INTRODUCTION. — FOOTNOTES:
The Tracts contained in this small volume will,
I trust, be perused with considerable interest by
every English reader who is a lover of ancient
lore; and whatever innovations may have been
made in the philosophical theories of the ancients
by the accumulated experiments of the moderns,
yet the scientific deductions of the former will, I
am persuaded, ultimately predominate over the
futile and ever-varying conclusions of the latter.
For science, truly so called, is, as Aristotle accurately
defines it to be, the knowledge of things
eternal, and which have a necessary existence.
Hence it has for its basis universals, and not particulars;
since the former are definite, immutable,
and real; but the latter are indefinite, are so incessantly
changing, that they are not for a moment
the same, and are so destitute of reality, that, in
the language of the great Plotinus, they may be
said to be “shadows falling upon shadow[1], like
images in water, or in a mirror, or a dream.”
With respect to Ocellus Lucanus, the author
of the first of these Tracts, though it is unknown
at what precise period he lived, yet as Archytas,
in his epistle to Plato (apud Diog. Laert. viii. 80.),
says “that he conversed with the descendants of
Ocellus, and received from them the treatises of
this philosopher On Laws, On Government, Piety,
and the Generation of the Universe[2],” “we cannot
be a great way off the truth,” as my worthy
and very intelligent friend Mr. J. J. Welsh, in a
letter to me, observes, “if we say that he lived
about the time Pythagoras first opened his school
in Italy, B.C. 500; which would give him for
contemporaries in the political world, Phalaris,
Pisistratus, Crœsus, Polycrates, and Tarquin the
Proud; and in the philosophical world, the seven
sages of Greece, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Democritus
of Abdera, &c. &c.”
All that is extant of his works is the treatise
On the Universe[3], and a Fragment preserved by
Stobæus of his treatise On Laws. And in such
estimation was the former of these works held by
Plato and Aristotle, that the latter, as Syrianus
observes (in Aristot. Metaphys.), “has nearly
taken the whole of his two books on Generation
and Corruption from this work;” and that the
former anxiously desired to see it, is evident from
his Epistle to Archytas, of which the following is
a translation:
“Plato to Archytas the Tarentine, prosperity.
“It is wonderful with what pleasure we received
the Commentaries which came from you, and how
very much we were delighted with the genius of
their author. To us, indeed, he appeared to be
a man worthy of his ancient progenitors. For
these men are said to have been ten thousand[4] in
number; and, according to report, were the
best of all those Trojans that migrated under
Laomedon.
“With respect to the Commentaries by me
about which you write, they are not yet finished.
However, such as they are, I have sent them to
you. As to guardianship, we both accord in our
sentiments, so that in this particular there is no
need of exhortation.”
“In the Preface to the Marquis d’Argens’
French translation of this Tract, he says: ‘I have
often thought that it would be much more advantageous
to read what some of the Greek authors
have said of the philosophy of the ancients, in
order to obtain a knowledge of it, than to consult
modern writers, who, though they may perhaps
write well, are in general too prolix[5].’
“In 1762 the Marquis d’Argens published
Ocellus Lucanus, and afterwards Timæus Locrus,
both writers, who according to Chalmers’ Biography
had been neglected by universal consent.
To show, however, the glaring absurdity and outrageous
injustice of what Chalmers says of this
Tract of Ocellus, it is necessary to observe, that
independently of the approbation of this work by
those two great luminaries of philosophy, Plato
and Aristotle, an enumeration of the various
editions of it will be sufficient. Ocellus was first
printed in Greek at Paris 1539, and afterwards
with a Latin version by Chretien 1541; by Bosch
1554 and 1556; by Nogarola, Ven. 1559; by
Commelin 1596; at Heidelberg 1598; Bologna,
1646, and revised by Vizanius 1661; and lastly,
by Gale, Cambridge, 1671. Here are ten editions,
the last of which is only 49 years prior to the year
1700; so that the universal consent had not yet
been given to neglect this work. Let us see when
it could have taken place afterwards. D’Argens’
translation appeared in 1762. A new French
translation by the Abbé Batteux was printed in
1768; and he made it without knowing of the
other. D’Argens’ version was reprinted in 1794;
and an amended Greek and Latin text by Rudolph
was printed at Leipsic in 1801; so that there are
in all fourteen known editions, of which Gale’s is
the best. This book has certainly been read in
Greek, Latin, and French, and it most certainly
will be read in English, if any competent translator
will favour us with a good version.
“In addition to the testimonies of Plato and
Aristotle in favour of this work, Philo, the platonizing
Jew, says: ‘Some are of opinion, that it was
not Aristotle, but certain Pythagoreans, who first
maintained the eternity of the world; but I have
seen a treatise of Ocellus, in which he says, the
world was not generated, and is imperishable, and
indeed he proves it by most exquisite reasoning.
Censorinus also, De Die natali, cap. ii. says, ‘that
the opinion that the human race is perpetual, has
for its authors Pythagoras the Samian, Ocellus
Lucanus, and Archytas of Tarentum.’ He is
likewise mentioned by Jamblichus in his Life of
Pythagoras; by Syrianus in Aristot. Metaphys.; by
Proclus in his Commentary on the Timæus of
Plato, who, as we have shown in the Notes on
Ocellus, demonstrates that he was wrong in ascribing
two powers only instead of three to each
of the elements; and in the last place, this Tract
is cited by Stobæus in Ecl. Phys. lib. i. c. 24: all
which testimonies clearly prove that Chalmers is a
man who cannot say with Socrates (in Plat. Gorg.)
that he has bid farewell to the honours of the
multitude, and has his eye solely directed to
truth[6].”
To the treatise of Ocellus I have subjoined a
translation of a Fragment of Taurus, a Platonic
philosopher, On the Eternity of the World[7];
and also a translation of the Mundi Thema, or
Geniture of the World, from the celebrated astrological
work of Julius Firmicus Maternus, because
it not only admits with Ocellus the perpetuity of
the universe, but unfolds the position of the stars
at the commencement of each of the periods comprehended
in the greater mundane apocatastasis,
which consists of 300,000 years; the first period
after a deluge and conflagration, being, as it were,
a reproduction of the world.
I have likewise annexed a translation of select
theorems from the 2nd Book of Proclus on Motion,
in which the perpetuity of time, and of the
bodies which are naturally moved with a circular
motion, is incontrovertibly proved, and is demonstrated
by what Plato calls “geometrical necessities”
(γεωμετρικαις αναγκαις).
In the last place, I have added copious Notes to
these treatises, in order that nothing might be
wanting to render the meaning of them perspicuous
to the unprejudiced and intelligent reader.
OCELLUS LUCANUS ON THE UNIVERSE. — CHAP. I. — CHAP. II. — CHAP. III. — CHAP. IV. — FOOTNOTES:
Ocellus Lucanus has written what follows concerning
the Nature of the Universe; having learnt
some things through clear arguments from Nature
herself, but others from opinion, in conjunction with
reason[8], it being his intention [in this work] to derive
what is probable from intellectual perception.
It appears, therefore, to me, that the Universe
is indestructible and unbegotten, since it always
was, and always will be; for if it had a temporal
beginning, it would not have always existed: thus,
therefore, the universe is unbegotten and indestructible;
for if some one should opine that it was
once generated, he would not be able to find anything
into which it can be corrupted and dissolved,
since that from which it was generated would be
the first part of the universe; and again, that into
which it would be dissolved would be the last part
of it.
But if the universe was generated, it was generated
together with all things; and if it should be
corrupted, it would be corrupted together with all
things. This, however, is impossible[9]. The universe,
therefore, is without a beginning, and without
an end; nor is it possible that it can have any
other mode of subsistence.
To which may be added, that everything which
has received a beginning of generation, and which
ought also to participate of dissolution, receives
two mutations; one of which, indeed, proceeds
from the less to the greater, and from the worse to
the better; and that from which it begins to change
is denominated generation, but that at which it at
length arrives, is called acme. The other mutation,
however, proceeds from the greater to the less, and
from the better to the worse: but the termination
of this mutation is denominated corruption
and dissolution.
If, therefore, the whole and the universe were
generated, and are corruptible, they must, when
generated, have been changed from the less to the
greater, and from the worse to the better; but
when corrupted, they must be changed from the
greater to the less, and from the better to the
worse. Hence, if the world was generated, it
would receive increase, and would arrive at its
acme; and again, it would afterwards receive decrease
and an end. For every nature which has a
progression, possesses three boundaries and two
intervals. The three boundaries, therefore, are
generation, acme, and end; but the intervals are,
the progression from generation to acme, and from
acme to the end.
The whole, however, and the universe, affords,
as from itself, no indication of a thing of this kind;
for neither do we perceive it rising into existence,
or becoming to be, nor changing to the better and
the greater, nor becoming at a certain time worse
or less; but it always continues to subsist in the
same and a similar manner, and is itself perpetually
equal and similar to itself.
Of the truth of this, the orders of things, their
symmetry, figurations, positions, intervals, powers,
swiftness and slowness with respect to each other;
and, besides these, their numbers and temporal
periods, are clear signs and indications. For all
such things as these receive mutation and diminution,
conformably to the course of a generated nature:
for things that are greater and better acquire
acme through power, but those that are less and
worse are corrupted through imbecility of nature.
I denominate, however, the whole and the universe,
the whole world; for, in consequence of being
adorned with all things, it has obtained this appellation;
since it is from itself a consummate and perfect
system of the nature of all things; for there is nothing
external to the universe, since whatever exists
is contained in the universe, and the universe subsists
together with this, comprehending in itself all
things, some as parts, but others as supervenient.
Those things, therefore, which are comprehended
in the world, have a congruity with the
world; but the world has no concinnity with anything
else, but is itself co-harmonized with itself.
For all other things have not a consummate or
self-perfect subsistence, but require congruity with
things external to themselves. Thus animals require
a conjunction with air for the purpose of
respiration, but sight with light, in order to see;
and the other senses with something else, in order
to perceive their peculiar sensible object. A conjunction
with the earth also is necessary to the germination
of plants. The sun and moon, the planets,
and the fixed stars, have likewise a coalescence with
the world, as being parts of its common arrangement.
The world, however, has not a conjunction
with anything else than itself.
Further still[10], what has been said will be easily
known to be true from the following considerations.
Fire, which imparts heat to another thing, is itself
from itself hot; and honey, which is sweet to the
taste, is itself from itself sweet. The principles
likewise of demonstrations, which are indicative of
things unapparent, are themselves from themselves
manifest and known. Thus, also, that which becomes
to other things the cause of self-perfection,
is itself from itself perfect; and that which becomes
to other things the cause of preservation and permanency,
is itself from itself preserved and permanent.
That, likewise, which becomes to other
things the cause of concinnity, is itself from itself
co-harmonized; but the world is to other things
the cause of their existence, preservation, and self-perfection.
The world, therefore, is from itself
perpetual and self-perfect, has an everlasting duration,
and on this very account becomes the cause
of the permanency of the whole of things.
In short, if the universe should be dissolved, it
would either be dissolved into that which has an
existence, or into nonentity. But it is impossible
that it should be dissolved into that which exists,
for there will not be a corruption of the universe
if it should be dissolved into that which has a
being; for being is either the universe, or a certain
part of the universe. Nor can it be dissolved
into nonentity, since it is impossible for being
either to be produced from non-beings, or to be
dissolved into nonentity. The universe, therefore,
is incorruptible, and can never be destroyed.
If, nevertheless, some one should think that it
may be corrupted, it must either be corrupted
from something external to, or contained in the
universe, but it cannot be corrupted by anything
external to it; for there is not anything external
to the universe, since all other things are comprehended
in the universe, and the world is the whole
and the all. Nor can it be corrupted by the things
which it contains, for in this case it will be requisite
that these should be greater and more powerful than
the universe. This, however, is not true[11],
for all things are led and governed by the universe,
and conformably to this are preserved and
co-adapted, and possess life and soul. But if the
universe can neither be corrupted by anything
external to it, nor by anything contained within it,
the world must therefore be incorruptible and indestructible;
for we consider the world to be the
same with the universe[12].
Further still, the whole of nature surveyed
through the whole of itself, will be found to derive
continuity from the first and most honourable of
bodies, attenuating this continuity proportionally,
introducing it to everything mortal, and receiving
the progression of its peculiar subsistence; for the
first [and most honourable] bodies in the universe,
revolve according to the same, and after a similar
manner. The progression, however, of the whole
of nature, is not successive and continued, nor yet
local, but subsists according to mutation.
Fire, indeed, when it is congregated into one
thing, generates air, but air generates water, and
water earth. From earth, also, there is the same
circuit of mutation, as far as to fire, from whence it
began to be changed. But fruits, and most plants
that derive their origin from a root, receive the
beginning of their generation from seeds. When,
however, they bear fruit and arrive at maturity,
again they are resolved into seed, nature producing
a complete circulation from the same to the same.
But men and other animals, in a subordinate degree,
change the universal boundary of nature; for
in these there is no periodical return to the first
age, nor is there an antiperistasis of mutation into
each other, as there is in fire and air, water and
earth; but the mutations of their ages being accomplished
in a four-fold circle[13], they are dissolved,
and again return to existence; these, therefore,
are the signs and indications that the universe,
which comprehends [all things], will always
endure and be preserved, but that its parts, and
such things in it as are supervenient, are corrupted
and dissolved.
