NOTICE TO THE READER.
The following Narrative of one of the most
brilliant and important Campaigns of the British
Army on the Peninsula, was originally published,
in parts, (commencing in May 1829) in the United
Service Journal, under the head of "A revised
Journal of an Officer on the Staff of the
Army." Though anonymous, it was soon discovered
by internal evidence to be the production
of Colonel Fitzclarence—now Earl of Munster,—who
served throughout the whole of the
Peninsular Campaigns, with the exception of
that of 1812, when he returned to England
on promotion.
Yielding, in point of fidelity and spirit, to no
existing Record of the Events of which it treats,
this soldier-like Sketch is reprinted in a complete
form, as a valuable addition to the Military
Memoirs of The British Army.—Editor.
AN ACCOUNT
OF THE
BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN 1809,
UNDER
SIR A. WELLESLEY,
IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.
On the 18th of January, 1809, when the last
transport, containing the rear guard of Sir. J.
Moore's army, sailed from the harbour of Corunna,
the British little foresaw that the Peninsula
was still to be the arena for their conquests and
renown. None were so sanguine as to hope that
their splendid successes and example should yet
cause Europe to regain the moral feelings she had
lost under the long victorious career of France, or
that the latter country was finally to sink under
their exertions.
Neither did Buonaparte suspect, when halting
on the confines of the Galician mountains, and
leaving to Soult the easy task of "driving the
leopard into the sea," that his legions were soon
to be checked and defeated; or that his vaunted
representation of the broken-hearted and dismayed
state of the British army, should, by the
repulse of his troops within a few days after in
a set battle, become a severe reflection on the
conduct of his own soldiery. Neither Soult nor
the Frenchmen under his command could have
supposed, at the same period, how early the fate
of war would create a total reverse in their
hitherto prosperous campaigns; or that their
corps, which had led the advance to Corunna,
should soon become the pursued, and in a retreat
not less disastrous than that they had just
witnessed. But Buonaparte ever miscalculated,
and at this time was wholly unacquainted with,
the perseverance of our national character, or the
power of England; and when he compared her
apparent means with those of France, by showing
she had not a million of infantry or one hundred
thousand cavalry to oppose her rival, he had to
learn the extent of her vast and boundless resources,
and the determined character of her
people.25
When this boastful and triumphant comparison
was made, the ruler of France little feared that
the refutation of England's inadequacy to cope
with his power would be proved within seven
years, by her hurling him from the throne, and
leading him a captive at her chariot wheels, or
that he should end his days in one of her distant
colonies, in confinement and obscurity! Buonaparte
thus considering the army expelled from Spain as
the utmost extent of the means and exertion of
the English as a military people, hastily concluded
that they could not again appear on the continent.
He naturally deduced from this, that the subjection
of both Spain and Portugal was the inevitable
consequence of his success in Galicia, and
that it only required the time necessary for their
occupation to secure them under Gallic sway.26
But how uncertain are the results of human
calculation! At the moment when Buonaparte
thought the Peninsula at his feet, the seeds of discontent
sown by that restless ambition, which was
urging him on to his ruin, began to develope
themselves in a distant nation. Their growth to
maturity was as rapid as opportune, and created a
powerful diversion in favour of those countries
to the southward suffering under his yoke.
The perhaps necessary employment of the
French nation, and of the military feeling and spirit
grown up since the revolution, which Napoleon
fostered, had twice, previously to his invasion of
Spain, caused him to direct his conquests against
his most powerful military neighbour,—Austria.
The last campaign of 1806 left the family of
Hapsburg indignant at their reverses, and on their
vanquisher becoming entangled by his unjust
aggression of Spain, they hoped a fit opportunity
was offered for redeeming their character and importance
in Europe. If the bold advance of Sir
J. Moore into the heart of Spain, and his demonstration
on Carrion, had made Buonaparte direct
the most considerable portion of his armies on
the front or flanks of the English, thus interrupting
for a time, in other quarters, the rapidity of
conquest, not less did the Austrian declaration of
war, drawing off a portion of the resources of
France, tend materially to the ultimate advantage
of the rightful cause. Buonaparte was not only
personally arrested from overrunning Spain by
his return to France, but from directing a just
combination among his dispersed marshals, which
circumstance fortunately allowed England to regain
a firm footing in the Peninsula, and, by the
events of the succeeding campaign, an opportunity
of renewing a good feeling and confidence
in the people. Considering the reorganized
Austrian as a more dangerous enemy than the
broken Spaniards or expelled English, Buonaparte,
on withdrawing from Astorga, only passed
through Madrid, and returned to Paris. He,
however, left (with the exception of the Imperial
Guard, about 15,000 of whom had accompanied
him across the Pyrenees,) his armies entire, under
the command of his various marshals, to complete
the subjugation of Spain.
Of these eight corps d'armée, (each equal to the
whole British army in Spain in 1809,) which had
crossed the frontier, five had co-operated directly
or otherwise against Sir J. Moore. The sixth,
commanded by the gallant Ney, was ordered to
remain in and reduce to control Galicia and the
Asturias. The fourth, under Mortier, with a vast
body of cavalry commanded by Kellerman, was
to overawe Leon and Castille; while Victor, with
the first corps, was at once to complete the ruin
of the beaten Spanish armies, and to threaten the
line of the Tagus, the south of Portugal, and
eventually its capital. The eighth corps, which
had, under Junot, served in 1807–8 in Portugal,
and according to the convention of Cintra been
carried to Rochelle, and subsequently recrossed
Spain, and met their old antagonists before
Corunna, was broken up, and its débris added to
the second corps under Soult.27
This force was intended to take the active part
of the campaign against Portugal, which country
was to be immediately attacked, the orders to that
effect being received within ten days after the
embarkation of the British. So certain was
Buonaparte of Soult's conquest, that he fixed the
5th of February for the arrival of his troops at
Oporto—and the 16th of the same month for his
triumphant entrance into Lisbon!
The army under Soult consisted of 23,500
men, of which 4,000 were cavalry, divided into
ten regiments. It was accompanied by fifty-six
pieces of cannon. Besides these troops, a division
under Gen. Lapisse was to be pushed south from
Salamanca to invade Portugal, by the way of Almeida,
at the same time becoming a point of communication
between the corps of Victor and Soult.
The army of the latter General advanced
to the southward, through Galicia, by several
routes, but the principal part, with the
artillery, marched through St. Jago. His directions
were to invade Portugal along the sea-coast,
and, with that view, he attempted to cross the
Minho at Tuy, but failing, was forced to proceed
up the right bank of the river as far as Orense,
where he crossed that barrier. Besides the great
loss of time from this disappointment and change
of route, the army was much detained by the opposition
of the peasantry and the remains of
Romana's dispersed army, and it was only on the
10th of March it was able to enter Portugal, by
the valley of the Tamega.
Though Soult met considerable opposition from
Gen. Silveira,28 the French army reached and
captured Chaves on the 12th, and Braga on the
20th, after defeating a corps of Portuguese troops
under Baron Eben; and nine days subsequently,
forced the entrenched lines covering Oporto, having
been more than seven times longer on their
march than had been calculated by Buonaparte.
The next day Gen. Franceschi, with several regiments
of cavalry, was pushed on to the banks
of the Vouga, where he established his posts opposite
those of Col. Trant, who had collected a
few troops and ordenança, and a corps of volunteers,
formed of the students of the University of
Coimbra, who gave up their literary pursuits for
the defence of their country. The division of
Gen. Mermet was cantoned in Villa Nova, with
the 31st regiment in its front in support of the
cavalry. Soult's corps had been diminished upwards
of 3,000 men within the two months occupied
in its march, having left great numbers of
sick at Chaves and Braga. Although it had overcome
all opposition, its chief found himself in an
isolated position, shut out from all intercourse
with the other French corps, and his difficulties
increasing every day, as he was obliged to separate
and detach a considerable portion of his force to
subdue the country, and attempt to open his communication
with Lapisse.
But, however insecure and critical his post, it
was likely to become more immediately endangered
by the activity of the British, whose
Government, far from being discouraged at the
result of the preceding year, was employed in
preparation for a hearty prosecution of the contest.
At the moment the British army withdrew
from Corunna, the troops left in the Peninsula,
including a brigade under Brigadier-Gen. Cameron,
(which had advanced to the north-east
frontier of Portugal,) the 14th Light Dragoons,
and the sick, convalescents, and stragglers of Sir
J. Moore's army, did not consist of above 7,000
men, under the command of Sir J. Craddock, at
Lisbon. The want of information was great, and
the state of alarm so exaggerated, that the advance
of the French on that capital was daily expected.
The artillery and cavalry were embarked, and
the forts of St. Julien and Bugio dismantled, to
prevent their guns being turned upon the ships
while withdrawing from the Tagus.
The Portuguese felt the danger in which their
country was placed, and the Regency called upon
the people to rise en masse. They had little
else than the populace to oppose the invader, as
the same principle which had instigated the march
of the Spanish corps under Romana to Denmark,
had been acted upon with the only respectable
part of the Portuguese army. These had been
sent into France under the Marquis de Lorna,
and suffered a harder fate than the Spanish troops,
the greater part of whom, by aid of the English
fleet, returned to fight their country's battles,
while the miserable remnant of the Portuguese
perished at Moscow, under the appellation of the
"Légion Portugaise." The remaining regular
troops were scarcely to be considered as organized,
and those under Silveira, though
actuated by the best spirit, were little better than
the rest. One regiment of two battalions, called
the Lusitanian legion, raised by Sir R. Wilson at
Oporto, was an exception to the general inefficiency,
it having made considerable progress
in discipline and order. Sir Robert had proceeded
with the first battalion to the frontier opposite
Ciudad Rodrigo, while the other, under
Baron Eben, had been engaged in the defence of
the Tras os Montes, and in the entrenchments
around Oporto.
But this inefficient army had a probability of
being regenerated. Scarce had the fleet returned
from Corunna, when the British Government
evinced its conviction that the Spanish and
Portuguese cause was not hopeless, and, with
a view to make the latter aid in their own
defence, sent General Beresford with twelve or
fourteen officers from England to re-organize and
form their army. This determination being made
so soon afterwards, and before the despondency
of the failure at Corunna had worn off, was much
ridiculed at the time as being too late, and doubts
were expressed if Lisbon would not be in the
possession of the enemy before they could reach
the Tagus. This anticipation was not confirmed
by events, and, with the rank of a Portuguese
Marshal, General Beresford, on the 13th of
March, issued a spirited address to that nation,
in which he assured them, that they only required
organization and discipline to make them equal to
face the invader. How just were the Marshal's ideas
of their latent martial character, is to be learned
from their brilliant conduct in the ensuing war.
Much, however, was to be done to raise from degradation
the military profession in Portugal.
Perhaps in no age or country had it fallen so
low. Even among the Chinese, where civil and
literary celebrity is ever sought before that of
arms, it was never so despised, as it had been
among our faithful allies since the war of succession.
In 1762–3, La Lippe had been called in by the
Marquis de Pombal, who formed the army into
twenty-four regiments of infantry, twelve of
cavalry, and four of artillery, and which had continued,
at least nominally, till the arrival of Junot.
Few of his regulations were permanent or long respected.
During the whole of the latter half of
the eighteenth century, in all the short successive
wars, though occasionally invigorated by fresh
disciplinarians from foreign countries, the Portuguese
army never rose above mediocrity. It is
true, but few opportunities were offered of trial,
but in 1801, at Arronches, the scandalous panic
that seized the corps commanded by the Duke
d'Alafoes, made them to be considered worse than
contemptible. Not that the people required
either physical or moral qualities, as might be
easily proved from their conflicts with the
Spaniards: having ever placed themselves at
least upon an equality, in courage and conduct,
with their neighbours. The French, in their progress
through the Tras os Montes, drew a favourable
comparison of their bravery with that of the
Spaniards, while it was impossible to see the
peasantry and not be convinced of their bodily
strength and capability of bearing fatigue.
The difficulty of creating a Portuguese army
lay not with the men but with the officers, who
had sunk so low in the estimation of the country,
of themselves, and of their men, as to be little
superior to the degrading and menial offices,
(as when La Lippe arrived in 1792,) they once
filled, of servants in the houses of the nobility.
No cause of improvement had offered itself since
those disgraceful times, which had naturally
placed them on terms of the greatest familiarity
and equality with their men. It was no uncommon
spectacle to find them in a common cabaret
gambling, if not cheating the soldiers out of the
pay they had just made over to them. It was not
less to counteract this deteriorating cause, than
to organize the soldiers, that Gen. Beresford had
taken officers with him from England, whose
numbers were subsequently greatly increased.
Those who accompanied him in the first instance,
and some who afterwards joined him, were, with
the view to place British Captains in command of
battalions, first raised a step of rank in their own
service, and received another in that of the Portuguese,
when appointed to regiments.
The Marshal established his head-quarters at
Thomar, and fairly grappled with all the prominent
difficulties, and, aided by the example and
conduct of the officers placed under his orders, at
once did away the causes of the want of respect
and confidence of the men. The interior economy
was strictly investigated, and the regiments
made efficient, not only by British arms and
equipments, but by being subsidized to fight their
own battles by the money of England.
Without going farther into detail, it will be
sufficient to remark, that the arrangement and
system of the Marshal were so good, and improvement
so rapid in the Portuguese army, that
within two months from the date of his first order,
a battalion of the 16th regiment was brought
into collision with the enemy; and if it did not
distinguish itself as much as it did on so many
subsequent occasions, it evinced neither confusion
nor dismay. Eighteen months after, the general
conduct of the whole Portuguese army was
marked by traits of discipline and bravery, and
even of individual gallantry, which continued on
the increase to the end of the war, and which
were most unquestionably shown on many subsequent
occasions, by overthrowing the veterans of
France with the bayonet.
The twenty-four regiments of the line formed by
La Lippe had been broken into two battalions each
in 1797, and were continued at that establishment;
as were the twelve regiments of cavalry, of which
not above one-third had been ever mounted. The
artillery was placed under British officers, as well
as the other arms. To this the whole population
was to be added, though as irregulars or ordenanza,
rather than militia. This force was increased in
the course of the next year, by six regiments of
Caçadores, which were, at a later period during
the war, doubled, on their value being duly appreciated.
But England was not less active in sending
reinforcements of her own troops to the Peninsula.
Doubts had been once entertained, whether
future operations should be carried on from the
south of Spain, rather than from Portugal; and
the first convoy of troops was directed to Cadiz.
On its reaching that port, the besotted Spaniards
hesitated, as they had the year before when Sir D.
Baird arrived at Corunna, respecting the disembarkation
of the troops. After some futile negotiations,
and (in consequence of the slow advance
of the French,) in the revived hope of saving
Lisbon, the British troops fortunately passed to
the latter place, as the frontier statistics of Portugal
are better calculated for military operations
than those of Andalusia.
The first reinforcement that reached the Tagus
early in March was commanded by Lieut.-Gen.
Sherbrooke, which was followed in the beginning
of April by another, under Major-Gen. Hill, together
increasing the army to 13,000 men. The
arrival allayed much the fears, and not only allowed
Sir J. Craddock to take up a position out
of Lisbon, and cover the great roads that led upon
it, with the right on Santarem, and the left on the
Sea, but even to contemplate offensive operations,
and in the middle of April to push the army in
advance towards the North.
