E-text prepared by Richard Tonsing, Brian Coe, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team ( http://www.pgdp.net ) from page images generously made available by Internet Archive ( https://archive.org ) — MEMOIR OF THE SERVICES OF THE BENGAL ARTILLERY, FROM THE FORMATION OF THE CORPS TO THE PRESENT TIME, WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF ITS INTERNAL ORGANIZATION.
The circumstances under which the greater portion
of this Memoir was written, are set forth so
truthfully in the following passages, taken from an
Indian periodical, that I cannot do better than
transcribe them:—
“It was well known for some years before Captain
Buckle, driven homewards by the pressure of ill-health,
resigned the important regimental office
which he had held so creditably to himself and so
advantageously to his corps, that he had long been
collecting materials for a Memoir of the Bengal
Artillery, and had been engaged, in brief intervals
of leisure, in their arrangement and reproduction in
the form of an elaborate work of military history.
In the immediate circle of his own private friends
it was known, moreover, how deep was the interest
that he took in the progress of this work; how
laboriously he pursued his investigations into the
past history of his regiment; and what gratification
viiiit afforded him, in the midst of much that was
necessarily dull and thankless, to exhume, out of
a mass of long-buried records, or a heap of printed
volumes with the damp of years upon them, some
neglected historical fact, some forgotten statistics,
or some illustrative anecdote which had never
reached the ears of the present generation. It
was emphatically a labour of love. It was the
recreation, after hours of office drudgery, of the
last few years of his sojourn in India,—of the
last few years of his life. His health had been for
some time perceptibly failing; and for many months
before he finally determined to turn his back upon
Dum-Dum, he had suffered under one of the most
distressing and most fatal disorders of the country.
Like many others, who have been buoyed up by
such delusive hopes, he thought that he could
weather it out a little longer. Intervals of seeming
convalescence gave him new confidence and
courage; and he was disinclined to anticipate the
date at which he had originally designed to visit
Great Britain. But the hot weather of 1846 tried
him severely; his disorder was aggravated; and at
last he reluctantly determined to strike his tent,
and to seek renewed health beneath the milder sun
ixof his native country. He embarked on board the
steamer leaving Calcutta in September; and it was
hoped that the sea-breeze would check the progress
of his malady; but as the vessel steamed down the
bay, he grew worse and worse, and on the 19th of
that month, off the island of Ceylon, he rendered
back his soul to his Maker.
“It was, we believe, one of his last expressions
of earthly solicitude, that the manuscript of the
Memoir of the Bengal Artillery, on which he had
been so long and anxiously employed, should be
given over to his executor, an old brother officer
and most esteemed friend, to be dealt with as might
seem best to him. It was the known wish of the
deceased, that the work should be published:
indeed, the thought of laying before the world
a fitting memoir of the distinguished regiment to
which he was attached, had often, in hours of sickness
and weariness, been a solace and a stimulant to
him. It is an ambition worthy of any soldier, to be
the historian of his corps.”[1]
The manuscript was placed in my hands by
Captain Buckle’s executor, and I undertook to see
it safely through the press. The Memoir was
xbrought down by the author to the close of the
Afghan war; but during the interval which had
elapsed since he laid down the pen, the Sikhs had
crossed the Sutlej, and the battles of Moodkhee,
Ferozshuhur, Aliwal, and Sobraon had been fought.
It seemed desirable that some record of these
engagements should be added to the Memoir, and
I attempted to supply what was wanting to complete
the work. But whilst the sheets containing
the annals of this campaign were passing through
the press, the second Sikh war broke out, and the
further necessity of bringing down the chronicle to
the close of that memorable campaign which resulted
in the annexation of the Punjab, was imposed upon
the editor. Others would have done this more
effectively and more expeditiously. My qualifications
for the due performance of the work intrusted
to me were mainly the cheerfulness with which,
both from respect for the memory of the deceased
author and affection for the regiment of which I
was once a member, I undertook the labours it
entailed; and such aptitude as may be supposed to
result from a life spent in literary pursuits. For
the three last chapters I alone am responsible. I
am indebted to others for the information they
xicontain; but if any errors should appear in them,
they must be laid to the account of my misuse of
the materials placed at my disposal.
That, valuable and interesting as are many of
the details of this Memoir, it would have been
more interesting and more valuable if Captain
Buckle had lived to complete it, is no mere
conjecture of mine. The marginal pencil notes
which appear on the face of the manuscript, indicate
the writer’s intention of furnishing fuller information
on many important points already touched
upon, and of supplying many additional details
which in the progress of the work had escaped
his notice, but which subsequent inquiries, or, in
some instances, the suggestions of friends, had
enabled him to introduce, and which would have
been introduced had he lived to superintend the
passage of his Memoir through the press. It is
certain, too, that the details in the concluding
chapters would have been more accurate and more
complete. I have followed the original manuscript,
as far as it went, with scarcely the alteration of a
word; and I have endeavoured, in the concluding
chapters, as nearly as possible to retain the manner
of the original work.
xiiSome apology is due for the delay which has
occurred in placing the Memoir before the public.
This has been occasioned partly by the necessity of
obtaining original information relative to the events
of the Sikh campaign, and partly by the pressure
of other literary engagements which have absorbed
the editor’s time. In the record of the great
victory of Goojrat, the history of the achievements
of the Bengal Artillery has a fitting termination;
and I can hardly regret the delay which has enabled
me to chronicle, however inefficiently, the
services of so many of my distinguished cotemporaries
in the course of the last few memorable years.
J. W. K.
CONTENTS.
xiii
CHAPTER I.
Introduction—Artillery previous to 1756—Destruction of 1st
Company in Black Hole—Recapture of Calcutta—Plassey—Re-formation
of 1st Company; 2nd Company and 3rd Company
raised—Campaigns of Colonel Calliaud, Major Adams,
&c.—Massacre at Patna—4th Company raised—Major
Munro’s Campaigns—Artillery attached to brigades—Artillery
Companies formed into a Battalion—Board of Ordnance—Practice-ground
near Dum-Dum—Three Companies of
Artillery raised for Nawab of Oude—Transferred to the
Establishment—Artillery formed into a Brigade, p.1–53.
CHAPTER II.
Reduction of Golundaz Battalion—Formation of Regiment into
Two European Battalions with Ten Battalions of Lascars—Goddard’s
Expedition—Popham’s Capture of Gwalior—Insurrection
at Benares—Attacks on Pateeta, Luteefpoor, and Siege
of Bidgegurh—Colonel Pearse’s Expedition to the Coast—Reduction
of Golundaz Companies—Transport Train, Foundry,
Powder-works—Reduction in Establishment—Pay—Artillery
formed into One European Battalion of Ten Companies—Lascar
Battalions abolished—Battalion Guns—Artillery
formed into Three European Battalions, Lascars into
Thirty Companies, p.54–106.
xivCHAPTER III.
Artillery, one of the brigades of the army—An Infantry Officer,
Brigade-Major—Succeeded by an Artillery Officer—Dress—School
orders—School—Inoculation—Companies numbered
by seniority—Method of exploding mortar-shells on reaching
the ground—Fire in the arsenal—Death of Colonel Pearse—Lieut.-Colonel
G. Deare, Commandant—War in the Carnatic—Second
Battalion of Artillery sent—Sattimungulum—Bangalore—Retreat
from Seringapatam—Nundydroog—Savendroog—Attack
on fortified camp at Seringapatam—Return to
Bengal, p.107–162.
CHAPTER IV.
Matériel organization, and its successive changes—Guns and
carriages first used—Royal pattern—Madras pattern—Ammunition-carriages—Tumbrils—Horse
Artillery ammunition-carriage—Elevating-screws—Ordnance
in use—Siege-carriages—Howitzer
and Mortar combined carriage—Gribeauval’s
pattern—French caisson—Hardwicke’s pattern—Horse
Artillery guns—Mountain-train carriages—Siege-carriages
and ordnance—Royal pattern (block trail)—Gun and Ammunition
carriages introduced, p.163–198.
CHAPTER V.
Reorganization in 1796 of the army—Successive additions to
Artillery companies—Ceylon—Seringapatam—Introduction
of Horse Artillery—Egypt—Deficiency of Artillery—Organization
of 1801–2—Composition of the regiment—Foreign
service—Sieges of Sarsnee, Bidgygurh, and Cutchwarah,
p.199–248.
CHAPTER VI.
Lord Lake’s Campaigns—Captain Hutchinson’s proceedings in the
neighbourhood of Rampoorah—Sieges of Komona, Gunnourie,
xvand Adjeegurh—Augmentation by adding Golundaz—Increase
of Horse Artillery—Ordnance-drivers organized—Colonel
Horsford, Commandant—Expeditions to the Isle of France
and Java—Bundlecund Campaigns—Callingur—Gribeauval
pattern carriages introduced—Additional Golundaz companies—Head-quarters
removed to Dum-Dum, p.249–311.
CHAPTER VII.
Campaigns against the Goorkhas—Rocket Troop raised—Bombardment
of Hattrass—Death of Sir John Horsford—Ordnance
General Officers debarred the General Staff—Conceded
to them—Guns formed into Batteries—Organization of 1818—Pindarrie
and Mahratta Campaigns—Gun Carriage Agency—Ordnance
Commissariat Department—Commandants’ position
improved—Model Department—Select Committee formed—Reduction
of Lascars—Increase to Golundaz—Battalion
system introduced into Bengal—Burmese War—Siege of
Bhurtpoor—Increase to the Regiment, p.312–391.
CHAPTER VIII.
Reductions—Half-batta order—Further reductions—Brevet of
Colonel given to Lieutenant-Colonels Commandant—Alterations
in uniform—Shekawuttee Campaign—Establishment of
Retiring Fund—The Afghan Campaign—Capture of Ghuznee—Services
of the Artillery—March to Bamean—Our disasters
at Caubul—Nichol’s troop—The Army of Retribution—Pollock’s
force—Honours to the Artillery, p.392–451.
CHAPTER IX.
State of affairs at Gwalior—The Army of Exercise—The battle
of Maharajpore—Want of heavy ordnance—The Battle of
Punniah—The Gwalior contingent—Honours conferred on
xvithe Artillery—The Ordnance Commissariat remodelled—The
Artillery in Sindh—Reorganization of the Regiment—Increase
of horse-batteries, p.452–466.
CHAPTER X.
The Sikh invasion—Battle of Moodkee—Services of the Artillery—Battle
of Ferozeshuhur—Scarcity of ammunition—Measures
taken for its prevention—The Artillery reinforced—Affair
at Buddowal—Battle of Aliwal—Battle of Sobraon—Honours
conferred on the Artillery—The Occupation of
Lahore, p.467–516.
CHAPTER XI.
Kote Kangra—Use of Elephant-draught—Interval of Peace—Reassembling
of the Army—Mooltan—Ramnuggur—Chillianwallah—Fall
of Mooltan—Goojrat—Close of the Sikh War—Honours
to the Artillery—Medals—Concluding Remarks,
p.517–571.
MEMOIRS
OF
THE BENGAL ARTILLERY.
CHAPTER I.
1
Introduction—Artillery previous to 1756—Destruction of 1st
Company in Black Hole—Recapture of Calcutta—Plassey—Re-formation
of 1st Company; 2nd Company and 3rd Company
raised—Campaigns of Colonel Calliaud, Major Adams,
&c.—Massacre at Patna—4th Company raised—Major
Munro’s Campaigns—Artillery attached to Brigades—Artillery
Companies formed into a Battalion—Board of Ordnance—Practice-ground
near Dum-Dum—Three Companies of
Artillery raised for Nawab of Oude—Transferred to the
Establishment—Artillery formed into a Brigade.
Adepts in natural history, from a few fossil bones
and teeth, are able to delineate the animal to which
they belonged, and from comparing the analogy of
the parts, to clothe their skeleton with appropriate
covering, thus making, as it were, the animal kingdom
of by-gone ages pass in review before the
present generation.
2A similar talent would be necessary, effectively
to rake up the early history of a regiment. Old
records preserved in public offices form the fossil
bones; and the “fleshy tenement” with which these
are to be clothed must be culled from many a
quarter ere the “animal” can be completed; and
when this is done, there still remains the difficult
task of giving him life and spirit, or, to drop the
metaphor, of rendering the record useful and
entertaining.
Much difficulty besets the undertaking; and,
though we are conscious of our want of ability to do
full justice to the present task, yet, as we believe that
a good deal of information not generally known, and
collected from sources inaccessible to the majority,
is contained in the following pages, and which will
be acceptable for its own sake, without reference
to the form in which it appears, we have been
induced to give publicity to our rough notes.
The first company of Bengal Artillery was raised
in 1749; the orders were received, it is believed,
from Bombay, then the chief presidency. A company
was ordered, at the same time, at each presidency,
in the Court of Directors’ general letter of
17th June, 1748. A copy of the warrant for that
3at Madras will be found in the “Artillery Records”
for October, 1843, and for Bombay in one of a
series of papers entitled “Three Years’ Gleanings,”
which appeared in the E. I. United Service Journal
in 1838, and some extracts from which are made
hereafter in these pages: the entire warrants are
too voluminous for insertion. A similar one was
most probably sent to Bengal, but all records
perished when Calcutta was taken.
Admiral Boscawen was requested to supply such
aid in raising the companies as he could spare from
the fleet, for gunners; and the master gunner was
appointed to the Bombay company. The companies
were to be completed as early as possible, and all
the gun-room’s crew, who were qualified, were to
be included.
The “gun-room’s crew” appears to have been the
denomination given to a certain number of men set
apart for the duties of the artillery; their officers
were called gunners, gunners’ mates, &c., and combined
the magazine duties with the more properly-called
duties of artillerymen.
The new company was to consist of one captain,
one second captain, one captain-lieutenant, and
three lieutenant-fireworkers; four serjeants, four
4corporals, three drummers, and one hundred gunners;
the established pay was as noted below:—
The want of artillery during the wars on the
coast from 1746 to 1754, and the impossibility of
forming a sufficient number on the spot, induced
the Court of Directors to obtain and send out two
companies of Royal Artillery to Bombay; and, when
the war broke out in 1756, three companies more
were sent, with the reinforcements under Clive, to
Bombay, and were afterwards distributed among
the presidencies.
With Colonel Aldercron’s regiment (39th Foot,—“primus
in Indis”) at Madras, there were also forty
artillerymen, on its arrival in 1754; these he considered
part of his regiment, and they were most
5probably borne on its rolls, and allotted to the
duties of the field-pieces attached.
At Madras, attention seems to have been earlier
paid to the military establishment than in Bengal.
A field train had been organized in 1755, to which
Lieutenant Jennings was appointed adjutant (this
officer was afterwards transferred to the Bengal
presidency), but in Bengal in 1756, on the war with
France breaking out, the whole force amounted to
only 300 European troops, including the company
of artillery raised in 1749.
In 1756 the company of artillery was commanded
by Captain Witherington, and stationed in Fort
William, with detachments at the smaller factories,
such as Dacca, Balasore, Cossimbazar, Patna, &c.
On the siege of Fort William by Sooraj-ul-Dowlah,
only forty-five artillerymen were in the garrison,
and these, with their commanding officer, perished
in the Black Hole.
The character of Capt. Witherington is sketched
in Mr. Holwell’s interesting “Narrative” as “a
laborious active officer, but confused. There would
have been few objections to his character, diligence,
or conduct, had he been fortunate in having any
commander-in-chief to have a proper eye over him,
6and take care that he did his duty.” One point,
however, is clear—that whatever his talents or character
may have been, he perished at his post, whilst
others deserted theirs.
An instance of devotion highly honourable is also
recorded by Mr. Holwell of a man named Leech, an
artificer, most probably of the artillery, “and clerk
of the parish, who had made his escape when the
Moors entered the fort, and returned just as it was
dark to tell me he had provided a boat, and would
insure my escape if I would follow him through a
passage few were acquainted with, and by which he
had entered. I thanked him in the best terms I
could, but told him it was a step I could not prevail
on myself to take, as I thereby should very ill repay
the attachment the gentlemen and garrison had
shewn me; that I was resolved to share their fate,
be it what it would, but pressed him to secure his
escape without loss of time, to which he gallantly
replied that ‘then he was resolved to share mine,
and would not leave me.’”[3]
7The remnants of the company were probably collected
together at Fultah, and joined the force with
8which Clive afterwards avenged our disgrace on its
reaching the Hooghly. In the arrangements made
for retaking Calcutta, it was intended that the guns
sent from Madras on the Marlborough should have
been worked by the artillerymen of Aldercron’s
regiment. This plan was, however, frustrated by
the colonel refusing to allow them to go, unless he
accompanied with his regiment, or, in other words,
unless the command of the expedition was vested
in him. The want of artillerymen was therefore
supplied by a detail from the Madras company
under Lieutenant Jennings. The actual strength is
not known; but as in February 1757, in the attack
on the Nawab’s troops near Omichund’s garden, we
find from Orme that Clive mustered about 100
artillerymen, and as not more than 20 or 30 of the
old company can be supposed to have escaped, it
must have been at least half a company.
The expedition reached Fultah on the 20th December,
1756, and met with but little opposition (a
night attack on the troops landed near Fort Marlborough
being the chief) in the progress to Calcutta,
which was retaken, after a short cannonade
from the shipping, on the 2nd January, 1757.
To protect Calcutta from the incursions of the
9Nawab’s army, Clive formed a fortified camp, with
outposts around it, about a mile north of the town,
and half a mile from the river, on the spot now
called Chitpore. This situation was well chosen, as
it was impossible for the enemy, when coming from
the northward, to enter Calcutta without passing
between the camp and salt-water lake (then more
extensive than at present), within sight of the
camp. Towards the end of January the field artillery
was completed by the arrival of the Marlborough,[4]
which had the greatest part on board.
On the 3rd February the Nawab’s army passed
along the Dum-Dum road, leaving it near the turning
at the Puckah-bridges, and spreading irregularly
over the plain to the eastward of the Mahratta
ditch, the Nawab’s own camp being pitched in
Omichund’s garden, the ground now called “Nunden
Bagh.”
Surrounded by so numerous an enemy, Clive
would soon have been straitened for provisions. To
prevent this inconvenience, and to alarm a timorous
10enemy, he resolved to surprise their camp before
daylight, and for this purpose he marched out from
his camp—the artillery, 100 men, and six 6–pounder
guns in the rear; the ammunition on lascars’ heads,
guarded by sailors; the sipahis and European battalion
leading. At dawn, they came upon the
enemy’s advanced posts, placed in the ditches of
the Dum-Dum road, whom they easily dispersed,
and continued their march parallel to the Mahratta
ditch until they came opposite Omichund’s garden,
when the fog, usual at that season, came on and
obscured every thing before them; they proceeded
onwards, however, the field-pieces in the rear firing
round shot obliquely outwards, until they reached a
causeway which ran from the ditch towards the
lake, and on which was a barrier; mounting the
causeway, the troops wheeled and marched along
it, which brought them under the fire of their own
guns, and caused considerable confusion. In order
to avoid this, Clive ordered all the troops to cross
the causeway and lie down till the firing from
the rear could be stopped. Some guns from the
ramparts of the Mahratta ditch also opened on
them, and made great havoc, so that Clive was
forced to continue his march until he reached the
11Bally-a-ghat road, when, turning to his right, he
marched up the Boitaconnah and Salt Bazaar to
the old fort, abandoning two of his guns, whose
carriages broke down, and in the evening regained
his camp by the road along the river.
This expedition, though ill-planned, produced the
desired effect on the Nawab, who eagerly desired to
enter into terms of accommodation with the British,
whose activity he feared.
In March, the reinforcements arrived from Bombay,
and an attack on the French settlement of
Chandernagore was resolved on; it was attacked
both by land and from the river, the chief attack
being made by the ships of war; the artillery had
but a comparatively small part to play.
The political events which followed, and the
intrigues which led to our subsequent hostilities
with Sooraj-ul-Dowlah, it is not our province to
detail. We purpose only to relate events with
which the corps is connected, and accordingly we
next join Clive on the 21st June at Cutwah. With
his little army, we find 100 artillerymen, eight
6–pounder guns, and two howitzers, commanded by
Captain Jennings. In the council of war which
sat, Captain Jennings’s vote was given for an
12immediate attack (as recorded in the Life of Clive,
while in Sir Eyre Coote’s evidence before the
Secret Committee, the names and votes of the
members are found very differently recorded.
Sir Eyre Coote’s is more probably the correct
list, as he spoke from memoranda); the majority
were for delay, but Clive, after dissolving the
council, followed the dictates of his own bold
spirit, and directed the army to cross the river,
which was done, and by midnight of the 22nd, the
army had reached Plassey.
The next day the battle took place; it was
chiefly a distant cannonade. The guns were placed
three on each flank of the Europeans, and the
remainder about 200 yards in advance of the left
division of sipahis, sheltered by some brick-kilns,
to check the fire of the enemy’s guns, manned by
the French party, and posted at a tank in front.
The shot from the British guns which missed those
opposed to them, took effect on the bodies of
cavalry and infantry in the rear. The cannonade
was sustained till noon, when rain falling damaged
the enemy’s ammunition, and forced them to slacken
their fire. The English fire continued, and Major
Kirkpatrick, advancing with a party, drove the
13French from the tank, and the English guns were
pushed on.
Meer Jaffier, with his troops, at this time advanced,
intending to join the British, but was
opposed and driven back by a party and the fire of
a field-gun, under Mr. Johnston, a volunteer.
The whole of the guns now cannonaded the
enemy’s camp from the high banks of the tank; the
enemy came out, and Clive advanced, posting half
his troops and guns at a smaller tank in advance,
and the rest on a rising ground about 200 yards to
their left; the French field-pieces renewed their
fire, and the enemy’s cavalry prepared to charge,
but were always driven back by the quick firing of
the English field artillery; the enemy beginning to
draw off, the whole British army advanced, and
driving them from a redoubt and mound, part of
the intrenchment of their camp, about five in the
afternoon completed the victory which laid the
foundation of our Eastern empire.
The volunteer, Mr. Johnston, above noticed,
was one of the fugitives collected at Fultah. His
name is mentioned among those saved at Dacca;
he not improbably belonged to the artillery, and
was employed as a clerk in some confidential office,
14for, in a letter dated in 1765, from himself to Lord
Clive, he endeavours to exculpate himself from a
charge of disclosing confidential transactions from
his office, preferred against him by Governor Drake.
In this letter, he mentions his having been “remanded
to the artillery, his former” occupation,
and serving with the army till 1765, when he
returned to Calcutta; the date of his removal is,
however, uncertain.[5]
A detachment was sent forwards towards Patna,
under Major Coote, consisting of 230 Europeans,
300 sipahis, 50 lascars, and two 6–pounders, but
much delay occurred in starting, owing to the
debaucheries ensuing on the plunder gained at
Plassey. It was protracted by a mutinous spirit on
the way, so that the French party had, by the time
they arrived, rendered their position at Patna too
strong, and the detachment returned to Cossimbazaar
in September. The remainder of the army
was removed to Chandernagore.
Towards the close of the year 1757, a second
advance, with a stronger party, and Clive at its
head, was made, and an arrangement satisfactory to
15the British having been concluded, he returned to
Moorshedabad in May, 1758.
His first care was to organize the army, and in
doing this, the coast army was taken as a model; a
company of artillery was raised in Fort William,
29th June, from the men who had served at Plassey.
Lieutenant Jennings was promoted to its captaincy,
and this may be considered as the first company of
the present establishment, and bears at present,
after many changes of numbers in the successive
formations of the regiment, the denomination of
1st company, 4th battalion.
A second company was raised at Cossimbazaar on
the 19th September, the party mentioned above as
being left there most probably having been incorporated
in it: Captain Broadbridge or Broadburn,
from the Royal Artillery, was its captain.
The company of Royal Artillery[6] which came
from Bombay accompanied Colonel Forde’s detachment
to Masulipatam in April, 1759, and aided in
that brilliant operation, but did not return with the
16detachment after the campaign. Since that period
no Royal Artillery have served in Bengal, except in
1798, when a company was in Fort William; but
this probably was a temporary arrangement, the
company coming to Bengal en route to Ceylon.
In 1759, a combination having been entered into
against the British, the English troops, aided by
Meer Jaffier, marched towards Patna, against the
Shahzadah; Patna was taken, a garrison left, and
Clive returned to Calcutta, Colonel Calliaud having
joined him first at Berhampoor, with 300 Europeans,
1,000 sipahis, 50 artillerymen, and 6 guns. The
artillerymen, there is reason to suppose, belonged
to the 2nd company.
The battalion of sipahis left at Patna with two
6–pounders and 70 Europeans, under Lieutenant
Cochrane, was defeated in an engagement into
which they were forced, in assisting our ally Ramnarain
against the Emperor’s forces, in January,
1760.
The conduct of the European troops is spoken of
as highly creditable. The European officers of the
sipahis all fell, and the sipahis were cut to pieces
or dispersed. The English who remained fought
their way back to the city under Doctor Fullerton.
17“Other English officers may have been present,”
says the author of the Siyar-ul-Mutakherin, “whose
names I know not, who ranged them in order, and
as one of their guns was to be left behind on the
field of battle, they found means to render it of no
avail, by thrusting a large needle of iron into its
eye; the other being in good condition, they took
it with them, together with its ammunition; and
that handful of men had the courage to retire in
the face of a victorious army, without once shrinking
from their ranks; during their journey, the car of
ammunition chanced to receive some injury, the
Doctor stopped unconcernedly, and after having
put it in order, he bravely pursued his route
again.”
Lieutenant Buck, of the artillery, was killed in
this action.
Calliaud’s advance having been delayed by his
allies, he did not engage the enemy till the 22nd
February, near Sooraj, and the same cause prevented
his following up the advantage.
The 50 artillerymen of the 2nd company were
engaged in this action, and the carriages of four
of their guns broke down during the engagement,
causing some delay in repairing them.
18After his defeat, the Emperor fled, and endeavoured
to double back and surprise Moorshedabad
ere Calliaud could overtake him. In this, however,
he failed; the British pursued in boats, and coming
up with him, he struck across the Currukpoor hills.
The British disembarked and followed him. After a
difficult march, the Emperor emerged from the hills,
about 30 miles from Moorshedabad. The English
and Jaffier had, however, joined, and on their
attacking him, he set fire to his camp and fled.
To secure Patna, a detachment of 200 Europeans,
a battalion of sipahis, and four field-pieces, marched
from Moorshedabad, under Captain Knox, in May,
1760, and, marching with the utmost rapidity,
reached it in thirteen days. Crossing the river, this
little band attacked and defeated the army of the
Naib of Purneah, who had come to the Emperor’s
assistance, near Mozufferpore, on the 27th May.
A third company of artillery was formed on the
26th May, 1760,[7] in Fort William, promoting
Captain-Lieutenant Kinch; but there is reason to
believe he remained with the second company,
until Captain Broadbridge’s death, in 1761, gave
him the command.
19Colonel Calliaud having been succeeded by Major
Carnac, returned to Calcutta; the latter pursued
the Emperor’s forces to Gyah Maunpoor, where he
overtook and completely routed him in January,
1761. Mr. Law, the head of the French party, was
captured in this engagement.
The 2nd company of artillery, under Captain
Broadbridge and Captain-Lieutenant Kinch, shared
in these transactions, and remained as part of the
garrison of Patna.
It forms no part of our plan to enter into the
history of such occurrences as those which led to
the dismissal of the members of council from the
Company’s service, and placed Mr. Ellis in charge
of the factory at Patna; or to examine whether our
subsequent misfortunes are attributable to his
mismanagement. For information on such points we
must refer the reader to the histories of the times.
Many points of difference arose with the Nawab,
Meer Cossim, which led to various misunderstandings;
they were brought to a crisis by the British, on
Mr. Ellis’s order, surprising and seizing Patna, on
the 26th June, 1763. Mr. Amyatt was attacked
and killed near Moorshedabad, by order of Cossim
Ali, whom he had left only two days before, having
20been deputed to him at Monghyr by the Council,
and this brought on open war.
The energy shewn at first was, however, suffered
to die away, and the troops in Patna dispersing for
plunder, the late governor of the city rallied his
men, and, being joined by a reinforcement from
Monghyr, attacked and drove out the British, who,
spiking their guns, retired to Bankipore, and afterwards
fled in boats to their factory at Manjee, near
Chuprah; where the whole, and among them the
company of artillery, were taken prisoners.
The prisoners taken were sent to Monghyr, and
there confined with others captured at Cossimbazar,
which factory was plundered about the same time.
On the news of these disasters, the English army,
under Major Adams, moved from their cantonments
at Ghyrettee early in July. The first company of
artillery was with this force, under the command of
Captain Jennings.
In the present day it would scarcely be deemed
possible to march a force at the season in which
this army moved through Bengal—in the middle of
the rains, when the whole land is a swamp, and
every stream full to overflowing; yet, in spite of
the difficulties presented, this gallant band, about
21800 Europeans (including the artillery) and 2,000
sipahis, forced its way, and came in contact with
Meer Cossim’s troops at Gheriah, near Sooty, on
the 2nd August.
A severe action was fought, lasting nearly four
hours, and at one time two of the British guns
were taken possession of by the enemy; victory at
length decided in favour of the British.
The artillery lost one officer, killed during the
action, Lieutenant Kaylor.
Undaunted by his defeat, Meer Cossim again disputed
the advance of the British at the pass of
Oudenullah, a little to the south of Rajmahl, where
the road is confined between the river and spurs of
hills. This pass had been intrenched with walls
and towers at short distances, and several strong
posts raised on eminences along its front. The
army was detained before these intrenchments for
nearly a month. At length, by an attack on the
hill forming the right of the lines, and a feint on
the river end, they were carried with severe loss on
5th September, Captain-Lieutenant Green, of the
artillery, acting as field engineer. Meer Cossim
left his troops the next night, and retired to
Monghyr in haste, thence carrying his prisoners
with him to Patna.
22
In October Monghyr was invested,
breached, and capitulated.
Meer Cossim, driven into a paroxysm
of rage by this event, directed
the massacre of all his English
prisoners. In this horrid act
he found a ready tool in Sumroo,
the German,[8] whose widow, the
Begum Sumroo, has rendered his
name notorious in history. All
23were massacred save Mr. Fullerton, the surgeon,
who, in the exercise of his profession, appears to
have gained a place in the esteem and affections of
Meer Cossim.
Whether Captain Kinch and his subalterns perished
in the attack on Patna or in this massacre we
are unable to say, but in one or other he fell. The
bodies of all were thrown into a large well, over
which a tomb has been since built, but no record
of the names of those who perished exists on it.[9]
After avenging the fate of their comrades by the
reduction of Patna, the army followed Meer Cossim,
who threw himself on the protection of the Nawab
of Oude, as far as the banks of the Carumnassa.
Here Major Adams left them, and the command
devolved on Major Jennings, of the artillery. The
force was cantoned on the frontier of the Nawab’s
territories, in the expectation that he would give
up Meer Cossim, and also to watch the Emperor’s
troops, which, under the pretence of preparing an
expedition against the Boondelas, remained in the
vicinity of Allahabad.
24In the month of December, 1763, a fourth company
of artillery was raised in the field, probably at
Patna.
In February, 1764, an alarming state of dissatisfaction
shewed itself in the English army, still in its
cantonments at Sant. The troops were dissatisfied
with the rewards bestowed upon them for having
regained the provinces from Meer Cossim. The
English battalion seized the park and marched
towards the Carumnassa. The sipahis were also in
motion; but by the exertions of Major Jennings and
the other officers, the English and sipahis were
nearly all induced to return. The French and
foreigners, to the number of 150, went off, under
Serjeant Delamar, to Allahabad. Few of the artillery
joined in this affair.
The seeds of this mutinous disposition still remained
when Major Carnac arrived in March and
assumed the command. Provisions were scarce;
and though the Government instructions were to
carry the war into the Nawab’s territories (whose
hostility was now open), he agreed with his officers,
that, in the then temper of the troops, it would
not be safe to proceed.
On the enemy’s forces crossing the river, the
25English fell back and encamped under Patna,
where, on the 3rd May, 1764, they were attacked.
Sumroo, with a large body of the Nawab’s cavalry
and infantry, assailed the front. The engagement
lasted till sunset, when the enemy withdrew with a
heavy loss; and although he hung about the neighbourhood
till the end of the month, did not venture
on another action.
A detachment, under Colonel Munro (whose
army had joined Major Carnac’s at Patna), marched
after one of the sipahi battalions, which had deserted,
with four guns. Colonel Munro sent on
100 Europeans, one sipahi battalion, and two guns.
This force overtook them at Chuprah, and coming
on them while asleep, took them all prisoners.
Colonel Munro, on receiving them, considered
that strong measures were necessary to check the
spirit of insubordination which had arisen, and accordingly
selected fifty of the worst for execution.
Twenty-four were blown from the guns at Patna
and other stations. On this occasion it was that
the grenadiers claimed precedence in death—an
anecdote familiar to all acquainted with the early
history of our Indian army.
The whole army now advanced towards the
26Soane. The advance was covered by Colonel
Champion with a detachment and four guns, who
was attacked by large bodies of the enemy’s horse
near Mooneah, at the junction of the Soane and
Ganges, whom they beat off, and Colonel Munro
coming up crossed the river immediately. The
march to Arrah was a good deal harassed, and the
guns frequently called into play to keep off the
enemy’s horse.
At Buxar, on the 22nd October, they came up
with the enemy, and on the following morning,
about 8 o’clock, the enemy marched out to attack
them. The British were drawn up in line with
their guns, twenty field-pieces and seventy-one
artillerymen of the 1st company, on the flanks of
battalions. The enemy were repulsed, and about
12 o’clock they retired slowly, blowing up their
tumbrils of ammunition. One hundred and thirty-three
pieces of artillery, mostly with English carriages,
and among them twenty-seven which had
been lost the previous year at Patna, were the
trophies on this occasion.
In the acknowledgment of this victory, written
by Mr. Vansittart and his council, 16th November,
1764, to Munro, he was requested “to return
27thanks to the field-officers and commandant of
artillery (Major Jennings) for their care and diligence
in preserving the disposition for attack, and
taking every advantage over the enemy.”
Captain Winwood and Lieutenant Duff of the
artillery are mentioned “as meriting particular
notice, and having gained great honour.”
A detachment of two battalions failed in November,
in an attempt to take the fortress of Chunar;
in January, 1765, however, Sir Robert Fletcher
succeeded in gaining possession of it, and in
February he breached Allahabad, when the garrison
evacuated it. On the 3rd May a battle was fought
near Korah,[10] against the vizier, aided by the
Mahrattas; these latter were quickly dispersed by
the fire of the artillery, and they separated from the
vizier and retired towards the Jumna with precipitation.
These events placed the southern part
of the Dooab under British rule.
The army was this year (1765) divided into three
brigades, and the companies of artillery attached
28one to each, while the remaining company was
stationed in Fort William.[11]
1st Brigade
1st Company
Monghyr.
2nd ditto
2nd ditto
Allahabad.
3rd ditto
4th ditto
Bankipore.
Ditto
3rd ditto
Fort William.
In addition to the guns with the park, each
battalion of infantry was equipped with two six-pounders
or three-pounders, worked by the men of
the regiment, assisted by native officers and lascars
from the artillery.
29A major was this year allowed to the artillery, to
command the corps, and a practice-ground formed
at Sulkeah.
In 1766 the alarming mutiny on the part of the
officers of the army, caused by the reduction of
allowances, broke out, and was only suppressed by
the firmness and decision of Lord Clive and
Colonel Smith. The part taken in this by artillery
officers cannot now be fully traced; but Captain
Duff, Captain-Lieutenant Clifton, and Lieutenant
Black, appear to have taken prominent parts.
Many, we learn from the army-list, were dismissed
about that time, most probably on account of the
mutiny; others resigned. Nearly all, in every branch
of the army, were, however, restored to the service,
and placed in the position they would have held,
had they remained in it.
Insubordinate as the conduct of a large portion of
the officers of the army was on this occasion, and
deservedly as it has been stigmatized, yet it must
be borne in mind that they failed of success by
conscientiously not admitting the soldiery to a
knowledge of or participation in the measures they
had taken to secure the batta, though solicited by
the latter to accept of their support, as soon as it
30was known that Government had resolved to persist
in enforcing their resolution to deprive them of
their allowance.
In 1768 a lieutenant-colonel and a major were
added to the regiment, and, in consequence of the
Court of Directors being desirous of obtaining, not
only cadets but officers from Woolwich, Major
Pearse was nominated to command the corps, with
the rank of lieutenant-colonel. He was, however,
superseded by Captain Martin, to whom the command
was given by the Indian Government, and
again by Major Kindersley, whose commission as
major was antedated by the local government, on
the vacancy being caused by Captain Fleming’s
removal to the engineers, from which he came. On
the death, however, of Major Kindersley, which
occurred in 1769, he succeeded to the command of
the regiment.
The application for a supply of officers and cadets
from the Royal Artillery originated in a difficulty
of finding candidates, the artillery service being
neither so lucrative, nor holding out the same prospects,
as the infantry. In the Secret Committee’s
letter of 30th September, 1765, to the Court of
Directors, it is stated that “it would be of the
31utmost benefit to our plan that you should send
out, every year, six or seven gentlemen from the
academy at Woolwich for artillery officers; this
being a service which suffers extremely for want of
persons properly instructed in the business, since
no officer who knows the benefit of the infantry
service here will choose to quit it for any advantages
the artillery offers.”[12]
On the death of Major Kindersley, 28th October,
1769, Lieutenant-Colonel Pearse succeeded to the
command of the regiment, and, as its organization
is much indebted to that officer, it is fortunate that
we are able to quote from letters to his early friends
his record of the state in which he found it:—
“When I first came into command of the corps
I was astonished at the ignorance of all who composed
it. It was a common practice to make any
midshipman who was discontented with the India
ships an officer of artillery, from a strange idea that
a knowledge of navigation would perfect an officer
of that corps in the knowledge of artillery. They
32were almost all of this class, and their ideas consonant
to the elegant military education which they
had received. But, thank God! I have got rid of
them all but seven.”
The strange idea above referred to appears to
have affected the Home Government at a still
earlier period, as, on the first formation of artillery
companies, “such assistance as the fleet could spare”
was given. To this idea are we indebted for many
terms which have hung about the corps till the
present day: our tindals, lascars, serangs, cossibs,
all came from the naval nomenclature, and their
etymology would most probably be found in the
Portuguese dialect, which has retained its influence
on shipboard; from the same fountain of “English
(not) undefiled” must have been drawn the “bankshall,”
a name by which our gun-sheds are known
throughout the regiment, but a term of considerable
mystification to the uninitiated.
In March, 1770, a fifth company of artillery was
raised in Fort William, and in May the companies
were formed into a battalion, to which an adjutant
was allowed. In September the lascars were divided
into 28 companies, of which seven (consisting
of 2 serangs, 2 tindals, and 100 lascars each) were
33attached to each of the three companies, with the
brigades, and to one of those in Fort William.
The embodying the companies of artillery into
one battalion must have increased the efficiency
of the army, by introducing uniformity of system
into their management, and a more effectual supervision
than could have existed in their scattered
state.
The regiment at this time, supposing no change
had occurred in the strength of companies, would
have consisted of—
Of the officers of the corps a description was
given in Colonel Pearse’s letter, above quoted. It
was written in 1775, and refers to the period now
described. An extract from one written in 1772
34contains a very graphic picture of a fast man of
those days, specimens of whom long continued:—
“To be a gentleman you must learn to drink by
all means—a man is honoured in proportion to the
number of bottles he can drink: keep a dozen dogs,
but in particular if you have not the least use for
them and hate hunting and shooting. Four horses
may barely suffice; but if you have eight, and seven
of them are too vicious for the syce to feed, it will
be much better.
“By no means let the horses be paid for; and
have a palanquin covered with silver trappings—get
10,000 rupees in debt, but 20,000 would make
you an honester man, especially if you are convinced
that you will never have the power to pay. Endeavour
to forget whatever you have learnt—ridicule
learning of all sorts—despise all military knowledge—call
duty a bore—encourage your men to
laugh at orders—obey such as you like—make a
joke of your commanding officer for giving those
orders you do not like, and, if you obey them, let it
be seen that it is merely to serve yourself.
“These few rules will make you an officer and a
gentleman, and they are the first lessons which
young men take when they arrive in this country.”
35With officers of this stamp, and the class of men
from whom the Company’s European troops were
then recruited, we cannot suppose that much discipline
existed. Drunkenness—the bane of the
European soldier in India—was rife, and its natural
consequences, disease and death, followed. To this
cause, too, must be added the want of good barracks
and internal economy, which of late years
have gone far to remove the idea of the climates of
India being deadly to the European constitution.
The lascars were employed in dragging and
assisting the Europeans to work the guns; a detail
also was detached with each infantry regiment, to
assist in working the guns attached to it, for two
6–pounders formed part of the equipment of each
battalion, and thirty sipahis were set apart for their
service. These duties, with those of the park, would
account for the number of lascars being so large
in comparison with the establishment of the present
day. They were in many respects native artillerymen,
and in the subsequent successive changes from
lascars to golundaz and back again, the change
was often rather in name, and increase and decrease
of pay, than of the men themselves.
They were a most efficient and useful body—a
36class on whom, perhaps, more of the hard work of
the service and fewer of its substantial rewards have
fallen than any other of the native army. At all
times accompanying the European artillery, they
have borne a part in every expedition which has
left the shores of India. On land and on board ship,
hard service has been their lot, and all who have
been brought into contact with them join in testifying
to the willingness, courage, and patience they
have exhibited.
A large body of artificers was also at this time
attached to the corps; these, with the quartermaster’s
establishment, completed the regiment as
to its personnel.
The matériel appears to have been as bad as
possible. At this time Colonel Pearse complains
that “the fuzees burnt from nineteen to forty-eight
seconds, though of the same nature; the portfires
were continually going out; the tubes would not
burn; the powder was infamous; the cartridges
were made conical, and, when necessary to prime
with loose powder, a great quantity was required
to fill the vacant cavity round the cartridge; the
carriages flew to pieces with common firing in a
week.” The contractor who furnished the carriages,
37and the laboratory in which the fuzees were made,
appear to have been beyond his control: “I have no
more to do with it than his Holiness at Rome,” are
his words. The iron guns were all very indifferent:
“two 12–pounders burst on the ramparts in 1770
in firing the morning and evening gun, and one
12–pounder on a rejoicing day, in firing salutes.”
It was under such circumstances that Colonel
Pearse took command, and set himself to work to
improve the state of the regiment. To weed the
inefficient from the officers; to teach the remainder
and the new-comers their duty; to introduce an
efficient internal economy and discipline into the
ranks, and to obtain a proper control over the
matériel of the regiment, were his first duties. That
his endeavours were in some degree successful may
be gathered from his correspondence, for in 1772 he
writes,—“Now I have got all the laboratory implements
with me at practice, and am going to teach
my officers what they never saw.” Steadily he pursued
his object through difficulties and disappointments,
and was rewarded, ere his death, by seeing
the corps raised to a high state of discipline and
efficiency. At a review of it by General Clavering in
November, 1774, he expressed himself as delighted
38with the corps, and astonished at its performance,
being superior to any thing he could have expected
in India, and so much to his satisfaction, that
Colonel Pearse, in a letter to an old friend, writes,
“the performances at the review would not have
been a disgrace to dear old Woolwich.”
The years 1771–2 afforded leisure to attend to
the discipline of the corps, for it seems not to have
been called on for any field service. In 1773 the
expedition under Captain Jones proceeded against
the hill fort of Delamcotta, situated on the pass by
which the Durla river, which runs into the Teestah,
emerges from the mountains, and not far from
the present sanatarium, Darjeeling. Lieutenant
R. Bruce, of the artillery, was present at the attack,
but with what portion of the corps is unknown.
This year the army was again called into the
field to check the Mahrattas, but after a cannonade
across the Jumna at Ramghat, near Delhi, they
retired, and our army went into cantonments at
Sultanpoor, Oude.
In 1774 a portion of the army under Colonel
Champion was sent to assist the vizier in his
attack on the Rohillas. An action was fought on
the 23rd April, in which the 2nd company of
39artillery was present. In his report Colonel Champion
says, “The Rohillas made repeated attempts
to charge; but our guns being so much better served
than theirs, kept so constant and galling a fire, that
they could not advance, and where they were closest
was the greatest slaughter.” Captain W. A. Baillie
was wounded in this action. Lieutenant G. Deare,
Lieutenant B. Doxat, and Lieutenant W. W. Hussey
were also present.
The action was followed by much severe marching
and exposure in the hot and rainy season, in the
jungles of the Pillibeet district. While encamped
near Pillibeet, a report reached Colonel Champion
of four crores of rupees being concealed in the fort;
and in a letter to Government he suggests “the
propriety of examining into the truth of the report,
in duty both to the Company and to the army:”
a naïve suggestion, which, considering the British
were there as allies of the vizier, the Government
negatived. However, as a compensation to the
army, the vizier granted a donation of 10½ lacs,
which was divided among the 2nd brigade in
August, 1779, agreeably to a scale laid down by
a committee of officers. This scale gave a sipahi
two-thirds of a European soldier’s share,—a proportion
40which has been adhered to ever since in distributing
prize-money. The scale there fixed is
here given:—
Colonel.
19,000
Lieut.-Colonel.
16,000
Major.
13,700
Captain.
6,850
Subaltern.
3,425
Cadet.
1,000
Conductor.
300
Serj.-Major.
90
Serjeants.
60
Corporals.
45
Privates.
30
Commandants.
300
Soobahdars.
131
Jemadars, Serangs.
65
Havildars, Tindals.
40
Naicks.
30
Privates, Lascars, Black Doctors.
20
Bheesties, &c.
10
In 1775 an alteration took place in the arrangements
for the matériel of the army; a Board of
Ordnance was formed, and magazines established,
at the principal fixed stations of the army.
The Board consisted of the “Governor-General
as president, the Commander of the Forces, the
members of the Supreme Council, the Commissary-General
of Comptrol; the Commandant of Artillery;
the Chief Engineer; the Commissary of
Stores, and the Military Store-keeper, as members;
with a secretary, and such assistants as
might be found necessary.”
41To this Board returns of all ordnance and
military stores were to be made by commanding
officers of garrisons and cantonments, artillery
officers, and all others in charge; all contracts for
the supply of stores, proofs of ordnance and powder,
plans for new construction of ordnance, reports of
powder-works, laboratory and arsenal, were to be
submitted: in short, the general control of the
stores for the army was vested in this Board.
Magazines were established at the fixed stations
of Berhampore, Dinapore, and Chunar; a commissary,
a deputy-commissary, and two conductors
were appointed to them, and placed under the
control of the Board; they were to be paid by the
Board-office, and receive instructions for carrying
on their duties and office from the Board, independent
of any other control but that consistent with
the general regulations of the army, which required
that they should be subordinate to the commanding
officer in the field or fixed stations, and the commanding
officer of the artillery under whose immediate
control they were placed.
To the commissaries were intrusted the ordnance
stores, camp equipage, &c., for the use of corps; and
an officer of the department was to accompany the
42army, when moving on service, to superintend their
issues. A return was to be made monthly of all
receipts and issues; and no issue was to be made without
the orders of the Board, or commanding officer.
Carriages for the ordnance were to be constructed
in Fort William by the military storekeeper. No
repairs of magnitude involving large contingent
bills were to be made in the field, but the articles
required supplied on indent.
The establishments for the magazines were
furnished by a reduction of the artificers and
lascars attached to the artillery; the lascars were
reduced to a small number, and the surplus applied
to the magazines.
2
Serangs,
}
on the peace establishment;
4
Tindals,
100
Lascars,
7
Serangs,
}
on the war establishment;
16
Tindals,
400
Lascars,
were the number retained with the regiment.
The appointment of this Board appears to have
interfered with the control which the commandant
of artillery had previously exercised over his department,
and Colonel Pearse attributed its formation
to a personal motive, on the part of General
Clavering, to lower him. In writing to an old
friend, after other complaints he goes on to say:
43“General Clavering instituted a Board of Ordnance,
and made me a member of it; took all my
authority away, and made me a cipher. I was
hurt, and complained, as he had put into the Board
a Lieutenant-Colonel Dow, the translator of a
miserable history of Hindustan, and the author of
two wretched plays. This man is commissary-general,
and, as such, controller of military accounts.
He uniformly attacked me and my department, and
I defended myself and officers. This created disputes,
and, as I was wounded, I was warm; and
thus, because my opinions were always contrary to
Dow’s (and D—— is the general’s tongue, brains,
head, and heart), it was as bad as attacking the
general himself.”
Of the working of the cumbrous machinery of the
Board of Ordnance, in its original formation and
in the successive changes which have been made
from time to time, in the vain attempts to obtain
energy and celerity from a body of men without
individual power or responsibility, it will often, in
the course of these pages, be necessary to speak, for
to the want of arrangement on their part must
be attributed, in many instances, the inefficient
state of the siege-trains with the armies.
44At this time the head-quarters of the regiment
were quartered in Fort William, moving out during
the cold months to a practice-ground at Sulkeah,
nearly opposite the western mouth of the Circular
Canal: the powder-works were between the canal
and Cossipoor. The dress of the regiment consisted
of a blue coat, faced with scarlet, and cut away in
the fashion of the time; white cloth waistcoat and
breeches, with buckles at the knees; and gaiters,
or half-spatterdashes, as they were called; red
leathern belt, with swivels; black silk stock; buff
gloves, and regimental hat, supposed to be a plain
cocked, in the fashion of George the Second’s time.
The hair was worn greased, powdered, and tied in a
queue, false hair being substituted when the natural
was not long enough.
The hours for parades, and, in fact, for every
thing, were early: parades were before gun-fire in
the cold season; dinners were in the middle of the
day, not only in private houses, but on public
occasions; and invitations were given on a scale of
hospitality only practicable in a small society. The
orderly book was the common channel of invitation
used by the Governor-General and officer commanding
the garrison. Many such entries as the
45following will be found in it:—“The Honourable
the Governor-General requests to be favoured with
the company of officers and gentlemen belonging to
the army now in the garrison of Fort William and
the Chitpoor cantonment and the presidency on
Monday next to dinner, at the Court House, and in
the evening to a ball and supper. The Governor-General
requests that gentlemen will not bring any
servants to dinner, nor their hookahs to the ball at
night.”
Or, “Lieutenant-Colonel Wilding presents his
compliments to all the officers in Fort William,
staff of the garrison, and surgeons, and requests
their company to breakfast, and dinner at half-past
two o’clock.”
A good account of the manners and habits of
the people at this period would be interesting, and
probably materials for the purpose could be found,
were a qualified person to undertake the task:[15]
they are only noticed above incidentally, as likely
to affect the discipline of the regiment. The early
dinner was too much followed by a long sederunt
over the bottle, and the absence of ladies’ society
46gave a tone of grossness to the habits, which are
happily much improved in modern days.
This year a number of memorials were presented
to the Board by artillery officers, as to the relative
rank of cadets; and it was decided that those
appointed expressly to the artillery should have the
full benefit of the Court of Directors’ order, that all
cadets appointed in India were to rank below those
of the same year appointed in England, but that
the time of service was to date from arrival in
Bengal; and all those who were in the infantry,
and entered as cadets in the artillery, were to rank
above all who were cadets in the artillery at the
same time. This, and the circumstance of several
who resigned in the mutiny of 1766 being allowed
to return to their original standing, will partly
account for the supersessions which will appear on
consulting the gradation list.
At the conclusion of the year 1775 three companies
of artillery, to be commanded by European
officers, were ordered to be raised for the Nawab of
Oude and attached to the brigade of disciplined
troops raised for his service; officers were nominated
to them, and struck off the strength of the
regiment; but whether the companies were ever
47raised seems doubtful. In the following year they
were directed to be formed into a battalion, under
command of Major Patrick Duff, and then to be
transferred to the regular army, and fresh ones
raised of native artillery in August, 1777. If the
companies first ordered had been European, it is
difficult to say what became of them, because the
sixth, seventh, and eighth companies were raised by
minutes of council, July 13th and 24th, 1778; the
two former, however, may have been raised from
the men of the Oude companies.
The artillery, in 1775, appear first to have used
Dum-Dum as a practice-ground, and to have been
encamped there, when, their tents being wanted for
the use of a brigade marching to Patna, they were
ordered into Fort William, and their practice cut
short with one fortnight instead of two months. In
the following year, however, in December, they
marched out with their tents and stores, and began
the practice (as the orders record) by firing “a royal
salute, and after that one of 19 guns, for the
Company.”
It is not easy to ascertain what Dum-Dum was
previous to its occupation by the artillery. The first
mention made of it is by Orme, in the account of
48the action near Omichund’s garden, in 1757. He
speaks of Clive crossing “the Dum-Dum road:”
this road, however, was only a cutcha-bund[16] leading
to Dum-Dum, the name of the place now occupied
by Dum-Dum House, the origin of which building
is enveloped in mystery. It is said to have been
built by a Mr. or Colonel Home,[17] but who he was,
or the date, cannot be ascertained. Supernatural
aid has been called into play, and the mound on
which it stands is reported to have been raised by
some spirit of the ring or camp, in the course of a
single night, and to this day visions of ghosts haunt
the grounds.
At the practice season the officers inhabited the
house, and the men’s tents were pitched in the
compound, and the natives in the “Montague lines,”
the ground now occupied by the Nya Bazaar, called
after Lieutenant Montague, the adjutant who
marked them out. The name is known to the
present day.
It was not until 1783 that the cantonment was
marked out by Colonel Duff, who is said to have
49made, or rather widened, the road from Shambazar
to Barasut,[18] and to have planted the avenue
of mulseery trees now running along the southern
end of the small exercising-ground.
Many villages were scattered over the ground
occupied by the cantonment; their sites were
purchased up, from time to time, by Government;
the last, that of Deiglah, in 1820.
From 1775 to 1778 the corps does not appear to
have been called into the field, and Colonel Pearse
occupied himself in improving its internal economy.
A regimental school for the instruction of the native
officers and gunners was established in 1775—an
institution which, with all the faults which still
exist in it, has been of much use, both in teaching
the elements of knowledge and affording a rational
employment to some of the many hours which hang
heavily on the soldier.
That the corps had attained a respectable proficiency
in its peculiar duties we may believe from
an extract of one of his letters, dated March, 1777:
“I have had my corps reviewed twice; first by the
governor, who was excessively pleased, and thanked
50us in orders; and next by the general, who also
thanked us. It was our good performance forced
the general’s thanks; he would have been better
pleased to have found fault—first, because we
pleased the governor; and next, because I commanded
and had disciplined them myself.” ... “Not
one circumstance had I to lessen the pleasure I
received from the good performance of my corps, as
a battalion of infantry, as a battalion of artillery with
sixteen cannons, and as a body of artillery on service
in their batteries; for we went through all these
exercises equally well. The Saturday following,
General Clavering reviewed us, and what gave me
most satisfaction was, to hear that he had said in
private he had reviewed most of the King’s regiments,
and never saw any perform better.”
In May, 1778, General Leslie’s force marched
from Culpee, on its expedition to assist the Bombay
Government; it consisted of six infantry and one
cavalry corps, some European artillery, and the
1st company of golundaz, raised for the Nawab’s
service. A short account of this detachment will
be given when we come to speak of its return, in
1784.
The formation of the three native or golundaz
51companies for the Oude service was most probably
recommended by Colonel Pearse, and the experiment
answered so well that in August, 1778, a
new organization of the artillery was ordered, in
which the golundaz were to form a considerable
part.
Hitherto, as want dictated, company after company
of artillery had been added to the establishment;
but the artillery was now formed into an
independent brigade of one European regiment and
three native battalions. The European consisted of
seven field and one mounted, or garrison, company,
and the native battalions of eight companies each:
the former was to be completed by drafts of fifty
men from each of the three European infantry
regiments (and possibly the Oude companies), and
the latter by all fit for the service who might volunteer
from the two native companies, with the temporary
(Oude) brigade and their lascars, from the
lascars of European companies and with the guns
of infantry regiments, and from the eight companies
of lascars at the Presidency.
The lascars were all reduced.
The European regiment, exclusive of garrison
company, consisted of seven companies:—
52
Lieut.-Colonel.
1
Majors.
2
Captains.
7
Capt.-Lieutenants.
7
Lieutenants.
21
Lieut. Fireworkers.
21
Adjutant.
1
Quarter-Master.
1
Surgeon.
1
Assist.-Surgeons.
3
Serjt.-Major.
1
Qr.-Master Serjt.
1
Drill Serjeant.
1
Drill Corporals.
2
Drum-Major.
1
Fife-Major.
1
Serjeants.
42
Corporals.
42
Drummers.
21
Bombardiers.
56
Gunners.
168
Matrosses.
361
The three golundaz battalions consisted of eight
companies each, in all—
Major.
1
Captains.
3
Lieutenants.
24
Jemadars.
48
Havildars.
192
Naicks.
192
Drummers.
24
Fifers.
24
Golundaz.
2400
Soobahdars Commt.
3
Ditto Adjutant.
3
Havildars Major.
3
Adjutant.
1
Quarter-Master.
1
Surgeon.
1
Assist.-Surgeons.
3
Serjt.-Major.
1
Qr.-Master Serjt.
1
Native Doctors.
9
Sircars.
24
Armourers, Master.
3
Ditto Workmen.
9
Chucklers.
3
Watermen.
24
The European commissioned officers of the artillery
brigade were—
Lt.-Col. Commt.
1
Lieut.-Colonel.
1
Majors.
3
Captains.
10
Capt.-Lieutenants.
7
Lieutenants.
45
Lieut.-Fireworkers.
21
Major of Brigade.
1
Aide-de-Camp.
1
Adjutants.
2
Quarter-Masters.
2
Head Surgeon.
1
Surgeons.
2
Assist.-Surgeons.
6
Paymaster.
1
The staff and artificers of the field-train will be
referred to shortly, when another formation of the
corps renders it necessary to advert to the subject.
In the above formation we find the great error
which has pervaded the service ever since—the supposition
53that companies of Native do not require as
many officers as companies of European artillery;
and while the establishment of officers of the latter
was fixed at a proportion which shews that the
wants of the branch were then better understood
than they have been in later times, the former was
left ridiculously unprovided with officers.
The officers of a company of artillery should be
proportioned to the number of guns it is intended
to man. No officer can do justice to more than two
pieces; and as the companies were then adapted
to eight field-pieces, four officers, with a fifth to
command the whole, is the number which ought to
have been present in the field. On this subject,
however, it will be necessary to dwell more, as the
successive changes pass under review.
CHAPTER II.
54
Reduction of Golundaz Battalion—Formation of Regiment into
Two European Battalions with Ten Battalions of Lascars—Goddard’s
Expedition—Popham’s Capture of Gwalior—Insurrection
at Benares—Attacks on Pateeta, Luteefpoor, and Siege
of Bidgegurh—Colonel Pearse’s Expedition to the Coast—Reduction
of Golundaz Companies—Transport Train, Foundry,
Powder-works—Reduction in Establishment—Pay—Artillery
formed into One European Battalion of Ten Companies—Lascar
Battalions abolished—Battalion Guns—Artillery
formed into Three European Battalions, Lascars into Thirty
Companies.
The formation detailed in the preceding chapter
was not destined to remain, for in March, 1779,
Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote arrived from
England with the commission of commander-in-chief,
and soon after his arrival it was rumoured
that he had brought authority to disband the
golundaz.
From representations grounded in error and
party views, alarm had been taken by the Court
of Directors and the Government at the supposed
danger of teaching the natives the use of artillery,
and in August the golundaz were ordered to be
55disbanded, the men having the option allowed
them of entering infantry regiments or joining the
lascars.
To this corps, having been raised at his suggestion
and disciplined by himself, Colonel Pearse was
much attached, and, both on public grounds and
private feelings, was averse to its being broken up.
He unfortunately had many enemies in high rank
in Calcutta;—the consequence of the feelings of
rancour which had so long disturbed the settlement,
and which were still kept up by Mr. Francis’s and
General Clavering’s faction and Warren Hastings’s
adherents. Among these was Colonel Watson,
commanding the engineers, who vowed the overthrow
of the golundaz, and, having considerable
influence, urged Sir Eyre Coote to proceed in this
ill-judged measure.
Those readers, who may recollect the golundaz
at Cawnpore under Major Hay, may well conceive
how deeply it must have wounded Colonel Pearse
to see a similar corps sacrificed to jealousy and
party views; and there is every reason to suppose
that Colonel Pearse’s golundaz were equal to Major
Hay’s, which is saying every thing, for there never
was a corps better disciplined than the latter.
56Colonel Pearse determined that the golundaz
should not be reduced, if any exertions on his part
could save them; and accordingly, as soon as the
rumours reached him, addressed a letter to the
commander-in-chief, in which he urged the necessity
of employing native artillery, from the impossibility
of keeping up sufficient European artillery
for the service of our extended empire, liable to
be attacked at both extremities, and at such a
distance as to preclude the possibility of assistance.
He combated the argument of danger from native
artillerymen deserting and teaching their art to
the golundaz of native powers, by proving that, at
that time and previously, the native states had
artillerymen not inferior to ours in the mere gun
exercise and preparation of common stores, and
that, were this not the case, the desertion of a few
European artillerymen would render all precautions
useless; that in reality for many years past there
were thirty men nominally infantry, but in reality
artillerymen attached to each battalion, for the
service of the two field guns, which arrangement
entailed the possibility of all the evils now feared,
though without the advantages which a regular
corps of native artillery would give. He deprecated
57the system of battalion guns as useless, the guns
being without officers to manage them so as to produce
the best effect, by attending to the advantages
of ground and selection of ammunition best adapted
to the occasion; the two European artillerymen
detached with each battalion for this purpose being
ignorant of the higher—the more scientific parts
of the profession, which knowledge is confined in
general to the officers; that it ruined the discipline
of these men, who, though they went out good
men, returned, in general, drunken vagabonds; that
the lascars sent, though of the artillery, were only
employed in dragging the guns, and were unarmed
and undisciplined, but that they served for menial
offices, which made them desirable to captains
commanding the infantry battalions. He recommended
that the guns should be collected in small
brigades, or batteries, and brought to the points
wanted, instead of being frittered away along the
line; that the discipline of the men working them,
from being under their own officers, would be
better preserved, and that cannon would be better
looked after, and their fire produce more effect
in action, by being under the exclusive command
of an officer bred up to the profession. He concluded
58by urging that, even should the artillery
desert and take service with native powers, there
was in reality little to fear, for though the country
powers have infantry formed like ours, they are
inferior in every respect: their irregularity of pay
is the grand foundation of it; their want of sufficient
instruction and of the essential knowledge
of our discipline, will long keep them so; and such
as their sipahis are to ours their artillery will
be to our artillery, though the men should desert
in equal proportion, which he did not think would
occur, particularly if the golundaz had a small
increase of pay over the infantry, which was the
case in all other services.
On the receipt of the order, Colonel Pearse again
attempted to prevent this ill-judged measure, by a
respectful representation to Government, in which
he pointed out that the European artillery numbered
but 370 in all, of whom only 150 were at the
presidency; that two ships of the season had come
in without a single recruit; that it would therefore
be impossible to complete the corps till the next
year, and that, even, was doubtful, from the scarcity
of recruits, his Majesty’s regiments being filled by
pressing; that if an attack was made, the European
59artillery were insufficient even for the defence of
Fort William, much more were they unable to
furnish the detachments which would be necessary;
that the golundaz were good artillerymen; the
name and service the highest in repute among the
natives; and that they would not, even if the pay
were equal, enter the ranks of the lascars; so that
raw and ignorant men must be enlisted for that
class, who would require instruction, and, till they
were taught, the presidency would be almost destitute
of artillery. He submitted that, under these
circumstances, the execution of the order should
be delayed until the commander-in-chief could be
consulted, lest any ill consequences should follow
the immediate execution of it.
Colonel Pearse’s endeavours were, however, looked
upon by Sir Eyre Coote as arising from a spirit of
insubordination, which never had a place in his
breast; and they drew forth a severe and cutting
letter from the commander-in-chief, taxing him
with unmilitary and unprecedented conduct, tending
to sap subordination and obedience to its foundation,
and telling him that he was called upon for obedience
and not for an opinion, and that he was in nowise
answerable for the results.
60It must, however, be stated, in justice to Colonel
Pearse, that, during the command of General Stibbert,
several important military transactions occurred,
and General Stibbert being absent in the
field, Colonel Pearse obtained permission from him,
as commander-in-chief, to address the Government
direct on urgent occasions; and it was in the spirit of
this permission, considering the disbanding the golundaz
as a measure fraught with danger, that Colonel
Pearse addressed the representation to Government.
To the commander-in-chief’s letter Colonel Pearse
replied, regretting he had fallen under his displeasure,
and detailing circumstances, such as the rumour
of a body of Mahrattas being in the neighbourhood
of Burdwan; the arrival of the ships without any
recruits, of which he believed the commander-in-chief
to have been in ignorance when the order was dictated,
and which seemed to call for the exercise of
some discretion on his part, in carrying into execution
an order which would cramp the means of defence;
that he had, in the exercise of what he deemed
a sound discretion, stated the facts to Government,
who could at once determine whether orders might
with safety be instantly carried into execution, or
whether they should be delayed until the commander-in-chief
61could be consulted; he deprecated
any unguarded expressions, if such there were, in
his former letter, being construed into a want of
respect; and concluded by begging that the step he
had taken might be considered as founded in error
of judgment, and not in want of obedience; and
entreated the commander-in-chief to overlook his
error, and entertain a more favourable opinion of
him than that expressed in the letter with which he
had been honoured.
The appeal to Government was ineffectual, and the
minutes of Council of 23rd November, 1779, “ordered
that the native officers of the golundaz corps, at
the presidency, be paid up to the end of this month
and immediately discharged from the service; that
the commandant of artillery be directed to repeat the
offers already made to the men, and those who still decline
to accept of them be immediately discharged.”
Those who feared the native powers training up
good artillerymen by means of deserters from the
British service, do not appear to have considered
that without the material which is provided and
kept up at a heavy expense, the best artillerymen
would be useless; and that, although artillerymen
are taught the preparation of stores, still very few
62have that intimate knowledge which only results
from constantly handling and making them up;
and which is, in reality, found in a much greater
degree in the magazine workmen—a class who come
and go at their pleasure, and appear to be little
thought of, although the practical information they
could carry to an enemy would be worth more than
hundreds of mere well drilled artillerymen.
The Court of Directors, however, must be
excepted, for in their warrant (17th June, 1748)
they direct that “no Indian, black, or person of a
mixed breed, nor any Roman Catholic, of what
nation soever, shall, on any pretence, be admitted
to set foot in the laboratory, or any of the military
magazines, either out of curiosity, or to be employed
in them, or to come near them, so as to see what is
doing or contained therein.” And to such an extent
did this fear then carry them, that another paragraph
runs: “And if any person belonging to the company
of artillery marry a Roman Catholic, or his wife
become a Roman Catholic after marriage, such person
shall immediately be dismissed from the company
of artillery, and be obliged to serve the remainder
of his time in one of the other companies, or be
removed to another of the Company’s settlements,
63to serve it out there, if the Council think fit,” &c.
And again, in their military letter to Bombay (6th
April, 1770), they say: “As it is very essential that
the natives should be kept as ignorant as possible,
both of the theory and practice of the artillery
branch of the art of war, we esteem it a very pernicious
practice to employ the people of the country
in working the guns; and, if such practice is in
use with you, we direct that in future you attach
European artillerymen to the service of the guns
which may belong to sipahi corps, and that no
native be trusted with any part of this important
service, unless absolute necessity should require it.”
With these views it is not to be wondered at
that the Home Government should have directed
the golundaz to be reduced; but Indian experience
might even then have taught that no more
dangerous ally can be found for a native army than
a large and imperfectly-equipped artillery. A native
power will hardly bear the heavy continued expense
required to keep it efficient; or, if the state should
supply the means, the want of integrity in its
agents will divert them from their proper course;
and consequently, in the hour of emergency, the
army is forced to fight a pitched battle to protect
64the unwieldy train of cannon, which becomes an
incumbrance instead of a support: so it had been
at Plassey and Buxar, and so it has been in every
general action since. Assye, Argaum, Laswaree,
Mahidpoor, would have been avoided, had there
been no artillery in the native armies; unencumbered,
they could have evaded the British; but the
necessity of protecting their trains, and, perhaps,
the confidence which their presence inspired, induced
them to try the result of a battle.
Instead of discouraging native powers from organizing
large parks of artillery, our policy should have
been the reverse, resting confident that native parsimony
and dishonesty would insure inefficiency in
that branch.
In the new organization of the artillery now
ordered, it was formed into two European battalions
of five companies each, and to each company was
attached a battalion of six companies of lascars,
under the command of the same officer; they were
to perform the whole duty dependent on the corps
of artillery, and to be instructed in the usual
services of artillery, with the exception “of pointing
and loading guns and mortars.” They were
dressed in uniform, and armed with a light pike, so
constructed as to form a cheveux-de-frise.
65
ORGANIZATION of 1779.
per Company.
per Battalion.
Total.
On returns 1 Feb. 1780.
Colonel Commandant.
1
Effective.
Invalids.
EUROPEAN.
Lieutenant-Colonels.
1
2
2
Majors.
1
2
2
Captains.
1
5
10
10
1
Captain-Lieutenants.
1
5
10
9
Lieutenants.
3
15
30
29
2
Lieut. Fireworkers.
3
15
30
30
Adjutants.
1
3
4
Aides-de-Camp.
1
Serjeant-Majors.
1
2
Qr.-Master Serjeants.
1
2
Drill Serjeants.
1
2
Drill Corporals.
2
4
Pay Serjeants.
1
5
10
Serjeants.
6
30
60
44
17
Corporals.
6
30
60
41
10
Drummers.
3
15
30
31
Bombardiers.
8
40
80
529
43
Gunners.
24
120
240
Matrosses.
53
265
530
LASCARS.
Serangs Commandant.
1
10
3
Serangs.
1
6
60
53
Tindals.
2
12
120
106
Cossibs.
2
12
120
87
Lascars.
50
300
3000
2272
Sircars.
1
10
10
8
Native Doctors.
2
20
20
16
Doolies.
3
30
30
Havildars.
1
10
10
8
Bheesties.
6
60
60
48
66The regiment was to be commanded by a colonel,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Pearse was to hold the
rank of lieutenant-colonel commandant, “until the
lieutenant-colonel in the army next above him was
disposed of by promotion or otherwise; and then, in
conformity with the custom in Bengal, and the concurrence
of the Court of Directors, to be promoted
to the rank of colonel;” the promotion of the additional
lieutenant-colonel and major, to complete the
new establishment, to take place on the arrival of
the recruits of the season.
The brigade-majorship was abolished, and his
duties performed by a regimental adjutant.
These changes were not completed until April,
1780, as far as relates to the European portion.
The golundaz were discharged in December,
1779, very few taking service in the ranks of the
lascars.
The golundaz considered themselves belonging
to the most honourable branch of the army, and
were unwilling to enter an inferior service; the
difference of pay was another, and a stronger reason,
and we accordingly find, that from 2,438 golundaz
of all ranks who were on the rolls of the regiment
in November, 1779, in December 1,783 took their
67discharge. The returns for the next months are
incomplete, and it therefore cannot now be ascertained
what became of the remaining 650 men;
but it is probable some were those who were entertained
from the lascars in 1778, and had less
objection to return.
It has been said before, that a company of golundaz
from the Oude Brigade accompanied General
Leslie’s detachment. The force marched from
Culpee in May, 1778, on what appeared to many
the wild expedition of crossing India and effecting
a diversion in favour of the Bombay Government,
heavily pressed by the Mahrattas.
After crossing the Jumna, the force was soon
brought into contact with the enemy; the Boondeelas
met them at M’how, near Chatterpoor, but
they were beaten, with the loss of their guns; all
of which that were serviceable were taken on by
General Leslie, who found his own train of four
12–pounders, twelve 6–pounders, and two howitzers
insufficient.
Leslie remained in Bundelcund until October,
when his death devolved the command on Colonel
Goddard, who pushed on to Hoshungabad, which
place he reached on 30th November, and remained
68at until the middle of January, awaiting a reply
from Bombay.
That the sipahis looked on this service with some
dread and dislike we may conclude from the desertions
which took place, and which called forth
strong reprehension from Colonel Goddard in the
orders of 1st November; after pointing out the
ingratitude for all the former indulgences they
had received, and the unmilitary nature of their
conduct, in quitting their colours in their present
situation, with the daily expectation of being engaged
with an enemy, he concluded with the
following high compliment to the golundaz:—
“The commanding officer, with much pleasure,
excepts the corps of artillery in the foregoing observations.
Their steadiness, fidelity, and military
conduct claim his particular thanks; and he desires
the commanding officer will assure himself that he
will make proper mention of their merits to the
Honourable the Governor-General in Council.”
Leaving Hoshungabad on 16th January, this
gallant band continued their route through an
unknown country until, on the 9th February, 1780,
Colonel Goddard received a letter from the Bombay
field deputies, directing his return to Bengal, in
69consequence of a treaty they had negotiated with
the Mahrattas. This mandate he declined obeying,
urging that his orders were from the Supreme
Government, and he continued his march to Surat,
which he reached on the 25th February.