Further still, it is credible that the universe is
without a beginning, and without an end, from its
figure, from motion, from time, and its essence;
and, therefore, it may be concluded that the world
is unbegotten and incorruptible: for the form of
its figure is circular; but a circle is on all sides
similar and equal, and is therefore without a beginning,
and without an end. The motion also
of the universe is circular, but this motion is stable
and without transition. Time, likewise, in which
motion exists is infinite, for this neither had a beginning,
nor will have an end of its circulation.
The essence, too, of the universe, is without egression
[into any other place], and is immutable, because
it is not naturally adapted to be changed,
either from the worse to the better, or from the
better to the worse. From all these arguments,
therefore, it is obviously credible, that the world is
unbegotten and incorruptible. And thus much
concerning the whole and the universe.
Since, however, in the universe, one thing is generation,
but another the cause of generation; and
generation indeed takes place where there is a
mutation and an egression from things which rank
as subjects; but the cause of generation then subsists
where the subject matter remains the same:
this being the case, it is evident that the cause of
generation possesses both an effective and motive
power, but that the recipient of generation is
adapted to passivity, and to be moved.
But the Fates themselves distinguish and separate
the impassive part of the world from that which
is perpetually moved [or mutuable][14]. For the
course of the moon is the isthmus of immortality
and generation. The region, indeed, above the
moon, and also that which the moon occupies, contain
the genus of the gods; but the place beneath
the moon is the abode of strife and nature; for in
this place there is a mutation of things that are
generated, and a regeneration of things which have
perished.
In that part of the world, however, in which
nature and generation predominate, it is necessary
that the three following things[15] should be present.
In the first place, the body which yields to the
touch, and which is the subject of all generated
natures. But this will be an universal recipient,
and a signature of generation itself, having the
same relation to the things that are generated from
it, as water to taste, silence to sound[16], darkness
to light, and the matter of artificial forms to the
forms themselves. For water is tasteless and devoid
of quality, yet is capable of receiving the sweet
and the bitter, the sharp and the salt. Air, also,
which is formless with respect to sound, is the recipient
of words and melody. And darkness, which
is without colour, and without form, becomes the
recipient of splendour, and of the yellow colour
and the white; but whiteness pertains to the statuary’s
art; and to the art which fashions figures
from wax. Matter, however, has a relation in a
different manner to the statuary’s art; for in matter
all things prior to generation are in capacity, but
they exist in perfection when they are generated
and receive their proper nature. Hence matter
[or a universal recipient] is necessary to the existence
of generation.
The second thing which is necessary, is the existence
of contrarieties, in order that mutations and
changes in quality may be effected, matter for this
purpose receiving passive qualities, and an aptitude
to the participation of forms. Contrariety is also
necessary, in order that powers, which are naturally
mutually repugnant, may not finally vanquish,
or be vanquished by, each other. But these powers
are the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist.
Essences rank in the third place; and these are
fire and water, air and earth, of which the hot and
the cold, the dry and the moist, are powers. But
essences differ from powers; for essences are locally
corrupted by each other, but powers are neither
corrupted nor generated, for the reasons [or forms]
of them are incorporeal.
Of these four powers, however, the hot and the
cold subsist as causes and things of an effective
nature, but the dry and the moist rank as matter
and things that are passive[17]; but matter is the first
recipient of all things, for it is that which is in
common spread under all things. Hence, the
body, which is the object of sense in capacity,
and ranks as a principle, is the first thing; but
contrarieties, such as heat and cold, moisture and
dryness, form the second thing; and fire and water,
earth and air, have an arrangement in the third
place. For these change into each other; but
things of a contrary nature are without change.
But the differences of bodies are two: for some
of them indeed are primary, but others originate
from these: for the hot and the cold, the moist
and the dry, rank as primary differences; but the
heavy and the light, the dense and the rare, have
the relation of things which are produced from the
primary differences. All of them, however, are
in number sixteen, viz. the hot and the cold, the
moist and the dry, the heavy and the light, the
rare and the dense, the smooth and the rough, the
hard and the soft, the thin and the thick, the acute
and the obtuse. But of all these, the touch has a
knowledge, and forms a judgement; hence, also,
the first body in which these differences exist in
capacity, may be sensibly apprehended by the
touch.
The hot and the dry, therefore, the rare and
the sharp, are the powers of fire; but those of
water are, the cold and the moist, the dense and
the obtuse; those of air are, the soft, the smooth,
the light, and the attenuated; and those of earth
are, the hard and the rough, the heavy and the
thick.
Of these four bodies, however, fire and earth are
the transcendencies and summits [or extremities]
of contraries. Fire, therefore, is the transcendency
of heat, in the same manner as ice is of cold:
hence, if ice is a concretion of moisture and frigidity,
fire will be the fervour of dryness and heat.
On which account, nothing is generated from ice,
nor from fire[18].
Fire and earth, therefore, are the extremities
of the elements, but water and air are the media,
for they have a mixed corporeal nature. Nor is it
possible that there could be only one of the extremes,
but it is necessary that there should be a
contrary to it. Nor could there be two only, for
it is necessary that there should be a medium,
since media are opposite to the extremes.
Fire, therefore, is hot and dry, but air is hot and
moist; water is moist and cold, but earth is cold
and dry. Hence, heat is common to air and fire;
cold is common to water and earth; dryness to
earth and fire; and moisture to water and air.
But with respect to the peculiarities of each, heat
is the peculiarity of fire, dryness of earth, moisture
of air, and frigidity of water. The essences, therefore,
of these remain permanent, through the possession
of common properties; but they change
through such as are peculiar, when one contrary
vanquishes another.
Hence, when the moisture in air vanquishes the
dryness in fire, but the frigidity in water, the heat
in air, and the dryness in earth, the moisture in
water, and vice versâ, when the moisture in water
vanquishes the dryness in earth, the heat in air, the
coldness in water, and the dryness in fire, the
moisture in air, then the mutations and generations
of the elements from each other into each
other are effected.
The body, however, which is the subject and
recipient of mutations, is a universal receptacle,
and is in capacity the first tangible substance.
But the mutations of the elements are effected,
either from a change of earth into fire, or from fire
into air, or from air into water, or from water into
earth. Mutation is also effected in the third place,
when that which is contrary in each element is
corrupted, but that which is of a kindred nature,
and connascent, is preserved. Generation, therefore,
is effected, when one contrariety is corrupted.
For fire, indeed, is hot and dry, but air is hot and
moist, and heat is common to both; but the peculiarity
of fire is dryness, and of air moisture.
Hence, when the moisture in air vanquishes the
dryness in fire, then fire is changed into air.
Again, since water is moist and cold, but air is
moist and hot, moisture is common to both. The
peculiarity however of water is coldness, but of
air heat. When, therefore, the coldness in water
vanquishes the heat in air, the mutation from air
into water is effected.
Further still, earth is cold and dry, but water
is cold and moist, and coldness is common to
both; but the peculiarity of earth is dryness, and
of water moisture. When, therefore, the dryness
in earth vanquishes the moisture in water, a mutation
takes place from water into earth.
The mutation, however, from earth, in an ascending
progression, is performed in a contrary way; but
an alternate mutation is effected when one whole
vanquishes another, and two contrary powers are
corrupted, nothing at the same time being common
to them. For since fire is hot and dry, but
water is cold and moist; when the moisture in water
vanquishes the dryness in fire, and the coldness in
water the heat in fire, then a mutation is effected
from fire into water.
Again, earth is cold and dry, but air is hot and
moist. When, therefore, the coldness in earth
vanquishes the heat in air, and the dryness in
earth, the moisture in air, then a mutation from air
into earth is effected.
But when the moisture of air corrupts the heat
of fire, from both of them fire will be generated;
for the heat of air and the dryness of fire will still
remain. And fire is hot and dry.
When, however, the coldness of earth is corrupted,
and the moisture of water, from both of
them earth will be generated. For the dryness of
earth, indeed, will be left, and the coldness of water.
And earth is cold and dry.
But when the heat of air, and the heat of fire
are corrupted, no element will be generated; for
the contraries in both these will remain, viz. the
moisture of air and the dryness of fire. Moisture,
however, is contrary to dryness.
And again, when the coldness of earth, and in a
similar manner of water, are corrupted, neither
thus will there be any generation; for the dryness
of earth and the moisture of water will remain.
But dryness is contrary to moisture. And thus, we
have briefly discussed the generation of the first
bodies, and have shown how and from what subjects
it is effected.
Since, however, the world is indestructible and
unbegotten, and neither received a beginning of
generation, nor will ever have an end, it is necessary
that the nature which produces generation in
another thing, and also that which generates in itself,
should be present with each other. And that,
indeed, which produces generation in another
thing, is the whole of the region above the moon;
but the more proximate cause is the sun, who, by
his accessions and recessions, continually changes
the air, so as to cause it to be at one time cold, and
at another hot; the consequence of which is, that
the earth is changed, and everything which the
earth contains.
The obliquity of the zodiac, also, is well posited
with respect to the motion of the sun, for it likewise
is the cause of generation. And universally
this is accomplished by the proper order of the
universe; so that one thing in it is that which
makes, but another that which is passive. Hence,
that which generates in another thing, exists above
the moon; but that which generates in itself, has
a subsistence beneath the moon; and that which
consists of both these, viz. of an ever-running
divine body, and of an ever-mutable generated
nature, is the world.
The origin, however, of the generation of man
was not derived from the earth, nor that of other
animals, nor of plants; but the proper order of
the world being perpetual, it is also necessary that
the natures which exist in it, and are aptly arranged,
should, together with it, have a never-failing
subsistence. For the world primarily always
existing, it is necessary that its parts should
be co-existent with it: but I mean by its parts, the
heavens, the earth, and that which subsists between
these; which is placed on high, and is denominated
aerial; for the world does not exist
without, but together with, and from these.
The parts of the world, however, being consubsistent,
it is also necessary that the natures, comprehended
in these parts, should be co-existent
with them; with the heavens, indeed, the sun and
moon, the fixed stars, and the planets; but with
the earth, animals and plants, gold and silver; with
the place on high, and the aerial region, pneumatic
substances and wind, a mutation to that which is
more hot, and a mutation to that which is more
cold; for it is the property of the heavens to
subsist in conjunction with the natures which it
comprehends; of the earth to support the plants
and animals which originate from it; and of the
place on high, and the aerial region, to be consubsistent
with all the natures that are generated in it.
Since, therefore, in each division of the world,
a certain genus of animals is arranged, which surpasses
the rest contained in that division; in the
heavens, indeed, the genus of the gods, but in the
earth men, and in the region on high demons;—this
being the case, it is necessary that the race of
men should be perpetual, since reason truly induces
us to believe, that not only the [great] parts
of the world are consubsistent with the world, but
also the natures comprehended in these parts.
Violent corruptions, however, and mutations,
take place in the parts of the earth; at one time,
indeed, the sea overflowing into another part of the
earth; but at another, the earth itself becoming
dilated and divulsed, through wind or water
latently entering into it. But an entire corruption
of the arrangement of the whole earth never did
happen, nor ever will.
Hence the assertion, that the Grecian history
derived its beginning from the Argive Inachus,
must not be admitted as if it commenced from a
certain first principle, but that it originated from
some mutation which happened in Greece; for
Greece has frequently been, and will again be,
barbarous, not only from the migration of foreigners
into it, but from nature herself, which, though
she does not become greater or less, yet is always
younger, and with reference to us, receives a
beginning.
And thus much has been sufficiently said by me
respecting the whole and the universe; and further
still, concerning the generation and corruption of
the natures which are generated in it, and the manner
in which they subsist, and will for ever subsist;
one part of the universe consisting of a nature
which is perpetually moved, but another part of a
nature which is always passive; and the former of
these always governing, but the latter being always
governed.
Concerning the generation of men, however,
from each other, after what manner, and from what
particulars, it may be most properly effected, law,
and temperance and piety at the same time co-operating,
will be, I think, as follows. In the first
place, indeed, this must be admitted,—that we
should not be connected with women for the sake
of pleasure, but for the sake of begetting children.
For those powers and instruments, and appetites,
which are subservient to copulation, were imparted
to men by Divinity, not for the sake of
voluptuousness, but for the sake of the perpetual
duration of the human race. For since it was impossible
that man, who is born mortal, should participate
of a divine life, if the immortality of his
genus was corrupted; Divinity gave completion to
this immortality through individuals, and made
this generation of mankind to be unceasing and
continued. This, therefore, is one of the first
things which it is necessary to survey,—that copulation
should not be undertaken for the sake of
voluptuous delight.
In the next place, the co-ordination itself of
man should be considered with reference to the
whole, viz. that he is a part of a house and a city,
and (which is the greatest thing of all) that each
of the progeny of the human species ought to give
completion to the world[19], if it does not intend to
be a deserter either of the domestic, or political, or
divine Vestal hearth.
For those who are not entirely connected with
each other for the sake of begetting children, injure
the most honourable system of convention.
But if persons of this description procreate with
libidinous insolence and intemperance, their offspring
will be miserable and flagitious, and will be
execrated by gods and demons, and by men, and
families, and cities.
Those, therefore, who deliberately consider
these things, ought not, in a way similar to irrational
animals, to engage in venereal connections,
but should think copulation to be a necessary
good. For it is the opinion of worthy men, that
it is necessary and beautiful, not only to fill houses
with large families, and also the greater part of
the earth[20], (for man is the most mild and the best
of all animals,) but, as a thing of the greatest consequence,
to cause them to abound with the most
excellent men.