In the mean time, the administration at home
had determined to give the command of the army
for the defence of Portugal to the same general
officer who had so successfully attacked it the
year before, and, in order to make room for him,
Sir J. Craddock was appointed to be Governor of
Gibraltar.
Sir A. Wellesley sailed on the 16th of April on
board the Surveillant, Sir George Collier, from
Portsmouth, to which place or to England he did
not again return, until 1814, as Duke of Wellington,
when, on his first arrival from the south of
France, his Grace proceeded direct to the same
town—where the Prince Regent was showing to
the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia
the arsenal and fleet.
The same night the frigate was nearly lost off St.
Catherine's Head in the Isle of Wight: so imminent
was the danger, and so close the ship to the
breakers, that Sir G. Collier desired Sir Arthur to
dress, and, thinking the loss of the vessel certain,
advised him to stay by the wreck as long as possible,
this being considered a more probable means of escape
than a premature attempt to reach the shore.
The frigate missed stays more than once: but a fortunate
start of wind off the land prevented her
wreck.29 Even had all escaped with life, but for this
shift of wind, (or rather the never failing happy destiny
of Sir Arthur, who might have desired Sir G.
Collier not to despair, while he had not Cæsar,
but Wellesley and his fortunes on board) much
valuable time would have been lost, not only as to
striking the blow at Soult, but by allowing fresh
combinations between the distant French Marshals,
and perhaps not giving the opportunity of
opposing them in detail.
The entrance of the Surveillant into the Tagus
was an interesting event, when, at a distance
of twenty years, it was considered, that she bore
in her bosom the regeneration of England's military
fame, and that Europe was to date from
it the positive commencement of that formidable
and permanent position taken up by our armies,
which allowed its nations to breathe, and
subsequently, by our victories over the common
enemy, to break the spell of gloomy conviction,
becoming daily universal, that the French
armies were invincible.
Sir Arthur's landing at Lisbon on the 22nd
of April was strongly marked by the gratifying
expression of the people's feeling; they hailed
him as their former deliverer, and evinced their
gratitude by illuminating the city during his stay.
On the 25th Sir J. Craddock, in a farewell address,
bade adieu to the army, and two days
subsequently Sir Arthur took the command, and
in his first order changed its staff, placing Brig.-Gen.
Stewart at the head of the Adj.-General's,
and Col. Murray, 3d Guards, at that of the Quarter-master
General's department. The same day
his Excellency went in procession with the royal
carriages, escorted by a squadron of the 16th
dragoons, to be introduced to the Regency, at
the palace of the Inquisition in the Roçio, on
his receiving from them the rank of Marshal
General.
The state of affairs in the Peninsula at this
time was neither satisfactory nor encouraging.
Although Buonaparte had withdrawn from Spain,
his legions, which had passed through Madrid,
and witnessed the replacing Joseph on the throne,
had subsequently overthrown all the Spanish armies.
The advanced guard of the Duke del Infantado's
army under Vanegas had been beaten
at Ucles in January, and the army of Cartojal
had met a defeat at Ciudad Real. Cuesta,
with the main Spanish army, after retiring across
the Tagus, and taking position at Almaraz, had
allowed his flank to be turned by the bridge of
Arzobispo, and was forced, in consequence, to
retreat across the Guadiana, when, at Medellin
on its banks, he was on the 28th of March completely
routed, through the bad conduct of his
cavalry. His infantry, who from their behaviour
on this occasion deserved a better fate, were so
completely,—not at the mercy, for none was
shown, but—in the power of the enemy's cavalry,
that their horsemen were worn out with
slaughtering their easily routed victims; and it
was reported, many wore their arms for several
days in slings, from having had such opportunity
of using their sabres. The remnant of
the Spanish army took refuge in the Sierra Morena,
where attempts were made to recruit the
infantry—the dastardly cavalry, not less disgraced
in the action by their conduct, than after by
the General's notice of it, scarcely requiring a
man. While so little aid was to be expected
for the British from these broken armies, Victor
was left with 22,000 men, in a position threatening
the weakest part of Portugal, and, by the
existence of the bridge of Alcantara, both banks
of the Tagus.
But in the mean time, Soult's position at Oporto
had become more critical every day. Vigo had surrendered
to the Spaniards, aided by some English
ships, while Silveira had retaken Chaves, with
1,300 sick, and had continued his advance by Amarante
to Penafiel. Lapisse had advanced as far
as Ciudad Rodrigo, but, on finding himself opposed
by Sir R. Wilson and the Spanish troops, he made
no attempt to communicate with or join Soult,
and, after a little skirmishing, passed on to join
Victor on the Tagus. Soult's communications
were thus wholly destroyed, and his force had
been much dispersed in trying to make them good;
not less than between six and 7000 men having
been sent into the valley of the Tamega and other
points. But, although Marshal Soult had not
above half the number of men collected at Oporto
that Victor's army consisted of, still the British
army was not strong enough to oppose both
at once. It became necessary, therefore, to act
with vigour on one point, and the former army
being the weakest, and in the Portuguese territory,
while its retreat was endangered, drew
the more immediate attention of the British General.
Lest Victor should be enabled to advance
to the south of the Tagus, Sir Arthur lost no
time at Lisbon, and, after a stay of but six days,
set out on the 23d for the army, part of which
had arrived at Coimbra. All the towns were
illuminated on the road, and on his Excellency's
arrival at Coimbra on the 2d, in addition to
other demonstrations of joy, the ladies from the balconies
covered him with roses and sugar-plums!
The army was brigaded anew on the 4th of
May.
- Cavalry.
- MAJOR-GEN. COTTON.
- 14th Light Dragoons.
- 20th — —
- 16th — —
- 3rd — — King's G. Ln.
- Infantry.
- BRIG.-GEN. H. CAMPBELL.
- 2 Battalions of Guards.
- 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regt.
- First Brigade.
- MAJOR-GEN. HILL.
- 3rd or Buffs
- 66th Regiment.
- 48th —
- 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regt.
- Third Brigade.
- MAJOR-GEN. TILSON.
- 5 Comp. 5 Batt. 60 Regt.
- 88th Regiment.
- 1 Batt. Portse. Grenadiers.
- 87th Regiment.
- Fifth Brigade.
- BRIG.-GEN. A. CAMPBELL.
- 7th Fusileers.
- 1 Batt. 10th Portse. Regt.
- 53rd Regiment.
- 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regt.
- Seventh Brigade.
- BRIG.-GEN. CAMERON.
- 9th Regiment
- 2nd Batt. 10th Portse. Regt.
- 83rd Regiment
- 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regt.
- Sixth Brigade.
- BRIG-GEN. STEWART.
- 1st Batt. Detachments.
- 1st Batt. 16th Portse. Regt.
- 29th Regiment.
- Fourth Brigade.
- BRIG.-GEN. SONTAG.
- 2nd Batt. Detachments.
- 1st. Batt. 16th Portse. Regt.
- 79th Regiment.
- 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regt.
- Second Brigade.
- MAJOR-GEN. M'KENZIE.
- 27th Regiment
- 45th —
- 31st —
- King's German Legion.
- MAJOR-GEN. MURRAY.
- 1 Brigade (2 Regiments)
- BRIG.-GEN. LANGWORTH.
- 2 Brigade (2 Regiments)
- BRIG.-GEN. DRIBOURG.
It was subsequently divided into wings under
Lieut.-Gens. Sherbrooke and Paget, and the
cavalry placed under Lieut.-Gen. Payne. The
same reasons that pressed the departure of the
Commander of the Forces from Lisbon, accelerated
the preparations of the campaign, and advance
upon Oporto. A few days' delay were,
however, necessary to complete the arrangements,
according to the following plan of operations.
While Sir A. advanced with the main force of
the army on the enemy's front, a corps that
quitted Coimbra on the 5th, was intended to
move on the enemy's left flank and rear. This
was to be under the orders of Marshal Beresford,
and consisted of Maj.-Gen. Tilson's brigade,
and some cavalry. It was ordered to direct
its march on Viseu, and across the Douro,
to co-operate with Silveira. This officer was unfortunately
driven from Amarante on the 2d of
May, the enemy thus opening to themselves a
practicable route for carriage to the eastern frontier.
Lisbon was to be covered during these
northern operations by a corps of observation,
under Maj.-Gen. M'Kenzie, to watch Victor.
It was posted at Santarem, consisting of the
General's own brigade, a brigade of British heavy
cavalry, and 7,000 Portuguese. In his front at
Alcantara, was Col. Mayne, with a battallion
of the Lusitanian legion.
On the 6th, opportunity was taken of inspecting
that portion of the army around Coimbra,
on some sands two miles from the town. The
British troops appeared in excellent order, and
the Portuguese regiments, though not so soldier-like
as their allies, looked better than was
expected, as it was the fashion of the day to
hold them in utter contempt. Their dark olive
complexions, and blue single-breasted coats, gave
them a sombre appearance when in contrast with
our countrymen, and it could not be denied that
the comparison was to the advantage of the latter.
It was a fine sight, although of the 21,000
British in Portugal, only 17,000 were present,
on account of the two detachment corps.30
On the 7th, part of these troops advanced in
two columns on the main roads towards Oporto,
by Adiha on the Vouga, and by the bay of Aveiro
to Ovar. On the 9th, the remainder of the
army and head quarters quitted Coimbra in the
same direction. The advance of the French under
Gen. Franceschi had remained on the Vouga,
and arrangements were made for surprising it
on the 10th.31 If the success of this coup d'essai
was to be taken as a sample of our future proceedings,
it would have been unfortunate, as,
between the neighing of the horses of the Portuguese
cavalry, and the stupidity of the guides,
the enemy were prepared, and the whole was
a complete failure. But for the withdrawing of
the French, and the capture of two four-pounders,
we had little to boast in the scrambling
skirmish it produced. We advanced to the spot
where they had been encamped, which was as
much chosen for beauty of situation as strength.
We had here the first instance of the trouble
the French took in embellishing their camps;
in the centre of the front they were erecting a
pretty wooden obelisk.
On the following day the army advanced on
the great northern road, and, about twelve o'clock,
a squadron of the enemy was seen on the skirts
of a wood, in front of a little village. On
some three-pounders and our cavalry advancing
against them, they fell back, but showed some
infantry, and our light troops were directed
to attack them. This produced some skirmishing
as we continued to advance. The country
was much inclosed; the enemy clung longer
to their ground than was expected, as we only
supposed it an affair of posts; but a column of
infantry on a height over the village of Grijon
soon convinced us that it was at least a strong
advanced guard. The road here crossed a ridge
of hills, at right angles, covered with olives and
fir woods, which offered a strong position. The
ground was not ill chosen, though the left was
without any appui. Brigadier Gen. Stewart's brigade
formed in line to the support of the 16th
Portuguese regiment, acting as skirmishers on
the left of the road, while the German light
infantry were engaged on the right. The four
battalions of the German legion brought their
left shoulders up, and marched diagonally across
to turn the left, the enemy's weak point.
The skirmishing was very sharp in the woods,
and the 29th regiment was forced to support
the Portuguese, who were once obliged to fall
back. At this moment they pushed a column
of infantry down the road through the village
of Grijon, which being reported to Sir Arthur,
he replied in the most quiet manner, "If they
come any farther, order the battalion of detachments
to charge them with the bayonet."
The officers of the staff, many of them at
that time young soldiers, could not help evincing
strong feeling on hearing the simple and distinct
manner in which this order was given;
but before some months had passed over their
heads, they had opportunities of not only hearing,
but seeing them carried into execution. On
this occasion the alternative mentioned by Sir
Arthur did not occur, as, on their flank being
turned, and finding our whole force on their
front, about two o'clock they retired from their
position. Our guns were brought up to bear
upon them in their retreat, Brig.-Gen. Stewart
put himself at the head of two squadrons, and trotted
after the enemy, who withdrew their troops
with astonishing rapidity. The country was much
inclosed and intersected, and, on nearing the enemy's
rear guard, the cavalry entered a deep ravine,
closely wooded. The French lined the sides
with their light infantry, who opened a close
and sharp fire, which, for a moment, created some
confusion, and checked the advance; but on coming
in sight of five companies, drawn up in line
in a wider space, by the exertion and example
of the General, the latter led them to the charge,
broke through the enemy, and made above one
hundred prisoners. This rapid movement threw
the 31st French regiment off the road of retreat,
and they fell back on Ovar, where finding Maj.-Gen.
Hill, they withdrew, after some skirmishing,
to Oporto, during the night. Thus ended
the operations of this day, which were beautiful
in their prosecution and satisfactory in the
result.
The enemy's corps (besides the cavalry engaged
the day before on the Vouga,) consisted
of 4 or 5,000 infantry of the division of Mermet,
which had been pushed on to this ground
from Villa Nova on the 8th, on Soult's hearing
of our probable advance. It was the 47e
de ligne that was charged on the retreat, and
however valiantly they may have acted, they cannot
be praised for prudence or judgment in
forming a line to receive cavalry.32 Instead of
this, had they vaulted over the enclosures, or
scrambled up the banks, they might have killed
every man of the cavalry without endangering
a soldier. One of the privates was very loud
in his attempts to draw notice, and by his vociferation,
that he was the son of a marquis,
proved the aristocratic feeling not quite deadened
by the revolution, though the conscription
had reached and levelled all ranks of society.
Our loss was under one hundred men: one officer
of the 16th Dragoons received no less than
three balls, though happily none proved mortal.
Our first progress to the front, on the morning
of the 12th, showed us the horrors produced
by a war of invasion. Beyond Grijon nine bodies
of unfortunate Portuguese peasants were
seen hanging on trees by the side of the road,
blackened in the sun. The common people, naturally
considering the enemy as hors de la loi,
sought every means, open or otherwise, for their
destruction. This brought on them that retaliation
produced by the military ideas of a regular
army, who conceived they had only a right
to be opposed by soldiers, and not by the unclothed
and unorganized population. These they
considered as insurgents and brigands, and shot
and hung, with as little compassion as we should
a burglar. The exasperation of the French was
not wholly uncalled-for, as the atrocities committed
on the stragglers and sick were horrible,
amounting often, besides shocking lingering
deaths, to frightful mutilations.
A hair-dresser who escaped from Oporto in the
night, had brought in, soon after daybreak, the
intelligence that the enemy had destroyed the
bridge of boats over the Douro at one o'clock; and
the still more disagreeable information, that all
the boats were secured on the other side the
Douro. On the fugitive barber being taken to
Sir Arthur by Colonel Waters of the Adjutant General's
Department, that officer was instructed
to proceed immediately to the banks of the river,
and directed to procure boats, coute qui coute.
As we advanced on the high road to Oporto,
this report of the destruction of the bridge was
confirmed, and doubts came fast and thick upon
us, respecting the passage of the Douro in the
face of an enemy. On our arrival at Villa Nova,
we found General Hill's brigade arrived from
Ovar, and with the troops of the centre column
choking the streets; through these Sir Arthur
threaded his way, and took post on the right of
the town in the garden of the convent of Sierra.
From this elevated spot the whole city was visible,
like a panorama, and nothing that passed within
it could be hidden from the view of the British
general. The French guards and sentries were
seen in the various parts of the town, but no
bustle was evinced, or even apparent curiosity.
No groups were noticed looking at us, which was
afterwards accounted for, by learning that the
French were ordered to remain in their quarters
ready to turn out, and the Portuguese not allowed
to appear beyond the walls of their houses.
