Foreword
Prologue
Introduction to Rapid Dominance
Chapter 1. Background and Basis
Chapter 2. Shock and Awe
Chapter 3. Strategic, Policy, and Operational
Application
Chapter 4. An Outline for System Innovation and
Technological Integration
Chapter 5. Future Directions
Appendices -- Reflections of Three Former Commanders
Biographies of the Study Group Members
We are in the early stages of what promises to be an extended
debate about the future of conflict and the future of our defense
establishment. Few will deny that the winds of change are blowing
as never before, driven by a radically altered geopolitical
situation, an evolving information-oriented society, advancing
technology, and budgetary constraints. How our nation responds to
the challenge of change will determine our ability to shape the
future and defend ourselves against 21st century threats. The
major issue, however it may be manifested, involves the degree of
change that is required. Advocates, all along the spectrum from a
military technical revolution to a revolution in military affairs
to a revolution in security affairs, are making their cases.
Military institutions are by their very nature somewhat
conservative. History has shown that success has often sown the
seeds of future failure. We as a nation can ill afford to follow
in the footsteps of those who have rested on their laurels and
failed to stretch their imaginations.
Often, those who are the most knowledgeable and experienced
about a subject are not in the most advantageous position to
understand a new world order. Yet these same individuals are
often among the most credible voices and therefore are essential
to progress. The authors of Shock and Awe are a highly
accomplished and distinguished group with the credibility that
comes from years of front line experience. Thus, this work is
important not only because of the ideas contained within, but
because of the caliber and credibility of the authors.
ACTIS seeks to articulate and explore advanced concepts. In
sponsoring this work and in disseminating its initial results, we
hope to contribute to the ongoing dialogue about alternatives,
their promises, and their risks. As the authors note, this is a
work in progress meant not to provide definitive solutions but a
proposed perspective for considering future security needs and
strategies. To the extent that vigorous debate ensues we will be
successful.
David S. Alberts
Washington, D.C.
October 1996
The purpose of this paper is to explore alternative concepts
for structuring mission capability packages (MCPs) around which
future U. S. military forces might be configured. From the very
outset of this study group's deliberations, we agreed that the
most useful contribution we could make would be to attempt to
reach beyond what we saw as the current and commendable efforts,
largely but not entirely within the Department of Defense, to
define concepts for strategy, doctrine, operations, and force
structure to deal with a highly uncertain future. In approaching
this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent and actual limits
and difficulties in attempting to reach beyond what may prove to
be the full extent of our grasp.
It is, of course, clear that U.S. military forces are
currently the most capable in the world and are likely to remain
so for a long time to come. Why then, many will ask, should we
examine and even propose major excursions and changes if the
country occupies this position of military superiority? For
reasons noted in this study, we believe that excursions are
important if only to confirm the validity of current defense
approaches. There are several overrarching realities that have
led us to this conclusion. First, while everyone recognizes that
the Cold War has ended, there is not a consensus about what this
means for more precisely defining the nature of our future
security needs. Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a
galvanizing external danger, the United States is actively
examining new strategic options and choices. The variety of
conceptual efforts underway in the Pentagon to deal with this
uncertainty exemplifies this reality.
At the same time, the current dominance and superiority of
American military power, unencumbered by the danger of an
external peer competitor, have created a period of strategic
advantage during which we have the luxury of time, perhaps
measured in many years, to re-examine with a margin of safety our
defense posture. On the other hand, potential adversaries cannot
be expected to ignore this predominant military capability of the
United States and fail to try to exploit, bypass, or counter it.
In other words, faced with American military superiority in
ships, tanks, aircraft, weapons and, most importantly, in
competent fighting personnel, potential adversaries may try to
change the terms of future conflict and make as irrelevant as
possible these current U.S. advantages. We proceed at our own
risk if we dismiss this possibility.
Second, it is relatively clear that current U.S. military
capability will shrink. Despite the pledges of the two major
American political parties to maintain or expand the current
level of defense capability, both the force structure and defense
infrastructure are too large to be maintained at even the present
levels and within the defense budgets that are likely to be
approved. Unless a new menace materializes, defense is headed for
"less of the same." Such reductions may have no strategic
consequences. However, that is an outcome that we believe should
not be left to chance.
This shrinkage also means that the Pentagon's good faith
strategic reviews aimed at dealing with our future security needs
may be caught up in the defense budget debate over downsizing and
could too easily drift into becoming advocacy or marketing
documents. As the services are forced into more jealously
guarding a declining force structure, the tendency to
"stove-pipe" and compartmentalize technology and special programs
is likely to increase, thereby complicating the problem of making
full use of our extraordinary technological resources. This means
that some external thinking, removed from the bureaucratic
pressures and demands, may be essential to stimulating and
sustaining innovation.
Third, the American commercial-industrial base is undergoing
profound change propelled largely by the entrepreneurial nature
of the free enterprise system and the American personality.
Whether in information or materials-related technology or for
that matter in other areas too numerous to count, the nature of
competition is driving both product breadth and improvement at
rates perhaps unthinkable a decade ago. One sign of these trends
is the reality that virtually all new jobs in this country are
being created by small business. In the areas of commercial
information and related management information systems, these
changes are extraordinary and were probably unpredictable even a
few years ago.
On the so-called information highway, performance is
increasing dramatically and quickly while price, cost, and the
time to bring to market new generation technology are
diminishing. These positive trends are not matched yet in the
defense-industrial base. One consequence of this broad commercial
transformation is that any future set of defense choices may be
inexorably linked to and dependent on this profound, ongoing
change in the commercial sector and in learning to harness
private sector advances in technology-related products. It must
also be understood that only the United States among all states
and nations has the vastness and breadth of resources and
commercial capability to undertake the full exploitation of this
revolutionary potential.
Finally, it is clear that U.S. forces are engaged and deployed
worldwide, often at operating tempos as high as or higher than
during the Cold War. These demands will continue and the
diversity of assigned tasks is unlikely to contract. These forces
must be properly manned, equipped, and trained and must carry out
their missions to standards that are both high and expected by
the nation's leaders and its public. The matter of maintaining
this capability while attempting to reshape the force for a
changing future is a major and daunting challenge not to be
underestimated.
These structural realities are exciting and offer a major
opportunity for real revolution and change if we are able and
daring enough to exploit them. This, in turn, has led us to
develop the concept of Rapid Dominance and its attendant focus on
Shock and Awe. Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate these
multifaceted realities and facts and apply them to the common
defense at a time when uncertainty about the future is perhaps
one of the few givens. We believe the principles and ideas
underlying this concept are sufficiently compelling and different
enough from current American defense doctrine encapsulated by
"overwhelming or decisive force," "dominant battlefield
awareness," and "dominant maneuver" to warrant closer
examination.
Since before Sun Tzu and the earliest chroniclers of war
recorded their observations, strategists and generals have been
tantalized and confounded by the elusive goal of destroying the
adversary's will to resist before, during, and after battle.
Today, we believe that an unusual opportunity exists to determine
whether or not this long-sought strategic goal of affecting the
will, understanding, and perception of an adversary can be
brought closer to fruition. Even if this task cannot be
accomplished, we believe that, at the very minimum, such an
effort will enhance and improve the ability of our military
forces to carry out their missions more successfully through
identifying and reinforcing particular points of leverage in the
conflict and by identifying and creating additional options and
choices for employing our forces more effectively.
Perhaps for the first time in years, the confluence of
strategy, technology, and the genuine quest for innovation has
the potential for revolutionary change. We envisage Rapid
Dominance as the possible military expression, vanguard, and
extension of this potential for revolutionary change. The
strategic centers of gravity on which Rapid Dominance
concentrates, modified by the uniquely American ability to
integrate all this, are these junctures of strategy, technology,
and innovation which are focused on the goal of affecting and
shaping the will of the adversary. The goal of Rapid Dominance
will be to destroy or so confound the will to resist that an
adversary will have no alternative except to accept our strategic
aims and military objectives. To achieve this outcome, Rapid
Dominance must control the operational environment and through
that dominance, control what the adversary perceives,
understands, and knows, as well as control or regulate what is
not perceived, understood, or known.
In Rapid Dominance, it is an absolutely necessary and vital
condition to be able to defeat, disarm, or neutralize an
adversary's military power. We still must maintain the capacity
for the physical and forceful occupation of territory should
there prove to be no alternative to deploying sufficient numbers
of personnel and equipment on the ground to accomplish that
objective. Should this goal of applying our resources to
controlling, affecting, and breaking the will of an adversary to
resist remain elusive, we believe that Rapid Dominance can still
provide a variety of options and choices for dealing with the
operational demands of war and conflict.
To affect the will of the adversary, Rapid Dominance will
apply a variety of approaches and techniques to achieve the
necessary level of Shock and Awe at the appropriate strategic and
military leverage points. This means that psychological and
intangible, as well as physical and concrete effects beyond the
destruction of enemy forces and supporting military
infrastructure, will have to be achieved. It is in this broader
and deeper strategic application that Rapid Dominance perhaps
most fundamentally differentiates itself from current doctrine
and offers revolutionary application.
Flowing from the primary concentration on affecting the
adversary's will to resist through imposing a regime of Shock and
Awe to achieve strategic aims and military objectives, four
characteristics emerge that will define the Rapid Dominance
military force. These are noted and discussed in later chapters.
The four characteristics are near total or absolute knowledge and
understanding of self, adversary, and environment; rapidity and
timeliness in application; operational brilliance in execution;
and (near) total control and signature management of the entire
operational environment.
Whereas decisive force is inherently capabilities driven-that
is, it focuses on defeating the military capability of an
adversary and therefore tends to be scenario sensitive-Rapid
Dominance would seek to be more universal in application through
the overriding objective of affecting the adversary's will beyond
the boundaries traditionally defined by military capability
alone. In other words, where decisive force is likely to be most
relevant is against conventional military capabilities that can
be overwhelmed by American (and allied) military superiority. In
conflict or crisis conditions that depart from this idealized
scenario, the superior nature of our forces is assumed to be
sufficiently broad to prevail. Rapid Dominance would not make
this distinction in either theory or in practice.
We note for the record that should a Rapid Dominance force
actually be fielded with the requisite operational capabilities,
this force would be neither a silver bullet nor a panacea and
certainly not an antidote or preventative for a major policy
blunder, miscalculation, or mistake. It should also be fully
appreciated that situations will exist in which Rapid Dominance
(or any other doctrine) may not work or apply because of
political, strategic, or other limiting factors.
We realize some will criticize our focus on affecting an
adversary's will, perception, and understanding through Shock and
Awe on the grounds that this idea is not new and that such an
outcome may not be physically achievable or politically
desirable. On the first point, we believe the use of basic
principles of strategy can stand us in good stead even and
perhaps especially in the modern era when adversaries may not
elect to fight the United States along traditional or expected
lines. On whether this ability can and should be achieved, we
believe that question should be part of a broader
examination.
Finally, we argue that what is also new in this approach is
the way in which we attempt to integrate far more broadly
strategy, technology, and innovation to achieve Shock and Awe. It
is this interaction and focus which we think will provide the
most interesting results.
For these and other reasons, we have embarked on an ambitious
intellectual excursion in making a preliminary definition of
Rapid Dominance. For the moment, we view Rapid Dominance in the
formation stage and not as a final product. Over the next months,
we believe further steps should be taken to refine Rapid
Dominance and to develop "paper" systems and force designs that
will add crucial specificity to this concept. Then, this Rapid
Dominance force can be assessed against five sets of
questions:
- First, assuming that a Rapid Dominance force can be fielded
with the appropriate capabilities of Shock and Awe to affect and
shape the adversary's will, how would this force compare with and
improve on our ability to fight, win, and deal with a major
regional contingency (MRC)?
- Second, what utility, if any, does Rapid Dominance and its
application of Shock and Awe imply for Operations Other Than War
(OOTW)? Where might Rapid Dominance apply in OOTW, where would it
not, and where might it offer mixed benefits?
- Third, what are the political implications of Rapid Dominance
in both broad and specific applications and could this lead to a
form of political deterrence to underwrite future U.S. policy?
Would this political deterrence prove acceptable to allies and to
our own public?
