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LIFE
OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
BY
WASHINGTON IRVING.
VOL. II.
NEW YORK: G. P. PUTNAM.
1860.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1855.
BY G. P. PUTNAM & CO.,
In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
John F. Trow,
Printer, Stereotyper, and Electrotyper,
46, 48 & 50 Greene Street,
Between Grand & Broome, New York.
CONTENTS OF VOL. II. — CHAPTER I. WASHINGTON TAKES COMMAND OF THE ARMIES—SKETCH OF GENERAL LEE—CHARACTERS OF THE BRITISH COMMANDERS, HOWE, CLINTON, AND BURGOYNE—SURVEY OF THE CAMPS FROM PROSPECT HILL—THE CAMPS CONTRASTED—DESCRIPTION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY—RHODE ISLAND TROOPS—CHARACTER OF GENERAL GREENE—WASHINGTON REPRESENTS THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE ARMY—HIS APOLOGY FOR THE MASSACHUSETTS TROOPS—GOVERNOR TRUMBULL—CRAGIE HOUSE, WASHINGTON’S HEAD-QUARTERS.
v
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
Washington takes command of the Armies—Sketch of General Lee—Characters of the British Commanders, Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne—Survey of the Camps from Prospect Hill—The Camps contrasted—Description of the Revolutionary Army—Rhode Island Troops—Character of General Greene—Washington represents the Deficiencies of the Army—His Apology for the Massachusetts Troops—Governor Trumbull—Cragie House, Washington’s Head-Quarters
Questions of Military Rank—Popularity of Putnam—Arrangements at Head-Quarters—Colonel Mifflin and John Trumbull, Aides-de Camp—Joseph Reed, Washington’s Secretary and confidential friend—Gates as Adjutant-General—Hazardous Situation of the Army—Strengthening of the Defences—Efficiency of Putnam—Rapid Changes—New Distribution of the Forces—Rigid Discipline—Lee and his cane—His Idea as to Strong Battalions—Arrival of Rifle Companies—Daniel Morgan and his Sharp Shooters—Washington declines to detach Troops to distant points for their Protection—His Reasons for so doing
Washington’s Object in distressing Boston—Scarcity and Sickness in the Town—A Startling Discovery—Scarcity of Powder in the Camp—Its Perilous Situation—Economy of Ammunition—Correspondence between Lee and Burgoyne—Correspondence between Washington and Gage—The Dignity of the Patriot Army asserted
viDangers in the Interior—Machinations of the Johnson Family—Rivalry of Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold—Government Perplexities about the Ticonderoga Capture—Measures to secure the Prize—Allen and Arnold ambitious of further Laurels—Projects for the Invasion of Canada—Ethan Allen and Seth Warner honored by Congress—Arnold displaced by a Committee of Inquiry—His Indignation—News from Canada—The Revolution to be extended into that Province—Enlistment of Green Mountain Boys—Schuyler at Ticonderoga—State of Affairs there—Election for Officers of the Green Mountain Boys—Ethan Allen dismounted—Joins the Army as a Volunteer—Preparations for the Invasion of Canada—General Montgomery—Indian Chiefs at Cambridge—Council Fire—Plan for an Expedition against Quebec—Departure of Troops from Ticonderoga—Arrival at Isle aux Noix
A Challenge declined—A Blow meditated—A cautious Council of War—Preparations for the Quebec Expedition—Benedict Arnold the Leader—Advice and Instructions—Departure—General Schuyler on the Sorel—Reconnoitres St. Johns—Camp at Isle aux Noix—Illness of Schuyler—Returns to Ticonderoga—Expedition of Montgomery against St. Johns—Letter of Ethan Allen—His Dash against Montreal—Its Catastrophe—A Hero in Irons—Correspondence of Washington with Schuyler and Arnold—His Anxiety about them
British in Boston send out Cruisers—Depredations of Captain Wallace along the Coast—Treason in the Camp—Arrest of Dr. Church—His Trial and Fate—Conflagration of Falmouth—Irritation throughout the Country—Fitting out of Vessels of War—Embarkation of General Gage for England—Committee from Congress—Conferences with Washington—Resolutions of Congress to carry on the War—Return of Secretary Reed to Philadelphia
Measures of General Howe—Desecration of Churches—Three Proclamations—Seizure of Tories—Want of Artillery—Henry Knox, the Artillerist—His Mission to Ticonderoga—Re-enlistment of Troops—Lack of Public Spirit—Comments of General Greene
Affairs in Canada—Capture of Fort Chamblee—Siege of St. Johns—Maclean and his Highlanders—Montgomery on the Treatment of Ethan Allen—Repulse of Carleton—Capitulation of the Garrison of St. Johns—Generous Conduct of Montgomery—Maclean re-embarks for Quebec—Weary Struggle of Arnold through the Wilderness—Defection of Colonel Enos—Arnold in the Valley of the Chandiere—His Arrival opposite Quebec—Surrender of Montreal—Escape of Carleton—Home sickness of the American Troops
Washington’s anticipations of Success at Quebec—His Eulogium of Arnold—Schuyler and Montgomery talk of resigning—Expostulations of Washington—Their Effect—Schuyler’s Conduct to a Captive Foe
Difficulties in filling up the Army—The Connecticut Troops persist in going Home—Their reception there—Timely Arrival of Spoils in the Camp—Putnam and the Prize Mortar—A Maraud by Americans—Rebuked by Washington—Correspondence of Washington with General Howe about the treatment of Ethan Allen—Fraternal zeal of Levi Allen—Treatment of General Prescott—Preparations to Bombard Boston—Battery at Lechmere’s Point—Prayer of Putnam for Powder
Mount Vernon in Danger—Mrs. Washington invited to the Camp—Lund Washington, the General’s Agent—Terms on which he serves—Instructed to keep up the Hospitality of the House—Journey of Mrs. Washington to Camp—Her Equipage and Liveries—Arrival at Camp—Domestic Affairs at Head-Quarters—Gayeties in Camp—A Brawl between Round Jackets and Rifle Shirts
Affairs in Canada—Arnold at Point Levi—Quebec reinforced—Crossing of the St. Lawrence—Landing in Wolfe’s Cove—Arnold on the Heights of Abraham—Cautious Counsel—Quebec aroused—The Invaders baffled—Withdraw to Point aux Trembles—Booming of Cannon—Carleton at Quebec—Letter of Washington to Arnold
Lord Dunmore—His Plans of harassing Virginia—Lee’s Policy respecting Tory Governors and Placemen—Rhode Island harassed by Wallace and his Cruisers, and infested by Tories—Lee sent to its Relief—His Vigorous Measures—The Army disbanding—Washington’s Perplexities—Sympathy of General Greene—His Loyalty in time of Trouble—The Crisis—Cheering News from Canada—Gloomy Opening of the New Year—News from Colonel Knox
Military Preparations in Boston—A Secret Expedition—Its Object—Lee’s Plan for the Security of New York—Opinion of Adams on the Subject—Instructions to Lee—Transactions of Lee in Connecticut—Lee’s Policy in regard to the Tories—Uneasiness in New York—Letter of the Committee of Safety to Lee—His Reply—His Opinion of the People of Connecticut—Of the Hysterical Letter from the New York Congress
Montgomery before Quebec—His Plan of Operations—A Summons to Surrender—A Flag Insulted—The Town Besieged—Plan of an Escalade—Attack of the Lower Town—Montgomery in the Advance—His Death—Retreat of Colonel Campbell—Attack by Arnold—Defence of the Lower Town—Arnold wounded—Retreat of the Americans—Gallant Resolve of Arnold
Correspondence of Washington and Schuyler on the disasters in Canada—Reinforcements required from New England—Dangers in the Interior of New York—Johnson Hall Beleaguered—Sir John Capitulates—Generous Conduct of Schuyler—Governor Tryon and the Tories—Tory Machinations—Lee at New York—Sir Henry Clinton in the Harbor—Menaces of Lee—The City and River fortified—Lee’s Treatment of the Tories—His Plans of Fortification—Ordered to the Command in Canada—His Speculations on Titles of Dignity
Monotonous State of Affairs before Boston—Washington anxious for Action—Exploit of Putnam—Its Dramatic Consequences—The Farce of the Blockade of Boston—An Alarming Interruption—Distresses of the Besieged—Washington’s Irksome Predicament—His Bold Proposition—Demur of the Council of War—Arrival of Knox with Artillery—Dorchester Heights to be seized and fortified—Preparations for the Attempt
The affair of Dorchester Heights—American and English Letters respecting it—A Laborious Night—Revelations at Daybreak—Howe in a Perplexity—A Night Attack meditated—Stormy Weather—The Town to be evacuated—Negotiations and Arrangements—Preparations to Embark—Excesses of the Troops—Boston Evacuated—Speech of the Duke of Manchester on the subject—A Medal voted by Congress
Destination of the Fleet—Commission of the two Howes—Character of Lord Howe—The Colonies divided into Departments—Lee assigned to the Southern Department—General Thomas to Canada—Character of Lee, by Washington—Letters of Lee from the South—A Dog in a Dancing School—Committee of Safety in Virginia—Lee’s Grenadiers—Putnam in Command at New York—State of Affairs there—Arrival of Washington—New Arrangements—Perplexities with respect to Canada—England subsidizes Hessian Troops
ixArnold blockades Quebec—His Difficulties—Arrival of General Wooster—Of General Thomas—Abortive Attempt on Quebec—Preparations for Retreat—Sortie of Carleton—Retreat of the Americans—Halt at Point Deschambeault—Alarm in the Colonies at the Retreat of the Army—Popular Clamor against Schuyler—Slanders refuted
Gates sent to Philadelphia with the Canada Despatches—Promoted to the rank of Major-General—Washington Summoned to Philadelphia—Putnam left in Command—Conference with Congress—Army Arrangements—A Board of War instituted—The Clintons of New York—Mrs. Washington Inoculated—Reed made Adjutant-General
Affairs in Canada—Disaster at the Cedars—Hostile Designs of the Johnsons—A Bloody Summer expected—Forts in the Highlands—Colonel James Clinton in Command—Fortifications at King’s Bridge and on Long Island
Retreat of General Thomas—His Death—General Sullivan in Command—Scene on the Sorel—Sanguine Expectations of Sullivan—Washington’s Opinion of Sullivan’s Character—Gates appointed to the Command in Canada—Reinforcements of the Enemy—Reverses—Thompson Captured—Retreat of Sullivan—Close of the Invasion of Canada
Designs of the Enemy against New York and the Hudson—Plot of Tryon and the Tories—Arrival of a Fleet—Alarm Posts—Treachery up the Hudson—Fresh Arrivals—General Howe at Staten Island—Washington’s Preparations
First Appearance of Alexander Hamilton—His Early Days—General Hugh Mercer in command of the Flying Camp—Declaration of Independence—Announced to the Army—Downfall of the King’s Statue
Arrival of more Ships—Movements of the Phœnix and the Rose—Panic in the City—Hostile Ships up the Hudson—Stir of War along the River—General George Clinton, and the Militia of Ulster County—Fresh Agitation of New York—Arrival of Lord Howe
Precautions against Tories—Secret Committees—Declaration of Lord Howe—His Letter to the Colonial Governors—His Letter to Washington rejected—Interview between the British Adjutant-General and Colonel Reed—Reception of the Adjutant-General by Washington—The Phœnix and Rose in the Tappan Sea, and Haverstraw Bay—Arming of the River Yeomanry—George Clinton at the Gates of the Highlands
Question of Command between Gates and Schuyler—Condition of the Army at Crown Point—Discontent and Departure of Sullivan—Fortifications at Ticonderoga—The Question of Command adjusted—Secret Discontents—Sectional Jealousies in the Army—Southern Troops—Smallwood’s Macaroni Battalion—Connecticut Light-Horse
Southern Cruise of Sir Henry Clinton—Fortifications at Charleston—Arrival there of General Lee—Battle at Sullivan’s Island—Washington Announces the result to the Army
Putnam’s Military Projects—Chevaux-de-frise at Fort Washington—Meditated Attack on Staten Island—Arrival of Ships—Hessian Reinforcements—Scotch Highlanders—Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis—Putnam’s Obstructions of the Hudson—The Phœnix and Rose Attacked by Row Galleys at Tarrytown—General Order of Washington on the subject of Sectional Jealousies—Profane Swearing prohibited in the Camp—Preparations against Attack—Levies of Yeomanry—George Clinton in Command of the Levies along the Hudson—Alarms of the People of New York—Benevolent Sympathy of Washington—The Phœnix Grappled by a Fire-Ship—The Ships Evacuate the Hudson
Long Island in Possession of the Enemy—Distressed Situation of the American Army at New York—Question of Abandoning the City—Letters from either Camp—Enemy’s Ships in the Sound—Removal of Women and Children from the City—Yearning for Home among the Militia—Tolerant Ideas of Washington and Greene—Fort Constitution—Conference of Lord Howe with a Committee from Congress
Movements of the Enemy—Councils of War—Question of the Abandonment of the City—Distribution of the Army—Ships in the East River—The Enemy at Hell Gate—Skirmish at Turtle Bay—Panic of the Connecticut Militia—Rage and Personal Peril of Washington—Putnam’s Perilous Retreat from the City—British Regale at Murray Hill
Fortified Camp at King’s Bridge—American and British Lines—The Morris House—Alexander Hamilton—The Enemy Advance—Successful Skirmish—Death of Knowlton—Great Fire in New York—Reorganization of the Army—Exchange of Prisoners—Daniel Morgan Regained—De Lancey’s Tory Brigade—Robert Rogers, the Partisan—His Rangers—The Roebuck, Phœnix, and Tartar in the Hudson—Military Movements by Land and Water—Letter of John Jay
Lee expected in Camp—His Letter of Advice to the President of Congress—The Enemy at Throg’s Neck—Washington’s Arrangements—Rides to Throg’s Neck—The Enemy brought to a Stand—Military Movements—Arrival of Lee—A Command assigned to Him—Criticises the Conduct of Congress and the Army—Council of War—The Army to move to the Mainland—Fort Washington to be kept up
Army Arrangements—Washington at White Plains—The Enemy at Throg’s Point—Skirmish of Colonel Glover—Attempt to Surprise Rogers, the Renegade—Troopers in a rough country—Alarms at White Plains—Cannonading of Ships at Fort Washington—March of Lee—Fortified Camp at White Plains—Reconnoitring—The Affair at Chatterton Hill—Relative Situation of the Armies—Change of Position—Contrast of the Appearance of the Troops—George Clinton’s Idea of Strategy—Movement of the British Army—Incendiaries at White Plains
Conjectures as to the Intentions of the Enemy—Consequent Precautions—Correspondence with Greene respecting Fort Washington—Distribution of the Army—Lee left in Command at Northcastle—Instructions to Him—Washington at Peekskill—Visits to the Posts in the Highlands
Affairs on Lake Champlain—Gates at Ticonderoga—Arnold’s Flotilla—Military Preparations of Sir Guy Carleton at St. John’s—Nautical Encounters—Gallant Conduct of Arnold and Waterbury—Carleton in Possession of Crown Point—His return to Canada and Winter Quarters
Washington Crosses the Hudson—Arrives at Fort Lee—Affairs at Fort Washington—Question about its Abandonment—Movements of Howe—Tho Fort summoned to Surrender—Refusal of Colonel McGaw—The Fort Attacked—Capture of the Fort and Garrison—Comments of Washington on the State of Affairs
The Enemy Cross the Hudson—Retreat of the Garrison from Fort Lee—The Crossing of the Hackensack—Lee Ordered to Move to the West side of the River—Reed’s Letter to Him—Second Move of the Army Beyond the Passaic—Assistance sought from various quarters—Correspondence and Schemes of Lee—Heath stanch to his Instructions—Anxiety of George Clinton for the Safety of the Hudson—Critical Situation of the Army—Preparing Correspondence between Lee and Reed—Washington Retreats across the Raritan—Arrives at Trenton—Removes his Baggage across the Delaware—Dismay and Despondency of the Country—Proclamation of Lord Howe—Exultation of the Enemy—Washington’s Resolve in case of Extremity
Lee at Peekskill—Stanch Adherence of Heath to Orders—Lee Crosses the Hudson—Washington at Trenton—Lee at the heels of the Enemy—His Speculations on Military Greatness—Forced March of Cornwallis—Washington Crosses the Delaware—Putnam in Command at Philadelphia—Baffling Letters of Lee—Hopes to Reconquer the Jerseys—Gates on the March—Lee Quartered at Baskingridge—Surprised and Captured—Speculations on his Conduct
Washington Clothed with Additional Powers—Recruitment of the Army—Increased Pay—Colonel John Cadwalader—Arrival of Sullivan—Gates—Wilkinson—A Coup de Main Meditated—Posture of Affairs at Trenton—Gates Declines to take a Part—His Comments on Washington’s Plans—Preparations for the Coup de Main—Crossing of the Delaware—Attack on the Enemy’s Forces at Trenton—Death of Rail—His Character
Episode—Colonel Griffin in the Jerseys—Donop Decoyed—Inroad of Cadwalader and Reed—Retreat and Confusion of the Enemy’s Outposts—Washington Recrosses the Delaware with his Troops—The Game Reversed—The Hessians Hunted back through the Country—Washington made Military Dictator
Howe learns of the Affair at Trenton—Cornwallis sent back to the Jerseys—Reconnoitering Expedition of Reed—His Exploits—Washington in Peril at Trenton—Reinforced by Troops under Cadwalader and Mifflin—Position of his Men—Cornwallis at Trenton—Repulsed at the Assunpink—The American Camp Menaced—Night March of Washington—Affair at Princeton—Death of Mercer—Rout of British Troops—Pursued by Washington—Cornwallis at Princeton—Baffled and Perplexed—Washington at Morristown—His System of Annoyance—The Tables Turned upon the Enemy
On the 3d of July, the morning after his arrival at Cambridge,
Washington took formal command of the army. It was drawn
up on the Common about half a mile from head-quarters. A
multitude had assembled there, for as yet military spectacles
were novelties, and the camp was full of visitors, men, women,
and children, from all parts of the country, who had relatives
among the yeoman soldiery.
An ancient elm is still pointed out, under which Washington,
as he arrived from head-quarters accompanied by General Lee and
2a numerous suite, wheeled his horse, and drew his sword as
commander-in-chief of the armies. We have cited the poetical
description of him furnished by the pen of Mrs. Adams; we
give her sketch of his military compeer—less poetical, but no
less graphic.
“General Lee looks like a careless, hardy veteran; and by
his appearance brought to my mind his namesake, Charles XII.
of Sweden. The elegance of his pen far exceeds that of his
person.”[1]
Accompanied by this veteran campaigner, on whose military
judgment he had great reliance, Washington visited the different
American posts, and rode to the heights, commanding views over
Boston and its environs, being anxious to make himself acquainted
with the strength and relative position of both armies: and
here we will give a few particulars concerning the distinguished
commanders with whom he was brought immediately in competition.
Congress, speaking of them reproachfully, observed, “Three
of England’s most experienced generals are sent to wage war
with their fellow-subjects.” The first here alluded to was the
Honorable William Howe, next in command to Gage. He was
a man of a fine presence, six feet high, well proportioned, and of
graceful deportment. He is said to have been not unlike Washington
in appearance, though wanting his energy and activity.
He lacked also his air of authority; but affability of manners,
and a generous disposition, made him popular with both officers
and soldiers.
There was a sentiment in his favor even among Americans at
the time when he arrived at Boston. It was remembered that
3he was brother to the gallant and generous youth, Lord Howe
who fell in the flower of his days, on the banks of Lake George,
and whose untimely death had been lamented throughout the
colonies. It was remembered that the general himself had won
reputation in the same campaign, commanding the light infantry
under Wolfe, on the famous plains of Abraham. A mournful
feeling had therefore gone through the country, when General
Howe was cited as one of the British commanders who had most
distinguished themselves in the bloody battle of Bunker’s Hill.
Congress spoke of it with generous sensibility, in their address
to the people of Ireland already quoted, “America is amazed,”
said they, “to find the name of Howe on the catalogue of her
enemies—she loved his brother!”
General Henry Clinton, the next in command, was grandson
of the Earl of Lincoln, and son of George Clinton, who had been
Governor of the province of New York for ten years, from 1743.
The general had seen service on the continent in the Seven
Years’ War. He was of short stature, and inclined to corpulency;
with a full face and prominent nose. His manners were
reserved, and altogether he was in strong contrast with Howe,
and by no means so popular.
Burgoyne, the other British general of note, was natural son
of Lord Bingley, and had entered the army at an early age.
While yet a subaltern, he had made a runaway match with a
daughter of the Earl of Derby, who threatened never to admit
the offenders to his presence. In 1758, Burgoyne was a lieutenant-colonel
of light dragoons. In 1761, he was sent with a
force to aid the Portuguese against the Spaniards, joined the
army commanded by the Count de la Lippe, and signalized himself
by surprising and capturing the town of Alcantara. He
4had since been elected to Parliament for the borough of Middlesex,
and displayed considerable parliamentary talents. In 1772,
he was made a major-general. His taste, wit, and intelligence,
and his aptness at devising and promoting elegant amusements,
made him for a time a leader in the gay world; though Junius
accuses him of unfair practices at the gaming table. His reputation
for talents and services had gradually mollified the heart
of his father-in-law, the Earl of Derby. In 1774, he gave celebrity
to the marriage of a son of the Earl with Lady Betty Hamilton,
by producing an elegant dramatic trifle, entitled, “The Maid
of the Oaks,” afterwards performed at Drury Lane, and honored
with a biting sarcasm by Horace Walpole. “There is a new
puppet-show at Drury Lane,” writes the wit, “as fine as the
scenes can make it, and as dull as the author could not help
making it.”[2]
It is but justice to Burgoyne’s memory to add, that in after
years he produced a dramatic work, “The Heiress,” which extorted
even Walpole’s approbation, who pronounced it the genteelest
comedy in the English language.
Such were the three British commanders at Boston, who were
considered especially formidable; and they had with them eleven
thousand veteran troops, well appointed and well disciplined.
In visiting the different posts, Washington halted for a time
at Prospect Hill, which, as its name denotes, commanded a wide
view over Boston and the surrounding country. Here Putnam
had taken his position after the battle of Bunker’s Hill, fortifying
himself with works which he deemed impregnable; and here
the veteran was enabled to point out to the commander-in-chief,
5and to Lee, the main features of the belligerent region, which
lay spread out like a map before them.
Bunker’s Hill was but a mile distant to the west; the British
standard floating as if in triumph on its summit. The main
force under General Howe was intrenching itself strongly about
half a mile beyond the place of the recent battle. Scarlet
uniforms gleamed about the hill; tents and marquees whitened
its sides. All up there was bright, brilliant, and triumphant.
At the base of the hill lay Charlestown in ashes, “nothing to be
seen of that fine town but chimneys and rubbish.”
Howe’s sentries extended a hundred and fifty yards beyond
the neck or isthmus, over which the Americans retreated after
the battle. Three floating batteries in Mystic River commanded
this isthmus, and a twenty-gun ship was anchored between the
peninsula and Boston.
General Gage, the commander-in-chief, still had his head-quarters
in the town, but there were few troops there besides
Burgoyne’s light-horse. A large force, however, was intrenched
south of the town on the neck leading to Roxbury,—the only
entrance to Boston by land.
The American troops were irregularly distributed in a kind
of semicircle eight or nine miles in extent; the left resting on
Winter Hill, the most northern post; the right extending on the
south to Roxbury and Dorchester Neck.
Washington reconnoitred the British posts from various points
of view. Every thing about them was in admirable order. The
works appeared to be constructed with military science, the
troops to be in a high state of discipline. The American camp,
on the contrary, disappointed him. He had expected to find
eighteen or twenty thousand men under arms; there were not
6much more than fourteen thousand. He had expected to find
some degree of system and discipline; whereas all were raw
militia. He had expected to find works scientifically constructed,
and proofs of knowledge and skill in engineering; whereas,
what he saw of the latter was very imperfect, and confined to
the more manual exercise of cannon. There was abundant evidence
of aptness at trenching and throwing up rough defences;
and in that way General Thomas had fortified Roxbury Neck,
and Putnam had strengthened Prospect Hill. But the semicircular
line which linked the extreme posts, was formed of
rudely-constructed works, far too extensive for the troops which
were at hand to man them.
Within this attenuated semicircle, the British forces lay
concentrated and compact; and having command of the water,
might suddenly bring their main strength to bear upon some
weak point, force it, and sever the American camp.
In fact, when we consider the scanty, ill-conditioned and
irregular force which had thus stretched itself out to beleaguer
a town and harbor defended by ships and floating batteries, and
garrisoned by eleven thousand strongly posted veterans, we are
at a loss whether to attribute its hazardous position to ignorance,
or to that daring self-confidence, which at times, in our military
history, has snatched success in defiance of scientific rules. It
was revenge for the slaughter at Lexington which, we are told,
first prompted the investment of Boston. “The universal voice,”
says a contemporary, “is, starve them out. Drive them from
the town, and let His Majesty’s ships be their only place of
refuge.”
In riding throughout the camp, Washington observed that
nine thousand of the troops belonged to Massachusetts; the rest
7were from other provinces. They were encamped in separate
bodies, each with its own regulations, and officers of its own
appointment. Some had tents, others were in barracks, and
others sheltered themselves as best they might. Many were
sadly in want of clothing, and all, said Washington, were strongly
imbued with the spirit of insubordination, which they mistook
for independence.
A chaplain of one of the regiments[3] has left on record a
graphic sketch of this primitive army of the Revolution. “It is
very diverting,” writes he, “to walk among the camps. They
are as different in their forms, as the owners are in their dress;
and every tent is a portraiture of the temper and taste of the
persons who encamp in it. Some are made of boards, and some
are made of sail-cloth; some are partly of one, and partly of
the other. Again others are made of stone and turf, brick and
brush. Some are thrown up in a hurry, others curiously wrought
with wreaths and withes.”
One of the encampments, however, was in striking contrast
with the rest, and might vie with those of the British for order
and exactness. Here were tents and marquees pitched in the
English style; soldiers well drilled and well equipped; every
thing had an air of discipline and subordination. It was a body
of Rhode Island troops, which had been raised, drilled, and
brought to the camp by Brigadier-general Greene, of that province,
whose subsequent renown entitles him to an introduction to
the reader.
Nathaniel Greene was born in Rhode Island, on the 26th of
May, 1742. His father was a miller, an anchor-smith, and a
Quaker preacher. The waters of the Potowhammet turned the
8wheels of the mill, and raised the ponderous sledge-hammer of
the forge. Greene, in his boyhood, followed the plough, and
occasionally worked at the forge of his father. His education
was of an ordinary kind; but having an early thirst for knowledge,
he applied himself sedulously to various studies, while
subsisting by the labor of his hands. Nature had endowed him
with quick parts, and a sound judgment, and his assiduity was
crowned with success. He became fluent and instructive in conversation,
and his letters, still extant, show that he held an able
pen.