There were a few sentries in the quays, but none
without the limits or above the town. A line
of baggage discovered retiring beyond the town
across the distant hills, was the sole indication of
our threatening neighbourhood.
The passage of a river in the front of an enemy
is allowed to be the most difficult of military
operations; and when it became obvious, from
the collection of boats on the other bank, that
precautions had been taken to secure them from
us, the barrier appeared insurmountable. General
Murray had been directed to march in the
morning to try and cross the river, about five
miles up at Aventas, but having only four battalions
and two squadrons, unless we could aid
his successful passage, he would lie open to defeat;
and in consequence our anxiety was very
great to establish ourselves on the opposite bank.
In the meanwhile Colonel Waters (who has since
become so distinguished for his intelligence and
activity) had passed up the left bank of the river,
searching for means to cross it, and about two
miles above the city, found a small boat lying in
the mud. The peasantry demurred at going over
to the other side to procure some larger boats
seen on the opposite bank; but the Colonel,
(from speaking Portuguese like a native,) learned
that the Prior of Amarante was not distant
from the spot, and hoped by his influence to attain
his object. This patriotic priest, on learning
the desire of the British, joined with Colonel
Waters in inducing the peasants, after some persuasion,
to accompany the Colonel across, who
brought back four boats.
When our doubts and fears were at the highest,
this agreeable information arrived, and was received
by all with the greatest satisfaction, while
three companies of the Buffs, accompanied by
General Paget, were immediately conveyed to
the other side.
The spot at which they passed over and landed
was about half a mile above the city, at the foot
of a steep cliff, up which a zigzag road, or winding
path, led to a vast unfinished brick-building,
standing on the brink. This was intended as a
new residence for the bishop, and placed in the
Prado, being surrounded by a wall with a large
iron-gate, opening on the road to Vallongo. It
was a strong post, and the three companies, on
gaining the summit, threw themselves into it, as
it at once covered the place of disembarkation,
and was for themselves a good means of defence.
Our artillery was posted on the high bank, on the
other side, completely commanding the Prado
and the Vallongo road.
Soult had his quarters on the side of the city
near the sea, and, having collected all the boats,
as he supposed, on the right bank, considered
himself in perfect security. He thought if we
made any attempt to cross, it would be in conjunction
with our ships lying off the bar, and all
his attention was directed to that quarter. He
even turned into ridicule the first report of our
having crossed, and discredited the fact to the
last, until it was incontestably proved by our
firing. The boats had made more than one trip
before any one in the town appeared to notice it.
Foy has the credit of being the first to discover
our having passed, and he instantly ordered the
drums of the nearest battalion to beat the general.
We heard the drums beat when nearly the whole
of the Buffs had crossed, and soon saw symptoms
of bustle and confusion in the town, and the
French regiments forming on their parades.
This was an anxious moment, and just as the
whole of the Buffs had landed, a battalion was
observed moving down a road towards them.
This was the 17th, brought down by Foy, and
which was quickly supported by the 70th. The
first made an attack on the Buffs, who stood their
ground, giving a tremendous fire, while our artillery
from the opposite side killed and wounded
a great number of the enemy.
More boats, in the mean time, were brought
across and more troops; the 48th, 66th, and a
Portuguese battalion landed, and not only defended
themselves successfully, but even drove
the enemy from the walls, between the town and
the bishop's palace. This petty success was seen
by Sir Arthur and his staff, who cheered our soldiery
as they chased the enemy from the various
posts. The enemy's troops now came through
the town in great numbers, and obliged our troops
to confine themselves to the enclosure. They
continued running along the road towards and
beyond the iron-gate, while our shells and shot
were whizzing through the trees and between the
houses into the road as they passed. They
brought up a gun through the gate to batter the
house; but this proved an unfortunate experiment,
as our troops increasing in number by fresh
embarkations, (though General Paget was
wounded), charged and captured it. They also
brought some guns to bear from the open spaces
in the town, but they were tamely if not badly
served. But General Murray had made good his
position on the north bank of the river, and we
soon descried him making as much show as possible,
marching with his ranks open towards the
Vallongo road, thus threatening the communication
of the enemy with Loison. He was not,
however, strong enough to interrupt the retreat
of 10,000 desperate men; for the French now
began to think of nothing else, and directed their
march toward Amarante. On their deserting
the quays, the Portuguese jumped into the boats,
which soon transported across, (amidst the cheers
of the people and the waving of pocket-handkerchiefs
by the women from the windows,) the
guards and General Stewart's brigade, who proceeded
through the town with the greatest speed.
The Buffs, in the mean time, had dashed into
the city and cut off a battery of Light Artillery in
retreat, which, becoming jammed between that
regiment, and the 29th received the fire of both,
and was captured. The flight of the enemy
was continued, but they were overtaken by the
two squadrons which had passed with General
Murray, led by Brig.-Gen. Charles Stewart, who
charged the rear and made 200 prisoners. Major
Hervey, who commanded the Dragoons, lost
his arm. The enemy collected their scattered
troops at some distance, but continued their retreat
towards Amarante in the night. Our loss
did not exceed 120 men, while the enemy, besides
killed and wounded, left in our hands 500
prisoners and 1000 sick in the hospitals,
and several pieces of cannon. The city was illuminated
at night, and Sir Arthur, without allowing
himself any rest, the same evening gave
out an order of thanks to the army. The operations
of the three preceding days had been most
gratifying, and the quickness with which the
enemy had been forced from his various positions
and pursued, seldom equalled. The army had
advanced 80 miles in four days, three of which
were in constant presence of the enemy.
Sir Arthur had completely surprised in his
quarters one of the most distinguished French
Marshals, and consummated in his face the most
difficult operation in war, that of crossing a deep
and rapid river before an enemy. Nothing can
relieve Soult from the disgrace of this day; and
all that has been or whatever may be written in
his defence, can but palliate his want of precaution
and fatal security. The rapidity of Sir Arthur's
own movements had been wonderful; for
within twenty-six days since leaving Portsmouth,
Oporto was captured and the enemy in full retreat.
Captain Fitzroy Stanhope, one of the Commander-of-the-Forces'
aide-de-camps, was sent
to England with the dispatches of this success
by one of the ships cruising off the port,
whose crews from the sea had seen the smoke of
the firing during the actions of the 11th and
12th.
The retreat of the enemy was directed upon
Amarante, the seizure of that place from Silveira
by Loison, ten days before, having opened
them a loop-hole for escape. But Marshal Beresford,
after crossing the Douro at Pedro de Regoa,
had joined Silveira, and on the 11th drove Loison
out of Amarante, and thus closed the road and
the enemy's hopes in that direction. Loison fell
back on Guimaraens by the good carriage-road
that led to Chaves, sending information of his
movement to Soult at Oporto. Soult on his
arrival at Penafiel, on the night of the 12th, received
this disagreeable news, and finding himself
pressed in so many directions, and no road
open for carriages, determined at once to destroy
the heavy material of his corps and to join Loison
across the Sierra de Santa Catherina, at Guimaraens.
Capt. Mellish, who was sent on the
morning of the 13th to Penafiel, confirmed the
report which had reached Oporto, of the destruction
of their ammunition-waggons, guns,
and carriages. The cannon had been placed
mouth to mouth and discharged into each other,
by trains laid communicating through the mass
of baggage and ammunition waggons.
Want of provisions and uncertainty of the enemy's
route prevented the advance of the army on
the 13th, but the Germans were pushed on with
some six-pounders on the road of the enemy's
retreat. On ascertaining that the enemy had
given up the idea of retreating by Amarante,
orders were sent to Marshal Beresford, to direct
his march on Chaves, at which place he arrived on
the 16th, detaching Silveira in the direction of
the enemy's rear on Ruivaens. On the 14th, the
army advanced half-way on the road towards
Braga. Soult collected his army, (the garrison of
Braga retiring on our advance) on the morning of
the 15th at Guimaraens, but finding our troops at
Villa Nova de Famillacao, and no road open for
cannon, he destroyed the baggage and the military
chest of Loison's corps, and in despair took
to the Goat-herds' paths across the mountain,
trusting to the interest, aid, and information procured
by the Bishop of Braga. Their army was
in great confusion during the 13th, but the two
following days it became totally disorganized.
The paths were so narrow, that but one man
could pass at a time, and the cavalry were
obliged to lead their horses, while their column,
thus distressingly lengthened, had the additional
misery of incessant rain that fell in torrents
during the whole of this trying period. The
peasantry, happy in revenging the horrors and
atrocities of their enemy's advance, watched them
like vultures, and failed not to dart upon all who
sunk under fatigue; the stones they rolled on
them swept whole files into the abysses, while
single shots from the mountain-tops slew soldiers
in the column of march. Their sufferings met
commiseration from the British alone, who had
not suffered from the guilty acts for which they
were now receiving retribution.
Their déroute was so complete, that Sir A.
Wellesley thought it unnecessary to follow them
with the whole army beyond Braga, which city
he reached on the 16th. The probability of Victor's
threatening the south was also to be taken
into consideration, and he therefore contented
himself in pursuing with some cavalry, the
Guards, and Brig.-Gen. Cameron's brigade,
while the Germans, following the enemy, even
with three-pounders, across the Sierra de Santa
Catherina, reached Guimaraens the same day.
The French continued their retreat, and on the
night of the 15th reached Salamonde, where their
position was most alarming. They found one of
the bridges on the Cavado, on the road to Ruivaens,
destroyed and occupied, while that called
Pontè Nova only offered a single beam. They,
however, surprised and killed the Portuguese who
guarded the last, and this proved the safety of
their army. They restored the troops into some
order on the night between the 15th and 16th,
while the bridge was being repaired, which was
made passable by the morning, and allowed them
to continue their march towards Montalegre,
leaving a rear-guard at Salamonde. Our cavalry
discovered them about half-past one o'clock, but
the Guards did not arrive until late. The position
of the enemy was behind a deep and wide
ravine, accessible only by the road, with their
right on the torrent, and the left upon a ridge of
broken mountains. The light troops were directed
to turn this point, and when sufficiently
on their flank, about half past six, the column
and two-three-pounder guns, which had joined
from Gen. Murray's column, were pushed along
the road to attack in front. The enemy, who
had placed their pickets, thinking the cavalry
were the only troops up, and hoping to continue
all night, instantly retired from the position,
and, as it was almost dark, little advantage could
be taken of the confusion in which they fled,
farther than that of the guns firing on their
columns, and the light infantry pressing them en
tirailleur. A few prisoners were made, among
whom was an officer. The rain continued incessant,
and the miserable village scarcely allowed
cover for a quarter of the troops.
The next morning the disasters of the enemy
in their flight of the night before were fully revealed
by the wreck left at and near the bridge
over the Cavado. The bridge had been only
partially repaired, and the infantry were obliged
to file, and the cavalry to lead their horses across.
The passage must have been ever dangerous, but
the confusion occasioned by our pursuit and cannonade,
and the darkness of the night, rendered
it to a degree hazardous. The rocky torrent of
the Cavado, in consequence, presented next
morning an extraordinary spectacle. Men and
horses, sumpter animals and baggage, had been
precipitated into the river, and literally choked
the course of the stream. Here, with these fatal
accompaniments of death and dismay, was
disgorged the last of the plunder of Oporto, and
the other cities north of the Douro. All kinds of
valuable goods were left on the road, while above
300 horses, sunk in the water, and mules laden
with property, fell into the hands of the grenadier
and light companies of the guards. These active-fingered
gentry soon found that fishing for boxes
and bodies out of the stream produced pieces of
plate, and purses and belts full of gold and silver;
and, amidst scenes of death and destruction, arose
shouts of the most noisy merriment.
Soult reached the pass of Ruivaens before Silveira,
or his capture would have been certain;
but at that place learning that Marshal Beresford
had arrived at Chaves, he turned the head of
his columns towards Montalegre. The British
army being greatly distressed from fatigue, want
of provisions, and bad weather, only advanced a
league on the 17th; but a squadron of cavalry
and a battalion of Germans, were pushed to the
bridge of Miserele and Villa da Ponte. On the
18th, the Guards, Germans, and Brig.-Gen.
Cameron's brigade, pushed on in pursuit of the
enemy, whose track might have been found from
the débris of baggage, dead and dying men,
(worn down by fatigue and misery to skeletons,)
houghed mules, and immense quantities of cartridges,
which the wearied soldiery threw away to
lighten themselves from even the weight of the
balls.
Marshal Beresford had directed Silveira to
march on Montalegre, but he arrived about two
hours too late, the enemy having dragged their
weary march along by that town and across the
frontier, at twelve o'clock. This was witnessed
by some of our officers, who had pushed on, and
observed their distressed and miserable state.
On our arrival at Montalegre, we saw their retiring
columns in march fairly over the Spanish
frontier, and a village on their route in flames.
However, Col. Talbot, of the 14th light dragoons,
followed the enemy's route for some way, and
made prisoners an officer and 50 men. Marshal
Beresford crossed the frontier, but proceeded no
farther than Ginso, on hearing that Sir Arthur
had given up the pursuit. The Commander-of-the-Forces,
from the advices received from Gen.
M'Kenzie, had become anxious respecting the
line of the Tagus, and, being content with seeing
the enemy across the frontier, desisted from a
more northern advance, and ordered the troops to
be cantoned in the nearest villages, wherever
the order might reach them.
Thus ended this short but active operation of
twelve days, in which the disasters of the Corunna
campaign were repaid on the corps of
Soult with interest, as the distress and misery of
the enemy were more considerable than we had
suffered in the preceding January. Instead of the
fine Gallician road of retreat, they were obliged
to file through mule and even goat-herd paths,
while the incessant rain was more distressing than
the snow. The French had not stores and supplies
to fall back upon, but, on the contrary,
passed through the most unproductive wilds in
the valleys and mountains. But the difference of
the circumstances of the two retreats marks their
degrees of misery. The peasantry, while friendly
to us in Gallicia, evinced, in the Tras os Montes,
every mark of hatred to the enemy, whose cruelties
had well deserved severe retributive justice.
This was carried to a distressing extent, and
though it kept the French together, added greatly
to the extent of their loss. Our army was never
so disorganized in Gallicia as that of the French,
who could not have attempted to fight a battle at
Montalegre, as we did at Corunna. The loss of
men (including Soult's invasion and retreat) seems
to have been nearly equal; but the enemy, besides
the military chest and baggage, (of which we only
sacrificed a part,) left the whole of their artillery,
while we embarked ours safely at Corunna. But
Soult saw that his escape could be alone confined
to his men, and barely avoided capture, if not
destruction, by sacrificing the whole of his matériel.
The fortunate chance of finding a traitor
in the Bishop of Braga tended to the safety
of their retreat, which had been constantly
endangered, and would have been intercepted,
had he continued his march from Salamonde,
on Chaves, instead of Montalegre.
Intelligence from the south of Victor's intention
to invade Portugal had induced Sir A. Wellesley
to avoid pushing more troops beyond Braga
than was absolutely necessary, in order that
they should be as near and as ready as practicable,
to proceed against Victor. This Marshal,
having been joined by Lapisse, hoping to create a
diversion in favour of Soult, seized, with a corps
of 12 to 14,000 men, the bridge of Alcantara, and
pushed his patrols to Castello Branco. This
movement required strict attention, and rendered
necessary a more speedy retrograde movement
from the northern frontier than would have been
desired after the fatigues of the troops; but, only
allowing two days' rest at Oporto, they were withdrawn
to Coimbra, by the same routes by which
they had advanced. Head-quarters were on the
23rd at Coimbra. Here the Portuguese regiments,
which had acted with us in the Tras os
Montes, were ordered to form the garrison of
Oporto. These regiments had given some hopes
of good promise, yet none were so sanguine at
this time as to expect from them their subsequent
bravery and efficiency.
