In cheerfulness is the success of our studies, says Pliny—studia
hilaritate proveniunt. It was still the habit of Marius, encouraged by his
experience that sleep is not only a sedative but the best of stimulants, to
seize the morning hours for creation, making profit when he might of the
wholesome serenity which followed a dreamless night. “The morning for
creation,” he would say; “the afternoon for the perfecting labour
of the file; the evening for reception—the reception of matter from
without one, of other men’s words and thoughts—matter for our own
dreams, or the merely mechanic exercise of the brain, brooding thereon
silently, in its dark chambers.” To leave home early in the day was
therefore a rare thing for him. He was induced so to do on the occasion of a
visit to Rome of the famous writer Lucian, whom he had been bidden to meet. The
breakfast over, he walked away with the learned guest, having offered to be his
guide to the lecture-room of a well-known Greek rhetorician and expositor of
the Stoic philosophy, a teacher then much in fashion among the studious youth
of Rome. On reaching the place, however, they found the doors closed, with a
slip of writing attached, which proclaimed “a holiday”; and the
morning being a fine one, they walked further, along the Appian Way. Mortality,
with which the Queen of Ways—in reality the favourite cemetery of
Rome—was so closely crowded, in every imaginable form of sepulchre, from
the tiniest baby-house, to the massive monument out of which the Middle Age
would adapt a fortress-tower, might seem, on a morning like this, to be
“smiling through tears.” The flower-stalls just beyond the city
gates presented to view an array of posies and garlands, fresh enough for a
wedding. At one and another of them groups of persons, gravely clad, were
making their bargains before starting for some perhaps distant spot on the
highway, to keep a dies rosationis, this being the time of roses, at the grave
of a deceased relation. Here and there, a funeral procession was slowly on its
way, in weird contrast to the gaiety of the hour.
The two companions, of course, read the epitaphs as they strolled along. In
one, reminding them of the poet’s—Si lacrimae prosunt, visis te
ostende videri!—a woman prayed that her lost husband might visit her
dreams. Their characteristic note, indeed, was an imploring cry, still to be
sought after by the living. “While I live,” such was the promise of
a lover to his dead mistress, “you will receive this homage: after my
death,—who can tell?”—post mortem nescio. “If ghosts,
my sons, do feel anything after death, my sorrow will be lessened by your
frequent coming to me here!” “This is a privileged tomb; to my
family and descendants has been conceded the right of visiting this place as
often as they please.” “This is an eternal habitation; here lie I;
here I shall lie for ever.” “Reader! if you doubt that the soul
survives, make your oblation and a prayer for me; and you shall
understand!”
The elder of the two readers, certainly, was little affected by those pathetic
suggestions. It was long ago that after visiting the banks of the Padus, where
he had sought in vain for the poplars (sisters of Phaethon erewhile) whose
tears became amber, he had once for all arranged for himself a view of the
world exclusive of all reference to what might lie beyond its “flaming
barriers.” And at the age of sixty he had no misgivings. His elegant and
self-complacent but far from unamiable scepticism, long since brought to
perfection, never failed him. It surrounded him, as some are surrounded by a
magic ring of fine aristocratic manners, with “a rampart,” through
which he himself never broke, nor permitted any thing or person to break upon
him. Gay, animated, content with his old age as it was, the aged student still
took a lively interest in studious youth.—Could Marius inform him of any
such, now known to him in Rome? What did the young men learn, just then? and
how?
In answer, Marius became fluent concerning the promise of one young student,
the son, as it presently appeared, of parents of whom Lucian himself knew
something: and soon afterwards the lad was seen coming along briskly—a
lad with gait and figure well enough expressive of the sane mind in the healthy
body, though a little slim and worn of feature, and with a pair of eyes
expressly designed, it might seem, for fine glancings at the stars. At the
sight of Marius he paused suddenly, and with a modest blush on recognising his
companion, who straightway took with the youth, so prettily enthusiastic, the
freedom of an old friend.