The following are the Artillery officers who
served with the force:—
Major
W. A. Baillie, on the returns till April, 1781—retired in 1802.
Captain
— Sears, joined detachment in March, 1781—returned in 1784.
Lieutenant
R. Bruce, promoted to Captain in 1781 and joined Major Popham’s detachment.
Lieutenant
A. Forbes, died in 1779.
Lieutenant
L. Kempt, returned in 1784.
Lieutenant
— Hamilton, ditto.
Lieutenant
J. Harris, died October 15, 1780.
Lieutenant
W. Rattray, returned in 1784.
Lieutenant
H. Cotes, died in 1782 in China, whither he must have gone sick.
Lieutenant
A. Rattray, joined detachment October, 1779—died at sea 1782.
Lieut. Fireworker
McLean, joined detachment March, 1781—returned in 1784.
Lieut. Fireworker
Boyce, joined detachment December, 1782—returned sick in March, 1783.
In January, 1780, this force took the field again,
and, crossing the Taptee, attacked the fortress of
Dubhoy, in Guzerat, on the 19th, and took possession
of the province; on the 10th February the
70army was before Ahmedabad, and stormed it on the
15th, and it was intended to have attacked the
combined camps of Holkar and Scindia at night;
but intimation that the Mahrattas were willing to
treat prevented its being carried into execution;
evasion followed, and all attempts to bring them
to action were fruitless, till on the 3rd April,
marching at 2 A.M., Colonel Goddard, with four
European companies, four grenadier sipahi battalions,
and twelve field-pieces, entered the camp at
dawn, and quickly threw the Mahrattas into confusion;
they attempted to take up a position near,
but on being again attacked, fled and dispersed.
In this attack Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, of the
artillery, led the first line.
The detachment returned to Surat, and in
October, 1780, moved against Bassein, a fort on
the mainland opposite the northern extremity of
Bombay Island. The detachment was increased by
a body of Europeans from Madras. A battery was
opened on the 16th November of six guns and six
mortars, at 900 yards, and a second of nine heavy
guns at 500 yards on 9th December, together with
twenty mortars to bombard the works; on the
10th, the breach being practicable, the enemy
71offered to surrender, but some demur taking place,
the fire was renewed, and on the 11th they yielded
at discretion.
From Bassein, in the middle of January, 1781,
the detachment marched for the Bore ghat, and
reached it on the 8th February. Holkar and the
Poonah armies were encamped on the top, but
Goddard struck awe into them by storming the
pass the night of his arrival, and by 5 A.M. the next
day gained complete possession. It was not deemed
advisable to carry the war further into the Mahrattas’
territories, so the detachment remained
holding the ghats until the middle of April, when
they descended without disturbance, but were a
little harassed by the enemy in the three days’
march to the coast, during which Lieutenant W.
Rattray, of the artillery, was wounded.
The detachment continued in the Bombay Presidency
until the cold weather, 1783, when it set out
on its return to Bengal, under Colonel Charles
Morgan (Brigadier-General Goddard having sailed
sick for England), and reached Caunpoor in April,
1784.
The European artillerymen who returned with
it were posted to the company at Caunpoor, and the
72golundaz were also cantoned at that station. All
the lascars entertained previous to 1783 were retained
in the service, the worst from the battalions
being discharged to make room for them. The remainder
were discharged.
The orders which were issued by Government, on
this occasion, will be noticed when the return of
Colonel Pearse’s detachment is mentioned, and in
the mean time it is necessary to look back a little,
to relate the part the regiment took in other operations
then going on.
With the detachment under Captain Popham,
collected in 1779, for the purpose of reinforcing
Colonel Goddard, was a portion of the 2nd company
1st battalion, being under the command of Captain
Mayaffre, Lieutenants Legertwood and Vernon. The
original destination of this force being changed, it was
employed in aiding the Ranee of Gohud against the
Mahrattas. In February, 1780, it crossed the Scind,
and in April besieged Lahar. From want of a sufficient
battering train, the breach made was imperfect,
and on this, as on many future occasions, the want
of matériel was supplied by the spirit of the troops.
Lahar was successfully stormed on the 21st April.
To this succeeded, on the 3rd August, the dazzling
73enterprise of the escalade of Gwalior. In this
attack the advance of two companies of sipahis was
followed by twenty Europeans, artillerymen of Captain
Mayaffre’s detachment.
Captain Popham’s detachment was replaced towards
the end of the year by one under Colonel
Carnac, with which was the 1st company 2nd battalion
of artillery, with the officers noted in the margin.[19]
The detachment pushed on to Seronje, where, surrounded
by a powerful enemy, and their supplies
cut off, they were reduced to great distress, and
would have perished, had not the bold resolution of
attacking Scindia’s camp by night, on 24th March,
1781, been taken and successfully carried out, rewarding
the victors with guns, elephants, and grain,
the “spolia opima” of an Indian camp.
The difficulties being removed, the detachment
fell back towards Gwalior, and met Colonel Muir’s
brigade coming to their assistance at Antree, on 4th
April. The detachments then moved into cantonments.
When Captain Popham’s detachment was broken
up, Captain Mayaffre with his company (2nd company
741st battalion) was stationed at Mirzapoor, and on the
massacre of the force placed by Warren Hastings
over the Rajah of Benares, on the 16th August,
1781, an order was sent to him, as senior officer at
Mirzapoor, to march, with the company of artillery,
remaining four companies of Popham’s battalion, and
the French Rangers (sending his guns and stores by
water to Chunar), upon Ramnagur, viâ Chunar, and
wait further orders; and also by Major Popham,
with a caution to avoid hostilities, and attend to the
safety of the whole party until Major Popham should
arrive.
On receiving the order from Warren Hastings, on
17th August, Captain Mayaffre immediately set out,
replying, that he would march, “observing his directions
in every respect, and otherwise acting to the
best of his judgment for the good of the service.”
Colonel Blair, commanding at Chunar, was also
directed to send four 6–pounders, two tumbrils of
ammunition, an 8 and 10–inch mortar with 100 shells
and 200 fuzes each, with powder, &c. to Chota
Mirzapoor on the 20th, where Captain Mayaffre was
expected to be. These were intended to have been
used from an open space on the shore opposite,
selected by Major Popham to bombard Ramnagur,
75and there is little doubt that a place so particularly
ill-adapted for defence against such a mode of attack
would have proved an easy conquest.
On reaching Ramnagur, however, without waiting
for the arrival of Major Popham or further orders,
without plan, without inquiry, and contrary to the
advice of the officers with him, Captain Mayaffre,
on the morning of the 20th August, marched precipitately
into the narrow streets, where, in an
instant, the leading party was annihilated. Captain
Mayaffre, and Captain-Lieut. Doxat, with thirty-three
of the Rangers, fell at once, and the detachment
was forced to retreat with a loss of 107 killed
and 72 wounded, two field-pieces and a howitzer
remaining in the enemy’s possession.
It is most probable that Captain Mayaffre was
urged to his precipitate and rash attack by the recollection
of the successful enterprise against Gwalior,
in which he had shared the preceding year; the
hope of acquiring reputation led him to disregard
the maxims of prudence, forgetting that, although
he staked his own life upon the issue, he also
hazarded his Government’s safety unnecessarily.
This failure raised the whole country in arms, and
rendered Mr. Hastings’s flight to Chunar imperative—a
76flight which gave rise to the memorable but
oft misquoted distich—
Ghora per howdah, hat’hee per zeen,
Juldee bagh gee’a, Warren Hasteen.
Lieuts. F. W. Grand[20] and Sand, doing duty
with Major Popham’s detachment, accompanied
W. Hastings to Chunar.
Active measures were taken to collect troops,
and on the 3rd September a party was sent out to
surprise the enemy’s camp, which was formed at
Pateeta (about seven miles from Chunar), but being
retarded by the bad bullocks and drivers with the
two 6–pounders which accompanied it, at daylight it
found the enemy, to the number of 4,000 infantry
and 400 cavalry and six guns, drawn up; the fire of
our artillery and infantry was, however, so quick and
effective, that the enemy fled, leaving four guns,
among which was the one left by Captain Mayaffre
at Ramnagur, in our possession.
77With the enemy’s guns, was all the usual apparatus
of artillery, such as portfires, tubes, chain-shot,
quilted grape, equal or nearly equal to the production
of an European laboratory; the artillery, however,
was not equal to the stores: one gun, a modern
cast, was pretty good; the others old and indifferent;
the carriages of all much worn and bad.
The conduct and activity of Lieut. Baillie, of the
artillery, was particularly acknowledged by the
commanding officer.
On the 10th September, a brigade from Caunpoor,
under Major Crabb, arrived, with which were thirty
European artillerymen (1st company 2nd battalion),
four 6–pounders and 1 howitzer, under Captain
Hill.
The enemy had collected in force at the strong
holds of Pateeta and Luteefpoor, the former seven
miles, the latter fourteen miles from Chunar, and
from information received, it was deemed advisable
to drive them from those positions, rather than attack
Ramnagur; two detachments were therefore got
ready, one under Major Crabb, and the other under
Major Popham; the former, accompanied by four
6–pounders and one howitzer, under Lieut. Baillie,
with the ammunition, carried on bullocks, marched,
78on the night of 15th September, by a route through
the hills, to take Luteefpoor in reverse, under the
guidance of a native, named Bandoo Khan, who had
proposed the plan of attack; and as the chief difficulties
of this march were caused by the guns, it will
not be out of place to give an abstract of Major
Crabb’s interesting journal of the expedition:—
“15th.—The stores and ammunition being ready
by ten P.M., the detachment marched at that hour,
but was very shortly brought up at a nullah, the
water in which was deep, and the limber ammunition-boxes
forced to be taken off and carried over
on the lascars’ heads: a delay of two hours. The
road led along a plain through low jungle, a ghat
with sharp turnings caused a long delay, and it was
sunrise ere the guns reached the top. A low thick
jungle continued for about a coss, and was succeeded
by an extensive plain, slightly cultivated and with
two small villages. About a coss in advance, two
hours’ delay was caused by a narrow deep nullah,
and three-fourths of a coss further, a second, with
rocky beds and banks, occupied an hour and a half
in crossing. The road led along the bank under a
high hill, for about a mile, full of rocks. Recrossed
the river with more difficulty than before; the banks
79very high, and forced to cut a road for the guns, and
it was two P.M. ere all were over; the jungle thick,
ground broken, hills on both sides. Came upon a
small nullah, its bed full of rocks and the opposite
sides a steep pass; the cattle were knocked up, and
the sipahis were put on to the drag-ropes to aid
them; over by four P.M., and then no water to
be found nearer than a lake three miles in front,
which they reached by sunset and halted, after
twenty hours’ marching and about six coss from
Chunar.
“17th.—Under arms at four A.M.; marched
through a thick jungle, crossed a small river by a
steep and narrow road, up a long steep pass with a
deep gully on the right, the ascent very difficult from
large smooth stones, on which the cattle could not
retain their footing; the sipahis again at the drag-ropes,
and by ten A.M. the top was gained. A large
level but rocky plain, studded with large trees, now
opened; about a mile further a river, bed full of
large rocks, and the guns were moved with much
labour.—One P.M.; after moving over rocky ground,
the country opened, and about a coss from the river,
an extensive plain near the village of Korada; several
villages scattered over the plain, whose inhabitants
80fled. The country was cultivated, chiefly rice khets.
At sunset encamped: computed distance, six coss.
“18th.—Started three A.M., over a plain full of
deep holes, difficult and dangerous for the cattle;
before daylight, entered a thick jungle with many
deep dry nullahs—forced to cut roads for guns; no
trace of a road. About two P.M., entered a large
plain with several small villages, whose inhabitants
fled. At three P.M., encamped by a large lake, and
set smiths and carpenters to mend yokes and pintles
of two guns, broken: distance, five coss.
“19th.—Marched at four A.M., at first over a
plain, then through swamps and rice-fields; the high
banks retarded the detachment much. Passed a
large deserted village, Muddoopoor; had the intelligence
that the Rajah’s troops were in front, with
guns, at the village of Loorah; encamped: day’s
march, three coss.
“20th.—Moved at daylight, for one coss through
jungle, in parts thick; by sunrise, the advance guard
was clear of jungle, and saw the enemy drawn up,
about 2,000 in number, in a good situation, guns
on their right, immediately opposite the road out of
the jungle, on a rising ground, and with a small
bank thrown up in front. Tope and village of
81Loora on their left, and a deep morass in front.
The enemy’s guns opened on the troops emerging
into the plain, and fired briskly until all had cleared
the jungle and formed, the advanced guard returning
it from one gun. When formed, the detachment
advanced as quickly as the ground would admit,
firing the 6–pounder until near enough for small-arms.
A party was detached to the (enemy’s) right, under
Lieut. Polhill, to carry the guns, and the enemy
fled, leaving their guns, 150 dead, and 20 wounded,
and made for Luteefpoor, distant about four coss,
through the jungle. The ammunition was destroyed
and the guns spiked and buried, there being no
means to carry them off. The road to Luteefpoor
ran through the jungle, rugged and steep, and no
water; pursued them to the pass of Succroot, about
a coss from Loora, and halted to bury the dead and
collect the wounded, amounting to thirty-four; two
and a half coss.
“21st.—Marched at four A.M., road good but
jungly for two coss; a dry nullah, descent rugged
and ascent still more so; road narrow and winding,
full of large stones and rocks; the guns were lifted
over these, and gained the summit with much labour.
The fort visible about three miles off; the road now
82along the side of hill was worse than ever; from the
bottom of hill to fort very narrow though level,
through thick jungle; at noon, entered town of
Luteefpoor, which had been evacuated and plundered
by the Rajah’s people while the detachment
was getting down the hill; six pieces of cannon
and a quantity of ammunition were found; three
pieces were taken on the hills, intended to defend
the entrance from Pateeta.
“The fort of Luteefpoor stands in a bottom, surrounded
on three sides by high steep hills, with thick
jungle close up to the ditch, which is deep on the
Pateeta side, where, too, the wall is of stone with
loopholes; on the other sides it is part stone and
part mud; the guns, on wooden swivels in the centre
of bastions; the citadel has a high stone wall,
with deep ditch and loopholes, in many places
much cracked.”
In concluding his report, Major Crabb says,
“Lieut. Fireworker Baillie, of artillery, in particular
I beg leave to recommend to your notice, for the
very great attention he shewed in his particular
department.”
The other detachment under Major Popham
marched against Pateeta on the 16th, but, on
83arriving, he found it so strong, that he sent back
for the two battering-guns and one mortar, originally
intended for Ramnagur; these reached him, and
Captain Hill either accompanied these or was with
the original detachment. After five days’ firing he
made no impression; he ordered a storm, which took
place successfully on the 20th, about the same time
that Major Crabb defeated the enemy at Loora
Succroot.
After these defeats the Rajah fled to Bidjegurh,
through the hills, and was followed by Major
Popham.[21]
On the 4th November, a battery of two 18–pounders
opened against the fort, but probably from
the rapidity of the firing, one of the guns burst,
and it became necessary to send back to Chunar
for others; in the mean time a mine was opened,
which it was hoped would be ready to be sprung
on the 6th.
84On the 11th the place was taken, and the spoil
divided among the captors on the spot, giving a
large amount of prize-money to officers of all
ranks,—a proceeding highly disapproved of by the
Governor-General, though not unwarranted by his
instructions. All attempts, and there were several
subsequently made to recover the amount for the
use of Government, were ineffectual. The total
value of the prize was estimated at twenty-five lacs.[22]
The officers in the margin[23] took a part in these
exciting proceedings, and those marked§ shared
in the prize-money of Bidjegurh. Lieut. Balfour
claimed a share for bringing up the heavy ordnance,
but they probably arrived too late, and his claim
was not allowed.
The misfortunes which had occurred in the
Madras Presidency in the war with Hyder Ali,
and particularly by the defeat of Colonel Baillie’s
detachment and retreat of Colonel Munroe, rendered
assistance from the Supreme Government necessary:
85a detachment, consisting of two European companies
of artillery (5th company 1st battalion, and
4th company 2nd battalion), with their battalions of
lascars, and 350 European infantry, was prepared,
and sailed in October, 1780, under the command of
Sir Eyre Coote. The detachment reached Madras
early in November, and shared in the relief of Wandewash
and Cuddalore in January and February,
1781, in the unsuccessful attack on the fortified
pagoda at Chillambram, and the victory near Porto
Novo.
Another detachment, under the command of
Colonel Pearse, of the artillery, consisting of one
European (5th company 2nd battalion), and one
Native (2nd golundaz) company of artillery, with
their lascars, and three additional companies raised
for the service, one company of gentlemen volunteers,
about forty or fifty, and six battalions of native
infantry, and 16 field-pieces, followed by land.
The golundaz company raised for this service
was most probably formed from the remnants of the
old golundaz battalions, reduced in the preceding
year; so soon had the inexpediency of that measure
forced itself into notice.
Much delay occurred in preparing camp equipage,
86and it was not until the middle of January, 1781,
that Colonel Pearse joined the detachment at Midnapoor.
Before starting, he complained of the inadequacy
of his artillery (twelve 6–pounders, two 12–pounders,
and two howitzers), and indented for six more 6–pounders;
but whether these were furnished is not
known.
Soon after the detachment started, we find Colonel
Pearse complaining of the absurdity of the Board
of Ordnance expecting regular and minute returns
of all articles expended in a train while on service
with the same punctuality as within a settled cantonment;
and pointing out that all stores issued to
a train on service should be struck off the Board’s
books, and an account rendered when the service
was over.
The detachment reached Ganjam in March,
where it suffered severely from cholera, then a new
disease, and which gave an impression that the
water had been poisoned.
In April they had reached Vizianagram, Ellore
on 20th May, Pulicat on 1st August, and joined
Sir E. Coote’s army at St. Thomas’s Mount on the
3rd August, 1781.
87Immediately after their arrival, the Bengal
division was broken up and divided among the other
brigades; an ill-judged and rash measure, causing
much desertion, which resulted from ill-feeling
on the part of Sir Eyre Coote towards Colonel
Pearse, partly, perhaps, on account of the correspondence
regarding the golundaz, but chiefly, no
doubt, from Colonel Pearses being a friend of
Warren Hastings, against whom he expressed himself
very strongly in a letter to the Supreme Government
in March, 1781, objecting to Colonel Pearses
detachment accounts being kept separate, as likely to
cause expense and unnecessary staff appointments;
to his being entrusted with permanent authority
in any shape, as unjust to himself, and assuming
a privilege (on the Governor-General’s part) in military
details, which cannot be vindicated; and complaining
that the instructions given Colonel Pearse
were a direct indignity offered to his authority.
He concludes by observing, “that he sees the newspapers
are replete with promotions and arrangements
in the military department in Bengal, without any
reference to him as commander-in-chief: he protests
against the whole as irregular, unmilitary, and
entailing enormous unnecessary expense, and has
88the satisfaction of committing to record in this place,
that he ascribes these encroachments on the authority
of the commander-in-chief to the Governor-General,
who now unites in his person the whole
powers of Government.”
The officers and companies of the regiment employed
in this service were as follows, as well as
can be gleaned from the records. Unfortunately,
from July, 1780, to April, 1781, the returns are
left blank, and these companies are not included in
the returns until their rejoining in 1785.
No. 2.
4th Company 2nd Battalion.
Captain
Elliott, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant
Woodburn, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant
Wilkinson, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant
Holland, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant
Groat, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker
Turton, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker
Dunn, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker
McDonald, rejoined May, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker
Neish, rejoined May, 1784.
No. 5.
5th Company 1st Battalion.
Captain
Hussey, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant
Carnegie, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant
Maud, died August, 1783.
89Lieutenant Fireworker
Douglas, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker
Exshaw, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker
J. Green, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant
Robinson, rejoined June, 1784.
The above sailed with Sir Eyre Coote’s detachment.
No. 10.
5th Company 2nd Battalion and 2nd Golundaz.
Captain
C. R. Deare, rejoined June, 1784.
Captain-Lieutenant
E. Montague, rejoined April, 1784.
Lieutenant
Horsburgh, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant
Blundel, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant
W. Bruce, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant
Tomkyns, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant
J. Walker, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker
McDermott, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker
Hardwicke, rejoined November, 1783.
Lieutenant Fireworker
Nelly, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant Fireworker
Barton, rejoined December, 1783.
Lieutenant Fireworker
Macbeagh, died August, 1781.
Commandant’s Company of Volunteers.
Captain-Lieutenant
W. Harris, rejoined June, 1784.
Staff to Colonel Pearse.
Captain-Lieutenant
C. Green, Aide-de-Camp, rejoined June, 1784.
Lieutenant
Herbert, Quarter-Master, died December, 1781.
Lieutenant
Brown, Adjutant, rejoined May, 1784.
Joined Detachment at Madras.
Lieutenant
Constable, December, 1783, went on sick leave and joined detachment.
90Lieutenant
Addison, March, 1783.
Lieutenant
Flemyng, March, 1783, returned June, 1784, with 5th company 1st battalion.
Lieutenant
Nash, November, 1781, returned June, 1784, with 5th company 1st battalion.
Lieutenant Fireworker
Hollingsbury, 1782.
Lieutenant
Syme, died June, 1784.
On the 16th August, 1781, the army marched
from the Mount, and reached Tripassore on the 18th,
and took possession of it after only three days’ siege.
27th.—Engaged Hyder Ali’s army on the spot
where Baillie had been defeated, and were forced to
retire to the Mount from want of provisions. On
the 19th September the army again took the field,
and on the 23rd the Fort of Pollom surrendered to
it. Hyder’s army was in sight; the two next days
were spent in collecting grain, and on the 27th, Sir
E. Coote went out to reconnoitre, and found the
enemy’s whole force in camp near Cuppoor, about
five miles off. He then advanced to attack them,
Colonel Pearse commanding the left wing, which,
from having to pass through much broken ground,
bore the heaviest part of the action. Hyder endeavoured
to turn it, but his attempts were frustrated
by Colonel Pearse’s movements, and his cavalry
driven back by discharges of grape. The two
91wings were much separated, and Colonel Pearse
was at one time nearly captured, from his horse
taking fright and running away with some of Hyder’s
horsemen, who charged through an interval in the
line; in endeavouring to get back, he was followed
by a horseman, whom his aide-de-camp shot. The
action lasted from three till dark, and it was eleven
p.m. before the army had encamped at Cuppoor, on
Hyder’s ground.
In October, the army marched into the Pollams,
and a detachment of six battalions with two
6–pounders from the artillery, the whole under
the command of Captain Owen, were sent to
secure provisions and intercept a convoy of Hyder’s.
Captain Owen conceived the quixotic design of
storming the fort of Chittoor, but, unluckily, Hyder
marched suddenly and attacked him, on the 23rd
October, in his camp, and drove him back with
heavy loss. One of the guns fell into the enemy’s
hands, but was retaken by a gallant effort made by
Captain Moore, with forty Bengal grenadiers, whom
an artilleryman informed of the loss.
After this, the whole army moved against Chittoor,
on the 7th November. On the 8th, a battery of
two guns and two howitzers fired from a hill against
92the fort, but without effect. On the 19th, a battery
of two 18–pounders was formed on the banks of an
artificial lake, within three hundred yards of a ruinous
round tower, in which a breach was made before
night, and the enemy offered to capitulate. Their
terms were refused, and firing renewed, and the next
day, the troops being ready to storm, the fort surrendered.
Hyder had, in the mean time, taken Poloor, in
which were four 18–pounders, and surprised Polipett,
where the baggage was left under charge of a battalion
with three 6–pounders, and carried off all, and
moved against Tripassore.
The army marched to relieve Tripassore, and arrived
just in time, as a breach was just made. After
destroying the works, they moved into Poonamalee
on the 30th November.
Early in January, 1782, the army marched to the
relief of Vellore, and on the 9th, encamped near
Hyder’s troops. On the 10th, Hyder attacked the
rear, while the main body was moving through the
dry bed of a lake. Beyond this was a wet one, and
the main body crossed this also, but the carts and
followers were in the swamp when Hyder reached
the bank of the dry lake. Colonel Pearse, who was
93commanding the rear, formed up three battalions, and
his guns, consisting of one 12–pounder, one howitzer,
and six 6–pounders, which checked the enemy, who
opened a cannonade from upwards of twenty heavy
guns, but, with little effect. The position was held
for upwards of an hour, until the baggage had all
crossed, when Colonel Pearse crossed also, and joined
Sir Eyre Coote, and after a little desultory firing
Hyder withdrew.
Having thrown his convoy into Vellore, Sir Eyre
Coote returned on the 13th, and on reaching his
old ground, at the swamp, was again attacked. The
passage was covered by a heavy cannonade from the
12 and 18–pounders, and when across, Hyder fell
back, but made another attempt at sunset, which was
beaten off. The succeeding days were spent in manœuvres
on both sides, without coming to an action.
The detachment was engaged in no further service
of any consequence until the unsuccessful and mismanaged
attack on Cuddalore, in June, 1783, in
which Colonel Pearse was wounded, whence they
returned to Madras, and remained encamped till
April of the next year,—the death of Hyder Ali,
and conclusion of a peace with Tippoo, rendering
their further services unnecessary.
94On the 22nd April the detachment made their
first march homewards, and the European artillery
accompanied them as far as Musulipatam, where,
about the middle of May, they embarked with guns
and stores, and reached Calcutta in June, 1784.
The strength of each company on its return is
annexed.[24] There must, however, have been some
recruits sent during the service; but as from the
day of their quitting Bengal, the companies were
struck off the strength of the regiment, it is impossible
to trace their actual loss. Captain Hussey
and Lieutenant Brown appear to have suffered
from wounds, for in Mem. C. 19th July, 1784, on
Lieutenant Browns promotion to Captain-Lieut.,
“The Board observes that this promotion occasions
the number of artillery officers to exceed the
establishment, which they have been induced to
admit, in consequence of the peculiar situations of
Captain Hussey and Lieutenant Brown, by the
95wounds they received while on service in the
Carnatic.”
The following order was issued by Government
the 5th July, 1784:—“The Board having received
ample testimony from the late Sir Eyre Coote,
from Colonel Pearse, and from the President and
Council of Fort St. George, of the uniform good
conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Elliot, and the
officers and men of the artillery, who have served
under his command in the Carnatic, have much
pleasure in expressing to this part of the Bengal
detachment, the high sense they entertain of their
gallant behaviour, and the important service which
they have rendered to the Company, during the
course of the war.
“The Board trust that this special mark of
their approbation will be remembered as an animating
example to the Bengal troops, whenever the
public service may call for similar exertions.”
The golundaz company, when the Europeans
embarked, continued its march with the detachment,
and the whole reached Ghyretti in January,
1785, where Warren Hastings honoured them
with a visit, and testified the approbation of
Government, in general orders, which after expressing
96thanks to the commander and troops, for
“their gallant behaviour, and useful services in the
defence of the Company’s territories,” direct that,
“as a lasting mark of their approbation, a pair of
honorary standards be bestowed on each sipahi
regiment; on each soobadar a gold, and on each
of the jemadars, a silver medal, with such device,
motto, and description as shall be judged applicable
to the occasion; and medals of the same sort
to the officers of the golundaz company; also
similar badges of inferior value, to such of the men,
warrant officers and privates, as have served with
the detachment from the commencement of the
expedition until its return to the provinces.
“The Governor-General and council further
direct, that in acknowledgment of the services of
the two great detachments, which have served in
the Carnatic, and the West of India, an additional
pay of two rupees per month be granted to each
non-commissioned officer and private of the European
corps, and one rupee per month to each
non-warrant officer and sipahi of the native corps,
composing those detachments, who were originally
attached to the same, on the march to their respective
destinations, and returned with them.”
97The Governor-General likewise issued an order
on the occasion of his visiting the detachment, and
one of the last acts of his government was a proposal
in Council that “a sword should be given to
Col. Pearse and the two officers next in command;
that all officers holding commands in the detachment
of infantry battalions should be confirmed in
them, notwithstanding the general rules of appointment,
and that the names of all the officers be
entered on record, for such future marks of the
favour of Government as the rules of the service
may admit;” and to these propositions the Council
readily agreed.
It was also ordered, that the lascars of the artillery
who were with these detachments should receive
medals, in like manner as the sipahi regiments.
We are not sure whether medals for these services
can now be found; we have been able to obtain a
medal, the reverse of which is illegible, which we
are induced to believe was
given to one of these detachments,
probably Colonel
Goddard’s, and the fort in the
distance, representing Ahmedabad:
a drawing of it is annexed.
98We have also been informed by an old
native officer, that the medal was of the same pattern
for both detachments.
The 1st golundaz company, which marched with
Colonel Leslie’s detachment, was raised in 1777;
the 2nd, which marched with Colonel Pearse, in
1780; and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th were raised in
1782, at the Presidency, Chunar, and Dinapore. But
the same feeling, before spoken of, prevented their
retention, and accordingly, in August, 1784, the 3rd
and 4th golundaz companies were reduced, with
the option to the men of the former of entering the
lascars, and the latter, the 9th or 14th regiments,
which were at the same station. In March, 1785,
the 5th company followed, the native officers being
allowed the option of half-pay at Chunar, or three
months’ gratuity and discharge, and the men, after
completing the 2nd company, of enlisting in the
infantry.
In 1779, the necessity of a train of draught-bullocks
for the artillery was pressed on the Government
by Sir Eyre Coote, and 4,000 were directed to
be kept at certain stations for this purpose: they
were to be from four to six years old, of fifty inches
high, and to be condemned at twelve years old, and
99able to draw ordnance, as in annexed statement.[25]
The commanding officers of artillery and of trains
were to be inspectors of all bullocks received into the
service, and responsible that none but proper cattle
were admitted, and they were to be marked in the
presence of an artillery officer. They were reduced
to 600 at Caunpoor, 400 at Futteygurh, and 250
at Chunar, by Mem. of Council, 14th February,
1785, and the contract given to Sir Charles Blunt.
A gun-foundry existed at this time, for, in 1781,
we find that “two 12–pounders and ten 6–pounders
were ordered to be cast (if none available) for the
use of the ship ‘Betsey,’ Captain Giddes, going with
opium to China.” It was probably under the commissary
of stores.
Powder-works also existed on the banks of the
river, near Cossipoor. The gun-carriages were all
constructed by the commissary of stores at Fort
William.
On the reduction of the artillery brigade, Captain
C. R. Deare, the major of brigade, was appointed
100regimental adjutant, but the brigade-majorship was
restored in April, 1781, to be again, however, reduced
to a regimental adjutant in 1785. Captain
G. Deare resigned it in October, 1784, and Captain
C. R. Deare was appointed.
In July, 1784, the adjutancy to the train in the
field was abolished, but each company in the field
appears to have had an adjutant and quarter-master
attached to it.
In March, 1785, at the recommendation of Colonel
Ironside, commanding at Caunpoor, tatties were
first allowed to the European troops at Caunpoor.
Colonel Pearse at this time resumed command
of the corps, Colonel Duff having temporarily held
it while he was employed with the army on the
coast; and earned the acknowledgments of the
Council and General Orders, for the state of discipline
it was in.
In this year many reductions were made in the
army, by abolishing staff appointments, fixing the
rate of pay and allowances to all classes, and laying
the foundation of a code of regulations to guide all.
The commissaries of ordnance were reduced from
five to two, and the deputies from eight to four;
the brigade-majorship of artillery was altered to
101an adjutancy; the general command of artillery
in the field was given to Lieutenant-Colonel Duff;
his station was not fixed, but he was to move as his
judgment prompted, was to inspect the field magazines
and report on their state, but in these tours
he was to exercise no command (though entitled by
seniority) in the stations which he visited.
The following was the rate of pay allowed to all
classes of the regiment:—
The scale of pay differs but little from the present
day; but the subject will more properly be
touched on when the effect of placing the army in
certain stations on half batta in 1828 comes to be
noticed.
In conjunction with the reductions above noticed,
on the 30th January, 1786, it was resolved in
Council to incorporate the two battalions of artillery
into one, of ten companies; but that the establishment
of commissioned and non-commissioned officers
attached to them should remain as at present until
vacancies and casualties reduced them to the necessary
establishment; but afterwards (March), all in
excess to the latter were permitted to reside
wherever they pleased within the Company’s territories,
drawing the pay and half batta of their
ranks, and, such as were entitled to them, the
gratuity and additional allowance.
103
Necessary
Temporary
Colonel.
1
Lieut-Col. Commt.
1
1
Majors.
1
2
Captains.
10
10
Capt-Lieutenants.
10
10
Lieutenants.
20
30
Lieut.-Fireworkers.
30
30
Serjeants.
60
60
Corporals.
60
60
Drummers.
30
30
Bombardiers.
80
80
Gunners.
240
240
Matrosses.
530
530
Adjutant.
1
1
Quarter-Master.
1
1
Surgeons.
2
2
Assist-Surgeons.
6
6
Serjeant-Major.
1
1
Qr.-Master Serjeant.
1
1
Drum-Major.
1
1
Fife-Major.
1
1
Pay Serjeants.
10
10
Drill Serjeant.
1
1
Drill-Corporals.
2
2
In making these arrangements, the original
numbering was restored to companies. Lascars
were to be attached to each company; in the field,
1 serang, 6 tindals, 6 cossibs, and 156 lascars; and
in the provinces, 1 serang and half the number of
tindals and lascars. The battalions of lascars were
broken up. Two six-pounders were attached to
each infantry regiment, with 5 European artillerymen,
and 24 lascars to point and work them. The
remainder of the lascars were paid up and discharged,
and grants of waste land in the Rhotas
district given to all who would settle on them.
A slight alteration was made in two months, viz.
substituting golundaz, 1 havildar or naik, and 6
golundaz in lieu of the European artillerymen, who
were in the first instance furnished by reducing the
1st and 2nd golundaz companies, the companies
which marched with Goddard and Pearse, and the
sole remnants of the golundaz battalions; the men
104were divided among the regiments, and in April
directed to be enrolled as privates; the commissioned
officers were retained in the service, and
stationed, 1 soobodar at Caunpoor, and 1 jemadar
at Futteygurh, Chunar, Dinapoor, Berhampoor, and
Barrackpoor, to be employed at the discretion of
the commanding officer.
As, however, in the case of the organization in
1779, the Home authorities appear to have entered
upon the same subject at the same time as the
Indian, and in consequence, the above arrangement
was hardly completed when the order of the Court
of Directors (sess. 85) was received, and published
in Minutes of Council, 2nd June, 1786, re-forming
the whole military establishment, and directing the
artillery to be formed into three battalions of
five companies each; each company to consist of
1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 lieutenant-fireworkers;
4 serjeants, 4 corporals, 8 gunners, 56 matrosses,
2 drummers, 2 puckalies. The lascars to consist of
30 companies, each having 1 serang, 2 first tindals,
2 second tindals, 56 lascars, 1 puckalie.
Each infantry regiment, when in the field, to be
equipped with 1 European non-commissioned officer,
and 8 privates, for pointing the guns, and 2 tindals
105and 28 lascars, to work them, while with each
brigade there were to be, in addition to the battalion
guns, 4 guns attached to the grenadiers,
making a total of 16 guns, exclusive of the field
train, and one company of European artillery and
four of lascars.
An additional company of artillery was raised for
service at Fort Marlborough, but not brought on
the establishment.
Colonel Pearse, although a colonel and the officer
next in seniority in the Company’s service to the
commander-in-chief, was declared available to command
a battalion, thus lowering him from the command
of a brigade, which the artillery had hitherto
been, to that of a battalion, a command below what
his rank entitled him to. This indignity was not,
however, long continued, for in August he was
appointed to the general command of the artillery
stationed at the Presidency, and allowed an aide-de-camp.
The lascars lately broken up and dispersed among
the regiments were withdrawn, to reform the companies,
the first 6 of which were stationed at Caunpoor,
the next 4 at Futteygurh, next 4 at Dinapoor,
next 4 at Berhampoor, 6 with first battalion, and
1066 with third battalion, at the Presidency; the
tindals lately discharged were re-entertained; all
lascars in excess of the establishment were discharged,
and none in future were to be entertained,
except such as were seamen or boatmen by profession;
and in March, 1787, 5 feet 6 inches was the standard
fixed for them.
The artillery companies were stationed, 10 at the
Presidency, 1 at Berhampoor, 1 at Dinapoor, 2 at
Caunpoor, and 1 at Futteygurh, and the companies
were enrolled in the battalions according to the
seniority of their captains at first; this, however,
was shortly altered, by making the first and second
battalions change numbers.
The regiment now stood, according to this arrangement—
Establishment
Actual
Colonel.
1
Lieut-Colonels.
3
2
Majors.
3
3
Captains.
15
15
Capt-Lieutenants. Lieutenants.
30
30
Lieut.-Fireworkers.
30
30
Adjutants.
3
3
non-eff.
Quarter-Masters.
3
3
Serj-Major.
3
3
Qr.-Master Serj.
3
3
Drill Serjeants.
3
non-effect.
Drill-Corporals.
5
Drum-Major.
3
2
Fife-Major.
3
1
Serjeants.
60
71
Corporals.
60
59
Gunners.
120
825
Matrosses.
840
Drummers.
30
32
Serangs.
30
27
1st Tindals.
60
60
2nd Tindals.
60
54
Lascars.
1680
1679
The right hand line is actual strength, taken from the
returns of the regiment for August, 1786.
CHAPTER III.
107
Artillery, one of the brigades of the army—An Infantry Officer,
Brigade-Major—Succeeded by an Artillery Officer—Dress—School
orders—School—Inoculation—Companies numbered
by seniority—Method of exploding mortar-shells on reaching
the ground—Fire in the arsenal—Death of Colonel Pearse—Lieut.-Colonel
G. Deare, Commandant—War in the Carnatic—Second
Battalion of Artillery sent—Sattimungulum—Bangalore—Retreat
from Seringapatam—Nundydroog—Savendroog—Attack
on fortified camp at Seringapatam—Return to
Bengal.
Although so recent, the formation with which the
last chapter closed was soon modified. In April, 1787,
the artillery was constituted one of the brigades of
the army,—a change made probably with the view
of placing Colonel Pearse on an equality with other
officers of his rank, though junior to him in standing.
But a curious circumstance is connected with
this formation, in the nomination of an infantry
officer, “Lieutenant Peter Cullen, brigade-major to
Colonel MacLeod, to act as brigade-major to the
artillery, with the rank of captain, conformably to
the orders of the Court of Directors, until a vacancy
108happens in that staff-line in the infantry to which
he is to succeed.” The reason of this appointment
is, however, clearly shewn in a subsequent order:
“The Honourable Captain T. Maitland, H. M.’s
72nd regiment, is appointed major of brigade, to do
duty under Colonel MacLeod vice Lieutenant Cullen.”
In March, 1788, however, Captain Grace, of
the artillery, succeeded to this appointment.
Several changes took place at this period in the
army, at which we need only glance. The colonels
were detached from their brigades, and placed in a
situation similar to that of general officers of divisions
and brigades in the present day; tent allowance
was given to officers in all situations; fuzils and
spontoons were superseded with infantry officers by
swords; the dress of the army was altered, as was
that of the artillery, and it is amusing to find that
what is ordered in 1844 should be little more than
reverting to the orders of 1786; for what is the order
directing white covers to be worn on caps, but the
principle of “White hats may be worn on the line
of march, or black hats with white linen folded
round them?” though, in truth, there may be little
doubt whether the round hat so prepared was not
a far preferable head-dress to the present shako.
109The formation of a regimental school was an
object of much interest with Colonel Pearse; as
early as 1770 some orders were issued on the
subject; but we learn from subsequent orders, in
1778, that these had “for various causes been
neglected and forgotten, but that the commanding
officer now resolves to carry them into execution;”
and accordingly, rules are laid down for conducting
the school duties,—the amount each man is to pay
for being taught, what stoppages are to be carried
to the school fund, and, finally, that any deficiency
is to be borne, half by the commanding officer, and
half by the captains. Again, in the year 1787,
“Colonel Pearse, having the welfare of his soldiers
at heart, and being desirous to do for their benefit
any thing that lies in his power, has thought proper
to establish a school for their instruction; that, by
teaching them to read, he may enable them to
learn their duty as Christians from books of their
religion, and as soldiers, from the orders and regulations
laid down for their guidance. It is his
intention to visit it from time to time, and by his
authority, to make it seriously a matter of attention.”
Then follow some rules for the school, and
as an encouragement to the non-commissioned
110officers to qualify themselves, he directs that every
“serjeant employing a man to write and read for
him shall pay him 6 rupees a month, or to write for
him, 4 rupees a month, and he shall not read on
parade, or be excused his duties.” The number
allowed to attend the school from each company
was limited, and the order has remained so nominally
till late years, although, in reality, none
wishing for instruction have been refused; but of
late years the recruits for the regiment have been
from a better class, and a very large proportion are
able to read and write when they join the regiment.
This may be partly caused by the more general
diffusion of education in all classes, or from the
crowded state of all lines in England, impelling
a class to enlist who formerly found occupation in
other professions.
As another instance of the interest which Colonel
Pearse took in the welfare of his corps may be
quoted the following order; it shews, too, how just
were his views on questions of duty and discipline:
“The rules of duty, as laid down, may seem
extremely rigorous to those who do not properly
consider the consequence; Colonel Pearse hopes
that there are not any; but lest there should be,
111he desires that they will carefully remember that
military discipline can only be really made easy by
being enforced with precision in every part, however
minute it may appear; that strictness with
mildness will make the soldiers love their officers
as their parents, and create in their minds a desire
to be highest in esteem, and an emulation to
deserve the preference, and the fear of losing it;
then it will habituate the officers to regard the
soldiers as the object of their attention, and lead
them to watch over their morals with that pleasing
anxiety which naturally arises from the desire to
produce superior excellence in those who are immediately
under them; and lastly, that in the corps
in which these principles are most conspicuous,
courts-martial and punishments are very rare; the
lash is only heard when it falls on the really worthless
and abandoned, whom the rest shun and detest
for having brought disgrace upon them, and who
are, of course, discharged soon after.”
Vaccination had not at this time been introduced,
but, to lessen the danger from small-pox, inoculation
on a large scale appears to have been first tried on
Europeans in India this year. In February, 1787,
1 officer, 20 artillery, 26 infantry, and 53 children
112of artillerymen and lascars, were admitted into the
artillery hospital at Dum-Dum, and inoculated; the
party were left under the charge of Captain Rattray
when the regiment marched into Fort William, and
a report of the result was published in orders in
April, from which it appeared that 90 took the
infection and recovered; of the remainder who did
not take it, some had been previously inoculated in
England, but without such effect as to induce the
supposition that they had had the small-pox; from
the result above detailed, there is, however, little
doubt but that they must have taken it.
In September, a general order having been issued
directing the companies of artillery to be numbered
in the different battalions, Colonel Pearse searched
into the records of the corps as far back as 1770, at
which time only 5 companies existed, and ascertained
the exact seniority of each company; he laid
a plan before Lord Cornwallis, which was approved
of and published. Hitherto, the companies had
stood on the returns agreeably to the seniority of
their captains, or the order for field duty; this led
to constant changes, for on the promotion, for
instance, of a captain to a majority, his company
would be given to the captain just promoted, and
113the company would be moved from the first to the
last in the battalion. In the accompanying tabular
arrangement these successive changes could not all
be shewn, though it is believed that it will be found
essentially correct; however, from this period there
can be no doubt of the identity of the different portions
of the regiment, and for the valuable materials
from which it has been arranged, the author is indebted
to Lieutenant-Colonel Tennant, for many
years assistant adjutant-general of artillery, and at
a time when documents, which have since crumbled
away, were accessible.
In March, 1789, Lord Cornwallis attended at
Dum-Dum, to witness the results of some experiments
carried on by Lieutenant Hill, with a view to
insure the ignition of the powder in a shell on the
moment of its touching the ground; the success
seems to have been complete, for “Lord Cornwallis
has been pleased to desire Colonel Pearse to communicate
to Lieutenant Hill, that his lordship has
received the utmost satisfaction from the experiments
this day carried on before him, and from the
successful endeavours of Lieutenant Hill to fire the
powder within shells the instant they touch the
ground. Colonel Pearse adds his own hearty congratulations
114on this success, and feels the utmost
pleasure that what has so long been sought for by
artillerists, has at length been discovered by an
officer of the Bengal Artillery under his command.”
Lieutenant Hill’s plan, from an incidental notice
in the third number of the East-India Military
Repository, seems to have been the same as that of
an Englishman named W. Wilton, which was tried
at Woolwich in 1784. The wood of a common
fusee is partly cut away to about half
its thickness on both sides, and the
space filled up by two small wedges of
brass; a washer of leather being placed
under them, a hole is drilled through
them and the fusee, a brass or copper
wire is inserted, and riveted firmly on
both sides. The wire, when heated,
becomes as brittle as glass, and the shock of the
shell touching the ground breaks it off; the little
wedges fall into the shell, and the fire finds two
lateral vents into the powder. “A fusee similar to
Mr. Wilton’s (East-India Military Repository), with
the leaden pins (four small ones to give additional
security to the brass wedges), was produced by the
conductor of the Expense Magazine, amongst several
115other kinds said to have been invented by the late
Colonel Hill, of the Bengal Artillery. These
specimens are now in the model-room at Dum-Dum,
but we have never seen any invention for
the purpose more simple or more perfect than
Mr. Wilton’s fusee.” Of eight shells fired with
the fusees at Woolwich, in 1784, six ignited at
the moment of the shell touching the ground.
At the beginning of this month a fire broke out
in the Arsenal, at night, consuming the workshops,
and all they contained, “except a number of carriages
of different kinds, which, by the unparalleled
efforts of the officers and soldiers, were preserved
from the flames.” Colonel Pearse was present, and
his presence stimulated their exertions to the
utmost, but there is reason to believe that his own
end was hastened by the exposure to this night,
under the influence of mercury, as we find was the
case from his own correspondence. Early in April
he gave over the command of the garrison to the
next senior officer, and proceeded down the river
for a change of air, in the hope of restoring himself
to health, but without the desired effect, and on
the 15th June he ended his life; a garrison order
by the Governor-General thus announces it:—
116“It is with the utmost concern that Earl Cornwallis
has occasion to prepare the mournful duties
of a last tribute of military honour to the remains
of Colonel Pearse, in whose demise the army has
lost a zealous and most respectable officer.
“On the corpse being brought into garrison the
colours are to be lowered half-staff, and to remain
so until the corpse is interred.
“The brigade of artillery is to furnish the funeral
party, which is to consist of such part of the late
Colonel Pearses own battalion as is in the garrison,
completed to the strength of a battalion, and commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Deare; the remainder
of the brigade, with the 4th battalion
European infantry, are to attend the interment with
their side-arms, in such disposition as the senior
officer present may direct.”
He was buried in the great burial-ground of
Calcutta, and a handsome pillar of the Corinthian
order raised to his memory at Dum-Dum.
The inscription given below is cut on a tablet
let into the base of the pillar:—
117
COLONEL PEARSE’S MONUMENT.
TO THE MEMORY OF
THOMAS DEANE PEARSE,
COLONEL COMMANDANT OF ARTILLERY,
THIS COLUMN IS
ERECTED BY THE OFFICERS OF THE BRIGADE
IN TESTIMONY OF THEIR RESPECT,
MDCCXC.
118In Colonel Pearse the regiment lost a commandant
devoted to its welfare; of a high order of talent,
fitted, in no common degree, for command, fond of
his profession, and anxious for distinction in it, his
whole energies were directed to the performance of
his duties; his intercourse with his officers and men
was marked by an earnest desire for their happiness
and comfort, and an endeavour to raise the tone of
manners and habits to be found existing in both
ranks. Although a personal friend of Warren
Hastings, his influence never seems to have been
used for any private end; the good of the service
was emphatically his guide; from his duty he never
swerved, and in it he was influenced always by high-souled
and chivalrous feelings. That he would have
won for himself high honours, had an opportunity
been afforded, who can doubt who has carefully
considered his conduct when in command of
the detachment to the coast; and that he had not
opportunity must be in part attributed to the prejudice
or jealousy of Coote.
For twenty years he commanded the regiment,
and under his eye it grew from infancy to maturity,
and passed through many trials, yet always winning
for itself thanks and praises; to his exertions in
119instructing all parties in the details of their duties,
it owed its excellence, and long as the regiment
may last, and high as its fame may rise, the name
of Pearse ought always to be gratefully associated
with it.
The command of the artillery brigade now devolved
upon Lieutenant-Colonel G. Deare (who
joined the corps as a 2nd lieutenant when Pearse
commanded it); he was at this time at Cawnpoor,
commanding a battalion, and the duties of the
brigade were carried on till he could join by “the
brigade-major, Captain Grace, referring for advice
to Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Deare, commissary of
stores, and brother to the commandant.”
There being a paucity of artillery officers, such
officers as chose to volunteer from the line and
were approved of by the commandant of artillery
were appointed. The following, this year, joined
the corps from the infantry:—Lieutenants Drummond,
Jones, H. Green, Clements Brown, Winbolt,
Matthews, and Hopper; others joined in a similar
manner previously, but their names have not been
ascertained, though from a correspondence three
years afterwards, we find Lieutenants Macalister
and R. Browne were among them.
120From the return of the two great detachments
from Western India and the coast in 1785, the corps
does not appear to have been called on to take the
field; but this calm was soon to be at an end, and
the Carnatic once again became the field of battle.
Tippoo inherited with his dominions all his father’s
hatred and jealousy of the British, and from the
time of his succession it was evident that he would
take the earliest favourable opportunity to renew
the war; with such feelings on his part, and
jealousy and fear on the part of the British, peace
could not long remain.
The war having recommenced with Tippoo in
the Carnatic, assistance was called for from the
Bengal Government, and in January, 1790, the
whole of the second battalion of artillery was
directed to be in readiness to embark for Madras
on the shortest notice; and to economize the store
of gunpowder, its issue was prohibited, save for
service and artillery practice; country powder was
ordered to be purchased by agents, and supplied for
all other purposes.
The men of the 2nd battalion, unequal to the
fatigues of field service, were removed to the 1st
and 3rd battalions, and their places supplied by
121volunteers from them; twelve companies of lascars
were attached, and the whole marched from Dum-Dum
on the 5th February, and embarked on the
16th on the “Houghton” and “Chesterfield”
Indiamen, and sloop “Lucnow,” except a detachment
of one-half of the 2nd company, which
marched with the infantry of the detachment
under Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell, and which
was afterwards joined at Masulipatam by a complete
company in addition, from the 1st battalion.
Lieutenant-Colonel Deare was at this time commissary
of stores in Fort William, but giving over
charge of the arsenal to Lieutenant Humphries,
secretary to the Military Board, he took command
of his battalion.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Deare, commandant;
Lieutenant Johnson, adjutant; Lieutenant Balfour,
quartermaster; and Conductor Johnson.
Lascar Companies.
Company.
Battalion.
Captains.
Lieutenants.
Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
Non-com. Officers and Men.
1, 7
1
2
Ellwood
Horsburgh Macpherson
Butler C. Brown
74
2
2
Nash
Feade
37
3, 4, 13
3
2
Horsford
Tomkyns Nelly
Winbolt H. Green
74
2, 5
4
2
Smith
Wittit Clarke
Dowell Matthews
74
6, 15, 16
5
2
Sampson
Hardwicke Cranch
Dunn Jones
71
122The 2nd battalion was probably selected for this
service from its being complete at the presidency;
but the officers of the other battalions seem to have
thought they had been wronged by a departure
from the regular roster, and accordingly Major
Greene, 5 captains, and 20 subalterns appealed to
Lord Cornwallis, that their juniors, or others out
of turn, should not be sent. Lord Cornwallis, in
general orders, commented on their proceedings,
exculpating the subalterns on the plea of inexperience,
but blaming the seniors for attempting to
dictate to Government on such a point.
Lieutenant-Colonel Deare, his staff the 1st, 5th,
and a quarter of the 2nd company, under Lieutenant
Nash; the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 13th, and 16th companies
of lascars, with one-half the magazine and quartermaster’s
establishment, embarked on board the
“Houghton,” while Major Woodburn, with the 3rd,
4th, and a quarter of the 2nd company, under
Lieutenant-Fireworker Feade; the 1st, 3rd, 4th,
5th, and 15th companies of lascars, with the remainder
of the magazine and quartermaster’s
establishment, embarked on the “Chesterfield;”
a party, however, of 150 lascars from 2nd and 5th
companies, with Lieutenants Horsburgh and Wittit,
proceeded in the “Lucnow.”
123The former ships had a fair passage for that
season, and reached Madras before the end of
March; the companies landed, and the headquarters,
with 1st, 3rd, and 5th companies, immediately
marched for Conjeveram, where, on the
30th March, they joined Colonel Musgrave’s detachment,
en route to Trichinopoly, the rendezvous
of the grand army, and arrived there on the 29th
April; the 4th company remained at Conjeveram.
The “Lucnow” was delayed in the river till
6th March, and did not leave the pilot till the 10th;
their passage was so slow, that on the 3rd April it
became necessary to reduce the allowance of water
to each man; however, on the 19th April she reached
Madras; the detachment of the 2nd company was
landed and marched to the Mount, where it joined
the part under Lieutenants Nash and Feade;
Lieutenant Horsford marched for Trichinopoly, to
join his company, and Lieutenant Wittit, with the
lascars, set out for Wallajabad, where he arrived on
the 2nd May, and gave them over to Captain Smith,
commanding the Bengal artillery, with the force at
that station, under Colonel Kelly.
The King’s ships being all withdrawn, an armament,
consisting of four Company’s ships and two
124coasting vessels, was fitted out under command of
Commodore Mitchell, who was knighted for his conduct
in this expedition, succeeded in capturing two
privateers, equal in size to small frigates, and in
engaging and beating off two large frigates and
another stout ship.
At this time a circumstance occurred which
caused the relative precedence of the different arms
of the service in the King’s and Company’s service
to be set at rest by general orders.
Lieutenant Wittit, being for picket duty with a
party of artillerymen, was proceeding to take the
right of the party from H. M.’s 74th regiment, when
the adjutant on duty directed him to parade on
the left; to this he objected, but on being told it
was Colonel Kelly’s positive order, he reluctantly
obeyed, and reported the circumstance to his
commanding officer, Captain Smith, and Captain
Speediman, commanding the artillery at the station.
In forwarding the statement, Captain Smith mentioned
a case having occurred in Bengal, between
Captain Montague and Colonel MacLeod, of H.M.’s
73rd regiment, and requested that it might be
referred to Earl Cornwallis, the commander-in-chief,
which was done, and his lordship decided that
125“H.M.’s cavalry takes post of the Company’s
cavalry, H.M.’s artillery of the Company’s artillery,
and H.M.’s infantry of the Company’s infantry;
but the artillery takes post of the infantry, without
considering the service to which they belong.”
The relative precedence of the troops of the
three presidencies was also decided at the same
time: the Bengal troops are always to be on the
right; the Madras and Bombay to take the right
of each other in their own presidency, but to draw
lots for the post when they meet on neutral
ground.
The main body of the army was now assembled,
to the number of 15,000 fighting men, at Trichinopoly;
to each European battalion were attached
two 12–pounders, and to each native battalion
two 6–pounder guns, while a park of four iron and
four brass 18–pounders, and four howitzers, for
field service, accompanied, together with a large
train of battering guns.
General Meadows arrived and reviewed the army
on the 24th May, and on the 26th it commenced
its march, the plan of the campaign being to enter
Mysore by the Guzelhutty Pass, securing a communication
by occupying, as a line of posts and
126depôts, Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Carrore, Erroad, and
Sattimungulum.
On the 15th June, the army reached Carrore,
which they found evacuated, and, to lighten their
march, deposited the iron and two of the brass
18–pounders, two of the howitzers, and about
1,200 sick in the fort.
Daropooram was taken; Coimbatore evacuated
by the end of July; Erroad was taken early in
August, but want of carriage was even thus early
felt; officers were all directed to double up in their
tents, and the battering guns, stores, and convalescents
were left in Coimbatore. In the attack on
Erroad the Bengal Artillery was employed under
Colonel Deare. Dindigul and Palacatcherry were
taken, and Sattimungulum surrendered to a detachment
under Colonel Lloyd, with which was Captain
Sampson’s company of artillery; in the two former,
the artillery of the coast were employed, and at
Dindigul Colonel Moorhouse, an officer much
respected, met his death.
It has been said that a detachment of the 2nd
company 2nd battalion marched with Colonel
Cockerell’s division from Bengal; they joined the
division at Balasore on the 24th March, and a
127complete company, in addition, from the 1st battalion,
was sent by sea, and overtook them on the
20th June at Masulipatam; the officers were as
follows:—
Lascar Companies.
Company.
Battalion.
Captains.
Lieutenants.
Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
No. of Privates.
11, 12
2
2
Montagu
Douglas
Briscoe
37
23, 29, 30
5
1
Barton
Hinde Toppin
Tulloh Hill
74
With the former were four 6–pounders and eight
tumbrils, with spare carriages, and with the latter
were ten 6–pounders and two 12–pounders.
The division reached Conjeveram on the 1st
August. The 2nd company 2nd battalion, now
completed by the other half joining, was attached,
to the 1st brigade; the 5th company 1st battalion
to the 2nd brigade, and a Madras company to the
3rd or reserve, Major Woodburn commanding the
artillery.[27] This division marched under Colonel
Kelly, by Wandiwash to Arnee, which place they
had reached by the end of August, and were thus
ready to penetrate the valley of Baramahl.
Thus far the campaign had been successful; a
line of communication had been established, and
128the main body and centre division were ready
to fall on Tippoo’s dominions from two points—the
Baramahl Valley and the Guzelhutty Pass.
The advanced division, under Colonel Lloyd,
with which were the 1st, 3rd, and 5th companies
of the 2nd battalion artillery was at Sattimungulum,
the main body, under General Meadows,
at Coimbatore, 60 miles in rear, and the rear
division under Colonel Stewart at Palacatcherry,
30 miles in rear of the main body, while Colonel
Kelly’s with the centre army was at Baramahl.
Such were the positions of the British army,
when, on the 11th September, Tippoo with
his whole force descended by the Guzelhutty
Pass. His movements had been unknown; want
of intelligence, partly caused by the numbers of
cavalry who enveloped Tippoo’s movements, and
partly from want of arrangements, was a prevailing
misfortune in these campaigns, and the first intelligence
of this movement was received by Colonel
Lloyd on the 12th from some battalions sent out
to collect grain.
On the 13th, a cavalry party sent out to
reconnoitre, fell in with the advance of Tippoo’s
army, and falling back on their supports, kept
129the enemy at bay till he drew off, and then
returned to camp. Tippoo soon followed, but
Colonel Floyd took up a position which confined
his attack to a cannonade, commencing with three
pieces, which he advanced under cover of the
hedges, and which, from being at a distance, and
the supply of ammunition with the British being
short, were not at first molested, he gradually
increased them until, by 2 o’clock, there was a
semicircle of 15 pieces playing with much execution
on the British line; but it may be as well
to extract, from a letter of Lieutenant Hardwicke,
who was in the action with Captain Sampson’s
company, to Lieutenant Wittit:—“The enemy
advanced so fast, that the camp was struck a second
time, and all baggage thrown into a place of security.
The line formed and advanced, and about
10 o’clock the enemy’s guns opened upon us, and
by 11 o’clock we had taken our position and
returned the fire. The enemy extended his line
so as to form a crescent, and opened guns to bear
upon us in every situation, and so well were they
served that every shot did execution. * * *
On the right of our line an 18, two 12, and two
6–pounders kept up a smart fire, against which the
130enemy returned a most galling one. About 12 o’clock
our commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Deare,[28]
received a shot in his breast, and expired immediately.
Half an hour afterwards, Captain Sampson,
our second in command, while speaking to me,
received a very dangerous wound in the head, from
a stone which a shot, that at this moment killed
my horse, had raised; whole files of the grenadiers
were swept away; half our gun bullocks fell; and
the desertion of all the drivers increased the confusion.
The cannonade continued till the close
131of day, and before it was quite dark we could
perceive they were drawing off their guns. The
two 12–pounders were rendered useless very early
in the day by the axletrees giving way; the
18–pounder limber received a shot and blew up;
both my 6–pounders were so damaged by shot
that one only could travel; except the left of the
line, every part of the ordnance suffered much, and
it appeared impossible to bear such a cannonade
till relief could come from the grand army; to
stand another day seemed likely to lessen our
means of getting off, and while we had guns to
defend ourselves in a retreat, that measure was
thought most advisable.”
The day had been disastrous, many killed and
wounded, and three guns disabled, but Colonel
Floyd reported that the “rest of the guns fired
with excellent aim, but sparingly, for the stock of
ammunition was not great. H. M.’s regiments and
the artillery did themselves justice with their
accustomed valour.”
A council of war followed at night, and, as
might be expected (for when did a council of war
ever recommend an energetic plan?), a retreat to
Coimbatore, sacrificing baggage and followers, was
132resolved on. It certainly does appear strange, with
a fort at hand and the main army within 60 miles,
the resolution of holding the fort till help arrived
was not determined on.
The intention of abandoning the followers got
abroad, and they all fled, so that no artificers could
be found to repair the damaged carriages; however,
the experience of the officers, with the aid of the
Europeans, supplied the deficiency, and by 1 A.M.
of the 14th they were in a serviceable state; by
4 A.M. the army was in retreat, but from the loss
of bullocks one 18, two 12, and three 6–pounders
were left behind.
Crossing the “Bavani” in basket-boats, the retreat
commenced unmolested, but “about 10 o’clock
(and here we again quote Lieutenant Hardwicke’s
letter) we could discern the enemy’s line of march,
and at 1 o’clock they opened their guns upon us,
moving parallel with our line and taking advantage
of every situation which gave them a view of the
line. About 3 o’clock their infantry and horse
crowded on the rear, an advantage the nature of
the country or badness of the road gave them; they
enfiladed us from behind hedges, buildings, &c.,
and at 5 o’clock they appeared in all quarters and
133advanced with a ‘ding’ in crowds. The battalions
reserved their fire, and gave it almost on the point
of the bayonet with surprising effect; some faced
to the rear and resisted the attacks there. * * *
A 6–pounder and two tumbrils were, however, here
lost, but it was astonishing the havoc the remaining
6–pounder in that quarter made at this time;
so severe did they feel our fire, that theirs
slackened, and a charge made by the whole of
our cavalry gave a turn to the fate of the day.
Night closed on the bloody scene, and we continued
our march till 9 o’clock. By the lights in
the enemy’s camp we could tell they were not far
off, and it was thought prudent, weakened as we
were by two such days’ fatigue, to continue our
march; we accordingly set off again at 3 o’clock,
and directed our route towards the hills, expecting
to meet a reinforcement from the general; we crept
along all the day, suffering almost as much from
fatigue, heat, and want of sustenance, as we had
before from the enemy. * * * We lost in
all six guns and the greatest part of our baggage.
Lieutenant Horsborough was slightly wounded in
the head, and Lieutenant Winbolt in the arm.”
The artillery lost in these actions—1 lieutenant-colonel,
1341 corporal, 6 lascars killed, 2 captains,
2 lieutenants, 10 Europeans, and 15 lascars
wounded.
The whole army was now collected at Coimbatore,
and on it moving forwards, Tippoo made an
unsuccessful attempt on the place.
On Colonel Kelly’s death, on the 24th September,
the centre army fell under Colonel Maxwell’s
command, and entered the Baramahl valley; but
the operations of this division only once brought
them into contact with the enemy, on the 12th of
November, on which occasion the good position
taken up, and the correct fire of a gun, prevented
an attack by the overwhelming numbers opposed.
A junction took place with the main army on the
10th November, and both armies followed Tippoo,
to relieve Trichinopoly, and after some desultory
operations, the campaign concluded.
In November and December Lieutenants Jones
and Nash, of the artillery, died, and Lieutenants
T. Green, Exshaw, McLeod, Drummond, and
Buchan came round from Bengal to join the
battalion.
By Lieutenant-Colonel Deare’s death, Captain
Montague was promoted to a majority, but directed
135to remain with the 2nd battalion; Lieutenant
Glass to a company, and joined; Colonel Duff was
ordered round to command the Bengal artillery,
and arrived about the middle of December. These
promotions were made subject to the Court of
Directors’ approval, because Colonel Duff had
memorialized to be allowed to command the artillery
brigade as senior officer. The regimental
formation having taken place, his claim was not
allowed by the Indian Government, but referred
home, where it was finally negatived, and these
promotions confirmed, in the Courts letter, 4th
August, 1791.
On the 12th December Lord Cornwallis arrived,
and assumed command of the army; fresh energy
was instilled into every department, and by the
5th February the march commenced.
The park consisted of eleven 18–pounders, six
12–pounders, and eight mortars, with an ample
supply of ammunition and stores. Lieutenant-Colonel
Giels (Madras artillery) commanded artillery
of right wing; Major Moorhouse, left wing;
Major Woodburn, heavy park; Major Montague, of
the advance.
The plan of the campaign was to penetrate
136Mysore by the line of Vellore, Ambore, and Bangalore;
and to meet the British, Tippoo moved off
from Pondicherry (where he had been intriguing
with the French), and was ready to oppose them by
the usual routes; but Lord Cornwallis, marching in
the direction of Ambore, turned suddenly to the
north, and gained the foot of the Mooglee pass on
the 17th February, and by the 21st the whole army
had ascended, and were encamped in Mysore before
Tippoo could oppose them; the ghat presented but
few difficulties; the heavy guns, with the aid of
men and elephants, gave little trouble.
On the 24th marched for Bangalore, in three
columns: the artillery on the right, infantry in the
centre, and cavalry on the left; to keep the enemy’s
cavalry at a distance, the European regiments were
equipped with the iron 12–pounders from the
park, and on several occasions their services were
found very useful on the march to Bangalore,
before which the army took up their position on
the 5th March. On the next day the cavalry went
out on a reconnaisance, in which they were worsted
by Tippoo’s troops, and but for the opportune
arrival of Major Gowdie and Major Montague, with
assistance, and contrary to orders, our loss would
137have been severe. On the 7th the pettah was
attacked and carried, and Tippoo’s endeavour to
retake it repulsed; the fort was now attacked; on
the 12th, a 10–gun, a 2–gun, a mortar battery,
and a 9–gun battery in the ditch of the pettah
were commenced, and opened on the 15th; on
the 16th a breach appeared, but two guns, an
18–pounder and a 24–pounder, were disabled.
On the night of the 17th a 4–gun battery was
erected against the gateway. “So just was the
aim of our artillery,” Major Dirom says, “that on
the 18th, notwithstanding the strength of the wall,
the breach was considered practicable by several
qualified to judge from the experience of several
years’ service; another parallel, however, was laid
out and completed within 200 yards, and its batteries
armed.
“On the 19th, the 4–gun battery opened;
this and the others kept up a constant cannonade
on the breach and neighbouring towers, replied
to sharply by musketry from covert way and outworks;
to keep which down, additional batteries
were erected in the advanced parallel, and were
ready by daylight.
“On the 20th the fire widened the breach, and
138rendered it easier of access, although its defences
were still numerous, and at dusk a working party
opened a sap from the advanced battery to the
crest of the glacis; the enemy employed in attempting
to stockade the breach.”
On the 21st the enemy meditated an attack on
the British camp, but, being met, retreated; they
however advanced again in the evening.
At 11 o’clock at night the storming party prepared
to move forward, and for about an hour
previous a heavy cannonade was kept up on the
breach, and as this intimidated the defenders from
remaining there, it was kept up with blank cartridges
while the storming party advanced; the
party gained the top of the breach without very
much opposition, and wheeled off to the right and
left, overcoming a considerable resistance at different
points.
The whole of the Bengal artillery (six companies)
it is believed were employed in this service. The
casualties, from 7th to 21st March, amounted to
only 8 Europeans and 2 gun lascars killed; and
the following extract from the general orders of
the 22nd March records the satisfaction they gave.
“The judicious arrangements made by Colonel
139Duff, in the artillery department, his exertions
and those of the other officers and soldiers of that
corps in general, in the service of the batteries, are
entitled to his lordship’s perfect approbation; to
which he desires to add, that he thinks himself
much obliged to Lieutenant-Colonel Giels (Madras
establishment) for the able manner in which he
conducted the fire during the day of the 21st.”
The army remained in Bangalore till the 4th
May, during which time every exertion was used to
collect carriage,—every expedient that could be
suggested was tried: private cattle were obtained
by leaving behind camp equipage and every necessary;
a reward was given to camp-followers of
1½ rupees for every 24–pounder, and 1 rupee
for every 18–pounder shot they would carry
to Seringapatam; every nerve was strained,
that an attack might be made at once upon the
capital; the train was put in order, but beyond
bullocks for 52 field-pieces and a few howitzers,
sufficient for only 15 battering-guns could be collected.
Thus equipped, on the 4th the army
marched, and after much difficulty, from the state of
the carriage cattle, reached Arakerry, on the river
Cavery, a few miles below Seringapatam, on the
14013th May; the river was found unfordable, and no
place nearer than Caniambaddy, eight miles above
the fort, could be found. Tippoo, with his army,
was encamped about six miles off, with his right to
the river, and left to a rugged mountain. While
attempting to render the ford passable, on the 14th,
the army halted, and Lord Cornwallis conceived the
idea of attacking Tippoo by a night march, and
cutting him off from a retreat on Seringapatam.
The attempt was made, but a heavy storm overtaking
the army soon after it started, the way was
lost, and the troops got entangled, so that they
were forced to halt till daylight; the effect of a
surprise was lost; the enemy, however, were defeated
with loss. The artillery had Lieutenant Macpherson,
one European, and four lascars wounded;
but the chief part were probably left behind, under
Colonel Duff, with the camp, heavy guns, and
stores. Lieutenant Macpherson died of his wounds
on the 21st May.
On the 20th the army had reached the ford at
Caniambaddy, but in such a state, from deficiency of
food, carriage, and material, and the state of the
weather, that Lord Cornwallis found it would be
impossible to move the battering-train from where
141it was, and that he must give up the hope of taking
Seringapatam for the present. On the 22nd,
three 24–pounders and eight 18–pounders were
burst, all the stores were buried or destroyed, and
the whole of the public grain distributed among the
troops, and the whole army were in motion on their
melancholy retreat on the 26th May; they moved
slowly back to Bangalore, which they reached on
the 11th July, putting all their spare tumbrils and
stores into Bangalore (Lieutenant Douglas was
appointed commissary of ordnance). The army
moved lightly on the 15th, to cover the passage of
a convoy from below the ghats. Ossoor surrendered
and Captain Glass’s (2nd company 2nd battalion)
company of artillery was thrown into it, with a
battalion of Bengal volunteers as a garrison. This
company, with heavy guns, was employed in September
in escorting a convoy to Bangalore.
In September, a detachment under Major Gowdie
was sent against Nundydroog, a hill fort, which, if
left in the enemy’s possession, would have given
trouble to the army on their advance to Seringapatam,
for which every thing was now nearly ready.
With Major Gowdie’s detachment was a detachment
of artillery under Major Montague, four iron
14212–pounders and two small mortars. This detail
was probably from the 5th company 1st battalion,
as Lieutenant T. Hill’s name is mentioned during
the subsequent operations, and to that company he
belonged.
On the road to Nundydroog the hill fortress of
Raymanghur was taken. “The indefatigable exertion
of Major Montague in getting four 6–pounders
and two mortars on a rock which completely flanked
the proposed point of attack, his firing with great
effect, and throwing shells with much judgment,”
are acknowledged by Major Gowdie, as contributing
to the early capture of the place.
From Raymanghur the division proceeded against
Nundydroog, a hill fortress of great strength, situated
on ground most difficult of approach, where,
on the 29th, they were joined by two 24–pounder
guns and four mortars, with a quantity of stores.
With astonishing labour and exertion, Major
Montague, on the night of the 2nd October, got
two 24–pounders into the battery by means of
ropes fastened round posts driven into the ground,
and trees, and all the resources which an artillery
officer must bring into play in such circumstances;
and on the 4th, this and a mortar battery from the
143pettah opened, but the height was too great, for the
mortars, and the guns were unable to make any
impression on the solid blocks of stone of which the
walls were formed; regular approaches were resolved
on, and an 8–gun battery (18–pounders)
got ready up the hill, into which, on the 11th
October, the guns were drawn by two elephants
each, aided by four drag-ropes and crowds of men.
On the 12th this battery opened with excellent
effect, and soon silenced all the guns in its direction,
except one on the south-east angle, which did
much mischief; a traverse was raised against this,
and an advanced battery for two 6–pounders; into
this, with infinite labour, a 12–pounder was also
conveyed, and the angle gave way to a few well-directed
shots by Major Montague, and the troublesome
gun came tumbling down the rock. The
ammunition running short, the fire was slack until
the 16th, when a fresh supply arrived from Bangalore.
The breach being now practicable, on the 18th
the army moved up, and on that evening the assault
took place. An artillery officer, with a party of
men and a small mortar, to be used as a petard for
blowing open the gate of the inner wall, accompanied
144the storming party. The resistance, though great
at first, was not continued, and the place was won
without a heavy loss.
