in such cases.
See Chicago, R. I. and Pac. Ry. Co. vs. Zernieke, 183 U. S., 582.
The man who put into operation the dangerous machinery
of dangerous employment would be liable by reason of public
necessity to be controlled under the elements of the police
power for the protection of the general welfare. It has been
intimated here that this rule would not apply except in the case
of quasi public corporations, but this is not the law. Relations
otherwise private may become public under public necessity if the
State decides that the public needs protection. See State vs.
Wagener, 77 Minn., 483; Harbison vs. Knoxvill Iron Co., 183
U. S., 13.
It has been urged that no man can have the right taken
away from him to sue in the courts for injuries under such circumstances.
Generally speaking, it is the rule that a party has
no vested interests to a right of action at common law for a
future injury. A tort action grows out of a breach of the
duty which the State provides that one of its individuals owes to
another, either by reason of the peculiar situation as between
the parties, or by reason of a public burden which has a peculiar
favor in it for the one who is injured. This direct liability the
State has imposed by the implied adoption of the common law
or by statute, both of which it has the power to repeal. It
has repealed or has modified the common law or statutes every
time it has imposed a new obligation or taken away an old obligation
with respect to tort actions. See Martin vs. Pittsburg and
L. E. R. Co., 103 U. S., 284; Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U. S., 366;
Snead vs. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 151 Fed., 608.
With respect to the remedy, we think that the remedy provided
here is the appropriate and proper one. It would be so
if it were fire insurance. See Wild Rice Lbr. Co. vs. Royal Ins.
Co., 99 Minn., 190. Such a law, leaving the general question of
liability to be determined and simply providing a reasonable
method of estimating and ascertaining the amount of the loss, is
unquestionably valid in both this country and Europe. See Hamilton
vs. The Liverpool and London Ins. Co., 136 U. S., 242, and
cases therein cited.
The fact that the liability is conditioned upon the application
of a remedy as substantially provided in the act does not
in any way affect the constitutionality if it is carried out as we
suggest. The theory is that until the appraisal is made by the
award provided there is no liability. See President, etc., V. and
H. Canal Co. vs. Penn. Coal Co., 50 N. Y., 250; Wolff vs. Liverpool,
L. and G. Ins. Co., 50 N. J. Law, 453; Hall vs. Norwalk
Fire Ins. Co., 57 Conn., 105; Reed vs. Washington Ins. Co., 138
Mass., 572.
It has been intimated that the employer might be forced by
such law, when the employe could not be so forced. We fail
to see the force of this argument. The reason why the employers
cannot be forced, if it is done equally, is that it deprives them
of their liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution to contract with respect to their labor as
they see fit upon the theory that the liberty of contract is a
property right; but neither the right of property of the employe
nor the employer stands above the general public good. The
general welfare was one of the principal purposes given in the
Preamble of the Federal Constitution as the reason for the
making of that constitution. It has been consistently and persistently
upheld by the courts whenever needed for the protection
of public good; as long as government exists it always will be
so upheld. It is an absolute and final necessity. With this right
the Federal Constitution was never intended to interfere except in
the few instances limited by the Fourteenth Amendment; except
as specifically limited the State has as much power as a foreign
nation upon this question, and that amendment does not prohibit
the exercise of such power to the extent that it is necessary in
dangerous employments. See Mayor, Alderman, etc., of N. Y.
vs. Miln, 11 Peters, 102; Lochner vs. N. Y., 198 U. S., 45. Other
cases cited supra.
In this respect, too, we must not overlook the fact that
the employer and the employe do not stand upon an equality in
their negotiations with respect to dangerous employments.
Stripped of political perplexities and personal prejudices and ambitions,
the fact is, and must be recognized, that the fundamental
reason for the interference by the State with respect to these
matters rests upon the bare fact of the inequality of abilities of
the respective parties to take care of their interests by reason of
the peculiar situations. In the case of Harbison vs. Knoxville
Iron Co., 53 S. W., 955, the Court said:
"The Legislature, as it thought, found the employe at a
disadvantage in this respect, and by this enactment undertook to
place him and the employer more nearly upon an equality. This
alone commends the act, and entitled it to a place on the statute
book as a valid police regulation."
The Supreme Court of the United States approved this
opinion in Knoxville vs. Harbison, 183 U. S., 13.
In respect to the length of hours, dangerous labor may be
required, it was said by the Supreme Court in Holden vs. Hardy,
169 U. S., 366:
"The Legislature has also recognized the fact, which the
experience of Legislatures in many States has corroborated, that
the proprietors of these establishments and their operatives do
not stand upon an equality, but that their interests are, to a
certain extent, conflicting."
Then in the case of Narramore vs. Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co.,
96 Fed., 298, a case involving the rights of railway employes to
have switches blocked, while Judge Taft was sitting on the Circuit
Court of Appeals, he used this language:
"The only ground for passing such a statute is found in the
inequality of terms upon which the railway company and its servants
deal in regard to the dangers of their employment. The
manifest legislative purpose was to protect the servant by positive
law, because he had not previously shown himself capable of
protecting himself by contract; and it would entirely defeat this
purpose thus to permit the servant 'to contract the master out'
of the statute."
An employe cannot successfully say to a railway president,
"Run your business carefully or I will quit." This is a new
right and not necessarily triable by jury in State courts. Am. vs.
Morrison, 22 Minn., 178. See Minor vs. Happersett, 21
Wall., 162.
We might argue this legislation at length, but it seems useless
at the present time. There is an agitation throughout this
country, unequaled upon any other single subject, in favor of a
fairer system of compensation to meet the necessities somewhat
along the lines that foreign countries have done. No subject in
this country has ever been studied more deliberately; no attempt
has ever been made upon the part of all parties to approach a
legislative subject in this country with less partisan feeling or
more careful study. Employes have awakened to the conditions
in a substantial way. Employers are willing that they should
have something of a fairer and more substantial nature. The
State needs it for its own protection as well as the protection
of its members. Public sentiment is aroused, but it is being
judiciously controlled. We might have pending in this country
a civil war larger than the Civil War of the sixties was and not
do as much injury at the present time as the industrial accidents.
Fair people, therefore, are going to be willing to have
laws that will tend first to prevent accidents, and, second, to
fairly compensate for them, and to do it in such way as to be an
inducement to both the employer and employe to prevent the
accident. We want society protected also. No better time will
ever come for a fairer legislative act upon this question than at
the beginning. If the movement is uniform, and held in check
long enough to be understood, there will be no difficulty about
passing the laws. Every bad law injures the cause, every unfair
law will prejudice it. The basis is the police power and the
liberty of occupation, and contract can only be controlled where
necessary; that is, in dangerous employments, but can be in all
such employments.
(This concluded the business to come before the Conference,
and on motion of Joseph A. Parks, of Massachusetts, the meeting
stood adjourned sine die.)