Sir Arthur continued his route on the 5th to
Thomar, where we found the heavy brigade, consisting
of the 3rd dragoon guards and 4th dragoons,
which had disembarked while we were in
the north, and appeared in excellent condition.
Head-quarters were established at Abrantes on
the 8th of June, from whence Major-Gen.
M'Kenzie, on our advance, had been pushed
forward to Castello Branco; as Victor, finding
that Soult's retreat had left Portugal free from
danger in the north, considered his own position
less tenable, and had withdrawn from the north of
the Tagus. The French army soon afterwards fell
back from Caseres upon Merida and Medellin.
Although it was understood that Sir Arthur's
orders only extended to the defence of Portugal,
yet he felt that these stirring times required active
exertions from all Europe, and that tranquillity
was incompatible with the strides France
was making to universal dominion. The cause
of our allies on the spot, and of those more
distant, struggling in Germany, pointed out the
propriety of some attempt to create at least a
diversion in their favour. It was evident that,
could arrangements be made with the Spaniards,
the disorganization of Soult's army offered an opportunity
for striking a blow at Victor, and perhaps
at the Spanish capital, particularly as Sebastiani
was supposed to be fully employed in
La Mancha. Sir Arthur, in consequence, offered
to aid the Spaniards in a forward offensive movement
into Spanish Estramadura. Such a step
appeared the only means of re-establishing the
war in the Peninsula, as the cause of Spain was
fast sinking under the superior troops and management
of the French, who, however they
might dread the population, had learned that the
armies were incapable of opposing their progress33.
Much precious time was wasted in the
arrangements for the necessary co-operation of
the two armies, which, but for the pride and
obstinacy of Cuesta, might have been more
usefully employed. It was only after considerable
negotiation, (an expression perfectly applicable
to the intercourse between ourselves
and our allies, though we had only in view the
saving their country,) that it was determined to
make a simultaneous advance into Spanish Estramadura.
In the meanwhile, Victor, who had retreated from
the Guadiana, and withdrawn his army across
the Tagus, was evidently falling back to receive aid
from Madrid and La Mancha. The plan for this
forward movement, was the advance of both
armies along each bank of the Tagus, and a
junction of the allies in front of the enemy in the
plains of Estramadura. The British were to march
to the north of the river by Coria and Placentia,
turning Almaraz and the enemy's posts facing
Cuesta, while the others were to cross at Almaraz,
and to co-operate with our advancing columns.
It was necessary to secure the frontier of Portugal
to the north and north-east, and the passes
along the frontier of that country leading from
Castille and Leon, as two corps d'armée, besides
that of Soult, were in the north of Spain.
Marshal Beresford, posted near Almeida, was
to undertake the first with the Portuguese army,
while Cuesta promised to occupy the Banos pass,
leading direct from Salamanca upon Placentia.
The Spaniards engaged to find means of collecting
and furnishing us with provisions. On the
27th June, head-quarters left Abrantes for Villa
del Rey; on the 28th, they reached Cortesada;
the 29th, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco on the
following day; and halted the 1st of July. They
continued their march on the 2nd to Zobreira;
and the 3rd, passed the frontier to Zarza Mayor,
where they crossed upon the route of the captured
Gen. Franceschi, who, after reaching Spain
with Soult's army, had been taken in Leon, and
was being carried to Seville, fated to die incarcerated
within the walls of Grenada. He was a
distinguished officer of light cavalry, and had been
opposed to us not only six weeks before on the
Vouga, but the like number of months antecedently
on the plain of Leon. He was dressed in a hussar's
uniform, and decorated with a star, bearing
an emblem similar to the arms of the Isle of
Man, three legs diverging from a common centre.
The army was here joined by the Lusitanian
legion under Sir R. Wilson, and after halting on
the 4th, reached Coria on the 5th, Galestad on
the 7th, and Placentia on the 8th. The approach
to this city drew forth the admiration of all. The
bishop's palace and cathedral tower above the
houses, which rise from a bed of verdure, bordered
by the river, while the whole is backed
with the most splendid mountains, with silver tops
of perpetual snow. The river above this city is
divided into two branches, which form an island,
covered with the finest trees.
The several reinforcements received antecedently
to, and during our short stay at Placentia, rendered
necessary a new distribution of the regiments
and brigades. The cavalry were divided
into three brigades; the first, of the 14th and 16th
light dragoons, under Sir Stapleton Cotton; the
second, commanded by Gen. Fane, consisted of
the 3d dragoon guards and 4th dragoons; and
the third, of the first German hussars, and 23d
light dragoons, led by Gen. Anson.
The infantry was divided into four divisions:—
- 1st. DIVISION.—Lieut.-Gen. Sherbrooke.
- Brig.-Gen. H. Campbell, Guards and 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th. Regiment.
- Brig.-Gen. Cameron, 61st, 83d. Regiments, 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th. Regiment.
- Brig.-Gen. Langworth, 2 Batt. King's German Legion.
- Brig.-Gen. Lowe, 2 Batt. King's German Legion.
- 2d. DIVISION.—Major-Gen. Hill.
- Brig-Gen. Stewart, 29th, 48th Regiments, 1 Batt. Detachment.
- Maj.-Gen. Tilson, Buffs. 48th, 66th. Regiments.
- 3d. DIVISION.—Major-Gen. M'Kenzie.
- 1st. Brigade, 24th, 31st, 45th. Regiments.
- Col. Donkin's Brigade, 5 Comps. 5 Batt. 60th Regt. and 87th 88th Regts.
- 4th DIVISION.—Brig.-Gen. A. Campbell.
- 1st Brigade, 7th, 53d, Regiments, 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regiment.
- 2nd Brigade, 2 Batt. Detachment, 97th Regt. 1 Comp. 5 Batt. 60th Regiment.
To these was to be added the Lusitanian
legion under Sir R. Wilson, being the only Portuguese
troops employed in this operation.
This distribution into divisions was the first
step to the gradual growth of these corps into
little armies, complete in themselves like the
Roman legions, being, (with the sole exception
of cavalry,) about their strength. The light companies
of the regiments composing them were
formed into a battalion, which under some intelligent
officer, ever marched at the head, and to
which was added a company or more of the
deadly riflemen of the foreign corps, the 60th.
These were the Velites, while the battalions were
all worthy to be considered as Triarii or Principes.
They had subsequently artillery, spare
ammunition, and engineer, medical, and commissariat
staff attached to them; and when each was
increased in 1810, by a Portuguese brigade, consisting
of a battalion of light infantry, and two
line battalions, they became in themselves
superior in numbers to some of the petty expeditions
in which England has often placed her
hope, while they have only wasted her strength.
Our whole force of British did not consist of
18,000 men, principally of men raised by the
voluntary enrolment of the militia.
We learned at Placentia, that the French occupied
Talavera de la Reyna, and were supposed
to be waiting for reinforcements from Madrid
and La Mancha. During the concentration of
the army at Placentia, Sir Arthur had his first
personal communication with Cuesta at Casa del
Puertos. His Excellency passed in review the
Spanish army, and definitively settled the plan of
the campaign.
The British army was to cross the Teitar, and
direct its march upon Oropesa, where it was to
form a junction with the Spanish army from
Almaraz, and to advance on Talavera de la Reyna.
The cavalry of the Spaniards under the Duke of
Albuquerque, and the division of infantry commanded
by Ballasteros, were to continue and
move on the left bank of the Tagus, and cross
that river at the Puente del Arzobispo.
To diminish and separate the enemy's force,
and distract their attention, General Vanegas
from La Mancha was to threaten Aranjuez, while
Sir R. Wilson, who was already on the Teitar,
was to have, besides his own corps, some few
Spanish troops, and to act upon their other flank,
and by pushing to and beyond Escalona, make
them uneasy respecting the capital.
Sir Arthur, after having halted eight days at
Placentia, moved on the 17th to Talaquela; on
the 18th to Majedas, and on the following day to
Casa de Centinela, across vast plains, occasionally
covered with forests of cork trees. These quarters
of the 19th, as the name indicates, consisted
of a single house, which offered such miserable
accommodation, that Sir Arthur, as well as the
rest of the staff, preferred sleeping in wigwams,
made with boughs of trees. On the 20th, while
the army pushed on to Oropesa, the heat and the
want of water were so great, that the troops suffered
exceedingly, and several men sank under
exhaustion. Here we became an allied army,
forming a junction with the Spaniards, from
whom we hoped, however we might doubt,
to receive support and assistance. But the first
view of the infantry considerably damped our
expectations, though we were assured their cavalry,
moving across at Arzobispo, were to appearance
(for we had not forgotten their conduct
at Medellin) the best of the army. On further
acquaintance, however, our conclusions respecting
even this part of the army were not more
favourable than that we had formed of their sister
arm the first day we joined them; as they wanted
in spirit and conduct, what the foot soldiers required
in appointments and organization.
The army of Spain, before the breaking out of
the Revolution, though not so degraded as
that of Portugal, had been long declining.
Although the army intended for the coast of Barbary,
assembled under Gen. Count O'Reilley, as
late as 1788, was in an efficient state, it had
greatly altered for the worse within the last
twenty years. Instead of keeping pace with the
rest of Europe in improvements in the art of war,
Spain had considerably retrograded; and while
the two last years had shaken to pieces the old
establishment, the officers educated under it were
incapable of forming a new army.
Although the men were the same as those who,
three centuries before, had raised the Spanish
name to the height of celebrity it so well deserved
and so long maintained, they were no longer
led by a chivalrous nobility and gentry. The
officers taken from these classes in the beginning
of the 19th century, evinced in their character the
debasing state of the Court and Government.
In July, 1809, it was but the remnant of an
organized army, and even this was only evinced
(except in a few regiments) in the appellation of
the corps known to be of long standing. A portion
of the garde-du-corps accompanied this
army; the sole remains of the court establishment
of the past Bourbons, whether of France
or Spain. It had been created by Philip V. on
taking possession of the throne of Spain at the
beginning of the last century, and consisted entirely
of officers. Those with Cuesta bore cartouch
belts of green leather and silver. Some of
the heavy cavalry looked respectable, particularly
the regimento del Rey, the first of dragoons,
which, commanded by a relation of Cuesta, would
have passed muster in any army.
The carabineers, a part of the royal guard, and
who bore a better character for conduct in the
field than the other regiments of cavalry, were
efficient both in men and horse, as well as in appointments.
A brigade of two regiments of heavy dragoons,
one of which was the regiment of Saguntum, attracted
the attention of the British officers, from
being dressed in yellow with cocked-hats, and
they looked better than would be supposed from
so singular a costume.
Their light cavalry consisted of Hussars
(Usares) and Chasseurs, dressed in all the
colours of the rainbow. Little judgment seemed
to have been employed in proportioning the size
of the horse to the light or heavy cavalry, though
it must be allowed the Spanish horses offer little
choice, being universally slight, and not so well
adapted for the shock of a charge as for an Eastern
irregular kind of warfare.
The Spanish cavalry had a means of turning
their jackets and sleeved waistcoats into a stable
dress, by the sleeves, taking off at the shoulders,
being only laced on with a differently coloured cord
from that of the coat; thus, besides being useful,
having a good appearance. Their mode of
riding was new to the English; the stirrup leathers
were so long, that they could only touch
them with their toe; while the carabine, hanging
perpendicularly along the valise, was equally
novel. Boots were far from universal, and many
had in their stead a kind of leather legging, stiff-fitting,
buttoned tight to the limbs, and formed
like a gaiter, coming over the shoe. Many horsemen,
however, were devoid of covering for the
legs or feet, and the naked toe was seen peeping
through a sandal, touching the stirrup. Of the
infantry, the Walloon Guards, (consisting principally
of foreigners,) and the Irish brigade, were
in the best order. The first, in two or more battalions,
were dressed in dark blue, and broad
white lace; while the uniforms of the latter were
light blue. These consisted of the regiments of
Yrlanda, Ultonia, and Hibernia, being the remains
of the Irish Catholic regiments. At this
time, although they had no privates, there were
still among them some few officers of that nation.
The white Bourbon uniform had entirely disappeared,
and circumstances and economy had
changed the colour of the principal part of the
infantry into a deep chocolate.
But several battalions were, with the exception
of the British arms, little better in appearance
than peasantry; and though the major part of
them had chaccos, many could only boast a kind
of sandal instead of shoes, and in lieu of cross,
waist-belts, from which hung tubes like the ancient
Bandeleer, lined with tin, each containing a cartridge.
Few had great coats; the generality having
blankets, (with a hole in the middle for the head
to pass through,) hanging loose about their person.
Their artillery was good, from attention having
been given to it before the breaking out of the
war, but the train was unlike any other in modern
armies, the guns and ammunition-waggons being
drawn by mules, not two abreast, but in teams like
cart-horses, without reins, and under no farther
command than the voice of their conductors, who
ran on foot on the side of the road. Their guns
were heavy, and among the field batteries were
several of twelve-pounders.
Their matériel for provisions, stores, and baggage
was perfectly inadequate to their army, and
ill adapted for their country. Instead of a large
proportion of sumpter mules, they were accompanied
by a vast train of tilted two wheeled carts,
carrying little, and with long teams of mules,
lengthening to inconvenience the line of march.
The whole army was said to consist of 7000
cavalry and 31,000 infantry.
But we should not have been dissatisfied with
our allies, malgré their appearance, or even their
rags, had we felt any reason to confide in them.
The men were evidently capable of "all that
man dare," but the appearance of their officers at
once bespoke their not being fit to lead them to
the attempt. These not only did not look like
soldiers, but not even like gentlemen; and it
was difficult, from their mean and abject appearance,
particularly among the infantry, to guess
from what class of society they could have been
taken. Few troops will behave well if those to
whom they ought to look up are undeserving respect;
and on this principle we might, at
Oropesa, have predicted coming events, as far as
the conduct of the Spanish soldiers was concerned.
But besides their general inefficiency,
we found their moral feeling different from what
we expected. The preceding two years had made
a great alteration in the feeling of the nation;
the burst of enthusiasm was but momentary,
and being only fed by accidental victory, soon
subsided on a reverse of fortune. Far from their
army evincing devotion, or even the most common
courage in their country's cause, they were
more often guilty, individually and collectively, of
the most disgraceful cowardice.
The inefficiency of the officers spread to the
staff, and we hourly regretted that the revolution
had not occasioned a more complete bouleversement,
so as to bring forward fresh and vigorous talents
from all classes. The proof that this opinion was
just, was evinced by none of the regular military
showing themselves worthy of command. Indeed,
with the exception of a few self-made
soldiers among the Guerillas, who had risen from
among the farmers and peasantry, it would be
difficult to point out during the whole war any officer,
whose opinion, even in his own department,
or on the most trivial military subject, was
worthy of being asked.
The Cortes ruling for Ferdinand, and continuing
the old system, formed one of the causes of the
want of success of the Spaniards. They had to
meet youthful Generals and the fresh energies of
France with all the improvements of modern
warfare, by old besotted and prejudiced Generals,
whose armies were formed of obsolete principles,
while the system of an ancien régime of a decrepit
Government continued to cramp every step
to improvement. To these were added that blind
pride and self-vanity, which made them still consider
themselves what history and tradition had
represented their forefathers and nation. No
proofs of inferiority would open their eyes, and
without reflection or consideration they rushed
from one error and misfortune into others, benefiting
by no experience, and disdaining to seek
aid or improvement from those capable of restoring
them to efficiency.