For on this account men inhabit cities governed
by the best laws, rightly manage their domestic
affairs, and [if they are able] impart to their friends
such political employments as are conformable to
the polities in which they live, since they not only
provide for the multitude at large, but [especially]
for worthy men.
Hence, many err, who enter into the connubial
state without regarding the magnitude of [the
power of] fortune, or public utility, but direct
their attention to wealth, or dignity of birth. For
in consequence of this, instead of uniting with
females who are young and in the flower of their
age, they become connected with extremely old
women; and instead of having wives with a disposition
according with, and most similar to their
own, they marry those who are of an illustrious
family, or are extremely rich. On this account,
they procure for themselves discord instead of concord;
and instead of unanimity, dissention; contending
with each other for the mastery. For the
wife who surpasses her husband in wealth, in
birth, and in friends, is desirous of ruling over
him, contrary to the law of nature. But the husband
justly resisting this desire of superiority in his
wife, and wishing not to be the second, but the
first in domestic sway, is unable, in the management
of his family, to take the lead.
This being the case, it happens that not only
families, but cities, become miserable. For families
are parts of cities, but the composition of the whole
and the universe derives its subsistence from parts[21].
It is reasonable, therefore, to admit, that such as
are the parts, such likewise will be the whole and
the all which consists of things of this kind.
And as in fabrics of a primary nature the first
structures co-operate greatly to the good or bad
completion of the whole work; as, for instance,
the manner in which the foundation is laid in
building a house, the structure of the keel in building
a ship, and in musical modulation the extension
and remission of the voice; so the concordant
condition of families greatly contributes to the
well or ill establishment of a polity.
Those, therefore, who direct their attention to
the propagation of the human species, ought to
guard against everything which is dissimilar and
imperfect; for neither plants nor animals, when
imperfect, are prolific, but to their fructification a
certain portion of time is necessary, in order that
when the bodies are strong and perfect, they may
produce seeds and fruits.
Hence, it is necessary that boys, and girls also
while they are virgins, should be trained up in exercises
and proper endurance, and that they should
be nourished with that kind of food, which is
adapted to a laborious, temperate, and patient
life.
Moreover, there are many things in human life
of such a kind, that it is better for the knowledge
of them to be deferred for a certain time. Hence,
it is requisite that a boy should be so tutored, as
not to seek after venereal pleasures before he is
twenty years of age, and then should rarely engage
in them. This, however, will take place, if
he conceives that a good habit of body, and continence,
are beautiful and honourable.
It is likewise requisite that such legal institutes
as the following should be taught in Grecian cities,
viz. that connection with a mother, or a daughter,
or a sister, should not be permitted either in temples,
or in a public place; for it is beautiful and
advantageous that numerous impediments to this
energy should be employed.
And universally, it is requisite that all preternatural
generations should be prevented, and those
which are attended with wanton insolence. But
such as are conformable to nature should be admitted,
and which are effected with temperance,
for the purpose of producing a temperate and legitimate
offspring.
Again, it is necessary that those who intend to
beget children, should providentially attend to the
welfare of their future offspring. A temperate and
salutary diet, therefore, is the first and greatest
thing which should be attended to by him who
wishes to beget children; so that he should neither
be filled with unseasonable food, nor become intoxicated,
nor subject himself to any other perturbation,
from which the habits of the body may become
worse. But, above all things, it is requisite
to be careful that the mind, in the act of copulation,
should be in a tranquil state: for, from depraved,
discordant, and turbulent habits, bad seed
is produced.
It is requisite, therefore, to endeavour, with all
possible earnestness and attention, that children
may be born elegant and graceful, and that when
born, they should be well educated. For neither
is it just that those who rear horses, or birds, or
dogs, should, with the utmost diligence, endeavour
that the breed may be such as is proper, and from
such things as are proper, and when it is proper[22];
and likewise consider how they ought to be disposed
when they copulate with each other, in order
that the offspring may not be a casual production;—but
that men should pay no attention to their
progeny, but should beget them casually; and when
begotten, should neglect both their nutriment and
their education: for these being disregarded, the
causes of all vice and depravity are produced,
since those that are thus born will resemble cattle,
and will be ignoble and vile.
ADDITIONAL NOTES. — FOOTNOTES:
Page 1.—“But others from opinion in conjunction with
reason;”—which in the original is, τα δε και δοξῃ, μετα
λογου. But Ocellus is not accurate in what he here asserts,
as is evident from what Plato says in his Timæus. For the
divine philosopher having, in the former part of this dialogue,
proposed to consider “what that is which is always being,
but is without generation, and what that is which is generated
[or consists in becoming to be], but is never [really] being,”
adds: “The former of these, indeed, is comprehended
by intelligence in conjunction with reason, since it
always subsists with invariable sameness; but the latter is
perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense,
since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly is.” Τι το ον
μεν αει, γενεσιν δε ουκ εχον· και τι το γιγνομενον μεν, ον
δε ουδεποτε· το μεν δη, νοησει μετα λογου περιληπτον,
αει κατα ταυτα ον· το δ’αυ δοξῃ μετ’ αισθησεως αλογου,
δοξαστον, γιγνομενον και απολλυμενον, οντως δε ουδεποτε
ον. Plato, as is evident from what is said in the Introduction
to this work, had seen this tract of Ocellus, and corrects
him in what he here says, as he also did the opinions
of other philosophers anterior to, or contemporary with him.
For if Ocellus had spoken accurately, he should have said,
“that he had learnt some things through clear arguments
from nature herself, but others from opinion in conjunction
with irrational sense.” For, as Proclus admirably demonstrates
in his Commentary on the above passage from the
Timæus of Plato, truly existing being is only to be apprehended
by us through illuminations from an intellect
superior to the human, in conjunction with the energy of
the summit of our reasoning power; for such is the accurate
meaning of λογος in this place. But opinion is a knowledge
of sensibles conformable to reason, yet without being able to
assign the cause of what it knows; and sense is an irrational
knowledge of the objects to which it is passive, and the instrument
of sense is passion only. See the first volume
of my translation of the Commentaries of Proclus on the
Timæus of Plato, p. 202, &c.
Ocellus adds, “that it is his intention [in this treatise On
the Universe] to derive what is probable from intellectual
perception.” For in physiological discussions we must be
satisfied with probability and an approximation to the truth.
Hence, Proclus, in his Commentary on that part of the
Timæus in which Plato says, “What essence is to generation,
that truth is to faith,” admirably observes as follows:
“The faith of which Plato now speaks is rational, but is
mingled with irrational knowledge, as it employs sense and
conjecture; hence, it is filled with much of the unstable.
For receiving from sense or conjecture the ὁτι, or that a
thing is, it thus explains causes. But these kinds of knowledge
have much of the confused and unstable. Hence,
Socrates, in the Phædo, reprehends sense in many respects,
because we neither hear nor see anything accurately.
“How, therefore, can the knowledge which originates
from sense possess the accurate and the irreprehensible?
For the powers which use science alone, comprehend the
whole of the thing known with accuracy; but those that
energise with sense, are deceived, and deviate from accuracy,
on account of sense, and because the object of knowledge is
unstable. For, with respect to that which is material, what
can any one say of it? since it is always changing and flowing,
and is not naturally adapted to abide for a moment.
But that which is celestial, in consequence of being remote
from us, is not easily known, nor can it be apprehended by
science, but we must be satisfied in the theory of it with
an approximation to the truth, and with probability [instead
of certainty]. For everything which is in place requires
the being situated there, in order to a perfect knowledge of
its nature. The intelligible, however, is not a thing of this
kind, since it is not apprehended by us in place; for, wherever
any one establishes his reasoning energy, there, truth
being everywhere present, he comes into contact with it.
But if it is possible to assert anything firm and stable about
that which is celestial, this also is possible, so far as it participates
of being, and so far as it can be apprehended by
intelligence. For, if anything necessary can be collected
concerning it, it is alone through geometrical demonstrations
which are universal. But so far as it is sensible, it is
difficult to be apprehended, and difficult to be surveyed.”—See
the first volume of my translation of Proclus on the
Timæus of Plato, p. 291.
In p. 293, he also observes, “that perfectly accurate arguments,
and such as are truly scientific, are not to be expected
in physical discussions, but such as are assimilated to
them. It is besides this requisite to know, that as the world
is mingled from physical powers, and an intellectual and
divine essence; for “physical works, as the [Chaldean] Oracle
says, co-subsist with the intellectual light of the father;”
thus, also, the discussion of the world makes a commixture
of faith and truth. For things which are assumed from
sense participate largely of conjectural discussion; but
things which commence from intelligibles, possess that
which is irreprehensible, and cannot be confuted.” And,
lastly, in p. 296, he adds, “that the want of accuracy in
the theory of the images of being, arises from our imbecility;
for, to the knowledge of them we require imagination,
sense, and many other organs. But the Gods contractedly
contain these in their unity and divine intellection;
for, in sublunary natures, we are satisfied in apprehending
that which, for the most part, takes place on account of the
instability of their subject matter. But again, in celestial
natures, we are filled with much of the conjectural, through
employing sense and material instruments. On this account
we must be satisfied with proximity in the apprehension, of
them, since we dwell remotely at the bottom, as it is said, of
the universe. This also is evident from those that are conversant
with them, who collect the same things respecting
them from different hypotheses; some things, indeed,
through eccentrics, others through epicycles, and others
through evolvents, [in all these] preserving the phænomena.”
Shuttleworth, in his Astronomy, has demonstrated that
the celestial phænomena may be solved by the hypotheses
of Ptolemy and Tycho Brahe, equally as well as by those
of Copernicus. But astronomers of the present day, from
not being skilled in the logic of Aristotle, are not aware that
true conclusions may be deduced from false premises; and
hence, because their theory solves the phænomena, they
immediately conclude that it is true. Aristotle, in his Posterior
Analytics, has incontrovertibly shown, that the
things from which demonstrative science consists, must be
necessarily true, the causes of, more known than, and prior
to the conclusion. But where the premises of a syllogism
are false, the conclusion is not scientifically, i. e. necessarily,
true. Thus in the syllogism, Every stone is an animal;
every man is a stone; therefore every man is an animal,—the
conclusion is true, but not scientific.
Note to p. 14.—Ocellus is wrong in ascribing two powers
only to each of the elements, instead of three, as is clearly
shown by Proclus, in the following extract from his admirable
Commentary on the Timæus of Plato. “There are
some physiologists (says he) who ascribe one power to each
of the elements; to fire indeed heat, to air frigidity, to
water moisture, and to earth dryness; in so doing, entirely
wandering from the truth. In the first place, because they
subvert the world and order. For it is impossible for things
to be co-adapted to each other, when they possess the most
contrary powers, unless they have something in common. In
the next place, they make the most contrary natures allied
to each other, viz. the hot to the cold, and the moist to the
dry[26]. It is necessary, however, to make things which are
hostile more remote than things which are less foreign.
For such is the nature of contraries. In the third place,
therefore, the first two powers will have no sympathy whatever
with the rest, but will be divulsed[27] from each other.
For it is impossible to say what is common to humidity and
frigidity. And in addition to all these things, as the elements
are solids, they will not be conjoined to each other by
any medium. It has however been shown that it is not possible
for solids to be conjoined through one medium. Nor
can they be conjoined without a medium. For this is alone
the province of things that are perfectly without interval.
“But some others, as Ocellus, who was the precursor of
Timæus, attribute two powers to each of the elements; to
fire indeed heat and dryness; to air, heat and moisture; to
water, moisture and coldness; and to earth, coldness and
dryness. And these things are written by this man in his
treatise On Nature. In what, therefore, do these err who
thus speak? In the first place, indeed, wishing to discover
the common powers in the elements, in order that
they may preserve the co-arrangement of them with each
other, they no more assign communion than separation to
them, but equally honour their hostility and their harmony.
What kind of world, therefore, will subsist from these; what
order will there be of things which are without arrangement
and most foreign, and of things which are most allied and
co-arranged? For things which in an equal degree are hostile
and peaceful, will in an equal mode dissolve and constitute
communion. But this communion being similarly dissolved,
and similarly implanted, the universe will no more
exist than not exist. In the second place, they do not assign
the greatest contrariety to the extremes, but to things most
remote from the extremes; though we everywhere see, that
of homogeneous natures, those which are most distant have
the nature of contraries, and not those which are less distant.
How likewise did nature arrange them, since they are
most remote in their situation from each other? Was it not
by perceiving their contrariety, and that the third was more
allied than the last to the first? How, also, did she arrange
the motions of them, since fire is most light and tends upward,
but earth is most heavy and tends downward? But
whence were the motions of them which are most contrary
derived, if not from nature? If, therefore, nature distributed
to them most contrary motions, it is evident that they are
themselves most contrary. For as the motions of simple
beings are simple, and those things are simple of which the
motions are simple, thus also those things are most contrary
of which the motions are most contrary. And this may
occasion some one to wonder at Aristotle, who, in what he
says about motion, places earth as most contrary to fire;
but in what he says about powers, he makes the most remote
of similar natures to be more friendly than those
that are proximate, when they are moved with most contrary
motions. For, as the elements have contrary places
in their positions, as they have contrary motions in lations,
as they have contrary powers, gravity and levity, through
which motions subsist in their forms, thus also they have
contrary passive qualities. Aristotle himself likewise manifests
that earth is contrary to fire. For wishing to show
that it is necessary there should be more bodies than one, he
says: “Moreover, if earth exists, it is also necessary that fire
should exist. For in things, one of the contraries of which
naturally is, the other likewise has a natural subsistence.”