Lieutenant T. Hill, of the artillery, was wounded,
during the siege, in the thigh by the bursting
of a shell, and Lieutenant Cranch slightly in the
shoulder.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart’s division now proceeded
against Savendroog, a hill fortress on a
rocky mountain, half a mile high, and eight or ten
miles in circumference; on the 10th December,
the division was within three miles of it, the Commander-in-Chief
covering the siege with the main
army; the hill was surrounded by a deep belt of
jungle, composed of bamboos and trees, interspersed
with large masses of rock; a narrow path was the
only road, and this was rendered difficult from
barriers. A road for the guns was with great labour
formed through this forest, and they were transported
with much difficulty through; the enemy
offered little or no interruption, confident in the
strength of their post and the fearful ally, malaria,
which haunted the jungle, and, which Tippoo
affirmed, would destroy one-half of the army, while
he would slaughter the other. On the 17th December,
145two batteries opened, one of three 18–pounders,
at 800 yards, at an elevation of 23°, and
the other of three 12–pounders and two 18–pounders,
at 700 yards; the artillery was under Major
Montague, but we are unable to ascertain what
company.
The wall being formed of solid slabs of stone
fastened together by iron rivets, and the guns firing
at an elevation, the effect of the 12–pounders did
not at first answer the expectations formed. Two
2–gun batteries were pushed on to within 250 yards,
and the 12–pounders were replaced by 18–pounders
drawn from the main army, and their continued
fire soon opened a breach in the upper wall. On
the 20th, the breach was reconnoitred, and Major
Montague not considering it sufficiently open, kept
up an incessant and well-directed fire upon it all
day, and before dark the breach was widened, and
the outer wall shattered to its foundation.
On the 21st the storm took place; the signal
was to be given when the fogs, which daily rise
from the low ground and ascend the hill, should wrap
the fortress in their sombre mantle, hiding from
the besieged the besiegers’ intentions. At about
11 o’clock A.M. the signal-guns were fired, and
146the enemy moved down to defend the breach, but
the batteries opened a deadly fire of grape, under
cover of which the storming party advanced, and
rapidly drove the enemy back, entering the citadel
with them, and gaining possession of the place.
Major Montague’s successful exertions in bringing
his guns into battery, and his professional
skill in directing their fire, again earned the
praises of the Commander-in-Chief in Government
Orders.
Other fortresses fell—Ramghurry, Sheriaghurry,
and Outredroog, with little resistance; Lieutenant
Shipton, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Charles Brown
and Butler, were present at their taking; but now
all attention was turned to the main object of the
campaign, the siege of Seringapatam.
During the operations above detailed, convoys of
stores and ordnance had been arriving, and every
care taken to put the matériel of the army on the
best possible footing; every thing was collected in
Bangalore, and the train under Colonel Duff arrived
there on the 12th January, 1792, in high order;
“the draught cattle were in such high order” (to
quote from a letter of that period), “that they literally
came in with the heavy guns on a gallop.”
147The train consisted of—
4
24–pounders,
24
18–pounders,
4
12–pounders,
60
6–pounders,
3
8–inch howitzers,
4
5½-inch howitzers,
6
5½ and 4⅕ mortars,
1
8–inch mortar,
60
6–pounder tumbrils,
206
store tumbrils,
9
spare carriages,
225
carts.
The Bengal Artillery during the last few months
had been weakened by the loss of officers: Captain
Smith and Lieutenant Horsborough died in October,
1791, at Bangalore, and Captain Sampson early in
January, 1792; but Captains Howell and Burnett
supplied their vacancies.
On the 1st February, the army marched from
Bangalore, the troops on the right, the battering-train
in the centre, and the baggage on the left;
the cattle and the carriages were so good that
the train moved without difficulty, and on the 5th
February, the army came in sight of Seringapatam.
Tippoo had drawn his army into a fortified camp
on the north side of the Cavery; Lord Cornwallis,
on the 6th, reached Seringapatam, and resolved to
attack the enemy that night. The army marched
at 7 o’clock in the evening, in three divisions, for
this purpose, leaving their artillery in camp, protected
by the cavalry, quarter, and rear-guards,
148under the command of Colonel Duff. No guns
accompanied the army; but with Lord Cornwallis’s
division were Major Montague (Captain Ross,
Royal Artillery), and subalterns, and 50 European
artillerymen; with General Meadows, Captain
Howell, 2 subalterns, and 50 European artillerymen;
150 lascars went with each division to carry the
scaling-ladders; and with Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell
were 2 subalterns, 30 European artillerymen,
and 50 lascars. In spite of the opposition and the
difficulties the nature of the ground presented, the
intentions of the Commander-in-Chief were carried
out, and the morning of the 7th found the British
army in possession of the camp; but several
attempts were made by Tippoo to dislodge them
from some of the redoubts they had taken, particularly
the one called, hitherto, the Sultan’s
redoubt, but from this day Sibbald’s, in compliment
to the gallant man who, with a very small force,
held it this day against Tippoo’s repeated attacks.
In this defence, the life of a valuable officer of the
Bengal Artillery, Lieutenant Buchan, was lost,
one to whose resources in the hour of emergency
its successful defence was indebted.
The detachment with Major Montague was
149actively employed in securing the field-artillery in
the enemy’s camp; instead of spiking the guns,
Major Montague directed that they should be
thrown off their carriages and the wheels rolled
different ways, by which means the guns taken were
secured without being damaged, and the parts afterwards
easily collected: upwards of sixty guns were
thus taken.[29] The chief loss fell on the lascars, of
whom eight were killed and twenty-two wounded
or missing.
The fortress was now invested by the combined
armies, and preparations made for the siege; in this
Lieutenant Hind, of the Bengal Artillery, with 300
lascars assisted, collecting and preparing materials
for gabions and fascines; but a treaty formed with
Tippoo rendered these useless, and in May the
army broke up.
The artillery marched to the coast, where Colonel
Duff left them, and sailed for England in the
“Dutton,” Indiaman, with General Meadows: the
rest embarked in the “Ardesir,” “Mary,” “Hero,”
and “Juliana Maria,” and reached Bengal early in
July.
150The following tabular statement, compiled from
the Prize-money Distribution Statements, will shew
more clearly the officers who were present in these
campaigns, as each officer had not been mentioned
at the time of his joining.
Rank.
Name.
Proportion of Shares for Companies.
Remarks.
90
91
91½
Colonel
P. Duff Staff
full
full
Lieut.-Col.
C. R. Deare Staff
¾
killed at Sattimungalum.
Major
W. Woodburn Staff
full
full
full
Major
E. Montague Staff
full
full
full
Captain
P. Cranell Staff
full
full
full
died at Madras.
Captain
T. Hardwicke Staff
full
full
full
Captain
T. Ellwood
full
full
full
Captain
G. Howell
¾
full
Captain
A. Glass
full
full
Captain
J. Horsford
full
full
full
Captain
J. Smith
full
Captain
G. F. Sampson
full
full
Captain
J. Burnett
full
Captain
C. Wittit
full
full
Lieutenant
J. Horsborough
full
full
Lieutenant
D. McPherson
full
½
Lieutenant
H. Douglas
¼
full
Lieutenant
J. R. Exshaw
full
full
Lieutenant
T. Greene
full
full
Lieutenant
J. Tomkyns
full
full
full
Lieutenant
J. Nelly
full
full
full
Lieutenant
E. Clarke
full
full
Lieutenant
T. Hardwicke
full
full
full
Lieutenant
H. Balfour
full
full
151Lieutenant
W. Shipton
full
Lieutenant
T. Hill
full
Lieutenant
J. P. Drummond
full
Lieutenant
T. Dowell
full
full
Lieutenant
R. Tulloh
full
Lt.-Firewk.
A. Dunn
½
full
full
Lt.-Firewk.
A. McLeod
full
full
Lt.-Firewk.
A. Buchan
full
full
Lt.-Firewk.
A. Mathews
full
full
Lt.-Firewk.
W. Winbolt
full
full
full
Lt.-Firewk.
H. Green
full
full
full
Lt.-Firewk.
W. Feade
full
full
Lt.-Firewk.
E. Butler
full
full
full
Lt.-Firewk.
Charles Brown
full
full
full
Lt.-Firewk.
J. J. Briscoe
full
full
full
Cadet
J. P. Keeble
full
Inf. Invalided Lt.Co. 1820.
Cadet
P. Fortnham
full
resigned Aug 1800.
Cadet
J. Gore
full
Inf., died at sea 97–8.
During these campaigns the following officers
lost their lives, either in action or from disease:—Lieutenant-Colonel
C. R. Deare, killed; Captains
Smith and Sampson; Lieutenants Macpherson and
Buchan, killed. Lieutenants Horsborough, Nash,
and Jones, and several others, were forced to seek
health in a sea-voyage.
152The services of the native troops, including the
artillery lascars, on this occasion, were rewarded by
a medal, and six months’ batta was given to all the
officers and troops.
1788
1789
1790
1791
1792
1793
1794
1795
Strength on 1st Nov.
969
980
1176
1155
1162
1083
844
755
Died
51
80
133
146
102
83
65
65
Deserted
3
6
7
11
14
10
10
8
Discharged
25
30
9
7
10
11
5
7
Invalided
26
15
21
25
35
31
15
37
Total
105
131
170
189
161
135
95
117
153It will not be uninteresting at this period to
examine the casualties of the regiment, with a view
to ascertaining the relative health enjoyed in those
days and at present: fortunately, the long rolls of
the regiment are tolerably perfect at this period,
and the following is an abstract, giving an average
of 138 casualties per annum to a strength of
1,016, or about 13 per cent. per annum,—almost
the same proportion of casualties as have taken
place from the same causes during the last three
years: their amount is 368, and the strength of the
regiment in Europeans maybe taken as 3,000. The
average, however, of a longer period will be more
favourable to modern times, as the losses during
the Afghanistan war, the destruction of the 1st
troop, and the mortality from disease at Sukkhur,
all tend to swell these years beyond their predecessors;
but this subject will be adverted to hereafter,
when abstracts of longer periods have been
made.
In August, 1793, five companies of artillery, the
2nd and 4th of 1st battalion, the 1st of 2nd battalion,
and the 4th and 5th of 3rd battalion, under
command of Major Bruce, sailed for the coast,
forming part of an expedition against Pondicherry.
The troops do not appear to have been employed,
and the artillery returned in October.
The allowances of officers of similar rank and in
similar commands, at this time and fifty years later,
form a contrast much in favour of the liberality of
the old scale.
154
The allowances to Major Bruce in 1793 were fixed at
The allowances to a Major similarly placed in 1843 would be
Pay as Major Rs.
180
0
0
Pay as Major Rs.
182
10
0
Batta as Colonel
1,200
0
0
Batta as Major
456
9
0
½ Table allowance
600
0
0
Tentage as Major
120
0
0
Field allowance
120
0
0
Horse allowance
30
0
0
Command allow.
300
0
0
Total
2,100
0
0
Total
1,089
3
0
But it must be allowed that the juniors of the army
are in much better circumstances than they were
then.
The whole of the officers employed were to
receive full batta at Madras, and the difference of
full and double full batta to be audited to them in
Bengal.
A detachment of 105 Europeans and 230 lascars,
under Captain Frazer,[30] embarked in October on
board Commodore Mitchell’s fleet as marines, and
served for nearly a year. Their good conduct, and
the unanimity which prevailed between them and
the crews of the different ships, were eulogized by
the Commander-in-Chief in General Orders on their
return.
The regiment was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief,
Sir Robert Abercrombie, in February, and
155by the Governor-General, Sir John Shore, in March,
1794, and elicited, on both occasions, praises for its
appearance, discipline, and performance of exercises
and evolutions.
From the General Orders of 9th June of this year,
we learn that, “at the recommendation of the
commandant of artillery and chief engineer, the
Rev. W. Paul Limerick, chaplain, was appointed
teacher of mathematics to the corps of artillery and
engineers, with the allowance of 500 rupees per
mensem, formerly received by W. Burroughs in a
similar situation.”
A detail under Captain Carnegie accompanied
the force commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Erskine, which proceeded to Chittagong in February
and returned in June; and a detachment of
36 matrosses proceeded in June, under Captain
Howell to Bencoolen, and were lost on the passage.
Another detachment of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th companies,
2nd battalion, proceeded to the coast, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Hussey, returning, however, in
October.
The only portion of the regiment which was
engaged in active service this year, 1794, was the
3rd battalion, three companies of which were
156employed with the army under Sir R. Abercrombie,
in Rohilcund, in the short campaign against Gholam
Mohummud, who had murdered his brother,
and usurped the government of the district of
Rampoor.
The following are the companies and officers
employed:—
Major C. Green, Commanding.
Lascar Companies.
Company.
Battalion.
Captains.
Lieutenants.
Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
1, 9, 20
1
3
Hardwicke
Watkins & Macleod
C. Brown
8, 17, 28
2
3
Mordaunt
Baker, A. Dunn
Hoffer, Tilfer
18, 19, 25
3
3
Macintyre
W. Shipton
Lt.-Firew. Clem. Brown was Adj.
F. Maynard (doubtful).
On the 26th October, the line (consisting of one
European regiment, ten native, two weak regiments
of native cavalry, and the artillery above mentioned
and 28 pieces of ordnance) was under arms before
daylight. The Commander-in-Chief and staff rode
forwards to reconnoitre the enemy, whom they
found some miles in advance, near Bittowrah. The
line came up, the artillery in the intervals, and the
Rohillas pressing forwards, the reserve was brought
up into line; they moved so fast, that the artillery
attached to the reserve were unable to keep up,
157and fell into the rear. The enemy at this time
were in the jungle on the front and flanks, and
some lamentable error committed by Captain Ramsay,
commanding the cavalry on the right, wheeled
it to the left, and brought it upon the infantry,
throwing both into confusion, which was instantly
taken advantage of by the enemy, who charged in
a most daring and gallant manner (though suffering
severely from the fire of grape, which was well
directed, and caused great havoc), cutting up the
regiments on the right fearfully. Lieutenant Tilfer
and the artillerymen and lascars at the guns were
cut down to a man. The confusion was great for
a time; and the enemy in part reached the centre
and rear. However, by strenuous exertions, the
tide of victory was stayed, and turned in favour of
the British, but not without a heavy loss, as is
attested by a monument at the village of Futteygunge,
erected by the order of the Governor-General
in Council to the memory of Colonel Burrington
and fourteen British officers who fell in the action,
among whom were Captain Mordaunt, Lieutenant
Baker, and Lieutenant-Fireworker Tilfer, of the
artillery.
One serjeant, 2 gunners, and 20 matrosses, and
15827 lascars also fell; and from the casualties being
all in the same company (2nd company 3rd battalion),
it was probably on the right where the
confusion occurred.
The officers of the army considered that Rampoor
ought to have been plundered, and probably made
their opinion known, for in this case, as in the
similar one of 1774, as a sort of compensation for
plunder, the Nawab presented to the Governor-General
for distribution among the troops engaged
11 lacs of rupees, and one lac for the families of
the officers who fell. The division was made on a
scale drawn up by the junior auditor-general, giving
each person engaged a sum equal to 328 days’
batta of his rank; the amount of the shares is
annexed.
Colonels Rs.
16,400
0
0
Lieut.-Colonels
13,120
0
0
Majors
9,840
0
0
Captains
3,936
0
0
Lieutenants
2,624
0
0
Lt.-Fireworkers
1,968
0
0
Conductors
1,312
0
0
Serjeants
218
0
8
Gunners
109
0
0
Serangs
54
10
8
Tindals
43
11
0
Lascars
21
13
10
The lac of rupees devoted to the families of
deceased officers was divided—40,000 to Colonel
Burrington’s; 20,000 to Captain Bolton’s widow;
and 10,000 to Captain Mawbey’s children; the
159remainder was reserved for such purpose as the
Governor-General might determine hereafter.
In September, 1795, a complete company of
European artillery (5th company 1st battalion),
with two companies (29th and 30th) of lascars,
attached under command of Captain Barton, embarked
for Madras, and a second (5th company
2nd battalion), under Captain Clark, soon followed.
The following officers joined the force under General
Stewart in the expedition against the Dutch
possessions in Ceylon:—
Fifth company 1st battalion, Captain Barton,
Lieutenants Humphries and Winbolt, Lieutenant-Fireworkers
Clarke and Graham. Fifth company
2nd battalion, Captain Clark.
The first service they were engaged in was the
siege of Trincomalee, in January, 1796, in which
the artillery suffered both from climate and fatigue,
and from a daring, and for a time successful attack
the enemy made on the batteries, spiking the guns,
and killing some of the artillerymen. The fort
capitulated after a siege of three weeks.
Jaffna next surrendered, and the troops then
proceeded to Negumbo, where they landed in February,
1796, and meeting no resistance, General
160Stewart marched on towards Colombo, a portion of
the artillery accompanying his force. During this
march, though the road ran through a jungle, and was
intersected by many rivers, the army was unmolested
by the Dutch. Not even at the Matwal river, a
strong natural position which they had taken up,
did they offer any resistance, but retired in the night,
alleging afterwards as a reason their fear of a landing
being effected from the shipping in their rear.
The English passed the river without opposition;
but the following morning were attacked unexpectedly
before daylight by a party of Malays, under
Colonel Raymond, a Frenchman in the Dutch
service thoroughly ashamed of his associates: the
attack was beaten off, and Colombo in a day or
two capitulated.
The Indian Government granted medals to the
native troops employed in this service, probably
more as a reward for embarking on service beyond
seas, than for the arduousness of its nature. A
sketch of the medal is given on the opposite page.
161
CEYLON MEDALS.
The year 1796 is a memorable one in the annals
of the Indian army, its constitution having been
entirely remodelled, and many advantages granted
it at that time, placing it on a footing of respectability
which it had not held before; but the subject
will be reverted to in a future chapter.
The artillery was converted into a regiment of
three battalions, of five companies each, with thirty
companies of lascars attached.
The command of the regiment was vested in the
senior colonel, and a brigade-major was allowed as
his staff officer.
The chief alteration from the organization of 1786
consists in the addition of three colonels and fifteen
captain-lieutenants, and the reduction of fifteen
162lieutenant-fireworkers. The allowance of officers
per company was five, and the rank of captain-lieutenant
was a compensation for the necessarily
slower promotion in a large than a small seniority
regiment, thus keeping the artillery on a level with
the infantry of the army.
per Company.
per Battalion.
Total.
Returns Dec. 1796.
Colonels.
1
3
2
Lieut.-Colonels.
1
3
3
Majors.
1
3
3
Captains.
1
5
15
15
Capt.-Lieutenants.
1
5
15
15
Lieutenants.
2
10
30
29
Lieut.-Fireworkers.
1
5
15
14
Serjeants.
4
20
60
50
Corporals.
4
20
60
59
Drummers.
2
10
30
30
Gunners.
8
40
120
120
Matrosses.
56
280
840
512
Serangs.
1
10
30
30
1st Tindals.
2
20
60
60
2nd Tindals.
2
20
60
60
Lascars.
56
560
1680
1733
CHAPTER IV.
163
Matériel organization, and its successive changes—Guns and
carriages first used—Royal pattern—Madras pattern—Ammunition-carriages—Tumbrils—Horse
Artillery ammunition-carriage—Elevating-screws—Ordnance
in use—Siege-carriages—Howitzer
and Mortar combined carriage—Gribeauval’s
pattern—French caisson—Hardwicke’s pattern—Horse
Artillery guns—Mountain-train carriages—Siege-carriages
and ordnance—Royal pattern (block trail)—Gun and Ammunition
carriages introduced.
Having traced the personnel of the regiment up
to this point, let us take a retrospective survey
and endeavour to track out the matériel; this
cannot be satisfactorily done in the early stage;
the absence of records and drawings renders it
almost impossible; little more than a general idea
can be given, and in this even there must be some
guesswork; occasionally restoring (as the geologists
say) a carriage from a few points found scattered
in the reports of committees, or incidentally alluded
to in other documents.
During Clive’s early wars, 6–pounder guns seem
to have been generally in use, mixed occasionally
164with howitzers and 3–pounders, and when battalion
guns a few years later became the system, two
3–pounders were with most native battalions. In
his organization of the army in 1765, this became
the establishment, and with the European companies
of artillery there were six 6–pounders and two
(probably 5½ inch) howitzers: 12–pounders as field-guns
were introduced later.
The carriages at this time were probably of a
double-cheek pattern, and from the histories of
the actions, we find they were weak and often
breaking down. When Colonel Pearse came into
the command of the regiment, it will be recollected
that he found great fault with them: “They flew
to pieces with common firing in a week;” and
his sweeping condemnation was probably quite
just.
About 1770, it is believed that Colonel Pearse
succeeded in introducing the carriage then in use in
England, adapting its limber to bullock-draught
(Plate No. 1). It is clumsy and ugly certainly, and
with its wooden axle[31] not very strong; doubtless it
was an improvement on the old one. This appears
to have been the pattern till the beginning of this
165century; minor improvements and alterations were
made from time to time as experience pointed out
their necessity, but no radical change. An iron
was probably substituted for the wooden axletree,
during or at the close of the war with Hyder.
Iron axles first appear on the ledgers of the arsenal
of Fort William in 1782–3; the ledger of the preceding
year is missing, and in the antecedent years
they are not mentioned. At this time too the
number is so small (2) as to lead to the supposition
that the introduction was an experiment just being
tried. The entry in the ledger is not sufficiently
detailed to determine whether the axletrees in
question are for siege or field-carriages; but as we
find Colonel Deare alluding to four siege-carriages
with iron axles sent round to Bangalore as having
stood well, it is probable that about this time they
became generally in use.
During the wars with Hyder, the Bengal artillery
was brought into contact with that of the Madras
Presidency, and comparisons were of course made
as to the relative efficiency of the matériel of the
two corps, which doubtless led to the adoption of
some improvements by both.
The campaigns with Tippoo in 1790–1–2 again
166took a large portion of Bengal artillery into the
field with the Madras regiment, and the general
superiority of the Madras carriages for light field-pieces
was admitted by our most experienced
officers. A committee, composed of Majors Woodburne
and Montague,[32] Captains Horsford, Howell,
and Glass, all officers who had served during these
campaigns, was appointed in 1793, and continued
sitting until 1796, to report on, and suggest improvements
to, the ordnance carriages and equipments.
This committee declared that the Bengal 6–pounder
carriages were much too heavy and
unwieldy for field service, but that the weight
and construction of the limber was by far the
most objectionable part. The extension of the
pintle behind the axletree lengthened the draught
nearly three feet between the wheels; the height
of the wheels threw the weight nearly all on the
rear axletree, increasing the draught, and frequently
rendering it impossible to turn the carriage without
unlimbering the gun. The pintle being fixed, tore
the trail-transom to pieces in travelling over rough
167ground; and the position of the elevating screw-boxes
in the centre transom weakened it: these
objections rendered it often impossible to keep up
with infantry in cases of emergency when guns
would have been of the greatest use; this happened
frequently in the late war, when guns, mounted on
the Madras pattern carriage did not meet the same
difficulties.
The committee therefore without hesitation proposed
the introduction of the Madras carriage, with
exception to the wheels and elevating-screw, the
Bengal wheels and the royal 3–pounder screw being
considered better.
The Military Board, on the suggestion of the
commandant of artillery (Colonel Deare), recommended
that the Madras Government should be requested
to send round musters of their 6–pounders,
and 5½-inch howitzer-carriages, and Lord Cornwallis
approved of the plan. Colonel Deare was also
requested to correspond with Colonel Giels (who
had commanded the Madras Artillery in the campaign)
on the subject of any defects which he
might consider to exist in the carriages in question.
This correspondence has not fallen in our way, and
it seems doubtful whether the Madras carriage was
168at this time introduced. Up to 1801 no pattern
seems to have been permanently fixed on, or else
the Madras pattern had intermediately fallen into
disrepute, for, as will be hereafter noticed, some
modification of the Bengal pattern was at this time
preferred.
The Madras pattern alluded to is believed to
have been a block trail—the trail divided in
two pieces, with the cheeks on each cut out from
the solid timber; the trail was very long and the
limber had a projection with a limbering-hook at
the end (Plate No. 2). The chief faults in this construction
were the waste of timber in cutting out
the trail and cheeks; the unnecessary length of the
trail, which, although it rendered the recoil easier,
yet made the draught heavier; and this was again
increased by the projection in rear of the limber.
Another, and a serious evil, arose from the lever
with which the weight of the carriage acted on the
cattle in draught, the axle of the limber being the
fulcrum. This pattern, however, considerably modified,
became the galloper or horse-artillery carriage
in Bengal.
It is, however, worthy of notice, how nearly the
principle of this carriage corresponds with that of
169the royal pattern introduced twenty years later,
and now the standard of all India; had the fantail
been cut off, and the limbering-hook attached to
the axle-bed, there would have been little difference;
and it is strange that this was not done, for the
objection had been seen and noticed in the siege-carriages,
and a remedy adopted, not indeed by
giving the hook to the axle-bed, but by lowering
the limber-wheels and fixing a moveable pintle on
the bolster.
The matériel equipment was again submitted to
the consideration of a committee early in 1801;
Lieutenant-Colonel MacIntyre was the president,
and Major Gordon, Captains Grace, Wittit, and
Johnson, members. By this time a muster-carriage
for the horse artillery had been made up on the
general principle of the Madras pattern, by Major
Glass, and in Colonel Greene’s letter of instructions
to the committee, he says it is “well adapted for
the purpose, and can be used with equal efficacy
with a line of infantry;” its particular construction
was recommended to the committee’s consideration,
“but at the same time, as many field-carriages are
wanted immediately, and cannot be delayed so long
as required to complete carriages on that pattern,”
170he advised “the adoption of the 6–pounder as altered
by Colonel Duff, in preference to the present field-carriage,
for the service in the line of infantry, it
being much lighter, and having been found on trial
sufficiently strong.”
The committee gave the preference to the pattern
then in use, that is, apparently, the old one
with a few alterations, such as making the axletree
equally thick all through, the cheek-bolts through
the axle-bed, the elevating screw-box being removed
from the centre transom and placed a little in front,
and its shoulders working in gudgeons fitted to the
cheeks; and their recommendation was adopted by
the board, who ordered the 6–pounder carriages
then wanted to be made of this construction.
An experiment was also made at this time with
iron[33] cheeks for a horse artillery gun-carriage; the
wooden ones were, however, preferred, but unfortunately
171no record appears of the reasons on which
the iron cheeks were disapproved; it would be
interesting, now that the question of iron carriages
has been agitated; it is one of the many instances
which a research into the history of artillery shews
perhaps more than any other science, “the thing
that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that
which is done is that which shall be done; and there
is no new thing under the sun.”
Another instance may be given. In 1840, Major
Timbrell made a pair of flat twisted chain traces for
pole-horses, and being found very convenient, the experiment
was tried on a larger scale. Captain Brind’s
troop was equipped with them, as also was another
on the march to join the Army of Reserve in 1842,
but they failed from the difficulty of insuring perfectly
good workmanship. In December, 1800,
“the commissary of stores is ordered to have a set
of flat chains made up in the arsenal as soon as
possible, for the traces of the (experimental horse
artillery) harness.”
At this time then there were two patterns of
light field-carriages in use,—one a beam-trail with
the galloper-guns; the other a double-cheek with
the foot artillery and battalion guns. In the
172accompanying sketches, Plate No. 3 represents
the galloper-carriage, while the foot artillery retained
a double-cheek pattern, modified from
No. 1.
We must now follow the ammunition-carriages
up to the same point, and in so doing less difficulty
exists, as the changes which have taken place are
more marked.
The earliest record we have shews us Clive
carrying his ammunition on lascars’ heads, their
fidelity and steadiness insured by a detachment of
Europeans with their muskets in the rear, to shoot
deserters. This plan, of course, could only be
adopted when the distance intended to be gone
over was very small.
Tumbrils are early mentioned, both in our armies
and those of native powers, and there is reason to
believe that they differed but slightly from those
which are now found in magazines, and generally
used in the transport of treasure; they were larger
and more unwieldy, and required many bullocks to
draw them.
The committee in 1793 condemned them as too
high, too heavy, liable to overturn, and the ammunition
in them, from the absence of partitions, was
173shaken and broken[34] on rough ground; they were
also unnecessarily large for the quantity of ammunition
intended to be carried in them.
They recommended the introduction of one which
was built under their orders, and which corresponds
very nearly in measurement with that still existing
(Plate No. 5), subdivided for the reception of the
ammunition, and capable of containing 90 rounds of
12–pounder, or 150 of 6–pounder ammunition; the
box was easily removable, and fitted with a seat in
front for the driver and his bundle; to counterbalance
his weight, the centre of gravity of the box
was a little thrown back; and probably this very
precaution has caused the chief fault which can be
found with this carriage, a tendency to fall back in
going up hills; it travels lightly and easily to the
cattle, and is well adapted for bullock-draught.
During the last war with Tippoo, the heavy
tumbril, drawn by many bullocks,—five to eight
pair, was found very inconvenient with the galloper-guns,
either keeping the guns in the rear, or leaving
them without ammunition if they kept up with
174their corps. As a remedy, Colonel Blaquiere, of
H.M.’s 25th dragoons, proposed a carriage “consisting
of a sort of double limber, with four wheels
of equal height, drawn by four horses, and driven
by two men riding the near horses.” Its advantages
were, “the means of carrying six additional men,
the power of substituting the limber for that of the
gun, if the latter was wounded, or to avoid the
necessity of shifting the ammunition when the
supply in the gun limber was expended.”
This ammunition-carriage was adopted for the
Bengal horse artillery and galloper-guns, and is
represented in the sketch (Plate No. 6). We
must here again remark how nearly the present
principle was approached, the gun and ammunition
limbers similar, and the ammunition divided into
several boxes; but still the fault already noticed in
the gun-carriage, the unnecessarily long projection
to which the limbering-hook was attached, was continued.
This fault probably caused this pattern, both
gun and ammunition-carriage, to be discarded, and
it was not until twenty years had passed that the
simple alterations necessary were introduced.
The light field-carriages then at this period (end
of 1801), were the beam-trail gun and ammunition-carriage
175with limber for the gallopers, and the
double-cheek carriage and ammunition-tumbril for
the foot artillery.
As the elevating-screw is an important item in a
carriage, a few lines to trace its progress will not be
amiss. The earliest screw was fixed horizontally,
and ran through a quoin, which, by its action, was
forced in or out, depressing or elevating the gun;
it was a cumbrous machine, and could scarcely have
worked smoothly. This must have fallen into disuse
between 1780 and 1790. At this latter date, a
capstan-headed screw fixed in the centre transom
had superseded it. A good deal of attention was
given to the elevating-screw about this period, and
many plans appear to have been proposed, among
other officers, by Lieutenants Toppin and Taylor, as
we learn from a minute by Colonel Deare; but
what they were, it is not easy to say.
The action of the screw was found to injure the
centre transoms, and it was therefore placed a little
in advance, the trunnions of the plate in which the
screw worked resting on gudgeons fixed in each
cheek; this gave the screw a power of self-adjustment
to the movement of the gun, and most probably
contemporary with this was the introduction
176of screws fixed to the neck of the cascable of the
gun.
Another pattern, and which probably followed,
was one placing the screw under an elevating-board
on which the gun rested.[35]
In the sketch (Plate No. 6) the general character
of the screws is shewn.
A cursory notice must now be taken of the
ordnance in use with the regiment. In the early
times, 6–pounders were chiefly used; they were
afterwards mixed with 3–pounders with the native
corps, and 6–pounders with the artillery companies;
the former most probably of 3¾, and the latter of
4¾ cwt. A heavier 6–pounder (6½ cwt.) superseded
this light gun, and was in general use to the end of
the century. This gun Major Woodburne’s committee
proposed replacing again by a lighter one.
During the wars with Hyder and Tippoo, brass
18–pounders constantly accompanied the armies,
and were used in all the actions; and in the
campaigns of 1791–2, iron 12–pounders were
attached to the European regiments, and found
very useful in keeping the hordes of cavalry at a
respectful distance; brass 12–pounders had previously
177been attached to the artillery and to
European regiments.
The relative merits of light and heavy guns has
been a vexata quæstio from the earliest date, nor is
it entirely set at rest up to the present day, though
general opinion has decided in favour of a via media,
rejecting both extremes. Still some members of
the profession maintain that, by a judicious disposition
of metal, a light gun may be made as
effective as a heavy, while others, on the contrary,
run into the other extreme, and would introduce
guns heavier even than those at present in use.
Late experiments at Woolwich on a 9–pounder of
10 cwt., nearly similar to the Bengal pattern,
strengthen the opinion that the two extremes
should be avoided.
A curious experiment was tried at Dum-Dum in
1787, with a view to deciding the point at issue;
and it furnishes some data which, combined with
practical experience, would tend to prove that a
medium gun will give a range so slightly below
that of a heavier one, that the increase would be
dearly purchased by the increased difficulty of
draught. A 6–pounder was cast, weighing 10 cwt.
and 24 lbs., and fired a certain number of rounds,
178after which a portion equal to a calibre in length
was cut off, and the firing continued; this process
was carried on, diminishing the gun, calibre by
calibre, until it weighed only 3 cwt. 3 qrs. and
2 lbs., the elevation and charge of powder being
in all cases the same. The result was, that of
the first sixteen lengths, the seventh carried the
furthest,—2,305 yards, the gun weighing 8 cwt.
2 qrs. 20 lbs.; at the fourteenth length the gun
threw 2,098 yards, the gun weighing 6 cwt. 1 qr.
3 lbs.; and at the seventeenth length, 2,106 yards,
the gun weighing 4 cwt. 3 qrs. 23 lbs.
It would have been more satisfactory had the first
graze, as well as the extreme range, as has been
the case, been given; however, it appears that
200 yards are gained by nearly doubling the weight
of the gun, and the conclusion would be in favour
of the very light gun, were it not that experience
shews that a light gun shakes its carriage very
much, and therefore that what is gained in metal
is lost in strengthening the carriage to bear the
shock; it is also found that a gun giving a long
point-blank range does not give a proportional
extreme range; and the result has been to make
6–pounders of the present day 6 cwt. in weight.
179The best test perhaps is a range of 800 yards, with
the least elevation for a field-gun.
One other point now only remains to be noticed
to bring up the matériel to the end of the last
century,—the pattern of siege-carriages. From
the faults found with it by the committee in 1793,
we can make a tolerable guess at it; the lowness
and narrowness of the wheels, the projection of
the pintle behind, to make room for a large store-box,
and the height of the limber-wheels are complained
of; and it therefore must have been something
similar to that represented in sketch No. 8;
in all probability, up to this time little alteration
had taken place in the pattern in use.
While preparing the siege-train for Seringapatam,
at Bangalore, in 1792, Colonel Duff made considerable
alterations in the siege-carriages; he cut off
the projection from the limbers, and placed a pintle
on a bolster on the axle-bed, carried the draught-chain
back to the gun-carriage, and cut travelling
trunnion-beds in the cheeks, to divide the weight
better on the axles, and make the carriage travel
easier; in fact, rendered the carriages very nearly
what are now known as the “old pattern.” All
the alterations were continued by the committee,
180and they directed that the carriage should be five,
and the limber-wheels three feet high, to enable
them to turn under the cheeks when limbered up.
Minor improvements were added: the draught-chain
was made in pieces, so as to allow of a portion of
the cattle being taken off in sharp turnings, or on
ground where all could not act; and a carriage was
then built, which, with slight changes (reducing the
gun-wheels two inches) in 1801 by Colonel MacIntyre’s
committee, became the standard, and remained
so till 1823.
A fancy existed to obtain the use of a mortar
from an howitzer, by fitting its carriage with a
sliding transom, on withdrawing which, the
howitzer could be elevated to 45°, its cascable
resting on an additional transom fixed underneath.
Major Green constructed a carriage of this kind in
1796, which was experimented on at Dum-Dum,
and spoken favourably of, but eventually not found
to answer, and therefore discarded.
Whether the result of imitation, or of half-informed
mechanical taste, we find Lena Sing
Majeetiah, commandant of the Punjab artillery,
indulging in a similar fantasy: a carriage adapted
for the double purpose. It is scarcely possible that
181such a one could be useful; the shock acting
vertically on the axle, would be too severe for any
moderate dimensions to bear; this was found in
Major Green’s carriage, and the proposed remedy
was shortening the axle, which would, while
strengthening, have rendered it very likely to
overturn.
To preserve the connection of the subject, it may
be as well here to notice the successive changes of
ordnance and carriages up to about the present
time, instead of referring to each as the record
of the regiment reaches the date of its occurrence.
The object is rather to give a general idea of the
carriages and guns in use at different eras, and to
mark the strong, rather than to note the more minute
and trifling, changes which are always taking
place. To do the latter would require more space
than can be afforded, and after all the reader might
rise from the perusal, his mind crowded with a
heap of minutiæ, leaving no other impression than
that at different times a carriage had been shortened
in one direction and lengthened in another,
the wheels heightened or lowered—now all of the
same height, and then those of the limber reduced—a
hook added from the front or taken from the
182rear. This is not our object, we wish to shew the
principal features of the subject, so as to point out
the stages through which our present excellent
matériel has been attained.
The galloper-gun and ammunition-carriages, as
well as those in use with the foot artillery at the
beginning of the century, were destined to be
superseded by the Gribeauval pattern, about 1810,
one carriage answering for horse and foot, with
the exception of some difference in the limber.
The carriage was a double-cheek one, limbered up
on a moveable pintle on the bottom of a limber,
with two low wheels; the foot artillery limber had
an arched axle with the pintle on the top.
[Plates Nos. 10 and 11.]
These carriages had a tendency to overturn, on
any but the smoothest ground; the low wheels
made the draught heavy, and were also difficult to
keep in order; yet this pattern held its position
as the standard until 1823, when a thorough reform
in the ordnance department took place.
Early in the century, the French “caisson” was
introduced as the ammunition-carriage, and continued
with slight changes until superseded by the
royal pattern. It was a long waggon with low
183wheels in front, on the axle of which a pintle was
fixed, working in a socket in a compartment of the
body of the carriage, and enabling the front wheels
to turn. This formation caused many accidents;
the powder getting shaken out of the cartridges,
came in contact with the pintle, and an explosion
ensued; the construction was therefore altered by
fixing the pintle to the carriage and the socket on
the axle-bed. [Plate No. 12.]
The faults of this carriage were the liability to
overturn; the danger from explosion, the whole
ammunition being in one large box; and the inconvenience,
when embarking on board ship or
crossing rivers, of having to unpack it all.
An attempt to remedy this was made in 1801
by the partial introduction of “Hardwicke’s pattern”
ammunition-carriage, consisting of two tumbrils
connected by a bent iron perch. It proved, however,
a perfect failure, and never came into general
use, so that the caisson continued as the standard
until superseded by the royal pattern; the last, probably,
which existed in use was in Captain Wood’s
troop, 1st company 3rd battalion, at Meerut, us late
as 1828.
In 1801, on its formation, the experimental
184horse artillery was armed with two 3–pounders
and four 6–pounders; the 3–pounders in 1806 gave
place to two 5½-inch howitzers, and two of the
6–pounders were at a later period (when the
number of troops had been increased) withdrawn,
and their place supplied by 12–pounders of a
pattern proposed by General Horsford of 8¾ cwt.
The lines of this gun were drawn at Woolwich,
but, at the same time, it was said that a gun of
such light metal must prove insufficient.
The armament of troops and field-batteries continued
of these three calibres until the new
arrangements, introducing the 9 and 6–pounder guns
and 24 and 12–pounder howitzers, in 1828 and
the following years.
The breaking out of hostilities with Nepal in
1814 called for a new species of carriages adapted
to carry 3–pounders and 4⅖-inch howitzers in a
hilly country. Lightness, strength, and a facility
of being taken to pieces and put together were
the points sought to be combined in the “mountain-train”
carriages planned by Sir J. Horsford. They
were not, however, much used during the war,
for in general it was found that elephants could
convey 6–pounders in the hills easier than men
185could the smaller pieces; and the former, being so
much more effective, were, nearly in all cases, used.
The mountain-train carriages were found too slight,
and quite unequal to bear the rough usage artillery
meets with even from the hands of its friends; they
required a degree of petting which appears not
always to have been shewn them. During a retreat
in the Nepal country, several which had, for convenience
and from the loss of their bearers, been
limbered up to other carriages drawn by cattle,
went to pieces in crossing the terrain at the foot of
the hills. The fault was laid on the officers in
charge, and not on the weakness of the carriages,
by Sir John Horsford; but there will always be
great difficulty in preventing these carriages experiencing
the same treatment, if put together before
entering the hills.
No. 14 is a sketch of the mountain-train pattern,
which has remained unaltered up to the present
day, excepting some changes introduced by Major
Backhouse in the mountain-train of the late Shah
Sujah, but which have not been made generally
known. Some changes are now probable, as a
mountain-train 12–pounder howitzer has been
substituted for the old 4⅖-inch howitzer. This new
186piece weighs 3 cwt., and its lines are drawn on the
principles of the 12–pounder howitzer; the charge
is 12 oz. of powder (an increase of 4 oz.), which,
with the increased length, makes it a much more
effective piece.
The siege-carriages underwent little change
during this time. From their solid nature they have
been always less liable to injury than field-carriages;
and, consequently, attention has been less forced
to them by the repairs of daily accidents; less
temptation has therefore offered to introduce
improvements and alterations, and the pattern
established in 1801 remained in use till 1823;
indeed, at the present time there are many
carriages of that kind in magazines.
In 1823 a new pattern siege-carriage (No. 15)
was introduced; not, however, differing essentially
from the old one; uniformity in axles, beds,
limbers, &c., and improvements in minutiæ, were
the chief alterations.
A new kind of carriage was also introduced at
this time for the iron howitzers, which superseded
the brass 8–inch as a siege-piece; the trail was
much shorter than that of siege-carriages, and
furnished with small truck-wheels, to ease the
recoil. [Plate No. 16.]
187Iron mortars and mortar-beds also superseded
the brass mortars of 8–inch and upwards, and their
wooden beds. No alteration has been made in
any of these articles.
In 1823, a general reform in the ordnance
equipment in Bengal took place, and, with the
changes above noted, the block trail pattern was
introduced for the light field-carriages. The
ammunition-carriage was made with a limber
exactly similar to that of the gun, and the
ammunition was divided into six boxes, two on
the limber, and four on the body of the carriage,
easily removable; the wheels, axles, and beds
were made similar, and pains were taken to render
all parts as uniform as possible, so that one set
might answer for the repairs of all.
On their first introduction into Bengal, in the
attempts to lighten the carriages as much as possible,
some were made too weak, especially those for the
24–pounder howitzers, and slight alterations were
made from time to time to obviate this defect.
At this time, the elevating-screws of the guns
were fixed to the cascable neck, while those of
the howitzers were capstan-headed. In 1834,
Captain Timbrell suggested the adoption of the fixed
188screw with all, and several howitzer-carriages were
altered accordingly; in doing this, however, it became
necessary to pierce the beams to receive the
screw further to the rear than before, filling up the
former hole with a plug: this double piercing
weakened the beam so much, that with the increased
action from the fixed screw, many broke down, and
the change was discontinued at that time; the
subject, however, was agitated for many years, and
many trials made, and the result has been the retention
of the original method.
The advantages of the fixed screw consist in its
uniting the gun and carriage, and thereby preventing
its jumping, in travelling or firing; greater
facility of mending it, and an increased power in
limbering up; it is also more economical, as a less
depth of beam is required, the fixed screw adjusting
itself by means of trunnions, while the capstan-headed
requires a horizontal hump on the
beam to receive it. On the other hand, the capstan-headed
screw is supposed to strain the carriage less;
to us, however, the advantages seem to be on
the side of the fixed screw, and from the result
of the experiments tried, there appears no doubt
but that when applied to a new, not an altered,
189beam, the howitzer-carriages are strong enough to
bear it.
In these ordnance arrangements, the European
horse and all the foot artillery batteries were armed
with 9–pounder guns and 24–pounder howitzers,
while the native horse had 6–pounders; and this
continued until 1834, when, under instructions
from the Court of Directors, the whole of the horse
artillery were armed with 6–pounder guns and 12–pounder
howitzers.
In 1836, at the recommendation of Sir Henry
Fane, then Commander-in-Chief, a special board of
artillery officers from the three presidencies was
convened at Calcutta, for the purpose of assimilating
the ordnance equipment and arrangements throughout
India. They sat for about two years, and
during that time musters of the carriages they recommended
for general adoption were built. This
carriage, the “Indian pattern,” was much like those
in use with the Madras Artillery, and may be
shortly described as having contracted cheek, narrow
axles, and metal naves: the carriage was heavier
than the Bengal pattern.
The proceedings of the board were transmitted
to England and returned in 1841, with the orders
190of the Court of Directors (among other points), that if
the pattern carriage had given satisfaction, it should
be adopted throughout all India. In the interim,
however, the Afghan war had taken place, and the
carriages of the Bengal and Bombay presidencies
been severely tried. The former stood the test of
the service in that most difficult country, while the
latter, constructed on a plan nearly similar to the
Madras one, proved utterly worthless. These circumstances,
and the failure of some 6–pounder
carriages of the “Indian pattern,” with the Bombay
horse artillery, during the short affair at Hykulzie,
rendered the strength of the pattern doubtful, and
after calling for reports from all who had been engaged
in these campaigns, the Supreme Government
in 1842 finally decided on adopting the Bengal
block trail as the pattern for Indian light field-carriages.
This appears an appropriate place in which to
detail the different means of draught adopted from
time to time, and the arrangement will have the advantage
of presenting the subject in one view, and
saving the reader the trouble of searching for it
through different periods.
To the end of the last century, bullocks were the
191only draught cattle in use for artillery purposes; they
were attached to the carriage by yokes, most probably
similar to those which may now be seen in
every native hackery, and traces made of raw hide:
these latter, during Lord Cornwallis’s campaigns,
were superseded by draught-chains, the whole chain
in one long piece, very cumbrous and inconvenient.
This pattern was early modified, we believe, by
making the lengths for siege ordnance for three or
four pairs of bullocks; but it was not until about
1825 that a separate chain was allotted to each pair,
facilitating the lengthening, or reducing the line of
draught greatly. The yoke was attached by a swivel
playing loosely on the pole, with a neck which
passed through the upper part of the yoke, and was
fastened with a nut. The yoke, at this period we
think, consisted of two bars, and has remained up
to the present day with little alteration. An attempt
was made to supersede it by a single bar yoke with
short stanchions, and chains to confine the bullocks
in their places, by General Hardwicke, about 1781.
This was supposed to be an improvement on the
native yoke, and more economical than the pattern
in use; but an important point having been overlooked,
viz. the native yoke-bar being fixed immoveably
192to the pole, while the H. P. yoke was
moveable on its swivel, the result was not satisfactory,
as the bullocks were continually in danger
of suffocation, from the bar twisting and tightening
the chain round their necks. The double band
yoke was therefore retained, and it was fitted on
the pole with a clip-band, which, by embracing the
upper bar, saved the necessity of piercing it for the
reception of the swivel, and added much to its
strength.
About 1801, horses were first used for the draught
of guns in India. Experimental horse artillery was
formed, and two galloper-guns were attached to
each cavalry regiment. The original plan has been
followed with little variation up to the present
time; each horse of the team was ridden, and the
guns were worked by the men who rode the horses.
The chief advantages of this system are economy,
greater exertion to be got out of the horses in a
difficulty, and a smaller number of men and horses
exposed to an enemy’s fire; its disadvantages are,
the horses being overweighted, and a liability, from
the paucity of numbers, of a gun being crippled in
action by a few casualties. It may, however, after
many years’ experience, be pronounced a system
193combining with economy a very considerable degree
of efficiency.
The bullocks, much improved by the arrangements
of 1809, which transferred them to the care of the
artillery, continued the sole draught animal of the
foot artillery until 1818, when an experimental 12–pounder
battery was horsed with a limited number
of an inferior description of cattle: yet, under these
disadvantages, so superior did this battery prove,
that others were soon afterwards similarly equipped,
and their numbers gradually increased until 1827,
when it was decided that all the light field-batteries
should be horsed; so convinced had the local
Government and the Court of Directors become of
the utility of the measure. But scarcely were the
orders issued, when one of those extraordinary
changes, so often to be met with in Indian arrangements,
consequent on the change in the head of
the Government, took place, and in 1828 the
horses were ordered to be sold, and their place to be
supplied with bullocks. Against this arrangement,
destructive of the efficiency of the regiment, the
representations of the commandant of artillery were
of no avail; and the remonstrances of a general
officer, unwilling to be left with an inefficient field-artillery,
194were met by the reply that the change
had been resolved on “not only from motives of
economy, but from a conviction that the number
and efficiency of the horse artillery rendered the
maintenance of horse field-batteries unnecessary;”
as if the duties and use of the two branches of the
arm were not quite distinct and incompatible with
one another!
The horse-batteries being thus extinguished, for
many years there was not a foot field-battery that
could be considered efficient for service; fortunately
it was a period of profound peace, or the twelve
troops of horse artillery would have proved but a
“broken reed” to rest upon as the whole effective
field-artillery of an army mustering, perhaps,
80,000 men, and scattered over a country twelve
hundred miles in length, with hostile powers bordering
on it in all directions.
In 1835, attempts were made to turn the enduring
powers of the camel to gun-draught. Arguing
on the fact that the animal had in former times
been employed in draught, and that in the present day
he is used in the plough in the Hurrianah and other
sandy districts, Major Pew made many experiments,
and at length succeeded so far, that Government
195authorized a battery to be fitted for this draught at
Dehli, and it was placed under the command of
Captain W. Anderson. Its first performances,
when with the camp of the Commander-in-Chief,
appeared to promise well—so well, indeed, that on
the formation of the Army of the Indus, it was
attached to it under the command of Captain A.
Abbott. In the field, however, it did not keep up
its character; while the ground was smooth and
sandy, the camels worked well, but in moist or
slippery soil they were continually liable to accidents,
and in ground intersected by trenches they were
peculiarly awkward; at all times they were found
deficient in muscular exertion, weight constituting
their sole power of traction; and when the work
became hard, and food scarce, they knocked up
completely and suddenly, without any warning; and
on the army moving from Candahar towards
Ghuznee, the camels were replaced by the horse
and yaboo of the country. A second battery, which
proceeded to Scinde in 1843, fared no better. A
third, stationed at Nusseerabad, seems to answer for
cantonment duties, but we believe has not been
tried in any other way. The result of the experiments
appears to be, that though the camel will
196answer as gun-draught in particular localities, he will
not do for a battery which is liable to move in all
directions.
The war in Afghanistan forced on the Government
the necessity of improving their field-artillery,
and as a commencement, a battery on the frontier
was supplied with cast horses from the horse artillery
and cavalry; but on the apparent termination of
the war in 1840, with a view to economy, these
horses were withdrawn and replaced, with much
delay, with bullocks, leaving the frontier, on which
our dubious friends the Sikhs could in a week have
mustered 100,000 men and 200 pieces of artillery,
with no other artillery than one or two 6–pounder
troops of horse artillery, and this battery ill equipped
with bullocks and drivers from the Commissariat;
and such was its state when the Afghan reverses
broke upon India like a clap of thunder.
In 1841, the orders of the Court of Directors
were received, to supersede bullocks entirely by
horses, camels, and elephants, which were supposed
likely to form cheap and efficient field-batteries,
horses were given to a few, and one was furnished
with elephants. We believe no one expected that
this latter would answer. The awkward line of
197traction, the great power of the animal, and the
fear of his becoming unmanageable under fire, were
the obvious objections; to which might be added
the disadvantage of the whole power of draught being
concentrated in one animal, in case of this one being
wounded, and which his great bulk rendered extremely
probable. After two years’ experience, the
elephant was rejected from field-artillery; but it
was proposed to use his strength more advantageously
in the movement of siege-guns, where
several of the objections would not apply, particularly
that of being exposed to an enemy’s fire.
During the recent campaign on the Sutlej, elephants
were used in siege-guns, and also in a battery of
iron 12–pounders; but although this battery was
provided with spare limbers, with bullocks for
carrying it into action, yet, by some mismanagement,
the elephants were used at Sobraon, and, as
had been anticipated, took fright at the first shot
which passed over them, and ran off to the rear
with the limbers, proving clearly the soundness of
the opinion originally pronounced against their use
for field-artillery.
We believe, too, that they are to be given up for
siege-artillery, but not, we think, on such sound
198grounds; their adoption was an experiment; the
harness intended for field-guns was transferred to
siege, without alteration, and, as might have been
expected, proved too weak: whether a stronger
pattern, which was recommended, was used in the
hurried march, by which the heavy guns were
brought up from Dehli to the Sutlej, and how that
answered; whether the animals proved themselves
unequal to the work, or whether, as a means of
instituting a fair comparison, a gun drawn by bullocks
accompanied the elephants, and moved with
greater ease or difficulty, we know not; but we
think it is a pity that the animal has not been fairly
tried, or if so, that the experiments have not been
recorded and published for general information.
CHAPTER V.
199
Reorganization in 1796 of the army—Successive additions to
artillery companies—Ceylon—Seringapatam—Introduction of
horse artillery—Egypt—Deficiency of artillery—Organization
of 1801–2—Composition of the regiment—Foreign service—Sieges
of Sarsnee, Bidgygurh, and Cutchwarah.
The supercession which the officers of the Indian
army suffered by those of H.M.’s service; the slowness
of promotion; the absence of any furlough regulations
enabling them from time to time to visit
their native country without giving up their profession;
the want of a provision on which to retire,
together with other disabilities, had engendered
much discontent[36] in the army, and rendered it
200absolutely necessary that the defects in its constitution
should be remedied, lest the whole machine
should be rendered unfit for the duties required
from it; and with this view, Lord Cornwallis prepared
a plan on his voyage to England, and submitted
it to the Home Government; previously,
however, many representations had been made by
the armies of the three presidencies, and they
selected from their own officers in England agents
to superintend their interests, and urge on H. M.’s
ministers and the Court of Directors their claims
to be placed on a liberal footing.
Captain Burnett on this occasion represented the
Bengal Artillery, and in the Committee combated
the views of Lord Cornwallis and Mr. Dundas, of
uniting the artillery of the three presidencies into
one corps, and then incorporating it with the Royal
Artillery.
In the remarks on Lord Cornwallis’s propositions
by Sir Henry Crosby (president of the Home Committee),
we find that the Bengal Artillery officers
declared that “an union of the army of the three
presidencies promises no advantage to the service
in general, nor any fair one to the respective officers
of each presidency in particular: it would but render
201the officers less acquainted with the language,
manners, religion, and customs of the natives of
their respective corps (lascars), who, in Bengal and
on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, are
scarce less different from each other than all are
from Europeans, and in the adjustment of individual
rank would create, perhaps, insurmountable difficulties.
“Every officer now in the Company’s service
commenced his career at a particular presidency,
and took, as was reasonable and inevitable, his
chance of quick or slow promotion, according to
the casualties of his own establishment. These
casualties of natural death, of actual service, and of
increased or diminished establishments, have made
such an alteration in the general proportion of promotion,
that he who went with General Goddard
an old lieutenant to Bombay, would, in the event
of an union of the three presidencies, find himself
superseded by one whom he left a cadet on that
establishment: the Bengal officers therefore could
never agree, nor would the liberality of the officers
of the other presidencies wish that all should be
melted into one mass mutually interchangeable,
without first equalizing the rank of the officers of
202each establishment by a reference to their original
appointments as cadets; and the difficulties of such
a reference, with its consequent effects, need not be
pointed out.
“They have likewise declared that an incorporation
with the King’s artillery will be a sacrifice of
their dearest interests.” But that in “the event of
a general transfer of the Bengal army to the King’s
service, the three battalions of artillery on that
establishment should be completed, agreeably to
seniority, to a full complement of officers of all ranks
above that of lieutenant-fireworker, and established
to the same number of battalions of artillery, supposing
each battalion in the two services to contain
the same number of companies, if not in proportion
to the number of companies in the King’s service
in the time of war; and, being thus completed, that
they may be then transferred, and always remain
independent; that the officers in the battalions do
afterwards rise by regular gradation, as vacancies
occur in either battalion, agreeably to the present
practice, without being, in either case, subject to
removal to other corps, or to exchange with, or
supercession from, officers in any other corps whatsoever;
and that these three battalions, so transferred,
203be not relieved from Europe or any other
quarter, at this present, or any future time, or in
any manner whatsoever, but be stationed in Bengal
as heretofore.”
It was also urged that an incorporation of the
artillery would tend to augment the mutual discontents,
which had so long subsisted between the
King’s and Company’s troops in India, in this branch,
in proportion as the evil was removed from the
other branches of the service; for as the incorporation
would certainly be directly contrary to the
wishes of all the Company’s artillery officers, so it
was believed that those of H.M.’s service would not
be less averse to it, seeing that they were to admit
strangers to a participation of their rights in return
for a very distant and precarious advantage. Each
would therefore consider the other as an intruder,
jealousies and animosities would be the inevitable
consequence of such a contest of opposite interests
and inclinations, while the public service could not
fail of being deeply injured by the constant operation
of such destructive passions.
The contemplated transfer of the artillery (and
European infantry) to the King’s army was looked
upon as highly prejudicial, not only to the interests of
204that branch, but to the Company’s army at large, as
tending to lower the respectability of the portion
left, and on this account was strongly opposed by
the whole of the agents from the armies of the three
presidencies, and eventually their exertions were
successful; the whole army was left with the Directors
(perhaps more from the Ministry not being
strong enough to carry the point, or sufficiently at
leisure to organize the details immediately necessary),
its organization was however considerably
altered, and the service of the East-India Company
materially improved; furlough and retiring rules
were introduced, a larger proportion of field-officers
given, and a general code of regulations made.
It is only necessary here to notice these as they
affected the artillery. The organization detailed at
the conclusion of the last chapter took place, and
many officers[37] obtained brevet rank to equalize
their ranks with the rest of the army, and a very
fair proportion of officers was given to each
company; viz. a captain, captain-lieutenant, two
205lieutenants, and a lieutenant-fireworker. Seventy-four
non-commissioned officers and gunners are not
sufficient when they are liable to be much detached,
and when vacancies cannot be filled by ready-trained
men.
The artillery being found numerically insufficient
for the duties required from it, in October, 1798, it
was increased by an addition of two non-com. officers,
two gunners, and[38] four matrosses per company, and
a detail of golundaz of one jemadar, three havildars,
three naiks, and forty privates to each of the eleven
companies in Bengal (the other four companies
were at Ceylon and Madras, and they were added to
these early next year); thus adding upwards of nine
hundred men. These were raised by selecting the
best-qualified men from age, size, and good conduct,
from the lascars, and enlisting in general Mahommedans,
“under an express stipulation, on oath, previous
to their being enrolled,” of “their engaging
to embark on board of ship whenever the service
shall require their proceeding by sea;” their age
was limited from twenty to twenty-eight years, and
their height from five feet seven inches to five feet
ten inches. The required number was soon raised,
206and were so well drilled and disciplined by the following
February, that the Commander-in-Chief on
inspecting them “expressed his pleasure and surprise
at the creditable state into which they had
been so rapidly brought.”
This admixture of natives with Europeans was
injudicious, for although at first sight it might be
supposed that the effect would have been the same
on the native artilleryman as on the lascar, and
that he would have acquired, from constant contact
with Europeans, a portion of their hardness of character,
and lost his own prejudices, yet it must be
remembered that the lascar was looked upon as an
inferior grade, and never took an equal part in the
duties of the gun as was intended with the native
artillerymen, and therefore the European never felt
his own credit or safety entrusted to the former,
while with the latter both were intimately connected;
distrust and jealousy were the result, and
the admixture was found to work so ill, that it
was soon discarded; it being found that, valuable as
native artillerymen are alone, they became worse
than useless when mixed with Europeans.
As the opinion of so practical and experienced a
man as the late Sir John Horsford on this point will
207bear considerable weight, we quote it. “The European
saw a native made a constituent part of that
detail of the posts of the gun, of which he was one;
he viewed this native with jealousy, and diffident
of his ability (perhaps without reason) to serve the
vent, or manage the portfire, he positively refused
to stand between the wheels, as either sponge-man
or loader, urging, in spite of reasoning on the matter,
that ‘it was hard to be blown away by a black
fellow.’ The native, on the other hand, perceiving
the European hostile to him, and suspicious of
mischief, refused in his turn to take the sponge-staff
or be server; declaring that he might be
‘blown away by the design or carelessness of the
European.’ Discord, recrimination, and hatred
were the consequences.
“But this was not all, the ‘component part’
looked around and saw itself a miserable handful of
men isolated, and put down in a company composed
of men of different language and country, and dissimilar
habits and religion, unsupported by number
and marked as an inferior body, by having no rank
amongst them higher than that of a jemadar. They
saw themselves considered as so many shreds and
patches on the coat of a European company, and
208pointed at by the sipahis as a laughing-stock:
lastly, that in the eyes of their own officers they
were viewed as unprofitable interlopers, who brought
no promotion in return for the trouble of disciplining
them.”
The regiment at this time (1799) therefore was
constituted as below:—
per Company.
per Battalion.
Total.
Returns Feb. 1799.
Colonels.
1
3
3
Lieut.-Colonels.
1
3
3
Majors.
1
3
3
Captains.
1
5
15
15
Capt.-Lieutenants.
1
5
15
15
Lieutenants.
2
10
30
29
Lieut.-Fireworkers.
1
5
15
13
Serjeants.
5
25
75
73
Corporals.
5
25
75
73
Drummers.
2
10
30
30
Gunners.
10
50
150
146
Matrosses.
70
350
1050
751
Golundas.
Jemadars.
1
5
15
10
Havildars.
3
15
45
28
Naicks.
3
15
45
27
Golundas.
40
200
600
358
Lascars.
Serangs.
1
10
30
30
1st Tindals.
2
20
60
60
2nd Tindals.
2
20
60
60
Lascars.
70
70
2100
2055
1,380 Europeans, 705 golundaz, and 2,250 lascars,
or a total of 4,335.[39] The infantry of the army at
this period amounted to 40,000,[40] so that the artillery
209was in the proportion of one to every nine
infantry soldiers, a proportion less than that usually
considered sufficient in European armies, but considerably
greater than has been preserved in the
successive changes which have taken place in this
regiment, and which we shall remark on as these
changes come to be detailed.
In January, 1797, Major-General Duff being
expected from England, whose arrival would supersede
Colonel Deare in command of the artillery, it
was declared this latter officer’s tour for command
in the field as colonel of the artillery, and in March
(29) General Duff assumed the command of the
regiment.
General Duff joined the regiment in September,
1762, and was present at the battle of Buxar, where
his conduct elicited the laudatory mention of his
name in the Government reply to Major Munro.
He does not appear to have been again employed
on active service for some years; as a major he was
selected to command the battalion of artillery raised
for the Nawab of Oude in 1776, and on its reduction
he commanded the artillery at Futteygurh.
In 1780 he attained his lieutenant-colonelcy, and
commanded the regiment during Colonel Pearse’s
210absence on service in the Carnatic. In 1788, he
went to England, and returning in 1791–2, was appointed
to command the Bengal Artillery of the
army under Lord Cornwallis, in which capacity he
was present during the last campaign, and prepared
the battering-train against Seringapatam. At the
conclusion of the war, he again returned to England,
in consequence of the Court of Directors (to whom
a reference had been made) refusing to allow him
to command a battalion and the brigade of artillery.
The refusal may have originated in his rank of
colonel, as the promotion, in the place of Lieutenant-Colonel
C. R. Deare (killed at Sattimungulum),
was delayed until the reply came from home;
or from his junior officer Colonel G. Deare having
been intermediately appointed. Whatever the cause
was, it had ceased to operate in 1797, as he was
then appointed to the command. He did not,
however, hold it long, for the following month he
was appointed to command at the Presidency, and
Colonel Hussey succeeded to the regiment.
Major-General Duff was a man of a powerful
frame of body; anecdotes of his strength are told to
the present day; on one occasion, a leopard sprung
suddenly upon him, but seizing the animal by the
211throat, they rolled over and over, the general never
relinquishing his grasp until the animal was fairly
powerless, when he was easily put an end to. On
another occasion, finding a sentry asleep over the
park, he took a 6–pounder[41] off its carriage and
carried it under his arm (doorbien ke mooafik, as an
old native officer, at that time his orderly, described
it) “like a telescope.”
Major-General Duff returned to Europe in December,
1797—Major-General G. Deare succeeding
him in the command at the Presidency, and as the
vice-president of the Military Board, in the absence
of the Commander-in-Chief; Colonel Hussey, the
commandant of artillery, acting in the latter capacity
till his arrival.
Colonel Hussey had but a short tenure of the
command, for his promotion to major-general being
known in India in September, 1798, it was declared
in orders, “that Colonel Hussey having attained the
rank of major-general, came under the influence
of the Minutes of Council, 5 June, 1797,” and
“Lieutenant-Colonel C. Green, the senior officer of
artillery, under the rank of a general officer,” was
212ordered to “conduct the regimental duties and
details, until further orders.”
The unsettled state of the great Mahratta powers,
and the threatening aspect of Zeman Shah, with
whom the deposed Nawab of Oude, Vizier Ali,
had been corresponding, rendered the assembly of
an army of observation necessary to the defence
of British India; a considerable force was assembled
under Sir James Craig at Anopsheher,
with which were five companies of artillery under
Lieutenant-Colonel Woodburn; but this force
appears to have been very ill equipped with ammunition,
a circumstance noticed by Sir J. Craig to
Lord Mornington:—“Our proportion of musket
ammunition is 120 rounds per man, and that for
the small-arms of the cavalry is 40; with this, I
certainly would not venture to stir a step from the
Ganges, and how we are to gut up more, in the
time in which I think it is probable that it may be
requisite for us to do so, I know not: I have written
in strong terms to the Commander-in-Chief on the
subject. For our artillery, we have 300 rounds;
but that is, if possible, still less equal to what we
ought to have, at least, in a depôt to which we could
have a much more ready access than we have to
213Chunar or Allahabad. The latter should be our
grand depôt, in which should be lodged a quantity
of stores of every species, equal to every possible
emergency; while a field-depôt, fed continually
from it, should move successively from post to post
as we advance, and be always at hand to renew our
deficiencies.”
The unprovided state in which the army in
advance had been left, is an instance how ill the
machinery of the Military Board had worked. A
divided responsibility produced its never-failing
result. No one member feeling it his particular
duty to provide for the contingencies which might
occur, the whole was left to chance, and the nearest
magazine, on which the brigades at Cawnpoor and
Futteygurh were dependent, was Chunar. Had
there been one head to the Ordnance department,
this would not have happened. In this instance,
from Zeman Shah retiring, no harm occurred, but
far from taking warning and being better provided
for the future, we shall find that when, in 1805,
Lord Lake sat down before Bhurtpoor, there was
the same want of equipment, and that time it
resulted in our lamentable failure.
While one portion of the regiment was in the
214field on the northern frontier, another was called
on to form part of the army against Tippoo Sultan,
whose proceedings had latterly been of so hostile
a nature, that self-defence forced the British Government
to curb his ambitious and dangerous
designs.
The army was collected from all the presidencies.
Bengal furnished three battalions of native volunteers
and four companies of European artillery,
with their lascars (eight companies) attached.[42] One
of these companies (5th company 2nd battalion)
was taken from Ceylon; another (3rd company 1st
battalion) had been despatched with Lieutenant-Colonel
Errskine’s force to Ganjam the preceding
year, and thence to Hyderabad; and the two
215remaining ones, the 1st and 2nd of the 3rd
battalion, sailed under command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Montague towards the end of the year,
and reached Madras in January, 1799.
The army under Lieutenant-General Harris was
put in motion on the 3rd February, and entered
Mysore on the 5th March. The artillery of the
right wing, with which was the battering-train,
consisting of four 24–pounders, thirty 18–pounders,
eight 12–pounders, two brass 8–inch and eight
5½ mortars, was under Lieutenant-Colonel Montague’s
command.
On the 6th March the right brigade, under
Colonel Montresor, was attacked at Seedaseer, but
Tippoo’s troops were driven off. On the 27th the
grand army was attacked at Malavelly, but the
loss was trifling, and on the 5th April the army
encamped before Seringapatam, on which night
and the following day the outposts of the army
were engaged, in which action Lieutenant Brooke,
of the artillery, was wounded.
Tippoo made no further attempts, but retired
within the fort, against which approaches and
batteries were commenced and carried on, the
S.W. angle being the point selected for attack.
216Batteries were thrown up on both sides the river;
and on the 4th May, the breach being practicable,
the place was stormed.
But little personal record is to be found of the
part the artillery took in this exploit; that their
fire was well directed and kept up, the general
orders of the day testify. “The merit of the
artillery corps is so strongly expressed by the
effects of their fire, that the Commander-in-Chief
can only desire Colonel Smith[43] to assure the
officers and men of the excellent corps under his
command, that he feels most fully their claim to
approbation” are the words; but in the routine of
a siege on a large scale, their unremitting duty in
the batteries leaves less to record than on many
other occasions far less harassing and dangerous.
Although their casualties were few, one took place
which was deeply regretted: “Lieutenant-Colonel
Montague’s arm was shattered near the shoulder
on the 2nd May while in the battery, and required
immediate amputation; for some days he appeared
to be going on in a fair way; a contusion, however,
on his chest, occasioned by the same shot,
produced mortification, which caused his death on
217the 10th May. In him the regiment lost an officer
of whom they may be deservedly proud. His
talents, improved by a regular military education,
and his long experience in active service, rendered
him invaluable. In the early part of his career,
his skill in his profession, his zeal and indefatigable
activity, having been displayed on various occasions,
he was afterwards selected for every important
service. With General Goddard, with Sir Eyre
Coote, and at the siege of Cuddalore, he was particularly
distinguished, and in the campaigns of
Lord Cornwallis he not only confirmed but increased
his established reputation. He was called
forth on the projected expedition against the Isle
of France and Manilla, and finally was chosen to
command the Bengal Artillery destined for the
glorious enterprise against Seringapatam.”[44]
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Montague “was the
fourth son of Admiral J. Montague, and brother of
the late Captain James Montague, who commanded
the ship Montague on the glorious 1st June, in
which action he was killed by a cannon-shot while
closely engaged with two of the enemy’s ships, the
Impétueux of 74, and Le Républicain of 110 guns.
218“Being originally designed for the army, he was
placed in the academy at Woolwich, from whence
he was sent out as a cadet to Bengal in the year
1770. On his arrival in Calcutta, there being a
superabundance of officers, he was placed in a
separate corps formed for the cadets of that year,
and called the Select Picquet. In this situation
he attended chiefly to his improvement in military
knowledge and discipline, and from the gracefulness
of his person, as well as an uncommon activity,
he was soon distinguished by a superior skill and
address in the performance of all military duties.
“After serving twelve months in this corps, he
attached himself to the artillery. While he was
a lieutenant-fireworker, by the strict attention he
paid to his duty, the interest he took in his profession,
and the ardour with which he pursued
every branch of it, he greatly improved himself
in the knowledge of tactics, and his practice was
proportionably advanced by being on several occasions
employed on actual service.
“About the year 1781 he was promoted to the
command of a company. He was sent to join
General Goddard, who was employed to demolish
various forts in the Rohilla country, several of
219which were defended with the most obstinate
bravery. In attacking one of them he was
wounded by an arrow while attempting to force
the gates, which, entering just below the eye,
penetrated obliquely through part of the jaw, and
almost reached the opposite cheek. Without a
moment’s hesitation, he broke the arrow off close
to the iron barb, and continued at the head of his
corps till the object of the attack was accomplished.
The barb remained in his face several days, and
was at length extracted with great skill by Dr.
Brinch Harwood,[45] now professor of anatomy in
the University of Cambridge. In these active
scenes Captain Montague completely established
his military character, gained the confidence and
recorded approbation of his commanding officer,
and greatly advanced the good opinion and regard
which General Goddard had already entertained for
him.[46]
220“In the year 1782, Captain Montague was called
forth to join Sir Eyre Coote on the coast of Coromandel.
Captain Montague was in every engagement,
and in services where so much real military
merit was displayed, it is no common praise to say he
was always peculiarly distinguished. He obtained
the rank of major, and at Cuddalore, in 1784, he
was appointed to command the artillery of one of
the wings of the army, and there manifested his
superior judgment by taking post on an eminence
which produced the greatest advantages, and it was
honourably acknowledged by a French officer of
rank who was stationed to oppose him. On his return
to Bengal, he was employed in Oude until
the memorable expedition of the Marquis Cornwallis
to Seringapatam. On this important service
Major Montague was selected to attack the stupendous
fortresses of Nunder-droog and Ramali-droog.
“The chief engineer having reported Nunderdroog
221to be a fortress of uncommon strength, his lordship
ordered Major Montague to proceed with his
best train of artillery from Bangalore to join the army
encamped about half-way to the place of attack.