In the late turn of public affairs, he had caught the belligerent
spirit prevalent throughout the country. Plutarch and
Cæsar’s Commentaries became his delight. He applied himself
to military studies, for which he was prepared by some knowledge
of mathematics. His ambition was to organize and discipline a
corps of militia to which he belonged. For this purpose, during
a visit to Boston, he had taken note of every thing about the
discipline of the British troops. In the month of May, he had
been elected commander of the Rhode Island contingent of the
army of observation, and in June had conducted to the lines
before Boston, three regiments, whose encampment we have just
described, and who were pronounced the best disciplined and
appointed troops in the army.
Greene made a soldierlike address to Washington, welcoming
him to the camp. His appearance and manner were calculated
to make a favorable impression. He was about thirty-nine years
of age, nearly six feet high, well built and vigorous, with an open,
animated, intelligent countenance, and a frank, manly demeanor.
He may be said to have stepped at once into the confidence
of the commander-in-chief, which he never forfeited, but became
9one of his most attached, faithful, and efficient coadjutors
throughout the war.
Having taken his survey of the army, Washington wrote to
the President of Congress, representing its various deficiencies,
and, among other things, urging the appointment of a commissary-general,
a quartermaster-general, a commissary of musters, and
a commissary of artillery. Above all things, he requested a supply
of money as soon as possible. “I find myself already much
embarrassed for want of a military chest.”
In one of his recommendations we have an instance of frontier
expediency, learnt in his early campaigns. Speaking of the
ragged condition of the army, and the difficulty of procuring the
requisite kind of clothing, he advises that a number of hunting-shirts,
not less than ten thousand, should be provided; as being
the cheapest and quickest mode of supplying this necessity. “I
know nothing in a speculative view more trivial,” observes he,
“yet which, if put in practice, would have a happier tendency to
unite the men, and abolish those provincial distinctions that lead
to jealousy and dissatisfaction.”
Among the troops most destitute, were those belonging
to Massachusetts, which formed the larger part of the army.
Washington made a noble apology for them. “This unhappy
and devoted province,” said he, “has been so long in a state of
anarchy, and the yoke has been laid so heavily on it, that great
allowances are to be made for troops raised under such circumstances.
The deficiency of numbers, discipline, and stores,
can only lead to this conclusion, that their spirit has exceeded
their strength.”
This apology was the more generous, coming from a Southerner;
for there was a disposition among the Southern officers
10to regard the Eastern troops disparagingly. But Washington
already felt as commander-in-chief, who looked with an equal eye
on all; or rather as a true patriot, who was above all sectional
prejudices.
One of the most efficient co-operators of Washington at this
time, and throughout the war, was Jonathan Trumbull, the Governor
of Connecticut. He was a well educated man, experienced
in public business, who had sat for many years in the legislative
councils of his native province. Misfortune had cast him down
from affluence, at an advanced period of life, but had not subdued
his native energy. He had been one of the leading spirits of
the Revolution, and the only colonial governor who, at its commencement,
proved true to the popular cause. He was now sixty-five
years of age, active, zealous, devout, a patriot of the primitive
New England stamp, whose religion sanctified his patriotism. A
letter addressed by him to Washington, just after the latter had
entered upon the command, is worthy of the purest days of the
Covenanters. “Congress,” writes he, “have, with one united
voice, appointed you to the high station you possess. The Supreme
Director of all events hath caused a wonderful union of
hearts and counsels to subsist among us.
“Now, therefore, be strong, and very courageous. May the
God of the armies of Israel shower down the blessings of his
Divine providence on you; give you wisdom and fortitude, cover
your head in the day of battle and danger, add success, convince
our enemies of their mistaken measures, and that all their attempts
to deprive these colonies of their inestimable constitutional
rights and liberties, are injurious and vain.”
11NOTE.
We are obliged to Professor Felton, of Cambridge, for correcting an error
in our first volume in regard to Washington’s head-quarters, and for some particulars
concerning a house, associated with the history and literature of our
country.
The house assigned to Washington for head-quarters, was that of the president
of the Provincial Congress, not of the University. It had been one of
those tory mansions noticed by the Baroness Reidesel, in her mention of Cambridge.
“Seven families, who were connected by relationship, or lived in
great intimacy, had here farms, gardens, and splendid mansions, and not far
off, orchards; and the buildings were at a quarter of a mile distant from each
other. The owners had been in the habit of assembling every afternoon in one
or other of these houses, and of diverting themselves with music or dancing;
and lived in affluence, in good humor, and without care, until this unfortunate
war dispersed them, and transformed all these houses into solitary abodes.”
The house in question was confiscated by Government. It stood on the
Watertown road, about half a mile west of the college, and has long been
known as the Cragie house, from the name of Andrew Cragie, a wealthy gentleman,
who purchased it after the war, and revived its former hospitality.
He is said to have acquired great influence among the leading members of the
“great and general court,” by dint of jovial dinners. He died long ago, but
his widow survived until within fifteen years. She was a woman of much talent
and singularity. She refused to have the canker worms destroyed, when
they were making sad ravages among the beautiful trees on the lawn before
the house. “We are all worms,” said she, “and they have as good a right
here as I have.” The consequence was that more than half of the trees perished.
The Cragie House is associated with American literature through some of
its subsequent occupants. Mr. Edward Everett resided in it the first year or
two after his marriage. Later, Mr. Jared Sparks, during part of the time that
he was preparing his collection of Washington’s writings; editing a volume or
two of his letters in the very room from which they were written. Next came
Mr. Worcester, author of the pugnacious dictionary, and of many excellent
books, and lastly Longfellow, the poet, who, having married the heroine of
Hyperion, purchased the house of the heirs of Mr. Cragie and refitted it.
CHAPTER II. QUESTIONS OF MILITARY RANK—POPULARITY OF PUTNAM—ARRANGEMENTS AT HEAD-QUARTERS—COLONEL MIFFLIN AND JOHN TRUMBULL, AIDES-DE-CAMP—JOSEPH REED, WASHINGTON’S SECRETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL FRIEND—GATES AS ADJUTANT-GENERAL—HAZARDOUS SITUATION OF THE ARMY—STRENGTHENING OF THE DEFENCES—EFFICIENCY OF PUTNAM—RAPID CHANGES—NEW DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCES—RIGID DISCIPLINE—LEE AND HIS CANE—HIS IDEA AS TO STRONG BATTALIONS—ARRIVAL OF RIFLE COMPANIES—DANIEL MORGAN AND HIS SHARP SHOOTERS—WASHINGTON DECLINES TO DETACH TROOPS TO DISTANT POINTS FOR THEIR PROTECTION—HIS REASONS FOR SO DOING.
12
The justice and impartiality of Washington were called into exercise
as soon as he entered upon his command, in allaying discontents
among his general officers, caused by the recent appointments
and promotions made by the Continental Congress. General
Spencer was so offended that Putnam should be promoted
over his head, that he left the army, without visiting the commander-in-chief;
but was subsequently induced to return. General
Thomas felt aggrieved by being outranked by the veteran
Pomeroy; the latter, however, declining to serve, he found himself
senior brigadier, and was appeased.
The sterling merits of Putnam soon made everyone acquiesce
in his promotion. There was a generosity and buoyancy about
13the brave old man that made him a favorite throughout the army;
especially with the younger officers, who spoke of him familiarly
and fondly as “Old Put;” a sobriquet by which he is called
even in one of the private letters of the commander-in-chief.
The Congress of Massachusetts manifested considerate liberality
with respect to head-quarters. According to their minutes,
a committee was charged to procure a steward, a housekeeper, and
two or three women cooks; Washington, no doubt, having brought
with him none but the black servants who had accompanied him
to Philadelphia, and who were but little fitted for New England
housekeeping. His wishes were to be consulted in regard to the
supply of his table. This his station, as commander-in-chief, required
should be kept up in ample and hospitable style. Every
day a number of his officers dined with him. As he was in the
neighborhood of the seat of the Provincial Government, he
would occasionally have members of Congress and other functionaries
at his board. Though social, however, he was not convivial
in his habits. He received his guests with courtesy; but his
mind and time were too much occupied by grave and anxious
concerns, to permit him the genial indulgence of the table. His
own diet was extremely simple. Sometimes nothing but baked
apples or berries, with cream and milk. He would retire early
from the board, leaving an aide-de-camp or one of his officers to
take his place. Colonel Mifflin was the first person who officiated
as aide-de-camp. He was a Philadelphia gentleman of high
respectability, who had accompanied him from that city, and received
his appointment shortly after their arrival at Cambridge.
The second aide-de-camp was John Trumbull,[4] son of the Governor
of Connecticut. He had accompanied General Spencer to
14the camp, and had caught the favorable notice of Washington
by some drawings which he had made of the enemy’s works.
“I now suddenly found myself,” writes Trumbull, “in the family
of one of the most distinguished and dignified men of the age;
surrounded at his table by the principal officers of the army, and
in constant intercourse with them—it was further my duty to receive
company, and do the honors of the house to many of the
first people of the country of both sexes.” Trumbull was young,
and unaccustomed to society, and soon found himself, he says, unequal
to the elegant duties of his situation; he gladly exchanged
it, therefore, for that of major of brigade.
The member of Washington’s family most deserving of mention
at present, was his secretary, Mr. Joseph Reed. With this
gentleman he had formed an intimacy in the course of his visits
to Philadelphia, to attend the sessions of the Continental Congress.
Mr. Reed was an accomplished man, had studied law in America,
and at the Temple in London, and had gained a high reputation at
the Philadelphia bar. In the dawning of the Revolution he had
embraced the popular cause, and carried on a correspondence with
the Earl of Dartmouth, endeavoring to enlighten that minister on
the subject of colonial affairs. He had since been highly instrumental
in rousing the Philadelphians to co-operate with the
patriots of Boston. A sympathy of views and feelings had attached
him to Washington, and induced him to accompany him to
the camp. He had no definite purpose when he left home, and
his friends in Philadelphia were surprised, on receiving a letter
from him written from Cambridge, to find that he had accepted
the post of secretary to the commander-in-chief.
They expostulated with him by letter. That a man in the
thirty-fifth year of his age, with a lucrative profession, a young
15wife and growing family, and a happy home, should suddenly
abandon all to join the hazardous fortunes of a revolutionary
camp, appeared to them the height of infatuation. They remonstrated
on the peril of the step. “I have no inclination,” replied
Reed, “to be hanged for half treason. When a subject draws
his sword against his prince, he must cut his way through, if he
means to sit down in safety. I have taken too active a part in
what may be called the civil part of opposition, to renounce,
without disgrace, the public cause when it seems to lead to danger;
and have a most sovereign contempt for the man who can
plan measures he has not the spirit to execute.”
Washington has occasionally been represented as cold and reserved;
yet his intercourse with Mr. Reed is a proof to the contrary.
His friendship towards him was frank and cordial, and
the confidence he reposed in him full and implicit. Reed, in fact,
became, in a little time, the intimate companion of his thoughts,
his bosom counsellor. He felt the need of such a friend in the
present exigency, placed as he was in a new and untried situation,
and having to act with persons hitherto unknown to him.
In military matters, it is true he had a shrewd counsellor in
General Lee; but Lee was a wayward character; a cosmopolite,
without attachment to country, somewhat splenetic, and prone to
follow the bent of his whims and humors, which often clashed
with propriety and sound policy. Reed on the contrary, though
less informed on military matters, had a strong common sense,
unclouded by passion or prejudice, and a pure patriotism, which
regarded every thing as it bore upon the welfare of his country.
Washington’s confidence in Lee had always to be measured
and guarded in matters of civil policy.
The arrival of Gates in camp, was heartily welcomed by the
16commander-in-chief, who had received a letter from that officer,
gratefully acknowledging his friendly influence in procuring him
the appointment of adjutant-general. Washington may have promised
himself much cordial co-operation from him, recollecting
the warm friendship professed by him when he visited at Mount
Vernon, and they talked together over their early companionship
in arms; but of that kind of friendship there was no further
manifestation. Gates was certainly of great service, from his
practical knowledge and military experience at this juncture, when
the whole army had in a manner to be organized; but from the
familiar intimacy of Washington he gradually estranged himself.
A contemporary has accounted for this, by alleging that he was
secretly chagrined at not having received the appointment of
major-general, to which he considered himself well fitted by his
military knowledge and experience, and which he thought Washington
might have obtained for him had he used his influence with
Congress. We shall have to advert to this estrangement of
Gates on subsequent occasions.
The hazardous position of the army from the great extent and
weakness of its lines, was what most pressed on the immediate attention
of Washington; and he summoned a council of war, to
take the matter into consideration. In this it was urged that, to
abandon the line of works, after the great labor and expense of
their construction, would be dispiriting to the troops and encouraging
to the enemy, while it would expose a wide extent of the
surrounding country to maraud and ravage. Beside, no safer
position presented itself, on which to fall back. This being generally
admitted, it was determined to hold on to the works, and
defend them as long as possible; and, in the mean time, to augment
the army to at least twenty thousand men.
17Washington now hastened to improve the defences of the
camp, strengthen the weak parts of the line, and throw up additional
works round the main forts. No one seconded him more
effectually in this matter than General Putnam. No works were
thrown up with equal rapidity to those under his superintendence.
“You seem, general,” said Washington, “to have the faculty of
infusing your own spirit into all the workmen you employ;”—and
it was the fact.
The observing chaplain already cited, gazed with wonder at
the rapid effects soon produced by the labors of an army. “It
is surprising,” writes he, “how much work has been done. The
lines are extended almost from Cambridge to Mystic River; very
soon it will be morally impossible for the enemy to get between
the works, except in one place, which is supposed to be left purposely
unfortified, to entice the enemy out of their fortresses.
Who would have thought, twelve months past, that all Cambridge
and Charlestown would be covered over with American camps,
and cut up into forts and intrenchments, and all the lands, fields,
orchards, laid common,—horses and cattle feeding on the choicest
mowing land, whole fields of corn eaten down to the ground, and
large parks of well-regulated forest trees cut down for fire-wood
and other public uses.”
Beside the main dispositions above mentioned, about seven
hundred men were distributed in the small towns and villages
along the coast, to prevent depredations by water; and horses
were kept ready saddled at various points of the widely extended
lines, to convey to head-quarters intelligence of any special movement
of the enemy.
The army was distributed by Washington into three grand
divisions. One, forming the right wing, was stationed on the
18heights of Roxbury. It was commanded by Major-general Ward,
who had under him Brigadier-generals Spencer and Thomas.
Another, forming the left wing under Major-general Lee, having
with him Brigadier-generals Sullivan and Greene, was stationed
on Winter and Prospect Hills; while the centre, under Major-general
Putnam and Brigadier-general Heath, was stationed at Cambridge.
With Putnam was encamped his favorite officer Knowlton
who had been promoted by Congress to the rank of major
for his gallantry at Bunker’s Hill.
At Washington’s recommendation, Joseph Trumbull, the eldest
son of the governor, received on the 24th of July the appointment
of commissary-general of the continental army. He had
already officiated with talent in that capacity in the Connecticut
militia. “There is a great overturning in the camp as to order
and regularity,” writes the military chaplain; “new lords, new
laws. The generals Washington and Lee are upon the lines every
day. New orders from his excellency are read to the respective
regiments every morning after prayers. The strictest government
is taking place, and great distinction is made between officers and
soldiers. Every one is made to know his place and keep it, or be
tied up and receive thirty or forty lashes according to his crime.
Thousands are at work every day from four till eleven o’clock in
the morning.”
Lee was supposed to have been at the bottom of this rigid
discipline; the result of his experience in European campaigning.
His notions of military authority were acquired in the armies of
the North. Quite a sensation was, on one occasion, produced in
camp by his threatening to cane an officer for unsoldierly conduct.
His laxity in other matters occasioned almost equal scandal. He
scoffed, we are told, “with his usual profaneness,” at a resolution
19of Congress appointing a day of fasting and prayer, to obtain the
favor of Heaven upon their cause. “Heaven,” he observed,
“was ever found favorable to strong battalions.”[5]
Washington differed from him in this respect. By his orders
the resolution of Congress was scrupulously enforced. All labor,
excepting that absolutely necessary, was suspended on the appointed
day, and officers and soldiers were required to attend divine
service, armed and equipped and ready for immediate action.
Nothing excited more gaze and wonder among the rustic visitors
to the camp, than the arrival of several rifle companies, fourteen
hundred men in all, from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia;
such stalwart fellows as Washington had known in his
early campaigns. Stark hunters and bush fighters; many of
them upwards of six feet high, and of vigorous frame; dressed
in fringed frocks, or rifle shirts, and round hats. Their displays
of sharp shooting were soon among the marvels of the camp.
We are told that while advancing at quick step, they could hit a
mark of seven inches diameter, at the distance of two hundred
and fifty yards.[6]
One of these companies was commanded by Captain Daniel
Morgan, a native of New Jersey, whose first experience in war
had been to accompany Braddock’s army as a waggoner. He had
since carried arms on the frontier and obtained a command. He
and his riflemen in coming to the camp had marched six hundred
miles in three weeks. They will be found of signal efficiency in
the sharpest conflicts of the revolutionary war.
While all his forces were required for the investment of
Boston, Washington was importuned by the Legislature of Massachusetts
and the Governor of Connecticut, to detach troops for
20the protection of different points of the sea-coast, where depredations
by armed vessels were apprehended. The case of New
London was specified by Governor Trumbull, where Captain
Wallace of the Rose frigate, with two other ships of war, had
entered the harbor, landed men, spiked the cannon, and gone off
threatening future visits.
Washington referred to his instructions, and consulted with
his general officers and such members of the Continental Congress
as happened to be in camp, before he replied to these requests;
he then respectfully declined compliance.
In his reply to the General Assembly of Massachusetts, he
stated frankly and explicitly the policy and system on which the
war was to be conducted, and according to which he was to act
as commander-in-chief. “It has been debated in Congress and
settled,” writes he, “that the militia, or other internal strength of
each province, is to be applied for defence against those small and
particular depredations, which were to be expected, and to which
they were supposed to be competent. This will appear the more
proper, when it is considered that every town, and indeed every
part of our sea-coast, which is exposed to these depredations,
would have an equal claim upon this army.
“It is the misfortune of our situation which exposes us to
these ravages, and against which, in my judgment, no such temporary
relief could possibly secure us. The great advantage the
enemy have of transporting troops, by being masters of the sea,
will enable them to harass us by diversions of this kind; and
should we be tempted to pursue them, upon every alarm, the
army must either be so weakened as to expose it to destruction,
or a great part of the coast be still left unprotected. Nor, indeed,
does it appear to me that such a pursuit would be attended with
21the least effect. The first notice of such an excursion would be
its actual execution, and long before any troops could reach the
scene of action, the enemy would have an opportunity to accomplish
their purpose and retire. It would give me great pleasure
to have it in my power to extend protection and safety to every
individual; but the wisdom of the General Court will anticipate
me on the necessity of conducting our operations on a general
and impartial scale, so as to exclude any just cause of complaint
and jealousy.”
His reply to the Governor of Connecticut was to the same
effect. “I am by no means insensible to the situation of the
people on the coast. I wish I could extend protection to all, but
the numerous detachments necessary to remedy the evil would
amount to a dissolution of the army, or make the most important
operations of the campaign depend upon the piratical expeditions
of two or three men-of-war and transports.”
His refusal to grant the required detachments gave much
dissatisfaction in some quarters, until sanctioned and enforced by
the Continental Congress. All at length saw and acquiesced in
the justice and wisdom of his decision. It was in fact a vital
question, involving the whole character and fortune of the war;
and it was acknowledged that he met it with a forecast and determination
befitting a commander-in-chief.
CHAPTER III. WASHINGTON’S OBJECT IN DISTRESSING BOSTON—SCARCITY AND SICKNESS IN THE TOWN—A STARTLING DISCOVERY—SCARCITY OF POWDER IN THE CAMP—ITS PERILOUS SITUATION—ECONOMY OF AMMUNITION—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LEE AND BURGOYNE—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND GAGE—THE DIGNITY OF THE PATRIOT ARMY ASSERTED.
22
The great object of Washington at present, was to force the enemy
to come out of Boston and try a decisive action. His lines
had for some time cut off all communication of the town with
the country, and he had caused the live stock within a considerable
distance of the place to be driven back from the coast, out of
reach of the men-of-war’s boats. Fresh provisions and vegetables
were consequently growing more and more scarce and extravagantly
dear, and sickness began to prevail. “I have done and
shall do every thing in my power to distress them,” writes he to
his brother John Augustine. “The transports have all arrived,
and their whole reinforcement is landed, so that I see no reason
why they should not, if they ever attempt it, come boldly out and
put the matter to issue at once.”
“We are in the strangest state in the world,” writes a lady
from Boston, “surrounded on all sides. The whole country is
in arms and intrenched. We are deprived of fresh provisions,
23subject to continual alarms and cannonadings, the Provincials
being very audacious and advancing to our lines, since the arrival
of Generals Washington and Lee to command them.”
At this critical juncture, when Washington was pressing the
siege, and endeavoring to provoke a general action, a startling
fact came to light; the whole amount of powder in the camp
would not furnish more than nine cartridges to a man![7]
A gross error had been made by the committee of supplies
when Washington, on taking command, had required a return of
the ammunition. They had returned the whole amount of powder
collected by the province, upwards of three hundred barrels;
without stating what had been expended. The blunder was detected
on an order being issued for a new supply of cartridges.
It was found that there were but thirty-two barrels of powder in
store.
This was an astounding discovery. Washington instantly
despatched letters and expresses to Rhode Island, the Jerseys,
Ticonderoga and elsewhere, urging immediate supplies of powder
and lead; no quantity, however small, to be considered beneath
notice. In a letter to Governor Cooke of Rhode Island, he suggested
that an armed vessel of that province might be sent to
seize upon a magazine of gunpowder, said to be in a remote part
of the Island of Bermuda. “I am very sensible,” writes he,
“that at first view the project may appear hazardous, and its success
must depend on the concurrence of many circumstances; but
we are in a situation which requires us to run all risks. * * *
Enterprises which appear chimerical, often prove successful from
that very circumstance. Common sense and prudence will suggest
vigilance and care, where the danger is plain and obvious;
24but where little danger is apprehended, the more the enemy will
be unprepared, and, consequently, there is the fairest prospect of
success.”
Day after day elapsed without the arrival of any supplies; for
in these irregular times, the munitions of war were not readily
procured. It seemed hardly possible that the matter could be
kept concealed from the enemy. Their works on Bunker’s Hill
commanded a full view of those of the Americans on Winter and
Prospect Hills. Each camp could see what was passing in the
other. The sentries were almost near enough to converse.
There was furtive intercourse occasionally between the men.
In this critical state, the American camp remained for a fortnight;
the anxious commander incessantly apprehending an
attack. At length a partial supply from the Jerseys put an end
to this imminent risk. Washington’s secretary, Reed, who had
been the confidant of his troubles and anxieties, gives a vivid expression
of his feelings on the arrival of this relief. “I can
hardly look back, without shuddering, at our situation before this
increase of our stock. Stock did I say? it was next to nothing.
Almost the whole powder of the army was in the cartridge-boxes.”[8]
It is thought that, considering the clandestine intercourse
carried on between the two camps, intelligence of this deficiency
of ammunition on the part of the besiegers must have been conveyed
to the British commander; but that the bold face with
which the Americans continued to maintain their position, made
him discredit it.
Notwithstanding the supply from the Jerseys, there was not
more powder in camp than would serve the artillery for one
25day of general action. None, therefore, was allowed to be
wasted; the troops were even obliged to bear in silence an occasional
cannonading. “Our poverty in ammunition,” writes
Washington, “prevents our making a suitable return.”
One of the painful circumstances attending the outbreak of a
revolutionary war is, that gallant men, who have held allegiance
to the same government, and fought side by side under the same
flag, suddenly find themselves in deadly conflict with each other.
Such was the case at present in the hostile camps. General Lee,
it will be recollected, had once served under General Burgoyne,
in Portugal, and had won his brightest laurels when detached by
that commander to surprise the Spanish camp, near the Moorish
castle of Villa Velha. A soldier’s friendship had ever since existed
between them, and when Lee had heard at Philadelphia,
before he had engaged in the American service, that his old comrade
and commander was arrived at Boston, he wrote a letter to
him giving his own views on the points in dispute between the
colonies and the mother country, and inveighing with his usual
vehemence and sarcastic point, against the conduct of the court
and ministry. Before sending the letter, he submitted it to the
Boston delegates and other members of Congress, and received
their sanction.
Since his arrival in camp he had received a reply from
Burgoyne, couched in moderate and courteous language, and
proposing an interview at a designated house on Boston Neck,
within the British sentries; mutual pledges to be given for each
other’s safety.
Lee submitted this letter to the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,
and requested their commands with respect to the
proposed interview. They expressed, in reply, the highest confidence
26in his wisdom, discretion and integrity, but questioned
whether the interview might not be regarded by the public with
distrust; “a people contending for their liberties being naturally
disposed to jealousy.” They suggested, therefore, as a means of
preventing popular misconception, that Lee on seeking the interview,
should be accompanied by Mr. Elbridge Gerry; or that the
advice of a council of war should be taken in a matter of such
apparent delicacy.
Lee became aware of the surmises that might be awakened by
the proposed interview, and wrote a friendly note to Burgoyne
declining it.
A correspondence of a more important character took place
between Washington and General Gage. It was one intended
to put the hostile services on a proper footing. A strong disposition
had been manifested among the British officers to regard
those engaged in the patriot cause as malefactors, outlawed from
the courtesies of chivalric warfare. Washington was determined
to have a full understanding on this point. He was peculiarly
sensitive with regard to Gage. They had been companions in
arms in their early days; but Gage might now affect to look
down upon him as the chief of a rebel army. Washington
took an early opportunity to let him know, that he claimed to be
the commander of a legitimate force, engaged in a legitimate
cause, and that both himself and his army were to be treated on
a footing of perfect equality. The correspondence arose from
the treatment of several American officers.
