⁂ All but one of the essays brought together in this volume
have already been printed, either in the Atlantic Monthly, the
Century Magazine, or the Forum. The essay on Burke appears
here for the first time in print.
MERE LITERATURE. — I. “MERE LITERATURE.”
A singular phrase this, “mere literature,”—the
irreverent invention of a scientific age. Literature
we know, but “mere” literature? We are
not to read it as if it meant sheer literature, literature
in the essence, stripped of all accidental or
ephemeral elements, and left with nothing but its
immortal charm and power. “Mere literature” is
a serious sneer, conceived in all honesty by the
scientific mind, which despises things that do not
fall within the categories of demonstrable knowledge.
It means nothing but literature, as who
should say, “mere talk,” “mere fabrication,”
“mere pastime.” The scientist, with his head
comfortably and excusably full of knowable things,
takes nothing seriously and with his hat off, except
human knowledge. The creations of the human
spirit are, from his point of view, incalculable
vagaries, irresponsible phenomena, to be regarded
only as play, and, for the mind’s good, only as
recreation,—to be used to while away the tedium
of a railway journey, or to amuse a period of rest
or convalescence; mere byplay, mere make-believe.
And so very whimsical things sometimes happen,
because of this scientific and positivist spirit of the
age, when the study of the literature of any language
is made part of the curriculum of our colleges.
The more delicate and subtle purposes of
the study are put quite out of countenance, and
literature is commanded to assume the phrases and
the methods of science. It would be very painful
if it should turn out that schools and universities
were agencies of Philistinism; but there are some
things which should prepare us for such a discovery.
Our present plans for teaching everybody
involve certain unpleasant things quite inevitably.
It is obvious that you cannot have universal education
without restricting your teaching to such things
as can be universally understood. It is plain that
you cannot impart “university methods” to thousands,
or create “investigators” by the score,
unless you confine your university education to
matters which dull men can investigate, your laboratory
training to tasks which mere plodding diligence
and submissive patience can compass. Yet,
if you do so limit and constrain what you teach,
you thrust taste and insight and delicacy of perception
out of the schools, exalt the obvious and
the merely useful above the things which are only
imaginatively or spiritually conceived, make education
an affair of tasting and handling and smelling,
and so create Philistia, that country in which they
speak of “mere literature.” I suppose that in
Nirvana one would speak in like wise of “mere
life.”
The fear, at any rate, that such things may happen
cannot fail to set us anxiously pondering certain
questions about the systematic teaching of
literature in our schools and colleges. How are we
to impart classical writings to the children of the
general public? “Beshrew the general public!”
cries Mr. Birrell. “What in the name of the
Bodleian has the general public got to do with
literature?” Unfortunately, it has a great deal to
do with it; for are we not complacently forcing the
general public into our universities, and are we not
arranging that all its sons shall be instructed how
they may themselves master and teach our literature?
You have nowadays, it is believed, only to
heed the suggestions of pedagogics in order to know
how to impart Burke or Browning, Dryden or Swift.
There are certain practical difficulties, indeed; but
there are ways of overcoming them. You must
have strength if you would handle with real mastery
the firm fibre of these men; you must have a
heart, moreover, to feel their warmth, an eye to see
what they see, an imagination to keep them company,
a pulse to experience their delights. But if
you have none of these things, you may make shift
to do without them. You may count the words
they use, instead, note the changes of phrase they
make in successive revisions, put their rhythm into
a scale of feet, run their allusions—particularly
their female allusions—to cover, detect them in
their previous reading. Or, if none of these things
please you, or you find the big authors difficult
or dull, you may drag to light all the minor writers
of their time, who are easy to understand. By setting
an example in such methods you render great
services in certain directions. You make the higher
degrees of our universities available for the large
number of respectable men who can count, and
measure, and search diligently; and that may prove
no small matter. You divert attention from thought,
which is not always easy to get at, and fix attention
upon language, as upon a curious mechanism, which
can be perceived with the bodily eye, and which is
worthy to be studied for its own sake, quite apart
from anything it may mean. You encourage the
examination of forms, grammatical and metrical,
which can be quite accurately determined and quite
exhaustively catalogued. You bring all the visible
phenomena of writing to light and into ordered
system. You go further, and show how to make
careful literal identification of stories somewhere
told ill and without art with the same stories told
over again by the masters, well and with the transfiguring
effect of genius. You thus broaden the
area of science; for you rescue the concrete phenomena
of the expression of thought—the necessary
syllabification which accompanies it, the inevitable
juxtaposition of words, the constant use of
particles, the habitual display of roots, the inveterate
repetition of names, the recurrent employment
of meanings heard or read—from their confusion
with the otherwise unclassifiable manifestations of
what had hitherto been accepted, without critical
examination, under the lump term “literature,”
simply for the pleasure and spiritual edification to
be got from it.
An instructive differentiation ensues. In contrast
with the orderly phenomena of speech and
writing, which are amenable to scientific processes
of examination and classification, and which take
rank with the orderly successions of change in
nature, we have what, for want of a more exact
term, we call “mere literature,”—the literature
which is not an expression of form, but an expression
of spirit. This is a fugitive and troublesome
thing, and perhaps does not belong in well-conceived
plans of universal instruction; for it offers
many embarrassments to pedagogic method. It
escapes all scientific categories. It is not pervious
to research. It is too wayward to be brought under
the discipline of exposition. It is an attribute of
so many different substances at one and the same
time, that the consistent scientific man must needs
put it forth from his company, as without responsible
connections. By “mere literature” he means
mere evanescent color, wanton trick of phrase, perverse
departures from categorical statement,—something
all personal equation, such stuff as
dreams are made of.
We must not all, however, be impatient of this
truant child of fancy. When the schools cast her
out, she will stand in need of friendly succor, and
we must train our spirits for the function. We
must be free-hearted in order to make her
happy, for she will accept entertainment from no
sober, prudent fellow who shall counsel her to mend
her ways. She has always made light of hardship,
and she has never loved or obeyed any, save those
who were of her own mind,—those who were indulgent
to her humors, responsive to her ways of
thought, attentive to her whims, content with her
“mere” charms. She already has her small following
of devotees, like all charming, capricious
mistresses. There are some still who think that
to know her is better than a liberal education.
There is but one way in which you can take
mere literature as an education, and that is directly,
at first hand. Almost any media except her own
language and touch and tone are non-conducting.
A descriptive catalogue of a collection of paintings
is no substitute for the little areas of color and
form themselves. You do not want to hear about
a beautiful woman, simply,—how she was dressed,
how she bore herself, how the fine color flowed
sweetly here and there upon her cheeks, how her
eyes burned and melted, how her voice thrilled
through the ears of those about her. If you have
ever seen a woman, these things but tantalize and
hurt you, if you cannot see her. You want to be
in her presence. You know that only your own
eyes can give you direct knowledge of her. Nothing
but her presence contains her life. ’Tis
the same with the authentic products of literature.
You can never get their beauty at second hand, or
feel their power except by direct contact with them.
It is a strange and occult thing how this quality
of “mere literature” enters into one book, and is
absent from another; but no man who has once
felt it can mistake it. I was reading the other
day a book about Canada. It is written in what
the reviewers have pronounced to be an “admirable,
spirited style.” By this I take them to mean
that it is grammatical, orderly, and full of strong
adjectives. But these reviewers would have known
more about the style in which it is written if they
had noted what happens on page 84. There a
quotation from Burke occurs. “There is,” says
Burke, “but one healing, catholic principle of
toleration which ought to find favor in this house.
It is wanted not only in our colonies, but here. The
thirsty earth of our own country is gasping and
gaping and crying out for that healing shower from
heaven. The noble lord has told you of the right
of those people by treaty; but I consider the right
of conquest so little, and the right of human nature
so much, that the former has very little consideration
with me. I look upon the people of Canada
as coming by the dispensation of God under the
British government. I would have us govern it in
the same manner as the all—wise disposition of
Providence would govern it. We know he suffers
the sun to shine upon the righteous and the
unrighteous; and we ought to suffer all classes to
enjoy equally the right of worshiping God according
to the light he has been pleased to give them.”
The peculiarity of such a passage as that is, that it
needs no context. Its beauty seems almost independent
of its subject matter. It comes on that
eighty-fourth page like a burst of music in the
midst of small talk,—a tone of sweet harmony
heard amidst a rattle of phrases. The mild noise
was unobjectionable enough until the music came.
There is a breath and stir of life in those sentences
of Burke’s which is to be perceived in nothing else
in that volume. Your pulses catch a quicker
movement from them, and are stronger on their
account.
It is so with all essential literature. It has a
quality to move you, and you can never mistake it,
if you have any blood in you. And it has also a
power to instruct you which is as effective as it is
subtle, and which no research or systematic method
can ever rival. ’Tis a sore pity if that power cannot
be made available in the classroom. It is not
merely that it quickens your thought and fills your
imagination with the images that have illuminated
the choicer minds of the race. It does indeed exercise
the faculties in this wise, bringing them into
the best atmosphere, and into the presence of the
men of greatest charm and force; but it does a
great deal more than that. It acquaints the mind,
by direct contact, with the forces which really govern
and modify the world from generation to generation.
There is more of a nation’s politics to be
got out of its poetry than out of all its systematic
writers upon public affairs and constitutions. Epics
are better mirrors of manners than chronicles;
dramas oftentimes let you into the secrets of statutes;
orations stirred by a deep energy of emotion
or resolution, passionate pamphlets that survive their
mission because of the direct action of their style
along permanent lines of thought, contain more
history than parliamentary journals. It is not
knowledge that moves the world, but ideals, convictions,
the opinions or fancies that have been held
or followed; and whoever studies humanity ought
to study it alive, practice the vivisection of reading
literature, and acquaint himself with something
more than anatomies which are no longer in use by
spirits.
There are some words of Thibaut, the great
jurist, which have long seemed to me singularly
penetrative of one of the secrets of the intellectual
life. “I told him,” he says,—he is speaking of
an interview with Niebuhr,—“I told him that I
owed my gayety and vigor, in great part, to my
love for the classics of all ages, even those outside
the domain of jurisprudence.” Not only the gayety
and vigor of his hale old age, surely, but also his
insight into the meaning and purpose of laws and
institutions. The jurist who does not love the
classics of all ages is like a post-mortem doctor presiding
at a birth, a maker of manikins prescribing
for a disease of the blood, a student of masks setting
up for a connoisseur in smiles and kisses. In
narrating history, you are speaking of what was
done by men; in discoursing of laws, you are seeking
to show what courses of action, and what manner
of dealing with one another, men have adopted.
You can neither tell the story nor conceive the law
till you know how the men you speak of regarded
themselves and one another; and I know of no way
of learning this but by reading the stories they have
told of themselves, the songs they have sung, the
heroic adventures they have applauded. I must
know what, if anything, they revered; I must hear
their sneers and gibes; must learn in what accents
they spoke love within the family circle; with what
grace they obeyed their superiors in station; how
they conceived it politic to live, and wise to die;
how they esteemed property, and what they deemed
privilege; when they kept holiday, and why; when
they were prone to resist oppression, and wherefore,—I
must see things with their eyes, before I
can comprehend their law books. Their jural relationships
are not independent of their way of living,
and their way of thinking is the mirror of their
way of living.
It is doubtless due to the scientific spirit of the
age that these plain, these immemorial truths are
in danger of becoming obscured. Science, under
the influence of the conception of evolution, devotes
itself to the study of forms, of specific differences,
of the manner in which the same principle of life
manifests itself variously under the compulsions of
changes of environment. It is thus that it has become
“scientific” to set forth the manner in which
man’s nature submits to man’s circumstances;
scientific to disclose morbid moods, and the conditions
which produce them; scientific to regard
man, not as the centre or source of power, but as
subject to power, a register of external forces instead
of an originative soul, and character as a
product of man’s circumstances rather than a sign
of man’s mastery over circumstance. It is thus
that it has become “scientific” to analyze language
as itself a commanding element in man’s life.
The history of word-roots, their modification under
the influences of changes wrought in the vocal
organs by habit or by climate, the laws of phonetic
change to which they are obedient, and their persistence
under all disguises of dialect, as if they
were full of a self-originated life, a self-directed
energy of influence, is united with the study of
grammatical forms in the construction of scientific
conceptions of the evolution and uses of human
speech. The impression is created that literature
is only the chosen vessel of these forms, disclosing
to us their modification in use and structure from
age to age. Such vitality as the masterpieces of
genius possess comes to seem only a dramatization
of the fortunes of words. Great writers construct
for the adventures of language their appropriate
epics. Or, if it be not the words themselves that
are scrutinized, but the style of their use, that style
becomes, instead of a fine essence of personality, a
matter of cadence merely, or of grammatical and
structural relationships. Science is the study of
the forces of the world of matter, the adjustments,
the apparatus, of the universe; and the scientific
study of literature has likewise become a study of
apparatus,—of the forms in which men utter
thought, and the forces by which those forms have
been and still are being modified, rather than of
thought itself.
The essences of literature of course remain the
same under all forms, and the true study of literature
is the study of these essences,—a study, not
of forms or of differences, but of likenesses,—likenesses
of spirit and intent under whatever varieties
of method, running through all forms of speech
like the same music along the chords of various instruments.
There is a sense in which literature is
independent of form, just as there is a sense in
which music is independent of its instrument. It
is my cherished belief that Apollo’s pipe contained
as much eloquent music as any modern orchestra.
Some books live; many die: wherein is the secret
of immortality? Not in beauty of form, nor even
in force of passion. We might say of literature
what Wordsworth said of poetry, the most easily
immortal part of literature: it is “the impassioned
expression which is in the countenance of all science;
it is the breath of the finer spirit of all knowledge.”
Poetry has the easier immortality because it has
the sweeter accent when it speaks, because its
phrases linger in our ears to delight them, because
its truths are also melodies. Prose has much to
overcome,—its plainness of visage, its less musical
accents, its homelier turns of phrase. But it also
may contain the immortal essence of truth and
seriousness and high thought. It too may clothe
conviction with the beauty that must make it shine
forever. Let a man but have beauty in his heart,
and, believing something with his might, put it
forth arrayed as he sees it, the lights and shadows
falling upon it on his page as they fall upon it in
his heart, and he may die assured that that beauty
will not pass away out of the world.
Biographers have often been puzzled by the contrast
between certain men as they lived and as they
wrote. Schopenhauer’s case is one of the most
singular. A man of turbulent life, suffering himself
to be cut to exasperation by the petty worries
of his lot, he was nevertheless calm and wise when
he wrote, as if the Muse had rebuked him. He
wrote at a still elevation, where small and temporary
things did not come to disturb him. ’Tis a
pity that for some men this elevation is so far to
seek. They lose permanency by not finding it.
Could there be a deliberate regimen of life for the
author, it is plain enough how he ought to live, not
as seeking fame, but as deserving it.
“Fame, like a wayward girl, will still be coy
To those who woo her with too slavish knees;
But makes surrender to some thoughtless boy,
And dotes the more upon a heart at ease.
* * * * *
“Ye love-sick bards, repay her scorn with scorn;
Ye love-sick artists, madmen that ye are,
Make your best bow to her and bid adieu;
Then, if she likes it, she will follow you.”
It behooves all minor authors to realize the possibility
of their being discovered some day, and
exposed to the general scrutiny. They ought to
live as if conscious of the risk. They ought to
purge their hearts of everything that is not genuine
and capable of lasting the world a century, at least,
if need be. Mere literature is made of spirit. The
difficulties of style are the artist’s difficulties with
his tools. The spirit that is in the eye, in the pose,
in mien or gesture, the painter must find in his
color-box; as he must find also the spirit that
nature displays upon the face of the fields or in the
hidden places of the forest. The writer has less
obvious means. Word and spirit do not easily
consort. The language which the philologists set
out before us with such curious erudition is of very
little use as a vehicle for the essences of the human
spirit. It is too sophisticated and self-conscious.
What you need is, not a critical knowledge of
language, but a quick feeling for it. You must
recognize the affinities between your spirit and its
idioms. You must immerse your phrase in your
thought, your thought in your phrase, till each becomes
saturated with the other. Then what you
produce is as necessarily fit for permanency as if it
were incarnated spirit.
And you must produce in color, with the touch
of imagination which lifts what you write away
from the dull levels of mere exposition. Black-and-white
sketches may serve some purposes of the
artist, but very little of actual nature is in mere
black-and-white. The imagination never works
thus with satisfaction. Nothing is ever conceived
completely when conceived so grayly, without suffusion
of real light. The mind creates, as great
Nature does, in colors, with deep chiaroscuro and
burning lights. This is true not only of poetry
and essentially imaginative writing, but also of the
writing which seeks nothing more than to penetrate
the meaning of actual affairs,—the writing of
the greatest historians and philosophers, the utterances
of orators and of the great masters of political
exposition. Their narratives, their analyses,
their appeals, their conceptions of principle, are all
dipped deep in the colors of the life they expound.
Their minds respond only to realities, their eyes see
only actual circumstance. Their sentences quiver
and are quick with visions of human affairs,—how
minds are bent or governed, how action is shaped
or thwarted. The great “constructive” minds, as
we call them, are of this sort. They “construct”
by seeing what others have not imagination enough
to see. They do not always know more, but they
always realize more. Let the singular reconstruction
of Roman history and institutions by Theodor
Mommsen serve as an illustration. Safe men distrust
this great master. They cannot find what he
finds in the documents. They will draw you
truncated figures of the antique Roman state, and
tell you the limbs cannot be found, the features of
the face have nowhere been unearthed. They will
cite you fragments such as remain, and show you
how far these can be pieced together toward the
making of a complete description of private life
and public function in those first times when the
Roman commonwealth was young; but what the
missing sentences were they can only weakly conjecture.
Their eyes cannot descry those distant
days with no other aids than these. Only the
greatest are dissatisfied, and go on to paint that
ancient life with the materials that will render it
lifelike,—the materials of the constructive imagination.
They have other sources of information.
They see living men in the old documents. Give
them but the torso, and they will supply head and
limbs, bright and animate as they must have been.
If Mommsen does not quite do that, another man,
with Mommsen’s eye and a touch more of color on
his brush, might have done it,—may yet do it.
It is in this way that we get some glimpse of the
only relations that scholarship bears to literature.
Literature can do without exact scholarship, or
any scholarship at all, though it may impoverish
itself thereby; but scholarship cannot do without
literature. It needs literature to float it, to
set it current, to authenticate it to the race, to get
it out of closets, and into the brains of men who
stir abroad. It will adorn literature, no doubt;
literature will be the richer for its presence; but
it will not, it cannot, of itself create literature.
Rich stuffs from the East do not create a king, nor
warlike trappings a conqueror. There is, indeed,
a natural antagonism, let it be frankly said, between
the standards of scholarship and the standards
of literature. Exact scholarship values
things in direct proportion as they are verifiable;
but literature knows nothing of such tests. The
truths which it seeks are the truths of self-expression.
It is a thing of convictions, of insights, of
what is felt and seen and heard and hoped for. Its
meanings lurk behind nature, not in the facts of
its phenomena. It speaks of things as the man
who utters it saw them, not necessarily as God
made them. The personality of the speaker runs
throughout all the sentences of real literature. That
personality may not be the personality of a poet:
it may be only the personality of the penetrative
seer. It may not have the atmosphere in which
visions are seen, but only that in which men and
affairs look keenly cut in outline, boldly massed
in bulk, consummately grouped in detail, to the
reader as to the writer. Sentences of perfectly
clarified wisdom may be literature no less than
stanzas of inspired song, or the intense utterances
of impassioned feeling. The personality of the
sunlight is in the keen lines of light that run
along the edges of a sword no less than in the burning
splendor of the rose or the radiant kindlings of
a woman’s eye. You may feel the power of one
master of thought playing upon your brain as you
may feel that of another playing upon your heart.
Scholarship gets into literature by becoming
part of the originating individuality of a master of
thought. No man is a master of thought without
being also a master of its vehicle and instrument,
style, that subtle medium of all its evasive effects
of light and shade. Scholarship is material; it
is not life. It becomes immortal only when it is
worked upon by conviction, by schooled and chastened
imagination, by thought that runs alive out
of the inner fountains of individual insight and
purpose. Colorless, or without suffusion of light
from some source of light, it is dead, and will not
twice be looked at; but made part of the life of a
great mind, subordinated, absorbed, put forth with
authentic stamp of currency on it, minted at some
definite mint and bearing some sovereign image, it
will even outlast the time when it shall have ceased
to deserve the acceptance of scholars,—when it
shall, in fact, have become “mere literature.”
Scholarship is the realm of nicely adjusted opinion.
It is the business of scholars to assess evidence
and test conclusions, to discriminate values
and reckon probabilities. Literature is the realm
of conviction and vision. Its points of view are as
various as they are oftentimes unverifiable. It
speaks individual faiths. Its groundwork is not
erudition, but reflection and fancy. Your thoroughgoing
scholar dare not reflect. To reflect is to let
himself in on his material; whereas what he wants
is to keep himself apart, and view his materials in
an air that does not color or refract. To reflect is
to throw an atmosphere about what is in your
mind,—an atmosphere which holds all the colors
of your life. Reflection summons all associations,
and they so throng and move that they dominate
the mind’s stage at once. The plot is in their
hands. Scholars, therefore, do not reflect; they
label, group kind with kind, set forth in schemes,
expound with dispassionate method. Their minds
are not stages, but museums; nothing is done
there, but very curious and valuable collections are
kept there. If literature use scholarship, it is only
to fill it with fancies or shape it to new standards,
of which of itself it can know nothing.
True, there are books reckoned primarily books
of science and of scholarship which have nevertheless
won standing as literature; books of science
such as Newton wrote, books of scholarship such
as Gibbon’s. But science was only the vestibule
by which such a man as Newton entered the temple
of nature, and the art he practiced was not the art
of exposition, but the art of divination. He was
not only a scientist, but also a seer; and we shall not
lose sight of Newton because we value what he was
more than what he knew. If we continue Gibbon
in his fame, it will be for love of his art, not for
worship of his scholarship. We some of us, nowadays,
know the period of which he wrote better
even than he did; but which one of us shall build
so admirable a monument to ourselves, as artists,
out of what we know? The scholar finds his immortality
in the form he gives to his work. It is
a hard saying, but the truth of it is inexorable: be
an artist, or prepare for oblivion. You may write
a chronicle, but you will not serve yourself thereby.
You will only serve some fellow who shall come
after you, possessing, what you did not have, an
ear for the words you could not hit upon; an eye
for the colors you could not see; a hand for the
strokes you missed.
Real literature you can always distinguish by its
form, and yet it is not possible to indicate the
form it should have. It is easy to say that it
should have a form suitable to its matter; but how
suitable? Suitable to set the matter off, adorn,
embellish it, or suitable simply to bring it directly,
quick and potent, to the apprehension of the reader?
This is the question of style, about which many
masters have had many opinions; upon which you
can make up no safe generalization from the practice
of those who have unquestionably given to the
matter of their thought immortal form, an accent
or a countenance never to be forgotten. Who shall
say how much of Burke’s splendid and impressive
imagery is part and stuff of his thought, or tell
why even that part of Newman’s prose which is devoid
of ornament, stripped to its shining skin, and
running bare and lithe and athletic to carry its
tidings to men, should promise to enjoy as certain
an immortality? Why should Lamb go so quaintly
and elaborately to work upon his critical essays,
taking care to perfume every sentence, if possible,
with the fine savor of an old phrase, if the same
business could be as effectively done in the plain
and even cadences of Mr. Matthew Arnold’s prose?
Why should Gibbon be so formal, so stately, so
elaborate, when he had before his eyes the example
of great Tacitus, whose direct, sententious style had
outlived by so many hundred years the very language
in which he wrote? In poetry, who shall
measure the varieties of style lavished upon similar
themes? The matter of vital thought is not separable
from the thinker; its forms must suit his
handling as well as fit his conception. Any style
is author’s stuff which is suitable to his purpose and
his fancy. He may use rich fabrics with which to
costume his thoughts, or he may use simple stone
from which to sculpture them, and leave them
bare. His only limits are those of art. He may
not indulge a taste for the merely curious or fantastic.
The quaint writers have quaint thoughts;
their material is suitable. They do not merely
satisfy themselves as virtuosi, with collections of
odd phrases and obsolete meanings. They needed
twisted words to fit the eccentric patterns of their
thought. The great writer has always dignity, restraint,
propriety, adequateness; what time he
loses these qualities he ceases to be great. His
style neither creaks nor breaks under his passion,
but carries the strain with unshaken strength. It
is not trivial or mean, but speaks what small meanings
fall in its way with simplicity, as conscious of
their smallness. Its playfulness is within bounds;
its laugh never bursts too boisterously into a
guffaw. A great style always knows what it would
be at, and does the thing appropriately, with the
larger sort of taste.
This is the condemnation of tricks of phrase, devices
to catch the attention, exaggerations and loud
talk to hold it. No writer can afford to strive
after effect, if his striving is to be apparent. For
just and permanent effect is missed altogether
unless it be so completely attained as to seem like
some touch of sunlight, perfect, natural, inevitable,
wrought without effort and without deliberate purpose
to be effective. Mere audacity of attempt
can, of course, never win the wished for result;
and if the attempt be successful, it is not audacious.
What we call audacity in a great writer
has no touch of temerity, sauciness, or arrogance in
it. It is simply high spirit, a dashing and splendid
display of strength. Boldness is ridiculous
unless it be impressive, and it can be impressive
only when backed by solid forces of character and
attainment. Your plebeian hack cannot afford the
showy paces; only the full-blooded Arabian has
the sinew and proportion to lend them perfect
grace and propriety. The art of letters eschews
the bizarre as rigidly as does every other fine art.
It mixes its colors with brains, and is obedient to
great Nature’s sane standards of right adjustment
in all that it attempts.
You can make no catalogue of these features of
great writing; there is no science of literature.
Literature in its essence is mere spirit, and you
must experience it rather than analyze it too formally.
It is the door to nature and to ourselves.
It opens our hearts to receive the experiences of
great men and the conceptions of great races. It
awakens us to the significance of action and to the
singular power of mental habit. It airs our souls
in the wide atmosphere of contemplation. “In
these bad days, when it is thought more educationally
useful to know the principle of the common
pump than Keats’ Ode on a Grecian Urn,” as
Mr. Birrell says, we cannot afford to let one single
precious sentence of “mere literature” go by us
unread or unpraised. If this free people to which
we belong is to keep its fine spirit, its perfect temper
amidst affairs, its high courage in the face of
difficulties, its wise temperateness and wide-eyed
hope, it must continue to drink deep and often
from the old wells of English undefiled, quaff the
keen tonic of its best ideals, keep its blood warm
with all the great utterances of exalted purpose
and pure principle of which its matchless literature
is full. The great spirits of the past must
command us in the tasks of the future. Mere
literature will keep us pure and keep us strong.
Even though it puzzle or altogether escape scientific
method, it may keep our horizon clear for us,
and our eyes glad to look bravely forth upon the
world.
II. THE AUTHOR HIMSELF.
Who can help wondering, concerning the modern
multitude of books, where all these companions of
his reading hours will be buried when they die;
which will have monuments erected to them; which
escape the envy of time and live? It is pathetic
to think of the number that must be forgotten,
after having been removed from the good places to
make room for their betters.
Much the most pathetic thought about books,
however, is that excellence will not save them.
Their fates will be as whimsical as those of the
humankind which produces them. Knaves find it
as easy to get remembered as good men. It is not
right living or learning or kind offices, simply and
of themselves, but—something else that gives
immortality of fame. Be a book never so scholarly,
it may die; be it never so witty, or never so
full of good feeling and of an honest statement
of truth, it may not live.
When once a book has become immortal, we
think that we can see why it became so. It contained,
we perceive, a casting of thought which could not
but arrest and retain men’s attention; it said some
things once and for all because it gave them their
best expression. Or else it spoke with a grace or
with a fire of imagination, with a sweet cadence
of phrase and a full harmony of tone, which have
made it equally dear to all generations of those
who love the free play of fancy or the incomparable
music of perfected human speech. Or perhaps it
uttered with candor and simplicity some universal
sentiment; perchance pictured something in the
tragedy or the comedy of man’s life as it was never
pictured before, and must on that account be read
and read again as not to be superseded. There
must be something special, we judge, either in its
form or in its substance, to account for its unwonted
fame and fortune.
This upon first analysis, taking one book at a
time. A look deeper into the heart of the matter
enables us to catch at least a glimpse of a single
and common source of immortality. The world is
attracted by books as each man is attracted by his
several friends. You recommend that capital fellow
So-and-So to the acquaintance of others because
of his discriminating and diverting powers of observation:
the very tones and persons—it would
seem the very selves—of every type of man live
again in his mimicries and descriptions. He is the
dramatist of your circle; you can never forget him,
nor can any one else; his circle of acquaintances can
never grow smaller. Could he live on and retain
perennially that wonderful freshness and vivacity
of his, he must become the most famous guest and
favorite of the world. Who that has known a man
quick and shrewd to see dispassionately the inner
history, the reason and the ends, of the combinations
of society, and at the same time eloquent to tell of
them, with a hold on the attention gained by a certain
quaint force and sagacity resident in no other
man, can find it difficult to understand why we
still resort to Montesquieu? Possibly there are
circles favored of the gods who have known some
fellow of infinite store of miscellaneous and curious
learning, who has greatly diverted both himself
and his friends by a way peculiar to himself of giving
it out upon any and all occasions, item by item,
as if it were all homogeneous and of a piece, and
by his odd skill in making unexpected application
of it to out-of-the-way, unpromising subjects, as if
there were in his view of things mental no such disintegrating
element as incongruity. Such a circle
would esteem it strange were Burton not beloved
of the world. And so of those, if any there be,
who have known men of simple, calm, transparent
natures, untouched by storm or perplexity, whose
talk was full of such serious, placid reflection as
seemed to mirror their own reverent hearts,—talk
often prosy, but more often touchingly beautiful,
because of its nearness to nature and the solemn
truth of life. There may be those, also, who have
felt the thrill of personal contact with some stormy
peasant nature full of strenuous, unsparing speech
concerning men and affairs. These have known
why a Wordsworth or a Carlyle must be read by
all generations of those who love words of first-hand
inspiration. In short, in every case of literary
immortality originative personality is present.
Not origination simply,—that may be mere invention,
which in literature has nothing immortal about
it; but origination which takes its stamp and character
from the originator, which is his spirit given
to the world, which is himself outspoken.
Individuality does not consist in the use of the
very personal pronoun, I: it consists in tone, in
method, in attitude, in point of view; it consists in
saying things in such a way that you will yourself
be recognized as a force in saying them. Do we
not at once know Lamb when he speaks? And
even more formal Addison, does not his speech bewray
and endear him to us? His personal charm
is less distinct, much less fascinating, than that
which goes with what Lamb speaks, but a charm he
has sufficient for immortality. In Steele the matter
is more impersonal, more mortal. Some of Dr.