The expedition with which he performed that duty
excited the astonishment, as it called forth the applause,
of Lord Cornwallis; and though he was the
youngest artillery officer with the army, he was entrusted
with the conduct of the artillery employed
in the reduction of that important fortress. His
skill, courage, and talents were crowned with complete
success, and the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief
expressed in the strongest terms the sense
he entertained of his eminent services. The manner,
also, in which he was entrusted with the command
of the artillery employed against Severn-droog,
manifested the great confidence which the Marquis
Cornwallis possessed in his military enthusiasm and
professional abilities.[47]
222“In the year 1794, Major Montague was advanced
to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and was
third on the list of the artillery officers when he was
chosen to direct the artillery attached to the Bengal
army, and which was destined to join General
Harris, commander-in-chief, in the late glorious
enterprise against Seringapatam, where this gallant
and most distinguished officer found his most
honourable grave.
“If it is true, as has been asserted, that the commander
of the artillery, Colonel Smith, a brave and
deserving officer, had, from a long succession of
223illness, become too infirm to be continually in the
trenches, the executive duty must have necessarily
devolved upon Lieut.-Colonel Montague, who was
next in command. But be that as it may, it is
certain that three days previous to the capture of
Seringapatam, a cannon-ball shattered his arm,
while he was in the trenches, in such a manner as
to require immediate amputation, and it was taken
off within an inch of the shoulder. In this state,
however, such was his zealous, active, and unconquerable
spirit, he insisted on being carried into
the trenches, where he continued to the last to
encourage by his presence the troops, who adored
him. During three or four days, it was hoped and
believed that he was in a fair way of recovery; but
having by the same shot received a contusion in his
chest, it turned to a mortification, and carried him
off on the eighth day after he had received his
wound.
“Thus fell Lieut.-Colonel Edward Montague, in
the forty-fifth year of his age, lamented as he was
beloved by the whole army; leaving a widow[48] and
224three orphans, the youngest of whom was born a
fortnight before his glorious but lamentable death.
He served the Honourable East-India Company
with zeal, fidelity, and superior military talents,
during an honourable course of twenty-nine years;
had been in more engagements than usually happens
even to an active soldier, and had been noticed
with the most flattering distinction by every commanding
officer under whom he had served. On
this last occasion his being only mentioned in the
general list of killed and wounded, without a single
word of regret or eulogium, causes the mingled
emotions of grief and astonishment[49] in the minds of
his afflicted family and friends.
“In private life he was not less distinguished
than in his public services. He was benevolent and
generous, possessing at the same time the most
frank and candid disposition. He was an affectionate
husband, a tender father, and a dutiful son.
He loved his country with a patriotic ardour, and
he died in the contest to extend its dominion and
its glory.
225“He will live long in the remembrance of all
who knew him; and it remains for the nation whom
he served so well, and for whom he died too soon,
to transmit his name to the times that are to come.”
(Asiatic Annual Register, 1800.)
After the fall of Seringapatam, one of the Bengal
companies (5th company 2nd battalion) returned to
Ceylon, and one (3rd company 1st battalion)[50] to
Cawnpoor with the 10th regiment native infantry,
and the remaining two companies (1st and 2nd company
3rd battalion) continued with the brigades in
Mysore, and were present at the occupation of Bednore
and Hurryhur and pursuit of Doondia Khan,
under Major-General Wellesley: they returned to
Bengal in September, 1801. Medals of the annexed
226pattern were granted to all the native troops engaged
in the expedition.
The following regimental order was issued by
Colonel Green, R. O., September 19, 1801:—“Colonel
Green feels a particular pleasure in congratulating
Captain Tomkyns, the officers and soldiers of
his detachment, upon their safe return from a long
and arduous service, to join the regiment he has the
honour to command, and he deems it his duty, in
justice to the meritorious zeal and professional
exertions shewn by the Bengal artillery during the
late various campaigns in Mysore and in the pursuit
of Doondia Khan, to thank him and them thus publicly
and in the name of the corps to whose general
reputation the good conduct of the detachment has
so highly contributed: at the same time that Colonel
Green has to lament their diminution in point
of numbers since they quitted Bengal, it must
reflect additional credit on them that, however thus
weakened by casualties incidental to long warfare,
they have ever manifested a cheerful, patient, and
steady adherence to the active performance of those
services they have been called upon for, under many
227trying and fatiguing exigencies; they are in consequence
most justly entitled to the character of good
and veteran soldiers, and as such, will ever merit
his warmest support and good offices.”
The 5th company 2nd battalion returned to
Ceylon, and when the Kandian insurrection broke
out, in 1802, marched with General MᶜDouall’s
army from Columbo, and assisted in the capture of
Kandy; it remained as part of the garrison when
the general returned in April to Columbo.
The following month the general came back, and
trusting in the professions of the king, and thinking
all was settled, again retired, taking with him the
whole force except 200 men, H.M.’s 19th regiment,
500 Malays, and a detachment of artillery, Major
Davies commanding the whole, and Lieutenant
Humphreys the artillery.
Their position was attacked 23–4th of June,
1803, and the following day Major Davies capitulated,
under the conditions that he was to march off,
with arms and ammunition. The garrison retired
to the river at Allemgonath, and halted, intending
to pass the next day, but the Kandians set upon
them, and, worn out with fatigue and hunger, they
laid down their arms, and delivered themselves up
228as prisoners. The Europeans were immediately
murdered, except nine of the officers; about 500
Malays and lascars were made prisoners; six
6–pounders, three howitzers, and a 5½ inch howitzer
were lost.[51]
Lieutenant Humphreys was kept a prisoner for a
time, but in September, on some solemn festival,
was brought out and executed by order of the king.
The native prisoners were mutilated by cutting off
their noses and ears.
Reinforcements arrived, and the war was successfully
prosecuted; most of the ordnance and
many of the lascars were recaptured, and in October,
1804, the company, and the 5th company
1st battalion, returned to Bengal. On its departure
the following order was issued:—
“The governor cannot allow Captain Edward
Clarke, of the Bengal artillery, to leave this island,
with the detachment under his command, without
expressing his thanks to that officer for the useful
and active services which he has rendered to the
229government of Ceylon during a period of more than
eight years.
“He requests Captain Clarke to communicate to
the non-commissioned officers and privates of the
artillery, and to the detachment of lascars, his
approbation of their conduct, and his wishes for
their future prosperity.”
In following out the services of these companies,
we have anticipated a little, and it is now therefore
requisite to go back a few years. Napoleon’s expedition
to Egypt, coupled, as it had been, with
intrigues with Tippoo Sultan, alarmed Government
as to his views on India, and rendered it necessary
to take some steps in self-defence, to check his
career of conquest.
Lord Nelson had destroyed the French fleet in
the Bay of Aboukir; an army from England, under
Sir Ralph Abercrombie, had effected a landing in
Egypt, and to co-operate with the latter, Lord
Wellesley prepared detachments from the three
presidencies, which, landing at Cossier or Suez,
were to hem in the French army, deprived of all
communication with France between the two
armies. Towards this detachment, Bengal contributed
a detachment of horse and foot artillery.
230H.M.’s 10th regiment of foot, and 1,200 sipahi
volunteers.
Horse artillery, which had for some time been
used in European warfare, was now about being
introduced into India. It appears to have been
first used by the Russians in the campaigns of
1757–8–9 against the Prussians, whose light cavalry
often found themselves, at the time they felt sure
of success, opposed by batteries of cannon, although
no infantry were present. Frederick the Great
introduced it into his army in 1759, and took great
pains to exercise and instruct them himself in his
camp near Landstruth, and soon found the arm of
essential use.
The Austrians followed the example about 1780,
and since that period it has been introduced into
all European armies, though with considerable
variation in the weight and calibre of the guns, and
in the manner of mounting the gunners.
Some experimental horse artillery was raised, and
part of it accompanied the expedition to Egypt;
it was however embarked almost as soon as raised,
so that no time was allowed for its acquiring any
experience. From the returns, a portion of the
231Governor-General’s body-guard was attached to it,
and altogether but 36 horses.
European.
Brevet-Captain.
1
Act. Conductor.
1
Sergeants.
3
Corporals.
3
Farriers.
1
Gunners.
6
Matrosses.
14
Body-Guard.
Jemadar.
1
Havildars.
2
Naiks.
2
Troopers.
22
2nd Tindals.
1
Lascars.
11
Syees.
27
Grass-cutters.
27
Golundaz.
Havildars.
2
Naiks.
2
Privates.
20
Lascars.
1st Tindals.
1
2nd Tindals.
2
Lascars.
40
Syees.
9
Grass-cutters.
9
With a quartermaster’s and train-artificer’s establishment:
Brevet-Captain Clement Brown commanded
it.
The foot artillery, under Captain-Lieutenant
Flemyng, consisted of—
European.
Captain-Lieut.
1
Lieutenants.
2
Sergeants.
4
Corporals.
4
Gunners.
6
Matrosses.
24
Golundaz.
Jemadar.
1
Havildars.
3
Naiks.
3
Privates.
40
Lascars.
Serang.
1
1st Tindals.
3
2nd Tindals.
6
Lascars.
93
Lieutenants Drummond and Starke were with
this detachment.
A bounty of one month’s pay and full batta was
given to each native officer and soldier who embarked,
and all possible attention was paid to the
laying in the stock of provisions and water under
their own inspection.
232The foot artillery embarked on 27th November,
reached Trincomalee on the 13th November, and
Bombay on the 27th March, 1801; the horse
artillery embarked in February.
The first division of transports reached Cossier on
the 17th May; the disembarkation immediately
took place, and on the 21st June the army commenced
its march across the desert in successive
small detachments, following each other at intervals,
on account of the scarcity of water; mussuls were
sent forward with each detachment, and returned
for the use of the succeeding one; much suffering
was experienced in this march; the extreme heat
and want of water killed many men and horses;
but it was observed in this, as in subsequent cases,
that Europeans bore the exposure and drought
better than natives.
The guns of the foot artillery were drawn by
bullocks brought from Bombay; and the horse
artillery joined the army which was collected at
Ghennah about the middle of July, and the whole
embarked in jermes, or country boats, on the 31st,
and sailed down the Nile. The stream was rapid,
and they floated successively past towns and ruins,
pyramids and other monuments of mystic Egypt;
233and on the 7th August reached Gizah, and on the
8th and following days disembarked and encamped
on the Isle of Roda, where they remained till the
28th, awaiting orders from General Hutchinson;
on their reception they once more embarked, and
arrived at Rosetta[52] on the 31st August,—too late
to participate in any of the service.
The detachment remained in Egypt till May,
1802, when it marched from Gizeh (near Cairo)
to Suez, detachments following each other successively,
and completed it in five marches, losing only
three Europeans by the way. On the 5th June the
head-quarters embarked on H.M.S. Victor, and
reached Calcutta towards the end of July.
The foot artillery, under command of Lieutenant
Starke (Lieutenant Drummond[53] having returned to
Calcutta on sick leave in September, 1801, and
Captain-Lieutenant Flemyng most probably having
sailed direct for England from the same cause, for
234he does not appear to have returned to India, nor
to have been in Egypt in October, 1801, and he
subsequently retired in England in December, 1802),
returned in the Commerce, and the men composing
the detachment rejoined their companies in Fort
William on the 1st August, 1802. The horse artillery
disembarked on the 4th August, and rejoined
the remainder of the experimental horse artillery.
The services of these detachments were acknowledged
by the Governor-General on their landing,
in Orders, from which the following is an extract:—“Under
a grateful impression of the important aid
derived to the common cause of our country by the
able and successful conduct of the expedition from
India to Egypt, his Excellency is pleased to order,
that honorary medals be conferred on all the native
235officers, non-commissioned officers, troopers, sipahis,
golundaz, and gun-lascars who have been employed
on the service in Egypt.”
The insufficiency of the artillery in India had
early attracted Lord Mornington’s attention; in
June, 1799, we find him writing to Mr. Dundas—“Our
artillery throughout India is very deficient. * * *
I cannot too strongly press the necessity of
attention to the artillery in India: if you do not
send out ample supplies of proper men and officers
for this useful corps, it will soon fall to ruin; it is
already on the decay,—a larger annual supply of
cadets, and a reduction of the export of writers
would tend to recruit it.”
The Court of Directors had previously (July 5th,
1797) “advised the Government of their intention
to send out properly-qualified cadets for the artillery,
and prohibited the transfer of any infantry
officers” to that branch, and “with a view to promote
emulation in the cadets for the artillery or
engineer corps who are educated at Woolwich,”
the Court “resolved (5th March, 1800) to make it
a standing regulation, that those who by their progress
in the different studies are first reported
qualified to proceed to India, shall have precedence
236in rank in the general list of cadets appointed for
the respective presidencies;” and this order was
highly approved by the Governor-General in his
minute on establishing the College of Fort William.
In July, 1800, Lord Wellesley writes again to
Mr. Dundas,—“Every augmentation of native
troops in India should be accompanied by a due
augmentation of the European force, artillery as
well as infantry.
“The Company’s European artillery are everywhere
extremely weak. The fixed establishment
of this corps is defective at all the presidencies,
and the numbers wanting to complete even that
defective establishment are now so considerable that
I intend without delay to reduce one of the Company’s
European regiments in Bengal for the purpose
of augmenting the artillery of this presidency. * * *
But the best remedy I may be able to
apply will be insufficient, on account of the great
deficiency of officers of artillery: some companies
have now no more than one commanding officer
doing duty with them. This deficiency proceeds,
in a great measure, from the original deficiency of
the establishment in point of commanding officers,
237and partly from the neglect of a regular supply of
cadets.”
It is probable that men were allowed to volunteer
from the European regiments for the artillery at
once, for the returns of the regiment shew that
277 men joined “from other corps” in the months
of July, August, and September, 1801, but the
2nd European regiment was not reduced until the
February following. At the same time, two companies
were added to each battalion of artillery,
and the strength raised to 1 captain, 1 captain-lieutenant,
2 lieutenants, 2 lieutenant-fireworkers,
5 sergeants, 5 corporals, 2 drummers, 10 gunners,
and 80 matrosses; the companies, however, remained
incomplete, for upwards of 800 men were
deficient.
This increase was reluctantly sanctioned by the
Home authority, for we find Mr. Dundas writing to
the Court of Directors, 30th June, 1801, on the subject
of the liquidation of their debts:—“Mr. Wright
observes, that if the addition to the artillery
could be postponed, it would save £54,000; but I
consider the addition to your artillery establishment
to be of such deep importance to the security of
your extended Indian empire, that I do not think
238the saving suggested should be adopted.” The authority
was therefore given, and Lord Wellesley, in
writing to General Lake, says, “in issuing the order
for the reduction of the 2nd European regiment, I
request your Excellency to annex to it the order
for the augmentation of the artillery, as directed by
the Honourable Court. The improvement of our
artillery is a point of such importance, that I am
resolved not to postpone it under any circumstances
whatever.”
The augmentation was accordingly carried into
effect; the companies were levelled, so as to divide
the old gunners and matrosses equally among the
companies, and they were filled up as well as they
could be from the volunteers who joined; and the
regiment consisted, at the beginning of 1802, of
three battalions, of seven companies each, with
thirty companies of lascars: neither lascars nor golundaz
details being added with the six additional
companies; and the golundaz details, all except
nine, were reduced in the following November.
239
ORGANIZATION OF 1802.
per Company.
per Battalion.
Total.
On the returns 1st April, 1802.
EUROPEANS.
Colonels.
-
1
3
3
Lieut.-Colonels Commandant.
-
1
3
3
Majors.
-
1
3
3
Captains.
1
7
21
21
Capt.-Lieutenants.
1
7
21
21
Lieutenants.
2
14
42
28
Lieut.-Fireworkers.
2
14
42
-
Serjeants.
5
35
105
96
Corporals.
5
35
105
106
Gunners.
10
70
210
187
Matrosses.
80
560
1680
891
Drummers.
2
14
42
46
GOLUNDAZ.
Jemadars.
1
5
15
15
Havildars.
3
15
45
45
Naicks.
3
15
45
45
Privates.
40
200
600
575
LASCARS.
Serangs.
1
10
30
30
1st Tindals.
2
20
60
60
2nd Tindals.
2
20
60
60
Lascars.
70
700
2100
2113
240The men composing the corps of horse artillery
were borne on the rolls of the companies.
The remonstrances of Lord Mornington having
thus obtained a numerical increase to the corps, and
the Court’s step of obtaining educated cadets from
Woolwich having prepared men to fill the vacancies
in the commissioned grades (the first of whom had
arrived the preceding year), a new era may be
considered as opening in the history of the regiment,
and it may not be uninteresting to consider the
state of the corps at this time.
Of the officers in its early years we have seen
sketches in some of Pearse’s letters already quoted,
and from the specimens who lived on into this
century, and of whom many anecdotes are current
among the present seniors of the regiment, they
appear to have been deficient not only in the
scientific knowledge necessary for their profession,
but many were without even the ordinary education
of gentlemen of that period; boatswains and gunners
in their original calling, they never rose to the
manners and acquirements which are expected in
commissioned officers; they therefore shewed to
great disadvantage when contrasted with the lately-arrived
cadets, who to the usual liberal education of
241gentlemen had superadded a course of study at
Woolwich fitting them for the attainment of the
higher degrees of their professional knowledge.
At the time, too, when they were studying, Indian
affairs had awakened great attention; the wars with
Hyder and Tippoo had just been brought to a conclusion,
and all England rang with applause at the
gallant and successful storming of Seringapatam
and the expedition to Egypt; their minds were
filled with these subjects, and themselves, on their
arrival, either partaking in or watching the meteor-like
career of Lake, how could they fail receiving a
high tone, and infusing it into those who immediately
followed, and thus laying the foundation of
a permanent improvement in the commissioned
grades.
But while we must consider many of the old
hands deficient in some qualities requisite to the
formation of good officers, let us not forget the
habits of the times in which they lived, nor that
these men proved themselves good and brave
soldiers in the many hard services in which they
were employed; “per mare, per terras” might
have been their motto. In the wars of Bengal and
the Carnatic they filled their part with credit, and
242many are the names from among them which have
been handed down to our respect and esteem both
as good soldiers and men of high talent and conduct.
Pearse, Montague, Hutchinson, Duff, of the
old hands, and others, such as Horsford, Clement
Brown, Pennington, who living long into this century
may fairly claim no small share in giving a tone
to the present corps, are all names which we should
not willingly allow to be forgotten; and although
we may laugh at the anecdotes of the Hindes,
Paschauds, and Greenes, and be tempted to rate
the moderns highly when we look to the bright
halo with which the Mahrattas, Nepal, Ava, and
Affghanistan campaigns have encircled the heads
of those whom we delight to honour, let us not
forget those who shared in the wars with Hyder
and Tippoo, and in the earlier campaigns in which
the foundation of our Indian empire was laid.
“Vixerunt fortes ante Agamemnona, multi.”
The ranks were filled with men of an indifferent
class; the great demand caused by European wars
rendered it difficult to recruit for the Company’s
service, and, as a natural consequence, the worst
men were enlisted. The Regimental Orders, as
might be expected, record many courts-martial and
243the infliction of punishments to preserve order; still,
however, when any portion was sent on service,
they never forgot what was expected from them,
and always supported the national character by
their conduct in the field.[54]
A very mistaken notion as to the composition of
the regiment has long prevailed, and is still repeated
by those ignorant of the facts of the case; it is
often affirmed that a large majority of the regiment
is Irish, but from a reference to the long rolls at
the period of which we are writing, we find the
respective numbers as stated below,[55] and at a period
six years anterior to it (1795), the proportion of
Irish was still less, the English being 437 and the
Irish 284. At the present time (1845) the English
and Irish are nearly equal. We purpose noticing
the constitution of the regiment in this point from
time to time at different epochs, and also adding
the casualties wherever we are able to ascertain
them, and this we trust will form a valuable addition
244to our knowledge of the statistics of Indian
mortality.
Having detailed the formation of 1802, we must
revert to the preceding year to bring up the record
of the services of portions of the regiment.
In November, 1801, two complete companies
were ordered for foreign service, to embark on the
Dover Castle and Asia Indiamen.
Lascar Companies.
4, 1
5, 3
Company.
9
5
Battalion.
18
12
Captains.
A. Fraser
C. Wittit
Captain Lieutenants.
A. Hinde
P. Paschaud
Lieutenants.
Fuller
A. Dunn
Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
C. H. Palmer
S. S. Hay
The former company proceeded to Macao, and
returned the following November, but does not
appear to have been engaged in any active service
during the expedition. The latter had a much
longer absence; for, reaching Goa in January, 1802,
it was sent on to Bombay, and thence to Guzerat
in May, Surat in June, and back to Bombay in
October; in December it was stationed at Tannah,
having been detained by the Bombay Government.[56]
In August, 1803, it participated in the successful
attack on Baroach, and then continued with the
245Bombay army, under Major-General Jones, and
joined the army before Bhurtpore in 1805, towards
the conclusion of the siege; returned to Bombay in
1806, and reached Fort William in the Sir William
Pulteney in July, 1806, after an absence of nearly
five years, reduced to 33 men.
Captain C. Wittit, Captain-Lieutenant Paschaud,
and Lieutenant-Fireworker S. Hay returned to the
presidency in March, 1803. Lieutenant Drummond
joined the company in December, 1802, and left in
September following. Captain Watkins and Lieutenant
T. D. Smith joined it at a later period.
Lieutenant Dunn appears to have remained with it
throughout.
Other portions of the regiment were called into
the field, at the end of 1802, against a powerful
zemindar, Bulwunt Sing, who was in possession of
three forts, Sarsnee, Bidgegurh, and Cutchowrah, in
the neighbourhood of Hattrass; these forts were
situated in the districts ceded in 1801 by the Vizier
of Oude and Nawab of Furruckabad, to maintain
the stipulated British force. Mustering 20,000
followers, he trusted he could successfully resist the
demand for his jumma, he therefore tendered a
lower sum; this, of course, was refused, and as he
246appeared determined not to yield the point, a force
was collected against him, which gradually increased
to 4 battalions of infantry, 4 troops of cavalry, and
detachments from 3 companies of artillery, with
four 18–pounders, two 4⅖-inch howitzers, and ten
6–pounders.
Major Gordon, Commandant.
Company.
Battalion.
Lascar Companies.
Captains.
Captain-Lieutenants.
Lieutenants.
1
2
4, 23, 28
E. Constable
3
2
7, 21, 22
W. Shipton
R. Best
4
2
14, 16
J. Robinson T. Green
A. Mathews T. D. Boyle
The trenches were opened against Sarsnee on the
27th December, and a battery erected on the 4th
January, 1803, but at such a distance that the
rownee was not breached; a storm was nevertheless
made on the 15th, which proved unsuccessful.
Lieutenant Boyle was dangerously wounded by a
cannon-ball on the 8th, and died on the 24th of
January.
Reinforcements under the Commander-in-Chief
arrived, and the siege was renewed; the approaches
being advanced 200 yards, the town was taken on
the 8th February, and on the 11th the garrison
abandoned Sarsnee and fled to Bidgegurh; thither
247the army moved on the 13th; batteries were ready
on the 21st February, and by the 27th a practicable
breach was effected; during the night, however,
the enemy were discovered evacuating the fort, and
next morning it was taken possession of by the
British.
Whilst proceeding round the fort in the morning,
most probably with a view to ascertain the ordnance
and stores, Major (Lieutenant-Colonel) Gordon was
killed, along with several sipahis and lascars, by the
accidental explosion of a powder-magazine. In
reporting his death, the Commander-in-Chief says
that he felt “particularly indebted for his exertions,
directed by uncommon zeal and ability.”
The Governor-General, in the order published to
the army, “deeply regrets the severe loss which the
public service had sustained by the death of Lieutenant-Colonel
Gordon;” he also notified his “high
approbation of the gallantry and steadiness displayed
by the troops, and of the readiness with
which they submitted to extreme labour under
circumstances of peculiar hardship from the unusual
severity of the weather.”
The force next moved to Cutchowrah, which,
after some attempts at treachery and delay, was
248given up. Major T. Green had command of the
artillery, and the troops then broke up and returned
to their cantonments, small garrisons being left in
Sarsnee and Bidgegurh.
In the contemporary accounts of these sieges we
meet with no intimation of excessive rain having
fallen, which, no doubt, adds exceedingly to the
fatigues and hardships incidental to troops in
trenches, and we are therefore rather at a loss to
understand what the excessive hardships caused by
the season, adverted to in the general orders, were;
the heat in the month of March, in the provinces,
is not overpowering, and we cannot help smiling
when we recollect that within a few months these
very troops were to form part of that army which
Lake, contemning the seasons, led, in the hottest
parts of successive years, through the Dooab and
Rajasthan.
CHAPTER VI.
249
Lord Lake’s campaigns—Captain Hutchinson’s proceedings in the
neighbourhood of Rampoorah—Sieges of Komona, Gunnourie,
and Adjeegurh—Augmentation by adding golundaz—Increase
of horse artillery—Ordnance-drivers organized—Colonel
Horsford, Commandant—Expeditions to the Isle of France
and Java—Bundlecund campaigns—Callingur—Gribeauval
pattern carriages introduced—Additional golundaz companies—Head-quarters
removed to Dum Dum.
The conduct of the Mahrattas having rendered
hostilities unavoidable, the Governor-General determined
to carry them on upon such a scale as would
completely destroy their power, and, at the same
time, eradicate the French party from the Dooab,
where Mr. Perron, nominally a commander of
Scindia’s disciplined brigades, had in reality established
a small independent principality of his
own.
To carry out his intentions, the Governor-General
assembled forces in the Dukhun, Guzerat, Cuttack,
Mirzapoor, Allahabad, and in the Dooab; with all of
which, except the first, were portions of the Bengal
Artillery.
250The main army (in Bengal) was under the personal
command of the Commander-in-Chief, General Lake;
the corps composing it were put in motion early in
August, 1803, and collected, on the 13th, at Arowl,
on the Kali Muddee. They reached Coel on the
28th of the same month.
On the 29th August, General Lake attacked Perron’s
army, drawn up behind a jheel, with their right
resting on Aligurh. The attack was made by the cavalry
and gallopers, and the enemy drew off towards
Agra. Mr. Perron was left in charge of the fort,
with instructions to defend it to the last extremity.
General Lake determining to storm the fort on
the 4th September, during the night preceding two
batteries of four 18–pounders each, under Captains
251Greene and Robinson, were erected by Colonel
Horsford at a village in the vicinity and at Perron’s
country house, to cover the advance to the party.
Before daylight the storming party, under Colonel
Monson, moved out to within 400 yards of the fort,
and there awaited the morning gun, the signal for
the advance; on its being fired, they moved on,
covered by a heavy fire from the supporting batteries.
The fort had been alarmed, and the gates
were closed. The ladders proved too short. A 6–pounder
was sent for to burst the gate open, but
proving insufficient, a 12–pounder was substituted,
which succeeded after four or five rounds. During
this delay, the party was exposed to a heavy fire, by
which many were wounded; among others, Captain
Shipton, who commanded the guns; notwithstanding
this, he continued to advance with the
party. The second and third gates were stormed,
but at the fourth, his gun was again required, this
gate resisted its fire, but the wicket being forced, the
party entered, and obtained possession of the fortress,
capturing 281 pieces of ordnance of all kinds.
The artillery lost but 2 Europeans and 4 lascars
killed, 7 Europeans and 1 lascar wounded, in addition
to Captain Shipton. The services of the artillery
252were acknowledged by the Commander-in-Chief
in his report to the Governor-General:—“To
Captain Shipton, of the artillery, who had charge
of the guns which forced the gate, and who, though
wounded, still remained at his post, I feel myself
much indebted. To Colonel Horsford, who commanded
the artillery, as well as Captains Greene
and Robinson, who commanded the covering batteries,
I feel myself under infinite obligations, and
indeed the whole corps merit my warmest praise
for the gallantry displayed on this occasion as well
as in every other in which they have been engaged.”
The Governor-General in General Orders, 15th
September, 1803, “desires that his particular approbation
may be signified to Captain Shipton, of the
artillery, and also to Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford,
Captains Robinson and Greene;” and also says, “it
is with the greatest satisfaction that the Governor-General
expresses his approbation of the bravery,
discipline, and steadiness of the corps of artillery
who were employed on this occasion.”
A small detachment of half a corps, with one gun,
under Lieutenant Winbolt, at this time in the cantonment
of Shekoabad or Etawah, were attacked by
a large body of horse, under a Mr. Fleury. The
253first attack, on the 2nd September, was beaten off,
but being renewed on the 4th September, after
several hours’ resistance, the party capitulated, and
were allowed to march off to Cawnpoor with their
guns and arms. Lieutenant Winbolt was wounded
in this affair.
The army reached the Jumna, near Delhi, on the
11th, and found the Mahrattas posted behind intrenchments,
with their park of artillery in front,
the whole covered by long grass. The Commander-in-Chief
moved on to reconnoitre with the cavalry,
and directed the artillery and infantry to follow;
the front alone was accessible, and the cavalry were
exposed to a heavy cannonade. They moved to the
rear to avoid this, and to cover the advance of the
line, but the enemy mistaking it for a retreat,
moved out from their intrenchments. The cavalry
opened to allow the infantry to pass through, who
attacked in line, the cavalry forming as a support
in their rear. The advance was made under a tremendous
fire of round and grape, without returning
a shot until close, when, firing a volley, they charged,
broke into open column, and allowed the cavalry
and gallopers to pass through and complete the
victory.
254Colonel Horsford was employed covering the left
with four guns and a battalion from a threatened
attack by a body of Seik cavalry.
The loss of the artillery consisted of 3 Europeans
and 1 lascar killed, 1 subaltern, 13 Europeans, and
16 lascars wounded. Lieutenant Mathews[57] lost his
leg by a cannon-shot; 67 brass and iron guns, 37
tumbrils of ammunition (besides 24 blown up),
and 2 tumbrils of treasure, were captured on this
occasion. The iron guns were of European manufacture,
the brass nearly all cast in India on French
models; the carriages were all fitted with elevating
screws, strong and neat, and of the French pattern;
255the tumbrils stout, but clumsy; some with modern
draught-chains, others with a trace of raw hide.
General Lake wrote to the Governor-General:—“To
Colonel Horsford and every officer of the corps
of artillery I feel myself infinitely indebted for their
meritorious exertions on this occasion;” and in the
general orders of the Governor-General of 1st
February we find,—“To Colonel Horsford and the
artillery the Governor-General in Council repeats
the public testimony of approbation which that
meritorious corps has uniformly deserved in every
exigency of the service.”
The officers present were the same as at Aligurh,
with the exception of Captain-Lieutenant Best, who
was left in charge of the ordnance in that fortress.
The Governor-General in Council deemed “it to
be the duty of the Government to anticipate the
sanction of His Majesty and the Honourable the
Court of Directors for the distribution of the treasure
captured, as a testimony of the applause and
gratitude with which the British Government
viewed the exemplary valour, discipline, zeal, and
firmness displayed by the army;” and directed
that “the general principles of this order should
constitute the proceedings of the Governor-General
256in Council with respect to all prize-money captured
during the progress of the war.”
The heavy artillery and stores intended for the
siege of Agra were embarked on the Jumna in
boats, the army marching down along the western
banks. On the 7th October they reached Agra,
and cut off all communication with the country, and
on the 10th the enemy’s battalions outside the fort
were driven from the ravines and glacis, with a loss
of 600 men and 26 guns. In this affair Lieutenants
Beagham and J. Hay (who together with Lieutenant
W. Parker joined the army a little previously) are
mentioned as having distinguished themselves.
“The intrepidity and courage evinced by Lieutenant
Beagham, of the artillery, employed in the
assault, calls for his Excellency’s warmest approbation
and thanks.”
“Lieutenant Hay, of the artillery, who went
with a detachment of that corps to bring off the
enemy’s guns, merits my approbation for his successful
exertions in this service.”
The siege commenced, and by the 17th a breaching
battery of eight 18–pounders and four howitzers,
with an enfilading battery of four 12–pounders on
its left and another of two 12–pounders on its right,
257were ready and commenced firing, and on the 20th
the fort capitulated.
Seventy-six brass and 86 iron guns, 20 tumbrils,
with two lacs of rupees and ammunition, &c. were
captured; among them was the celebrated great
gun of Agra, which lay on the banks of the Jumna
until some twenty years afterwards it was broken up
and sold, an attempt to carry it down the Jumna
having failed, as also a fine brass 72–pounder, now
in the barrack square at Dum-Dum.
General Lake wrote:—“I attribute the early
surrender of Agra to the great impression our
breaching battery made on the walls, which opened
yesterday within 350 yards, and which would have
caused a practicable breach in a few hours more
battering.
“To Colonel Horsford, of the artillery, * * * as
well as to every officer of the * * * corps, I feel
myself under great obligations for their unremitted
exertions on this occasion, and to which I principally
attribute my early success against this place.”
Twenty-four lacs of rupees of prize-money were
on this occasion divided among the troops, in
accordance with the principle of the General Order
1st November, 1803, above quoted.
258On the 27th October the army marched from
Agra, and on the 31st (having previously left their
baggage and heavy guns under a guard at Futtypoor
Sicoree) had nearly come up with the Mahrattas.
In the evening, General Lake moved on
again with the cavalry, directing the infantry to
follow at three o’clock next morning, and after a
march of twenty-five miles overtook the Mahrattas
at sunrise, near Laswaree, amounting to about 9,000
infantry and 5,000 cavalry, with 72 guns. As they
appeared to be in some confusion, he was tempted
to make an attack at once, without waiting for the
artillery and infantry.
The enemy retarded this movement by cutting a
bund and flooding the road, and availed themselves
of the time gained to form their line, the right
resting on Laswaree and the left on Mohalpoor, the
front covered by the guns, and, as at Delhi, the
country around covered with long grass. The
cavalry charged boldly through the guns several
times, the gunners falling down as they passed and
reopening on their return, while the infantry plied
them with musketry from behind an intrenchment
formed of the baggage-hackeries: the guns could
not be secured from want of infantry.
259The loss having been great, and the men and
horses much fatigued, the cavalry were withdrawn
to wait the arrival of the infantry, the enemy having
been effectually stopped and crippled. By noon
the infantry reached the banks of the nullah, but
some slight rest was necessary after a march of
twenty-five miles; and as the enemy offered to
surrender their guns on certain terms, a favourable
answer was returned, though preparations were
made for renewing the attack when the stipulated
time should expire.
The enemy threw back their right, so as almost
to encircle Mohalpoor, their whole front bristling
with guns. The British infantry prepared to attack
in two columns, the right, under Major-General
Ware, against Mohalpoor, the left, under Major-General
St. John, against the enemy’s right, covered
by the cavalry. All the guns which had come up
were formed with the gallopers into four distinct
batteries to support these attacks. The whole
advanced under a heavy fire from the enemy’s
artillery, which were well and quickly served, and
by four P.M. had entirely routed the enemy, capturing
elephants, camels, 1,600 bullocks, 72 guns,
5,000 stand of arms, 44 colours, 64 tumbrils of
260ammunition and 3 of treasure, and 57 carts with
stores.
In this brilliant action the artillery suffered but
little,—4 Europeans and 3 lascars killed, and 6
Europeans and 5 lascars wounded: the brunt fell
upon the other branches.
From Laswaree the army returned towards Agra,
sending in the wounded and captured stores, and
remained in the neighbourhood till the end of the
month, when Colonel White, with a proportion of
artillery, was detached to aid the Bundelcund force
in the siege of Gwalior. The main army soon after
moved to a position near the Biana Pass, where the
horse artillery troop (formed from the experimental
horse artillery), under Captain Clement Brown,
with Lieutenants Starke and Young, joined; but
we must make a slight retrospect to bring up the
proceedings of the other forces to this point.
The detachment of artillery, with Lieutenant-Colonel
Fawcett’s force, destined for Bundelcund,
consisted of—
Major C. Wittit, Commandant.
Company.
Battalion.
Captains.
Captain-Lieutenants.
Lieutenants.
1
3
Tomkyns
Feade
Richards.
2
Dowell
M. Brown. W. Hopper.
261The force reached the banks of the Caine, near
Tiroha, on the 23rd September, and on the 10th
October crossed, and, after a long march over a
rough country, came in sight of Shumsheer Bahadur’s
troops. A distant cannonade was all that
occurred, the enemy made off as fast as he could,
and the force proceeded against Culpee, which surrendered
on the 4th December, as soon as a battery
opened against it.
Its next move was to Gwalior, where the whole
or a portion joined Colonel White, with whose detachment
were Captain Green, Lieutenants Hay,
Morris, Swiney, and Pollock. Batteries were opened,
and on the 5th February, 1804, Gwalior had once
again fallen into our possession.
The following General Order was issued on its
capture: “The Commander-in-Chief is particularly
happy to notice the valuable services of the artillery
employed at Gwalior; and the great effect produced
by the fire of the batteries under circumstances
peculiarly unfavourable reflects the highest
credit on the abilities of Captain Green, and on the
officers and men under his command.”
The detachments under Major-General Deare, of
the artillery, and Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton, at
262Mirzapoor and Sumbulpoor, were equally successful,
though not so brilliantly employed; their exertions
frustrated the Mahrattas’ hopes of plundering Mirzapoor
and Benares.
The Balasore force met with complete success;
they had chiefly, however, to contend against the
difficulty of moving guns through a swampy, heavy
country; the different towns surrendered with but
little opposition. The fort of Barabutty alone required
batteries to be erected against it; they were
ready on the 13th October, and the defences being
taken off, and the enemy’s guns silenced, the
storming party advanced, accompanied by some
artillerymen, under Lieutenant G. Faithfull, with a
6–pounder, for the purpose of blowing open the
gate. In passing the bridge, the party was exposed
for 40 minutes to a heavy fire of musketry ere the
gate could be forced, it was so blocked up with
masses of stone: these removed, the attack was
soon successful. Lieutenant Faithfull was wounded,
though not dangerously, and his conduct, as well as
that of Captain-Lieutenant Hetzler, was praised
in General Orders by the Governor-General:—“He
trusts that Lieutenant Faithfull, of the
artillery, will be speedily restored to the public
263service, in which his courage and resolution has
already been distinguished.
“The Governor-General expresses his sense of
the conduct of Captain Hetzler, of the Bengal
artillery.”
To bring up the events of the campaign in all
quarters, we must here turn briefly to the force in
Guzerat, with which was the 5th company 3rd
battalion. This force marched on the 21st August;
at Bargood they met with but a feeble resistance
on the 24th, and on the 26th a battery of two
18–pounders was completed against the fort of
Baroach, and opened. By the 29th a breach was
made, but the storm was delayed till 3 P.M., in
hopes of profiting by the assistance of the Fury
gun-vessel (on board which was a detail of Bengal
artillery), and an armed boat, which were hourly
expected, but which were prevented by the shallowness
of the water; the storming party therefore
advanced at the given signal (two 6–pounders fired
in quick succession), and overcoming a vigorous
resistance, gained possession of the fort.
With this company Captain-Lieutenant Dunn
and Lieutenant Drummond appear to have been.
The main army, with the Commander-in-Chief,
264remained encamped near Biana until the 9th
February, when they moved in the direction of
Jeypoor, to which town a detachment under Colonel
Monson was sent from Dowsah on the 18th April;
on the 10th May, a second detachment, under
Colonel Don, was sent against Tonk Rampoorah
from Nurwalee; and on the 18th May, the main
army broke up, and retraced its steps towards
Agra, suffering much from the extreme heat of the
weather ere it reached its destination in June.
Lieutenant-Colonel Don’s force arrived before
Rampoor on the 14th May, and to avoid exciting
the enemy’s suspicions and inducing him to block
up the gateways really intended to be attacked,
took up its position on the opposite side of the fort.
At two A.M. on the next morning, the storming
party advanced, headed by a 12–pounder, to blow
the gates open, and followed by another, to keep in
check a body of the enemy’s cavalry; while Captain
Raban, with one 12–pounder and four 6–pounders,
took up a position from which he was enabled to
fire upon any point of the works which the enemy
might man to meet the attack; a picquet of the
enemy was driven in, the first gate was blown in
by the gun, the second was found open, and the
265third and fourth were also blown in; the storming
party entered, and the town was taken possession
of.
Thanks were given to Captain Raban and every
officer and soldier of the detachment; the 2nd company
1st battalion, or a portion of it, was employed
on this duty.
Hitherto the operations of the army had been
perfectly successful, but we have now to recount
two failures, in both of which, but particularly in
that in Bundelcund, the artillery suffered heavily.
The Bundelcund force, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Fawcett, had been protecting that province from
Holkar’s incursions, and was encamped in May,
1804, near Kooch. A detachment of seven companies
of native infantry, under Captain N. Smith,
and fifty European artillery, from the 1st and 2nd
companies 3rd battalion, under Captain-Lieutenant
Feade and Lieutenant Morris, were sent against a
small fort, named Baillah, in the neighbourhood.
The guns having opened on the 21st May, the killidar
offered to surrender on the following morning
if the firing was directed to cease; his offer was
accepted, but availing himself of the respite, he immediately
despatched intelligence to Ameer Khan,
266who was in the vicinity, and requested him to fall
on the detachment, which he did the next morning
with 8,000 cavalry, and cut up two companies of
the infantry, and the whole of the artillery,[58] with
their officers, and took possession of the guns,[59]
except one, which, with the remaining five companies,
made good their retreat to Lieutenant-Colonel
Fawcett’s head-quarters. This officer,
alarmed at the reports he received, and unequal to
the emergency in which he was placed, immediately
retreated to Betwah; which movement caused
much annoyance to the Commander-in-Chief, as it
opened Bundelcund to Holkar, and left him undistracted
to turn his whole force against Colonel
Monson’s detachment in Rajasthan. Lord Lake
would have ordered the command of this force to
have been previously made over to “Lieutenant-Colonel
Wittit, of the artillery, a most excellent
267officer; but for his ill-health;” this was very indifferent;
so much so, indeed, that he died on the
27th May. In him the regiment lost a most valuable
officer; as a subaltern he had served with his
company in Lord Cornwallis’s campaigns on the
coast, and was considered by Sir John Horsford one
of the most superior officers in the regiment.
Colonel Martindell, after some changes, was
appointed to the command of the force, and in
June succeeded in capturing Mahobar, and defeating
the Ram Rajah and Nagahs, and with this
the campaign closed.
We must now follow Colonel Monson’s force,
with which was the 2nd company 2nd battalion of
artillery, commanded by Captain Hutchinson and
Lieutenant Winbolt, in its unfortunate retreat.
Advancing, after the capture of Hinglaizgurh to
the Mokundra Pass, with the object of co-operating
with Colonel Murray’s force from Guzerat, on the
7th July Colonel Monson received intelligence of
Holkar’s having crossed the Chumbul, and moved
to meet him; but almost immediately learning that
Colonel Murray had fallen back on the Myhie, he
retired to the pass on the 8th, beating off the
attacks of the enemy. Fearful, however, of the
268enemy getting behind him, he commenced his
retreat on Kotah. On the 12th he was again
attacked, and again beat Holkar off; he pushed on
for the Janee Nuddee, but the rain falling heavily,
he did not reach the ghat till the morning of the
13th, and then finding the rivulet not fordable, he
was obliged to halt till the 15th; the state of the
roads was such that the guns sunk deep in the
mud, several were abandoned, and most of the
ammunition destroyed. On the 17th the Chumbul
was reached; the Europeans were passed over on
elephants, and sent on to Rampoorah, while the
main body crossed over in detachments wherever
fords could be found. On the 24th there was
another severe contest with the enemy, and it was
not until the 27th that the last battalion, with
Colonel Monson, reached Rampoorah; but here
this unhappy detachment found no rest,—want of
provisions forced them to push on, and after leaving
a garrison under Captain Hutchinson, of the
artillery, they again moved (they were however
reinforced by two battalions, four guns, and some
irregular cavalry, under Major Frith) to the Bunass.
On the 22nd August they reached its banks, and
found it so swollen that the largest elephants could
269scarcely pass; three boats only could be found, and
in them the treasure was sent across. On the 23rd
the enemy appeared in force, and on the 24th, the
river having run off a little, the baggage was got
over, Monson covering the retreat by an attack on
the enemy, which was at first successful, but the
enemy rallying, forced him back, with the loss of
his last gun; the baggage was abandoned, and,
harassed by the enemy’s cavalry, the broken army
reached Koosialgurh during the night; from hence
they moved in a square to the Biana Pass, where
they hoped for some respite; but Holkar, bringing
his guns to bear, forced them to continue their
flight, and parties of broken and disordered fugitives
were all of Monson’s army that arrived at Agra.
In crossing the Bunass on the 24th Lieutenant
Winbolt, of the artillery, was drowned. He was an
officer of high promise, and one who stood high in
the opinion of Sir J. Horsford, in whose company
he had served on the coast in the campaigns of
1790–1–2.
To check Holkar, the army was called out again;
the horse artillery and other troops from Cawnpoor
marched on Agra on the 3rd September, and
towards the end of the month the camp was formed
270between Agra and Secundra. Holkar was too
wary to be led into a general action, and moving
northwards with his main body, he was followed by
Lord Lake, who reached Delhi and relieved the
siege on the 15th October. Holkar moved towards
Parriput, and crossed the Jumna into the Upper
Dooab; Lake (with the horse artillery, cavalry, and
reserve brigade, under Colonel Don) crossed near
Delhi on the 31st, and leaving all private wheel-carriages
and all baggage that could possibly be
spared, pushed on, determined to give Holkar no
rest. This rapid movement relieved Colonel Burn,
who, with some nujeebs, was shut up in the ruined
fort of Shamlee by Holkar. Following closely, Lord
Lake came in sight of him near Meerut, but he fled
with all speed, by the route of Hassur to Futteygurh.
On the 16th, Lake was within sixty miles
of Futteygurh, and starting again at night, he
made great exertions to come up with him. Just
as he mounted his horse, news came of the decisive
victory gained by Major-General Fraser over the
Mahrattas at Deig, an inspiriting omen to his own
troops. At dawn on the 17th, they reached the
skirts of the enemy’s camp; the horses were at
their picquets, the men sleeping beside them, when
271their sleep was either broken or rendered final by
discharges of grape poured in upon them from the
horse-artillery guns; the dragoons charged, and the
enemy took to flight,—Holkar among the first. The
blowing up of a tumbril had first alarmed him, but
he was persuaded it was the morning gun being
fired at Futteygurh; but the firing continuing, the
cry of “Lord Lake’s army” arose, and a general
flight followed; some took refuge in trees, and
might have escaped, but from their indiscretion in
firing on our troops, who, thus taught in what
direction to look, soon brought them down with
their pistols. The pursuit continued for upwards
of 10 miles, which, added to the previous march of
58, made a total of 68 miles in 24 hours, and when
it is recollected that this had been preceded by
350 miles in a fortnight, it may be considered one
of the most surprising feats on record, and speaking
more powerfully to the state of efficiency of the
regiments so employed, than words can do.
The services of the horse artillery were acknowledged
by Lord Lake; in writing to the Governor-General,
he says: “I have great satisfaction in
reporting to your lordship the very meritorious
conduct of Captain Brown and the corps of horse
272artillery under his command, who, by the rapidity of
their movements, were able to do great execution.
Captain Brown’s great attention in the management
of his corps, and his zeal and activity when called
into action, have on every occasion merited my best
acknowledgments.” And in the General Order,
November 18th, he returned his thanks “to
Captain Brown, and officers and men of the horse
artillery, for their highly meritorious and intrepid
behaviour in the engagement of yesterday.”
The officers with the horse artillery were Captain
C. Brown, Lieutenants H. Starke and J. Young.
The wounded were 1 European, 1 Indian, and 4
horses; the killed 1 lascar and 7 horses.
The main body of the army, which had been left
at Delhi on the 1st November, moved in the direction
of Govindhur, and on the 13th attacked the
Mahratta army under the walls of Deig, gained a
complete victory, and captured 87 guns, all mounted
on field-carriages, and fitted with elevating screws
and every apparatus; among them were six of the
18–pounders presented to the Mahrattas in 1791,
and (which must have been a pleasing circumstance
to Colonel Monson, who fell into the command
on the death of Major-General Fraser)
273fourteen of the guns, nine tumbrils, and four casts
of those which had been lost in his disastrous
campaign.
In this action the artillery lost 4 Europeans and
5 natives killed; 6 Europeans and 19 natives
wounded: Captain Butler had a horse killed under
him.
Lord Lake followed Holkar from Futtehgurh on
the 20th; crossed the Jumna near Muttra, on the
28th; sent on the captured guns to Agra, and
ordered out a battering-train, which joining him on
the 10th, he moved towards Deig, and on the
13th took up a position. Trenches were opened
during the night, and a breach being ready by the
23rd, the place was carried by storm. Captain
Raban accompanied the storming party with a
detail of artillery to spike the guns, and distinguished
himself by the way in which he performed
this duty.
Lieutenant Groves, of the artillery, was killed on
the 20th December, and Lieutenant T. D. Smith
wounded; 100 guns were taken, together with
many tumbrils.
The details of this siege, as well as those of
Bhurtpoor, Gunnourie, Komona, and Adjegurh, are
274so fully recorded in that valuable publication the
East-India Military Repository, that it would only
unnecessarily swell this work, were more than the
briefest allusion made, compatible with our object.
For this siege six or eight 18–pounders, four
8–inch and four 5½-inch mortars were all the siege
ordnance available.
The insufficient provision of ordnance and stores
for siege purposes will henceforth often strike the
reader; and the question why—possessed, as Bengal
is, of an inland navigation from one extremity of
the presidency to the other, offering every facility
for a speedy and cheap conveyance of stores—ample
materials had not been pushed forward to meet our
wants, must continually recur. The suddenness of
the campaign cannot be admitted as a valid reason;
the war had been deliberately entered on eighteen
months before, and it was known that the enemy
possessed many strongholds which required battering-trains
for their reduction. The first campaign had
given us Agra, a place admirably situated for a
depôt, with reference to the scene of war, to which
an adequate equipment should have been forwarded;
but it was not done, and the want was severely felt
in the course of this campaign. If ample supplies
275are not available against a fortified place, and it is
absolutely necessary to reduce it, men’s lives must
be substituted for shot and shells; in some cases,
no doubt, time is most precious, and it may be a
matter of calculation whether time or men can best
be spared; but when near our own frontier, there
can be no excuse for the improvidence which has
failed to provide the requisite stores, and by that
means to take from the commander the choice
between expenditure of his troops or of the munitions
of war.
In most we must attribute the blame to the
cumbrous and inefficient machinery of the Military
Board, in whose province lies the supervision of
the magazines; but the Board, composed of many
members, becomes a screen for individual responsibility,
and this must always be the case until each
member is vested with the sole control of the details
of his own department, subject only to a discussion
in the Board of the general question, that each may
have the benefit of his colleagues’ opinions, and be
made aware of what is going on in other departments,
that all may work in concert.
The opinion above given of the inefficient state
of our siege-trains is fully borne out by that
276recorded by the Marquis of Hastings in his
“Summary,” when, speaking of Hattrass, he says,
“One of my earliest military cares on arriving in
India had been to satisfy myself why we had made
so comparatively unfavourable a display in sieges.”
The details at once unfolded the cause: it is well
known that nothing can be more insignificant than
shells thrown with long intervals; and we never
brought forward more than four or five mortars
where we undertook the capture of a fortified
place. Hence the bombardment was futile, so that
at last the issue was to be staked on mounting a
breach and fighting hand to hand with a soldiery
skilful as well as gallant, in defending the prepared
intrenchments. This was not the oversight of the
Bengal Artillery officers, for no men can be better
instructed in the theory, or more careful in the
practice of their profession than they are; it was
imputable to a false economy on the part of government.
The outlay for providing for the transport
of mortars, shells, and platforms in due quantity
would certainly have been considerable, and it was
on that account forborne; the miserable carriages
of the country, hired for the purpose, where a
military exertion was contemplated, were utterly
277unequal to the service, and constantly failed under
the unusual weight in the deep roads through
which they had to pass. Therefore we never sat
down before a place of real strength furnished with
the means which a proper calculation would have
allotted for its reduction.
These remarks have been particularly brought
out by studying the details of the attack on Bhurtpoor,
which next employed Lord Lake’s army, but
which we shall not enter into, referring the reader
to the same authority as mentioned when speaking
of the siege of Deig, and contenting ourselves with
a very concise account of the operations.
The army marched from Deig to Bhurtpoor;
trenches were opened on the 4th of January, 1805;
batteries were erected, a breach effected, and an
unsuccessful storm attempted, on the 9th; other
batteries were raised and a fresh breach made, but
the enemy were so active in stockading it every
night, that a second attack could not be made until
the 21st: this, also, was unsuccessful. During the
storm, the British cavalry were forced to turn out
to keep off Holkar. On the 23rd, a convoy, slenderly
escorted, was plundered; a second and a
larger one was successfully brought in on the 28th,
278containing, among other stores, 8,000 18–pounder
shot. On the 6th February the army changed
ground; Meer Khan crossed the Jumna on the 7th,
and was pursued by Major-General Smith, with all
the cavalry and horse artillery, who came up with
and defeated him at Afzulgurh, near Moradabad, on
the 2nd of March; the scattered remains of this
army recrossed the Ganges, and Major-General
Smith returned to camp on the 23rd, after a march
of 700 miles.
The siege had been still carried on; the Bombay
army joined on the 10th February, but the troops,
although nearly exhausted, petitioned to be allowed
to finish the operation; the artillery were particularly
eager, for, though few in number, and fatigued
beyond conception by working the guns without a
relief since the commencement of the siege, the
thoughts of being deprived of their post distressed
them exceedingly, and they entreated permission to
be allowed to discharge the duties of their station
alone.
Regular approaches were made, and the batteries
pushed on to within 400 yards of the walls, but the
means of arming them were very insufficient; six
18–pounders, four heavy mortars, four light mortars,
279and two 12–pounders to take off the defences,
appear to have been the extent of ordnance preparations
brought against a place six or eight miles
in circumference! On the morning of the 21st, a
sally made by the enemy was driven back, and in
the afternoon a storm was attempted, covered by
the artillery guns drawn out on the plain, but
without success. A fourth attack was made the
following day, but it equally failed. The siege was
still continued, but the enemy offering to give up
the fortress on certain terms, it was accepted, and
the army finally broke up from its melancholy camp
at Bhurtpoor on the 21st April, and after remaining
a short time on the banks of the Chumbul,
watching Scindiah, retired to Agra the following
month.
During the siege, the artillery lost Lieutenant
Percival, killed on 9th January; Lieutenant Gowing,
killed on 22nd February; Captain Nelly, wounded
on 21st February; Captain Pennington, wounded
on 22nd February; and Lieutenant Swiney, wounded
on 21st February.
From this melancholy detail it is cheering to
turn to the successful proceedings of Captain Hutchinson,
of the artillery, who, it will be recollected,
280was left during Monson’s retreat in command of
Rampoorah, and whose judicious application of a
small force led to the most brilliant results.
On the 17th January, 1805, he marched with his
company, 2nd company 2nd battalion (or a portion
of it), 320 sipahis, a few irregulars, and two
6–pounders, against Gemeena; reaching it as the
moon rose on the 18th, he instantly commenced the
attack. The road to the gate was blocked up by
loaded hackeries, their wheels removed, and thus
the approach of the guns was prevented; the
hackeries were set fire to, steps were cut in the
side of the ramparts, and the sipahis mounted;
their only officer, Lieutenant Purvis, being wounded.
Captain Hutchinson supplied his place, and aided
by Corporals Cross and Hislop, mounted the ramparts;
a hole was made through the parapet, and
the assailants increasing in number, the enemy
were driven back on the gate; but the wicket
being forced open by the butt ends of the muskets,
the place was captured with but little loss.
Lord Lake, reporting the above to Lord Wellesley,
says, “The enterprise and gallantry this meritorious
officer has on every occasion manifested
during his command at Rampoorah has never been
281more conspicuous than on the present occasion,
where he appears to have accomplished a most
arduous and dangerous undertaking, with a spirit
and perseverance which reflects on him the highest
credit.”
On the 22nd February, he went against Bommongaon,
a mud fort, with high ramparts and a ditch;
the gates built up and remarkably well defended by
a garrison of 300 men. His party consisted of his
own company and 160 sipahis, with two 6–pounders
and two howitzers; these light guns made no impression,
but on the 24th two 12–pounders arrived,
and by the evening a practicable breach was
effected, but the assault being delayed till morning,
the garrison made off in the night.
On the 25th February he moved to Karawul, a
large walled town, with a number of bastions, four
small guns, and 1,100 men as a garrison; he placed
his two 12–pounders and one 6–pounder in battery
within 300 yards of the walls; his battery was
formed with empty tumbrils and ammunition-boxes
filled with earth, finished up with bags of grain;
his two howitzers and remaining 6–pounder were
placed in a similar manner in another direction. By
the afternoon of the 26th a breach was made, which
he immediately stormed.
282Captain Hutchinson was not unmindful of the
deserts of his subordinates; he says: “I should be
proud if his Excellency General Lake would notice
Corporals Cross[60] and Hislop; they are soldiers who
have distinguished themselves more than once, and
there are not two better or braver men in the 2nd
company 2nd battalion of artillery.”
His next exploit was against Darrara, a fort with
a broad and deep ditch and high ramparts, the gate
defended by a ditch and covered with an outwork.
Captain Hutchinson placed his garrison in two batteries,
one at 35 yards from the counterscarp, one
still nearer, and by noon on the 21st March, a
breach was effected; the storming party, headed by
six artillerymen, whom it would be injustice not to
name,—Corporals Cross and Hislop, Gunners Campbell
and Johnstone, Matrosses Muller and Hudson,—moved
to the attack, and after overcoming a severe
opposition, succeeded in gaining possession of the
fort; of the enemy between 60 and 70 were killed,
and the remainder taken prisoners. Of the artillerymen,
Johnstone was killed, and Hudson shot through
283the body and arm, after which he charged and killed
three of the enemy.
But we must once more return to Lord Lake’s
army, whom we left at Agra. The rainy season
limited their repose. Holkar’s restless spirit urged
him to collect his scattered followers, at the head
of whom, equipped with 60 guns, he approached
Muttra in October; Lord Lake followed, and
Holkar moved to the north. It soon became a
perfect chase. Holkar fled into the Punjab; Lake
crossed the Sutlej on the 7th December, and was
on the point of engaging him on the banks of the
Beas on the 25th, but was prevented by positive
instructions from the Governor-General, who probably
wished to avoid embroiling himself with the
Seikhs. A treaty was therefore reluctantly entered
into, and the army returned slowly to Dehli.
Captain Pennington was commissary of ordnance
with this force; Captain C. Brown, Lieutenant-Fireworkers
Frith and Boileau, were with the
horse artillery, and Captain T. Greene, Lieutenants
Hay and Rodber, with the 1st company 1st battalion.
In closing the account of these glorious campaigns,
it will not be out of place here to record
284the names of the officers sharing in them, and we
fortunately have a memorandum, in Sir John Horsford’s
writing, of those entitled to share in the
prize-money, which gives the necessary information.
1st Campaign.
Lieut.-Col. Horsford,
Capt. Butler,
Capt. T. Greene,
Capt. Raban,
Capt. Nelly,
Capt. Constable,
Capt. Hutchinson,
Capt. W. Shipton,
Capt. Best,
Capt. J. Robinson,
Capt. Mathews,
Lieut. M. Browne,
Lieut. Morris,
Lieut. S. Hay,
Agra and Laswaree only.
Lieut. Beagham,
Lieut. W. Parker.
2nd Campaign.
Lieut.-Col. Horsford,
Capt. C. Brown,
Capt. Raban,
Capt. Nelly,
Capt. Hutchinson,
Capt. Best,
Capt. Butler,
Capt. Paschaud,
Capt. Mathews,
Lieut. M. Browne,
Lieut. H. Starke,
Lieut. Swiney,
Lieut. Young,
Lieut. Grove,
Lieut. Gowing,
Lieut. Pollock,
Lieut. Parker,
Lieut. Hay,
Lieut. Percival,
Lieut. T. D. Smith,
Capt. Hinde,
Bhurtpoor from January to April.
Capt. Dunn,
Capt. Pennington,
Lieut. W. H. Frith,
The paucity of British troops in the ceded provinces
induced several of the zemindars to resist
the revenue authorities, and, among others, Doondia
Khan, who possessed two strong mud forts in the
285vicinity of Aligurh. The failure of the attacks on
Bhurtpoor added to their contumacy, but the want
of power to punish, rendered it necessary to pass it
over for the time, and be content with some show
of submission, which Doondia Khan made to Major-General
Smith on his return from Afzulgurh to
Bhurtpoor.
Causes of complaint continued to arise, and
towards the end of 1806, the collector reported he
had strengthened Komona with a new outwork and
attacked a neighbouring zemindar.
All efforts at accommodation proving useless, a
force was collected in August, 1807, under Major-General
Dickens, and proceeded against Komona
on the 12th of October. With this force were—
Company.
Battalion.
Captain-Lieutenant.
Lieutenants.
3
1
Lindsay
MᶜQuake, Harris, Pryce,
2
2
Forrester, and Parlby.
Lieutenant-Colonel Horsford was also present,
commanding a brigade, but also specially directing
the artillery.
An assault was made on the 18th November, but
proved unsuccessful, owing to the determined opposition
the enemy made, and the way in which he
286defended the breach, with mines, powder-bags,
burning choppahs, &c. The assailants were beat
back with heavy loss, but the enemy deserted the
place during the night.
Lieutenants Harris and MᶜQuake, acting as
engineers, were wounded; 5 Europeans and 9
natives killed; 10 Europeans and 10 lascars, of the
artillery, were wounded.
From Komona the force proceeded to Gunnouree
on the 22nd November, and carried on the attack
of that fort until the 11th December, when the
enemy evacuated it.
For the detail of these operations we would refer
the reader to the fourth volume of the East-India
Military Repository.
The strength of the artillery, as fixed in 1802,
having proved itself quite insufficient for the duties
of the Presidency, in August, 1805, five companies
of golundaz were raised; they were formed from
the “component parts” which remained on the
alteration in 1802. These companies were added
without any officers, but in the following year (19th
June, 1806) a lieutenant-colonel and major were
added to each battalion.
287The regiment, therefore, at this period consisted
of—
Colonels.
3
Lieut.-Colonels
6
Majors.
6
Captains.
21
Capt.-Lieutenants.
21
Lieutenants.
42
Lieut.-Fireworkers.
42
Horse.
Serjeants.
4
Corporals.
4
Gunners.
10
Trumpeters.
Matrosses.
40
Foot.
Serjeants.
105
Corporals.
105
Gunners.
210
Drummers.
42
Matrosses.
1680
Golundaz.
Native Officers.
10
Havildars.
40
Naicks.
40
Drummers.
Lascars.
Privates.
500
Serangs.
40
1st Tindals.
81
2nd Tindals.
81
Lascars.
2750
The staff are omitted in this abstract, as they
would only tend to swell the headings, and their
number is trifling.
In July three additional companies of golundaz
were added of similar strength.
In Bundelcund disturbances still continued, and
during several years a force continued to find employment
in that district. In February, 1806,
Gohud was taken, and in January, 1807, Chumar,
near Kooch. The General Orders on the capture
of the latter, notice “the professional ability and
zealous emulation displayed by Captain Hopper, of
288the artillery * * * employed on that service in
preparing the way * * * for which all are entitled
to his lordship’s particular praise and thanks.”
Captain Turton and Lieutenant G. Faithfull also
appear to have been in this campaign.
The following year, towards the conclusion, the
force again took the field to reduce Adjeegurh,
which Luchmun Dowlah refused to yield, agreeably
to stipulation.
A portion marched against Heerapoor, with which
were Major Brooke, Lieutenants Granishaw and C.
H. Campbell, of the artillery; after ascending the
pass on the 19th December, with much difficulty,
the fort was reconnoitred, and batteries formed of
fascines and sand-bags on the 20th, and by 3 P.M.
a breach was made; a fire was kept up at intervals
during the night, the enemy made a feeble attack on
an outpost, and evacuated the fort during the night.
The report of the Governor-General’s agent to
the secretary to Government said, “The exertions of
the pioneers and their officers, and those of Captain
Brooke, Lieutenants Granishaw and Campbell, the
Europeans and lascars of the artillery, in preparing
the batteries and serving and laying the guns, could
not be surpassed.”
289Captain Brooke’s services were also acknowledged
in orders by Major-General Martindell.
On the 22nd January the force was brought into
contact with the enemy, who, surrounded in the
strong position of Rugowley, made a desperate
resistance, and, although driven to a corner, rendered
it necessary to withdraw the troops from the
attack.
Major Brooke, Captain-Lieutenant Ferris, Lieutenants
D. Macleod, Granishaw, Campbell, and
Marshall, were present in this action.
On the 27th January the army took up their
position before Adjeegurh; a battery was erected on
the plain, but the distance was found to have been
miscalculated, probably from the overhanging appearance
which forts built on hills assume, and it
was found necessary to occupy the spur up which
the road ran to the gate. Much labour was
required to convey the heavy guns to their positions,
and it was not until the morning of the
11th February that they opened their fire; it continued
during the 12th and the morning of the
13th, when the whole of a wall came down; the
killidar then came out, and the fort was given up.
“To the artillery the heavy duties of the siege
290more particularly fell; their exertions were great,
and vied with the natural objects they had to
encounter. Their fire was inimitably well directed,
and the commanding officer must ever feel himself
indebted to the officers and men who conducted it.
“The judgment, zeal, and energy of Captain
Brooke, commanding the artillery, his personal and
unremitting exertions, were so conspicuous during
the siege, that to do ample justice to the merits of
that valuable officer, the commanding officer cannot
convey in terms too strong his high sense of approbation
and approval.”
A small force was also employed this year in reducing
Bhowanee, a fort in the Hurrianah country.
The inhabitants had been in the habit of plundering
all travellers, and at length ventured on the baggage
of a British detachment. The chief met a representation
by a peremptory denial of reparation in
terms of insolence. The force in Rewaree, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Ball, moved out towards the
end of August, and arriving on the 27th, allowed
the enemy twenty-four hours to consider. The terms
were absolutely rejected, and on the 28th batteries
were quickly erected; their fire opened the following
morning, and by noon a breach was made, and
291the place carried by assault after a vigorous resistance.
“To Captain Mason, in the general command of
the artillery, the very able arrangement of that
officer’s department throughout, but particularly in
conducting the duties of the breaching-batteries,
with the very heavy and well-directed fire that was
so rapidly kept up, in covering the advance and
approach of the storming party to the points of
attack, entitles Captain Mason to every commendation,
and reflects great credit on the officers
and men under his command.”
This detachment order was republished in the
Government General Order, detailing the service.
We have been unable to ascertain what portion
of the regiment, and what officers, were on this
occasion employed.
We must now advert to two important additions
which were made to the regiment in the course
of this year. In August the Governor-General,
adverting to the original establishment of the experimental
horse artillery, the success of which on
various occasions in the field has fully confirmed
the judgment which was formed of the superior
efficiency of a corps of that description for service
292in India, determined to make a considerable augmentation
to the corps, and place it on a permanent
establishment. It was accordingly directed to be
increased to three troops; the officers and men to
be drawn from the foot artillery.
per Troop.
Total
Captains.
1
3
Capt.-Lieutenants.
1
3
Lieutenant.
3
9
Adjutant.
1
Riding Master.
1
Serj.-Major.
1
R. R. Sergeant.
1
Qr.-Master Serj.
1
Serjeants.
6
18
Corporals.
6
18
Gunners.
10
30
Matrosses.
80
240
Trumpeters.
2
6
Farriers.
1
3
Native Farriers.
1
3
Native Doctors.
1
3
Serangs.
1
3
Tindals.
2
6
Lascars.
24
72
Horses.
145
438
Syces.
145
438
Grass-cutters.
145
438
The senior captain exercised the command over
the whole, in addition to the command of his own
troop, subject to the orders of the commandant of
artillery.
In December orders were issued for the formation
of a corps of ordnance-drivers. Hitherto the drivers
for the ordnance carriages had been hired as
required, and discharged when the service was
over; this system had worked so ill, and its faults
had been so strongly brought to light in the late
campaigns, that it was now resolved to introduce a
better plan. An organized corps was raised, sufficient
to provide a driver to every two bullocks,
and divided into companies, which were attached to
293companies of artillery, in the same manner as the
lascars, with whom they were assimilated as much
as possible. They were clothed in uniform, and
were not to be discharged except by the authority
of the commandant of artillery or officers commanding
the principal stations of the army.
Raised from the middle castes,—the Gwalas and
Aheeas chiefly,—and attached to the service by the
regular pay, the pension when worn out, and the
treatment they received, this proved a valuable
addition to the regiment.
In November two companies of independent
golundaz were raised, to take the duties of Prince
of Wales’ Island.
We have omitted to state that in May, 1808,
Colonel Carnegie resigned the command of the
regiment and sailed for England. He was succeeded
by Colonel Horsford, who had, with so much
credit to himself, been commanding the artillery in
the field. Colonel Horsford originally entered the
corps as a private; he was born of a good family,
and well educated, but his friends wishing him to
enter the church, he evaded it by enlisting in the
Honourable Company’s service, and coming to
Bengal as a private in the artillery, under the
294assumed name of Rover, and in 1778 he was a
serjeant in Captain Thelwall’s, or the 1st, company.
Inquiries having been made for him, it is said
he was suspected by Colonel Pearse, who had
employed him in copying some papers, from his
pointing out an error in a Greek quotation; his
appearance answering to the description may also
have furnished a clue. Colonel Pearse tried him
by calling out his name suddenly as he was leaving
the room; the test was successful; his confusion
betrayed his identity, and he was promoted to a
cadetship in the regiment, and continued to rise
by seniority. He was employed in the campaigns
against Tippoo in 1791–2 and 1799, establishing
for himself a high name, both as a practical and
scientific artillery officer; his advent to the command
of the regiment was hailed with universal
pleasure and satisfaction, for much benefit was
expected to the corps by the manner in which he
would exercise his authority, increased as it was by
the great personal influence which his character
had established.
In 1810 the regiment was again called on to
take part in an expedition, beyond seas. In the
295preceding year a force, chiefly of Madras troops,
was sent against the Isle of France, and occupied
Rodriguez; it was reinforced by Bengal troops,
and directed against the remaining islands in 1810.
The 6th company 1st battalion of artillery sailed
on the expedition, but had little opportunity of
gaining distinction. Bourbon was occupied in July,
and the force sailing for the Isle of France, landed
at an unexpected point, and moved forward with
rapidity and decision. Fort Malartic was carried
by assault, and the town surrendered in December.
The officers in the margin[61] accompanied the
296artillery; and the native troops were decorated
with a medal, not so much for the service, probably,
as for the purpose of stimulating the native
army to embark with alacrity for service beyond
seas.
In this year the regiment furnished a portion for
a far more serious conflict, in which native troops
were once again brought into personal contest with
Europeans, an event which had not occurred since
the destruction of the French power in the Carnatic;
we refer to the expedition to Java.
The artillery detachment was as follows:—
Major Caldwell, Commandant. Lieut. J. Scott, Adjutant.
Company.
7
1
Battalion.
1
2
Lascar Companies.
15, 16
19, 24
Captains.
W. Richards
J. Dundas H. Faithful
Captain Lieutenants.
J. D. Smith
J. Farrington Cameron
Lieutenants.
Harris
Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
Archer
Farnabie W. Bell
3rd Independent Golundaz.
The detachment embarked on the 11th March,
and reached Malacca in April, where the Madras
division joined; the expedition remained inactive
till the 11th June, almost the only event being the
burning of one of the Bengal store-ships laden with
powder; and this occurred fortunately without doing
297any damage to the fleet. Lieutenant Archer died
on the voyage.
On the 4th August the fleet anchored near Chillingching;
the troops were landed, and took possession of
Batavia without opposition on the 8th; an attempt
by the enemy to drive them out the following night
failed; and on the 10th the British advanced and
drove the enemy from their intrenched camp at
Weltervreeden. Captain Noble, with the Madras
horse artillery, performed the chief artillery duties
on this occasion.
The enemy having concentrated their force in
the strong lines around Fort Cornelis, a battering-train
was landed, and trenches were opened at about
800 yards from the position. These the enemy
flooded by cutting dams on the 19th; on the 20th
batteries for twelve and eight 18–pounders and nine
howitzers and mortars were commenced; on the
21st the enemy opened a heavy fire on the unfinished
batteries; but nevertheless the guns were
mounted by the 22nd, when the enemy made a
vigorous sally, and overcoming the unarmed working
parties, who were not even protected by a guard,
succeeded for a moment in capturing the batteries;
but they were quickly driven back. On the 23rd
298and 24th a heavy fire was kept up by the enemy
from twenty-four 32–pounders on the batteries and
trenches; but although, on the 24th the fire of
the nearest redoubt was repeatedly silenced, and
towards evening several of the enemy’s guns were
dismounted by the fire from the batteries, yet it
became evident that without regular approaches
the place could not be carried (unless by a coup de
main), and this would require time, labour, and
exposure in a baneful climate, which was to be
avoided by all means.
Lieutenant Farnabie was killed by a stray shot
while standing in the trench, and Captain Richards
was wounded by some cartridges taking fire in the
battery during these two days.