“I understand,” writes Washington to Gage, “that the officers
engaged in the cause of liberty and their country, who by
the fortune of war have fallen into your hands, have been thrown
indiscriminately into a common jail, appropriated to felons; that
27no consideration has been had for those of the most respectable
rank, when languishing with wounds and sickness, and that some
have been amputated in this unworthy situation. Let your opinion,
sir, of the principles which actuate them, be what it may,
they suppose that they act from the noblest of all principles, love
of freedom and their country. But political principles, I conceive,
are foreign to this point. The obligations arising from the
rights of humanity and claims of rank are universally binding
and extensive, except in case of retaliation. These, I should
have hoped, would have dictated a more tender treatment of
those individuals whom chance or war had put in your power.
Nor can I forbear suggesting its fatal tendency to widen that unhappy
breach which you, and those ministers under whom you
act, have repeatedly declared your wish to see for ever closed.
My duty now makes it necessary to apprise you that, for the future,
I shall regulate all my conduct towards those gentlemen
who are, or may be, in our possession, exactly by the rule you
shall observe towards those of ours, now in your custody.
“If severity and hardships mark the line of your conduct,
painful as it may be to me, your prisoners will feel its effects.
But if kindness and humanity are shown to us, I shall with pleasure
consider those in our hands only as unfortunate, and they
shall receive from me that treatment to which the unfortunate
are ever entitled.”
The following are the essential parts of a letter from General
Gage in reply.
“Sir,—To the glory of civilized nations, humanity and war
have been compatible, and humanity to the subdued has become
almost a general system. Britons, ever pre-eminent in mercy,
have outgone common examples, and overlooked the criminal in the
28captive. Upon these principles your prisoners, whose lives by the
law of the land are destined to the cord, have hitherto been
treated with care and kindness, and more comfortably lodged
than the King’s troops in the hospitals; indiscriminately it is
true, for I acknowledge no rank that is not derived from the King.
“My intelligence from your army would justify severe recriminations.
I understand there are of the King’s faithful subjects,
taken some time since by the rebels, laboring, like negro slaves
to gain their daily subsistence, or reduced to the wretched alternative
to perish by famine or take arms against their King and
country. Those who have made the treatment of the prisoners
in my hands, or of your other friends in Boston, a pretence for
such measures, found barbarity upon falsehood.
“I would willingly hope, sir, that the sentiments of liberality
which I have always believed you to possess, will be exerted to
correct these misdoings. Be temperate in political disquisition;
give free operation to truth, and punish those who deceive and
misrepresent; and not only the effects, but the cause, of this
unhappy conflict will be removed. Should those, under whose
usurped authority you act, control such a disposition, and dare to
call severity retaliation; to God, who knows all hearts, be the
appeal of the dreadful consequences,” &c.
There were expressions in the foregoing letter well calculated
to rouse indignant feelings in the most temperate bosom. Had
Washington been as readily moved to transports of passion as
some are pleased to represent him, the rebel and the cord might
readily have stung him to fury; but with him, anger was checked
in its impulses by higher energies, and reined in to give a grander
effect to the dictates of his judgment. The following was his
noble and dignified reply to General Gage:
29“I addressed you, sir, on the 11th instant, in terms which gave
the fairest scope for that humanity and politeness which were
supposed to form a part of your character. I remonstrated with
you on the unworthy treatment shown to the officers and citizens
of America, whom the fortune of war, chance, or a mistaken
confidence had thrown into your hands. Whether British or
American mercy, fortitude and patience, are most pre-eminent;
whether our virtuous citizens, whom the hand of tyranny has
forced into arms to defend their wives, their children and their
property, or the merciless instruments of lawless domination,
avarice, and revenge, best deserve the appellation of rebels, and
the punishment of that cord, which your affected clemency has
forborne to inflict; whether the authority under which I act is
usurped, or founded upon the genuine principles of liberty, were
altogether foreign to the subject. I purposely avoided all political
disquisition; nor shall I now avail myself of those advantages
which the sacred cause of my country, of liberty, and of human
nature give me over you; much less shall I stoop to retort and
invective; but the intelligence you say you have received from
our army requires a reply. I have taken time, sir, to make a
strict inquiry, and find it has not the least foundation in truth.
Not only your officers and soldiers have been treated with the
tenderness due to fellow-citizens and brethren, but even those execrable
parricides, whose counsels and aid have deluged their
country with blood, have been protected from the fury of a justly
enraged people. Far from compelling or permitting their assistance,
I am embarrassed with the numbers who crowd to our
camp, animated with the purest principles of virtue and love to
their country. * * * * * * * *
“You affect, sir, to despise all rank not derived from the same
30source with your own. I cannot conceive one more honorable,
than that which flows from the uncorrupted choice of a brave and
free people, the purest source and original fountain of all power.
Far from making it a plea for cruelty, a mind of true magnanimity
and enlarged ideas would comprehend and respect it.
“What may have been the ministerial views which have
precipitated the present crisis, Lexington, Concord, and Charlestown
can best declare. May that God, to whom you, too, appeal,
judge between America and you. Under his providence, those
who influence the councils of America, and all the other inhabitants
of the united colonies, at the hazard of their lives, are determined
to hand down to posterity those just and invaluable
privileges which they received from their ancestors.
“I shall now, sir, close my correspondence with you, perhaps
for ever. If your officers, our prisoners, receive a treatment from
me different from that which I wished to show them, they and
you will remember the occasion of it.”
We have given these letters of Washington almost entire, for
they contain his manifesto as commander-in-chief of the armies
of the Revolution; setting forth the opinions and motives by
which he was governed, and the principles on which hostilities on
his part would be conducted. It was planting with the pen, that
standard which was to be maintained by the sword.
In conformity with the threat conveyed in the latter part of
his letter, Washington issued orders that British officers at
Watertown and Cape Ann, who were at large on parole, should be
confined in Northampton jail; explaining to them that this conduct,
which might appear to them harsh and cruel, was contrary
to his disposition, but according to the rule of treatment observed
by General Gage toward the American prisoners in his hands;
31making no distinction of rank. Circumstances, of which we
have no explanation, induced subsequently a revocation of this
order; the officers were permitted to remain as before, at large
upon parole, experiencing every indulgence and civility consistent
with their security.
CHAPTER IV. DANGERS IN THE INTERIOR—MACHINATIONS OF THE JOHNSON FAMILY—RIVALRY OF ETHAN ALLEN AND BENEDICT ARNOLD—GOVERNMENT PERPLEXITIES ABOUT THE TICONDEROGA CAPTURE—MEASURES TO SECURE THE PRIZE—ALLEN AND ARNOLD AMBITIOUS OF FURTHER LAURELS—PROJECTS FOR THE INVASION OF CANADA—ETHAN ALLEN AND SETH WARNER HONORED BY CONGRESS—ARNOLD DISPLACED BY A COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY—HIS INDIGNATION—NEWS FROM CANADA—THE REVOLUTION TO BE EXTENDED INTO THAT PROVINCE—ENLISTMENT OF GREEN MOUNTAIN BOYS—SCHUYLER AT TICONDEROGA—STATE OF AFFAIRS THERE—ELECTION FOR OFFICERS OF THE GREEN MOUNTAIN BOYS—ETHAN ALLEN DISMOUNTED—JOINS THE ARMY AS A VOLUNTEER—PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF CANADA—GENERAL MONTGOMERY—INDIAN CHIEFS AT CAMBRIDGE—COUNCIL FIRE—PLAN FOR AN EXPEDITION AGAINST QUEBEC—DEPARTURE OF TROOPS FROM TICONDEROGA—ARRIVAL AT ISLE AUX NOIX.
32
We must interrupt our narrative of the siege of Boston to give
an account of events in other quarters, requiring the superintending
care of Washington as commander-in-chief. Letters from
General Schuyler, received in the course of July, had awakened
apprehensions of danger from the interior. The Johnsons were
said to be stirring up the Indians in the western parts of New
York to hostility, and preparing to join the British forces in
Canada; so that, while the patriots were battling for their rights
along the seaboard, they were menaced by a powerful combination
in rear. To place this matter in a proper light, we will give a
33brief statement of occurrences in the upper part of New York,
and on the frontiers of Canada, since the exploits of Ethan Allen
and Benedict Arnold, at Ticonderoga and on Lake Champlain.
Great rivalry, as has already been noted, had arisen between
these doughty leaders. Both had sent off expresses to the provincial
authorities, giving an account of their recent triumphs.
Allen claimed command at Ticonderoga, on the authority of the
committee from the Connecticut Assembly, which had originated
the enterprise. Arnold claimed it on the strength of his instructions
from the Massachusetts committee of safety. He bore a
commission, too, given him by that committee; whereas Allen
had no other commission than that given him before the war by
the committees in the Hampshire Grants, to command their Green
Mountain Boys against the encroachments of New York.
“Colonel Allen,” said Arnold, “is a proper man to head his
own wild people, but entirely unacquainted with military service,
and as I am the only person who has been legally authorized to
take possession of this place, I am determined to insist on my
right; * * * and shall keep it [the fort] at every hazard,
until I have further orders.”[9]
The public bodies themselves seemed perplexed what to do
with the prize, so bravely seized upon by these bold men. Allen
had written to the Albany committee, for men and provisions, to
enable him to maintain his conquest. The committee feared this
daring enterprise might involve the northern part of the province
in the horrors of war and desolation, and asked advice of the
New York committee. The New York committee did not think
themselves authorized to give an opinion upon a matter of such
importance, and referred it to the Continental Congress.
34The Massachusetts committee of safety, to whom Arnold had
written, referred the affair to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress.
That body, as the enterprise had begun in Connecticut,
wrote to its General Assembly to take the whole matter under
their care and direction, until the advice of the Continental Congress
could be had.
The Continental Congress at length legitimated the exploit,
and, as it were, accepted the captured fortress. As it was
situated within New York, the custody of it was committed to
that province, aided if necessary by the New England colonies,
on whom it was authorized to call for military assistance.
The Provincial Congress of New York forthwith invited the
“Governor and Company of the English colony of Connecticut”
to place part of their forces in these captured posts, until relieved
by New York troops; and Trumbull, the Governor of Connecticut,
soon gave notice that one thousand men under Colonel Hinman,
were on the point of marching, for the reinforcement of
Ticonderoga and Crown Point.
It had been the idea of the Continental Congress to have
those posts dismantled, and the cannon and stores removed to the
south end of Lake George, where a strong post was to be established.
But both Allen and Arnold exclaimed against such a
measure; vaunting, and with reason, the importance of those
forts.
Both Allen and Arnold were ambitious of further laurels.
Both were anxious to lead an expedition into Canada; and
Ticonderoga and Crown Point would open the way to it. “The
Key is ours,” writes Allen to the New York Congress. “If the
colonies would suddenly push an army of two or three thousand
men into Canada, they might make an easy conquest of all that
35would oppose them, in the extensive province of Quebec, except
a reinforcement from England should prevent it. Such a diversion
would weaken Gage, and insure us Canada. I wish to God
America would, at this critical juncture, exert herself agreeably
to the indignity offered her by a tyrannical ministry. She might
rise on eagles’ wings, and mount up to glory, freedom, and
immortal honor, if she did but know and exert her strength.
Fame is now hovering over her head. A vast continent must
now sink to slavery, poverty, horror and bondage, or rise to
unconquerable freedom, immense wealth, inexpressible felicity,
and immortal fame.
“I will lay my life on it, that with fifteen hundred men, and
a proper train of artillery, I will take Montreal. Provided I
could be thus furnished, and if an army could command the field,
it would be no insuperable difficulty to take Quebec.”
A letter to the same purport, and with the same rhetorical
flourish, on which he appeared to value himself, was written by
Allen to Trumbull, the Governor of Connecticut. Arnold urged
the same project, but in less magniloquent language, upon the
attention of the Continental Congress. His letter was dated from
Crown Point; where he had a little squadron, composed of the
sloop captured at St. Johns, a schooner, and a flotilla of bateaux.
All these he had equipped, armed, manned, and officered; and
his crews were devoted to him. In his letter to the Continental
Congress he gave information concerning Canada, collected
through spies and agents. Carleton, he said, had not six hundred
effective men under him. The Canadians and Indians were disaffected
to the British Government, and Montreal was ready to
throw open its gates to a patriot force. Two thousand men, he
was certain, would be sufficient to get possession of the province.
36“I beg leave to add,” says he, “that if no person appears
who will undertake to carry the plan into execution, I will undertake,
and, with the smiles of Heaven, answer for the success, provided
I am supplied with men, &c., to carry it into execution
without loss of time.”
In a postscript of his letter, he specifies the forces requisite for
his suggested invasion. “In order to give satisfaction to the
different colonies, I propose that Colonel Hinman’s regiment,
now on their march from Connecticut to Ticonderoga, should form
part of the army; say one thousand men; five hundred men to
be sent from New York, five hundred of General Arnold’s regiment,
including the seamen and marines on board the vessels (no
Green Mountain Boys).”
Within a few days after the date of this letter, Colonel Hinman
with the Connecticut troops arrived. The greater part of
the Green Mountain Boys now returned home, their term of enlistment
having expired. Ethan Allen and his brother in arms,
Seth Warner, repaired to Congress to get pay for their men, and
authority to raise a new regiment. They were received with distinguished
honor by that body. The same pay was awarded to
the men who had served under them as that allowed to the continental
troops; and it was recommended to the New York Convention
that, should it meet the approbation of General Schuyler, a
fresh corps of Green Mountain Boys about to be raised, should
be employed in the army under such officers as they (the Green
Mountain Boys) should choose.
To the New York Convention, Allen and Warner now repaired.
There was a difficulty about admitting them to the hall
of Assembly, for their attainder of outlawry had not been repealed.
Patriotism, however, pleaded in their behalf. They
37obtained an audience. A regiment of Green Mountain Boys, five
hundred strong, was decreed, and General Schuyler notified the
people of the New Hampshire Grants of the resolve, and requested
them to raise the regiment.
Thus prosperously went the affairs of Ethan Allen and Seth
Warner. As to Arnold, difficulties instantly took place between
him and Colonel Hinman. Arnold refused to give up to him the
command of either post, claiming on the strength of his instructions
from the committee of safety of Massachusetts, a right to
the command of all the posts and fortresses at the south end of
Lake Champlain and Lake George. This threw every thing into
confusion. Colonel Hinman was himself perplexed in this conflict
of various authorities; being, as it were, but a locum tenens
for the province of New York.
Arnold was at Crown Point, acting as commander of the
fort and admiral of the fleet; and having about a hundred and
fifty resolute men under him, was expecting with confidence to
be authorized to lead an expedition into Canada.
At this juncture arrived a committee of three members of the
Congress of Massachusetts, sent by that body to inquire into the
manner in which he had executed his instructions; complaints
having been made of his arrogant and undue assumption of
command.
Arnold was thunderstruck at being subjected to inquiry, when
he had expected an ovation. He requested a sight of the committee’s
instructions. The sight of them only increased his indignation.
They were to acquaint themselves with the manner in which
he had executed his commission; with his spirit, capacity, and conduct.
Should they think proper, they might order him to return
to Massachusetts, to render account of the moneys, ammunition
38and stores he had received, and the debts he had contracted on
behalf of the colony. While at Ticonderoga, he and his men
were to be under command of the principal officer from Connecticut.
Arnold was furious. He swore he would be second in command
to no one, disbanded his men, and threw up his commission.
Quite a scene ensued. His men became turbulent; some refused
to serve under any other leader; others clamored for their pay,
which was in arrears. Part joined Arnold on board of the
vessels which were drawn out into the lake; and among other
ebullitions of passion, there was a threat of sailing for St. Johns.
At length the storm was allayed by the interference of several
of the officers, and the assurances of the committee that every
man should be paid. A part of them enlisted under Colonel
Easton, and Arnold set off for Cambridge to settle his accounts
with the committee of safety.
The project of an invasion of Canada, urged by Allen and
Arnold, had at first met with no favor, the Continental Congress
having formally resolved to make no hostile attempts upon that
province. Intelligence subsequently received, induced it to change
its plans. Carleton was said to be strengthening the fortifications
and garrison at St. Johns, and preparing to launch vessels on the
lake wherewith to regain command of it, and retake the captured
posts. Powerful reinforcements were coming from England and
elsewhere. Guy Johnson was holding councils with the fierce
Cayugas and Senecas, and stirring up the Six Nations to hostility.
On the other hand, Canada was full of religious and political dissensions.
The late exploits of the Americans on Lake Champlain,
had produced a favorable effect on the Canadians, who
would flock to the patriot standard if unfurled among them by an
39imposing force. Now was the time to strike a blow to paralyze
all hostility from this quarter; now, while Carleton’s regular
force was weak, and before the arrival of additional troops. Influenced
by these considerations, Congress now determined to extend
the revolution into Canada, but it was an enterprise too important
to be entrusted to any but discreet hands. General
Schuyler, then in New York, was accordingly ordered, on the 27th
June, to proceed to Ticonderoga, and “should he find it practicable,
and not disagreeable to the Canadians, immediately to take
possession of St. Johns and Montreal, and pursue such other measures
in Canada as might have a tendency to promote the peace
and security of these provinces.”
It behooved General Schuyler to be on the alert, lest the enterprise
should be snatched from his hands. Ethan Allen and
Seth Warner were at Bennington, among the Green Mountains.
Enlistments were going on, but too slow for Allen’s impatience,
who had his old hankering for a partisan foray. In a letter to
Governor Trumbull (July 12th), he writes, “Were it not that the
grand Continental Congress had totally incorporated the Green
Mountain Boys into a battalion under certain regulations and
command, I would forthwith advance them into Canada and invest
Montreal, exclusive of any help from the colonies; though under
present circumstances I would not, for my right arm, act without
or contrary to order. If my fond zeal for reducing the King’s
fortresses and destroying or imprisoning his troops in Canada
be the result of enthusiasm, I hope and expect the wisdom of the
Continent will treat it as such; and on the other hand, if it proceed
from sound policy, that the plan will be adopted.”[10]
Schuyler arrived at Ticonderoga on the 18th of July. A
40letter to Washington, to whom, as commander-in-chief, he made
constant reports, gives a striking picture of a frontier post in
those crude days of the Revolution.
“You will expect that I should say something about this place
and the troops here. Not one earthly thing for offence or defence
has been done; the commanding officer has no orders; he only
came to reinforce the garrison, and he expected the general.
About ten last night I arrived at the landing-place, at the north
end of Lake George; a post occupied by a captain and one hundred
men. A sentinel, on being informed that I was in the boat,
quitted his post to go and awaken the guard, consisting of three
men, in which he had no success. I walked up and came to
another, a sergeant’s guard. Here the sentinel challenged, but
suffered me to come up to him; the whole guard, like the first,
in the soundest sleep. With a penknife only I could have cut off
both guards, and then have set fire to the block house, destroyed
the stores, and starved the people here. At this post I had
pointedly recommended vigilance and care, as all the stores from
Lake George must necessarily be landed here. But I hope to get
the better of this inattention. The officers and men are all good-looking
people, and decent in their deportment, and I really believe
will make good soldiers as soon as I can get the better of
this nonchalance of theirs. Bravery, I believe, they are far from
wanting.”
Colonel Hinman, it will be recollected, was in temporary
command at Ticonderoga, if that could be called a command
where none seemed to obey. The garrison was about twelve hundred
strong: the greater part Connecticut men brought by himself;
some were New York troops, and some few Green Mountain
Boys. Schuyler, on taking command, despatched a confidential
41agent into Canada, Major John Brown, an American, who resided
on the Sorel River, and was popular among the Canadians. He
was to collect information as to the British forces and fortifications,
and to ascertain how an invasion and an attack on St.
Johns would be considered by the people of the province: in the
mean time, Schuyler set diligently to work to build boats and
prepare for the enterprise, should it ultimately be ordered by
Congress.
Schuyler was an authoritative man, and inherited from his
Dutch ancestry a great love of order; he was excessively annoyed,
therefore, by the confusion and negligence prevalent around him,
and the difficulties and delays thereby occasioned. He chafed in
spirit at the disregard of discipline among his yeoman soldiery,
and their opposition to all system and regularity. This was especially
the case with the troops from Connecticut, officered generally
by their own neighbors and familiar companions, and unwilling
to acknowledge the authority of a commander from a different
province. He poured out his complaints in a friendly letter to
Washington; the latter consoled him by stating his own troubles
and grievances in the camp at Cambridge, and the spirit with
which he coped with them. “From my own experience,” writes
he (July 28), “I can easily judge of your difficulties in introducing
order and discipline into troops, who have, from their infancy,
imbibed ideas of the most contrary kind. It would be far beyond
the compass of a letter, for me to describe the situation of things
here [at Cambridge], on my arrival. Perhaps you will only be able
to judge of it, from my assuring you, that mine must be a portrait
at full length of what you have had in miniature. Confusion
and discord reigned in every department, which, in a little
time, must have ended either in the separation of the army, or
42fatal contests with one another. The better genius of America
has prevailed, and most happily, the ministerial troops have not
availed themselves of these advantages, till, I trust, the opportunity
is in a great measure passed over. * * * We mend every
day, and, I flatter myself, that in a little time we shall work up
these raw materials into a good manufacture. I must recommend
to you, what I endeavor to practise myself, patience and perseverance.”
Schuyler took the friendly admonition in the spirit in which it
was given. “I can easily conceive,” writes he (Aug. 6th), “that
my difficulties are only a faint semblance of yours. Yes, my general,
I will strive to copy your bright example, and patiently and
steadily persevere in that line which only can promise the
wished-for reformation.”
He had calculated on being joined by this time by the regiment
of Green Mountain Boys which Ethan Allen and Seth
Warner had undertaken to raise in the New Hampshire Grants.
Unfortunately, a quarrel had arisen between those brothers in
arms, which filled the Green Mountains with discord and party
feuds. The election of officers took place on the 27th of July.
It was made by committees from the different townships. Ethan
Allen was entirely passed by, and Seth Warner nominated as
Lieutenant-colonel of the regiment. Allen was thunderstruck
at finding himself thus suddenly dismounted. His patriotism
and love of adventure, however, were not quelled: and he forthwith
repaired to the army at Ticonderoga to offer himself as a
volunteer.
Schuyler, at first, hesitated to accept his services. He was
aware of his aspiring notions, and feared there would be a difficulty
in keeping him within due bounds, but was at length persuaded
43by his officers to retain him, to act as a pioneer on the Canadian
frontier.
In a letter from camp, Allen gave Governor Trumbull an account
of the downfall of his towering hopes. “Notwithstanding
my zeal and success in my country’s cause, the old farmers on the
New Hampshire Grants, who do not incline to go to war, have
met in a committee meeting, and in their nomination of officers for
the regiment of Green Mountain Boys, have wholly omitted me.”
His letter has a consolatory postscript. “I find myself in the
favor of the officers of the army and the young Green Mountain
Boys. How the old men came to reject me I cannot conceive,
inasmuch as I saved them from the encroachments of New
York.”[11]—The old men probably doubted his discretion.
Schuyler was on the alert with respect to the expedition
against Canada. From his agent Major Brown, and from other
sources, he had learnt that there were but about seven hundred
king’s troops in that province; three hundred of them at St.
Johns, about fifty at Quebec, the remainder at Montreal, Chamblee,
and the upper posts. Colonel Guy Johnson was at Montreal
with three hundred men, mostly his tenants, and with a
number of Indians. Two batteries had been finished at St.
Johns, mounting nine guns each: other works were intrenched
and picketed. Two large row galleys were on the stocks, and
would soon be finished. Now was the time, according to his
informants, to carry Canada. It might be done with great ease
and little cost. The Canadians were disaffected to British rule,
and would join the Americans, and so would many of the Indians.
“I am prepared,” writes he to Washington, “to move against
44the enemy, unless your Excellency and Congress should direct
otherwise. In the course of a few days I expect to receive the
ultimate determination. Whatever it may be, I shall try to execute
it in such a manner as will promote the just cause in which
we are engaged.”
While awaiting orders on this head, he repaired to Albany,
to hold a conference and negotiate a treaty with the Caughnawagas,
and the warriors of the Six Nations, whom, as one of the
commissioners of Indian affairs, he had invited to meet him at
that place. General Richard Montgomery was to remain in command
at Ticonderoga, during his absence, and to urge forward
the military preparations. As the subsequent fortunes of this
gallant officer are inseparably connected with the Canadian campaign,
and have endeared his name to Americans, we pause to
give a few particulars concerning him.
General Richard Montgomery was of a good family in the
north of Ireland, where he was born in 1736. He entered the
army when about eighteen years of age; served in America in
the French war; won a lieutenancy by gallant conduct at Louisburg;
followed General Amherst to Lake Champlain, and, after
the conquest of Canada, was promoted to a captaincy for his services
in the West Indies.
After the peace of Versailles he resided in England; but,
about three years before the breaking out of the Revolution, he
sold out his commission in the army and emigrated to New York.
Here he married the eldest daughter of Judge Robert R. Livingston,
of the Clermont branch of that family; and took up his
residence on an estate which he had purchased in Dutchess
County on the banks of the Hudson.
Being known to be in favor of the popular cause, he was
45drawn reluctantly from his rural abode, to represent his county
in the first convention of the province; and on the recent organization
of the army, his military reputation gained him the unsought
commission of Brigadier-general. “It is an event,”
writes he to a friend, “which must put an end for a while, perhaps
for ever, to the quiet scheme of life I had prescribed for
myself; for, though entirely unexpected and undesired by me,
the will of an oppressed people, compelled to choose between
liberty and slavery, must be obeyed.”
At the time of receiving his commission, Montgomery was
about thirty-nine years of age, and the beau ideal of a soldier.
His form was well proportioned and vigorous; his countenance
expressive and prepossessing; he was cool and discriminating in
council, energetic and fearless in action. His principles commanded
the respect of friends and foes, and he was noted for winning
the affections of the soldiery.
While these things were occurring at Ticonderoga, several Indian
chiefs made their appearance in the camp at Cambridge.
They came in savage state and costume, as ambassadors from
their respective tribes, to have a talk about the impending invasion
of Canada. One was chief of the Caughnawaga tribe,
whose residence was on the banks of the St. Lawrence, six miles
above Montreal. Others were from St. Francis, about forty-five
leagues above Quebec, and were of a warlike tribe, from which
hostilities had been especially apprehended.
Washington, accustomed to deal with the red warriors of the
wilderness, received them with great ceremonial. They dined at
head-quarters among his officers, and it is observed that to some
of the latter they might have served as models; such was their
grave dignity and decorum.
46A council fire was held. The sachems all offered, on behalf
of their tribes, to take up the hatchet for the Americans, should
the latter invade Canada. The offer was embarrassing. Congress had
publicly resolved to seek nothing but neutrality from
the Indian nations, unless the ministerial agents should make an
offensive alliance with them. The chief of the St. Francis tribe
declared that Governor Carleton had endeavored to persuade him
to take up the hatchet against the Americans, but in vain. “As
our ancestors gave this country to you,” added he grandly, “we
would not have you destroyed by England; but are ready to
afford you our assistance.”