- Fourth, what might Rapid Dominance mean for alliances,
coalitions, and the conduct of allied and combined
operations?
- Finally, what are the consequences of Rapid Dominance on
defense resource investment priorities and future budgets?
From this examination and experimentation, we believe useful
results will flow.
We also would like to acknowledge the support and role of the
National Defense University in sponsoring this first effort. In
particular, we owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. David Alberts
of NDU whose intelligence, enthusiasm, and wisdom, as well as his
full support, have been invaluable and without which this project
would have been far less productive.
Washington, D.C.
1 September 1996
| L.A. Edney |
J.T. Howe |
| F.M. Franks |
H.K. Ullman |
| C. A. Horner |
J.P. Wade |
The military posture and capability of the United States of
America are, today, dominant. Simply put, there is no external
adversary in the world that can successfully challenge the
extraordinary power of the American military in either regional
conflict or in "conventional" war as we know it once the United
States makes the commitment to take whatever action may be
needed. To be sure, the first phase of a crisis may be the most
difficult-if an aggressor has attacked and U.S. forces are not in
place. However, it will still be years, if not decades, before
potential adversaries will be able to deploy systems with a full
panoply of capabilities that are equivalent to or better than the
aggregate strength of the ships, aircraft, armored vehicles, and
weapons systems in our inventory. Even if an adversary could
deploy similar systems, then matching and overcoming the superb
training and preparation of American service personnel would
still be a daunting task.
Given this reality that our military dominance can and will
extend for some considerable time to come, provided we are
prepared to use it, why then is a re-examination of American
defense posture and doctrine important? The answers to this
question involve (1) the changing nature of the domestic and
international environments; (2) the complex nature of resolving
inter and intra-state conflict that falls outside conventional
war, including peacekeeping, and countering terrorism, crime, and
the use of weapons of mass destruction; (3) resource constraints;
(4) defense infrastructure and technical industrial bases raised
on a large, continuous infusion of funding now facing a future of
austerity; and (5) the vast uncertainties of the so-called
social, economic, and information revolutions that could check or
counter many of the nation's assumptions as well as public
support currently underwriting defense.
It is clear that these so-called grey areas involving
non-traditional Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and law
enforcement tasks are growing and pose difficult problems and
challenges to American military forces, especially when and where
the use of force may be inappropriate or simply may not work. The
expansion of the role of UN forces to nation-building in Somalia
and its subsequent failure comes to mind as an example of this
danger. It is also arguable that the formidable nature and huge
technological lead of American military capability could induce
an adversary to move to a strategy that attempted to circumvent
all this fighting power through other clever or agile means. The
Vietnam War is a grim reminder of the political nature of
conflict and how our power was once outflanked. Training, morale,
and readiness to fight are perishable commodities requiring both
a generous expenditure of resources and careful nurturing.
Thus, the greatest constraints today to retaining the most
dominant military force in the world, paradoxically, may be in
overcoming the inertia of this success. We may be our own worst
enemy.
During the Cold War when the danger was clear, the defense
debate was often fought over how to balance the so-called
"strategy-force structure-budget" formula. Today, that formula
has expanded to include "threat, strategy, force structure,
budget, and infrastructure." Without a "clear and present danger"
such as the Axis Powers in 1941 or, later, the Soviet Union to
coalesce public agreement on the threat, it is difficult to
construct a supporting strategy that can be effective either in
setting priorities or objectives. Hence, today's "two war" or two
nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy has
been criticized as strategically and financially excessive. As
noted by administration officials, the current force structure
does not meet the demands of the "two war," MRC strategy and, in
any event, the budget will not support the planned force
structure. Finally, it is widely recognized that the United
States possesses far more infrastructure such as bases and
facilities than it needs to support the current force, thereby
draining scarce resources away from fighting power. As a result,
there is a substantial defense imbalance that will erode fighting
power.
In designing its defense posture, the United States has
adopted the doctrine of employing "decisive or overwhelming
force." This doctrine reinforces American advantages in strategic
mobility, prepositioning, technology, training, and in fielding
integrated military systems to provide and retain superiority,
and responds to the minimum casualty and collateral damage
criteria set first in the Reagan Administration. The Revolution
in Military Affairs or RMA is cited as the phenomenon or process
by which the United States continues to exploit technology to
maintain this decisive force advantage, particularly in terms of
achieving "dominant battlefield awareness." Through this
awareness, the United States should be able to obtain perfect or
near perfect information on virtually all technical aspects of
the battlefield and therefore be able to defeat or destroy an
adversary more effectively, with fewer losses to ourselves and
with a range of capabilities from long-range precision strike to
more effective close-in weapons.
Before proceeding further, an example is useful to focus some
of the as yet unknowable consequences of these broader realities,
changes, and trends. The deployment of American forces to Bosnia
is a reaction to and representation of major shifts occurring in
the post-Cold War world. With these shifts, this deployment is
suggestive of what may lie ahead for the use, relevance, and
design of military force. The legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
and then, the start of the Cold War, caused the West to adopt
policies for containing and deterring the broad threat posed by
the Soviet Union and its ideology. Thermonuclear weapons,
complemented over time by strong conventional forces, threatened
societal damage to Russia. Conventional forces backed by tactical
nuclear weapons were later required, in part, to halt a massive
Soviet ground attack in Europe and, in part, to provide an
alternative to (immediate) use of nuclear weapons.
Today, the First Armored Division, the principal American unit
serving in Bosnia is, in essence, the same force that fought so
well in Desert Storm and, for the bulk of the Cold War
along with our other units, had been designed to defend NATO
against and then defeat a numerically superior, armored and
mechanized Soviet adversary advancing across the plains of
Germany. Now these troops, as well as others from both sides of
the former Iron Curtain, are engaged in OOTW for which special
training, rules of engagement, command arrangements, and other
support structures have been put in place at short notice, few of
which were even envisaged a few years ago. These are also
operations that, because of intense, instantaneous media
coverage, can have huge domestic political impact especially if
events go wrong.
Whether or not this armored division is the most optimally
configured force for such an operation is not relevant for the
moment even though this unit probably was the most appropriate
for this task. However, it is prudent to examine the consequences
of changing tasks presaged by Bosnia, in which the enemy is
instability rather than an ideological or regional adversary we
are trying to contain or defeat and neutrality on our part may be
vital to the success of the mission. Do these changes mean that
we should alter our traditional approach to the doctrine for and
design of forces? If so, how? Are there alternative or more
effective ways and means to conduct these peacekeeping-related
operations? And, in this evaluation, are there alternative
doctrines we should consider to fight wars more effectively as we
envisage scenarios under the construct of the MRC?
With the end of the USSR and absent a hostile Russian
superpower, there is no external threat to the existence or
survival of the United States as a nation and there will not be
such an immediate threat for some time to come. This means that
there is a finite window of opportunity when there is no external
adversary threatening the total existence of American society;
that our forces are far superior to any possible military
adversary choosing to confront us directly; and that, with
innovative thought, we may be able to create a more relevant,
effective, and efficient means to ensure for the common defense
at the likely levels of future spending.
At the same time that the Bosnia operation is underway, the
fundamental changes occurring at home and abroad must be
addressed. The industrial and technical base of the United States
is changing profoundly. The entrepreneurial and technical
advantages of the American economy were never greater and it is
small business that is creating virtually all new jobs and
employment opportunities. Commercial technology and products are
turning over on ever shortening cycles. Performance, especially
in high-technology products, is improving and costs are being
driven downwards.
Sadly, the opposite trends are still found in the defense
sector, where cost is high and will create even tougher choices
among competing programs, especially as the budget shrinks. Cycle
time to field new generation capabilities is lengthening and
performance, especially in computer and information systems, is
often obsolete on delivery. The defense industrial base will
continue to compress and it is not clear that the necessary level
of efficiencies or increases in effectiveness in using this base
can be identified and implemented, suggesting further pressures
on a defense budget that is only likely to be cut.
Indeed, the question must be carefully examined of whether the
military platforms that served us so well in both cold and hot
wars such as tanks, fixed wing aircraft, and large surface ships
and submarines represent the most effective mix of numbers,
technology, strategic mobility, and fighting capability. Our
national preference for "attrition" and "force on forces" warfare
continues to shape the way we design and rationalize our military
capability. Therefore, it is no surprise that in dealing with the
MRC, American doctrine, in some ways, remains an extension of
Cold War force planning. While the magnitude and number of
dangerous threats to the nation have been remarkably reduced by
the demise of the USSR, we continue to use technology to fill
traditional missions better rather than to identify or produce
new and more effective solutions for achieving military and
strategic/political objectives.
While there is much talk about "military revolutions" and
winning the "information war," what is generally meant in this
lexicon and discussion is translated into defense programs that
relate to accessing and "fusing" information across command,
control, intelligence, surveillance, target identification, and
precision strike technologies. What is most exciting among these
revolutions is the potential to achieve "dominant battlefield
awareness," that is, achieving the capability to have
near-perfect knowledge and information of the battlefield while
depriving the adversary of that capacity and producing "systems
of systems" for this purpose.
The near and mid-term aims of these "revolutions" largely
remain directed at exploiting our advantages in firepower and on
fielding more effective ways of defeating an adversary's weapons
systems and infrastructure for using those systems. The doctrine
of "decisive or overwhelming force" is the conceptual and
operational underpinning for winning the next war based largely
on this force-on-force and attrition model, and winning the
information war is vital to this end. Few have asked whether the
pattern of employing more modern technology for traditional
firepower solutions is the best one and if there are alternative
ways to achieve military objectives more effectively and
efficiently. In other words, can the idea of dominant battlefield
awareness be expanded doctrinally, operationally, and in terms of
fixing on alternative military, political, or strategic
objectives?
Rapid Dominance, if realized as defined in this paper, would
advance the military revolution to new levels and possibly new
dimensions. Rapid Dominance extends across the entire "threat,
strategy, force structure, budget, infrastructure" formula with
broad implications for how we provide for the future common
defense. Organization and management of defense and defense
resources should not be excluded from this examination although,
in this paper, they are not discussed in detail.
The aim of Rapid Dominance is to affect the will, perception,
and understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our
strategic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe.
Clearly, the traditional military aim of destroying, defeating,
or neutralizing the adversary's military capability is a
fundamental and necessary component of Rapid Dominance. Our
intent, however, is to field a range of capabilities to induce
sufficient Shock and Awe to render the adversary impotent. This
means that physical and psychological effects must be
obtained.
Rapid Dominance would therefore provide the ability to
control, on an immediate basis, the entire region of operational
interest and the environment, broadly defined, in and around that
area of interest. Beyond achieving decisive force and dominant
battlefield awareness, we envisage Rapid Dominance producing a
capability that can more effectively and efficiently achieve the
stated political or military objectives underwriting the use of
force by rendering the adversary completely impotent.
In Rapid Dominance, "rapid" means the ability to move quickly
before an adversary can react. This notion of rapidity applies
throughout the spectrum of combat from pre-conflict deployment to
all stages of battle and conflict resolution.
"Dominance" means the ability to affect and dominate an
adversary's will both physically and psychologically. Physical
dominance includes the ability to destroy, disarm, disrupt,
neutralize, and to render impotent. Psychological dominance means
the ability to destroy, defeat, and neuter the will of an
adversary to resist; or convince the adversary to accept our
terms and aims short of using force. The target is the
adversary's will, perception, and understanding. The principal
mechanism for achieving this dominance is through imposing
sufficient conditions of "Shock and Awe" on the adversary to
convince or compel it to accept our strategic aims and military
objectives. Clearly, deception, confusion, misinformation, and
disinformation, perhaps in massive amounts, must be employed.
The key objective of Rapid Dominance is to impose this
overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an
immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to
carry on. In crude terms, Rapid Dominance would seize control of
the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary's
perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would be
incapable of resistance at tactical and strategic levels. An
adversary would be rendered totally impotent and vulnerable to
our actions. To the degree that non-lethal weaponry is useful, it
would be incorporated in the ability to Shock and Awe and achieve
Rapid Dominance.