It was determined to storm the lines on the
26th. To occupy the enemy, a party, covered with
nine guns, took post behind a rising ground on the
right, and opened their fire, while the main column,
under Major-General Gillespie, attacked the left,
and after sustaining a severe loss, finally succeeded
in carrying the lines,—capturing 6,000 prisoners
and 280 pieces of fine brass ordnance.
In the orders issued to the army after this exploit,
no mention is made of the artillery; and this
299omission has been attributed to a dislike said to
have been taken to the Bengal artillery. That
some such feeling was supposed to exist, we may
conclude from the following passage, which appears
in a letter from an engineer officer on the island to
Colonel Horsford, written in October:—“You will
see that the artillery were left out in the thanks to
the army on the 26th August; but allow me to say,
and that decidedly, that had it not been from the
fire of our 18–pounders on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th,
I believe not a man would have returned from the
storm of the 26th without some remembrance, as
the day before the storm 130 men and 4 officers
were killed and wounded by our batteries; the
consequence was, that their artillerymen positively
refused to work at the batteries, and hardly a gun
was fired by the enemy during the storm, although
they had plenty of time; in short, I declare to you
that I scarcely ever saw a more destructive fire kept
up than by our batteries; indeed the killed and
wounded in a hospital four miles to the south of
Cornelis showed it, as well as the number of guns
that were dismounted. I was constantly in the
batteries. * * * The effect of our artillery,
when they did fire, was so conspicuous, that at a
300practice I never saw better firing, especially of three
guns on the right of the twelve-gun battery, commanded
by Lieutenant Cameron. I declare to
you I never witnessed anything like it, for every
shot he fired went into the enemy’s embrasures;
the consequence was, that in an hour and a half the
redoubt which was opposed to it was silenced.”
In Sir Samuel Achmuty’s report to Lord Minto,
the following mention is made of the ordnance
branches:—“I have the satisfaction to assure you
that both the artillery and engineers were actuated
by the same zeal in performing their respective
duties which has been so conspicuous in all ranks
and departments, though, from deficiency of the
means at their disposal, their operations were
unavoidably embarrassed with uncommon difficulties.”
From Cornelis, General Jansens fled to Bintenzorg,
and thence to Samarang, near which town he
took up a position, Jattoo, on high and rugged hills,
defended by thirty pieces of artillery, and the road
cut off by cheveux de frise; he was attacked on the
16th of September by a detachment of 1,200 men,
under Colonel Gibbs, with whom were 110 artillerymen
and six guns; with the artillery were Major
301Caldwell, Lieutenants Scott, Farrington, Cameron,
and Ralfe. Two of the guns were sent to the right
with a force to seize on a hill which overlooked the
enemy’s left, while the remainder were placed in a
position in front to throw their shot across the
valley into the enemy’s position. As soon as the
two detached guns opened their fire, the advance
rushed on; the enemy were surprised and fled,
doing little execution with their artillery, which
was all taken.
This was the last effort of General Jansens; he
fled to Salatiga and capitulated; Fort Ludovick was
surrendered, and the war, as far as the Dutch were
concerned, may be said to have ended; but to avoid
returning to Java again, we will here notice such
other affairs as occurred during the time the British
held possession of the island. But before continuing
the narrative, we will here insert a sketch
of the medal granted to the native troops employed
in the expedition; and we may also state that medals
were for this service granted to officers in H.M.’s
service, but to none under the rank of commanding
officer of a corps, or holding an important staff
office.
302
The next service on which this force was employed
was the expedition under Gillespie to the
Palmsbury river, in April, 1822, in which were
Captain S. Shaw, Lieutenants Hill and Delafosse.
In June, they again started for Samarang. Major
Butler, who had previously come round, commanded
the artillery; Lieutenants Farrington,
Cameron, and Hill accompanied. They reached
Djocjocarta on the 17th of June, and prepared
for the attack of the “kraken,” or fortified residence
of the Sultan of Mataram, three miles in circumference,
armed with many guns, and defended by a
broad wet ditch with drawbridges, by 17,000 regular
troops, and an armed population of 100,000.
The enemy were kept on the alert by a heavy fire
303till three in the morning of the 20th, they were
then allowed a respite, and two hours before daylight
the troops moved to the assault and carried
the works. Major Butler, one drummer, and eleven
rank and file of the artillery, were wounded.
In the Orders, we find, “The Commander of the
Forces performs a pleasing task in recognizing the
valuable services of Major Butler, commanding the
artillery, who has uniformly displayed his wonted
zeal and indefatigable exertion; the Commander of
the Forces is therefore happy in the opportunity of
bearing public testimony to the professional
superiority and valuable acquirements of this excellent
officer;” and Lieutenant Cameron’s conduct is
also spoken of.
Other expeditions[62] took place during the time
we held possession of the island, in which, Captain-Lieutenant
Shaw, Lieutenant Farrington, Lieutenants
Cameron, Harris, and Delafosse, took part;
in those against the town of Boni, in 1814, and
against Macassar, in 1816, Lieutenant Farrington
304is mentioned in Orders, and attention drawn to his
exertions.
Bundlecund still continued the seat of war;
Gopal Sing, availing himself of the natural fastnesses
of the country, evaded our troops continually. He
was overtaken near Perereea in February (and
Lieutenant Timbrell is mentioned on this occasion),
but escaping, he fled to the hills, from whence he
came out the following month, and before assistance
could be sent, burned the cantonment of Tiroha,
maintaining a harassing and desultory warfare,
which, without producing any marked events, kept
the troops constantly on the move during that and
the following year; and it was only brought to a
close by the siege of Callingur, in February, 1812;
after which, Gopal Sing returned to his allegiance.
Callingur is a fort situated on one of those detached
rocky eminences abounding in Bundlecund,
and which require little aid from art, as they are
almost natural fortifications. The rock at the summit
forms a natural scarp, of from ten to twenty
feet high, and the whole side of the hill is very
difficult of access. The only entrance is in the centre
of the northern wall, and the approach to it is by a
steep pathway winding up the face of the hill; this
305gained, a succession of gates bar the entrance to
the fort.
The force under Colonel Martindell assembled
on the 19th January; on the 21st occupied a small
hill, within 800 yards, which promised to be the
most favourable point for attack. The 22nd, 23rd,
and 24th were employed in clearing the jungle and
making a road for the guns, and, on the 25th, two
18–pounders were, with great labour, got up. In
the night, two more guns and two mortars followed,
and were placed in battery: two other batteries
were erected at the foot of the hill, against the
main gateway, and the whole being ready by the
28th, opened with great effect. The enemy’s guns
were immediately dismounted, and the bastion
opposed to the guns on the hill demolished.
The town was taken this day; and the batteries
continuing to play till the 2nd of February, the
breach was supposed practicable, and a party advanced
to storm it, but finding a perpendicular
ascent of twenty feet, their ladders crushed and
broken by the showers of large stones the enemy
rolled down, the party were forced to retire with
heavy loss: the killadar, however, was glad to
come to terms, and capitulated on the 8th February.
306Major Fuller commanded the artillery in this
siege, and their exertions were acknowledged in
General Orders:—“The Governor-General deems
it his duty to express his concurrence in the
honourable testimony borne to the distinguished
services of the artillery and engineer departments
by Colonel Martindell.”
The neighbouring districts of Boglecund and
Rewah were, during the next year, the scenes of
petty warfare, similar to what had taken place in
Bundlecund; marked by no features of great importance,
yet involving much exertion on the part of
the troops, particularly the artillery employed, from
the mountainous and rugged features of the country
and the number of nullahs and rivers intersecting
it. We have but few records of this campaign, and
are therefore unable to give the details, interesting
as they would be to those who are acquainted with
the country, and can, from the present state of the
Heerapoor, Bisramgunge, and Bundry ghats, easily
imagine the difficulties they presented at the time
of which we are now writing.
About this period an alteration took place in the
matériel of the regiment, by the introduction of the
Gribeauval pattern of gun-carriage and the long
307caisson for ammunition, a description of which will
be found in the fourth chapter. The matériel and
the means of draught occupied much attention at
this period, and there is every reason to believe
that the recently organized driver corps and the
gun bullocks about this period, under the particular
care and attention of Lieutenant-Colonel Grace,
commanding the artillery in the field, were in a
most efficient state. The bullocks were carefully
selected and trained, fairly worked and well looked
after, and the consequence was, that we find the gun
bullocks condemned as past their work, selling, from
the high condition they were in, for the purpose of
slaughter, at a higher rate than the good young
cattle bought to replace them were costing.
As the next war in which the army was engaged
proved how insufficient the strength of the regiment
was, and caused a considerable addition to the
native portion of it, we propose here to notice the
additions to the end of 1815, although the war
commenced the preceding year: by so doing, we
shall avoid breaking the thread of the narrative of
the Goorkha war.
The last additions we have noticed were two
companies of independent golundaz, added in 1809;
308a third company was raised in February, 1812, and
a fourth in August, 1814; in 1815 four additional
companies of golundaz were raised to meet the
wants of the service; so that the regiment now
consisted of 1 horse brigade of three troops, 3 European
battalions of 7 companies each, and 1 Native
battalion of 16 companies, together with lascars
(42 companies) and ordnance-drivers (26 companies);
but these additions to the numerical strength of
the regiment had been made without any corresponding
increase to the ranks of the commissioned
officers. This was peculiarly galling; for while
struggling with the difficulties of their position, the
officers had the mortification of seeing the numbers
of the infantry increased by whole regiments at a
time, bringing fair promotion with the augmentations,
while, in their own branch, from 1802 to
1815, the troops and companies had increased from
21 to 40, yet, with the exception of the field officers
added in 1806, not an officer had been given: the
infantry had during that time risen from 25 to 31
regiments.
An important change in the location of the
regiment took place in 1813. The head-quarters
had hitherto been in Fort William, and moved
309out to Dum-Dum during the cold months for practice
and exercise; this year, barracks having been
completed, Dum-Dum was permanently occupied
as the head-quarters of the artillery,—a change,
no doubt, adding much to the comfort of all ranks,
for there can be no comparison as to the comfort
and health of men cooped up within the narrow
limits of a fortress, and those occupying an airy
roomy cantonment,—even if a cantonment surrounded
with swamps, as Dum-Dum is; and in spite
of which it is now one of the most salubrious of
stations for European troops. As it had been used
as a practice-ground for upwards of thirty years,
many bungalows of different degrees of stability had
sprung up,—chiefly, we believe, of mat and thatch;
and as the officers doubtless were not idle while the
barracks were building, we may believe that they
found plenty of accommodation ready for them; and
houses, of a more durable nature, soon began to
spring up, some on new sites, others replacing the
temporary habitations. A mess-house, we believe,
had been previously built by Government; occupying
the site of the centre room of the present
building, which, by gradual additions and alterations,
has reached its present handsome proportions. These
310were chiefly made in 1824–5, in 1836, and in
1841–2, when the verandah was raised and the
portico added. The last improvement was made in
1845, when the roof, put on twenty years before,
requiring to be renewed, the centre rooms were
raised several feet. The other houses in the cantonment
have hardly undergone less change: brick
walls first replaced the mats, and then puckah roofs
superseded the thatch; the usual additions of rooms
and verandahs taking place. The very last of the
old bungalows was recently transformed into a
puckah house, and, save the old avenue, which all
declare to have been exactly in its present state
when they landed half a century ago, there is little
in the present cantonment which can be recognized
by those who first occupied it permanently. The
barracks had an upper story placed on them about
1830; the church was built in 1819; and a year
or two ago a racket-court, for the men of the
regiment, was built: the officers erected one for
themselves in 1834.
For many years Dum-Dum was a very favourite
station; its mess, its amateur theatre, its band, and,
at one time, its pack of fox-hounds, rendered it a
place of resort to many from Calcutta and the
311neighbouring stations; but the gradual change in
the location of the artillery has necessarily reduced
the numbers there, and the heavy tax upon the
means of living, caused by the station being placed
on half-batta in 1829, causes all who can to avoid
it; and consequently hardly any are to be found
there save the staff of the regiment of the station
and the battalions quartered there, with the young
men just arrived from England and awaiting their
dispatch to the provinces.
CHAPTER VII.
312
Campaigns against the Goorkhas—Rocket Troop raised—Bombardment
of Hattrass—Death of Sir John Horsford—Ordnance
General Officers debarred the General Staff—Conceded
to them—Guns formed into Batteries—Organization of 1818—Pindarrie
and Mahratta Campaigns—Gun Carriage Agency—Ordnance
Commissariat Department—Commandants’ position
improved—Model department—Select Committee
formed—Reduction of Lascars—Increase to Golundaz—Battalion
system introduced into Bengal—Burmese war—Siege
of Bhurtpoor—Increase to the Regiment.
The overbearing conduct of the Nepaulese having
forced the British into war, Lord Hastings prepared
to carry it on with vigour, and bring it to as speedy
a termination as possible; and with this view no
preparations were spared which the most consummate
foresight and consideration could suggest. A
nearly simultaneous attack on four different points,
necessitating the Goorkhas to spread their forces
and resources along their whole extensive frontier,
was the plan originally adopted, and carried out with
some alterations, suggested by an increased knowledge,
or forced upon us by those obstacles and
313failures which must ever attend upon extended
combinations.
Major-General Sir D. Ochterlony, with about
6,000 native infantry and a small train of artillery,
was to attack the western or extreme right of the
Goorkha territories,—the districts in the neighbourhood
of the present hill station, Simlah.
Major-General Sir R. R. Gillespie, with about
1,000 Europeans and 2,500 native troops, with
artillery, was to penetrate the valley of Deyrah,
and, after dislodging the Goorkhas from their positions
in it, to attack Gurhwal; this done, another
force was to attack Kumaon from Rohilcund.
Major-General J. S. Wood, further to the eastward,
was to penetrate by Bootwul to Palpa: about
1,000 Europeans and 3,000 native troops, with a
small artillery, composed this force.
Major-General Marley was to operate on the
east, or left, against their capital at Katmandro, by
the passes between the Gunduck and Bagmuttee
rivers: a moderate train of artillery, 1,000 Europeans,
and 7,000 native troops, formed this division.
With all these forces were portions of the regiment,
which we shall enumerate as we notice the
actions of each division.
314The first which came in contact with the enemy
was Gillespie’s. This force marched from Meerut,
and entered the Dhoon by the Kheeree pass, and
seized Deyrah on the 22nd October, 1814: the
horse artillery under Major Pennington accompanied
this division.[63]
Colonel Mawbey having been sent forward to
seize Nalapanee (Kalunga), found it so much
stronger than was expected, that he fell back, and
the whole force advanced; one end of the ridge
was seized on the 30th, and under cover of this
party a hasty battery was raised during the night to
receive ten field guns, about 600 yards from the
fort; at daylight they opened their fire, and four
columns were to have advanced to the assault, but
by some misunderstanding only two advanced; the
enemy, throwing open a wicket, pushed out a gun,
took them in flank, and forced them to retire. A
fresh attack by three companies of H.M.’s 53rd was
315equally fruitless, and, rendered impatient by the
repulse, Gillespie rushed on at the head of a small
party of dismounted dragoons from his own regiment,
the 8th Royal Irish: in this attack he fell.
The force now retired to Deyrah, and awaited till
the 24th November the arrival of siege guns[64] from
Delhi. On the 25th operations were recommenced;
a battery for the 18–pounders was raised at about
300 yards, and by the 27th the wall was brought
down. The enemy made a spirited sally on the
battery, but were driven back by discharges of case
shot. The assault was attempted, and failed, and a
gun was run up by Lieutenant Luxford, who volunteered,
and was shot in the attempt to clear the
breach. The troops would not advance.
Open force having thus failed, a successful
attempt to cut off the supply of water was made,
while shells were continually poured into the fort.
Cooped up in so small a space, without shelter, their
execution was great, and on the 30th the brave
garrison evacuated the place, leaving to their victors
a scene which none could look on without shuddering.
316With the siege guns, parts of the 5th and 6th
companies 3rd battalion arrived, with the officers
noted in the margin.[65] The horse artillery also
remained, “as the professional advice and opinion
of so able an officer as Major Pennington on the
subject of artillery as affected by local circumstances,
could not fail of being of the greatest use to
Captain-Lieutenant Battine.”
The artillery losses were not severe: Lieutenant
Luxford was the only officer killed; and in reporting
it Colonel Mawbey said, “Lieutenant Luxford, of
the horse artillery, is so severely wounded that I
have no hopes of his recovery. This excellent
officer had gone to the foot of the breach in
command of an howitzer and 12–pounder gun,
which I sent in hopes, with the assistance of
shrapnell shells, of lessening the astonishing exertions
made by the Goorkhas.”
A detachment being left near the Jumna, the
main body marched for Nahun by the plains on the
5th December, and on the 20th Major-General
Martindell assumed the command. His first efforts
were not successful. A combined attack on the
317enemy’s positions on the heights by columns under
Majors Ludlow and Richards, was beaten back, the
former with much loss, and the division took up its
position before Nahun.
Major-General Ochterlony’s division was accompanied
by the 4th company 3rd battalion artillery,
and early in November attacked Nalagurh. The
place was breached, and the garrison capitulated on
the 5th November, on which occasion the Major-General
considered it his “particular duty to express
his obligations to Major McLeod and officers and
men who manned the batteries.”[66]
The next object was the attack of Ramgurh, and
some manœuvring was necessary. The news of the
failures at Kalunga arriving, gave fresh confidence
to the Goorkhas, and made the British cautious.
Sir David waited for reinforcements till near the
end of the year. Light guns arriving, the force
moved, and manœuvred to place itself in rear of the
Goorkha position, who, to meet it, changed their
front, and occupied the heights of Maloun, exposing
Ramgurh, which was the immediate object of the
318movement. With incredible labour and perseverance,
two 18–pounders were carried up the hills
and placed in battery about 700 yards from the
fort by the 12th November. Their fire was ably
directed by Captain Webbe, and the walls having
crumbled away under it, the garrison were glad to
capitulate on the 17th, and were suffered to join
their comrades in Maloun.
Before following this division to its victorious
conclusion, we shall find it more convenient to
glance at the proceedings of the other forces, which
were acting against the Goorkha line of frontier.
Major-General J. S. Wood’s division left Gorukpoor
late in December: the 5th company 2nd
battalion artillery was attached to it.[67] In January
it entered the Teraie, and, coming suddenly on a
stockade at Jeilgurh, carried it at once, in which
operation Captain McDowall was wounded. Fearing
that he could not retain the stockade if
attacked, Major-General Wood retired to Nichloul,
and, though reinforced by more troops, remained
inactive till the end of the season, when he made an
attempt with his guns on Bootwul, and retired to
Gorukpoor.
319To the eastward, Major Bradshaw, with the
advance of Major-General Marley’s army, on the
25th November attacked and carried the post of
Burhurwa, on the Baghmuttee, on which the
Goorkhas evacuated the Teraie, and Major Bradshaw
occupied posts at Boragurhee, Sumunpoor,
and Pursa.
Major-General Marley, with the main army,
arrived on the 12th December: the 6th company 2nd
battalion, and detachment, were with this force, and
the artillery officers noticed in the margin,[68] and a
small train of heavy guns, some field and mountain
train guns, and wall pieces. The force moved in
four columns; the main one towards the Bicheea-koh
and Hetounda passes; the second towards Hurheehurpoor;
the third by the Sookturdurree pass and
Joorgooree; while the fourth was kept in Jusspoot.
The end of the month of December found the
main body at Puchroutee Tuppah, with the posts of
Pursa and Sumunpoor twenty miles on the left and
right flanks of the army, the posts in the same state
they had been three weeks previously, and no steps
320taken to strengthen them. They were garrisoned by
about 500 men each, and Pursa had, in addition,
a single 6–pounder, commanded by Lieutenant
Mathison. On the night of the 17th January, 1815,
both posts were attacked by the Goorkhas; the
party at Sumunpoor was taken by surprise and cut
to pieces; that at Pursa was a little better prepared,
and, aided by Mathison’s gun, defended themselves
for some time; but the enemy, availing themselves
of the shelter the trees afforded, picked off nearly
every artilleryman. Mathison then proposed to
charge the enemy, but the sepoys refused, and a
retreat was attempted, Lieutenant Mathison serving
the gun by himself, when all his men were killed or
wounded, by which the enemy were kept back; the
gun being lost, the retreat became a flight, and had
the enemy followed, all must have perished.
Lieutenant Mathison, in his report, says, “I
cannot refrain from particularly mentioning the
persevering bravery displayed by Matross William
Levey, who, though wounded by a musket-ball
through one leg and one arm, yet gallantly continued
to keep his station until the priming-pouch was
blown away from his side, and his wounds becoming
too painful to endure, obliged him to sit down.
321‘Sillaree,’ gun-lascar of the 42nd company, is also
deserving of particular mention; who, although
wounded in both hand and foot, continued alone to
assist me to the last, and was the person who seized
and carried away with him the silver spear planted
by the enemy close to the gun at the commencement
of the action, and now in the possession of
Major-General Marley.”
In the orders of the day, the Major-General
“expressed his best thanks to Lieutenant Mathison
for his gallant conduct in defending his gun till
every man, European and native, fell around it,
and all the ammunition was expended.”
The artillery in this unhappy affair lost 4 Europeans
and 6 natives killed, and 6 Europeans and
11 natives wounded; and it is probable that many
of the wounded died afterwards. Want of foresight
in not strengthening the position, and want of proper
information of the enemy’s movements, seem to have
been the chief causes of this catastrophe: we may
add another,—the detaching a single gun. Two guns
mutually support each other, and in case of a misfire
occurring, the second gun is ready to pour in its fire,
should it be attempted to carry the first by a rush;
and we have heard it said that Lieutenant Mathison
322declared on this occasion, that had he had another
gun he could have beaten off the enemy. A general
order has since prohibited the practice by declaring
that never less than two are to be detached.
After this, Major-General Marley gave up all
idea of penetrating the hills; he strengthened the
post of Baragurhee, and never again entered the
forest. On the 10th February he left his division,
and Major-General G. Wood arrived on the 20th,
but the season passed away in inactivity.
In February detachments of irregulars under
Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner and Major Hearsey
advanced on Almorah from Kasheepore and Pilheebheet,
and were followed by a small division of
regulars under Colonel Nicolls, with which was a
detachment of European artillerymen under Lieutenants
C. H. Bell and R. B. Wilson, with ten
pieces of artillery. On the 5th April the force
entered the hills, and heard of the defeat of the
irregulars before Almorah; on the 23rd, a detachment
from it overtook Hastee-Dull with his troops,
near Gunnanath; an action followed, in which the
Goorkhas were beaten and their leader slain. On
the 25th the whole force attacked the breastworks
on the Seetolee heights, and, following up their
323success, drove the enemy into Fort Almorah, and
formed a lodgment on the ridge. “With considerable
exertion on the parts of the officers of artillery,
Lieutenants Bell and Wilson, the small mortars
were laid in the battery, and opened at six in the
evening, and the larger ones (8–inch) at midnight.”
Several shells were thrown into the fort, which
compelled the garrison to remain concealed; many
Goorkhas and Cassiahs having quitted the fort, it
was supposed that the garrison had fled, but during
the night a sharp attack on the outposts proved that
they had determined to make a last effort; this
failing, on the 27th they evacuated the fort.
In Colonel Nicolls’s report he says, “I feel much
indebted to Lieutenants Bell and Wilson for their
activity in laying and bringing these mortars into
use so soon,” and in the General Orders the Governor-General
records that these officers “are mentioned
in terms of strong commendation.”
This well-executed expedition materially affected
the aspect of the war; in the language of the
Goorkha chief, it “broke the camel’s back,” it separated
the extremities of the frontier, and prevented
reinforcements being sent from Katmandoo to
Maloun, and it stood out in brilliant contrast with
324the other events of the campaign; but we must
now return to the divisions employed against Nahun
and Maloun.
Major-General Martindell’s force, which we left
in front of Nahun, remained inactive till February;
its subsequent operations were marked by vacillation;
with great labour, 18–pounders were carried up the
hills, and, after the time and labour thus expended,
no further result was obtained than levelling a
stockade, which was found to be of no use to the
general plan of the campaign. Operations were
commenced against Jythuck, and a position taken
up on the ridge on the 1st April, although opposed
by the enemy; this advantage was followed up, and
Punchul Point seized; other positions were taken
up, which straitened the enemy’s post, and would
have eventually forced him to evacuate the fort,
had not the operations at Maloun caused the Goorkhas
to leave the province. To these operations
we must now turn.
We left Major-General Ochterlony in possession
of Ramgurh, with his forces interposed between
the enemy on the Maloun ridge and Belaspore.
Great exertions were made by the artillery in moving
the ordnance up the heights; but on the 10th March
325a battery was raised against Taragurh; on the 11th
a breach was practicable, and the enemy fled;
Chumba was attacked and breached by the 16th,
and the garrison capitulated; other forts were
reduced, and the detachments joined the main body
which was in front of the Goorkha lines. These extended
from the forts of Maloun to Soorujgurh,
all the peaks crowned with stockades, except those
of Ryla and Deothul, the former, convenient for
future operations against Soorujgurh, the latter, in
the heart of the Goorkha line, within 1,000 yards
of Maloun. The main attack was against Deothul,
while a second was made on Kyla, while other
columns moved, as if against Maloun, to distract
the enemy.
Five columns were prepared, and on the night of
the 14th April, Kyla was occupied, and on a signal
made, two other detachments moved to that point;
this done, two other columns moved on at night
and occupied positions till daylight, when they
attacked Deothul from opposite sides: with these
columns were two field-guns, to assist in holding the
height when gained, as considerable efforts were
expected from the enemy. The position was carried
after a severe contest, and much desultory fighting
326continued till evening; but on the morning of the
16th the Goorkhas, 2,000 in number, made a furious
attack on the hill; the artillerymen were nearly all
killed at their guns, and at one time, Lieutenant
Cartwright, with one artilleryman only, was left; but,
aided by Lieutenant Hutchinson of the Engineers,
and Lieutenant Armstrong of the Native Infantry,
they kept up a fire which tended materially to check
the Goorkha onset; and reinforcements and ammunition
arriving opportunely from Ryla, their efforts
slackened, and they were driven back by a charge
headed by Major Lawrie.
A road was made for heavy artillery to Deothul,
and with incredible labour the 18–pounders were
placed in battery against Maloun early in May; but
news of the fall of Almorah having arrived, the
Goorkhas urged their chief, Ummer Sing, to yield,
and on his refusing, they left him, and he was forced
to capitulate on the 5th May.
The exertions of the artillery in this campaign
were acknowledged in the following General Orders.
“The unwearied alacrity, the labour, the conspicuous
gallantry, and the skill, displayed by the whole of
the artillery, engineers, and pioneer departments
throughout the course of the service, have been
327pointed out to the special notice of the Governor-General,
and His Excellency accordingly expresses
his earnest sense of the meritorious conduct exhibited
by Major McLeod, commanding the artillery,
and by Captain Webbe, of the same corps.”
Early in the following year it became evident that
the court of Nepal intended evading the treaty
they had agreed to, and the force was assembled
again in the neighbourhood of Dinapore, and placed
under Sir D. Ochterlony’s command, with the object
of occupying the capital.
In addition to the former artillery, the 7th company
2nd battalion, and 3rd company 3rd battalion,
with the following officers,[69] joined the force. On the
10th February the main body entered the Sal forest,
and took up a position at Bicheea-koh; four days
were spent in reconnoitring and inquiry, when it was
discovered that the regular road, which was fortified,
might be turned by some very difficult passes in
the Chooriaghati range; on the 14th, at night, a battalion
(3rd) marched, and entering a ravine, called
Baleekola, followed its course five or six miles, then
striking up a water-course, came to a steep acclivity
328of 300 feet in height; the advance clambered up,
and were followed by the brigade, and the heights
were gained. The other brigade (4th) marched by
the direct road on the 15th, and the Goorkhas,
hearing that the ghat was turned, retreated on
Muckwanpore with but little resistance. Lieutenant
Walcote of the artillery was wounded severely
in reconnoitring the stockaded position. On the
27th the two brigades united at Mukwanpore; a
reconnoitring party came in contact with the
enemy, and Lieutenant Pickersgill with difficulty
regained the camp; but reinforcements proceeding
from each side brought on a general action, which
was eagerly contested; the artillery came into full
play, and the effect of the guns upon the enemy’s
masses moving on the opposite ridge considerably
aided in the victory gained.
The only other action was that in which Colonel
Kelly’s brigade was engaged in the attack on Hurryhurpore
Hill. The infantry were engaged from
six to eleven, when “two 6–pounders and two
5½-inch howitzers being brought up on elephants,
in a few minutes decided the affair, and left us in
possession of an almost natural redoubt.” “Amongst
the wounded you will see Captain Lindsay; although
329his wounds are not severe, I fear I shall lose
his active service for a time, which I lament exceedingly,
having found Captain Lindsay a most zealous,
able officer, both as an artillerist and engineer,”
are the words of Colonel Kelly in reporting the
affair.
With this campaign the war ended; the pride of
the Nepalese was effectually humbled for the time,
on finding a British force in full march on their
capital, and they were compelled to execute the
treaty; but since that period they never ceased to
look forward to the arrival of the time when an
opportunity of revenge might offer.
The services of the native troops were rewarded
by a medal to all native officers who had served
within the hills, and to such of the native infantry
officers and privates as had distinguished themselves
by their gallantry or energy. This medal we have
never seen, though by the records we observe
several were given to the native branches of the
regiment. The sketch here given is copied from
one which appeared in the East-India United Service
Journal, in 1837.
330
In the early part of the present century the
attention of the Ordnance department in England
was turned towards a weapon which had long been
in use with the native armies in India—the rocket;
and, under Sir William Congreve’s superintendence,
rockets of a large size and great power of flight
had been manufactured and used with much success
in the bombardment of Boulogne and Copenhagen.
Experience suggested improvement in details, and
the results seemed so satisfactory, that a troop
equipped with cars for firing volleys and tripods for
single rockets was added to the corps of Royal Artillery,
and employed with considerable effect at the
battles of Leipsic and Waterloo. Acting upon this
example, and considering that it would be advantageous
to beat our Indian enemies at their own
331weapons, the Government decided this year on
adding a rocket troop to the Bengal Artillery. It
was ordered in September, and consisted of European
artillerymen mounted on camels, and volley-cars
drawn by horses. Its strength is detailed in
the margin.[70]
Captain Whish, Lieutenants G. N. Campbell
and G. Brooke, and Lieutenant-Fireworker Cartwright
were posted to this troop, and it was soon in
a state of efficiency. It was attached to the horse brigade,
which was at this time commanded by
Major Pennington, who was retained in the command,
although “his promotion to the rank of
major rendered him in excess to the establishment
of officers attached to it, at the recommendation of
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in consideration
of his general merits as an officer and his
particular qualifications for the command of the
corps of horse-artillery, which had attained such
an eminent degree of discipline under his superintendence.”
The dress of the regiment in January underwent
332some change; the dress-jacket had embroidered
button-holes on its scarlet facings; the breastplate
was gilt, with the Company’s arms embossed in
silver; the pantaloon continued to be worn as dress
with the Hessian boots; but trousers or overalls
were worn on all duties; the chako was introduced,
displacing the bearskin cap. There are pictures
in existence which give a good idea of the dress
at particular periods, and in them all the changes
may be traced.
A large portion of the regiment was this year
called into the field against Diaram, the zemindar
of Hattrass, whose fort and territory had been ceded
by Scindia to the British in 1803, at which time no
terms were made exempting Diaram from the
general laws in force in the Company’s territories;
but, in the expectation that, finding no necessity for
armed followers, his force would gradually have dissolved
and his fort gone to ruin, the Government
took no steps to break it up at once. Mistaking
this forbearance, in spite of several warnings, he
persisted in a course of aggrandizement and opposition
to the civil officers, which drew down on him
the powerful hand of Government, who determined
that no ill-timed economy should interfere with the
333rapid and complete reduction of his power. Lord
Hastings directed the preparations to be made on
such a scale to convince all that our failures heretofore
were caused not from a want of skill or
resources, but from our failing to bring them forward,
and being more lavish of the blood of our troops
than the matériel of our magazines.
For this siege two troops of horse artillery and
the rocket-troop, seven companies of European, and
four of native artillery, and eighteen companies of
lascars, moved from different points and collected
before Hattrass, together with a battering train of
six 24–pounders, fourteen 18–pounders, four 8–inch
howitzers, six 10–inch mortars, fourteen 8–inch
mortars, and twenty-two 5½-inch mortars; total, 20
guns, 8 howitzers, and 42 mortars. The general
command of the artillery was held by
Major-General Sir J. Horsford; Captain C. H. Campbell, M. B.; Major Pennington, commanding horse artillery; Lieutenant Lumsden, adjutant and quarter-master; Majors Mason, McLeod, and Butler, fort adjutants.
Troop.
Captains.
Captain-Lieutenant.
Lieutenants.
Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
1
Boileau
G. Gowan
Morland, Pennington
3
J. Brooke
Rodber
Hyde MacAlister Sconce
Rocket
Whish
G. Brooke
Cartwright
334_
Company.
Battalion.
Captain-Lieutenants.
Lieutenants.
Lieutenant-Fireworkers.
2
2
Fraser
Croxton
G. R. Scott R. B. Wilson
3
2
Curphy
Pereira
Hele, Vanrenen
4
2
Pryce
Carne
Sanders, Crommelin
6
2
Lindsay
Roberts
Coulthard
4
3
L. Lawrence
Smith, Whinfield
6
3
Battine
Fordyce
R. Dickson, Delafosse
7
3
Tollemache
Timbrell
Wood, E. P. Gowan
1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th companies of golundaz battalion; 1st, 5th, 6th, 8th, 12th, 18th, 20th, 27th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 37th, 38th, 40th, 41st, 43rd, 44th, and 45th companies of gun lascars.
The force assembled on the 11th February, and
from that time till the 21st was employed in collecting
and preparing matériel for the siege and waiting
for the train; on its arrival, three batteries were
erected against the kuttra, which opened on the
22nd, and continued firing during the 23rd: a breach
was effected, and during the night the enemy left
the kuttra.
On the 25th, batteries were commenced against
the fort, three armed with guns, and two with
mortars from the kuttra, and on the right, two
guns, and three mortar batteries, one of the latter
of sixteen 5½-inch mortars; the trenches were
pushed up to within 50 yards of the ditch, a rocketbattery
335was erected between the kuttra and fort;
much delay occurred from want of fuses or from
those sent turning out bad, so that fresh had to be
driven and materials sent for from Agra; the time
was employed in completing the batteries and
approaches; a slight fire was kept up till the 2nd
March, when preparations being all made, the bombardment
commenced, at a signal from the rocketbattery,
by a general salvo. “The effect and sight
(an eye-witness writes) was beautiful, and was only
excelled by a spectacle which took place about 5
in the afternoon. While in the battery watching
the flight of a shell, it scarcely touched the ground
before an explosion took place, the most awful and
grand I ever beheld—a powder-magazine had been
exploded. It is hardly possible to give an accurate
description of it; it was more like an immense
column of red smoke, forming itself like an enormous
chattah in rolls, continually changing form as
it ascended to an incredible height: several fragments
fell in the trenches and hurt some people.”
Another writes, “The effect of our shells and the
ruins they have occasioned, are indescribable; the
house and zenana of Diaram is a complete riddle—shot
and shell holes in every direction; the mortality
336is great, men and horses lying in the gateway and
works.”
For the details of this operation, the first in India
in which artillery was used on a large scale, we
would refer our readers to a journal of the siege,
which appeared in the East-India United Service
Journal, in 1837, and content ourselves with adding
the orders issued on the occasion.
Major-General Marshall’s order says, “The science
and skill displayed by the engineers and artillery
department were eminently conspicuous, and the
bombardment and explosion of the enemy’s principal
magazine, which, without derogating from the
merits of others, must be allowed to have given us
almost immediate possession of the place, will long
be regarded as the most memorable among the
brilliant events of the last fortnight, and as demonstrative
of the extent and soundness of that judgment
and penetration which, in the avowed anticipation
of the very consequences, enabled the army,
by the provision of adequate means, to insure them.
The practice of the artillery has answered the expectations
of that high authority to which the
Major-General has ventured to allude in the forgoing
observations. Another motive for them is to
337bring forward and illustrate the fact more closely,
that where the means are equal to the science
and practical knowledge known to pervade every
branch of this army, the results must invariably be
rapid and successful, even against such strong and
formidable forts as Hattrass proved to be.” * * *
We cannot refrain from quoting the order issued
to the artillery by Major-General Sir John Horsford;
the more so, as it proved the last he was permitted
to pen to the corps, his valuable life having terminated
suddenly, soon after returning to Cawnpoor
from this service:—
“Major-General Sir John Horsford, commanding
the artillery brigaded before Hattrass, performs with
pleasure the last exercise of his command in conveying
to the horse and foot artillery and rocket-troop
his congratulations on the brilliant services
which their united exertions have effected for the
state, Government having through their means
principally been placed in possession of Hattrass,
the rapid reduction of which has caused the surrender
of the important fortress of Morsaum and
eleven other forts.
“The acknowledgments of Major-General Marshall,
338commanding the army, and the favourable
sentiments entertained by the army at large, must
be much more satisfactory to the artillery than
any tribute of praise which Sir John Horsford
could bestow in confirmation of their meritorious
services.
“But the Major-General considers public acknowledgments
due to Major Mason, commanding the
foot artillery, who, with Majors MacLeod and
Butler, superintended in turn the several batteries.
He begs to offer his best thanks to Major Mason
and the experienced field-officers above mentioned,
for their several important services.
“The Major-General duly appreciates the labour
and exertions of every officer and man employed in
the batteries before the kuttra and fort, and more
particularly the heavy duty all had to perform on
the 2nd instant during the general bombardment.
To the officers commanding batteries, and to their
juniors doing duty under them, the Major-General’s
notice is particularly due. The state of the fort after
its capture evinced to all that the means employed
for its reduction had been directed by hands well
acquainted with their use. Where every officer was
equally zealous, the Major-General hopes he will be
339excused for not naming all who deserve his praise
and thanks.
“The mature judgment of Major Pennington
was displayed on every occasion which offered itself.
“The spirit and conduct of the officers and men
of the horse artillery throughout the service deserve
the Major-General’s warmest approbation.
“The zeal evinced by Captain Whish, the officers
and men of the rocket-troop, require the Major-General’s
notice in public orders.
“The Major-General’s personal feelings are much
gratified by the important consequences which have
resulted from the unanimity which prevailed amongst
every branch of the artillery to forward the objects
of the service. The preparations which were made
caused much to be expected from their exertions,
and the Major-General is satisfied that the expectations
of the most sanguine have been realized.
It is a source of great pleasure for the Major-General
to reflect that the last period of his service with a
corps in which he has long served, should be distinguished
by events which call forth the admiration
of all who witnessed them, and by services which
conspicuously increase the credit and the established
high character of the regiment of Bengal Artillery.”
340From Hattrass Sir John Horsford returned to
Cawnpoor, and on the 20th April closed his honourable
career. His death was sudden, and it is
believed was occasioned by a disease of the heart.
To his public character the Governor-General bore
testimony in the following order:—“The Governor-General
cannot direct the succession in the regiment
of artillery without expressing his deep concern at
the loss the Honourable Company’s service has suffered
by the death of Major-General Sir John
Horsford, K.C.B. The ardent spirit, the science,
and the generous zeal of that admirable officer,
were in no less degree an advantage to the public
interest than an honour to himself. It is consolatory
to think that when sinking under the
malady which so early deprived his country of an
energy incessantly devoted to her glory, he had the
consciousness of having just displayed with signal
triumph the skill and superiority of the corps
which he had so materially contributed to fashion
and perfect.”
The part Sir John Horsford had borne in some of
the severest service the regiment had been engaged
in, his thorough knowledge of the profession, his
high talents and commanding character, gave him
341great influence in the regiment, and secured for his
opinions great weight with the authorities; and,
had he been spared to exercise the command for
a few years more, the regiment would undoubtedly
have been placed on a far more efficient footing
than it hitherto had been. From the time of
Pearse’s death to Horsford’s succession to the command,
no man of talent or influence had been at its
head; and the consequence was, that while the other
branches of the army were increased on a scale
more adequate to their wants, the artillery was
added to by driblets, kept in the lowest state, and
its organization made a subject of continual experiment.
Just before his death, Sir John Horsford submitted
to the Marquis of Hastings a memoir,
pointing out the faults which had thus been committed,
and detailing the principles upon which the
corps of artillery ought to be formed; going on
from these principles through all the details, he
presented a complete scheme of a regiment of
artillery adapted to the wants of Bengal. His
character insured attention to the subject, and the
result was, that in the following year the corps was
reorganized, not indeed upon the scale Sir John
342Horsford proposed, but upon the most efficient it
had yet been.
Major-General Hardwicke was appointed commandant
in succession to Major-General Sir John
Horsford.
We must pause at this point for a time to consider
a circumstance which was of great importance
to the regiment,—the question of general officers
of the ordnance branch being eligible to the general
staff of the army. In the arrangements for remodelling
the army in 1796, no doubt existed on the
point. In the Minutes of Council, 5th June, 1797,
it was directed that the artillery regimental command
was to be held by the senior officer present,
“not being a general officer,” and several artillery
general officers had been employed on the general
staff; such was the state of the case up to 1814,
when the Court of Directors thought proper to
annul the existing orders, for reasons which may be
briefly thus stated:—
1st. That the services of the artillery and engineer
generals are required by the state in their own
departments.
2nd. That the practice, though not the theory
(so to speak), of His Majesty’s service excludes
343ordnance generals from any employment on the
staff.[71]
To the first, it might be replied, that even supposing
one artillery and one engineer general are
wanted at the heads of the corps, it is no reason
why the others should not be employed on the
general staff during the period they are not required
with their own. That till now a general officer
was never allowed to serve in this position; and if
while debarred from the general staff and holding
the regimental command on the regimental allowances,
his position would be a very unfavourable one,
as contrasted with that of a general officer of cavalry
or infantry.
To the second we would say, that if true, some
compensation would be found to the Royal Ordnance
general officers in the numerous regimental superiorities
they enjoy in Europe over regiments of the
line; such as rising regimentally to colonelcies, the
greater proportion of field officers, higher pay, the
use of a horse, superior regimental rank, ordnance
staff offices, and many other points which it would
344require more space than we can afford to go fully
into; but, in reality, Royal Ordnance officers were
not excluded, and at the time of publication of the
order there were twelve or fifteen of them employed
on the home and foreign staff of the army.
Feeling that their prospects were much blighted
by being thus debarred from those honourable and
lucrative commands to which every officer hopes
(though few live) to succeed, the officers of the
ordnance corps in Bengal (and also in Madras and
Bombay) memorialized the Court of Directors,
praying for a revision of the orders in question, and
their reply was published in August, 1817. The
Court did not enter into the question; they refused
the point at issue, but directed that general officers
of artillery and engineers in command of their regiments
should be placed on a similar footing as to
allowances with other general officers serving on
the army staff. But although at this time the
representations of the ordnance officers had no
effect, there is little doubt that they were subsequently
reconsidered and their justice admitted,
for in the general remodelling of the military system
in 1824, “an additional general officer on the
Honourable Company’s establishment was authorized
345for the staff of each presidency, and the generals
of artillery and engineers were rendered eligible to
the staff, the command of those corps devolving on
the senior colonels or field-officers.”
The comparative efficiency of guns collected into
batteries kept in order and directed by officers of the
artillery, and of the same scattered as battalions and
galloper-guns, had been proved so strongly in favour
of the former, that the Government now resolved
on following up the practice of European powers.
The gallopers from six native regiments were directed
to be embodied into two troops of native
horse artillery at Meerut and Cawnpoor, and placed
under the command of Captains G. Gowan and Biggs
in July, and those of the two remaining regiments
were some months later withdrawn and formed into
a third troop at Nagpoor under Lieutenant George
Blake, and subsequently Captain Rodber. The horses
and troopers accompanied the guns; and as the best
horses had generally been given to the galloper-guns,
these troops were exceedingly well provided
with draught cattle. For officers the foot-artillery
was again indented on, but this time not without
an augmentation, for, “adverting to the number of
officers withdrawn from the foot to the horse artillery,
346and to the total inadequacy of the number of
officers which would remain with the battalions of
foot artillery, and for the numerous and important
duties required of them, the Governor-General
was pleased to determine that the officers actually
attached to the horse artillery should be struck off
the strength of the foot artillery, and the vacancies
supplied by promotion;” and accordingly one major
and six captains were now (25th October) added to
the corps.
Before adverting to the campaigns which the
Marquis of Hastings’s grand combinations against
the Pindarees caused, we will notice the additions
made to the regiment previous to its reorganization
in October, 1818, and detail its strength
when that change had taken place, and then succinctly
refer to those well-planned operations which
with very little bloodshed rooted out the Pindarees,
and humbled the Mahratta power.
In continuation of the system of collecting guns
in batteries, an experimental horse field-battery was
formed in November, and placed under Captain
Battine with the 6th company 3rd battalion. The
battery consisted of eight guns and eight waggons
(two 12–pounders, two 5½-inch howitzers, and four
3476–pounders), and ninety-six horses were allowed to
drag it; these horses were led by “Syce drivers,”
a class of syces placed on the same footing as lascars
with respect to pay, clothing, and pension.
The rocket-troop was modified as to the numbers
of its men and cattle, but camels were still continued
with it, nor was it till 1822 that they were
superseded by horses, and two additional companies
of independent golundaz were raised for the Islands
and Bengal. Colonel Sherwood was appointed
acting commandant during Major-General Hardwicke’s
absence on sick leave.
The regiment now was composed of the horse
artillery, consisting of seven troops, including the
rocket-troop; three European battalions of seven
companies each, twelve regular and six irregular
companies of golundaz, forty-five lascar and twenty-six
driver companies. The new organization directed
it to consist of seven troops of horse artillery,
three European battalions, of eight companies each,
one native battalion of fifteen companies, with a
company of lascars attached to each company,
European or native (39), and seventeen bullock and
two horse field-batteries, each of eight pieces, with
a driver company to each.
348The officers were allotted to the different portions
of the regiment in the following proportion:—
Horse Artillery.
3 European Battalions.
Native Battalion.
Total.
1
Colonel
3
...
4
2
Lieutenant-Colonels
6
...
8
2
Majors
6
1
9
7
Captains
24
13
44
28
1st Lieutenants
48
4
80
2nd Lieutenants
48
4
2
The rank of 2nd captain was abolished, and that
of 2nd lieutenant substituted for lieutenant-fireworker;
serangs of gun-lascars were made jemadars;
serang-major, soobahdar; 1st and 2nd tindals, havildars
and naiks; gunners were styled bombardiers,
and matrosses, gunners.
European Troop or Company.
Serjeants.
7
6
Corporals.
6
5
Bombardiers.
10
10
Trumpeters.
2
2
Farriers.
2
-
Rough-riders.
2
-
Gunners.
80
80
Jemadars, Havildars.
1
12
Naiks.
2
2
Lascars.
24
70
Native Troop or Company.
Soobahdars.
1
1
Jemadars.
1
2
Havildars.
6
8
Naiks.
6
8
Trumpeters.
-
2
Rough-riders.
-
-
Farriers.
-
-
Troopers.
90
100
Staff-Serjeants.
-
-
Jemadars, Havildars.
1
12
Naiks.
2
2
Lascars.
24
70
Sirdars.
4
-
Drivers.
85
-
The whole regiment consisted of
349
ORGANIZATION OF THE REGIMENT.
Returns Dec. 1818.
Colonels.
4
4
Lieutenant-Colonels.
8
8
Majors.
9
9
Captains.
44
44
1st Lieutenants.
80
75
2nd Lieutenants.
52
43
HORSE ARTILLERY.
EUROPEAN.
Non-commissioned Staff.
-
7
Non-commissioned Officers.
52
46
Bombardiers and Gunners.
320
321
Farriers, Rough-riders, Trumpeters.
24
13
Native Officers.
6
6
NATIVE.
Non-commissioned Officers.
36
56
Troopers.
270
246
Farriers, Rough-riders, Trumpeters.
18
12
Non-commissioned Officers.
21
-
Lascars.
168
-
FOOT ARTILLERY.
EUROPEAN.
Non-commissioned Staff.
-
23
Non-commissioned Officers.
264
249
Bombardiers and Gunners.
2160
1469
Buglers.
48
37
NATIVE.
Native Officers.
45
39
Non-commissioned Staff.
-
-
Non-commissioned Officers.
240
245
Privates.
1500
1632
Buglers.
30
32
LASCARS.
Native Officers.
39
49
Non-commissioned Officers.
156
190
Privates.
2730
3261
DRIVERS.
Sirdars.
76
129
Drivers.
1615
2640
350Forming a total of 8,094, including lascars, and excluding
drivers.
The infantry of the army at this period amounted
to about 64,000 men, or nearly in the proportion of
eight infantry to one artilleryman, bringing the
relative numbers of the two branches pretty much
to what they were in 1796, at which time the infantry
were 7½ to one artilleryman.
In a preceding page we have alluded to the
operations of the Governor-General for the purpose
of rooting out the Pindaree hordes by whom Central
India was overrun, and the Company’s provinces
yearly threatened, and in some instances plundered.
Their numbers may have reached some 20,000
horse, undisciplined, and prepared to run rather
than fight, and were scattered about in small durras
or bands, so that no large bodies of troops would
have been necessary to overcome them had it not
been for the tacit protection afforded these freebooters
by the Mahratta powers, and whose attitude
was such, that preparations were forced to be made
on a scale sufficient to meet their armies, and this
called a far larger portion of the armies of India
into the field than would otherwise have been
required.
351The Bengal divisions took the field about November,
1817. The masterly position taken up by
Lord Hastings, with the centre division of the grand
army threatening Scindeah’s capital, his park and
magazines, in case he ventured to move from
Gwalior to join the Mahratta confederacy, completely
paralyzed him; but the Peshwah and
Nagpoor rajah being unawed by any sufficient body
of troops at hand, attacked the residents at their
courts, and it was only by the heroic exertions of
the small escorts, and which have immortalized the
names of Poonah and Seetabuldee, that the posts
were made good till reinforcements could arrive.
Many portions of the regiment were employed
with the five divisions of Bengal troops, and in
operations extending over so great a space, must
necessarily have undergone much severe marching;
but as the actual service was partial, and we do not
pretend to enter into a detailed account of the whole
campaigns, we shall only refer to the occasions on
which they came in contact with the enemy.
We have already mentioned that the galloper-guns
of the cavalry regiments were incorporated
into troops of horse artillery; the gallopers of two
regiments employed on the Nerbudda were formed
352into a troop under Lieutenant G. Blake, and, with
a squadron of native cavalry, detached by Colonel
Adams to Nagpoor on the first news of the expected
attack on the residency, to share in the noble
defence of Seetabuldee; they arrived too late, but
they joined Brigadier Doveton’s force on the 16th
December, and were employed in the action fought
against the Arabs, who formed the chief strength
of the Nagpoor army.
In the battle of Mahidpoor, fought by Sir T.
Hyslop’s army on the 21st December against Holkar
and the Peshwah’s forces, one Bengal Artillery
officer was present—Lieutenant Sotheby, commanding
the golundaz company of the Russell brigade.
Major-General Brown was detached with a column
from the grand army against Jawud, and on
the 20th January, 1818, attacked the troops of
Holkar, drawn up under the walls, and drove
them into the fort by a charge of cavalry, supported
by a fire of shrapnell from two guns of the 2nd
troop horse artillery under Lieutenant Mathison,[72]353silencing the enemy’s guns. This success was followed
up by an immediate attack; the guns of
Captain Biggs’s native troop were drawn up on the
right and left to destroy the defences of the entrance,
while a 12–pounder, under Mathison, was dragged
up by the European artillery and pioneers to blow
open the gate, and which was not effected until
the third round, during which time the party were
exposed to a heavy and galling fire.
In the field orders issued on this occasion, “the
major-general desired to express his particular satisfaction
at the manner in which the artillery under
Captain Biggs and Lieutenant Mathison was served,
and at the soldier-like manner in which Lieutenant
Mathison took up his 12–pounder to force open the
gate.”
Lieutenant-Colonel Pennington, in writing to
Lieutenant Mathison on this occasion, said, “Accept
my best thanks for the great credit you brought
the horse artillery by the ability and gallantry you
displayed in the attack on Jeswunt Rao Bhao and
354his town, and my cordial congratulations on your
personal safety.”
The next action we have occasion to notice was
that of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams at Seonee on the
16–17th April, in which Captain Rodber’s troop
(who had been appointed to the troop lately engaged
at Nagpoor under Lieutenant Blake) did
good service.
The Peshwah’s army flying from Brigadier Doveton’s
division, was intercepted by Lieutenant-Colonel
Adams, who immediately attacked with the cavalry
and horse artillery, driving the enemy from position
to position.[73] “Great praise,” says Colonel Blacker,
“has been given to the horse artillery on this occasion,
and, from a comparison of several accounts
of this affair, whatever loss was sustained by the
enemy is chiefly attributable to their fire. The
ground was unfavourable for cavalry, yet the guns,
by admirable exertion, were advanced and the
355cavalry may be said to have only covered them.”[74]
It must be borne in mind, too, that these exertions
were preceded by a march of unparalleled length.
Captain Rodber was sent from Nagpoor to join
Colonel Adams’s force, and in a letter written many
years afterwards, he says, “I could not have gone
less than ninety miles. At 1 A.M., on the 16th
April, I commenced my march (after going the
previous day eighteen miles over an execrable road,
large loose stones and hills) to join Colonel Adams
at Hingun ghat; on the road I received a letter,
informing me that Colonel Adams had marched
and encamped at Alundaboo; this information
obliged me to retrace my road for some distance;
I reached the colonel’s camp between 2 and 3 P.M.
(I am quite positive to the time exactly); I could
not have gone less than fifty-six miles, as I pushed
on. At 8 P.M., same day, I mounted again, and
moved with the detachment in pursuit of the Peshwah,
and was not dismissed till between 12 and 1
next day. About six of the last miles were over a
356succession of wooded heights covered with large
loose stones, and hollows deep and wide enough
to hide both gun and horses in. From what we
see of roads in any part of India I have visited,
no notion can be formed of the ways here; in a
march sometimes you have to cross seven or eight
nullahs with swampy bottoms and difficult approaches.”
In the same letter Captain Rodber, speaking of
this service, says, “I dined with Jenkins (at Nagpoor)
the night before I marched, and late some of
his hurkarus came in and reported that the Peshwah’s
army had got round Colonel Adams, and was
in full march on Nagpoor, said to have eighty guns,
and 10,000 Arabs, and a number of horse. It was not
for me to say a word about my little party marching
into the very jaws of this host, but I thought it
very inconsiderate allowing me to move. I remember
one morning, when quite dark, a trooper from
the advance guard coming into the line, and declaring
he heard the noise of horses’ feet, and when
I had satisfied myself of the fact, I put all in the
most defensible position, firmly believing it was
the van of the Peshwah’s army; it proved, however,
a large body of the Nizam’s horse, sent to me by
357the colonel; I do not know that I ever felt greater
relief.”
Major-General Marshall’s division occupied
Sagur in March, 1818, and a portion of the force
moved out against Dhamoney, a small fortress about
thirty miles distant, at the head of a ravine or valley
leading to the Dussan river, the neighbouring
country being very rugged and broken. The detachment
took possession of the town on the 20th
March, and by the 24th had raised batteries against
the fort, in which two 24–pounders, four 18–pounders,
one 12–pounder, and two 5½-inch howitzers,
were placed; a mortar-battery also was completed
to the rear. These opened on the 24th March, and
after six hours’ firing the killidar surrendered.
The 4th company 2nd battalion artillery was employed
in this service,—Captain Hetzler, Captain
Lindsay, Captain-Lieutenant Coulthard, Lieutenants
Carne, W. Bell, Lieutenant-Fireworkers Saunders,
Crommelin, and Patch.
This force then marched, viâ Dumoh, to Jubbulpoor,
and proceeded against “Mundlah,” on
the Nerbudda, and by the 25th, batteries had
been formed for thirty-two pieces of artillery;
they were immediately armed, and by the next
358day a breach was open, which was successfully
stormed.
The artillery operations were directed by Captain
Hetzler. The following officers were present:—Captain
Lindsay, Lieutenants Dickson, Carne, Saunders,
Patch, D’Oyley, Kirby, and Crommelin.
Lieutenant-Colonel Adams’s division was employed
against the fortress of Chandah in May,
1818. Both Bengal and Madras artillery were
with him; of the former, the three native troops of
horse artillery, under Captain Rodber, Lieutenant
Twemlow, the 5th company 2nd battalion, Captain
MacDowell, Lieutenant Crawford, acting field engineer,
Lieutenant Walcott, commissary of ordnance.
On the 9th May the force arrived, and on reconnoitring,
it was found to be nearly six miles in
circumference, and mounting eighty guns; the ordnance
available for the attack consisted of three
18–pounders, four brass 12–pounders, six howitzers,
and twelve 6–pounders. On the night of the 13th,
a battery was raised on an eminence to the south of
the fort, from which four pieces of ordnance, to
divert the enemy’s attention, played on the town
with shells and hot shot, while materials were being
collected, and a thorough reconnoissance made. The
359south-east angle was finally determined on for the
breach. On the 17th, the four 12–pounders were
placed in battery to destroy the flanking defences, as
well as the howitzers and three 6–pounders. During
the night of the 18th, the three 18–pounders were
placed in a breaching battery within 250 yards of the
place, and opened their fire on the 19th. By 4 P.M.,
the breach was practicable; the assault was, however,
delayed till the following morning, but a fire was
kept up at intervals during the night to prevent the
enemy retrenching the breach, which they attempted.
In the morning the assault took place;
the storming party was accompanied by a detail
of artillerymen with spikes and sponges for spiking
or turning the enemy’s guns. The storming party
were completely successful, and obtained possession
of the town and fort after overcoming a very serious
resistance.
In noticing this action, the General Order says:
“The rapid demolition of the enemy’s defences,
and the speed with which a breach was effected,
would sufficiently testify the service of * * *
Lieutenant Crawford, Bengal Artillery, acting as
engineer, in indicating the positions for the batteries,
even had not Lieutenant-Colonel Adams
360professed his obligations to those officers so
warmly.”
“Captain Rodber, Captain MacDowell, * * * and
Lieutenant Walcott, seem to have highly deserved
the praise their commander bestows upon them.
Indeed, the efforts of all the officers and men of the
artillery appear to have been highly laudable.”
The Sagur troops under Brigadier-General
Watson, in October, 1818, again took the field
against Urjun Sing, Rajah of Gunakota, who refused
to give up his fort, agreeably to treaty. It was
situated about thirty miles from Sagur, on the banks
of the Sonar, at a point where a small nullah ran
into it, so that the river and nullah formed ditches
on two sides, while the third, in which was the gateway,
had a well-formed artificial ditch; but it was
not a place of any strength. On the 23rd October,
a battery of fourteen mortars and four howitzers
was formed on the opposite bank of the Sonar, near
the city of Hardynugger, and opened its fire on the
fort. An accident occurred next day in the battery,
which caused several casualties. The shells for expenditure
had been placed in the rear of the mortars
covered by paulins, and by some mischance[75] a
361spark got among and ignited them, upwards of one
hundred blowing up. On the 26th, a breaching battery
was ready, and opened from two 24–pounders,
four 18–pounders, and two 12–pounders, to which
two more 24–pounders were added on the 29th.
The battery was 900 yards from the wall, but a
breach was soon accomplished, and the enemy
capitulated without standing an assault.
The 4th and 6th companies 2nd battalion artillery
were present, with Captain Hetzler, Captain-Lieutenant
Coulthard, Lieutenants Pew, Saunders,
D’Oyley, Patch, Kirby, and Crommelin.
In June a detachment from the 4th company
2nd battalion, with Lieutenants Carne and Saunders,
were sent with a column against the fort of Satunwaree;
a breach was effected by the 18–pounders
on the 8th June, and assaulted, but unsuccessfully;
the place, however, was evacuated during the night.
The unsuccessful assault led to a report that the
breach had not been sufficiently cleared, and charges
were preferred against Lieutenant Carne for bad
practice of the artillery, for serving out an excess of
liquor to the men on duty, leading to their intoxication,
and for being intoxicated himself. Of the first
and third he was acquitted by a general court-martial,
362and partially of the second; the fact probably was,
that the men, being much exposed and overworked
under the burning sun of June, a small quantity of
liquor, which in other circumstances would have
been taken with perfect impunity, flew to their
heads.
The Nagpoor subsidiary force, under Major-General
Doveton, marched against Assurghur to
receive charge of it from Scindia’s killidar, but the
killidar, according to the native custom, pretended
to have received no orders, and it therefore became
necessary to proceed against it; all the available
trains were sent for, including those from Sagur
and Hoshunabad, and when collected, amounted
to the number detailed in the margin;[76] but the
siege commenced with those with the force. Many
difficulties were experienced in carrying on the
approaches up the steep sides of the hills; an accident,
though fortunately attended with but little
loss, occurred, by the magazine in rear of the
363breaching battery, containing 130 barrels of powder,
exploding on the 21st March. Towards the end of
the month, half of the 5th company 2nd battalion
under Lieutenant Debrett arrived with the Hoshunabad
train, and on the 31st, the Sagur force, with
the 4th and 6th companies 2nd battalion and 22
heavy guns; from this time the siege was pressed
with vigour, and on the 9th April the garrison surrendered,
having made a very stout resistance.
Lieutenant-Colonel Crossdill, of the Madras Artillery,
commanded the artillery. Captains Coulthard
and Pew, Lieutenants Debrett and Counsell, appear
to have been present at this siege; the latter officer
was slightly wounded.
Having thus brought our history to the close of
the Pindaree war and its consequent service, we
may notice such internal changes as were going on
in the regiment and ordnance department generally,
following their chronological occurrence until held
service shall again call for our attention.
Originally the gun-carriages were constructed by
a contractor in Fort William, under the inspection
of the commissary of stores; in 1800, the system
was altered, and an agency for this purpose was
formed with a superintendent on a staff salary of
364Rs. 1,200 per mensem and his military pay and
allowances. The agency was established at Cossipoor,
and connected with it was another for the
supply of seasoned timber. In 1814, a second
agency was found necessary to meet the wants of
the department, now scattered over a very extended
space, and established at Allahabad, under Major
Clement Brown. In 1817, it was transferred to
Futteygurh; this agency was dependent on a half-wrought
matériel yard at Cawnpoor. The Honourable
Company’s timber-yards at Cossipoor and
Cawnpoor were annexed to the gun-carriage
agencies in 1823 and 1825 respectively, and in the
year 1829, the Cossipoor agency was incorporated
with that at Futteygurh.
In May, 1818, the ordnance commissariat officers
were organized into a department upon the principles
which had governed the previous formation
of an army commissariat department; it was made
one generally of seniority, and a provision was made
for a certain number of warrant officers in the grade
of deputy commissary, as well for two other ranks
above that of conductor.
To carry out the reorganization of the regiment,
adverted to in a former page, in November, the 8th
365company to each European battalion was added; a
draught of 100 men from the European regiment was
taken for this purpose. Two companies of golundaz
(11th and 12th[A]) and five companies (41st to 45th[77])
of gun lascars were reduced. The driver companies
were reduced to nineteen, two for the horse, and
seventeen for the bullock batteries; nine were reduced
(2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and
12th), and transferred to the commissariat; each
company was fixed at four sirdars and eighty-six
drivers, and the batteries consisted of eight pieces.
The lascar companies were strengthened by the
addition of one havildar and fourteen privates to
each company, with European battalions, and by
one havildar with the companies attached to the
4th battalion.
The field-train establishments, which in 1809
were placed entirely under the control and care of
commanding officers of artillery at Agra and Cawnpoor,
were now transferred to the magazines, and
kept in order by the commissaries under the general
control of the commanding officer of artillery.
366The horse field-batteries were increased to three,
and considered part of the permanent establishment,
making the number, fourteen bullock and three
horse-batteries. Another bullock-battery was shortly
added, on Mhow becoming a Bengal station.
The Governor-General, adverting to the important,
responsible, and laborious duty which the
recent signal alterations in the constitution of the
artillery have imposed on the commandant, and
considering the staff salary at present allowed to
him, when not a general officer, to bear no proportion
to the extent and variety of his command, was
pleased to sanction a personal allowance, in addition,
of Rs. 500 per mensem; and also, on the same
principle, the commanding officer of artillery in the
field was allowed to draw 600, and all field commanding
divisions, 300. The major of brigade was
raised to an assistant adjutant-general of the regiment,
and a brigade-major permanently sanctioned
in the field.
A model department was formed at Dum-Dum
under Captain Parlby, and the establishment for
bouching guns and preparing tangent-scales was
attached to it. In this department a very valuable
collection of models was made up, and which, on
367the breaking up of the establishment in 1829, were
transferred to the expense magazine, and thence to
the regimental mess in 1839, the regiment having
added a room for their reception.
A permanent select committee was formed,
consisting of certain regimental and staff officers of
artillery, at Dum-Dum and in the neighbourhood,
to whom every question involving change in the
matériel equipment of the department was to be
submitted in the first instance, and their opinion
was to be forwarded to assist Government in coming
to a decision, and they were soon fully occupied
with the important questions of windage, brass
ordnance, and patterns of light field-carriages.
In August the lascars of the regiment were very
much reduced; the use of drag-ropes as a means of
moving guns, except for trifling distances, or out of
a difficulty, was given up, and with that, the necessity
of such strong bodies of lascars with artillery
companies ceased. They were reduced to a detail
of one havildar, two naiks, and twenty-four privates,
to each troop and European company, and taken
away entirely from the native battalions; the men
thus struck off from the regiment were formed into
sixteen companies of store lascars, each consisting
368of one subahdar, one jemadar, four havildars, four
naiks, and eighty privates, and were posted to the different
magazines. But this arrangement was not
found to answer, and the lascar companies were, on
the war breaking out in 1824, increased to forty
privates, partly, perhaps, from the insufficiency of
Europeans to keep the companies up to their proper
strength.
An interpreter was allowed to the regiment at
head-quarters, and attached to the golundaz companies
at Dum-Dum.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. MacLeod was appointed
commandant on Major-General Hardwicke’s sailing
for Europe in December, and with Colonel MacLeod
the command of the artillery in the field ceased;
the brigade-majorship was also abolished, and
Captain Tennant, who held it, was appointed assistant
secretary to the Military Board.
In February five companies were added to the
golundaz battalion, raising its number to twenty
companies, to meet the exigency of the war with
Ava. In June, to meet the deficiency of Europeans,
three additional companies of lascars of
eighty-four men each were raised; four privates
were added to each golundaz company, and the
369lascar companies increased, as above mentioned, to
forty men each, those who had been transferred to
the store lascars being taken back again.
In May, a fundamental change took place in the
Indian army; the battalions were formed into regiments,
and the officers of all branches of the service
were placed on the same footing as to the chances
of promotion, by the regiments being of equal
strength in this particular. This new organization
caused a considerable degree of promotion throughout
the army, and in this the artillery shared. The
officers of the regiment continued, as previously, to
rise in one general gradation list, and the regiment
was to be composed of
3 brigades of horse artillery,
each consisting of
3 European and 1 Native troop.
5 battalions of European foot artillery;
each consisting of
4 companies.
1 battalion of Native foot artillery
each consisting of
20 companies.
The rocket-troop was to form one of the troops
of a brigade.
Lascar details were attached to the troops, and a
company to each European company, and a driver
company to each field-battery.
These changes, however, were not even nominally
carried into effect until the middle of the next year,
370owing to the scattered state of the regiment, the
occupation the Burmese war gave, and the difficulty
in obtaining a sufficient supply of European recruits
to meet the demand. In reality, some of the troops
of horse artillery were not formed until the end of
1826; we therefore shall not in this place give a
tabular statement of the strength of the regiment,
but reserve it until we arrive at the year 1826,
when a reorganization of the native battalion made
another change, and the state of the regiment, before
and after its alteration, will then be seen at one
glance.
The aggression of the Burmese on our frontiers,
and the contempt with which they treated all remonstrances,
forced the Indian Government reluctantly
to declare war in 1824. Unfortunately, little
was known of the country, and a most injudicious
plan of operations was drawn out, which, by seizing
Rangoon and the numerous native craft the maritime
capital was expected to furnish, embarking the
troops in them, and sailing up the Irawaddy in the
rainy season, and threatening Amerapoora, was to
terminate the war in one campaign. With this
intention the expedition sailed in April, and was
joined by the Madras portion early in May at Port
Cornwallis in the Andaman Islands.
371Two companies of the Bengal Artillery with
their lascars accompanied the expedition.
Major Pollock, Commandant; Lieutenant Laurenson, Adjutant; Lieutenant B. Brown, Deputy Quarter-master General.
On the 10th May the fleet reached Rangoon, and,
overcoming a very faint resistance by a few broadsides
from the Liffey, the troops landed and took
possession. They found it deserted by its inhabitants,
and incapable of affording either subsistence
or the means of advancing. No choice was left;
nothing could be done till the cold weather, except
shelter themselves against the approaching rainy
season, to which the Bengal monsoon is but as summer
showers in comparison. During this season, the
troops suffered much from exposure, from bad and
insufficient supplies, harassment by the enemy, and
continual petty attacks on stockades, so that when
372the season for operations arrived, it found an army
of invalids, instead of one fit to take the field.
The Burmese recalled their army under Bundoola
from Arracan, and it arrived in the vicinity of Rangoon
in November. Rangoon was invested, but,
awaiting reinforcements and supplies, Sir Archibald
Campbell offered little opposition, contenting himself
with strengthening his own position and placing all his
artillery in battery, to bear on the enemy’s trenches.
Things remained thus till the 5th December, when
the guns all opening, the columns moved out under
cover of their fire, attacked and overcame the
enemy’s left; Bundoola, however, rallied again, and
pushed on his attack on the Shevé-da-gon pagoda.
On the morning of the 7th the attack was renewed;
every gun that would bear on the enemy was opened,
and continued firing till noon, when the infantry
moving out, completely routed the enemy. He
rallied in a strong position at Kokaing, from which,
on the 13th, he was with difficulty dislodged, and in
which action the regiment lost a fine young officer,
Lieutenant O’Hanlon, who, volunteering with the
body-guard, was shot in a gallant charge, made to
cover a column hard pressed by the enemy.
This action cleared the vicinity of Rangoon of
373the enemy, and reinforcements, stores, and supplies
arriving, health was restored to the army, and preparations
for an advance were strenuously made.
Among the reinforcements, were a troop of horse
artillery and half the rocket-troop, “corps which
excited great hopes, and never disappointed them.”
Troop.
Brigade.
Captains.
Lieutenants.
Sub-Lieutenant.
1
1
Lumsden
Thompson, Timmings, C. Grant.
2
2
Graham
Paton, G. Campbell
Allen.
But, leaving the force at this point, let us trace
the steps of the other divisions, and then return to
the Rangoon column, on which the chief exertions
of the war fell.
The small advanced party at Ramoo, unsupported
by the force at Chittygong, fell an easy prey to
Bundoola’s force, which gradually closed on and cut
it up; a detail of artillery, with two 6–pounders
under Lieutenant J. W. Scott, formed part. Lieutenant
Scott, severely wounded, was placed on an
elephant and carried into Chittygong, whither the
few who escaped fled.
After this reverse, the force at Chittygong was
374strengthened and formed into a division, under
Major-General Morrison, for the purpose of driving
the Burmese out of Arracan, crossing the Yemidong
mountains and joining the Rangoon force about
Prome. With it were two companies of artillery.
Lieutenant J. W. Scott was attached to the pioneers.
This column marched in the cold weather slowly,
for it experienced much difficulty both from the
wild and swampy country it traversed, and from the
breadth of the rivers it had to cross, which, from its
route being as near the coast as possible, were complete
estuaries. Transporting the guns and stores
over these deep and rapid streams required no small
exertions from the artillery, as also in traversing
the swampy delta of the Koladine river, leading to
the capital. No opposition was offered until the
army reached the Padhna pass, on the 25th March,
1825; there the advanced guard was fired upon,
and it became necessary to drive the enemy from
375the heights. On the 28th, the army debouched
into an open plain, under a line of hills, covering
the town of Arracan. The foot of these hills was a
swampy thicket, the upper part cleared from jungle
and strengthened by a breastwork. Without much
reconnoissance, the guns were pushed on into battery
under the hills, and a general assault took place.
It was unsuccessful; such as effected their way
through the tangled thicket at the foot were driven
back by the musketry and volleys of stones of the
defenders. The guns were abandoned for the time,
and withdrawn under cover of the night. During
the night of the 31st, some troops with two 9–pounders
on elephants ascended the ridge to the right of
the enemy’s position, moved along the crest at daylight,
and bringing the guns into play, the enemy
fled, leaving the city at our mercy. And here the
operations of this army may be said to terminate;
disease, engendered by the pestilential locality, soon
raged most fearfully, and converted the town into
a large cemetery. Small detachments were sent
against Ramree; Lieutenant Hotham, with two
guns, engaged in the attack, which was at first unsuccessful;
it was, however, finally occupied, as was
Aeng, a station on the pass leading through the hills.