Had they placed their armies at our disposal,
and allowed the introduction of the active and intelligent
British officers into command, their regular
army might have become as celebrated in
after-ages for the defence of the Peninsula, as
the Portuguese or their own Guerillas; while at
present, with the exception of their irregular warfare
and defence of cities, their military character,
during a period so brilliant for their allies,
both Portuguese and British, appears absolutely
contemptible. The army which we joined at
Oropesa, in addition to its other drawbacks, was
headed by a general as decrepit in mind as body.
To abilities not superior to the most common intellect
he united the greatest fault in a commander
of an army, that of indecision, while every
act bespoke his suspicion and jealousy of his allies
and their commander.
Attached to this army was an example, in the
person of Lord Macduff, of one of those gallant
spirits, who occasionally shaking off the indolence
of wealth, volunteer to aid some soul-stirring
cause. His Lordship had the rank of a Spanish
Colonel.
On the 21st, the two Commanders-in-Chief
dined together, and in return for the military
spectacle Cuesta had given to Sir Arthur at Casa
de Puertos, when he visited him from Placentia,
the British troops, with the exception of
Gen. M'Kenzie's division on the advance, were
drawn out in the evening for his inspection. The
mounting on horseback to proceed to the review,
showed how ill-fitted was Cuesta for the activity
of war. He was lifted on his horse by two grenadiers,
while one of his aide-de-camps was ready on
the other side to conduct his right leg over the
horse's croup, and place it in the stirrup! Remarks
were whispered at this moment, that if
his mental energy and activity did not compensate
for his bodily infirmity, Sir Arthur would
find him but an incapable coadjutor. The Spanish
General passed along the line from left to right,
just as the night fell, and we saw him put comfortably
into an antiquated square-cornered coach,
drawn by nine mules, to proceed to his quarters.
On the morning of the 22d, we came in sight
of the town of Talavera de la Reyna, which has
since become so celebrated in English history.
The town, seen about three miles distant, was
embosomed in trees and inclosures, while the
scarped hills on the right marked the course of
the Tagus. The inclosures ended about a mile
to the left of the town, joining some low, open,
undulating hills, which stretched to some valleys
and higher ridges. This open country communicated
with an extensive plain in front of the
town, across which passed the road from Oropesa,
being gradually lost as it approached Talavera
in the vineyards and woods. In the midst of
this plain were posted about 800 or 1000 French
cavalry, who, with the utmost indifference,
were dismounted, feeling assured that a few
skirmishers would check the advance of the
Spanish cavalry in their front. These, under the
Duke d'Albuquerque, had crossed the Tagus at
the Puente del Arzobispo, and had arrived early
opposite the French advance. Instead of being
anxious to show their Allies their activity when
at so little cost, being five or six times more
numerous than the enemy, they made no attempt
to drive them in, but contented themselves with
deploying into several long lines, making a very
formidable appearance. With feelings of astonishment
we rode on to the skirmishers, who consisted
of mounted Guerillas, dressed like the farmers
of the country. We expected to see them closely
and successfully engaged, having heard they were
peculiarly adapted for petty warfare; but we
found them utterly incapable of coping with the
enemy's tirailleurs, who were driving them
almost into a circle. They were so careless and
inexpert in the use of their arms, that one of
them nearly shot, by accident, an English officer
near him.
The Spaniards (from the commencement) thus
continued skirmishing for four hours,34 until Gen.
Anson's brigade arrived, which they allowed at
once, and as a matter of course, without any
reference or notice, to pass through the intervals
of their squadrons; at the same time these
heroes notified their own want of efficiency and
spirit, by acknowledging and paying tribute to
both in their allies, by a profusion of vivas!
On our advancing, the French drew off to the
left of the town along the open ground, skirting
the inclosures, and exchanging shots with our
skirmishers. The Spaniards kept to the right
along the great road, and could scarcely be brought
by the intercession of British officers to enter the
town, from whence they learned a body of 4
or 500 infantry had just retired. Brig. General
Charles Stewart, who happened to be on the
spot, persuaded their officers to follow their
retreat along the fine Madrid road, which was one
hundred and fifty yards wide. The enemy were
overtaken retiring in two small columns, and to
the attack of one General Stewart led the Spanish
cavalry. The result, as indeed all we saw on this
day of our allies, was a proof of their total want,
not only of discipline, but of courage. On this
and two succeeding attempts, (to which the
English general headed them), on receiving the
enemy's fire, when the principal danger was past,
they pulled up and fled in every direction; yet
in Cuesta's account of this affair, he called it an
"intrepid charge."
Cruelty and cowardice are ever combined, and
these same Spaniards who had thus avoided
closing with the unmaimed enemy, murdered in
cold blood a few wounded and dying men their
column left in the road when they retired, who
were struck down by the artillery which was
brought up after the cavalry's repulse. Their
barbarity was even heightened by accompanying
each stab with invectives and comments on their
victims' never again seeing their homes or Paris.
On the left the enemy retired before our cavalry,
about four miles beyond the town. Anson's
brigade made an attempt to charge about 1,500
of their cavalry, but they were found unassailable,
having taken post beyond the bed of the Alberche,
which, running for about two miles at right angles
with the Tagus, empties itself into that river.
The enemy allowed them to come close, and then
opened a fire of four guns and two howitzers,
which occasioned some small loss before they
could withdraw out of fire. One of the horses of
this brigade, the hip and leg of which was carried
off, and its entrails trailing on the ground, recovered
itself on three legs, and tried to take its
place again in squadron.
The enemy had tirailleurs in the underwood
near the river, and were very jealous of its banks,
opening a fire of artillery on all who showed
themselves. Sir Arthur and head-quarter staff
came unexpectedly in the afternoon under a fire
of some light guns on the right in front of the
Spaniards, and one of several four-pound shots
whizzed close over the General's head. The
troops were ordered to bivouack in the neighbourhood
of Talavera, and General M'Kenzie's division
was pushed on to the front in the neighbourhood
of an old ruined building, at the angle of
the Alberche, where it turned east. It was
evident that the enemy were in force on the opposite
side of the river; and a ridge of hills, above
800 yards from the bank, sloping towards it,
offered them a very suitable defensive position.
Its left rested on the Tagus, and its right was
secured by the turning of the Alberche, and some
difficult wooded ridges beyond. Their strength
could not exceed 23,000 men, being the troops
which had fallen back from the south of the Tagus,
not having been joined by any troops from Madrid
or Aranjuez.
We fully expected a battle on the following
day, and about twelve o'clock on the 23rd, the
first and third division got under arms, and advanced
in the direction of the enemy's right, while
the rest of the army were ready to move at a
moment's notice; but, unfortunately, Sir Arthur
had to overcome the wavering conduct of his confederate
General, who appeared quite unaware of
the use of time or opportunity in military operations.
He could not be brought so to decide on
attack, that Sir Arthur could feel secure of the
Spaniards making a simultaneous attack with his
army, or that the British might not be left to gain
the day alone. The bivouack of Cuesta was on
the road to Madrid, about three-quarters of a mile
from the Alberche, where, on the cushions taken
out of his carriage, he sat, the picture of mental
and physical inability.
Two soldiers stood near to aid or support him
in any little necessary operation, and the scene
would have been ridiculous had it not been painful,
as we saw the tide, which, "when taken at its
flood," might, nay, would "lead us on to
fortune" and victory, fast ebbing, without our
taking advantage of it. After considerable suspense,
it was universally reported throughout the
army, that on being pressed and driven to his
last excuse, Cuesta pleaded that it was Sunday,
at the same time promising to attack at daylight
the next morning; and our troops were in consequence
ordered back to their bivouacks. It may
be fairly considered that pride had considerable
weight on this occasion. Cuesta was a true
Spaniard, and disliked the suggestion of an
English general in his own country, and, with
recollections of two hundred and fifty years
before, could not bring his ideas down to present
changes and circumstances. These feelings were
national, and ever evinced, and it was only very
late in the war, after the Spaniards found they
had not an officer to lead their armies, and they
despaired of finding one, that they consented to
place Sir Arthur at their head. Sir Arthur
deserves as much credit for keeping his temper
during his six years' intercourse with the Spanish
Government and officers, as for the general conduct
of the war. When we reflect on promises
broken and engagements violated, involving the
safety of his army, the honour of his character,
and his credit as an officer, and yet know of no
quarrel that extended (if any existed) beyond
correspondence or negotiation, future ages are
bound to give our Commander credit for unbounded
placidity of temperament.
Though sorely annoyed by this determination,
the officers could not let pass without ridicule the
incongruity we had observed within the last three
days in the old gentleman's proceedings. It was
impossible not to notice the Spanish General
going out to battle, to within half a mile of the
advanced-posts, in a carriage drawn by nine
mules, and the precautions to preserve him from
the rheumatism, like those taken by delicate
ladies, in our humid climate, at a fête champêtre,
in placing the carriage cushions on the grass.
To these the Spanish Commander-in-Chief was
supported by two grenadiers, who let him
drop on them, as his knees were too feeble to
attempt reclining without the chance, nay certainty,
of a fall. Yet this was the man to whom
the Cortes had entrusted their armies, but who
ought (if he did not himself feel his own inability),
to have been removed without a moment's delay
after the first trial. They had only one excuse;
the year before had made common honesty a
virtue, and they forgot every other requisite, in
a desire to avoid treachery.
We began, however, to have some hope on
the evening of the 23rd, when orders were
delivered out for attack the next morning at daylight.
General Sherbrooke was to move at two
in the morning, while the remainder of the army
was to rendez-vous in rear of the third division,
at the angle of the Alberche. The British column
of attack, with the third division at its head,
supported by General Anson's brigade, and
followed by the first, second, and fourth divisions,
was to attack the enemy's right, the
Spaniards were to force the troops on the heights
crossed by the road to Madrid, while the remainder
of the British and the whole of the
Spanish cavalry were to cross the river on the
open ground in the enemy's front. No drums or
trumpets were to sound. The columns for
attack were formed before daybreak on the 24th,
and the left column, which was to cross the river
and ascend the heights round the enemy's right
and opposite the village of Casaleguas, was already
on its march, when it was discovered the enemy
had retired during the night.
While this event proved the effect of procrastination
in warfare, it was to be deeply lamented
on every account. The enemy, the day before,
not consisting of above 22,000 men, had most
imprudently offered us battle before the reinforcements
from Madrid or la Mancha had reached
him, and, if he had been attacked, must have
been annihilated. We had near 18,000 British
and 36,000 Spaniards, of whom 10,000 were
horse, and, the position once forced, they would
have had to retire across an open plain of many
leagues, pursued by a victorious enemy and a
superior cavalry.
Colonel Delancey had gained and continued in
the rear of the enemy all night, and joined us at
daylight with a French officer he had taken. We
entered their variously-hutted camps across the
river, which we found arranged with comfort
and taste. Their army, on arriving from the line
of the Tagus, had found the ripe wheat standing,
and, regardless of its value, had not only thatched,
but made whole huts, with the corn in the ear,
which, hanging down, shed the grain on the
ground as we passed along and between them.
They had built with boughs of trees an immense
Salle de Spectacle, and formed, by cutting down
and removing the largest olive trees, and sticking
their pointed ends into the ground, an avenue,
leading up to it, of some length—an act more
wanton and reprehensible than that of taking the
unthrashed corn, as the fruit of the olive is not
produced under several years' growth.
Shy as Cuesta was of coming to blows with
the enemy when in his front, he became most
anxious for his pursuit when at a distance and in
retreat. Without considering that Victor was
only falling back on reinforcements, he ordered
his army to advance, (as if the French were in
full retreat for the Ebro,) and established his
posts on the 25th at Torrijos. Had not the
English General taken quite a different view of
the subject, it would have been most imprudent,
if not impossible to advance, as provisions began
to fail us. The Spaniards, far from aiding our
commissariat, took no precautions whatever to
prepare food for 18,000 additional mouths, and
our position threatened to be untenable for want of
food.
Sir Arthur, in consequence, declined making
any forward movement, and contented himself
with pushing two divisions of infantry across the
Alberche, and posting them at Casaleguas. In
the meanwhile the enemy were concentrating
their various corps. The reserve, and the Guards
from Madrid left that capital with King Joseph
on the 22d at night, and joined the 4th corps
d'armée, under Sebastiani, at Toledo. These
united on the 25th, between Torrijos and Toledo,
with the corps under Victor, and formed an army
of 45 to 48,000 men, after a garrison of 2,000
had been left in Toledo. This small force was
sufficient to cover any advance of the Spaniards
from La Mancha, as Vanegas frittered away the
time to no purpose, while Madrid was overawed
by General Belliard, entrenched in the Retiro.
On the junction of these armies, Cuesta saw
too late his mistake in so inconsiderately advancing
from the neighbourhood of the British, and
before he could withdraw his most advanced
corps, became engaged with the enemy. The cavalry
Regiment of Villa Viciosa, drawn up in an enclosure
surrounded by a deep ditch, with but one
means of egress, was hemmed in by the enemy
and cut to pieces, without a possibility of escape.
A British officer of Engineers saved himself by
his English horse taking at a leap the barrier
which surrounded the Spaniards, and which their
horses were incapable of clearing. The Spaniards,
on the 26th, fell back towards the Alberche
and Talavera, in such confusion that it
can only be compared to a flight, while the enemy
followed with the evident intention of bringing
the Allies to battle.
Every one now felt its approach, and some little
preparations were made to strengthen a position
which Sir Arthur had selected, resting on
Talavera. These consisted in placing some of
the Spanish heavy guns in battery on the main
road, in front of the Madrid gate, and throwing
up some barricades on the different approaches
to the town. A breastwork was commenced on
a small rising ground in a little plain, at the spot
where the flanks of the British and Spanish
would unite, about the centre of the Allied army.
These were the only attempts at entrenchment,
and the last was not completed. All the troops
were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to
move at a moment's notice.
On the 27th the British cavalry were ordered
to the front, to cover the retreat of the Spaniards
and of our own divisions across the Alberche.
About mid-day the enemy's army began to show
itself, and while our cavalry withdrew to the
right bank of the river, in the open ground, the
5th division fell back from Casaleguas, through
a woody country, to the same spot, near an old
ruined house, the Casa de Salinas, which they
had occupied before the enemy retreated. Before
re-crossing the Alberche, they set fire to the old
hutted camps of the enemy, the smoke from
which rose so thickly as completely to hide from
view the country beyond and to the west of the
village of Casaleguas. The two brigades of the
5th division lay upon their arms in front of this
ruin, the highest part of which overlooked the
surrounding trees, offering a view of the country.
Sir Arthur dismounted, and, leaving his horse
standing below, scrambled with some difficulty
up the broken building, to reconnoitre the advancing
enemy. Though ever as gallant, we
were by no means such good soldiers in those
days as succeeding campaigns made us, and sufficient
precautions had not been taken to ascertain
what was passing within the wood (on the skirt
of which the division was posted,) and between
it and the ford below Casaleguas.