Johnson’s essays, you feel, might have been written
by a dictionary. It is impersonal matter that is
dead matter. Are you asked who fathered a certain
brilliant, poignant bit of political analysis?
You say, Why, only Bagehot could have written
that. Does a wittily turned verse make you hesitate
between laughter at its hit and grave thought
because of its deeper, covert meaning? Do you
not know that only Lowell could do that? Do
you catch a strain of pure Elizabethan music and
doubt whether to attribute it to Shakespeare or to
another? Do you not know the authors who still
live?
Now, the noteworthy thing about such individuality
is that it will not develop under every star, or
in one place just as well as in another; there is an
atmosphere which kills it, and there is an atmosphere
which fosters it. The atmosphere which
kills it is the atmosphere of sophistication, where
cleverness and fashion and knowingness thrive:
cleverness, which is froth, not strong drink; fashion,
which is a thing assumed, not a thing of
nature; and knowingness, which is naught.
Of course there are born, now and again, as
tokens of some rare mood of Nature, men of so
intense and individual a cast that circumstance and
surroundings affect them little more than friction
affects an express train. They command their own
development without even the consciousness that to
command costs strength. These cannot be sophisticated;
for sophistication is subordination to the
ways of your world. But these are the very greatest
and the very rarest; and it is not the greatest
and the rarest alone who shape the world and its
thought. That is done also by the great and the
merely extraordinary. There is a rank and file in
literature, even in the literature of immortality, and
these must go much to school to the people about
them.
It is by the number and charm of the individualities
which it contains that the literature of any
country gains distinction. We turn anywhither to
know men. The best way to foster literature, if it
may be fostered, is to cultivate the author himself,—a
plant of such delicate and precarious growth
that special soils are needed to produce it in its full
perfection. The conditions which foster individuality
are those which foster simplicity, thought and
action which are direct, naturalness, spontaneity.
What are these conditions?
In the first place, a certain helpful ignorance.
It is best for the author to be born away from literary
centres, or to be excluded from their ruling
set if he be born in them. It is best that he start
out with his thinking, not knowing how much has
been thought and said about everything. A certain
amount of ignorance will insure his sincerity, will
increase his boldness and shelter his genuineness,
which is his hope of power. Not ignorance of life,
but life may be learned in any neighborhood;—not
ignorance of the greater laws which govern
human affairs, but they may be learned without a
library of historians and commentators, by imaginative
sense, by seeing better than by reading;—not
ignorance of the infinitudes of human circumstance,
but these may be perceived without the intervention
of universities;—not ignorance of one’s self and
of one’s neighbor; but innocence of the sophistications
of learning, its research without love, its knowledge
without inspiration, its method without grace;
freedom from its shame at trying to know many
things as well as from its pride of trying to know
but one thing; ignorance of that faith in small confounding
facts which is contempt for large reassuring
principles.
Our present problem is not how to clarify our
reasonings and perfect our analyses, but how to
reënrich and reënergize our literature. That literature
is suffering, not from ignorance, but from
sophistication and self-consciousness; and it is suffering
hardly less from excess of logical method.
Ratiocination does not keep us pure, render us
earnest, or make us individual and specific forces
in the world. Those inestimable results are accomplished
by whatever implants principle and
conviction, whatever quickens with inspiration,
fills with purpose and courage, gives outlook, and
makes character. Reasoned thinking does indeed
clear the mind’s atmospheres and lay open to its
view fields of action; but it is loving and believing,
sometimes hating and distrusting, often
prejudice and passion, always the many things
which we call the one thing, character, which
create and shape our acting. Life quite overtowers
logic. Thinking and erudition alone will not equip
for the great tasks and triumphs of life and literature:
the persuading of other men’s purposes, the
entrance into other men’s minds to possess them
forever. Culture broadens and sweetens literature,
but native sentiment and unmarred individuality
create it. Not all of mental power lies in the processes
of thinking. There is power also in passion,
in personality, in simple, native, uncritical conviction,
in unschooled feeling. The power of
science, of system, is executive, not stimulative. I
do not find that I derive inspiration, but only information,
from the learned historians and analysts
of liberty; but from the sonneteers, the poets, who,
speak its spirit and its exalted purpose,—who,
recking nothing of the historical method, obey only
the high method of their own hearts,—what may
a man not gain of courage and confidence in the
right way of politics?
It is your direct, unhesitating, intent, headlong
man, who has his sources in the mountains, who
digs deep channels for himself in the soil of his
times and expands into the mighty river, to become
a landmark forever; and not your “broad” man,
sprung from the schools, who spreads his shallow,
extended waters over the wide surfaces of learning,
to leave rich deposits, it may be, for other men’s
crops to grow in, but to be himself dried up by a
few score summer noons. The man thrown early
upon his own resources, and already become a conqueror
of success before being thrown with the
literary talkers; the man grown to giant’s stature
in some rural library, and become exercised there
in a giant’s prerogatives before ever he has been
laughingly told, to his heart’s confusion, of scores
of other giants dead and forgotten long ago; the
man grounded in hope and settled in conviction
ere he has discovered how many hopes time has
seen buried, how many convictions cruelly given
the lie direct by fate; the man who has carried
his youth into middle age before going into the
chill atmosphere of blasé sentiment; the quiet,
stern man who has cultivated literature on a little
oatmeal before thrusting himself upon the great
world as a prophet and seer; the man who pronounces
new eloquence in the rich dialect in which
he was bred; the man come up to the capital
from the provinces,—these are the men who people
the world’s mind with new creations, and give
to the sophisticated learned of the next generation
new names to conjure with.
If you have a candid and well-informed friend
among city lawyers, ask him where the best masters
of his profession are bred,—in the city or in
the country. He will reply without hesitation,
“In the country.” You will hardly need to have
him state the reason. The country lawyer has
been obliged to study all parts of the law alike, and
he has known no reason why he should not do so.
He has not had the chance to make himself a
specialist in any one branch of the law, as is the
fashion among city practitioners, and he has not
coveted the opportunity to do it. There would not
have been enough special cases to occupy or remunerate
him if he had coveted it. He has dared
attempt the task of knowing the whole law, and
yet without any sense of daring, but as a matter of
course. In his own little town, in the midst of his
own small library of authorities, it has not seemed
to him an impossible task to explore all the topics
that engage his profession; the guiding principles,
at any rate, of all branches of the great subject
were open to him in a few books. And so it often
happens that when he has found his sea legs on
the sequestered inlets at home, and ventures, as
he sometimes will, upon the great, troublous, and
much-frequented waters of city practice in search
of more work and larger fees, the country lawyer
will once and again confound his city-bred brethren
by discovering to them the fact that the law is a
many-sided thing of principles, and not altogether
a one-sided thing of technical rule and arbitrary
precedent.
It would seem to be necessary that the author
who is to stand as a distinct and imperative individual
among the company of those who express
the world’s thought should come to a hard crystallization
before subjecting himself to the tense strain
of cities, the corrosive acids of critical circles.
The ability to see for one’s self is attainable, not
by mixing with crowds and ascertaining how they
look at things, but by a certain aloofness and self-containment.
The solitariness of some genius is
not accidental; it is characteristic and essential.
To the constructive imagination there are some immortal
feats which are possible only in seclusion.
The man must heed first and most of all the suggestions
of his own spirit; and the world can be
seen from windows overlooking the street better
than from the street itself.
Literature grows rich, various, full-voiced largely
through the re-discovery of truth, by thinking re-thought,
by stories re-told, by songs re-sung. The
song of human experience grows richer and richer
in its harmonies, and must grow until the full accord
and melody are come. If too soon subjected
to the tense strain of the city, a man cannot expand;
he is beaten out of his natural shape by the
incessant impact and press of men and affairs. It
will often turn out that the unsophisticated man
will display not only more force, but more literary
skill even, than the trained littérateur. For one
thing, he will probably have enjoyed a fresher contact
with old literature. He reads not for the sake
of a critical acquaintance with this or that author,
with no thought of going through all his writings
and “working him up,” but as he would ride a
spirited horse, for love of the life and motion of it.
A general impression seems to have gained currency
that the last of the bullying, omniscient
critics was buried in the grave of Francis Jeffrey;
and it is becoming important to correct the misapprehension.
There never was a time when there
was more superior knowledge, more specialist
omniscience, among reviewers than there is to-day;
not pretended superior knowledge, but real. Jeffrey’s
was very real of its kind. For those who
write books, one of the special, inestimable advantages
of lacking a too intimate knowledge of the
“world of letters” consists in not knowing all that
is known by those who review books, in ignorance
of the fashions among those who construct canons
of taste. The modern critic is a leader of fashion.
He carries with him the air of a literary worldliness.
If your book be a novel, your reviewer will
know all previous plots, all former, all possible,
motives and situations. You cannot write anything
absolutely new for him, and why should you
desire to do again what has been done already?
If it be a poem, the reviewer’s head already rings
with the whole gamut of the world’s metrical music;
he can recognize any simile, recall all turns of
phrase, match every sentiment; why seek to please
him anew with old things? If it concern itself
with the philosophy of politics, he can and will set
himself to test it by the whole history of its kind
from Plato down to Benjamin Kidd. How can it
but spoil your sincerity to know that your critic
will know everything? Will you not be tempted
of the devil to anticipate his judgment or his pretensions
by pretending to know as much as he?
The literature of creation naturally falls into two
kinds: that which interprets nature or human action,
and that which interprets self. Both of these
may have the flavor of immortality, but neither
unless it be free from self-consciousness. No man,
therefore, can create after the best manner in either
of these kinds who is an habitué of the circles
made so delightful by those interesting men, the
modern literati, sophisticated in all the fashions,
ready in all the catches of the knowing literary
world which centres in the city and the university.
He cannot always be simple and straightforward.
He cannot be always and without pretension himself,
bound by no other man’s canons of taste in
speech or conduct. In the judgment of such circles
there is but one thing for you to do if you
would gain distinction: you must “beat the record;”
you must do certain definite literary feats
better than they have yet been done. You are
pitted against the literary “field.” You are hastened
into the paralysis of comparing yourself with
others, and thus away from the health of unhesitating
self-expression and directness of first-hand
vision.
It would be not a little profitable if we could
make correct analysis of the proper relations of
learning—learning of the critical, accurate sort—to
origination, of learning’s place in literature.
Although learning is never the real parent of literature,
but only sometimes its foster-father, and although
the native promptings of soul and sense are
its best and freshest sources, there is always the
danger that learning will claim, in every court of
taste which pretends to jurisdiction, exclusive and
preëminent rights as the guardian and preceptor
of authors. An effort is constantly being made to
create and maintain standards of literary worldliness,
if I may coin such a phrase. The thorough
man of the world affects to despise natural feeling;
does at any rate actually despise all displays of
it. He has an eye always on his world’s best manners,
whether native or imported, and is at continual
pains to be master of the conventions of society;
he will mortify the natural man as much as need
be in order to be in good form. What learned
criticism essays to do is to create a similar literary
worldliness, to establish fashions and conventions in
letters.
I have an odd friend in one of the northern counties
of Georgia,—a county set off by itself among
the mountains, but early found out by refined people
in search of summer refuge from the unhealthful
air of the southern coast. He belongs to an excellent
family of no little culture, but he was surprised
in the midst of his early schooling by the
coming on of the war; and education given pause
in such wise seldom begins again in the schools.
He was left, therefore, to “finish” his mind as
best he might in the companionship of the books in
his uncle’s library. These books were of the old
sober sort: histories, volumes of travels, treatises
on laws and constitutions, theologies, philosophies
more fanciful than the romances encased in neighbor
volumes on another shelf. But they were books
which were used to being taken down and read;
they had been daily companions to the rest of the
family, and they became familiar companions to my
friend’s boyhood. He went to them day after day,
because theirs was the only society offered him in
the lonely days when uncle and brothers were at
the war, and the women were busy about the tasks
of the home. How literally did he make those
delightful old volumes his familiars, his cronies!
He never dreamed the while, however, that he was
becoming learned; it never seemed to occur to him
that everybody else did not read just as he did, in just
such a library. He found out afterwards, of course,
that he had kept much more of such company than
had the men with whom he loved to chat at the
post-office or around the fire in the village shops,
the habitual resorts of all who were socially inclined;
but he attributed that to lack of time on
their part, or to accident, and has gone on thinking
until now that all the books that come within his
reach are the natural intimates of man. And so
you shall hear him, in his daily familiar talk with
his neighbors, draw upon his singular stores of wise,
quaint learning with the quiet colloquial assurance,
“They tell me,” as if books contained current
rumor; and quote the poets with the easy unaffectedness
with which others cite a common maxim of
the street! He has been heard to refer to Dr.
Arnold of Rugby as “that school teacher over there
in England.”
Surely one may treasure the image of this
simple, genuine man of learning as the image of a
sort of masterpiece of Nature in her own type of
erudition, a perfect sample of the kind of learning
that might beget the very highest sort of literature;
the literature, namely, of authentic individuality. It
is only under one of two conditions that learning
will not dull the edge of individuality: first, if one
never suspect that it is creditable and a matter of
pride to be learned, and so never become learned
for the sake of becoming so; or, second, if it never
suggest to one that investigation is better than
reflection. Learned investigation leads to many
good things, but one of these is not great literature,
because learned investigation commands, as
the first condition of its success, the repression of
individuality.
His mind is a great comfort to every man who
has one; but a heart is not often to be so conveniently
possessed. Hearts frequently give trouble;
they are straightforward and impulsive, and can
seldom be induced to be prudent. They must be
schooled before they will become insensible; they
must be coached before they can be made to care
first and most for themselves: and in all cases the
mind must be their schoolmaster and coach. They
are irregular forces; but the mind may be trained
to observe all points of circumstance and all motives
of occasion.
No doubt it is considerations of this nature that
must be taken to explain the fact that our universities
are erected entirely for the service of the
tractable mind, while the heart’s only education
must be gotten from association with its neighbor
heart, and in the ordinary courses of the world.
Life is its only university. Mind is monarch,
whose laws claim supremacy in those lands which
boast the movements of civilization, and it must
command all the instrumentalities of education.
At least such is the theory of the constitution of
the modern world. It is to be suspected that, as a
matter of fact, mind is one of those modern monarchs
who reign, but do not govern. That old House of
Commons, that popular chamber in which the passions,
the prejudices, the inborn, unthinking affections
long ago repudiated by mind, have their full
representation, controls much the greater part of
the actual conduct of affairs. To come out of the
figure, reasoned thought is, though perhaps the presiding,
not yet the regnant force in the world. In
life and in literature it is subordinate. The future
may belong to it; but the present and past do not.
Faith and virtue do not wear its livery; friendship,
loyalty, patriotism, do not derive their motives from
it. It does not furnish the material for those masses
of habit, of unquestioned tradition, and of treasured
belief which are the ballast of every steady ship of
state, enabling it to spread its sails safely to the
breezes of progress, and even to stand before the
storms of revolution. And this is a fact which
has its reflection in literature. There is a literature
of reasoned thought; but by far the greater
part of those writings which we reckon worthy of
that great name is the product, not of reasoned
thought, but of the imagination and of the spiritual
vision of those who see,—writings winged, not
with knowledge, but with sympathy, with sentiment,
with heartiness. Even the literature of reasoned
thought gets its life, not from its logic, but from
the spirit, the insight, and the inspiration which
are the vehicle of its logic. Thought presides, but
sentiment has the executive powers; the motive
functions belong to feeling.
“Many people give many theories of literary
composition,” says the most natural and stimulating
of English critics, “and Dr. Blair, whom we
will read, is sometimes said to have exhausted the
subject; but, unless he has proved the contrary,
we believe that the knack in style is to write like a
human being. Some think they must be wise,
some elaborate, some concise; Tacitus wrote like a
pair of stays; some startle us, as Thomas Carlyle,
or a comet, inscribing with his tail. But legibility
is given to those who neglect these notions, and are
willing to be themselves, to write their own thoughts
in their own words, in the simplest words, in the
words wherein they were thought.... Books are
for various purposes,—tracts to teach, almanacs to
sell, poetry to make pastry; but this is the rarest sort
of a book,—a book to read. As Dr. Johnson
said, ‘Sir, a good book is one you can hold in your
hand, and take to the fire.’ Now there are extremely
few books which can, with any propriety,
be so treated. When a great author, as Grote or
Gibbon, has devoted a whole life of horrid industry
to the composition of a large history, one feels one
ought not to touch it with a mere hand,—it is not
respectful. The idea of slavery hovers over the
Decline and Fall. Fancy a stiffly dressed gentleman,
in a stiff chair, slowly writing that stiff compilation
in a stiff hand; it is enough to stiffen you for life.”
It is devoutly to be wished that we might learn to
prepare the best soils for mind, the best associations
and companionships, the least possible sophistication.
We are busy enough nowadays finding
out the best ways of fertilizing and stimulating
mind; but that is not quite the same thing as discovering
the best soils for it, and the best atmospheres.
Our culture is, by erroneous preference,
of the reasoning faculty, as if that were all of us.
Is it not the instinctive discontent of readers seeking
stimulating contact with authors that has given
us the present almost passionately spoken dissent
from the standards set themselves by the realists in
fiction, dissatisfaction with mere recording or observation?
And is not realism working out upon
itself the revenge its enemies would fain compass?
Must not all April Hopes exclude from their number
the hope of immortality?
The rule for every man is, not to depend on the
education which other men prepare for him,—not
even to consent to it; but to strive to see things as
they are, and to be himself as he is. Defeat lies
in self-surrender.
III. ON AN AUTHOR’S CHOICE OF COMPANY.
Once and again, it would seem, a man is born into
the world belated. Strayed out of a past age, he
comes among us like an alien, lives removed and
singular, and dies a stranger. There was a touch
of this strangeness in Charles Lamb. Much as he
was loved and befriended, he was not much understood;
for he drew aloof in his studies, affected
a “self-pleasing quaintness” in his style, took no
pains to hit the taste of his day, wandered at sweet
liberty in an age which could scarcely have bred
such another. “Hang the age!” he cried. “I
will write for antiquity.” And he did. He wrote
as if it were still Shakespeare’s day; made the
authors of that spacious time his constant companions
and study; and deliberately became himself
“the last of the Elizabethans.” When a new book
came out, he said, he always read an old one.
The case ought, surely, to put us occasionally
upon reflecting. May an author not, in some degree,
by choosing his literary company, choose also
his literary character, and so, when he comes to
write, write himself back to his masters? May he
not, by examining his own tastes and yielding himself
obedient to his natural affinities, join what congenial
group of writers he will? The question can
be argued very strongly in the affirmative, and
that not alone because of Charles Lamb’s case. It
might be said that Lamb was antique only in the
forms of his speech; that he managed very cleverly
to hit the taste of his age in the substance of
what he wrote, for all the phraseology had so strong
a flavor of quaintness and was not at all in the
mode of the day. It would not be easy to prove
that; but it really does not matter. In his tastes,
certainly, Lamb was an old author, not a new one;
a “modern antique,” as Hood called him. He
wrote for his own age, of course, because there was
no other age at hand to write for, and the age he
liked best was past and gone; but he wrote what
he fancied the great generations gone by would
have liked, and what, as it has turned out in the
generosity of fortune, subsequent ages have warmly
loved and reverently canonized him for writing; as
if there were a casual taste that belongs to a day and
generation, and also a permanent taste which is
without date, and he had hit the latter.
Great authors are not often men of fashion.
Fashion is always a harness and restraint, whether
it be fashion in dress or fashion in vice or fashion
in literary art; and a man who is bound by it is
caught and formed in a fleeting mode. The great
writers are always innovators; for they are always
frank, natural, and downright, and frankness and
naturalness always disturb, when they do not wholly
break down, the fixed and complacent order of
fashion. No genuine man can be deliberately in
the fashion, indeed, in what he says, if he have any
movement of thought or individuality in him. He
remembers what Aristotle says, or if he does not,
his own pride and manliness fill him with the
thought instead. The very same action that is
noble if done for the satisfaction of one’s own sense
of right or purpose of self-development, said the
Stagirite, may, if done to satisfy others, become
menial and slavish. “It is the object of any action
or study that is all-important,” and if the author’s
chief object be to please he is condemned already.
The true spirit of authorship is a spirit of liberty
which scorns the slave’s trick of imitation. It is a
masterful spirit of conquest within the sphere of
ideas and of artistic form,—an impulse of empire
and origination.
Of course a man may choose, if he will, to be
less than a free author. He may become a reporter;
for there is such a thing as reporting for books as
well as reporting for newspapers, and there have
been reporters so amazingly clever that their very
aptness and wit constitute them a sort of immortals.
You have proof of this in Horace Walpole,
at whose hands gossip and compliment receive a
sort of apotheosis. Such men hold the secret of
a kind of alchemy by which things trivial and temporary
may be transmuted into literature. But
they are only inspired reporters, after all; and
while a man was wishing, he might wish to be more,
and climb to better company.
Every man must, of course, whether he will or
not, feel the spirit of the age in which he lives and
thinks and does his work; and the mere contact
will direct and form him more or less. But to wish
to serve the spirit of the age at any sacrifice of individual
naturalness or conviction, however small,
is to harbor the germ of a destroying disease.
Every man who writes ought to write for immortality,
even though he be of the multitude that die
at their graves; and the standards of immortality
are of no single age. There are many qualities
and causes that give permanency to a book, but
universal vogue during the author’s lifetime is not
one of them. Many authors now immortal have
enjoyed the applause of their own generations;
many authors now universally admired will, let us
hope, pass on to an easy immortality. The praise
of your own day is no absolute disqualification;
but it may be if it be given for qualities which
your friends are the first to admire, for ’tis likely
they will also be the last. There is a greater
thing than the spirit of the age, and that is the
spirit of the ages. It is present in your own day;
it is even dominant then, with a sort of accumulated
power and mastery. If you can strike it,
you will strike, as it were, into the upper air of
your own time, where the forces are which run
from age to age. Lower down, where you breathe,
is the more inconstant air of opinion, inhaled, exhaled,
from day to day,—the variant currents, the
forces that will carry you, not forward, but hither
and thither.
We write nowadays a great deal with our eyes
circumspectly upon the tastes of our neighbors, but
very little with our attention bent upon our own
natural, self-speaking thoughts and the very truth
of the matter whereof we are discoursing. Now
and again, it is true, we are startled to find how
the age relishes still an old-fashioned romance, if
written with a new-fashioned vigor and directness;
how quaint and simple and lovely things, as well
as what is altogether modern and analytic and
painful, bring our most judicious friends crowding,
purses in hand, to the book-stalls; and for a while
we are puzzled to see worn-out styles and past
modes revived. But we do not let these things
seriously disturb our study of prevailing fashions.
These books of adventure are not at all, we assure
ourselves, in the true spirit of the age, with its
realistic knowledge of what men really do think
and purpose, and the taste for them must be only
for the moment or in jest. We need not let our
surprise at occasional flurries and variations in the
literary market cloud or discredit our analysis of
the real taste of the day, or suffer ourselves to be
betrayed into writing romances, however much we
might rejoice to be delivered from the drudgery of
sociological study, and made free to go afield with
our imaginations upon a joyous search for hidden
treasure or knightly adventure.
And yet it is quite likely, after all, that the
present age is transient. Past ages have been. It
is probable that the objects and interests now so
near us, looming dominant in all the foreground
of our day, will sometime be shifted and lose their
place in the perspective. That has happened with
the near objects and exaggerated interests of other
days, so violently sometimes as to submerge and
thrust out of sight whole libraries of books. It
will not do to reckon upon the persistence of new
things. ’Twere best to give them time to make
trial of the seasons. The old things of art and
taste and thought are the permanent things. We
know that they are because they have lasted long
enough to grow old; and we deem it safe to assess
the spirit of the age by the same test. No age
adds a great deal to what it received from the age
that went before it; no time gets an air all its
own. The same atmosphere holds from age to age;
it is only the little movements of the air that are
new. In the intervals when the trades do not
blow, fleeting cross-winds venture abroad, the which
if a man wait for he may lose his voyage.
No man who has anything to say need stop and
bethink himself whom he may please or displease
in the saying of it. He has but one day to write
in, and that is his own. He need not fear that he
will too much ignore it. He will address the men
he knows when he writes, whether he be conscious
of it or not; he may dismiss all fear on that score
and use his liberty to the utmost. There are some
things that can have no antiquity and must ever be
without date, and genuineness and spirit are of
their number. A man who has these must ever
be “timely,” and at the same time fit to last, if he
can get his qualities into what he writes. He may
freely read, too, what he will that is congenial, and
form himself by companionships that are chosen
simply because they are to his taste; that is, if he
be genuine and in very truth a man of independent
spirit. Lamb would have written “for antiquity”
with a vengeance had his taste for the quaint
writers of an elder day been an affectation, or
the authors he liked men themselves affected and
ephemeral. No age this side antiquity would ever
have vouchsafed him a glance or a thought. But
it was not an affectation, and the men he preferred
were as genuine and as spirited as he was.
He was simply obeying an affinity and taking
cheer after his own kind. A man born into the
real patriciate of letters may take his pleasure in
what company he will without taint or loss of
caste; may go confidently abroad in the free
world of books and choose his comradeships without
fear of offense.
More than that, there is no other way in which
he can form himself, if he would have his power
transcend a single age. He belittles himself who
takes from the world no more than he can get
from the speech of his own generation. The only
advantage of books over speech is that they may
hold from generation to generation, and reach, not
a small group merely, but a multitude of men;
and a man who writes without being a man of
letters is curtailed of his heritage. It is in this
world of old and new that he must form himself if
he would in the end belong to it and increase its
bulk of treasure. If he has conned the new theories
of society, but knows nothing of Burke; the
new notions about fiction, and has not read his
Scott and his Richardson; the new criminology,
and wots nothing of the old human nature; the new
religions, and has never felt the power and sanctity
of the old, it is much the same as if he had
read Ibsen and Maeterlinck, and had never opened
Shakespeare. How is he to know wholesome air
from foul, good company from bad, visions from
nightmares? He has framed himself for the great
art and handicraft of letters only when he has
taken all the human parts of literature as if they
were without date, and schooled himself in a catholic
sanity of taste and judgment.
Then he may very safely choose what company
his own work shall be done in,—in what manner,
and under what masters. He cannot choose amiss
for himself or for his generation if he choose like a
man, without light whim or weak affectation; not
like one who chooses a costume, but like one who
chooses a character. What is it, let him ask himself,
that renders a bit of writing a “piece of
literature”? It is reality. A “wood-note wild,”
sung unpremeditated and out of the heart; a description
written as if with an undimmed and
seeing eye upon the very object described; an
exposition that lays bare the very soul of the
matter; a motive truly revealed; anger that is
righteous and justly spoken; mirth that has its
sources pure; phrases to find the heart of a thing,
and a heart seen in things for the phrases to find;
an unaffected meaning set out in language that is
its own,—such are the realities of literature.
Nothing else is of the kin. Phrases used for their
own sake; borrowed meanings which the borrower
does not truly care for; an affected manner; an
acquired style; a hollow reason; words that are
not fit; things which do not live when spoken,—these
are its falsities, which die in the handling.
The very top breed of what is unreal is begotten
by imitation. Imitators succeed sometimes,
and flourish, even while a breath may last; but
“imitate and be damned” is the inexorable
threat and prophecy of fate with regard to the
permanent fortunes of literature. That has been
notorious this long time past. It is more worth
noting, lest some should not have observed it, that
there are other and subtler ways of producing
what is unreal. There are the mixed kinds of
writing, for example. Argument is real if it come
vital from the mind; narrative is real if the thing
told have life and the narrator unaffectedly see it
while he speaks; but to narrate and argue in the
same breath is naught. Take, for instance, the
familiar example of the early history of Rome.
Make up your mind what was the truth of the
matter, and then, out of the facts as you have disentangled
them, construct a firmly touched narrative,
and the thing you create is real, has the confidence
and consistency of life. But mix the narrative
with critical comment upon other writers and their
variant versions of the tale, show by a nice elaboration
of argument the whole conjectural basis of
the story, set your reader the double task of doubting
and accepting, rejecting and constructing, and
at once you have touched the whole matter with
unreality. The narrative by itself might have had
an objective validity; the argument by itself an
intellectual firmness, sagacity, vigor, that would
have sufficed to make and keep it potent; but
together they confound each other, destroy each
other’s atmosphere, make a double miscarriage.
The story is rendered unlikely, and the argument
obscure. This is the taint which has touched all
our recent historical writing. The critical discussion
and assessment of the sources of information,
which used to be a thing for the private mind of
the writer, now so encroach upon the open text
that the story, for the sake of which we would believe
the whole thing was undertaken, is oftentimes
fain to sink away into the foot-notes. The
process has ceased to be either pure exegesis or
straightforward narrative, and history has ceased
to be literature.
Nor is this our only sort of mixed writing.
Our novels have become sociological studies, our
poems vehicles of criticism, our sermons political
manifestos. We have confounded all processes in
a common use, and do not know what we would be
at. We can find no better use for Pegasus than
to carry our vulgar burdens, no higher key for
song than questionings and complainings. Fancy
pulls in harness with intellectual doubt; enthusiasm
walks apologetically alongside science. We
try to make our very dreams engines of social reform.
It is a parlous state of things for literature,
and it is high time authors should take heed what
company they keep. The trouble is, they all want
to be “in society,” overwhelmed with invitations
from the publishers, well known and talked about
at the clubs, named every day in the newspapers,
photographed for the news-stalls; and it is so hard
to distinguish between fashion and form, costume
and substance, convention and truth, the things
that show well and the things that last well; so
hard to draw away from the writers that are new
and talked about and note those who are old and
walk apart, to distinguish the tones which are
merely loud from the tones that are genuine, to
get far enough away from the press and the hubbub
to see and judge the movements of the crowd!
Some will do it. Choice spirits will arise and
make conquest of us, not “in society,” but with
what will seem a sort of outlawry. The great
growths of literature spring up in the open, where
the air is free and they can be a law unto themselves.
The law of life, here as elsewhere, is the
law of nourishment: with what was the earth
laden, and the atmosphere? Literatures are renewed,
as they are originated, by uncontrived impulses
of nature, as if the sap moved unbidden in
the mind. Once conceive the matter so, and
Lamb’s quaint saying assumes a sort of gentle
majesty. A man should “write for antiquity” as
a tree grows into the ancient air,—this old air
that has moved upon the face of the world ever
since the day of creation, which has set the law of
life to all things, which has nurtured the forests
and won the flowers to their perfection, which has
fed men’s lungs with life, sped their craft upon the
seas, borne abroad their songs and their cries,
blown their forges to flame, and buoyed up whatever
they have contrived. ’Tis a common medium,
though a various life; and the figure may serve
the author for instruction.