376In the following cold season reinforcements were
sent, among them the 4th company 4th battalion,
Lieutenants Rutherfurd and Buckle, and it was
intended that the force should attempt the passage
of the hills, and for that purpose it was partially
collected at Amherst Island; but the difficulties and
want of transport were too great, and the idea was
abandoned. Arracan was evacuated, and the troops
located at Ackyab, an island at the mouth of the
Koladine and Myoo rivers, Cheduba, Ramree, and
Sandoway, and finally withdrawn in 1826.
That the passage of the hills was possible, there
is no doubt; two regiments from Prome succeeded
in the attempt by the Aeng pass, while Lieutenant
B. Browne; Lieutenant Brady, of artillery; and
Captain Trant, deputy quarter-master general,
reached Arracan by another, early in 1826.
In 1823, a squadron of gun-boats was sent to
cruise on the Burrampooter, probably with the intention
of protecting that frontier from threatened incursions
of the Burmese. Captain Timbrell, Lieutenants
Bedingfield and Burton, were with this flotilla.
On the Sylhet frontier detachments of the 6th
battalion were with the army, Captain J. Scott,
Captain C. Smith, Lieutenants Brind and Lane,
377Lieutenant Turton, adjutant; but this force never
came in contact with the enemy. The country
proved impassable.
Lieutenant Huthwaite was with a detail of native
artillery employed against Munneypoor, and engaged
in the successful attack on the enemy’s blockaded
position at Daoudputlee.
Let us now return to the Rangoon army. Such
preparations as circumstances admitted of being
made, the army advanced on the 11th February,
1825, in two columns, one by land and one by
water: the main portion of the artillery was with
the former; with the latter, Lieutenant Paton and
some of the rocket-troop were placed in the Diana
steamer. The inadequacy of the supplies of the
land column may be easily imagined when it is
stated that it was with the utmost difficulty Captain
Lumsden obtained four bullocks for his forge-cart!—its
value, however, was repeatedly acknowledged,
and its aid gladly sought, almost daily, to repair
public carriages of every department.
To the water column was intrusted the operations
of dislodging Bundoola from his strong position
at Donabeu, while the land column pushed on as
rapidly as possible for the capital. The enemy
378were driven from their stockade below Donabeu,
but on approaching that position, it was found far
more formidable than represented. The attack
on it proved unsuccessful, and Sir Archibald was
forced to retrograde to assist in its capture. On
the 1st April, the attack was renewed by land and
by water; from the latter, a brisk cannonade and
effectual flights of rockets were poured in, and the
batteries on the land side were equally effectual;
the rockets, however, then failed; the heat and
shaking they had been exposed to in the march
rendered them nearly or worse than useless. One,
however, is claimed as having decided the day, by
killing Bundoola. His energy alone kept the
enemy together, and after his death they fled from
the stockades during the night. The march was
resumed, and Prome occupied by the army for the
rainy season. Here Lieutenant Thompson died on
the 11th May.
During the rains, Lieutenant Timmings came
round to Dum-Dum for his own health, and returned
in October, carrying back with him reinforcements
in men and horses for the artillery; Lieutenants
G. Graham, Daniell, Begbie, and Brady also accompanied
him.
379The enemy rallied, and towards the middle of
October had nearly surrounded Prome with stockades.
On the 2nd December, Sir Archibald Campbell
attacked and defeated them, following up his
success the next day. The horse artillery were
pushed on in advance through nullahs and over
rocks, to obtain a position bearing well on the
enemy at Nassadee, and during the cannonade an
howitzer missing fire twice, Captain Lumsden directed
the shell to be withdrawn; this was done, but
the fuze having ignited, the shell burst, just as it
reached the muzzle, killing a lascar, wounding a
gunner and Captain Lumsden; but he immediately
rallied, and continued, in spite of his wound, directing
the operations of his battery. Six guns, manned
by the 3rd company 5th battalion, with Lieutenant-Colonel
Pollock, Captain Biddulph, and Lieutenant
Laurenson, were also engaged in this successful
attack.
The enemy retired on Melloon, a stockaded
position on the opposite bank of the river, there about
500 yards wide. Negotiations commenced on their
part, and an armistice was concluded, to last till
the 18th January, 1826. The ratified treaty not
having been received, at midnight preparations for
380the attack commenced; batteries for the guns were
got ready; boats in waiting for the troops, and at
11 A.M., when the fog cleared up, the whole of the
guns, mortars, rockets, heavy and light, opened with a
salvo. The range was hit at once, and shot, shells,
and rockets flew into all parts of the stockades, the
interior of which, from their being planted on the
side of a rising ground, was distinctly visible. The
“hurtling of this iron shower” continued for about
an hour and a half, when the storming columns
crossed in the boats of the flotilla, and were soon
masters of the place.
The rocket practice was particularly efficient,
scarce a rocket failed; a strong contrast to the
rockets carried by land, which had proved worthless
on several occasions: those used at Melloon were
brought up with the flotilla, and perhaps never has
there been an occasion since the invention of the
weapon where they were more successful, or their
effects could be so distinctly seen, as when blazing
and roaring, their long trails of smoke marking their
course, they plunged into the stockades of Melloon
and raked them from side to side in their eccentric
courses after grazing.
The army pressed on, allowing no respite.
381“Officers’ chargers were put in requisition to drag
the guns of the invaluable horse brigade;” horses
of the rocket-troop were similarly employed, and
their place supplied by Burmah ponies. The horse
artillery, body-guard, and H.M.’s 13th light infantry
now formed the advance guard, and on the 9th
February came up with the enemy at Pagahen-Meen;
the guns immediately opened, and the enemy were
soon broken, but, in pursuing them too rashly, the
13th regiment got entangled in the difficult ground,
and the main body coming up, in endeavouring to
debouch from a defile, got wedged together, artillery,
rockets, guns, and carriages. Of this confusion
and delay the enemy took advantage and rallied,
and had they not been held in check by the gallant
conduct of the horse artillery, body-guard, and the
13th, much mischief might have been done. The
confusion was soon remedied, and a complete victory
rewarded the troops.
This was the last action. The enemy, thoroughly
humbled, now opened negotiations in earnest, which
were soon concluded. A deputation proceeded to
the “Golden Fort,” at Amerapoora, and returned
with the ratified treaty of peace. Among those
selected for this distinguished duty was Captain
382Lumsden, than whom and his gallant troop, none had
borne a more honourable and useful part during these
laborious campaigns.
A silver medal, of the annexed pattern, was
awarded to all the native troops engaged in the war,
either in Rangoon, Arracan, or Sylhet.
Among the General Orders we find, “The Governor-General
entertains the highest sense of the
efficient services and honourable exertions of
Captains * * * Timbrell of the artillery;” and
“the services of the Bengal * * * foot artillery,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock, and of the
Bengal rocket-troop and horse artillery, under
Captains Graham and Lumsden, demand also the
special acknowledgments of Government.”
Early in 1825, British interference[79] in the state
383of Bhurtpoor became necessary, and Major-General
Sir D. Ochterlony, the agent to the Governor-General
at Delhi, exercising the authority vested
in him, ordered the assembly of a force for the
purpose. It was disapproved by the Governor-General,
and many portions of the regiment had in
consequence the désagrémens of a useless march in
the months of April, May, and June.
In the cold weather, however, affairs in Bhurtpoor
continuing the same, and those in Ava more satisfactory,
the project was resumed, and a force ordered
to collect at Agra and Muttra, in November, under
the command of Lord Combermere, who had just
been appointed to the chief command in India.
For this army the whole of the available artillery
was drawn together and the provinces were denuded.
The field batteries were thrown into the magazines,
and their bullocks appropriated to the siege-trains,
and yet when collected, the whole were barely sufficient
to work the guns in battery, without one
single relief. In like manner the magazines from
Cawnpore to Kurnal poured forth all their munitions
of war, but this afforded only 114 siege-pieces, with
about 1,000 rounds of shot per gun, and 500 shells
per mortar and howitzer, with a proportion of shrapnell
384and case.[80] A reserve was formed at Allahabad
to be pushed on as opportunity offered.
The personnel consisted of five and a-half troops
of European, and two of native horse artillery, nine
companies of European, and five of native foot
artillery,[81] forming a total of about 1,200 Europeans,
and 700 native artillerymen, with 500 lascars, but
of these only 1,100 were foot artillery, barely
sufficient to man the guns, even when augmented
by a body of horse artillery recruits, who, just
drafted into that branch on the augmentation,
were not qualified for the duties of mounted artillerymen.
The trains and stores were collected at Agra and
Muttra, and started, in two divisions, on the 9th
December. On the 17th they were united before
Bhurtpoor, and the grand park formed. The
cavalry and horse artillery had preceded the army
and secured the bund of the lake, just as the enemy
were about to cut it, to flood the ditch of the
fortress.
The laboratory tents were pitched on the 16th,
and the preparation of the platforms and stores
commenced upon. On the 23rd, the first battery
was armed, and it opened its fire on the 24th;
daily the approaches, parallels, and batteries were
extended, under a fire from the enemy always hot,
and generally well directed. In addition to breaching-batteries,
a mine was driven under the N.E.
bastion, and sprung, but without effect, on the 7th
January, the charge being too small. The gun
387breach was by this time practicable, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Stark and his adjutant ascended it; the
firing was directed to be continued, to improve it,
but the shot buried themselves, pounding the earth
into fine dust. On the 9th a depôt of ammunition,
formed to supply the batteries, was blown up by a
shot from the enemy passing through a tumbril;
the whole was consumed with a fearful explosion;
but although the enemy kept up a heavy fire all
night, from every gun which would bear upon the
spot, clearly indicated by the burning stores, the
casualties were few. A mine was sprung in the
counterscarp opposite the gun breach, making the
descent into the ditch easy. On the 12th, a mine
was commenced under the long-necked bastion; it
was ready and loaded by the 18th January, and the
firing it was to be the signal for the assault. A
heavy fire was kept up from all the batteries on the
morning of the 18th; the mine was sprung, and
scarcely had the heavy mass of dust and smoke
cleared away, when the columns moved out to the
assault and were shortly in possession of the place.
The artillery casualties in this siege were remarkably
few; the labours undergone by both officers
and men in the batteries for twenty-six days were
388extreme, but borne with the utmost cheerfulness
and good temper. The ammunition expended was,
24–pounder round shot
18,331
24–pounder shrapnell
345
24–pounder case
639
18–pounder round shot
22,533
18–pounder shrapnell
524
18–pounder case
391
Shells, 13–inch
236
Shells, 10–inch
4,506
Shells, 8–inch
13,720
Shells, 8–inch shrapnell
119
Grand Total
61,446
The average rate of firing was forty-eight rounds
per gun, and twelve per mortar per diem; the
greatest, 142 and 20. Nine 24–pounders, sixteen
18–pounders, one 10–inch and seven 8–inch mortars,
were rendered unserviceable, and the carriages of
six 8–inch (brass) howitzers broke down during the
siege.[82]
General Orders of the Commander-in-Chief:—“To
Brigadier MacLeod, C.B., in the general command
of the artillery, and Brigadiers Hetzler and
Brown, commanding the siege and field artillery respectively,
the Commander-in-Chief feels greatly indebted
for their highly creditable exertions, as, also,
to the whole of the officers and men of the artillery,
for the excellent display of scientific correctness in
389the batteries, as well as for their commendable endurance
of fatigue which the nature of the service
necessarily exposed them to.”
The Commandant issued the following regimental
order:—“The Commandant begs to offer to
officers and men of that part of the regiment engaged
in the field under his more immediate command
his best thanks for their conduct and exertions
during the siege, which have, in General Orders
to-day published, obtained the approbation of the
Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief; and
to Brigadiers Hetzler, C.B., and C. Brown, he has
more especially to tender his acknowledgments for
the assistance he has derived from them in their
respective commands.”
“To Captain Tennant, the assistant adjutant-general
of the arm, he feels much indebted for his
able assistance on this and many other occasions,
for which he is entitled to his warmest acknowledgments
and thanks. To Lieutenant Dashwood, his
aide-de-camp, he also tenders his best thanks for
his conspicuously useful exertions.”
In a former page we stated our intention of
reserving a tabular statement of the organization of
1824, until we reached the year 1827, when a fresh
390arrangement of the native artillery took place; we
have now reached that period, for the year 1826
has little to be recorded, except that in November
four companies of golundaz and three of lascars
(those raised in 1824) were reduced.
In September, 1827, an additional battalion of
officers was added to the regiment, and the native
artillery divided into two battalions, of eight companies
each, denominated the 6th and 7th battalions.
391
1824
1827
On Returns, 1st Dec. 1827
Colonels.
9
10
10
Lieutenant-Colonels.
9
10
10
Majors.
9
10
10
Captains.
45
50
50
1st Lieutenants.
90
100
100
2nd Lieutenants.
45
50
50
HORSE ARTILLERY.
EUROPEAN.
Brigade Staff.
27
27
27
Non-commissioned Officers.
207
207
218
Trumpeters, Farriers, Rough-riders.
54
54
57
Gunners.
720
720
732
NATIVE.
Native Officers.
6
6
7
Brigade Staff
6
6
6
Non-commissioned Officers.
36
36
36
Trumpeters, Farriers, Rough-riders.
28
28
28
Troopers.
270
270
270
LASCARS.
Non-commissioned Officers.
36
36
36
Lascars.
288
288
288
FOOT ARTILLERY.
EUROPEAN.
Battalion Staff.
43
46
46
Non-commissioned Officers.
424
424
436
Buglers.
40
40
40
Gunners.
1620
1600
1600
NATIVE.
Native Officers.
60
48
50
Battalion Staff.
3
6
6
Non-commissioned Officers.
320
256
293
Buglers.
40
32
32
Privates
2080
1664
1700
LASCARS.
Native Officers.
20
20
21
Non-commissioned Officers.
80
80
82
Lascars.
800
800
921
CHAPTER VIII.
392
Reductions—Half-batta order—Further reductions—Brevet of
Colonel given to Lieutenant-Colonels Commandant—Alterations
in uniform—Shekawuttee campaign—Establishment of
Retiring Fund.
At the conclusion of the Burmese war, the horses
from the Sylhet local corps were transferred to
Dum-Dum, for the purpose of being attached to a
battery, and in the early part of 1827, the undersized
stud horses, which had hitherto been sold to
the public, were directed to be admitted into the
service for the light field-batteries, as Government
had decided on horsing them all, the uselessness of
bullocks for the purpose having been thoroughly
proved. The number of batteries was, in July,
1827, fixed at twelve. The arrangement was immediately
commenced on, and, by the end of the
year, six batteries were in an effective state, and
the remainder would soon have been ready. It
will, however, scarcely be credited that in April,
1828, these orders were countermanded, and
393bullocks directed to be retained and the horses of
the batteries so equipped sold off.
It is difficult to penetrate the veil of mystery
which shrouds the acts of the Council Chamber, so as
to ascertain the real author of such vacillating policy;
the reasons which induced the equipment of 1827,
and which were the accumulated experience of
years, were equally cogent in 1828, and that they were
sound, every one who has had experience of Indian
warfare will vouch. That there is no reason to suppose
the change was made consequent on orders from
home, we may conclude, for in 1834, we find the
Court of Directors “satisfied of the superiority of
horses over bullocks for light field-artillery,” directing
“their gradual substitution,” an order to which no
attention was paid by the then Governor-General.
Under these circumstances, rumour, with her hundred
tongues, is perhaps not wrong in attributing it
to a “malignant influence,” which for a quarter of a
century opposed every suggestion for the improvement
of the prospects or efficiency of the ordnance
branch. A late military member of the Council of
India, long secretary to Government in the military
department, who, repeating the one argument, equally
applicable against every advance, “We won India
394with bullocks, and why should we not keep it with
bullocks?” supported the late Lord W. Bentinck
in putting aside the Court’s orders of 1834, and
Lord Auckland in paying a slow and partial obedience
to them when repeated in 1841.
Cotemporary with this retrograde movement,
was the reduction of the field-batteries from eight
to six pieces each, a good arrangement, had it been
accompanied by a proportionate increase in their
numbers; but this was not done, and it therefore
reduced, by one fourth, the field-artillery, already
far too low, in reference to the other branches of
the army. The gun contract was at this time transferred
from the senior artillery officer at the station
to the officer commanding the battery, a very
judicious change, as it placed the power in the
hands of the person most properly responsible for
the efficiency of the battery, and left to the superior
officer his proper duty of supervision unfettered by
personal considerations.
The rocket-troop was converted into a gun-troop;
but, that the use of the weapon might not be forgotten,
a proportion of rockets was directed to be
attached to each field-battery. For this purpose,
the Commandant submitted a proposition to add a
395car, capable of carrying 120 6–pounder rockets, to
each field-battery, and capable of manœuvring in
line with it; but after the pattern car had been prepared,
the subject was, somehow or other, allowed
to fall into oblivion, probably, we believe, from the
supplies of rockets having been countermanded;
and thus for many years neither officers nor men
had any opportunities of accustoming themselves to
their use. From 1828 till 1840, when at the headquarters
of the regiment their use was resumed
previous to despatching a supply to China, and at
Kurnal and Ferozepore, where, in 1842, some which
were sent for service in the passes of Affghanistan
were used, not a rocket was fired.
Another reduction followed, causing great excitement
in the army at large, but which pressed more
heavily on the artillery than any other branch. We
refer to the orders of December, 1828, placing
certain stations on half-batta; of these, Allahabad,
Benares, Dinapore, and Dum-Dum, were artillery
stations, and the latter, that of the head-quarters of
the regiment, the artillery being a European regiment,
and therefore considered not liable to be
called on for sudden movements: the officers were
placed on half-tentage likewise.
396That the reduction in allowances was such as to
bear heavily on individuals, especially in the lower
grades, the marginal statement[83] will show, and this,
moreover, was subject to another tax of 4½ per
cent., the exchange between sonat and sicca rupees,
the former being the coin in which the military
accounts are kept, while the latter was that current
in Calcutta, and in which the troops were actually
paid. The head-quarters of the regiment being at
Dum-Dum, the mess, band, library, and other regimental
institutions, were there, and officers were
naturally fond of being stationed there, for various
reasons; such as its gaiety and amusements, and the
opportunities it offered for studying their profession
or improving their prospects in the service.
From these circumstances, the regimental head-quarters
generally had in a time of peace a large
number of officers of the higher ranks present, and
this contributed to render it a desirable station.
But all this was reversed by the half-batta order;
397instead of thronging to the head-quarters, the
station was avoided by all ranks, and the discipline
of the regiment suffered much in after years from
the difficulty of keeping sufficient officers of standing
for the common routine duties of the place and
instruction of the young officers joining the regiment.
The want of a sufficient body of officers at
Dum-Dum of known talents and experience is also
felt when vacancies suddenly occur in any of the
important artillery situations dependent on it for
the temporary arrangement in cases of exigency.
We refer to the arsenal, foundry, powder-works,
expense magazine, acting assistant quarter-master,
and ordnance secretary in the Military Board; in
several of these situations much difficulty has at
times been experienced, and has only been met by
doubling-up the duties of two appointments on
several occasions in one person.
The regiment (and the army) memorialized
strongly on the occasion, but without effect, though
some years afterwards the hardship was partially
ameliorated by the grant of full tentage to the
artillery, it having been clearly shown that the
officers of no branch of the army are subject to such
sudden and repeated movements, and these as individuals,
398and not with the aids and conveniences
which the officers of a wing or detachment of infantry
find by combining their means. In the margin[84]
is noted the receipts of officers at half-batta stations,
as sanctioned in 1835, and since continued. Recently,
a further modification of the order, limiting
its effects to stations within two hundred miles of
each presidency, has taken place, and as the saving
caused by it is now reduced to so very a trifle, and
its weight laid so unequally on the different branches
of the army, a strong feeling of hope exists that the
order will finally be totally repealed.
Further reductions followed; two troops and
companies were struck off from each regiment of
cavalry and infantry, and with them two lieutenants
and one ensign. Although the reduction of the
companies neither was nor could be made applicable
to the artillery, yet the three subalterns per battalion,
or thirty in all, were reduced, the twenty first lieutenants
remaining supernumerary till absorbed, and
399thus stopping the promotion of the second lieutenants
about four years. The results of this were not felt
for some time, because the actual number of officers
present with the regiment continued much the
same, and the number of cadets sent out to replace
casualties was not altered, the supernumerary list
continued long, and it was even attempted to retain
the cadets unpromoted until vacancies occurred;
but we believe that the Government law officers
decided that it would not be legal, and they were
accordingly all promoted to commissions.
With the reduction above noticed, was coupled
what was thought a boon, at the time, but which in
fact has proved the cause of much supersession by
the royal service,—the promotion of all lieutenant-colonels
commandant to the rank of colonel. Every
lieutenant-colonel in H.M.’s service in India who
happened to be senior in that rank to any one of
the lieutenant-colonels commandant now promoted,
was also breveted with the rank of colonel, and as
in each presidency there are no less than four distinct
gradation-lists leading to this rank, viz., artillery,
engineers, cavalry, and infantry, each of which
has had its fortunate period, the confusion and
supersession which followed may easily be imagined.
400It was brought to a crisis by Lieutenant-Colonel
MacLeod, a lieutenant-colonel of 1827 (a cadet of
1794), obtaining his regimental colonelcy in four
years, and, of course, all lieutenant-colonels of
H. M.’s service senior to him were also promoted,
and the anomalies became so stupendous, that an
alteration was made in the plan, and the Bengal
native infantry, as the largest body, was made the
guide; but this destroys the only chance the other
branches had of ever retrieving in the higher grade
the slow promotion they may have had in the
lower, and gives the royal service, with its promotion
by purchase and regimentally to the rank of
lieutenant-colonel, a fearful advantage[85] over the
Company’s service, which has been increased by the
power exercised by the Commander-in-Chief in
India to grant brevets of major-general to such
401colonels in India as H.M.’s brevet to Company’s
officers may supersede. The rank thus given is of
a double nature, and may be made use of or laid
aside at pleasure, allowing them to be lieutenant-colonels
or major-generals, as most convenient, and
thus enabling them to reap the benefits of high
rank without its drawback—removal from lucrative
commands in India.
In 1828, the uniform of the officers of the horse
artillery was changed; the jack-boots and leather
breeches were superseded by the overalls, and the
equipments and horse furniture of a similar pattern
to those worn by light cavalry were adopted; but
the uniform of the non-commissioned officers and
gunners remained unchanged. For actual hard
work on horseback, such as is riding in the guns,
few will deny that the boots and breeches are the
most serviceable dress, but they are inconvenient
when dismounted, and ill-adapted for exposure to
wet, and at no time can they be indued in a hurry.
The foot artillery about the same time discarded
their short jacket faced with scarlet and embroidered
with gold, for the present plain but handsome
uniform: the second epaulette to the subaltern
ranks was ordered in 1833. The undress remained
402a blue jacket with scarlet cuffs and collar, unrelieved
by a button or atom of lace until 1841, when a row
of studs down the front, and gilt shoulder-scales,
were added; the latter adding as much to its appearance
as they detracted from its comfort.
Several years now passed away void of internal
change or external employment. Such universal
quiet reigned, that it appeared as if swords and
spears might be most usefully turned into ploughshares
and reaping-hooks, and the army looked
round in vain for employment. Central India
was at rest, Nepal not likely to disturb the quiet, and
the Punjab, under the strong rule of Runjeet Sing,
seemed removed from the chance of inimical contact
with the Indian Government.
Suddenly rumours sprung up of disturbances in
Rajasthan, which, by degrees, assumed a more determined
aspect, and Maun Sing, of Joudpoor, was
mentioned as the delinquent, and an army was
about to assemble against him, but, humbling himself,
he averted his ruin, and a portion of the force
was sent against the robber tribes of Shekawut.
With the force were three troops of horse artillery,
eight companies of foot, and a siege-train of
twenty-six pieces.
403Brigadier Parker commanded the artillery; Captain
Sanders, commissary of ordnance; but the force
met with no opposition, and after destroying
many of the robbers’ strongholds, returned to
cantonments.
The reductions which took place in 1828 by this
time began to tell, as the supernumeraries were
absorbed; and to provide even a small number of
officers for the foot artillery, the subalterns of the
horse artillery were reduced to two per troop; a
very inadequate number when the Indian contingencies
are borne in mind.
For many years the officers of the Bengal army
had been accustomed to procure the retirement of
their seniors by the donation of a sum of money,
varying in amount according to the value of the
step and the abilities of the donors. The custom, it
is true, was contrary to the orders of the Court of
Directors, but they were aware of and permitted
it. In the artillery the same custom prevailed; and
this year it was systematized by the establishment
of a fund by monthly contributions from all captains
and subalterns to provide for two retirements annually.
Its advantages have been most apparent in
its working, and the principle of a mutual insurance
404tontine, on which it was formed, has rendered it
more effective even than was expected. The other
branches of the army were not successful in establishing
funds of the sort; but the question being
much agitated, led to a memorial, from Lieutenant-Colonel
Powel, of the Bombay army, to the Court
of Directors, praying that the system might be put
a stop to, on the plea of its interfering with the
seniority system of the Company’s army. It was met
by several counter-memorials, and, on replying to
the whole together, the Court gave the proceedings
their sanction, by declaring that, although they
would not cancel the orders forbidding purchase,
they would hold them in abeyance, unless there
appeared such a probability of the pension-list being
overloaded, that their interference would be necessary,
and that of this, due warning should be
given.
These years passed off without any portion of
the army being called on to take the field, if we
except a slight émeute among the Bheels in the
neighbourhood of Mhow, in 1837, to check which,
a small body of troops with two horse artillery
guns, from the 2nd troop 3rd brigade, under
Lieutenant Kinleside, were detached; but towards
405the end of the next, a storm appeared to be
gathering in the north-west. The Persians besieged
Heerat, and were only foiled in their attempt
by the steady persevering gallantry and resources
of Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, of the Bombay
Artillery, who, throwing himself into the fortress,
inspired its defenders with a portion of his own
dauntless spirit. Persia was supposed to be egged
on by Russian intrigue, and India to be its ultimate
object. Self-defence called upon the Indian Government
to check these designs, and having vainly
endeavoured by negotiation to render Affghanistan
under Dost Mahomed a barrier, the Government
resolved to espouse the cause of its exiled sovereign,
Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, with the hopes that,
when replaced on the throne of his forefathers, he
would prove a stanch friend. To carry this plan
out, an army was assembled after the rains, at
Ferozepore; but information arriving of the Persians,
baffled by Pottinger’s cool resolution, having decamped
from before Heerat, the plan of the campaign
was altered. In fact, our end was gained;
and had it not been for the very unnecessary
connection with Shah Soojah as a reason for our
interference, and which would have stood better
406on the simple plea of self-preservation, not a soldier
need have moved from Ferozepore. But before
entering on the eventful campaigns which followed
this step, let us glance at events in other parts of
India which necessitated the assembly of a force
in Bundlecund, though the campaign was a bloodless
one.
The Jhansee raj having lapsed through the
failure of direct heirs, the widow of a former Raja
endeavoured to place, as the adopted son of the
previous ruler, a boy on the throne. A disturbance
arose, which ended in the murder of the minister
supported by the British authority. This act of the
Bhaiee was called in question by the Governor-General’s
agent; his authority was treated with
disrespect, and he found it necessary to call in
the aid of a regiment and a couple of guns. At
these, the insurgents, who had seized the fort,
laughed, and on his attempting a parley with them,
attacked and wounded his elephant and chuprassees,
and forced him precipitately to retreat. Reinforcements
and a battering train were sent for from
Sagur; but the country had been so denuded of
troops to form the army of the Indus, that, had
it not been for the Mhow troops just being relieved
407from Bombay, a very insufficient force could
have been collected. A train of four 18–pounders
and four 8–inch mortars, with as much ammunition
as carriage could be obtained for, was got ready,
and, in the absence of available artillery officers,
the commissary of ordnance at Sagur, Lieutenant
Buckle, who had offered his services, started in
charge of it early in December, and after a march
of twelve days, rendered difficult and fatiguing
by the badness of the roads, the steep banks and
rocky beds of the rivers and nullahs which
abounded, and the broken rocky ghats leading from
table-land into Bundlecund, reached Jhansee on
the 18th December.
The troops collected by degrees, and the artillery,
when reinforced from Cawnpoor, amounted to that
detailed in the margin.[86] The engineer park was
408placed in the charge of the commissary of ordnance,
the field engineer, Major Smith, having joined dak,
and the preparation of matériel instantly commenced.
Continual communications passed between the
Bhaiee and the agent, which were warlike to the
last, and, as she had collected bands of Nagas,
resistance was expected; but on the preparations
being completed, the force moving down to invest
the fort, carrying their train and the stock of
gabions and fascines which had been prepared, she
fled during the night, and the fort was taken possession
of without firing a shot.
The labour of conveying the heavy ordnance
over a broken country was the chief difficulty, but
this was not much felt, owing to the season of the
year.
The army of the Indus assembled at Ferozepore,
and a meeting took place between the Governor-General
and Runjeet Sing. The news of the
Persians breaking up from before Heerat determined
Government on sending only one division
of the army, accompanied by the troops which were
being raised for Shah Soojah, under British officers,
into Affghanistan. The artillery for the Shah’s
409service consisted originally of two troops of horse
artillery, to which were afterwards added a mountain
train and some body-guard guns. Captain
W. Anderson was intrusted with the formation of
the horse artillery, and though but little time was
allowed him, and many difficulties arose from the
demand for men and horses for the other branches,
his exertions succeeded in overcoming them, and
he marched in good time from Dehli, with his
two troops fully equipped, but, of course, untrained.
His endeavours were well seconded by
his two subalterns, Lieutenants Cooper and Turner.
The Shah’s guns were in Lieutenant Warburton’s
charge, and the mountain train was organized by
Captain Backhouse, but not until 1840.
The regular artillery, with this division from
Bengal, consisted of
Major Pew, commanding; Captain Day, commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant Backhouse, M.B.
410Captain Todd, of the artillery, who had been
employed in Persia, was attached to the political
department.
The army commenced its march on the 10th
December, and met with no difficulties until the
16th March, 1839, when they entered the Bolan
pass, a pass as terrible to the Indian, as that of
Avernus to the classical, imagination. Here the
toils of the campaign began, and, as usual in such
cases, a double share fell to the artillery. The
horses, overweighted and ill-fed, with difficulty
dragged the carriages through its stony lengths;
the camels and bullocks, over-driven to keep pace
with the column, and escape the new danger arising
from the matchlocks of the Murrees and Brahoos
perched on the rocks, stumbled and fell, many
never to rise again: store-carts and baggage were
lost by these accidents.
The difficulties of procuring provisions were increased
after clearing the pass by the arrival of
the Bombay column, though the country became
easier until reaching the Kojuck pass; narrow,
steep, and in places blocked up by large rocks,
it was with the greatest difficulty, and by incredible
perseverance, that the heavy and light artillery
411were got through this obstacle. Great loss of
baggage occurred here from the deaths of camels.
At this point, the camel battery, which had hitherto
got on very well, showed symptoms of knocking
up; the animal’s conformation, from want of
power of muscular exertion, being quite unfitted
for draught in situations of difficulty. All at length
reached Candahar towards the end of April, but the
horses of the horse artillery and cavalry so worn,
that a long rest was necessary to fit them for work;
the troops, too, required rest and food, and the halt
continued till the end of June, though not entirely
without employment, for the camel battery took
part in the expedition against Girisk, and two guns
of the 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Lieutenant
E. Kaye, were detached with the Shah’s troops
against refractory chiefs in Tezeen.
From Candahar a mission was sent to Heerat;
Captain Todd was placed at the head of it, and
Lieutenants J. Abbott and R. Shakespear were
his assistants. Of the results of this mission, or
of his assistants, to Khiva; of the difficulties and
dangers endured and overcome by Abbott as the
pioneer, and the success which crowned Shakespear,
in following his path, nothing need be said in this
412place. Their own accounts have already been
published.
On the army moving forward, the 2nd troop 2nd
brigade, 2nd company 6th battalion, with No. 6
light field battery, alone accompanied it. The Shah’s
artillery, the 4th troop 3rd brigade, the 4th company
2nd battalion, and the heavy guns, remained at
Candahar. On the 21st July the fortress of Ghuznee
was reached, reconnoitred the next day, and the
artillery placed in position, by 3 A.M. of the 23rd,
to cover the assault which was ordered at dawn.
On the gate being blown in by two bags of powder,
every gun opened to cover the advance of the
storming party, which was perfectly successful, and,
by 5 o’clock, the place was in our possession.
The exertions of the troops were rewarded by
a medal from Shah Soojah, and which is remarkable
for one thing—being the first given in India to
all engaged. Hitherto, these decorations had been
granted to the native troops alone; but on this
occasion the medal was given to all, without any
distinction whatever. It was suspended from a
crimson and green ribbon.
413
The army continued its march to Cabul without
opposition. Deserted by his followers, Dost Mahomed
fled, leaving his guns at Maidan a spoil to
the invaders; and himself narrowly escaping from a
band of officers, among whom was Lieutenant Backhouse,
of the artillery, who, under Major Outram,
followed him closely, but were misled by the arch
traitor Haji Khan Kokur.
But while the main army was thus employed, a
small column, chiefly of irregulars, with Colonel
Wade, escorted the Shah-Zada by the Khyber pass
to his father’s capital. With this column were
two howitzers, manned by a detachment of the
4th company 2nd brigade, and commanded by
Lieutenant Barr: Lieutenant Maule, of the artillery,
was attached to the prince’s suite. This column
met with no opposition, except on first entering
414the Khyber pass, where they were engaged with
the Afreedis at Koulsir, and again at Alee Musjid.
The names of Lieutenants Barr and Maule are
both mentioned in Lieutenant-Colonel Wade’s
despatches on the occasion.
The main army reached Cabul on the 6th August,
and Colonel Wade’s column on the 3rd September.
The Bombay column returned in October, and,
picking up four of the Shah’s horse artillery guns,
under Lieutenant Cooper, proceeded against Khelat.
Reaching it on the 13th November, the troops
advanced to the assault under cover of the fire
from the guns, which drove the enemy from the
neighbouring heights; the guns were now directed
against the gates, and, these being forced, the place
was soon won. In his despatch, General Wiltshire
says, “To Lieutenants Forster and Cooper I feel
greatly indebted for the scientific and steady
manner in which the service of dislodging the
enemy from the heights and afterwards effecting
an entrance into the fort was performed.”
The main army left Cabul for Hindustan in
October, 1839; the 2nd company 6th battalion
with No. 6 battery alone remained. The camel
draught had proved so useless for such a country,
415that horses were now directed to be substituted, and
so promptly was this order carried out by Captain
Abbott, that within fifteen days after receiving it,
half the battery was equipped, and marched against
the Ghilzies, under Lieutenant Dawes, moving
upwards of 400 miles ere it returned. The other
half of the battery was employed in the following
January in the Koh-i-daman under Captain Abbott.
Pushoot held out, and the 9–pounders being placed
in battery at daylight, a breach was formed on
both sides of the outer gate, but an inner one
existing, against which the guns could not be
brought to bear, bags of powder were tried without
avail, and the troops were forced to withdraw;
but the enemy fled during the night. “To Captain
Abbott,” Colonel Orchard wrote, “the highest
praise is due, for the manner in which he has
conducted the arduous duties devolving on him,
as well as the great service rendered by him
yesterday.”
We have now to notice perhaps the most extraordinary
march ever performed by artillery,—that
of a native troop of horse artillery across the Hindoo
Kosh to Bamian; extraordinary both from obstacles
overcome, and the circumstance of the men of this
416troop being natives of Hindostan. The 4th troop
3rd brigade was ordered for this trip in September,
1839, and, Captain Timmings having just died, it
was under the command of a subaltern, Lieutenant
M. Mackenzie, with whom was Lieutenant E. Kaye.
The valley of Bamian lies about N. W. from
Cabul, distant only 112 miles; but it is separated
from the valley in which the capital is situate by
a broad belt of stupendous mountains, the highest
range of which exceeds in altitude 12,000 feet.
The troop entered upon its mountain road near
the village of Urghundee, and while toiling up the
first laborious ascent (steep in itself, but rendered
still more difficult by huge stones and fragments
of rock), it was met by Major Thomson, of the
engineers, and some other officers,[88] who were just
returning from an excursion to Bamian. Major
Thomson immediately declared the road to Bamian
to be impracticable for guns,—that the passes in
advance were still more difficult in their nature
than that of Urghundee, and said that he would,
immediately on arrival at Cabul, report to the envoy
that it would be useless to attempt to reach Bamian.
417The troop, however, continued its march, and, the
passage of the Urghundee ghât accomplished, descended
into the beautiful valley of the Cabul
river, along the banks of which the route continued
for three marches, passing Julraiz and Sir-i-Chushmeh.
The road was at times difficult, being
frequently in the rocky bed of the stream, and
always ascending, gradually becoming steeper and
more toilsome.
The summit of the Oonai pass is said to be
11,400 feet in elevation; at this great elevation,
even in September, the cold was intense. The
passage of the range was a work of great toil, as
the ascents and descents were numerous. The
summit of the range is in general a table-land,
gradually sloping towards the north-west; not one
continuous table-land, but intersected by numerous
deep glens, running parallel to each other, with
steep precipitous sides, difficult to ascend or
descend. On the 21st, a small mud fort, named
Youatt, was reached, and on the 23rd the troop,
after crossing several spurs from the range just
surmounted, descended to the banks of the Helmund,
beyond which towered the snow-capped
peaks of Koh-i-Baba.
418In consequence of the report received from
Major Thomson of the impracticable nature of the
road to Bamian, the envoy had sent instructions
for three guns and all the ammunition-waggons to
return to Cabul, the other three guns to halt until
elephants sent from Cabul should arrive; it was
then intended that the three guns should be dismounted
and carried over the remaining passes
on elephants. These instructions were received at
Youatt, but the neighbourhood being entirely
destitute of forage, it was considered advisable to
move the troop on to Gurden Dewaal, on the river
Helmund. Having arrived there, the troop halted,
and Lieutenant Mackenzie went forward and examined
the pass over the Hindoo-Koosh range.
This officer having considered the passage practicable,
forwarded a report to that effect to head-quarters,
and requested permission to proceed with the whole
of the troop. Permission was at length received,
and on the 30th the march was resumed. The
foot of the Irak pass was attained in three difficult
marches, the ascent being constant and fatiguing.
The passage was commenced immediately, nearly
all the guns and carriages being pulled up by hand
(the horses being taken out); at this work, the
419artillery and infantry soldiers and some 200
Hazarehs were employed during the whole day,
and it was not until dark that the entire battery
had reached the foot of the western face of the
mountain, which was found to be considerably
steeper than that up which the ascent led. On
the following day the march was resumed through
a deep and dreary defile, abounding in rocks, and
the precipices enclosing it so steep and lofty, that
the sun’s rays scarcely ever penetrated to its lowest
depths. Through this tortuous glen the troop
wound its way, until, after many an interruption
from rocky ledges of dangerous descent, the small
valley of Meeanee Irak was reached on the 4th
of October, and vegetation and human habitations
were once more seen.
The whole of the 5th was occupied in passing
the Kuski ghât, over a range of no great elevation
(a spur only of the Hindoo-Koosh) but of great
difficulty. The ascent was occasionally so steep
(at an angle of 45°) that the men working at the
drag-ropes could not keep their footing; horses,
of course, were out of the question. The ascent
was, however, accomplished in the afternoon, and
the descent by the edge of a precipice, where a
420false step would have insured instant destruction,
commenced. This, too, was effected, but night
found the troop in a defile so narrow, and enclosed
by such steep walls, that it seemed to be but a
fissure in the mountain, caused by some convulsion
of nature. Nothing further could be done till daylight;
early on the morning of the 6th of October,
the troop crossed the last intervening ridge and
entered the valley of Bamian at Zohauk. Next
day the troop reached Bamian, and encamped close
to some mud forts, which were destined now, for
the first time, to become the dwelling-places of
British officers and soldiers.
This march to Bamian has been dwelt upon
somewhat longer than is altogether suitable to the
pages of a work of this nature; but, within a smaller
space it would have been scarcely practicable to
give an idea of the service performed. It was
certainly one of the most arduous undertakings
ever accomplished by horse-artillery.[89]
Nor less singular the position of the troop after
its arrival; in the midst of a belt of mountains
more than 200 miles in width, separated from
421Cabul by the highest range, impassable by troops
during some months in the year, and in a valley
scarcely ever exceeding 500 yards in breadth
(generally much less), and only a few miles long.
As might have been expected, the horses had
suffered, though not in a very great degree, from the
severity of the march, the cold, and the great scarcity
of forage. The two latter evils continued to press
upon the troop for many months, until the returning
summer brought the green crops and more genial
weather. The carriages of the troop had, however
stood the hard work over rocky roads admirably,
and a most favourable report was made on them by
Lieutenant Mackenzie.
On the 15th of October, the troop went into winter
quarters in a large mud fort.
With the exception of a movement to Syghan,
at the beginning of November, in which sixty horse-artillery
troopers, acting as cavalry, took part, and
an attack on Mahomed Ali Beg’s fort in December,
when two small mortars and a 3–pounder mountain-gun,
mounted on ponies, were sent with the troopers,
the long dreary winter season passed over
quietly—the soldiers of the artillery and infantry
being employed for some time in throwing up
422intrenchments, connecting the various forts in
possession of the British. This was done at the
suggestion of Dr. Lord, the political agent, there
having been some probability of a coalition among
the Usbeg powers to support the ex-Ameer. Had
such an event occurred during the winter, the
Bamian detachment would have been thrown entirely
on its own resources, as no help could come
from Cabul, while, on the other hand, the roads
from Toorkhistan were open. The cold was intense
during the winter, the thermometer at sunrise
being often as low as 12° below zero. All the
rivers were frozen over.
On the 1st of March, 1840, Captain H. Garbett
(who had been posted to the troop on the decease
of Captain Timmings) joined, and took command
of all the troops at Bamian; he had been obliged
to walk 100 miles through the snow, as the mountains
were now only passable by men.
On the 14th of March, two guns of the troop were
present in a small affair with the Hazarehs at
Fouladee, about six miles from Bamian. A mud
fort had to be captured, and the surrounding hills
to be cleared of a considerable body of Hazarehs;
the gateway was knocked down by a few round
423shot, and the fort was then carried by the infantry,
while a few rounds of shrapnels cleared the neighbouring
hills of the Hazarehs. The whole affair did
not last much above half an hour. The artillery lost
one European laboratory-man, one syce, and one
horse killed, and one trooper wounded. Dr. Lord
admitted the chiefs of the refractory tribe to terms,
and affairs resumed their wonted peaceful aspect.
In July, however, there seemed to be every
prospect of hostilities being renewed; Dost Mahomed,
who had for months been a prisoner at
Bokhara, had effected his escape to Kooloom, and
the Usbegs began to arm in his cause. The British
infantry had been pushed forward to Bajgah,
twenty-five miles northward of Syghan, and had
come into contact with the unfriendly tribes. At
the beginning of August, a small affair occurred
near Kamurd, in which two companies of infantry
suffered a very severe loss. On the 4th of August,
two guns of horse-artillery were sent to Syghan,[90]
more as a demonstration than with any other object,
as the roads to Kamurd and Bajgah, across the
Dundan-Shikun and Nal-i-Ferish passes, were
424totally impracticable. The Dost was now advancing
from Kooloom, accompanied by the Wallee of
that place, at the head of about 10,000 men, and
every prospect of his force increasing daily.
On the 13th of September, Brigadier Dennie
arrived from Cabul with reinforcements, which
had been despatched on hearing of the Ameer’s
advance. The force at Bamian, besides the troop,
consisted now of the 35th native infantry, the Goorkah
regiment, a resallah of irregular cavalry, and
400 janbaz, or Afghan horse. The Afghan infantry
had been disarmed and sent to Cabul.
On the 17th, in the evening, the Dost’s piquets
entered the Bamian valley at Soorukdhurrah, about
four miles distant, and on the following morning
the brigadier having received information which
led him to believe that merely the advanced guard
of the enemy had arrived, took out a small detachment
of only eight companies, and engaged the
whole Usbeg force, who were completely routed and
driven from the field in great confusion. Two guns
of the troop, under Lieutenant Mackenzie, were
present in this affair. The Usbegs fell back almost
immediately when the guns opened on them,
abandoning in succession three positions in which
425they attempted to make a stand, but from which
they were instantly dislodged by the guns advancing.
Thus in the valley itself, where the main
body of the enemy was, the contest was decided
by the horse-artillery, but on the heights the
infantry were engaged with some other parties of
the enemy, mostly foot-men. The cavalry pursued
the Usbegs for some miles up the defile of Soorukdhurrah.
The enemy has been variously computed
at from 5,000 to 10,000 men in the field.
Four guns of the troop accompanied Brigadier
Dennie in his subsequent pursuit of the enemy,
but the movements of the Usbegs had been too
rapid to allow it to be effectual; but the results
were most happy, as it induced the Ameer to leave
the Usbeg camp, and forced the Wallee to abandon
his cause. The rest is well known: the Dost
threw himself into the Kohistan of Cabul, and the
theatre of war being thus changed, the British
troops were recalled from Bamian, and on the 8th
October (exactly a year and a day after its arrival),
the troop marched in progress to Cabul with
Colonel Dennie. At the commencement of the
following year the troop returned to India with
the escort in charge of the captive Ameer.
426In the expedition to the Kohistan, under Brigadier
Sale, Captain A. Abbott and his battery, and
Lieutenant Warburton with two of the Shah’s bodyguard
guns, were employed. The fort of Tootundurra
was carried with little loss, a fact attributed
“in a great measure to the dread inspired by the
excellent practice of the artillery under the able
direction of Captain Abbott, assisted by Lieutenants
Maule and Warburton.”
In breaching Julga in October, these same guns
were again employed, and Captain A. Abbott and
Lieutenant Warburton are reported as having
distinguished themselves in the service of the artillery.
In November the detachment was engaged with
the Dost’s followers at Purwundurrah, and two
guns of No. 6 battery, under Lieutenant Dawes,
covered the successful attack on the heights after
the shameful flight of the cavalry.
At this period, a brigade marched from the
provinces under Colonel Shelton, to relieve part
of the Cabul force; with it was Captain Nicholl’s
(1st company 1st brigade) troop of horse artillery—Lieutenants
Waller and Stewart, subalterns—and
the newly-formed mountain-train under Captain
427Backhouse and Lieutenant Green. The brigade
advanced as far as Jellalabad, when rumours
arising of the disaffection of the Sikhs in the
rear, it returned by forced marches to Jumrood,
but, finding its presence not required, again
marched without rest to Jellalabad. By the difficulty
and rapidity of this march the horses of
the troop were much knocked up, and their distress
was much increased by the officer commanding
the brigade having insisted, in spite of Captain
Nicholl’s remonstrances, on the troop marching in
rear of the infantry, checking the natural pace of
the horse, and subjecting the troop to continual
halts. Two of its guns, under Captain Nicholl,
were employed in February in reducing forts in
the Nazian valley, as also was the mountain-train.
While the artillery with the Cabul force was
thus employed, that at Candahar was not inactive.
In April, 1840, Captain W. Anderson, with one
of his troops of horse-artillery and a body of the
Shah’s troops, marching in the direction of Ghuznee,
fell in with a large body of insurgent Ghilzies,
and defeated them near Tazee, on the Tornuek
river. The enemy made a firm stand, twice charged
our line, and were driven back by the steadiness
428of the troops and the well-sustained fire of the guns
under Lieutenant Cooper.
Colonel Wymer’s detachment was attacked at
Ealmee on the 19th May, on its route to Khelat-i-Ghilzie,
by a large body of Ghilzies. Two of the
Shah’s horse-artillery guns under Lieutenant
Hawkins were present, “and opened upon the
enemy’s dense masses of attack at about 900 yards,
with beautiful precision and effect, causing them
to break into three columns, which still continued
the attack,” but were driven back by the steady
fire of the line, though they continued their efforts
from five till nearly ten at night. “Too much
cannot be said of the scientific and destructive
manner in which the artillery practice was conducted
by Lieutenant Hawkins, which created
awful havoc in the ranks of the enemy, to the
admiration of the troops present.”
In July, Lieutenant Cooper, with two guns,
accompanied Captain Woodburn against Uctar
Khan, in the neighbourhood of Girisk. The
enemy attacked the left “with great boldness, but
were repulsed by the well-directed fire of the guns,
and three companies on the left; failing in this,
they attacked the right, but were again met by
429a most destructive fire from the guns and five companies
which were on the right.” The rear was
then attacked, but a gun being reversed, and the
rear rank of the infantry facing about, the enemy
were driven off, after standing three rounds of case
shot.
“Lieutenant Cooper deserves my best acknowledgments
for the rapidity and admirable manner
in which he brought his guns to play upon the
enemy; and I had frequent opportunities of noticing
the precision of his practice. His guns are never
in difficulty,” are Captain Woodburn’s words in
his official report, in which also he speaks in another
place of the “admirable conduct of the
artillery.”
In August, this same officer, with four guns, when
attached to Captain Griffin’s force, was again in
action with the enemy near Khawind, and again
rendered effectual assistance, and earned the praises
of his superiors for himself and his details.
On the arrival of Shah Soojah at Cabul, a grand
durbar was held, and a new order of chivalry was
instituted,—that of the “Dur-i-Dooranee,” or Pearl
of the Dooranee Empire, consisting of three ranks,
similar to those of the Bath. The annexed is a
430representation of the star of the order. It was
conferred on several artillery officers at various
times previous to Shah Soojah’s death.
Hitherto we have had the gratifying task of
recounting the exploits of a victorious army; a
darker page must now follow; but though success
no longer brightens the narrative, we have still
the consolation of knowing that those parts of
the regiment employed, heroically performed their
duty in scenes of no common trial, and that their
exertions, in a cause which from the first was
evidently hopeless, only ceased when the cold hand
of death laid them low in the dark defiles of the
Koord Kabool and Jugdulluck.
In October, the Eastern Ghilzies occupied the
431passes between Bhootkhak and Jellalabad. Brigadier
Sale, with a brigade, was sent to clear them;
No. 6 battery and the mountain-train accompanied.
Lieutenant Dawes with the two 9–pounders was
with the advance-guard, on whom, in forcing the
Kabool pass, the chief brunt fell. In the Tezeen
valley, all the guns were brought into action, in
a succession of skirmishes which lasted till dusk,
with much effect. The march was now a daily
struggle; two guns, sometimes commanded by
Lieutenant Dawes, sometimes by Captain Backhouse
(part of whose train, under Lieutenant Green,
had returned with the 37th regiment of native infantry
to Cabul), on the rear-guard, were engaged
daily; at Jugdulluck a severe struggle ensued,
and its favourable conclusion was insured by the
guns seizing an unoccupied position, which took
the enemy’s line in reverse; the rear-guard was,
however, suddenly attacked and the baggage seized;
“soon, however, by the praiseworthy exertions,
and cool and soldier-like orders and example of
Captain Backhouse, * * * confidence was restored
and the rear-guard extricated from the defile.”
“I have been much pleased,” continues the report,
“with the address and able arrangements of Captain
432Abbott, who has twice commanded the advance-guard.”
The insurrection burst out on all sides; myriads
of Ghilzies, &c., re-occupied the passes in the rear,
and cut off all communication with Cabul, forcing
Sir Robert Sale to seek the safety of his brigade
by occupying Jellalabad. The Kohistanees rose in
Charekar, and murdered Lieutenant Maule, of the
artillery. Candahar was surrounded. Ghuznee fell.
The Khyberees sealed the mouth of their pass.
Colonel Wild’s[91] attempt to force it failed, and the
last act of the tragedy was completed in the annihilation
of the Cabul garrison on its fatal and
ill-judged retreat. The details of these sad events
have been so graphically described, that we need
here do no more than record the losses of the
regiment, and extract from the accounts of eye-witnesses
their testimony to the admirable conduct
of that noble troop, the 1st troop 1st brigade horse-artillery,
both during the siege and the retreat.
After detailing the disastrous action of the
43323rd November, Captain Melville says, “Here,
amidst so much that was condemnable, let me again
bear just and heartfelt testimony to the behaviour
of that brave, though small, body of men, whose
conduct on this, and every other occasion during
the war, was that of a band of heroes, and who,
preferring death to dishonour, met their fate, nobly
fighting to the last for the gun they had so ably
served. I allude to the horse-artillery; when
Sergeant Mulhall and six gunners, whose names I
feel deep sorrow I cannot here record, sword in
hand awaited the advance of the foe, and it was
not until they saw themselves alone in the midst
of thousands of the enemy, that they dashed at
full gallop, cutting their way through them, down
the hill; and though surrounded by cavalry and
infantry, yet they managed to bring their gun
safely to the plain, where, however, only three of
them being alive, and they desperately wounded,
they were obliged to leave it, and contrived to
reach cantonments.” Again, during the retreat,
he says, “On reaching the extremity of the (Khoord
Cabool) pass, the horse-artillery, that noble branch
of the service, whose courage, even in extremity,
never failed, and who supported all their misfortunes
434cheerfully, halted, and, turning a gun on the pass,
awaited the debouchment of our troops and the
arrival of the enemy’s. This soon happened, and
we received them with some well-directed rounds
of grape.” * * * After their guns and horses
were lost, “the artillerymen, those few that remained,
formed in the ranks of the 44th, and
gallantly supported on foot that deathless reputation
they had gained when urging their steeds
into the heart of the battle.”
Lieutenant Eyre, speaking of the siege, says,
“The gunners, from first to last, never once partook
of a full meal or obtained their natural rest;
of the hardships and privations undergone, it would
be difficult to convey an adequate idea.” * * *
“On the retreat from Cabul, owing to the starved
condition of the horses, which disabled them from
pulling the guns through the deep snow and rugged
mountain-passes, the guns were, one by one, spiked
and abandoned. In the Khoord Cabool pass, a
whole gun’s crew perished rather than desert
their charge; on nearing Jugdulluck, some horse-artillerymen,
headed by Captain Nicholl, acting as
dragoons, charged and routed a party of the enemy’s
cavalry.”
435“Throughout the last struggle, up to Gundamuck,
all eye-witnesses concur in testifying to their
stubborn valour.”
Of his troop, Captain Nicholl, Lieutenant Green
(who joined it on the loss of the mountain-train
early in the retreat), and Lieutenant Stewart, were
killed; Lieutenants Eyre and Waller, both of
whom were wounded during the siege, were given
over, with their families, by the orders of Major-General
Elphinstone, to Akbar Khan; 8 non-commissioned
officers and gunners were killed in
Cabul, 30 in the Khoord Cabool pass, 26 between
that and Jugdulluck, 32 in reaching Gundamuck,
3 were taken prisoners at the close, 3 left wounded
at Cabul, and 3 doing duty with No. 6 battery and
the mountain-train at Jellalabad. Sergeant Mulhall
was killed at Gundamuck on the 13th January,
1842.
The regiment raised a monumental column to
the memory of this gallant troop, on the base of
which, on one marble slab, the circumstances under
which they fell are narrated, and on another, the
names of every non-commissioned officer and gunner
are inscribed.
Previous to the insurrection breaking out, the
4363rd company[92] 2nd battalion moved from Ferozepore
to relieve the 4th company at Candahar; it dropped
down the Indus to Sukkur, and marched to
Quettah, where it arrived on the 27th November,
1841, and remained, on account of the communications
with Candahar being closed. Here it was
employed in throwing up defences and field-works,
for the protection of the cantonment, whenever
the frost and snow intermitted. The only building
available for their barracks becoming unsafe, during
the winter they were forced to occupy their tents,
and the severity of the weather in which they
were exposed to this insufficient shelter, may be
judged of by the fact of 180 camels of the company
having perished from it. In the second advance
of Major-General England, and the successful
attack on the heights of Hykulzye, this company
shared; a party under Lieutenant Cornish assisting
in working the guns of Captain Leslie’s troop of
Bombay Horse Artillery, and with that force it
joined the head-quarters of the Candahar army on
10th May.
Before this junction occurred, the Candahar
force had been on more than one occasion moved
437out to clear the neighbourhood of the insurgents.
In January, they came up with them on the
Urghandab, and after driving them from their
position, the horse-artillery and cavalry pursued
them some distance. In the report of this action,
Captain W. Anderson’s name was brought to the
favourable notice of Government.
In March, the army again took the field, and
on the 9th the horse-artillery under Captain Anderson
got within range, and opened on the enemy
with good effect; they broke and fled too rapidly
for the infantry to come up with them. While
the main body was absent, an attack was made
on the city, but without success: part of the 4th
company 2nd battalion was present with the
garrison.
On the 25th March, the insurgents were attacked
near Baba Wala by Colonel Wymer. The well-directed
fire of two guns under Lieutenant Turner
soon drove in on the pass a large body of the enemy,
and they were finally put to flight by the arrival
of the main body under Major-General Nott. In
his report, Colonel Wymer writes, “I trust that
I may be permitted to bring to the Major-General’s
notice the admirable practice of the artillery under
438Lieutenant Turner’s guidance, every shot from which
told with beautiful effect on the dense masses of
the enemy.”
A small garrison, with which was one-half the
3rd company 2nd battalion artillery, under Lieutenant
Walker, had been left in Khelat-i-Ghilzie in
November, 1841; the insurrection isolated them
from the Candahar force, and for several months
they underwent very great hardships; an insufficient
supply of firewood exposed them to cold, barracks
without doors, and piercing cold winds, bread and
water for rations for days together, and an enemy
at the gates; under these privations the artillerymen
never grumbled nor lost their good temper,
but continued to work as if they had been highly
fed. The enemy gradually closed in round the
fort, and on the night of the 21st May commenced
a simultaneous attack on two points; at one point,
there were two 6–pounders, under Lieutenant
Walker, at the other only one. The enemy came
on in a determined manner, crossing the ditch by
means of scaling-ladders, and some even reached
the parapets; so closely were the artillery assailed,
that at one time they were forced to turn to their
small-arms to assist in driving them off; towards
439morning the attack ceased, and the little garrison
was left in quiet possession of their fort, and in
the course of a few days Colonel Wymer arrived
from Candahar with a force to relieve them.
This service was rewarded by a medal to all
engaged, the handsomest of any by which the campaigns
in Afghanistan are marked.
Brigadier Sale’s force, on reaching Jellalabad,
immediately occupied themselves in rendering its
defences tenable, collecting provisions, preparing
ammunition, and mounting their guns on the most
advantageous positions. In availing himself of
the resources of the country, and keeping up our
communications, Captain MacGregor’s services were
most conspicuous and successful, and perhaps to
his exertions it may mainly be attributed that the
“illustrious garrison” were enabled to hold out,
440and earn for themselves the undying honour they
have gained. The exertions also of Captain Abbott,
Captain Backhouse, and Lieutenant Dawes, are
honourably recorded in the records of that siege,
records which have been so fully published that
little is left to us beyond extracting a few passages;
and we shall first refer to the report of the construction
of the works. “With the exception of
a few of the larger bastions, all the batteries were
prepared by the artillerymen themselves, both
Captain Abbott’s company and Captain Backhouse’s
mountain-train, under the superintendence of their
own officers; besides this, a party of Captain
Abbott’s artillerymen was always ready to assist
in the works generally, and they were most ably
superintended by Lieutenant Dawes, to whom I
am indebted for aid as constant as it was valuable,
and willingly given. Captain Backhouse, with his
own men and detachment of the 6th infantry Shah
Soojah’s force, not only prepared the parapets and
embrasures for his own guns, and repaired the
damages done to them by the earthquake, but he
undertook and completed several of the most
useful and laborious operations executed.” * * *
“Captain MacGregor, political agent, gave me,”
441writes Brigadier Sale, “the aid of his local experience,
and through his influence and measures our
dâk communication with India was restored, and
a great quantity of grain collected. * * *
Captain Abbott made the artillery dispositions in
the ablest manner, and used every exertion to
add to and economize our resources, in the way of
gun and musket ammunition.”
“The artillery practice of No. 6 light field battery
has ever been excellent, and has been equalled
by that of the mountain-train. Captains Abbott
and Backhouse and Lieutenant Dawes have proved
themselves excellent ordnance officers.”
The siege, or rather blockade, continued from
November to April. The greatest want at times
prevailed of everything but grain; but the men
preserved their cheerfulness under all privations,
the native artillerymen of the 2nd company 6th
battalion vying with the Europeans of H. M.’s
light infantry in setting an example of good discipline
and patient and cheerful endurance of hardship
and danger. In April, Akbar Khan collected
a large body of troops in the neighbourhood, both
to overwhelm the garrison and meet the army
advancing to its succour through the Khyber. This
442body the garrison attacked on the morning of the
6th April, and completely overthrew, capturing
standards and baggage, and four of the guns lost
by the Cabul force. In the action, No. 6 battery,
with which, in addition to Captain Abbott and
Lieutenant Dawes, were Captains Backhouse and
MacGregor, as volunteers, was most effective;
moving rapidly to the front, it covered the advance
of the infantry, and held in check a large body of
cavalry which threatened the flank. This success
was most complete, and the garrison achieved its
safety by its own prowess. Its gallantry was
rewarded by a medal to all engaged; the corps
were permitted to wear a “mural crown,” with
the word “Jellalabad” on their appointments, and
a donation of six months’ batta was granted as a
compensation for the various losses suffered, and
at the close of the campaign the rank of major,
with the companionship of the Bath, was bestowed
on Captains Abbott, Backhouse, and MacGregor.
443
On the news of the insurrection reaching India,
steps were taken for despatching a force to aid the
troops in Affghanistan. Major-General Pollock,
C.B., of the artillery, was selected for its command,
and joined it at Peshawur in February. The artillery
with it was very insufficient. A troop of horse-artillery
and half a light field battery, a second
troop (Captain Delafosse’s), and the remainder of
the field battery, did not join until after the entrance
to the Khyber was won.
Troop.
Brigade.
Company.
Battalion.
Captains.
Lieutenants.
3
1
Delafosse
Richardson, Money, Abercrombie.
3
2
Alexander
A. Fitzgerald, Larkins.
2
2
L. Smith, Douglas.
4
6
A. Christie, Robertson.
Captain Lane, commissary of ordnance, Lieutenant
Pollock, aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Sir R.
444Shakespear, military secretary, Captain H. M. Lawrence,
political agent.
On the 5th April, the attack was made on the
Pass; the guns were directed on the barriers raised
to defend the entrance; two columns attacked the
heights on either side, and the main body carried
the Pass when the way had been opened by the
fire of the guns. The arrangements of General
Pollock were admirable. The attack was completely
successful; and the enemy evacuated Ali-Musjid at
our approach. Captains Alexander and Lawrence,
Lieutenants Shakespear and Pollock, are mentioned
in the despatches.
Jellalabad was reached, but the enemy had disappeared,
and here the force halted, pending the
receipt of orders for an advance on Cabul, and till
arrangements for carriage could be made to enable
them to carry out the order. This halt was not
altogether inactive; in July, No. 6 battery, with
Captains Abbott and Dawes, was engaged with Brigadier
Monteith’s force in the Shinwaree valley
with much credit. Captain MacGregor accompanied
the brigade, and “when opportunity offered itself,
served with the guns.”
While the force remained halted, a supply of
445rockets reached the artillery, which had been forwarded
by dâk banghy from Allahabad, under the
impression that the weapon was particularly calculated
to be serviceable in the passes at points
where artillery could not be used at all, or without
the greatest difficulty. The expectation was not
realized,—the rockets being too delicate to bear the
shaking they underwent; this, together with the
expansion of the iron case and the contraction of
the composition from the heat to which they were
exposed, rendered them nearly useless on reaching
their destination.
Towards the end of August the arrangements
were completed, and the force moved on; the artillery
strengthened by No. 6 battery and the mountain-train,
which had formed part of the “illustrious
garrison.” On the 24th, the enemy were driven
by General Pollock from Mammoo Khel, in which
action the services of Captains Abbott and MacGregor,
and Lieutenant Pollock are mentioned.
On the 8th September, some fighting occurred near
Jugdulluck, and on the 10th, the enemy assaulted
the rear-guard on all sides, but “were checked by
the very effective fire of the guns, ably directed
by Captain Lawrence (political agent), who volunteered
446his services, and by Lieutenant Abercrombie.”
The brigades were collected in the Tezeen
valley, for which purpose Major-General Pollock
halted on the 12th, and on the 13th were attacked
by the whole of Akbar Khan’s troops, who were
defeated with much loss. Two of the guns, a 24
and 12–pounder howitzer, lost on the retreat, were
here recaptured. The rear-guard was hard pressed
in defending the entrance to the pass as the troops
moved on, and the effective services of Captains
Alexander and Lawrence, and Lieutenant Douglas,
in the use of the guns at this period, are acknowledged.
In the despatches of Major-General Pollock,
the names of Major Delafosse, Captains Abbott,
Backhouse, Alexander, MacGregor, Lieutenants
Fitzgerald, Shakespear, and Pollock, are mentioned
with applause.
On the 15th, the force reached Cabul, and on
the 16th possession was taken of the Bala Hissar,
under a salute from Major Delafosse’s troop.
Major-General Nott, after being joined by Major-General
England’s force, as related in a previous
page, continued to hold Candahar, pending final
instructions. Towards the end of May the enemy,
collecting in numbers, endeavoured to carry the
447town, when Major-General Nott moved out against
them. Both Captain Anderson’s troops were engaged
in this affair with credit. Early in August,
Candahar was evacuated: one column with the
baggage retired by the Kojuck pass; with this was
Lieutenant Cooper’s troop of horse-artillery and
the 3rd company 2nd battalion artillery under
Lieutenant Walker. In its route to Sukkur this
force met with little or no opposition.
The main force marched on the 8th August.
The artillery consisted of Major Sotheby, commandant;
Lieutenant Brougham, adjutant, S. S.
Horse Artillery, Captain W. Anderson, Lieutenants
Turner and Hawkins; 3rd company, 2nd battalion,
Lieutenant Cornish, four 18–pounder guns attached.
On the 31st August, within forty miles of Ghuznee,
the governor, with about 12,000 men, moved
out to meet the British, but he was defeated with
the loss of guns, tents, &c. Major Sotheby was
mentioned in the despatch, which concluded by
saying, “I cannot close this despatch without expressing
my admiration of the dashing and gallant
conduct, rapid movements, and correct practice, of
Captain Anderson’s troop of horse-artillery; nothing
could exceed it, and I beg to bring this officer and
448Lieutenant Turner, attached to the same troop,
to the particular notice of his Lordship, as officers
who have on many occasions rendered me most
essential service.”
Ghuznee yielded without opposition; its walls
and bastions were destroyed—the gates of Somnath
and the Zubber Jung rewarded the conquerors and
graced their triumphant march to Cabul, which
they reached on the 17th, after defeating the enemy
at Beni Badam and Mydam on the 14th and 15th,
in which actions “the artillery” are reported as
having “distinguished themselves,” and the names
of Captain Anderson and Lieutenant Turner are
particularly mentioned.
A body of Kuzzilbash horse, despatched under
Sir R. Shakespear towards Bamean, to aid the
prisoners, met them on their return, they having
effected their escape; of the artillery, Lieutenants
Eyre, Waller, and Warburton; Sergeants MacNee
and Cleland; gunners A’Hearne, Kean, and Walton,
were the sole survivors.
A force was sent against Istaliff on the 30th
September, in which the mountain-train under
Captain Backhouse, and two 18–pounders under
Lieutenant Cornish, were employed. Lieutenants
449Richardson and Pollock accompanied the force, and
the former was slightly wounded.
The combined armies now turned homewards,
meeting with many difficulties from the exhausted
state of the cattle and the obstacles in the passes;
so much so, that the four 18–pounders which had
originally marched with the Army of the Indus were
burst in the passes and their carriages burnt. Daily
skirmishes took place, and in passing a ravine near
Alee Musjid just at dusk, a rush was made by the
Afredis on a small detachment of artillery with
a gun of the mountain-train under Lieutenant A.
Christie. He was killed, and the gun carried off,
but afterwards recovered.
Of the trophies, the Zubber Jung was burst at
Cabul; the Kazee travelled with difficulty as far
as Lundi-khana, in the Khyber, where, upsetting
into a ravine, it was burst and abandoned; the Somnath
gates alone reached Hindustan, travelling on a
spare 18–pounder carriage; but they were fated, even
after 800 years of absence, not to pass their kindred
threshold; they got no further than Agra in the
attempt, and were there deposited in the armoury
of the magazine.
The troops were received on their return by the
450Army of Reserve at Ferozepore, assembled in case
its aid should have been wanted, and medals bestowed
for the different services, bearing the inscriptions
of Candahar—Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabul,
1842—Ghuznee, Cabul, 1842—and Cabul, 1842;
the obverse of all was similar, and this, and all the
medals since that for Ghuznee, were worn on a particoloured
ribbon of light tints, called “the ribbon of
India,” ill fitted for a military decoration.
For these distinguished services General Pollock
was rewarded with the first class of the order of
the Bath, and received the thanks of both Houses
of Parliament. He was subsequently appointed a
member of the Supreme Council of India, and on
being compelled to quit the country on account
451of ill-health in 1846–7, a pension of £1,000 per
annum was bestowed upon him by the East-India
Company, with the unanimous approbation of the
Court of Proprietors. The freedom of the city was
also voted him by the corporation of London.
Of the artillery officers who served under Generals
Pollock and Nott, the following received honorary
distinctions:—Captains Anderson, Alexander,
Lane, and Lawrence, were gazetted brevet-majors;
and Majors Delafosse, Sotheby, and Anderson, companions
of the Bath.
Before closing this account of the war in Afghanistan,
it should be mentioned, that in the political
department several artillery officers were greatly
distinguished. The names of Captains Todd and
MacGregor are associated with important historical
events at Herat and Jellalabad; whilst Captain
Abbott and Lieutenant Richmond Shakespear (who
was subsequently knighted for these services) will
be remembered for their enterprising and perilous
journeys to Khiva and the Caspian for the purpose
of liberating the Russian slaves confined in the
former place.
CHAPTER IX.
452
State of affairs at Gwalior—The Army of Exercise—The battle
of Maharajpore—Want of heavy ordnance—The battle of
Punniah—The Gwalior contingent—Honours conferred on
the artillery—The ordnance commissariat remodelled—The
artillery in Sindh—Reorganization of the regiment—Increase
of horse-batteries.
In the following year (1843) the attention of the
Supreme Government was directed towards a new
quarter. The death of the Maharajah Junkojee
Rao Scindiah was followed by alarming disturbances
at Gwalior. The army became dominant in
the State. The Regent, who had been nominated
to preside over the Durbar, during the minority of
the adopted son of the deceased ruler, was incompetent
to control the rebellious soldiery; the widow
of the late king took part against the minister, and
the hostilities, which commenced with a bed-chamber
intrigue, ended in a civil war. Such, indeed,
became the anarchy and confusion at Gwalior, that
the British Resident quitted Scindiah’s court, and
the Governor-General, though not contemplating
453immediate interference, began to watch with some
anxiety the progress of events at the Mahratta
capital. As the year advanced, the Ranee’s party,
at the head of which was the Dadur Khasgeewallah,
a man whose temper and designs were notoriously
hostile to the British, became stronger and stronger.
Such of the officers, in the service of the Maharajah,
as were known to be friendly to the paramount
state, were ill-treated and dismissed. Covert
hostility began to rise into open defiance; and
it now became apparent, that from the other side
of the Sutlej, the Sikhs were watching, with
undisguised satisfaction, the excitement at Gwalior,
and waiting to take advantage of any disaster that
might befall us, to declare themselves on the side of
the Mahrattas.
As the cold weather approached, the aspect of
affairs became more and more threatening. To
bring about a satisfactory settlement by mere
diplomacy, appeared difficult, if not impossible;
and Lord Ellenborough determined on assembling
an army on the banks of the Jumna. The force
assembled at Agra, in the month of November,
under the personal command of Sir Hugh Gough, the
Commander-in-Chief, and was called the “Army of
454Exercise.” At the same time a left wing was
formed, under the command of General Gray, to
operate upon Gwalior from the Bundlekhund
country, whilst the main army advanced from Agra.
On the 16th of December, Sir Hugh Gough commenced
his march. Affairs were growing worse,
and armed intervention was inevitable. When at
length, the Khasgeewallah was given up, with the
hope of arresting the progress of the British, the
Army of Exercise was in full march upon Gwalior,
and was not to be stayed.
The artillery division of the Army of Exercise
was commanded by Brigadier G. E. Gowan,
Captain J. H. Macdonald being his assistant
adjutant-general. Colonel J. Tennant was appointed,
with the rank of brigadier, to the command
of the foot-artillery; Lieutenant and Brevet-Captain
A. Huish, acting as major of brigade; and
Captain E. F. Day, as commissary of ordnance.
