THE DISCUSSION—CONVICTION
It has been seen that one who wishes to establish the truth or the
falsity of a proposition must answer certain vital questions that are
bound to arise in connection with it. Then, as different persons may
answer these questions in different ways, it becomes necessary for him
to convince his audience that his answers are correct. He must always
beware of assertiveness. This defect occurs whenever a speaker or
writer makes a statement but does not establish its truth. As simple
denial is always sufficient answer to mere assertion, an unsupported
statement is worthless. No one can hope to win in debate or change
another's belief unless he can prove that what he says is true; he
must substantiate with proof every statement that he makes, and show
that no possibility for error or deceit can exist. In argumentation
every statement not commonly accented as true must be proved.
The following passage is a highly assertive bit of argument; its
worthlessness is apparent.
The decision of Congress to increase still further our already
enormous navy is an injustice to every individual who contributes to
the support of the national government. It is a crime to squander
millions of money on a fleet that we do not need. Our navy to-day is
more than the equal of any foreign armament that floats. Though
second in number of ships, it ranks first in efficiency among all
the navies of the world. No other country can boast of such
marksmanship as our gunners display; no other country can boast of
such armor plate as is to be found on our first-class battleships;
not even England can successfully compete with us in seamanship and
in general efficiency.
Proof is "anything which serves either immediately or mediately to
convince the mind of the truth or the falsehood of a fact or
proposition." [Footnote: On Evidence, Best, p. 45.] Belief in a
specific statement is induced by a presentation of pertinent facts,
and usually by a process of reasoning whereby from the existence of
these known facts, the conclusion, hitherto unaccepted, is reached.
Those facts that have to do with the proposition under discussion are
known as evidence. The process of combining facts and deriving
an inference from them is known as reasoning. Evidence may be
made up of the testimony of witnesses, the opinion of experts,
knowledge derived from experience, the testimony of documents, or
circumstances that are generally known to have existed. Reasoning is
the process by which men form opinions, render judgments, explain
events, or in any way seek new truths from established facts.
In the following bit of proof, notice the facts that are stated, and
see how, by a process of reasoning, they go to substantiate the idea
that they are intended to prove:—
New York hires two policemen where Nashville hires one, and pays
them double the salary; yet Nashville is as peaceable and orderly as
New York. In Nashville any child of school age can have a seat in the
public schools all through the year; in New York there has been a
shortage of seats for many years. Nashville has a filtered water
supply; New York is going to have one as soon as the $12,000,000
filtration plant can be built at Jerome Park. Street car fares are
five cents in both cities; in Nashville one can always get a seat; in
New York one has to scramble for standing room. The southern city
maintains hospitals, parks, food inspectors, and all other things
common to New York and other large cities. Apparently, Nashville is
giving as much to its inhabitants for six dollars per capita as New
York for thirty-one. These facts can point to but one conclusion—that
Nashville has a superior system of government.
Since the first step in the generation of proof is the discovery of
facts, the arguer should at the very outset become sufficiently
familiar with the various kinds of evidence to estimate the value and
strength of each idea that has a bearing upon the subject.
There are two kinds of evidence: (a) direct, and (b) indirect or
circumstantial. If a man sees a gang of strikers set fire to the
buildings of their former employer, his evidence is direct. If,
however, he only sees them stealthily leaving the buildings just
before the fire breaks out, his evidence is indirect. In the latter
case the man's testimony is direct evidence that the men were in the
vicinity of the fire when it started, but it is indirect evidence that
they perpetrated the crime. If a student who has failed to do good
work throughout the term, and who has had little or no opportunity for
special preparation, passes in a perfect paper at the close of an
examination, the presumption is that he has received aid. The evidence
on which this supposition rests is entirely circumstantial. But if
some one saw the student obtaining aid, that fact would be direct
evidence against him.
Direct evidence, as a rule, is considered more valuable than indirect,
but each kind is frequently sufficient to induce belief. The best
possible kind of evidence, the kind that is least liable to contain
error or falsehood, is a combination of both direct and indirect.
Either one by itself may be untrustworthy. The unreliability of
evidence given by eyewitnesses is shown by the conflicting stories
they frequently tell concerning the same incident even when they are
honestly attempting to relate the facts as they occurred. Also, it is
always possible that the inferences drawn from a combination of
circumstances may be entirely wrong. When, however, both kinds of
evidence are available, each confirming the other and leading up to
the same conclusion, then the possibility of error is reduced to a
minimum.
The opportunity of the college student for obtaining evidence in his
argumentative work is limited. A lawyer before entering upon an
important case often spends weeks and months in investigation;
scientists sometimes devote a whole lifetime in trying to establish a
single hypothesis. But the college student in preparing an argument
must obtain his evidence in a few days. There are several sources at
his disposal. The first available source is his fund of general
knowledge and experience. If a man can establish a statement by saying
that he personally knows it to be true, he has valuable proof. Then
the people with whom the student comes in contact constitute another
source of evidence. Anyone who can give information on a subject that
is being investigated is a valuable witness. Especially in discussions
on questions which pertain to college life, the opinions and
experiences of college men and of prominent educators are unsurpassed
as evidence. But the greatest source of evidence for the student of
argumentation is the library. Here he may consult the best thought of
all time in every branch of activity. He may review the opinions of
statesmen, economists, educators, and scientists, and introduce as
evidence their experiences and the results of their investigations.
Here he may familiarize himself with the current events of the world,
and draw his own conclusions as to their significance. In fact, a well
equipped library treats of all subjects, however broad or narrow they
may be, and furnishes evidence for all sorts of debatable questions.
As not all evidence is equally valuable, a large part of the work of
argumentation consists in applying tests to the evidence at hand for
the sake of determining what facts are irrefutable, what are doubtful,
and what are worthless. Moreover, one engaged in argumentation must
test not only his own evidence but also that of the other side. No
better method of refuting an opponent's argument exists than to show
that the facts on which it rests are untrustworthy. Tests of evidence
may be divided into two classes: tests of the source from which it
comes, and tests of the quality of the evidence itself.
Since in courts of law, in college debate, and in all kinds of
argumentation, facts are established by the testimony of witnesses,
the sources of evidence are the witnesses who give it. The debater and
the argumentative writer have not the opportunity, as has the lawyer,
of producing the witnesses and permitting them to tell their own
stories to the audience. He must himself relate the evidence; and, in
order that it may be believed, he must tell whence it comes. The
sources of evidence may be common rumor, newspapers, magazines,
official documents, private citizens, or public officials. The extent
to which these witnesses are accepted as trustworthy by the people
before whom they are quoted determines in a large measure whether or
not the evidence will be believed. Tests for determining the
trustworthiness of witnesses will next be given.
The first test of the source of evidence should be:—
(1) Is the witness competent to give a trustworthy account of the
matter under consideration?
To answer this question, first determine whether the facts to be
established are such that any ordinary person can speak concerning
them with reasonable accuracy, or whether they can be understood only
by persons who have received special training. A landsman could well
testify that a naval battle had occurred, but only a man with nautical
training could accurately describe the maneuvers of the ships and tell
just how the engagement progressed. A coal heaver's description of a
surgical operation would establish nothing, except perhaps the
identity of the people and a few other general matters; only a person
with a medical education could accurately describe the procedure. The
testimony of any one but a naturalist would not even tend to prove the
existence of an hitherto unknown species of animal life. A witness
without technical knowledge cannot give reliable evidence on matters
of a technical nature.
Then, if it is found that the witness does possess the necessary
technical training, or that no previous training is necessary, still
further test his ability to give reliable evidence by asking whether
he has had ample opportunity for investigating the facts to the
existence of which he testifies. For even a skilled player sitting in
the first base bleachers at a baseball game to criticise an umpire's
decisions on balls and strikes is absurd; the opinion of a transient
visitor to Panama on the methods used in digging the canal is not
valuable; a traveler who has spent a single month in Japan cannot draw
reliable conclusions on the merits and defects of its political
structure. In not one of these cases has the opportunity for
investigation been sufficient to render the witness able to give
reliable evidence.
A current magazine in discussing the weakness of testimony that comes
from incompetent witnesses says:—
Generalizations about the tastes and interests of the age are so
easy that all except the most wary fall into them, and the world is
full of off-hand opinions touching the condition of society and the
state of the world, which are far more conspicuous for courage than
for discretion. There are very few men or women in any particular
period who know it intimately enough, and with sufficient insight and
sympathy, to pass judgment upon it. One hears almost every day
sweeping judgments about Americans, English, French, Germans, Chinese,
and Japanese which are entirely valueless, unless they are based on a
very broad and intimate knowledge of these various peoples, a
knowledge which, in the nature of things, few people possess. The
charming American girl who declared that, since gloves are cheaper in
Paris, American civilization is a failure, may stand for a type of
interesting and piquant oracles, to be heard with attention, but under
no circumstances to be followed. Americans are so familiar with the
European traveler who arrives and makes up his opinion over night in
regard to men, morals, and manners in the Western world and have so
often been the victim of this self-confident critic, that they ought
not to repeat the same blunder in dealing with other peoples.