Theoretically, the magnitude of Shock and Awe Rapid Dominance
seeks to impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent
of the impact that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki had on the Japanese. The Japanese were prepared for
suicidal resistance until both nuclear bombs were used. The
impact of those weapons was sufficient to transform both the
mindset of the average Japanese citizen and the outlook of the
leadership through this condition of Shock and Awe. The Japanese
simply could not comprehend the destructive power carried by a
single airplane. This incomprehension produced a state of
awe.
We believe that, in a parallel manner, revolutionary potential
in combining new doctrine and existing technology can produce
systems capable of yielding this level of Shock and Awe. In most
or many cases, this Shock and Awe may not necessitate imposing
the full destruction of either nuclear weapons or advanced
conventional technologies but must be underwritten by the ability
to do so.
Achieving Rapid Dominance by virtue of applying Shock and Awe
at the appropriate level or levels is the next step in the
evolution of a doctrine for replacing or complementing
overwhelming force. By way of comparison, we have summarized how
we view the differences between the doctrines of Rapid Dominance
and Decisive Force in terms of basic elements that apply to the
objectives, uses of force, force size, scope, speed, casualties,
and technique. We recognize that there will be debate over the
relative utility and applicability of these doctrines and readers
are encouraged to participate.
In considering the differences between the concepts of Rapid
Dominance and Decisive Force, it is important to define the terms
as precisely as possible.
The goals of achieving Rapid Dominance using Shock and Awe
must be compared with overwhelming force. "Rapid" implies the
ability to "own" the dimension of time-moving more quickly than
an opponent, operating within his decision cycle, and resolving
conflict favorably in a short period of time. "Dominance" means
the ability to control a situation totally.
Rapid Dominance must be all-encompassing. It will require the
means to anticipate and to counter all opposing moves. It will
involve the capability to deny an opponent things of critical
value, and to convey the unmistakable message that unconditional
compliance is the only available recourse. It will imply more
than the direct application of force. It will mean the ability to
control the environment and to master all levels of an opponent's
activities to affect will, perception, and understanding. This
could include means of communication, transportation, food
production, water supply, and other aspects of infrastructure as
well as the denial of military responses. Deception,
misinformation, and disinformation are key components in this
assault on the will and understanding of the opponent.
Total mastery achieved at extraordinary speed and across
tactical, strategic, and political levels will destroy the will
to resist. With Rapid Dominance, the goal is to use our power
with such compellance that even the strongest of wills will be
awed. Rapid Dominance will strive to achieve a dominance that is
so complete and victory is so swift, that an adversary's losses
in both manpower and material could be relatively light, and yet
the message is so unmistakable that resistance would be seen as
futile.
"Decisive Force," on the other hand, implies delivering
massive enough force to prevail. Decisive means using force with
plenty of margin for error. Force implies a traditional
"force-on-force" and attrition approach. This concept does not
exclude psychological and other complementary damage imposition
techniques to enhance the application of force; they have been
used throughout the history of warfare. But such non-destructive
means would have an ancillary role. Military force would be
applied in a purer form and targeted primarily against the
military capabilities of an opponent. Time is not always an
essential component. As in Desert Shield/Storm, enough
time would have to be allowed to assemble an overwhelming force.
Such a luxury is not always feasible.
The differences become clearer if broken down into their
essential elements:
| Elements |
Rapid Dominance |
Decisive Force |
| Objective |
Control the adversary's will,
perceptions, and understanding |
Prevail militarily and decisively
against a set of opposing capabilities defined by the MRC |
| Use of Force |
Control the adversary's will,
perceptions, and understanding and literally make an adversary
impotent to act or react |
Unquestioned ability to prevail
militarily over an opponent's forces and based against the
adversary's capabilities |
| Force Size |
Could be smaller than opposition,
but with decisive edge in technology, training, and
technique |
Large, highly trained, and
well-equipped. Materially overwhelming |
| Scope |
All encompassing |
Force against force (and supporting
capability) |
| Speed |
Essential |
Desirable |
| Casualties |
Could be relatively few in number on
both sides |
Potentially higher on both
sides |
| Technique |
Paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny,
destroy |
Systematic destruction of military
capability. Attrition applicable in some situations |
Four general categories of core characteristics and
capabilities have been identified that Rapid Dominance-configured
mission capability packages must embrace. These are identified
briefly and discussed in later chapters.
First, Rapid Dominance seeks to maximize
knowledge of the environment, of the adversary,
and of our own forces on political, strategic, economic, and
military/operational levels. On one hand, we want to get into the
minds of the adversary far more deeply than we have in the past.
Beyond operational intelligence required for battlefield
awareness, Rapid Dominance means cultural understanding of the
adversary in ways that will affect both ours and their planning
and the outcome of the operation at all appropriate tactical and
strategic levels.
Second, Rapid Dominance must achieve rapidity
in the sense of timeliness. Rapid Dominance must have
capabilities that can be applied swiftly and relatively faster
than an adversary's.
Third, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve total control
of the environment from complete "signature management"
of both our and the adversary's information and intelligence to
more discrete means to deceive, disguise, and misinform.
Fourth, Rapid Dominance aims to achieve new levels of
operational competence that can virtually institutionalize
"brilliance." In some cases, this may mean
changing the longstanding principle of military centralization
and empowering individual soldiers, sailors, and airmen to be
crucial components in applying and directing the application of
force.
As we move to turn this concept into specific doctrine and
capabilities for future evaluation, there is another emerging
reality to consider. If the commercial-economic sector is
transforming at the current rate and breadth, it could be that,
over the course of many years, the defense industrial base would
follow suit, or face irrelevance and extinction. Clearly, there
are certain areas in defense which will never or may never be
eliminated or replaced. Nuclear systems are a current
example.
Should this trend of commercial dominance play out, it may
mean that military force design and procurement will become
dependent on the private sector and commercial technology. Rapid
Dominance is a first conceptual step to deal with this
possibility.
The purpose of this paper is to outline the beginnings of the
concept of Rapid Dominance, its concentration on strategy,
technology and innovation, and its focus on Shock and Awe. Based
on this, subsequent steps will involve expanding mission
capability packages concepts consisting of operations harmonized
with doctrine, organization, and systems and then move on to
field prototype systems for further test and evaluation as
advanced concept technology demonstrations.
In both relative and absolute terms, since the end of World
War II, the military strength and capability of the United States
have never been greater. Yet this condition of virtual military
superiority has created a paradox. Absent a massive threat or
massive security challenge, it is not clear that this military
advantage can (always) be translated into concrete political
terms that advance American interests. Nor is it clear that the
current structure and foundations for this extraordinary force
can be sustained for the long term without either spending more
money or imposing major changes to this structure that may exceed
the capacity of our system to accommodate. As a consequence, the
success of the current design and configuration of our forces may
ironically become self-limiting and constraining. That is not to
claim automatically that there are better military solutions or
that the current defense program is not the best our political
system can produce. It is to say, however, that we are
well-advised to pursue alternate ideas and concepts to balance
and measure against the current and planned program.
To stimulate and intrigue the reader, we note at the outset
that one thrust of Rapid Dominance is to expand on the doctrine
of overwhelming or decisive force in both depth and breadth. To
push the conceptual envelope, we ask two sets of broad questions:
Can a Rapid Dominance force lead, for example, to a force
structure that can win an MRC such as Desert Shield and
Desert Storm far more quickly and cheaply with far fewer
personnel than our planned force both in terms of stopping any
invasion in its tracks and then ejecting the invader? Can Rapid
Dominance produce a force structure with more effective capacity
to deal with grey areas such as OOTW?
Second, if achievable, can Rapid Dominance lead to a form of
political deterrence in which the capacity to make impotent or
"shut down" an adversary can actually control behavior? What are
the possible political implications of this capability and what
would this power mean for conducting coalition war and for how
our allies react and respond?
Because Rapid Dominance is aimed at influencing the will,
perception, and understanding of an adversary rather than simply
destroying military capability, this focus must cause us to
consider the broadest spectrum of behavior, ours and theirs, and
across all aspects of war including intelligence, training,
education, doctrine, industrial capacity, and how we organize and
manage defense.
We observe at first that even with the successful ending of
the Cold War, the response of the United States in re-evaluating
its national security and defense has been relatively and
understandably modest and cautious. In essence, while the size of
the force has been reduced from Cold War levels of 2.2 million
active duty troops to about 1.5 million, and the services have
been vocal in revising doctrine and strategy to reflect the end
of the Soviet threat, with the exception of emphasis on
jointness, there are few really fundamental differences in the
design and structure of the forces from even 10 or 15 years
ago.
Throughout the Cold War, the defense of the United States
rested on several central and widely accepted and publicly
supported propositions. The "clear and apparent danger" of the
Soviet threat was real and seen as such. The USSR was to be
contained and deterred from hostile action by a combination of
political, strategic, and military actions ranging from the
forging of a ring of alliances surrounding the USSR and its
allies to the deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons.
Following the truce ending the Korean War, a large, standing
military force was maintained and defined by the operational
requirements of fighting the large formations of military forces
of the USSR and its allies with similar types of military forces,
albeit outnumbered. The role of allies, principally NATO, was
assumed and taken into account in planning, although the paradox
of the issue of planning for a long versus short war in a nuclear
world remained unresolved.
Mobilization, as in World War II, was likewise assumed if the
Cold War went hot while, at the same time, it was hoped that any
war might be ended quickly. The largely World War II defense,
industrial, and basing structure was retained along with the
intent to rely on our technological superiority to offset
numerical or geographical liabilities.
It was not by accident that this Cold War concept of defense
through mobilization was similar to the strategy that won the
Second World War and the literal ability of ultimately
overwhelming the enemy using the massive application of force,
technology, and associated firepower. Two decades later, Vietnam
exposed the frailty of this approach of dependence on massive
application of firepower especially when political limits were
placed on applying that firepower.
Currently, Desert Storm and the liberation of Kuwait
in 1991 have been taken as the examples that confirm the validity
of the doctrine of overwhelming or decisive force and of ensuring
that both strategic objectives and tactical methods were in
congruence. We argue that now is the time to re-examine these
premises of reliance on overwhelming or decisive force as
currently employed and deployed in the force structure if only as
a prudent check.
Beyond prudence, however, it is clear that without a major
threat to generate consensus and to rally the country around
defense and defense spending, the military posture of the United
States will erode as the defense budget is cut. Hence, relying in
the future on what is currently seen to be as sufficient force to
be "decisive" could easily prove unachievable and the results
problematic or worse for U.S. policy.
The absence of a direct and daunting external security threat
is, of course, a most obvious aspect of the difficulty in
defining the future defense posture of the nation. The United
States has long resisted maintaining a large standing military
and the Cold War years could prove an aberration to that history.
Extending this historical observation of small standing forces,
it is clear that there is no adversary on the horizon even
remotely approaching the military power of the former USSR. While
we might conjure up nominal regional contingencies against Korea
or Iraq as sensible planning scenarios for establishing the
building blocks for force structure, it will prove difficult to
sustain the current defense program over the long term without a
real threat materializing to rally and coalesce public support.
Allocating three percent or less of GDP for defense could easily
prove to be a ceiling and not a floor. It should be noted that in
Europe, defense spending is closing in on 1 to 2 percent of
GDP.
Ironically, as the Department of Defense seeks to come to
grips with this new world, the structural limitations and
constraints in how we develop systems and procure weapons based
on current technological and industrial capacity for producing
them will be exacerbated by downward fiscal pressure giving us
little room for mistakes and flexibility. Air, land, space, and
sea forces are currently limited in the actual numbers and types
of systems that are available for purchase and more limited in
that there are virtually no new major systems on the horizon.
That could change.
The M-1A-1 tank is in production only for foreign sales.
Despite the allure of the Arsenal Ship, the Navy still has only
four active classes of warships from which to replace its
capability and, for the first time this century since aircraft
entered the inventory, is without a new aircraft in development.
The Air Force can be placed in similar straits if the F-22
program is deferred or canceled because of rising cost and fiscal
constraints. Time will tell what happens to the Joint Strike
Fighter. Assumptions about reliance on technology and R&D
providing insurance policies for future defense needs may prove
ill-advised if and as DOD is forced to cut back and reduce those
programs even further. Indeed, over time, commercial R&D
could become the main source for procuring software and other
systems needed to upgrade today's weapons systems and for
so-called "leap-ahead" technologies that may prove elusive to
create.