The components of the horse-artillery force were
the 2nd troop 2nd brigade, commanded by Captain
C. Grant, with Lieutenants Clifford and P. Christie,
as subalterns; the 3rd troop 2nd brigade, commanded
by Brevet-Major Alexander, with Brevet-Captain
A. Fitzgerald (adjutant of the brigade,
455who had volunteered to do subaltern’s duty with
the troop), and Lieutenant Wintle; and the 2nd
troop 3rd brigade, with which were Brevet-Major
Lane (commanding), Brevet-Captain C. Mills, and
Lieutenant Moir. The foot-artillery consisted of the
1st company 1st battalion (with No. 10 light field-battery)
under Brevet-Major Saunders; Lieutenants
Bruce, Milligan, and Sladen, subalterns;
and the 1st company 4th battalion, commanded by
Captain B. Brown, with Lieutenants Holland and
Remington. In addition to these were the heavy
batteries, consisting of six 18–pounders and four
8–inch howitzers, manned by the reserve companies
of the 4th battalion (European) and the 6th golundauze;
the former under Lieutenant-Colonel Farrington,
with Lieutenant Whiteford, adjutant; and
the latter under Lieutenant-Colonel Denniss, with
Lieutenant Warner, adjutant.
The artillery with the left wing was commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Biddulph (Captain Austin,
major of brigade), and was composed of the 1st
troop 3rd brigade, commanded by Captain F. Brind,
Lieutenants Coxe and Bourchier, subalterns; the
3rd troop 3rd brigade, under Captain George
Campbell, with whom was Lieutenant Humfrays;
456and the 6th company 6th battalion, with No. 16
light field-battery, under Lieutenant W. Olpherts.
On the arrival of the advanced columns at Dholpore,
they were met by the Khasgeewallah, whose
surrender, now become a matter of fact, was regarded
as a prelude to a general compliance with
the terms dictated by the Governor-General. The
bulk of the siege-train was therefore halted, and
eventually ordered back to Agra.
On the 27th of December information was obtained
that the enemy had advanced to Choundah,
a village within eight miles of the position occupied
by the “Army of Exercise” at Hurgonah, and arrangements
were made next day to attack them on
the 29th. On the morning of that day, the army
advanced upon the village of Maharajpore. It was
believed that the enemy were some miles distant;
but, as the British troops ascended the rising
ground, the Mahratta batteries opened suddenly
upon our advancing columns; and as our own
heavy artillery was in the rear, it was no easy
matter to silence the destructive fire kept up by
the enemy, with a spirit and a precision which
could scarcely be excelled by the best gunners in
the service of any European state.
457Our light field-batteries were overmatched by
the heavy metal of the Mahratta ordnance; but
their steadiness under fire was never exceeded, and
the determined resolution with which they carried
on the unequal contest, elicited the highest praise.
Captain Grant’s troop of horse-artillery came into
action about half-past eight o’clock, when it
engaged one of the enemy’s batteries, drawn up on
the left of the village of Maharajpore. Here it
was joined by Major Alexander’s troop, when
“both advanced to within 500 yards of the enemy,
and soon drove him from his guns, which were
taken possession of by the 3rd brigade of infantry.
On following up the enemy, the two troops were
suddenly exposed to a cross fire, from two of the
enemy’s batteries, which had hitherto been concealed;
one in front, and the other on our left
flank. Captain Grant was ordered to oppose the
former, and Major Alexander the latter, which was
soon after stormed and taken by the 3rd brigade of
infantry; upon which Major Alexander followed up
the retreating enemy with great effect, and Major
Lane, with the 2nd troop 3rd brigade, joined them
in the pursuit. In the mean time, Captain Grant
had advanced to within 600 yards of the Choundah
458position, and was opposed singly to the fire of a
heavy battery of 12 guns, for upwards of half an
hour, and I regret to say, sustained a considerable
loss in men and horses. So well chosen,” adds
Brigadier Gowan, from whose report to the Commander-in-Chief
these details are taken, “was the
enemy’s position, that even on horseback, I could
only discern the muzzles of their guns, which in
weight of metal, as well as in number, were very
superior to the troop’s. More than once, however,
the enemy were driven by our fire from their guns,
but being unsupported at the time, except by a
weak troop of cavalry, no advantage of this could
be taken, and he returned to his guns.”
In another letter, addressed to the assistant
adjutant-general of artillery, Brigadier Gowan,
with reference to the other details of field artillery,
says, “Major Lane’s troop (2nd troop 3rd brigade)
advanced with the 4th brigade of cavalry, under
Brigadier Scott, forming the left column, and
Nos. 17 and 10 light field-batteries, with the 4th
and 5th brigades of infantry, respectively forming the
centre column of attack. These came into action
on the opposite side of the village of Maharajpore
from that on which we were first engaged....
459The conduct of officers and men was highly satisfactory,
and everything I could desire.”
Nothing could have exceeded the resolute courage
with which the Mahratta batteries were defended,
alike by infantry and artillerymen, or the
precision with which the guns were served by the
latter. “I never witnessed,” wrote the Commander-in-Chief,
“guns better served, nor a body of infantry
apparently more devoted to the protection of
their regimental guns, held by the Mahratta corps
as objects of worship.” “The fire of the enemy,”
wrote Brigadier Gowan, “was remarkably accurate,
and was maintained with a smartness which surprised
me. At one time they got the range of
Captain Grant’s troop so exactly, that nearly every
shot fell between the guns and waggons of the
battery.”
It was only by the steady gallantry of the British
infantry, who charged the enemy’s batteries in the
face of destructive showers of grape and round shot,
that their position at last was carried. Her
Majesty’s 39th and 40th regiments headed the
columns. Nothing could have been more gallant
than the attack, more obstinate than the resistance.
The enemy’s golundaz stood to be bayoneted in
460their batteries, and only yielded up their guns with
their lives.
It is probable that, if in this engagement better
use had been made of the artillery, the loss that fell
upon the British army would have been much less
severe. Brigadier Tennant, who commanded the
foot-artillery, had brought up four 8–inch howitzers
in line with H. M.’s 39th, but he was not permitted
to advance. Had he been allowed, as was his
expressed desire, to move up within 800 yards’
distance, where he could see the enemy’s position
more distinctly, and therefore operate with greater
precision, he might, it was the opinion of those
present, have knocked the Mahratta batteries to
pieces, and enabled the infantry columns to advance
in comparative safety to the attack.
On the same morning of the 29th of December,
General Gray, who, with the left wing of the army,
had been advancing upon Gwalior from the Sindh
river, came up with the enemy at Punniah, a
village a few miles to the south of the capital.
Here the Mahratta batteries were strongly posted,
as at Maharajpore, on commanding ground, and in
gorges flanking one another. The 3rd Buffs, who
led the column sent forward to attack the enemy’s
461position, were supported by Captain Brind’s troop
of horse-artillery, 1st troop 3rd brigade, which
“opened upon the guns to the left of Mangore,
whilst Major Geddes, with Captain Campbell’s
troop, 3rd battalion 3rd brigade, and two guns of
Captain Brind’s, opened upon the battery of seven
guns in rear of Mangore; and their practice was
beautiful, silencing all but one of the enemy’s guns,
which was served with the greatest accuracy to the
last moment. Lieutenant Olpherts, with four guns
of No. 16 light field-battery, took up a position
south of Mangore, and opened on the enemy as
they retreated up the hills, with good effect.
Lieutenant Tombs, with two guns of light field-battery
attached to the rear-guard, fired with great
precision several shots upon the enemy’s left.”[93]
The Mahrattas made a gallant defence, but were
driven from their guns with considerable loss; and
night closed upon their total dispersion.
In these engagements on the 29th of December,
the artillery lost at Maharajpore, 1 2nd lieutenant,
1 serjeant, 1 gunner, killed; and 1 serjeant, and
46221 gunners, wounded; besides syces, ordnance-drivers,
and a considerable number of horses. At
Punniah, the loss was much smaller, only one man
and one horse having been killed. The officer who
fell at Maharajpore, was Lieutenant Leathes. He
was posted with the rear-guard, and had ridden
forward, it would seem, to watch the progress of
the action, when coming too close to the Mahratta
batteries, a round shot carried off his head.
For services rendered during this campaign,
Colonel Gowan received the companionship of the
Bath; Majors Geddes, Sanders, Alexander, and
Lane, were promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel
by brevet, and Captains Brown, Grant,
Brind, Campbell, and Macdonald, were gazetted as
brevet-majors. In the political transactions with
which these military operations were connected,
Lieutenant Sir Richmond Shakespear, of the artillery,
took a conspicuous part. He acted as an aide-de-camp
to the Commander-in-Chief, during the
battle of Maharajpore, and was thanked in his Excellency’s
despatch. Captain Macdonald also received
the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief. On the
subsequent settlement of the affairs of Gwalior,
four batteries were raised for service with the new
463Gwalior contingent; and placed under the command
of Lieutenants Eyre, Warburton, T. H. Smyth, and
Hawkins; Brevet-Captain Frank Turner being appointed
brigade major.
In honour of these victories, a bronze star, with
“Maharajpore” or “Punniah” in the centre, was
struck, and distributed to the troops engaged.
Early in the year 1844, the 4th troop 1st brigade
of horse-artillery, and the 4th company 6th battalion
of foot, which formed part of the relief ordered
to Scinde, had their fidelity severely tried by the
conduct of two native infantry regiments who refused
to cross the Sutlej, on the plea that their just
allowances had been withdrawn. The artillery,
consisting of a native troop and a native company,
who must have come under the operation of the
same order, do not appear to have taken a leading
part in the mutinous movement.
In the autumn of this year (1844), a reorganization
of the ordnance commissariat department was
ordered by the Supreme Government. Instead of
a principal commissary of ordnance, resident, as heretofore,
in Fort William, an inspector of magazines,
with his head-quarters at Allahabad, was appointed;
and the arsenal of Fort William was placed under
464the charge of the deputy principal commissary of
ordnance.
In the beginning of the year 1845, Sir Henry
Hardinge, then Governor-General, directed his attention
to the state of the artillery, and, in conjunction
with Sir George Pollock, the military
member of council, introduced several important
improvements. “The number of regular horse
field-batteries had been gradually increased to five.[94]
These were at first equipped with 89 horses, which
allowed six horses each for six guns and six waggons,
one spare per team, and five for the staff; the
gun-teams were subsequently allowed eight horses
to each. In 1845, the number of batteries was
increased to nine, and the complement of horses to
each fixed at 120, which gave eight horses to each
gun and waggon, and allowed a team for the forge-cart,
with six saddle-horses, including one spare
and one spare draught-horse per team. On the
frontier or on service, ten additional horses were
sanctioned.[95]
465“In July, 1845, a new organization of the whole of
the Indian artillery took place, by which the corps in
Bengal received a nominal increase, but a practical
decrease, except in the establishment of officers.
The five European battalions of five companies
each, were formed into six battalions of four
companies each, and the two golundaz battalions of
ten companies, into three battalions of six companies
each, causing a total reduction of one European,
and two native companies.
“One important advantage was, however, obtained
by the increase of European officers, the
want of which had been seriously felt on various
previous occasions. The relief thus granted could
466not of course be felt immediately, but its beneficial
effect is now becoming manifest.
“This gave an establishment of three brigades
and nine battalions, each having a complement of
officers similar to the infantry, with the exception
that an additional captain was allowed to the latter,
which has not been accorded to the artillery,
although greatly wanted.”
The important subject of elephant-draught at this
time engaged the attention of the Governor-General.
These animals had been long in use with the light
post-guns in Arracan and other places, and an
experimental elephant-battery had been recently
established at Dum-dum. But Sir Henry Hardinge
now turned his thoughts towards the application of
this description of draught to heavy ordnance, convinced
that, for the transport of siege-guns, artificers’
carts, &c., elephants would be found more
serviceable and more economical than bullocks.
During the Sikh campaign, the services of the
former were tested, especially on the march to and
from Kote Kangra; and the result more than
justified the expectations of the Governor-General.
CHAPTER X.
467
The Sikh invasion—Battle of Moodkee—Services of the artillery—Battle
of Ferozeshuhur—Scarcity of ammunition—Measures
taken for its prevention—The artillery reinforced—Affair
at Buddowul—Battle of Aliwal—Battle of Sobraon—Honours
conferred on the artillery—The occupation of
Lahore.
As the year 1845 drew towards its close, the
state of affairs in the Punjab demanded the most
anxious attention of the Governor-General. Eager
to maintain peace, but at the same time determined
to be prepared for war, Sir Henry Hardinge had
noiselessly increased the strength of the frontier
army, and had himself proceeded, in September, to
the North-west, apparently on an ordinary tour of
inspection. In July, 1844, there had been between
Meerut and Ferozepore 24,000 men, and 66 field-pieces.
This force he had, with as little ostentation as
possible, increased to 45,500 men, and 98 field-guns.
The most important position was Umballah. As it
was from this point that any attack from beyond the
468Sutlej must have been met, the Governor-General,
by December, 1845, had placed there, in the front
line, 32,470 men, and 66 field-guns, where before,
in July, 1844, there had only been 13,530 men,
and 48 field-guns. But all these preparations were
made in the manner least calculated to alarm or to
irritate the Sikhs, and it was hoped that, in spite of
the boastings of the turbulent soldiery, they would
be restrained by their own intestine feuds from
advancing to the attack of their neighbours. The
middle of December, however, saw them preparing
to cross the river; and the great event, which had
for many years been talked of in every cantonment
in India, was now on the eve of accomplishment;
the war in the Punjab was about to commence.
We come now to speak more in detail of the
disposition of the artillery at this time. At the
commencement of the war, there were stationed at
Ferozepore, the 5th troop 1st brigade, under Captain
E. F. Day; the 3rd troop 3rd brigade, under
Brevet-Major George Campbell; the 4th company
6th battalion, with No. 19 light field-battery, under
Captain J. Fordyce; and the 2nd company 7th
battalion, with No. 6 light field-battery, under 1st
Lieutenant A. G. Austen (Captain Boileau, lately
469posted, not having joined), in all 12 horse-artillery
guns and howitzers (6 and 12–pounders), and 12
foot-artillery guns and howitzers (9 and 24–pounders).
Besides these troops and companies,
there was a reserve company (the 2nd company
2nd battalion) for the service of heavy guns and
rockets. The whole were under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, of the 3rd brigade.
At Loodianah were posted the 1st troop 1st
brigade, under Captain F. Dashwood; and the
4th troop 3rd brigade, under Captain H. Garbett
(total 12 guns); the whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Geddes.
But the largest force of artillery was posted at
Umballah, under Lieutenant-Colonel George Brooke,
of the 1st brigade horse-artillery. At that station
were the 2nd troop 1st brigade, under Captain
D’Arcy Todd; the 3rd troop 1st brigade, under
Captain G. H. Swinley; the 1st troop 3rd brigade,
under Major F. Brind; the 3rd company 4th
battalion, under Captain Jasper Trower; and the
2nd company 6th battalion, under Captain R. Horsford;
Nos. 7 and 9 light field-batteries being
attached to these two companies. There were
also at Umballah, the 2nd and 4th companies
470(reserve) 4th battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel
G. Denniss.[96]
Thus the Sirhind division of artillery, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, numbered forty-two
horse-artillery and twenty-four foot-artillery guns
and howitzers. The four 9–pounder batteries were
horsed; but No. 19, at Ferozepore, having only
lately been changed from a bullock-battery, and
being incomplete in harness, was obliged to take
the field with bullock-draught. The Governor-General
was at this time at Umballah; and he had
with him on escort duty, two horse-artillery guns,
under 1st Lieutenant George Moir, of the 2nd
troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, then at Muttra.
The Sikhs crossed the Sutlej on the 11th and
12th. On the latter day Sir Hugh Gough marched
from Umballah to Rajpoora, with the head-quarters
of the Sirhind division, a distance of 18 miles; and
on the 13th, Sir John Littler moved his troops into
camp, to protect the cantonments of Ferozepore;
471one regiment being detached with three guns, from
No. 6 battery, under Lieutenant Tulloch, to defend
the city. On the same day, he brigaded his force;
Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, of the 3rd brigade,
being temporarily appointed a brigadier of artillery;
Lieutenant Abercrombie, adjutant of the
3rd brigade, being his brigade-major.
On the 13th, the Governor-General and the
Commander-in-Chief being then only a few miles
distant from each other, and in constant communication,
the Army of the Sutlej was formed into
brigades and divisions. Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke
was appointed brigadier to command the artillery;
consisting of all the troops and companies before
mentioned, as stationed at Ferozepore, Loodianah,
and Umballah, as well as the two guns under
Lieutenant Moir, from the escort of the Governor-General.
Brevet-Captain Murray Mackenzie, adjutant
of the 1st brigade, was appointed major of
brigade to the artillery, and Brevet-Captain Warner,
adjutant of the 4th battalion, commissary of
ordnance.
On the 13th, the troops at Loodianah received
orders from Sir H. Hardinge to march to Busseean,
a distance of twenty-eight miles; and at the same
472time, the two horse-artillery guns from Muttra, and
the 5th cavalry, which formed part of the Governor-General’s
escort, were sent thither to join them.
The object of this movement was to cover Busseean,
full as it was of supplies for the British army, which,
but for the interposition of the Loodianah force,
would in all probability have been destroyed by the
enemy. By this movement also, the force under
the Commander-in-Chief, marching up from Umballah,
was augmented by 4,000 men and 12 guns.
On the 15th the troops halted, and on the following
day moved on to Wudnee, of which place a
Sikh garrison was in possession. On their refusal
to furnish supplies to the force, the two troops of
artillery were brought into position before the town—a
movement which had the desired effect. Here
the Umballah force, with the main body of the
artillery, under Brigadier Brooke, joined the troops
from Loodianah.
On the 17th the army made a short march of ten
miles to Chirruck, where the troops suffered much
from scarcity of water.
On the 18th the whole force moved to Moodkee.
During the march a message was received from
Major Broadfoot, who was reconnoitring in front,
473to the effect that the Sikhs were in possession of
the fort and village of Moodkee, and that a portion
of their cavalry were in advance of that place.
The horse-artillery and cavalry were immediately
ordered to form line to the front; the enemy’s
pickets, however, had abandoned their advanced
position, and Moodkee opened its gates at the sight
of a few guns.
It was half-past two o’clock before the army was
encamped. The horses had been picketed, and
men and officers were about to seek some refreshment
after the fatigues of the march, when Major
Broadfoot brought intelligence that the enemy
was within three miles of our lines. The Governor-General
himself rode down the front of the
artillery camp, and the guns were quickly in
motion.
The camp of the British army was, at this time,
formed on a tract of cultivated ground immediately
to the west of Moodkee. In front, for about a
mile, extended ploughed fields, beyond which there
stretched a dense jungle of low brushwood and
stunted trees. Through this the Sikh columns were
now advancing. The horse-artillery, with cavalry
on the flanks, moved rapidly across the ploughed
474fields. The dust caused by the march of the Sikh
columns rose densely against the blue sky above the
brush-jungle; but when the enemy perceived that
the British line was in motion, they halted in the
jungle to make their arrangements for the battle.
The horse-artillery proceeded in line across the
fields, but halted before entering the jungle. The
light field-batteries, which had been directed to
follow, with the infantry columns, came up soon
after the action commenced; and in a short time
30 horse-artillery and 12 field-battery guns were in
full play.
Our fire soon told upon the enemy, who were
hidden in a thick jungle, and their position only
indicated by the smoke from their guns. Soon,
apparently, some of the Sikh pieces were either
silenced or withdrawn, for their fire gradually slackened.
Brigadier Brooke, in his official despatch,
reports, that “the line of artillery kept up a
heavy fire on the enemy, nearly silencing their
guns;” and the Commander-in-Chief corroborates
this statement, saying, that the enemy “opened a
very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops,
which was vigorously replied to by the battery of
horse-artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was
475soon joined by the two light field-batteries. The
rapid and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared
soon to paralyze that of the enemy.”
Rather more than half an hour after the commencement
of the action, the Commander-in-Chief
directed Colonel Geddes to take two troops of horse-artillery,
and to proceed with the 4th light cavalry
and 9th irregulars to the left, to oppose a demonstration
of the Sikhs from their right flank. The
1st and 4th troops of the 3rd brigade (under Major
Brind and Captain Garbett), being on the left of the
line, were those which accompanied Colonel Geddes.
The two troops with the cavalry moved rapidly into
the jungle towards the left front, and came into
action against some Sikh cavalry and infantry, who
had apparently been creeping round with the intention
of turning our left flank. Colonel Geddes, who
was the senior officer on the left, perceiving this
body of the enemy retiring before the fire of our
guns, directed the 9th irregular cavalry to charge.
This was accordingly done. As the cavalry moved
forward, the guns ceased firing, and again advanced
through the jungle, which at every step grew
denser and denser, and much impeded the movements
of the horse-artillery.
476At the same time that this occurred on the left,
a similar movement was made from our right to
turn the enemy’s left flank, and to check their
cavalry, who were endeavouring to circle round our
right. The 1st[97] and 3rd troops 1st brigade, under
Captains Dashwood and Swinley, and Captain
Trower’s battery, were pushed forward to support
the 3rd dragoons and a brigade of native cavalry,
who were now ordered to charge the enemy’s left
flank. The 2nd troop 1st brigade, under Captain
Todd, and Captain Horsford’s battery, still remained
in the centre, covering the advance of the infantry
brigades. After the brilliant and successful charges
of our cavalry on both flanks, the troops and batteries
detached to the right and left were ordered to
close in to the centre, in order to support the attack
of the infantry. It was nearly dusk. The early
evening of a winter day had set in whilst the action
still raged furiously. The jungle at every pace grew
denser, and it was with difficulty that the guns could
force their way through the brushwood. Captain
Swinley’s troop, in covering the advance of an
European regiment, suffered much from a close
477discharge of grape and musketry, and one gun,
having lost all its horses, was temporarily disabled.
The 1st troop 1st brigade sustained great loss from
the close fire of the enemy’s artillery and infantry.
Captain Dashwood, who commanded the troop, was,
at this period of the action, with his staff-serjeant
and several of his men, struck down by grape.
Lieutenant Pollock, of the 3rd troop 1st brigade,
also received a mortal wound; and Captain Trower
was shot at the head of his battery by a Sikh
soldier concealed in a bush. At this time darkness
was rapidly covering the field, and the artillery,
being within a few paces of the enemy’s line,
were suffering much from their galling fire. But
at length the Sikh line gave way before the advance
of the British infantry, who, supported by a part of
the artillery, pursued for a considerable distance the
retreating enemy; but, as the Commander-in-Chief
observed in his despatch, “night saved them from
worse disaster.”
The action commenced at half-past three in the
afternoon, and, as the day was one of the shortest
of the year, the rapid closing in of night prevented
the British force from taking full advantage of its
success. The Sikhs saved a portion of their ordnance,
478some of their guns being apparently withdrawn
early in the action. It is supposed that they
had in all from thirty to forty guns engaged, of
which seventeen fell into our hands.
The artillery suffered more in this action from
grape and musketry than from the round shot of
the enemy, which did comparatively little mischief.
Only one or two waggons were blown up, and in
fact scarcely any loss was sustained until the troops
and field-batteries were pushed up through the
jungle close to the enemy’s fire. It was then that
Captains Dashwood and Trower, and Lieutenant
R. H. Pollock (son of Major-General Sir George
Pollock, G.C.B.), received their death-wounds. The
first was struck down by grape, receiving two
wounds, one on the arm and the other on the foot,
the latter of which proved mortal. Lieutenant
Pollock had his knee smashed by a musket-ball, and
being for a long time exposed to the cold night air,
lying in a waggon, though the limb was amputated
immediately upon his arrival in camp, sunk on the
19th. Captain Trower, as we have said, was shot
by a Sikh concealed in the jungle; the ball passed
through his body, and he died during the night.
There were several Sikhs—Akalis and others—lying
479concealed behind the bushes, who waited until our
troops came close upon them, to pick out our officers.
The total loss of artillery was (killed) 2 European
officers, 4 serjeants, 13 rank and file, 5 syces
and grass-cutters, 3 drivers, and 45 horses;—and
(wounded) 4 European officers, 1 native officer,
2 serjeants, 22 rank and file, 11 lascars, 2 drivers,
7 syces, and 25 horses. The officers killed and
wounded were, Captain Jasper Trower, killed;
Lieutenant R. Pollock, killed; Captain F. Dashwood,
severely wounded; 1st Lieutenant C. V. Cox,
slightly wounded; 1st Lieutenant C. A. Wheelwright,
wounded; 1st Lieutenant C. Bowie, slightly
wounded. Captain Dashwood died soon afterwards.
The morning of the 19th[98] was devoted to the
mournful duty of bringing in the wounded and
burying the dead. The artillery sent out limbers
and cattle to bring in the captured ordnance.
Whilst thus employed, our working parties were
480disturbed and obliged to retire towards camp, by
some bodies of the enemy’s horse, who had returned
to the field probably with the same intention. As
large bodies of the enemy’s horse were still hovering
about, the Commander-in-Chief drew up his troops
again, prepared, if necessary, to renew the action;
but nothing, at this time, worthy of note in our
memoir, occurred.
On the night of the 20th, two 18–pounder guns
and two 8–inch howitzers arrived in camp from
Umballah, under Brigadier Denniss and Captain
Warner, commissary of ordnance. Short as the
time was, ammunition was prepared for the howitzers,
which were thus enabled to accompany the
force on the following morning. The 18–pounders
were, however, left behind in camp at Moodkee.
An hour before daybreak on the 21st, the army
broke ground. The main body of the artillery
moved in rear of the centre column under General
Gilbert. Two troops of horse-artillery were, however,
detached, one with the column under Brigadier
Wallace, and the other was attached to Major-General
Sir H. Smith’s division. The distance from
Moodkee to Ferozeshuhur, where, according to
intelligence received in camp, the main body of the
481enemy were posted,[99] is not above twelve miles; but
the army moved slowly, led by the infantry columns,
and a very considerable detour was made to the left,
in order that a junction with the Ferozepore division,
under Sir John Littler, might be made, at a sufficient
distance from the intrenched position of the
enemy. Although the communication with Ferozepore
had been lately interrupted, as the Sikhs
had interposed between that station and the headquarters
force, instructions had been sent to the
major-general to move out of his camp at Ferozepore
on the morning of the 21st, so as to form
the desired junction. The Governor-General’s despatches
had been duly received; and Sir John
Littler, with 5,900 men and 21 guns, marched early
on the 21st to Misrèe-wallah, a village a short distance
from the Sikh position. This movement was
skilfully accomplished by the general, who left the
whole of his camp standing, and threw out the usual
mounted picquets in front, thus deceiving that portion
of the Sikh force under Tej Singh which had been
employed in watching him. The sirdar, ignorant
482of Littler’s march, remained in front of the empty
camp during the whole of the day, and did not learn
the general’s movement until the next morning.
The junction of the two forces was effected about
half-past one P.M.; and “dispositions were made
for an united attack upon the enemy’s intrenched
camp.” About 4 o’clock the British troops moved
forward under their veteran commanders; Sir
Hugh Gough leading the right wing, and Sir Henry
Hardinge, who, after the battle of Moodkee, had
chivalrously volunteered his services as second in
command, placing himself at the head of the left.
The nature of the ground was somewhat similar
to that at Moodkee, covered with thick jungle,
and, as on that day, the sun was rapidly sinking
when the action commenced. It was the shortest
day of the year, and but a few hours of daylight
remained. The line of attack was formed, Sir John
Littler on the left, Brigadier Wallace in the centre,
and General Gilbert on the right. Sir Harry Smith’s
division, the reserve, was in the second line. The
cavalry was in reserve and on both flanks.
The artillery was thus posted—Lieutenant-Colonel
Huthwaite, of the 3rd brigade, was with Sir
John Littler. He had under his command the 5th
483troop 1st brigade, under Captain E. F. Day—3rd
troop 3rd brigade, under Major G. Campbell—4th
company 6th battalion (bullock-battery attached)
and three guns of No. 6 horse field-battery—the
other three guns having been left with a detachment
to protect the city of Ferozepore. Captain
D’Arcy Todd’s troop—the 2nd of the 1st brigade,
was on the left of Brigadier Wallace’s
division; and Captain G. H. Swinley’s, the 3rd
troop of the 1st brigade, was on the extreme right
of the line, beyond her Majesty’s 29th foot. The
4th troop 3rd brigade, under Captain Garbett, and
the 1st troop 1st brigade, now under Captain C. E.
Mills, with Lieutenant Moir’s two guns, were on
the left of Gilbert’s division. Major Brind’s troop
was with Sir Harry Smith’s in the second line;
but just as the action commenced was moved up to
the first line, and took post to the right of Captain
Garbett’s troop. These three troops, the 1st and
4th of the 3rd brigade, and the 1st of the 1st, were
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes.
To the left of these were two horse field-batteries
under Captain Horsford and Lieutenant Atlay, and
the heavy howitzers and rockets under Brigadier
Denniss and Captain Warner.
484The action commenced on the left, Colonel Huthwaite
pushing forward with his two troops of horse-artillery
and his light field-batteries, to the attack
of the enemy’s position. The heavy guns and
rockets and 9–pounder batteries next came into
action, and almost immediately afterwards the
horse-artillery in the centre and on the right. The
action now became general with the artillery on
both sides. The roar of the ordnance was tremendous.
The British had 65 pieces in action—but,
with the exception of two heavy howitzers, all light
guns. The enemy had upwards of 100 guns in
battery, and most of them of large calibre; whilst
even those of smaller dimensions, being of much
heavier metal than our own field-pieces, were fired
with increased charges and carried greater distances.
The ground in front of our line was, in the first
positions taken up, covered with jungle as at Moodkee,
but afterwards, as we neared the enemy,
became clear and open. After a few rounds, the
horse-artillery in the centre of the line were advanced
to a closer distance, and the troops moved
through the jungle at a rapid pace, the shot from
the enemy’s guns tearing up the ground on all sides,
but as yet causing little loss.
485As before mentioned, the detachment of artillery
under Colonel Huthwaite on the left, commenced
the action. Pushing the guns forward from one
position to another, until within grape distance, he
had for a time completely silenced the batteries
opposed to him. Meanwhile the infantry on his
left moved forward to the attack, but the movement
was not successful. Subsequently, however,
the 9th foot and 26th light infantry (with a portion
of the 14th N.I.), under Brigadier Wallace, carried
the enemy’s battery.
Meanwhile the other troops and batteries, from
their different positions in line, had advanced
through the jungle. The 2nd troop 1st brigade,
under Captain Todd, being on the left of Brigadier
Wallace, approached the artillery attached to Littler’s
division. Major Brind’s troop, the 1st of the
3rd, after advancing to a great distance, was despatched
to the right to join Captain Swinley’s, which
had accompanied the 29th foot. Two troops under
Colonel Geddes, after several positions, emerged
from the jungle and came into a clear open space in
front of the southern face of the enemy’s intrenchments,
and within reach of their grape-shot; and
now the artillery fire ceased, the infantry were
486moved forward and (forming line) advanced to the
storm. The batteries in front were carried at the
point of the bayonet, notwithstanding the most
determined resistance, and the great loss sustained,
just as the line reached the battery, by the explosion
of a large under-ground magazine, which had all
the effect of a mine.
The sun had now set, and darkness was rapidly
falling on the field. The obscurity was much increased
by the dust and the smoke from the batteries
and the exploding magazines. From the frequency
of these explosions, and the quantity of earth
thrown up by them, it was at first supposed that
the enemy’s position had been mined; but they
were nothing more than under-ground magazines,
which, some by accident, some by design, were
now exploded, adding to the confusion and din of
the fight.
Several regiments having penetrated the batteries,
reached the Sikh tents, many of which were now
on fire. Here the troops became partially broken
and entangled; nothing could be distinguished
clearly amidst the smoke and obscurity. It was
difficult to ascertain in which direction lay friend or
foe. Shots were falling thick on all sides, and even
487now the troops of horse-artillery, halting unemployed
before the Sikh position, suffered material
loss. Two waggons of Captain Mills’ troop exploded
simultaneously—giving at first a momentary
impression that the mines extended even so far from
the enemy’s batteries. The 3rd dragoons, who had
charged from the right of the line on the batteries
immediately opposed to them, carrying everything
before them in their course, now at length emerged
from the enemy’s position in scattered parties. It
was now dark. All our infantry were engaged.
The reserve, under Sir Harry Smith, had been
called up and had penetrated beyond the batteries,
most of which had been captured; and one brigade
had even reached the village of Ferozeshuhur. Yet
all opposition had not ceased, and the enemy still
held a great portion of their intrenchments.
Amidst, however, the darkness and intricacies of
the camp, it was impossible then to push our success
further. It was advisable, therefore, to withdraw
our shattered regiments, which within the Sikh
position were exposed to hidden dangers, without
any compensating advantage.
Accordingly, a bivouac was formed within two or
three hundred yards of the batteries. Here were
488collected, under Gilbert and Wallace, the 9th, 29th,
31st, and 80th regiments of foot, and the 1st European
light infantry. The 1st troop of 1st brigade,
and 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Colonel Geddes,
joined this division of infantry, near which the Governor-General
and Commander-in-Chief remained
throughout the night. The 2nd troop 1st brigade,
now under Lieutenant Mackinnon (Major Todd
having fallen in the action), and some field-battery
guns, under Captain Horsford, soon afterwards
came up to the ground. The 5th troop 1st brigade,
3rd troop 3rd brigade, and 9–pounder batteries attached
to the 4th company 6th battalion, and 2nd
company 7th battalion, bivouacked a short distance
to the left. The 3rd troop 1st brigade, 1st troop
3rd brigade, with some field-battery guns, bivouacked
during the night near Misrèe-wallah, which
was occupied by British troops of all arms.
The night passed wearily away in cold and watching;
the enemy, occasionally firing, allowed our harassed
troops little rest. One gun was particularly
troublesome during the greater part of the night,
until the Governor-General ordered its capture by
the 80th foot and 1st Europeans. Other guns were
playing during the night with little or no effect.
489The uproar in the Sikh position was tremendous;
the shouting was incessant, and the beating of
drums, the sounding of bugles, and the firing of
matchlocks and musketry continued, with short
intervals, until daybreak. Frequently their drums
beat to arms, and it was supposed that the enemy
were preparing to attack us. Accordingly, a few
guns were got into position and held ready with
grape; but nothing came of these indications.
About midnight the troops, having originally
bivouacked as they came upon the ground, were
formed up in order; the guns in front, and the
infantry in two lines in their rear. At length day
broke, and the Sikh position was now comparatively
quiet. The uproar had gradually diminished, and
it was generally supposed that the enemy had begun
to abandon their intrenchments. At first a thick
mist shrouded all surrounding objects; but the
beams of the rising sun soon dispelled it, and the
three troops of horse-artillery, under Captain Mills,
Lieutenant Mackinnon, and Captain Garbett, pushed
forward and again opened on the Sikh position.
But there was no longer the determined resistance
which had marked the contest of the previous
day. It is true that some batteries of heavy metal
490replied to our fire for a time, and did some little
mischief, a few of our waggons being blown up; but
the enemy’s fire soon grew feeble. The infantry,
who were close in rear of the guns, formed into line,
and with a hearty cheer sprang forward. Soon the
intrenchments, here most insignificant, were gained
and passed; and the British line swept through the
camp, meeting with but little opposition. The
horse-artillery, after ceasing their fire, limbered up
and accompanied the infantry line under command
of Lieutenant-Colonel Geddes. There was no check
to the progress of our troops. No steady resistance
was offered by the enemy. The village of Ferozeshuhur
was carried as the line advanced. There
was a smart skirmishing fire in front, but it was
evident that many of the Sikh battalions had already
fled, and that our advance expedited the retreat of
the others. The line having passed the village of
Ferozeshuhur, leaving it to the left, and having
reached the extremity of the enemy’s position,
halted. Upwards of seventy of the Sikh guns, and
the whole of their matériel and camp equipage, fell
into our hands. And thus apparently the battle
terminated.
But such in reality was not the case. We now
491come to a period of the engagement sufficiently difficult
to describe. Orders had been given to allow
a certain number of men to fall out for the purpose
of procuring water, and arrangements were also
being made for securing the captured ordnance.
It was generally believed that the contest had
ceased, when suddenly to the left of the British
line, and extending over a considerable arc of the
horizon, a dense cloud of dust was seen rising from
the jungle. The sirdar, Tej Singh, who had been
uselessly watching Sir John Littler’s empty camp,
had now marched from his position before Ferozepore
to join the main army under Lal Singh, whom he
supposed to be still in possession of the intrenched
position. But to his surprise he found himself in
the presence of the victorious British army.
Our ammunition was getting scarce.[100] The horse-artillery
492was at this time in three separate bodies.
Two troops (and a part of a field-battery, under
Lieutenant Austen) were with Colonel Huthwaite
on the left of the field. The troops commanded by
Major Brind and Captain Swinley were, early in the
morning, with Sir Harry Smith’s division; and Colonel
Geddes commanded three troops with headquarters.
Colonel Huthwaite moving through the
jungle on the left of the village, came unexpectedly
on the Sirdar Tej Singh. He immediately opened
upon the Sikh force, and drew down a heavy fire.
This was the commencement of the affair. Major
Brind, in command of his own troop and that of
Captain Swinley, soon after became engaged with
the enemy on the left front of the village. His fire
was answered by about thirty pieces of all kinds
from the Sikh batteries. The three troops under
Colonel Geddes were also directed to move forward
to the attack. The artillery under Colonel Huthwaite,
being entirely unsupported, and his ammunition
493failing, was compelled to fall back, as the
enemy was within a few hundred yards, and appeared
to be moving round his flanks. At the same time
the two troops of horse-artillery under Major Brind,
being exposed to an enfilading fire from some heavy
guns of the enemy, were obliged to retire upon the
village where the supports were posted. About
this period, Colonel Geddes, after sustaining a very
heavy fire, finding his ammunition expended and
that he was entirely unsupported, was compelled to
fall back upon the hollow square which, in the
mean time, had been formed by the infantry on the
right front of the village. The greater number of
the guns were now placed on the prolongation of
one of the sides of the square. Some were in the
village, and three guns of the 4th troop 3rd brigade
were posted in one of the angles of the square
immediately fronting the direction of Tej Singh’s
advance. There was now a pause—the army quietly
waiting the expected attack of the Sikh sirdar. Most
of our guns were now without, or nearly without,
ammunition, only a few rounds of grape remaining.
Near the village to the left of the large square were
several Sikh ammunition-carts, and the Commander-in-Chief
directed the artillery to seize as much of the
494enemy’s ammunition as time would admit of, to
replenish the exhausted boxes. But unfortunately
most of the guns, being on the right of the square,
were too far removed to avail themselves of this opportunity.
The three guns, however, which were in
the angle, procured each some fifteen or sixteen
rounds, which proved of material assistance. Meantime
the Sikh line under Tej Singh continued to
advance. At length, when he had arrived some six
hundred yards from the British position, Major
Brind’s troop in the village, and the three guns of
the 4th troop 3rd brigade in the angle of the square,
opened upon the enemy, and drew down a furious
cannonade from some forty field-guns. Those of
our guns which were on the right of the square,
besides being short of ammunition as before mentioned,
were placed with their left flank towards
the enemy, and therefore could not, even had they
ammunition, take part in the conflict. From their
position they suffered much from the enfilading fire
of the enemy, as did also the regiments on that side
of the square. For some twenty minutes, the few
guns which we had opposed to the enemy kept up
this unequal contest. Whilst the Sikh artillery
were playing upon our position, the sirdar appeared
495to be gradually crossing our front. It was about
this time that the Commander-in-Chief changed the
front of the line, bringing a portion of it within
shelter of the village. The fire of the artillery on
our side now entirely ceased. Major Brind, who
had been in the village with two troops, was directed
to join the entire mass of the artillery which was on
the extreme right, in column with the cavalry—as
did also the three guns of the 4th troop of the 3rd
brigade, which had expended all their ammunition,
including that which they had captured from the
Sikhs. But by this time the Sikh fire was gradually
lessening, and the sirdar appeared to be withdrawing
from the field.
It was after the change of front had been effected,
and whilst the artillery and cavalry, in a mass of
contiguous columns (the cavalry on the right, left in
front), were moving round the right of the village,
that orders were given to the latter to form line to
the right preparatory to charging. The cavalry accordingly,
whilst the artillery halted, moved forward
in line, and made a demonstration against the
enemy—which was the last offensive movement
made on either side.
During this movement of the cavalry, the artillery
496halted, to be able, if necessary, to support the
former. But on the cavalry re-forming and again
forming column, the march was resumed, and orders[101]
were received by the senior officer, Brigadier Harriott,
to escort the whole of the field-artillery into
Ferozepore for the purpose of refilling their ammunition-boxes.
But the action was now entirely over,
and the Sikh sirdar was making the best of his way
towards the river.
In this action the artillery lost 31 killed, including
officers; and 77 wounded (exclusive of lascars, &c.).
Major D’Arcy Todd had his head carried away by a
cannon-shot on the 21st; Captain J. F. Egerton, at
the time attached to the quarter-master general’s
department, was cut down on the 22nd, near the
village of Ferozepore, whilst carrying a message.
He lingered more than a month under very severe
sabre-cuts, and died on the 23rd of January, 1846.
1st Lieutenant P. C. Lambert, a very promising
young officer of horse-artillery, was killed by a cannon-shot
on the 22nd. The wounded officers were
Captain W. K. Warner, commissary of ordnance
(slightly), Captain M. Mackenzie, brigade major
497(slightly), 1st Lieutenant R. M. Paton (slightly), and
1st Lieutenant E. Atlay (slightly).
The artillery had several pieces disabled at different
periods of the action, and some six or seven
limbers or waggons were blown up.
The exhaustion of the ammunition with the
field-artillery at Ferozeshuhur was a matter of too
pregnant and suggestive a nature to be lost, in
the way of warning, upon the sagacious practical
mind of the Governor-General, who, soon after the
conclusion of the war, addressed himself to the
remedy of the evil which had threatened such
serious consequences during the campaign. It
was obvious that the guns had gone into the field
with a scanty supply of ammunition, and that the
Indian system, which allowed a smaller number
of rounds than is sanctioned by the regulations of
the royal army, was unequal to the exigencies of
such trying service.[102] To remedy this for the
498future, it was recommended by Lord Hardinge, that
there should be allotted to each gun of every troop
and battery, whether a 6–pounder or a 9–pounder,
two ammunition-waggons, giving to each 6–pounder
224 rounds, and to each 9–pounder 168 rounds.
One waggon, it was proposed should always be
close at hand with each gun in action, and the
other in reserve, the whole supply of ammunition
being under the charge of the officer commanding
the troop or battery. The Military Board, whilst
concurring in the expediency of the proposed
increase of ammunition, suggested that the six
waggons with the troop or battery, should be
under the charge of the officer commanding; and
the six spare waggons in magazine, a proposal
which was readily concurred in by the Governor-General.
On the 24th of December the army moved
to Sultan-Khan-Wallah, and thence, in a few
days, to Hurruff, with an advanced division at Mulloowal.
On the 1st of January the army was again
brigaded. Colonel Gowan, C.B., was appointed to
499the command of the artillery division; Captain
Edward Christie was nominated deputy assistant
adjutant-general; Captain Warner, commissary
of ordnance; Lieutenant H. H. Maxwell, deputy
assistant quartermaster-general (originally appointed
at Wudnee). Lieutenant-Colonels Biddulph,
Brooke, and Dennis, were appointed brigadiers;
with Captains Austin, Mackenzie, and
Lieutenant Kaye, as brigade majors. Great exertions
were now made, in anticipation of the renewal
of the struggle, to strengthen our ordnance force,
especially by the addition of a siege-train. To the
artillery formerly specified were accordingly added
three troops of horse-artillery from Meerut, and
one from Muttra—the 1st troop 2nd brigade,
under Captain Turton—the 2nd troop 2nd brigade,
under Major Grant—the 3rd troop 2nd brigade,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander; and the
2nd troop 3rd brigade (two guns of which had
been previously with the army), under Lieutenant-Colonel
Lane;—also, the 1st company 4th battalion,
under Captain Waller, with twelve 9–pounder
iron guns, reamed out to 12–pounders, and drawn
by elephants, with some reserve companies of the
3rd and 6th battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel
500Wood. The horse-artillery from Meerut, and Captain
Waller’s guns, joined the army early in January,
and the remainder at a later period.
On the 12th of January the head-quarters of the
army changed ground to Bootawallah, with its
extreme flanks resting on Mukkoo and Attaree.
On the 13th and 14th there was an interchange of
a few distant rounds between the British and Sikh
artillery, which led to no results. On the 18th, a
force under Sir Harry Smith was detached towards
Dhurrum Khote. The artillery which accompanied
this division, consisted of the 1st and 3rd troops of
the 2nd brigade, and No. 6 horse field-battery,
under Colonel Lawrenson. The 1st troop 1st brigade,
under 1st Lieutenant J. Mill, followed with
Brigadier Wheeler, who was sent to the reinforcement
of Sir Harry Smith, but did not take part in
the affair of Buddowal. It was on the 21st that
this incident occurred, in which the artillery assisted
in covering the retirement of Sir Harry Smith to
Loodianah. A few store-carts, which were in the
rear with the baggage, fell into the hands of the
enemy.
A week after this, the battle of Aliwal was
fought. Reinforced by a body of troops under
501Brigadier Wheeler, which joined the division on
the 26th of January, Sir Harry Smith made his
arrangements to attack the enemy’s position at
daybreak on the 28th. “My order of advance,”
writes the general, in his well known despatch,
“was the cavalry in front, in contiguous columns
of squadrons of regiments; two troops of horse-artillery,
in the intervals of brigades: the infantry
in contiguous columns of brigades, at intervals of
deploying distance; artillery in the intervals,
followed by two 8–inch howitzers, on travelling
carriages, brought into the field by the indefatigable
exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, horse-artillery.”
About 10 o’clock the enemy’s batteries
opened on our advancing columns, and the action
soon became general. All arms distinguished
themselves greatly on this memorable occasion:—“Lieutenant-Colonel
Lane’s and Captain Turton’s
troops of horse-artillery, under Major Lawrenson,
dashed almost among the flying infantry, committing
great havoc, until about 800 or 1,000 men rallied
under the high bank of a nullah, and opened a
heavy but ineffectual fire from below the bank.”
“I immediately,” adds Sir Harry Smith, “directed
the 30th native infantry to charge them, which
502they were able to do upon their left flank, while in
a line in rear of the village. This native corps
nobly obeyed my orders, and rushed among the
Avitabile troops, driving them from under the
bank, and exposing them once more to the deadly
fire of twelve guns within three hundred yards.
The destruction was very great, as may be supposed,
by guns served as these were. Her Majesty’s 53rd
moved forward in support of the 30th native
infantry, by the right of the village. The battle
was won; our troops advancing with the most
perfect order to the common focus, the passage of
the river. The enemy, completely hemmed in,
were flying from our fire, and precipitating themselves
in disordered masses into the ford and boats,
in the utmost confusion and consternation. Our
8–inch howitzers soon began to play upon their
boats, when the ‘debris’ of the Sikh army appeared
upon the opposite and high bank of the river, flying in
every direction, although a sort of line was
attempted, to countenance their retreat, until all
our guns commenced a furious cannonade, when
they quickly receded. Nine guns were on the
verge of the river by the ford. It appears as if
they had been unlimbered to cover the ford.
503These, being loaded, were fired once upon our
advance. Two others were sticking in the river;
one of them we got out; two were seen to sink in
the quicksands; two were dragged to the opposite
bank, and abandoned. These and the one in the
middle of the river were gallantly spiked by
Lieutenant Holmes, of the 11th irregular cavalry,
and Gunner Scott, of the 1st troop 2nd brigade
horse-artillery, who rode into the stream, and
crossed for the purpose, covered by our guns and
light infantry.”
The highest praise has been bestowed by Sir
Harry Smith on the artillery, for its conduct
throughout these operations,—“The guns literally
being,” he says, “constantly ahead of everything.”
“I would beg,” he continues, in his despatch to
the Commander-in-Chief, “to call his Excellency’s
marked attention to Major Lawrenson, commanding
the artillery; in Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander,
Captain Turton, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, the
service has officers of the very first order; and I
am equally satisfied with Captain Boileau, in
command of the 9–pounder battery, and with
Lieutenant Mill, in charge of four light guns. The
two 8–inch howitzers did right good service,
504organized, equipped, and brought into the field
by the exertions and determination to overcome all
difficulties of Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, equally
well served and brought forward always with the
infantry by Lieutenant Austen.” Lieutenant Tombs,
who was present as acting aide-de-camp to the general,
also received the thanks of Sir Harry Smith.
In this engagement the artillery lost 3 men and
30 horses, killed; 15 men and 9 horses, wounded;
5 men and 12 horses, missing.
We come now to the crowning action of Sobraon.
It was on the night of the 7th of February that the
long-expected siege-train arrived from Delhi, with
four companies of foot-artillery, under the command
of Lieutenant-Colonel Wood. The Commander-in-Chief,
overjoyed by this accession to his strength,
determined upon the immediate attack of the
enemy’s intrenched position. But short time was
allowed to the artillery to prepare ammunition for
the heavy ordnance. On the 8th, the artillery,
which had been detached with Sir Harry Smith,
rejoined head-quarters: on the 9th, the plan of
operations was sketched out for the following day.
A little before midnight the heavy ordnance moved
out of camp to the advanced position of Rodawallah,
505there to be joined by Brigadier Ashburnham’s
brigade of infantry, to which was added the 62nd
foot, which, owing to some mistake, did not reach
that post till near gun-fire. The following account
of the Sikh intrenchments and of the plan of attack
is taken from the Calcutta Review:—
“The Sikhs had taken up one of the falsest
positions possible; viz. with their rear resting on
the Sutlej; yet, by dint of much labour, some
foreign science, and the ingenuity natural to a
military people, they contrived to convert it into
one of the strongest fortifications against which
troops were ever led;—being nothing less than a
series of vast semicircular intrenchments, the outer
one of which was two miles and a half from end to
end, and three quarters of a mile in depth; the
whole surrounded by a deep ditch and ‘bristling’
with sixty-seven pieces of artillery. A bridge of
boats united this formidable camp to another on
the opposite bank of the Sutlej; where also were
planted some heavy guns, whose range swept easily
across the river.
“Sir Hugh Gough’s plan of attack was as follows:—The
heavy guns were to commence operations
by a cannonade upon the intrenchment, into which,
506crowded as it was with upwards of 30,000 men,
their fire was expected to carry confusion and dismay.
Sir Robert Dick’s division, on the extreme
left of the British line, was then to advance and
storm the right, or western corner of the Sikh
position; General Gilbert’s division on the centre,
and Sir H. Smith’s division on the right, were
simultaneously to make false attacks, with the view
of diverting the enemy’s attention from the real
attack of Sir Robert Dick. Brigadier Cureton,
with a brigade of cavalry and a troop of horse-artillery,
was directed to threaten the ford of Huríkí
Puttun, about a mile distant from the eastern
corner of the intrenchment, on the opposite bank
of which the enemy’s cavalry were posted.
“Agreeably to this plan, at about 7 o’clock A.M.,
the artillery opened; the fog rolled off as it were a
curtain, and the surprised Khalsa at once heard and
saw that the avenger had come upon them. In an
instant the Sikh drums beat to arms; and many
rounds had not been fired from the British guns
before an answering thunder from the intrenchment
told that the works were manned and the struggle
had begun.”
Owing to the delay above mentioned, it was not
507until a little after sunrise that the heavy guns were
placed in position. Opposite the enemy’s centre
was a mortar-battery, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel
Wood. On the prolongation of the
right flank of the enemy’s intrenchment, at a distance
of 1,300 yards, were placed three batteries
of heavy ordnance—six 18–pounders under command
of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrenson—six 10–inch howitzers
under Brigadier Dennis—and eight 8–inch
howitzers under Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite.
Further to the left of these batteries, and slightly
in advance, were the rockets, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Geddes; Brigadiers Biddulph and Brooke
superintended these batteries; the first on the
right, the second on the left. The attack was
commenced by Major Grant’s howitzer-troop. The
surprise was most complete. The Sikh position,
which up to this time had been wrapped in profound
silence, now became a scene of uproar and commotion.
Their drums beat to arms; and they began
to busy themselves in preparations for the engagement.
The 12–pounder reamers, manned by the
men of the 5th troop 1st brigade, under the command
of Captain Day, were the next to open.
These, after a short interval, were followed by the
508heavy batteries. Then, to use the words of the
Commander-in-Chief’s despatch, “The whole of our
artillery fire was developed. It was most spirited
and well directed. I cannot speak in terms too
high of the judicious disposition of the guns, their
admirable practice, or the activity with which the
cannonade was sustained; but notwithstanding the
formidable calibre of our iron guns, mortars, and
howitzers, and the admirable way in which they
were served, and aided by a rocket battery, it
would have been visionary to expect that they
could, within any limited time, silence the fire of
seventy pieces behind well-constructed batteries of
earth, plank, and fascines, or dislodge troops covered
either by redoubts or epaulements, or within a treble
line of trenches.”
As already mentioned, but a short time had been
allowed for the preparation of ammunition for the
heavy guns; to this and to the great distance at
which they were posted from the enemy’s works, is
to be attributed their inability to silence the
Sikh fire. But the practice both of guns and
rockets was considered highly effective. It had
been proposed by the commanding officers of
artillery, to place the guns in battery nearer the
509enemy’s intrenchments; and had this been done,
some satisfactory results might have been obtained.[103]
But the Commander-in-Chief was unwilling to
hazard the delay which the formation of the
necessary parapets would have occasioned. Hence,
at the time when Sir Robert Dick, who was on
the extreme left, was ordered to advance to the
attack, the ammunition of the heavy guns had been
well nigh expended.
“The attack,” says the writer in the Calcutta
Review, “was led by Brigadier Stacy with her
Majesty’s 10th and 53rd regiments, and the 43rd
510and 59th native infantry, supported on the flanks
by Captains Horsford’s and Fordyce’s batteries, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Lane’s troop of horse-artillery.
Beyond all comparison this was the finest attack
of the campaign. The artillery galloped up and
delivered their fire within 300 yards of the enemy’s
batteries, and the infantry charged home with the
bayonet, and carried the outworks without firing a
single round.”—“a forbearance,” says the Governor-General,
“much to be commended, and most
worthy of constant imitation.” As it was the finest
attack, so also did it meet with the most determined
hand-to-hand resistance which the Khalsa soldiers
had yet opposed to the British. Like lightning,
the real plan of the attack seemed to flash on the
minds of all the desperate men in that intrenchment;
and, disregarding the distant feints of
Gilbert’s and Smith’s divisions on their left and
centre, they rushed to the right to repel the real
danger that was upon them. In vain, Stacy’s
brigade tries to withstand the mass which every
moment is growing denser; in vain, Wilkinson’s
brigade comes up to the support; in vain, Ashburnham’s
reserve swells the furious tide of the
assault. It was like the meeting of two mighty
511rivers, one swifter and one deeper than the other;—and
as the swifter for a moment penetrates its
duller neighbour’s stream, then, yielding to the
overpowering waters, is rolled back and swept
away; so would the conquered trenches of the
Sikhs have been wrested again from the brave
division of the British, had not Sir Hugh, with the
intuitive quickness of a general’s eye, marked the
crisis and the struggle, foreseen its issue, and ordered
up Gilbert’s and Smith’s divisions to the rescue.
They advanced; the enemy beheld it, and, returning
tumultuously to the posts they had abandoned,
poured upon these new enemies, from every
foot of the intrenchment, a destructive fire of grape,
round shot, and musketry. In spite, however, of a
loss, unprecedented in so short a time,—Sir H.
Smith’s division losing 489, and General Gilbert’s
685 men, in about half an hour, these two indomitable
divisions persevered in storming what proved
to be the strongest part of the enemy’s position;
and the intrenchment being thus carried by the
British at three different points, the gunners, who
drew their swords when they could no longer fire,
were bayoneted beside the guns they had so murderously
served,—while the cavalry and infantry,
512driven from three sides into a confused and disordered
mass, but fighting to the last, were inch by
inch forced to retreat where alone retreat was
possible. Preferring death to surrender, they recklessly
plunged into the river. The bridge, of which
they were so proud, and to which they had so confidently
trusted, broke down under the first party of
flying horsemen, and became impassable; while the
Sutlej, having risen seven inches in the night, had
flooded the ford. “In their efforts to reach the
right bank,” says the graphic narrative of the Commander-in-Chief,
“through the deepened water, they
suffered from our horse-artillery a terrible carnage.[104]513Hundreds fell under this cannonade; hundreds
upon hundreds were drowned in attempting the
perilous passage. Their awful slaughter, confusion,
and dismay, were such as would have excited compassion
in the hearts of their generous conquerors,
if the Khalsa troops had not, in the earlier part of
the action, sullied their gallantry by slaughtering
and barbarously mangling every wounded soldier
whom, in the vicissitudes of attack, the fortune of
war left at their mercy.” “Sixty-seven pieces of
cannon, upwards of 200 camel swivels, numerous
standards, and vast munitions of war,” were left in
possession of the victors.
The loss of artillery in this action was not very
severe; Lieutenant Faithfull, of the 1st troop
2nd brigade, was killed by a cannon-shot. Major
514Grant was wounded in the arm. The total of
killed and wounded in the different troops and
batteries, was (killed), 1 European officer, 3 rank-and-file,
3 syces, and 17 horses; (wounded),
1 European officer, 1 sergeant, 33 rank-and-file,
5 lascars, 5 syces, and 23 horses.
The following officers were especially named
by the Commander-in-Chief:—Brigadiers Gowan,
Biddulph, Brooke, Denniss; Captain Christie,
deputy assistant adjutant-general; Captains
Pillans and Warner, commissaries of ordnance;
Lieutenant Maxwell, deputy assistant quartermaster-general;
Captains Austin, Mackenzie, and
Lieutenant Kaye, brigade majors; Lieutenant-Colonels
Wood, Huthwaite, Geddes, Alexander,
and Lane; Majors Lawrenson, Grant, Brind, and
Campbell; Captains Day, Turton, Swinley, Fordyce,
Horsford, Waller, and Lieutenant Holland.
It should be mentioned in this place, that, on the
death of Major Broadfoot, the political agent on
the north-western frontier, Major H. M. Lawrence,
of the artillery, then political agent at Catmandoo,
was summoned from Nepaul to take charge of
our relations with the Punjab, and to execute the
congenial policy of the Governor-General. The
515summons was responded to with remarkable despatch,
and, within a fortnight from its receipt, he
had joined the camp of the Governor-General. He
was present at the battle of Sobraon.
We subjoin here a complete list of the honours
conferred on the artillery:—
To be A.D.C. to the Queen:—Lieut.-Col. Gowan, C.B.
To be Lieut.-Cols.:—Majors F. Brind, G. Campbell, H. M.
Lawrence, C. Grant, and G. S. Lawrenson.
To be Majors:—Captains H. Garbett, R. Horsford, E. F.
Day, G. H. Swinley, J. Fordyce, W. S. Pillans, F. Boileau,
R. Waller, and E. Christie.
To be Companions of the Bath:—Lieut.-Cols. Biddulph,
Brooke, Denniss, Huthwaite, Geddes, Alexander, Lane, Lawrence,
and Lawrenson.
Immediately after this action, the British army
crossed the Sutlej, and marched upon Lahore.
Indeed, the firing had scarcely ceased, when the
Governor-General despatched a staff officer to
Khoondah ghaut, directing Sir John Littler to
commence the passage of the river at that point.
Captain Garbett’s troop of horse-artillery and two
native infantry regiments were ferried across the
Sutlej, and thus, both banks being in possession of
the British army, an excellent bridge of boats was
thrown across, and the passage of the river was effected
without opposition. Thus closed the first Sikh
516war—one of the most memorable and glorious in
the annals of our eastern empire. Upon the history
of the subsequent treaties, this memoir need not
enter. In April, 1846, the greater part of the
army returned to India, leaving a strong body of
troops to occupy Lahore.
CHAPTER XI. — ERRATA.
517
Kote Kangra—Use of Elephant-draught—Interval of Peace—Reassembling
of the Army—Mooltan—Ramnuggur—Chillianwallah—Fall
of Mooltan—Goojrat—Close of the Sikh War—Honours
to the Artillery—Medals—Concluding Remarks.
In accordance with the treaties entered into
with the Sikh government, the Jullundur Doab, and
the hill country immediately bordering upon it,
became a portion of the British territory. Within
the latter stood the celebrated fortress of Kote
Kangra, the killedar of which refused to deliver
up possession of the place to the British authorities,
declaring that, unless the Maharajah Runjeet
Singh himself appeared before the gates, he would
not surrender the keys. “The fort of Kangra is
one of those which is strong from its position:
it is built near the conflux of the Bub Gunja
with the Beeas; and is bounded, for the most
part, by precipices nearly perpendicular; and where
the declivities are less formidable, the aid of
518masonry has been had recourse to, so as to render
the place, in the opinion of Vigne, impregnable
under European engineers. * * * The
occupants of the fort were believed to amount to
about 500, principally Akalis, and their guns were
said to be ten in number.”[105]
It now, of course, became necessary to reduce
this fortress to subjection. Accordingly, a force,
under Colonel Wheeler, was sent against it. It
consisted of the 2nd, 11th, 41st, and 44th native
infantry, with a wing of the 63rd, and a siege-train
composed of three 18–pounder guns, two 8–inch
howitzers, and six mortars, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Wood, with Captain Swinley’s troop (3rd
troop 1st brigade), and Captain Fitzgerald’s (2nd
company 7th battalion), and Captain Christie’s
(4th company 6th battalion) batteries. The march
was one of the most arduous character. It seemed
impossible that heavy guns could be transported
up the precipitous defiles which led to the fort.
“With our heavy guns,” writes an officer of the
force, “we had to cross the river Gooj no less
than fifty-six times between the Beeas and Kote
Kangra; and the last day we crossed it, rain
519having fallen on the hills, it swelled to a roaring
torrent. Frequently the guns got completely fixed
between enormous boulders of rock, so as to defy
all the ingenuity both of artillery officers and
engineers; when the united strength of men,
horses, and bullocks, aided by two elephants
dragging had failed, one fine old mukhna (a male
elephant, with tusks like a female) was always
called for. Coming forward with an air of pitying
superiority—his look seeming to express clearly,
‘What! can’t you do it without me?’ he would
look carefully at the gun in every direction, and
when he had found the point where his power
could be best applied, he put his head to it, and
gave it a push, as if to weigh the opposition; then
followed another mightier push; and if that did
not suffice, a third, given with tremendous force,
almost invariably raised the gun out of its fixed
position, and sent it on. He would then retire
with the air of Coriolanus, when he said to Aufidius,
‘Alone I did it!’—a more valuable ally than
Coriolanus, because he said nothing, and was always
willing.” Such, indeed, were the difficulties of the
march, that the enemy, believing that our heavy
ordnance could never be brought under the walls of
520the fort, determined to hold out. The same opinion
of the impracticability of the road was entertained
by many of our own officers. “The brigadier,”
says the writer above quoted—Colonel Jack,
of the 30th native infantry—“was recommended
to leave his 18–pounders on the other side of the
river Beeas; he, however, determined to take
them on as far as possible, and, by extraordinary
management and exertion, he succeeded in taking
them all the way. They turned out, as the
Europeans quaintly remarked, to be the really
influential politicals.”
On the 25th of May this tremendous march—one
of which it has been rightly said, that it “reflects
everlasting credit on the artillery”—had been
successfully accomplished. Preparations were commenced
for the erection of batteries and the planting
of the guns in position; but siege operations
were rendered unnecessary by the unconditional
surrender of the fortress. A portion of the artillery
force, including the heavy guns, remained at Kote
Kangra throughout the greater part of the year,
being finally withdrawn in December. The return
march of the heavy ordnance was little less difficult
than the ascent; but on this, as on the former
521occasion, the elephant-draught was found to be
admirably adapted to the required service. “From
the experience of this march,” says Lieutenant
Clifford in an elaborate report, “I am satisfied, that
from their intelligence, docility, and strength, elephants
are admirably adapted for the draught of
heavy ordnance through a mountainous country;
and I doubt whether the heavy guns could possibly
have been taken up to Kangra and back without
the assistance of these animals; for though bullocks
answered sufficiently well for the draught of carts
and lighter carriages, the number requisite to move
a siege-gun could not have been used at many of
the windings and declivities met with during this
march, to say nothing of the difficulty of guiding
bullocks over narrow, dangerous roads, in which
the elephants appeared to show a sense of the
necessity of caution. Throughout the march, ten
elephants were immediately attached to the four
guns; viz. two in draught with each piece, accompanied
by two spare.”
The year 1847 was one of almost uninterrupted
tranquillity. During the first quarter of the following
year little occurred to break the quiet that
reigned in the Punjab; but in the month of April,
522affairs began to wear a more threatening aspect.
The refusal of Moolraj, the Dewan of Mooltan, to
give up that fortress to the British officers commissioned
to transfer it to the hands of another chief,
and the murder of those officers (Mr. Agnew and
Lieutenant Anderson) by the people of the garrison,
led, in the course of that year, to the celebrated
siege of that stronghold. Before, however, we
dwell upon this important event, it should be mentioned
that, in the month of May, some disturbances
having been created in the Manjha country by a
Sikh Ghooroo (Bhaee Maharaj), two guns of the
4th troop 1st brigade (which had marched from
Loodianah to Lahore early in the month), under
Lieutenant A. Bunny, accompanied the detachment
sent in pursuit of the rebels; and subsequently,
the entire troop, under Captain Murray Mackenzie,
proceeded on a similar service.
The operations of Lieutenant (now Major) Edwardes
having brought him before the walls of
Mooltan, it became matter of discussion between
the Commander-in-Chief and the Resident at Lahore
(Sir F. Currie),[106] whether a regular force should
523be sent against the fortress at that time, or delayed
to a later period. Eventually, the Resident took
upon himself the responsibility of ordering the
advance of the force; and Major-General W. S.
Whish, commandant of the Lahore division, an
old and experienced artillery officer, proceeded in
command of it.
The artillery with this force was commanded by
Major Garbett. Lieutenant J. Mill was appointed
major of brigade. The 4th troop of the 1st brigade,
under Captain Murray Mackenzie, marched down
with the Lahore column, along the left bank of the
Ravee. The 4th troop 3rd brigade, under Captain
John Anderson,marched with the Ferozepore column
along the right bank of the Sutlej. The 2nd company
2nd battalion, the 3rd and 4th companies of
the 3rd battalion, and the 6th company 7th battalion,
under the command of Major E. F. Day, went
by water down the Sutlej with the heavy ordnance.
Lieutenant Peter Christie was appointed commissary.
These details set out towards the close of
July. The land column reached Mooltan before
the end of August. On the 4th of September the
siege-train arrived. On the 5th, General Whish,
in the name of the Maharajah and the Queen of
524England, called upon the garrison to surrender.
No answer being returned to the summons, the
engineer officers were called upon to submit their
plans for the attack of the place. It was finally
determined to commence regular siege operations;
and on the morning of the 7th, the first parallel
was commenced. It had previously been in contemplation
to attempt the seizure of the place by a
coup-de-main; and on the 6th, our mortar batteries
had commenced playing on the town. On the 7th,
8th, and 9th, there was some slight skirmishing.
At daybreak on the 10th, some of our guns were
got into position, and a tolerably heavy fire was
maintained throughout that day. On the following
day orders were issued for an attack upon a position
which the enemy maintained in advance of the city.
The column named for this service was accompanied
by 4th troop 1st brigade of horse-artillery, under
Captain Mackenzie. The attack took place on the
morning of the 12th, and was highly successful,
though attended with considerable loss. Among
the officers wounded, was Lieutenant Bunny, of the
horse-artillery: General Whish had a horse shot
under him. This successful attack placed all the
defensible points on this side the city in our hands,
525and by enabling the heavy guns to be advanced to
within 600 yards of the city walls, would have considerably
shortened the operations of the siege, but
the defection of Shere Singh, which took place on
the 14th, entirely altered the aspect of affairs. This
circumstance, combined with other causes, the most
prominent of which was the numerical inefficiency
of the force employed to carry on the various duties
of the siege, embracing the formation of trenches
and batteries, the protection of the camp and lines
of ammunition, as well as the thorough investment
of the place, induced the general most unwillingly
to suspend operations until the arrival of reinforcements
should enable him to proceed with the siege.
In the meanwhile the standard of revolt had been
raised in the countries beyond the Indus, and on
the banks of the Chenab. The Sikh troops at
Bunnoo had mutinied and murdered their officers;
and Chuttur Singh, a chief of considerable note,
headed the insurrection in the Hazareh. Towards
this point the eyes of Shere Singh were directed.
He was the son of Chuttur Singh, and after his
defection, did not long remain with Moolraj, but
marched northward to join the rebels, taking with
him 5,000 men, 12 guns and howitzers, and 80
526zumbooruks. It was now no longer an isolated
case of rebellion in remote provinces. The whole
Sikh nation appeared to be rising up in arms
against us. The very troops which had been
despatched by the Durbar to assist General Whish
in his operations, had joined the insurgent force,
and it was doubtful whether we had a single friend,
Sikh or Mahomedan, in the country. It became
necessary, therefore, to take the field on a more
extended scale, and the Commander-in-Chief determined
to place himself at the head of the army.
It was thus that in vain General Whish applied
to Simla for reinforcements. All the available
troops were required for the campaign, which
appeared inevitable, on the Chenab. Accordingly
orders were sent to the Bombay Government to
afford the necessary assistance. Here for a time
we must quit that division of our army, and follow
the movements of the Commander-in-Chief.
In October, 1848, orders were issued for the
assembly of the army of the Punjab, under the
personal command of Lord Gough; Brigadier
Tennant was nominated to the command of the
artillery, with the rank of brigadier-general;
Brevet-Captain Abercrombie, adjutant of the 3rd
527brigade horse-artillery, was appointed deputy
assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant H. Tombs,
deputy assistant quartermaster-general; Captain
Hogge, commissary of ordnance, and Lieutenant
P. Christie (with General Whish at Mooltan),
deputy commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant H. A.
Olpherts was subsequently nominated aide-de-camp
to the brigadier-general. Lieutenant-Colonel
Brooke, C.B., 2nd brigade horse-artillery, and Lieutenant
C. V. Cox, his adjutant, were respectively
appointed brigadier and brigade-major of horse-artillery;
and Lieutenant-Colonel Huthwaite, C.B.,
1st brigade horse-artillery, and Lieutenant E. Kaye,
his adjutant, were nominated to the same situations
in the foot-artillery.
The artillery division was constituted as follows:
Head-quarters and 4th troop (at Mooltan) 1st
brigade horse-artillery; head-quarters and 1st, 2nd,
3rd, and 4th troops 2nd brigade horse-artillery;
head-quarters, 1st, 2nd, and 4th troops (at Mooltan)
3rd brigade horse-artillery; 1st company 1st battalion
(No. 10 horse field-battery); 3rd company 1st
battalion (No. 17 horse field-battery); 2nd company
2nd battalion (at Mooltan); 3rd and 4th companies
3rd battalion (at Mooltan); head-quarters, 1st, 2nd,
528and 4th companies 4th battalion; 2nd company 7th
battalion (No. 6 horse field-battery); 3rd company
7th battalion (No. 5 horse field-battery); and 6th
company 7th battalion (at Mooltan).
The several components of the army crossed the
river Sutlej near Ferozepore, at different times—the
majority during the month of October, or early in
November; but some of the corps and the artillery train,
with No. 6 field-battery, and some reserve
companies, did not move across the bridge till the
middle of November. Brigadier Huthwaite was
intrusted with the equipment and preparation of
the train and park, and all arrangements regarding
a plentiful supply of ammunition.
Some regiments of cavalry and troops of horse-artillery
had been early pushed forward, under command
of General Cureton; and Brigadier-General
Campbell followed him across the Ravee with his
division of infantry and some field-batteries. The
Commander-in-Chief followed with General Gilbert’s
division.
At the time that our troops crossed the frontier,
the Rajah Shere Singh was in force on both banks
of the Chenab, with his advanced parties pushed
forward to Eminabad and Goojranwallah, and occasionally
529even to the banks of the Ravee. These,
however, fell back before the advancing columns
under Brigadier-Generals Cureton and Campbell,
and the Rajah abandoned the town of Ramnuggur,
and placed the principal part of his force on the
right bank of the river, but still holding the left
with large masses of cavalry, and some smaller
bodies of infantry. The town of Ramnuggur, on
the left bank of the Chenab, is situated about two
miles from the river, from which it is divided by a
low tract of waste cander land, subject to occasional
inundation, and intersected by a few easy nullahs.
Nearly midway between the town and the river was
a small but dense grove of trees, around which
hovered the advanced bodies of the Sikh army.
On the 20th November, Brigadier-Generals Cureton
and Campbell were within an easy march of
Ramnuggur, and during the night they were joined
by the Commander-in-Chief. The following day
the first collision took place between the army
of the Punjaub and the Sikh troops under Shere
Singh. It was an unfortunate affair, which led to
the loss of some valuable lives without any corresponding
advantages to ourselves. Lord Gough was
530on the ground or in its neighbourhood, but Brigadier-General
Campbell was that day in command.