The breeding of authors is no doubt a very
occult thing, and no man can set the rules of it;
but at least the sort of “ampler ether” in which
they are best brought to maturity is known. Writers
have liked to speak of the Republic of Letters,
as if to mark their freedom and equality; but
there is a better phrase, namely, the Community
of Letters; for that means intercourse and comradeship
and a life in common. Some take up
their abode in it as if they had made no search for
a place to dwell in, but had come into the freedom
of it by blood and birthright. Others buy the
freedom with a great price, and seek out all the
sights and privileges of the place with an eager
thoroughness and curiosity. Still others win their
way into it with a certain grace and aptitude, next
best to the ease and dignity of being born to the
right. But for all it is a bonny place to be. Its
comradeships are a liberal education. Some, indeed,
even there, live apart; but most run always
in the market-place to know what all the rest have
said. Some keep special company, while others
keep none at all. But all feel the atmosphere and
life of the place in their several degrees.
No doubt there are national groups, and Shakespeare
is king among the English, as Homer is
among the Greeks, and sober Dante among his
gay countrymen. But their thoughts all have in
common, though speech divide them; and sovereignty
does not exclude comradeship or embarrass
freedom. No doubt there is many a willful, ungoverned
fellow endured there without question,
and many a churlish cynic, because he possesses
that patent of genuineness or of a wit which
strikes for the heart of things, which, without
further test, secures citizenship in that free company.
What a gift of tongues is there, and of
prophecy! What strains of good talk, what counsel
of good judgment, what cheer of good tales,
what sanctity of silent thought! The sight-seers
who pass through from day to day, the press of
voluble men at the gates, the affectation of citizenship
by mere sojourners, the folly of those who
bring new styles or affect old ones, the procession
of the generations, disturb the calm of that serene
community not a whit. They will entertain a
man a whole decade, if he happen to stay so long,
though they know all the while he can have no
permanent place among them.
’T would be a vast gain to have the laws of that
community better known than they are. Even the
first principles of its constitution are singularly
unfamiliar. It is not a community of writers, but
a community of letters. One gets admission, not
because he writes,—write he never so cleverly, like
a gentleman and a man of wit,—but because he is
literate, a true initiate into the secret craft and
mystery of letters. What that secret is a man
may know, even though he cannot practice or appropriate
it. If a man can see the permanent element
in things,—the true sources of laughter, the
real fountains of tears, the motives that strike
along the main lines of conduct, the acts which display
the veritable characters of men, the trifles that
are significant, the details that make the mass,—if
he know these things, and can also choose words
with a like knowledge of their power to illuminate
and reveal, give color to the eye and passion to the
thought, the secret is his, and an entrance to that
immortal communion.
It may be that some learn the mystery of that
insight without tutors; but most must put themselves
under governors and earn their initiation.
While a man lives, at any rate, he can keep the
company of the masters whose words contain the
mystery and open it to those who can see, almost
with every accent; and in such company it may at
last be revealed to him,—so plainly that he may,
if he will, still linger in such comradeship when he
is dead.
It would seem that there are two tests which
admit to that company, and that they are conclusive.
The one is, Are you individual? the other,
Are you conversable? “I beg pardon,” said a
grave wag, coming face to face with a small person
of most consequential air, and putting glass to
eye in calm scrutiny—“I beg pardon; but are you
anybody in particular?” Such is very much the
form of initiation into the permanent communion
of the realm of letters. Tell them, No, but that
you have done much better—you have caught the
tone of a great age, studied taste, divined opportunity,
courted and won a vast public, been most
timely and most famous; and you shall be pained
to find them laughing in your face. Tell them you
are earnest, sincere, consecrate to a cause, an
apostle and reformer, and they will still ask you,
“But are you anybody in particular?” They will
mean, “Were you your own man in what you
thought, and not a puppet? Did you speak with
an individual note and distinction that marked you
able to think as well as to speak,—to be yourself
in thoughts and in words also?” “Very well,
then; you are welcome enough.”
“That is, if you be also conversable.” It is
plain enough what they mean by that, too. They
mean, if you have spoken in such speech and spirit
as can be understood from age to age, and not in
the pet terms and separate spirit of a single day
and generation. Can the old authors understand
you, that you would associate with them? Will
men be able to take your meaning in the differing
days to come? Or is it perishable matter of the
day that you deal in—little controversies that
carry no lasting principle at their heart; experimental
theories of life and science, put forth for
their novelty and with no test of their worth; pictures
in which fashion looms very large, but human
nature shows very small; things that please everybody,
but instruct no one; mere fancies that are
an end in themselves? Be you never so clever an
artist in words and in ideas, if they be not the
words that wear and mean the same thing, and
that a thing intelligible, from age to age, the ideas
that shall hold valid and luminous in whatever day
or company, you may clamor at the gate till your
lungs fail and get never an answer.
For that to what you seek admission is a veritable
“community.” In it you must be able to be,
and to remain, conversable. How are you to test
your preparation meanwhile, unless you look to
your comradeships now while yet it is time to
learn? Frequent the company in which you may
learn the speech and the manner which are fit to
last. Take to heart the admirable example you
shall see set you there of using speech and manner
to speak your real thought and be genuinely and
simply yourself.
IV. A LITERARY POLITICIAN.
“Literary politician” is not a label much in
vogue, and may need first of all a justification, lest
even the man of whom I am about to speak should
decline it from his very urn. I do not mean a
politician who affects literature; who seems to appreciate
the solemn moral purpose of Wordsworth’s
Happy Warrior, and yet is opposed to ballot reform.
Neither do I mean a literary man who
affects politics; who earns his victories through
the publishers, and his defeats at the hands of the
men who control the primaries. I mean the man
who has the genius to see deep into affairs, and the
discretion to keep out of them,—the man to whom,
by reason of knowledge and imagination and sympathetic
insight, governments and policies are as
open books, but who, instead of trying to put haphazard
characters of his own into those books,
wisely prefers to read their pages aloud to others.
A man this who knows polities, and yet does not
handle policies.
There is, no doubt, a very widespread skepticism
as to the existence of such a man. Many people
would ask you to prove him as well as define him;
and that, as they assume, upon a very obvious
principle. It is a rule of universal acceptance in
theatrical circles that no one can write a good play
who has no practical acquaintance with the stage.
A knowledge of greenroom possibilities and of
stage machinery, it is held, must go before all successful
attempts to put either passion or humor
into action on the boards, if pit and gallery are to
get a sense of reality from the performance. No
wonder that Sheridan’s plays were effective, for
Sheridan was both author and actor; but abundant
wonder that simple Goldsmith succeeded with
his exquisite “She Stoops to Conquer,”—unless
we are to suppose that an Irishman of the last century,
like the Irishman of this, had some sixth
sense which enabled him to understand other people’s
business better than his own; for poor Goldsmith
could not act (even off the stage), and his
only connection with the theatre seems to have been
his acquaintance with Garrick. Lytton, we know,
had Macready constantly at his elbow, to give and
enforce suggestions calculated to render plays playable.
And in our own day, the authors of what
we indulgently call “dramatic literature” find
themselves constantly obliged to turn tragedies into
comedies, comedies into farces, to satisfy the managers;
for managers know the stage, and pretend to
know all possible audiences also. The writer for
the stage must be playwright first, author second.
Similar principles of criticism are not a little
affected by those who play the parts, great and small,
on the stage of politics. There is on that stage,
too, it is said, a complex machinery of action and
scene-shifting, a greenroom tradition and practice
as to costume and make-up, as to entry and exit,
necessities of concession to footlights and of appeal
to the pit, quite as rigorous and quite as proper for
study as are the concomitants of that other art
which we frankly call acting. This is an idea,
indeed, accepted in some quarters outside the political
playhouse as well as within it. Mr. Sydney
Colvin, for example, declares very rightly that:—
“Men of letters and of thought are habitually
too much given to declaiming at their ease against
the delinquencies of men of action and affairs. The
inevitable friction of practical politics,” he argues,
“generates heat enough already, and the office of
the thinker and critic should be to supply not heat,
but light. The difficulties which attend his own
unmolested task—the task of seeking after and
proclaiming salutary truths—should teach him to
make allowance for the far more urgent difficulties
which beset the politician; the man obliged, amidst
the clash of interests and temptations, to practice
from hand to mouth, and at his peril, the most uncertain
and at the same time the most indispensable
of the experimental arts.”
Mr. Colvin is himself of the class of men of letters
and of thought; he accordingly puts the case
against his class much more mildly than the practical
politician would desire to see it put. Practical
politicians are wont to regard closeted writers upon
politics with a certain condescension, dashed with
slight traces of uneasy concern. “Literary men
can say strong things of their age,” observes Mr.
Bagehot, “for no one expects that they will go out
and act on them. They are a kind of ticket-of-leave
lunatics, from whom no harm is for the moment
expected; who seem quiet, but on whose
vagaries a practical public must have its eye.”
I suppose that the really serious, practical man
in politics would see nothing of satirical humor in
such a description. He would have you note that,
although traced with a sharp point of wit, the picture
is nevertheless true. He can cite you a score
of instances illustrative of the danger of putting
faith in the political judgments of those who are
not politicians bred in the shrewd and moving
world of political management.
The genuine practical politician, such as (even
our enemies being the witnesses) we must be acknowledged
to produce in great numbers and perfection
in this country, reserves his acidest contempt
for the literary man who assumes to utter
judgments touching public affairs and political institutions.
If he be a reading man, as will sometimes
happen, he is able to point you, in illustration
of what you are to expect in such cases, to the very
remarkable essays of the late Mr. Matthew Arnold
on parliamentary policy and the Irish question. If
he be not a reading man, as sometimes happens, he
is able to ask, much to your confusion, “What
does a fellow who lives inside a library know about
politics, anyhow?” You have to admit, if you are
candid, that most fellows who live in libraries know
little enough. You remember Macaulay, and
acknowledge that, although he made admirable
speeches in Parliament, held high political office,
and knew all the considerable public men of his
time, he did imagine the creation to have been made
in accordance with Whig notions; did hope to find
the judgments of Lord Somers some day answering
mankind as standards for all possible times and
circumstances. You recall Gibbon, and allow, to
your own thought at least, that, had he not remained
silent in his seat, a very few of his sentences would
probably have sufficed to freeze the House of Commons
stiff. The ordinary literary man, even though
he be an eminent historian, is ill enough fitted to be
a mentor in affairs of government. For, it must
be admitted, things are for the most part very simple
in books, and in practical life very complex.
Not all the bindings of a library inclose the various
world of circumstance.
But the practical politician should discriminate.
Let him find a man with an imagination
which, though it stands aloof, is yet quick to conceive
the very things in the thick of which the politician
struggles. To that man he should resort for
instruction. And that there is occasionally such
a man we have proof in Bagehot, the man who
first clearly distinguished the facts of the English
constitution from its theory.
Walter Bagehot is a name known to not a few
of those who have a zest for the juiciest things of
literature, for the wit that illuminates and the
knowledge that refreshes. But his fame is still
singularly disproportioned to his charm; and one
feels once and again like publishing him, at least
to all spirits of his own kind. It would be a most
agreeable good fortune to introduce Bagehot to men
who have not read him! To ask your friend to
know Bagehot is like inviting him to seek pleasure.
Occasionally, a man is born into the world whose
mission it evidently is to clarify the thought of
his generation, and to vivify it; to give it speed
where it is slow, vision where it is blind, balance
where it is out of poise, saving humor where it is
dry,—and such a man was Walter Bagehot.
When he wrote of history, he made it seem human
and probable; when he wrote of political economy,
he made it seem credible, entertaining,—nay, engaging
even; when he wrote criticism, he wrote
sense. You have in him a man who can jest to
your instruction, who will beguile you into being
informed beyond your wont and wise beyond your
birthright. Full of manly, straightforward meaning,
earnest to find the facts that guide and
strengthen conduct, a lover of good men and seers,
full of knowledge and a consuming desire for it,
he is yet genial withal, with the geniality of a man
of wit, and alive in every fibre of him, with a life
he can communicate to you. One is constrained to
agree, almost, with the verdict of a witty countryman
of his, who happily still lives to cheer us, that
when Bagehot died he “carried away into the next
world more originality of thought than is now to
be found in the three Estates of the Realm.”
An epitome of Bagehot’s life can be given very
briefly. He was born in February, 1826, and
died in March, 1877,—the month in which one
would prefer to die. Between those two dates he had
much quaint experience as a boy, and much sober
business experience as a man. He wrote essays
on poets, prose writers, statesmen, whom he would,
with abundant insight, but without too much respect
of persons; also books on banking, on the
early development of society, and on English politics,
kindling a flame of interest with these dry
materials such as made men stare who had often described
the facts of society themselves, but who had
never dreamed of applying fire to them, as Bagehot
did, to make them give forth light and wholesome
heat. He set the minds of a few fortunate friends
aglow with the delights of the very wonderful tongue
which nature had given him through his mother.
And then he died, while his power was yet young.
Not a life of event or adventure, but a life of deep
interest, none the less, because a life in which those
two things of our modern life, commonly deemed
incompatible, business and literature, namely, were
combined without detriment to either; and from
which, more interesting still, politics gained a profound
expounder in one who was no politician and
no party man, but, as he himself said, “between
sizes in politics.”
Mr. Bagehot was born in the centre of Somersetshire,
that southwestern county of old England
whose coast towns look across Bristol Channel to
the highlands of Wales: a county of small farms,
and pastures that keep their promise of fatness to
many generous milkers; a county broken into abrupt
hills, and sodden moors hardly kept from the
inroads of the sea, as well as rural valleys open to
the sun; a county visited by mists from the sea,
and bathed in a fine soft atmosphere all its own;
visited also by people of fashion, for it contains
Bath; visited now also by those who have read
Lorna Doone, for within it lies part of that Exmoor
Forest in which stalwart John Ridd lived
and wrought his mighty deeds of strength and
love: a land which the Celts kept for long against
both Saxon and Roman, but which Christianity
easily conquered, building Wells Cathedral and
the monastery at Glastonbury. Nowhere else, in
days of travel, could Bagehot find a land of so
great delight save in the northwest corner of Spain,
where a golden light lay upon everything, where
the sea shone with a rare, soft lustre, and where
there was a like varied coast-line to that he knew
and loved at home. He called it “a sort of better
Devonshire:” and Devonshire is Somersetshire,—only
more so! The atmospheric effects of his
county certainly entered the boy Bagehot, and
colored the nature of the man. He had its
glow, its variety, its richness, and its imaginative
depth.
But better than a fair county is a good parentage,
and that, too, Bagehot had; just the parentage
one would wish to have who desired to be a force
in the world’s thought. His father, Thomas Watson
Bagehot, was for thirty years managing director
and vice-president of Stuckey’s Banking Company,
one of the oldest and best of those sturdy joint-stock
companies which have for so many years stood
stoutly up alongside the Bank of England as
managers of the vast English fortune. But he
was something more than a banker. He was a man
of mind, of strong liberal convictions in politics,
and of an abundant knowledge of English history
wherewith to back up his opinions. He was one
of the men who think, and who think in straight
lines; who see, and see things. His mother
was a Miss Stuckey, a niece of the founder of
the banking company. But it was not her connection
with bankers that made her an invaluable
mother. She had, besides beauty, a most lively
and stimulating wit; such a mind as we most desire
to see in a woman,—a mind that stirs without
irritating you, that rouses but does not belabor,
amuses and yet subtly instructs. She could
preside over the young life of her son in such a way
as at once to awaken his curiosity and set him in
the way of satisfying it. She was brilliant company
for a boy, and rewarding for a man. She
had suggestive people, besides, among her kinsmen,
into whose companionship she could bring her son.
Bagehot had that for which no university can ever
offer an equivalent,—the constant and intelligent
sympathy of both his parents in his studies, and
their companionship in his tastes. To his father’s
strength his mother added vivacity. He would
have been wise, perhaps, without her; but he would
not have been wise so delightfully.
Bagehot got his schooling in Bristol, his university
training in London. In Bristol lived Dr.
Prichard, his mother’s brother-in-law, and author
of a notable book on the Physical History of Men.
From him Bagehot unquestionably got his bent towards
the study of race origins and development.
In London, Cobden and Bright were carrying on
an important part of their great agitation for the
repeal of the corn laws, and were making such
speeches as it stirred and bettered young men to
hear. Bagehot had gone to University Hall, London,
rather than to Oxford or Cambridge, because
his father was a Unitarian, and would not have his
son submit to the religious tests then required at
the great universities. But there can be no doubt
that there was more to be had at University Hall
in that day than at either Oxford or Cambridge.
Oxford and Cambridge were still dragging the very
heavy chains of a hindering tradition; the faculty
of University Hall contained many thorough and
some eminent scholars; what was more, University
Hall was in London, and London itself was a
quickening and inspiring teacher for a lad in love
with both books and affairs, as Bagehot was. He
could ask penetrating questions of his professors,
and he could also ask questions of London, seek
out her secrets of history, and so experience to the
full the charm of her abounding life. In after
years, though he loved Somersetshire and clung to
it with a strong home-keeping affection, he could
never stay away from London for more than six
weeks at a time. Eventually he made it his place
of permanent residence.
His university career over, Bagehot did what so
many thousands of young graduates before him
had done,—he studied for the bar; and then,
having prepared himself to practice law, followed
another large body of young men in deciding to
abandon it. He joined his father in his business
as ship-owner and banker in Somersetshire, and
in due time took his place among the directors of
Stuckey’s Company. For the rest of his life, this
man, whom the world knows as a man of letters,
was first of all a man of business. In his later
years, however, he identified himself with what may
be called the literary side of business by becoming
editor of that great financial authority, the
“London Economist.” He had, so to say, married
into this position. His wife was the daughter of
the Rt. Hon. James Wilson, who was the mind
and manager, as well as the founder of the “Economist.”
Wilson’s death seemed to leave the great
financial weekly by natural succession to Bagehot;
and certainly natural selection never made a better
choice. It was under Bagehot that the “Economist”
became a sort of financial providence for
business men on both sides of the Atlantic. Its
sagacious prescience constituted Bagehot himself a
sort of supplementary chancellor of the exchequer,
the chancellors of both parties resorting to him
with equal confidence and solicitude. His constant
contact with London, and with the leaders of politics
and opinion there, of course materially assisted
him also to those penetrating judgments touching
the structure and working of English institutions
which have made his volume on the English
Constitution and his essays on Bolingbroke and
Brougham and Peel, on Mr. Gladstone and Sir
George Cornewall Lewis, the admiration and despair
of all who read them.
Those who know Bagehot only as the writer of
some of the most delightful and suggestive literary
criticisms in the language wonder that he should
have been an authority on practical politics; those
who used to regard the “London Economist” as
omniscient, and who knew him only as the editor
of it, marvel that he dabbled in literary criticism,
and incline to ask themselves, when they learn of
his vagaries in that direction, whether he can have
been so safe a guide as they deemed him, after all;
those who know him through his political writings
alone venture upon the perusal of his miscellaneous
essays with not a little surprise and misgiving that
their master should wander so far afield. And yet
the whole Bagehot is the only Bagehot. Each
part of the man is incomplete, not only, but a trifle
incomprehensible, also, without the other parts.
What delights us most in his literary essays is
their broad practical sagacity, so uniquely married
as it is with pure taste and the style of a rapid
artist in words. What makes his financial and
political writings whole and sound is the scope of
his mind outside finance and politics, the validity
of his observation all around the circle of thought
and affairs. He was the better critic for being a
competent man of business and a trusted financial
authority. He was the more sure-footed in his
political judgments because of his play of mind in
other and supplementary spheres of human activity.
The very appearance of the man was a sort of
outer index to the singular variety of capacity that
has made him so notable a figure in the literary
annals of England. A mass of black, wavy hair;
a dark eye, with depths full of slumberous, playful
fire; a ruddy skin that bespoke active blood, quick
in its rounds; the lithe figure of an excellent horseman;
a nostril full, delicate, quivering, like that of
a blooded racer,—such were the fitting outward
marks of a man in whom life and thought and
fancy abounded; the aspect of a man of unflagging
vivacity, of wholesome, hearty humor, of a ready
intellectual sympathy, of wide and penetrative observation.
It is no narrow, logical shrewdness or
cold penetration that looks forth at you through
that face, even if a bit of mockery does lurk in the
privatest corner of the eye. Among the qualities
which he seeks out for special praise in Shakespeare
is a broad tolerance and sympathy for illogical
and common minds. It seems to him an evidence
of size in Shakespeare that he was not vexed
with smallness, but was patient, nay, sympathetic
even, in his portrayal of it. “If every one were
logical and literary,” he exclaims, “how would there
be scavengers, or watchmen, or caulkers, or coopers?
A patient sympathy, a kindly fellow-feeling for the
narrow intelligence necessarily induced by narrow
circumstances,—a narrowness which, in some degrees,
seems to be inevitable, and is perhaps more
serviceable than most things to the wise conduct of
life,—this, though quick and half-bred minds may
despise it, seems to be a necessary constituent in
the composition of manifold genius. ‘How shall
the world be served?’ asks the host in Chaucer.
We must have cart-horses as well as race-horses,
draymen as well as poets. It is no bad thing, after
all, to be a slow man and to have one idea a year.
You don’t make a figure, perhaps, in argumentative
society, which requires a quicker species of thought,
but is that the worse?”
One of the things which strike us most in Bagehot
himself is his capacity to understand inferior
minds; and there can be no better test of sound
genius. He stood in the midst of affairs, and knew
the dull duty and humdrum fidelity which make up
the equipment of the ordinary mind for business,
for the business which keeps the world steady in
its grooves and makes it fit for habitation. He
perceived quite calmly, though with an odd, sober
amusement, that the world is under the dominion,
in most things, of the average man, and the average
man he knows. He is, he explains, with his
characteristic covert humor, “a cool, common person,
with a considerate air, with figures in his
mind, with his own business to attend to, with a
set of ordinary opinions arising from and suited to
ordinary life. He can’t bear novelty or originalities.
He says, ‘Sir, I never heard such a thing
before in my life;’ and he thinks this a reductio
ad absurdum. You may see his taste by the reading
of which he approves. Is there a more splendid
monument of talent and industry than the
‘Times’? No wonder that the average man—that
any one—believes in it.... But did you ever
see anything there you had never seen before?...
Where are the deep theories, and the wise axioms,
and the everlasting sentiments which the writers of
the most influential publication in the world have
been the first to communicate to an ignorant species?
Such writers are far too shrewd.... The
purchaser desires an article which he can appreciate
at sight, which he can lay down and say, ‘An
excellent article, very excellent; exactly my own
sentiments.’ Original theories give trouble; besides,
a grave man on the Coal Exchange does
not desire to be an apostle of novelties among the
contemporaneous dealers in fuel; he wants to be
provided with remarks he can make on the topics
of the day which will not be known not to be his,
that are not too profound, which he can fancy the
paper only reminded him of. And just in the
same way,”—thus he proceeds with the sagacious
moral,—“precisely as the most popular political
paper is not that which is abstractedly the best or
most instructive, but that which most exactly takes
up the minds of men where it finds them, catches
the floating sentiment of society, puts it in such a
form as society can fancy would convince another
society which did not believe, so the most influential
of constitutional statesmen is the one who most
felicitously expresses the creed of the moment, who
administers it, who embodies it in laws and institutions,
who gives it the highest life it is capable
of, who induces the average man to think, ‘I could
not have done it any better if I had had time myself.’”
See how his knowledge of politics proceeds out
of his knowledge of men. “You may talk of the
tyranny of Nero and Tiberius,” he exclaims, “but
the real tyranny is the tyranny of your next-door
neighbor. What law is so cruel as the law of doing
what he does? What yoke is so galling as the
necessity of being like him? What espionage of
despotism comes to your door so effectually as the
eye of the man who lives at your door? Public
opinion is a permeating influence, and it exacts
obedience to itself; it requires us to think other
men’s thoughts, to speak other men’s words, to follow
other men’s habits. Of course, if we do not,
no formal ban issues, no corporeal pain, the coarse
penalty of a barbarous society, is inflicted on the
offender, but we are called ‘eccentric;’ there is a
gentle murmur of ‘most unfortunate ideas,’ ‘singular
young man,’ ‘well intentioned, I dare say, but
unsafe, sir, quite unsafe.’ The prudent, of course,
conform.”
There is, no doubt, a touch of mockery in all
this, but there is unquestionable insight in it, too,
and a sane knowledge also of the fact that dull,
common judgments are, after all, the cement of
society. It is Bagehot who says somewhere that it
is only dull nations, like the Romans and the
English, who can become or remain for any length
of time self-governing nations, because it is only
among them that duty is done through lack of
knowledge sufficient or imagination enough to suggest
anything else to do: only among them that
the stability of slow habit can be had.
It would be superficial criticism to put forward
Bagehot’s political opinions as themselves the proof
of his extraordinary power as a student and analyst
of institutions. His life, his broad range of study,
his quick versatility, his shrewd appreciation of
common men, his excursions through all the fields
that men traverse in their thought of one another
and in their contact with the world’s business,—these
are the soil out of which his political judgments
spring, from which they get their sap and
bloom. In order to know institutions, you must
know men; you must be able to imagine histories,
to appreciate characters radically unlike your own,
to see into the heart of society and assess its
notions, great and small. Your average critic, it
must be acknowledged, would be the worst possible
commentator on affairs. He has all the movements
of intelligence without any of its reality. But a
man who sees authors with a Chaucerian insight
into them as men, who knows literature as a realm
of vital thought conceived by real men, of actual
motive felt by concrete persons, this is a man whose
opinions you may confidently ask, if not on current
politics, at any rate on all that concerns the permanent
relations of men in society.
It is for such reasons that one must first make
known the most masterly of the critics of English
political institutions as a man of catholic tastes and
attainments, shrewdly observant of many kinds of
men and affairs. Know him once in this way, and
his mastery in political thought is explained. If I
were to make choice, therefore, of extracts from
his works with a view to recommend him as a
politician, I should choose those passages which
show him a man of infinite capacity to see and understand
men of all kinds, past and present. By
showing in his case the equipment of a mind open
on all sides to the life and thought of society, and
penetrative of human secrets of many sorts, I
should authenticate his credentials as a writer upon
politics, which is nothing else than the public and
organic life of society.
Examples may be taken almost at random.
There is the passage on Sydney Smith, in the essay
on the First Edinburgh Reviewers. We have all
laughed with that great-hearted clerical wit; but
it is questionable whether we have all appreciated
him as a man who wrote and wrought wisdom.
Indeed, Sydney Smith may be made a very delicate
test of sound judgment, the which to apply to
friends of whom you are suspicious. There was
a man beneath those excellent witticisms, a big,
wholesome, thinking man; but none save men of
like wholesome natures can see and value his manhood
and his mind at their real worth.
“Sydney Smith was an after-dinner writer.
His words have a flow, a vigor, an expression,
which is not given to hungry mortals.... There
is little trace of labor in his composition; it is
poured forth like an unceasing torrent, rejoicing
daily to run its course. And what courage there
is in it! There is as much variety of pluck in
writing across a sheet as in riding across a country.
Cautious men ... go tremulously, like a timid
rider; they turn hither and thither; they do not
go straight across a subject, like a masterly mind.
A few sentences are enough for a master of sentences.
The writing of Sydney Smith is suited to
the broader kind of important questions. For anything
requiring fine nicety of speculation, long elaborateness
of deduction, evanescent sharpness of
distinction, neither his style nor his mind was fit.
He had no patience for long argument, no acuteness
for delicate precision, no fangs for recondite
research. Writers, like teeth, are divided into incisors
and grinders. Sydney Smith was a molar.
He did not run a long, sharp argument into the
interior of a question; he did not, in the common
phrase, go deeply into it; but he kept it steadily
under the contract of a strong, capable, jawlike
understanding,—pressing its surface, effacing its
intricacies, grinding it down. Yet this is done
without toil. The play of the molar is instinctive
and placid; he could not help it; it would seem
that he had an enjoyment in it.”
One reads this with a feeling that Bagehot both
knows and likes Sydney Smith, and heartily appreciates
him as an engine of Whig thought; and
with the conviction that Bagehot himself, knowing
thus and enjoying Smith’s freehand method of
writing, could have done the like himself,—could
himself have made English ring to all the old Whig
tunes, like an anvil under the hammer. And yet
you have only to turn back a page in the same
essay to find quite another Bagehot,—a Bagehot
such as Sydney Smith could not have been. He
is speaking of that other militant Edinburgh reviewer,
Lord Jeffrey, and is recalling, as every one
recalls, Jeffrey’s review of Wordsworth’s “Excursion.”
The first words of that review, as everybody
remembers, were, “This will never do;” and
there followed upon those words, though not a
little praise of the poetical beauties of the poem, a
thoroughly meant condemnation of the school of
poets of which Wordsworth was the greatest representative.
Very celebrated in the world of literature
is the leading case of Jeffrey v. Wordsworth.
It is in summing up this case that Bagehot gives
us a very different taste of his quality:—
“The world has given judgment. Both Mr.
Wordsworth and Lord Jeffrey have received their
reward. The one had his own generation, the
laughter of men, the applause of drawing-rooms,
the concurrence of the crowd; the other a succeeding
age, the fond enthusiasm of secret students, the
lonely rapture of lonely minds. And each has received
according to his kind. If all cultivated men
speak differently because of the existence of Wordsworth
and Coleridge; if not a thoughtful English
book has appeared for forty years without some
trace for good or evil of their influence; if sermon-writers
subsist upon their thoughts; if ‘sacred
poets’ thrive by translating their weaker portions
into the speech of women; if, when all this is over,
some sufficient part of their writing will ever be
found fitting food for wild musing and solitary meditation,
surely this is because they possessed the
inner nature,—‘an intense and glowing mind,’
‘the vision and the faculty divine.’ But if, perchance,
in their weaker moments, the great authors
of the ‘Lyrical Ballads’ did ever imagine that the
world was to pause because of their verses, that
‘Peter Bell’ would be popular in drawing-rooms,
that ‘Christabel’ would be perused in the city, that
people of fashion would make a handbook of ‘The
Excursion,’ it was well for them to be told at
once that this was not so. Nature ingeniously
prepared a shrill artificial voice, which spoke in
season and out of season, enough and more than
enough, what will ever be the idea of the cities of
the plain concerning those who live alone among the
mountains, of the frivolous concerning the grave, of
the gregarious concerning the recluse, of those who
laugh concerning those who laugh not, of the common
concerning the uncommon, of those who lend
on usury concerning those who lend not; the notion
of the world of those whom it will not reckon
among the righteous,—it said, ‘This won’t do!’