But the enemy had crossed, under cover of
the smoke from the burning huts, a very large
force of infantry, and, gradually advancing, opened
a fire so suddenly on our troops lying on the
ground, that several men were killed without
rising from it. This unexpected attack threatened
the greatest confusion, little short of dismay, but
the steadiness of the troops, particularly the 45th,
prevented disorder, and gave time for Sir Arthur
and his staff to withdraw from the house and
mount their horses. Sir Arthur's escape, may,
however, be considered most providential. The
troops were withdrawn from the wood into the
plain, but after we had lost many officers and
men. As this was the enemy's first attack, and
might, by our withdrawing, be considered successful,
it was peculiarly unfortunate, from adding
to the enemy's confidence in attacking our
army. These two brigades, being supported by
General Anson's cavalry, gradually fell back towards
our army.
The enemy now crowded the heights, extending
from Casaleguas to the Tagus, with vast bodies
of troops, accompanied with quantities of artillery.
These crossed at the various fords on the
Alberche, to the plain west of it; while some of
their cavalry, in the loosest order, came in crowds
through the woods, following our advanced corps
as they gradually withdrew to our position, of
which, as we approached the chosen ground, the
principal features began to show themselves.
Their horse artillery soon overtook us in our retreat,
and opened a heavy and constant fire, particularly
of shells, under which the troops formed
on their ground. As the enemy closed on our
position, our different divisions were seen hurrying
to the post assigned them, which formed
the left wing of the Allies; and some anxiety
was felt for the arrival of the troops who were to
defend a towering height, which, it was evident,
would be the key of the position.
The men, as they formed and faced the enemy,
looked pale, but the officers, riding along their
line, only of two deep, on which all our hopes
depended, observed they appeared not less cool
and tranquil than determined. In the mean while
the departing sun showed by his rays the immense
masses moving towards us, while the last
glimmering of twilight proved their direction to
be across our front towards the left, leaving a
sensation of anxiety and doubt if they would not
be able to attack that point even before our troops,
which had not yet arrived, were up. The darkness,
only broken in upon by the bursting shells
and flashes of the guns, closed quickly upon us,
and it was the opinion of many that the enemy
would rest till morning. But this was soon placed
beyond doubt, by the summit of the height on
our left being suddenly covered with fire, and for
an instant it was evident the enemy had nearly,
if not completely, made a lodgment in our line.
This attack was made by three regiments of
the division of Ruffin, the 24th, 96th, and
9th, but of which, the enemy say, the last only
reached the summit, the very citadel of our position.
They had marched, without halting, up the rise of
the hill, and came upon the German Legion, who
had, having been informed they were to the rear of
General Hill's division, and believing they were
in a second line, lain down on their arms, and
when the enemy topped the hill, en masse, many
were asleep. But General Hill's corps had not
arrived, and the Germans were first roused by
the enemy seizing them as prisoners, or firing
into them at brûle-pourpoint. The flashes of
the retiring fire of the broken and surprised Germans
marked the enemy's success, and the imminent
danger of our army. General Sherbrooke,
posted in the centre, with the promptitude
required in such an emergency, ordered the
regiments of the brigade next to the Germans to
wheel into open column, and then, facing them
about, was preparing to storm the hill, with the
rear-rank in front, when the brigade of Gen.
Donkin by a brilliant charge restored the height
to its proper owner, also driving the French from
the top of the hill into the valley, with immense
loss, and the colonel of the 9th regiment
terribly wounded. A second attack was afterwards
repelled by the timely arrival of the division of
Gen. Hill, Colonel Donkin's brigade having taken
ground to its right. There was some fear that the
enemy, when the Germans had been driven back,
had carried off the only heavy guns we had with our
army, but fortunately they had been withdrawn
at dusk from the brow of the hill. Major Fordice,
of the Adj.-Gen. department, an officer of great
promise, fell in retaking these heights, with many
valuable officers and men.
After this attack was repulsed, the enemy remained
quiet, awaiting the morn which was to
decide the fate of the battle. The British light
infantry was thrown out to the front, with sentries
still more advanced towards the enemy.
This necessary precaution, coupled with the inexperience
of our troops, principally militia-men,
produced a heavy loss, from the jealousy they
felt of all in their front, after this night attack.
This was increased by the constant word "stand
up" being passed along the line, and on more
than one occasion it led to an individual soldier
firing at some object in his front, which was taken
up by the next, and so passed, like, and to appearance
being a running wildfire, down the
front of one or more regiments, till stopped by
the officers. In this, the troops unfortunately
forgot their light infantry in front, and many
brave officers and men fell a sacrifice to the fire of
their comrades; amongst them was Colonel Ross
of the Guards.
The Spaniards were not less on the alert than
ourselves, but their anxiety not only extended
to firing musquetry, but to salvos of the cannon
placed in front of Talavera. On one occasion
this was said to have originated from a cow having
got loose and cantered up to their line. Our
troops, however, stood firm to their ground,
while regiments of the Spaniards, after giving a
volley, quitted their position and fled through
the gardens and enclosure, bearing down all before
them, and were only brought into line again
by degrees. One of these alarms about midnight,
in front of Talavera, was so great, that a large
portion of the troops posted in the front, left
their ground, and rushed through the town, and
in the midst of the crowd of fugitives was seen a
certain square-cornered coach, the nine mules
attached to it being urged to the utmost; implying
that its inmate was as anxious to escape as the
meanest in the army.
Sir Arthur, surrounded by his staff, slept,
wrapped in his cloak, on the open ground, in
rear of the second line, about the centre of the
British army. A hasty doze was occasionally
taken, as more continued rest was disturbed by
alarm of different kinds,—while the reflections of
others kept them waking. The bustle of the day
had prevented a review of our situation, but, on
being left to our own thoughts, it was impossible
not to reflect on the awfully approaching crisis.
We could not but feel that here was to be another
trial of the ancient military rivalry of England
and France; that the cool, constitutional, persevering
courage of the former was again to be
pitted against the more artificial, however chivalrous,
though not less praiseworthy, bravery of
the latter. This view of the relative valour of the
two nations cannot be questioned, if we consider
that the reminding the British of this moral quality
is wholly unnecessary, and instead of language
of excitement being constantly applied to
our soldiery, that of control, obedience, and composure
is solely recommended; while our ancient
opponents are obliged incessantly to drive into
the ears of their men, that they are nationally
and individually the bravest of the human race.
Hearing nothing else so flattering to their unbounded
vanity, they become so puffed up by this
eternal stimulant, as to be fully convinced of its
truth, which, in consequence, makes their first attack
tremendous.
Buonaparte, being aware of this weak point in
their character, fed it in every way, and the object
of wearing a paltry piece of enamel gained
him many battles. But this sort of created courage
is not capable of standing a severe test, and
the French have always been in their military character
more Gauls than Franks; and what Cæsar
said of the former eighteen centuries ago, is still
applicable to the races now occupying their
fine country. If stoutly opposed at first, this
kind of courage not only diminishes but evaporates,
and has, does, and will, ever fail before
that of the British. As soldiers, taking the
expression in its widest sense, they are equal, if
not superior, to us in many points; but on one, that
of individual constitutional courage, we rise far superior
to them. It is remarkable how often they evince
a knowledge of this, and in nothing more than their
subterfuges of all kinds to keep it from resting
on their minds. All France, aware of this inferiority,
by all species of casuistry attempts to conceal
it; and in order not to shock their national
vanity, they blame every unsuccessful officer opposed
to us, even should his dispositions be ever so
good, and such as might, but for the courage of
our men, have succeeded.
Buonaparte's conduct, after Vittoria, was directed
to work on this feeling, and, by sacrificing
the officers to the self-vanity of the troops,
established for a time the moral of the army, by
making those who had fled like sheep at Vittoria,
fight us again, though unsuccessfully, with renewed
spirit. Besides the bravery of the two nations,
no less was the plain of Talavera to try the
merit of two systems, and prove the value of
different means and education in forming a powerful
and efficient military. It was not only to
be shown if a chivalrous enthusiasm, and a confidence
founded on vanity was to overcome natural
and patriotic courage, but if a sense of
duty, inculcated by a real discipline, was to
sink under feelings created by an absence of
control and a long train of excess and military
license. It was whether an organized army,
worthy of a civilized period, and state of warfare,
should not overcome a military cast grown
up in the heart of Europe, (from the peculiarity
of the times and circumstances,) little better
than the Bandits led by Bourbon to the walls
of Rome in the sixteenth century. The system
on which the French armies were formed was so
demoralizing and pernicious in its effects, that the
army of Buonaparte ought not to be considered
as the national force of France, but that of a
conqueror, like Ghenghis Khan, or Tamerlane,
of a more civilized age and quarter of the world.
Like those scourges, the ruler of the French
existed by upholding that soldiery the times
had first created, and which his ambition subsequently
fostered, and, in perpetuating their attachment
to his person by leading them to victory
and plunder; in consequence, robbery was
not only overlooked but permitted, and an economist
of the French army has since dared in
print to excuse its atrocities. This, it is true,
is written by one of the revolutionary school,
but it will be, (as long as the work is read,) a
perpetual disgrace to the army whose acts he
records.35 All discipline sank under this state
of things. Coercion was neither necessary nor
prudent, where the views of all were directed
to the same lawless objects; and the military
code was rather a bond of union and companionship,
fostering a spurious glory, or ambition,
and a thirst and hope of reward in unshackled
military license and execution, than a collection
of laws respecting the rights and claims of
human nature.
The quickness and intelligence of the French
soldiery pointed out the necessity of an obedience
to their officers, whom they considered
as leading them to objects equally desirable to
all; and thus actuated, far from having to receive
orders, they readily anticipated them. A
Bedouin robber does not require the positive
commands of his chief to do his utmost to destroy
the guards, or to plunder the camels of
a caravan; and no more did the French, with
gain or impure military fame in view, require
farther stimulus or direction.
But these various causes so suited the French,
that they had the effect, since the Revolution,
of raising their armies to the summit of fame,
while their successes over the continental troops
had made them universally dreaded. They felt
this, which increased their confidence; and the
army before us, sleeping on the opposite side
of the ravine, was strongly imbued with this
impression, being formed of the fine regiments
of the Italian army, who had so often conquered
under Buonaparte, and subsequently
marched from one victory to another. Neither
the corps of Victor nor Sebastiani, nor the
guard or reserve under Desolles, from Madrid,
had formed parts of the armies defeated by
us at Vimiera or Corunna, nor had any recollections
of our prowess to shake that good opinion
of themselves, in which the principal strength
of the French armies consists.
Though no fears could be entertained for
the result, dependent on the brave fellows
lying around us, we could not but regret that
they were not composed of troops as fine as
those who accompanied Sir John Moore.
We could not hide from ourselves that our
ranks were filled with young soldiers, being
principally the second battalions of those English
regiments which had embarked at Corunna,
and consisting of draughts from the militia that
had never seen an enemy. With the exception
of the Guards and a few others, there were
more knapsacks with the names of militia regiments
upon them, than of numbered regular
regiments. Indeed we felt, no contrast could
be stronger than that of the two armies. The
ideas of England have never run wild on military
glory. We more soberly consider our army
rather as a necessary evil than an ornament
and boast; and as an appeal to brute force and
arms is a proof of barbarism, so ought the general
diffusion of the former sentiment in a
community to be viewed as conclusive evidence
of advance to civilization and intelligence; and
instead of directing the talents, or drawing forth
the best blood of a people to be wasted in the
field, a well-wisher to his country ought to
desire them to be retained at home for the general
advantage. But, however secure in ourselves,
we recollected that we formed but one-third
of the Allied army, and that 36,000 men
lay in the same line, every action of whom had
led us to consider them as more likely to occasion
some common reverse than a happy termination
to our operations. We were convinced
that if attacked, even in their strong and almost
impregnable position, it was most likely to be
attended by their immediate flight, which would
leave the whole of the enemy to direct his
efforts upon us single-handed. In addition, a
certain degree of coolness had grown up between
the two commanders; and Sir Arthur
must have felt that the weakness of his ally by
his side was not less to be dreaded than the
strength of his enemy in his front. The prospect
on the eve of the 28th July, 1809, was
thus, though far from hopeless, by no means
one of encouragement or sanguine expectation.
The rest of all the officers lying around Sir
Arthur was hasty and broken, and interrupted
by the uneasiness of the horses held at a distance,
and the arrival of deserters, a few of
whom came over during the night. They generally
informed us, that we were to be attacked
at daylight, and that the corps that stormed
the hill had consisted of 6000 men. Our glances
were constantly directed towards the point from
whence the sun was to rise for the last time
on many hundreds who were here assembled
within a mile around, while Sir Arthur, occasionally
asking the hour, showed he looked for
daylight with as much anxiety as any of us.
Just before day, we quietly mounted our horses
and rode slowly towards the height, where we
arrived just as the light allowed us to see the
opposite side of the ravine beneath us covered
with black indistinct masses. Every instant
rendered them more visible, and the first rays
of the sun showed us Sebastiani's division opposite
our centre, Victor's three divisions at our
feet, with the reserve, guard, and cavalry
extending backward to the wood near the Alberche.
Our eyes were, however, principally
attracted by an immense solid column opposite
but rather to the left of the hill, evidently intended
for attack. Its front was already covered with
tirailleurs, ready to advance at the word, and
who saw before them the dead bodies of their
comrades, who had fallen the night before,
strewing the ground. The gray of the morning
was not broken in upon by a single shot
from either side, and we had time to observe
our position, (which had not been completely
occupied before dark on the preceding eve,) and
how the troops were posted.
The distance from the Tagus to the height
on our left, which overlooked a deep valley,
bounded beyond by some sharp and rugged hills,
was little less than two miles. The right of the
Allied army rested on the town of Talavera
and the river. About half the ground from our
right to a little beyond the centre was flat, and
covered with woods and vineyards, but where
these ceased, the remainder of the country was
open, and gradually rose to the foot of our
important conical hill on the left.
A rill ran along the whole front of our line,
and in that part of the ground which was open
and undulating, it passed through a ravine, the
brow of which was taken advantage of in posting
our troops. The Spaniards, from being incapable
of moving, were posted in heavy columns
in the most difficult country, till they
joined our right, which was in an open space,
though in its front and rear were inclosures.
At this point had been commenced a little redoubt,
which however remained imperfect, and was
the only "intrenchment" of those with which the
French, in their accounts, as an excuse for their
defeat, have so liberally strengthened our line.
But as every thing is sacrificed by them to
vanity, truth cannot be expected alone to escape.
On the right of the British was posted the
fourth division, under Sir A. Campbell, supported
by Sir S. Cotton's brigade of cavalry;
on their left commenced the first division, of
which the Guards were on the right. The remainder
of this division, consisting of Brig.-Gen.
Cameron's brigade and the Germans, extended
across the most open ground, and joined
on the left to the brigade of Colonel Donkin
and the second division, clustered round the
height for its defence. The other brigade of
Gen. M'Kenzie was placed in the second line.
The remainder of the cavalry had bivouacked
at some distance to the rear, and were not come
up. The enemy were employed from daylight
in placing opposite our centre thirty pieces of
cannon on the opposite side of the ravine, but
not a shot was fired on either side, and the
whole looked as if the armies had met for a
review. But the calm augured the coming storm,
and the quiet evinced that all were aware of
the great approaching struggle, and that it was
useless to throw away a casual fire, or destroy
individuals, where salvos alone and the death
of thousands could decide the day. When the
vast column we had seen in the dusk was considered
ready, a single cannon shot from the
centre of the enemy's batteries was the signal
for its advance, and for the opening of all their
guns. A shower of balls instantly fell on all
parts of our position, and the smoke, (the wind
being east, and the damp of the morning preventing
its rising,) was blown across the ravine,
and completely enveloped us in a dense
fog. But we had seen the forward movement
intended for our dislodgment, and knew, under
cover of this cannonade and smoke, it was advancing
up the face of the hill. It consisted
of a close column of battalions, of the same division
of Ruffin which had attacked the night before.