Washington wished to be certain of the conduct of the enemy,
before he gave a reply to these Indian overtures. He wrote
by express, therefore, to General Schuyler, requesting him to ascertain
the intentions of the British governor with respect to the
native tribes.
By the same express, he communicated a plan which had occupied
his thoughts for several days. As the contemplated
movement of Schuyler would probably cause all the British force
in Canada to be concentrated in the neighborhood of Montreal
and St. Johns, he proposed to send off an expedition of ten or
twelve hundred men, to penetrate to Quebec by the way of the
Kennebec River. “If you are resolved to proceed,” writes he to
Schuyler, “which I gather from your last letter is your intention,
it would make a diversion that would distract Carleton. He must
either break up, and follow this party to Quebec, by which he
would leave you a free passage, or he must suffer that important
place to fall into other hands; an event that would have a decisive
effect and influence on the public interest. * * * *
The few whom I have consulted on the project approve it much,
47but the final determination is deferred until I hear from you.
Not a moment’s time is to be lost in the preparations for this enterprise,
if the advices from you favor it. With the utmost expedition
the season will be considerably advanced, so that you
will dismiss the express as soon as possible.”
The express found Schuyler in Albany, where he had been
attending the conference with the Six Nations. He had just received
intelligence which convinced him of the propriety of an
expedition into Canada; had sent word to General Montgomery
to get every thing ready for it, and was on the point of departing
for Ticonderoga to carry it into effect. In reply to Washington,
he declared his conviction, from various accounts which he
had received, that Carleton and his agents were exciting the Indian
tribes to hostility. “I should, therefore, not hesitate one
moment,” adds he, “to employ any savages that might be willing
to join us.”
He expressed himself delighted with Washington’s project of
sending off an expedition to Quebec, regretting only that it had
not been thought of earlier. “Should the detachment from your
body penetrate into Canada,” added he, “and we meet with success,
Canada must inevitably fall into our hands.”
Having sent off these despatches, Schuyler hastened back to
Ticonderoga. Before he reached there, Montgomery had received
intelligence that Carleton had completed his armed vessels at St.
Johns, and was about to send them into Lake Champlain by the
Sorel River. No time, therefore, was to be lost in getting possession
of the Isle aux Noix, which commanded the entrance to
that river. Montgomery hastened, therefore, to embark with
about a thousand men, which were as many as the boats now
ready could hold, taking with him two pieces of artillery; with
48this force he set off down the lake. A letter to General Schuyler
explained the cause of his sudden departure, and entreated him
to follow on in a whale-boat, leaving the residue of the artillery
to come on as soon as conveyances could be procured.
Schuyler arrived at Ticonderoga on the night of the 30th of
August, but too ill of a bilious fever to push on in a whale-boat.
He caused, however, a bed to be prepared for him in a
covered bateau, and, ill as he was, continued forward on the following
day. On the 4th of September he overtook Montgomery
at the Isle la Motte, where he had been detained by contrary
weather, and, assuming command of the little army, kept on the
same day to the Isle aux Noix, about twelve miles south of St.
Johns—where for the present we shall leave him, and return to
the head-quarters of the commander-in-chief.
CHAPTER V. A CHALLENGE DECLINED—A BLOW MEDITATED—A CAUTIOUS COUNCIL OF WAR—PREPARATION FOR THE QUEBEC EXPEDITION—BENEDICT ARNOLD THE LEADER—ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS—DEPARTURE—GENERAL SCHUYLER ON THE SOREL—RECONNOITRES ST. JOHNS—CAMP AT ISLE AUX NOIX—ILLNESS OF SCHUYLER—RETURNS TO TICONDEROGA—EXPEDITION OF MONTGOMERY AGAINST ST. JOHNS—LETTER OF ETHAN ALLEN—HIS DASH AGAINST MONTREAL—ITS CATASTROPHE—A HERO IN IRONS—CORRESPONDENCE OF WASHINGTON WITH SCHUYLER AND ARNOLD—HIS ANXIETY ABOUT THEM.
49
The siege of Boston had been kept up for several weeks without
any remarkable occurrence. The British remained within their
lines, diligently strengthening them; the besiegers having received
further supplies of ammunition, were growing impatient of a
state of inactivity. Towards the latter part of August there
were rumors from Boston, that the enemy were preparing for a
sortie. Washington was resolved to provoke it by a kind of challenge.
He accordingly detached fourteen hundred men to seize
at night upon a height within musket shot of the enemy’s line on
Charlestown Neck, presuming that the latter would sally forth on
the following day to dispute possession of it, and thus be drawn
into a general battle. The task was executed with silence and
celerity, and by daybreak the hill presented to the astonished foe,
the aspect of a fortified post.
50The challenge was not accepted. The British opened a heavy
cannonade from Bunker’s Hill, but kept within their works.
The Americans, scant of ammunition, could only reply with a
single nine-pounder; this, however, sank one of the floating batteries
which guarded the neck. They went on to complete and
strengthen this advanced post, exposed to daily cannonade and
bombardment, which, however, did but little injury. They continued
to answer from time to time with a single gun; reserving
their ammunition for a general action. “We are just in the
situation of a man with little money in his pocket,” writes Secretary
Reed; “he will do twenty mean things to prevent his breaking
in upon his little stock. We are obliged to bear with the
rascals on Bunker’s Hill, when a few shot now and then in return,
would keep our men attentive to their business and give the
enemy alarms.”[12]
The evident unwillingness of the latter to come forth was
perplexing. “Unless the ministerial troops in Boston are waiting
for reinforcements,” writes Washington, “I cannot devise
what they are staying there for, nor why, as they affect to despise
the Americans, they do not come forth and put an end to the contest
at once.”
Perhaps they persuaded themselves that his army, composed
of crude, half-disciplined levies from different and distant quarters,
would gradually fall asunder and disperse, or that its means
of subsistence would be exhausted. He had his own fears on the
subject, and looked forward with doubt and anxiety to a winter’s
campaign; the heavy expense that would be incurred in providing
barracks, fuel and warm clothing; the difficulty there would be
of keeping together, through the rigorous season, troops unaccustomed
51to military hardships, and none of whose terms of enlistment
extended beyond the 1st of January: the supplies of ammunition,
too, that would be required for protracted operations; the
stock of powder on hand, notwithstanding the most careful husbandry,
being fearfully small. Revolving these circumstances in
his mind, he rode thoughtfully about the commanding points in
the vicinity of Boston, considering how he might strike a decisive
blow that would put an end to the murmuring inactivity of the
army, and relieve the country from the consuming expense of
maintaining it. The result was, a letter to the major and brigadier-generals,
summoning them to a council of war to be held at
the distance of three days, and giving them previous intimation
of its purpose. It was to know whether, in their judgment, a
successful attack might not be made upon the troops at Boston
by means of boats, in co-operation with an attempt upon their
lines at Roxbury. “The success of such an enterprise,” adds he,
“depends, I well know, upon the Allwise Disposer of events, and
it is not within the reach of human wisdom to foretell the issue;
but if the prospect is fair, the undertaking is justifiable.”
He proceeded to state the considerations already cited, which
appeared to justify it. The council having thus had time for
previous deliberation, met on the 11th of September. It was
composed of Major-generals Ward, Lee, and Putnam, and Brigadier-generals
Thomas, Heath, Sullivan, Spencer, and Greene.
They unanimously pronounced the suggested attempt inexpedient,
at least for the present.
It certainly was bold and hazardous, yet it seems to have
taken strong hold on the mind of the commander-in-chief, usually
so cautious. “I cannot say,” writes he to the President of Congress,
“that I have wholly laid it aside; but new events may occasion
52new measures. Of this I hope the honorable Congress can
need no assurance, that there is not a man in America who more
earnestly wishes such a termination of the campaign, as to make
the army no longer necessary.”
In the mean time, as it was evident the enemy did not intend
to come out, but were only strengthening their defences and preparing
for winter, Washington was enabled to turn his attention
to the expedition to be sent into Canada by the way of the
Kennebec River.
A detachment of about eleven hundred men, chosen for the
purpose, was soon encamped on Cambridge Common. There
were ten companies of New England infantry, some of them from
General Greene’s Rhode Island regiments; three rifle companies
from Pennsylvania and Virginia, one of them Captain Daniel
Morgan’s famous company; and a number of volunteers; among
whom was Aaron Burr, then but twenty years of age, and just
commencing his varied, brilliant, but ultimately unfortunate
career.
The proposed expedition was wild and perilous, and required
a hardy, skilful and intrepid leader. Such a one was at hand.
Benedict Arnold was at Cambridge, occupied in settling his
accounts with the Massachusetts committee of safety. These
were nearly adjusted. Whatever faults may have been found
with his conduct in some particulars, his exploits on Lake Champlain
had atoned for them; for valor in time of war, covers a
multitude of sins. It was thought too, by some, that he had
been treated harshly, and there was a disposition to soothe his
irritated pride. Washington had given him an honorable reception
at head-quarters, and now considered him the very man for
the present enterprise. He had shown aptness for military
53service, whether on land or water. He was acquainted, too, with
Canada, and especially with Quebec, having, in the course of his
checkered life, traded in horses between that place and the West
Indies. With these considerations he intrusted him with the
command of the expedition, giving him the commission of lieutenant-colonel
in the continental army.
As he would be intrusted with dangerous powers, Washington,
beside a general letter of instructions, addressed a special one to
him individually, full of cautious and considerate advice. “Upon
your conduct and courage, and that of the officers and soldiers
detailed on this expedition, not only the success of the present
enterprise, and your own honor, but the safety and welfare of the
whole continent, may depend. I charge you, therefore, and the
officers and soldiers under your command, as you value your own
safety and honor, and the favor and esteem of your country, that
you consider yourselves as marching, not through the country of
an enemy, but of our friends and brethren; for such the inhabitants
of Canada and the Indian nations have approved
themselves, in this unhappy contest between Great Britain and
America; and that you check by every motive of duty and fear
of punishment every attempt to plunder or insult the inhabitants
of Canada. Should any American soldier be so base and infamous
as to injure any Canadian or Indian in his person or property,
I do most earnestly enjoin you to bring him to such severe
and exemplary punishment as the enormity of the crime may require.
Should it extend to death itself, it will not be disproportioned
to its guilt at such a time and in such a cause. * * * *
I also give in charge to you, to avoid all disrespect to the religion
of the country and its ceremonies. * * While we are contending
for our own liberty, we should be very cautious not to
54violate the rights of conscience in others, ever considering that
God alone is the judge of the hearts of men, and to him only, in
this case, are they answerable.”
In the general letter of instructions, Washington inserted the
following clause. “If Lord Chatham’s son should be in Canada,
and in any way fall into your power, you are enjoined to treat
him with all possible deference and respect. You cannot err in
paying too much honor to the son of so illustrious a character and
so true a friend to America.”
Arnold was, moreover, furnished with handbills for distribution
in Canada, setting forth the friendly objects of the present
expedition, as well as of that under General Schuyler; and calling
on the Canadians to furnish necessaries and accommodations
of every kind; for which they were assured ample compensation.
On the 13th of September, Arnold struck his tents, and set
out in high spirits. More fortunate than his rival, Ethan Allen,
he had attained the object of his ambition, the command of an
expedition into Canada; and trusted in the capture of Quebec, to
eclipse even the surprise of Ticonderoga.
Washington enjoined upon him to push forward, as rapidly as
possible, success depending upon celerity; and counted the days as
they elapsed after his departure, impatient to receive tidings of
his progress up the Kennebec, and expecting that the expedition
would reach Quebec about the middle of October. In the interim
came letters from General Schuyler, giving particulars of the
main expedition.
In a preceding chapter we left the general and his little
army at the Isle aux Noix, near the Sorel River, the outlet of
the lake. Thence, on the 5th of September, he sent Colonel
Ethan Allen and Major Brown to reconnoitre the country
55between that river and the St. Lawrence, to distribute friendly
addresses among the people and ascertain their feelings. This
done, and having landed his baggage and provisions, the general
proceeded along the Sorel River the next day with his boats,
until within two miles of St. Johns, when a cannonade was
opened from the fort. Keeping on for half a mile further, he
landed his troops in a deep, close swamp, where they had a sharp
skirmish with an ambuscade of tories and Indians, whom they beat
off with some loss on both sides. Night coming on, they cast up
a small intrenchment, and encamped, disturbed occasionally by
shells from the fort, which, however, did no other mischief than
slightly wounding a lieutenant.
In the night the camp was visited secretly by a person, who
informed General Schuyler of the state of the fort. The works
were completed, and furnished with cannon. A vessel pierced
for sixteen guns was launched, and would be ready to sail in
three or four days. It was not probable that any Canadians
would join the army, being disposed to remain neutral. This
intelligence being discussed in a council of war in the morning,
it was determined that they had neither men nor artillery sufficient
to undertake a siege. They returned, therefore, to the Isle
aux Noix, cast up fortifications, and threw a boom across the
channel of the river to prevent the passage of the enemy’s vessels
into the lake, and awaited the arrival of artillery and reinforcements
from Ticonderoga.
In the course of a few days the expected reinforcements arrived,
and with them a small train of artillery. Ethan Allen
also returned from his reconnoitring expedition, of which he made
a most encouraging report. The Canadian captains of militia
were ready, he said, to join the Americans, whenever they should
56appear with sufficient force. He had held talks, too, with the Indians,
and found them well disposed. In a word, he was convinced
that an attack on St. Johns, and an inroad into the province,
would meet with hearty co-operation.
Preparations were now made for the investment of St. Johns
by land and water. Major Brown, who had already acted as a
scout, was sent with one hundred Americans, and about thirty
Canadians towards Chamblee, to make friends in that quarter,
and to join the army as soon as it should arrive at St. Johns.
To quiet the restless activity of Ethan Allen, who had no
command in the army, he was sent with an escort of thirty men
to retrace his steps, penetrate to La Prairie, and beat up for recruits
among the people whom he had recently visited.
For some time past, General Schuyler had been struggling
with a complication of maladies, but exerting himself to the
utmost in the harassing business of the camp, still hoping to be
able to move with the army. When every thing was nearly
ready, he was attacked in the night by a severe access of his disorder,
which confined him to his bed, and compelled him to surrender
the conduct of the expedition to General Montgomery.
Since he could be of no further use, therefore, in this quarter, he
caused his bed, as before, to be placed on board a covered bateau,
and set off for Ticonderoga, to hasten forward reinforcements
and supplies. An hour after his departure, he met Colonel Seth
Warner, with one hundred and seventy Green Mountain Boys,
steering for the camp, “being the first,” adds he, “that have appeared
of that boasted corps.” Some had mutinied and deserted
the colonel, and the remainder were at Crown Point; whence
they were about to embark.
Such was the purport of different letters received from
57Schuyler; the last bearing date September 20th. Washington
was deeply concerned when informed that he had quitted the
army, supposing that General Wooster, as the eldest brigadier,
would take rank and command of Montgomery, and considering
him deficient in the activity and energy required by the difficult
service in which he was engaged. “I am, therefore,” writes he
to Schuyler, “much alarmed for Arnold, whose expedition was
built upon yours, and who will infallibly perish, if the invasion
and entry into Canada are abandoned by your successor. I hope
by this time the penetration into Canada by your army is effected;
but if it is not, and there are any intentions to lay it aside,
I beg it may be done in such a manner that Arnold may be
saved, by giving him notice; and in the mean time, your army
may keep such appearances as to fix Carleton, and to prevent the
force of Canada being turned wholly upon Arnold.
“Should this find you at Albany, and General Wooster about
taking the command, I entreat you to impress him strongly with
the importance and necessity of proceeding, or so to conduct,
that Arnold may have time to retreat.”
What caused this immediate solicitude about Arnold, was a letter
received from him, dated ten days previously from Fort Western,
on the Kennebec River. He had sent reconnoitring parties
ahead in light canoes, to gain intelligence from the Indians, and
take the courses and distances to Dead River, a branch of the
Kennebec, and he was now forwarding his troops in bateaux in
five divisions, one day’s march apart; Morgan with his riflemen
in the first division, Lieutenant-colonel Roger Enos commanding
the last. As soon as the last division should be under way, Arnold
was to set off in a light skiff to overtake the advance.
Chaudiere Pond on the Chaudiere River, was the appointed
58rendezvous, whence they were to march in a body towards
Quebec.
Judging from the date of the letter, Arnold must at this time
be making his way, by land and water, through an uninhabited
and unexplored wilderness; and beyond the reach of recall; his
situation, therefore, would be desperate should General Wooster
fail to follow up the campaign against St. Johns. The solicitude
of Washington on his account was heightened by the consciousness,
that the hazardous enterprise in which he was engaged had
chiefly been set on foot by himself, and he felt in some degree responsible
for the safety of the resolute partisan and his companions.
Fortunately, Wooster was not the successor to Schuyler in
the command of the expedition. Washington was mistaken as to
the rank of his commission, which was one degree lower than
that of Montgomery. The veteran himself, who was a gallant
soldier, and had seen service in two wars, expressed himself nobly
in the matter, in reply to some inquiry made by Schuyler.
“I have the cause of my country too much at heart,” said he,
“to attempt to make any difficulty or uneasiness in the army,
upon whom the success of an enterprise of almost infinite importance
to the country is now depending. I shall consider my rank
in the army what my commission from the Continental Congress
makes it, and shall not attempt to dispute the command with
General Montgomery at St. Johns.” We shall give some further
particulars concerning this expedition against St. Johns, towards
which Washington was turning so anxious an eye.
On the 16th of September, the day after Schuyler’s departure
for Ticonderoga, Montgomery proceeded to carry out the
plans which had been concerted between them. Landing on the
5917th at the place where they had formerly encamped, within a mile
and a half of the fort, he detached a force of five hundred men,
among whom were three hundred Green Mountain Boys under
Colonel Seth Warner, to take a position at the junction of two
roads leading to Montreal and Chamblee, so as to intercept relief
from those points. He now proceeded to invest St. Johns. A
battery was erected on a point of land commanding the fort,
the ship yards and the armed schooner. Another was thrown up
in the woods on the east side of the fort, at six hundred yards
distance, and furnished with two small mortars. All this was
done under an incessant fire from the enemy, which, as yet, was
but feebly returned.
St. Johns had a garrison of five or six hundred regulars and
two hundred Canadian militia. Its commander, Major Preston,
made a brave resistance. Montgomery had not proper battering
cannon; his mortars were defective; his artillerists unpractised,
and the engineer ignorant of the first principles of his art. The
siege went on slowly, until the arrival of an artillery company
under Captain Lamb, expedited from Saratoga by General
Schuyler. Lamb, who was an able officer, immediately bedded a
thirteen-inch mortar, and commenced a fire of shot and shells
upon the fort. The distance, however, was too great, and the
positions of the batteries were ill chosen.
A flourishing letter was received by the general from Colonel
Ethan Allen, giving hope of further reinforcement. “I am
now,” writes he, “at the Parish of St. Ours, four leagues from
Sorel to the south. I have two hundred and fifty Canadians
under arms. As I march, they gather fast. You may rely on
it, that I shall join you in about three days, with five hundred or
more Canadian volunteers I could raise one or two thousand in
60a week’s time; but I will first visit the army with a less number,
and, if necessary, go again recruiting. Those that used to be
enemies to our cause, come cap in hand to me; and I swear by
the Lord, I can raise three times the number of our army in
Canada, provided you continue the siege. * * * The eyes of
all America, nay, of Europe, are or will be on the economy of
this army and the consequences attending it.”[13]
Allen was actually on his way toward St. Johns, when, between
Longueil and La Prairie, he met Colonel Brown with his party
of Americans and Canadians. A conversation took place between
them. Brown assured him that the garrison at Montreal
did not exceed thirty men, and might easily be surprised.
Allen’s partisan spirit was instantly excited. Here was a
chance for another bold stroke equal to that at Ticonderoga. A
plan was forthwith agreed upon. Allen was to return to Longueil,
which is nearly opposite Montreal, and cross the St. Lawrence
in canoes in the night, so as to land a little below the town.
Brown, with two hundred men, was to cross above, and Montreal
was to be attacked simultaneously at opposite points.
All this was arranged and put in action without the consent
or knowledge of General Montgomery; Allen was again the partisan
leader, acting from individual impulse. His late letter
also to General Montgomery, would seem to have partaken of
fanfaronade; for the whole force with which he undertook his
part of this inconsiderate enterprise, was thirty Americans, and
eighty Canadians. With these he crossed the river on the night
of the 24th of September, the few canoes found at Longueil having
to pass to and fro repeatedly, before his petty force could be
landed. Guards were stationed on the roads to prevent any one
61passing and giving the alarm in Montreal. Day dawned, but
there was no signal of Major Brown having performed his part
of the scheme. The enterprise seems to have been as ill concerted,
as it was ill-advised. The day advanced, but still no signal;
it was evident Major Brown had not crossed. Allen would
gladly have recrossed the river, but it was too late. An alarm
had been given to the town, and he soon found himself encountered
by about forty regular soldiers, and a hasty levy of Canadians
and Indians. A smart action ensued; most of Allen’s Canadian
recruits gave way and fled, a number of Americans were
slain, and he at length surrendered to the British officer, Major
Campbell, being promised honorable terms for himself and
thirty-eight of his men, who remained with him, seven of whom
were wounded. The prisoners were marched into the town and
delivered over to General Prescott, the commandant. Their
rough appearance, and rude equipments, were not likely to gain
them favor in the eyes of the military tactician, who doubtless
considered them as little better than a band of freebooters on a
maraud. Their leader, albeit a colonel, must have seemed worthy
of the band; for Allen was arrayed in rough frontier style;
a deer-skin jacket, a vest and breeches of coarse serge, worsted
stockings, stout shoes, and a red woollen cap.
We give Allen’s own account of his reception by the British
officer. “He asked me my name, which I told him. He then
asked me whether I was that Colonel Allen who took Ticonderoga,
I told him I was the very man. Then he shook his cane
over my head, calling me many hard names, among which, he frequently
used the word rebel, and put himself in a great rage.”[14]
62Ethan Allen, according to his own account, answered with
becoming spirit. Indeed he gives somewhat of a melodramatic
scene, which ended by his being sent on board of the Gaspee
schooner of war, heavily ironed, to be transported to England for
trial; Prescott giving him the parting assurance, sealed with an
emphatic oath, that he would grace a halter at Tyburn.
Neither Allen’s courage nor his rhetorical vein deserted him
on this trying occasion. From his place of confinement, he
indited the following epistle to the general:—
“Honorable Sir,—In the wheel of transitory events I find
myself prisoner, and in irons. Probably your honor has certain
reasons to me inconceivable, though I challenge an instance of
this sort of economy of the Americans during the late war to any
officers of the crown. On my part, I have to assure your honor,
that when I had the command and took Captain Delaplace and
Lieutenant Fulton, with the garrison of Ticonderoga, I treated
them with every mark of friendship and generosity, the evidence
of which is notorious, even in Canada. I have only to add, that
I expect an honorable and humane treatment, as an officer of my
rank and merit should have, and subscribe myself your honor’s
most obedient servant,
“Ethan Allen.”
In the British publication from which we cite the above, the
following note is appended to the letter, probably on the authority
of General Prescott: “N. B.—The author of the above letter is
an outlaw, and a reward is offered by the New York Assembly for
apprehending him.”[15]
63The reckless dash at Montreal, was viewed with concern by
the American commander. “I am apprehensive of disagreeable
consequences arising from Mr. Allen’s imprudence,” writes General
Schuyler. “I always dreaded his impatience of subordination,
and it was not until after a solemn promise made me in the presence
of several officers, that he would demean himself with propriety,
that I would permit him to attend the army; nor would I
have consented then, had not his solicitations been backed by
several officers.”
The conduct of Allen was also severely censured by Washington.
“His misfortune,” said he, “will, I hope, teach a lesson
of prudence and subordination to others who may be ambitious
to outshine their general officers, and, regardless of order and
duty, rush into enterprises which have unfavorable effects on the
public, and are destructive to themselves.”
Partisan exploit had, in fact, inflated the vanity and bewildered
the imagination of Allen, and unfitted him for regular warfare.
Still his name will ever be a favorite one with his countrymen.
Even his occasional rhodomontade will be tolerated with
a good-humored smile, backed as it was by deeds of daring
courage; and among the hardy pioneers of our Revolution whose
untutored valor gave the first earnests of its triumphs, will be
remembered, with honor, the rough Green Mountain partisan,
who seized upon the “Keys of Champlain.”
In the letters of Schuyler, which gave Washington accounts,
from time to time, of the preceding events, were sad repinings at
his own illness, and the multiplied annoyances which beset him.
“The vexation of spirit under which I labor,” writes he, “that a
barbarous complication of disorders should prevent me from
reaping those laurels for which I have unweariedly wrought since
64I was honored with this command; the anxiety I have suffered
since my arrival here (at Ticonderoga), lest the army should
starve, occasioned by a scandalous want of subordination and inattention
to my orders, in some of the officers that I left to command
at the different posts; the vast variety of disagreeable and
vexatious incidents that almost every hour arise in some department
or other,—not only retard my cure, but have put me considerably
back for some days past. If Job had been a general in
my situation, his memory had not been so famous for patience.
But the glorious end we have in view, and which I have confident
hope will be attained, will atone for all.” Washington replied in
that spirit of friendship which existed between them. “You do
me justice in believing that I feel the utmost anxiety for your
situation, that I sympathize with you in all your distresses, and
shall most heartily share in the joy of your success. My anxiety
extends itself to poor Arnold, whose fate depends upon the issue
of your campaign. * * * * * The more I reflect upon
the importance of your expedition, the greater is my concern, lest
it should sink under insuperable difficulties. I look upon the
interests and salvation of our bleeding country in a great degree
as depending upon your success.”
Shortly after writing the above, and while he was still full of
solicitude about the fate of Arnold, he received a despatch from
the latter, dated October 13th, from the great portage or carrying-place
between the Kennebec and Dead River.
“Your Excellency,” writes Arnold, “may possibly think we
have been tardy in our march, as we have gained so little; but
when you consider the badness and weight of the bateaux, and
large quantities of provisions, &c., we have been obliged to force
up against a very rapid stream, where you would have taken the
65men for amphibious animals, as they were a great part of the
time under water: add to this the great fatigue in the portage,
you will think I have pushed the men as fast as they could possibly
bear.”
The toils of the expedition up the Kennebec River had
indeed been excessive. Part of the men of each division managed
the boats—part marched along the banks. Those on board had
to labor against swift currents; to unload at rapids; transport
the cargoes, and sometimes the boats themselves, for some distance
on their shoulders, and then to reload. They were days in
making their way round stupendous cataracts; several times
their boats were upset and filled with water, to the loss or
damage of arms, ammunition, and provisions.