There is also the crucial issue of revising or indeed
developing new doctrine and military thought to deal with these
changing circumstances. But, without a compelling rationale and
with the clear bureaucratic and political pressures of preparing
and defending an annual budget, more of the same (or more likely,
less of the same) becomes an almost irresistible outcome. While
the JCS or OSD or CINCs may have genuine need for jointly
packaged forces that are rapidly deployable irrespective of Army,
Navy, Marine, or Air Force labels, the services cannot be
expected to reverse the years of viewing the world through
service- specific arguments and doctrine.
Although the absolute danger has been dramatically reduced
with the end of the USSR, it would be the height of folly to
assume that there are no risks to the nation nor an absence of
evil-doers wishing this nation harm. It would also be
shortsighted to expect that potential adversaries are
unintelligent and would not rely on superior knowledge of their
environment and simplicity to overcome our current military and
technical superiority much as the North Vietnamese did. In
addition, as technology diffuses around, over, and under borders,
our assumptions about guarantees of permanent technological
superiority should welcome thoughtful examination.
Lenin asked the question, "what is to be done?" As a start,
the United States should act to exploit the several major
advantages it possesses. First, we have time. The clarity and
danger of future threats is sufficiently removed for us to take a
longer view. While we may have deferred adding to the inventory
of future systems in development, current systems possess more
than enough military capability to get us through this transition
period, even if this period were to last for more than a decade.
This does not mean we can rest on our oars; if we take advantage
of this opportunity, time is on our side. If we squander this
opportunity, then we could ultimately find ourselves in
trouble.
Second, the combination of American technical know-how, the
luxury of the best technically educated and trained society in
the world, and the entrepreneurial spirit of our system offers
vast potential if we are clever enough to exploit this
extraordinary resource.
Third, because of significant changes in law and organization
regarding the military, particularly the Goldwater-Nichols Act,
and through a willingness to examine alternatives, the Department
of Defense has actively sought new ideas and concepts. The
enhanced role of the CINCs and the acceptance of jointness are
positive illustrations. Yet, for understandable structural and
political realities noted above, assuring productive innovation
continues will not be automatic. Against these conducive signs,
vision, true joint thinking, and tactical advances still are
premium commodities to be nourished and encouraged.
In building an alternative intellectual concept, it is useful
to rely on successful lessons of the past. For five decades, we
have been successful in applying containment and deterrence in
the Cold War. When deterrence or diplomacy failed as in Kuwait,
then the use of force was inevitable. A first-order issue is how
can we augment or improve the use of existing military capability
should it be required.
Should force be needed, our proposal calls for establishing a
regime of Rapid Dominance throughout the area of strategic as
well as operational concern. By Rapid Dominance, we are seeking
the capability to dominate, control, and isolate the entire
environment in, around, over, and under the objective area as
quickly as possible, and with fewer forces than currently
envisaged, although direct insertion of forces is an important
component depending upon the tactical situation. In many cases,
this capacity need not be the traditional firepower solution of
only physically destroying an adversary's military capabilities.
Our focus is on the Clausewitzian principle of affecting the
adversary's will to resist as the first order of business,
quickly if not nearly instantaneously. A second goal would be to
stop an attack during the first stages. A third goal, should it
be achievable, would be to promote a regime of political
deterrence that might restrain aggression in the first place.
To accomplish the rendering an adversary incapable of action
means neutralizing the ability to command; to provide logistics;
to organize society; and to function; as well as to control,
regulate and deny the adversary of information, intelligence, and
understanding of what is and what is not happening. This means we
must control all necessary intelligence and information on our
forces-the ultimate form of stealth-and on an adversary's forces
as well and then exploit total situational awareness for rapid
action.
Regarding the emergence of current military thought and
doctrine, as implied earlier, warfare today may be in the early
and far less mature stages of a major revolution than is
generally assumed. It is understandable that despite major
strategic reassessments, current doctrine is still highly
influenced by Cold War tactics and strategy and perhaps by the
iron grip of the history of conflict since the early 19th
century.
Since Napoleon, the conduct of war between major states has
been largely dominated by combining industrial might with vast
amounts of manpower over time and space. The United States
advanced Napoleon's use of industry and mass armies in the Civil
War and our planning up to the Cold War tended to follow this
same pattern. World War II, of course, exemplified the triumph of
this industrial, mobilization, and massive use of force
approach.
In the evolution of U.S. military theory, it can be argued
that this model combining massive industrial might and manpower
finally ended in 1989. Although, by then, technological advances
to conventional military capabilities seemed to be approaching
the destructive power, or more precisely, the system lethality of
nuclear weapons. In other words, modern non-nuclear precision
weapons perhaps could produce effects against enemy targets
roughly comparable to the military lethality of theater-level
nuclear weapons. If this condition proves true, could this new
lethality fundamentally change the construct for designing
American doctrine and strategy? This question is at the heart of
the "precision and battlefield awareness" school of decisive
force thinking that believes that this fundamental change is in
place.
Since the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of the
need to prepare our forces to fight a more or less equally
powerful adversary, the United States military has conducted two
post-Cold War crises against lesser adversaries quite differently
than it fought the Cold War. In the Panama intervention in 1990
and in Kuwait shortly thereafter, the suggestion of newer and
different methods of warfare was present. Perhaps both will turn
out to be transition campaigns, where there is much of the old,
but also signs of the new. But there are specific pieces of
evidence that should command our attention.
Underlying the planning for Operation Just Cause in
Panama and Desert Shield/Storm in Kuwait was the
premeditated incorporation of a series of rapid, simultaneous
attacks designed to apply decisive force. The aim was to stun,
and then rapidly defeat the enemy through a series of carefully
orchestrated land, sea, air, and special operating forces strikes
that took place nearly simultaneously across a wide battle space
and against many military targets. The purpose of these rapid,
simultaneous attacks was to produce immediate paralysis of both
the national state and its armed forces that would lead to prompt
neutralization and capitulation.
In both Just Cause and Desert Storm, the
United States (plus coalition forces in Desert Storm)
had such overwhelming military capabilities that, in retrospect,
the outcome was largely a matter of drafting a cogent and
coordinated operation plan based on using the entire system of
capabilities, and then executing that plan to produce a decisive
victory. The Haitian incursion in 1995 used similar principles of
intimidation to eliminate any real fighting. However, in
Desert Storm unlike Haiti, it took the U.S. and its
allies nearly 6 months to deploy over a half million troops
before the fighting began.
The recently published JCS Pub 3.0 and the U.S. Army's 525-5
Pamphlet reflect and exploit operational rapidity and
simultaneity. Yet, progress in these operational directions may
be in danger of faltering if only old Cold War yardsticks are
used to make future force investments and to direct studies about
future force structure and associated infrastructure. As in any
transition period, innovation must be joined by a willingness to
experiment. This means the establishment and cultivation of an
experimental apparatus to test and evaluate new concepts are
matters of importance both to foster innovation and assess its
application.
We build on the trends of rapidity and simultaneity and seek
to emphasize control and time. Control is necessary to force
behavioral change in adversaries to achieve strategic or
political ends. Control and then influence come from a range of
threats and outcomes, including putting at risk the targets an
adversary holds dear, to imposing a hierarchy of Shock and Awe,
to affecting will, perception, and understanding. Achieving
control may now be theoretically possible in even more compressed
or shortened time periods because of the potential superiority of
enhanced U.S. military capability and further training and
education. To obtain this level of military superiority that can
affect the adversary's will and perception, or at least achieve
the practical military consequences, a great deal of thought,
debate, and experimentation over new concepts will be needed if
only to test and validate contemporary doctrine.
If the political objective is to achieve a level of Shock and
Awe beyond only temporary paralysis, then further actions must
follow. The end point will be to dominate the enemy in such a way
as to achieve the desired objectives. From this concept follows
the need to shut down either a state or an organized enemy
through the rapid and simultaneous application (or threat of
application) of land, sea, air, space, and special operating
forces against the broadest spectrum of the adversary's power
base and center or centers of gravity and against the adversary's
will and perception at tactical and strategic levels.
In Desert Storm, the objectives were first to evict
Iraqi forces from Kuwait and then to restore the legitimate
government. From these objectives, more limited strategic and
political objectives followed, some for purposes of maintaining
coalition solidarity and UN-imposed sanctions. Not occupying
Baghdad was one such political limitation. These strategic
objectives led to identification of the enemy's centers of
gravity as the basis for the application of force to destroy
these centers. This planning led to the repeated, rapid, and
simultaneous use of massive force with great effect.
One obvious tactical objective was to eliminate Saddam
Hussein's command and control. This was accomplished by
simultaneous and massive attacks. Once command and control was
destroyed, Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO)
would be destroyed as quickly as possible with overwhelming force
and with minimum casualties. As General Colin Powell simply
stated, "My plan is to cut off Saddam's army and then kill
it."
There was no sanctuary for Iraqi forces in the KTO. They were
completely vulnerable to unrelenting and devastating attack.
Outside the KTO, targeting was more selective, not because the
means were unavailable for imposing sufficient damage but because
our military objectives were purposely limited. Given the
effectiveness of the air campaign and the overwhelming
superiority on the ground, coalition land forces required only 4
of the 41 days of the war to defeat and to eject Iraq's forces
from Kuwait.
Suppose a Desert Storm-type campaign were fought 20
years from now based on a plan that exploited the concept of
Rapid Dominance. Further assume that Iraq has improved (and
rebuilt) its military and that, in a series of simultaneous and
nearly instantaneous actions, our primary objective was still to
shut Iraq down, threaten or destroy its leadership, and isolate
and destroy its military forces as we did in 1991. However, two
decades hence, Rapid Dominance might conceivably achieve this
objective in a matter of days (or perhaps hours) and not after
the 6 months or the 500,000 troops that were required in 1990 to
1991. Rapid Dominance may even offer the prospect of stopping an
invasion in its tracks.
Shutting the country down would entail both the physical
destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and
control of the flow of all vital information and associated
commerce so rapidly as to achieve a level of national shock akin
to the effect that dropping nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki had on the Japanese. Simultaneously, Iraq's armed forces
would be paralyzed with the neutralization or destruction of its
capabilities. Deception, disinformation, and misinformation would
be applied massively.
This level of simultaneity and Rapid Dominance must also
demonstrate to the adversary our endurance and staying power,
that is, the capability to dominate over as much time as is
necessary less an enemy mistakenly try to wait it out and use
time between attacks to recover sufficiently. If the enemy still
resisted, then conventional forms of attack would follow
resulting in the physical occupation of territory. Control is
thus best gained by the demonstrated ability to sustain the stun
effects of the initial rapid series of blows long enough to
affect the enemy's will and his means to continue. There must be
staying power effect on the enemy or they merely absorb the
blows, gain in confidence and their ability to resist, and change
tactics much as occurred during the WWII bombing campaigns and
the air war over North Vietnam.
Achieving these levels of Shock and Awe requires a wide
versatility and competence in employing land, sea, air, space,
and special operating forces and in investment in technology to
produce Rapid Dominance. Different methods for commanding the
battle using both hierarchical and non-hierarchical command to
control and direct our forces are likely to be required
especially given the simultaneous application of capabilities
throughout the given battle space by the full spectrum of our
forces. To use these combinations of forces will require
adjustment of current service doctrine and prescribed roles and
functions. Rapid Dominance also means looking to invest in
technologies perhaps not fully or currently captured by the Cold
War paradigm.
To develop the proper combination of forces and future
technology investment for Rapid Dominance, extensive
experimentation with this core concept will be required. This
exper-imentation must apply to all levels of military educational
institutions; it must be joint; it can be accelerated by
availability of recent advances in simulation technology; and it
must have operational trials in the field.
To advance this concept, technology and its infrastructure and
application are vital. Here, understanding several facts is
important. The U.S. today is graduating through its college and
universities system approximately 200,000 American and foreign
scientists and engineers per year. This is a great national
resource. This technology infrastructure is dimensions larger in
number and scope than the aggregate of anywhere else in the
world. Through appreciation and exploitation of this potential, a
U.S. position of pre-eminence in science and technology could be
assured for the foreseeable future.