So that neither was he able after any other manner to show
that there are more elements than one, than by asserting
that fire is contrary to earth.
“Further still, as the elements are solids, how can they be
bound together through one medium? For this is impossible
in solids, as we have before observed. Hence those who
assert these things, neither speak mathematically nor physically,
but unavoidably err in both these respects. For physical
are derived from mathematical entities. Timæus therefore
alone, or any other who rightly follows him, neither attributes
one or two powers alone to the elements, but triple powers;
to fire indeed tenuity of parts, acuteness, and facility of motion;
to air, tenuity of parts, obtuseness, and facility of motion; to
water, grossness of parts, obtuseness, and facility of motion; and
to earth, grossness of parts, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion.
But this is in order that each of the elements may have two
powers, each[28] of which is common to the element placed
next to it, and one power which is different, in the same
manner as it was demonstrated in mathematical numbers
and figures; this different power being assumed from one
of the extremes; and also in order that earth, according to
all the powers, may subsist oppositely to fire; and that the
extremes may have two media, and the continued quantities
two; the latter having solids for the media, but the former,
common powers. For let fire indeed be attenuated in its parts,
acute, and easily moved. For it has an attenuated essence,
and is acute, as having a figure of this kind [i. e. a pyramidal
figure], and on this account is incisive and fugitive[29], and
permeates through all the other elements. It is also moved
with facility[30], as being most near to the celestial bodies, and
existing in them. For the celestial fire itself is moved with
celerity, as is likewise sublunary fire, which is perpetually
moved in conjunction with it, and according to one circle,
and one impulse. Since, therefore, earth is contrary to fire,
it has contrary powers, viz. grossness, obtuseness, and difficulty
of motion, all which we see are present with it. But
these being thus hostile, and being solids, are also similar
solids. For their sides and their powers are analogous. For
as the gross is to the attenuated, so is the obtuse to the
acute, and that which is moved with difficulty, to that which
is moved with facility. But those are similar solids of
which the sides that constitute the bodies are analogous.
For the sides are the powers of which bodies consist. Hence, as
fire and earth are similar bodies, and similar solids, two analogous
media fall between them; and each of the media will
have two sides of the extremes situated next to it, and the
remaining side from the other extreme. Hence, since fire
has for its three physical sides the triple powers, tenuity,
acuteness, and facility of motion, by taking away the middle
power, acuteness, and introducing instead of it obtuseness,
we shall produce air, which has two sides of fire, but one of
earth, or two powers of fire, but one of earth; as it is fit
that what is near should rather communicate with it, than
what is separated in the third rank from it.
“Again, since earth has three physical powers, contrary to
the powers of fire, viz. grossness of parts, obtuseness, and
difficulty of motion; by taking away difficulty of motion,
and introducing facility of motion, we shall produce water,
which consists of gross parts, is obtuse, and is easily moved;
and which has indeed two sides or powers common with
earth, but receives one from fire. And thus these media
will be spontaneously conjoined with each other; communicating
indeed in twofold powers, but differing in similitude
by one power; and the extremes will be bound together by
two media. Each element also will thus be in a greater degree
conjoined to, than separated from, the element which
is near to it; and one world will be perfectly effected
through all of them, and one harmonious order, through
the predominance of analogy. Thus also, of the two cubes
8 and 27, the medium 12 being placed next to 8, will have
two sides of this, but one side of 27. For 12 is produced
by 2 × 2 × 3. But it is vice versâ with 18. For this is
produced by 3 × 3 × 2. And the side of 27 is 3, in the same
manner as 2 is the side of 8. The physical dogmas, therefore,
of Plato, about the elements of the universe, accord
with mathematical speculations.”
In the Introduction to my Translation of the Timæus of
Plato, I have added the following numbers, for the purpose
of representing this beautiful distribution of the elements,
by Proclus, arithmetically.
Let the number 60 represent fire, and 480 earth; and the
media between these, viz. 120 and 240, will correspond to
air and water. For, as 60 : 120 :: 240 : 480. But 60 =
3 × 5 × 4, 120 = 3 × 10 × 4, 240 = 6 × 10 × 4, and
480 = 6 × 10 × 8. So that these numbers will correspond
to the properties of the elements as follows:
Fire.
3 × 5 × 4
Subtle, acute, moveable. |
Air.
3 × 10 × 4 ::
Subtle, blunt, moveable. |
Water.
6 × 10 × 4 :
Dense, blunt, moveable. |
Earth.
6 × 10 × 8.
Dense, blunt, immoveable. |
“Hence,” Proclus adds, “these things being thus determined,
let us physically adapt them to the words of Plato.
We call a [physical] plane or superficies, therefore, that
which has two powers only, but a [physical] solid that which
has three powers. And we say, that if we fashion bodies from
two powers, one medium would conjoin the elements to each
other. But since, as we assert, bodies possess triple powers,
they are bound together by two media. For there are two
common powers of the adjacent media, and one power which
is different. And the extremes themselves, if they consisted of
two powers, would be conjoined through one medium. For
let fire, if you will, be alone attenuated and easily moved;
but earth, on the contrary, have alone grossness of parts
and immobility. One medium, therefore, will be sufficient
for these. For grossness of parts and facility of motion, and
tenuity of parts and difficulty of motion, are all that is requisite
to the colligation of both. Since, however, each of the
elements is triple, the extremes require two media, and the
things themselves that are adjacent are bound together
through two powers. For solids, and these are things that
have triple contrary powers, are never co-adapted by one
medium.”
FRAGMENTS OF TAURUS, A PLATONIC PHILOSOPHER, ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD. EXTRACTED FROM PHILOPONUS AGAINST PROCLUS. — FOOTNOTES:
Taurus, in his Commentaries on the Timæus of
Plato, says: “In the investigation, whether according
to Plato the world is unbegotten, philosophers
differ in their opinions. For Aristotle
asserts that Timæus says the world was generated[31].
And Theophrastus also, in his treatise
On Physical Opinions, says that, according to
Plato, the world was generated, and therefore
writes in opposition to him. At the same time,
however, he asserts that Timæus perhaps supposed
the world to be generated, for the sake of
perspicuity. Certain other persons also infer, that,
according to Plato, the world was generated.
But, again, others contend that Plato believed the
world to be unbegotten. Since, however, those
who assert that the world was generated, cite
many other words of Plato, and likewise the passage
in which Plato[32] says, ‘the world was generated,
for it is visible and tangible;’ this being the
case, it is requisite to direct our attention to the
different ways in which a thing is said to be generated,
and thus we shall know that Plato asserts
the world to be generated, not according to the
signification in which we affirm this of things
which derive their subsistence from a certain temporal
beginning. For this it is which deceives
the multitude, when they conceive the word generated
to imply a temporal origin. A thing, therefore,
is said to be generated, which never indeed
had a beginning in time, but yet is in the same
genus with generated natures. Thus we call a
thing visible, which is not seen, nor has been seen,
nor will be seen, but yet is in the same genus with
things of a visible nature. And this will take place
with a body which may exist about the centre of
the earth. That also is said to be generated,
which, in mental conception, subsists as a composite,
though it never has been a composite. Thus,
in music, the middle chord is said to be composed
of the lowest and highest chord. For though it is
not thus composed, yet there is perceived in it the
power of the one with reference to the other. The
like also takes place in flowers and animals. In
the world, therefore, composition and mixture are
perceived; according to which, we are able to
withdraw and separate qualities from it, and resolve
it into a first subject. The world also is said
to be generated, because it always subsists in becoming
to be, like Proteus changing into all-various
forms; hence, with respect to the world, the earth,
and the natures, as far as to the moon, are continually
changed into each other. But the natures
above the moon are as to their subject nearly the
same, sustaining only a small mutation. They
change, however, according to figure; just as a
dancer being one and the same according to subject,
is changed into various forms by a certain
gesture and motion of the hands. The celestial
bodies, therefore, are thus changed, and different
habitudes of them take place, between the motions
of the planets with reference to the fixed stars, and
of the fixed stars with respect to the planets.
“The world, likewise, may be said to be generated,
because it derives its existence from something
different from itself, viz. from God, by whom
it is adorned. Thus, also, with those who directly
admit that the world is perpetual, the moon possesses
a generated light from the sun, though there
never was a time when the former was not illuminated
by the latter. If, therefore, some one asserts
that the world is generated according to
Plato, conformably to these significations of the
word, what he says may be admitted. But so far as
the term ‘generated’ signifies a certain time, and
that the world, formerly not existing, was afterwards
generated, this signification, when applied
to the world, must by no means be granted. Plato
himself, indeed, indicates how what he asserts
is to be understood, when he says, ‘It must be
investigated, whether the universe always was, having
no principle whatever of generation, or whether
it was generated, commencing its generation from
a certain cause.’ For the words, ‘no principle
whatever,’ and ‘from a certain cause,’ manifest he
does not intend that a temporal principle should
be assumed; but that what he says, is to be understood
in the same way, as when we say that the
history of the Ephori commenced in the descendants
of Hercules. Others say, that the world had
a beginning from the Demiurgus. For the Demiurgus
is a principle, and so likewise is the paradigm
of the universe, and matter. But matter
cannot be properly said to be a principle. Again,
Plato does not say that the world is a body, but
that it has a body; indicating by this, that so far as
it possesses a corporeal nature, the very being of
which consists in becoming to be, it may be said to
be generated.”
Again, Taurus, in the same Commentaries on
the Timæus, having cited the following passage
from that dialogue, viz. “We who are about to
speak concerning the universe, whether it is generated,
or without generation,” observes: “Plato
says this, though the world is unbegotten. And
the poet,
‘Though in their race posterior found,’
Plato, however, for the sake of discipline, speaks
of the world which is unbegotten, as if it was generated.”
Shortly after this, Taurus says, “What,
therefore, are the causes through which the world
being unbegotten, is supposed to be generated?”
Both these inquiries[33], indeed, deserve to be philosophically
investigated. For one of them excites
to piety, but the other is assumed for the sake of
elucidation. For Plato, knowing that the multitude
apprehend that alone to be a cause which has a
precedency in time, and not conceiving it to be
possible for anything otherwise to be a cause, and
also inferring, that, from this opinion, they might
be led to disbelieve in the existence of Providence;
wishing likewise to inculcate this dogma, that the
world is governed by Providence, he tacitly manifests
it to those who are abundantly able to understand
that the world is unbegotten according to
time; but to those who are not able to understand
this, he indicates that it is generated. He is also
anxious that they may believe this, in order that
at the same time they may be persuaded in the
existence of Providence. But the second cause
which induced Plato thus to write, is this,—that
assertions are then more clear, when we meet with
them as with things which actually take place.
Thus geometricians compose diagrams as if they
were generated, though they are not composites.
And Euclid defines a circle, as being more simple,
to be a plane figure, comprehended under one
line, to which all lines falling from one point
within the figure are equal to each other. But
wishing to explain a sphere, he defines it, as if it
was among the number of things generated, to be
formed by the revolution of a semicircle about the
diameter, until it returns to the same point from
which it began to be moved. If, however, he had
intended to explain the sphere which already existed,
he would have defined it to be a solid figure,
comprehended under one superficies, to which all
right lines falling from one point within the figure,
are equal to each other. But it was usual with
Plato, for the sake of discipline, to unfold things
which are without generation[34], as if they were
generated. Thus, in the Republic, he introduces
the city as being made, in order that in the formation
of it, the generation of justice might become
more manifest. When, however, Theophrastus
says, that perhaps Plato speaks of the world as
generated for the sake of elucidation, just as we
consider geometrical diagrams to be generated,
perhaps generation does not subsist similarly in
diagrams. Aristotle also asserts the same thing;
for he says, that in diagrams it is not proper in
the beginning to suppose contraries, but this is to
be admitted in the generation of the world; just as
if some one should suppose motion and rest, order
and disorder. Neither, therefore, do all things
require invariable paradigms; but the examples
show that it is not more obvious to assert that the
world is generated, than that it is unbegotten.
But how is it possible to suppose contraries in
diagrams? For can it be supposed that a triangle
is at one and the same time stationary and moved?
Hence, the world is, according to itself, unbegotten.
Nor should any one fatigue himself in
endeavouring to prove from the Atlanticus and
Politicus of Plato, that the world is generated.
For we have shown after what manner the world
is unbegotten, and how it is said by Plato to be
generated. So far, therefore, as it is supposed to
be generated, it will be incorruptible through the
will of God; but so far as it is unbegotten, it will
be incorruptible from its own nature. And this
Plato knew. For everything else that is unbegotten,
is incorruptible.”
MUNDI THEMA, OR THE GENITURE OF THE WORLD. TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD BOOK OF THE MATHESIS OF JULIUS FIRMICUS MATERNUS. — FOOTNOTES: — ADDITIONAL NOTES. — FOOTNOTES:
“O Lollianus, the glory and ornament of our
country, it is requisite to know, in the first place,
that the God, who is the fabricator of man,
produced his form, his condition, and his whole
essence, in the image and similitude of the world,
nature pointing out the way[35]. For he composed
the body of man, as well as of the world, from the
mixture of the four elements, viz. of fire, water,
air, and earth, in order that the conjunction of all
these, when they were mingled in due proportion,
might adorn an animal in the form of a divine
imitation. And thus the Demiurgus exhibited
man by the artifice of a divine fabrication, in such
a way, that in a small body he might bestow the
power and essence of all the elements, nature, for
this purpose, bringing them together; and also, so
that from the divine spirit, which descended from
a celestial intellect, to the support of the mortal
body, he might prepare an abode for man, which,
though fragile, might be similar to the world. On
this account, the five stars[36], and also the sun and
moon, sustain man by a fiery and eternal agitation,
as if he were a minor world[37]; so that the
animal which was made in imitation of the world
might be governed by an essence similarly divine.