Those on land had to scramble over rocks and precipices, to
struggle through swamps and fenny streams; or cut their way
through tangled thickets, which reduced their clothes to rags.
With all their efforts, their progress was but from four to ten
miles a day. At night the men of each division encamped
together.
By the time they arrived at the place whence the letter was
written, fatigue, swamp fevers and desertion had reduced their
numbers to about nine hundred and fifty effective men. Arnold,
however, wrote in good heart. “The last division,” said he, “is
just arrived; three divisions are over the first carrying-place, and
as the men are in high spirits, I make no doubt of reaching the
river Chaudiere in eight or ten days, the greatest difficulty being,
I hope, already past.”
He had some days previously despatched an Indian, whom he
considered trusty, with a letter for General Schuyler, apprising him
66of his whereabouts, but as yet had received no intelligence either
of, or from the general, nor did he expect to receive any until he
should reach Chaudiere Pond. There he calculated to meet the
return of his express, and then to determine his plan of operations.
CHAPTER VI. BRITISH IN BOSTON SEND OUT CRUISERS—DEPREDATIONS OF CAPTAIN WALLACE ALONG THE COAST—TREASON IN THE CAMP—ARREST OF DR. CHURCH—HIS TRIAL AND FATE—CONFLAGRATION OF FALMOUTH—IRRITATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY—FITTING OUT OF VESSELS OF WAR—EMBARKATION OF GENERAL GAGE FOR ENGLAND—COMMITTEE FROM CONGRESS—CONFERENCES WITH WASHINGTON—RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS TO CARRY ON THE WAR—RETURN OF SECRETARY REED TO PHILADELPHIA.
67
While the two expeditions were threatening Canada from different
quarters, the war was going on along the seaboard. The British
in Boston, cut off from supplies by land, fitted out small armed
vessels to seek them along the coast of New England. The inhabitants
drove their cattle into the interior, or boldly resisted
the aggressors. Parties landing to forage were often repulsed by
hasty levies of the yeomanry. Scenes of ravage and violence occurred.
Stonington was cannonaded, and further measures of
vengeance were threatened by Captain Wallace of the Rose man-of-war,
a naval officer, who had acquired an almost piratical reputation
along the coast, and had his rendezvous in the harbor of
Newport: domineering over the waters of Rhode Island.[16]
About this time there was an occurrence, which caused great
68excitement in the armies. A woman, coming from the camp at
Cambridge, applied to a Mr. Wainwood of Newport, Rhode
Island, to aid her in gaining access to Captain Wallace, or Mr.
Dudley, the collector. Wainwood, who was a patriot, drew from
her the object of her errand. She was the bearer of a letter from
some one in camp, directed to Major Kane in Boston; but which
she was to deliver either to the captain or the collector. Suspecting
something wrong, he prevailed upon her to leave it with him
for delivery. After her departure he opened the letter. It was
written in cipher, which he could not read. He took it to Mr.
Henry Ward, secretary of the colony. The latter, apprehending
it might contain treasonable information to the enemy, transmitted
it to General Greene, who laid it before Washington.
A letter in cipher, to a person in Boston hostile to the cause,
and to be delivered into the hands of Captain Wallace the nautical
marauder!—there evidently was treason in the camp; but
how was the traitor to be detected? The first step was to secure
the woman, the bearer of the letter, who had returned to Cambridge.
Tradition gives us a graphic scene connected with her
arrest. Washington was in his chamber at head-quarters, when
he beheld from his window, General Putnam approaching on
horseback, with a stout woman en croupe behind him. He had
pounced upon the culprit. The group presented by the old general
and his prize, overpowered even Washington’s gravity. It
was the only occasion throughout the whole campaign, on which
he was known to laugh heartily. He had recovered his gravity by
the time the delinquent was brought to the foot of the broad staircase
in head-quarters, and assured her in a severe tone from the
head of it, that, unless she confessed every thing before the next
morning, a halter would be in readiness for her.
69So far the tradition;—his own letter to the President of Congress
states that, for a long time, the woman was proof against
every threat and persuasion to discover the author, but at length
named Dr. Benjamin Church. It seemed incredible. He had
borne the character of a distinguished patriot; he was the author
of various patriotic writings; a member of the Massachusetts
House of Representatives; one of the committee deputed to conduct
Washington to the army, and at present he discharged the
functions of surgeon-general and director of the hospitals. That
such a man should be in traitorous correspondence with the enemy,
was a thunderstroke. Orders were given to secure him and
his papers. On his arrest he was extremely agitated, but acknowledged
the letter, and said it would be found, when deciphered,
to contain nothing criminal. His papers were searched, but
nothing of a treasonable nature discovered. “It appeared, however,
on inquiry,” says Washington, “that a confidant had been
among the papers before my messenger arrived.”
The letter was deciphered. It gave a description of the
army. The doctor made an awkward defence, protesting that he
had given an exaggerated account of the American force, for the
purpose of deterring the enemy from attacking the American
lines in their present defenceless condition from the want of powder.
His explanations were not satisfactory. The army and
country were exceedingly irritated. In a council of war he was
convicted of criminal correspondence; he was expelled from the
Massachusetts House of Representatives, and the Continental Congress
ultimately resolved that he should be confined in some secure
jail in Connecticut, without the use of pen, ink, or paper; “and
that no person be allowed to converse with him, except in the presence
and hearing of a magistrate or the sheriff of the county.”
70His sentence was afterwards mitigated on account of his health,
and he was permitted to leave the country. He embarked for the
West Indies, and is supposed to have perished at sea.
What had caused especial irritation in the case of Dr. Church,
was the kind of warfare already mentioned, carried on along the
coast by British cruisers, and notoriously by Captain Wallace.
To check these maraudings, and to capture the enemy’s transports
laden with supplies, the provinces of Massachusetts, Rhode
Island and Connecticut, fitted out two armed vessels each, at their
own expense, without seeking the sanction or aid of Congress.
Washington, also, on his own responsibility, ordered several
to be equipped for like purpose, which were to be manned by
hardy mariners, and commanded by able sea captains, actually
serving in the army. One of these vessels was despatched as soon
as ready, to cruise between Cape Ann and Cape Cod. Two others
were fitted out with all haste, and sent to cruise in the waters of
the St. Lawrence, to intercept two unarmed brigantines which
Congress had been informed had sailed from England for Quebec,
with ammunition and military stores. Among the sturdy little
New England seaports, which had become obnoxious to punishment
by resistance to nautical exactions, was Falmouth (now
Portland), in Maine.
On the evening of the 11th of October, Lieutenant Mowat,
of the royal navy, appeared before it with several armed vessels,
and sent a letter on shore, apprising the inhabitants that he was
come to execute a just punishment on them for their “premeditated
attacks on the legal prerogatives of the best of sovereigns.”
Two hours were given them, “to remove the human species out
of the town,” at the period of which, a red pendant hoisted at
71the main-topgallant masthead, and a gun, would be the signal for
destruction.
The letter brought a deputation of three persons on board.
The lieutenant informed them verbally, that he had orders from
Admiral Graves to set fire to all the seaport towns between Boston
and Halifax; and he expected New York, at the present moment,
was in ashes.
With much difficulty, and on the surrendering of some arms,
the committee obtained a respite until nine o’clock the next morning,
and the inhabitants employed the interval in removing their
families and effects. The next morning the committee returned
on board before nine o’clock. The lieutenant now offered to
spare the town on certain conditions, which were refused. About
half past nine o’clock the red pendant was run up to the masthead,
and the signal gun fired. Within five minutes several
houses were in flames, from a discharge of carcasses and bombshells,
which continued throughout the day. The inhabitants,
“standing on the heights, were spectators of the conflagration,
which reduced many of them to penury and despair.” One hundred
and thirty-nine dwelling houses, and two hundred and
twenty-eight stores, are said to have been burnt.[17] All the vessels
in the harbor, likewise, were destroyed or carried away as
prizes.
Having satisfied his sense of justice with respect to Falmouth,
the gallant lieutenant left it a smoking ruin, and made
sail, as was said, for Boston, to supply himself with more ammunition,
having the intention to destroy Portsmouth also.[18]
The conflagration of Falmouth was as a bale fire throughout
72the country. Lieutenant Mowat was said to have informed the
committee at that place, that orders had come from England to
burn all the seaport towns that would not lay down and deliver
up their arms, and give hostages for their good behavior.[19]
Washington himself supposed such to be the case. “The
desolation and misery,” writes he, “which ministerial vengeance
had planned, in contempt of every principle of humanity, and so
lately brought on the town of Falmouth, I know not how sufficiently
to commiserate, nor can my compassion for the general
suffering be conceived beyond the true measure of my feelings.”
General Greene, too, in a letter to a friend, expresses himself
with equal warmth. “O, could the Congress behold the distresses
and wretched condition of the poor inhabitants driven from
the seaport towns, it must, it would, kindle a blaze of indignation
against the commissioned pirates and licensed robbers. * * * People begin heartily to wish a declaration of independence.”[20]
General Sullivan was sent to Portsmouth, where there was a
fortification of some strength, to give the inhabitants his advice
and assistance in warding off the menaced blow. Newport, also,
was put on the alert, and recommended to fortify itself. “I expect
every hour,” writes Washington, “to hear that Newport has
shared the same fate of unhappy Falmouth.”[21] Under the feeling
roused by these reports, the General Court of Massachusetts, exercising
a sovereign power, passed an act for encouraging the fitting
out of armed vessels to defend the sea-coast of America,
and for erecting a court to try and condemn all vessels that
should be found infesting the same. This act, granting letters
73of marque and reprisal, anticipated any measure of the kind on
the part of the General Government, and was pronounced by
John Adams, “one of the most important documents in history.”[22]
The British ministry have, in later days, been exculpated
from the charge of issuing such a desolating order as that said
to have been reported by Lieutenant Mowat. The orders under
which that officer acted, we are told, emanated from General
Gage and Admiral Graves. The former intended merely the annoyance
and destruction of rebel shipping, whether on the coast
or in the harbors to the eastward of Boston; the burning of the
town is surmised to have been an additional thought of Admiral
Graves. Naval officers have a passion for bombardments.
Whatever part General Gage may have had in this most ill-advised
and discreditable measure, it was the last of his military
government, and he did not remain long enough in the country
to see it carried into effect. He sailed for England on the 10th
of October. The tidings of the battle of Bunker’s Hill had
withered his laurels as a commander. Still he was not absolutely
superseded, but called home, “in order,” as it was considerately
said, “to give his majesty exact information of every
thing, and suggest such matters as his knowledge and experience
of the service might enable him to furnish.” During his absence,
Major-general Howe would act as commander-in-chief of
the colonies on the Atlantic Ocean, and Major-general Carleton
of the British forces in Canada and on the frontiers. Gage fully
expected to return and resume the command. In a letter written
to the minister, Lord Dartmouth, the day before sailing, he
74urged the arrival, early in the spring, of reinforcements which
had been ordered, anticipating great hazard at the opening of
the campaign. In the mean time he trusted that two thousand
troops, shortly expected from Ireland, would enable him “to distress
the rebels by incursions along the coast,”—and—“he hoped
Portsmouth in New Hampshire would feel the weight of his
majesty’s arms.” “Poor Gage,” writes Horace Walpole, “is to
be the scape-goat for what was a reason against employing
him—incapacity.” He never returned to America.
On the 15th of October a committee from Congress arrived
in camp, sent to hold a conference with Washington, and with
delegates from the governments of Connecticut, Rhode Island,
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, on the subject of a new organization
of the army. The committee consisted of Benjamin
Franklin, Thomas Lynch of Carolina, and Colonel Harrison of
Virginia. It was just twenty years since Washington had met
Franklin in Braddock’s camp, aiding that unwary general by his
sagacious counsels and prompt expedients. Franklin was regarded
with especial deference in the camp at Cambridge. Greene, who
had never met with him before, listened to him as to an oracle.
Washington was president of the board of conference, and
Mr. Joseph Reed secretary. The committee brought an intimation
from Congress that an attack upon Boston was much desired,
if practicable.
Washington called a council of war of his generals on the
subject; they were unanimously of the opinion that an attack
would not be prudent at present.
Another question now arose. An attack upon the British
forces in Boston, whenever it should take place, might require a
bombardment; Washington inquired of the delegates how far it
75might be pushed to the destruction of houses and property.
They considered it a question of too much importance to be decided
by them, and said it must be referred to Congress. But
though they declined taking upon themselves the responsibility,
the majority of them were strongly in favor of it; and expressed
themselves so, when the matter was discussed informally
in camp. Two of the committee, Lynch and Harrison, as well as
Judge Wales, delegate from Connecticut, when the possible
effects of a bombardment were suggested at a dinner table, declared
that they would be willing to see Boston in flames. Lee
who was present, observed that it was impossible to burn it unless
they sent in men with bundles of straw to do it. “It could
not be done with carcasses and red-hot shot. Isle Royal,” he
added, “in the river St. Lawrence, had been fired at for a long
time in 1760, with a fine train of artillery, hot shot and carcasses,
without effect.”[23]
The board of conference was repeatedly in session, for three
or four days. The report of its deliberations rendered by the
committee, produced a resolution of Congress, that a new army
of twenty-two thousand two hundred and seventy-two men and
officers, should be formed, to be recruited as much as possible
from the troops actually in service. Unfortunately the term for
which they were to be enlisted was to be but for one year. It
formed a precedent which became a recurring cause of embarrassment
throughout the war.
Washington’s secretary, Mr. Reed, had, after the close of the
conference, signified to him his intention to return to Philadelphia,
where his private concerns required his presence. His departure
76was deeply regretted. His fluent pen had been of great
assistance to Washington in the despatch of his multifarious correspondence,
and his judicious counsels and cordial sympathies had
been still more appreciated by the commander-in-chief, amid the
multiplied difficulties of his situation. On the departure of Mr.
Reed, his place as secretary was temporarily supplied by Mr.
Robert Harrison of Maryland, and subsequently by Colonel
Mifflin; neither, however, attained to the affectionate confidence
reposed in their predecessor.
We shall have occasion to quote the correspondence kept up
between Washington and Reed, during the absence of the latter.
The letters of the former are peculiarly interesting, as giving
views of what was passing, not merely around him, but in the recesses
of his own heart. No greater proof need be given of the
rectitude of that heart, than the clearness and fulness with
which, in these truthful documents, every thought and feeling is
laid open.
CHAPTER VII. MEASURES OF GENERAL HOWE—DESECRATION OF CHURCHES—THREE PROCLAMATIONS—SEIZURE OF TORIES—WANT OF ARTILLERY—HENRY KNOX, THE ARTILLERIST—HIS MISSION TO TICONDEROGA—RE-ENLISTMENT OF TROOPS—LACK OF PUBLIC SPIRIT—COMMENTS OF GENERAL GREENE.
77
The measures which General Howe had adopted after taking
command in Boston, rejoiced the royalists, seeming to justify
their anticipations. He proceeded to strengthen the works on
Bunker’s Hill and Boston Neck, and to clear away houses and
throw up redoubts on eminences within the town. The patriot
inhabitants were shocked by the desecration of the Old South
Church, which for more than a hundred years had been a favorite
place of worship, where some of the most eminent divines had
officiated. The pulpit and pews were now removed, the floor was
covered with earth, and the sacred edifice was converted into a
riding-school for Burgoyne’s light dragoons. To excuse its desecration,
it was spoken of scoffingly as a “meeting-house, where
sedition had often been preached.”
The North Church, another “meeting-house,” was entirely
demolished and used for fuel. “Thus,” says a chronicler of the
day, “thus are our houses devoted to religious worship, profaned
and destroyed by the subjects of his royal majesty.”[24]
78About the last of October, Howe issued three proclamations.
The first forbade all persons to leave Boston without his permission
under pain of military execution; the second forbade any
one, so permitted, to take with him more than five pounds sterling,
under pain of forfeiting all the money found upon his person
and being subject to fine and imprisonment; the third called
upon the inhabitants to arm themselves for the preservation of
order within the town; they to be commanded by officers of his
appointment.
Washington had recently been incensed by the conflagration
of Falmouth; the conduct of Governor Dunmore who had proclaimed
martial law in Virginia, and threatened ruin to the patriots,
had added to his provocation; the measures of General
Howe seemed of the same harsh character, and he determined
to retaliate.
“Would it not be prudent,” writes he to Governor Trumbull
of Connecticut, “to seize those tories who have been, are, and we
know will be active against us? Why should persons who are
preying upon the vitals of their country, be suffered to stalk at
large, whilst we know they will do us every mischief in their
power?”
In this spirit he ordered General Sullivan, who was fortifying
Portsmouth, “to seize upon such persons as held commissions under
the crown, and were acting as open and avowed enemies to their
country, and hold them as hostages for the security of the town.”
Still he was moderate in his retaliation, and stopped short of private
individuals. “For the present,” said he, “I shall avoid giving
the like order with regard to the tories of Portsmouth; but
the day is not far off when they will meet with this, or a worse
79fate, if there is not a considerable reformation in their conduct.”[25]
The season was fast approaching when the bay between the
camp and Boston would be frozen over, and military operations
might be conducted upon the ice. General Howe, if reinforced,
would then very probably “endeavor to relieve himself from the
disgraceful confinement in which the ministerial troops had been
all summer.” Washington felt the necessity, therefore, of guarding
the camps wherever they were most assailable; and of throwing
up batteries for the purpose. He had been embarrassed
throughout the siege by the want of artillery and ordnance stores;
but never more so than at the present moment. In this juncture,
Mr. Henry Knox stepped forward, and offered to proceed to the
frontier forts on Champlain in quest of a supply.
Knox was one of those providential characters which spring
up in emergencies, as if they were formed by and for the occasion.
A thriving bookseller in Boston, he had thrown up business to
take up arms for the liberties of his country. He was one of the
patriots who had fought on Bunker’s Hill, since when he had
aided in planning the defences of the camp before Boston. The
aptness and talent here displayed by him as an artillerist, had
recently induced Washington to recommend him to Congress for
the command of the regiment of artillery in place of the veteran
Gridley, who was considered by all the officers of the camp, too
old for active employment. Congress had not yet acted on that
recommendation; in the mean time Washington availed himself of
the offered services of Knox in the present instance. He was,
accordingly, instructed to examine into the state of the artillery
80in camp, and take an account of the cannon, mortars, shells, lead
and ammunition that were wanting. He was then to hasten to
New York, procure and forward all that could be had there; and
thence proceed to the head-quarters of General Schuyler, who was
requested by letter to aid him in obtaining what further supplies
of the kind were wanting from the forts at Ticonderoga, Crown
Point, St. Johns, and even Quebec, should it be in the hands of
the Americans. Knox set off on his errand with promptness and
alacrity, and shortly afterwards the commission of colonel of the
regiment of artillery which Washington had advised, was forwarded
to him by Congress.
The re-enlistment of troops actually in service was now attempted,
and proved a fruitful source of perplexity. In a letter
to the President of Congress, Washington observes that half of
the officers of the rank of captain were inclined to retire; and it
was probable their example would influence their men. Of those
who were disposed to remain, the officers of one colony were unwilling
to mix in the same regiment with those of another. Many
sent in their names, to serve in expectation of promotion; others
stood aloof, to see what advantages they could make for themselves;
while those who had declined sent in their names again to serve.[26]
The difficulties were greater, if possible, with the soldiers than
with the officers. They would not enlist unless they knew their
colonel, lieutenant-colonel and captain; Connecticut men being
unwilling to serve under officers from Massachusetts, and Massachusetts
men under officers from Rhode Island; so that it was necessary
to appoint the officers first.
Twenty days later he again writes to the President of Congress:
81“I am sorry to be necessitated to mention to you the
egregious want of public spirit which prevails here. Instead of
pressing to be engaged in the cause of their country, which I
vainly flattered myself would be the case, I find we are likely to
be deserted in a most critical time. * * * Our situation is
truly alarming, and of this General Howe is well apprised. No
doubt when he is reinforced he will avail himself of the information.”
In a letter to Reed he disburdened his heart more completely.
“Such dearth of public spirit, and such want of virtue; such
stock-jobbing, and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantage
of one kind or another in this great change of military arrangement,
I never saw before, and I pray God’s mercy that I may
never be witness to again. What will be the end of these
manœuvres is beyond my scan. I tremble at the prospect. We
have been till this time (Nov. 28) enlisting about three thousand
five hundred men. To engage these, I have been obliged to allow
furloughs as far as fifty men to a regiment, and the officers I am
persuaded indulge many more. The Connecticut troops will not
be prevailed upon to stay longer than their term, saving those
who have enlisted for the next campaign, and are mostly on furlough;
and such a mercenary spirit pervades the whole, that I
should not be surprised at any disaster that may happen. * * *
Could I have foreseen what I have experienced and am likely
to experience, no consideration upon earth should have induced
me to accept this command.”
No one drew closer to Washington in this time of his
troubles and perplexities than General Greene. He had a real
veneration for his character, and thought himself “happy in an
opportunity to serve under so good a general.” He grieved at
82Washington’s annoyances, but attributed them in part to his
being somewhat of a stranger in New England. “He has not
had time,” writes he, “to make himself acquainted with the
genius of this people; they are naturally as brave and spirited
as the peasantry of any other country, but you cannot expect
veterans of a raw militia from only a few months’ service. The
common people are exceedingly avaricious; the genius of the
people is commercial, from their long intercourse with trade.
The sentiment of honor, the true characteristic of a soldier, has
not yet got the better of interest. His Excellency has been
taught to believe the people here a superior race of mortals;
and finding them of the same temper and dispositions, passions
and prejudices, virtues and vices of the common people of other
governments, they sank in his esteem.”[27]
CHAPTER VIII. AFFAIRS IN CANADA—CAPTURE OF FORT CHAMBLEE—SIEGE OF ST. JOHNS—MACLEAN AND HIS HIGHLANDERS—MONTGOMERY ON THE TREATMENT OF ETHAN ALLEN—REPULSE OF CARLETON—CAPITULATION OF THE GARRISON OF ST. JOHNS—GENEROUS CONDUCT OF MONTGOMERY—MACLEAN RE-EMBARKS FOR QUEBEC—WEARY STRUGGLE OF ARNOLD THROUGH THE WILDERNESS—DEFECTION OF COLONEL ENOS—ARNOLD IN THE VALLEY OF THE CHAUDIERE—HIS ARRIVAL OPPOSITE QUEBEC—SURRENDER OF MONTREAL—ESCAPE OF CARLETON—HOME SICKNESS OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS.
83
Despatches from Schuyler dated October 26th, gave Washington
another chapter of the Canada expedition. Chamblee, an
inferior fort, within five miles of St. Johns, had been taken by
Majors Brown and Livingston at the head of fifty Americans and
three hundred Canadians. A large quantity of gunpowder and
other military stores found there, was a seasonable supply to the
army before St. Johns, and consoled General Montgomery for his
disappointment in regard to the aid promised by Colonel Ethan
Allen. He now pressed the siege of St. Johns with vigor. The
garrison, cut off from supplies, were suffering from want of provisions;
but the brave commander, Major Preston, still held out
manfully, hoping speedy relief from General Carleton, who was
assembling troops for that purpose at Montreal.
Carleton, it is true, had but about one hundred regulars
84several hundred Canadians, and a number of Indians with him;
but he calculated greatly on the co-operation of Colonel Maclean,
a veteran Scot, brave and bitterly loyal, who had enlisted three
hundred of his countrymen at Quebec, and formed them into
a regiment called “The Royal Highland Emigrants.” This
doughty Highlander was to land at the mouth of the Sorel,
where it empties into the St. Lawrence, and proceed along the
former river to St. Johns, to join Carleton, who would repair
thither by the way of Longueil.
In the mean time Montgomery received accounts from various
quarters that Colonel Ethan Allen and his men, captured in the
ill-advised attack upon Montreal, were treated with cruel and unnecessary
severity, being loaded with irons; and that even the
colonel himself was subjected to this “shocking indignity.”
Montgomery addressed a letter to Carleton on the subject, strong
and decided in its purport, but written in the spirit of a courteous
and high-minded gentleman, and ending with an expression of
that sad feeling which gallant officers must often have experienced
in this revolutionary conflict, on being brought into collision with
former brothers in arms.
“Your character, sir,” writes he, “induces me to hope I am
ill informed. Nevertheless, the duty I owe the troops committed
to my charge, lays me under the necessity of acquainting your
Excellency, that, if you allow this conduct and persist in it, I
shall, though with the most painful regret, execute with rigor the
just and necessary law of retaliation upon the garrison of Chamblee,
now in my possession, and upon all others who may hereafter
fall into my hands. * * * * I shall expect your
Excellency’s answer in six days. Should the bearer not return
in that time, I must interpret your silence into a declaration
85of a barbarous war. I cannot pass this opportunity without
lamenting the melancholy and fatal necessity, which obliges the
firmest friends of the constitution to oppose one of the most
respectable officers of the crown.”
While waiting for a reply, Montgomery pressed the siege
of St. Johns, though thwarted continually by the want of subordination
and discipline among his troops; hasty levies from various
colonies, who, said he, “carry the spirit of freedom into the
field, and think for themselves.” Accustomed as he had been, in
his former military experience, to the implicit obedience of European
troops, the insubordination of these yeoman soldiery was
intolerable to him. “Were I not afraid,” writes he, “the
example would be too generally followed, and that the public
service might suffer, I would not stay an hour at the head of
troops whose operations I cannot direct. I must say I have no
hopes of success, unless from the garrison’s wanting provisions.”
He had advanced his lines and played from his batteries on
two sides of the fort for some hours, when tidings brought by four
prisoners, caused him to cease his fire.
General Carleton, on the 31st of September, had embarked
his motley force at Montreal in thirty-four boats, to cross the St.
Lawrence, land at Longueil, and push on for St. Johns, where, as
concerted, he was to be joined by Maclean and his Highlanders.
As the boats approached the right bank of the river at Longueil,
a terrible fire of artillery and musketry was unexpectedly opened
upon them, and threw them into confusion. It was from Colonel
Seth Warner’s detachment of Green Mountain Boys and New
Yorkers. Some of the boats were disabled, some were driven on
shore on an island; Carleton retreated with the rest to Montreal,
with some loss in killed and wounded. The Americans captured
86two Canadians and two Indians; and it was these prisoners who
brought tidings to the camp of Carleton’s signal repulse.
Aware that the garrison held out merely in expectation of
the relief thus intercepted, Montgomery ceased his fire, and sent
a flag by one of the Canadian prisoners with a letter informing
Major Preston of the event, and inviting a surrender to spare
the effusion of blood.