One adjunct of this technology revolution is in the
information and information management areas- which, in the U.S.,
are heavily commercially oriented. Future military application
may well be analogous to the impact of the internal combustion
engine and wireless radio on land, sea, and air forces in the
1920s and 1930s. The size of this technological lead between
ourselves and the rest of the world, especially in the base for
new information products and services, should widen further in
knowledge and in application. The "Silicon Valley" revolution is
likely to continue increasing computer capacity on an almost
annual basis. By the year 2005, computing power should be many
fold times today's capacity-perhaps ultimately beginning to close
in on the ability of humans to handle data flow as well as the
ability to condense and synthesize data.
In parallel to advances in computing power will be the ability
to transfer information into and out of the hands of individual
users. The addition of virtual reality and other technical aids
will enhance and potentially quicken individual decision-making
ability. Technologies associated with bioscience and
bioengineering are likely to be of particular importance in
enhancing these capabilities and are also an area of American
predominance. Material sciences, software, and communications are
all American strengths, and should remain so well into the next
century.
A significant element supporting this explosion in applied
information and other technologies is the American free
enterprise system and its entrepreneurial character. This drive
is needed to translate this technology into military hardware.
The nature of the U.S. market and its competitive basis reinforce
this element. The largest challenges may be to shape and exploit
this commercial potential and then to ensure that its enduring
advantages become fundamental in the makeup of our military
forces. Unlike the defense industrial base required during the
Cold War, this new commercial base is neither heavy nor is it a
massive industry relying on producing large things. Indeed, its
edge has depended on getting "smaller, smarter, and cheaper."
The fundamental technology thrust for channeling this new
American industrial base to support Rapid Dominance must be
toward the control and management of everything that is
significant to the operations bearing on the particular Area of
Interest (AOI). And we mean everything! Control of the
environment is far broader than only the objective of achieving
dominant battlefield awareness. Control means the ability to
change, to a greater or lesser degree, the "signatures" of all of
the combat forces engaged in the AOI. With this concept, the
operational frameworks in applying force across the entire
spectrum of platforms (satellites, aircraft, land vehicles,
ships) can be measured (and controlled) from many minus decibels
of cross section, to many plus decibels; communications can be
entirely covert, i.e., many dB less than the ambient environment,
or that approaching "white noise." The location of both the
individual and his unit can be measured in real time in meters,
if not feet, anywhere in the world. Through virtual reality,
movement in three-dimensional grids over hundreds of square
kilometers, offer precise location and movement control, both
during day and night in conditions of unprecedented confidence.
This occurs in real time. Denying or deceiving the adversary,
including real-time manipulation of senses and inputs, is part of
this control.
A Rapid Dominance-configured force would enter an AOI and
immediately control the operational/environmental signatures both
individually and in the aggregate. As needed, line and
non-line-of-sight weapons of near pin-point accuracy would be
delivered across the entire area of operation. Stealthy UAVs and
mobile robotics systems, together with decoys, would be deployed
in large numbers for surveillance, targeting, strike, and
deception and would produce their own impact of electronic Shock
and Awe on the enemy. This application of force can be done as
rapidly as political and strategic conditions demand.
The effects mean literally "turning on and off" the "lights"
that enable any potential aggressor to see or appreciate the
conditions and events concerning his forces and, ultimately, his
society. What is radically different in Rapid Dominance is the
comprehensive system assemblage and integration of many evolving
and even revolutionary technical advances in dominant battlefield
awareness squared-materials application, sensor and signature
control, computer and bioengineering applied to massive amounts
of data, enable weapon application with simultaneity, precision,
and lethality that to date have not been applied as a total
system. Deception, disinformation, and misinformation will become
major elements of this systemic approach.
The R&D reality is that technology advances will likely
come from the commercial world as the DOD base continues to
shrink. It is clear that in certain areas, DOD must remain
involved where there is no private R&D or to fill gaps in
R&D. Warships, fighter aircraft, tanks, and missile defense
are examples. However, advances in commercial technology in the
Information Age are unlikely to be matched by DOD.
Of equal importance is how we train, organize, and educate our
combat officers and key enlisted personnel. Command must be
geared to achieving the best of the best-not the best among the
good. Assimilating in real time the vast amount of information
and putting information to use will no doubt lead to major
changes in the composition, competence, and authority of (even
and especially) individual military unit commanders perhaps to
the squad or private soldier level.
Of course, even with the most perfect information, an
unqualified, inexperienced, or unprepared military commander may
not win except with extraordinary luck or an incompetent foe.
And, we repeat that there are cases where NO military force may
be able to succeed if the objectives are unobtainable. The match
of the entrepreneurial individual with the potential of the
technology base is key. Optimizing and integrating all elements
into a total system is a certain way to exploit the opportunity
that we can perceive becoming more visible in the coming
years.
The basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the ability to affect
the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary through
imposing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the necessary
political, strategic, and operational goals of the conflict or
crisis that led to the use of force. War, of course, in the
broadest sense has been characterized by Clausewitz to include
substantial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the
Clausewitzian view, "shock and awe" were necessary effects
arising from application of military power and were aimed at
destroying the will of an adversary to resist. Earlier and
similar observations had been made by the great Chinese military
writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu observed that disarming an
adversary before battle was joined was the most effective outcome
a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well aware of the crucial
importance of achieving Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in
ending battle. He also observed that "war is deception," implying
that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through clever, if not
brilliant, employment of force.
In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary's will,
understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is
multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we need first
to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms by which Shock
and Awe affect an adversary. One recalls from old photographs and
movie or television screens, the comatose and glazed expressions
of survivors of the great bombardments of World War I and the
attendant horrors and death of trench warfare. These images and
expressions of shock transcend race, culture, and history.
Indeed, TV coverage of Desert Storm vividly portrayed
Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield Shock and
Awe.
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock
and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling
factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept our
will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims and
military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political end.
Then, Shock and Awe are linked to the four core characteristics
that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and
control.
The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of
different types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order
to identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that
differentiate each model as unique or important. At this stage,
historical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a
task will be to identify current and future examples to show the
effects of Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step
in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability
packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics,
force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and
determine how best each form or variant of Shock and Awe might be
achieved. To repeat, intimidation and compliance are the outputs
we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the actual
application of our alternative force package. Then the mission
capability package is examined in conditions of both MRCs and
OOTW.
For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing
historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe
have been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories
and overlap exists between and among them. The first example is
"Overwhelming Force," the doctrine and concept shaping today's
American force structure. The aims of this doctrine are to apply
massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an
adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy
militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to
ourselves and to non-combatants as possible. The superiority of
American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to
successful application.
There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of
this approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers
of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1 tank,
F-14,15, and 18 aircraft and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-688 ships designed
principally to be used jointly or individually to destroy and
attrite other forces and supporting capability. In other words,
this example has principally been derived from force-on-forces
attrition relationships even though command and control,
logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disaggregated from
this doctrine.
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a
platform-on-platform attrition basis is that with declining
numbers of worthy and well enough equipped adversaries against
whom to apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning
Congress and public will prove more difficult. While it is clear
that "system of systems" and other alternative military concepts
are under consideration, for the time being, these have not
replaced the current platform and force-on-force attrition
orientation. It should be noted, there will be no doctrinal
alternatives unless ample effort is made to provide a
comprehensive and detailed examination of possible
alternatives.
Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large
amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and
the time to transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not
always follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large
quantities of decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third,
the costs of maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may
outstrip the money provided to pay for the numbers of highly
capable forces needed. Finally, at a time when the commercial
marketplace is increasing the performance of its products while
also lowering price and cycle time to field newer generations
systems, the opposite trends are still endemic in the defense
sector. This will compound the tension between quality and
quantity already cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily
fatal. However, none should be dismissed without fuller
understanding.
Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives
that are similar to those of current doctrine. A major
distinction is that Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application
of force across a broader spectrum of leverage points to impose
Shock and Awe. This breadth should lead to a more comprehensive
and integrated interaction among all the specific components and
units that produce aggregate military capability and must include
training and education, as well as new ways to exploit our
technical and industrial capacity. It is possible that in these
resource, technical, and commercial industrial areas that Rapid
Dominance may provide particular utility that otherwise may
constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.
The second example is "Hiroshima and Nagasaki" noted earlier.
The intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and Awe through
delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive
destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning
its leadership and public, rather than targeting directly against
military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers
or systems. The employment of this capability against society and
its values, called "counter-value" in the nuclear deterrent
jargon, is massively destructive strikes directly at the public
will of the adversary to resist and, ideally or theoretically,
would instantly or quickly incapacitate that will over the space
of a few hours or days.
The major flaws and shortcomings are severalfold and rest in
determining whether this magnitude and speed of destruction can
actually be achieved using non-nuclear systems to render an
adversary impotent; to destroy quickly the will to resist within
acceptable and probably unachievably low levels of societal
destruction; and whether a political decision would be taken in
any case to use this type of capability given the magnitude of
the consequences and the risk of failure.
It can be argued that in the bombing campaign of Desert
Storm, similar objectives were envisioned. The differences
between this example and Desert Storm are through the
totality of a society that would be affected by a massive and
indiscriminate regime of destruction and the speed of imposing
those strikes as occurred to those Japanese cities. This example
of shock, awe, and intimidation rests on the proposition that
such effects must occur in very short periods of time.
The next example is "Massive Bombardment." This category of
Shock and Awe applies massive and, perhaps today, relatively
precise destructive power largely against military targets and
related sectors over time. It is unlikely to produce an immediate
effect on the will of the adversary to resist. In a sense, this
is an endurance contest in which the enemy is finally broken
through exhaustion. However, it is the cumulative effect of this
application of destruction power that will ultimately impose
sufficient Shock and Awe, as well as perhaps destroy the physical
means to resist, that an adversary will be forced to accept
whatever terms may be imposed. As noted, trench warfare of the
First World War, the strategic bombing campaign in Europe of the
Second World War (which was not effective in this regard), and
related B-52 raids in Vietnam and especially over the New Year
period of 1972-73, illustrate the application of massive
bombardment.
Massive Bombardment, directed at largely military-strategic
targets, is indeed an aspect of applying "Overwhelming Force,"
even though political constraints make this example most unlikely
to be repeated in the future. There is also the option of
applying massive destruction against purely civilian or
"counter-value" targets such as the firebombing of Tokyo in World
War II when unconditionality marks the terms of surrender. It is
the cumulative impact of destruction on the endurance and
capacity of the adversary that ultimately affects the will to
resist that is the central foundation of this example.
The shortcoming with this example is clear, and rests in the
question of political feasibility and acceptability, and what
circumstances would be necessary to dictate and permit use of
massive bombardment. Outright invasion and aggression such as
Iraq's attack against Kuwait could clearly qualify as reasons to
justify using this level of Shock and Awe. However, as with
Overwhelming Force, this response is not time-sensitive and would
require massive application of force for some duration as well as
political support.
Fourth is the "Blitzkreig" example. In real Blitzkreig, Shock
and Awe were not achieved through the massive application of
firepower across a broad front nor through the delivery of
massive levels of force. Instead, the intent was to apply
precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve
maximum leverage but with total economies of scale. The German
Wehrmacht's Blitzkreig was not a massive attack across a very
broad front, although the opponent may have been deceived into
believing that. Instead, the enemy's line was probed in multiple
locations and, wherever it could be most easily penetrated,
attack was concentrated in a narrow salient. The image is that of
the shaped charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in
a tank's armor and then exploding outwardly to achieve a maximum
cone of damage against the unarmored or less protected
innards.
To the degree that this example of achieving Shock and Awe is
directed against military targets, it requires skill if not
brilliance in execution, or nearly total incompetence in the
adversary. The adversary, finding front lines broken and the rear
vulnerable, panics, surrenders, or both. Hitler's campaign in
France and Holland and the seizure of the Dutch forts and the
occupation of Crete in 1940 are obvious illustrations. The use of
Special Operations forces in significant numbers is an adjunct to
imposing this level of Shock and Awe.