In a few moments the three were seated together, immediately above the fragrant
borders of a rose-farm, on the marble bench of one of the exhedrae for the use
of foot-passengers at the roadside, from which they could overlook the grand,
earnest prospect of the Campagna, and enjoy the air. Fancying that the
lad’s plainly written enthusiasm had induced in the elder speaker
somewhat more fervour than was usual with him, Marius listened to the
conversation which follows.—
“Ah! Hermotimus! Hurrying to lecture! —if I may judge by your pace,
and that volume in your hand. You were thinking hard as you came along, moving
your lips and waving your arms. Some fine speech you were pondering, some
knotty question, some viewy doctrine—not to be idle for a moment, to be
making progress in philosophy, even on your way to the schools. To-day,
however, you need go no further. We read a notice at the schools that there
would be no lecture. Stay therefore, and talk awhile with us.
—With pleasure, Lucian.—Yes! I was ruminating yesterday’s
conference. One must not lose a moment. Life is short and art is long! And it
was of the art of medicine, that was first said—a thing so much easier
than divine philosophy, to which one can hardly attain in a lifetime, unless
one be ever wakeful, ever on the watch. And here the hazard is no little
one:—By the attainment of a true philosophy to attain happiness; or,
having missed both, to perish, as one of the vulgar herd.
—The prize is a great one, Hermotimus! and you must needs be near it,
after these months of toil, and with that scholarly pallor of yours. Unless,
indeed, you have already laid hold upon it, and kept us in the dark.
—How could that be, Lucian? Happiness, as Hesiod says, abides very far
hence; and the way to it is long and steep and rough. I see myself still at the
beginning of my journey; still but at the mountain’s foot. I am trying
with all my might to get forward. What I need is a hand, stretched out to help
me.
—And is not the master sufficient for that? Could he not, like Zeus in
Homer, let down to you, from that high place, a golden cord, to draw you up
thither, to himself and to that Happiness, to which he ascended so long ago?
—The very point, Lucian! Had it depended on him I should long ago have
been caught up. ’Tis I, am wanting.
—Well! keep your eye fixed on the journey’s end, and that happiness
there above, with confidence in his goodwill.
—Ah! there are many who start cheerfully on the journey and proceed a
certain distance, but lose heart when they light on the obstacles of the way.
Only, those who endure to the end do come to the mountain’s top, and
thereafter live in Happiness:—live a wonderful manner of life, seeing all
other people from that great height no bigger than tiny ants.
—What little fellows you make of us—less than the
pygmies—down in the dust here. Well! we, ‘the vulgar herd,’
as we creep along, will not forget you in our prayers, when you are seated up
there above the clouds, whither you have been so long hastening. But tell me,
Hermotimus!—when do you expect to arrive there?
—Ah! that I know not. In twenty years, perhaps, I shall be really on the
summit.—A great while! you think. But then, again, the prize I contend
for is a great one.
—Perhaps! But as to those twenty years—that you will live so long.
Has the master assured you of that? Is he a prophet as well as a philosopher?
For I suppose you would not endure all this, upon a mere chance—toiling
day and night, though it might happen that just ere the last step, Destiny
seized you by the foot and plucked you thence, with your hope still
unfulfilled.
—Hence, with these ill-omened words, Lucian! Were I to survive but for a
day, I should be happy, having once attained wisdom.
—How?—Satisfied with a single day, after all those labours?
—Yes! one blessed moment were enough!
—But again, as you have never been, how know you that happiness is to be
had up there, at all—the happiness that is to make all this worth while?
—I believe what the master tells me. Of a certainty he knows, being now
far above all others.
—And what was it he told you about it? Is it riches, or glory, or some
indescribable pleasure?
—Hush! my friend! All those are nothing in comparison of the life there.
—What, then, shall those who come to the end of this
discipline—what excellent thing shall they receive, if not these?
—Wisdom, the absolute goodness and the absolute beauty, with the sure and
certain knowledge of all things—how they are. Riches and glory and
pleasure—whatsoever belongs to the body—they have cast from them:
stripped bare of all that, they mount up, even as Hercules, consumed in the
fire, became a god. He too cast aside all that he had of his earthly mother,
and bearing with him the divine element, pure and undefiled, winged his way to
heaven from the discerning flame. Even so do they, detached from all that
others prize, by the burning fire of a true philosophy, ascend to the highest
degree of happiness.
—Strange! And do they never come down again from the heights to help
those whom they left below? Must they, when they be once come thither, there
remain for ever, laughing, as you say, at what other men prize?
—More than that! They whose initiation is entire are subject no longer to
anger, fear, desire, regret. Nay! They scarcely feel at all.