Preston in reply expressed a doubt of the truth of the report
brought by the prisoners, but offered to surrender if not relieved in
four days. The condition was refused and the gallant major was
obliged to capitulate. His garrison consisted of five hundred
regulars and one hundred Canadians; among the latter were
several of the provincial noblesse.
Montgomery treated Preston and his garrison with the courtesy
inspired by their gallant resistance. He had been a British
officer himself, and his old associations with the service, made him
sympathize with the brave men whom the fortune of war had
thrown into his hands. Perhaps, their high-bred and aristocratic
tone contrasted favorably in his eyes, with the rough
demeanor of the crude swordsmen with whom he had recently
associated, and brought back the feelings of early days, when
war with him was a gay profession, not a melancholy duty.
According to capitulation, the baggage of both officers and men
was secured to them, and each of the latter received a new suit
of clothing from the captured stores. This caused a murmur
among the American soldiery, many of whom were nearly naked,
and the best but scantily provided. Even some of the officers
were indignant that all the articles of clothing had not been
treated as lawful spoil. “I would not have sullied my own
reputation, nor disgraced the Continental arms by such a breach
87of capitulation for the universe,” said Montgomery. Having
sent his prisoners up Lake Champlain to Ticonderoga, he prepared
to proceed immediately to Montreal; requesting General
Schuyler to forward all the men he could possibly spare.
The royal Highland Emigrants who were to have co-operated
with General Carleton, met with no better fortune than that
commander. Maclean landed at the mouth of the Sorel, and
added to his force by recruiting a number of Canadians in the
neighborhood, at the point of the bayonet. He was in full
march for St. Johns when he was encountered by Majors Brown
and Livingston with their party, fresh from the capture of
Chamblee, and reinforced by a number of Green Mountain Boys.
These pressed him back to the mouth of the Sorel, where, hearing
of the repulse of Carleton, and being deserted by his Canadian
recruits, he embarked the residue of his troops, and set off
down the St. Lawrence to Quebec. The Americans now took
post at the mouth of the Sorel, where they erected batteries so
as to command the St. Lawrence, and prevent the descent of any
armed vessels from Montreal.
Thus closed another chapter of the invasion of Canada.
“Not a word of Arnold yet,” said Montgomery, in his last
despatch. “I have sent two expresses to him lately, one by an
Indian who promised to return with expedition. The instant I
have any news of him, I will acquaint you by express.”
We will anticipate his express, by giving the reader the purport
of letters received by Washington direct from Arnold himself,
bringing forward the collateral branch of this eventful
enterprise.
The transportation of troops and effects across the carrying-place
between the Kennebec and Dead Rivers, had been a work
88of severe toil and difficulty to Arnold and his men, but performed
with admirable spirit. There were ponds and streams full
of trout and salmon, which furnished them with fresh provisions.
Launching their boats on the sluggish waters of the Dead River,
they navigated it in divisions, as before, to the foot of snow-crowned
mountains; a part of the great granite chain which extends
from south-west to north-east throughout our continent.
Here, while Arnold and the first division were encamped to
repose themselves, heavy rains set in, and they came near being
swept away by sudden torrents from the mountains. Several of
their boats were overturned, much of their provisions was lost,
the sick list increased, and the good spirits which had hitherto
sustained them began to give way. They were on scanty allowance,
with a prospect of harder times, for there were still twelve
or fifteen days of wilderness before them, where no supplies were
to be had. A council of war was now held, in which it was
determined to send back the sick and disabled, who were mere
incumbrances. Arnold, accordingly, wrote to the commanders
of the other divisions, to press on with as many of their men as
they could furnish with provisions for fifteen days, and to send
the rest back to a place on the route called Norridgewock. This
order was misunderstood, or misinterpreted by Colonel Enos,
who commanded the rear division; he gave all the provisions he
could spare to Colonel Greene of the third division, retaining
merely enough to supply his own corps of three hundred men on
their way back to Norridgewock, whither he immediately returned.
Letters from Arnold and Enos apprised Washington of this
grievous flaw in the enterprise. He regarded it, however, as
usual, with a hopeful eye. “Notwithstanding this great defection,”
89said he, “I do not despair of Colonel Arnold’s success.
He will have, in all probability, many more difficulties to encounter,
than if he had been a fortnight sooner; as it is likely
that Governor Carleton will, with what forces he can collect after
the surrender of the rest of Canada, throw himself into Quebec,
and there make his last effort.”[28]
Washington was not mistaken in the confidence he had placed
in the energy of Arnold. Though the latter found his petty
force greatly reduced by the retrograde move of Enos and his
party, and although snow and ice rendered his march still more
bleak among the mountains, he kept on with unflinching spirit
until he arrived at the ridge which divides the streams of New
England and Canada. Here, at Lake Megantic, the source of
the Chaudiere, he met an emissary whom he had sent in advance
to ascertain the feelings of the habitans, or French yeomanry,
in the fertile valley of that stream. His report being favorable,
Arnold shared out among the different companies the scanty
provisions which remained, directing them to make the best of
their way for the Chaudiere settlements; while he, with a light
foraging party, would push rapidly ahead, to procure and send
back supplies.
He accordingly embarked with his little party in five bateaux
and a birch canoe, and launched forth without a guide on the
swift current of the Chaudiere. It was little better than a
mountain torrent, full of rocks and rapids. Three of their boats
were dashed to pieces, the cargoes lost, and the crews saved with
difficulty. At one time, the whole party came near being precipitated
over a cataract, where all might have perished; at
90length they reached Sertigan, the first French settlement, where
they were cordially received. Here Arnold bought provisions,
which he sent back by the Canadians and Indians to his troops.
The latter were in a state of starvation. Some had not tasted
food for eight and forty hours; others had cooked two dogs, followers
of the camp; and others had boiled their moccasins, cartouch
boxes, and other articles of leather, in the hope of rendering
them eatable.
Arnold halted for a short time in the hospitable valley of the
Chaudiere, to give his troops repose, and distributed among the
inhabitants the printed manifesto with which he had been furnished
by Washington. Here he was joined by about forty Norridgewock
Indians. On the 9th of November, the little army
emerged from the woods at Point Levi, on the St. Lawrence,
opposite to Quebec. A letter written by an inhabitant of that
place, speaks of their sudden apparition.
“There are about 500 Provincials arrived at Point Levi,
opposite to the town, by the way of Chaudiere across the
woods. Surely a miracle must have been wrought in their favor.
It is an undertaking above the common race of men in this
debauched age. They have travelled through woods and bogs,
and over precipices, for the space of one hundred and twenty
miles, attended with every inconvenience and difficulty, to be surmounted
only by men of indefatigable zeal and industry.”
Leaving Arnold in full sight of Quebec, which, after his long
struggle through the wilderness, must have appeared like a land
of promise; we turn to narrate the events of the upper expedition
into Canada, of which the letters of Schuyler kept Washington
faithfully informed.
Montgomery appeared before Montreal on the 12th of November.
91General Carleton had embarked with his little garrison,
and several of the civil officers of the place, on board of a
flotilla of ten or eleven small vessels, and made sail in the night,
with a favorable breeze, carrying away with him the powder and
other important stores. The town capitulated, of course; and
Montgomery took quiet possession. His urbanity and kindness
soon won the good will of the inhabitants, both English and
French, and made the Canadians sensible that he really came to
secure their rights, not to molest them. Intercepted letters acquainted
him with Arnold’s arrival in the neighborhood of
Quebec, and the great alarm of “the king’s friends,” who expected
to be besieged: “which, with the blessing of God, they
shall be,” said Montgomery, “if the severe season holds off, and
I can prevail on the troops to accompany me.”
His great immediate object was the capture of Carleton;
which would form a triumphal close to the enterprise, and might
decide the fate of Canada. The flotilla in which the general was
embarked, had made repeated attempts to escape down the St.
Lawrence; but had as often been driven back by the batteries
thrown up by the Americans at the mouth of the Sorel. It now
lay anchored about fifteen miles above that river; and Montgomery
prepared to attack it with bateaux and light artillery, so as to
force it down upon the batteries.
Carleton saw his imminent peril. Disguising himself as a
Canadian voyager, he set off on a dark night accompanied by six
peasants, in a boat with muffled oars, which he assisted to pull;
slipped quietly and silently past all the batteries and guard-boats,
and effected his escape to Three Rivers, where he embarked in a
vessel for Quebec. After his departure the flotilla surrendered,
and all those who had taken refuge on board were made prisoners
92of war. Among them was General Prescott, late commander of
Montreal.
Montgomery now placed garrisons in Montreal, St. Johns and
Chamblee, and made final preparations for descending the St.
Lawrence, and co-operating with Arnold against Quebec. To his
disappointment and deep chagrin, he found but a handful of his
troops disposed to accompany him. Some pleaded ill health; the
term of enlistment of many had expired, and they were bent on
returning home; and others, who had no such excuses to make,
became exceedingly turbulent, and indeed mutinous. Nothing
but a sense of public duty, and gratitude to Congress for an
unsought commission, had induced Montgomery to engage in the
service; wearied by the continual vexations which beset it, he
avowed, in a letter to Schuyler, his determination to retire as
soon as the intended expedition against Quebec was finished.
“Will not your health permit you to reside at Montreal this
winter?” writes he to Schuyler; “I must go home, if I walk by
the side of the lake. I am weary of power, and totally want
that patience and temper so requisite for such a command.”
Much of the insubordination of the troops he attributed to the
want of tact and cultivation in their officers; who had been suddenly
advanced from inferior stations and coarse employments.
“An affair happened yesterday,” writes he to Schuyler on the
24th of November, “which had very near sent me home. A
number of officers presumed to remonstrate against the indulgence
I had given some of the king’s troops. Such an insult I
could not bear, and immediately resigned. To-day they qualified
it by such an apology, as put it in my power to resume the command.”
In the same spirit he writes: “I wish some method
could be fallen upon for engaging gentlemen to serve. A point
93of honor and more knowledge of the world, to be found in that
class of men, would greatly reform discipline, and render the
troops much more tractable.”
The troops which had given Montgomery so much annoyance
and refused to continue with him in Canada, soon began to arrive
at Ticonderoga. Schuyler, in a letter to Congress, gives a half
querulous, half humorous account of their conduct. “About
three hundred of the troops raised in Connecticut, passed here
within a few days. An unhappy home sickness prevails. These
all came down as invalids, not one willing to re-engage for the
winter’s service; and, unable to get any work done by them, I
discharged them en groupe. Of all the specifics ever invented
for any, there is none so efficacious as a discharge for this prevailing
disorder. No sooner was it administered but it perfected
the cure of nine out of ten; who, refusing to wait for boats to go
by the way of Lake George, slung their heavy packs, crossed the
lake at this place, and undertook a march of two hundred miles
with the greatest good will and alacrity.”
This home sickness in rustic soldiers after a rough campaign,
was natural enough, and seems only to have provoked the testy
and subacid humor of Schuyler; but other instances of conduct
roused his indignation.
A schooner and tow galley arrived at Crown Point, with
upwards of a hundred persons. They were destitute of provisions;
none were to be had at the Point, and the ice prevented
them from penetrating to Ticonderoga. In starving condition
they sent an express to General Schuyler, imploring relief. He
immediately ordered three captains of General Wooster’s regiment,
with a considerable body of men in bateaux, to “attempt a
relief for the unhappy sufferers.” To his surprise and disgust,
94they manifested the utmost unwillingness to comply, and made a
variety of excuses, which he spurned at as frivolous, and as evincing
the greatest want of humanity. He expressed himself to
that effect the next day, in a general order, adding the following
stinging words: “The general, therefore, not daring to trust a
matter of so much importance to men of so little feeling, has
ordered Lieutenant Riker, of Col. Holmes’s regiment, to make
the attempt. He received the order with the alacrity becoming
a gentleman, an officer, and a Christian.”
This high-minded rebuke, given in so public a manner, rankled
in the breasts of those whose conduct had merited it, and insured
to Schuyler that persevering hostility with which mean minds
revenge the exposure of their meanness.
CHAPTER IX. WASHINGTON’S ANTICIPATIONS OF SUCCESS AT QUEBEC—HIS EULOGIUM OF ARNOLD—SCHUYLER AND MONTGOMERY TALK OF RESIGNING—EXPOSTULATIONS OF WASHINGTON—THEIR EFFECT—SCHUYLER’S CONDUCT TO A CAPTIVE FOE.
95
We have endeavored to compress into a succinct account various
events of the invasion of Canada, furnished to Washington by
letters from Schuyler and Arnold. The tidings of the capture
of Montreal had given him the liveliest satisfaction. He now
looked forward to equal success in the expedition against Quebec.
In a letter to Schuyler, he passed a high eulogium on Arnold.
“The merit of this gentleman is certainly great,” writes he,
“and I heartily wish that fortune may distinguish him as one of
her favorites. I am convinced that he will do every thing that
prudence and valor shall suggest to add to the success of our
arms, and for reducing Quebec to our possession. Should he not
be able to accomplish so desirable a work with the forces he has,
I flatter myself that it will be effected when General Montgomery
joins him, and our conquest of Canada will be complete.”
Certain passages of Schuyler’s letters, however, gave him deep
concern, wherein that general complained of the embarrassments
and annoyances he had experienced from the insubordination of
96the army. “Habituated to order,” said he, “I cannot without
pain see that disregard of discipline, confusion and inattention,
which reign so generally in this quarter, and I am determined to
retire. Of this resolution I have advised Congress.”
He had indeed done so. In communicating to the President
of Congress the complaints of General Montgomery, and his intention
to retire, “my sentiments,” said he, “exactly coincide
with his. I shall, with him, do every thing in my power to put
a finishing stroke to the campaign, and make the best arrangement
in my power, in order to insure success to the next. This
done, I must beg leave to retire.”
Congress, however, was too well aware of his value, readily
to dispense with his services. His letter produced a prompt resolution
expressive of their high sense of his attention and perseverance,
“which merited the thanks of the United Colonies.”
He had alleged his impaired health,—they regretted the injuries
it had sustained in the service, but begged he would not insist on
a measure “which would deprive America of the benefits of his
zeal and abilities, and rob him of the honor of completing the
work he had so happily begun.”
What, however, produced a greater effect upon Schuyler than
any encomium or entreaty on the part of Congress, were the expostulations
of Washington, inspired by strong friendship and
kindred sympathies. “I am exceedingly sorry,” writes the latter,
“to find you so much embarrassed by the disregard of discipline,
confusion, and want of order among the troops, as to have
occasioned you to mention to Congress an inclination to retire.
I know that your complaints are too well founded, but would willingly
hope that nothing will induce you to quit the service. * * * * I have met with difficulties of the same sort, and
97such as I never expected; but they must be borne with. The
cause we are engaged in is so just and righteous, that we must
try to rise superior to every obstacle in its support; and, therefore,
I beg that you will not think of resigning, unless you have
carried your application to Congress too far to recede.”
And in another letter he makes a still stronger appeal to his
patriotism. “I am sorry that you, and General Montgomery,
incline to quit the service. Let me ask you, sir, when is
the time for brave men to exert themselves in the cause of
liberty and their country, if this is not? Should any difficulties
that they may have to encounter at this important crisis deter
them? God knows there is not a difficulty that you both very
justly complain of, that I have not in an eminent degree experienced,
that I am not every day experiencing; but we must bear
up against them, and make the best of mankind, as they are,
since we cannot have them as we wish. Let me, therefore, conjure
you, and Mr. Montgomery, to lay aside such thoughts—as
thoughts injurious to yourselves, and extremely so to your country,
which calls aloud for gentlemen of your ability.”
This noble appeal went straight to the heart of Schuyler, and
brought out a magnanimous reply. “I do not hesitate,” writes
he, “to answer my dear general’s question in the affirmative, by
declaring that now or never is the time for every virtuous
American to exert himself in the cause of liberty and his country;
and that it is become a duty cheerfully to sacrifice the
sweets of domestic felicity to attain the honest and glorious end
America has in view.”
In the same letter he reveals in confidence the true cause of
his wish to retire from an official station; it was the annoyance he
had suffered throughout the campaign from sectional prejudice
98and jealousy. “I could point out particular persons of rank in
the army,” writes he, “who have frequently declared that the
general commanding in this quarter, ought to be of the colony
from whence the majority of the troops came. But it is not from
opinions or principles of individuals that I have drawn the following
conclusion: that troops from the colony of Connecticut
will not bear with a general from another colony; it is from the
daily and common conversation of all ranks of people from that
colony, both in and out of the army; and I assure you that I
sincerely lament that people of so much public virtue should be
actuated by such an unbecoming jealousy, founded on such a
narrow principle.” Having made this declaration, he adds,
“although I frankly own that I feel a resentment, yet I shall continue
to sacrifice it to a nobler object, the weal of that country in
which I have drawn the breath of life, resolved ever to seek, with
unwearied assiduity, for opportunities to fulfil my duty to it.”
It is with pride we have quoted so frequently the correspondence
of these two champions of our Revolution, as it lays open
their hearts, and shows the lofty patriotism by which they were
animated.
A letter from John Adams to General Thomas, alleges as one
cause of Schuyler’s unpopularity with the eastern troops, the
“politeness” shown by him to Canadian and British prisoners;
which “enabled them and their ministerial friends to impose upon
him.”[29]
The “politeness” in fact, was that noble courtesy which a
high-minded soldier extends towards a captive foe. If his courtesy
99was imposed upon, it only proved that, incapable of doubledealing
himself, he suspected it not in others. All generous
natures are liable to imposition; their warm impulses being too
quick for selfish caution. It is the cold, the calculating and the
mean, whose distrustful wariness is never taken in.
CHAPTER X. DIFFICULTIES IN FILLING UP THE ARMY—THE CONNECTICUT TROOPS PERSIST IN GOING HOME—THEIR RECEPTION THERE—TIMELY ARRIVAL OF SPOILS IN THE CAMP—PUTNAM AND THE PRIZE MORTAR—A MARAUD BY AMERICANS—REBUKED BY WASHINGTON—CORRESPONDENCE OF WASHINGTON WITH GEN. HOWE ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF ETHAN ALLEN—FRATERNAL ZEAL OF LEVI ALLEN—TREATMENT OF GEN. PRESCOTT—PREPARATIONS TO BOMBARD BOSTON—BATTERY AT LECHMERE’S POINT—PRAYER OF PUTNAM FOR POWDER.
100
The forming even of the skeleton of an army under the new
regulations, had been a work of infinite difficulty; to fill it up
was still more difficult. The first burst of revolutionary zeal had
passed away; enthusiasm had been chilled by the inaction and
monotony of a long encampment; an encampment, moreover,
destitute of those comforts which, in experienced warfare, are
provided by a well-regulated commissariat. The troops had suffered
privations of every kind, want of fuel, clothing, provisions.
They looked forward with dismay to the rigors of winter, and
longed for their rustic homes and their family firesides.
Apprehending that some of them would incline to go home
when the time of their enlistment expired, Washington summoned
the general officers at head-quarters, and invited a delegation of
the General Court to be present, to adopt measures for the
101defence and support of the lines. The result of their deliberations
was an order that three thousand of the minute men and
militia of Massachusetts, and two thousand from New Hampshire,
should be at Cambridge by the 10th of December, to relieve the
Connecticut regiments, and supply the deficiency that would be
caused by their departure, and by the absence of others on
furlough.
With this arrangement the Connecticut troops were made acquainted,
and, as the time of most of them would not be out
before the 10th, they were ordered to remain in camp until relieved.
Their officers assured Washington that he need apprehend
no defection on the part of their men; they would not leave
the lines. The officers themselves were probably mistaken in
their opinion of their men, for on the 1st of December, many of
the latter, some of whom belonged to Putnam’s regiment, resolved
to go home immediately. Efforts were made to prevent
them, but in vain; several carried off with them their arms and
ammunition. Washington sent a list of their names to Governor
Trumbull. “I submit it to your judgment,” writes he, “whether
an example should not be made of these men who have deserted
the cause of their country at this critical juncture, when the
enemy are receiving reinforcements?”
We anticipate the reply of Governor Trumbull, received
several days subsequently. “The late extraordinary and reprehensible
conduct of some of the troops of this colony,” writes he,
“impresses me, and the minds of many of our people, with great
surprise and indignation, since the treatment they met with, and the
order and request made to them, were so reasonable, and apparently
necessary for the defence of our common cause, and safety
of our rights and privileges, for which they freely engaged.”
102We will here add, that the homeward-bound warriors seem to
have run the gauntlet along the road; for their conduct on quitting
the army drew upon them such indignation, that they could
hardly get any thing to eat on their journey, and when they
arrived at home they met with such a reception (to the credit of
the Connecticut women be it recorded), that many were soon disposed
to return again to the camp.[30]
On the very day after the departure homeward of these
troops, and while it was feared their example would be contagious,
a long, lumbering train of waggons, laden with ordnance and
military stores, and decorated with flags, came wheeling into the
camp escorted by continental troops and country militia. They
were part of the cargo of a large brigantine laden with munitions
of war, captured and sent in to Cape Ann by the schooner
Lee, Captain Manly, one of the cruisers sent out by Washington.
“Such universal joy ran through the whole camp,” writes an
officer, “as if each one grasped a victory in his own hands.”
Beside the ordnance captured, there were two thousand stand
of arms, one hundred thousand flints, thirty thousand round shot,
and thirty-two tons of musket balls.
“Surely nothing,” writes Washington, “ever came more
apropos.”
It was indeed a cheering incident, and was eagerly turned to
account. Among the ordnance was a huge brass mortar of a
new construction, weighing near three thousand pounds. It
was considered a glorious trophy, and there was a resolve to
christen it. Mifflin, Washington’s secretary, suggested the name.
The mortar was fixed in a bed; old Putnam mounted it, dashed
103on it a bottle of rum, and gave it the name of Congress. The
shouts which rent the air were heard in Boston. When the
meaning of them was explained to the British, they observed,
that “should their expected reinforcements arrive in time, the
rebels would pay dear in the spring for all their petty triumphs.”
With Washington, this transient gleam of nautical success
was soon overshadowed by the conduct of the cruisers he had
sent to the St. Lawrence. Failing to intercept the brigantines,
the objects of their cruise, they landed on the island of St.
Johns, plundered the house of the governor and several private
dwellings, and brought off three of the principal inhabitants
prisoners; one of whom, Mr. Callbeck, was president of the
council, and acted as governor.
These gentlemen made a memorial to Washington of this
scandalous maraud. He instantly ordered the restoration of the
effects which had been pillaged;—of his conduct towards the
gentlemen personally, we may judge by the following note addressed
to him by Mr. Callbeck.
“I should ill deserve the generous treatment which your Excellency
has been pleased to show me, had I not the gratitude to
acknowledge so great a favor. I cannot ascribe any part of it to
my own merit, but must impute the whole to the philanthropy and
humane disposition that so truly characterize General Washington.
Be so obliging, therefore, as to accept the only return in
my power, that of my most grateful thanks.”[31]
Shortly after the foregoing occurrence, information was received
of the indignities which had been heaped upon Colonel
Ethan Allen, when captured at Montreal by General Prescott,
104who, himself, was now a prisoner in the hands of the Americans.
It touched Washington on a point on which he was most sensitive
and tenacious, the treatment of American officers when captured;
and produced the following letter from him to General
Howe:
“Sir,—We have just been informed of a circumstance which,
were it not so well authenticated, I should scarcely think credible.
It is that Colonel Allen, who, with his small party, was defeated
and made prisoner near Montreal, has been treated without
regard to decency, humanity, or the rules of war; that he
has been thrown into irons, and suffers all the hardships inflicted
upon common felons.
“I think it my duty, sir, to demand, and do expect from you,
an eclaircissement on this subject. At the same time, I flatter
myself, from the character which Mr. Howe bears as a man of
honor, gentleman and soldier, that my demand will meet with his
approbation. I must take the liberty, also, of informing you
that I shall consider your silence as a confirmation of the report,
and further assuring you, that whatever treatment Colonel Allen
receives, whatever fate he undergoes, such exactly shall be the
treatment and fate of Brigadier Prescott, now in our hands.
The law of retaliation is not only justifiable in the eyes of God
and man, but absolutely a duty, which, in our present circumstances,
we owe to our relations, friends and fellow-citizens.
“Permit me to add, sir, that we have all here the highest regard
and reverence for your great personal qualities and attainments,
and the Americans in general esteem it as not the least of
their misfortunes, that the name of Howe, a name so dear to
them, should appear at the head of the catalogue of the instruments
employed by a wicked ministry for their destruction.”
105General Howe felt acutely the sorrowful reproach in the latter
part of the letter. It was a reiteration of what had already
been expressed by Congress; in the present instance it produced
irritation, if we may judge from the reply.
“Sir,—In answer to your letter, I am to acquaint you that
my command does not extend to Canada. Not having any accounts
wherein the name of Allen is mentioned, I cannot give you
the smallest satisfaction upon the subject of your letter. But
trusting Major-general Carleton’s conduct will never incur censure
upon any occasion, I am to conclude in the instance of your
inquiry, that he has not forfeited his past pretensions to decency
and humanity.
“It is with regret, considering the character you have always
maintained among your friends, as a gentleman of the strictest
honor and delicacy, that I find cause to resent a sentence in the
conclusion of your letter, big with invective against my superiors,
and insulting to myself, which should obstruct any further intercourse
between us. I am, sir, &c.”
In transmitting a copy of his letter to the President of Congress,
Washington observed: “My reason for pointing out Brigadier-general
Prescott as the object, who is to suffer for Mr.
Allen’s fate, is, that by letters from General Schuyler and copies
of letters from General Montgomery to Schuyler, I am given to
understand that Prescott is the cause of Allen’s sufferings. I
thought it best to be decisive on the occasion, as did the generals
whom I consulted thereon.”
For the sake of continuity we will anticipate a few facts connected
with the story of Ethan Allen. Within a few weeks after
the preceding correspondence, Washington received a letter from
Levi Allen, a brother to the colonel, and of like enterprising
106and enthusiastic character. It was dated from Salisbury in Connecticut;
and enclosed affidavits of the harsh treatment his
brother had experienced, and of his being confined on board of
the Gaspec, “with a bar of iron fixed to one of his legs and iron
to his hands.” Levi was bent upon effecting his deliverance, and
the mode proposed was in unison with the bold but wild schemes
of the colonel. We quote his crude, but characteristic letter.