Desert Storm could have been a classic Blitzkreig
maneuver if the attack were mounted without the long preparatory
bombardment and was concentrated in a single sector-either the
"left hook" or the Marine attack "up the middle," and with total
surprise. The major differences between the operation in Kuwait
and Germany's capture of France in 1940 were that the allies in
Saudi Arabia had complete military and technical superiority
unlike the Germans and that, once under attack, Iraq's front line
collapsed virtually everywhere, giving the coalition license to
pick and choose the points for penetration and then dominate the
battle with fire and maneuver. The lesson for future adversaries
about the Blitzkreig example and the United States is that they
will face in us an opponent able to employ technically superior
forces with brilliance, speed, and vast leverage in achieving
Shock and Awe through the precise application of force.
It must also be noted that there are certainly situations such
as guerilla war where this or most means of employing force to
obtain Shock and Awe may simply prove inapplicable. For example,
the German Blitzkreig would have performed with the greatest
difficulty in the Vietnam War, where enemy forces had relatively
few lines to be penetrated or selectively savaged by this type of
warfare.
The shortcomings of Blitzkrieg ironically rest in its
strengths. Can brilliance and superiority be maintained? Is there
a flexible enough infrastructure to ensure training to that
standard, and can the supporting industrial base continue to
produce at acceptable costs the systems to maintain this
operational and technical superiority? Rapid Dominance requires a
positive answer to these questions, at least theoretically.
The fifth example is named after the Chinese
philosopher-warrior, Sun Tzu. The "Sun Tzu" example is based on
selective, instant decapitation of military or societal targets
to achieve Shock and Awe. This discrete or precise nature of
applying force differentiates this from Hiroshima and Massive
Destruction examples. Sun Tzu was brought before Ho Lu, the King
of Wu, who had read all of Sun Tzu's thirteen chapters on war and
proposed a test of Sun's military skills. Ho asked if the rules
applied to women. When the answer was yes, the king challenged
Sun Tzu to turn the royal concubines into a marching troop. The
concubines merely laughed at Sun Tzu until he had the head cut
off the head concubine. The ladies still could not bring
themselves to take the master's orders seriously. So, Sun Tzu had
the head cut off a second concubine. From that point on, so the
story goes, the ladies learned to march with the precision of a
drill team.
The objectives of this example are to achieve Shock and Awe
and hence compliance or capitulation through very selective,
utterly brutal and ruthless, and rapid application of force to
intimidate. The fundamental values or lives are the principal
targets and the aim is to convince the majority that resistance
is futile by targeting and harming the few. Both society and the
military are the targets. In a sense, Sun Tzu attempts to achieve
Hiroshima levels of Shock and Awe but through far more selective
and informed targeting. Decapitation is merely one instrument.
This model can easily fall outside the cultural heritage and
values of the U.S. for it to be useful without major refinement.
Shutting down an adversary's ability to "see" or to communicate
is another variant but without many historical examples to show
useful wartime applications.
A subset of the Sun Tzu example is the view that war is
deception. In this subset, the attempt is to deceive the enemy
into what we wish the enemy to perceive and thereby trick,
cajole, induce, or force the adversary. The thrust or target is
the perception, understanding, and knowledge of the adversary. In
some ways, the ancient Trojan Horse is an early example of
deception. However, as we will see, the deception model may have
new foundations in the technological innovations that are
occurring and in our ability to control the environment.
The shortcomings with Sun Tzu are similar to those of the
Massive Destruction and the Blitzkreig examples. It is
questionable that a decision to employ American force this
ruthlessly in quasi- or real assassination will ever be made by
the U.S. Further, the standard to maintain the ability to perform
these missions is high and dependent on both resources and on
supporting intelligence, especially human intelligence-not an
American strong point.
Britain's Special Air Service provides the SAS example and is
distinct from the Blitzkreig or Sun Tzu categories because it
focuses on depriving an adversary of its senses in order to
impose Shock and Awe. The image here is the hostage rescue team
employing stun grenades to incapacitate an adversary, but on a
far larger scale. The stun grenade produces blinding light and
deafening noise. The result shocks and confuses the adversary and
makes him senseless. The aim in this example of achieving Shock
and Awe is to produce so much light and sound or the converse, to
deprive the adversary of all senses, and therefore to disable and
to disarm. Without senses, the adversary becomes impotent and
entirely vulnerable.
A huge "battlefield" stun grenade that encompasses large areas
is a dramatic if unachievable illustration. Perhaps a high
altitude nuclear detonation that blacks out virtually all
electronic and electrical equipment better describes the intended
effect regardless of likelihood of use. Depriving the enemy, in
specific areas, of the ability to communicate, observe, and to
interact is a more reasonable and perhaps more achievable
variant. This deprival of senses, including all electronics and
substitution of false signals or data to create this feeling of
impotence, is another variant. Above all, Shock and Awe are
imposed instantly and the mechanism or target is deprivation of
the senses.
The shortcomings of the SAS approach mirror in part
shortcomings of other approaches. Technological solutions are
crucial but may not be conceivable outside the EMP effects of
nuclear weapons. Intelligence is clearly vital. Without precise
knowledge of who and what are to be stunned, this example will
not work.
The sixth example of applying Shock and Awe is the "Haitian"
example (or to the purist, the Potemkin Village example). It is
based on imposing Shock and Awe through a show of force and
indeed through deception, misinformation, and disinformation and
is different from the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1995. In the
early 1800s, native Haitians were seeking to extricate their
country from French control. The Haitian leaders staged a martial
parade for the visiting French military contingent and marched,
reportedly, a hand full of battalions repeatedly in review. The
French were deceived into believing that the native forces
numbered in the tens of thousands and concluded that French
military action was futile and that its forces would be
overwhelmed. As a result, the Haitians were able to achieve their
freedom without firing a shot.
To be sure, there are points of similarity between the Haitian
example and the others. Deception, disinformation, and guile are
more crucial in this regime. However, the target or focus is the
will and perception of the intended target. Perhaps the Sun Tzu
category comes closest to this one except that while Sun Tzu is
selective in applying force, it is clear that imposing actual
pain and shock are essential ingredients and deception,
disin-formation, and guile are secondary. Demonstrative uses of
force are also important. The issue is how to determine what
demonstrations will affect the perceptions of the intended target
in line with the overall political aims.
The weakness of this form of Shock and Awe is its major
dependency on intelligence. One must be certain that the will and
perceptions of the adversary can be manipulated. The classic
misfire is the adversary who is not impressed and, instead, is
further provoked to action by the unintended actions of the
aggressor. Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis' invasion of Kuwait
demonstrate when this Potemkin Village model can backfire. Saddam
simply let his bluff be called.
The next example is that of "The Roman Legions." Achieving
Shock and Awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an
adversary through the adversary's perception and fear of his
vulnerability and our own invincibility, even though applying
ultimate retribution could take a considerable period of time.
The target set encompasses both military and societal values. In
occupying a vast empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Red
Sea, Rome could deploy relatively small number of forces to
secure each of these territories. In the first place, Roman
forces were far superior to native forces individually and
collectively. In the second place, if an untoward act occurred,
the perpetrator could rest assured that Roman vengeance
ultimately would take place. This was similar to British "Gunboat
Diplomacy" of the nineteenth century when the British fleet would
return to the scene of any crime against the crown and extract
its retribution through the wholesale destruction of offending
villages.
There were several vital factors in Rome's ability to achieve
Shock and Awe. The invincibility of its Legions, or the
perception of that prowess, and the inevitability of retribution
were among the most significant factors. In other words,
reprisals and the use of force to exact a severe punishment, as
well as the certainty that this sword of Damocles would descend,
were essential ingredients. The distinction between this category
and the others is the ex post facto nature of achieving Shock and
Awe. In the other categories, there is the need for seizing the
initiative and applying con-temporaneous force to achieve Shock
and Awe. With the Roman example, the Shock and Awe have already
been achieved. It is the breakdown of this regime or the rise of
new and as yet unbowed adversaries that leads to the reactive use
of force.
The major shortcoming is the assumption of the inevitability
of reprisals and the capacity to take punitive action. That is
not and may not always be the case with the United States,
although we can attempt to make others believe it will be. The
takeover of the Embassy in Tehran by dissident "students" in 1979
and American impotence in the aftermath are suggestive of the
shortcoming. That aside, the example or perception of the
invincibility of American military power is not a bad one to
embellish.
The next category for achieving Shock and Awe is termed the
Decay and Default model and is based on the imposition of
societal breakdown over a lengthy period but without the
application of massive destruction. This example is obviously not
rapid but cumulative. In this example, both military and societal
values are targets. Selective and focused force is applied. It is
the long-term corrosive effects of the continuing breakdown in
the system and society that ultimately compels an adversary to
surrender or to accept terms. Shock and Awe are therefore not
immediate either in application or in producing the end result.
Economic embargoes, long-term policies that harass and aggravate
the adversary, and other types of punitive actions that do not
threaten the entire society but apply pressure as in the Chinese
water torture, a drop at a time, are the mechanisms. Finally, the
preoccupation with the decay and disruption of society produces a
variant of Shock and Awe in the form of frustration collapsing
the will to resist.
The significant weakness of this approach is time duration. In
many cases, the time required to impose such a regime of Shock
and Awe is unacceptably long or simply cannot be achieved by
conventional or politically acceptable means.
The final example is that of "The Royal Canadian Mounted
Police," whose unofficial motto was "never send a man where you
can send a bullet." The distinction between this example and the
others is that this example is even more selective than Sun Tzu
and implies that standoff capabilities as opposed to forces in
place can achieve the required objectives. There should not be
too fine a point, however, in belaboring differences with the
other examples in this regard over standoff. A stealthy aircraft
bombing unimpededly is not distinct from a cruise missile fired
at 1,000 miles regarding the effect of ordnance on target.
A few observations about these examples offer insights on
which to test and evaluate means of applying Rapid Dominance. It
is clear that the targets in each category include military,
civilian, industrial, infrastructure, and societal components of
a country or group. In certain cases, time is the crucial
consideration in imposing Shock and Awe and in most of the
examples, emphasis is on a rapid or sudden imposition of Shock
and Awe. However, in several examples, the effects of Shock and
Awe must be and are cumulative. They are either achieved over
time or achieved through earlier conditioning and experiences.
Not all of these categories are dependent on technology or on new
technological breakthroughs. What is relatively new or different
is the extent to which brilliance and competence in using force,
in understanding where an adversary's weak points lie and in
executing military operations with deftness, are vital. While
this recognition is not new, emphasis is crucial on exploiting
brilliance and therefore on the presumption that brilliance may
be taught or institutionalized and is not a function only of
gifted individuals.
There is also a key distinction between selective or precise
and massive application of force. Technology, in the form of
"zero CEP" weapons, may provide the seemingly contradictory
capability of systems that are both precise and have the net
consequence of imposing massive disruption, destruction, or
damage. This damage goes beyond the loss of power grids and other
easily identifiable industrial targeting sets. Loss of all
communications can have a massively destructive impact even
though physical destruction can be relatively limited.
In some of the examples, the objective is to apply brutal
levels of power and force to achieve Shock and Awe. In the
attempt to keep war "immaculate," at least in limiting collateral
damage, one point should not be forgotten. Above all, war is a
nasty business or, as Sherman put it, "war is hell." While there
are surely humanitarian considerations that cannot or should not
be ignored, the ability to Shock and Awe ultimately rests in the
ability to frighten, scare, intimidate, and disarm. The
Clausewitzian dictum concerning the violent nature of war is
dismissed only at our peril.
For a policy maker in the White House or Pentagon and the
concerned Member of Congress with responsibility for providing
for the common defense, what lessons emerge from these examples
and hierarchies? First, there are always broader sets of
operational concepts and constructs available for achieving
political objectives than may be realized. Not all of these
alternatives are necessarily better or feasible. However, the
examples suggest that further intellectual and conceptual effort
is a worthwhile investment in dealing with national security
options in the future.