Hence those divine men Petosiris and Necepso[b],
who deserve all possible admiration, and whose
wisdom approached to the very penetralia of Deity,
scientifically delivered to us the geniture of the
world, that they might demonstrate and show that
man was fashioned conformably to the nature and
similitude of the world, and that he is under the
dominion of the same principles by which the
world itself is governed and contained, and is
perennially supported by the companions of perpetuity[38].
“According to Æsculapius, therefore, and Anubius[39],
to whom especially the divinity Mercury
committed the secrets of the astrological science,
the geniture of the world is as follows: They constituted
the Sun in the 15th part of Leo, the Moon
in the 15th part of Cancer, Saturn in the 15th part
of Capricorn, Jupiter in the 15th part of Sagittary,
Mars in the 15th part of Scorpio, Venus in the
15th part of Libra, Mercury in the 15th part of
Virgo, and the Horoscope in the 15th part of
Cancer. Conformably to this geniture, therefore,
to these conditions of the stars, and the testimonies
which they adduce in confirmation of this
geniture, they are of opinion that the destinies of
men, also, are disposed in accordance with the
above arrangement, as may be learnt from that
book of Æsculapius which is called Μυριογενεσις,
(i. e. Ten Thousand, or an innumerable multitude of
Genitures,) in order that nothing in the several
genitures of men may be found to be discordant
with the above-mentioned geniture of the world.
“We may see, therefore, how far or after what
manner a star accommodates the testimony of its
radiation to the luminaries. For the luminaries
are the Sun and Moon. But Saturn first conjoins
himself with the Moon: for he follows the
condition of the Moon. He does this, however,
because, being constituted in a feminine[40] sign, he
diametrically receives the rays of the Moon, which
is also constituted in a feminine sign. But when
the same Saturn, in that geniture, makes a transition
to the sign Aquarius, he again conjoins himself
to the Sun by a similar radiation, and is again
disposed in the same condition as that of the Sun.
For being constituted in a masculine sign, he associates
himself by an equal testimony of radiation,
since he diametrically looks towards the Sun, with
a radiation similar to that with which he regards
the Moon. After this manner also Jupiter is constituted
in Sagittary, and through a trigon affording
a testimony to the Sun, first conjoins himself
to his condition, and on this account being constituted
in a masculine sign, and associating with
the Sun, who is constituted in a sign of the same
kind, first follows the power of it; but when he
has made a transition to Pisces, he again conjoins
himself in a like condition to the Moon. For
he, in a similar manner, being posited through a
trigon in a feminine sign, looks towards the Moon,
who is constituted in a sign of the same kind, with
an equal radiation of condition.
“In like manner also the planet Mars, being
constituted in Scorpio, because he is in a feminine
sign, through a trigon, affords a testimony to the
Moon; but when he comes to Aries, he affords a
testimony to the Sun, and making a transition,
being placed in a masculine sign, he conjoins himself
by a trigonic radiation with the Sun. This
mode, however, is changeable; for Mars being
constituted in Libra, which is a masculine sign,
yet he affords a testimony to the Moon through a
square aspect; but when he has made a transition
to Taurus, being constituted in a feminine sign,
and looking towards the Sun by a square radiation,
he again affords a testimony to it. These
[divine] men, however, were of opinion that the
planet Mercury is common in the above-mentioned
geniture, this star affording no testimony
either to the Sun or Moon by a square, or a
trigon, or a diameter; nor does it conjoin itself
by radiation either with the Sun or Moon. But
if Mercury is a morning star, he is delighted by
day with the Sun, but if an evening star, by night
with the Moon. All that we have here said, these
men were of opinion ought to be observed in the
genitures of men[41], and thought that they could
not discover the destiny of man, except those
radiations were collected by a sagacious investigation.
Lest, however, the fabulous device[42] of these
men should deceive you, and lest some one should
think that this geniture of the world was contrived
by these most wise men, without a cause, it is requisite
that we should explain all things particularly,
in order that the great sagacity displayed in
this device, may, by the most diligent expositions,
be intimated to all men.
“The world had not a certain day of its origin,
nor was there any time in which the world was
formed by the counsel of a divine intellect, and providential
Deity; nor has the eager desire of human
fragility been able to extend itself so far as to conceive
or explain the origin of the world, especially
since the greater apocatastasis of it, which is effected
by a conflagration or a deluge[43], consists of
300,000 years[c]. For the mundane apocatastasis
is accustomed to be accomplished by these two
events; since a deluge follows a conflagration, because
substances which are burnt can no otherwise
be renovated and restored to their pristine
appearance and form, than by the admixtions and
the concrete dust of the ashes, which are a collection
of generative seeds becoming prolific. Divine
men, therefore, following the example of mathematicians
in the genitures of men, have prudently
devised this, as if it were the geniture of the world.
Hence I deem it expedient to explain the contrivance
of that divine composition, in order that
the admirable reason of the conjectural scheme
may be unfolded according to the rules of art.
“These divine men, therefore, wished so to constitute
the Moon [in the geniture of the world],
that it might conjoin itself with Saturn, and might
deliver the dominion of periodical revolutions.
Nor was this improperly devised. For because the
first origin of the world[d] [i. e. the beginning
of the first mundane period] was uncultivated and
rude, and savage through rustic association, and
also because barbarous men, having entered on
the first vestiges of light, and which were unknown
to them, were destitute of reason, in consequence
of having abandoned humanity[44], these divine men
were of opinion, that this rustic and barbarous
time was Saturnian, that, in imitation of this star,
the beginning of life might be characterized by
barbaric and inhuman ferocity. After Saturn,
Jupiter received periodical power. For to this
planet the Moon was conjoined in the second
place, in order that pristine and squalid rusticity
being deserted, and the ferocity of rude association
being laid aside, human life might be cultivated
through the purification of the manners. In the
third place, the Moon conjoining herself with
Mars, delivered to him the power of periodical
revolution; so that mortality having entered into
the right path of life, and inhumanity being subdued
by a certain moderation, all the ornaments
of arts and fabrications might originate from this
conjunction. After Mars, Venus received predominating
power, in order that, human disciplines
gradually increasing, prudence and wisdom
might adorn mankind. Hence they were of opinion
that this time, in which the manners of men
were cultivated by learning, and naturally formed
to rectitude by the several disciplines, was under
the dominion of Venus; so that being protected by
the majesty of this joyful and salutary divinity,
they might govern their erroneous actions by the
ruling power of Providence. But [these divine
men] conceived the last period to be under the
dominion of Mercury, to whom the Moon in the
last place conjoins herself. What can be found
more subtle than this arrangement? For mankind
being purified from rude and savage pursuits, arts
also having been invented, and disciplines disposed
in an orderly manner, the human race
sharpened its inventive power. And because the
noble genius in man could not preserve [uniformly]
one course of life, the improbity of evil increased
from various institutes, and confused manners and
the crimes of a life of wickedness prevailed: hence
the human race in this period both invented and
delivered to others more enormous machinations.
On this account these wise men thought that this
last period should be assigned to Mercury[e], so
that, in imitation of that star, the human race
might give birth to inventions replete with evil[45].
“That nothing, however, may be omitted by us
requisite to the elucidation of this subject, all
things are to be explained, which prove that man
was formed in the imitation and similitude of the
world[46]. And that the mundane apocatastasis is
effected through a conflagration and a deluge, we
also have asserted, and is confirmed by all men.
The substance likewise of the human body, the
course of life having received its completion, is,
after a similar manner, dissolved. For as often
as, through the natural ardour of heat, the human
body is too much relaxed, it evaporates in consequence
of the inundations of humours; and thus
it always suffers a decoction from a fiery ardour,
or is dissolved by excessive desudation. Nor do
the wisest interpreters of the medical art assert,
that the substance of the human race is dissolved
by a natural termination in any other way, than by
either moisture dissolving fire, or again heat predominating,
fire being inwardly and deeply extinguished,
is left without moisture. Thus the artificer,
Nature, constituted man in an all-various
imitation of the world, so that whatever dissolves,
or forms the essence of the world, this also should
be the cause of the formation and dissolution of
man.”
Page 50.—Petosiris and Necepso were two of the
most ancient writers of Egyptian astrology, which, in many
respects, differs from that of the Chaldeans. The former of
these celebrated men is greatly applauded by Manetho,
who, in his Apotelesmatica, professes to be his follower, and
calls him πολυφιλτατον ανδρα. Petosiris, however, was
much prior to Manetho, as is evident from Athenæus, iii.
p. 114, who says he is mentioned by Aristophanes. He is
also noticed by Ptolemy (in Tetrabiblo) under the appellation
‘of an ancient writer’ (του παλαιου or του αρχαιου).
According to Suidas, he wrote, among other things which
are unfortunately lost, Περι των παρ’ Αιγυπτιοις μυστηριων,
Concerning the Mysteries of the Egyptians, the loss of which
work must be deeply regretted by every lover of ancient
lore. He is also mentioned by Juvenal, vi. 580.
“Aptior hora cibo nisi quam dederit Petosiris.”
And in a Greek epigram (in Anthol. lib. ii. cap. 6.) on a
certain person who had predicted his death from the stars,
and, in order that the prediction might not be falsified, hung
himself, it is said: αισχυνθεις Πετοσιριν απηγξατο και
μετεωρος θνησκει, &c. i. e.
“Lest Petosiris should incur disgrace,
Himself he strangled from a lofty place.”
Thus, too, it is related of Cardan, the celebrated physician
and astrologer, that having predicted the year and day of
his death, when the time drew near, he suffered himself to
perish through hunger, to preserve his reputation. My
worthy and most intelligent friend Mr. J. J. Welsh has furnished
me with the following additional information concerning
the death of Cardan, and other astrologers: “Respecting
Cardan’s abstaining from food, in order to verify his
prediction, Thuanus says: ‘Cum tribus diebus minus septuagesimum
quintum annum implevisset, eodem quo prædixerat
anno et die, videlicet XI. Kalend. Octobris defecit,
ob id, ne falleret, mortem suâ inediâ accelerasse creditus.’
lib. lxii. p. 155. The same historian also relates, that Cardan
brought astrology into repute by the success he had in
calculating nativities. ‘Judiciaria quam vocant fidem apud
multos adstruxit, dum certiora per eam quam ex arte possint
plerumque promere.’ Id. ib. Cardan was not the only
astrologer who foretold the time of his own death; for Martin
Hortensius, Professor of Mathematics in Amsterdam,
not only predicted the time of his own death, but that of
two young men who were with him, and the result proved
the truth of his prophecy. The fact is admitted by Descartes,
while he ridicules the science and underrates the abilities of
Hortensius. See the 35th of his Letters to Father Mersenne,
in the second volume of that collection.
“When Ann of Austria, the wife of Louis XIII., was delivered
of the Dauphin, afterwards Louis XIV., a famous
German astrologer was in attendance to draw his nativity,
but refused to say more than these three words, which give
a true character of Louis the Fourteenth’s reign; Diu, durè,
feliciter. See Limier’s Hist. du Règne de Louis XIV.
“I omitted to mention above, a curious circumstance related
of Cardan in Lavrey’s Hist. of England, vol. i. p. 711, viz.
that having cured the Archbishop of St. Andrew’s of a disorder
which had baffled the most skilful physicians, he took
his leave of the Primate in these words: ‘I have been able
to cure you of your sickness, but cannot change your destiny,
nor prevent you from being hanged.’ Eighteen years
after, this Prelate was hung by order of the Commissioners
appointed by Mary Queen Regent of Scotland.
“By the way, I am much surprised that Cardan’s autobiography
has never been translated; for it is, without a single
exception, the most extraordinary book of the kind ever
published.”
We are informed by Fabricius, that Marsham, in Canone
Chron. p. 477, has eruditely collected many things pertaining
to Petosiris, and Necepso king of Egypt, from the most
ancient writers on judicial astrology. We likewise learn
from Fabricius, that Necepso, to whom Petosiris wrote, as
being coeval with him, is believed to have flourished about
the year 800 of the Attic æra, i. e. about the beginning of
the Olympiads. He is praised by Pliny, by Galen, ix. p. 2.
De Facultat. Simplicium Medicament., and from him by
Aetius.
Page 56.—Proclus in Tim. lib. iv. p. 277, informs us,
that the Chaldeans had observations of the stars, which
embraced whole mundane periods. What Proclus likewise
asserts of the Chaldeans is confirmed by Cicero in his first
book on Divination, who says that they had records of
the stars for the space of 370,000 years; and by Diodorus
Siculus, Bibl. lib. xi. p. 113, who says, that their observations
comprehended the space of 473,000 years.
Plato, in the Timæus, speaking of this greater apocatastasis,
says: “At the same time, however, it is no less possible
to conceive, that the perfect number of time will then
accomplish a perfect year, when the celerities of all the
eight periods being terminated with reference to each other,
shall have a summit, as they are measured by the circle, of
that which subsists according to the same and the similar
[i. e. according to the sphere of the fixed stars].”