[Footnote: The Outlook, July 20, 1907.]
In the court room, where witnesses are present and can be carefully
examined by the lawyers on both sides, it is customary to apply both
mental and physical tests. The witness who testifies to knowledge of
some event that occurred a long time before is given a memory test;
the senses, also, through which occurrences are perceived are
frequently examined. But as writers and debaters in general seldom
have the opportunity to apply tests of this sort to their sources of
information, and as these tests are seldom important outside of the
law courts, they are not taken up in detail in this book.
The second test of the source of evidence should be:—
(2) Is the witness willing to give an accurate account of the
matter?
One important influence that may cause a witness to give false
evidence is self-interest. Not only individuals, but social and
industrial organizations, political parties, communities, and states
are frequently swayed by this emotion to the extent of deliberately
perverting the truth. The evidence found in newspapers and other
publications is often false, or at least misleading, because it has
been tampered with by those who put their selfish interests before all
else. The owner of an industry protected by a high tariff would
scarcely be considered a reliable witness in matters affecting tariff
reform. The opinion of a railroad magnate on the subject of a
compulsory two-cent rate law would not be considered as unbiased. No
disinterested seeker after truth would accept the political
conclusions of a newspaper owned by a politician or recognized as the
organ of a certain party. In all such cases, self-interest may prompt
the witness to make statements not in strict accordance with the
truth. Perjury in the court room is not uncommon; falsehood elsewhere
must be guarded against. The arguer should always carefully scrutinize
the testimony of a witness that has any special interest in the matter
for which evidence is being sought. Though the self-interest is
strong, the witness may be willing to state the matter accurately;
but, as long as human nature remains as it is, this willingness
should not be taken for granted.
The third test of the source of evidence should be:—
(3) Is the witness prejudiced?
Another emotion that frequently keeps a witness from telling the exact
truth is prejudice. Every one is familiar with instances of how
this passion warps men's morals and corrupts their judgment. If a man
is prejudiced for or against a person or a system, he cannot be
accepted as a trustworthy witness in matters where his prejudice comes
into play. Should an economist known to favor socialism write a
treatise advocating municipal ownership of public utilities, his
evidence and his reasoning would not be convincing; it would be taken
for granted that he looked at the subject through socialistic
spectacles. A person who sets out with the expectation and intention
of finding flaws in anything usually succeeds. Though he is willing to
tell the exact truth, yet because of his prejudice he is sure to see
only that which will coincide with his preconceived opinions. For this
reason, political speeches and intensely partisan books and papers are
invariably unreliable sources of evidence even though they are not
intentionally dishonest.
The fourth test of the source of evidence is:—
(4) Does the witness have a good reputation for honesty and
accuracy?
The human conscience is so constituted that many people deviate from
the truth for no apparent reason whatever. Some are given to
exaggeration; some habitually pretend to know that of which they are
entirely ignorant; others are so inaccurate that everything they say
is open to grave suspicion. If a witness is known to have been
repeatedly dishonest or inaccurate in the past, little reliance should
be placed in his testimony. "Yellow journalism," which is largely the
reflection of common rumor, affords constant examples of witnesses
that give questionable evidence.
Ability and willingness to give exact evidence, an unprejudiced
attitude, and a good reputation for honesty and accuracy are the
qualities that should characterize the sources of evidence. If a
writer or speaker is securing testimony from friends or acquaintances,
the application of these tests is not difficult. If, however, the
sources are books and periodicals, his work is harder; but to be
successful, he must not shirk it. When one procures evidence from
books, he should investigate the character and standing of the author.
When one obtains it from signed articles in papers and magazines, he
must consider both the author and the character of the publication. In
the case of newspaper "stories" and editorials, one should find out on
what general policy and principles the paper is conducted. A cautious
arguer will always avoid, as far as he can, the use of evidence that
comes from a doubtful source. If one finds that an opponent has used
the testimony of questionable witnesses, he can, by exposing the fact,
easily refute the argument.
NECESSITY OF STATING SOURCES. It sometimes happens that an arguer
fails to state the source of his evidence. This omission is usually
fatal to success. No one is likely to put much confidence in
statements that are introduced by such flimsy preambles as, "A certain
statesman has declared"; "I have read somewhere"; "An acquaintance
told me." Not only must evidence come from sources that seem good to
the writer, but those sources must be satisfactory to the audience. In
the last analysis the audience is the judge of what is credible and
what is not. Moreover, if the evidence is of great importance, or is
liable to be disputed, the arguer should show in a few words why the
witness is especially reliable.
(1) Is the evidence consistent with (a) other evidence in the same
argument; (b) known facts; (c) human experience?
The requirement that every separate bit of evidence in an argument
shall be consistent with every other bit of evidence in the same
argument is too well understood to need explanation. One familiar with
courts of law knows that a witness who contradicts himself is not
believed. Furthermore, if the testimony of several witnesses for the
same side is inconsistent, the case for that side is materially
weakened. So it is in general debate: the arguer who wishes to succeed
must not use evidence that is self-contradictory. His proof must "hang
together"; his facts must all go to establish the same conclusion.
A flagrant violation of this principle once occurred in a class-room
debate. The speaker for the negative on the proposition,
"Resolved, That freshmen should be ineligible for college
teams," said that such a rule would deprive the freshmen of much-
needed physical exercise. Later on, he said that just as many freshmen
would receive injuries under this rule as without it, since they would
take part in equally dangerous contests as members of freshmen teams.
This contradiction ruined his argument.
In the next place, evidence to be of any value whatever, must be
consistent with what is known about the case. If an arguer is so
careless as to make statements contradictory either to well-
established facts or to facts easily proved, he cannot hope to attain
the slightest measure of success. Only one guilty of gross neglect or
absolute falsehood is likely to fall into such an error. At one time
the story was circulated that, during his early life, Lincoln had been
insane. In the following passage Ida M. Tarbell shows that the
testimony on which this belief was founded is inconsistent with the
known facts of the case, and is, therefore, palpably untrue:—
"Mr. Thornton went on to say that he knew beyond a doubt that the
sensational account of Lincoln's insanity was untrue, and he quoted
from the House journal to show how it was impossible that, as Lamon
says, using Herndon's notes, 'Lincoln went crazy as a loon, and did
not attend the legislature in 1841-1842, for this reason'; or, as
Herndon says, that he had to be watched constantly. According to the
record taken from the journals of the House by Mr. Thornton, which
have been verified in Springfield, Mr. Lincoln was in his seat in the
House on that 'fatal first of January' when he is asserted to have
been groping in the shadow of madness, and he was also there on the
following day."
Lincoln himself was an expert at detecting inconsistency wherever it
existed. He won many of his lawsuits by the straightforward method of
showing that the one or two vital statements on which the whole case
of the opposition rested were false, inasmuch as they were
inconsistent with well-established and incontrovertible facts. An
instance of this sort is here described:—
The most damaging evidence was that of one Allen, who swore that he
had seen Armstrong strike Metzker about ten or eleven o'clock in the
evening. When asked how he could see, he answered that the moon shone
brightly. Under Lincoln's questioning he repeated the statement until
it was impossible that the jury should forget it. With Allen's
testimony unimpeached, conviction seemed certain.
Lincoln's address to the jury was full of pathos. It was not as a
hired attorney that he was there, he said, but to discharge a debt of
friendship…. But Lincoln was not relying on sympathy alone to win
his case. In closing he reviewed the evidence, showing that all
depended on Allen's testimony, and this he said he could prove to be
false. Allen never saw Armstrong strike Metzker by the light of the
moon, for at the hour when he said he saw the fight, between ten and
eleven o'clock, the moon was not in the heavens. Then procuring an
almanac, he passed it to the judge and jury. The moon, which was on
that night only in its first quarter, had set before midnight.
[Footnote: The Life of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. I, p. 272. Ida M.
Tarbell. The Doubleday & McClure Co.]
An arguer should also be extremely careful to use evidence that on its
face appears reasonable. Only an extremely credulous audience will
accept ideas that run counter to human belief and experience. To
attribute the occurrence of an event to supernatural causes would
bring a smile of derision to any but a most ignorant and superstitious
person. To attribute to men qualities and characteristics that human
experience has shown they do not possess will bring equal discredit.
No one is likely to accept evidence that contradicts his habits of
thinking, that is contrary to what his life and experience have taught
him is true. For this reason savage people are slow to believe the
teachings of the Christian religion. For this reason it is difficult
to make an audience believe that any one will deliberately and
consistently work against his own interests, or follow any other
unusual line of action. Evidence contrary to human experience may be
true, but unless the exigencies of the argument demand its use, the
arguer will do well to omit it entirely. If he is obliged to use it,
he should make it appear as reasonable as he can, and also
substantiate it with careful proof.