Second, time becomes an opportunity as well as a constraint in
generating new thinking. In many past cases, time was generally
viewed as an adversary. We had to race against several clocks to
arrive "firstest with the mostest," to prevent an enemy from
advancing, or to ensure we had ample forces on station should
they be required. Rapid Dominance would alleviate many of these
constraints as we would have the capacity to deploy effective
forces far more quickly. Therefore, in this case, we can view
time as an ally. The political issue rests in longstanding
arguments to limit the President from having the capacity to
deploy or use force quickly, thereby involving the nation without
conferring with full consultation with Congress. While this is an
obvious point, it should not eliminate alternative types of force
packages derived from Rapid Dominance from full consideration and
experimentation. Indeed, our experience with nuclear weapons and
emergency release procedures shows that delegating instant
presidential authority can be handled responsibly.
Responding to the precise, rapid, and massive criteria of
several models, it is clear that one capability not presently in
the arsenal is a "zero-CEP" weapon, meaning one that is precise
and timely. It is also clear that, while deception, guile, and
brilliance are important attributes in war, there are no
guarantees that they can be institutionalized in any military
force.
Another capability that Rapid Dominance would stress relates
to the Sun Tzu example. Suppose there are "EMP-like" or High
Powered Microwave (HPM) systems that can be fielded and provide
broad ability to incapacitate even a relatively primitive
society. In using these weapons, the nerve centers of that
society would be attacked rather than using this illustrative
system to achieve hard target kill because there were few hard
targets. To be sure, HPM and EMP-like systems have been and are
being carefully researched.
Finally, to return to the idea that deception, disinformation,
and misinformation are crucial aspects of waging war, Rapid
Dominance would seek to achieve several further capabilities. By
using complete signature management, larger formations could be
made to look like smaller and smaller formations made to seem
larger. At sea, carrier battle groups could be disguised and
smaller warships could be made to appear as large formations.
This signature management would apply across the entire spectrum
of the senses and not just radar or electronic ranges. Indeed,
gaining the ability to regulate what information and intelligence
are both available and not available to the adversary is a key
aim. This is more than denial or deception. It is control in the
fullest sense of the word.
The next step is to match the four significant characteristics
that define Rapid Dominance- knowledge, rapidity, brilliance, and
control-with Shock and Awe against achievable military objectives
in order to derive suitable strategies and doctrines, configure
forces and force packages accordingly, and determine those
integrated systems and innovative uses of technologies and
capabilities that will provide the necessary means to achieve
these objectives in conditions that include both the MRC and
OOTW.
In assessing the future utility and applicability of Rapid
Dominance, it is crucial to consider the political context in
which force is likely to be employed. As we enter the next
century, the probability is low that an overriding, massive,
direct threat posed by a peer-competitor to the U.S. will emerge
in the near term. Without compelling reasons, public tolerance
toward American sacrifice abroad will remain low and may even
decrease. This reluctance on the part of Americans to tolerate
pain is directly correlated to perceptions of threat to U.S.
interests. Without a clear and present danger, the definition of
national interest may remain narrow.
Americans have always appreciated rapid and decisive military
solutions. But, many challenges or crises in the future are
likely to be marginal to U.S. interests and therefore may not be
resolvable before American political staying power is exhausted.
In this period, political micro-management and fine tuning are
likely to be even more prevalent as administrations respond to
public sentiments for minimizing casualties and, without a threat
or compelling reason, U.S. involvement.
Future actions and measures may likely reflect "politically
correct" alternatives. In 1991, the Gulf War came close to
presenting the nearly optimal situation for prosecution to a
decisive and irreversible conclusion. Such a course, however, was
not politically feasible because it would have shattered the
allied coalition while exceeding the authority of the UN mandate.
Military operations that impact across a whole population or
cause "innocent civilians" to suffer (e.g., some economic
sanctions, collateral damage from raids) also are likely to be
only politically acceptable in aggravated situations. For
example, if economic sanctions cause malnutrition or other health
problems or collateral damage from bombing or shelling impacts
hospitals, schools, orphanages, or refugee camps, the policy may
be the ultimate victim.
The U.S. military is more likely to find itself in a
supporting foreign policy role with discrete missions that are
only one facet of a larger political context. This context is
almost certainly going to expand into militarily grey areas of
OOTW, including those impinging on law enforcement and ensuring
political stability. Forces may be called upon to deal with or
control situations on the margin rather than to achieve total
submission or defeat of an opponent. The prevailing political
preference is likely to continue to be to try to bound these
complex challenges through fine tuning, artificial constructs,
and discretely limited tasks, often performed in the midst of
internal conflict. Economic sanctions (e.g., Serbia, Iraq), "no
fly" zones (e.g., Southern and Northern Iraq and Bosnia), "safe
havens" (e.g., Bosnia), humanitarian relief delivered by "all
means necessary" (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia), and embassy protection
and evacuation (e.g., Liberia in 1991 and again in 1996) are the
kinds of OOTW tasks more likely to be assigned by policy makers.
Such tasks tend to be inconclusive and of long duration. They
also increase vulnerability to terrorist attack such as the
bombing of the Kolbah Barracks in Riyadh in June 1996.
Americans prefer not to intervene, especially when the direct
threat to the U.S. is ambiguous, tenuous, or difficult to define.
Therefore, when intervention is necessary there is likely to be
both a political and practical imperative to have allied or
international involvement or at least the political cover of the
UN, NATO, or appropriate NGOs.
As more states (and sub-national groups) acquire nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capabilities and longer range delivery means, the ability for
rogues to inflict pain will increase as will the ability to
ratchet up the political risks. WMD can easily complicate our
ability to influence positive and constructive behavior of
possessors. Because of the threat of retaliation, WMD
capabilities may become politically acceptable targets provided
collateral damage to civilians is minimized. Preemption may
become a more realistic option along the lines of Israel's
strikes against Syria's nuclear reactors in 1982. It is, however,
a responsible state's worst nightmare to have successfully struck
a chemical, biological, or nuclear production facility with
precision only to learn the next day that hundreds of civilians
have been killed due to the inadvertent release of chemical,
biological, or nuclear materials.
There must also be an appropriate political context that
justifies the use of preemptive force, as opposed to less
destructive or non-lethal types of sanctions (e.g., responses to
terrorism in the case of Libya, invasion of Kuwait by Iraq,
exports of WMD to a threatening country such as Iran, the North
Korean threat to South Korea and Japan).
The U.S. will, nevertheless, need to maintain the capability
to deter and defeat both strategic and other direct threats to
its vital interests, preferably on a decisive basis. In an
unsettled, less structured, and volatile world, the ability to
use force with precision, effectiveness, impunity, and, when
needed, rapidity, will still be a powerful influence on
cooperation, stability, and, where relevant, submission.
Imposing Rapid Dominance on a nation, group, or situation, if
achievable, will be a highly desirable and relevant asset in this
turbulent period. Bosnia offers an example. At the outset of the
breakup of Yugoslavia, if we had had this type of capability,
without potentially high costs, to counter effectively the widely
predicted invasion of Bosnia, the U.S. strategy for dealing with
that tangled and messy situation might have been much different.
Thousands of lives might have been spared. In other grey or
marginal situations Rapid Dominance could make the difference
between a politically acceptable response or inadequate action
with consequences similar to what happened in Bosnia.
In considering how Rapid Dominance might apply and might be
used, it is first important to know what it is that we want to
achieve with military force. We need to consider whether the
application of force will allow us to influence and control an
adversary's will or merely exacerbate a bad situation. Therefore,
it is essential to know what is of value to that adversary. An
objective, realistic, and in-depth situational grasp will be
essential to such an understanding. For example, disarming or
destroying may produce unintended consequences. For a
conventional foe that values its military and depends on
technology, Rapid Dominance should be particularly effective and
persuasive. In the case of less developed nations, however, the
opportunity for exercising influence in this way and against
military formations may be considerably less and must be
carefully assessed.
As noted, in cases of marginal direct threats to U.S.
security, the cost in casualties needs to be low. To be
effective, we must take away an opponent's ability to make it
cost us in terms of casualty levels we consider intolerable. In
applying Rapid Dominance we also must be defending something
which is of value to us. The lower the value in terms of our
national interests, the lower the price we are likely to be
willing to pay.
In MRC situations, we need to have the capability to defeat,
destroy, or incapacitate an opponent. On the other hand, in OOTW,
other non-military factors are likely to be involved and goals
made more limited. For example, it may be necessary to intimidate
or capture the leadership in order to restore order or reverse an
action, or it may simply be necessary to anticipate, prevent, and
counter opposition to conduct of a more limited mission (e.g.,
feeding the starving or protecting innocent people from
genocide).
In U.S. planning for OOTW, it is a virtual given that risk
will be minimized and there will be a discrete and proportional
use of force with minimal collateral damage. This means that
there must be a belief that a mission can be accomplished and is
worth the resources necessary to do so. Before initiating action
in these often confusing situations, objectives must be clearly
established and, once engaged, there should be a willingness to
persevere through the inevitable rough patches.
Whether in an MRC or in OOTW, we first will need to know what
we want to achieve with Rapid Dominance. This is a task for
political leadership which is informed with military advice
concerning what is feasible, what is not, and what is uncertain.
The extent of the mission must be clearly defined. Is it to
defeat an enemy so it will no longer pose a threat? Do we only
need to stop an adversary from carrying out a particular act?
Must we control a situation entirely or only sufficiently to be
able to carry out a specific mission? Can we really affect the
adversary's will?
Recent events give us examples of outcomes likely to be
relevant in the future. MRCs call for the full spectrum of
outcomes-from reversing military action (e.g., the invasion of
Kuwait); to establishing a government more acceptable to the U.S.
and the world, probably using military coercion (Haiti, Panama);
to eliminating a threat to the U.S. or its allies. We may want to
persuade an adversary to cease an aggression or act of
interference or otherwise change behavior we cannot accept or
tolerate. Political expectations in MRCs are for the effective
use of force and for rapid success or at least steady progress.
Casualties should be moderate or at least acceptable, with the
threshold of American pain dependent on the directness of the
threat to U.S. interests and with the degree of compellance
appropriate to the political rationale.
OOTW present a different set of challenges. These challenges
are likely to require discrete dominance of specific
circumstances rather than total dominance. The general tasks may
include a wide variety of requirements. For example, it may be
necessary to try to prevent or stop genocide (e.g., Rwanda) and
ethnic cleansing (e.g., Bosnia). The task may be to cooperate
with a humanitarian relief effort (e.g., prevention of starvation
in Somalia or Bosnia). The goal of employing force may be free
and fair elections (e.g., Cambodia, Bosnia). The requirement
could be to destroy a limited objective (e.g., an above-ground or
underground chemical weapons plant or documented nuclear weapons
facilities developed by hostile or unfriendly states).
Other tasks could simply be to preserve international rights
(e.g., protecting the neutral shipping of the western oil flow in
the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war). A more testing challenge
might be to accomplish a limited political goal (e.g., gesture to
deal with Israeli incursion in Lebanon in 1982). We undoubtedly
will face the future requirement to reverse a potential threat to
Americans or to a region of importance with a limited military
action (e.g., in Grenada in 1983 or the Mayaguez rescue in
Cambodia in 1975). Discrete moves to bolster preventive diplomacy
and/or overt measures to demonstrate preparedness to assist
(e.g., forces sent to Sudan to support Chad under threat of
invasion from Libya and recent Navy operations in the Taiwan
Strait) will still be relevant.
Countering terrorism also will be part of a continuing agenda
(hostage rescue-e.g., Iran, Lebanon; hijacking-e.g., Achille
Lauro; deterrent to further moves-e.g., the Higgins
operation, Libyan raids, missile attack on Iraq after the threat
to former President Bush). We may also need to interdict weapons,
terrorists, or other discrete cargoes moving between nations
(e.g., North Korean missile shipments to Iran, Iranian and Libyan
arms exchanges).
Economic sanctions are likely to continue to be a preferable
political alternative or a necessary political prelude to an
offensive military step (e.g., implemented as the first step in
actions to counter Libyan-sponsored terrorism; tried first as an
alternative to war with Iraq; used ineffectively against the
Serbs to try to convince them not to continue to support Bosnian
Serb aggression; and tried with Haiti as an unsuccessful
alternative to occupation). Our past experience has been that we
seldom have had decisive or immediate results from these economic
measures, sanctions, and embargoes. Considerable time is required
to have impact and we have not been particularly efficient in
controlling the leakage and spillover in these situations.