—Well! as you have leisure to-day, why not tell an old friend in what way
you first started on your philosophic journey? For, if I might, I should like
to join company with you from this very day.
—If you be really willing, Lucian! you will learn in no long time your
advantage over all other people. They will seem but as children, so far above
them will be your thoughts.
—Well! Be you my guide! It is but fair. But tell me—Do you allow
learners to contradict, if anything is said which they don’t think right?
—No, indeed! Still, if you wish, oppose your questions. In that way you
will learn more easily.
—Let me know, then—Is there one only way which leads to a true
philosophy—your own way—the way of the Stoics: or is it true, as I
have heard, that there are many ways of approaching it?
—Yes! Many ways! There are the Stoics, and the Peripatetics, and those
who call themselves after Plato: there are the enthusiasts for Diogenes, and
Antisthenes, and the followers of Pythagoras, besides others.
—It was true, then. But again, is what they say the same or different?
—Very different.
—Yet the truth, I conceive, would be one and the same, from all of them.
Answer me then—In what, or in whom, did you confide when you first betook
yourself to philosophy, and seeing so many doors open to you, passed them all
by and went in to the Stoics, as if there alone lay the way of truth? What
token had you? Forget, please, all you are to-day—half-way, or more, on
the philosophic journey: answer me as you would have done then, a mere outsider
as I am now.
—Willingly! It was there the great majority went! ’Twas by that I
judged it to be the better way.
—A majority how much greater than the Epicureans, the Platonists, the
Peripatetics? You, doubtless, counted them respectively, as with the votes in a
scrutiny.
—No! But this was not my only motive. I heard it said by every one that
the Epicureans were soft and voluptuous, the Peripatetics avaricious and
quarrelsome, and Plato’s followers puffed up with pride. But of the
Stoics, not a few pronounced that they were true men, that they knew
everything, that theirs was the royal road, the one road, to wealth, to wisdom,
to all that can be desired.
—Of course those who said this were not themselves Stoics: you would not
have believed them—still less their opponents. They were the vulgar,
therefore.
—True! But you must know that I did not trust to others exclusively. I
trusted also to myself—to what I saw. I saw the Stoics going through the
world after a seemly manner, neatly clad, never in excess, always collected,
ever faithful to the mean which all pronounce ‘golden.’
—You are trying an experiment on me. You would fain see how far you can
mislead me as to your real ground. The kind of probation you describe is
applicable, indeed, to works of art, which are rightly judged by their
appearance to the eye. There is something in the comely form, the graceful
drapery, which tells surely of the hand of Pheidias or Alcamenes. But if
philosophy is to be judged by outward appearances, what would become of the
blind man, for instance, unable to observe the attire and gait of your friends
the Stoics?
—It was not of the blind I was thinking.
—Yet there must needs be some common criterion in a matter so important
to all. Put the blind, if you will, beyond the privileges of philosophy; though
they perhaps need that inward vision more than all others. But can those who
are not blind, be they as keen-sighted as you will, collect a single fact of
mind from a man’s attire, from anything outward?—Understand me! You
attached yourself to these men—did you not?—because of a certain
love you had for the mind in them, the thoughts they possessed desiring the
mind in you to be improved thereby?
—Assuredly!
—How, then, did you find it possible, by the sort of signs you just now
spoke of, to distinguish the true philosopher from the false? Matters of that
kind are not wont so to reveal themselves. They are but hidden mysteries,
hardly to be guessed at through the words and acts which may in some sort be
conformable to them. You, however, it would seem, can look straight into the
heart in men’s bosoms, and acquaint yourself with what really passes
there.
—You are making sport of me, Lucian! In truth, it was with God’s
help I made my choice, and I don’t repent it.
—And still you refuse to tell me, to save me from perishing in that
‘vulgar herd.’
—Because nothing I can tell you would satisfy you.
—You are mistaken, my friend! But since you deliberately conceal the
thing, grudging me, as I suppose, that true philosophy which would make me
equal to you, I will try, if it may be, to find out for myself the exact
criterion in these matters—how to make a perfectly safe choice. And, do
you listen.
—I will; there may be something worth knowing in what you will say.
—Well!—only don’t laugh if I seem a little fumbling in my
efforts. The fault is yours, in refusing to share your lights with me. Let
Philosophy, then, be like a city—a city whose citizens within it are a
happy people, as your master would tell you, having lately come thence, as we
suppose. All the virtues are theirs, and they are little less than gods. Those
acts of violence which happen among us are not to be seen in their streets.