Huxley appreciated the fact that evidence, to be believed, must be in
accordance with man's experience when he wrote the following:—
If any one were to try to persuade you that an oyster shell (which
is also chiefly composed of carbonate of lime) had crystallized out of
sea-water, I suppose you would laugh at the absurdity. Your laughter
would be justified by the fact that all experience tends to show that
oyster-shells are formed by the agency of oysters, and in no other
way.
The ease with which an argument that does not satisfy this requirement
may be overthrown is clearly shown in the following extract from a
student's forensic:—
To say that the Cuban reconcentrados sunk the Maine in an
effort to embroil the United States in a conflict with Spain is the
veriest foolishness. There is not one scrap of documentary evidence to
show that such was the case. Moreover, such an act would be
unparalleled in the annals of history. It is unreasonable, contrary to
all experience, that those oppressed people should have brought
disaster, involving the destruction of property and the loss of many
lives, upon the very nation that they were looking to for assistance.
(2) Is the evidence first-hand or hearsay evidence?
It is universally recognized that hearsay evidence is unreliable. A
narrative is sure to become so garbled by passing from mouth to mouth
that unless a witness can testify to a fact from his own personal
knowledge the evidence he gives is worthy of little credence. There is
sufficient chance for error when the person who witnessed the event
relates the account himself; if the story is told by a second, and
perhaps by a third person, it is likely to reflect but little of what
really happened. Every one is familiar with the exaggerations of
common rumor; it distorts facts so that they are unrecognizable. The
works of Herodotus are untrustworthy because he frequently believed
hearsay evidence. Since second-hand evidence both fails to establish
anything worth while, if allowed to stand, and is easily overthrown
even by a very little first-hand evidence, an arguer will do well to
follow the custom of the law courts, and, as a rule, exclude it
altogether.
(3) Can the evidence be considered as especially valuable?
(a) Hurtful admissions constitute an especially valuable kind
of evidence. Since men are not wont to give evidence detrimental to
their personal interest unless impelled to do so by conscientious
scruples, any testimony damaging to the one who gives it is in all
probability not only truthful, but also the result of careful
investigation. When a practising physician admits that half the
ailments of mankind are imaginary or so trivial as to need no medical
attention, he is making a statement that is likely to injure his
business; for this reason he is probably stating the result of his
experience truthfully. If a railroad president says that in his
opinion government supervision of railroads will benefit the public in
the matter of rates and service, it may be taken for granted that he
has given his honest belief, and that his natural reluctance to
surrender any authority of his own has kept him from speaking
carelessly. If a member of the United States Senate admits that that
body is corrupt, and selfish, and untrustworthy, he is lowering his
own rank; therefore it is reasonable to believe that he is speaking
the truth according to his honest belief.
The following is an example of this kind of evidence:—
It was stated during the Manchurian campaign that the Jewish
soldiers, of whom Kuropatkin had about 35,000, not only failed to hold
their ground under fire, but by their timidity threw their comrades
into panic. But good evidence can be cited from the correspondents of
the Novoye Vremya, an Anti-Semitic organ, to the effect that
among the Jews were found many "intrepid and intelligent soldiers,"
and that a number of them were awarded the St. George's cross for
gallantry. [Footnote: The Nation, June 11, 1908.]
It is hardly necessary to add that one who places especial reliance on
this kind of evidence must be sure that the admission is really
and not merely apparently contrary to the interest of the one
who gives it.
(b) Another particularly valuable kind of evidence is negative
evidence, or the evidence of silence. Whenever a witness
fails to mention an event which, if it had occurred, would have been
of such interest to him that he might reasonably have been expected to
have mentioned it, his silence upon the matter becomes negative
evidence that the event did not occur. For many years no one suggested
that Bacon wrote the Shakespearean plays; this absence of testimony to
the belief that Bacon wrote them is strong evidence that such belief
did not exist until recently, a fact that tends to discredit the
Baconian theory of authorship. The fact that in the writings of
Dickens and Thackeray no mention is made of the bicycle is negative
evidence that the bicycle had not then come into use. That Moses
nowhere in his writings speaks of life after death is negative
evidence that the Hebrews did not believe in the immortality of the
soul. If admittedly capable and impartial officials do not inflict
penalties for foul playing during a football game, there is strong
presumption that little or no foul playing occurred.
The following paragraph, taken from a current magazine, shows how this
kind of evidence may be handled very effectively:—
A sharp controversy has been raging in the European press over the
question whether Gambetta secretly visited Bismarck in 1878. Francis
Laur, Gambetta's literary executor, has published an article asserting
that he did, and giving details (rather vague, it must be admitted) of
the conversation between the two statesmen. But he offers not a scrap
of documentary proof. He is not even sure whether the interview took
place at Friedrichsruh or at Varzin. This is rather disconcerting,
especially in view of the fact that Bismarck never made the slightest
reference in his reminiscences or letters to the visit of Gambetta, if
it occurred, and that the minute Busch never mentioned it. [Footnote:
The Nation, September 5, 1907]
There is a particular kind of evidence frequently available for
debaters and argumentative writers known as argument from
authority. This evidence consists of the opinions and decisions of
men who are recognized, to some extent at least, as authorities on the
subjects of which they speak. An eminent scientist might explain with
unquestioned certainty the operation of certain natural phenomena. A
business man of wide experience and with well recognized insight into
national conditions might speak authoritatively on the causes of
business depressions. In religious matters the Bible is the highest
authority for orthodox Christians; the Koran, for Mohammedans. In
legal affairs the highest authorities are court decisions, opinions of
eminent jurists, and the Constitution. If a certain college president
is considered an authority in the matter of college discipline, then a
quotation from him on the evils of hazing becomes valuable evidence
for the affirmative of the proposition, "Hazing should be abolished in
all colleges." If the arguer wishes to strengthen his evidence, he may
do so by giving the president's reasons for condemning hazing; but he
then departs from pure argument from authority. Pure argument from
authority does not consist of a statement of the reasons involved; it
asserts that something is true because some one who is acknowledged to
be an authority on that subject says it is true.
Argument from authority differs from other evidence in that it
involves not merely investigation but also the exercise of a high
degree of judgment. The statement that in 1902, in the United Kingdom,
two hundred and ninety-five communities of from 8,000 to 25,000
inhabitants were without street-car lines is not argument from
authority; the discovery of this truth involved merely investigation.
On the other hand, if some reputable statesman or business man should
say that street-car facilities in the United States excelled those of
England, this evidence would be argument from authority; only through
both investigation and judgment could such a statement be evolved.
This kind of evidence is very strong when those addressed have
confidence in the integrity, ability, and judgment of the person
quoted. If, however, they do not know him, or if they do not consider
him reliable, the evidence is of little value. Therefore, the test
that an arguer should apply before using this kind of evidence is as
follows:—
Is the witness an acknowledged authority on the subject about which
he speaks?
Sometimes a short statement showing why the witness quoted is able to
speak wisely and conclusively will render the evidence more valuable
in the eyes of the audience. In the following example, notice how
Judge James H. Blount used "authority" in proving that the Filipinos
desired self-government:—
Senator Dubois, of Idaho, who was a member of the Congressional
party that visited the Philippines, has since said in the New York
"Independent": All the Filipinos, with the exception of those who were
holding positions under and drawing salaries from our Government,
favor a government of their own. There is scarcely an exception among
them…. There is nobody in the islands, no organization of any
kind or description, which favors the policy of our Government toward
them.
Senator Newlands, of Nevada, also a member of the Congressional party
aforesaid, has declared, in the number of this Review for December,
1905, that practically the whole people desire independence.
Congressman Parsons, also a member of the same party, has since said:
"There is no question that all the Filipino parties are now in favor
of independence."
Captain J. A. Moss, of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, a member of General
Corbin's staff, is quoted by Mr. Bryan, in the "Commoner" of April
27th, 1906, as saying in an article published in a Manila paper while
Mr. Bryan was in the islands, with reference to the wishes of "the
great majority" of Filipinos, that "to please them, we cannot get out
of the islands too soon." [Footnote: North American Review, Vol.
CLXXXIV, p. 136.]
As has been said, proof consists of evidence and reasoning. Evidence
has been considered first because this order corresponds to the way in
which proof is usually generated; obviously, the discovery of facts
precedes the process of reasoning which shows their significance. In
some instances, however, this order is reversed: a man may form a
theory and then hunt for the facts on which to base it; but in
general, facts precede inferences.
Since all people when they reason do not reach the same conclusion, it
is very essential for a student to investigate the various processes
of reasoning. Given exactly the same evidence, some men will draw one
conclusion, some another. A current periodical recognizes this fact
when it says:—
How widely divergent may be conclusions drawn from the same source
can be judged by contrasting these two statements: Messrs. Clark and
Edgar declare that "where municipal ownership has been removed from
the realm of philosophic discussion and put to the test of actual
experience it has failed ingloriously"; Professor Parsons and Mr.