On this passage, Proclus, in his Commentary, observes as
follows: “The whole mundane time measures the one life
of the universe, according to which all the celerities are terminated
of the celestial and sublunary circles. For in these
also there are periods, which have for the summit of their
apocatastasis the lation of the circle of the same [i. e. of the
sphere of the fixed stars]. For they are referred to this as
to their principle, because it is the most simple of all, since
the apocatastases are surveyed with reference to the points
of it. Thus, for instance, all of them make their apocatastasis
about the equinoctial point[47], or about the summer
tropic; or though the joint apocatastasis should not be considered
to be according to the same point, but with reference
to the same, when, for instance, rising or culminating,
yet all of them will have with reference to it a figure of
such a kind. For now the present order is entirely a certain
apocatastasis of all the heavenly bodies, yet the configuration
is not seen about the same, but with reference to
the same point. Once, however, it was about the same, and
according to one certain point, at which if it should again
take place, the whole of time will have an end. One certain
apocatastasis likewise seems to have been mentioned;
hence it is said that Cancer is the horoscope of the world,
and this year is called Cynic, or pertaining to the Dog, because,
among the constellations, the splendid star of the
Dog rises together with Cancer. If therefore the planets
should again meet in the same point of Cancer, this concurrence
will be one period of the universe. If, however,
the apocatastasis takes places in Cancer about the equinoctial
point, that also which is from the summer tropic will
be directed towards the summer tropic, and the number of
the one will be equal to the number of the other, and the
time of the one to the time of the other. For each of them
is one period, and is defined by quantity, on account of the
order of the bodies that are moved. In addition, however,
to what has been said, it must be observed, that this perfect
number differs from that mentioned in the Republic, which
comprehends the period of every divinely generated nature[48],
since it is more partial, and is apocatastatic of the eight
periods alone. For the other perfect number comprehends
the peculiar motions of the fixed stars, and, in short, of all
the divine genera that are moved in the heavens, whether
visibly or invisibly, and also of the celestial genera posterior
to the Gods, and of the longer or shorter periods of sublunary
natures, together with the periods of fertility and
sterility. Hence, likewise, it is the lord of the period of the
human race.”
“The year (says Macrobius) which is called mundane,
is truly revolving, because it is effected by a full convolution
of the universe, and is evolved in the most extended periods
of time, the reason of which is as follows: All the planets
and the stars which are seen fixed in the heavens, the peculiar
motion of the latter of which though the human sight
has never been able to perceive or apprehend, are yet moved,
and, besides the revolution of the heavens by which they are
always drawn along, have an advancing motion of their
own. This motion, however, is completed in such a length
of time, that the life of man is not sufficiently extended to
discover, by continual observation, their mutation to the place
in which they were first seen. The end, therefore, of the
mundane year is, when all the planets and all the fixed
stars have returned from a certain place to the same place,
so that no star in the heavens may be situated in a place
different from that in which it was before, since all the other
stars, when moved from that place to which they return,
give a termination to their year; so that the luminaries
[i. e. the sun and moon] also, together with the five wandering
stars, may be in the same places and parts in
which they were situated when the mundane year began.
This, however, according to the decision of physiologists,
will take place at the expiration of 15,000 years; hence, as
the lunar year is a month, and the solar year consists of
twelve months, and the years of the other planets are those
which we have before mentioned, so the mundane year consists
of 15,000 of such years as we now compute. This year,
therefore, is called the truly revolving year, which is not
measured by the retrogression of the sun, i. e. of one planet,
but is terminated by the return of all the planets to the
same place, under the same description of the whole heavens;
from whence also it is called mundane, because the world
is properly called heaven. Hence, as we not only denominate
the progression of the sun from the kalends of
January to the same kalends, the solar year, but also its
progression from the day after the kalends to the same
day, and its return from any day of any month to the same
day, a year; thus, also, the beginning of this mundane year
may be fixed by any one at any time he pleases. Thus, for
instance, Cicero now, from an eclipse of the sun, which happened
at the time of the death of Romulus, supposes the
beginning of the mundane year to commence. And though
frequently afterwards an eclipse of the sun may have happened,
yet a repeated eclipse of this luminary is not said to
give completion to the mundane year; but then this completion
takes place when the sun, during its eclipse, will be in
the same places and parts, and likewise all the planets and
fixed stars, in which they were at the time of the death of
Romulus. Hence, as physiologists assert, 15,000 years after
the death of Romulus the sun will again be so eclipsed, that
it will be in the same sign, and in the same part of the
heavens, as it was at that time; all the stars likewise returning
to the same place.”—Macrob. in Somn. Scip. lib. ii.
Hence, as the greater mundane apocatastasis consists of
300,000 years, and 15,000 years make a mundane year, the
greater apocatastasis will consist of 20,000 mundane years.
This greater apocatastasis is also alluded to by Synesius
in his treatise On Providence, and likewise in the Asclepian
Dialogue ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus. The extract
from Synesius, who informs us that his treatise is an Egyptian
narration relative to Osiris and Typhos, is as follows:
“Some time after this, Typhos obtained the kingdom by
fraud and force, and Osiris was banished: but during the
evils arising from the tyrannical government of Typhos,
some God manifestly appeared to a certain philosopher who
was a stranger in Egypt, and who had received great benefits
from Osiris, and ordered him to endure the present calamities,
because they were months only, and not years, in which
the Fates had destined that the Egyptian sceptres should
raise the nails of the wild beasts[49], and depress the heads of
the sacred birds[50]. But this is an arcane symbol. And the
philosophic stranger above mentioned knew that a representation
of this was engraved in obelisks and in the sacred
recesses of the temples. The divinity also unfolded to him
the meaning of the sacred sculpture, and gave him a sign of
the time in which it would be verified. For when those, said
he, who are now in power, shall endeavour to make an innovation
in our religion, then in a short time after expect that the
giants (meaning by these, men of another nation) shall be
entirely expelled, being agitated by their own avenging furies. If,
however, some remains of the sedition should still exist, and
the whole should not be at once extinguished, but Typhos
should still remain in the seat of government, nevertheless
do not despair of the Gods. The following also is another
symbol for you. When we shall purify the air which surrounds
the earth, and which is defiled with the breath of the impious,
with fire and water, then the punishment of the rest will
also follow, and then immediately expect a better order of things,
Typhos being removed. For we expel such-like prodigies by the
devastation of fire and thunder. In consequence of this, the
stranger considered that to be a felicitous circumstance,
which had before appeared to him to be dreadful, and no
longer bore with molestation a necessary continuance in
life, through which he would be an eye-witness of the advent
of the Gods; for it exceeded the power of human sagacity to
conjecture, that so powerful a multitude as were then collected
together in arms, and who even in time of peace were
by law obliged to be armed, should be vanquished without
any opposition. He considered with himself, therefore, how
these things could be accomplished, for they appeared to
surpass the power of reason. But after no great length of
time, a certain depraved fragment of religion, and an adulteration
of divine worship, like that of money, as it were, prevailed,
which the ancient law exterminated from cities, shutting the doors
against impiety, and expelling it to a great distance from the
walls. Typhos, however, did not himself introduce this impiety,
for he feared the Egyptian multitude, but for this purpose
called in the assistance of the Barbarians, and erected a temple
in the city, having previously subverted the laws of his
country. When these things, therefore, came to pass, the
stranger began to think that this was the event which divinity
had predicted. ‘And perhaps,’ said he, ‘I shall be a
spectator of what will follow.’ He likewise then learnt some
particulars about Osiris, which would shortly happen, and
others which would take place at some greater distance of
time, viz. when the boy Horus would choose, as his associate
in battle, a wolf instead of a lion. But who the wolf is,
is a sacred narration, which it is not holy to divulge, even
in the form of a fable.”
Typhos, however, through his tyranny, was at length
dethroned, and Osiris recalled from exile; and Synesius,
towards the end of this treatise, observes, “that the blessed
body which revolves in a circle is the cause of the events in
the sublunary world. For both are parts of the universe,
and they have a certain relation to each other. If, therefore,
the cause of generation[51] in the things which surround
us originates in the natures which are above us, it follows
that the seeds of things which happen here descend from
thence. And if some one should add, since astronomy imparts
credibility to this, that there are apocatastatic[52] periods
of the stars and spheres, some of which are simple, but
others compounded; such a one will partly accord with the
Egyptians, and partly with the Grecians, and will be perfectly
wise from both, conjoining intellect to science. A
man of this kind therefore will not deny, that, in consequence
of the same motions returning, effects also will return,
together with their causes; and that lives on the
earth, generations, educations, dispositions, and fortunes, will
be the same with those that formerly existed. We must
not wonder, therefore, if we behold a very ancient history
verified in life, and should see things which flourished before
our times accord with what is unfolded in this narration;
and, besides this, perceive that the forms which are
inserted in matter are consentaneous to the arcana of a
fable.”
The following is the extract from the Asclepian Dialogue,
a Latin translation only of which is extant, and is generally
believed by the learned to have been made by Apuleius:—
“An ignoras, O Asclepi, quod Ægyptus imago sit cœli,
aut, quod est verius, translatio et descensio omnium quæ
gubernantur atque exercentur in cœlo? Et, si dicendum est,
verius terra nostra totius mundi est templum: et tamen
quoniam præscire cuncta prudentes decet, istud vos ignorare
fas non est, futurum tempus est, quum appareat Ægyptios
incassum pia mente divinitatem et sedula religione servasse,
et omnis eorum sancta veneratio in irritum casura frustrabitur.
E terris enim ad cœlum est recursura divinitas.
Linquatur Ægyptus, terraque, quæ fuit divinitatis sedes, religione
viduata, Numinum præsentia destituetur. Alienigenis enim
regionem istam terramque complentibus, non solum neglectus
religionum, sed (quod est durius) quasi de legibus, a religione,
pietate, cultuque divino statuetur præscripta pœna, prohibitio.
Tunc terra ista sanctissima, sedes delubrorum et templorum,
sepulchrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima. O Ægypte,
Ægypte, religionum solæ supererunt fabulæ, eæque incredibiles
posteris suis; solaque supererunt verba lapidibus incisa,
tua pia facta narrantibus; et inhabitabit Ægyptum Scythos aut
Indus aut aliquis talis. Divinitas enim repetet cœlum, deserti
homines toti morientur, atque ita Ægyptus Deo et
homine viduata deseretur. Te verò appello sanctissimum
flumen, tibique futura prædico: torrenti sanguine plenus ad
ripas usque erumpes, undæque divinæ non solum polluentur
sanguine, sed totæ rumpentur, et vivis multo major erit
numerus sepultorum; superstes verò qui erit, lingua sola
cognoscetur Ægyptius, actibus verò videbitur alienus. Quid
fles, O Asclepi? Et his amplius, multoque deterius ipsa
Ægyptus suadebitur, imbueturque pejoribus malis, quæ
sancta quondam et divinitatis amantissima deorum in terras
religionis suæ merito, sola seductio [lege reductio] sanctitatis
et pietatis magistra, erit maximæ crudelitatis exemplum.
Et tunc tædio hominum non admirandus videbitur mundus,
neque adorandus. Hoc totum bonum, quo melius nec est,
nec fuit, nec erit, quod videri possit, periclitabitur. Eritque
grave hominibus, ac per hoc contemnetur, nec diligetur totus hic
mundus, Dei opus immutabile, gloriosa constructio, bonum multiformi
imaginum varietate compositum, machina voluntatis Dei
in suo opere sine invidia suffragantis omnium in unum, quæ venerari,
laudari, amari denique à videntibus possunt, multiformis
adunata congestio. Nam et tenebræ præponentur lumini,
et mors vita utiloir judicabitur. Nemo suspiciet cœlum.
Religiosus pro insano, irreligiosus putabitur prudens, furiosus
fortis, pro bono habebitur pessimus. Anima enim et omnia
circum eam quibus aut immortalis nata est, aut immortalitatem
se consecuturam esse præsumit, secundum quod vobis
exposui, non solum risus, sed etiam putabitur vanitas. Sed
mihi credite etiam periculum capitate constituetur in eum, qui se
mentis religioni dederit. Nova constituentur jura, lex nova;
nihil sanctum, nihil religiosum, nec cœlo, nec cœlestibus dignum
audietur, aut mente credetur. Fiet Deorum ab hominibus dolenda
secessio; soli nocentes angeli remanebant, qui humanitati
commixti ad omnia audaciæ mala miseros manu injecta compellent
in bella, in rapinas, in fraudes, et in omnia quæ sunt animarum
naturæ contraria. Tunc non terra constabit, nec
navigabitur mare, nec cœlum astrorum cursibus, nec siderum
cursus constabit in cœlo. Omnis vox divina necessaria
taciturnitate mutescet, fructus terræ corrumpentur, nec
fœcunda erit tellus, et aër ipse mœsto torpore languescet.
Hæc et talis senectus veniet mundi, irreligio, inordinatio,
irrationabilitas bonorum omnium. Cùm hæc cuncta contigerint,
O Asclepi, tunc ille dominus et pater, Deus primipotens,
et unus gubernator mundi, intuens in mores factaque
voluntaria voluntate sua, quæ est Dei benignitas, vitiis
resistens, et corruptelæ omnium errorem revocans, malignitatem
omnem vel alluvione diluens, vel igne consumens,
vel morbis pestilentiisque per diversa loca dispersis finiens,
ad antiquam faciem mundum revocabit, ut et mundus ipse
adorandus videatur et mirandus, et tanti operis effector et
restitutor Deus ab omnibus qui tunc erunt frequentibus
laudum præconiis benedictionibusque celebretur. Hæc enim
mundi genitura cunctarum reformatio rerum bonarum, et
naturæ ipsius sanctissima et religiosissima restitutio, peracto
temporis cursu, quæ est et fuit sine initio sempiterna. Voluntas
enim Dei caret initio, quæ eadem est, et ubique est
sempiterna.” i. e.
