My return to Hamburg—Government Committee established there—
Anecdote of the Comte de Chaban—Napoleon's misunderstanding with
the Pope—Cardinal Fesch—Convention of a Council—Declaration
required from the Bishops—Spain in 1811—Certainty of war with
Russia—Lauriston supersedes Caulaincourt at St. Petersburg—The war
in Spain neglected—Troops of all nations at the disposal of
Bonaparte—Levy of the National Guard—Treaties with Prussia and
Austria—Capitulation renewed with Switzerland—Intrigues with
Czernischeff—Attacks of my enemies—Memorial to the Emperor—Ogier
de la Saussaye and the mysterious box—Removal of the Pope to
Fontainebleau—Anecdote of His Holiness and M. Denon—Departure of
Napoleon and Maria Louisa for Dresden—Situation of affairs in Spain
and Portugal—Rapp's account of the Emperor's journey to Dantzic—
Mutual wish for war on the part of Napoleon and Alexander—Sweden
and Turkey—Napoleon's vain attempt to detach Sweden from her
alliance with Russia.
As I took the most lively interest in all that concerned the Hanse Towns,
my first care on returning to Hamburg was to collect information from the
most respectable sources concerning the influential members of the new
Government. Davoust was at its head. On his arrival he had established
in the Duchy of Mecklenburg, in Swedish Pomerania, and in Stralsund, the
capital of that province, military posts and custom-houses, and that in a
time of profound peace with those countries, and without any previous
declaration. The omnipotence of Napoleon, and the terror inspired by the
name of Davoust, overcame all obstacles which might have opposed those
iniquitous usurpations. The weak were forced to yield to the strong.
At Hamburg a Government Committee was formed, consisting of the Prince of
Eekmuhl as President, Comte de Chaban, Councillor of State, who
superintended the departments of the Interior and Finance, and of M.
Faure, Councillor of State, who was appointed to form and regulate the
Courts of Law. I had sometimes met M. de Chaban at Malmaison. He was
distantly related to Josephine, and had formerly been an officer in the
French Guards. He was compelled to emigrate, having been subjected to
every species of persecution during the Revolution.
M. de Chaban was among the first of the emigrants who returned to France
after the 18th Brumaire. He was at first made Sub-Prefect of Vendome,
but on the union of Tuscany with France Napoleon created him a member of
the Junta appointed to regulate the affairs of Tuscany. He next became
Prefect of Coblentz and Brussels, was made a Count by Bonaparte, and was
afterwards chosen a member of the Government Committee at Hamburg. M. de
Chaban was a man of upright principles, and he discharged his various
functions in a way that commanded esteem and attachment.
—[I recollect an anecdote which but too well depicts those
disastrous times. The Comte de Chaban, being obliged to cross
France during the Reign of Terror, was compelled to assume a,
disguise. He accordingly provided himself with a smockfrock; a cart
and horses, and a load of corn. In this manner he journeyed from
place to place till he reached the frontiers. He stopped at
Rochambeau, in the Vendomais, where he was recognised by the Marshal
de Rochambeau, who to guard against exciting any suspicion among-
his servants, treated him as if he had really been a carman and said
to him, "You may dine in the kitchen."—Bourrienne.]—
The Hanseatic Towns, united to the Grand Empire professedly for their
welfare, soon felt the blessings of the new organisation of a
regenerating Government. They were at once presented with; the stamp-
duty, registration, the lottery, the droits reunis, the tax on cards, and
the 'octroi'. This prodigality of presents caused, as we may be sure,
the most lively gratitude; a tax for military quarters and for warlike
supplies was imposed, but this did not relieve any one from laving not
only officers and soldiers; but even all the chiefs of the administration
and their officials billeted on them: The refineries, breweries, and
manufactures of all sorts were suppressed. The cash chests of the
Admiralty, of the charity houses, of the manufactures, of the savings-
banks, of the working classes, the funds of the prisons, the relief meant
for the infirm, the chests of the refuges, orphanages; and of the
hospitals, were all seized.
More than 200,000 men, Italian, Dutch, and French soldiers came in turn
to stay there, but only to be clothed and shod; and then they left newly
clothed from head to foot. To leave nothing to be wished for, Davoust,
from 1812, established military commissions in all the thirty-second.
military division, before he entered upon the Russian campaign. To
complete these oppressive measures he established at the same time the
High Prevotal Court of the Customs. It was at this time that M. Eudes,
the director of the ordinary customs, a strict but just man, said that
the rule of the ordinary customs would be regretted, "for till now you
have only been on roses.." The professed judgments of this court were
executed without appeal and without delay. From what I have just said
the situation and the misery of the north of Germany, and the consequent
discontent, can be judged.