Sanctions almost always require full international cooperation
which cannot be assumed or guaranteed. In Bosnia, of course, some
portions of the arms embargo were deliberately allowed to be
permeable and the U.S. turned a blind eye to Iran's support of
the Bosnians.
Past experience also has taught us some relevant lessons about
the potential of Shock and Awe. Improvements in the capabilities
enhancing these outcomes could make a decisive difference in
dealing with future challenges. History also cautions us as well
that there will be restraints in employing Rapid Dominance and
that there are fundamental differences in MRC and OOTW
applications.
Shock and Awe, when properly applied, have been very effective
in the past. They will be effective in the future, even when
applied in limited ways that do not reflect the more encompassing
impact envisioned by Rapid Dominance. There are many examples of
how a very limited application of force made a significant
difference through the mechanisms of Shock and Awe. Experiences,
including successes and failures, illustrate some of the
potential of Rapid Dominance if implemented effectively.
The Vietnam War provides certain lessons. When B-52 strikes,
which made the ground rumble, were added to the equation during
the Christmas 1972 bombing of Hanoi, dragging negotiations with
the North Vietnamese on a peace agreement moved swiftly to an
acceptable conclusion. Daily reports following the controversial
B-52 "carpet" bombing raids in Cambodia talked of North
Vietnamese/Vietcong soldiers wandering around in a daze due to
shock and concussion. Both B-52s and naval gunfire, especially
from 16 inch guns of a battleship, had a similar impact on
invading North Vietnamese troop concentrations. The mining of
Haiphong Harbor, although initiated late in the war, was equally
effective in immediately stopping shipping in and out of North
Vietnam.
When President Nixon wanted to deal with the perplexing
problems of our POWs and failing domestic morale, as well as take
away substantial political leverage from the North Vietnamese, he
directed the raid to rescue prisoners jailed just outside Hanoi.
The raid itself was well executed. American forces reached and
searched the prison and returned safely. But no Americans were
freed because a last minute transfer of the POWs from the prison
had not been detected. If there had been prisoners still there to
be rescued, the operation would have been a highly dramatic and
influential event. The point is that accurate and timely
intelligence remains crucial.
There seems to be little doubt that the combined F-111 and
naval air strike against Libya in 1986 in response to the
discotheque terrorist attack in Germany gave Gadhafi pause. The
perception that he personally might be targeted appeared to get
Gadhafi's attention.
When our troops were having difficulty dislodging Grenadian
soldiers from their main fortress, Marine tanks were sailed
around the island to confront them. At the sight of tank guns,
the seemingly stubborn occupants surrendered almost immediately
without a fight.
The cease fire in the bloody Iran-Iraq war was quick to follow
after the commencement of daily Iraqi long-range rocket
bombardments of Tehran that amounted to a reign of terror. Given
that both sides were exhausted at that point, a show of force
could have been convincing. Strong U.S. action in response to
Iran's mining of neutral waters may also have had a sobering
effect on the mullahs. Not only were Iran's vulnerable
oil-producing platforms in the Gulf boarded and destroyed with
impunity by the U.S., but Iranian naval forces that had come out
to challenge the U.S. Navy were destroyed. Iraq's reign of
terror, and the strong American message to Iran, possibly helped
end the war.
In our troublesome stay in Somalia, AC-130 gunships earned
immediate respect from potential troublemakers with their ability
to see wide areas night or day, remain on station for hours as
night patrols, and strike with precision and relative impunity.
The methodical drone of AC-130s circling in the air was enough to
restore some order, although a few civilians found the noise
unsettling. In another situation, the aftermath of systematic UN
efforts to destroy faction leader Mohamed Aideed's illegal arms
facilities generated an unexpected reaction from other warlords,
including those colluding with him, which was to volunteer to
hand over their own weapons storage areas. For a fleeting moment,
Shock and Awe created an important opportunity.
During the many vagaries of the Bosnia tragedy, it would
appear that when NATO accurately delivered potent doses of air
power, rather than occasional pin pricks, the Serbs seemed
finally to understand that an appearance of cooperation rather
than defiance was in their interest. This NATO message in the
form of air power, of course, was strengthened by the
effectiveness of the accompanying Croatian/Muslim
counter-offensive and the fatigue of Bosnian Serb fighters.
Sustaining the shock effect with forces on the ground was a
necessary combination to gain the staying power effect to change
the will of the Serbs. It was not accomplished by air alone.
Timing remains important.
Past failures also offer examples of how Rapid Dominance might
have made a difference in reacting to those difficult situations.
Rapid Dominance might have provided a better response to those
setbacks or might have offered a more effective alternative that
would have avoided the vulnerabilities in those situations in the
first place (e.g., Bay of Pigs, Iran embassy rescue in 1980,
Lebanon Marine barracks bombing in 1983, response to the Pueblo
seizure by North Korea in 1968, and the reaction to the downed
helicopters during the Ranger raid in Somalia).
We should also learn from other states who have demonstrated
effective application of the characteristics of Rapid Dominance.
Israel's rout of Syria's air force and missile defenses in
Lebanon's Baaka Valley shows how dramatic success can have
political spillover. On the other hand, Japan's surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor produced the reverse effects of Shock and Awe and
had the unintended consequence of galvanizing the U.S. into
action.
Even without a Rapid Dominance capability or when facing a
more technologically dependent opponent, it is clear from these
examples and many others in recent U.S. experiences that certain
improvements in capabilities would provide us with greater
flexibility in the future. This is especially true in OOTW
situations, which require a multiplicity of effective instruments
at our disposal. It is also true that certain operations such as
peacekeeping tend to be manpower intensive.
If we are to stay ahead of an adversary and deny things of
value to that adversary, dynamic, accurate, and integrated
intelligence is essential. Intelligence needs to move to levels
unprecedented in scope, timeliness, accuracy, and availability in
real time. The Gulf War, despite its success, showed classic
limitations in intelligence. Even though we had nearly every
intelligence asset designed to deal with the USSR available for
use, we were unable to detect the full extent of Iraq's WMD
capability; unable to find mobile missile launchers even with a
major expenditure of on-scene assets; in some cases, we could
only "see" kilometers in front of our advancing forces; and we
mistakenly attacked targets we thought were legitimate but had
civilians inside. In some instances, only reliable human
intelligence may provide the necessary information (for example,
in order to understand what is happening in deep underground
facilities).
Another important capability we should try to achieve in the
future is the ability to intimidate, capture, convince, or
significantly influence the perceptions and understanding of
individual troublemakers. This need has been demonstrated
repeatedly in recent years (e.g., Gadhafi in Libya, Aideed in
Somalia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Noreiga in Panama). Such a
perception is particularly relevant when the problem appears not
to be caused by a unified population but by the ambitions of
individual leaders who have intimidated or killed off any likely
internal opposition. Such a capability requires effective
real-time intelligence and a variety of methods for accomplishing
the task (from exceptionally precise weapons to effective
"snatch" operations).
In a world in which non-lethal sanctions are a political
imperative, we will continue to need the ability to shut down all
commerce into and out of any country from shipping, air, rail,
and roads. We ought to be able to do this in a much more
thorough, decisive, and shocking way than we have in the past.
The ability to apply pressure or cause acquiescence employing
non-lethal means also will be important in some circumstances.
Weapons that shock and awe, stun and paralyze, but do not kill in
significant numbers may be the only ones that are politically
acceptable in the future. This also means that crowd control with
minimum violence may be needed. In certain circumstances, the
costs of having to resort to lethal force may be too politically
expensive in terms of local support as well as support in the
U.S. and internationally.
As is already well recognized, we need to be able to shut down
key electronic communications to, from, and within a country (or
within a specific sub-group or faction). We also need the ability
to control radio and television within a country. It is
important, however, in all cases, to be able to deny an
adversary's ability to communicate and to have our own means of
reaching the population with appropriate messages.
In addition to being able to eliminate military capabilities
selectively, including weapons systems, overt and covert
stockpiles, fuel, WMD, and related logistics, we will need to
have the capability selectively to incapacitate, neutralize, or
destroy other things considered of great value to opponents.
Increased targeting precision will compound effectiveness as well
as help to avoid the political pitfalls of using force such as
the inevitable, unintended collateral damage that has been the
pattern of the past.
More surgical and carefully crafted applications of force,
however, will only partially reduce the restraints and limits on
utilizing Rapid Dominance in MRCs and OOTW. There are substantial
differences in the political constraints likely to be imposed in
dealing with MRCs and with OOTW. For example, there is much
greater latitude to use dominant force and Shock and Awe in MRCs
than in OOTW.
In MRC situations, we are often likely to face conventional
powers which are well organized, well equipped, and broadly
dependent on technology. Although more powerful, these developed
states are also likely to be especially vulnerable to a
technologically sophisticated approach such as Rapid Dominance as
long as we maintain this military edge and the ability to
neutralize their military systems. Even in the most compelling
circumstance where a Rapid Dominance force is used, however,
support from other nations will be politically desirable.
In most circumstances there will be limits to the targets of
value to an adversary which can be destroyed as well as to the
numbers and types of weapons that can be employed. For example,
the political circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be
employed are quite limited. In both MRCs and OOTW, certain
actions are politically as well as morally unacceptable except in
extreme cases. Such restrictions are likely to apply to targets
affecting control of access to food, water, and clean air, and to
destruction of religious and cultural centers, even if there is
low collateral damage.
In OOTW situations, we are much more vulnerable to criticism
of using excessive force, especially if there is civilian or
collateral damage. The concept of proportionality is likely to
remain an operative principle in U.S. policy and may be taken to
extremes, especially if the marginal nature of a situation leads
to a marginal and ineffective response. Some people, both
military and civilian, even argue that superior technology should
not be employed in such situations and that an adversary should
be fought on his own terms. While such arguments should be
rejected, they nonetheless sometimes have a political influence
that must be considered. We should always use technology to
minimize our casualties, give us every advantage, reduce
collateral damage, and make us look more formidable. At the same
time, there needs to be sufficient provocation to warrant
destruction or denial. Our actions must always be consistent with
our own system of values.
The "rapid" component of Rapid Dominance is one of the most
appealing aspects of the concept, both politically and
militarily. The ability to take action that is timely and
decisive multiplies substantially the chances of ultimate
success. Action needs to be taken precisely when it will have
greatest impact. Often initial public outrage and political
support for action in response to a provocation subsides if a
prolonged buildup is necessary in order to prepare to take
action.
The ability to react faster than an adversary, to assimilate
information and act on it effectively, is also an important
advantage. In a NATO region-wide dynamic computer war game a few
years ago, it was clear that the simulated enemy was advancing
faster than the defensive chain of command could make counter
moves. The tradition of sending decisions up the line was simply
too slow to cope with the dynamic challenge posed by the
adversary. Commanders on scene lacked the authority to respond
and adjust to rapidly changing situations. The exercise
graphically demonstrated to the country involved the need to
institute fundamental command and control streamlining. It also
demonstrated the advantages of being able to make local decisions
in real time while still effectively coordinating and optimizing
the overall effort.
The Navy's "command by negation" concept evolved in the 1980s
in order to deal with the rapidity of the air/missile threat and
the need to integrate dynamically the offensive and defensive
missile, air, sea, and undersea capabilities of a battle group
and its joint components (e.g., AWACs). This concept was one way
of solving the time problem while keeping the overall commander
in the picture. The commander could then intervene and modify
actions as necessary to conform to the broader strategy. This
type of control was helped by the evolution of electronic links
and secure communications and the availability of satellites.
Commanders employing Rapid Dominance will need to orchestrate
it using similar principles, while applying greater selective
ability to turn on and off a variety of systems, sensors, and
devices influencing the whole operational picture. Technology
should also give commanders a much better grasp of what is
evolving during a battle. Just as the American military of today
has made "owning the night" part of its tactical advantage,
"owning" the dimension of time will be critical to the success of
Rapid Dominance.
In conceptual terms, the following is suggestive of a future
force configuration and the design of a mission capability
package (MCP) based on Rapid Dominance.