And so in all time will the lovers of polished Liberalism
speak concerning the intense and lonely
prophet.”
This is no longer the Bagehot who could “write
across a sheet” with Sydney Smith. It is now
a Bagehot whose heart is turned away from the
cudgeling Whigs to see such things as are hidden
from the bearers of cudgels, and revealed only to
those who can await in the sanctuary of a quiet
mind the coming of the vision.
Single specimens of such a man’s writing do not
suffice, of course, even as specimens. They need
their context to show their appositeness, the full
body of the writing from which they are taken to
show the mass and system of the thought. Even
separated pieces of his matter prepare us, nevertheless,
for finding in Bagehot keener, juster estimates
of difficult historical and political characters
than it is given the merely exact historian, with
his head full of facts and his heart purged of all
imagination, to speak. There is his estimate of
the cavalier, for example: “A cavalier is always
young. The buoyant life arises before us, rich in
hope, strong in vigor, irregular in action: men
young and ardent, ‘framed in the prodigality of
nature;’ open to every enjoyment, alive to every
passion, eager, impulsive; brave without discipline,
noble without principle; prizing luxury, despising
danger; capable of high sentiment, but in each
of whom the
‘addiction was to courses vain;
His companies unlettered, rude, and shallow;
His hours filled up with riots, banquets, sports,
And never noted in him any study,
Any retirement, any sequestration
From open haunts and popularity.’
The political sentiment is part of the character;
the essence of Toryism is enjoyment.... The way
to keep up old customs is to enjoy old customs;
the way to be satisfied with the present state of
things is to enjoy the present state of things. Over
the cavalier mind this world passes with a thrill of
delight; there is an exultation in a daily event,
zest in the ‘regular thing,’ joy at an old feast.”
Is it not most natural that the writer of a passage
like that should have been a consummate
critic of politics, seeing institutions through men,
the only natural way? It was as necessary that
he should be able to enjoy Sydney Smith and recognize
the seer in Wordsworth as that he should
be able to conceive the cavalier life and point of
view; and in each perception there is the same
power. He is as little at fault in understanding
men of his own day. What would you wish better
than his celebrated character of a “constitutional
statesman,” for example? “A constitutional
statesman is a man of common opinions and uncommon
abilities.” Peel is his example. “His
opinions resembled the daily accumulating insensible
deposits of a rich alluvial soil. The great
stream of time flows on with all things on its surface;
and slowly, grain by grain, a mould of wise
experience is unconsciously left on the still, extended
intellect.... The stealthy accumulating
words of Peel seem like the quiet leavings of some
outward tendency, which brought these, but might
as well have brought others. There is no peculiar
stamp, either, on the ideas. They might have
been any one’s ideas. They belong to the general
diffused stock of observations which are to be
found in the civilized world.... He insensibly
takes in and imbibes the ideas of those around him.
If he were left in a vacuum, he would have no
ideas.”
What strikes one most, perhaps, in all these
passages, is the realizing imagination which illuminates
them. And it is an imagination with a
practical character all its own. It is not a creating,
but a conceiving imagination; not the imagination
of the fancy, but the imagination of the understanding.
Conceiving imaginations, however, are
of two kinds. For the one kind the understanding
serves as a lamp of guidance; upon the other the
understanding acts as an electric excitant, a keen
irritant. Bagehot’s was evidently of the first kind;
Carlyle’s, conspicuously of the second. There is
something in common between the minds of these
two men as they conceive society. Both have a
capital grip upon the actual; both can conceive
without confusion the complex phenomena of society;
both send humorous glances of searching insight
into the hearts of men. But it is the difference
between them that most arrests our attention.
Bagehot has the scientific imagination, Carlyle the
passionate. Bagehot is the embodiment of witty
common sense; all the movements of his mind
illustrate that vivacious sanity which he has himself
called “animated moderation.” Carlyle, on the
other hand, conceives men and their motives too
often with a hot intolerance; there is heat in his
imagination,—a heat that sometimes scorches and
consumes. Life is for him dramatic, full of fierce,
imperative forces. Even when the world rings
with laughter, it is laughter which, in his ears, is
succeeded by an echo of mockery; laughter which
is but a defiance of tears. The actual which you
touch in Bagehot is the practical, operative actual
of a world of workshops and parliaments,—a
world of which workshops and parliaments are the
natural and desirable products. Carlyle flouts at
modern legislative assemblies as “talking shops,”
and yearns for action such as is commanded by
masters of action; preaches the doctrine of work
and silence in some thirty volumes octavo. Bagehot
points out that prompt, crude action is the
instinct and practice of the savage; that talk, the
deliberation of assemblies, the slow concert of
masses of men, is the cultivated fruit of civilization,
nourishing to all the powers of right action
in a society which is not simple and primitive, but
advanced and complex. He is no more imposed
upon by parliamentary debates than Carlyle is.
He knows that they are stupid, and, so far as wise
utterance goes, in large part futile, too. But he is
not irritated, as Carlyle is, for, to say the fact, he
sees more than Carlyle sees. He sees the force
and value of the stupidity. He is wise, along with
Burke, in regarding prejudice as the cement of
society. He knows that slow thought is the ballast
of a self-governing state. Stanch, knitted timbers
are as necessary to the ship as sails. Unless the
hull is conservative in holding stubbornly together
in the face of every argument of sea weather,
there’ll be lives and fortunes lost. Bagehot can
laugh at unreasoning bias. It brings a merry
twinkle into his eye to undertake the good sport
of dissecting stolid stupidity. But he would not
for the world abolish bias and stupidity. He would
much rather have society hold together; much
rather see it grow than undertake to reconstruct it.
“You remember my joke against you about the
moon,” writes Sydney Smith to Jeffrey; “d—n
the solar system—bad light—planets too distant—pestered
with comets—feeble contrivance;
could make a better with great ease.” There was
nothing of this in Bagehot. He was inclined to be
quite tolerant of the solar system. He understood
that society was more quickly bettered by sympathy
than by antagonism.
Bagehot’s limitations, though they do not obtrude
themselves upon your attention as his excellencies
do, are in truth as sharp-cut and clear
as his thought itself. It would not be just the
truth to say that his power is that of critical analysis
only, for he can and does construct thought
concerning antique and obscure systems of political
life and social action. But it is true that he does
not construct for the future. You receive stimulation
from him and a certain feeling of elation.
There is a fresh air stirring in all his utterances
that is unspeakably refreshing. You open your
mind to the fine influence, and feel younger for having
been in such an atmosphere. It is an atmosphere
clarified and bracing almost beyond example elsewhere.
But you know what you lack in Bagehot if
you have read Burke. You miss the deep eloquence
which awakens purpose. You are not in contact
with systems of thought or with principles that
dictate action, but only with a perfect explanation.
You would go to Burke, not to Bagehot, for
inspiration in the infinite tasks of self-government;
though you would, if you were wise, go to Bagehot
rather than to Burke if you wished to realize just
what were the practical daily conditions under
which those tasks were to be worked out.
Moreover, there is a deeper lack in Bagehot.
He has no sympathy with the voiceless body of the
people, with the “mass of unknown men.” He
conceives the work of government to be a work
which is possible only to the instructed few. He
would have the mass served, and served with devotion,
but he would trouble to see them attempt
to serve themselves. He has not the stout fibre
and the unquestioning faith in the right and capacity
of inorganic majorities which make the democrat.
He has none of the heroic boldness necessary
for faith in wholesale political aptitude and capacity.
He takes democracy in detail in his thought, and
to take it in detail makes it look very awkward
indeed.
And yet surely it would not occur to the veriest
democrat that ever vociferated the “sovereignty of
the people” to take umbrage at anything Bagehot
might chance to say in dissection of democracy.
What he says is seldom provokingly true. There
is something in it all that is better than a “saving
clause,” and that is a saving humor. Humor ever
keeps the whole of his matter sound; it is an excellent
salt that keeps sweet the sharpest of his sayings.
Indeed, Bagehot’s wit is so prominent among
his gifts that I am tempted here to enter a general
plea for wit as fit company for high thoughts and
weighty subjects. Wit does not make a subject
light; it simply beats it into shape to be handled
readily. For my part, I make free acknowledgment
that no man seems to me master of his subject
who cannot take liberties with it; who cannot
slap his propositions on the back and be hail-fellow
well met with them. Suspect a man of shallowness
who always takes himself and all that he thinks
seriously. For light on a dark subject commend
me to a ray of wit. Most of your solemn explanations
are mere farthing candles in the great expanse
of a difficult question. Wit is not, I admit,
a steady light, but ah! its flashes give you sudden
glimpses of unsuspected things such as you will
never see without it. It is the summer lightning,
which will bring more to your startled eye in an
instant, out of the hiding of the night, than you
will ever be at the pains to observe in the full blaze
of noon.
Wit is movement, is play of mind; and the
mind cannot get play without a sufficient playground.
Without movement outside the world of
books, it is impossible a man should see aught but
the very neatly arranged phenomena of that world.
But it is possible for a man’s thought to be instructed
by the world of affairs without the man
himself becoming a part of it. Indeed, it is exceedingly
hard for one who is in and of it to hold
the world of affairs off at arm’s length and observe
it. He has no vantage-ground. He had better for
a while seek the distance of books, and get his perspective.
The literary politician, let it be distinctly
said, is a very fine, a very superior species of the
man thoughtful. He reads books as he would listen
to men talk. He stands apart, and looks on,
with humorous, sympathetic smile, at the play of
policies. He will tell you for the asking what the
players are thinking about. He divines at once
how the parts are cast. He knows beforehand
what each act is to discover. He might readily
guess what the dialogue is to contain. Were you
short of scene-shifters, he could serve you admirably
in an emergency. And he is a better critic of
the play than the players.
Had I command of the culture of men, I should
wish to raise up for the instruction and stimulation
of my nation more than one sane, sagacious, penetrative
critic of men and affairs like Walter Bagehot.
But that, of course. The proper thesis to
draw from his singular genius is this: It is not the
constitutional lawyer, nor the student of the mere
machinery and legal structure of institutions, nor
the politician, a mere handler of that machinery,
who is competent to understand and expound government;
but the man who finds the materials for
his thought far and wide, in everything that reveals
character and circumstance and motive. It is
necessary to stand with the poets as well as with
lawgivers; with the fathers of the race as well as
with your neighbor of to-day; with those who toil
and are sick at heart as well as with those who
prosper and laugh and take their pleasure; with
the merchant and the manufacturer as well as with
the closeted student; with the schoolmaster and
with those whose only school is life; with the
orator and with the men who have wrought always
in silence; in the midst of thought and also in the
midst of affairs, if you would really comprehend
those great wholes of history and of character
which are the vital substance of politics.
V. THE INTERPRETER OF ENGLISH LIBERTY.
In the middle of the last century two Irish
adventurers crossed over into England in search of
their fortunes. Rare fellows they were, bringing
treasure with them; but finding it somehow hard
to get upon the market: traders with a curious
cargo, offering edification in exchange for a living,
and concealing the best of English under a rich
brogue. They were Edmund Burke and Oliver
Goldsmith.
They did not cross over together: ’twas no joint
venture. They had been fellow students at Trinity
College, Dublin; but they had not, so far as we
can learn, known each other there. Each went
his own way till they became comrades in the reign
of Samuel Johnson at the Turk’s Head Tavern.
Burke stepped very boldly forth into the exposed
paths of public life; Goldsmith plunged into the
secret ways about Grub Street. The one gave us
essays upon public questions incomparable for their
reach of view and their splendid power of expression;
the other gave us writings so exquisite for
their delicacy, purity, and finish as to incline us to
love him almost as much as those who knew him
loved him. We could not easily have forgiven
Ireland if she had not given us these men. The
one had grave faults of temper; the other was a
reckless, roystering fellow, with a most irrepressible
Irish disposition; but how much less we should have
known without Burke, how much less we should
have enjoyed without Goldsmith! They have conquered
places for themselves in English literature
from which we neither can nor would dislodge
them. For their sakes alone we can afford to forgive
Ireland all the trouble she has caused us.
There is no man anywhere to be found in the
annals of Parliament who seems more thoroughly
to belong to England than does Edmund Burke,
indubitable Irishman though he was. His words,
now that they have cast off their brogue, ring out
the authentic voice of the best political thought of
the English race. “If any man ask me,” he cries,
“what a free government is, I answer, that, for any
practical purpose, it is what the people think so,—and
that they, and not I, are the natural, lawful,
and competent judges of the matter.” “Abstract
liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be
found. Liberty adheres in some sensible object;
and every nation has formed to itself some favorite
point, which by way of eminence becomes the criterion
of their happiness.” These sentences, taken
from his writings on American affairs, might serve
as a sort of motto of the practical spirit of our race
in affairs of government. Look further, and you
shall see how his imagination presently illuminates
and suffuses his maxims of practical sagacity with
a fine blaze of insight, a keen glow of feeling, in
which you recognize that other masterful quality of
the race, its intense and elevated conviction. “My
hold on the colonies,” he declares, “is in the close
affection which grows from common names, from
kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal
protection. These are the ties which, though light
as air, are as strong as links of iron. Let the
colonies always keep the idea of their civil rights
associated with your government,—they will cling
and grapple to you, and no force under heaven will
be of power to tear them from their allegiance.
But let it once be understood that your government
may be one thing and their privileges another, that
these two things may exist without any mutual
relation,—and the cement is gone, the cohesion is
loosened, and everything hastens to decay and dissolution.
So long as you have the wisdom to keep
the sovereign power of this country as the sanctuary
of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our
common faith, wherever the chosen race and sons
of England worship freedom, they will turn their
faces towards you.” “We cannot, I fear,” he says
proudly of the colonies, “we cannot falsify the
pedigree of this fierce people, and persuade them
that they are not sprung from a nation in whose
veins the blood of freedom circulates. The language
in which they would hear you tell them this
tale would detect the imposition; your speech
would betray you. An Englishman is the unfittest
person on earth to argue another Englishman into
slavery.” Does not your blood stir at these passages?
And is it not because, besides loving what
is nobly written, you feel that every word strikes
towards the heart of the things that have made
your blood what it has proved to be in the history
of our race?
These passages, it should be remembered, are
taken from a speech in Parliament and from a
letter written by Burke to his constituents in
Bristol. He had no thought to make them permanent
sentences of political philosophy. They were
meant only to serve an immediate purpose in the
advancement of contemporaneous policy. They
were framed for the circumstances of the time.
They speak out spontaneously amidst matter of the
moment: and they could be matched everywhere
throughout his pamphlets and public utterances.
No other similar productions that I know of have
this singular, and as it were inevitable, quality of
permanency. They have emerged from the mass
of political writings put forth in their time with
their freshness untouched, their significance unobscured,
their splendid vigor unabated. It is this
that we marvel at, that they should remain modern
and timely, purged of every element and seed of
decay. The man who could do this must needs
arrest our attention and challenge our inquiry.
We wish to account for him as we should wish to
penetrate the secrets of the human spirit and know
the springs of genius.
Of the public life of Burke we know all that we
could wish. He became so prominent a figure in
the great affairs of his day that even the casual
observer cannot fail to discern the main facts of
his career; while the close student can follow him
year by year through every step of his service.
But his private life was withdrawn from general
scrutiny in an unusual degree. He manifested
always a marked reserve about his individual and
domestic affairs, deliberately, it would seem, shielding
them from impertinent inquiry. He loved the
privacy of life in a great city, where one may escape
notice in the crowd and enjoy a grateful “freedom
from remark and petty censure.” “Though I
have the honor to represent Bristol,” he said to
Boswell, “I should not like to live there; I should
be obliged to be so much upon my good behavior.
In London a man may live in splendid society at
one time, and in frugal retirement at another,
without animadversion. There, and there alone, a
man’s house is truly his castle, in which he can
be in perfect safety from intrusion whenever he
pleases. I never shall forget how well this was
expressed to me one day by Mr. Meynell: ‘The
chief advantage of London,’ he said, ‘is, that a
man is always so near his burrow.’” Burke took
to his burrow often enough to pique our curiosity
sorely. This singular, high-minded adventurer had
some queer companions, we know: questionable
fellows, whose life he shared, perhaps with a certain
Bohemian relish, without sharing their morals or
their works. It seems as incongruous that such
wisdom and public spirit as breathe through his
writings should have come to his thought in such
company as that an exquisite idyll like Goldsmith’s
“Vicar of Wakefield” should have been conceived
and written in squalid garrets. But neither Burke
nor Goldsmith had been born into such comradeships
or such surroundings. Doubtless, as sometimes
happens, their minds kept their first freshness,
taking no taint from the world that touched them
on every hand in their manhood, after their minds
had been formed. Goldsmith, as everybody knows,
remained an innocent all his life, a naïf and pettish
boy amidst sophisticated men; and Burke too, notwithstanding
his dignity and commanding intellectual
habit, shows sometimes a touch of the same
simplicity, a like habit of unguarded self-revelation.
’Twas their form, no doubt, of that impulsive and
ingenuous quality which we observe in all Irishmen,
and which we often mistake for simplicity. ’Twas
a flavor of their native soil. It was also something
more and better than that, however. Not every
Irishman displays such hospitality for direct and
simple images of truth as these men showed, for
that is characteristic only of the open and unsophisticated
mind,—the mind that has kept pure
and open eyes. Not that Burke always sees the
truth; he is even deeply prejudiced often, and
there are some things that he cannot see. But the
passion that dominates him when he is wrong, as
when he is right, is a natural passion, born with
him, not acquired from a disingenuous world that
mistakes interest for justice. His nature tells in
everything. It is stock of his character which he
contributes to the subjects his mind handles. He
is trading always with the original treasure he
brought over with him at the first. He has never
impaired his genuineness, or damaged his principles.
Just where Burke got his generous constitution
and predisposition to enlightened ways of thinking
it is not easy to see. Certainly Richard Burke,
his brother, the only other member of the family
whose character we discern distinctly, had a quite
opposite bent. The father was a steady Dublin
attorney, a Protestant, and a man, so far as we
know, of solid but not brilliant parts. The mother
had been a Miss Nagle, of a Roman Catholic
family, which had multiplied exceedingly in County
Cork. Of the home and its life we know singularly
little. We are told that many children were
born to the good attorney, but we hear of only four
of them that grew to maturity, Garret, Edmund,
Richard, and a sister best known to Edmund’s biographers
as Mrs. French. Edmund, the second
son, was born on the twelfth of January, 1729, in
the second year of the reign of George II., Robert
Walpole being chief minister of the Crown. How
he fared or what sort of lad he was for the first
twelve years of his life we have no idea. We only
know that in the year 1741, being then twelve
years old, he was sent with his brothers Garret and
Richard to the school of one Abraham Shackleton,
a most capable and exemplary Quaker, at Ballytore,
County Kildare, to get, in some two years’ time,
what he himself always accounted the best part of
his education. The character of the good master
at Ballytore told upon the sensitive boy, who all
his life through had an eye for such elevation and
calm force of quiet rectitude as are to be seen in
the best Quakers; and with Richard Shackleton,
the master’s son, he formed a friendship from which
no vicissitude of his subsequent career ever loosened
his heart a whit. All his life long the ardent,
imaginative statesman, deeply stirred as he was by
the momentous agitation of affairs,—swept away
as he was from other friends,—retained his love
for the grave, retired, almost austere, but generous
and constant man who had been his favorite
schoolfellow. It is but another evidence of his unfailing
regard for whatever was steady, genuine,
and open to the day in character and conduct.
At fourteen he left Ballytore and was entered at
Trinity College, Dublin. Those were days when
youths went to college tender, before they had become
too tough to take impressions readily. But
Burke, even at that callow age, cannot be said to
have been teachable. He learned a vast deal, indeed,
but he did not learn much of it from his
nominal masters at Trinity. Apparently Master
Shackleton, at Ballytore, had enabled him to find
his own mind. His four years at college were
years of wide and eager reading, but not years of
systematic and disciplinary study. With singular,
if not exemplary, self-confidence, he took his
education into his own hands. He got at the
heart of books through their spirit, it would seem,
rather than through their grammar. He sought
them out for what they could yield him in thought,
rather than for what they could yield him in the
way of exact scholarship. That this boy should
have had such an appetite for the world’s literature,
old and new, need not surprise us. Other lads before
and since have found big libraries all too small
for them. What should arrest our attention is,
the law of mind disclosed in the habits of such lads:
the quick and various curiosity of original minds,
and particularly of imaginative minds. They long
for matter to expand themselves upon: they will
climb any dizzy height from which an exciting
prospect is promised: it is their joy by some means
to see the world of men and affairs. Burke set
out as a boy to see the world that is contained in
books; and in his journeyings he met a man after
his own heart in Cicero, the copious orator and
versatile man of affairs,—the only man at all like
Burke for richness, expansiveness, and variety of
mind in all the ancient world. Cicero he conned
as his master and model. And then, having had
his fill for the time of discursive study and having
completed also his four years of routine, he was
graduated, taking his degree in the spring of 1748.
His father had entered him as a student at the
Middle Temple in 1747, meaning that he should
seek the prizes of his profession in England rather
than in the little world at home; but he did not take
up his residence in London until 1750, by which
time he had attained his majority. What he did
with the intervening two years, his biographers do
not at all know, and it is idle to speculate, being
confident, as we must, that he quite certainly did
whatever he pleased. He did the same when he
went up to London to live his terms at the Temple.
“The law,” he declared to Parliament more than
twenty years afterwards, “is, in my opinion, one
of the first and noblest of human sciences,—a
science which does more to quicken and invigorate
the understanding than all other kinds of learning
put together; but it is not apt, except in persons
very happily born, to open and to liberalize the
mind exactly in the same proportion;” and, although
himself a person “very happily born” in
respect of all natural powers, he felt that the life
of a lawyer would inevitably confine his roving
mind within intolerably narrow limits. He learned
the law, as he learned everything else, with an eye
to discovering its points of contact with affairs,
its intimate connections with the structure and
functions of human society; and, studying it thus,
he made his way to so many of its secrets, won so
firm a mastery of its central principles, as always
to command the respect and even the admiration
of lawyers. But the good attorney in Dublin
was sorely disappointed. This was not what he
had wanted. The son in whom he had centred
his hopes preferred the life of the town to systematic
study in his chambers; wrote for the papers
instead of devoting himself to the special profession
he had been sent to master. “Of his leisure
time,” said the “Annual Register” just after his
death, “of his leisure time much was spent in the
company of Mrs. Woffington, a celebrated actress,
whose conversation was not less sought by men of
wit and genius than by men of pleasure.”
We know very little about the life of Burke for
the ten years, 1750–60, his first ten years in England,—except
that he did not diligently apply
himself to his nominal business, the study of the
law; and between the years 1752 and 1757 his
biographers can show hardly one authentic trace of
his real life. They know neither his whereabouts
nor his employments. Only one scrap of his correspondence
remains from those years to give us any
hint of the time. Even Richard Shackleton, his
invariable confidant and bosom friend, hears never
a word from him during that period, and is told
afterwards only that his correspondent has been
“sometimes in London, sometimes in remote parts
of the country, sometimes in France,” and will
“shortly, please God, be in America.” He disappears
a poor law student, under suspicion of his
father for systematic neglect of duty; when he reappears
he is married to the daughter of a worthy
physician and is author of two philosophical works
which are attracting a great deal of attention. We
have reason to believe that, in the mean time, he
did as much writing as they would take for the
booksellers; we know that he frequented the London
theatres and several of the innumerable debating
clubs with which nether London abounded,
whetting his faculties, it is said, upon those of a certain
redoubtable baker. He haunted the galleries
and lobbies of the House of Commons. His health
showed signs of breaking, and Dr. Nugent took him
from his lodgings in the Temple to his own house
and allowed him to fall in love with his daughter.
Partly for the sake of his health, perhaps, but more
particularly, no doubt, for the sake of satisfying an
eager mind and a restless habit, he wandered off to
“remote parts of the country” and to France,
with one William Burke for company, a man either
related to him or not related to him, he did not
himself know which. In 1755, a long-suffering
patience at length exhausted, his father shut the
home treasury against him; and then,—’twas the
next year,—he published two philosophical works
and married Miss Nugent.
One might say, no doubt, that this is an intelligible
enough account of a young fellow’s life between
twenty and thirty: and that we can fill in
the particulars for ourselves. We have known
other young Irishmen of restless and volatile natures,
and need make no mystery of this one.
Goldsmith, too, disappeared, we remember, in that
same decade, making show of studying medicine in
Edinburgh, but not really studying it, and then
wandering off to the Continent, and going it afoot
in light-hearted, happy-go-lucky fashion through
the haunts both of the gay Latin races and the
sad Teutonic, greatly to the delectation, no doubt,
of the natives,—for all the world loves an innocent
Irishman, with his heart upon his sleeve.
’Twould all be very plain indeed if we found in
Burke that light-hearted vein. But we do not.
The fellow is sober and strenuous from the first,
studying the things he was not sent to study
with even too intent application, to the damage of
his health, and looking through the pleasures of
the town to the heart of the nation’s affairs. He
was a grave youth, evidently, gratifying his mind
rather than his senses in the pleasures he sought;
and when he emerges from obscurity it is first to
give us a touch of his quality in the matter of intellectual
amusement, and then to turn at once to
the serious business of the discussion of affairs to
which the rest of his life was to be devoted.
The two books which he gave the world in 1756
were “A Vindication of Natural Society,” a satirical
piece in the manner of Bolingbroke, and “A Philosophical
Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of
the Sublime and Beautiful,” which he had begun
when he was nineteen and had since reconsidered
and revised. Bolingbroke, not finding revealed religion
to his taste, had written a “Vindication of
Natural Religion” which his vigorous and elevated
style and skillful dialectic had done much to
make plausible. Burke put forth his “Vindication
of Natural Society” as a posthumous work of
the late noble lord, and so skillfully veiled the
satirical character of the imitation as wholly to
deceive some very grave critics, who thought they
could discern Bolingbroke’s flavor upon the tasting.
For the style, too, they took to be unmistakably
Bolingbroke’s own. It had all his grandeur and
air of distinction: it had his vocabulary and formal
outline of phrase. The imitation was perfect.
And yet if you will scrutinize it, the style is
not Bolingbroke’s, except in a trick or two, but
Burke’s. It seems Bolingbroke’s rather because
it is cold and without Burke’s usual moral fervor
than because it is rich and majestic and various.
There is no great formal difference between
Burke’s style and Bolingbroke’s: but there
is a great moral and intellectual difference. When
Burke is not in earnest there is perhaps no important
difference at all. And in the “Vindication
of Natural Society” Burke is not in earnest. The
book is not, indeed, a parody, and its satirical
quality is much too covert to make it a successful
satire. Much that Burke urges against civil
society he could urge in good faith, and his mind
works soberly upon it. It is only the main thesis
that he does not seriously mean. The rest he might
have meant as Bolingbroke would have meant it.
The essay on The Sublime and Beautiful, though
much admired by so great a master as Lessing, has
not worn very well as philosophy. It is full, however,
of acute and interesting observations, and is
adorned in parts with touches of rich color put on
with the authentic strokes of a master. We preserve
it, perhaps, only because Burke wrote it;
and yet when we read it we feel inclined to pronounce
it worth keeping for its own sake.
Both these essays were apprentice work. Burke
was trying his hand. They make us the more
curious about the conditions of what must have
been a notable apprenticeship. Young Burke
must have gone to school to the world in a way
worth knowing. But we cannot know, and that’s
the end on ’t. Probably even William Burke,
Edmund’s companion, could give us no very satisfactory
account of the matter. The explanation
lay in what he thought and not in what he did as
he knocked about the world.
The company Burke kept was as singular as his
talents, though scarcely so eminent. We speak of
“Burke,” but the London of his day spoke of “the
Burkes,” meaning William, who may or may not
have been Edmund’s kinsman, Edmund himself,
and Richard, Edmund’s younger brother, who had
followed him to London to become, to say truth, an
adventurer emphatically not of the elevated sort.
Edmund was destined to become the leader of England’s
thought in more than one great matter of
policy, and has remained a master among all who
think profoundly upon public affairs; but William
was for long the leader and master of “the Burkes.”
He was English born; had been in Westminster
School; and had probably just come out from
Christ Church, Oxford, when he became the companion
of Edmund’s wanderings. He was a man
of intellect and literary power enough to be deemed
the possible author of the “Letters of Junius;” he
was born moreover with an eye for the ways of
the world, and could push his own fortunes with an
unhesitating hand. It was he who first got public
office, and it was he who formed the influential
connections which got Edmund into Parliament.
He himself entered the House at the same time,
and remained there, a useful party member, for
some eight years. He made those from whom he
sought favors dislike him for his audacity in demanding
the utmost, and more than the utmost, that he
could possibly hope to get; but he seems to have
made those whom he served love him with a very
earnest attachment. He was self-seeking; but he
was capable of generosity, to the point of self-sacrifice
even, when he wished to help his friend. He
early formed a partnership with Richard Burke in
immense stock-jobbing speculations in the securities
of the East India Company; but he also formed a
literary partnership with Edmund in the preparation
of a sketch of the European settlements in
America, and made himself respected as a strong
party writer in various pamphlets on questions of
the day. He could unite the two brothers by speculating
with the one and thinking with the other.
Such were “the Burkes.” Edmund’s home was
always the home also of the other two, whenever
they wished to make it so; the strongest personal
affection, avowed always by Edmund with his characteristic
generous warmth, bound the three men
together; their purses they had in common. Edmund
was not expected, apparently, to take part
in the speculations which held William and Richard
together; something held him aloof to which
they consented,—some natural separateness of
mind and character which they evidently accepted
and respected. There can hardly be said to have
been any aloofness of disposition on Edmund’s
part. There is something in an Irishman,—even
in an Irishman who holds himself to the strictest
code of upright conduct,—which forbids his acting
as moral censor upon others. He can love a
man none the less for generous and manly qualities
because that man does what he himself would not
do. Burke, moreover, had an easy standard all
his life about accepting money favors. He seems
to have felt somehow that his intense and whole-hearted
devotion to his friends justified gifts and
forgiven loans of money from them. He shared
the prosperity of his kinsmen without compunction,
using what he got most liberally for the assistance
of others; and when their fortunes came to a sudden
ruin, he helped them with what he had. We
ought long ago to have learned that the purest motives
and the most elevated standards of conduct
may go along with a singular laxness of moral detail
in some men; and that such characters will
often constrain us to love them to the point of justifying
everything that they ever did. Edmund
Burke’s close union with William and Richard
does not present the least obstacle to our admiration
for the noble qualities of mind and heart
which he so conspicuously possessed, or make us
for a moment doubt the thorough disinterestedness
of his great career.
Burke’s marriage was a very happy one. Mrs.