During my stay in Hamburg, which on this occasion was not very long,
Napoleon's attention was particularly engaged by the campaign of
Portugal, and his discussions with the Pope. At this period the
thunderbolts of Rome were not very alarming. Yet precautions were taken
to keep secret the excommunication which Pius VII. had pronounced
against Napoleon. The event, however, got reported about, and a party in
favour of the Pope speedily rose up among the clergy, and more
particularly among the fanatics. Napoleon sent to Savona the Archbishops
of Nantes, Bourges, Treves, and Tours, to endeavour to bring about a
reconciliation with His Holiness. But all their endeavours were
unavailing, and after staying a month at Savona they returned to Paris
without having done anything. But Napoleon was not discouraged by this
first disappointment, and he shortly afterwards sent a second deputation,
which experienced the same fate as the first. Cardinal Fesch, Napoleon's
uncle, took part with the Pope. For this fact I can vouch, though I
cannot for an answer which he is said to have made to the Emperor. I
have been informed that when Napoleon was one day speaking to his uncle
about the Pope's obstinacy the Cardinal made some observations to him on
his (Bonaparte's) conduct to the Holy Father, upon which Napoleon flew
into a passion, and said that the Pope and he were two old fools.
"As for the Pope," said he, "he is too obstinate to listen to anything.
No, I am determined he shall never have Rome again . . . . He will
not remain at Savona, and where does he wish I should send him?"—"To
Heaven, perhaps," replied the Cardinal.
The truth is, the Emperor was violently irritated against Pius VII.
Observing with uneasiness the differences and difficulties to which all
these dissensions gave rise, he was anxious to put a stop to them. As
the Pope would not listen to any propositions that were made to him,
Napoleon convoked a Council, which assembled in Paris, and at which
several Italian Bishops were present. The Pope insisted that the
temporal and spiritual interests should be discussed together; and,
however disposed a certain number of prelates, particularly the Italians,
might be to separate these two points of discussion, yet the influence of
the Church and well-contrived intrigues gradually gave preponderance to
the wishes of the Pope. The Emperor, having discovered that a secret
correspondence was carried on by several of the Bishops and Archbishops
who had seats in the Council, determined to get rid of some of them, and
the Bishops of Ghent, Troyes, Tournay, and Toulouse were arrested and
sent to Vincennes. They were superseded by others. He wished to
dissolve the Council, which he saw was making no advance towards the
object he had in view, and, fearing that it might adopt some act at
variance with his supreme wish, every member of the Council was
individually required to make a declaration that the proposed changes
were conformable to the laws of the Church. It was said at the time that
they were unanimous in this individual declaration, though it is certain
that in the sittings of the Council opinions were divided. I know not
what His Holiness thought of these written opinions compared with the
verbal opinions that had been delivered, but certain it is though still a
captive at Savona, he refused to adhere to the concessions granted in the
secret declarations.
The conflicts which took place in Spain during the year 1811 were
unattended by any decisive results. Some brilliant events, indeed,
attested the courage of our troops and the skill of our generals. Such
were the battle of Albufera and the taking of Tarragona, while Wellington
was obliged to raise the siege of Badajoz. These advantages, which were
attended only by glory, encouraged Napoleon in the hope of triumphing in
the Peninsula, and enabled him to enjoy the brilliant fetes which took
place at Paris in celebration of the birth of the King of Rome.
On his return from a tour in Holland at the end of October Napoleon
clearly saw that a rupture with Russia was inevitable. In vain he sent
Lauriston as Ambassador to St. Petersburg to supersede Caulaincourt, who
would no longer remain there: all the diplomatic skill in the world could
effect nothing with a powerful Government which had already formed its
determination. All the Cabinets in Europe were now unanimous in wishing
for the overthrow of Napoleon's power, and the people no less, ardently
wished for an order of things less fatal to their trade and industry. In
the state to which Europe was reduced no one could counteract the wish of
Russia and her allies to go to war with France—Lauriston no more than
Caulaincourt.