However, as the work was entirely confined to the
cavalry and horse-artillery, Brigadier Cureton was
the actual leader. It was his lordship’s wish to
drive Shere Singh completely across the river. The
Sikh cavalry were, as before mentioned, hovering
between the grove and the left bank. Our cavalry
and two troops of horse-artillery (Lane’s and Warner’s)
were pushed forward rapidly to dislodge them.
The 14th dragoons, charging inconsiderately too far
in advance, came unexpectedly upon a nullah filled
with Sikh infantry, and were received with a heavy
musketry fire, which caused them considerable loss.
Colonel Havelock and many others fell in the skirmish,
and also the brave old General Cureton. Nor
was this all; one of our troops of horse-artillery
(2nd troop 3rd brigade) advancing too close to the
river’s edge, got under a heavy fire from the enemy’s
batteries, and was compelled to retreat with the
loss of a gun, which stuck against the bank of a
nullah and could not be extricated. Such was the
unpropitious commencement of the campaign. The
Sikhs were certainly compelled to confine themselves
to the right bank, but no doubt the same
531object might have been gained without so great an
expenditure of life.
Meantime the heavy train, with No. 6 horse field-battery,
and Penny’s brigade of infantry, were
moving up as rapidly as possible. After crossing
the Ravee, the detachment diverged from the main
road for the purpose of attacking a fort of some
strength, called Jhubber, into which a rebel sirdar,
Attar Singh, had thrown a small garrison, when he
proceeded to join the camp of the sirdar. Two
guns of No. 6 field-battery, with small detachments
of infantry and irregular cavalry, proceeded in
advance against the fort, while the main body followed.
The garrison, however, refused to surrender
to the nine-pounders, and the walls were too strong
for field-pieces. It needed, however, but a sight
of the elephant-guns to induce the garrison to throw
open their gates, and yield themselves prisoners.
Some small pieces of ordnance were captured in
the fort, which, together with the neighbouring
village, were destroyed by orders from head-quarters.
On the 30th November, the heavy ordnance,
anxiously awaited by Lord Gough, joined head-quarters
at Ramnuggur, and that very night several
532pieces were placed in battery near the grove, and
also farther to the right and higher up the stream,
while Sir J. Thackwell, with nearly all the cavalry,
Campbell’s division of infantry, and three troops of
horse-artillery, and two field-batteries, marched up
the stream to find a ford whereby to effect a passage,
and so turn the enemy’s position.[107] This
Lord Gough expected could be effected about nine
miles above Ramnuggur; but Sir J. Thackwell
found himself under the necessity of moving nearly
as far as Wuzeerabad before he could effect the
passage. This of course occasioned considerable
delay.
On the 1st and 2nd there was some exchange of
shots between our batteries and those of the enemy
on the opposite bank; but the distance was too great
to allow of any effect being produced. On the
night of the second, our batteries were advanced to
within 400 yards of the river’s edge; but in the
morning it was apparent that the enemy had drawn
back a great part of his camp, though he had left some
batteries near the river, between which and ours
some desultory firing took place. In the afternoon
heavy firing was heard some few miles up the river.
533This was Thackwell, who had been attacked while
resting after several long marches.
There was nothing more than a cannonade from
either side. Shere Singh tried to dislodge Thackwell,
but could effect nothing by his fire, while, on the
other hand, he himself was soon driven from the
field by three troops of horse-artillery, 1st and 3rd
troop 2nd brigade, and 1st troop 3rd brigade, under
Huish, Christie, and Warner, and two field-batteries
(No. 5 under Captain Kinleside, and four guns of
No. 10 under Captain Austin). Thackwell made no
pursuit; being ignorant of the strength of the
enemy both in men and guns, and his own troops
being somewhat weary, he was unwilling to become
more closely engaged. The enemy suffered considerably,
but our loss was trifling, and principally in
the artillery; Captain E. G. Austin, of No. 10
heavy field-battery, was severely, and Lieutenant
J. E. Watson, of 1st troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery,
slightly wounded.
As day broke on the morning of the 4th, it was
discovered by the indefatigable General Gilbert, as
he rode from our batteries to the river’s edge, that
the enemy had entirely deserted his position. A
ford was immediately sought for, and soon discovered;
534Thackwell, reinforced from head-quarters,[108]
pursued the retreating Sikhs until they entered a
thick belt of jungle, into which he did not consider
it prudent to follow them. He accordingly encamped
at Hailah, his camp equipage and baggage
having been sent to join him from Ramnuggur.
About the 8th or 9th he was again reinforced.
The remainder of the horse-artillery, under Brigadier
Brooke, C.B., crossed the river, also No. 17
heavy field-battery under Captain Dawes, and the
1st company 4th brigade with four 18–pounders and
two 8–inch howitzers, under Captain Sir R. C.
Shakespear. Thackwell had with him now nearly
all the force; two brigades of infantry, Hearsay’s
brigade of irregular cavalry, Miles’s battery (No. 6),
and the park, being all now left at head-quarters.
His camp was formed at Hailah, in an extensive
and for the most part uncultivated plain. In his
front was the broad belt of jungle before mentioned,
which extends from the sandy ridge on the banks
of the Jhelum, some twelve or fifteen miles into
the Dooab. At the further edge of this belt lay
535Shere Singh, his left resting on Russool, at the
western extremity of the sand-ridge, his right flank
being at Futteh-shah-ke-chuck, and his back towards
the river. After the 5th December, each
force remained inactive for a considerable period,
save that the Sikhs occasionally sent small parties
of horse through the jungle, who annoyed Thackwell
by carrying off baggage, camels, &c.
On the 18th, a pontoon bridge having been constructed
across the river, head-quarters, Mountain’s
brigade of infantry, Hearsay’s of irregular cavalry
(with the exception of the 11th under Holmes, left
at Ramnuggur), and Brigadier Huthwaite and his
staff, crossed the Chenab, and were then joined by
No. 10 light field-battery under Lieutenant Robertson.
On the 1st January, the head-quarters force
moved to Janu-ke (about 1½ miles in rear of Hailah),
when the artillery train and park joined from Ramnuggur,
at which place a bridge-head had been constructed,
armed with two 24–pounders and the guns
of No. 6 heavy field-battery.
On the 9th, head-quarters force and that under
Madwell changed ground, and effected a junction at
Lussooria and Loah Tibbee, on the main road from
Lahore to Attock, and about 12 miles in advance
536of the Chenab. Here it was supposed that the force
would remain for a considerable time, and no doubt
such was the original intention; but Attock,
long defended by the gallant Herbert, fell, and
Chutter Singh was known to be in full march to join
his son, the Rajah, on the Jhelum; and Mackeson,
the Governor-General’s agent, impressed upon the
Commander-in-Chief the advisability of overthrowing
the latter before reinforced by his father. His
lordship, willing always to follow warlike counsels,
readily consented: he reviewed his army, ordered
up two corps of native infantry from Ramnuggur,
on the 12th moved through the jungle, to Dhingee,
and on the 13th fought the battle of Chillianwallah.
The strongest part of the enemy’s position was
supposed to be his left, at Russool, on the extremity
of the sand ridge, where it abuts on the river
Jhelum. The immediate neighbourhood of Dhingee
was pretty free from jungle, but along the base
of the sand ridge, and in front of the whole of the
Sikh position, it was exceedingly dense,—rendering
all military operations (especially movements of
cavalry or artillery) most difficult and hazardous;
and concealing effectually the enemy’s line. It was
Lord Gough’s original intention to attack Russool
537with his right (Gilbert’s division), while General
Campbell should operate upon Lallianwallah and
Futteh-shah-ke-chuck; but there was so much
counter advice offered to him on the night of the
12th, that he was induced to forego his intention
of attacking the enemy on the following morning.
The force, however, marched from camp on the
13th, and the line of contiguous columns at first bore
steadily down towards the enemy, the right directed
on Russool. After a time, the right was brought
more forward, so that the direction of our march
became parallel to the enemy’s line, and Lord
Gough gave orders to his quartermaster’s department
to find a suitable spot for encampment, without going
too near the enemy, and, at the same time, without
the necessity of retracing our steps towards Dhingee.
This was somewhat difficult, as the army had
just passed some villages,—Burra and Chota Oomrao,
between which and Chillianwallah there was no
water. At Chillianwallah, on a mound, or small
hillock, was the enemy’s most advanced post; of
this, however, we were not aware, till a small party
of our cavalry came upon it unexpectedly, and was
fired upon; and thus Lord Gough was forced to
fight the action on that day.
538Our cavalry (with exception of 3rd and 9th
irregulars, under Hearsay, our rear-guard) was
divided between the two extreme flanks. Gilbert’s
division formed the right wing, Campbell’s the left,
and Penny’s brigade was in reserve.
The 1st troop 2nd brigade, 3rd troop 2nd
brigade, and 2nd troop 3rd brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel
C. Grant, were with the cavalry on
the right; Captain Dawes’s, H.F.B. (No. 17), was
with Gilbert; No. 5, H.F.B., and three guns of
No. 10 (the other three guns being on rear-guard),
were, under Major Mowatt, with Campbell. The
2nd troop 2nd brigade, 4th troop 2nd brigade, and
1st troop 3rd brigade, were under Lieutenant-Colonel
Brind. The heavy guns (consisting of six
18–pounders and four 8–inch howitzers), under
Major Horsford (the respective batteries commanded
by Majors Ludlow and Sir R. C. Shakespear), were
in the centre of the line. These were all drawn by
elephants, which were, however, exchanged for
bullocks before the action commenced. Brigadiers
Brooke and Huthwaite were, with their respective
brigades, on the march, but during the action with
the Commander-in-Chief’s staff. The army moved
in line of contiguous columns of brigades, at first
539directed towards the enemy’s position, but subsequently
changing front to the left, parallel to the
Sikh line, our right towards it. As soon as the
Sikh post on the mound at Chillianwallah had been
discovered, line was formed from the columns.
The outpost was of course soon driven in; after
which, Lord Gough again changed front,—to his
right this time, so as to bring our front again
opposite the Sikh line. The army halted, arms
were piled, and the quarter-masters proceeded to
mark out ground for encampment. But the Sikhs,
determined to bring matters to an issue under
cover of the jungle, brought up some light pieces,
and fired upon us. As it was evidently impossible
to encamp within reach of their guns, which the
denseness of the jungle enabled them to move up
unobserved by us, and as we could not encamp
elsewhere from want of water, without retracing
our steps, which would have borne too much the
appearance of retreating, Lord Gough was compelled
to fight, and that, too, under peculiar disadvantages,
as he knew little or nothing of the ground in his
front, nor did the thick jungle admit of his reconnoitring.
He was forced, too, to abandon his
original plan of attacking Russool, as we had now
540got opposite their centre; the enemy, too, had
frustrated all, by moving out of their position into
the jungle in front of it.
The enemy’s position was a very extensive one,
and Lord Gough was forced to lengthen his own
line. The consequence was, that our left and right
wings were at a considerable distance apart. The
cavalry on the right was divided into two parties;
the one under Brigadier Pope comprised the 14th
dragoons, a wing of the 9th lancers, the 1st light
cavalry, and a wing of the 6th; with these were
Huish’s troop (1st troop 2nd brigade) and half of
Christie’s (3rd troop 2nd brigade), under Colonel
Grant. Further to the right, and somewhat to the
rear, so as to cover the right flank of our army,
were a wing of 9th lancers and a wing of 6th light
cavalry, with Lane’s troop (2nd troop 3rd brigade),
and half of 3rd troop 2nd brigade, under a subaltern.
To the left of Brigadier Pope was Gilbert’s division,
with Dawes’s battery; and left of these again the
heavy guns. Campbell’s division and the remaining
cavalry, with which were three troops of horse-artillery,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, were far
removed to the left, and could not be seen from the
centre of the line. The action commenced with
541the heavy guns. It would have been well had they
had the battle to themselves a little longer. They
produced soon a very considerable effect on the
enemy’s fire. In the words of the Commander-in-Chief,
“After about an hour’s fire, that of the
enemy appeared to be, if not silenced, sufficiently
disabled to justify an advance. I then ordered my
left division to advance.” Campbell soon became
closely engaged. Lord Gough then deemed it
necessary to push forward his right wing, and the
heavy guns were ordered to cease firing. The Commander-in-Chief
soon received intelligence of a great
misfortune having happened to Pennycuick’s brigade
(one of Campbell’s division)—the 24th regiment of
foot especially suffered severe loss.[109] The other
brigade, consisting of 61st foot and two native corps,
had, however, made a more successful advance.
The reserve under Penny was now ordered forward
542to support Gilbert’s division; but this consisted of
but two native regiments (one having been left on
rear-guard). Sir W. Gilbert’s division, well supported
by Dawes’s brigade, met with but little loss,
with the exception of the 30th and 56th native
infantry, which corps suffered severely. But
further on the right, Pope’s brigade of cavalry, and
the horse-artillery under Colonel Grant, were driven
back with much loss. The cavalry, it seems, had
formed line on the right of the guns, and were then
ordered to advance through the jungle. From
some unexplained causes, they had only just come
within sight of the enemy, when the brigade—notwithstanding
the efforts of the officers to stop the
movement—retreated, not, however, without loss,
for the Sikh cavalry hung closely on their heels.
Unfortunately, the men did not retreat directly to
the position from whence they had advanced, but,
obliquing, came in front of the guns (some of which
were unlimbered) and galloped through them, the
Sikhs mixed up with them, or close behind; so that
our men could not fire without slaying our own
cavalry. The consequence was, many of the
gunners were cut down at their guns, and six of the
pieces fell into the enemy’s hands (two were afterwards
543recovered by Lieutenant C. Cookworthy, of
3rd troop 2nd brigade, who, after the action, took
limbers and horses, and sought for his division).
Major Christie received several severe sword and
spear wounds, of which he died on the 15th. The
other three guns and the cavalry retreated through
the jungle, until they reached an open space, near
which stood the Chief and his staff. Here the
guns drew up, and the cavalry rallied, with the
exception of a small party, which continued its flight
as far as the field hospital, established on the mound
near Chillianwallah.
The Sikh cavalry, who had followed in pursuit,
halted at the edge of the jungle, and a few rounds
from our remaining pieces soon forced them to
retire. Colonel Lane, who commanded on the extreme
right, had also been attacked by cavalry, but
he had repulsed them with a grape fire from his
guns. Meantime our cavalry and artillery on the
left had made a successful advance, and Campbell,
at the head of the 61st foot and some native infantry,
had swept all before him, taking several
batteries. Gilbert too, in his advance, had overthrown
everything, capturing a great quantity of
ordnance. The enemy was everywhere driven
544from his ground and forced back upon his positions,
and our troops, somewhat shattered, remained in
possession of the field. But night had now come
on, and, seeing the great loss that we had met with,
the difficulty of the ground, and that our men were
weary and exhausted, the Commander-in-Chief,
after consultation with Campbell, considered it
expedient to bivouac on the edge of the jungle,
at the foot of the mound at Chillianwallah. Unfortunately,
this caused the loss of nearly all the guns
which we had taken from the enemy—most of them
were recovered by them in the night—four of our own
too, were carried off, and we secured only thirteen
of the enemy’s. Whether the Sikhs claimed the
victory, or whether it was in exultation at the
trophies gained—some colours besides the guns—or
whether it was merely to inform their friends
that they still held Russool, they fired a salute that
night from the summit of the ridge.
Our loss in this action was severe. Of the artillery,
Major Christie, as before mentioned, died of his
wounds, as also did Lieutenant Manson, of the 4th
troop 2nd brigade; Captain Dawes and 1st Lieutenant
Dundas were wounded. The total loss of
killed was 2 serjeants, 14 rank-and-file, 1 lascar and
5451 syce; wounded, 1 serjeant, 1 trumpeter, 28 rank
and file, 8 lascars, and 1 syce; missing, 2 rank and
file, and 6 syces.
The morning of the 14th set in wet and gloomy,
and the Chief then issued orders to pitch camp
upon ground marked out immediately in rear of
the mound, fronting the enemy’s position. Whatever
intentions Lord Gough may have half-formed
of resuming the attack on the 14th, the heavy fall
of rain which commenced that evening and continued
during several following days, induced him to
abandon them. He immediately set about strengthening
his position, and the sad task of collecting
and burying his dead. And so the British and
Sikh armies sat down in sight of each other, with
scarcely four miles of ground between their respective
camps.
Such was the battle of Chillianwallah; a victory,
certainly, insomuch as we remained in possession
of the field of battle; but a failure, inasmuch as
Lord Gough did not accomplish his object—to
drive Shere Singh across the Jhelum, and to completely
overthrow him before Chuttur Singh could
form a junction with his son.
A month of inactivity succeeded. Our position
546was a bad one; it covered no road, did not protect
the country in our rear, nor guard our communications;
neither did it in any way confine the enemy.
Our communication with Dhingee was exceedingly
precarious; supplies and forage, as well as water,
were scarce. We should have felt the want of the
latter severely, had it not been for several heavy
falls of rain, which filled some dry hollows. As
considerable reinforcements were in progress to
join Shere Singh, it seemed not at all improbable
that he might venture to attack us in our camp.
The Commander-in-Chief therefore strengthened
our position as much as possible. A good deal of
jungle which might conceal the enemy’s designs
was cut down; several trenches were dug in front
of the line, to afford temporary protection to picquets;
the heavy ordnance was placed in battery at
the mound to sweep all the ground in front,—and
subsequently, a square redoubt was erected to
strengthen our right flank, which approached the
sand-ridge, and was more liable to attack than any
other part. This redoubt was at first armed with
some spare field-pieces, drawn by bullocks, but
afterwards by the 3rd company 2nd brigade horse-artillery,[110]547to which Captain Kinleside, of No. 5
heavy field-battery, had been appointed—Major
Ludlow succeeding him in command of the battery.
The right flank of our camp was thrown back
nearly at right angles. In it were two troops of
horse-artillery under Colonel Grant. Fordyce’s
troop (2nd company 2nd brigade) of 9–pounders
was at the angle, and afterwards placed in a small
battery a short distance to the front. Dawes was
in the front face with Gilbert, sending out two guns
on picquet; the heavy ordnance at the mound;
No. 5, with Campbell’s division near the village;
No. 10, in rear with Penny. Beyond the village were
three troops of horse-artillery under Colonel Brooke
(when the 3rd troop 2nd brigade was removed to
the redoubts, the number with him was reduced to
two). Our left, beyond the village, was slightly
retired in an oblique direction. The park was in
rear of the mound. As the enemy became stronger
and more threatening, several changes took place.
The whole of the left was thrown back so as to
548unite the village of Mojawalla in rear of camp—with
the front face, and our right flank was also connected
with the village by a rear face—thus our
camp formed an irregular quadrilateral figure, or
rhomboid, and four pieces of heavy ordnance were
placed near Mojawalla. But it was some time
before our camp had assumed this form.
The enemy almost daily received accessions of
strength. Chuttur Singh joined the Sikh force, and
salutes were common in their camp. Reports were
frequent of their intention to attack, but little credit
was given to them. The Chief, however, considered
it prudent to be prepared; half the men, and latterly
all, were ordered to sleep in their clothes, and a
signal (three guns from the mound) was agreed
upon, at which all the troops should turn out. The
enemy occasionally made some demonstration.
Sometimes his whole line turned out, but more frequently
he brought small parties into the jungle,
below Russool, and then attacked our right wing,
which was frequently on the alert. But the Sikhs
gave us the greatest annoyance by capturing our
baggage-cattle. This they did frequently, and we
were obliged to send out very strong parties of
cavalry to protect them. Our horse-artillery, too,
549had very fatiguing work, guns being frequently
out with detachments sent to protect convoys of
grain, &c. These had to make long, harassing
marches, and latterly it became necessary to send
out parties of cavalry and horse-artillery to reconnoitre
the country in our right rear.
Thus wearily passed the time, news from Mooltan
being most anxiously looked for. At length we had
the pleasure to fire a royal salute for its capture and
to discuss the circumstances of the successful siege.
What those circumstances were, should be here
briefly recorded:—On the 26th of December the
Bombay troops joined General Whish under the
walls of Mooltan. The force now amounted to
17,000 men, with sixty-four pieces of artillery. The
time for renewed action had arrived, and Whish
was ready to commence operations. Indeed, on the
morning of the 26th, before the Bombay division
had come up, he had issued an order, expressing his
hope that within twenty-four hours after their
arrival, “all the enemy’s posts that are a requisite
preliminary to the commencement of a regular
attack on the citadel,” would be carried; and in the
course of the following day they were in our possession.
In these operations, four guns of the 4th troop
5503rd brigade of horse-artillery, under Captain Anderson,
and four guns of the 4th troop 1st brigade,
under Captain Mackenzie, were engaged; the
former with the centre column, and the latter with
the right column. On the following day Whish,
reporting these operations to the adjutant-general,
wrote, “I hope to-morrow morning to have an
8–inch mortar-battery of six pieces playing on the
citadel, at five or six hundred yards’ distance.”
On the 30th the general reported that our batteries
were in full play, and that already a shell
from a mortar, laid by Lieutenant Newall, had
exploded the principal magazine in the citadel.
Whish had been with the rocket troop at Hatrass,
when the great magazine had been blown up there,
and now he wrote that the sight of the Mooltan
explosion was “awfully grand, and precisely similar
to that at the siege of Hatrass, on the 1st of
March, 1817.” “I hope,” he added, “that the
consequence may be the same; in which case the
enemy would abandon the fort to-night; otherwise
I contemplate assaulting the city to-morrow.” The
batteries at this time in operation, as reported in
the general’s letter, were six 8–inch mortars, three
10–inch ditto, four 5½-inch ditto (opened on the
55128th), six 18–pounders (opened on the Kooneeh-Boorj),
two 8–inch mortars, two 10–inch ditto, and
two 24–pounders (with the mortars in the first line,
opened on the 29th). Five more 8–inch mortars
were then laid down.
Seldom or never in any part of the world has a
city been exposed to such a terrific shelling as the
doomed city of Mooltan. The well served ordnance
did tremendous execution upon both houses and
inhabitants; and soon the ruined streets were
choked with the mutilated bodies of the dead.
The effect was highly creditable to the skill of both
artillery and engineers. On the first day of the
new year (1849) the breaches in the city walls
appeared to be practicable, and the assault was
fixed for the following day. It was on the 2nd of
January that the city of Mooltan was carried by the
British troops. The gallantry of the infantry column,
on this occasion, will never be overlooked by the
general historian; but it does not come within the
scope of this memoir to record it. Mooltan was
carried at the point of the bayonet, but the citadel
still remained in the hands of Moolraj.
The batteries now, therefore, opened again, with
tremendous effect, on the fortress. The possession
552of the city had enabled Whish to advance his
guns, and he had erected new batteries of heavy
ordnance to bear upon the citadel. On the 7th a
battery of seven 18–pounders was completed and
armed, and a mortar battery for three 10–inch
howitzers. On the 8th a battery for six 24–pounders
and six 18–pounders was commenced. “The object
of this battery,” wrote the general, “is to keep
down the fire of the citadel opposite to it, and
eventually to breach at the north-east angle.” On
the following day a shell from the enemy’s position
ignited the seven 18–pounder battery, which was
constructed of fascines and sand-bags, and burnt it
down, in spite of every effort to extinguish the
flames. The engineers in the mean time were
sapping up to the foot of the glacis; and the enemy,
alarmed by our near approach, were thinking of
making terms for themselves. The interior of the
citadel had become a ruin; and further resistance
was, indeed, hopeless. The garrison declared that
they could no longer hold out against the terrible
shelling, which was destroying them. Moolraj was
at the last gasp. All his efforts to rally his followers
were in vain. They told him that he must either
sally out at the head of his men and cut his way
553through the besiegers, or abandon his post and trust
himself to the clemency of the victors. So the
Dewan began to sue for terms. The answer of the
British general was, that nothing would satisfy him
but an unconditional surrender. So on the morning
of the 22nd of January the garrison laid down their
arms, and Moolraj came into the British camp.
The operations had lasted nearly four weeks,
throughout which time the artillery were continually
engaged—keeping up an incessant fire of shot and
shell, from guns, howitzers, and mortars—first upon
the city, and then upon the citadel of Mooltan.
The practice is admitted to have been excellent.
It was, said General Whish, with the enthusiasm
of an old artillery officer, “the theme of admiration
with all.”[111] The officers of the Bengal division
554especially named in his official despatch were
Majors Garbett and Day; Captains Daniel, Anderson,
Master, and Mackenzie; Lieutenant Mill (brigade-major),
and Lieutenant Peter Christie (commissary
of ordnance).
The following officers were present at the siege
of Mooltan:—
Majors—H. Garbett, E. F. Day; Captains—J. H.
Daniell, J. Anderson, E. V. Master, M. Mackenzie;
Lieutenants—W. Hay, G. Moir, F. W. Swinhoe,
F. Alexander, H. Francis, R. Mecham, D. J. Newall,
A. Bunny, W. Miller, J. F. Raper, J. Thompson,
H. T. Bishop; 2nd Lieutenants—F. R. Debudé,
J. Hunter, C. T. Graham, F. C. Simons, M. C. Sankey,
J. G. Worthington, W. F. Quayles, E. W. Day;—Lieutenant
John Mill, brigade-major; Lieutenant
P. Christie, commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant W.
K. Footes, brigade quarter-master.
In the course of the operations, the casualties
in the Bengal artillery amounted to 1 European
officer (Lieutenant James Thompson), 2 havildars,
555and 10 rank and file, killed; with 4 European
officers (Lieutenants Bunny, Hunter, Sankey, and
Graham), 3 havildars, and 62 rank and file, wounded.
These include all the casualties since the raising
of the siege. Lieutenant Bunny was wounded in
September, and Lieutenant Sankey in November,
1848; the other two officers in the course of the
January siege.
Before quitting the subject of these memorable
operations, we must insert the following memorandum
of the artillery practice at Mooltan, by
Lieutenant Newall, which affords much interesting
information relative to the details of the siege:—
“During the siege of Mooltan, the Bengal artillerymen were
so few, that it was found impossible to afford a relief in the
batteries without withdrawing gunners from the troops of horse-artillery.
A relief, however, was thus effected daily between
3 and 4 P.M., which was found the most convenient hour, as it
afforded time to the relieving officer to ascertain his range, &c.
before nightfall, and to prepare and fix his ammunition for
expenditure during the night. It was convenient, also, for the
men in other respects.
“In the howitzer batteries, it was the practice to receive the
charge ready weighed out from the magazine; but in the mortar
batteries the charges were invariably weighed out in battery.
The bursting charges of all shells were received in battery ready
weighed out in small bags, and the shells were always filled by
means of a funnel, and fuzes prepared and set by means of a
fuze-bench in the battery. Live shells were never sent down to
battery from the magazine, as no advantage in point of time was
556to be gained thereby, the preparing of shells being found in the
hands of expert men to fully keep pace with the working of the
ordnance. The practice was thus rendered very much more
satisfactory, as the length of the fuze could be altered according
to circumstances; such as the variation of strength of powder,
which was found to be most dependent on the state of the
weather, and even of the ordnance, which as the day advanced
would gradually warm, contracting the dampness of the powder,
and rendering necessary an alteration in the length of fuze.
The effects of the howitzers employed in breaching was a subject
of satisfaction and astonishment to all; indeed it is doubtful
whether the natural mounds of the fort would have been practically
breached without their aid. Even against the brickwork
their effects were conspicuous. These shells, made to burst at
the moment of contact with the walls, afterwards during their
passage through the revêtement, and ultimately with a longer
fuze in the earth beyond it, would probably (against such
masonry) have alone effected practicable breaches without the
assistance of heavy guns.
“At a distance of 150 yards, both the 8–inch and 10–inch
howitzers were employed in breaching a scarp wall, part of
which was invisible from the battery, and only reached by a
plunging fire, obtained by very small charges, and succeeded
admirably. At a distance of thirty-five yards, 8–inch howitzers
were similarly employed with a charge of 8 oz., a very low
velocity being requisite to prevent the shell from burying itself
too far in the soft earth. Of the effects of the vertical fire,
nothing could have afforded a clearer proof than the ruinous
appearance presented by the interior of the fort on its surrender;
and the explosion of the great magazine, which took
place within one hour of its site being indicated to the batteries,
was a subject of congratulation to the Bengal artillery employed,
bearing testimony as it did to the accuracy of their practice.
“On the 9th January, 600 shells were fired from an 8–inch
mortar battery of six pieces in twenty-four hours, and the
mortars did not suffer. No new feature, however, presented
557itself from the employment of these pieces, nor from that of the
heavy guns, which, however, vied with the mortars and
howitzers in utility. Doubtless it is by a judicious combination
of the three that such powerful effects are produced,—but
it may be worth inquiring whether, in the siege-trains employed
against fortresses in the East, built as they generally are of old
and often crazy materials, a greater proportion of howitzers
might not be used with advantage, in cases where no particular
object exists to curtail the transport of the shells, which is
doubtless great. In addition to what has been above stated of
the effects of these most useful pieces in mining the defences and
in counter-battery, which was conspicuous throughout the siege,
it may be remarked that one shell was often found sufficient to
silence the fire from an embrasure of the enemy for a whole
day. Rack-lashing platforms were used by the Bengal artillery
throughout the siege for the guns and howitzers, and were found
to answer most satisfactorily, and the small Bengal mortar
platforms, consisting of three sleepers, upon which seven strong
planks, each four feet long, were pegged transversely, were made
up in the park, and thus taken down to the batteries, where they
were expeditiously laid, and stood the firing both of the 8–inch
and 10–inch mortars without renewal during the siege; the
only difference being, that from the 10–inch mortars other
sleepers were laid transversely beneath, to prevent the platforms
sinking.”
Having now reduced Mooltan, and captured the
Dewan, General Whish determined to move forward,
with all possible despatch, to reinforce the Commander-in-Chief.
Leaving, therefore, a British garrison
in Mooltan, he commenced his march, with
the head-quarters, on the 29th January; an advanced
brigade, with a troop of horse-artillery,
558having broken ground two days before. The main
body of the Bengal division was accompanied by a
siege-train of twelve pieces. The march which he
then accomplished, though it has been unaccountably
slurred over in the published papers, is one of
the most memorable upon record. It was not only
distinguished by the energy and rapidity which
marked the general’s movements, but by its effect
upon the issue of the entire campaign. Had not
Whish, with his leading column, reached Ramnuggur,
as he did, on the 13th of February, Shere
Singh would have ravaged the Rechna Doab, and
the campaign would have been a long and desultory
one.[112]
Whilst the troops under the Commander-in-Chief
were patiently awaiting the coming of General
Whish, which would enable them to resume the
559offensive, the enemy seemed at one time inclined to
become the assailant, but by some unaccountable
freak of madness chose to abandon his strong
position, and take to the open country. His probable
object was more readily to procure food. In
the second week of February, about half the Sikh
army changed ground to its left, and took possession
of the Khuri defile, running through the sand-ridge.
His advanced parties held Noor Jumal and Dingee,
and occasionally even the villages of Burra and Chota
Omrao, between our camp and Dingee. They were
now on both sides of us; but as our camp was now
formed, we were well prepared for an attack. On
the 11th, the signal-guns were fired, and our whole
army turned out. The enemy was threatening us
on both sides; but to our rear, his line had
advanced from Khuri, even beyond the villages of
Omrao, and could be plainly seen at the edge of
the jungle from Mojawalla. Cavalry and horse-artillery
were sent out to meet him on this side.
The former threw out a chain of videttes, which the
Sikhs did not attempt to break. It was not Shere
Singh’s object to attack us in camp, but to draw us
out into the jungle. After a demonstration of about
four hours, the Sikhs withdrew into their camps.
560Early on the morning of the 12th, it was discovered,
to our surprise, that the enemy had abandoned
his position at Russool. His rear-guard was
then quickly leaving the sand-ridge. On the
13th, he withdrew also from Khuri. At first we
were rather perplexed to ascertain in what direction
he had proceeded, but it was soon ascertained that
his march was towards Goojerat. Thus he had
completely turned our right flank, and our remaining
at Chillianwallah was consequently no longer
prudent; but, on the contrary, there was the utmost
need that we should make a corresponding movement,
as it seemed to be the design of the enemy
to cross the Chenab, and march straight upon
Lahore. Luckily this was frustrated. On the
15th, the army marched to Lussooria, which we
had so fruitlessly quitted only a month before.
From this it had been intended to cross the river
at Ramnuggur, and endeavour to outstrip the
enemy in the race to Lahore. But, fortunately,
General Whish had now reached Ramnuggur, and,
seeing the danger, should the enemy be able to
cross the Chenab, he pushed forward the 53rd foot
(which had come out from Lahore), with two guns
of No. 6 field-battery, and some other troops, to
561guard the fords near Wuzeerabad, and Markham’s
brigade, with two guns of 4th troop 3rd brigade
horse-artillery,—those lower down. Thus Shere
Singh was foiled, and his army remained encamped
near the town of Goojrat, the centre of a richly-cultivated
province.
From Lussooria our army moved towards the
enemy, slowly, to enable the Mooltan troops to join.
On the 16th, they marched to Sadoolapore; on the
17th, to Kunjur; and after a halt, they reached
Shahdiwaol on the 20th. By this time all Whish’s
force had joined, except Markham’s brigade, and two
guns—4th troop 3rd brigade—watching the fords.
The brigade, however, crossed before the action.
The accession of strength in artillery which
Whish brought us, was as follows:—4th troop 1st
brigade horse-artillery, under Captain M. Mackenzie;
4th troop 3rd brigade horse-artillery (2 guns absent),
under Captain J. Anderson; a troop of horse-artillery
of the Bombay army (the horse field-battery of
Bombay was on rear-guard duty), and four 18–pounders,
and four 10–inch howitzers, under Major
Day.
Our march from Lussooria had been through most
beautiful cultivation. We had marched in a line
562of contiguous columns, encamping in the same
order.
On the 21st, our artillery was thus disposed:—On
the extreme right, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Grant, Warner’s troop, 1st troop 3rd brigade
(attached to Lockwood’s cavalry brigade), with
Whish’s division; Mackenzie’s and Anderson’s troops,
under Major H. Garbett, with Gilbert’s division;
Fordyce’s troop, and Dawes’s battery.
In the centre, Major Horsford; four 18–pounders
and two 8–inch howitzers, under Major Sir R. Shakespear;
two 18–pounders, and two 8–inch howitzers,
under Captain J. D. Shakespear.
Major Day; two 18–pounders and two 8–inch
howitzers, under Captain Master; two 18–pounders,
and two 8–inch howitzers under Captain Austin.
On their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind,
Kinleside’s and Lane’s troops, with Campbell’s
division—No. 5 (Major Ludlow’s), and 10 (under
Lieutenant Robertson), horse field-battery, commanded
by Major Mowatt, with the cavalry on the
extreme left,—Huish’s and Duncan’s troops.
This time we had everything in our favour—a
beautiful, level, open country, with no obstructions,
a richly-cultivated plain, dotted with a few villages
563and trees. It was a bright sunny day: before nine
the action was commenced. The enemy’s camp
was close to Goojrat, but he moved out about a
mile to oppose us, occupying the villages of Burra
and Chota Kalrha, in front of his centre and left.
But we were not aware at first that he had any
troops in them. As soon as he perceived our line,
he fired three signal-guns. Our line then halted,
while the Commander-in-Chief reconnoitred and
made his dispositions. But little delay was, however,
necessary—all was so clear—and we had marched
from camp in battle order. The action soon commenced.
“At half-past seven o’clock,” says the Commander-in-Chief,
in his official despatch, “the army
advanced with the precision of a parade movement.
The enemy opened their fire at a very long distance,
which exposed to my artillery both the position and
range of their guns. I halted the infantry just out
of fire, and advanced the whole of my artillery,
covered by skirmishers. The cannonade now opened
upon the enemy was the most magnificent I ever
witnessed.[113] The Sikh guns were served with
564their accustomed rapidity; and the enemy well and
resolutely maintained its position. But the terrific
force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate
resistance, to fall back.”
In his despatch to the Commander-in-Chief,
General Gilbert says,—“Having received orders
to push forward my light troops, to force the enemy
to show their position, I immediately advanced a
troop of horse-artillery (Fordyce’s), and Dawes’s
field-battery, which constantly drew a very heavy
and well-directed fire from two large batteries which
the enemy had established on either side of the
village of Kalrha, by which they were nearly
screened from the fire of our guns, which, with the
light companies, were still further pushed forward.
The heavy guns on our centre at this time opened
a very destructive fire.”
Of the artillery with his division, General Whish
observes,—“Both troops (Anderson’s and Mackenzie’s)
began a spirited cannonade, and continued
it for about three hours, at the rate of forty rounds
565per gun per hour, until the enemy’s guns in our
front were silenced.”
Nos. 5 and 10, light field-batteries, were attached
to the infantry division, under General Campbell.
Of these, the General writes:—“I cannot find
language to express my sense of the calm, steady,
and admirable manner in which these two batteries
were commanded and worked by Major Mowatt,
the commanding officer, and by Major Ludlow, and
Lieutenant Robertson. The infantry of the 3rd
division had not occasion to fire a shot. The enemy
were driven from their different positions, and from
the field, by the fire of these two field-batteries,
aided by that of the Bombay troop.”
In the meanwhile, Huish’s and Duncan’s troops
on the left, and Warner’s on the right, acted in
conjunction with the cavalry on our flanks. Of
the former, General Thackwell thus writes:—“To
oppose the enemy’s guns, I ordered Captain Duncan
to move his troop of horse-artillery to the front,
which he did in good style, and opened his fire
within 500 or 600 yards. This movement was followed
by the advance of Captain Huish’s troop, and
both did considerable execution upon the enemy.
These troops [the Scinde Horse and a
566squadron of the 9th Lancers] made a most brilliant
charge upon the enemy. At the same time I advanced
the guns and cavalry towards the enemy’s
line. The fire of the guns soon put the Gowcherras
to retreat, and the glorious charge of the troops on
the right, caused their whole force to seek safety in
flight.” Brigadier Lockwood says:—“At the commencement
of the action, I directed Captain
Warner to open his fire upon a large body of the
enemy near a village in our front. But as they
returned a heavy fire within accurate range, I
changed position, left back, and the horse-artillery
ceased firing. The enemy’s horsemen now appeared
in great force on our right, threatening to turn our
flank. So I changed front to the right. Captain
Warner’s guns opened with great effect upon the
horsemen, and turned them; but they only retired
a short distance, and then a regiment of their
regular cavalry moved round by a circuitous route
and got completely into our rear. I immediately
detached towards them three guns, with a squadron
of the 16th dragoons, who, in conjunction with
Major Christie’s corps of irregular cavalry, drove
them off. About this time a large gole of horse
came on towards me, but as they turned at once
567from the fire of the guns, I refrained from advancing
after them.”
The two troops of horse-artillery under Lieut.-Colonel
Brind were in reserve at the commencement
of the action, but soon afterwards were brought
to the front, for the purpose of enfilading one of the
enemy’s batteries.
After detailing the attacks on the villages of
Burra and Chota Kalrha, which were taken in the
most spirited manner by Brigadiers Penney and
Hervey, Lord Gough continues, in his published
despatch: “The heavy artillery continued to advance
with extraordinary celerity, taking up successive
forward positions, driving the enemy from those
they had retired to, whilst the rapid advance and
beautiful fire of the horse-artillery and light field-batteries,
which I strengthened, by bringing to the
front the two reserved troops of horse-artillery
under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind (Brigadier Brooke
having the general superintendence of the whole of
the horse-artillery), broke the ranks of the enemy at
all points.”
The battle was now over, and the pursuit commenced,
the whole of the horse-artillery accompanying.
The action was almost entirely an artillery
568fight. For about two hours and a half that arm
alone was engaged. It was before the terrible fire
of eighty-eight guns that the Sikh army abandoned
the field.
In his official despatch, the Commander-in-Chief
thus writes:—“To Brigadier-General Tennant,
commanding that splendid arm, the artillery, to
whose irresistible power I am mainly indebted for
the glorious victory of Goojrat, I am indeed most
grateful. Conspicuous as the artillery has ever
proved itself, never was its superiority over the
enemy, its irresistible and annihilating power, more
truthfully shown than in this battle. The heavy
batteries manœuvred with the celerity of light guns;
and the rapid advance, the scientific and judicious
selection of points of attack, the effective and well-directed
fire of the troops of horse-artillery and
light field-batteries merit my warmest praise.”
At the two villages alone were the infantry
seriously engaged. Penney’s (late Godby’s) and
Hervey’s brigades were sent to take them, and
were somewhat surprised to find them occupied by
some considerable parties. Our left wing scarcely
fired a shot. The cavalry was hardly engaged at
569all. The Scinde horse made one charge. All the
horse-artillery suffered severely, especially the 4th
troop 1st brigade, the 2nd troop 2nd brigade, and
the 4th troop 3rd brigade. Captain Anderson, of
the last-mentioned troop, was killed, as was also
Lieutenant Day, of No. 10 horse field-battery.
The artillery loss was greater than that of any
other branch in proportion to its numbers.
The artillery division lost in killed, 2 officers,
1 sergeant, 20 rank and file, 2 lascars, 1 syce-driver,
and 3 syces; wounded, 1 European officer
(Sir Richard Shakespear), 1 native officer, 4 sergeants,
two trumpeters, 50 rank and file, 10 lascars,
8 syce-drivers, and 7 syces: total, killed and
wounded, 111.
The enemy did not attempt to rally at the town
of Goojrat, as it was supposed they would, but fled
precipitately at once, leaving camp, baggage, and
a vast quantity of material and artillery in the
hands of the victors. It was almost to be regretted
that they did not wait on their ground a little
longer; their loss, except in the two villages, was
from the artillery alone, and they suffered but
little that afternoon in the pursuit.
570The broken Sikh army fled across the Jhelum,
with a few hundred Afghan cavalry, who had left
their mountains, hoping for some opportunity to
avenge themselves on their old enemies. Sir W.
Gilbert, with two divisions of infantry, and cavalry,
and artillery, was ordered in pursuit.
The artillery branch consisted of the 2nd troop
2nd brigade and the 4th troop 2nd brigade horse-artillery,
Blood’s troop horse-artillery, Dawes’s
horse-battery, the Bombay horse brigade, and four
reserve companies, with a well-equipped train,
adapted to elephant-draught, the whole under
Brigadier Huthwaite, C.B., with Brigade-Major
Kaye as his staff officer. The brilliant success which
attended Gilbert’s rapid pursuit is well known. No
further opportunity was given to our troops to gain
distinction in the field. The march was an arduous
one, the country most difficult, especially for heavy
ordnance; but perseverance overcame all. The
Sikhs soon saw the futility of further opposition;
the sirdars surrendered,—their army was disarmed,
and disbanded at Hoormuch and Rawul-pindee,—and
Gilbert drove the Afghans across the Attock,
and into the rugged mountains of the Khyber;
and thus ended the second Sikh war.
571The under-named artillery officers were mentioned
in general orders:—
Major-General Whish, C.B.; Brigadier-General Tennant;
Lieutenant Olpherts, A.D.C.; Captain Abercrombie, D.A.A.G.A.;
Brigadiers Brooke, C.B., and Huthwaite, C.B.; Brigade Majors
Kaye and Cox; Captain Hogge, commissary, and
Lieutenant Christie, deputy-commissary of ordnance; Lieutenant-Colonel
Grant; Majors Garbett, Horsford, Day; Lieutenant-Colonel
Brind; Major Mowatt; Lieutenant-Colonel
Lane, C.B.; Majors Ludlow, Fordyce; Captains J. D. Shakespear,
F. K. Duncan, L. P. Master, R. R. Kinleside, A. Huish,
Major Sir R. Shakespear; Captains E. G. Austen, M. Mackenzie,
W. K. Warner, M. Dawes; Lieutenants A. Robertson,
H. Tombs (deputy assistant quartermaster-general), E. B.
Johnson (deputy judge-advocate-general).
The following honorary distinctions were conferred:—
To be a Knight-Commander of the Bath.—Major-General
Whish.
To be Commanders of the Bath.—Colonel Tennant, Lieutenant-Colonels
Grant, Brind.
To be Lieutenant-Colonels.—Majors Garbett, Horsford,
Day, Mowatt, Ludlow, Fordyce, Sir R. Shakespear.
To be Majors.—Captains J. D. Shakespear, Duncan, Master,
Kinleside, Huish, Austen, Mackenzie, Warner, Dawes, Hogge,
Abercrombie.
Also to be Majors on promotion to Captains regimentally.—Lieutenant
E. Kaye, C. V. Cox, A. Robertson, P. Christie,
H. A. Olpherts, H. Tombs, E. B. Johnson.
Brigadier-General Tennant was subsequently
created a K.C.B.
572In commemoration of the victories of the Punjab,
a medal was struck, of which the following is a
transcript:—
A vote of thanks was passed by both Houses of
Parliament and by the Court of Proprietors to the
armies engaged in these operations, and the eminent
services of General Whish and Brigadier Tennant,
of the artillery, were especially named. To the
splendid working of the artillery the highest military
authorities in the country mainly attributed
the brilliant termination of the war: and we know
not how this record of the services of the corps
can be more fitly brought to a close than with the
following well-merited tribute paid to the artillery
by Lord Hardinge in the House of Lords, on the
24th of April, 1849:—
573“It was, it appeared, to the skilful employment
of the artillery that they were indebted for this
victory; and great as the result had been with so
small a loss of men, he (Viscount Hardinge) felt
that that arm of the service was most admirably
conducted on that occasion. This argued most
admirable conduct on the part of the artillery;
and it would appear, by most of the accounts
received, that so effectually had this arm of the
service been employed, that the Sikh artillery,
though managed as usual with great bravery, was,
notwithstanding all their efforts, perfectly silenced;
so that it was not necessary for the British
infantry to fire in line, with the exception of
two regiments of Europeans and four regiments
of Native Infantry. With the exception of those
regiments, not a regiment of their infantry fired
a musket-shot, so considerable was the service
rendered by the Indian artillery. That force was
certainly a most splendid one, and second he would
say to none; and it had been mainly instrumental
in obtaining for Lord Gough one of his best and
most splendid triumphs. The statement made by
his Lordship, in his despatch, was, that the heavy
artillery—eighteen-pounders—were actually manœuvred
574and handled with the facility of field-guns.
He (Viscount Hardinge) had seen the same thing
done with those eighteen-pounders during the campaign
of the Sutlej. Two elephants were harnessed
to each eighteen-pounder, and they carried the guns
with the greatest facility over every sort of ground
without any assistance and without causing any
delay or impediment to the infantry. That practice
was first resorted to in the campaign of 1846, when
the heavy guns were brought up from Delhi, a
distance of 300 miles, and were carried on every
occasion without any trouble, and he believed that
had never before been seen in India. The able
officer who commanded the artillery in the late
battle had been mentioned,—he referred to Brigadier-General
Tennant, who had been so much
praised by Lord Gough; and he (Viscount Hardinge)
wished to say that he had the honour of
knowing him, and he was ably seconded by another
excellent officer. Seeing the great importance of
artillery in modern warfare, and seeing, also, that
its value had been so signally manifested in India,
he would remind their Lordships at the same time
that a committee was sitting elsewhere to investigate
the state of the Ordnance Department; and he
575trusted that their Lordships would not allow that
valuable arm of the service, which took so much
time to create, and which when created was so
valuable, to be reduced below a scale of proper
strength and efficiency. In Bengal alone, the regular
army had 200 pieces of artillery ready to be
moved, comprising 120 nine-pounders, and the remainder
three and six-pounders, and that was exclusive
of all the artillery that belonged to local
and irregular corps. Besides that, there was during
the campaign more than 100 pieces of heavy artillery,
of eighteen and twenty-four pounders, actually
on the Sutlej, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition per
gun. They were all complete and ready for action,
and all that was required was the actual necessity
for their movement. That was a state of readiness
that was very much to be admired, and he hoped
they would never consent to cripple that noble arm
of their service.”
Note to page 435.—It is stated at page 435, that a monumental
column was raised (at Dum-Dum) to the memory of
Captain Nicholl and the officers and men of the 1st troop
1st brigade, who perished so gloriously on the retreat from
576Caubul. As this sheet is going through the press, I learn that
the column has been blown down during a typhaun, and that it
is the intention of the regiment not to restore it, but to place, in
its stead, a monumental slab in the Dum-Dum church. I trust
that I shall be pardoned for saying that I believe such a resolution,
if carried into effect, will be greatly regretted by many of
the relatives of the brave men to whom the column was dedicated,
and by some, at least, of the original promoters of the
testimonial.—Editor.
In the preface, page x, line 4, for “Sikhs crossed the Punjab,” read
“Sikhs crossed the Sutlej.”
Page 130, line 8 from bottom (Colonel Deare’s Epitaph), for “Royal
Artillery,” read “Bengal Artillery.”
Page 371, line 8, for “G. R. MacGregor,” read “R. G. MacGregor.”
Page 409, last line of text, for “Walrek,” read “Walker.”
2. There were probably some perquisites or other sources of
emolument.
3. The following was copied from an inscription in charcoal,
on the wall of a small mosque on the declivity of a hill, about a
mile from Chunar, and the same distance from the Ganges, in
October, 1780:—
“This is the place of confinement of Ann Wood, wife to
Lieutenant John Wood, taken prisoner by Jaffir Beg, Commandant
to Sir Roger Dowler, taken out of the house at Calcutta
where so many unhappy gentlemen suffered; the said Jaffir
Beg obtained promotion of Segour Dowler for his long service,
Fouzdar of Chunar Gur.”
“I, Alexander Campbell, was taken, along with the unfortunate
lady, at eleven years old, by the same persons who afterwards
made me an eunuch; my only employment was to attend
this lady, which I did in this place four years. 1762, May 3rd,
the said Jaffir Beg sent to acquaint the lady that if she did not
consent to live with him the 4th of the said month, she should
be strangled, and by my hands. The 3rd, at midnight, we
jumped out of this window and got to the river side, where I hired
boat for fifty gold rupees, to carry us safe to Chinsurah, where
we arrived on the 11th. The first news we heard was that
Lieutenant Wood died for grief; soon as she heard this, she fell
sick, and died the 27th of the month.”
“Mr. Drake behaved with the greatest imprudence, he did
deserve to be shot! shot! shot!
“Alexander Campbell, I am now in Dowlah’s service.”
“N.B.—Mrs. Wood’s apartment, and which is all the house
consists of, is 9 feet 5 inches by 8 feet 9 inches, and 7 feet
9 inches high; the window, 18 inches.”
“Mrs. Bowers was a young woman, and inhabitant of Calcutta
when it was taken by the Moors in the year ——, where
upwards of —— British subjects were confined in the dungeon;
she concealed herself until night in one of the warehouses in the
factory, from whence she made her escape on board a small
vessel lying in the river opposite the old fort.”—Hickey’s Gazette,
1780.
Neither of these names is mentioned by Holwell.
4. It is probable that Captain (afterwards Sir R.) Barker was
in this vessel; he was transferred from the Royal to the Bengal
Artillery, but appears to have been employed in line commands,
and never to have joined the regiment.
5. This man was afterwards a member of council, and a bitter
opponent of Clive.
6. This was rather a detachment of Royal, Bombay, and Bengal
Artillery; Lieutenants Winwood and Kinch, of the Bengal
Artillery, seem to have been with it, but nothing very distinct
can be ascertained.
8. His real name was Walter Reinhart,
but he was called Sombre from the darkness
of his countenance, and this was easily
changed into Sumroo. Franklyn says:—“Major
Polier, at Delhi, to Colonel Ironside,
at Belgaum, in May, 1776, writes—‘His
name is Balthazar ——; the rest I have
forgot. Sombre is ‘son nomme de guerre.’
He is a deserter of ours; he enlisted at
Calcutta before the taking of the place, I
think, in one of the Swiss companies, commanded
by a young officer, I suppose
Vussarot or Ziegler, and deserted shortly
after. This anecdote is not generally
known, and might serve, should he ever
fall into our hands, for a valid plea to
hang him, which could not well be done
otherwise without straining a point, as
he certainly only executed the commands
of his infamous master, and his life
might have been endangered by non-compliance.’”
9. Six subalterns of artillery, including a commissary and
adjutant, appear to have perished: Lieutenants Hockler,
J. Brown, Deckers, Perry, Adamson, and J. Read.
10. This was not the battle of Korah, for which the 1st and 10th
regiments of N. I. wear an honorary distinction; that took place
in 1778, between the English and some of the Nawab’s troops,
on their being disbanded.
12. In consequence of this want, the recent mutiny and perhaps
the inefficiency of some of the officers of the corps. Russell,
Baillie, and Thelwall came into the corps from Madras; Rosat
and Burnett from H.M.S. Folly, from Bencoolen.
13. With a staff of 1 surveyor of stores, 1 regimental adjutant,
5 adjutants and quarter-masters, and 12 conductors.
20. Lieutenant F. W. Grand was a younger brother of the Mr.
Grand whose name is connected with Sir Philip Francis, from
the latter having seduced his wife, who afterwards was married
to Talleyrand. Lieut. G. commanded two 6–pounders attached
to the two companies of Popham’s regiment acting as a bodyguard
to Hastings.
Lieutenant Sand probably commanded two guns with the
remaining companies of the wing of the regiment.
21. The Governor-General noticed Lieutenant Baillie’s conduct
in General Orders of 8th September and 19th October, 1781;
on the latter occasion the order says: “The strong recommendation
which Major Crabb has given Lieutenant Fw. Baillie for
his distinguished attention and activity in the management of
the artillery under his charge, affords the Governor-General a
second occasion of acknowledging the services of that officer on
the same campaign, and publishing his thanks for it.”
23. Captains Mayaffre and J. Hill,§ Lieutenants Gillespie§ and
B. Bruce,§ Lieutenant Fireworkers E. F. Baillie, H. Balfour,
W. Shipton,§ J. E. Grand, R. Sands.§
27. Four 18–pounders, eight 12–pounders, twenty 6–pounders,
two 3–pounders, and two 5½-inch howitzers.
28. In the Calcutta burying-ground is a tomb to the memory
of Lieut.-Colonel and Mrs. Deare. She died a few days before
him. The inscription on the tomb is as follows:—
HERE REST THE REMAINS OF
Mrs. CATHERINE DEARE,
WHO DIED AT CALCUTTA 6TH SEPT. 1791,
AGED XXXIV YEARS:
IN MEMORY OF HER AND HER HUSBAND,
LIEUT.-COLONEL CHARLES RUSSELL DEARE,
WHO FELL BY A CANNON-SHOT ON THE 13TH OF THE SAME MONTH,
WHILE COMMANDING THE BENGAL ARTILLERY,
IN AN ACTION FOUGHT
BETWEEN A DETACHMENT OF THE BRITISH FORCES
AND THOSE OF TIPPOO SULTAN,
NEAR SATTIMUNGULUM,
AGED XL YEARS.
THIS MONUMENT WAS ERECTED BY HIS BROTHER,
COLONEL GEORGE DEARE.
29. Among them two brass 6–pounders which had been lost at
Sattimungalum.
30. Lieutenants Douglas, Hinde, Dowell, Tulloh, and Humphrays.
32. Major Woodburne and Captain Howell going away, were
succeeded by Captains Barton and Rattray.
33. A letter from Colonel Green to the Secretary of the
Military Board, July, 1801, says, “As the two 6–pounders, with
brass cheeks, the Board were pleased to direct the agent to make
up for the service of the horse artillery experiment, carrying on
under my control, to replace those sent to Egypt, will take some
time, &c.” These carriages were proved by Major Wittit, when
ready, and some alterations suggested. It is probable some mistake
between brass and iron has crept into the report from which
the extract was taken, or else both brass and iron were tried.
34. At this time serge had not been introduced it is supposed,
and cartridges were made of paper—that now called cannon-cartridge,
or packing.
35. Another was a crutch in which to receive the needle.
36. So great had been the alarm at one time, excited by the
desperate projects (of some officers), that Sir John Murray, the
commandant of Fort William, without communicating his precautionary
proceedings to the Governor-General, placed the
fortress in a state of defence, relying on the unshaken steadiness
of the artillery; (Life of Lord Teignmouth, vol. i. p. 351) ...
and but for the firmness of the artillery at Calcutta, and the
manly resistance of several officers at Cawnpore, the army would
have dictated to the Government their own terms.—Idem,
L. M. to Lord C., p. 371.
39. The lascars can scarcely be called artillerymen; it is true
that they fill certain numbers at the gun, but the greater portion
were employed on the drag-ropes.
45. His brother was one of the council of revenue at Dinagepoor
in 1766.
46. There is some unaccountable error in the above. Goddard
left Culpee in May, 1778, with Leslie’s force. He was employed
in 1781 at the Bhoreghat against the Mahrattas, who may have
been mistaken for Rohillas. The detachment with Sir Eyre
Coote sailed from Calcutta in October, 1780. Montague appears
on the returns of one of these companies, but from the circumstantial
account of his wound, we must suppose he went round
and joined Goddard, and returned in the end of 1781. The
regimental returns are blank from July 1780 to April 1781,
and the companies absent on service are not included till their
return. We had thought that Lieutenant Montague was quarter-master
to the artillery in 1781.—E. B.
47. The following conversation took place between the deputy
adjutant-general and Major Montague as the latter passed headquarters
on his march: “Lord C. has it in contemplation to give
Colonel Smith the command of the artillery to be employed
against Severn-droog, and he wishes to know if that circumstance
will be any impediment to your exertions.” The major
replied, “that he did not expect to take the command; that his
only wish was to be employed, and that his lordship might rely
on his utmost exertions for the public service under Smith.”
The deputy adjutant-general did not think that answer sufficiently
explicit; and said, “Lord C. wished to know whether
Major M. could act with more effect when independent of
Colonel Smith, than when under his command?” The major
answered, “that he could certainly carry a plan of his own into
execution in the same time that it would require to suggest and
explain it to another.” The deputy adjutant-general therefore
concluded that Major M.’s real opinion was that he should prefer
to conduct the business by himself, and informed him that his
lordship was disposed to give Colonel Smith an opportunity of
knocking down the walls of the place where he had been so long
confined in a former war; but as it might be attended with
some risk to the service, he was at length determined to
appoint Major M. to command and conduct the artillery against
that important place, as the capture of it was absolutely necessary
to the further progress of the campaign.
48. He married a Miss Fleetwood at Masulipatam in 1792,
when on his return to Bengal from the first campaign against
Tippoo.
49. The note in a former page may serve to explain this
neglect, as the commanding officer of artillery was the same
Colonel Smith to whom he had been preferred at Severn-droog.
50. Minute by Governor-General, January 19, 1800.—“The
conduct of the artillery and lascars attached to the regiment
during the time of its absence from these provinces is equally
entitled to commendation.”
51. Captain Humphreys at the time of the massacre was seized
by a junior assistant surgeon who rolled with him down the
steep where the dead were flung; they remained concealed three
or four days, but being discovered were taken before the king
and separately confined.
52. On the march from Rosetta to Alexandria the axletree of
one of the limbers broke, and for want of a forge-cart the
detachment was detained eighteen hours on the desert without
water or provisions; had a forge-cart been there, two hours would
have sufficed.—Captain Brown to Colonel Green, 2nd April, 1803.
53. Returned to India on sick certificate September, 1801.—Letter
from Military Board to Military Secretary, 26th September,
1801.
54. The uniform at this time consisted of the bearskin cap,
long coat, with scarlet facings and embroidered button-holes,
and grey trowsers with a red cord down the seam.
55. English 516, Irish 484, Scotch 74, Welsh 19, Foreigners
211, no description 32.
56. Letter of John Duncan, 10th November, 1802, to Supreme
Government.
57. Lieutenant Mathews was appointed fort adjutant at Agra
the following year, and afterwards deputy commissary of ordnance
at Futteygurh, and on his promotion to a captaincy was
retained. “At the particular recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief,
in consideration of the peculiar services of
Lieutenant Mathews, who lost his leg and thigh in the battle of
Delhi, the Governor-General is pleased to determine that Captain
Mathews shall be exempted from the operation of the
General Orders of 14th November, declaring the situation of
deputy commissary of ordnance to be incompatible with the rank
of regimental captain.”
“This exemption is admitted as a mark of attention and
indulgence to a deserving officer, who has suffered severely in
the execution of his duty on active service against the enemy.”—General
Orders of May 15, 1806.
58. In moving for the production of papers in the House of
Commons on this occurrence, Sir Philip Francis said it had cost
“two complete companies of sipahis, some cannon, and fifty
European artillerymen, every man of whom were cut to pieces:
the loss of the sipahis is to be lamented, that of the artillerymen
is invaluable.” A most infelicitous expression for the author of
Junius.
59. Two 12-pounders, one 6-pounder, two howitzers, and
tumbrils.
60. Cross was appointed to the Ordnance Commissariat Department,
and at the present moment is living at Penang,
having, after a long, laborious, and honourable career, been
allowed to retire on a pension with the rank of captain.
61. Capt.-Lieutenant A. Graham; Lieutenant T. Pereira; Lieut.-Fireworker
Ewart, I. Rawlins, H. C. Baker, T. D. Fordyce.
62. In this year the Java Light Cavalry, with H. A. attached,
was formed; Capt.-Lieutenant Boileau, Lieutenant Gowan, and
Lieutenant Parlby accompanied it; but we believe this corps
was never engaged.
Captain-Lieutenant McQuake was quarter-master to the
reserve.
64. Four 18-pounders, 2,400 shot; two 8-inch mortars, 400
shells.
65. Capt.-Lieutenant Battine; Lieutenants Tennant, Lyons,
C. Smith, C. G. Dixon; Chesney, adjutant.
66. Major McLeod, commandant; Lieutenant Cruikshanks,
adjutant; Captains Webbe, G. Brooke, Mason, Fordyce,
Cartwright, C. Graham, Timbrell, and Hall and E. P. Gowan,
who joined at Nahun.
67. Captain McDowall; Lieutenants De Brett, Crawford,
Twemlow.
71. The subject is fully gone into in “Considerations on behalf
of the Officers of the Indian Artillery and Engineer Corps,”
by Lieutenant-Colonel James Young, of the artillery. Published
in 1816.
72. During the most severe part of this affair, a circumstance
occurred truly creditable to the character of this officer, and
fully substantiated by the testimony of an eye-witness. An European
horse artilleryman fell deadly wounded, and on his comrades
attempting to carry him to the rear, he entreated them to
desist, adding, “I know I must die, and I only wish to shake
Lieutenant Mathison by the hand before I die.” His wish
was immediately gratified, and he expired uttering “God
bless you.”
73. The artillery were in front, and the first gun that opened
was a Madras horse-artillery gun under Lieutenant Hunter,
which killed the enemy’s beenee-wala, or quarter-master-general,
upon which they took to flight. One of Captain Hunter’s
two guns sticking on the stump of a tree, Lieutenant Crawford
moved on with the other, accompanying Captain Rodber’s
guns.
74. Lieutenant Crawford says, “After a five-mile gallop we
pulled up, having no troops near but about 80 of the 5th cavalry,
and so dead beat were we all with the long march and gallop,
that the Peshwah and those with him, being fresh, got off easily.”
85. The effect is clearly shown in the brigading the late army
of the Sutlej, where the army, consisting of fifteen cavalry and
thirty-seven infantry regiments, formed into six divisions and
sixteen brigades, was thus commanded:—
Cavalry regiments
3 Queen’s,
12 Company’s
Infantry regiments
8 Queen’s,
29 Company’s
Division Commanders
4 Queen’s,
2 Company’s
Brigade regiments
7 Queen’s,
9 Company’s
Of the cavalry, although four-fifths were Company’s regiments,
the division and three of the brigade commands fell to H.M.’s
service.
88. Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Salter of the cavalry, and
Lieutenant Sturt of the engineers (since killed in action).
89. The highest point surmounted, the Irak pass, was 12,400
feet above the sea.
90. A good practicable road across the mountains had, ere this,
been made.
91. The 4th company 6th battalion, with Lieutenants A.
Christie and Robertson, formed part of this force. Captain
Lawrence, as political agent, accompanied it, and procured four
guns from the Seiks, which, however, were of little use, as their
carriages broke down.
92. Captain Sotheby, Lieutenants Cornish and Brougham.
93. From the report of Brevet-Captain Reid, assistant quartermaster-general.
The latter portion of the extract is adopted
word for word by General Gray in his despatch.
94. This, and the following paragraphs distinguished by inverted
commas, are taken verbatim from a very valuable article
on the “Bengal Artillery” in the Calcutta Review, No. xviii.
95. The following extract from a minute by Sir Henry Hardinge,
dated January 20, 1845, relates to this important subject.
“In reference to the 4-horse field-batteries, it appears to me
essential that 9-pounders should be drawn by eight horses instead
of six; that a battery of six pieces should therefore have, when
ordered on field service, a complement of 120 horses, instead of
98; and considering the immediate result of a few weeks’ campaigning,
the number ought to be 130 horses. When not under
orders for field service, the number may remain at 98. On this
matter, and every other relating to the artillery, the Governor-General
requests the Honourable Sir George Pollock to make
the arrangements which his experienced judgment may decide,
so as to secure the utmost efficiency; for in all these matters,
efficiency will be found to be true economy.” [The number of
horses would seem to have been raised in the first instance from
89 to 98.]
96. On the deaths of Captains Dashwood and Todd, Captain
Mills (of the political department) commanded the 1st troop
1st brigade at Ferozeshuhur, and Lieutenant Mackinnon commanded
the 2nd troop in the same action; Captain Waller
commanded the latter at Sobraon.
97. Two guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade accompanied this
troop throughout the action.
98. During the night of the 18th and the morning of the 19th
the ammunition-boxes of the horse-artillery and light field-batteries
were replenished, as far as practicable, from the spare
waggons attached to each troop and battery. The two guns of
the 2nd troop 3rd brigade, which had originally marched from
Muttra merely on escort duty, being unprovided with spare
ammunition, borrowed a few rounds from other guns, but not
sufficient to complete.
99. Ferozeshuhur is a small village between Moodkee and Ferozepore,
and about five miles south of the high-road from the
latter place to Loodianah.
100. Sir Hugh Gough has stated in his despatch, that the ammunition
of the artillery had been completely exhausted in
this protracted engagement. And an able writer in the Calcutta
Review (No. XI.) has made a similar assertion, which, however,
is not quite correct as to the time indicated, as all the troops of
horse-artillery present were engaged with Tej Singh. The author
of the article on the “Sikh invasion of British India” adds,
“We believe the complement of a horse-artillery gun on service
is 300 rounds.” This is not quite accurate. Each 6-pounder
gun carries with it 128 rounds of all sorts; and each 12-pounder
howitzer has 80 rounds. The troops of horse-artillery from
Umballah and Loodianah had each two spare 6-pounder waggons,
and one howitzer waggon, making up the complement to
166⅖ rounds per gun, and 140 per howitzer. The Ferozepore
troops brought out with them no extra waggons, and the two
guns of the 2nd troop 3rd brigade had no spare ammunition at all.
101. The order was given to the brigadier, without authority
from the Commander-in-Chief.
102. “The royal waggons carry 146 rounds a gun, the Indian
waggons, I believe, only contain 96 rounds. In the royal service,
the (6-pounder) gun and waggon carry 194 rounds a gun.
The extra waggons in the royal service have 29 rounds a gun,
and in the Indian service only 19 rounds a gun. The waggon
in the Indian service is, I have no doubt, best adapted to the
country and the draught animals, but if a battery of five guns
had ten waggons (and the howitzer one waggon), the number of
rounds a gun would be about 220. The 9-pounder field batteries,
I understand, take into action 139 rounds a gun. The royal
9-pounder takes 166.”—Minute of Lord Hardinge, Feb. 2,
1847.
103. In a memorandum on this subject left by Captain Buckle,
the author says:—“At Sobraon, the heavy guns, which had been
waited for nearly a month, were placed on the plain about 1,300
yards from the intrenchments, instead of in batteries prepared
for them at half that distance, and the facilities for which were
great in the abundance of men and material, and in the softness
of the soil. They might easily have been erected during the
night of the 9-10th of February, had previous arrangements
been made; and had this been done, the enemy’s intrenchments,
instead of being nearly uninjured, would have been swept away
by the storm of shot poured upon them. As it was, the effect
of the fire was greater on the defenders of the works than upon
the works themselves; and quite as much as was expected by
those competent to form an opinion, considering the greatness of
the distance, and the shortness of time during which they fired.
And for the selection of the distance we are credibly informed
that the artillery are not responsible.”
104. “For the severe punishment inflicted on the Sikhs during
their retreat across the river, we are indebted to the singular
forethought and cool calculating judgment of the Governor-General.
Owing to the paucity of artillerymen, men had been
taken from the horse-artillery to serve the heavy guns in the
field; and the troops—three if not four—to which they belonged,
were left behind in camp. The services of these troops would
have been lost to the army on the 10th February, had not Sir
Henry Hardinge, while the battle was yet raging, ascertained
that the ammunition of the heavy guns was nearly expended,
and deduced, from this misfortune, the more than fortunate conclusion,
that the horse-artillerymen would soon be again available
for their proper duties. He accordingly sent back orders to
the troops left in camp to move down without delay to Rhodawallah;
and they were brought down by their drivers alone, to
that post, where they found their own artillerymen waiting for
them, and were galloped into action. The anecdote is not generally
known, but is worthy of record as highly characteristic of
a mind peculiarly happy in the arrangement of details, whose judicious
combination alone produces military success.”—Reviewer.
[Colonel Alexander’s, Major Campbell’s, and Captain Turton’s
troops were on the right; Colonel Lane, with Sir R. Dick’s
division. Major Grant, as before mentioned, had commenced
the action with his 24-pounder howitzers. The officers and men
of the 2nd troop 1st brigade, 3rd troop 1st brigade, 5th troop
1st brigade, and 1st troop 3rd brigade, were employed with the
heavy batteries, rockets, and reamers. The 1st troop 1st brigade
had remained with Wheeler near Loodhianah.]—Editor.
106. Colonel Lawrence had by this time proceeded to Europe
for the recovery of his health.
107. Thackwell marched without baggage or camp equipage.
108. A brigade had been sent across previously by pontoons a
few miles up the river, but too late to take part in the action of
Sadoolapore.
109. With regard to Pennycuick’s brigade, the Commander-in-Chief
says in his official despatch: “In justice to this brigade, I
must be allowed to state that they behaved heroically, and but
for their too hasty and, consequently, disorderly advance, would
have emulated the conduct of the left brigade, which, left unsupported
for a time, had to charge to their front and right
wherever an enemy appeared. The brigade of horse-artillery
on their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, judiciously and
gallantly aiding, maintained an effective fire.”
110. This troop had been on the detachment system experimentally,
but, after Chillianwallah, when new guns were given, it
reverted to the old system.
111. The following remarks by Major Siddons on the artillery
practice at Mooltan, taken from his admirable report of the
siege, will be read with interest:—“The artillery practice was
most excellent, and the exertions of officers and men indefatigable.
It is impossible to over-rate the service rendered by the 8-inch
and 10-inch howitzers. The walls are mostly of mud, or brick
and mud; and it so happened that the part selected for the
breach was very defective—a mere facing over the old wall.
In this the 24-pounder shot brought down large masses; but
where the wall was sound the shot buried themselves, whereas
the shells penetrated and then acted as small mines. Against a
mud fort, an howitzer must therefore be considered far preferable
to a gun, though of course the latter would be more effective
against a well-built stone wall. The inconvenience to howitzers
is the difficulty of preserving the cheeks of the embrasures. The
iron howitzer might, perhaps, with advantage be lengthened.”
112. As another opportunity is not likely to occur, it may be
mentioned here that General Whish was instrumental in introducing
some important improvements in the internal organization
of the artillery. He was the first, when in temporary command
of the horse-artillery (April, 1821), to establish regimental
libraries for the use of the men. In 1836, he so far reformed
the horse-artillery system, as to render it unnecessary that the
guns should be accompanied into action by their waggons,—a
change, however, which was reversed in 1845. He was also,
in 1841, instrumental in the abolition of winkers, as a portion of
the harness of the horses.
113. “The batteries engaged in action by those attached to the
1st and 2nd divisions, advancing to within about six hundred
yards; and the heavy guns within eight hundred or one thousand
yards of the enemy’s artillery, on which they opened their fire
about nine o’clock A.M.”—Brigadier-General Tennant’s Despatch
to the Commander-in-Chief.
114. Non-effective—1 pay serjeant, 1 drill serjeant, 1 major
serjeant, 1 park serjeant, 1 drill corporal, 3 camp colour-men, a
bullock serjeant, and overseer of bildars in time of service.
The ordnance with each company appears to have consisted of
six light 6-pounders and two howitzers; to assist in working
these and the field-pieces with sipahi battalions, a large body
of lascars were attached to each company.
Heavy guns and mortars were supplied from magazines at the
head-quarters of brigades to the extent available and required
for any particular service.
PRINTED BY COX (BROTHERS) AND WYMAN, GREAT QUEEN STREET.
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Several tables with more columns than rows were rotated 90° left so they would fit
portrait format.
All items in the ERRATA were corrected in the text.
Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.
Retained anachronistic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed.
Footnotes have been re-indexed using numbers and collected together at the end of the
last chapter.
The cover image was created by the transcriber and is placed in the public domain.