Bemis on the contrary assert, to use Professor Parsons' words, "it is
not public ownership, but private ownership, that is responsible for
our periodic crisis and the ruin of our industries," and "it is not
impossible that the elimination of the public service corporations
through public ownership is one of the things that would do more to
help along the process of making our cities fit." [Footnote:
Outlook, July 27, 1907.]
Because of the divergencies in the results produced by reasoning, a
student should study with considerable care the various processes of
arriving at a conclusion, so that he may be able to tell what methods
are strong, what are weak, and what are fallacious.
According to a common classification, there are two methods of
reasoning: the inductive process, and the deductive process.
1. INDUCTIVE REASONING. When one carefully investigates his reasons
for believing as he does, he often finds that he accepts a certain
statement as true because he is familiar with many specific instances
that tend to establish its truth. The belief that prussic acid is
poisonous is based upon the large number of instances in which its
deadly effect has been apparent. The fact that railroad men are
exposed to injury is unquestioned because every one is familiar with
the many accidents that occur each year. The statement that water
freezes at thirty-two degrees Fahrenheit has been proved true by
innumerable tests. This process of reasoning by which, from many
specific instances, the truth of a general statement is established,
is called induction.
An example of inductive reasoning is found in the following passage:—
Does the closing of the saloons affect appreciably the amount of
drunkenness in the community? A comparison of the same town or city in
successive years—one year under one system, and the next year under
the other—furnishes a basis for accurate judgment. Evidence of this
sort is all one way, and it seems to be conclusive.
The tables prepared by the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of
Labor, in 1905, under special instructions from the legislature, show
that in Haverhill the average number of arrests per month under
license was 81.63, under no-license, 26.50; in Lynn, under license,
315, under no-license, 117.63; in Medford, under license, 20.12,
under no-license, 13.25; in Pittsfield, under license, 93.25, under
no-license, 36.75; and in Salem, under license, 140.50, under
no-license, 29.63. Such comparisons might be multiplied, but it is
unnecessary. There is no escaping the conclusion that the closing of
the saloons, under the Local Option system, does sensibly diminish the
volume of drunkenness. [Footnote: Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XC, p. 437.]
In using inductive reasoning, one must always be on his guard against
drawing conclusions too hastily. It is never correct to conclude from
a consideration of only a few instances that a general truth has been
discovered. Further examination may show that the opinion first formed
will not hold. Some people call all men dishonest because several
acquaintances have not kept faith with them. Others are ready to
believe that because they have made money in the stock market all can
do likewise. Most superstitions arise through generalization from too
few instances: those who have several times met misfortune on the
thirteenth day of the month are apt to say that the thirteenth is
always an unlucky day. Such reasoning as this shows the weakness of
inductive argument: a conclusion is worthless if it is drawn from too
few examples.
Professor Fred Lewis Pattee, in writing on Errors in Reasoning,
says:—
Children and even adults often generalize from a single experience.
A little boy cautioned me at one time to keep away from a certain
horse, for "white horses always kick." An old Pennsylvania farmer laid
down the law that shingles laid during the increase of the moon always
curl up. He had tried it once and found out. A friend will advise you
to take Blank's Bitters: "I took a bottle one spring and felt much
better; they always cure." Physicians base their knowledge of
medicines upon the observations of thousands of trained observers
through many years, and not upon a single experience. Most people are
prone to judge their neighbors from too slight acquaintance. If a man
is late at an appointment twice in succession, someone is sure to say:
"Oh, he's always late." This is poor thinking because it is bad
judgment. Judgments should be made with care and from fullness of
experience. [Footnote: The Adult Bible Class and Teacher Training
Monthly, May, 1908, page 295.]
The following quotation illustrates how often hasty generalizations
create prejudice and sway public judgment:—
There is an impression shared by many that the relation between the
white and black races in this country is becoming less amicable and
more and more surcharged with injustice. The basis for this impression
is to be found in certain dramatic and sensational events, in
particular the riots in Springfield, Illinois, and in Atlanta,
Georgia. The memory of those events is becoming faint in many minds;
but the impression they created remains. A dramatic event will have an
effect upon public opinion which statistics, more significant but less
picturesque, will altogether fail to produce. In the horror at the
brief work of a mob the diminution in the annual number of lynchings
is forgotten.
The fundamental mistake in this is in the picking out of a startling
episode or a reckless utterance and regarding it as typical. We do not
arrive at the truth in that way. The Black Hand assassin does not
furnish a true index to the Italian character. Aaron Burr is not an
exhibit of the product of American Puritanism. So, if we wish to find
out what American democracy has done with the negro, we do not search,
if we are wise, into the chain-gang of Georgia or into the slums of
New York. [Footnote: The Outlook, April 4, 1908.]
The value of inductive reasoning depends upon the number of instances
observed. Very seldom is it possible to investigate every case of the
class under discussion. Of course this can sometimes be done. For
instance, one may be able to state that all his brothers are college
graduates, since he can speak authoritatively concerning each one of
them. But usually an examination of every instance is out of the
question, and whenever induction is based on less than all existing
cases, it establishes only probable truth.
From the foregoing it is seen that the tests for induction are two:—
(1) Have enough instances of the class under consideration been
investigated to establish the existence of a general law?
(2) Have enough instances been investigated to establish the
probable existence of a general law?
2. DEDUCTIVE REASONING. Deductive reasoning is the method of
demonstrating the truth of a particular statement by showing that some
general principle, which has previously been established or which is
admitted to be true, applies to it. A stranger on coming to the United
States might ask whether our postal system is a success. The answer
would perhaps be, "Yes, certainly it is, for it is maintained by the
government, and all our government enterprises are successful." When
the metal thurium was discovered, a query doubtless arose as to
whether it was fusible. It was then reasoned that since all metals
hitherto known were fusible, and since thurium was a metal,
undoubtedly it was fusible. Stated in clearer form, the reasoning in
each case would be:—
A. All our government enterprises are successful.
B. The United States postal system is a government enterprise.
C. Therefore the United States postal system is successful.
A. All metals are fusible.
B. Thurium is a metal.
C. Therefore thurium is fusible.
Such a series of statements is called a syllogism. A syllogism always
consists of a major premise (A), a minor premise (B), and a conclusion
(C). The major premise always states a general law; the minor premise
shows that the general law applies to the particular case under
consideration; and the conclusion is, in the light of the two
premises, an established truth.
The strength of deductive argument depends on two things: the truth of
the premises and the framing of the syllogism. The syllogism must
always be so stated that a conclusion is derived from the application
of a general law to some specific instance to which the law obviously
applies. In the next place, the premises must be true. If they are
only probably correct, the conclusion is a mere presumption; if either
one is false, the conclusion is probably false. But if the syllogism
is correctly framed, and if both premises are true, the conclusion is
irrefutable. As premises are facts that have first been established by
induction, the relation between inductive and deductive reasoning is
very close. In fact, deduction depends on induction for its very
existence. To overthrow a deductive argument all that is necessary is
to show the error in the inductive process that built up either one or
both of the premises.
The tests for deduction are:—
(1) Are both premises true?
(2) Is the fact stated in the minor premise an instance of the
general law expressed in the major premise?
In practical argumentation it is not always necessary or desirable to
express a deductive argument in full syllogistic form. One premise is
frequently omitted; the syllogism thus shortened is called an
enthymeme. The reasoning then takes some such form as, "This
man will fail in business because he is incompetent." The major
premise, "All incompetent men fail in business," is understood, but is
not expressed. The enthymeme constitutes as strong and forceful an
argument as the syllogism, provided the suppressed premise is a well-
established fact; but whenever this premise is not accepted as true,
it must be stated and proved. The argument will then consist of the
full syllogistic process.
The following outline illustrates the chief difference between
induction and deduction:—
The game of football benefits the players physically, because
(Induction.)
1. Football is known to have benefited Henry Harvey.
2. Football is known to have benefited Frank Barrs.
3. Football is known to have benefited Penn Armstrong.
(Deduction.)
1. The game affords the players regular exercise.
2. The game takes them out in the open air.
3. The game develops the lungs.
The deductive reasoning expressed in full would be:—
(1) A. All games that afford the players regular exercise benefit them
physically.
B. Football affords the players regular exercise.
C. Therefore football benefits the players physically.
The reasoning given in (2) and (3) may be expressed in similar
syllogisms.
To test the inductive part of this argument, one should determine how
well the three examples show the existence of a general law. To test
the deductive part, he should ask whether the premises, both those
stated and those suppressed, are admitted facts, or whether they need
to be proved.