The war for which Napoleon was now obliged to prepare forced him to
neglect Spain, and to leave his interests in that country in a state of
real danger. Indeed, his occupation of Spain and his well-known wish to
maintain himself there were additional motives for inducing the powers of
Europe to enter upon a war which would necessarily divide Napoleon's
forces. All at once the troops which were in Italy and the north of
Germany moved towards the frontiers of the Russian Empire. From March
1811 the Emperor had all the military forces of Europe at his disposal.
It was curious to see this union of nations, distinguished by difference
of manners,
—[It should be remarked that Napoleon was far from being anxious
for the war with Russia. Metternich writing on 26th March 1811,
says "Everything seems to indicate that the Emperor Napoleon is at
present still far from desiring a war with Russia. But it is not
less true that the Emperor Alexander has given himself over, 'nolens
volens', to the war party, and that he will bring about war, because
the time is approaching when he will no longer be able to resist the
reaction of the party in the internal affairs of his Empire, or the
temper of his army. The contest between Count Romanzov and the
party opposed to that Minister seems on the point of precipitating a
war between Russia and France." This, from Metternich, is strong
evidence.]—
language, religion, and interests, all ready to fight for one man against
a power who had done nothing to offend them. Prussia herself, though she
could not pardon the injuries he had inflicted upon her, joined his
alliance, but with the intention of breaking it on the first opportunity.
When the war with Russia was first spoken of Savary and I had frequent
conversations on the subject. I communicated to him all the intelligence
I received from abroad respecting that vast enterprise. The Duc de
Rovigo shared all my forebodings; and if he and those who thought like
him had been listened to, the war would probably have been avoided.
Through him I learnt who were the individuals who urged the invasion.
The eager ambition with which they looked forward to Viceroyalties,
Duchies, and endowments blinded them to the possibility of seeing the
Cossacks in Paris.
The gigantic enterprise being determined on, vast preparations were made
for carrying it into effect. Before his departure Napoleon, who was to
take with him all the disposable troops, caused a 'Senatus-consulte' to
be issued for levying the National Guards, who were divided into three
corps. He also arranged his diplomatic affairs by concluding, in
February 1812, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with
Prussia, by virtue of which the two contracting powers mutually
guaranteed the integrity of their own possessions, and the European
possessions of the Ottoman Porte, because that power was then at war with
Russia. A similar treaty was concluded about the beginning of March with
Austria, and about the end of the same month Napoleon renewed the
capitulation of France and Switzerland. At length, in the month of
April, there came to light an evident proof of the success which had
attended M. Czernischeff's intrigues in Paris. It was ascertained that a
clerk in the War Office, named Michel, had communicated to him the
situation of the French forces in Germany. Michel was condemned to
death, for the time was gone by when Bonaparte, confident in his genius
and good fortune, could communicate his plans to the spy of General
Melas.
In March 1812, when I saw that the approaching war would necessarily take
Napoleon from France, weary of the persecutions and even threats by which
I was every day assailed, I addressed to the Emperor a memorial
explaining my conduct and showing the folly and wickedness of my
accusers. Among them was a certain Ogier de la Saussaye, who had sent a
report to the Emperor, in which the principal charge was, that I had
carried off a box containing important papers belonging to the First
Consul. The accusation of Ogier de la Saussaye terminated thus: "I add
to my report the interrogatories of MM. Westphalen, Osy, Chapeau Rouge,
Aukscher, Thierry, and Gumprecht-Mores. The evidence of the latter bears
principally on a certain mysterious box, a secret upon which it is
impossible to throw any light, but the reality of which we are bound to
believe." These are his words. The affair of the mysterious box has
been already explained. I have already informed the reader that I put my
papers into a box, which I buried lest it should be stolen from me.
But for that precaution I should not have been able to lay before the
reader the autograph documents in my possession, and which I imagine form
the most essential part of these volumes. In my memorial to the Emperor
I said, in allusion to the passage above quoted, "This, Sire, is the most
atrocious part of Ogier's report.
"Gumprecht being questioned on this point replies that the accuser has
probably, as well as himself, seen the circumstance mentioned in an
infamous pamphlet which appeared seven or eight years, ago. It was, I
think, entitled 'Le Secret du Cabinet des Tuileries,' and was very likely
at the time of its appearance denounced by the police. In that libel it
is stated, among a thousand other calumnies equally false and absurd,
'that when I left the First Consul I carried away a box full of important
papers, that I was in consequence sent to the Temple, where your brother
Joseph came to me and offered me my liberation, and a million of francs,
if I would restore the papers, which I refused to do,' etc. Ogier,
instead of looking for this libel in Hamburg, where I read it, has the
impudence to give credit to the charge, the truth of which could have
been ascertained immediately: and he adds, 'This secret we are bound to
believe.' Your Majesty knows whether I was ever in the Temple, and
whether Joseph ever made such an offer to me." I entreated that the
Emperor would do me the favour to bring me to trial; for certainly I
should have regarded that as a favour rather than to remain as I was,
exposed to vague accusations; yet all my solicitations were in vain.