Gen. Hill, with the brigades of Tilson and
Stewart, which had already successfully tried
their strength with these same troops, was
ready to receive them. The Buffs, 48th, and
66th, advanced to the brow of the hill, wheeling
round to meet them with their arms ported,
ready to rush on the ascending foe as soon as
perceived through the intense smoke. They
were not long in suspense, and without a moment's
hesitation, by a desperate charge and
volley, they overthrew, as they topped the hill, the
enemy, who fled in the utmost confusion and consternation,
followed by our troops, even across the
ravine. Here they rallied, and, after an exchange
of sharp firing, our regiments were withdrawn
again to their vantage ground. Had the cavalry
been present, the victory might have been
completed at this early hour, but they had not
come in from their bivouack. As the smoke
and tumult cleared off, and the troops were
seated behind the summit of the hill, we found
our loss considerable, and that Gen. Hill had
been forced to quit the field from a shot in
the head. The dead of the enemy lay in vast
numbers on the face of the hill, and had been
tall, healthy, fine young men, well-limbed, with
good countenances; and as proof of their courage,
(the head of their column having reached
within a few yards of the top of the hill before
being arrested,) the bodies lay close to our ranks.
The face of the height was furrowed out into deep ravines
by the water rushing down its steep sides during
the rains, and the dead and wounded of both
nations lay heaped in them.36 Musquetry almost
ceased after this defeat, but the cannonade continued;
our centre and right suffering considerably,
though in the other parts of the line, as our
shots were plunging, while theirs were directed
upwards, it was not so deadly. It continued
for above an hour after the repulse, and showed
us the inferiority of our calibre. All our guns,
with the exception of one brigade of heavy, were
miserably light six pounders, while the French
returned our fire with eights and twelves.
As the weather was dreadfully hot, and it was
impossible to know how long we should occupy
this ground, orders were given to bury the men
who had fallen the night before and in the morning
attack, lying around the hill interspersed with
the living.
The entrenching tools were thus employed,
and it was curious to see the soldiers burying
their fallen comrades, with the cannon shot falling
around, and in the midst of them, leaving it probable
that an individual might thus be employed
digging his own grave! Gradually, however, the
fire slakened, and at last wholly ceased, and war
appeared as much suspended as before daylight
and previously to the attack of the morning. The
troops on the advance talked together, and the
thirsty of both armies met at the bottom of the
ravine, and drank from the same stream. There
was also a well at the foot of the hill to the left,
where the same water was divided among the collected
of both nations around its brink.
About nine it was evident that the enemy had
no intention of disturbing us for some time, as
their numerous fires proved they were not inclined
to fight again on empty stomachs. This
was a painful sight to us, who felt acutely for our
starving soldiery, who began to experience the most
pinching want. All the promises of the Spaniards
had ended in nought. They had made no arrangements
to act up to their word, and starvation
began to stare us in the face. Generally,
however, it was borne by our men with philosophy,
but one hungry soldier became almost
troublesome, and, close to Sir Arthur and his staff,
said, "It was very hard that they had nothing to
eat," and wished that they might be let to go down
and fight, "for when engaged, they forgot their
hunger." The poor fellow was, however, at
last persuaded to retire. Till about eleven
o'clock all remained quiet, but about that hour
immense clouds of dust were seen rising above
the woods towards the Alberche opposite the
centre of the Allied army, implying movements
of large bodies of troops. This indicated the
preparing for a general assault, and was occasioned
by Sebastiani's corps forming a column of
attack.37 As the enemy's troops approached, the
cannonade was renewed, and our inferiority of
metal was so evident, that a brigade of Spanish
12 pounders was borrowed from Cuesta. The
fellows attached to these guns showed good spirit,
and, posting their guns on the side of the hill,
were found most effective. The French, at times,
had the most exact range of the height, and
threw shot and shells upon it with terrible precision.
One shell killed four horses, held by a
man, who escaped uninjured. Their fuses,
however, often burned too quick, exploding the
shells high in the air and forming little clouds of
smoke. It was curious that the enemy changed
their fire from the troops to our artillery, or from
our batteries to our line, whenever we gave them
the example.
But the dust drew near in the woods, and a
vast column was seen preparing to advance against
Sir A. Cameron's brigade in the open ground.
General Sherbrooke had cautioned his division to
use the bayonet, and when the enemy came
within about fifty yards of the Guards, they
advanced to meet them, but on their attempting to
close the enemy by a charge, they broke and fled.
The regiment on their left, the 83rd, made a
simultaneous movement, driving the enemy with
immense loss before them; but the impetuosity
of the Guards led to endangering the day. The
flying enemy led them on till they opened a
battery on their flank, which occasioned so heavy
a loss, that the ranks could not be formed after
the disorder of pursuit, and, on being ordered to
resume their ground, produced confusion.
The enemy instantly rallied and followed them,
and were so confident of victory, that their officers
were heard to exclaim, "Allons, mes enfans;
ils sont tous nos prisonniers." But Sir Arthur
had foreseen the difficulty in which the Guards
were likely to become entangled, and had
ordered the 48th from the height to their
support. This gallant regiment arrived in the
rear of the Guards at the moment when they were
retiring in confusion, pressed by the enemy, on
the line of position. They allowed the Guards
to pass through them, and then, breaking in upon
the enemy, gave them a second repulse. The
Guards quickly formed in the rear, and moved up
into the position; and their spirit and appearance
of good humour and determination after having
lost in twenty minutes five hundred men, was
shown by their giving a hurrah, as they took up
their ground; and a report soon after that the
enemy's cavalry was coming down upon them,
was answered by a contemptuous laugh along
their ranks.
The remainder of Sherbrooke's division, after
repulsing the enemy, had retired to their former
ground in excellent order. The enemy had made
an attack at the same time on the fourth division;
they accompanied this by a ruse, which nothing
but the determination of our troops could have
overcome. Trusting to the similarity of uniform,
they advanced towards the 7th, 97th, and 53d,
crying out they were Spaniards, and repeating the
Spanish cry of Vivan los Ingleses! Though this
did not deceive our officers, it did the men, who,
under this false impression, could not be brought
to fire on them; this allowed their approaching
quite close, when they gave their fire so unexpectedly,
that it staggered our line, and even
caused them to fall back. This was, however,
only to exemplify the French proverb, reculer
pour mieux sauter, as indignation and anger
took place of surprise, and a spontaneous rush
with the bayonet instantly threw the enemy into
utter rout. A Spanish regiment of infantry, on
the right flank of the fusileers, broke and fled on
this attack; but the King's regiment of horse,
with great gallantry, dashed into the wood in
co-operation with our troops in pursuit. Several
pieces of cannon fell into the hands of Gen. A.
Campbell, and three were captured by the
Spanish cavalry, while the flight of the enemy
was so rapid, that several others were left in
their retreat.
Besides these attacks, the enemy's endeavours
and intentions were extended along the whole
British line, with the exception of the hill, which
they did not again attack after the morning. We
had not posted any troops in the valley, or on
the hills on our left, the former being commanded,
and the latter considered too distant;
but it soon became evident that the enemy had
turned their views to these points.
The Spanish division of Gen. Bassecourt was
in consequence borrowed from Cuesta, and sent
across the valley to oppose the enemy's light
troops on the distant ridge. The French soon
after advanced two heavy columns into the valley,
consisting of the divisions of Vilelle and Ruffin,
and two-thirds of our cavalry were ordered to
occupy the valley opposite them. Gen. Anson's
brigade arrived first, while the heavy brigade was
moving from the rear of the centre to its support.
The enemy's two columns advanced, supported
by cavalry, threatened to turn our left, and orders,
either positive or discretionary, were given
to charge them if opportunity offered; these were
either interpreted into direct orders, or considered
as definitive, under particular circumstances,
and the 23d regiment soon after advanced
in line against one of the columns, the
brigade of Laval, which had taken post with its
flank against a house. This gallant regiment
moved forward with great steadiness, and the
squadron, (for the width of only one could embrace
the front of the column,) on arriving within
firing distance, received a well-directed volley.
It seemed to stop them in their career—the whole
country was instantly covered with horses galloping
back without riders, and men straggling
to the rear without horses, while a dense spot
seen from the hill marked where the slaughtered
lay.
Though this squadron was annihilated, the
others dashed on, passed between and round the
columns, and fell upon a brigade of cavalry in
the rear, broke through them, and rushed on a
second brigade beyond. Of these, some cut their
way back, while many were slain or taken.
Though this desperate charge cost the 23d two-thirds
of its men and horses, it had the effect of
astounding the enemy, who, seeing not only the
1st German, and the 3d and 4th dragoons prepared
for a similar act, but the Spanish cavalry
moving into the valley in support, and their
efforts unsuccessful elsewhere, not only gave up
all farther idea of penetrating in that quarter, but
seemed satisfied that it was imprudent and hopeless
any longer to continue the contest. But for
being on the defensive, the gaps in our lines,
which now forcibly showed themselves, by the
regiments not covering one-third of their former
ground, would have made us come to the like
conclusion; and it was no unpleasing sight to
see them begin gradually to draw off their infantry,
and bring forward, to cover their retreat,
their cavalry, which had been all day in numerous
échelons, extending back to the woods.
They formed several lines, and must have numbered
not less than 9 or 10,000 cavalry, dressed
in all the colours of the rainbow.
But the views of the British were attracted to
a new enemy which had threatened occasionally
during the day, and had gained great head soon
after the defeat on the right and centre. The
ripe corn and dry grass took fire from the cartridges
and wadding, and hundreds of acres were
rapidly consumed, involving in their conflagrations
the more severely wounded and helpless;
adding a new and horrid character to the misery
of war.
It was so general, that it was a consolation to
the friends of officers slain, to learn that their
bodies, when found, did not bear the marks of
being scorched or burned in their last moments!
But the attention of all was directed till dusk
to the enemy's evident preparations for retreat,
and during the night they drew off behind the
Alberche, which river they had all crossed by the
daylight of the 29th; on which morning, Brig.-Gen.
R. Craufurd joined the army with 3000 men,
and a troop of horse-artillery, and was pushed on
to the old ruin, from which Sir Arthur had so
narrowly escaped two days before. But these
reinforcements, consisting of the 43d, 52d, and
95th, (the beginning of the celebrated light division,)
did not make up for the heavy loss we
had sustained during the 27th and 28th.
Out of 17,500 men we had lost 5,335, including
Generals M'Kenzie and Langworth killed,
and Gen. Hill, Sir H. Campbell, and Brig.-Gen.
A. Campbell, wounded. This was two-sevenths
of our force, and is, with the exception of Albuera,
the heaviest list of casualties offered, for
the men engaged, of any victorious army in
modern war. The loss of the 23d Dragoons was
remarkable from its extent; that fine regiment,
which had only joined three weeks, being only
able to assemble, after the action, one hundred
men. Two officers and forty-six men and ninety-five
horses were killed on the spot, and besides
the numerous wounded, three officers, and about
one hundred men were taken, in consequence of
penetrating into the enemy's supporting cavalry.
The whole regiment was so reduced, as to be sent
home to England, on our return to the Portuguese
frontier.
The Spanish returns gave between 1300 and
1400 men, but this included their loss on the
25th in front of St. Ollala38.
The French army fell back across the Alberche,
diminished not less than one-fifth, if not one-fourth
of their effectives, their loss being indifferently
rated from 10 to 14,000 men. Some of
the little enclosures in front of the right of the
British were choked with their dead, and in one
little field more than 400 bodies were counted.
Besides the innumerable dead, vast numbers of
wounded were left in our front; and many more
stand of arms than the most sanguine rated their
loss, were abandoned on the field of battle39.
Nineteen pieces of cannon remained in our possession
as trophies of our victory40. Besides
these, they left in our possession several silk
standards, but whether they had borne eagles or
not it was difficult to say; as, besides being much
broken and torn when brought into head-quarters,
the staff of one had been used as a poker to a
bivouac fire. It was the custom of the French to
unscrew their eagles, and for the eagle-bearers to
conceal them about their person when in danger.
Having only one to a regiment, and there
being five battalions to each, every eagle taken
by us during the war, may be considered as equivalent
to five stand of colours, and the trophies
at Whitehall as ten times more numerous than
they appear.
It is a remarkable and curious instance of the
instability of human institutions, that these idols
of the French armies for so many years, and
around which so much blood was spilt, only now
exist as trophies to their conquerors.
This hard-fought battle was remarkable from
the circumstance of almost the entire efforts of
an army being directed on the troops of one nation
of their allied opponents. It is, perhaps, fortunate,
that the rancour and vanity of the enemy
led them to this conduct, as, had they forced the
Spaniards from the difficult country on our right,
our army would have been thrown off the Tagus,
and had to combat the whole French army, with
its communications threatened, if not cut off.
With the exception of occupying the ground,
the dash of the regiment of King's cavalry, and
the employment of a few battalions in skirmishing
on the hills on our left, the Spaniards
did nothing whatever41. But their previous behaviour
had tended to make us uneasy during the
whole battle, and so disgusted was Cuesta with
some of his troops, that he ordered several officers
and men to be shot for cowardice the next
day. This battle gave the character to all the
subsequent actions in the Peninsula. They were
ever almost entirely of infantry and artillery,
while the cavalry, which acted with such effect
on the continent, did not assert its power. However
brilliant Vimiera and Corunna, still Talavera
must be considered as the place where the military
character of the two nations was fairly
brought to trial and proved. This battle proved
the total want of firmness of the enemy in meeting
our troops with the bayonet, and offered an
example, followed by others on every occasion, of
their best troops flying like chaff before the wind,
on the hostile troops arriving within charging
distance.
The French would ever expose themselves to
fire at the smallest distance as long as ourselves,
but a hurra and a rush with the bayonet, within
reach, caused their instant flight.
With the exception of a few desperate men at
the rear of a flying column, or from accidental
circumstances, scarce any bayonet wounds were
exchanged during the whole war; and their dread
of closing was so strongly evinced in foggy weather,
that a shout was sufficient, as at the pass of Maida
in the Pyrenees, to disperse a forming column.
Indeed, our bayonets might as well have been of
pasteboard, from their temper being so seldom
tried, for the dread of them alone was sufficient
to scatter the best troops of France. In fact it is a
bad, if not useless weapon in their hands, and the
Portuguese beat them with it on more than one
occasion.
Brig.-Gen. Alexander Campbell had two horses
shot under him, and though wounded through the
thigh, continued on his horse till the close of the
battle. Sir H. Campbell, who headed the brigade
of Guards, was wounded in the face, the ball entering
the cheek and coming out behind the ear.
Col. Gordon, of the 83d, was badly wounded in
the neck, and when in the act of being removed
to the rear, a shell fell into the blanket in which
he was carried, and bursting, slew alike the
wounded and his bearers. A man of the 87th,
while lying down, was shot, the ball entering the
head, and was alive five days after.