Burke’s thoroughly sweet temperament acted as a
very grateful and potent charm to soothe her husband’s
mind when shaken by the agitations of public
affairs; her quiet capacity for domestic management
relieved him of many small cares which might
have added to his burdens. Her affection satisfied
his ardent nature. He speaks of her in his will as
“my entirely beloved and incomparable wife,” and
every glimpse we get of their home life confirms the
estimate. After his marriage the most serious part
of his intellectual life begins; the commanding passion
of his mind is disclosed. He turns away from
philosophical amusements to public affairs. In
1757 appeared “An Account of the European Settlements
in America,” which William Burke had
doubtless written, but which Edmund had almost
certainly radically revised; and Edmund himself
published the first part of “An Abridgment of the
History of England” which he never completed. In
1758, he proposed to Dodsley, the publisher, a yearly
volume, to be known as the “Annual Register,”
which should chronicle and discuss the affairs of
England and the Continent. It was the period of
the Seven Years’ War, which meant for England a
sharp and glorious contest with France for the possession
of America. Burke was willing to write
the annals of the critical year 1758 for a hundred
pounds; and so, in 1759, the first volume of the
“Annual Register” appeared; and the plan then
so wisely conceived has yielded its annual volume
to the present day. Burke never acknowledged his
connection with this great work,—he never publicly
recognized anything he had done upon contract
for the publishers,—but it is quite certain that for
very many years his was the presiding and planning
mind in the production of the “Register.” For
the first few years of its life he probably wrote the
whole of the record of events with his own hand.
It was a more useful apprenticeship than that in
philosophy. It gave him an intimate acquaintance
with affairs which must have served as a direct
preparation for the great contributions he was destined
to make to the mind and policy of the Whig
party.
But this, even in addition to other hack work
for the booksellers, did not keep Burke out of pecuniary
straits. He sought, but failed to get, an
appointment as consul at Madrid, using the interest
of Dr. Markham, William’s master at Westminster
School; and then he engaged himself as a sort of
private secretary or literary attendant to William
Gerard Hamilton, whom he served, apparently to
the almost entire exclusion of all other employments,
for some four years, going with him for a
season to Ireland, where Hamilton for a time held
the appointment of Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant.
Hamilton is described by one of Burke’s
friends as “a sullen, vain, proud, selfish, cankered-hearted,
envious reptile,” and Mr. Morley says that
there is “not a word too many nor too strong in
the description.” At any rate, Burke’s proud
spirit presently revolted from further service, and
he threw up a pension of three hundred pounds
which Hamilton had obtained for him rather than
retain any connection with the man, or remain
under any sort of obligation to him. In the mean
time, however, his relations with Hamilton had put
him in the way of meeting many public men of
weight and influence, and he had gotten his first
direct introduction to the world of affairs.
It was 1764 when he shook himself free from
this connection. 1764 is a year to be marked in
English literary annals. It was in the spring of
that year that that most celebrated of literary clubs
was formed at the Turk’s Head Tavern, Gerrard
Street, Soho, by notable good company: Dr. Johnson,
Garrick, Sir Joshua Reynolds, Goldsmith,
Sheridan, Gibbon, Dr. Barnard, Beauclerk, Langton,—we
know them all; for has not Boswell
given us the freedom of the Club and made us delighted
participants in its conversations and diversions?
Into this company Burke was taken at
once. His writings had immediately attracted the
attention of such men as these, and had promptly
procured him an introduction into literary society.
His powers told nowhere more brilliantly than in
conversation. “It is when you come close to a
man in conversation,” said Dr. Johnson, “that you
discover what his real abilities are. To make a
speech in an assembly is a sort of knack. Now
I honor Thurlow; Thurlow is a fine fellow, he
fairly puts his mind to yours.” There can be no
disputing the dictum of the greatest master of conversation:
and the admirer of Burke must be willing
to accept it, at any rate for the nonce, for
Johnson admitted that Burke invariably put him
on his mettle. “That fellow,” he exclaimed, “calls
forth all my powers!” “Burke’s talk,” he said,
“is the ebullition of his mind; he does not talk
from a desire of distinction, but because his mind
is full; he is never humdrum, never unwilling to
talk, nor in haste to leave off.” The redoubtable
doctor loved a worthy antagonist in the great game
of conversation, and he always gave Burke his ungrudging
admiration. When he lay dying, Burke
visited his bedside, and, finding Johnson very
weak, anxiously expressed the hope that his presence
cost him no inconvenience. “I must be in a
wretched state indeed,” cried the great-hearted old
man, “when your company would not be a delight
to me.” It was short work for Burke to get the
admiration of the company at the Turk’s Head.
But he did much more than that: he won their devoted
affection. Goldsmith said that Burke wound
his way into a subject like a serpent; but he made
his way straight into the hearts of his friends.
His powers are all of a piece: his heart is inextricably
mixed up with his mind: his opinions are
immediately transmuted into convictions: he does
not talk for distinction, because he does not use his
mind for the mere intellectual pleasure of it, but
because he also deeply feels what he thinks. He
speaks without calculation, almost impulsively.
That is the reason why we can be so sure of the
essential purity of his nature from the character of
his writings. They are not purely intellectual productions:
there is no page of abstract reasoning
to be found in Burke. His mind works upon concrete
objects, and he speaks always with a certain
passion, as if his affections were involved. He is
irritated by opposition, because opposition in the
field of affairs, in which his mind operates, touches
some interest that is dear to him. Noble generalizations,
it is true, everywhere broaden his matter:
there is no more philosophical writer in English
in the field of politics than Burke. But look, and
you shall see that his generalizations are never derived
from abstract premises. The reasoning is
upon familiar matter of to-day. He is simply taking
questions of the moment to the light, holding
them up to be seen where great principles of conduct
may shine upon them from the general experience
of the race. He is not constructing
systems of thought, but simply stripping thought
of its accidental features. He is even deeply impatient
of abstractions in political reasoning, so
passionately is he devoted to what is practicable,
and fit for wise men to do. To know such a man
is to experience all the warmer forces of the mind,
to feel the generous and cheering heat of character;
and all noble natures will love such a man, because
of kinship of quality. All noble natures that came
close to Burke did love him and cherish their
knowledge of him. They loaned him money without
stint, and then forgave him the loans, as if it
were a privilege to help him, and no way unnatural
that he should never return what he received, finding
his spirit made for fraternal, not for commercial
relations.
It is pleasing, as it is also a little touching, to
see how his companions thus freely accorded to
Burke the immunities and prerogatives of a prince
amongst them. No one failed to perceive how
large and imperial he was, alike in natural gifts
and in the wonderful range of his varied acquirements.
Sir James Mackintosh, though he very
earnestly combated some of Burke’s views, intensely
admired his greatness. He declared that
Gibbon “might have been taken from a corner of
Burke’s mind without ever being missed.” “A wit
said, of Gibbon’s ‘Autobiography’ that he did not
know the difference between himself and the Roman
Empire. He has narrated his ‘progressions from
London to Buriton and from Buriton to London’
in the same monotonous, majestic periods that he
recorded the fall of states and empires.” And
we certainly feel a sense of incongruity: the two
subjects, we perceive, are hardly commensurable.
Perhaps in Burke’s case we should have felt differently,—we
do feel differently. In that extraordinary
“Letter to a Noble Lord,” in which he defends
his pension so proudly against the animadversions
of the Duke of Bedford, how magnificently he speaks
of his services to the country; how proud and majestic
a piece of autobiography it is! How insignificant
does the ancient house of Bedford seem,
with all its long generations, as compared with this
single and now lonely man, without distinguished
ancestry or hope of posterity! He speaks grandly
about himself, as about everything; and yet I see
no disparity between the subject and the manner!
Outside the small circle of those who knew and
loved him, his generation did not wholly perceive
this. There seemed a touch of pretension in this
proud tone taken by a man who had never held
high office or exercised great power. He had made
great speeches, indeed, no one denied that; he had
written great party pamphlets,—that everybody
knew; his had been the intellectual force within
the group of Whigs that followed Lord Rockingham,—that,
too, the world in general perceived
and acknowledged; and when he died, England
knew the man who had gone to be a great man.
But, for all that, his tone must, in his generation,
have seemed disproportioned to the part he had
played. His great authority is over us rather than
over the men of his own day.
Burke had the thoughts of a great statesman,
and uttered them with unapproachable nobility;
but he never wielded the power of a great statesman.
He was kept always in the background in
active politics, in minor posts, and employed upon
subordinate functions. This would be a singular
circumstance, if there were any novelty in it; but
the practice of keeping men of insignificant birth
out of the great offices was a practice which had
“broadened down from precedent to precedent”
until it had become too strong for even Burke to
breast or stem. Perhaps, too, there were faults of
temper which rendered Burke unfit to exercise
authority in directing the details, and determining
the practical measures, of public policy:—but we
shall look into that presently.
In July, 1765, the Marquis of Rockingham
became prime minister of England, and Burke
became his private secretary. He owed his introduction
to Lord Rockingham, as usual, to the good
offices of William Burke, who seems to have found
means of knowing everybody it was to the interest
of “the Burkes” to know. A more fortunate connection
could hardly have been made. Lord Rockingham,
though not a man of original powers, was
a man of the greatest simplicity and nobleness of
character, and, like most upright men, knew how
to trust other men. He gave Burke immediate
proof of his manly qualities. The scheming old
Duke of Newcastle, who ought to have been a
connoisseur in low men, mistook Burke for one.
Shocked that this obscurely born and unknown fellow
should be accorded confidential relations by
Lord Rockingham, he hurried to his lordship with
an assortment of hastily selected slanders against
Burke. His real name, he reported, was O’Bourke;
he was an Irish adventurer without character, and
a rank Papist to boot; it would ruin the administration
to have such a man connected with the
First Lord of the Treasury. Rockingham, with
great good sense and frankness, took the whole
matter at once to Burke; was entirely satisfied by
Burke’s denials; and admitted him immediately
to intimate relations of warm personal friendship
which only death broke off. William Burke obtained
for himself an Undersecretaryship of State
and arranged with Lord Verney, at that time his
partner in East India speculations, that two of his
lordship’s parliamentary boroughs should be put
at his and Edmund’s disposal. Edmund Burke,
accordingly, entered Parliament for the borough
of Wendover on the 14th of January, 1766, at
the age of thirty-seven, and in the first vigor of
his powers.
“Now we who know Burke,” announced Dr.
Johnson, “know that he will be one of the first
men in the country.” Burke promptly fulfilled
the prediction. He made a speech before he had
been in the House two weeks; a speech that made
him at once a marked man. His health was now
firmly established; he had a commanding physique;
his figure was tall and muscular, and his bearing
full of a dignity which had a touch almost of haughtiness
in it. Although his action was angular and
awkward, his extraordinary richness and fluency of
utterance drew the attention away from what he
was doing to what he was saying. His voice was
harsh, and did not harmonize with the melodious
measures in which his words poured forth; but it
was of unusual compass, and carried in it a sense
of confidence and power. His utterance was too
rapid, his thought bore him too impulsively forward,
but the pregnant matter he spoke “filled the
town with wonder.” The House was excited by
new sensations. Members were astonished to recognize
a broad philosophy of politics running
through this ardent man’s speeches. They felt the
refreshment of the wide outlook he gave them, and
were conscious of catching glimpses of excellent
matter for reflection at every turn of his hurrying
thought. They wearied of it, indeed, after a while:
the pace was too hard for most of his hearers, and
they finally gave over following him when the
novelty and first excitement of the exercise had
worn off. He too easily lost sight of his audience
in his search for principles, and they resented his
neglect of them, his indifference to their tastes.
They felt his lofty style of reasoning as a sort of
rebuke, and deemed his discursive wisdom out of
place amidst their own thoughts of imperative personal
and party interest. He had, before very
long, to accustom himself, therefore, to speak to an
empty House and subsequent generations. His
opponents never, indeed, managed to feel quite
easy under his attacks: his arrows sought out their
weak places to the quick, and they winced even
when they coughed or seemed indifferent; but they
comforted themselves with the thought that the
orator was also tedious and irritating to his own
friends, teasing them too with keen rebukes and
vexatious admonitions. The high and wise sort of
speaking must always cause uneasiness in a political
assembly. The more equal and balanced it is, the
more must both parties be threatened with reproof.
I would not be understood as saying that Burke’s
speeches were impartial. They were not. He had
preferences which amounted to prejudices. He
was always an intense party man. But then he
was a party man with a difference. He believed
that the interests of England were bound up with
the fortunes of the Rockingham Wings; but he
did not separate the interests of his party and the
interests of his country. He cherished party connections
because he conceived them to be absolutely
necessary for effective public service. “Where
men are not acquainted with each other’s principles,”
he said, “nor experienced in each other’s
talents, nor at all practiced in their mutual habitudes
or dispositions by joint efforts in business;
no personal confidence, no friendship, no common
interest, subsisting among them; it is evidently
impossible that they can act a public part with
uniformity, perseverance, or efficacy. In a connection,
the most inconsiderable man, by adding to
the weight of the whole, has his value, and his use;
out of it, the greatest talents are wholly unserviceable
to the public.” “When bad men combine,
the good must associate.” “It is not enough in a
situation of trust in the commonwealth, that a man
means well to his country; it is not enough that in
his single person he never did an evil act, but
always voted according to his conscience, and even
harangued against every design which he apprehended
to be prejudicial to the interests of his
country.... Duty demands and requires, that
what is right should not only be made known, but
made prevalent; that what is evil should not only
be detected, but defeated. When the public man
omits to put himself in a situation of doing his
duty with effect, it is an omission that frustrates
the purposes of his trust almost as much as if he
had formally betrayed it.” Burke believed the
Rockingham Whigs to be a combination of good
men, and he felt that he ought to sacrifice something
to keep himself in their connection. He
regarded them as men who “believed private honor
to be the foundation of public trust; that friendship
was no mean step towards patriotism; that he
who, in the common intercourse of life, showed he
regarded somebody besides himself, when he came
to act in a public situation, might probably consult
some other interest than his own.” He admitted
that such confederacies had often “a narrow, bigoted,
and prescriptive spirit;” “but, where duty
renders a critical situation a necessary one,” he
said, “it is our business to keep free from the evils
attendant upon it; and not to fly from the situation
itself. If a fortress is seated in an unwholesome
air, an officer of the garrison is obliged to be
attentive to his health, but he must not desert his
station.” “A party,” he declared, “is a body of
men united for promoting by their joint endeavors
the national interest upon some particular principle
in which they are all agreed.” “Men thinking
freely, will,” he very well knew, “in particular instances,
think differently. But still as the greater
part of the measures which arise in the course of
public business are related to, or dependent on,
some great, leading, general principles in government,
a man must be peculiarly unfortunate in the
choice of his political company, if he does not agree
with them at least nine times in ten. If he does
not concur in these general principles upon which
the party is founded, and which necessarily draw
on a concurrence in their application, he ought
from the beginning to have chosen some other,
more conformable to his opinions. When the
question is in its nature doubtful, or not very
material, the modesty which becomes an individual,
and that partiality which becomes a well-chosen
friendship, will frequently bring on an acquiescence
in the general sentiment. Thus the disagreement
will naturally be rare; it will be only enough to
indulge freedom, without violating concord, or disturbing
arrangement.”
Certainly there were no party prizes for Burke.
During much the greater part of his career the
party to which he adhered was in opposition; and
even when in office it had only small favors for
him. Even his best friends advised against his
appointment to any of the great offices of state,
deeming him too intemperate and unpractical.
And yet the intensity of his devotion to his party
never abated a jot. Assuredly there was never a
less selfish allegiance. His devotion was for the
principles of his party, as he conceived and constructed
them. It was a moral and intellectual
devotion. He had embarked all his spirit’s fortunes
in the enterprise. Faults he unquestionably
had, which seemed very grave. He was passionate
sometimes beyond all bounds: he seriously frightened
cautious and practical men by his haste and
vehemence in pressing his views for acceptance.
He was capable of falling, upon occasion, into a
very frenzy of excitement in the midst of debate,
when he would often shock moderate men by the
ungoverned license of his language. But his friends
were as much to blame for these outbreaks as he
was. They cut him to the quick by the way in
which they criticised and misunderstood him. His
heart was maddened by the pain of their neglect
of his just claims to their confidence. They seemed
often to use him without trusting him, and their
slights were intolerable to his proud spirit. Practically,
and upon a narrow scale of expediency,
they may have been right: perhaps he was not circumspect
enough to be made a responsible head of
administration. Unquestionably, too, they loved
him and meant him no unkindness. But it was
none the less tragical to treat such a man in such
a fashion. They may possibly have temporarily
served their country by denying to Burke full public
acknowledgment of his great services; but they
cruelly wounded a great spirit, and they hardly
served mankind.
They did Burke an injustice, moreover. They
greatly underrated his practical powers. In such
offices as he was permitted to hold he showed in
actual administration the same extraordinary mastery
of masses of detail which was the foundation
of his unapproachable mastery of general principles
in his thinking. His thought was always immersed
in matter, and concrete detail did not confuse him
when he touched it any more than it did when he
meditated upon it. Immediate contact with affairs
always steadied his judgment. He was habitually
temperate in the conduct of business. It was only
in speech and when debating matters that stirred
the depths of his nature that he gave way to uncalculating
fervor. He was intemperate in his emotions,
but seldom in his actions. He could, and
did, write calm state papers in the very midst and
heat of parliamentary affairs that subjected him to
the fiercest excitements. He was eminently capable
of counsel as well as of invective.
He served his party in no servile fashion, for all
he adhered to it with such devotion. He sacrificed
his intellectual independence as little as his personality
in taking intimate part in its counsels. He
gave it principles, indeed, quite as often as he
accepted principles from it. In the final efforts of
his life, when he engaged every faculty of his mind
in the contest that he waged with such magnificent
wrath against the French revolutionary spirit, he
gave tone to all English thought, and direction to
many of the graver issues of international policy.
Rejected oftentimes by his party, he has at length
been accepted by the world.
His habitual identification with opposition rather
than with the government gave him a certain advantage.
It relaxed party discipline and indulged
his independence. It gave leave, too, to the better
efforts of his genius: for in opposition it is principles
that tell, and Burke was first and last a master
of principles. Government is a matter of practical
detail, as well as of general measures; but the
criticism of government very naturally becomes a
matter of the application of general principles, as
standards rather than as practical means of policy.
Four questions absorbed the energies of Burke’s
life and must always be associated with his fame.
These were, the American war for independence;
administrative reform in the English home government;
reform in the government of India; and the
profound political agitations which attended the
French Revolution. Other questions he studied,
deeply pondered, and greatly illuminated, but upon
these four he expended the full strength of his
magnificent powers. There is in his treatment of
these subjects a singular consistency, a very admirable
simplicity of standard. It has been said, and
it is true, that Burke had no system of political
philosophy. He was afraid of abstract system in
political thought, for he perceived that questions
of government are moral questions, and that questions
of morals cannot always be squared with the
rules of logic, but run through as many ranges of
variety as the circumstances of life itself. “Man
acts from adequate motives relative to his interest,”
he said, “and not on metaphysical speculations.
Aristotle, the great master of reasoning, cautions
us, and with great weight and propriety, against
this species of delusive geometrical accuracy in
moral arguments, as the most fallacious of all
sophistry.” And yet Burke unquestionably had a
very definite and determinable system of thought,
which was none the less a system for being based
upon concrete, and not upon abstract premises.
It is said by some writers (even by so eminent a
writer as Buckle) that in his later years Burke’s
mind lost its balance and that he reasoned as if he
were insane; and the proof assigned is, that he, a
man who loved liberty, violently condemned, not
the terrors only,—that of course,—but the very
principles of the French Revolution. But to reason
thus is to convict one’s self of an utter lack of comprehension
of Burke’s mind and motives: as a very
brief examination of his course upon the four great
questions I have mentioned will show.
From first to last Burke’s thought is conservative.
Let his attitude with regard to America
serve as an example. He took his stand, as everybody
knows, with the colonies, against the mother
country; but his object was not revolutionary.
He did not deny the legal right of England to tax
the colonies (we no longer deny it ourselves), but
he wished to preserve the empire, and he saw that
to insist upon the right of taxation would be irrevocably
to break up the empire, when dealing with
such a people as the Americans. He pointed out
the strong and increasing numbers of the colonists,
their high spirit in enterprise, their jealous love of
liberty, and the indulgence England had hitherto
accorded them in the matter of self-government,
permitting them in effect to become an independent
people in respect of all their internal affairs;
and he declared the result matter for just pride.
“Whilst we follow them among the tumbling
mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into
the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson’s Bay and
Davis’s Straits,” he exclaimed, in a famous passage
of his incomparable speech on Conciliation with
America, “whilst we are looking for them beneath
the arctic circle, we hear that they have pierced
into the opposite region of polar cold, that they are
at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen
serpent of the South. Falkland Island, which
seemed too remote and romantic an object for the
grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting
place in the progress of their victorious industry.
Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to
them than the accumulated winter of both the poles.
We know that whilst some of them draw the line
and strike the harpoon on the coast of Africa,
others run the longitude, and pursue their gigantic
game along the coast of Brazil. No sea but what
is vexed by their fisheries. No climate that is not
witness to their toils. Neither the perseverance of
Holland, nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous
and firm sagacity of English enterprise,
ever carried this most perilous mode of hardy
industry to the extent to which it has been pushed
by this recent people,—a people who are still, as
it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened
into the bone of manhood. When I contemplate
these things,—when I know that the colonies in
general owe little or nothing to any care of ours,
and that they are not squeezed into this happy
form by the constraints of watchful and suspicious
government, but that, through a wise and salutary
neglect, a generous nature has been suffered to
take her own way to perfection,—when I reflect
upon these effects, when I see how profitable they
have been to us, I feel all the pride of power sink,
and all the presumption in the wisdom of human
contrivances melt and die away within me,—my
rigor relents,—I pardon something to the spirit
of liberty.”
“I think it necessary,” he insisted, “to consider
distinctly the true nature and the peculiar circumstances
of the object we have before us: because,
after all our struggle, whether we will or not, we
must govern America according to that nature and
those circumstances, and not according to our own
imaginations, not according to abstract ideas of
right, by no means according to mere general
theories of government, the resort to which appears
to me, in our present situation, no better than
arrant trifling.” To attempt to force such a people
would be a course of idle folly. Force, he declared,
would not only be an odious “but a feeble instrument,
for preserving a people so numerous, so
active, so growing, so spirited as this, in a profitable
and subordinate connection with” England.
“First, Sir,” he cried, “permit me to observe,
that the use of force alone is but temporary. It
may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove
the necessity of subduing again: and a nation is
not governed which is perpetually to be conquered.
“My next objection is its uncertainty. Terror
is not always the effect of force, and an armament
is not a victory. If you do not succeed, you are
without resource: for, conciliation failing, force
remains; but, force failing, no further hope of
reconciliation is left. Power and authority are
sometimes bought by kindness; but they can never
be begged as alms by an impoverished and defeated
violence.
“A further objection to force is, that you impair
the object by your very endeavors to preserve it.
The thing you fought for is not the thing you
recover, but depreciated, sunk, wasted, and consumed
in the contest. Nothing less will content
me than whole America. I do not choose to consume
its strength along with our own; for in all
parts it is the British strength I consume....
Let me add, that I do not choose wholly to break
the American spirit; because it is the spirit that
has made the country.
“Lastly, we have no sort of experience in favor
of force as an instrument in the rule of our colonies.
Their growth and their utility has been owing to
methods altogether different. Our ancient indulgence
has been said to be pursued to a fault. It
may be so; but we know, if feeling is evidence,
that our fault was more tolerable than our attempt
to mend it, and our sin far more salutary than our
penitence.”
“Obedience is what makes government,” “freedom,
and not servitude, is the cure of anarchy,”
and you cannot insist upon one rule of obedience
for Englishmen in America while you jealously
maintain another for Englishmen in England.
“For, in order to prove that the Americans have
no right to their liberties, we are every day endeavoring
to subvert the maxims which preserve
the whole spirit of our own. To prove that the
Americans ought not to be free, we are obliged to
depreciate the value of freedom itself; and we
never seem to gain a paltry advantage over them
in debate, without attacking some of those principles,
or deriding some of those feelings, for which
our ancestors have shed their blood.” “The question
with me is, not whether you have a right to
render your people miserable, but whether it is not
your interest to make them happy. It is not what
a lawyer tells me I may do, but what humanity,
reason, and justice tell me I ought to do....
Such is steadfastly my opinion of the absolute
necessity of keeping up the concord of this empire
by a unity of spirit, though in a diversity of operations,
that, if I were sure that the colonists had, at
their leaving this country, sealed a regular compact
of servitude, that they had solemnly abjured
all the rights of citizens, that they had made a vow
to renounce all ideas of liberty for them and their
posterity to all generations, yet I should hold myself
obliged to conform to the temper I found universally
prevalent in my own day, and to govern
two million of men, impatient of servitude, on the
principles of freedom. I am not determining a
point of law; I am restoring tranquillity: and the
general character and situation of a people must
determine what sort of government is fitted for
them. That point nothing else can or ought to
determine.” “All government, indeed every human
benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every
prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter.
We balance inconveniences; we give and take;
we remit some rights, that we may enjoy others;
and we choose rather to be happy citizens than
subtle disputants.” “Magnanimity in politics is
not seldom the truest wisdom; and a great empire
and little minds go ill together.”
Here you have the whole spirit of the man, and
in part a view of his eminently practical system of
thought. The view is completed when you advance
with him to other subjects of policy. He pressed
with all his energy for radical reforms in administration,
but he earnestly opposed every change that
might touch the structure of the constitution itself.
He sought to secure the integrity of Parliament,
not by changing the system of representation, but
by cutting out all roots of corruption. He pressed
forward with the most ardent in all plans of just
reform, but he held back with the most conservative
from all propositions of radical change. “To
innovate is not to reform,” he declared, and there
is “a marked distinction between change and reformation.
The former alters the substance of the
objects themselves, and gets rid of all their essential
good as well as of all the accidental evil annexed
to them. Change is novelty; and whether it is to
operate any one of the effects of reformation at all,
or whether it may not contradict the very principle
upon which reformation is desired, cannot certainly
be known beforehand. Reform is not a
change in the substance or in the primary modification
of the object, but a direct application of a
remedy to the grievance complained of. So far as
that is removed, all is sure. It stops there; and
if it fails, the substance which underwent the operation,
at the very worst, is but where it was.” This
is the governing motive of his immense labors to
accomplish radical economical reform in the administration
of the government. He was not seeking
economy merely; to husband the resources of
the country was no more than a means to an end,
and that end was, to preserve the constitution in its
purity. He believed that Parliament was not truly
representative of the people because so many place-men
found seats in it, and because so many members
who might have been independent were bought
by the too abundant favors of the Court. Cleanse
Parliament of this corruption, and it would be restored
to something like its pristine excellence as
an instrument of liberty.
He dreaded to see the franchise extended and
the House of Commons radically made over in its
constitution. It had never been intended to be
merely the people’s House. It had been intended
to hold all the elements of the state that were not
to be found in the House of Lords or the Court.
He conceived it to be the essential object of the
constitution to establish a balanced and just intercourse
between the several forces of an ancient
society, and it was well that that balance should be
preserved even in the House of Commons, rather
than give perilous sweep to a single set of interests.
“These opposed and conflicting interests,” he said
to his French correspondent, “which you considered
as so great a blemish in your old and in our present
Constitution, interpose a salutary check to all
precipitate resolutions. They render deliberation
a matter, not of choice, but of necessity; they
make all change a subject of compromise, which
naturally begets moderation; they produce temperaments,
preventing the sore evil of harsh, crude,
unqualified reformations, and rendering all the
headlong exertions of arbitrary power, in the few
or in the many, forever impracticable. Through
that diversity of members and interests, general
liberty had as many securities as there are separate
views in the several orders; whilst by pressing
down the whole by the weight of a real monarchy,
the separate parts would have been prevented from
warping and starting from their allotted places.”
“We wish,” he said, “to derive all we possess as
an inheritance from our forefathers. Upon that
body and stock of experience we have taken care
not to inoculate any scion alien to the nature of the
original plant.” “This idea of a liberal descent
inspires us with a sense of habitual native dignity,
which prevents that upstart insolence almost inevitably
adhering to and disgracing those who are
the first acquirers of any distinction. By this
means our liberty becomes a noble freedom. It
carries an imposing and majestic aspect. It has a
pedigree and illustrating ancestors. It has its
bearings and its ensigns armorial. It has its gallery
of portraits, its monumental inscriptions, its
records, evidences, and titles. We procure reverence
to our civil institutions on the principle upon
which Nature teaches us to revere individual men:
on account of their age, and on account of those
from whom they are descended.”
“When the useful parts of an old establishment
are kept, and what is superadded is to be fitted to
what is retained, a vigorous mind, steady, persevering
attention, various powers of comparison
and combination, and the resources of an understanding
fruitful in expedients are to be exercised;
they are to be exercised in a continued conflict
with the combined force of opposite vices, with the
obstinacy that rejects all improvement, and the
levity that is fatigued and disgusted with everything
of which it is in possession.... Political
arrangement, as it is a work for social ends, is to
be only wrought by social means. There mind
must conspire with mind. Time is required to
produce that union of minds which alone can produce
all the good we aim at. Our patience will
achieve more than our force. If I might venture
to appeal to what is so much out of fashion in
Paris,—I mean to experience,—I should tell you
that in my course I have known, and, according to
my measure, have coöperated with great men; and
I have never yet seen any plan which has not been
mended by the observations of those who were
much inferior in understanding to the person who
took the lead in the business. By a slow, but well
sustained progress, the effect of each step is
watched; the good or ill success of the first gives
light to us in the second; and so, from light to light,
we are conducted with safety, through the whole
series.... We are enabled to unite into a consistent
whole the various anomalies and contending
principles that are found in the minds and affairs
of men. From hence arises, not an excellence in
simplicity, but one far superior, an excellence in
composition. Where the great interests of mankind
are concerned through a long succession of
generations, that succession ought to be admitted
into some share in the counsels which are so deeply
to affect them.”
It is not possible to escape deep conviction of
the wisdom of these reflections. They penetrate to
the heart of all practicable methods of reform.
Burke was doubtless too timid, and in practical
judgment often mistaken. Measures which in
reality would operate only as salutary and needed
reformations he feared because of the element of
change that was in them. He erred when he supposed
that progress can in all its stages be made
without changes which seem to go even to the substance.
But, right or wrong, his philosophy did
not come to him of a sudden and only at the end
of his life, when he found France desolated and
England threatened with madness for love of revolutionary
principles of change. It is the key to
his thought everywhere, and through all his life.