My letter to the Emperor remained unanswered; but though Bonaparte could
not spare a few moments to reply to an old friend, I learned through
Duroc the contempt he cherished for my accusers. Duroc advised me not to
be uneasy, and that in all probability the Emperor's prejudices against
me would be speedily overcome; and I must say that if they were not
overcome it was neither the fault of Duroc nor Savary, who knew how to
rightly estimate the miserable intrigues just alluded to.
Napoleon was at length determined to extend the limits of his Empire, or
rather to avenge the injuries which Russia had committed against his
Continental system. Yet, before he departed for Germany, the resolute
refusal of the Pope to submit to any arrangement urgently claimed his
consideration. Savona did not appear to him a sufficiently secure
residence for such a prisoner. He feared that when all his strength
should be removed towards the Niemen the English might carry off the
Pope, or that the Italians, excited by the clergy, whose dissatisfaction
was general in Italy, would stir up those religious dissensions which are
always fatal and difficult to quell. With the view, therefore, of
keeping the Pope under his control he removed him to Fontainebleau, and
even at one time thought of bringing him to Paris.
The Emperor appointed M. Denon to reside with the Pope at Fontainebleau;
and to afford his illustrious prisoner the society of such a man was
certainly a delicate mark of attention on the part of Napoleon. When
speaking of his residence with Pius VII. M. Denon related to me the
following anecdote. "The Pope," said he, "was much attached to me. He
always addressed me by the appellation 'my son,' and he loved to converse
with me, especially on the subject of the Egyptian expedition. One day
he asked me for my work on Egypt, which he said he wished to read; and as
you know it is not quite orthodox, and does not perfectly agree with the
creation of the world according to Genesis, I at first hesitated; but the
Pope insisted, and at length I complied with his wish. The Holy Father
assured me that he had been much interested by the perusal of the book.
I made some allusion to the delicate points; upon which he said, "No
matter, no matter, my son; all that is exceedingly curious, and I must
confess entirely new to me." I then," continued M. Denon, told His
Holiness why I hesitated to lend him the work, which, I observed, he had
excommunicated, together with its author. "Excommunicated you, my son?"
resumed the Pope in a tone of affectionate concern. "I am very sorry for
it, and assure you I was far from being aware of any such thing."
When M. Denon related to me this anecdote he told me how greatly he had
admired the virtues and resignation of the Holy Father; but he added that
it would nevertheless have been easier to make him a martyr than to
induce him to yield on any point until he should be restored to the
temporal sovereignty of Rome, of which he considered himself the
depositary, and which he would not endure the reproach of having
willingly sacrificed. After settling the place of the Pope's residence
Napoleon set off for Dresden, accompanied by Maria Louisa, who had
expressed a wish to see her father.
The Russian enterprise, the most gigantic, perhaps, that the genius of
man ever conceived since the conquest of India by Alexander, now absorbed
universal attention, and defied the calculations of reason. The
Manzanares was forgotten, and nothing was thought of but the Niemen,
already so celebrated by the raft of Tilsit. Thither, as towards a
common centre, were moving men, horses, provisions, and baggage of every
kind, from all parts of Europe. The hopes of our generals and the fears
of all prudent men were directed to Russia. The war in Spain, which was
becoming more and more unfortunate, excited but a feeble interest; and
our most distinguished officers looked upon it as a disgrace to be sent
to the Peninsula. In short, it was easy to foresee that the period was
not far distant when the French would be obliged to recross the Pyrenees.
Though the truth was concealed from the Emperor on many subjects, yet he
was not deceived as to the situation of Spain in the spring of 1812. In
February the Duke of Ragusa had frankly informed him that the armies of
Spain and Portugal could not, without considerable reinforcements of men
and money, hope for any important advantages since Ciudad-Rodrigo and
Badajoz had fallen into the hands of the English.