They live together in one mind, very seemly; the things which beyond everything
else cause men to contend against each other, having no place upon them. Gold
and silver, pleasure, vainglory, they have long since banished, as being
unprofitable to the commonwealth; and their life is an unbroken calm, in
liberty, equality, an equal happiness.
—And is it not reasonable that all men should desire to be of a city such
as that, and take no account of the length and difficulty of the way thither,
so only they may one day become its freemen?
—It might well be the business of life:—leaving all else,
forgetting one’s native country here, unmoved by the tears, the
restraining hands, of parents or children, if one had them—only bidding
them follow the same road; and if they would not or could not, shaking them
off, leaving one’s very garment in their hands if they took hold on us,
to start off straightway for that happy place! For there is no fear, I suppose,
of being shut out if one came thither naked. I remember, indeed, long ago an
aged man related to me how things passed there, offering himself to be my
leader, and enrol me on my arrival in the number of the citizens. I was but
fifteen—certainly very foolish: and it may be that I was then actually
within the suburbs, or at the very gates, of the city. Well, this aged man told
me, among other things, that all the citizens were wayfarers from afar. Among
them were barbarians and slaves, poor men—aye! and cripples—all
indeed who truly desired that citizenship. For the only legal conditions of
enrolment were—not wealth, nor bodily beauty, nor noble
ancestry—things not named among them—but intelligence, and the
desire for moral beauty, and earnest labour. The last comer, thus qualified,
was made equal to the rest: master and slave, patrician, plebeian, were words
they had not—in that blissful place. And believe me, if that blissful,
that beautiful place, were set on a hill visible to all the world, I should
long ago have journeyed thither. But, as you say, it is far off: and one must
needs find out for oneself the road to it, and the best possible guide. And I
find a multitude of guides, who press on me their services, and protest, all
alike, that they have themselves come thence. Only, the roads they propose are
many, and towards adverse quarters. And one of them is steep and stony, and
through the beating sun; and the other is through green meadows, and under
grateful shade, and by many a fountain of water. But howsoever the road may be,
at each one of them stands a credible guide; he puts out his hand and would
have you come his way. All other ways are wrong, all other guides false. Hence
my difficulty!—The number and variety of the ways! For you know, There is
but one road that leads to Corinth.
—Well! If you go the whole round, you will find no better guides than
those. If you wish to get to Corinth, you will follow the traces of Zeno and
Chrysippus. It is impossible otherwise.
—Yes! The old, familiar language! Were one of Plato’s
fellow-pilgrims here, or a follower of Epicurus—or fifty
others—each would tell me that I should never get to Corinth except in
his company. One must therefore credit all alike, which would be absurd; or,
what is far safer, distrust all alike, until one has discovered the truth.
Suppose now, that, being as I am, ignorant which of all philosophers is really
in possession of truth, I choose your sect, relying on yourself—my
friend, indeed, yet still acquainted only with the way of the Stoics; and that
then some divine power brought Plato, and Aristotle, and Pythagoras, and the
others, back to life again. Well! They would come round about me, and put me on
my trial for my presumption, and say:—‘In whom was it you confided
when you preferred Zeno and Chrysippus to me?—and me?—masters of
far more venerable age than those, who are but of yesterday; and though you
have never held any discussion with us, nor made trial of our doctrine? It is
not thus that the law would have judges do—listen to one party and refuse
to let the other speak for himself. If judges act thus, there may be an appeal
to another tribunal.’ What should I answer? Would it be enough to
say:—‘I trusted my friend Hermotimus?’—‘We know
not Hermotimus, nor he us,’ they would tell me; adding, with a smile,
‘your friend thinks he may believe all our adversaries say of us whether
in ignorance or in malice. Yet if he were umpire in the games, and if he
happened to see one of our wrestlers, by way of a preliminary exercise, knock
to pieces an antagonist of mere empty air, he would not thereupon pronounce him
a victor. Well! don’t let your friend Hermotimus suppose, in like manner,
that his teachers have really prevailed over us in those battles of theirs,
fought with our mere shadows. That, again, were to be like children, lightly
overthrowing their own card-castles; or like boy-archers, who cry out when they
hit the target of straw. The Persian and Scythian bowmen, as they speed along,
can pierce a bird on the wing.’