It is the key (which many of his critics have
never found) to his position with regard to the
revolution in France. He was roused to that
fierce energy of opposition in which so many have
thought that they detected madness, not so much
because of his deep disgust to see brutal and
ignorant men madly despoil an ancient and honorable
monarchy, as because he saw the spirit of
these men cross the Channel and find lodgment
in England, even among statesmen like Fox, who
had been his own close friends and companions in
thought and policy; not so much because he loved
France as because he feared for England. For
England he had Shakespeare’s love:
“That fortress built by nature for herself
Against infection and the hand of war;
That happy breed of men, that little world,
That precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands;
That blessed plot, that earth, that realm, that England.”
’T was to keep out infection and to preserve such
precious stores of manly tradition as had made that
little world “the envy of less happier lands” that
Burke sounded so effectually that extraordinary
alarm against the revolutionary spirit that was
racking France from throne to cottage. Let us
admit, if you will, that with reference to France
herself he was mistaken. Let us say that when he
admired the institutions which she was then sweeping
away he was yielding to sentiment, and imagining
France as perfect as the beauty of the sweet
queen he had seen in her radiant youth. Let us
concede that he did not understand the condition
of France, and therefore did not see how inevitable
that terrible revolution was: that in this case, too,
the wages of sin was death. He was not defending
France, if you look to the bottom of it; he
was defending England:—and the things he
hated are truly hateful. He hated the French revolutionary
philosophy and deemed it unfit for
free men. And that philosophy is in fact radically
evil and corrupting. No state can ever be
conducted on its principles. For it holds that
government is a matter of contract and deliberate
arrangement, whereas in fact it is an institute of
habit, bound together by innumerable threads of
association, scarcely one of which has been deliberately
placed. It holds that the object of government
is liberty, whereas the true object of government
is justice; not the advantage of one class, even
though that class constitute the majority, but right
equity in the adjustment of the interests of all
classes. It assumes that government can be made
over at will, but assumes it without the slightest
historical foundation. For governments have
never been successfully and permanently changed
except by slow modification operating from generation
to generation. It contradicted every principle
that had been so laboriously brought to light in
the slow stages of the growth of liberty in the only
land in which liberty had then grown to great proportions.
The history of England is a continuous
thesis against revolution; and Burke would have
been no true Englishman, had he not roused himself,
even fanatically, if there were need, to keep
such puerile doctrine out.
If you think his fierceness was madness, look
how he conducted the trial against Warren Hastings
during those same years: with what patience,
with what steadiness in business, with what temper,
with what sane and balanced attention to detail,
with what statesmanlike purpose! Note, likewise,
that his thesis is the same in the one undertaking
as in the other. He was applying the same principles
to the case of France and to the case of India
that he had applied to the case of the colonies.
He meant to save the empire, not by changing its
constitution, as was the method in France, and so
shaking every foundation in order to dislodge an
abuse, but by administering it uprightly and in a
liberal spirit. He was persuaded “that government
was a practical thing, made for the happiness
of mankind, and not to furnish out a spectacle of
uniformity to gratify the schemes of visionary politicians.
Our business,” he said, “was to rule, not
to wrangle; and it would be a poor compensation
that we had triumphed in a dispute, whilst we had
lost an empire.” The monarchy must be saved
and the constitution vindicated by keeping the
empire pure in all parts, even in the remotest
provinces. Hastings must be crushed in order
that the world might know that no English governor
could afford to be unjust. Good government,
like all virtue, he deemed to be a practical
habit of conduct, and not a matter of constitutional
structure. It is a great ideal, a thoroughly English
ideal; and it constitutes the leading thought of all
Burke’s career.
In short, as I began by saying, this man, an
Irishman, speaks the best English thought upon the
essential questions of politics. He is thoroughly,
characteristically, and to the bottom English in all
his flunking. He is more liberal than Englishmen
in his treatment of Irish questions, of course; for
he understands them, as no Englishman of his
generation did. But for all that he remains the
chief spokesman for England in the utterance of
the fundamental ideals which have governed the
action of Englishmen in politics. “All the ancient,
honest, juridical principles and institutions of England,”
such was his idea, “are so many clogs to
check and retard the headlong course of violence
and oppression. They were invented for this one
good purpose, that what was not just should not be
convenient.” This is fundamental English doctrine.
English liberty has consisted in making it unpleasant
for those who were unjust, and thus getting
them in the habit of being just for the sake of a
modus vivendi. Burke is the apostle of the great
English gospel of Expediency.
The politics of English-speaking peoples has
never been speculative; it has always been profoundly
practical and utilitarian. Speculative politics
treats men and situations as they are supposed
to be; practical politics treats them (upon no general
plan, but in detail) as they are found to be at
the moment of actual contact. With reference to
America Burke argues: No matter what your legal
right in the case, it is not expedient to treat
America as you propose: a numerous and spirited
people like the colonists will not submit; and your
experiment will cost you your colonies. In the
case of administrative reform, again, it is the
higher sort of expediency he urges: If you wish
to keep your government from revolution, keep it
from corruption, and by making it pure render it
permanent. To the French he says, It is not expedient
to destroy thus recklessly these ancient parts
of your constitution. How will you replace them?
How will you conduct affairs at all after you shall
have deprived yourselves of all balance and of all
old counsel? It is both better and easier to reform
than to tear down and reconstruct.
This is unquestionably the message of Englishmen
to the world, and Burke utters it with incomparable
eloquence. A man of sensitive imagination
and elevated moral sense, of a wide knowledge and
capacity for affairs, he stood in the midst of the
English nation speaking its moral judgments upon
affairs, its character in political action, its purposes
of freedom, equity, wide and equal progress. It is
the immortal charm of his speech and manner that
gives permanence to his works. Though his life
was devoted to affairs with a constant and unalterable
passion, the radical features of Burke’s mind
were literary. He was a man of books, without
being under the dominance of what others had
written. He got knowledge out of books and the
abundance of matter his mind craved to work its
constructive and imaginative effects upon. It is
singular how devoid of all direct references to
books his writings are. The materials of his
thought never reappear in the same form in which
he obtained them. They have been smelted and
recoined. They have come under the drill and
inspiration of a great constructive mind, have
caught life and taken structure from it. Burke is
not literary because he takes from books, but because
he makes books, transmuting what he writes
upon into literature. It is this inevitable literary
quality, this sure mastery of style, that mark the
man, as much as his thought itself. He is a master
in the use of the great style. Every sentence, too,
is steeped in the colors of an extraordinary imagination.
The movement takes your breath and
quickens your pulses. The glow and power of the
matter rejuvenate your faculties.
And yet the thought, too, is quite as imperishable
as its incomparable vehicle.
“The deepest, plainest, highest, clearest pen;
The voice most echoed by consenting men;
The soul which answered best to all well said
By others, and which most requital made;
Tuned to the highest key of ancient Rome,
Returning all her music with his own;
In whom, with nature, study claimed a part,
And yet who to himself owed all his art.”
VI. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER.
“Give us the facts, and nothing but the facts,”
is the sharp injunction of our age to its historians.
Upon the face of it, an eminently reasonable requirement.
To tell the truth simply, openly, without
reservation, is the unimpeachable first principle
of all right dealing; and historians have no license
to be quit of it. Unquestionably they must tell us
the truth, or else get themselves enrolled among a
very undesirable class of persons, not often frankly
named in polite society. But the thing is by no
means so easy as it looks. The truth of history is
a very complex and very occult matter. It consists
of things which are invisible as well as of things
which are visible. It is full of secret motives, and
of a chance interplay of trivial and yet determining
circumstances; it is shot through with transient
passions, and broken athwart here and there by
what seem cruel accidents; it cannot all be reduced
to statistics or newspaper items or official recorded
statements. And so it turns out, when the actual
test of experiment is made, that the historian must
have something more than a good conscience, must
be something more than a good man. He must
have an eye to see the truth; and nothing but a
very catholic imagination will serve to illuminate
his matter for him: nothing less than keen and
steady insight will make even illumination yield
him the truth of what he looks upon. Even when
he has seen the truth, only half his work is done,
and that not the more difficult half. He must
then make others see it just as he does: only when
he has done that has he told the truth. What an
art of penetrative phrase and just selection must
he have to take others into the light in which he
stands! Their dullness, their ignorance, their prepossessions,
are to be overcome and driven in, like
a routed troop, upon the truth. The thing is infinitely
difficult. The skill and strategy of it cannot
be taught. And so historians take another way,
which is easier: they tell part of the truth,—the
part most to their taste, or most suitable to their
talents,—and obtain readers to their liking among
those of similar tastes and talents to their own.
We have our individual preferences in history,
as in every other sort of literature. And there are
histories to every taste: histories full of the piquant
details of personal biography, histories that blaze
with the splendors of courts and resound with
drum and trumpet, and histories that run upon the
humbler but greater levels of the life of the people;
colorless histories, so passionless and so lacking in
distinctive mark or motive that they might have
been set up out of a dictionary without the intervention
of an author, and partisan histories, so
warped and violent in every judgment that no
reader not of the historian’s own party can stomach
them; histories of economic development, and histories
that speak only of politics; those that tell
nothing but what it is pleasant and interesting to
know, and those that tell nothing at all that one
cares to remember. One must be of a new and
unheard of taste not to be suited among them all.
The trouble is, after all, that men do not invariably
find the truth to their taste, and will often
deny it when they hear it; and the historian has to
do much more than keep his own eyes clear: he
has also to catch and hold the eye of his reader.
’Tis a nice art, as much intellectual as moral.
How shall he take the palate of his reader at unawares,
and get the unpalatable facts down his
throat along with the palatable? Is there no way
in which all the truth may be made to hold together
in a narrative so strongly knit and so harmoniously
colored that no reader will have either the wish or
the skill to tear its patterns asunder, and men will
take it all, unmarred and as it stands, rather than
miss the zest of it?
It is evident the thing cannot be done by the
“dispassionate” annalist. The old chroniclers,
whom we relish, were not dispassionate. We love
some of them for their sweet quaintness, some for
their childlike credulity, some for their delicious
inconsequentiality. But our modern chroniclers
are not so. They are, above all things else, knowing,
thoroughly informed, subtly sophisticated.
They would not for the world contribute any spice
of their own to the narrative; and they are much
too watchful, circumspect, and dutiful in their care
to keep their method pure and untouched by any
thought of theirs to let us catch so much as a
glimpse of the chronicler underneath the chronicle.
Their purpose is to give simply the facts, eschewing
art, and substituting a sort of monumental index
and table of the world’s events.
The trouble is that men refuse to be made any
wiser by such means. Though they will readily
enough let their eyes linger upon a monument of
art, they will heedlessly pass by a mere monument
of industry. It suggests nothing to them. The
materials may be suitable enough, but the handling
of them leaves them dead and commonplace. An
interesting circumstance thus comes to light. It
is nothing less than this, that the facts do not of
themselves constitute the truth. The truth is abstract,
not concrete. It is the just idea, the right
revelation of what things mean. It is evoked only
by such arrangements and orderings of facts as
suggest interpretations. The chronological arrangement
of events, for example, may or may not be
the arrangement which most surely brings the
truth of the narrative to light; and the best arrangement
is always that which displays, not the
facts themselves, but the subtle and else invisible
forces that lurk in the events and in the minds of
men,—forces for which events serve only as lasting
and dramatic words of utterance. Take an instance.
How are you to enable men to know the truth
with regard to a period of revolution? Will you
give them simply a calm statement of recorded
events, simply a quiet, unaccentuated narrative of
what actually happened, written in a monotone,
and verified by quotations from authentic documents
of the time? You may save yourself the
trouble. As well make a pencil sketch in outline
of a raging conflagration; write upon one portion
of it “flame,” upon another “smoke;” here “town
hall, where the fire started,” and there “spot where
fireman was killed.” It is a chart, not a picture.
Even if you made a veritable picture of it, you
could give only part of the truth so long as you
confined yourself to black and white. Where
would be all the wild and terrible colors of the
scene: the red and tawny flame; the masses of
smoke, carrying the dull glare of the fire to the
very skies, like a great signal banner thrown to the
winds; the hot and frightened faces of the crowd;
the crimsoned gables down the street, with the
faint light of a lamp here and there gleaming
white from some hastily opened casement? Without
the colors your picture is not true. No inventory
of items will even represent the truth: the
fuller and more minute you make your inventory,
the more will the truth be obscured. The little
details will take up as much space in the statement
as the great totals into which they are summed up;
and, the proportions being false, the whole is false.
Truth, fortunately, takes its own revenge. No one
is deceived. The reader of the chronicle lays it
aside. It lacks verisimilitude. He cannot realize
how any of the things spoken of can have happened.
He goes elsewhere to find, if he may, a
real picture of the time, and perhaps finds one that
is wholly fictitious. No wonder the grave and
monk-like chronicler sighs. He of course wrote to
be read, and not merely for the manual exercise of
it; and when he sees readers turn away his heart
misgives him for his fellow-men. Is it as it always
was, that they do not wish to know the truth?
Alas! good eremite, men do not seek the truth as
they should; but do you know what the truth is?
It is a thing ideal, displayed by the just proportion
of events, revealed in form and color, dumb till
facts be set in syllables, articulated into words, put
together into sentences, swung with proper tone
and cadence. It is not revolutions only that have
color. Nothing in human life is without it. In a
monochrome you can depict nothing but a single
incident; in a monotone you cannot often carry
truth beyond a single sentence. Only by art in all
its variety can you depict as it is the various face
of life.
Yes; but what sort of art? There is here a
wide field of choice. Shall we go back to the art
of which Macaulay was so great a master? We
could do worse. It must be a great art that can
make men lay aside the novel and take up the history,
to find there, in very fact, the movement and
drama of life. What Macaulay does well he does
incomparably. Who else can mass the details as
he does, and yet not mar or obscure, but only
heighten, the effect of the picture as a whole?
Who else can bring so amazing a profusion of
knowledge within the strait limits of a simple plan,
nowhere encumbered, everywhere free and obvious
in its movement? How sure the strokes, and how
bold and vivid the result! Yet when we have laid
the book aside, when the charm and the excitement
of the telling narrative have worn off, when we
have lost step with the swinging gait at which the
style goes, when the details have faded from our
recollection, and we sit removed and thoughtful,
with only the greater outlines of the story sharp
upon our minds, a deep misgiving and dissatisfaction
take possession of us. We are no longer
young, and we are chagrined that we should have
been so pleased and taken with the glitter and
color and mere life of the picture. Let boys be
cajoled by rhetoric, we cry; men must look deeper.
What of the judgment of this facile and eloquent
man? Can we agree with him, when he is not
talking and the charm is gone? What shall we
say of his assessment of men and measures? Is
he just? Is he himself in possession of the whole
truth? Does he open the matter to us as it was?
Does he not, rather, ride us like an advocate, and
make himself master of our judgments?
Then it is that we become aware that there were
two Macaulays: Macaulay the artist, with an exquisite
gift for telling a story, filling his pages with
little vignettes it is impossible to forget, fixing
these with an inimitable art upon the surface of
a narrative that did not need the ornament they
gave it, so strong and large and adequate was it;
and Macaulay the Whig, subtly turning narrative
into argument, and making history the vindication
of a party. The mighty narrative is a great engine
of proof. It is not told for its own sake. It is
evidence summed up in order to justify a judgment.
We detect the tone of the advocate, and
though if we are just we must deem him honest,
we cannot deem him safe. The great story-teller
is discredited; and, willingly or unwillingly, we
reject the guide who takes it upon himself to determine
for us what we shall see. That, we feel
sure, cannot be true which makes of so complex a
history so simple a thesis for the judgment. There
is art here; but it is the art of special pleading,
misleading even to the pleader.
If not Macaulay, what master shall we follow?
Shall our historian not have his convictions, and
enforce them? Shall he not be our guide, and
speak, if he can, to our spirits as well as to our
understandings? Readers are a poor jury. They
need enlightenment as well as information; the
matter must be interpreted to them as well as related.
There are moral facts as well as material,
and the one sort must be as plainly told as the
other. Of what service is it that the historian
should have insight if we are not to know how the
matter stands in his view? If he refrain from
judgment, he may deceive us as much as he
would were his judgment wrong; for we must
have enlightenment,—that is his function. We
would not set him up merely to tell us tales, but
also to display to us characters, to open to us the
moral and intent of the matter. Were the men
sincere? Was the policy righteous? We have but
just now seen that the “facts” lie deeper than the
mere visible things that took place, that they involve
the moral and motive of the play. Shall
not these, too, be brought to light?
Unquestionably every sentence of true history
must hold a judgment in solution. All cannot be
told. If it were possible to tell all, it would take
as long to write history as to enact it, and we should
have to postpone the reading of it to the leisure
of the next world. A few facts must be selected
for the narrative, the great majority left unnoted.
But the selection—for what purpose it is to be
made? For the purpose of conveying an impression
of the truth. Where shall you find a more radical
process of judgment? The “essential” facts taken,
the “unessential” left out! Why, you may make
the picture what you will, and in any case it must
be the express image of the historian’s fundamental
judgments. It is his purpose, or should be, to give
a true impression of his theme as a whole,—to
show it, not lying upon his page in an open and
dispersed analysis, but set close in intimate synthesis,
every line, every stroke, every bulk even,
omitted which does not enter of very necessity into
a single and unified image of the truth.
It is in this that the writing of history differs,
and differs very radically, from the statement of
the results of original research. The writing of
history must be based upon original research and
authentic record, but it can no more be directly
constructed by the piecing together of bits of
original research than by the mere reprinting together
of state documents. Individual research
furnishes us, as it were, with the private documents
and intimate records without which the public
archives are incomplete and unintelligible. But
by themselves these are wholly out of perspective.
It is the consolation of those who produce them to
make them so. They would lose heart were they
forbidden to regard all facts as of equal importance.
It is facts they are after, and only facts,—facts
for their own sake, and without regard to their
several importance. These are their ore,—very
precious ore,—which they are concerned to get
out, not to refine. They have no direct concern
with what may afterwards be done at the mint or
in the goldsmith’s shop. They will even boast that
they care not for the beauty of the ore, and are
indifferent how, or in what shape, it may become
an article of commerce. Much of it is thrown
away in the nice processes of manufacture, and you
shall not distinguish the product of the several
mines in the coin, or the cup, or the salver.
The historian must, indeed, himself be an investigator.
He must know good ore from bad; must
distinguish fineness, quality, genuineness; must stop
to get out of the records for himself what he lacks
for the perfection of his work. But for all that,
he must know and stand ready to do every part of
his task like a master workman, recognizing and
testing every bit of stuff he uses. Standing sure,
a man of science as well as an artist, he must take
and use all of his equipment for the sake of his
art,—not to display his materials, but to subordinate
and transform them in his effort to make, by
every touch and cunning of hand and tool, the perfect
image of what he sees, the very truth of his
seer’s vision of the world. The true historian
works always for the whole impression, the truth
with unmarred proportions, unexaggerated parts,
undistorted visage. He has no favorite parts of
the story which he boasts are bits of his own, but
loves only the whole of it, the full and unspoiled
image of the day of which he writes, the crowded
and yet consistent details which carry, without obtrusion
of themselves, the large features of the
time. Any exaggeration of the parts makes all
the picture false, and the work is to do over.
“Test every bit of material,” runs the artist’s rule,
“and then forget the material;” forget its origin
and the dross from which it has been freed, and
think only and always of the great thing you
would make of it, the pattern and form in which
you would lose and merge it. That is its only
high use.
’Tis a pity to see how even the greatest minds
will often lack the broad and catholic vision with
which the just historian must look upon men and
affairs. There is Carlyle, with his shrewd and seeing
eye, his unmatched capacity to assess strong
men and set the scenery for tragedy or intrigue, his
breathless ardor for great events, his amazing flashes
of insight, and his unlooked-for steady light of occasional
narrative. The whole matter of what he
writes is too dramatic. Surely history was not all
enacted so hotly, or with so passionate a rush of
men upon the stage. Its quiet scenes must have
been longer, not mere pauses and interludes while
the tragic parts were being made up. There is not
often ordinary sunlight upon the page. The lights
burn now wan, now lurid. Men are seen disquieted
and turbulent, and may be heard in husky cries or
rude, untimely jests. We do not recognize our
own world, but seem to see another such as ours
might become if peopled by like uneasy Titans.
Incomparable to tell of days of storm and revolution,
speaking like an oracle and familiar of destiny
and fate, searching the hearts of statesmen
and conquerors with an easy insight in every day of
action, this peasant seer cannot give us the note of
piping times of peace, or catch the tone of slow
industry; watches ships come and go at the docks,
hears freight-vans thunder along the iron highways
of the modern world, and loaded trucks lumber
heavily through the crowded city streets, with a
hot disdain of commerce, prices current, the haggling
of the market, the smug ease of material
comfort bred in a trading age. There is here no
broad and catholic vision, no wise tolerance, no
various power to know, to sympathize, to interpret.
The great seeing imagination of the man lacks that
pure radiance in which things are seen steadily and
seen whole.
It is not easy, to say truth, to find actual examples
when you are constructing the ideal historian,
the man with the vision and the faculty divine
to see affairs justly and tell of them completely.
If you are not satisfied with this passionate and
intolerant seer of Chelsea, whom will you choose?
Shall it be Gibbon, whom all praise, but so few
read? He, at any rate, is passionless, it would
appear. But who could write epochal history
with passion? All hot humors of the mind must,
assuredly, cool when spread at large upon so vast
a surface. One must feel like a sort of minor
providence in traversing that great tract of world
history, and catch in spite of one’s self the gait and
manner of a god. This stately procession of generations
moves on remote from the ordinary levels of
our human sympathy. ’Tis a wide view of nations
and peoples and dynasties, and a world shaken by
the travail of new births. There is here no scale
by which to measure the historian of the sort we
must look to see handle the ordinary matter of
national history. The “Decline and Fall” stands
impersonal, like a monument. We shall reverence
it, but we shall not imitate it.
If we look away from Gibbon, exclude Carlyle,
and question Macaulay; if we put the investigators
on one side as not yet historians, and the deliberately
picturesque and entertaining raconteurs as
not yet investigators, we naturally turn, I suppose,
to such a man as John Richard Green, at once the
patient scholar,—who shall adequately say how
nobly patient?—and the rare artist, working so
like a master in the difficult stuffs of a long national
history. The very life of the man is as beautiful
as the moving sentences he wrote with so subtle
a music in the cadence. We know whence the
fine moral elevation of tone came that sounds
through all the text of his great narrative. True,
not everybody is satisfied with our doctor angelicus.
Some doubt he is too ornate. Others are troubled
that he should sometimes be inaccurate. Some are
willing to use his history as a manual; while others
cannot deem him satisfactory for didactic uses,
hesitate how they shall characterize him, and quit
the matter vaguely with saying that what he wrote
is “at any rate literature.” Can there be something
lacking in Green, too, notwithstanding he
was impartial, and looked with purged and open
eyes upon the whole unbroken life of his people,—notwithstanding
he saw the truth and had the art
and mastery to make others see it as he did, in all
its breadth and multiplicity?
Perhaps even this great master of narrative
lacks variety—as who does not? His method,
whatever the topic, is ever the same. His sentences,
his paragraphs, his chapters are pitched
one and all in the same key. It is a very fine and
moving key. Many an elevated strain and rich
harmony commend it alike to the ear and to the
imagination. It is employed with an easy mastery,
and is made to serve to admiration a wide range
of themes. But it is always the same key, and
some themes it will not serve. An infinite variety
plays through all history. Every scene has its
own air and singularity. Incidents cannot all be
rightly set in the narrative if all be set alike. As
the scene shifts, the tone of the narrative must
change: the narrator’s choice of incident and his
choice of words; the speed and method of his sentence;
his own thought, even, and point of view.
Surely his battle pages must resound with the
tramp of armies and the fearful din and rush of
war. In peace he must catch by turns the hum of
industry, the bustle of the street, the calm of the
country-side, the tone of parliamentary debate, the
fancy, the ardor, the argument of poets and seers
and quiet students. Snatches of song run along
with sober purpose and strenuous endeavor through
every nation’s story. Coarse men and refined,
mobs and ordered assemblies, science and mad impulse,
storm and calm, are all alike ingredients of
the various life. It is not all epic. There is rough
comedy and brutal violence. The drama can scarce
be given any strict, unbroken harmony of incident,
any close logical sequence of act or nice unity of
scene. To pitch it all in one key, therefore, is to
mistake the significance of the infinite play of
varied circumstance that makes up the yearly
movement of a people’s life.
It would be less than just to say that Green’s
pages do not reveal the variety of English life the
centuries through. It is his glory, indeed, as all
the world knows, to have broadened and diversified
the whole scale of English history. Nowhere else
within the compass of a single book can one find
so many sides of the great English story displayed
with so deep and just an appreciation of them all,
or of the part of each in making up the whole.
Green is the one man among English historians
who has restored the great fabric of the nation’s
history where its architecture was obscure, and its
details were likely to be lost or forgotten. Once
more, because of him, the vast Gothic structure
stands complete, its majesty and firm grace enhanced
at every point by the fine tracery of its
restored details.
Where so much is done, it is no doubt unreasonable
to ask for more. But the very architectural
symmetry of this great book imposes a limitation
upon it. It is full of a certain sort of variety; but
it is only the variety of a great plan’s detail, not
the variety of English life. The noble structure
obeys its own laws rather than the laws of a people’s
fortunes. It is a monument conceived and
reared by a consummate artist, and it wears upon
its every line some part of the image it was meant
to bear, of a great, complex, aspiring national existence.
But, though it symbolizes, it does not contain
that life. It has none of the irregularity of
the actual experiences of men and communities.
It explains, but it does not contain, their variety.
The history of every nation has certainly a plan
which the historian must see and reproduce; but
he must reconstruct the people’s life, not merely
expound it. The scope of his method must be as
great as the variety of his subject; it must change
with each change of mood, respond to each varying
impulse in the great process of events. No rigor
of a stately style must be suffered to exclude the
lively touches of humor or the rude sallies of
strength that mark it everywhere. The plan of
the telling must answer to the plan of the fact,—must
be as elastic as the topics are mobile. The
matter should rule the plan, not the plan the matter.
The ideal is infinitely difficult, if, indeed, it be
possible to any man not Shakespearean; but the
difficulty of attaining it is often unnecessarily enhanced.
Ordinarily the historian’s preparation for
his task is such as to make it unlikely he will
perform it naturally. He goes first, with infinite
and admirable labor, through all the labyrinth of
document and detail that lies up and down his
subject; collects masses of matter great and small,
for substance, verification, illustration; piles his
notes volumes high; reads far and wide upon the
tracks of his matter, and makes page upon page
of references; and then, thoroughly stuffed and
sophisticated, turns back and begins his narrative.
’Tis impossible then that he should begin naturally.
He sees the end from the beginning, and all the intermediate
way from beginning to end; he has made
up his mind about too many things; uses his details
with a too free and familiar mastery, not like one
who tells a story so much as like one who dissects a
cadaver. Having swept his details together beforehand,
like so much scientific material, he discourses
upon them like a demonstrator,—thinks too little
in subjection to them. They no longer make a
fresh impression upon him. They are his tools,
not his objects of vision.
It is not by such a process that a narrative is
made vital and true. It does not do to lose the
point of view of the first listener to the tale, or to
rearrange the matter too much out of the order of
nature. You must instruct your reader as the
events themselves would have instructed him, had
he been able to note them as they passed. The
historian must not lose his own fresh view of the
scene as it passed and changed more and more
from year to year and from age to age. He must
keep with the generation of which he writes, not
be too quick to be wiser than they were or look
back upon them in his narrative with head over
shoulder. He must write of them always in the
atmosphere they themselves breathed, not hastening
to judge them, but striving only to realize them at
every turn of the story, to make their thoughts
his own, and call their lives back again, rebuilding
the very stage upon which they played their parts.
Bring the end of your story to mind while you set
about telling its beginning, and it seems to have
no parts: beginning, middle, end, are all as one,—are
merely like parts of a pattern which you see as
a single thing stamped upon the stuff under your
hand.
Try the method with the history of our own land
and people. How will you begin? Will you start
with a modern map and a careful topographical
description of the continent? And then, having
made your nineteenth-century framework for the
narrative, will you ask your reader to turn back
and see the seventeenth century, and those lonely
ships coming in at the capes of the Chesapeake?
He will never see them so long as you compel him
to stand here at the end of the nineteenth century
and look at them as if through a long retrospect.
The attention both of the narrator and of the
reader, if history is to be seen aright, must look
forward, not backward. It must see with a contemporaneous
eye. Let the historian, if he be
wise, know no more of the history as he writes
than might have been known in the age and day
of which he is writing. A trifle too much knowledge
will undo him. It will break the spell for
his imagination. It will spoil the magic by which
he may raise again the image of days that are
gone. He must of course know the large lines of
his story; it must lie as a whole in his mind. His
very art demands that, in order that he may know
and keep its proportions. But the details, the
passing incidents of day and year, must come fresh
into his mind, unreasoned upon as yet, untouched
by theory, with their first look upon them. It is
here that original documents and fresh research
will serve him. He must look far and wide upon
every detail of the time, see it at first hand, and
paint as he looks; selecting, as the artist must, but
selecting while the vision is fresh, and not from
old sketches laid away in his notes,—selecting
from the life itself.
Let him remember that his task is radically
different from the task of the investigator. The
investigator must display his materials, but the
historian must convey his impressions. He must
stand in the presence of life, and reproduce it in
his narrative; must recover a past age; make dead
generations live again and breathe their own air;
show them native and at home upon his page. To
do this, his own impressions must be as fresh as
those of an unlearned reader, his own curiosity as
keen and young at every stage. It may easily be
so as his reading thickens, and the atmosphere of
the age comes stealthily into his thought, if only
he take care to push forward the actual writing of
his narrative at an equal pace with his reading,
painting thus always direct from the image itself.
His knowledge of the great outlines and bulks of
the picture will be his sufficient guide and restraint
the while, will give proportion to the individual
strokes of his work. But it will not check his zest,
or sophisticate his fresh recovery of the life that is
in the crowding colors of the canvas.
A nineteenth-century plan laid like a standard
and measure upon a seventeenth-century narrative
will infallibly twist it and make it false. Lay a
modern map before the first settlers at Jamestown
and Plymouth, and then bid them discover and
occupy the continent. With how superior a nineteenth-century
wonder and pity will you see them
grope, and stumble, and falter! How like children
they will seem to you, and how simple their age,
and ignorant! As stalwart men as you they were
in fact; mayhap wiser and braver too; as fit to
occupy a continent as you are to draw it upon
paper. If you would know them, go back to their
age; breed yourself a pioneer and woodsman; look
to find the South Sea up the nearest northwest
branch of the spreading river at your feet; discover
and occupy the wilderness with them; dream what
may be beyond the near hills, and long all day to
see a sail upon the silent sea; go back to them and
see them in their habit as they lived.