“Have some thoughts of going to England incognito, after
my brother; but am not positively certain he is sent there,
though believe he is. Beg your excellency will favor me with a
line, and acquaint me if any intelligence concerning him, and if
your excellency please, your opinion of the expediency of going
after him, and whether your excellency would think proper to advance
any money for that purpose, as my brother was a man
blessed with more fortitude than fortune. Your excellency may
think, at first thought, I can do nothing by going to England; I
feel as if I could do a great deal, by raising a mob in London,
bribing the jailer, or by getting into some servile employment
with the jailer, and over-faithfulness make myself master of the
key, or at least be able to lay my hand on it some night. I beg
your excellency will countenance my going; can muster more
than one hundred pounds, my own property; shall regard spending
that no more than one copper. Your excellency must know
Allen was not only a brother, but a real friend that sticketh
closer than a brother.”
In a postscript he adds, “cannot live without going to England,
if my brother is sent there.”
In reply, Washington intimated a belief that the colonel had
been sent to England, but discountenanced Levi’s wild project of
following him thither; as there was no probability of its success,
107and he would be running himself into danger without a prospect
of rendering service to his brother.
The measure of retaliation mentioned in Washington’s letter
to Howe, was actually meted out by Congress on the arrival of
General Prescott in Philadelphia. He was ordered into close
confinement in the jail; though not put in irons. He was subsequently
released from confinement, on account of ill health, and
was treated by some Philadelphia families with unmerited hospitality.[32]
At the time of the foregoing correspondence with Howe,
Washington was earnestly occupied preparing works for the
bombardment of Boston, should that measure be resolved upon
by Congress. General Putnam, in the preceding month, had
taken possession in the night of Cobble Hill without molestation
from the enemy, though a commanding eminence; and in two
days had constructed a work, which, from its strength, was named
Putnam’s impregnable fortress.
He was now engaged on another work on Lechmere Point, to
be connected with the works at Cobble Hill by a bridge thrown
across Willis’s Creek, and a covered way. Lechmere Point is immediately
108opposite the north part of Boston; and the Scarborough
ship-of-war was anchored near it. Putnam availed himself
of a dark and foggy day (Dec. 17), to commence operations, and
broke ground with four hundred men, at ten o’clock in the morning,
on a hill at the Point. “The mist,” says a contemporary
account, “was so great as to prevent the enemy from discovering
what he was about until near twelve o’clock, when it cleared up,
and opened to their view our whole party at the Point, and
another at the causeway throwing a bridge over the creek. The
Scarborough, anchored off the Point, poured in a broadside.
The enemy from Boston threw shells. The garrison at Cobble
Hill returned fire. Our men were obliged to decamp from the
Point, but the work was resumed by the brave old general at
night.”
On the next morning, a cannonade from Cobble Hill obliged
the Scarborough to weigh anchor, and drop down below the
ferry; and General Heath was detached with a party of men to
carry on the work which Putnam had commenced. The enemy
resumed their fire. Sentinels were placed to give notice of a
shot or shell; the men would crouch down or dodge it, and continue
on with their work. The fire ceased in the afternoon, and
Washington visited the hill accompanied by several officers, and
inspected the progress of the work. It was to consist of two redoubts,
on one of which was to be a mortar battery. There was,
as yet, a deficiency of ordnance; but the prize mortar was to be
mounted which Putnam had recently christened, “The Congress.”
From the spirit with which the work was carried on,
Washington trusted that it would soon be completed, “and
then,” said he, “if we have powder to sport with, and Congress
gives the word, Boston can be bombarded from this point.”
109For several days the labor at the works was continued; the
redoubts were thrown up, and a covered way was constructed
leading down to the bridge. All this was done notwithstanding
the continual fire of the enemy. The letter of a British officer
gives his idea of the efficiency of the work.
“The rebels for some days past have been erecting a battery
on Phipps’ Farm. The new constructed mortar taken on board
the ordnance brig, we are told, will be mounted upon it, and we
expect a warm salute from the shells, another part of that vessel’s
cargo; so that, in spite of her capture, we are likely to be
complimented with the contents of her lading.”
“If the rebels can complete their battery, this town will be on
fire about our ears a few hours after; all our buildings being of
wood, or a mixture of brick and wood-work. Had the rebels
erected their battery on the other side of the town, at Dorchester,
the admiral and all his booms would have made the first blaze,
and the burning of the town would have followed. If we cannot
destroy the rebel battery by our guns, we must march out
and take it sword in hand.”
Putnam anticipated great effects from this work, and especially
from his grand mortar, “The Congress.” Shells there
were in abundance for a bombardment; the only thing wanting
was a supply of powder. One of the officers, writing of the unusual
mildness of the winter, observes: “Every thing thaws here
except old Put. He is still as hard as ever, crying out for powder—powder—powder.
Ye gods, give us powder!”
CHAPTER XI. MOUNT VERNON IN DANGER—MRS. WASHINGTON INVITED TO THE CAMP—LUND WASHINGTON, THE GENERAL’S AGENT—TERMS ON WHICH HE SERVES—INSTRUCTED TO KEEP UP THE HOSPITALITY OF THE HOUSE—JOURNEY OF MRS. WASHINGTON TO CAMP—HER EQUIPAGE AND LIVERIES—ARRIVAL AT CAMP—DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AT HEAD-QUARTERS—GAYETIES IN CAMP—A BRAWL BETWEEN ROUND JACKETS AND RIFLE SHIRTS.
110
Amid the various concerns of the war, and the multiplied perplexities
of the camp, the thoughts of Washington continually
reverted to his home on the banks of the Potomac. A constant
correspondence was kept up between him and his agent, Mr. Lund
Washington, who had charge of his various estates. The general
gave clear and minute directions as to their management, and the
agent rendered as clear and minute returns of every thing that
had been done in consequence.
According to recent accounts, Mount Vernon had been considered
in danger. Lord Dunmore was exercising martial law in
the Ancient Dominion, and it was feared that the favorite abode
of the “rebel commander-in-chief” would be marked out for hostility,
and that the enemy might land from their ships in the
Potomac, and lay it waste. Washington’s brother, John Augustine,
had entreated Mrs. Washington to leave it. The people of
111Loudoun had advised her to seek refuge beyond the Blue Ridge,
and had offered to send a guard to escort her. She had declined
the offer, not considering herself in danger. Lund Washington
was equally free from apprehensions on the subject. “Lord
Dunmore,” writes he, “will hardly himself venture up this river,
nor do I believe he will send on that errand. You may depend
I will be watchful, and upon the least alarm persuade her to
move.”
Though alive to every thing concerning Mount Vernon, Washington
agreed with them in deeming it in no present danger of
molestation by the enemy. Still he felt for the loneliness of
Mrs. Washington’s situation, heightened as it must be by anxiety
on his own account. On taking command of the army, he had
held out a prospect to her, that he would rejoin her at home in
the autumn; there was now a probability of his being detained
before Boston all winter. He wrote to her, therefore, by express,
in November, inviting her to join him at the camp. He at the
same time wrote to Lund Washington, engaging his continued
services as an agent. This person, though bearing the same
name, and probably of the same stock, does not appear to have
been in any near degree of relationship. Washington’s letter
to him gives a picture of his domestic policy.
“I will engage for the year coming, and the year following,
if these troubles and my absence continue, that your wages shall
be standing and certain at the highest amount that any one year’s
crop has produced you yet. I do not offer this as any temptation
to induce you to go on more cheerfully in prosecuting those
schemes of mine. I should do injustice to you were I not to
acknowledge, that your conduct has ever appeared to me above
every thing sordid; but I offer it in consideration of the great
112charge you have upon your hands, and my entire dependence upon
your fidelity and industry.
“It is the greatest, indeed it is the only comfortable reflection
I enjoy on this score, that my business is in the hands of a
person concerning whose integrity I have not a doubt, and on
whose care I can rely. Were it not for this, I should feel very
unhappy on account of the situation of my affairs. But I am
persuaded you will do for me as you would for yourself.”
The following were his noble directions concerning Mount
Vernon.
“Let the hospitality of the house with respect to the poor be
kept up. Let no one go hungry away. If any of this kind of people
should be in want of corn, supply their necessaries, provided
it does not encourage them to idleness; and I have no objection
to your giving my money in charity to the amount of forty or
fifty pounds a year, when you think it well bestowed. What I
mean by having no objection is, that it is my desire it should be
done. You are to consider that neither myself nor wife, is now
in the way to do those good offices.”
Mrs. Washington came on with her own carriage and horses,
accompanied by her son, Mr. Custis, and his wife. She travelled
by very easy stages, partly on account of the badness of the
roads, partly out of regard to the horses, of which Washington
was always very careful, and which were generally remarkable for
beauty and excellence. Escorts and guards of honor attended
her from place to place, and she was detained some time at Philadelphia,
by the devoted attention of the inhabitants.
Her arrival at Cambridge was a glad event in the army. Incidental
mention is made of the equipage in which she appeared
there. A chariot and four, with black postilions in scarlet and
113white liveries. It has been suggested that this was an English
style of equipage, derived from the Fairfaxes; but in truth it
was a style still prevalent at that day in Virginia.
It would appear that dinner invitations to head-quarters,
were becoming matters of pride and solicitude. “I am much
obliged to you,” writes Washington to Reed, “for the hints
respecting the jealousies which you say are gone abroad. I cannot
charge myself with incivility, or what in my opinion is tantamount,
ceremonious civility to gentlemen of this colony; but if
such my conduct appears, I will endeavor at a reformation; as I
can assure you, my dear Reed, that I wish to walk in such a line
as will give most general satisfaction. You know that it was my
wish at first to invite a certain number to dinner, but unintentionally
we somehow or other missed of it. If this has given
rise to the jealousy, I can only say that I am very sorry for it;
at the same time I add, that it was rather owing to inattention,
or more properly, too much attention to other matters, which
caused me to neglect it.”
And in another letter:
“My constant attention to the great and perplexing objects
which continually arise to my view, absorbs all lesser considerations;
and, indeed, scarcely allows me to reflect that there is
such a body as the General Court of this colony, but when I am
reminded of it by a committee; nor can I, upon recollection,
discover in what instance I have been inattentive to, or slighted
them. They could not surely conceive that there was a propriety
in unbosoming the secrets of the army to them; that it was
necessary to ask their opinion in throwing up an intrenchment or
forming a battalion. It must be, therefore, what I before hinted
to you; and how to remedy it I hardly know, as I am acquainted
114with few of the members, never go out of my own lines, nor see
any of them in them.”
The presence of Mrs. Washington soon relieved the general
from this kind of perplexity. She presided at head-quarters
with mingled dignity and affability. We have an anecdote or
two of the internal affairs of head-quarters, furnished by the descendant
of one who was an occasional inmate there.
Washington had prayers morning and evening, and was regular
in his attendance at the church in which he was a communicant.
On one occasion, for want of a clergyman, the Episcopal
service was read by Colonel William Palfrey, one of Washington’s
aides-de-camp; who substituted a prayer of his own composition
in place of the one formerly offered up for the king.
Not long after her arrival in camp, Mrs. Washington claimed
to keep twelfth-night in due style, as the anniversary of her wedding.
“The general,” says the same informant, “was somewhat
thoughtful, and said he was afraid he must refuse it.” His objections
were overcome, and twelfth-night and the wedding anniversary
were duly celebrated.
There seems to have been more conviviality at the quarters
of some of the other generals; their time and minds were less
intensely engrossed by anxious cares, having only their individual
departments to attend to. Adjutant-general Mifflin’s house
appears to have been a gay one. “He was a man of education,
ready apprehension and brilliancy,” says Graydon; “had spent
some time in Europe, particularly in France, and was very easy
of access, with the manners of genteel life, though occasionally
evolving those of the Quaker.”[33]
115Mrs. Adams gives an account of an evening party at his
house. “I was very politely entertained and noticed by the
generals,” writes she, “more especially General Lee, who was very
urgent for me to tarry in town, and dine with him and the ladies
present at Hobgoblin Hall; but I excused myself. The general
was determined that I should not only be acquainted with him,
but with his companions too; and therefore placed a chair before
me, into which he ordered Mr. Spada (his dog) to mount, and
present his paw to me for a better acquaintance. I could not do
otherwise than accept it.”[34]
John Adams, likewise, gives us a picture of festivities at
head-quarters, where he was a visitant on the recess of Congress.
“I dined at Col. Mifflin’s with the general (Washington) and
lady, and a vast collection of other company, among whom were
six or seven sachems and warriors of the French Caughnawaga
Indians, with their wives and children. A savage feast they
made of it; yet were very polite in the Indian style. I was introduced
to them by the general as one of the grand council at
Philadelphia, which made them prick up their ears. They came
and shook hands with me.”[35]
While giving these familiar scenes and occurrences at the
camp, we are tempted to subjoin one furnished from the manuscript
memoir of an eye witness. A large party of Virginia
riflemen, who had recently arrived in camp, were strolling about
Cambridge, and viewing the collegiate buildings, now turned into
barracks. Their half-Indian equipments, and fringed and ruffled
hunting garbs, provoked the merriment of some troops from
116Marblehead, chiefly fishermen and sailors, who thought nothing
equal to the round jacket and trowsers. A bantering ensued
between them. There was snow upon the ground, and
snowballs began to fly when jokes were wanting. The parties
waxed warm with the contest. They closed, and came to blows
both sides were reinforced, and in a little while at least a thousand
were at fisticuffs, and there was a tumult in the camp worthy
of the days of Homer. “At this juncture,” writes our informant,
“Washington made his appearance, whether by accident or
design, I never knew. I saw none of his aides with him; his
black servant just behind him mounted. He threw the bridle of
his own horse into his servant’s hands, sprang from his seat,
rushed into the thickest of the melée, seized two tall brawny
riflemen by the throat, keeping them at arm’s-length, talking to
and shaking them.”
As they were from his own province, he may have felt peculiarly
responsible for their good conduct; they were engaged,
too, in one of those sectional brawls which were his especial abhorrence;
his reprimand must, therefore, have been a vehement
one. He was commanding in his serenest moments, but irresistible
in his bursts of indignation. On the present occasion, we
are told, his appearance and strong-handed rebuke put an instant
end to the tumult. The combatants dispersed in all directions,
and in less than three minutes none remained on the ground but
the two he had collared.
The veteran who records this exercise of military authority,
seems at a loss which most to admire, the simplicity of the process
or the vigor with which it was administered. “Here,”
writes he, “bloodshed, imprisonments, trials by court-martial, revengeful
feelings between the different corps of the army, were
117happily prevented by the physical and mental energies of a single
person, and the only damage resulting from the fierce encounter
was, a few torn hunting frocks and round jackets.”[36]
CHAPTER XII. AFFAIRS IN CANADA—ARNOLD AT POINT LEVI—QUEBEC REINFORCED—CROSSING OF THE ST. LAWRENCE—LANDING IN WOLFE’S COVE—ARNOLD ON THE HEIGHTS OF ABRAHAM—CAUTIOUS COUNSEL—QUEBEC AROUSED—THE INVADERS BAFFLED—WITHDRAW TO POINT AUX TREMBLES—BOOMING OF CANNON—CARLETON AT QUEBEC—LETTER OF WASHINGTON TO ARNOLD.
118
We again turn from the siege of Boston, to the invasion of Canada,
which at that time shared the anxious thoughts of Washington.
His last accounts of the movements of Arnold, left him at
Point Levi, opposite to Quebec. Something brilliant from that
daring officer was anticipated. It was his intention to cross the
river immediately. Had he done so, he might have carried the
town by a coup de main; for terror as well as disaffection prevailed
among the inhabitants. At Point Levi, however, he was
brought to a stand; not a boat was to be found there. Letters
which he had despatched some days previously, by two Indians,
to Generals Schuyler and Montgomery, had been carried by his
faithless messengers, to Caramhe, the lieutenant-governor, who,
thus apprised of the impending danger, had caused all the boats
of Point Levi to be either removed or destroyed.
Arnold was not a man to be disheartened by difficulties.
With great exertions he procured about forty birch canoes from
119the Canadians and Indians, with forty of the latter to navigate
them; but stormy winds arose, and for some days the river was
too boisterous for such frail craft. In the mean time the garrison
at Quebec was gaining strength. Recruits arrived from
Nova Scotia. The veteran Maclean, too, who had been driven
from the mouth of the Sorel by the detachment under Brown
and Livingston, arrived down the river with his corps of Royal
Highland Emigrants, and threw himself into the place. The
Lizard frigate, the Hornet sloop-of-war, and two armed schooners
were stationed in the river, and guard-boats patrolled at night.
The prospect of a successful attack upon the place was growing
desperate.
On the 13th of November, Arnold received intelligence that
Montgomery had captured St. Johns. He was instantly roused
to emulation. His men, too, were inspirited by the news. The
wind had abated: he determined to cross the river that very
night. At a late hour in the evening he embarked with the first
division, principally riflemen. The river was wide; the current
rapid; the birch canoes, easy to be upset, required skilful management.
By four o’clock in the morning, a large part of his
force had crossed without being perceived, and landed about a
mile and a half above Cape Diamond, at Wolfe’s Cove, so called
from being the landing-place of that gallant commander.
Just then a guard-boat, belonging to the Lizard, came slowly
along shore and discovered them. They hailed it, and ordered it
to land. Not complying, it was fired into, and three men were
killed. The boat instantly pulled for the frigate, giving vociferous
alarm.
Without waiting the arrival of the residue of his men, for
whom the canoes had been despatched, Arnold led those who had
120landed to the foot of the cragged defile, once scaled by the intrepid
Wolfe, and scrambled up it in all haste. By daylight he had
planted his daring flag on the far-famed Heights of Abraham.
Here the main difficulty stared him in the face. A strong
line of walls and bastions traversed the promontory from one of
its precipitous sides to the other; enclosing the upper and lower
towns. On the right, the great bastion of Cape Diamond crowned
the rocky height of that name. On the left was the bastion of
La Potasse, close by the gate of St. Johns opening upon the
barracks; the gate where Wolfe’s antagonist, the gallant Montcalm,
received his death wound.
A council of war was now held. Arnold, who had some
knowledge of the place, was for dashing forward at once and
storming the gate of St. Johns. Had they done so, they might
have been successful. The gate was open and unguarded.
Through some blunder and delay, a message from the commander
of the Lizard to the lieutenant-governor had not yet been delivered,
and no alarm had reached the fortress.
The formidable aspect of the place, however, awed Arnold’s
associates in council. They considered that their whole force was
but between seven and eight hundred men; that nearly one third
of their fire-arms had been rendered useless, and much of their ammunition
damaged in their march through the wilderness; they
had no artillery, and the fortress looked too strong to be carried
by a coup de main. Cautious counsel is often fatal to a daring
enterprise. While the council of war deliberated, the favorable
moment passed away. The lieutenant-governor received the tardy
message. He hastily assembled the merchants, officers of militia,
and captains of merchant vessels. All promised to stand by
him; he had strong distrust, however, of the French part of the
121population and the Canadian militia; his main reliance was on
Colonel Maclean and his Royal Highland Emigrants.
The din of arms now resounded through the streets. The
cry was up—“The enemy are on the Heights of Abraham!
The gate of St. Johns is open!” There was an attempt to shut
it. The keys were not to be found. It was hastily secured by
ropes and handspikes, and the walls looking upon the heights
were soon manned by the military, and thronged by the populace.
Arnold paraded his men within a hundred yards of the walls,
and caused them to give three hearty cheers; hoping to excite a
revolt in the place, or to provoke the scanty garrison to a sally.
There were a few scattered cheerings in return; but the taunting
bravado failed to produce a sortie; the governor dared not venture
beyond the walls with part of his garrison, having too little
confidence in the loyalty of those who would remain behind.
There was some firing on the part of the Americans, but merely
as an additional taunt; they were too far off for their musketry
to have effect. A large cannon on the ramparts was brought to
bear on them, and matches were procured from the Lizard, with
which to fire it off. A few shots obliged the Americans to retire
and encamp.
In the evening Arnold sent a flag, demanding in the name of
the United Colonies the surrender of the place. Some of the
disaffected and the faint-hearted were inclined to open the gates,
but were held in check by the mastiff loyalty of Maclean. The
veteran guarded the gate with his Highlanders; forbade all
communication with the besiegers, and fired upon their flag as
an ensign of rebellion.
Several days elapsed. Arnold’s flags of truce were repeatedly
insulted, but he saw the futility of resenting it, and attacking
122the place with his present means. The inhabitants gradually
recovered from their alarm, and armed themselves to defend their
property. The sailors and marines proved a valuable addition
to the garrison, which now really meditated a sortie.
Arnold received information of all this from friends within the
walls; he heard about the same time of the capture of Montreal,
and that General Carleton, having escaped from that place, was
on his way down to Quebec. He thought at present, therefore,
to draw off on the 19th to Point aux Trembles (Aspen-tree
Point), twenty miles above Quebec, there to await the arrival of
General Montgomery with troops and artillery. As his little
army wended its way along the high bank of the river towards
its destined encampment, a vessel passed below, which had just
touched at Point aux Trembles. On board of it was General
Carleton, hurrying on to Quebec.
It was not long before the distant booming of artillery told of
his arrival at his post, where he resumed a stern command. He
was unpopular among the inhabitants; even the British merchants
and other men of business, were offended by the coldness
of his manners, and his confining his intimacy to the military and
the Canadian noblesse. He was aware of his unpopularity, and
looked round him with distrust; his first measure was to turn
out of the place all suspected persons, and all who refused to aid
in its defence. This caused a great “trooping out of town,”
but what was lost in numbers was gained in strength. With the
loyally disposed who remained, he busied himself in improving
the defences.
Of the constant anxiety, yet enduring hope, with which
Washington watched this hazardous enterprise, we have evidence
in his various letters. To Arnold, when at Point Levi, baffled in
123the expectation of finding the means of making a dash upon
Quebec, he writes: “It is not in the power of any man to command
success, but you have done more, you have deserved it;
and before this time (Dec. 5th), I hope you have met with the
laurels which are due to your toils, in the possession of Quebec.
“I have no doubt but a junction of your detachment with
the army under General Montgomery, is effected before this. If
so, you will put yourself under his command, and will, I am persuaded,
give him all the assistance in your power, to finish the
glorious work you have begun.”
CHAPTER XIII. LORD DUNMORE—HIS PLANS OF HARASSING VIRGINIA—LEE’S POLICY RESPECTING TORY GOVERNORS AND PLACEMEN—RHODE ISLAND HARASSED BY WALLACE AND HIS CRUISERS, AND INFESTED BY TORIES—LEE SENT TO ITS RELIEF—HIS VIGOROUS MEASURES—THE ARMY DISBANDING—WASHINGTON’S PERPLEXITIES—SYMPATHY OF GENERAL GREENE—HIS LOYALTY IN TIME OF TROUBLE—THE CRISIS—CHEERING NEWS FROM CANADA—GLOOMY OPENING OF THE NEW YEAR—NEWS FROM COLONEL KNOX.
124
In the month of December a vessel had been captured, bearing
supplies from Lord Dunmore, to the army at Boston. A letter
on board, from his lordship to General Howe, invited him to
transfer the war to the southern colonies; or, at all events, to
send reinforcements thither; intimating at the same time his plan
of proclaiming liberty to indentured servants, negroes, and others
appertaining to rebels, and inviting them to join his majesty’s
troops. In a word,—to inflict upon Virginia the horrors of a
servile war.
“If this man is not crushed before spring,” writes Washington,
“he will become the most formidable enemy America has.
His strength will increase as a snowball. * * * Motives of
resentment actuate his conduct to a degree equal to the destruction
of the colony.”
125General Lee took the occasion to set forth his own system of
policy, which was particularly rigid wherever men in authority
and tories were concerned. It was the old grudge against ministers
and their adherents set on edge.
“Had my opinion been thought worthy of attention,” would
he say, “Lord Dunmore would have been disarmed of his teeth
and claws.” He would have seized Tryon too, “and all his
tories at New York,” and, having struck the stroke, would have
applied to Congress for approbation.
“I propose the following measures,” would he add: “To seize
every governor, government man, placeman, tory and enemy to
liberty on the continent, to confiscate their estates; or at least lay
them under heavy contributions for the public. Their persons
should be secured, in some of the interior towns, as hostages for
the treatment of those of our party, whom the fortune of war
shall throw into their hands; they should be allowed a reasonable
pension out of their fortunes for their maintenance.”[37]
Such was the policy advocated by Lee in his letters and conversation,
and he soon had an opportunity of carrying it partly into
operation. Rhode Island had for some time past been domineered
over by Captain Wallace of the royal navy; who had stationed
himself at Newport with an armed vessel, and obliged the place
to furnish him with supplies. Latterly he had landed in Conanicut
Island, opposite to Newport, with a number of sailors and
marines, plundered and burnt houses, and driven off cattle for
the supply of the army. In his exactions and maraudings, he
was said to have received countenance from the tory part of the
inhabitants. It was now reported that a naval armament was
126coming from Boston against the island. In this emergency, the
governor (Cooke) wrote to Washington, requesting military aid,
and an efficient officer to put the island in a state of defence, suggesting
the name of General Lee for the purpose.
Lee undertook the task with alacrity. “I sincerely wish,” said
Washington, “he may be able to do it with effect; as that place,
in its present state, is an asylum for such as are disaffected to
American liberty.”
Lee set out for Rhode Island with his guard and a party of
riflemen, and at Providence was joined by the cadet company of
that place, and a number of minute men. Preceded by these, he
entered the town of Newport on Christmas day, in military style.
While there, he summoned before him a number of persons who
had supplied the enemy; some according to a convention originally
made between Wallace and the authorities, others, as it was
suspected, through tory feelings. All were obliged by Lee to
take a test oath of his own devising, by which they “religiously
swore that they would neither directly, nor indirectly, assist the
wicked instruments of ministerial tyranny and villainy commonly
called the king’s troops and navy, by furnishing them with provisions
and refreshments.” They swore, moreover, to “denounce
all traitors before the public authority, and to take arms in defence
of American liberty, whenever required by Congress or the
provincial authority.” Two custom-house officers, and another
person, who refused to take the oath, were put under guard and
sent to Providence. Having laid out works, and given directions
for fortifications, Lee returned to camp after an absence of ten
days. Some of his proceedings were considered too high-handed,
and were disapproved by Congress. Lee made light of legislative
127censures. “One must not be trammelled by laws in war
time,” said he; “in a revolution, all means are legal.”
Washington approved of his measures. “I have seen General
Lee since his expedition,” writes he, “and hope Rhode Island
will derive some advantage from it. I am told that Captain
Wallace’s ships have been supplied for some time by the town of
Newport, on certain conditions stipulated between him and the
committee. * * * I know not what pernicious consequences
may result from a precedent of this sort. Other places, circumstanced
as Newport is, may follow the example, and by that
means their whole fleet and army will be furnished with what it
highly concerns us to keep from them. * * * Vigorous regulations,
and such as at another time would appear extraordinary,
are now become absolutely necessary for preserving our country
against the strides of tyranny, making against it.”[38]
December had been throughout a month of severe trial to
Washington; during which he saw his army dropping away piecemeal
before his eyes. Homeward every face was turned as soon as
the term of enlistment was at an end. Scarce could the disbanding
troops be kept a few days in camp until militia could be procured
to supply their place. Washington made repeated and
animated appeals to their patriotism; they were almost unheeded.