If all reasoning were purely inductive or purely deductive, and if it
always appeared in as simple a form as in the preceding illustration,
one would have little difficulty in classifying and testing it. But
frequently the two kinds appear in such obscure form and in such
varied combinations that only an expert logician can separate and
classify them. Because of this difficulty, it is worth while to know a
second method of classification, one which is often of greater
practical service than the method already discussed in assisting the
arguer to determine what methods of reasoning are strong and what are
weak. A knowledge of this classification is also very helpful to one
who is searching for ways in which to generate proof. This method
considers proof from the standpoint of its use in practical argument;
it teaches not so much the different ways in which the mind may work,
as the ways in which it must work to arrive at a sound conclusion.
The process of reasoning from cause to effect is known as the
argument from antecedent probability. Whenever a thinking man is
asked to believe a statement, he is much readier to accept it as true
if some reasonable cause is assigned for the existence of the
fact that is being established. The argument from antecedent
probability supplies this cause. The reasoning may be from the past
toward the present, or from the present toward the future. If an
inspector condemns a bridge as unsafe, the question arises, "What has
made it so?" If some one prophesies a rise in the price of railroad
bonds, he is not likely to be believed unless he can show an adequate
cause for the increase. In itself, the establishment of a cause proves
nothing. A bridge may have been subjected to great strain and still be
unimpaired. Though at present there may be ample cause for a future
rise in the securities market, some other condition may intervene and
prevent its operation. The assignment of a cause can at best establish
merely a probability, and yet the laws of cause and effect are
so fundamental that man is usually loath to believe that a condition
exists or will exist, until he knows what has brought it about or what
will bring it about. A course of reasoning which argues that a
proposition is true because the fact affirmed is the logical result of
some adequate cause is called argument from antecedent
probability.
Simple examples of this kind of reasoning are found in the following
sentences: "It will rain because an east wind is blowing"; "As most of
our officers in the standing army have been West Point graduates, the
United States military system has reached a high standard of
efficiency." The following are more extended illustrations:—
It appears to have been fully established that, in certain
industries, various economies in production—such as eliminating cross
freights, concentrating the superintending force, running best plants
to full capacity, etc.—can be made from production on a large scale,
or, in other instances, through the combination of different
establishments favorably located in different sections of the country.
It is, of course, not to be expected that any one source of saving
will be found applicable in all industries, nor that the importance of
any will be the same in different industries; but in many industries
enough sources of saving will be found to make combination profitable.
This statement does not ignore the fact that there may be, in many
instances, disadvantages enough to offset the benefits; but experience
does seem to show that, in many cases, at least, the cost of
manufacture, and distribution is materially lessened.
Granting that these savings can be made, it is evident that the
influence of Industrial Combinations might readily be to lower prices
to consumers. [Footnote: Jeremiah W. Jenks, North American Review,
June, 1901, page 907.]
In attempting to prove that operas can be successfully produced in
English, Francis Rogers says:—
We have a poetic literature of marvelous richness. Only the Germans
can lay claim to a lyric wealth as great as ours. The language we
inherit is an extraordinarily rich one. A German authority credits it
with a vocabulary three times as large as that of France, the poorest,
in number of words, of all the great languages. With such an enormous
fund of words to choose from it seems as if we should be able to
express our thoughts not only with unparalleled exactness and
subtlety, but also with unequalled variety of sound. Further it is
probable that English surpasses the other three great languages of
song, German, Italian, and French, in number of distinguishable vowel
sounds, but in questions of ear authorities usually differ, and it is
hazardous to claim in this an indubitable supremacy. It seems certain,
however, that English has rather more than twice as many vowel sounds
as Italian (the poorest language in this respect), which has only
seven or eight. [Footnote: Scribner's, January, 1909, p. 42.]
Since reasoning from antecedent probability can at best establish only
a strong presumption, and since it is often not of sufficient weight
to accomplish even this, an arguer, to be successful, must know the
tests that determine how strong and how weak an argument of this sort
is. He may apply these tests both to his own reasoning and to the
reasoning of others. The first test is:—
(1) Is the assigned cause of sufficient strength to produce the
alleged effect?
The significance of this question is at once apparent. In the case of
a criminal prosecution, it asks whether the accused had sufficient
motive for performing the deed. In connection with political and
economic propositions that advocate a change in existing conditions,
this test asks whether the new method proposed is sufficiently virile
and far-reaching actually to produce the excellent results
anticipated. A few years ago the advocates of free silver were
maintaining that "sixteen to one" would be a sure cure for all poverty
and financial distress. A careful application of this test would have
materially weakened such an argument. Believers in reformatory rather
than punitive methods of imprisonment say it is antecedently probable
that kind treatment, healthful surroundings, and instruction in
various directions will reclaim most criminals to an honest life.
Before accepting or rejecting this argument, one should decide in his
own mind whether or not such treatment is adequate to make a released
convict give up his former criminal practices.
If the argument stands the first test, the next question to ask is:—
(2) May some other cause intervene and prevent the action of the
assigned cause?
During the spring of 1908 it was generally known that the Erie
Railroad had no money with which to pay the interest that was about
due on its outstanding bonds. Wall Street prophesied that the road
would go into a receiver's hands. This result was extremely probable.
Mr. Harriman, however, president of the Union Pacific, stepped in and
by arranging for the payment of the interest saved the road from
bankruptcy. This was an example of how an intervening cause prevented
the action of the assigned cause. When Congress passed the Fifteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, many people said that this legislation
would inevitably cause the social, political, and financial ruin of
the whole South. Since they did not take into consideration the
intervening action of another cause, namely, drastic measures for
negro disfranchisement by the white inhabitants of the South, their
reasoning from antecedent probability was entirely erroneous.
ARGUMENT FROM EFFECT TO CAUSE. The process of reasoning from effect to
cause is called argument from sign. Since every circumstance must be
the result of some preceding circumstance, the arguer tries to find
the cause of some fact that is known to exist, and thereby to
establish the existence of a hitherto unknown fact. For instance, when
one sees a pond frozen over, he is likely to reason back to the cause
of this condition and decide that there has been a fall in
temperature, a fact that he may not have known before. The sight of
smoke indicates the presence of fire. Human footprints in the snow are
undoubted proof that someone has been present.
In the following quotation, the recent prohibition movement in the
South is said to be a sign that the voters wish to keep liquor away
from the negro:—
What is the cause of this drift toward prohibition in the South? The
obvious cause, and the one most often given in explanation, is the
presence of the negro. It is said that the vote for prohibition in the
South represents exactly the same reasoning which excludes liquor from
Indian reservations, shuts it out by international agreement from the
islands of the Pacific, and excludes it from great areas in Africa
under the British flag; and that, wherever there is an undeveloped
race, the reasons for restrictions upon the liquor traffic become
convincing. [Footnote: Atlantic Monthly, May, 1908, p. 632.]
The strength of this kind of reasoning depends upon the closeness of
the connection between the effect and the assigned cause. In testing
argument from sign, one should ask:—
(1) Is the cause assigned adequate to produce the observed
effect?
This test is precisely the same as the test of adequacy for antecedent
probability. One could not maintain that the productiveness of a
certain piece of ground was due entirely to the kind of fertilizer
used on it, nor that a national financial upheaval was caused by the
failure of a single unimportant bank. In each of these cases the cause
suggested may have assisted in producing the result, but obviously it
was not of itself adequate to be the sole cause.
(2) Could the observed effect have resulted from any other cause
than the one assigned?
If several possible causes exist, then it is necessary to consider
them all, and show that all the causes except the assigned cause did
not produce the observed effect. If an employer who has been robbed
discovers that one of his clerks has suddenly come into possession of
a large sum of money, he may surmise that his clerk is a thief. This
argument is valueless, however, unless he can show that his employee
did not receive his newly acquired wealth through inheritance,
fortunate investment, or some other reasonable method. But if no other
reason than burglary or embezzlement can explain the presence of this
money, the argument is very strong.
One might greatly weaken the argument (quoted earlier) which assigned
the cause of the recent prohibition movement in the South to the
presence of the negro by showing that this action was not the result
of the assigned cause, but largely of another cause. He might prove
that during the debate in the Georgia Legislature upon the pending
prohibitory bill, the negro was not once mentioned as a reason for the
enactment of prohibition; and that the chief arguments in favor of
prohibition were based upon the fact that the saloon element had
formed a political ring in the South and were controlling the election
of sheriffs, mayors, aldermen, and legislators.
ARGUMENT FROM EFFECT TO EFFECT. Argument from sign also includes the
process of reasoning from effect to effect through a common cause.
This method consists of combining the process just described with the
argument from antecedent probability. A reduction of wages in one
cotton mill is a sign that there may be a reduction in other cotton
mills. Here the reasoning goes from effect to effect, passing,
however, though perhaps the reasoner is not aware that the process is
so complex, through a cause common to both effects. In full, the
reasoning would be: a reduction in the first mill is the result of the
cause "hard times"; it is then antecedently probable that this cause
will produce a similar reduction of wages in other mills.