The picturesque writers of history have all along
been right in theory: they have been wrong only
in practice. It is a picture of the past we want—its
express image and feature; but we want the
true picture and not simply the theatrical matter,—the
manner of Rembrandt rather than of Rubens.
All life may be pictured, but not all of life is picturesque.
No great, no true historian would put
false or adventitious colors into his narrative, or
let a glamour rest where in fact it never was.
The writers who select an incident merely because
it is striking or dramatic are shallow fellows.
They see only with the eye’s retina, not with that
deep vision whose images lie where thought and
reason sit. The real drama of life is disclosed
only with the whole picture; and that only the
deep and fervid student will see, whose mind goes
daily fresh to the details, whose narrative runs
always in the authentic colors of nature, whose art
it is to see, and to paint what he sees.
It is thus and only thus we shall have the truth
of the matter: by art,—by the most difficult of all
arts; by fresh study and first-hand vision; at the
mouths of men who stand in the midst of old letters
and dusty documents and neglected records,
not like antiquarians, but like those who see a distant
country and a far-away people before their
very eyes, as real, as full of life and hope and incident,
as the day in which they themselves live. Let
us have done with humbug and come to plain
speech. The historian needs an imagination quite
as much as he needs scholarship, and consummate
literary art as much as candor and common honesty.
Histories are written in order that the bulk of men
may read and realize; and it is as bad to bungle
the telling of the story as to lie, as fatal to lack a
vocabulary as to lack knowledge. In no case can
you do more than convey an impression, so various
and complex is the matter. If you convey a false
impression, what difference does it make how you
convey it? In the whole process there is a nice
adjustment of means to ends which only the artist
can manage. There is an art of lying;—there is
equally an art,—an infinitely more difficult art,—of
telling the truth.
VII. A CALENDAR OF GREAT AMERICANS.
Before a calendar of great Americans can be
made out, a valid canon of Americanism must first
be established. Not every great man born and
bred in America was a great “American.” Some
of the notable men born among us were simply
great Englishmen; others had in all the habits of
their thought and life the strong flavor of a peculiar
region, and were great New Englanders or
great Southerners; others, masters in the fields of
science or of pure thought, showed nothing either
distinctively national or characteristically provincial,
and were simply great men; while a few displayed
odd cross-strains of blood or breeding. The great
Englishmen bred in America, like Hamilton and
Madison; the great provincials, like John Adams
and Calhoun; the authors of such thought as might
have been native to any clime, like Asa Gray and
Emerson; and the men of mixed breed, like Jefferson
and Benton,—must be excluded from our
present list. We must pick out men who have
created or exemplified a distinctively American
standard and type of greatness.
To make such a selection is not to create an artificial
standard of greatness, or to claim that greatness
is in any case hallowed or exalted merely
because it is American. It is simply to recognize
a peculiar stamp of character, a special make-up of
mind and faculties, as the specific product of our
national life, not displacing or eclipsing talents of
a different kind, but supplementing them, and so
adding to the world’s variety. There is an American
type of man, and those who have exhibited this
type with a certain unmistakable distinction and
perfection have been great “Americans.” It has
required the utmost variety of character and energy
to establish a great nation, with a polity at once
free and firm, upon this continent, and no sound
type of manliness could have been dispensed with
in the effort. We could no more have done without
our great Englishmen, to keep the past steadily
in mind and make every change conservative
of principle, than we could have done without
the men whose whole impulse was forward, whose
whole genius was for origination, natural masters
of the art of subduing a wilderness.
Certainly one of the greatest figures in our history
is the figure of Alexander Hamilton. American
historians, though compelled always to admire
him, often in spite of themselves, have been inclined,
like the mass of men in his own day, to look
at him askance. They hint, when they do not
plainly say, that he was not “American.” He rejected,
if he did not despise, democratic principles;
advocated a government as strong, almost, as a
monarchy; and defended the government which
was actually set up, like the skilled advocate he
was, only because it was the strongest that could
be had under the circumstances. He believed in
authority, and he had no faith in the aggregate
wisdom of masses of men. He had, it is true, that
deep and passionate love of liberty, and that steadfast
purpose in the maintenance of it, that mark
the best Englishmen everywhere; but his ideas of
government stuck fast in the old-world politics, and
his statesmanship was of Europe rather than of
America. And yet the genius and the steadfast
spirit of this man were absolutely indispensable to
us. No one less masterful, no one less resolute
than he to drill the minority, if necessary, to have
their way against the majority, could have done the
great work of organization by which he established
the national credit, and with the national credit the
national government itself. A pliant, popular,
optimistic man would have failed utterly in the
task. A great radical mind in his place would
have brought disaster upon us: only a great conservative
genius could have succeeded. It is safe
to say that, without men of Hamilton’s cast of
mind, building the past into the future with a deep
passion for order and old wisdom, our national life
would have miscarried at the very first. This tried
English talent for conservation gave to our fibre at
the very outset the stiffness of maturity.
James Madison, too, we may be said to have inherited.
His invaluable gifts of counsel were of
the sort so happily imparted to us with our English
blood at the first planting of the States which
formed the Union. A grave and prudent man,
and yet brave withal when new counsel was to be
taken, he stands at the beginning of our national
history, even in his young manhood, as he faced
and led the constitutional convention, a type of
the slow and thoughtful English genius for affairs.
He held old and tested convictions of the uses of
liberty; he was competently read in the history
of government; processes of revolution were in his
thought no more than processes of adaptation: exigencies
were to be met by modification, not by
experiment. His reasonable spirit runs through all
the proceedings of the great convention that gave
us the Constitution, and that noble instrument
seems the product of character like his. For all it
is so American in its content, it is in its method a
thoroughly English production, so full is it of old
principles, so conservative of experience, so carefully
compounded of compromises, of concessions
made and accepted. Such men are of a stock so
fine as to need no titles to make it noble, and yet
so old and so distinguished as actually to bear the
chief titles of English liberty. Madison came of
the long line of English constitutional statesmen.
There is a type of genius which closely approaches
this in character, but which is, nevertheless,
distinctively American. It is to be seen in
John Marshall and in Daniel Webster. In these
men a new set of ideas find expression, ideas which
all the world has received as American. Webster
was not an English but an American constitutional
statesman. For the English statesman constitutional
issues are issues of policy rather than issues
of law. He constantly handles questions of change:
his constitution is always a-making. He must at
every turn construct, and he is deemed conservative
if only his rule be consistency and continuity with
the past. He will search diligently for precedent,
but he is content if the precedent contain only a
germ of the policy he proposes. His standards are
set him, not by law, but by opinion: his constitution
is an ideal of cautious and orderly change.
Its fixed element is the conception of political
liberty: a conception which, though steeped in
history, must ever be added to and altered by
social change. The American constitutional statesman,
on the contrary, constructs policies like a
lawyer. The standard with which he must square
his conduct is set him by a document upon whose
definite sentences the whole structure of the government
directly rests. That document, moreover,
is the concrete embodiment of a peculiar theory of
government. That theory is, that definitive laws,
selected by a power outside the government, are
the structural iron of the entire fabric of politics,
and that nothing which cannot be constructed
upon this stiff framework is a safe or legitimate
part of policy. Law is, in his conception, creative
of states, and they live only by such permissions
as they can extract from it. The functions of the
judge and the functions of the man of affairs have,
therefore, been very closely related in our history,
and John Marshall, scarcely less than Daniel
Webster, was a constitutional statesman. With
all Madison’s conservative temper and wide-eyed
prudence in counsel, the subject-matter of thought
for both of these men was not English liberty or
the experience of men everywhere in self-government,
but the meaning stored up in the explicit
sentences of a written fundamental law. They
taught men the new—the American—art of
extracting life out of the letter, not of statutes
merely (that art was not new), but of statute-built
institutions and documented governments: the art
of saturating politics with law without grossly discoloring
law with politics. Other nations have
had written constitutions, but no other nation has
ever filled a written constitution with this singularly
compounded content, of a sound legal conscience
and a strong national purpose. It would have
been easy to deal with our Constitution like subtle
dialecticians; but Webster and Marshall did much
more and much better than that. They viewed
the fundamental law as a great organic product, a
vehicle of life as well as a charter of authority; in
disclosing its life they did not damage its tissue;
and in thus expanding the law without impairing
its structure or authority they made great contributions
alike to statesmanship and to jurisprudence.
Our notable literature of decision and commentary
in the field of constitutional law is America’s
distinctive gift to the history and the science of
law. John Marshall wrought out much of its substance;
Webster diffused its great body of principles
throughout national policy, mediating between
the law and affairs. The figures of the two men
must hold the eye of the world as the figures of
two great national representatives, as the figures
of two great Americans.
The representative national greatness and function
of these men appear more clearly still when
they are contrasted with men like John Adams
and John C. Calhoun, whose greatness was not
national. John Adams represented one element of
our national character, and represented it nobly,
with a singular force and greatness. He was an
eminent Puritan statesman, and the Puritan ingredient
has colored all our national life. We have
got strength and persistency and some part of our
steady moral purpose from it. But in the quick
growth and exuberant expansion of the nation it
has been only one element among many. The
Puritan blood has mixed with many another strain.
The stiff Puritan character has been mellowed by
many a transfusion of gentler and more hopeful
elements. So soon as the Adams fashion of man
became more narrow, intense, acidulous, intractable,
according to the tendencies of its nature, in the
person of John Quincy Adams, it lost the sympathy,
lost even the tolerance, of the country, and
the national choice took its reckless leap from a
Puritan President to Andrew Jackson, a man cast
in the rough original pattern of American life at
the heart of the continent. John Adams had not
himself been a very acceptable President. He had
none of the national optimism, and could not understand
those who did have it. He had none of
the characteristic adaptability of the delocalized
American, and was just a bit ridiculous in his stiffness
at the Court of St. James, for all he was so
honorable and so imposing. His type,—be it said
without disrespect,—was provincial. Unmistakably
a great man, his greatness was of the commonwealth,
not of the empire.
Calhoun, too, was a great provincial. Although
a giant, he had no heart to use his great strength
for national purposes. In his youth, it is true, he
did catch some of the generous ardor for national
enterprise which filled the air in his day; and all
his life through, with a truly pathetic earnestness,
he retained his affection for his first ideal. But
when the rights and interests of his section were
made to appear incompatible with a liberal and
boldly constructive interpretation of the Constitution,
he fell out of national counsels and devoted
all the strength of his extraordinary mind to holding
the nation’s thought and power back within
the strait limits of a literal construction of the law.
In powers of reasoning his mind deserves to rank
with Webster’s and Marshall’s: he handled questions
of law like a master, as they did. He had,
moreover, a keen insight into the essential principles
and character of liberty. His thought moved
eloquently along some of the oldest and safest lines
of English thought in the field of government.
He made substantive contributions to the permanent
philosophy of politics. His reasoning has
been discredited, not so much because it was not
theoretically sound within its limits, as because its
practical outcome was a negation which embarrassed
the whole movement of national affairs.
He would have held the nation still, in an old
equipoise, at one time normal enough, but impossible
to maintain. Webster and Marshall gave leave
to the energy of change inherent in all the national
life, making law a rule, but not an interdict;
a living guide, but not a blind and rigid discipline.
Calhoun sought to fix law as a barrier across the
path of policy, commanding the life of the nation
to stand still. The strength displayed in the effort,
the intellectual power and address, abundantly entitle
him to be called great; but his purpose was
not national. It regarded only a section of the
country, and marked him,—again be it said with
all respect,—a great provincial.
Jefferson was not a thorough American because
of the strain of French philosophy that permeated
and weakened all his thought. Benton was altogether
American so far as the natural strain of his
blood was concerned, but he had encumbered his
natural parts and inclinations with a mass of undigested
and shapeless learning. Bred in the West,
where everything was new, he had filled his head
with the thought of books (evidently very poor
books) which exhibited the ideals of communities
in which everything was old. He thought of the
Roman Senate when he sat in the Senate of the
United States. He paraded classical figures whenever
he spoke, upon a stage where both their
costume and their action seemed grotesque. A
pedantic frontiersman, he was a living and a
pompous antinomy. Meant by nature to be an
American, he spoiled the plan by applying a most
unsuitable gloss of shallow and irrelevant learning.
Jefferson was of course an almost immeasurably
greater man than Benton, but he was un-American
in somewhat the same way. He brought a foreign
product of thought to a market where no natural
or wholesome demand for it could exist. There
were not two incompatible parts in him, as in Benton’s
case: he was a philosophical radical by nature
as well as by acquirement; his reading and his
temperament went suitably together. The man is
homogeneous throughout. The American shows in
him very plainly, too, notwithstanding the strong
and inherent dash of what was foreign in his
make-up. He was a natural leader and manager
of men, not because he was imperative or masterful,
but because of a native shrewdness, tact, and
sagacity, an inborn art and aptness for combination,
such as no Frenchman ever displayed in the management
of common men. Jefferson had just a
touch of rusticity about him, besides; and it was
not pretense on his part or merely a love of power
that made him democratic. His indiscriminate
hospitality, his almost passionate love for the simple
equality of country life, his steady devotion to
what he deemed to be the cause of the people, all
mark him a genuine democrat, a nature native to
America. It is his speculative philosophy that is
exotic, and that runs like a false and artificial note
through all his thought. It was un-American in
being abstract, sentimental, rationalistic, rather
than practical. That he held it sincerely need not
be doubted; but the more sincerely he accepted it
so much the more thoroughly was he un-American.
His writings lack hard and practical sense. Liberty,
among us, is not a sentiment, but a product
of experience; its derivation is not rationalistic,
but practical. It is a hard-headed spirit of independence,
not the conclusion of a syllogism. The
very aërated quality of Jefferson’s principles gives
them an air of insincerity, which attaches to them
rather because they do not suit the climate of the
country and the practical aspect of affairs than because
they do not suit the character of Jefferson’s
mind and the atmosphere of abstract philosophy.
It is because both they and the philosophical
system of which they form a part do seem suitable
to his mind and character, that we must pronounce
him, though a great man, not a great American.
It is by the frank consideration of such concrete
cases that we may construct, both negatively and
affirmatively, our canons of Americanism. The
American spirit is something more than the old,
the immemorial Saxon spirit of liberty from which
it sprung. It has been bred by the conditions
attending the great task which we have all the
century been carrying forward: the task, at once
material and ideal, of subduing a wilderness and
covering all the wide stretches of a vast continent
with a single free and stable polity. It is, accordingly,
above all things, a hopeful and confident
spirit. It is progressive, optimistically progressive,
and ambitious of objects of national scope and
advantage. It is unpedantic, unprovincial, unspeculative,
unfastidious; regardful of law, but as using
it, not as being used by it or dominated by any
formalism whatever; in a sense unrefined, because
full of rude force; but prompted by large and generous
motives, and often as tolerant as it is resolute.
No one man, unless it be Lincoln, has ever
proved big or various enough to embody this active
and full-hearted spirit in all its qualities; and the
men who have been too narrow or too speculative
or too pedantic to represent it have, nevertheless,
added to the strong and stirring variety of our
national life, making it fuller and richer in motive
and energy; but its several aspects are none the
less noteworthy as they separately appear in different
men.
One of the first men to exhibit this American
spirit with an unmistakable touch of greatness and
distinction was Benjamin Franklin. It was characteristic
of America that this self-made man should
become a philosopher, a founder of philosophical
societies, an authoritative man of science; that his
philosophy of life should be so homely and so practical
in its maxims, and uttered with so shrewd a
wit; that one region should be his birthplace and
another his home; that he should favor effective
political union among the colonies from the first,
and should play a sage and active part in the
establishment of national independence and the
planning of a national organization; and that he
should represent his countrymen in diplomacy
abroad. They could have had no spokesman who
represented more sides of their character. Franklin
was a sort of multiple American. He was versatile
without lacking solidity; he was a practical statesman
without ceasing to be a sagacious philosopher.
He came of the people, and was democratic; but
he had raised himself out of the general mass of
unnamed men, and so stood for the democratic law,
not of equality, but of self-selection in endeavor.
One can feel sure that Franklin would have succeeded
in any part of the national life that it might
have fallen to his lot to take part in. He will
stand the final and characteristic test of Americanism:
he would unquestionably have made a successful
frontiersman, capable at once of wielding the
axe and of administering justice from the fallen
trunk.
Washington hardly seems an American, as most
of his biographers depict him. He is too colorless,
too cold, too prudent. He seems more like a wise
and dispassionate Mr. Alworthy, advising a nation
as he would a parish, than like a man building
states and marshaling a nation in a wilderness.
But the real Washington was as thoroughly an
American as Jackson or Lincoln. What we take
for lack of passion in him was but the reserve and
self-mastery natural to a man of his class and
breeding in Virginia. He was no parlor politician,
either. He had seen the frontier, and far beyond
it where the French forts lay. He knew the rough
life of the country as few other men could. His
thoughts did not live at Mount Vernon. He knew
difficulty as intimately and faced it always with as
quiet a mastery as William the Silent. This calm,
straightforward, high-spirited man, making charts
of the western country, noting the natural land
and water routes into the heart of the continent,
marking how the French power lay, conceiving the
policy which should dispossess it, and the engineering
achievements which should make the utmost
resources of the land our own; counseling Braddock
how to enter the forest, but not deserting him
because he would not take advice; planning step
by step, by patient correspondence with influential
men everywhere, the meetings, conferences, common
resolves which were finally to bring the great
constitutional convention together; planning, too,
always for the country as well as for Virginia; and
presiding at last over the establishment and organization
of the government of the Union: he certainly—the
most suitable instrument of the national life
at every moment of crisis—is a great American.
Those noble words which he uttered amidst the
first doubtings of the constitutional convention
might serve as a motto for the best efforts of liberty
wherever free men strive: “Let us raise a
standard to which the wise and honest can repair;
the event is in the hand of God.”
In Henry Clay we have an American of a most
authentic pattern. There was no man of his
generation who represented more of America than
he did. The singular, almost irresistible attraction
he had for men of every class and every temperament
came, not from the arts of the politician, but
from the instant sympathy established between him
and every fellow-countryman of his. He does not
seem to have exercised the same fascination upon
foreigners. They felt toward him as some New
Englanders did: he seemed to them plausible
merely, too indiscriminately open and cordial to be
sincere,—a bit of a charlatan. No man who really
takes the trouble to understand Henry Clay, or
who has quick enough parts to sympathize with
him, can deem him false. It is the odd combination
of two different elements in him that makes
him seem irregular and inconstant. His nature
was of the West, blown through with quick winds
of ardor and aggression, a bit reckless and defiant;
but his art was of the East, ready with soft and
placating phrases, reminiscent of old and reverenced
ideals, thoughtful of compromise and accommodation.
He had all the address of the trained and
sophisticated politician, bred in an old and sensitive
society; but his purposes ran free of cautious restraints,
and his real ideals were those of the somewhat
bumptious Americanism which was pushing
the frontier forward in the West, which believed
itself capable of doing anything it might put its
hand to, despised conventional restraints, and
followed a vague but resplendent “manifest destiny”
with lusty hurrahs. His purposes were sincere,
even if often crude and uninstructed; it was
only because the subtle arts of politics seemed inconsistent
with the direct dash and bold spirit of
the man that they sat upon him like an insincerity.
He thoroughly, and by mere unconscious sympathy,
represented the double America of his day,
made up of a West which hurried and gave bold
strokes, and of an East which held back, fearing
the pace, thoughtful and mindful of the instructive
past. The one part had to be served without
offending the other: and that was Clay’s mediatorial
function.
Andrew Jackson was altogether of the West.
Of his sincerity nobody has ever had any real
doubt; and his Americanism is now at any rate
equally unimpeachable. He was like Clay with
the social imagination of the orator and the art
and sophistication of the Eastern politician left out.
He came into our national politics like a cyclone
from off the Western prairies. Americans of the
present day perceptibly shudder at the very recollection
of Jackson. He seems to them a great
Vandal, playing fast and loose alike with institutions
and with tested and established policy, debauching
politics like a modern spoilsman. But
whether we would accept him as a type of ourselves
or not, the men of his own day accepted him with
enthusiasm. He did not need to be explained to
them. They crowded to his standard like men
free at last, after long and tedious restraint, to
make their own choice, follow their own man.
There can be no mistaking the spontaneity of the
thoroughgoing support he received. His was the
new type of energy and self-confidence bred by
life outside the States that had been colonies. It
was a terrible energy, threatening sheer destruction
to many a carefully wrought arrangement handed
on to us from the past; it was a perilous self-confidence,
founded in sheer strength rather than in
wisdom. The government did not pass through
the throes of that signal awakening of the new
national spirit without serious rack and damage.
But it was no disease. It was only an incautious,
abounding, madcap strength which proved so dangerous
in its readiness for every rash endeavor. It
was necessary that the West should be let into the
play: it was even necessary that she should assert
her right to the leading rôle. It was done without
good taste, but that does not condemn it. We
have no doubt refined and schooled the hoyden
influences of that crude time, and they are vastly
safer now than then, when they first came bounding
in; but they mightily stirred and enriched our
blood from the first. Now that we have thoroughly
suffered this Jackson change and it is over, we are
ready to recognize it as quite as radically American
as anything in all our history.
Lincoln, nevertheless, rather than Jackson, was
the supreme American of our history. In Clay,
East and West were mixed without being fused or
harmonized: he seems like two men. In Jackson
there was not even a mixture; he was all of a piece,
and altogether unacceptable to some parts of the
country,—a frontier statesman. But in Lincoln
the elements were combined and harmonized. The
most singular thing about the wonderful career of
the man is the way in which he steadily grew into
a national stature. He began an amorphous, unlicked
cub, bred in the rudest of human lairs;
but, as he grew, everything formed, informed,
transformed him. The process was slow but unbroken.
He was not fit to be President until he
actually became President. He was fit then
because, learning everything as he went, he had
found out how much there was to learn, and had
still an infinite capacity for learning. The quiet
voices of sentiment and murmurs of resolution
that went whispering through the land, his ear
always caught, when others could hear nothing but
their own words. He never ceased to be a common
man: that was his source of strength. But he
was a common man with genius, a genius for things
American, for insight into the common thought,
for mastery of the fundamental things of politics
that inhere in human nature and cast hardly more
than their shadows on constitutions; for the practical
niceties of affairs; for judging men and assessing
arguments. Jackson had no social imagination:
no unfamiliar community made any impression on
him. His whole fibre stiffened young, and nothing
afterward could modify or even deeply affect it.
But Lincoln was always a-making; he would have
died unfinished if the terrible storms of the war
had not stung him to learn in those four years
what no other twenty could have taught him.
And, as he stands there in his complete manhood,
at the most perilous helm in Christendom, what a
marvelous composite figure he is! The whole
country is summed up in him: the rude Western
strength, tempered with shrewdness and a broad
and humane wit; the Eastern conservatism, regardful
of law and devoted to fixed standards of duty.
He even understood the South, as no other Northern
man of his generation did. He respected, because
he comprehended, though he could not hold, its
view of the Constitution; he appreciated the inexorable
compulsions of its past in respect of
slavery; he would have secured it once more, and
speedily if possible, in its right to self-government,
when the fight was fought out. To the Eastern
politicians he seemed like an accident; but to history
he must seem like a providence.
Grant was Lincoln’s suitable instrument, a great
American general, the appropriate product of West
Point. A Western man, he had no thought of
commonwealths politically separate, and was instinctively
for the Union; a man of the common
people, he deemed himself always an instrument,
never a master, and did his work, though ruthlessly,
without malice; a sturdy, hard-willed, taciturn
man, a sort of Lincoln the Silent in thought
and spirit. He does not appeal to the imagination
very deeply; there is a sort of common greatness
about him, great gifts combined singularly with a
great mediocrity; but such peculiarities seem to
make him all the more American,—national in
spirit, thoroughgoing in method, masterful in
purpose.
And yet it is no contradiction to say that Robert
E. Lee also was a great American. He fought on
the opposite side, but he fought in the same spirit,
and for a principle which is in a sense scarcely less
American than the principle of Union. He represented
the idea of the inherent—the essential—separateness
of self-government. This was not
the principle of secession: that principle involved
the separate right of the several self-governing
units of the federal system to judge of national
questions independently, and as a check upon the
federal government,—to adjudge the very objects
of the Union. Lee did not believe in secession,
but he did believe in the local rootage of all government.
This is at the bottom, no doubt, an
English idea; but it has had a characteristic American
development. It is the reverse side of the
shield which bears upon its obverse the devices of
the Union, a side too much overlooked and obscured
since the war. It conceives the individual
State a community united by the most intimate
associations, the first home and foster-mother of
every man born into the citizenship of the nation.
Lee considered himself a member of one of these
great families; he could not conceive of the nation
apart from the State: above all, he could not live
in the nation divorced from his neighbors. His
own community should decide his political destiny
and duty.
This was also the spirit of Patrick Henry and of
Sam Houston,—men much alike in the cardinal
principle of their natures. Patrick Henry resisted
the formation of the Union only because he feared
to disturb the local rootage of self-government, to disperse
power so widely that neighbors could not control
it. It was not a disloyal or a separatist spirit,
but only a jealous spirit of liberty. Sam Houston,
too, deemed the character a community should give
itself so great a matter that the community, once
made, ought itself to judge of the national associations
most conducive to its liberty and progress.
Without liberty of this intensive character there
could have been no vital national liberty; and Sam
Houston, Patrick Henry, and Robert E. Lee are
none the less great Americans because they represented
only one cardinal principle of the national
life. Self-government has its intrinsic antinomies
as well as its harmonies.
Among men of letters Lowell is doubtless most
typically American, though Curtis must find an
eligible place in the list. Lowell was self-conscious,
though the truest greatness is not; he was
a trifle too “smart,” besides, and there is no
“smartness” in great literature. But both the
self-consciousness and the smartness must be admitted
to be American; and Lowell was so versatile,
so urbane, of so large a spirit, and so admirable
in the scope of his sympathies, that he must certainly
go on the calendar.
There need be no fear that we shall be obliged to
stop with Lowell in literature, or with any of the
men who have been named in the field of achievement.
We shall not in the future have to take
one type of Americanism at a time. The frontier
is gone: it has reached the Pacific. The country
grows rapidly homogeneous. With the same pace
it grows various, and multiform in all its life.
The man of the simple or local type cannot any
longer deal in the great manner with any national
problem. The great men of our future must be of
the composite type of greatness: sound-hearted,
hopeful, confident of the validity of liberty, tenacious
of the deeper principles of American institutions,
but with the old rashness schooled and
sobered, and instinct tempered by instruction.
They must be wise with an adult, not with an
adolescent wisdom. Some day we shall be of one
mind, our ideals fixed, our purposes harmonized,
our nationality complete and consentaneous: then
will come our great literature and our greatest
men.
VIII. THE COURSE OF AMERICAN HISTORY. 1
1 An address delivered before the New Jersey Historical Society.
In the field of history, learning should be deemed
to stand among the people and in the midst of life.
Its function there is not one of pride merely: to
make complaisant record of deeds honorably done
and plans nobly executed in the past. It has also a
function of guidance: to build high places whereon
to plant the clear and flaming lights of experience,
that they may shine alike upon the roads already
traveled and upon the paths not yet attempted.
The historian is also a sort of prophet. Our
memories direct us. They give us knowledge of
our character, alike in its strength and in its weakness:
and it is so we get our standards for endeavor,—our
warnings and our gleams of hope. It is
thus we learn what manner of nation we are of,
and divine what manner of people we should be.
And this is not in national records merely.
Local history is the ultimate substance of national
history. There could be no epics were pastorals
not also true,—no patriotism, were there no homes,
no neighbors, no quiet round of civic duty; and I,
for my part, do not wonder that scholarly men
have been found not a few who, though they might
have shone upon a larger field, where all eyes
would have seen them win their fame, yet chose
to pore all their lives long upon the blurred and
scattered records of a country-side, where there was
nothing but an old church or an ancient village.
The history of a nation is only the history of its
villages written large. I only marvel that these
local historians have not seen more in the stories
they have sought to tell. Surely here, in these old
hamlets that antedate the cities, in these little
communities that stand apart and yet give their
young life to the nation, is to be found the very
authentic stuff of romance for the mere looking.
There is love and courtship and eager life and
high devotion up and down all the lines of every
genealogy. What strength, too, and bold endeavor
in the cutting down of forests to make the clearings;
what breath of hope and discovery in scaling
for the first time the nearest mountains; what
longings ended or begun upon the coming in of
ships into the harbor; what pride of earth in the
rivalries of the village; what thoughts of heaven
in the quiet of the rural church! What forces of
slow and steadfast endeavor there were in the
building of a great city upon the foundations of a
hamlet: and how the plot broadens and thickens
and grows dramatic as communities widen into
states! Here, surely, sunk deep in the very fibre
of the stuff, are the colors of the great story of
men,—the lively touches of reality and the striking
images of life.
It must be admitted, I know, that local history
can be made deadly dull in the telling. The men
who reconstruct it seem usually to build with kiln-dried
stuff,—as if with a purpose it should last.
But that is not the fault of the subject. National
history may be written almost as ill, if due pains
be taken to dry it out. It is a trifle more difficult:
because merely to speak of national affairs is to
give hint of great forces and of movements blown
upon by all the airs of the wide continent. The
mere largeness of the scale lends to the narrative
a certain dignity and spirit. But some men will
manage to be dull though they should speak of
creation. In writing of local history the thing
is fatally easy. For there is some neighborhood
history that lacks any large significance, which is
without horizon or outlook. There are details in
the history of every community which it concerns
no man to know again when once they are past
and decently buried in the records: and these are
the very details, no doubt, which it is easiest to
find upon a casual search. It is easier to make
out a list of county clerks than to extract the social
history of the county from the records they have
kept,—though it is not so important: and it is
easier to make a catalogue of anything than to say
what of life and purpose the catalogue stands for.
This is called collecting facts “for the sake of the
facts themselves;” but if I wished to do aught for
the sake of the facts themselves I think I should
serve them better by giving their true biographies
than by merely displaying their faces.
The right and vital sort of local history is the
sort which may be written with lifted eyes,—the
sort which has an horizon and an outlook upon
the world. Sometimes it may happen, indeed,
that the annals of a neighborhood disclose some
singular adventure which had its beginning and its
ending there: some unwonted bit of fortune which
stands unique and lonely amidst the myriad transactions
of the world of affairs, and deserves to be
told singly and for its own sake. But usually the
significance of local history is, that it is part of a
greater whole. A spot of local history is like an
inn upon a highway: it is a stage upon a far
journey: it is a place the national history has
passed through. There mankind has stopped and
lodged by the way. Local history is thus less than
national history only as the part is less than the
whole. The whole could not dispense with the
part, would not exist without it, could not be
understood unless the part also were understood.