Before he commenced his great operations on the Niemen and the Volga
Napoleon made a journey to Dantzic, and Rapp, who was then Governor of
that city, informed me of some curious particulars connected with the
Imperial visit. The fact is, that if Rapp's advice had been listened to,
and had been supported by men higher in rank than himself, Bonaparte
would not have braved the chances of the Russian war until those chances
turned against him. Speaking to me of the Russians Rapp said, "They will
soon be as wise as we are! Every time we go to war with them we teach
them how to beat us." I was struck with the originality and truth of
this observation, which at the time I heard it was new, though it has
been often repeated since.
"On leaving Dresden," said Rapp to me, "Napoleon came to Dantzic. I
expected a dressing; for, to tell you the truth, I had treated very
cavalierly both his custom-house and its officers, who were raising up as
many enemies to France as there were inhabitants in my Government. I had
also warned him of all that has since happened in Russia, but I assure
you I did not think myself quite so good a prophet. In the beginning of
1812 I thus wrote to him: 'If your Majesty should experience reverses you
may depend on it that both Russians and Germans will rise up in a mass to
shake off the yoke. There will be a crusade, and all your allies will
abandon you. Even the King of Bavaria, on whom you rely so confidently,
will join the coalition. I except only the King of Saxony. He, perhaps,
might remain faithful to you; but his subjects will force him to make
common cause with your enemies. The King of Naples," continued Rapp, "who
had the command of the cavalry, had been to Dantzic before the Emperor.
He did not seem to take a more favourable view of the approaching
campaign than I did. Murat was dissatisfied that the Emperor would not
consent to his rejoining him in Dresden; and he said that he would rather
be a captain of grenadiers than a King such as he was."
Here I interrupted Rapp to tell him what had fallen from Murat when I met
him in the Champs Elysees "Bah!" resumed Rapp, "Murat, brave as he was,
was a craven in Napoleon's presence! On the Emperor's arrival in Dantzic
the first thing of which he spoke to me was the alliance he had just then
concluded with Prussia and Austria. I could not refrain from telling him
that we did a great deal of mischief as allies; a fact of which I was
assured from the reports daily transmitted to me respecting the conduct
of our troops. Bonaparte tossed his bead, as you know he was in the
habit of doing when he was displeased. After a moment's silence,
dropping the familiar thee and thou, he said, 'Monsieur le General, this
is a torrent which must be allowed to run itself out. It will not last
long. I must first ascertain whether Alexander decidedly wishes for
war.' Then, suddenly changing the subject of conversation, he said,
'Have you not lately observed something extraordinary in Murat? I think
he is quite altered. Is be ill?'—'Sire,' replied I, 'Murat is not ill,
but he is out of spirits.'—'Out of spirits! but why? Is he not
satisfied with being a King?'—'Sire, Murat says he is no King.'—'That
is his own fault. Why does he make himself a Neapolitan? Why is he not
a Frenchman? When he is in his Kingdom he commits all sorts of follies.
He favours the trade of England; that I will not suffer.'
"When," continued Rapp, "he spoke of the favour extended by Murat to the
trade between Naples and England I thought my turn would come next; but I
was deceived. No more was said on the subject, and when I was about to
take my leave the Emperor said to me, as when in his best of humours,
'Rapp, you will sup with me this evening.' I accordingly supped that
evening with the Emperor, who had also invited the King of Naples and
Berthier. Next day the Emperor visited the fortress, and afterwards
returned to the Government Palace, where he received the civil and
military authorities. He again invited Murat, Berthier, and me to
supper. When we first sat down to table we were all very dull, for the
Emperor was silent; and, as you well know, under such circumstances not
even Murat himself dared to be the first to speak to him. At length
Napoleon, addressing me, inquired how far it was from Cadiz to Dantzic.
'Too far, Sire,' replied I. 'I understand you, Monsieur le General, but
in a few months the distance will be still greater.'—'So much the worse,
Sire!' Here there was another pause. Neither Murat nor Berthier, on
whom the Emperor fixed a scrutinising glance, uttered a word, and
Napoleon again broke silence, but without addressing any one of us in
particular: 'Gentlemen,' said be in a solemn and rather low tone of
voice, 'I see plainly that you are none of you inclined to fight again.
The King of Naples does not wish to leave the fine climate of his
dominions, Berthier wishes to enjoy the diversion of the chase at his
estate of Gros Bois, and Rapp is impatient to be back to his hotel in
Paris.' Would you believe it," pursued Rapp, "that neither Murat nor
Berthier said a word in reply? and the ball again came to me. I told
him frankly that what he said was perfectly true, and the King of Naples
and the Prince of Neufchatel complimented me on my spirit, and observed
that I was quite right in saying what I did. 'Well,' said I, 'since it
was so very right, why did you not follow my example, and why leave me to
say all?' You cannot conceive," added Rapp, "how confounded they both
were, and especially Murat, though be was very differently situated from
Berthier."