—Let us leave Plato and the others at rest. It is not for me to contend
against them. Let us rather search out together if the truth of Philosophy be
as I say. Why summon the athletes, and archers from Persia?
—Yes! let them go, if you think them in the way. And now do you speak!
You really look as if you had something wonderful to deliver.
—Well then, Lucian! to me it seems quite possible for one who has learned
the doctrines of the Stoics only, to attain from those a knowledge of the
truth, without proceeding to inquire into all the various tenets of the others.
Look at the question in this way. If one told you that twice two make four,
would it be necessary for you to go the whole round of the arithmeticians, to
see whether any one of them will say that twice two make five, or seven? Would
you not see at once that the man tells the truth?
—At once.
—Why then do you find it impossible that one who has fallen in with the
Stoics only, in their enunciation of what is true, should adhere to them, and
seek after no others; assured that four could never be five, even if fifty
Platos, fifty Aristotles said so?
—You are beside the point, Hermotimus! You are likening open questions to
principles universally received. Have you ever met any one who said that twice
two make five, or seven?
—No! only a madman would say that.
—And have you ever met, on the other hand, a Stoic and an Epicurean who
were agreed upon the beginning and the end, the principle and the final cause,
of things? Never! Then your parallel is false. We are inquiring to which of the
sects philosophic truth belongs, and you seize on it by anticipation, and
assign it to the Stoics, alleging, what is by no means clear, that it is they
for whom twice two make four. But the Epicureans, or the Platonists, might say
that it is they, in truth, who make two and two equal four, while you make them
five or seven. Is it not so, when you think virtue the only good, and the
Epicureans pleasure; when you hold all things to be material, while the
Platonists admit something immaterial? As I said, you resolve offhand, in
favour of the Stoics, the very point which needs a critical decision. If it is
clear beforehand that the Stoics alone make two and two equal four, then the
others must hold their peace. But so long as that is the very point of debate,
we must listen to all sects alike, or be well-assured that we shall seem but
partial in our judgment.
—I think, Lucian! that you do not altogether understand my meaning. To
make it clear, then, let us suppose that two men had entered a temple, of
Aesculapius,—say! or Bacchus: and that afterwards one of the sacred
vessels is found to be missing. And the two men must be searched to see which
of them has hidden it under his garment. For it is certainly in the possession
of one or the other of them. Well! if it be found on the first there will be no
need to search the second; if it is not found on the first, then the other must
have it; and again, there will be no need to search him.
—Yes! So let it be.
—And we too, Lucian! if we have found the holy vessel in possession of
the Stoics, shall no longer have need to search other philosophers, having
attained that we were seeking. Why trouble ourselves further?
—No need, if something had indeed been found, and you knew it to be that
lost thing: if, at the least, you could recognise the sacred object when you
saw it. But truly, as the matter now stands, not two persons only have entered
the temple, one or the other of whom must needs have taken the golden cup, but
a whole crowd of persons. And then, it is not clear what the lost object really
is—cup, or flagon, or diadem; for one of the priests avers this, another
that; they are not even in agreement as to its material: some will have it to
be of brass, others of silver, or gold. It thus becomes necessary to search the
garments of all persons who have entered the temple, if the lost vessel is to
be recovered. And if you find a golden cup on the first of them, it will still
be necessary to proceed in searching the garments of the others; for it is not
certain that this cup really belonged to the temple. Might there not be many
such golden vessels?—No! we must go on to every one of them, placing all
that we find in the midst together, and then make our guess which of all those
things may fairly be supposed to be the property of the god. For, again, this
circumstance adds greatly to our difficulty, that without exception every one
searched is found to have something upon him—cup, or flagon, or diadem,
of brass, of silver, of gold: and still, all the while, it is not ascertained
which of all these is the sacred thing. And you must still hesitate to
pronounce any one of them guilty of the sacrilege—those objects may be
their own lawful property: one cause of all this obscurity being, as I think,
that there was no inscription on the lost cup, if cup it was. Had the name of
the god, or even that of the donor, been upon it, at least we should have had
less trouble, and having detected the inscription, should have ceased to
trouble any one else by our search.
—I have nothing to reply to that.