Local history is subordinate to national only in the
sense in which each leaf of a book is subordinate
to the volume itself. Upon no single page will the
whole theme of the book be found; but each page
holds a part of the theme. Even were the history
of each locality exactly like the history of every
other (which it cannot be), it would deserve to be
written,—if only to corroborate the history of the
rest, and verify it as an authentic part of the
record of the race and nation. The common elements
of a nation’s life are the great elements of
its life, the warp and woof of the fabric. They
cannot be too much or too substantially verified and
explicated. It is so that history is made solid
and fit for use and wear.
Our national history, of course, has its own great
and spreading pattern, which can be seen in its
full form and completeness only when the stuff of
our national life is laid before us in broad surfaces
and upon an ample scale. But the detail of the
pattern, the individual threads of the great fabric,
are to be found only in local history. There is all
the intricate weaving, all the delicate shading, all
the nice refinement of the pattern,—gold thread
mixed with fustian, fine thread laid upon coarse,
shade combined with shade. Assuredly it is this
that gives to local history its life and importance.
The idea, moreover, furnishes a nice criterion of
interest. The life of some localities is, obviously,
more completely and intimately a part of the
national pattern than the life of other localities,
which are more separate and, as it were, put upon
the border of the fabric. To come at once and
very candidly to examples, the local history of the
Middle States,—New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania,—is much more structurally a part
of the characteristic life of the nation as a whole
than is the history of the New England communities
or of the several States and regions of the South.
I know that such a heresy will sound very rank in
the ears of some: for I am speaking against accepted
doctrine. But acceptance, be it never so
general, does not make a doctrine true.
Our national history has been written for the
most part by New England men. All honor to
them! Their scholarship and their characters alike
have given them an honorable enrollment amongst
the great names of our literary history; and no
just man would say aught to detract, were it never
so little, from their well-earned fame. They have
written our history, nevertheless, from but a single
point of view. From where they sit, the whole of
the great development looks like an Expansion of
New England. Other elements but play along the
sides of the great process by which the Puritan has
worked out the development of nation and polity.
It is he who has gone out and possessed the land:
the man of destiny, the type and impersonation of
a chosen people. To the Southern writer, too, the
story looks much the same, if it be but followed to
its culmination,—to its final storm and stress and
tragedy in the great war. It is the history of the
Suppression of the South. Spite of all her splendid
contributions to the steadfast accomplishment
of the great task of building the nation; spite of
the long leadership of her statesmen in the national
counsels; spite of her joint achievements in the
conquest and occupation of the West, the South
was at last turned upon on every hand, rebuked,
proscribed, defeated. The history of the United
States, we have learned, was, from the settlement
at Jamestown to the surrender at Appomattox, a
long-drawn contest for mastery between New England
and the South,—and the end of the contest
we know. All along the parallels of latitude ran
the rivalry, in those heroical days of toil and adventure
during which population crossed the continent,
like an army advancing its encampments.
Up and down the great river of the continent, too,
and beyond, up the slow incline of the vast steppes
that lift themselves toward the crowning towers of
the Rockies,—beyond that, again, in the gold-fields
and upon the green plains of California, the
race for ascendency struggled on,—till at length
there was a final coming face to face, and the masterful
folk who had come from the loins of New
England won their consummate victory.
It is a very dramatic form for the story. One
almost wishes it were true. How fine a unity it
would give our epic! But perhaps, after all, the
real truth is more interesting. The life of the
nation cannot be reduced to these so simple terms.
These two great forces, of the North and of the
South, unquestionably existed,—were unquestionably
projected in their operation out upon the
great plane of the continent, there to combine or
repel, as circumstances might determine. But the
people that went out from the North were not an
unmixed people; they came from the great Middle
States as well as from New England. Their
transplantation into the West was no more a
reproduction of New England or New York or
Pennsylvania or New Jersey than Massachusetts
was a reproduction of old England, or New Netherland
a reproduction of Holland. The Southern
people, too, whom they met by the western rivers
and upon the open prairies, were transformed, as
they themselves were, by the rough fortunes of the
frontier. A mixture of peoples, a modification of
mind and habit, a new round of experiment and
adjustment amidst the novel life of the baked and
unfilled plain, and the far valleys with the virgin
forests still thick upon them: a new temper, a new
spirit of adventure, a new impatience of restraint,
a new license of life,—these are the characteristic
notes and measures of the time when the nation
spread itself at large upon the continent, and was
transformed from a group of colonies into a family
of States.
The passes of these eastern mountains were the
arteries of the nation’s life. The real breath of
our growth and manhood came into our nostrils
when first, like Governor Spotswood and that gallant
company of Virginian gentlemen that rode
with him in the far year 1716, the Knights of the
Order of the Golden Horseshoe, our pioneers stood
upon the ridges of the eastern hills and looked
down upon those reaches of the continent where
lay the untrodden paths of the westward migration.
There, upon the courses of the distant rivers that
gleamed before them in the sun, down the farther
slopes of the hills beyond, out upon the broad fields
that lay upon the fertile banks of the “Father of
Waters,” up the long tilt of the continent to the
vast hills that looked out upon the Pacific—there
were the regions in which, joining with people
from every race and clime under the sun, they
were to make the great compounded nation whose
liberty and mighty works of peace were to cause
all the world to stand at gaze. Thither were to
come Frenchmen, Scandinavians, Celts, Dutch,
Slavs,—men of the Latin races and of the races
of the Orient, as well as men, a great host, of the
first stock of the settlements: English, Scots, Scots-Irish,—like
New England men, but touched with
the salt of humor, hard, and yet neighborly too.
For this great process of growth by grafting, of
modification no less than of expansion, the colonies,—the
original thirteen States,—were only preliminary
studies and first experiments. But the
experiments that most resembled the great methods
by which we peopled the continent from side to
side and knit a single polity across all its length
and breadth, were surely the experiments made
from the very first in the Middle States of our
Atlantic seaboard.
Here from the first were mixture of population,
variety of element, combination of type, as if of
the nation itself in small. Here was never a
simple body, a people of but a single blood and
extraction, a polity and a practice brought straight
from one motherland. The life of these States was
from the beginning like the life of the country:
they have always shown the national pattern. In
New England and the South it was very different.
There some of the great elements of the national
life were long in preparation: but separately and
with an individual distinction; without mixture,—for
long almost without movement. That the elements
thus separately prepared were of the greatest
importance, and run everywhere like chief threads
of the pattern through all our subsequent life, who
can doubt? They give color and tone to every
part of the figure. The very fact that they are so
distinct and separately evident throughout, the
very emphasis of individuality they carry with
them, but proves their distinct origin. The other
elements of our life, various though they be, and
of the very fibre, giving toughness and consistency
to the fabric, are merged in its texture, united,
confused, almost indistinguishable, so thoroughly
are they mixed, intertwined, interwoven, like the
essential strands of the stuff itself: but these of
the Puritan and the Southerner, though they run
everywhere with the rest and seem upon a superficial
view themselves the body of the cloth, in fact
modify rather than make it.
What in fact has been the course of American
history? How is it to be distinguished from European
history? What features has it of its own,
which give it its distinctive plan and movement?
We have suffered, it is to be feared, a very serious
limitation of view until recent years by having all
our history written in the East. It has smacked
strongly of a local flavor. It has concerned itself
too exclusively with the origins and Old-World
derivations of our story. Our historians have
made their march from the sea with their heads
over shoulder, their gaze always backward upon the
landing-places and homes of the first settlers. In
spite of the steady immigration, with its persistent
tide of foreign blood, they have chosen to speak
often and to think always of our people as sprung
after all from a common stock, bearing a family
likeness in every branch, and following all the while
old, familiar, family ways. The view is the more
misleading because it is so large a part of the truth
without being all of it. The common British
stock did first make the country, and has always
set the pace. There were common institutions up
and down the coast; and these had formed and
hardened for a persistent growth before the great
westward migration began which was to re-shape
and modify every element of our life. The national
government itself was set up and made strong by
success while yet we lingered for the most part
upon the eastern coast and feared a too distant
frontier.
But, the beginnings once safely made, change
set in apace. Not only so: there had been slow
change from the first. We have no frontier now,
we are told,—except a broken fragment, it may
be, here and there in some barren corner of the
western lands, where some inhospitable mountain
still shoulders us out, or where men are still lacking
to break the baked surface of the plains and occupy
them in the very teeth of hostile nature. But at
first it was all frontier,—a mere strip of settlements
stretched precariously upon the sea-edge of
the wilds: an untouched continent in front of
them, and behind them an unfrequented sea that
almost never showed so much as the momentary
gleam of a sail. Every step in the slow process of
settlement was but a step of the same kind as the
first, an advance to a new frontier like the old.
For long we lacked, it is true, that new breed of
frontiersmen born in after years beyond the mountains.
Those first frontiersmen had still a touch of
the timidity of the Old World in their blood: they
lacked the frontier heart. They were “Pilgrims”
in very fact,—exiled, not at home. Fine courage
they had: and a steadfastness in their bold design
which it does a faint-hearted age good to look back
upon. There was no thought of drawing back.
Steadily, almost calmly, they extended their seats.
They built homes, and deemed it certain their children
would live there after them. But they did not
love the rough, uneasy life for its own sake. How
long did they keep, if they could, within sight of
the sea! The wilderness was their refuge; but
how long before it became their joy and hope!
Here was their destiny cast; but their hearts lingered
and held back. It was only as generations
passed and the work widened about them that their
thought also changed, and a new thrill sped along
their blood. Their life had been new and strange
from their first landing in the wilderness. Their
houses, their food, their clothing, their neighborhood
dealings were all such as only the frontier
brings. Insensibly they were themselves changed.
The strange life became familiar; their adjustment
to it was at length unconscious and without effort;
they had no plans which were not inseparably a part
and a product of it. But, until they had turned
their backs once for all upon the sea; until they
saw their western borders cleared of the French;
until the mountain passes had grown familiar, and
the lands beyond the central and constant theme
of their hope, the goal and dream of their young
men, they did not become an American people.
When they did, the great determining movement
of our history began. The very visages of the
people changed. That alert movement of the eye,
that openness to every thought of enterprise or adventure,
that nomadic habit which knows no fixed
home and has plans ready to be carried any whither,—all
the marks of the authentic type of the
“American” as we know him came into our life.
The crack of the whip and the song of the teamster,
the heaving chorus of boatmen poling their
heavy rafts upon the rivers, the laughter of the
camp, the sound of bodies of men in the still forests,
became the characteristic notes in our air. A
roughened race, embrowned in the sun, hardened
in manner by a coarse life of change and danger,
loving the rude woods and the crack of the rifle,
living to begin something new every day, striking
with the broad and open hand, delicate in nothing
but the touch of the trigger, leaving cities in its
track as if by accident rather than design, settling
again to the steady ways of a fixed life only when
it must: such was the American people whose
achievement it was to be to take possession of their
continent from end to end ere their national government
was a single century old. The picture is a
very singular one! Settled life and wild side by
side: civilization frayed at the edges,—taken forward
in rough and ready fashion, with a song and
a swagger,—not by statesmen, but by woodsmen
and drovers, with axes and whips and rifles in their
hands, clad in buckskin, like huntsmen.
It has been said that we have here repeated
some of the first processes of history; that the
life and methods of our frontiersmen take us back
to the fortunes and hopes of the men who crossed
Europe when her forests, too, were still thick upon
her. But the difference is really very fundamental,
and much more worthy of remark than the likeness.
Those shadowy masses of men whom we see
moving upon the face of the earth in the far-away,
questionable days when states were forming:
even those stalwart figures we see so well as they
emerge from the deep forests of Germany, to displace
the Roman in all his western provinces and
set up the states we know and marvel upon at this
day, show us men working their new work at their
own level. They do not turn back a long cycle of
years from the old and settled states, the ordered
cities, the tilled fields, and the elaborated governments
of an ancient civilization, to begin as it were
once more at the beginning. They carry alike
their homes and their states with them in the camp
and upon the ordered march of the host. They
are men of the forest, or else men hardened always
to take the sea in open boats. They live no more
roughly in the new lands than in the old. The
world has been frontier for them from the first.
They may go forward with their life in these new
seats from where they left off in the old. How
different the circumstances of our first settlement
and the building of new states on this side the
sea! Englishmen, bred in law and ordered government
ever since the Norman lawyers were followed
a long five hundred years ago across the narrow
seas by those masterful administrators of the strong
Plantagenet race, leave an ancient realm and come
into a wilderness where states have never been;
leave a land of art and letters, which saw but yesterday
“the spacious times of great Elizabeth,”
where Shakespeare still lives in the gracious leisure
of his closing days at Stratford, where cities teem
with trade and men go bravely dight in cloth of
gold, and turn back six centuries,—nay, a thousand
years and more,—to the first work of building
states in a wilderness! They bring the steadied
habits and sobered thoughts of an ancient realm
into the wild air of an untouched continent. The
weary stretches of a vast sea lie, like a full thousand
years of time, between them and the life in which
till now all their thought was bred. Here they
stand, as it were, with all their tools left behind,
centuries struck out of their reckoning, driven back
upon the long dormant instincts and forgotten craft
of their race, not used this long age. Look how
singular a thing: the work of a primitive race, the
thought of a civilized! Hence the strange, almost
grotesque groupings of thought and affairs in that
first day of our history. Subtle politicians speak
the phrases and practice the arts of intricate diplomacy
from council chambers placed within log huts
within a clearing. Men in ruffs and lace and
polished shoe-buckles thread the lonely glades of
primeval forests. The microscopical distinctions
of the schools, the thin notes of a metaphysical
theology are woven in and out through the labyrinths
of grave sermons that run hours long upon
the still air of the wilderness. Belief in dim refinements
of dogma is made the test for man or woman
who seeks admission to a company of pioneers.
When went there by an age since the great flood
when so singular a thing was seen as this: thousands
of civilized men suddenly rusticated and
bade do the work of primitive peoples,—Europe
frontiered!
Of course there was a deep change wrought, if
not in these men, at any rate in their children;
and every generation saw the change deepen. It
must seem to every thoughtful man a notable thing
how, while the change was wrought, the simplest
of things complex were revealed in the clear air of
the New World: how all accidentals seemed to
fall away from the structure of government, and
the simple first principles were laid bare that abide
always; how social distinctions were stripped off,
shown to be the mere cloaks and masks they were,
and every man brought once again to a clear realization
of his actual relations to his fellows! It
was as if trained and sophisticated men had been
rid of a sudden of their sophistication and of all
the theory of their life, and left with nothing but
their discipline of faculty, a schooled and sobered
instinct. And the fact that we kept always, for
close upon three hundred years, a like element in
our life, a frontier people always in our van, is, so
far, the central and determining fact of our national
history. “East” and “West,” an ever-changing
line, but an unvarying experience and a constant
leaven of change working always within the body
of our folk. Our political, our economic, our social
life has felt this potent influence from the wild
border all our history through. The “West” is
the great word of our history. The “Westerner”
has been the type and master of our American life.
Now at length, as I have said, we have lost our
frontier: our front lies almost unbroken along all
the great coast line of the western sea. The Westerner,
in some day soon to come, will pass out of
our life, as he so long ago passed out of the life of
the Old World. Then a new epoch will open for
us. Perhaps it has opened already. Slowly we
shall grow old, compact our people, study the delicate
adjustments of an intricate society, and ponder
the niceties, as we have hitherto pondered the bulks
and structural framework, of government. Have
we not, indeed, already come to these things? But
the past we know. We can “see it steady and
see it whole;” and its central movement and motive
are gross and obvious to the eye.
Till the first century of the Constitution is
rounded out we stand all the while in the presence
of that stupendous westward movement which has
filled the continent: so vast, so various, at times
so tragical, so swept by passion. Through all the
long time there has been a line of rude settlements
along our front wherein the same tests of power
and of institutions were still being made that were
made first upon the sloping banks of the rivers of
old Virginia and within the long sweep of the Bay
of Massachusetts. The new life of the West has
reacted all the while—who shall say how powerfully?—upon
the older life of the East; and yet
the East has moulded the West as if she sent forward
to it through every decade of the long process
the chosen impulses and suggestions of history.
The West has taken strength, thought, training,
selected aptitudes out of the old treasures of the
East,—as if out of a new Orient; while the East
has itself been kept fresh, vital, alert, originative
by the West, her blood quickened all the while, her
youth through every age renewed. Who can say in
a word, in a sentence, in a volume, what destinies
have been variously wrought, with what new examples
of growth and energy, while, upon this unexampled
scale, community has passed beyond community
across the vast reaches of this great continent!
The great process is the more significant because
it has been distinctively a national process. Until
the Union was formed and we had consciously set
out upon a separate national career, we moved but
timidly across the nearer hills. Our most remote
settlements lay upon the rivers and in the open
glades of Tennessee and Kentucky. It was in the
years that immediately succeeded the war of 1812
that the movement into the West began to be a
mighty migration. Till then our eyes had been
more often in the East than in the West. Not
only were foreign questions to be settled and our
standing among the nations to be made good, but
we still remained acutely conscious and deliberately
conservative of our Old-World connections. For
all we were so new a people and lived so simple and
separate a life, we had still the sobriety and the
circumspect fashions of action that belong to an old
society. We were, in government and manners,
but a disconnected part of the world beyond the
seas. Its thought and habit still set us our standards
of speech and action. And this, not because
of imitation, but because of actual and long abiding
political and social connection with the mother
country. Our statesmen,—strike but the names
of Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry from the list,
together with all like untutored spirits, who stood
for the new, unreverencing ardor of a young democracy,—our
statesmen were such men as might
have taken their places in the House of Commons
or in the Cabinet at home as naturally and with as
easy an adjustment to their place and task as in
the Continental Congress or in the immortal Constitutional
Convention. Think of the stately ways
and the grand air and the authoritative social
understandings of the generation that set the new
government afoot,—the generation of Washington
and John Adams. Think, too, of the conservative
tradition that guided all the early history of that
government: that early line of gentlemen Presidents:
that steady “cabinet succession to the Presidency”
which came at length to seem almost like
an oligarchy to the impatient men who were shut
out from it. The line ended, with a sort of chill,
in stiff John Quincy Adams, too cold a man to be
a people’s prince after the old order of Presidents;
and the year 1829, which saw Jackson come in,
saw the old order go out.
The date is significant. Since the war of 1812,
undertaken as if to set us free to move westward,
seven States had been admitted to the Union: and
the whole number of States was advanced to
twenty-four. Eleven new States had come into
partnership with the old thirteen. The voice of
the West rang through all our counsels; and, in
Jackson, the new partners took possession of the
Government. It is worth while to remember how
men stood amazed at the change: how startled,
chagrined, dismayed the conservative States of the
East were at the revolution they saw effected, the
riot of change they saw set in; and no man who
has once read the singular story can forget how
the eight years Jackson reigned saw the Government,
and politics themselves, transformed. For
long,—the story being written in the regions
where the shock and surprise of the change was
greatest,—the period of this momentous revolution
was spoken of amongst us as a period of
degeneration, the birth-time of a deep and permanent
demoralization in our politics. But we see it
differently now. Whether we have any taste or
stomach for that rough age or not, however much
we may wish that the old order might have stood,
the generation of Madison and Adams have been
prolonged, and the good tradition of the early days
handed on unbroken and unsullied, we now know
that what the nation underwent in that day of
change was not degeneration, great and perilous as
were the errors of the time, but regeneration.
The old order was changed, once and for all. A
new nation stepped, with a touch of swagger, upon
the stage,—a nation which had broken alike with
the traditions and with the wisely wrought experience
of the Old World, and which, with all the
haste and rashness of youth, was minded to work
out a separate policy and destiny of its own. It
was a day of hazards, but there was nothing sinister
at the heart of the new plan. It was a wasteful
experiment, to fling out, without wise guides, upon
untried ways; but an abounding continent afforded
enough and to spare even for the wasteful. It was
sure to be so with a nation that came out of the
secluded vales of a virgin continent. It was the
bold frontier voice of the West sounding in affairs.
The timid shivered, but the robust waxed strong
and rejoiced, in the tonic air of the new day.
It was then we swung out into the main paths
of our history. The new voices that called us were
first silvery, like the voice of Henry Clay, and
spoke old familiar words of eloquence. The first
spokesmen of the West even tried to con the classics,
and spoke incongruously in the phrases of
politics long dead and gone to dust, as Benton did.
But presently the tone changed, and it was the
truculent and masterful accents of the real frontiersman
that rang dominant above the rest, harsh,
impatient, and with an evident dash of temper.
The East slowly accustomed itself to the change;
caught the movement, though it grumbled and
even trembled at the pace; and managed most of
the time to keep in the running. But it was
always henceforth to be the West that set the
pace. There is no mistaking the questions that
have ruled our spirits as a nation during the present
century. The public land question, the tariff
question, and the question of slavery,—these dominate
from first to last. It was the West that
made each one of these the question that it was.
Without the free lands to which every man who
chose might go, there would not have been that
easy prosperity of life and that high standard of
abundance which seemed to render it necessary
that, if we were to have manufactures and a diversified
industry at all, we should foster new undertakings
by a system of protection which would
make the profits of the factory as certain and as
abundant as the profits of the farm. It was the
constant movement of the population, the constant
march of wagon trains into the West, that made it
so cardinal a matter of policy whether the great
national domain should be free land or not: and
that was the land question. It was the settlement
of the West that transformed slavery from an
accepted institution into passionate matter of controversy.
Slavery within the States of the Union stood
sufficiently protected by every solemn sanction the
Constitution could afford. No man could touch it
there, think, or hope, or purpose what he might.
But where new States were to be made it was not
so. There at every step choice must be made:
slavery or no slavery?—a new choice for every
new State: a fresh act of origination to go with
every fresh act of organization. Had there been
no Territories, there could have been no slavery
question, except by revolution and contempt of
fundamental law. But with a continent to be peopled,
the choice thrust itself insistently forward at
every step and upon every hand. This was the
slavery question: not what should be done to reverse
the past, but what should be done to redeem
the future. It was so men of that day saw it,—and
so also must historians see it. We must not
mistake the programme of the Anti-Slavery Society
for the platform of the Republican party,
or forget that the very war itself was begun ere
any purpose of abolition took shape amongst those
who were statesmen and in authority. It was a
question, not of freeing men, but of preserving a
Free Soil. Kansas showed us what the problem
was, not South Carolina: and it was the Supreme
Court, not the slave-owners, who formulated the
matter for our thought and purpose.
And so, upon every hand and throughout every
national question, was the commerce between East
and West made up: that commerce and exchange
of ideas, inclinations, purposes, and principles which
has constituted the moving force of our life as a
nation. Men illustrate the operation of these singular
forces better than questions can: and no
man illustrates it better than Abraham Lincoln.
“Great captains with their guns and drums
Disturb our judgment for the hour;
But at last silence comes:
These all are gone, and, standing like a tower,
Our children shall behold his fame,
The kindly-earnest, brave, foreseeing man,
Sagacious, patient, dreading praise not blame,
New birth of our new soil, the first American.”
It is a poet’s verdict; but it rings in the authentic
tone of the seer. It must be also the verdict of
history. He would be a rash man who should say
he understood Abraham Lincoln. No doubt natures
deep as his, and various almost to the point
of self-contradiction, can be sounded only by the
judgment of men of a like sort,—if any such there
be. But some things we all may see and judge
concerning him. You have in him the type and
flower of our growth. It is as if Nature had made
a typical American, and then had added with liberal
hand the royal quality of genius, to show us
what the type could be. Lincoln owed nothing to
his birth, everything to his growth: had no training
save what he gave himself; no nurture, but only a
wild and native strength. His life was his schooling,
and every day of it gave to his character a
new touch of development. His manhood not only,
but his perception also, expanded with his life.
His eyes, as they looked more and more abroad,
beheld the national life, and comprehended it: and
the lad who had been so rough-cut a provincial
became, when grown to manhood, the one leader in
all the nation who held the whole people singly in
his heart:—held even the Southern people there,
and would have won them back. And so we have
in him what we must call the perfect development
of native strength, the rounding out and nationalization
of the provincial. Andrew Jackson was a
type, not of the nation, but of the West. For all
the tenderness there was in the stormy heart of
the masterful man, and staunch and simple loyalty
to all who loved him, he learned nothing in the
East; kept always the flavor of the rough school in
which he had been bred; was never more than a
frontier soldier and gentleman. Lincoln differed
from Jackson by all the length of his unmatched
capacity to learn. Jackson could understand only
men of his own kind; Lincoln could understand
men of all sorts and from every region of the land:
seemed himself, indeed, to be all men by turns, as
mood succeeded mood in his strange nature. He
never ceased to stand, in his bony angles, the
express image of the ungainly frontiersman. His
mind never lost the vein of coarseness that had
marked him grossly when a youth. And yet how
he grew and strengthened in the real stuff of dignity
and greatness: how nobly he could bear himself
without the aid of grace! He kept always the
shrewd and seeing eye of the woodsman and the
hunter, and the flavor of wild life never left him:
and yet how easily his view widened to great
affairs; how surely he perceived the value and the
significance of whatever touched him and made
him neighbor to itself!
Lincoln’s marvelous capacity to extend his comprehension
to the measure of what he had in hand
is the one distinguishing mark of the man: and to
study the development of that capacity in him is
little less than to study, where it is as it were perfectly
registered, the national life itself. This boy
lived his youth in Illinois when it was a frontier
State. The youth of the State was coincident with
his own: and man and State kept equal pace in
their striding advance to maturity. The frontier
population was an intensely political population.
It felt to the quick the throb of the nation’s life,—for
the nation’s life ran through it, going its
eager way to the westward. The West was not
separate from the East. Its communities were
every day receiving fresh members from the East,
and the fresh impulse of direct suggestion. Their
blood flowed to them straight from the warmest
veins of the older communities. More than that,
elements which were separated in the East were
mingled in the West: which displayed to the eye
as it were a sort of epitome of the most active and
permanent forces of the national life. In such
communities as these Lincoln mixed daily from the
first with men of every sort and from every quarter
of the country. With them he discussed neighborhood
politics, the politics of the State, the politics
of the nation,—and his mind became traveled as
he talked. How plainly amongst such neighbors,
there in Illinois, must it have become evident that
national questions were centring more and more in
the West as the years went by: coming as it were
to meet them. Lincoln went twice down the
Mississippi, upon the slow rafts that carried wares
to its mouth, and saw with his own eyes, so used
to look directly and point-blank upon men and
affairs, characteristic regions of the South. He
worked his way slowly and sagaciously, with that
larger sort of sagacity which so marked him all his
life, into the active business of state politics; sat
twice in the state legislature, and then for a term
in Congress,—his sensitive and seeing mind open
all the while to every turn of fortune and every
touch of nature in the moving affairs he looked
upon. All the while, too, he continued to canvass,
piece by piece, every item of politics, as of old,
with his neighbors, familiarly around the stove, or
upon the corners of the street, or more formally
upon the stump; and kept always in direct contact
with the ordinary views of ordinary men. Meanwhile
he read, as nobody else around him read,
and sought to gain a complete mastery over speech,
with the conscious purpose to prevail in its use;
derived zest from the curious study of mathematical
proof, and amusement as well as strength from
the practice of clean and naked statements of
truth. It was all irregularly done, but strenuously,
with the same instinct throughout, and with
a steady access of facility and power. There was
no sudden leap for this man, any more than for
other men, from crudeness to finished power, from
an understanding of the people of Illinois to an
understanding of the people of the United States.
And thus he came at last, with infinite pains and a
wonder of endurance, to his great national task
with a self-trained capacity which no man could
match, and made upon a scale as liberal as the life
of the people. You could not then set this athlete
a pace in learning or in perceiving that was too
hard for him. He knew the people and their life
as no other man did or could: and now stands in
his place singular in all the annals of mankind, the
“brave, sagacious, foreseeing, patient man” of the
people, “new birth of our new soil, the first
American.”
We have here a national man presiding over
sectional men. Lincoln understood the East better
than the East understood him or the people from
whom he sprung: and this is every way a very
noteworthy circumstance. For my part, I read a
lesson in the singular career of this great man. Is
it possible the East remains sectional while the
West broadens to a wider view?
“Be strong-backed, brown-handed, upright as your pines;
By the scale of a hemisphere shape your designs,”
is an inspiring programme for the woodsman and
the pioneer; but how are you to be brown-handed
in a city office? What if you never see the upright
pines? How are you to have so big a purpose on
so small a part of the hemisphere? As it has
grown old, unquestionably, the East has grown
sectional. There is no suggestion of the prairie in
its city streets, or of the embrowned ranchman and
farmer in its well-dressed men. Its ports teem with
shipping from Europe and the Indies. Its newspapers
run upon the themes of an Old World. It
hears of the great plains of the continent as of foreign
parts, which it may never think to see except
from a car window. Its life is self-centred and
selfish. The West, save where special interests
centre (as in those pockets of silver where men’s
eyes catch as it were an eager gleam from the very
ore itself): the West is in less danger of sectionalization.
Who shall say in that wide country where
one region ends and another begins, or, in that free
and changing society, where one class ends and
another begins?
This, surely, is the moral of our history. The
East has spent and been spent for the West: has
given forth her energy, her young men and her substance,
for the new regions that have been a-making
all the century through. But has she learned as
much as she has taught, or taken as much as she
has given? Look what it is that has now at last
taken place. The westward march has stopped,
upon the final slopes of the Pacific; and now the
plot thickens. Populations turn upon their old
paths; fill in the spaces they passed by neglected
in their first journey in search of a land of promise;
settle to a life such as the East knows as well as
the West,—nay, much better. With the change,
the pause, the settlement, our people draw into
closer groups, stand face to face, to know each other
and be known: and the time has come for the East
to learn in her turn; to broaden her understanding
of political and economic conditions to the scale of
a hemisphere, as her own poet bade. Let us be
sure that we get the national temperament; send
our minds abroad upon the continent, become
neighbors to all the people that live upon it, and
lovers of them all, as Lincoln was.
Read but your history aright, and you shall not
find the task too hard. Your own local history,
look but deep enough, tells the tale you must take
to heart. Here upon our own seaboard, as truly as
ever in the West, was once a national frontier, with
an elder East beyond the seas. Here, too, various
peoples combined, and elements separated elsewhere
effected a tolerant and wholesome mixture. Here,
too, the national stream flowed full and strong, bearing
a thousand things upon its currents. Let us
resume and keep the vision of that time; know
ourselves, our neighbors, our destiny, with lifted
and open eyes; see our history truly, in its great
proportions; be ourselves liberal as the great principles
we profess; and so be the people who might
have again the heroic adventures and do again the
heroic work of the past. ’Tis thus we shall renew
our youth and secure our age against decay.
Transcriber’s Notes
Simple typographical errors were corrected.
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made
consistent when a predominant preference was found
in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.