The incessant and terrible cannonade had
created the most shocking wounds, and an unusual
portion of wounded were not expected again
to join the ranks. The standard of one of the
regiments of Guards had three balls in its staff.
The prisoners and deserters stated that, during
the action, a Westphalian regiment, in the
enemy's service, mutinied, but that they were
reduced to obedience and marched to the rear.
The morning after the battle was employed in
removing our numerous and suffering wounded
into the convents and churches, now converted
into hospitals. By requisitions of beds and
blankets, within three days, principally through
the exertion of the head of the medical staff, Dr.
Frank, no patient was without a mattrass. Nurses
and orderlies were selected to attend, and Sir
Arthur visited the hospitals himself. The number
of deaths from wounds that proved mortal,
obliged immense burial parties to be employed
during the first three or four days in removing
the bodies from the hospitals. Even in the case
of the officers, it was only through the attention
of their brother officers, who read the service
themselves, that the usual funeral forms were
used, while the men were interred without prayers,
being generally placed in ditches and the bank
dug in upon them.
The heat of the weather rendered as necessary
a proper attention to the dead of the enemy, and
the Spaniards burned a vast number of the slain;
but the weather was too rapid for all exertion,
and the tainted air was fraught with every horror,
so that the quarters of some of the troops were
forced to be changed. Though distressing to relate,
it must not be overlooked, that the 29th was
disgraced by the atrocious conduct of the
Spaniards, in putting to death most of the enemy's
wounded left in our front. The amount has been
rated as high as one thousand, but it is certain
several hundred were thus inhumanly butchered.
One of our officers found a French officer badly
wounded, and, on offering to seek aid, the poor
fellow remarked, that he had no right to expect
it, until our own numerous wounded were housed
and dressed. But during the search for assistance,
the Spaniards had passed the spot, and he was
found stabbed to death!
Sir Arthur felt he could not too soon thank
the army which had so nobly aided his efforts,
and on the 29th his Excellency issued a long
order to that effect, naming distinguished officers
and regiments. The enemy continued a rear
guard on the Alberche till the night of the 31st
July, when they retired through St. Ollala, and
our patrols passed through that town: here our
officers learned some curious details of the
enemies' bearing, under the different feelings
of confidence of success and the discouragement
of subsequent defeat. In the house where
the King had lodged, an instance was given
highly creditable to Joseph. A caricature was
discovered of El Rey Pepé, which created
great indignation in those around Joseph's person,
accompanied by threats and ill-treatment.
The King, the next morning, on his departure,
tendered his host a snuff-box, remarking, that he
should be more careful of its contents than of the
caricature; on its being opened, it was found to
contain the King's miniature.
We were prevented from moving after the
enemy, not only on account of our numerous
wounded, but from want of provisions. Our difficulties
on this head greatly increased after the
battle, and were felt to so great an extent, that
the army in part became disorganized, from the
ravenous callings for food overpowering all other
considerations. While, it was said, comparative
plenty reigned in the Spanish camp, our troops
were driven to seek and take provisions by force,
wherever they could find them; this led to such
straggling from the camp, that on the 2d of August
the rolls were ordered to be called every two
hours. While our position was thus unsatisfactory
and even doubtful, news reached head-quarters
that our rear was threatened by troops moving
down from Castile and Leon. On the 30th a
rumour (proved however to be anticipated) spread
that the French had arrived in Placentia, and the
anxiety became universal.
Our information at this time was less perfect
than it afterwards became, and the various reports
left the impression that it was Soult's corps alone
of 12 to 15,000 men that was thus menacing our
communication with Portugal. This however did
not make our position untenable, as our army of
between 15 and 16,000, was capable of defeating
his force, if Cuesta could be persuaded to hold his
ground, and keep in check the lately defeated
army, and thus cover our hospitals. To this
Cuesta agreed, and, ordering Gen. Bassecourt's
division to act as our advance, caused it to march
to Oropesa on the 2d. Arrangements were made
respecting the hospitals, and Col. M'Kinnon was
left in their charge, with but thirty-four medical
officers (all we could spare) to attend 5,000 sick
and wounded.
We left Talavera on the 3d, under the full expectation
of fighting the forces coming from the
north, concentrating about Naval Moral. On our
arrival at Oropesa on the evening of that day, Bassecourt
was pushed on towards that place, and
orders were given out implying active and immediate
operations, by directing the troops to hold
themselves in readiness to march by such orders
as they might receive from the Quarter-master-general.
But the course of the night changed all our
prospects. Sir Arthur received a despatch from
Cuesta stating, that he had received information
on which he could depend, that not only had
Soult's corps moved from the north, but that it
was accompanied by the two other corps, the 5th
and 6th, and that he had, in consequence, determined
to retire from Talavera. This implied the
sacrifice to the enemy of all in our hospitals who
had not the power of walking, as the Spaniards,
on Col. M'Kinnon applying to them for means of
transport, furnished only ten or a dozen carts,
while very many quitted the town empty. Col.
M'Kinnon, thus under the painful necessity of
leaving nearly 2,300 sick and wounded, gave directions
for the rest to withdraw by a nearer road to
the bridge of Arzobispo, than through Oropesa.42
This unexpected news added to Sir Arthur's
difficulties; and while these were under consideration,
they were greatly increased by the whole
Spanish army coming in upon us, at daylight on
the 4th, with their carts and baggage.
On this occasion the old General had not
wanted decision, as was proved by the arrival of
himself and army within a few hours after forming
his opinion.
The intelligence of Cuesta proved most true; a
junction of the three corps had taken place,
and the King, before he left Madrid, had
sent them orders on the 22d to advance on Placentia.
The head-quarters of the 2d, 5th, and
6th corps were at Salamanca on the 27th of July,
and directing their march on three succeeding
days to the south, forced all the weak passes and
posts, and arrived on the 1st of August, at Placentia,
making prisoners 300 sick in the hospitals.
The Spanish troops, retiring before Soult, crossed
the Tagus, and fortunately destroyed the
bridge of boats at Almarez. But the enemy only
thought of intercepting and surrounding the
British, and their advance reached Naval Moral
on the 3d, but five leagues from Oropesa, thus
cutting off the direct road by Almarez to Portugal.
No time was now to be lost, as we were not
only likely to be attacked from the west, but, in
consequence of the retreat of the Spaniards,
threatened with the advance of King Joseph, and
his defeated army at Talavera, within three or
four days: in which case we should have had,
besides 36 to 38,000 from Madrid, 30 to 34,000
from Placentia.
But Sir Arthur soon decided, and gave directions,
at four o'clock on the 4th, for all the baggage
to proceed across the bridge of Arzobispo.
This was preparatory to a similar movement of the
army; and having recalled Bassecourt's division,
the whole British force filed over to the left bank
of the Tagus, where the wounded from Talavera
arrived a short time before.
The Spaniards followed to the side of the
river, but did not cross that evening. So nearly
had the enemy intercepted our retreat, that at
dusk his cavalry interchanged some shots with
our advance-posts, close to Arzobispo, and
carried off one of our videttes. The Spaniards
did not cross the next day; but the British army
proceeded down the river, by the same road where
the enemy had turned Cuesta's flank before the battle
of Medellin, in the preceding spring. This was
rendered most necessary, as the occupation of
Almarez could alone secure a retreat upon Portugal;
and the pontoons, though removed, had
been left but in the charge of some militia.
Head-quarters on the 5th were near the village
of Peretada de Gabern, and the 3rd division,
which had been placed under the orders of General
Craufurd, with the addition of his light brigade,
was pushed by narrow paths across the mountain,
and reached a point within two leagues of the
passage over the Tagus.
On the 6th it reached Roman Gourdo, which
secured this important position, and head-quarters
moved on to Meza de Ibor, (the spot of Cuesta's
unsuccessful affair on the 17th of March), and
the following day to Deleytoza. It was now possible
to halt with security; from the pass at
Almarez being secured; and in a large convent,
about a mile from the town, a hospital was formed,
and it was found above 2,000 wounded had accompanied
the army.
General A. Campbell had found his way in a
huckster's tilted-cart, with a bed made in it,
across the most difficult passes in the mountain.
The roads during three days' march were
scarcely capable of transport, and the greatest
difficulty was experienced in conveying the artillery,
while the troops were often halted to cover
their retreat.
As we moved over the high ridges, we had a
most extensive view across the place we had
traversed a fortnight before from Placentia, and
saw the glittering of the arms, and the rising
dust of the French columns moving on Oropesa.
Colonel Waters and Captain Mellish crossed
the river, and reconnoitered the last of these
columns, and learned from the peasants, that it
was the third of the same size that had passed
along that road within the preceding few days;
thus fully confirming the information of the three
corps having been directed on our rear.
Thus, as in the preceding year, the British
had again drawn five corps d'armée of the eight
in Spain upon them. Some of the troops from
the north were not re-equipped after their losses
in the north of Portugal, but the three corps had
little short of 35,000 effectives. However precipitate
the retreat of Cuesta, it would have been
eventually necessary, for, although we could have
checked on the 5th, 6th, and 7th, the successive
arriving columns of the enemy from Naval Moral,
(allowing time for the very desirable transport of
many more of our wounded beyond Arzobispo),
still our position would sooner or later have
become untenable.
It may be conjectured that few armies have
witnessed such vicissitudes as the French and
English armies within the short period of eleven
months. The two armies had more than once
advanced and retired in the face of each other.
Many of those we saw marching across the plain
with the sanguine hope of intercepting our retreat,
had been driven from Portugal and carried
to France, had witnessed our embarkation from
Corunna, and had since been expelled from the
Tras os Montes, and now again were compelling
us, by an immense superiority of numbers, again
to retrograde.
After leaving the Spaniards at Arzobispo, the
two armies were totally disunited, and little or
no subsequent communication took place between
them. We had seen enough of both officers and
men to despise and distrust them, from their
chief to the drummer, and to hope that we might
never again be in the same camp. They not
only were incapable of acting as a military auxiliary,
but were wholly remiss in fulfilling their
promises, and instead of attempting to find us in
provisions, while plenty reigned in their camp,
even our officers were destitute of bread. While
our troops were on one occasion four days without
this indispensable necessary, they had the shameless
impudence to sell loaves to our starving
soldiers at an immoderate price. So pressing
were our wants, that one of our commissaries
took from them by force one hundred bullocks
and one hundred mule loads of bread. But if
their conduct before us had been despicable, it no
less at a distance deserved reprehension. Vanegas,
who was to have made a powerful diversion from
La Mancha on Toledo, completely failed, even to
the extent of alarming the enemy, who felt satisfied
that 2,000 men in that city were sufficient to
keep in check his whole force, while the passes
along the Portuguese and Spanish frontier were
gained almost without a struggle.
But disasters quickly followed the Spaniards
after our separation. On the 6th they crossed
to the left bank of the Tagus, and on the following
day Cuesta retired with his main force,
leaving two divisions of infantry, and the cavalry
with the artillery in battery to defend the bridge.
The enemy showed themselves on the 6th on the
opposite bank, and increased in number on the
7th, but the interposition of the river between
them made the Spaniards consider themselves
in perfect safety. On the 8th, the French
brought up the artillery, and opened a fire on
some redoubts constructed by the Spaniards,
while they made preparations for crossing the
river. The Spanish cavalry, devoid of all caution,
were out in watering order, when 2,000 cavalry
dashed into the river, above the bridge, at a good
ford, and attacked the redoubts in the rear, at
once enveloping the Spanish camp in confusion,
dismay, and rout. They fled, some in the
direction of Messa de Ibor, others to the southward,
leaving their baggage and guns in the
hands of the enemy. Those who fled on the
former road abandoned guns and ammunition-waggons
several leagues beyond the point of pursuit;
and Colonel Waters, sent from our head-quarters
with a flag of truce, finding them thus
safe, persuaded the Spaniards, with difficulty,
to return and bring back their deserted guns.
This disgraceful affair was the climax of disasters
to this army. It could not assemble in a
few days subsequently 18,000 men, and the Duke
of Albuquerque (against whose advice the Spanish
cavalry had been left unprepared), quitted it in
disgust, sending in charges to the Cortes against
his commander. This was anticipated by Cuesta,
who, on the plea of his health, resigned on the
13th the command of the army. To complete
the sad picture presented by the Spaniards,
Vanegas, without answering any purpose, just so
committed himself on the Toledo side, that
Sebastiani fell upon him at Almonacaio on the
10th, and routed him with considerable loss.
Want of forage and provisions continued to an
alarming degree in the mountainous tract around
Deleytosa and Almarez, and, still keeping the
advance at the latter place, rendered necessary
the armies' moving more to the westward. Head-quarters
were on the 11th at Jarecejo, in order
to be nearer Truxillo, where a large depôt was
forming. Sir Arthur ordered, with justice, that
the stoppage for the troops usually of sixpence
a-day for their provisions, should be only three-pence
from the 27th of July till further orders,
in reference to their want of regular supplies.43
While the head-quarters were at this place, the
effects of want of food began to show themselves
on the troops, by sickness breaking out, though
not at first to the alarming extent it did a month
after on the Guadiana.
But the road by Castel Branco to Lisbon
was only covered by a small force of four
British regiments, which had been moving up
under General C. Craufurd, and it became
necessary to place the army nearer to Portugal,
in a position to cover both banks of
the Tagus, should the enemy direct his march
from Placentia. Although Craufurd was soon
joined by Marshal Beresford from the north, the
army moved on the 20th from Jarecejo to Truxillo,
and gradually withdrew towards the frontier,
head-quarters passing through Majadas, Medellin,
Merida, to Badajoz, where Sir Arthur established
himself on the 3rd of September with the troops
cantoned as follows:—
| |
| First Division at |
Badajos, Arroyo, Lobone, Almendralejo, Talavera la Real, and Santa Marta. |
| Second Division |
Modtejo, La Mata, La Puebla de la Calsada, Gorravilla, and Torre Major. |
| Third Division |
Campo Mayor.
Villa de Rey. |
| Fourth Division |
Olivenza.
Badajos. |
| |
In the mean time the enemy had not followed
the defeated Spaniards, but, fearful of leaving the
north of Spain without troops, as early as they
had separated the two armies, and felt secure of
the capital, the three corps set out on their
return, on the 9th, towards Salamanca. Sir R.
Wilson, whose advance to Escalona had not produced
the supposed effect on the French army,
or at Madrid, in retiring from his exposed situation,
took post in the pass of Baños. This was the
direct road for the enemies returning columns,
who, after a sharp affair on the 12th, forced the
position, and continued their route, leaving Sir
Robert to fall back on the frontier of Portugal.
Thus ended the campaign of 1809, which was
not less brilliant than interesting, and tended
greatly to the ultimate deliverance of Spain and
Europe. Though no immediate results were produced
from it, there can be no doubt it saved
Andalusia for a time, which province would never
have fallen into the enemy's power, had not the
besotted Spaniards sought opportunities for defeat,
and committed themselves, as at Ocana. In drawing
the three corps from the north, it showed all that
part of Spain that the struggle was continued
with firmness in other quarters; and the very
fact of relieving the country from the pressure of
the enemy, allowed breathing time, and proved
their stay might not be permanent.
The battle of the 27th and 28th July broke
much the enemy's confidence when opposed to
us; and their repulse not only gave spirits to the
Spaniards, but opened the eyes of Europe to the
possibility of defeating the French; for it may
be fearlessly advanced, that the morale of the
European armies was restored by this and our
succeeding campaigns in Spain.