—Hardly anything plausible. So that if we wish to find who it is has the
sacred vessel, or who will be our best guide to Corinth, we must needs proceed
to every one and examine him with the utmost care, stripping off his garment
and considering him closely. Scarcely, even so, shall we come at the truth. And
if we are to have a credible adviser regarding this question of
philosophy—which of all philosophies one ought to follow—he alone
who is acquainted with the dicta of every one of them can be such a guide: all
others must be inadequate. I would give no credence to them if they lacked
information as to one only. If somebody introduced a fair person and told us he
was the fairest of all men, we should not believe that, unless we knew that he
had seen all the people in the world. Fair he might be; but, fairest of
all—none could know, unless he had seen all. And we too desire, not a
fair one, but the fairest of all. Unless we find him, we shall think we have
failed. It is no casual beauty that will content us; what we are seeking after
is that supreme beauty which must of necessity be unique.
—What then is one to do, if the matter be really thus? Perhaps you know
better than I. All I see is that very few of us would have time to examine all
the various sects of philosophy in turn, even if we began in early life. I know
not how it is; but though you seem to me to speak reasonably, yet (I must
confess it) you have distressed me not a little by this exact exposition of
yours. I was unlucky in coming out to-day, and in my falling in with you, who
have thrown me into utter perplexity by your proof that the discovery of truth
is impossible, just as I seemed to be on the point of attaining my hope.
—Blame your parents, my child, not me! Or rather, blame mother Nature
herself, for giving us but seventy or eighty years instead of making us as
long-lived as Tithonus. For my part, I have but led you from premise to
conclusion.
—Nay! you are a mocker! I know not wherefore, but you have a grudge
against philosophy; and it is your entertainment to make a jest of her lovers.
—Ah! Hermotimus! what the Truth may be, you philosophers may be able to
tell better than I. But so much at least I know of her, that she is one by no
means pleasant to those who hear her speak: in the matter of pleasantness, she
is far surpassed by Falsehood: and Falsehood has the pleasanter countenance.
She, nevertheless, being conscious of no alloy within, discourses with boldness
to all men, who therefore have little love for her. See how angry you are now
because I have stated the truth about certain things of which we are both alike
enamoured—that they are hard to come by. It is as if you had fallen in
love with a statue and hoped to win its favour, thinking it a human creature;
and I, understanding it to be but an image of brass or stone, had shown you, as
a friend, that your love was impossible, and thereupon you had conceived that I
bore you some ill-will.
—But still, does it not follow from what you said, that we must renounce
philosophy and pass our days in idleness?
—When did you hear me say that? I did but assert that if we are to seek
after philosophy, whereas there are many ways professing to lead thereto, we
must with much exactness distinguish them.
—Well, Lucian! that we must go to all the schools in turn, and test what
they say, if we are to choose the right one, is perhaps reasonable; but surely
ridiculous, unless we are to live as many years as the Phoenix, to be so
lengthy in the trial of each; as if it were not possible to learn the whole by
the part! They say that Pheidias, when he was shown one of the talons of a
lion, computed the stature and age of the animal it belonged to, modelling a
complete lion upon the standard of a single part of it. You too would recognise
a human hand were the rest of the body concealed. Even so with the schools of
philosophy:—the leading doctrines of each might be learned in an
afternoon. That over-exactness of yours, which required so long a time, is by
no means necessary for making the better choice.
—You are forcible, Hermotimus! with this theory of The Whole by the Part.
Yet, methinks, I heard you but now propound the contrary. But tell me; would
Pheidias when he saw the lion’s talon have known that it was a
lion’s, if he had never seen the animal? Surely, the cause of his
recognising the part was his knowledge of the whole. There is a way of choosing
one’s philosophy even less troublesome than yours. Put the names of all
the philosophers into an urn. Then call a little child, and let him draw the
name of the philosopher you shall follow all the rest of your days.
—Nay! be serious with me. Tell me; did you ever buy wine?
—Surely.
—And did you first go the whole round of the wine-merchants, tasting and
comparing their wines?
—By no means.
—No! You were contented to order the first good wine you found at your
price. By tasting a little you were ascertained of the quality of the whole
cask. How if you had gone to each of the merchants in turn, and said, ‘I
wish to buy a cotylé of wine. Let me drink out the whole cask. Then I shall be
able to tell which is best, and where I ought to buy.’ Yet this is what
you would do with the philosophies. Why drain the cask when you might taste,
and see?