“Are you ignorant, O Asclepius, that Egypt is the
image of heaven, or, which is more true, a translation and
descent of everything which is governed and exercised in
heaven? And, if it may be said, our land is truly the temple
of the whole world. Nevertheless, because it becomes wise
men to foreknow all things, it is not lawful that you should be
ignorant that the time will come when it may seem that the
Egyptians have in vain, with a pious mind and sedulous religion,
paid attention to divinity, and all their holy veneration
shall become void and of no effect. For divinity shall
return back from earth to heaven. Egypt shall be forsaken,
and the land which was the seat of divinity shall be destitute
of religion, and deprived of the presence of the Gods. For
when strangers shall possess and fill this region and land, there
shall not only be a neglect of religion, but (which is more miserable)
there shall be laws enacted against religion, piety, and
divine worship; they shall be prohibited, and punishments shall
be inflicted on their votaries. Then this most holy land, the seat
of places consecrated to divinity, and of temples, shall be full
of sepulchres and dead bodies. O Egypt, Egypt, fables alone
shall remain of thy religion, and these such as will be incredible
to posterity; and words alone shall be left engraved in stones,
narrating thy pious deeds. The Scythian also, or Indian, or
some other similar nation, shall inhabit Egypt. For divinity
shall return to heaven, all its inhabitants shall die, and thus
Egypt, bereft both of God and man, shall be deserted. I
call on thee, O most holy river, and predict to thee future
events. Thou shalt burst forth with a torrent of blood, full
even to thy banks, and thy divine waters shall not only be
polluted with blood, but the land shall be inundated with it,
and the number of the dead shall exceed that of the living.
He, likewise, who survives, shall only, by his language, be
known to be an Egyptian, but by his deeds he will appear
to be a stranger. Why do you weep, O Asclepius? Egypt
shall experience more ample and much worse evils than
these, though she was once holy, and the greatest lover of
the Gods on the earth, by the desert of her religion. And
she who was alone the reductor of sanctity and the mistress
of piety will be an example of the greatest cruelty. Then
also, through the weariness of men, the world will not appear
to be an admirable and adorable thing. This whole
good, a better than which, as an object of perception, there
neither is, nor was, nor will be, will be in danger, and will be
grievous to men. Hence this whole world will be despised,
and will not be beloved, though it is the immutable work of
God, a glorious fabric, a good compounded with a multiform
variety of images, a machine of the will of God, who,
in his work, gave his suffrage without envy, that all things
should be one. It is also a multiform collected heap, capable
of being venerated, praised and loved by those that behold
it. For darkness shall be preferred to light, and death
shall be judged to be more useful than life. No one shall
look up to heaven. The religious man shall be accounted insane,
the irreligious shall be thought wise, the furious brave, and the
worst of men shall be considered a good man. For the soul, and
all things about it, by which it is either naturally immortal,
or conceives that it shall attain to immortality, conformably
to what I have explained to you, shall not only be the subject
of laughter, but shall be considered as vanity. Believe
me, likewise, that a capital punishment shall be appointed for
him who applies himself to the religion of intellect. New statutes
and new laws shall be established, and nothing religious,
or which is worthy of heaven or celestial concerns, shall be heard,
or believed by the mind. There will be a lamentable departure
of the Gods from men[53]; noxious angels[54] will alone remain, who,
being mingled with human nature, will violently impel the miserable
men [of that time] to war, to rapine, to fraud, and to every
thing contrary to the nature of the soul. Then the earth shall
be in a preternatural state; the sea shall not be sailed in,
nor shall the heavens accord with the course of the stars,
nor the course of the stars continue in the heavens. Every
divine voice shall be dumb by a necessary silence, the fruits of
the earth shall be corrupted, nor shall the earth be prolific,
and the air itself shall languish with a sorrowful torpor.
These events and such an old age of the world as this shall
take place, such irreligion, inordination, and unreasonableness
of all good. When all these things shall happen, O
Asclepius, then that lord and father, the God who is first in
power, and the one governor of the world, looking into the
manners and voluntary deeds [of men], and by his will,
which is the benignity of God, resisting vices, and recalling
the error arising from the corruption of all things; washing
away likewise all malignity by a deluge, or consuming it by
fire, or bringing it to an end by disease and pestilence dispersed
in different places, will recall the world to its ancient
form, in order that the world itself may appear to be an
adorable and admirable production, and God, the fabricator
and restorer of so great a work, may be celebrated, by all that
shall then exist, with frequent solemn praises and benedictions.
For this geniture[55] of the world is the reformation of
all good things, and the most holy and religious restitution
of the nature of it, the course of time being accomplished[56];
since time is perpetual, and always was without a beginning.
For the will of God is without beginning, is always the
same, and is everywhere eternal.”
Of this very remarkable extract, it is necessary to observe,
in the first place, that it was principally made by me from
the edition of the Asclepian Dialogue by Ficinus, as he appears
to have had a more correct manuscript in his possession
than any that have been consulted by more modern
editors. Of this the learned and at the same time philosophic
reader will be immediately convinced, by comparing
this extract with the same part of that dialogue in the most
modern editions of it. In the second place, that this dialogue
is of genuine antiquity and no forgery, is, I think,
unquestionably evident from neither Lactantius nor Augustin
having any doubt of its authenticity, though it was their
interest to have proved it to be spurious if they could, because
it predicts, (which is the third thing especially deserving
of remark,) that the memorials of the martyrs should
succeed in the place of the temples of the Gods. Hence
Augustin concludes this to be a prophecy or prediction made
instinctu fallacis spiritûs,—by the instinct or suggestion of a deceitful
spirit. But that this prediction was accomplished, is
evident, as Dr. Cudworth observes in his True Intellectual
System of the Universe, p. 329, from the following passages
of Theodoret, which I shall quote as translated by the
Doctor. “Now the martyrs have utterly abolished and
blotted out of the minds of men the memory of those who
were formerly called Gods.” And again, “Our Lord hath
now brought his dead (i. e. his martyrs) into the room and
place (i. e. into the temples) of the Gods; whom he hath
sent away empty, and bestowed their honour upon these his
martyrs. For now, instead of the festivals of Jupiter and
Bacchus, are celebrated those of Peter and Paul, Thomas
and Sergius, and other holy martyrs.” Antoninus the philosopher
also, according to Eunapius, predicted the very same
thing, viz. that after his decease the magnificent temple of
Serapis in Egypt, together with the rest, should be demolished,
and the temples of the Gods be turned into sepulchres,
και τα ἱερα ταφους γενησεσθαι. And in the fourth
and last place, the intelligent reader who compares this prediction
with what is said about the philosophic stranger by
Synesius, in the foregoing extract, will immediately see that
the former wonderfully accords with the latter.
Page 57.—This first period of the world, which was
uncultivated and rude, and, according to Firmicus, was under
the dominion of Saturn, is mentioned by Plato at the beginning
of his third book On Laws. For there having observed
that time is infinite, he says, “that myriads upon
myriads of cities have existed in this time, and that, in consequence
of the same temporal infinity, as many have been
destroyed.” He also says, “that they will everywhere
have been governed according to every kind of polity; and
at one time pass from the less to the greater, and at another
from the greater to the less, and have become worse from
the better, and better from the worse.” He adds, “that the
cause of this mutation, viz. the many destructions of the
human race, is through deluges, diseases, and numerous
other things, in which a very small part of mankind was
left....” After this he observes, “that those who escaped
the destruction which was caused by a deluge, were nearly
mountain shepherds, a few dormant sparks of the human
race, preserved on the summits of mountains. That such
as these must necessarily have been ignorant of other arts,
and of those artifices, in cities, of men towards each other,
with a view to prerogative and contention, and other base
ends.” He also supposes “that the cities which were situated
in plains, and those bordering on the sea, entirely perished
at that time. That hence, all instruments were destroyed,
together with every invention pertaining to art, political
discipline, or anything else characterized by wisdom.” He
adds, “We must therefore assert, that when that devastation
by a deluge took place, human affairs were in a state of
infinite and dreadful solitude; that a prodigious part of the
earth was unprolific; and other animals having perished,
some herds of oxen, and a few goats, which were rarely
found, supplied those men with food that escaped the devastation.”
See what the divine philosopher further observes on
this interesting subject, in my Translation of this book of his
Laws.
The reader, however, must be careful not to confound
this Saturnian period with the golden age, which also was
under Saturn. For the latter, says Damascius (apud Phot.),
consisted of a race of men proximate to the gods, and is
most magnificently celebrated by poets who were seated on
the tripos of the Muse. But by the golden age, as Proclus
on Hesiod beautifully observes, “an intellectual life is implied.
For such a life is pure, impassive, and free from
sorrow; and of this impassivity and purity gold is an image,
because it is never subject to rust or putrefaction. Such a
life, too, is very properly said to be under Saturn, because
Saturn is an intellectual god.”—See more concerning this
Divinity in the Additional Notes at the end of the 5th vol.
of my Plato, p. 675, &c.
Page 59.—Plato, in the eighth book of his Republic,
speaking of the dissolution of the city which he has constituted,
observes as follows: “Not only with respect to terrestrial
plants, but likewise in terrestrial animals, a fertility
and sterility of soul as well as of body takes place, when the
revolutions of the heavenly bodies complete the periphery of
their respective orbits; which are shorter to the shorter
lived, and contrarywise to such as are the contrary.” The
necessity for such a mutation taking place is this (as I have
observed in the Introduction to my Translation of Aristotle’s
History of Animals),—that all the parts of the universe are
unable to participate the providence of divinity in a similar
manner, but some of its parts enjoy this perpetually, and
others only for a time; some in a primary, and others in a
secondary degree. For the universe, being a perfect whole,
must have a first, a middle, and a last part. But its first
part, as having the most excellent subsistence, must always
exist according to nature; and its last part must sometimes
subsist according to, and sometimes contrary to, nature.
Hence the celestial bodies, which are the first parts of the
universe, perpetually subsist according to nature, both the
whole spheres and the multitude co-ordinate to these wholes[57];
and the only alteration which they experience is a mutation
of figure, and variation of light at different periods; but in
the sublunary region, while the spheres of the elements
remain, on account of their subsistence as wholes, always
according to nature, the parts of these wholes have sometimes
a natural, and sometimes an unnatural subsistence;
for thus alone can the circle of generation unfold all the
variety which it contains.
The different periods in which these mutations happen
are called by Plato, with great propriety, periods of fertility
and sterility; for in these periods a fertility or sterility of
men, irrational animals, and plants takes place; so that
in fertile periods mankind will be both more numerous, and
upon the whole superior in mental and bodily endowments,
to the men of a barren period. And a similar reasoning
must be extended to animals and plants. The so much
celebrated heroic age was the result of one of these fertile
periods, in which men transcending the herd of mankind
both in practical and intellectual virtue abounded on the
earth. And a barren period may be considered as having
commenced somewhat prior to the Augustan age, the destruction
of all the great ancient cities, with all their rites,
philosophy, &c. being the natural consequence of such a
period. It appears to me that this period commenced in
the time of Sylla, and I found this opinion on the following
passage in Plutarch’s Life of that great commander:—Το
δε παντων μεγιστον, εξ ανεφελου και διαιθρου του
περιεχοντος ηχησε φωνη σαλπιγγος, οξυν αποτεινουσα και
θρηνωδη φθογγον, ὡστε παντας εκφρονας γενεσθαι, και
καταπτηξαι το μεγεθος. Τυρῥηνων δε οἱ λογιοι μεταβολην
ἑτερου γενους απεφαινοντο, και μετακοσμησιν αποσημαινειν
το τερας. ειναι μεν γαρ αυτῳ οκτω τα συμπαντα γενη διαφεροντα
τοις βιοις και τοις ηθεσι δ’ αλληλων, ἑκαστῳ δε
αφωρισθαι χρονων αριθμον, ὑπο του θεου συμπεραινομενον
ενιαυτου μεγαλου περιοδῳ· και ὁταν αυτη σχη τελος, ἑτερας
ενισταμενης κινεισθαι τι σημειον εκ γης ἢ ουρανου θαυμασιον.
i. e. “But the greatest of all [the signs prior to the
civil wars] was the following: On a cloudless and clear day,
the sound of a trumpet was heard, so acute and mournful as
to astonish and terrify by its loudness all that heard it. The
Tuscan wise men and soothsayers, therefore, declared that
this prodigy signified the mutation into and commencement
of another age. For according to them there are eight
ages, differing from each other in lives and manners, each
of which is limited by divinity to a certain time of duration,
and the number of years of which this time consists is
bounded by the period of the great year. Hence, when one
age is finished, and another is about to commence, a certain
wonderful sign will present itself, either from the earth
or the heavens.” The mournfulness of this sound of the
trumpet was evidently an indication that a barren period
was about to commence.—For an account of the great year,
see the note to page 478 of the treatise on Meteors.
The following extracts from a work entitled “Sketches
chiefly relating to the History, Religion, &c. of the Hindoos,
concerning the Mundane Periods,” appear to me to be
highly interesting, and to form a most important addition
to what has been before said about the revolutions which
take place in the universe.
“They reckon the duration of the world by four Yougs,
corresponding in their nature with the Golden, Silver,
Brazen, and Iron ages of the ancients.
|
Years. |
| The first, or the Sutty Youg, is said to have lasted |
3,200,000 |
| The Tirtah Youg, or second age |
2,400,000 |
| The Dwapaar Youg, or third age |
1,600,000 |
| And they say the Kaly Youg, or present age, will last |
400,000.” |
p. 222.