This method may be represented by the following figure:—
Cause
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
Effect Effect
Only one effect is known; the other effect is inferred, first, by a
process of reasoning from a known effect to an unknown cause, and
secondly, by the process of reasoning from this assumed cause to an
unknown effect.
This method of reasoning is sound and legitimate when both effects
have the same cause. Its weakness lies in the fact that it may be
attacked on two sides: on the reasoning from effect to cause, and on
the reasoning from cause to effect. If the connection can be broken in
either process, the argument is overthrown. The tests to be used have
already been given.
Argument from example is the name given to the process by which one
reasons that what has been true under certain circumstances will again
be true under the same or similar circumstances. In using this method
of reasoning one argues that whenever several persons or things or
conditions are alike in some respects, any given cause operating upon
them will in each case produce the same effect; any line of action
adopted by them will in each case have the same result.
There are two divisions of argument from example. When the resemblance
between the things compared is close, the process is called argument
by generalization; when the resemblance is so slight that there can be
no direct comparison, but only a comparison of functions, the process
is called argument from analogy.
ARGUMENT BY GENERALIZATION. If one finds that a certain mastiff
becomes with training an excellent watch dog, he may reasonably take
it for granted that training will produce the same result in another
dog of the same breed. If a college student with certain pronounced
physical and mental characteristics is known to be an exceptionally
good football player, the athletic trainer is sure to reason by
generalization that another student with these same characteristics
would be a valuable addition to the team. Burke in his Speech on
Conciliation uses this kind of reasoning when he says that just as
Turkey and Spain have found it necessary to govern their distant
possessions with a loose rein, so, too, England will be obliged to
govern the American Colonies leniently.
Benjamin Harrison used this method of argument in the following
quotation:—
That we give back to Porto Rico all the revenue derived from the
customs we levy, does not seem to me to soften our dealings with her
people. Our fathers were not mollified by the suggestion that the tea
and stamp taxes would be expended wholly for the benefit of the
colonies. It is to say: We do not need this money; it is only levied
to show that your country is no part of the United States, and that
you are not citizens of the United States, save at our pleasure.
[Footnote: North American Review, January, 1901, p. 17.]
Argument by generalization very rarely constitutes absolute proof. In
dealing with things, it may do so in rare cases; in dealing with human
actions, almost never. The reason why it can establish only a strong
probability lies in a weakness in the process of reasoning.
Notice that while this kind of argument apparently reasons directly
from the example cited to the case in hand, there is in reality an
intermediate step. This step is a general truth of which both the
known fact and the fact to be proved must be instances. When it is
argued that since one mastiff makes a good watch dog another mastiff
will also make a good watch dog, the reasoning passes through the
general statement, "All mastiffs make good watch dogs."
Graphically the process might be represented thus:—
General Law
/\
/ \
/ \
/ \
Known Fact Fact to be Proved
This method is very much like the method of reasoning from effect to
effect, except that here the intermediate step does not cause,
but merely accounts for the facts. In the illustration taken from
Burke, the known fact is that neither Turkey nor Spain can govern
their distant provinces despotically. The general law is that no
country can govern a distant dependency harshly. The fact proved is
that England cannot play the despot with the American Colonies.
The weakness of this sort of reasoning is now easily seen. In the
first place, there are few general laws governing human action that
always hold true. In the second place, unless there is a very strong
resemblance between the cases compared, unless they are alike in all
essential particulars, they will not both be examples of the working
of one general law.
The following quotation points out an error that might be made from
too hasty reasoning by example:—
On August 23d the Southern Railway, which since 1902 had been paying
5 per cent. annual dividends on its preferred stock, voted to reduce
those dividends from a 5 per cent. annual rate to one of 3. Five days
later, on August 28th, the Erie Railroad, which had been paying 4 per
cent … announced that it would pay no cash dividend this time, but
would issue to the amount of the usual 4 per cent. dividend, what it
called dividend warrants, which were practically notes at 4 per cent.
redeemable in cash in 1907.
It was natural that this action regarding dividends should have
awakened much uneasiness…. To predict a similar cutting of dividends
by other railway companies would, however, be unwarranted. The case of
the Southern Railway and the Erie was peculiar. Each had been classed
among the financially weak railways of the country. Both were
reorganized from absolute railway wrecks, and in each the new scheme
of capitalization was proposed to the markets at a time when recovery
from the depression of 1893 had not made such progress as it had
achieved when the greater companies, like the Union Pacific, were
reorganized. The result was that, with both these railways, provisions
of working capital and adjustment of liabilities to the possible needs
of an active industrial future were inadequately made. [Footnote:
Alexander D. Noyes, The Forum, October-December, 1907, p.198.]
An excellent illustration of how to refute argument by generalization
is found in the following quotation. It has been said that since
England finds free trade beneficial, the United States should adopt
the same policy. Mr. Reed, a leading advocate of protection, points
out the weakness of this argument.
According to the usual story that is told, England had been engaged
with a long and vain struggle with the demon of protection, and had
been year after year sinking farther into the depths, until at a
moment when she was in her distress and saddest plight, her
manufacturing system broke down, "protection, having destroyed home
trade by reducing," as Mr. Atkinson says, "the entire population to
beggary, destitution, and want." Mr. Cobden and his friends
providentially appeared, and after a hard struggle established a
principle for all time and for all the world, and straightway England
enjoyed the sum of human happiness. Hence all good nations should do
as England has done and be happy ever after.
Suppose England, instead of being a little island in the sea, had been
the half of a great continent full of raw material, capable of an
internal commerce which would rival the commerce of all the rest of
the world.
Suppose every year new millions were flocking to her shores, and every
one of those new millions in a few years, as soon as they tasted the
delights of a broader life, would become as great a consumer as any
one of her own people.
Suppose that these millions, and the 70,000,000 already gathered under
the folds of her flag, were every year demanding and receiving a
higher wage and therefore broadening her market as fast as her
machinery could furnish production. Suppose she had produced cheap
food beyond all her wants, and that her laborers spent so much money
that whether wheat was sixty cents a bushel or twice that sum hardly
entered the thoughts of one of them except when some democratic tariff
bill was paralyzing his business.
Suppose that she was not only but a cannon shot from France, but that
every country in Europe had been brought as near to her as Baltimore
is to Washington—for that is what cheap ocean freights mean between
us and European producers. Suppose all those countries had her
machinery, her skilled workmen, her industrial system, and labor forty
per cent. cheaper. Suppose under that state of facts, with all her
manufactures proclaiming against it, frantic in their disapproval,
England had been called upon by Cobden to make the plunge into free
trade, would she have done it? Not if Cobden had been backed by the
angelic host. History gives England credit for great sense. [Footnote:
Thomas B. Reed, Speech in House of Representatives, Feb. 1, 1904.]
ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY. When two instances of objects which are
unlike in themselves, but which perform similar functions or
have similar relations, are compared for the sake of showing that
what is true in one case is true in the other, the process is called
argument from analogy. The following quotation is a good
illustration of this kind of argument:—
"Mr. Pinchot compared our present consumption of wood to the case of
a man in an open boat at sea, cut adrift from some shipwreck and with
but a few days' supply of water on board. He drinks all the water the
first day, simply because he is thirsty, though he knows that the
water will not last long. The American people know that their wood
supply will last but a few decades. Yet they shut their eyes to the
facts."
Water and wood are not alike in themselves; they cannot be directly
compared, but they are alike in the relations they bear to other
circumstances.
When President Lincoln refused to change generals at a certain time
during the Civil War, saying that it was not wise to "swap horses
while crossing a stream," he reasoned from analogy. Since the horse in
taking its master across the stream and the general in conducting a
campaign are totally unlike in themselves but have similar relations,
the argument is from analogy and not from generalization.
It is easy to see that such reasoning never constitutes indubitable
proof. If argument from generalization, where the objects compared
differ from each other in only a few respects, is weak, plainly,
argument from analogy is much weaker, since the objects are alike
merely in the relations they bear.
Though argument from analogy does not constitute proof, yet it is
often valuable as a means of illustration. Truths frequently need
illumination more than verification, and in such cases this sort of
comparison may be very useful. Many proverbs are condensed arguments
from analogy, their strength depending upon the similarity between the
known case and the case in hand. It is not hard to find the analogy in
these expressions: "Lightning never strikes twice in the same place";
"Don't count your chickens before they are hatched"; "A fool and his
money are soon parted."
The student who has carefully read this chapter up to this point
should have a fairly clear idea of the nature of proof; he should know
that proof consists of evidence and reasoning; he should know the
tests for each of these; and he should be able to distinguish between
strong and weak arguments. The next step for him to take will be to
apply these instructions in generating proof for any statement that he
wishes to establish.