The negotiations which Bonaparte opened with Alexander, when he yet
wished to seem averse to war, resembled those oratorical paraphrases
which do not prevent us from coming to the conclusion we wish. The two
Emperors equally desired war; the one with the view of consolidating his
power, and the other in the hope of freeing himself from a yoke which
threatened to reduce him to a state of vassalage, for it was little short
of this to require a power like Russia to close her ports against England
for the mere purpose of favouring the interests of France. At that time
only two European powers were not tied to Napoleon's fate—Sweden and
Turkey. Napoleon was anxious to gain the alliance of these two powers.
With respect to Sweden his efforts were vain; and though, in fact, Turkey
was then at war with Russia, yet the Grand Seignior was not now, as at
the time of Sebastiani's embassy, subject to the influence of France.
The peace, which was soon concluded at Bucharest, between Russia, and
Turkey increased Napoleon's embarrassment. The left of the Russian army,
secured by the neutrality of Turkey, was reinforced by Bagration's corps
from Moldavia: it subsequently occupied the right of the Beresina, and
destroyed the last hope of saving the wreck of the French army. It is
difficult to conceive how Turkey could have allowed the consideration of
injuries she had received from France to induce her to terminate the war
with Russia when France was attacking that power with immense forces.
The Turks never had a fairer opportunity for taking revenge on Russia,
and, unfortunately for Napoleon, they suffered it to escape.
Napoleon was not more successful when he sought the alliance of a Prince
whose fortune he had made, and who was allied to his family, but with
whom he had never been on terms of good understanding. The Emperor
Alexander had a considerable corps of troops in Finland destined to
protect that country against the Sweden, Napoleon having consented to
that occupation in order to gain the provisional consent of Alexander to
the invasion of Spain. What was the course pursued by Napoleon when,
being at war with Russia, he wished to detach Sweden from her alliance
with Alexander? He intimated to Bernadotte that he had a sure
opportunity of retaking Finland, a conquest which would gratify his
subjects and win their attachment to him. By this alliance Napoleon
wished to force Alexander not to withdraw the troops who were in the
north of his Empire, but rather to augment their numbers in order to
cover Finland and St. Petersburg. It was thus that Napoleon endeavoured
to draw the Prince Royal into his coalition. It was of little
consequence to Napoleon whether Bernadotte succeeded or not. The Emperor
Alexander would nevertheless have been obliged to increase his force in
Finland; that was all that Napoleon wished. In the gigantic struggle
upon which France and Russia were about to enter the most trivial
alliance was not to be neglected. In January 1812 Davoust invaded
Swedish Pomerania without any declaration of war, and without any
apparent motive. Was this inconceivable violation of territory likely to
dispose the Prince Royal of Sweden to the proposed alliance, even had
that alliance not been adverse to the interests of his country? That was
impossible; and Bernadotte took the part which was expected of him. He
rejected the offers of Napoleon, and prepared for coming events.
The Emperor Alexander wished to withdraw his force from Finland for the
purpose of more effectively opposing the immense army which threatened
his States. Unwilling to expose Finland to an attack on the part of
Sweden, he had an interview on the 28th of August 1812, at Abo, with the
Prince-Royal, to come to an arrangement with him for uniting their
interests. I know that the Emperor of Russia pledged himself, whatever
might happen, to protect Bernadotte against the fate of the new
dynasties, to guarantee the possession of his throne, and promised that
he should have Norway as a compensation for Finland. He even went so far
as to hint that Bernadotte might supersede Napoleon. Bernadotte adopted
all the propositions of Alexander, and from that moment Sweden made
common cause against Napoleon. The Prince Royal's conduct has been much
blamed, but the question resolved itself into one of mere political
interest. Could Bernadotte, a Swede by adoption, prefer the alliance of
an ambitious sovereign whose vengeance he had to fear, and who had
sanctioned the seizure of Finland to that of a powerful monarch, his
formidable neighbour, his protector in Sweden, and where hostility might
effectually support the hereditary claims of young Gustavus? Sweden, in
joining France, would thereby have declared herself the enemy of England.
Where, then, would have been her navy, her trade and even her existence?