—How slippery you are; how you escape from one’s fingers! Still,
you have given me an advantage, and are in your own trap.
—How so?
—Thus! You take a common object known to every one, and make wine the
figure of a thing which presents the greatest variety in itself, and about
which all men are at variance, because it is an unseen and difficult thing. I
hardly know wherein philosophy and wine are alike unless it be in this, that
the philosophers exchange their ware for money, like the wine-merchants; some
of them with a mixture of water or worse, or giving short measure. However, let
us consider your parallel. The wine in the cask, you say, is of one kind
throughout. But have the philosophers—has your own master even—but
one and the same thing only to tell you, every day and all days, on a subject
so manifold? Otherwise, how can you know the whole by the tasting of one part?
The whole is not the same—Ah! and it may be that God has hidden the good
wine of philosophy at the bottom of the cask. You must drain it to the end if
you are to find those drops of divine sweetness you seem so much to thirst for!
Yourself, after drinking so deeply, are still but at the beginning, as you
said. But is not philosophy rather like this? Keep the figure of the merchant
and the cask: but let it be filled, not with wine, but with every sort of
grain. You come to buy. The merchant hands you a little of the wheat which lies
at the top. Could you tell by looking at that, whether the chick-peas were
clean, the lentils tender, the beans full? And then, whereas in selecting our
wine we risk only our money; in selecting our philosophy we risk ourselves, as
you told me—might ourselves sink into the dregs of ‘the vulgar
herd.’ Moreover, while you may not drain the whole cask of wine by way of
tasting, Wisdom grows no less by the depth of your drinking. Nay! if you take
of her, she is increased thereby.
And then I have another similitude to propose, as regards this tasting of
philosophy. Don’t think I blaspheme her if I say that it may be with her
as with some deadly poison, hemlock or aconite. These too, though they cause
death, yet kill not if one tastes but a minute portion. You would suppose that
the tiniest particle must be sufficient.
—Be it as you will, Lucian! One must live a hundred years: one must
sustain all this labour; otherwise philosophy is unattainable.
—Not so! Though there were nothing strange in that, if it be true, as you
said at first, that Life is short and art is long. But now you take it hard
that we are not to see you this very day, before the sun goes down, a
Chrysippus, a Pythagoras, a Plato.
—You overtake me, Lucian! and drive me into a corner; in jealousy of
heart, I believe, because I have made some progress in doctrine whereas you
have neglected yourself.
—Well! Don’t attend to me! Treat me as a Corybant, a fanatic: and
do you go forward on this road of yours. Finish the journey in accordance with
the view you had of these matters at the beginning of it. Only, be assured that
my judgment on it will remain unchanged. Reason still says, that without
criticism, without a clear, exact, unbiassed intelligence to try them, all
those theories—all things—will have been seen but in vain.
‘To that end,’ she tells us, ‘much time is necessary, many
delays of judgment, a cautious gait; repeated inspection.’ And we are not
to regard the outward appearance, or the reputation of wisdom, in any of the
speakers; but like the judges of Areopagus, who try their causes in the
darkness of the night, look only to what they say.
—Philosophy, then, is impossible, or possible only in another life!
—Hermotimus! I grieve to tell you that all this even, may be in truth
insufficient. After all, we may deceive ourselves in the belief that we have
found something:—like the fishermen! Again and again they let down the
net. At last they feel something heavy, and with vast labour draw up, not a
load of fish, but only a pot full of sand, or a great stone.
—I don’t understand what you mean by the net. It is plain that you
have caught me in it.
—Try to get out! You can swim as well as another. We may go to all
philosophers in turn and make trial of them. Still, I, for my part, hold it by
no means certain that any one of them really possesses what we seek. The truth
may be a thing that not one of them has yet found. You have twenty beans in
your hand, and you bid ten persons guess how many: one says five, another
fifteen; it is possible that one of them may tell the true number; but it is
not impossible that all may be wrong. So it is with the philosophers. All alike
are in search of Happiness—what kind of thing it is. One says one thing,
one another: it is pleasure; it is virtue;—what not? And Happiness may
indeed be one of those things. But it is possible also that it may be still
something else, different and distinct from them all.