A common fault in argumentation is the failure to support important
points with sufficient proof. One or two points well established will
go farther toward inducing belief in a proposition than a dozen points
that are but weakly substantiated. A statement should be proved not
only by inductive reasoning, but, if possible, by deductive. If one
uses argument from antecedent probability in establishing a statement,
he should not rest content with this one method of proof, but he
should try also to use argument from sign, and argument from example,
and, whenever he can, he should quote authority.
Notice that in the following outline three kinds of proof are used.
The amount of proof here given is by no means sufficient to establish
the truth of the proposition being upheld; the outline, however, does
illustrate the proper method of building up the proof of a
proposition.
The present condition of the United States Senate is deplorable.
ANTECEDENT PROBABILITY.
I. The present method of electing Senators is ample cause for such a
condition, since
A. Senators are not responsible to any one, as
1. They are not responsible to the people, for
a. The people do not elect them.
2. They are not responsible to the legislature, for
a. The legislature changes inside of six years.
SIGN.
II. There is ample evidence to prove that the condition is
deplorable.
A. States are often unrepresented in the Senate. (Haynes'
Election of Senators, page 158.)
B. Many Senators have fallen into disrepute, for
1. One out of every ten members of the Fifty-eighth
Congress had been before the courts on criminal charges.
(Harper's Weekly, Vol. XLIV, page 113.)
C. Many Senators have engaged in fist fights on the floor of the
Senate Chamber.
AUTHORITY.
III. Prominent men testify to its deplorable condition. (A. M. Low,
North American Review, Vol. CLXXIV, page 231; D. G. Phillips,
Cosmopolitan, Vol. XL, page 487.)
Though it has been stated in a previous chapter that the persuasive
portions of an argument should be found for the most part in the
introduction and the conclusion, still persuasion in the discussion is
extremely important. It is true that the real work of the discussion
is to prove the proposition; but if conviction alone be used, there is
great danger, in most cases, that the arguer will weary his audience,
lose their attention, and thus fail to drive home the ideas that he
wishes them to adopt. Since everything depends upon how the arguer has
already treated his subject, and how it has been received by the
audience, specific directions for persuasion in the discussion cannot
possibly be given. Suggestions in regard to this matter must be even
more abstract and general than were the directions for persuasion in
the introduction.
To begin with, persuasion in the discussion should usually be of a
supplementary nature. Unless the arguer has won the attention and, to
some extent at least, the good will of his audience before he
commences upon his proof, he may as well confess failure and proceed
no farther. If, however, the persuasiveness of his introduction has
accomplished the purpose for which it exists, he may introduce his
proof without hesitation, taking care all the time to interweave
enough persuasion to maintain the favorable impression that he has
already made.
In general, the directions for doing this are the same as those for
securing persuasion in the introduction. In both divisions
modesty, fairness, and sincerity, are the characteristics that make
for success. The same conditions that demand these qualities in one place
require their use throughout the whole argument. Then, too, it is often
effective to make occasionally an appeal to some strong emotion. As a
rule, the attitude of the modern audience is essentially one of
indifference, of so great indifference that special effort must be made
first to gain, then to hold, their attention. The direct emotional appeal,
when the subject, the occasion, and the audience are such that
there is no danger of its being ludicrous, will usually accomplish this
result. If such a method, however, is manifestly out of place, other means
must be sought for producing a similar effect.
One of the very commonest devices for gaining attention is to relate a
short anecdote. Everybody enjoys a good story, and if it is chosen
with proper regard for its illustrative value, the argument is sure to
be strengthened. On the whole, humorous stories are best. They often
relieve the tedium of an otherwise dry speech, and not only serve as
persuasion, but drive home a point with greater emphasis than could
the most elaborate course of reasoning. This method is so familiar to
every one that detailed explanation is unnecessary. Owing to the
limited amount of time at their command, student debaters can, as a
rule, use only the very shortest stories, and these should be chosen
for their illustrative rather than for their persuasive value; in
written arguments greater latitude is possible.
Another method that often finds favor in both written and spoken
arguments is the introduction of a paragraph showing the importance of
the topic under consideration. Oftentimes the arguer can show that
this particular phase of the subject is of wider significance than at
first appears. Perhaps he can draw a picture that will turn a
seemingly uninteresting and commonplace subject into one that is
teeming with romance and wonderment. For example, consider the
following extract from Burke's speech on Conciliation with the
American Colonies:—
This is the relative proportion of the importance of the colonies at
these two periods: and all reasoning concerning our mode of treating
them must have this proportion as its basis; or it is a reasoning
weak, rotten and sophistical.
Mr. Speaker, I cannot prevail on myself to hurry over this great
consideration. It is good for us to be here. We stand where we have an
immense view of what is, and what is passed. Clouds, indeed, and
darkness rest upon the future. Let us, however, before we descend from
this noble eminence, reflect that this growth of our national
prosperity has happened within the short period of the life of man. It
has happened within sixty-eight years. There are those alive whose
memory might touch the two extremities. For instance, my Lord Bathurst
might remember all the stages of the progress. He was in 1704 of an
age at least to be made to comprehend such things. He was then old
enough acta parentum jam legere, et quae sit poterit cognoscere
virtus. Suppose, sir, that the angel of this auspicious youth, foreseeing
the many virtues which made him one of the most amiable, as he is one
of the most fortunate, men of his age, had opened to him in vision, that
when in the fourth generation the third prince of the House of
Brunswick had sat twelve years on the throne of that nation which (by
the happy issue of moderate and healing counsels) was to be made
Great Britain, he should see his son, Lord Chancellor of England, turn
back the current of hereditary dignity to its fountain and raise him to an
higher rank of peerage, whilst he enriched the family with a new one;
—if, amidst these bright and happy scenes of domestic honor and
prosperity, that angel should have drawn up the curtain and unfolded
the rising glories of his country, and, whilst he was gazing with
admiration on the then commercial grandeur of England, the genius
should point out to him a little speck, scarcely visible in the mass of
the national interests, a small seminal principle rather than a formed
body, and should tell him,—"Young man, there is America, which at this
day serves for little more than to amuse you with stories of savage men
and uncouth manners; yet shall, before you taste of death, show itself
equal to the whole of that commerce which now attracts the envy of
the world. Whatever England has been growing to by a progressive
increase of improvement, brought in by varieties of people, by
succession of civilizing conquests and civilizing settlements in a series
of seventeen hundred years, you shall see as much added to her by
America in the course of a single life!" If this state of his country had
been foretold to him, would it not require all the sanguine credulity of
youth and all the fervid glow of enthusiasm to make him believe it?
Fortunate man, he has lived to see it! Fortunate indeed, if he lives to
see nothing that shall vary the prospect and cloud the setting of his day!
Excuse me, sir, if, turning from such thoughts, I resume this
comparative view once more. [Footnote: Speech in House of Commons,
March 22, 1775.]
These devices an arguer will often find helpful for bringing an
element of persuasion into his proof, but he should aim at a type of
persuasion much more effective, yet much harder to attain, than is the
result of any mere device. Proof is the strongest when each separate
bit of it appeals both to the reason and the emotions. If an arguer
can connect his subject with the feelings of his audience and then
introduce reasoning processes that will at the same time both convince
them and play upon their feelings, he is certain to attain a large
measure of success. Although not all subjects readily lend themselves
to this method of treatment, yet if the debater will go to the very
bottom of his subject and consider the real significance of the
question he is arguing upon, he can usually succeed in making his
conviction persuasive and his persuasion convincing. Undoubtedly the
best way for a student to train himself in this respect is to study
great arguments. The following quotation from Beecher's speech in
Liverpool, delivered before an audience composed mostly of men
engaged in manufacturing, is an excellent example of persuasive
proof:—
The things required for prosperous labor, prosperous manufactures,
and prosperous commerce are three: first, liberty; secondly, liberty;
thirdly, liberty—but these are not merely the same liberty, as I
shall show you.
First, there must be liberty to follow those laws of business which
experience has developed, without imposts or restrictions, or
governmental intrusions. Business simply wants to be let alone.
Then, secondly, there must be liberty to distribute and exchange
products of industry in any market without burdensome tariffs, without
imposts, and without vexatious regulations. There must be these two
liberties—liberty to create wealth, as the makers of it think best
according to the light and experience which business has given them;
and then liberty to distribute what they have created without
unnecessary vexatious burdens. The comprehensive law of the ideal
industrial condition of the world is free manufacture and free trade.
I have said there were three elements of liberty. The third is the
necessity of an intelligent and free race of customers. There must be
freedom among producers; there must be freedom among the distributors;
there must be freedom among the customers. It may not have occurred to
you that it makes any difference what one's customers are; but it
does, in all regular and prolonged business. The condition of the
customer determines how much he will buy, determines of what sort he
will buy. Poor and ignorant people buy little and that of the poorest
kind. The richest and the intelligent, having the more means to buy,
buy the most, and always buy the best.