“The beginning of the Kaly Youg, or present age, is
reckoned from 2 hours, 27 minutes, and 30 seconds of the
morning of the 16th of February 3102 years before the
Christian era; but the time for which their astronomical
tables are constructed, is 2 days, 3 hours, 32 minutes, and
30 seconds after that on the 18th of February, about six
in the morning. They say there was then a conjunction
of the planets, and their tables show that conjunction.
Monsieur Bailly observes[58], that by calculation it appears,
that Jupiter and Mercury were then in the same degree of
the ecliptic; that Mars was distant about 8 degrees, and
Saturn 17; and it results from thence, that at the time of the
date given by the Brahmans to the commencement of the
Kaly Youg, they saw those four planets successively disengage
themselves from the rays of the sun; first Saturn, then
Mars, then Jupiter, and then Mercury. These four planets,
therefore, showed themselves in conjunction; and though
Venus could not have appeared, yet, as they only speak in
general terms, it was natural enough to say there was then
a conjunction of the planets. The account given by the
Brahmans is confirmed by the testimony of our European
tables, which prove it to be the result of a true observation.
Monsieur Bailly is of opinion, that their astronomical time
is dated from an eclipse of the moon, which appears then
to have happened, and that the conjunction of the planets
is only mentioned by the way.”—pp. 224, 225.
The conjunction of the planets mentioned in the above
extract, is admirably elucidated by Olympiodorus in his
MS. Scholia on the Gorgias of Plato, as follows: “There
are seven spheres, that of the moon, that of the sun, and
those of the other planets; but the inerratic is the eighth
sphere. The lunar sphere, therefore, makes a complete
revolution more swiftly, for it is accomplished in thirty
days. That of the sun is more slow, for it is accomplished
in a year. That of Jupiter is still slower, for it is effected
in twelve years. And much more that of Saturn, for it is
completed in thirty years. The stars, therefore, are not
conjoined with each other in their revolutions, except rarely.
Thus, for instance, the sphere of Saturn and the sphere of
Jupiter are conjoined with each other in their revolutions
in sixty years. For if the sphere of Jupiter comes from the
same to the same in twelve years, but that of Saturn in
thirty years, it is evident that when Jupiter has made five,
Saturn will have made two revolutions; for twice thirty
is sixty, and so likewise is twelve times five; so that their
revolutions will be conjoined in sixty years. Souls, therefore,
are punished for such-like periods. But the seven planetary
spheres conjoin their revolutions with the inerratic sphere,
through many myriads of years; and this is the period which
Plato calls τον αει χρονον, for ever.”—See the Introduction
to the volume of my Aristotle, which contains a translation
of Aristotle’s treatise on the Soul, &c. &c.
SELECT THEOREMS IN PROOF OF THE PERPETUITY OF TIME, AND OF THAT WHICH IS NATURALLY MOVED WITH A CIRCULAR MOTION. EXTRACTED FROM THE SECOND BOOK OF PROCLUS ON MOTION. — HYPOTHESES. — DEFINITIONS. — THEOREM 1. — THEOREM 2. — THEOREM 3. — THEOREM 4. — THEOREM 5. — THEOREM 6. — THEOREM 7. — THEOREM 8. — THEOREM 9. — THEOREM 10. — THEOREM 11. — THEOREM 12. — THEOREM 13. — FOOTNOTES:
Every natural body is moveable according to
place.
Every local motion is either in a circle, or in a
right line, or mixed from these.
Every natural body is moved according to one
of these motions.
Every natural body is either simple or compounded.
Every simple motion is the motion of a simple[59]
body.
Every simple body is moved with one motion
according to nature.
That is heavy which is moved towards the
middle.
That is light which is moved from the middle.
That is said to be moved in a circle which is
continually borne from the same to the same.
Contrary motions are from contraries to contraries.
One motion is contrary to one.
Time is the number of the motion of the celestial
bodies.
The motion is one which is without difference
according to species, and belongs to one subject,
and is produced in a continued time.
Things which are naturally moved in a circle
are simple.
Demonstration.—Let AB be that which is naturally
moved in a circle. I say that AB is simple:
for, since the motion in a circle is a simple motion;
but every simple motion is the motion of a simple
body; hence AB is a simple body. Things, therefore,
which are naturally moved in a circle are
simple.
Things naturally moved in a circle, are neither
the same with those moved in a right line, nor
with those which are composed from things moved
in a right line.
Demonstration.—Let AB be that which is naturally
moved in a circle. I say that it is not the
same with those things which are moved in a right
line. For, if it is the same with any one of these,
it must either be naturally moved upwards or
downwards. But every simple body is moved with
one simple motion according to nature. Hence,
that which is naturally moved in a circle, is not the
same with anything moved in a right line. But
neither is it the same with anything compounded.
For it has been shown that everything which naturally
moves in a circle is simple; but that which
consists from things moved in a right line is a composite.
AB therefore, which is naturally moved
in a circle, is neither the same with things moved
in a right line, nor with those composed from
these.
Things which are naturally moved in a circle,
neither participate of gravity nor levity.
Demonstration.—For if AB is either heavy or
light, it is either naturally moved to the middle, or
from the middle: for, from the definitions, that is
heavy which is moved to the middle, and that is
light which is moved from the middle. But that
which is moved either from or to the middle, is
the same with some one of the things moved in a
right line. AB, therefore, is the same with something
moved in a right line, though naturally
moved in a circle, which is impossible.
Nothing is contrary to a circular motion.
Demonstration.—For if this be possible, let the
motion from A to B be a circular motion, and let
the motion contrary to this be either some one of
the motions in a right line, or some one of those
in a circle. If, then, the motion upwards is contrary
to that in a circle, the motion downwards and
that in a circle will be one. But if the motion
downwards is contrary to that in a circle, the motion
upwards and that in a circle will be the same
with each other; for one motion is contrary to one
into opposite places. But if the motion from A is
contrary to the motion from B, there will be infinite
spaces between two contraries; for between
the points A, B infinite circumferences may be described.
But let AB be a semicircle, and let the
motion from A to B be contrary to the motion from
B to A. If, therefore, that which moves in the
semicircle from A to B stops at B, it is by no
means a motion in a circle: for a circular motion
is continually from the same to the same point.
But, if it does not stop at B, but continually moves
in the other semicircle, A is not contrary to B.
And if this be the case, neither is the motion from
A to B contrary to the motion from B to A: for
contrary motions are from contraries to contraries.
But let ABCD be a circle, and let the motion
from A to C be contrary to the motion from C to A.
If therefore that which is moved from A passes
through all the places similarly, and there is one
motion from A to D, C is not contrary to A. But
if these are not contrary, neither are the motions
from them contrary. And in a similar manner
with respect to that which is moved from C, if it
is moved with one motion to B, A is not contrary
to C, so that neither will the motions from these
be contrary.
Things which are naturally moved in a circle,
neither receive generation nor corruption.
Demonstration.—For let AB be that which is
naturally moved in a circle, I say that AB is without
generation and corruption: for if it is generable
and corruptible, it is generated from a contrary,
and is corrupted into a contrary. But that
which is moved in a circle has not any contrary.
It is therefore without generation and corruption.
But that there is nothing contrary to things naturally
moving in a circle, is evident from what has
been previously demonstrated: for the motions of
things contrary according to nature are contrary.
But, as we have demonstrated, there is nothing
contrary to the motion in a circle. Neither, therefore,
has that which is moved in a circle any
contrary.
The powers of bodies terminated according to
magnitude are not infinite.
Demonstration.—For, if possible, let B be the
infinite power of the finite body A; and let the
half of A be taken, which let be C, and let the
power of this be D. But it is necessary that the
power D should be less than the power B: for a
part has a power less than that of the whole. Let
the ratio, therefore, of C to A be taken, and D will
measure B. The power B therefore is finite, and
it is as C to A, so D to B; and alternately as C
to D, so A to B. But the power D is the power
of the magnitude C, and therefore B will be the
power of the magnitude A. The magnitude A,
therefore, has a finite power B; but it was infinite,
which is impossible: for, that a power of the same
species should be both finite and infinite in the
same thing, is impossible.
Simple bodies are terminated according to species.
Demonstration.—For let the magnitude A be a
simple body. Since, therefore, a simple body is
moved with a simple motion, A will be moved with
a simple motion. And if it is moved in a circle, it
will have one nature and one form. But if it is
moved according to any one of the motions in a
right line, if it is moved from the middle only, it
will be fire, but if only to the middle, earth. But,
if it is light with respect to one thing, and heavy
with respect to another, it will be some one of the
middle elements. The species therefore of simple
bodies are terminated.
Time is continued and perpetual.
Demonstration.—For, if it is neither continued
nor eternal, it will have a certain beginning. Let,
therefore, A B be time, and let its beginning be A.
But if A is time, it is divisible, and we shall not
yet have the beginning of time, but there will be
another beginning of the beginning. But, if A is
a moment or the now, it will be indivisible, and
the boundary of another time: for the now is not
only a beginning, but an end. There will therefore
be time before A. Again: if B is the boundary
of time, if B is time, it may be divided to
infinity, and into the many boundaries which it
contains. But if B is the now, the same will also
be a beginning: for the now is not only a boundary,
but a beginning[60].
A motion which is naturally circular is perpetual.
Demonstration.—Let the circular motion be that
of the circle A B, I say that it is perpetual: for,
since time is perpetual, it is also necessary that
motion should be perpetual. And since time is
continued, (for there is the same now in the past
and present time,) it is necessary that there should
be some one continued motion: for time is the
number of motion. However, all other motions
are not perpetual: for they are generated from
contraries into contraries. A circular motion,
therefore, is alone perpetual: for to this, as we have
demonstrated, nothing is contrary. But that all
the motions which subsist between contraries, are
bounded, and are not perpetual, we thus demonstrate.
Let A B be a motion between the two
contraries A and B. The motion, therefore, of
A B is bounded by A and B, and is not infinite.
But the motion from A is not continued with that
from B. But, when that which is moved returns,
it will stand still in B: for, if the motion from A
is one continued motion, and also that from B, that
which is moved from B will be moved into the
same. It will therefore be moved in vain, being
now in A. But nature does nothing in vain: and
hence, there is not one motion. The motions,
therefore, between contraries are not perpetual.
Nor is it possible for a thing to be moved to infinity
in a right line: for contraries are the boundaries.
Nor when it returns will it make one
motion.
That which moves a perpetual motion is perpetual.
Demonstration.—For let A be that which moves
a perpetual motion. I say that A also is perpetual:
for, if it is not, it will not then move when
it is not. But this not moving, neither does the
motion subsist, which it moved before. It is however
supposed to be perpetual. But, nothing else
moving, that will be immoveable which is perpetually
moved. And if anything else moves when
A is no more, the motion is not continual; which
is impossible. Hence, that which moves a perpetual
motion is itself perpetual.
That which is immoveable is the leader of things
moving and moved.
Demonstration.—For let A be moved by B, and
B by C, I say that this will some time or other
stop, and that not everything which moves will be
itself moved: for, if possible, let this take place.
Motions, therefore, are either in a circle, or ad
infinitum. But, if things moving and moved are
infinite, there will be infinite multitude and magnitude:
for everything which is moved is divisible,
and moves from contact. Hence, that which consists
from things moving and moved infinite in
multitude, will be infinite in magnitude. But it is
impossible that any body, whether composite or
simple, can be infinite. But if motions are in a
circle, some one of things moved at a certain time,
will be the cause of perpetual motion, if all things
move and are moved by each other in a circle.
This, however, is impossible: for that which moves
a perpetual motion is perpetual. Neither, therefore,
is the motion of things moved, in a circle, nor
ad infinitum. There is, therefore, that which moves
immoveably, and which is perpetual.
But from hence it is evident, that all things are
not moved; for there is also something which is
immoveable. Nor are all things at rest; for there
are also things which are moved. Nor are some
things always at rest, but others always moved;
for there are also things which are sometimes at
rest, and sometimes moved, such as are things
which are moved from contraries into contraries.
Nor are all things sometimes at rest, and sometimes
moved; for there is that which is perpetually
moved, and also that which is perpetually immoveable.
Everything which is moved, is moved by something.
Demonstration.—Let A be that which is moved,
I say that A is moved by something: for it is either
moved according or contrary to nature. If, therefore,
it is moved according to nature, that which
moves is nature; but, if contrary to nature, that
which employs violence moves; for every motion
contrary to nature is violent.
That which first moves a circular motion is impartible,
or without parts.
Demonstration.—For let A be that which moves
the first motion: for it is necessary that there
should be something of this kind, because everything
which is moved is moved by something. But
A, if it is that which first moves, will be immoveable:
for that which is immoveable is the
leader of all things which are moved. And, since
it moves a perpetual motion, it will possess an
infinite power of moving; for finite powers have
also finite energies: for energy proceeds from
power. So that if its energy is infinite, its power
also will be infinite. Hence, that which first
moves a circular motion, must necessarily either
be body, or incorporeal. But if body, it is either
finite or infinite. There is not however an infinite
body. And if it is a finite body, it will not possess
an infinite power. But the powers of things
bounded according to magnitude are finite, as has
been demonstrated. Hence, that which first moves
a circular motion, is not a body. It is therefore
incorporeal, and possesses infinite power.
THE END.
PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR, RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.