—What is this?—There is something, I know not how, very sad and
disheartening in what you say. We seem to have come round in a circle to the
spot whence we started, and to our first incertitude. Ah! Lucian, what have you
done to me? You have proved my priceless pearl to be but ashes, and all my past
labour to have been in vain.
—Reflect, my friend, that you are not the first person who has thus
failed of the good thing he hoped for. All philosophers, so to speak, are but
fighting about the ‘ass’s shadow.’ To me you seem like one
who should weep, and reproach fortune because he is not able to climb up into
heaven, or go down into the sea by Sicily and come up at Cyprus, or sail on
wings in one day from Greece to India. And the true cause of his trouble is
that he has based his hope on what he has seen in a dream, or his own fancy has
put together; without previous thought whether what he desires is in itself
attainable and within the compass of human nature. Even so, methinks, has it
happened with you. As you dreamed, so largely, of those wonderful things, came
Reason, and woke you up from sleep, a little roughly: and then you are angry
with Reason, your eyes being still but half open, and find it hard to shake off
sleep for the pleasure of what you saw therein. Only, don’t be angry with
me, because, as a friend, I would not suffer you to pass your life in a dream,
pleasant perhaps, but still only a dream—because I wake you up and demand
that you should busy yourself with the proper business of life, and send you to
it possessed of common sense. What your soul was full of just now is not very
different from those Gorgons and Chimaeras and the like, which the poets and
the painters construct for us, fancy-free:—things which never were, and
never will be, though many believe in them, and all like to see and hear of
them, just because they are so strange and odd.
And you too, methinks, having heard from some such maker of marvels of a
certain woman of a fairness beyond nature—beyond the Graces, beyond Venus
Urania herself—asked not if he spoke truth, and whether this woman be
really alive in the world, but straightway fell in love with her; as they say
that Medea was enamoured of Jason in a dream. And what more than anything else
seduced you, and others like you, into that passion, for a vain idol of the
fancy, is, that he who told you about that fair woman, from the very moment
when you first believed that what he said was true, brought forward all the
rest in consequent order. Upon her alone your eyes were fixed; by her he led
you along, when once you had given him a hold upon you—led you along the
straight road, as he said, to the beloved one. All was easy after that. None of
you asked again whether it was the true way; following one after another, like
sheep led by the green bough in the hand of the shepherd. He moved you hither
and thither with his finger, as easily as water spilt on a table!
My friend! Be not so lengthy in preparing the banquet, lest you die of hunger!
I saw one who poured water into a mortar, and ground it with all his might with
a pestle of iron, fancying he did a thing useful and necessary; but it remained
water only, none the less.”
Just there the conversation broke off suddenly, and the disputants parted. The
horses were come for Lucian. The boy went on his way, and Marius onward, to
visit a friend whose abode lay further. As he returned to Rome towards evening
the melancholy aspect, natural to a city of the dead, had triumphed over the
superficial gaudiness of the early day. He could almost have fancied Canidia
there, picking her way among the rickety lamps, to rifle some neglected or
ruined tomb; for these tombs were not all equally well cared for (Post mortem
nescio!) and it had been one of the pieties of Aurelius to frame a severe law
to prevent the defacing of such monuments. To Marius there seemed to be some
new meaning in that terror of isolation, of being left alone in these places,
of which the sepulchral inscriptions were so full. A blood-red sunset was dying
angrily, and its wild glare upon the shadowy objects around helped to combine
the associations of this famous way, its deeply graven marks of immemorial
travel, together with the earnest questions of the morning as to the true way
of that other sort of travelling, around an image, almost ghastly in the traces
of its great sorrows—bearing along for ever, on bleeding feet, the
instrument of its punishment—which was all Marius could recall distinctly
of a certain Christian legend he had heard. The legend told of an encounter at
this very spot, of two wayfarers on the Appian Way, as also upon some very
dimly discerned mental journey, altogether different from himself and his late
companions—an encounter between Love, literally fainting by the road, and
Love “travelling in the greatness of his strength,” Love itself,
suddenly appearing to sustain that other. A strange contrast to anything
actually presented in that morning’s conversation, it seemed nevertheless
to echo its very words—“Do they never come down again,” he
heard once more the well-modulated voice: “Do they never come down again
from the heights, to help those whom they left here
below?”—“And we too desire, not a fair one, but the fairest
of all. Unless we find him, we shall think we have failed.”