Here, then, are the three liberties: liberty of the producer,
liberty of the distributor, and liberty of the consumer. The first two
need no discussion—they have been long, thoroughly, and brilliantly
illustrated by the political economists of Great Britain, and by her
eminent statesmen; but it seems to me that enough attention has not
been directed to the third, and, with your patience, I will dwell on
that for a moment, before proceeding to other topics.
It is a necessity of every manufacturing and commercial people that
their customers should be very wealthy and intelligent. Let us put the
subject before you in the familiar light of your own local experience.
To whom do the tradesmen of Liverpool sell the most goods at the
highest profit? To the ignorant and poor, or to the educated and
prosperous? The poor man buys simply for his body; he buys food, he
buys clothing, he buys fuel, he buys lodging. His rule is to buy the
least and the cheapest that he can. He goes to the store as seldom as
he can,—he brings away as little as he can—and he buys for the least
he can. Poverty is not a misfortune to the poor only who suffer it,
but it is more or less a misfortune to all with whom they deal.
On the other hand, a man well off—how is it with him? He buys in far
greater quantity. He can afford to do it; he has the money to pay for
it. He buys in far greater variety, because he seeks to gratify not
merely physical wants, but also mental wants. He buys for the
satisfaction of sentiment and taste, as well as of sense. He buys
silk, wool, flax, cotton; he buys all metals—iron, silver, gold,
platinum; in short, he buys for all necessities and of all substances.
But that is not all. He buys a better quality of goods. He buys richer
silks, finer cottons, higher grained wools. Now, a rich silk means so
much skill and care of somebody's that has been expended upon it to
make it finer and richer; and so of cotton, and so of wool. That is,
the price of the finer goods runs back to the very beginning, and
remunerates the workman as well as the merchant. Indeed, the whole
laboring community is as much interested and profited as the mere
merchant, in this buying and selling of the higher grades in the
greater varieties and quantities.
The law of price is the skill; and the amount of skill expended in the
work is as much for the market as are the goods. A man comes to the
market and says, "I have a pair of hands"; and he obtains the lowest
wages. Another man comes and says, "I have something more than a pair
of hands—I have truth and fidelity"; he gets a higher price. Another
man comes and says, "I have something more; I have hands and strength,
and fidelity, and skill." He gets more than either of the others. The
next man comes and says, "I have got hands and strength, and skill,
and fidelity; but my hands work more than that. They know how to
create things for the fancy, for the affections, for the moral
sentiments"; and he gets more than any of the others. The last man
comes and says, "I have all these qualities, and have them so highly
that it is a peculiar genius"; and genius carries the whole market and
gets the highest price. So that both the workman and the merchant are
profited by having purchasers that demand quality, variety, and
quantity.
Now, if this be so in the town or the city, it can only be so because
it is a law. This is the specific development of a general or
universal law, and therefore we should expect to find it as true of a
nation as of a city like Liverpool. I know it is so, and you know that
it is true of all the world; and it is just as important to have
customers educated, intelligent, moral, and rich, out of Liverpool as
it is in Liverpool. They are able to buy; they want variety; they want
the very best; and those are the customers you want. That nation is
the best customer that is freest, because freedom works prosperity,
industry, and wealth. Great Britain, then, aside from moral
considerations, has a direct commercial and pecuniary interest in the
liberty, civilization, and wealth of every people and every nation on
the globe.
You have also an interest in this, because you are a moral and a
religious people. You desire it from the highest motives, and
godliness is profitable in all things, having the promise of the life
that is, as well as of that which is to come; but if there were no
hereafter, and if man had no progress in this life, and if there were
no question of moral growth at all, it would be worth your while to
protect civilization and liberty, merely as a commercial speculation.
To evangelize has more than a moral and religious import—it comes
back to temporal relations. Wherever a nation that is crushed,
cramped, degraded under despotism, is struggling to be free, you,
Leeds, Sheffield, Manchester, Paisley, all have an interest that that
nation should be free. When depressed and backward people demand that
they may have a chance to rise—Hungary, Italy, Poland—it is a duty
for humanity's sake, it is a duty for the highest moral motives, to
sympathize with them; but beside all these there is a material and an
interested reason why you should sympathize with them. Pounds and
pence join with conscience and with honor in this design. [Footnote:
The World's Famous Orations, Vol. X, p. 12. Funk and Wagnalls
Company.]
A. In the following passage point out all assertions that are made,
note whether the source of the evidence is definitely stated, and test
the witnesses that give the evidence.
Reciprocity is the only remedy for the commercial antagonism which
is fast separating Canada and the United States. Canada has long
waited in vain for the culmination of treaties whereby she can trade
with us on equal terms. Now, angered by our long evasion of the
question, she is, according to prominent Canadian statesmen,
contemplating the passage of high protective tariff laws, which will
effectually close the doors of Canadian trade to us. Canada is young,
but she is growing fast. The value of her imports is steadily growing
larger, and if we do not make some concession to her we shall lose
this vast trade. She makes and sells many things of which we do not
have a home supply. Why not then open our doors to her and admit her
products? Would it not be of distinct advantage to us?
The American Press is almost unanimous in declaring that the sum of
the advantages attending this step would far offset any disadvantages.
For instance, the supply of lumber in the United States is fast
becoming exhausted; experts say that in fifteen years we shall have a
lumber famine. If we turn to Canada, however, we see her mountain
slopes green with trees and her wooded valleys covered with millions
of feet of lumber. Why, then, not get our lumber from Canada and
preserve what few forests we do have? Because of the exorbitant tariff
on imported lumber. Lumber at its present high prices is even cheap
compared with the price of imported lumber. Moreover, lumber is not
the only article that is expensive here, though it is cheap just
across the line in Canada. The World's Work, Vol. V, page 2979, says
that reciprocity with Canada would cheapen many articles that are now
costly.
B. Point out the kind of reasoning found in each of the following
arguments:—
1. The wholesale destruction of the forests in many States portends
the loss of our whole timber supply.
2. His faithful performance of every duty assures him an early
promotion.
3. Since he succeeded well in his college work, it is an assured fact
that he will make a brilliant reputation for himself in business.
4. Caesar had his Brutus, Charles I his Cromwell, and George III—may
profit by their example.
5. The well-tilled fields, the carefully-trimmed hedges, and the sleek
appearance of the stock bespoke a thrifty and industrious farmer.
6. You tried in Wales to raise a revenue which the people thought
excessive and unjust: the attempt ended in oppression, resistance,
rebellion, and loss to yourselves. You tried in the Duchy of Lancaster
to raise a revenue which the people believed unjust: this effort ended
in oppression, rebellion, vexation, and loss to yourselves. You are
now trying to raise in America a revenue which the Colonists
disapprove. What must be the result?
7. Then, sir, from these six capital sources: of descent; of form of
government; of religion in the northern provinces; of manners in the
southern; of education; of the remoteness of situation from the first
mover of government—from all these causes a fierce spirit of liberty
has grown up.
8. Collective bargaining is an advantage to working men; it tends to
give them some share in the control of the industry to which they
contribute.
9. That a free labor union is not the impractical dream of an idealist
is to be found in the fact that some of the greatest and most
successful of the labor organizations have always adhered to the
principle of the open shop. In the Pennsylvania coal-mines union and
non-union miners labored together in the same mine and reaped the same
benefits from the collective bargaining carried on for them by John
Mitchell. In the recent anarchy in Colorado, the one mine which went
on with its work peacefully, prosperously, and without disturbance,
until it was closed by military orders, was a mine which maintained
the principle of the open shop, and in which union and non-union men
worked peacefully together.
10. Suppose that all the property you were worth was in gold, and you
had put it in the hands of Blondin, the famous rope-walker, to carry
across the Niagara Falls on a tight rope. Would you shake the rope
while he was passing over it, or keep shouting to him, "Blondin, stoop
a little more! Go a little faster!" No, I am sure you would not. You
would hold your breath as well as your tongue, and keep your hand off
until he was safely over. Now the government is in the same situation.
It is carrying an immense weight across a stormy ocean. Untold
treasures are in its hands. It is doing the best it can. Don't badger
it! Just keep still and it will get you safely over.
C. Prove or disprove the following statements, using, wherever it is
possible, argument from antecedent probability, sign, example, and
authority. Give references for all evidence except generally admitted
facts.
1. The negro is not prepared to receive the same kind of education
that the white man receives.
2. Railway pooling lowers freight rates.
3. The election of Senators by State Legislatures is undemocratic.
4. The present commercial relations between Canada and the United
States are detrimental to the industries of the United States.
5. The influence of labor unions has greatly diminished child labor in
the United States.
6. Woman suffrage would purify politics.
7. Egypt is benefited by the control of England.
8. Strikes benefit the working man.
9. The municipal ownership of street railways is a financial failure.
10. Lumber companies threaten the extermination of the forests in the
United States.