He caused popular and patriotic songs to be sung about the
camp. They passed by like the idle wind. Home! home!
home! throbbed in every heart. “The desire of retiring into a
chimney-corner,” says Washington reproachfully, “seized the
troops as soon as their terms expired.”
Can we wonder at it? They were for the most part yeomanry,
128unused to military restraint, and suffering all the hardships
of a starveling camp, almost within sight of the smoke of their
own firesides.
Greene, throughout this trying month, was continually by
Washington’s side. His letters expressing the same cares and
apprehensions, and occasionally in the same language with those
of the commander-in-chief, show how completely he was in his
councils. He could well sympathize with him in his solicitudes.
Some of his own Rhode Island troops were with Arnold in his
Canada expedition. Others encamped on Prospect Hill, and
whose order and discipline had been his pride, were evincing the
prevalent disposition to disband. “They seem to be so sick of
this way of life, and so homesick,” writes he, “that I fear the
greater part of the best troops from our colony will soon go
home.” To provide against such a contingency, he strengthened
his encampment, so that, “if the soldiery should not engage as
cheerfully as he expected, he might defend it with a less number.”[39]
Still he was buoyant and cheerful; frequently on his white
horse about Prospect Hill, haranguing his men, and endeavoring
to keep them in good humor. “This is no time for disgusting
the soldiery,” would he say, “when their aid is so essential to the
preservation of the rights of human nature and the liberties of
America.”
He wore the same cheery aspect to the commander-in-chief;
or rather he partook of his own hopeful spirit. “I expect,”
would he say, “the army, notwithstanding all the difficulties we
meet with, will be full in about six weeks.”
129It was this loyalty in time of trouble; this buoyancy under
depression, this thorough patriotism, which won for him the entire
confidence of Washington.
The thirty-first of December arrived, the crisis of the army;
for with that month expired the last of the old terms of enlistment.
“We never have been so weak,” writes Greene, “as we
shall be to-morrow, when we dismiss the old troops.” On this
day Washington received cheering intelligence from Canada. A
junction had taken place, a month previously, between Arnold
and Montgomery at Point aux Trembles. They were about two
thousand strong, and were making every preparation for attacking
Quebec. Carleton was said to have with him but about
twelve hundred men, the majority of whom were sailors. It was
thought that the French would give up Quebec, if they could get
the same conditions that were granted to the inhabitants of Montreal.[40]
Thus the year closed upon Washington with a ray of light
from Canada, while all was doubt around him.
On the following morning (January 1st, 1776), his army did
not amount to ten thousand men, and was composed of but half-filled
regiments. Even in raising this inadequate force, it had
been necessary to indulge many of the men with furloughs, that
they might visit their families and friends. The expedients
resorted to in equipping the army, show the prevailing lack of
arms. Those soldiers who retired from service, were obliged to
leave their weapons for their successors; receiving their appraised
value. Those who enlisted, were required to bring a gun, or
were charged a dollar for the use of one during the campaign.
130He who brought a blanket was allowed two dollars. It was impossible
to furnish uniforms; the troops, therefore, presented a
motley appearance, in garments of divers cuts and colors; the
price of each man’s garb being deducted from his pay.
The detachments of militia from the neighboring provinces
which replaced the disbanding troops, remained but for brief
periods; so that, in despite of every effort, the lines were often
but feebly manned, and might easily have been forced.
The anxiety of Washington, in this critical state of the army,
may be judged from his correspondence with Reed. “It is
easier to conceive than to describe the situation of my mind for
some time past, and my feelings under our present circumstances,”
writes he on the 4th of January. “Search the volumes of
history through, and I much question whether a case similar to
ours is to be found; namely, to maintain a post against the power
of the British troops for six months together, without powder,
and then to have one army disbanded and another raised within
the same distance (musket shot) of a reinforced enemy. What
may be the issue of the last manœuvre, time only can unfold.
I wish this month were well over our head. * * * We are
now left with a good deal less than half-raised regiments, and
about five thousand militia, who only stand engaged to the
middle of this month; when, according to custom, they will
depart, let the necessity of their stay be ever so urgent. Thus,
for more than two months past, I have scarcely emerged from one
difficulty before I have been plunged in another. How it will
end, God, in his great goodness, will direct. I am thankful for
his protection to this time. We are told that we shall soon get
the army completed, but I have been told so many things which
have never come to pass, that I distrust every thing.”
131In a subsequent letter to Mr. Reed, he reverts to the subject,
and pours forth his feelings with confiding frankness. What can
be more touching than the picture he draws of himself and his
lonely vigils about his sleeping camp? “The reflection on my
situation and that of this army, produces many an unhappy hour,
when all around me are wrapped in sleep. Few people know the
predicament we are in on a thousand accounts; fewer still will
believe, if any disaster happens to these lines, from what cause it
flows. I have often thought how much happier I should have
been, if, instead of accepting the command, under such circumstances,
I had taken my musket on my shoulder and entered the
ranks; or, if I could have justified the measure to posterity and
my own conscience, had retired to the back country and lived in a
wigwam. If I shall be able to rise superior to these and many
other difficulties, which might be enumerated, I shall most religiously
believe that the finger of Providence is in it, to blind the
eyes of our enemies; for surely if we get well through this
month, it must be for want of their knowing the disadvantages
which we labor under.”
Recurring to the project of an attack upon Boston, which he
had reluctantly abandoned in deference to the adverse opinions
of a council of war—“Could I have foreseen the difficulties
which have come upon us; could I have known that such a backwardness
would have been discovered among the old soldiers to
the service, all the generals upon earth should not have convinced
me of the propriety of delaying an attack upon Boston till this
time. When it can now be attempted, I will not undertake to say;
but thus much I will answer for, that no opportunity can present
itself earlier than my wishes.”
In the midst of his discouragements, Washington received letters
132from Knox, showing the spirit and energy with which he was
executing his mission, in quest of cannon and ordnance stores.
He had struggled manfully and successfully with all kinds of
difficulties from the advanced season, and head winds, in getting
them from Ticonderoga to the head of Lake George. “Three
days ago,” writes he, on the 17th of December, “it was very
uncertain whether we could get them over until next spring; but
now, please God, they shall go. I have made forty-two exceedingly
strong sleds, and have provided eighty yoke of oxen to drag
them as far as Springfield, where I shall get fresh cattle to take
them to camp.”
It was thus that hardships and emergencies were bringing out
the merits of the self-made soldiers of the Revolution; and
showing their commander-in-chief on whom he might rely.
CHAPTER XIV. MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN BOSTON—A SECRET EXPEDITION—ITS OBJECT—LEE’S PLAN FOR THE SECURITY OF NEW YORK—OPINION OF ADAMS ON THE SUBJECT—INSTRUCTIONS TO LEE—TRANSACTIONS OF LEE IN CONNECTICUT—LEE’S POLICY IN REGARD TO THE TORIES—UNEASINESS IN NEW YORK—LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY TO LEE—HIS REPLY—HIS OPINION OF THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT—OF THE HYSTERICAL LETTER FROM THE NEW YORK CONGRESS.
133
Early in the month of January, there was a great stir of preparation
in Boston harbor. A fleet of transports were taking in
supplies, and making arrangements for the embarkation of troops.
Bomb-ketches and flat-bottomed boats were getting ready for sea,
as were two sloops-of-war, which were to convey the armament.
Its destination was kept secret; but was confidently surmised by
Washington.
In the preceding month of October, a letter had been laid
before Congress, written by some person in London of high credibility,
and revealing a secret plan of operations said to have been
sent out by ministers to the commanders in Boston. The following
is the purport: Possession was to be gained of New York
and Albany, through the assistance of Governor Tryon, on whose
influence with the tory part of the population, much reliance was
placed. These cities were to be very strongly garrisoned. All
134who did not join the king’s forces were to be declared rebels.
The Hudson River, and the East River or Sound, were to be
commanded by a number of small men-of-war and cutters, stationed
in different parts, so as wholly to cut off all communication
by water between New York and the provinces to the northward
of it; and between New York and Albany, except for the king’s
service; and to prevent, also, all communication between the city
of New York and the provinces of New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and those to the southward of them. “By these means,”
said the letter, “the administration and their friends fancy they
shall soon either starve out or retake the garrisons of Crown
Point and Ticonderoga, and open and maintain a safe intercourse
and correspondence between Quebec, Albany and New York; and
thereby offer the fairest opportunity to their soldiery and the
Canadians, in conjunction with the Indians to be procured by
Guy Johnson, to make continual irruptions into New Hampshire,
Massachusetts and Connecticut, and so distract and divide the
Provincial forces, as to render it easy for the British army at
Boston to defeat them, break the spirits of the Massachusetts people,
depopulate their country, and compel an absolute subjection
to Great Britain.”[41]
It was added that a lord, high in the American department,
had been very particular in his inquiries about the Hudson River;
what sized vessels could get to Albany; and whether, if batteries
were erected in the Highlands, they would not control the
navigation of the river, and prevent vessels from going up and
down.
This information had already excited solicitude respecting the
135Hudson, and led to measures for its protection. It was now
surmised that the expedition preparing to sail from Boston, and
which was to be conducted by Sir Henry Clinton, might be destined
to seize upon New York. How was the apprehended blow
to be parried? General Lee, who was just returned from his
energetic visit to Rhode Island, offered his advice and services in
the matter. In a letter to Washington, he urged him to act at
once, and on his own responsibility, without awaiting the tardy
and doubtful sanction of Congress, for which, in military matters,
Lee had but small regard.
“New York must be secured,” writes he, “but it will never,
I am afraid, be secured by due order of the Congress, for obvious
reasons. They find themselves awkwardly situated on this head.
You must step in to their relief. I am sensible no man can be
spared from the lines under present circumstances; but I would
propose that you should detach me into Connecticut, and lend
your name for collecting a body of volunteers. I am assured
that I shall find no difficulty in assembling a sufficient number
for the purposes wanted. This body, in conjunction (if there
should appear occasion to summon them) with the Jersey regiment
under the command of Lord Stirling, now at Elizabethtown,
will effect the security of New York, and the expulsion or
suppression of that dangerous banditti of tories, who have
appeared on Long Island, with the professed intention of acting
against the authority of Congress. Not to crush these serpents
before their rattles are grown would be ruinous.
“This manœuvre, I not only think prudent and right, but
absolutely necessary to our salvation; and if it meets, as I
ardently hope it will, with your approbation, the sooner it is
136entered upon the better; the delay of a single day may be
fatal.”
Washington, while he approved of Lee’s military suggestions,
was cautious in exercising the extraordinary powers so recently
vested in him, and fearful of transcending them. John Adams
was at that time in the vicinity of the camp, and he asked his
opinion as to the practicability and expediency of the plan, and
whether it “might not be regarded as beyond his line.”
Adams, resolute of spirit, thought the enterprise might easily
be accomplished by the friends of liberty in New York, in connection
with the Connecticut people, “who are very ready,” said
he, “upon such occasions.”
As to the expediency, he urged the vast importance, in the
progress of this war, of the city and province of New York, and
the Hudson River, being the nexus of the northern and southern
colonies, a kind of key to the whole continent, as it is a passage
to Canada, to the Great Lakes, and to all the Indian nations.
No effort to secure it ought to be omitted.
That it was within the limits of Washington’s command, he
considered perfectly clear, he being “vested with full power and
authority, to act as he should think for the good and welfare of
the service.”
If there was a body of people on Long Island, armed to oppose
the American system of defence, and furnishing supplies to
the British army and navy, they were invading American liberty
as much as those besieged in Boston.
If, in the city of New York, a body of tories were waiting
only for a force to protect them, to declare themselves on the
side of the enemy, it was high time that city was secured.[42]
137Thus fortified, as it were, by congressional sanction, through
one of its most important members, who pronounced New York
as much within his command as Massachusetts; he gave Lee authority
to carry out his plans. He was to raise volunteers in
Connecticut; march at their head to New York; call in military
aid from New Jersey; put the city and the posts on the Hudson,
in a posture of security against surprise; disarm all persons on
Long Island and elsewhere, inimical to the views of Congress, or
secure them in some other manner if necessary; and seize upon
all medicines, shirts and blankets, and send them on for the use
of the American army.
Lee departed on his mission on the 8th of January. On the
16th, he was at New Haven, railing at the indecision of Congress.
They had ordered the enlistment of troops for the security of
New York. A Connecticut regiment under Colonel Waterbury
had been raised, equipped, and on the point of embarking for
Oyster Bay, on Long Island, to attack the tories, who were to be
attacked on the other side by Lord Stirling, “when suddenly,”
says Lee, “Colonel Waterbury received an order to disband his
regiment; and the tories are to remain unmolested till they are
joined by the king’s assassins.”
Trumbull, the governor of Connecticut, however, “like a
man of sense and spirit,” had ordered the regiment to be reassembled,
and Lee trusted it would soon be ready to march with
him. “I shall send immediately,” said he, “an express to the
Congress, informing them of my situation, and at the same time,
conjuring them not to suffer the accursed Provincial Congress of
New York to defeat measures so absolutely necessary to salvation.”
Lee’s letter to the President of Congress, showed that the instructions
138dictated by the moderate and considerate spirit of
Washington, were not strong enough on some points, to suit his
stern military notions. The scheme, simply of disarming the
tories, seemed to him totally ineffectual; it would only embitter
their minds, and add virus to their venom. They could and
would always be supplied with fresh arms by the enemy. That
of seizing the most dangerous, would, from its vagueness, be attended
with some bad consequences, and could answer no good
one. “The plan of explaining to these deluded people the
justice of the American cause, is certainly generous and humane,”
observed he; “but I am afraid will be fruitless. They
are so riveted in their opinions, that I am persuaded, should an
angel descend from heaven with his golden trumpet, and ring in
their ears that their conduct was criminal, he would be disregarded.”
Lee’s notion of the policy proper in the present case was, to
disarm the disaffected of all classes, supplying our own troops
with the arms thus seized; to appraise their estates, and oblige
them to deposit at least one half the value with the Continental
Congress, as a security for good behavior; to administer the
strongest oath that could be devised, that they would act offensively
and defensively in support of the common rights; and
finally, to transfer all such as should prove refractory, to some
place in the interior, where they would not be dangerous.
The people of New York, at all times very excitable, were
thrown into a panic on hearing that Lee was in Connecticut, on
his way to take military possession of the city. They apprehended
his appearance there would provoke an attack from the
ships in the harbor. Some, who thought the war about to be
brought to their own doors, packed up their effects, and made off
139into the country with their wives and children. Others beleaguered
the committee of safety with entreaties against the deprecated
protection of General Lee. The committee, through Pierre
Van Cortlandt, their chairman, addressed a letter to Lee, inquiring
into the motives of his coming with an army to New York,
and stating the incapacity of the city to act hostilely against the
ships of war in port, from deficiency of powder, and a want of
military works. For these, and other reasons, they urged the
impropriety of provoking hostilities for the present, and the necessity
of “saving appearances,” with the ships of war, till at
least the month of March, when they hoped to be able to face
their enemies with some countenance.
“We, therefore,” continued the letter, “ardently wish to remain
in peace for a little time, and doubt not we have assigned
sufficient reasons for avoiding at present, a dilemma, in which the
entrance of a large body of troops into the city, will almost certainly
involve us. Should you have such an entrance in design,
we beg at least the troops may halt on the western confines of
Connecticut, till we have been honored by you with such an explanation
on this important subject, as you may conceive your
duty may permit you to enter upon with us, the grounds of
which, you may easily see, ought to be kept an entire secret.”
Lee, in reply, dated Stamford, Jan. 23d, disclaimed all intention
of commencing actual hostilities against the men-of-war in
the harbor; his instructions from the commander-in-chief being
solely to prevent the enemy from taking post in the city, or lodging
themselves on Long Island. Some subordinate purposes
were likewise to be executed, which were much more proper to be
communicated by word of mouth than by writing. In compliance
with the wishes of the committee, he promised to carry with
140him into the town just troops enough to secure it against any
present designs of the enemy, leaving his main force on the western
border of Connecticut. “I give you my word,” added he,
“that no active service is proposed, as you seem to apprehend.
If the ships of war are quiet, I shall be quiet; but I declare
solemnly, that if they make a pretext of my presence to fire on
the town, the first house set on flames by their guns shall be the
funeral pile of some of their best friends.”
In a letter to Washington, written on the following day, he
says of his recruiting success in Connecticut: “I find the people
throughout this province, more alive and zealous than my most
sanguine expectations. I believe I might have collected two
thousand volunteers. I take only four companies with me, and
Waterbury’s regiment. * * * These Connecticutians are, if
possible, more eager to go out of their country, than they are to
return home, when they have been absent for any considerable
time.”
Speaking of the people of New York, and the letter from
their Provincial Congress, which he encloses: “The whigs,” says
he, “I mean the stout ones, are, it is said, very desirous that a
body of troops should march and be stationed in the city—the
timid ones are averse, merely from the spirit of procrastination,
which is the characteristic of timidity. The letter from the
Provincial Congress, you will observe, breathes the very essence
of this spirit; it is wofully hysterical.”
By the by, the threat contained in Lee’s reply about a
“funeral pile,” coming from a soldier of his mettle, was not calculated
to soothe the hysterical feelings of the committee of
safety. How he conducted himself on his arrival in the city, we
shall relate in a future chapter.
CHAPTER XV. MONTGOMERY BEFORE QUEBEC—HIS PLAN OF OPERATIONS—A SUMMONS TO SURRENDER—A FLAG INSULTED—THE TOWN BESIEGED—PLAN OF AN ESCALADE—ATTACK OF THE LOWER TOWN—MONTGOMERY IN THE ADVANCE—HIS DEATH—RETREAT OF COL. CAMPBELL—ATTACK BY ARNOLD—DEFENCE OF THE LOWER TOWN—ARNOLD WOUNDED—RETREAT OF THE AMERICANS—GALLANT RESOLVE OF ARNOLD.
141
From amid surrounding perplexities, Washington still turned a
hopeful eye to Canada. He expected daily to receive tidings
that Montgomery and Arnold were within the walls of Quebec,
and he had even written to the former to forward as much as
could be spared of the large quantities of arms, blankets, clothing
and other military stores, said to be deposited there; the army
before Boston being in great need of such supplies.
On the 18th of January came despatches to him from General
Schuyler, containing withering tidings. The following is
the purport. Montgomery, on the 2d of December, the day after
his arrival at Point aux Trembles, set off in face of a driving
snow storm for Quebec, and arrived before it on the 5th. The
works, from their great extent, appeared to him incapable of
being defended by the actual garrison; made up, as he said, of
“Maclean’s banditti,” the sailors from the frigates and other
142vessels, together with the citizens obliged to take up arms; most
of whom were impatient of the fatigues of a siege, and wished to
see matters accommodated amicably. “I propose,” added he,
“amusing Mr. Carleton with a formal attack, erecting batteries,
&c., but mean to assault the works, I believe towards the lower
town, which is the weakest part.”
According to his own account, his whole force did not exceed
nine hundred effective men, three hundred of whom he had
brought with him; the rest he found with Colonel Arnold.
The latter he pronounced an exceeding fine corps, inured to fatigue,
and well accustomed to a cannon shot, having served at
Cambridge. “There is a style of discipline among them,” adds
he, “much superior to what I have been used to see in this campaign.
He, himself (Arnold), is active, intelligent and enterprising.
Fortune often baffles the sanguine expectations of poor
mortals. I am not intoxicated with her favors, but I do think
there is a fair prospect of success.”[43]
On the day of his arrival, he sent a flag with a summons to
surrender. It was fired upon, and obliged to retire. Exasperated
at this outrage, which, it is thought, was committed by the
veteran Maclean, Montgomery wrote an indignant, reproachful,
and even menacing letter to Carleton, reiterating the demand,
magnifying the number of his troops, and warning him against
the consequences of an assault. Finding it was rejected from
the walls, it was conveyed in by a woman, together with letters
addressed to the principal merchants, promising great indulgence
in case of immediate submission. By Carleton’s orders, the
messenger was sent to prison for a few days, and then drummed
out of town.
143Montgomery now prepared for an attack. The ground was
frozen to a great depth, and covered with snow; he was scantily
provided with intrenching tools, and had only a field train of artillery,
and a few mortars. By dint of excessive labor a breastwork
was thrown up, four hundred yards distant from the walls
and opposite to the gate of St. Louis, which is nearly in the
centre. It was formed of gabions, ranged side by side, and filled
with snow, over which water was thrown until thoroughly frozen.
Here Captain Lamb mounted five light pieces and a howitzer.
Several mortars were placed in the suburbs of St. Roque, which
extends on the left of the promontory, below the heights, and
nearly on a level with the river.
From the “Ice Battery” Captain Lamb opened a well-sustained
and well-directed fire upon the walls, but his field-pieces
were too light to be effective. With his howitzer he threw shells
into the town and set it on fire in several places. For five days
and nights the garrison was kept on the alert by the teasing fire
of this battery. The object of Montgomery was to harass the
town, and increase the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants. His
flag of truce being still fired upon, he caused the Indians in his
camp to shoot arrows into the town, having letters attached to
them, addressed to the inhabitants, representing Carleton’s refusal
to treat, and advising them to rise in a body, and compel him.
It was all in vain; whatever might have been the disposition of
the inhabitants, they were completely under the control of the
military.
On the evening of the fifth day, Montgomery paid a visit to
the ice battery. The heavy artillery from the wall had repaid
its ineffectual fire with ample usury. The brittle ramparts had
been shivered like glass; several of the guns had been rendered
144useless. Just as they arrived at the battery, a shot from the
fortress dismounted one of the guns, and disabled many of the
men. A second shot immediately following, was almost as destructive.
“This is warm work, sir,” said Montgomery to Captain
Lamb. “It is indeed, and certainly no place for you, sir.”
“Why so, captain?” “Because there are enough of us here to
be killed, without the loss of you, which would be irreparable.”
The general saw the insufficiency of the battery, and, on retiring,
gave Captain Lamb permission to leave it whenever he
thought proper. The veteran waited until after dark, when, securing
all the guns, he abandoned the ruined redoubt. The general
in this visit was attended by Aaron Burr, whom he had appointed
his aide-de-camp. Lamb wondered that he should encumber
himself with such a boy. The perfect coolness and self-possession
with which the youth mingled in this dangerous scene,
and the fire which sparkled in his eye, soon convinced Lamb, according
to his own account, that “the young volunteer was no
ordinary man.”[44]
Nearly three weeks had been consumed in these futile operations.
The army, ill-clothed, and ill-provided, was becoming impatient
of the rigors of a Canadian winter; the term for which
part of the troops had enlisted would expire with the year, and
they already talked of returning home. Montgomery was sadly
conscious of the insufficiency of his means; still he could not endure
the thoughts of retiring from before the place without
striking a blow. He knew that much was expected from him, in
consequence of his late achievements, and that the eyes of the
public were fixed upon this Canadian enterprise. He determined,
145therefore, to attempt to carry the place by escalade. One
third of his men were to set fire to the houses and stockades of
the suburb of St. Roque, and force the barriers of the lower
town; while the main body should scale the bastion of Cape
Diamond.
It was a hazardous, almost a desperate project, yet it has met
with the approbation of military men. He calculated upon the
devotion and daring spirit of his men; upon the discontent
which prevailed among the Canadians, and upon the incompetency
of the garrison for the defence of such extensive works.
In regard to the devotion of his men, he was threatened with
disappointment. When the plan of assault was submitted to a
council of war, three of the captains in Arnold’s division, the
terms of whose companies were near expiring, declined to serve,
unless they and their men could be transferred to another command.
This almost mutinous movement, it is supposed, was fomented
by Arnold’s old adversary, Major Brown, and it was with
infinite difficulty Montgomery succeeded in overcoming it.
The ladders were now provided for the escalade, and Montgomery
waited with impatience for a favorable night to put it
into execution. Smallpox and desertion had reduced his little
army to seven hundred and fifty men. From certain movements
of the enemy, it was surmised that the deserters had revealed his
plan. He changed, therefore, the arrangement. Colonel Livingston
was to make a false attack on the gate of St. Johns and
set fire to it; Major Brown, with another detachment, was to
menace the bastion of Cape Diamond. Arnold, with three hundred
and fifty of the hardy fellows who had followed him through
the wilderness, strengthened by Captain Lamb and forty of his
company, was to assault the suburbs and batteries of St. Roque;
146while Montgomery, with the residue of his forces, was to pass
below the bastion at Cape Diamond, defile along the river, carry
the defences at Drummond’s Wharf, and thus enter the lower
town on one side, while Arnold forced his way into it on the
other. These movements were all to be made at the same time,
on the discharge of signal rockets, thus distracting the enemy,
and calling their attention to four several points.
On the 31st of December, at two o’clock in the morning, the
troops repaired to their several destinations, under cover of a
violent snow storm. By some accident or mistake, such as is apt
to occur in complicated plans of attack, the signal rockets were
let off before the lower divisions had time to get to their fighting
ground. They were descried by one of Maclean’s Highland officers,
who gave the alarm. Livingston, also, failed to make the
false attack on the gate of St. Johns, which was to have caused
a diversion favorable to Arnold’s attack on the suburb below.
The feint by Major Brown, on the bastion of Cape Diamond,
was successful, and concealed the march of General Montgomery.
That gallant commander descended from the heights to Wolfe’s
Cove, and led his division along the shore of the St. Lawrence,
round the beetling promontory of Cape Diamond. The narrow
approach to the lower town in that direction was traversed by a
picket or stockade, defended by Canadian militia; beyond which
was a second defence, a kind of block house, forming a battery of
small pieces, manned by Canadian militia, and a few seamen, and
commanded by the captain of a transport. The aim of Montgomery
was to come upon these barriers by surprise. The pass
which they defended is formidable at all times, having a swift
river on one side, and overhanging precipices on the other; but
at this time was rendered peculiarly difficult by drifting snow,
147and by great masses of ice piled on each other at the foot of
the cliffs.
The troops made their way painfully, in extended and straggling
files, along the narrow footway, and over the slippery piles
of ice. Among the foremost, were some of the first New York
regiment, led on by Captain Cheeseman. Montgomery, who was
familiar with them, urged them on. “Forward, men of New
York!” cried he. “You are not the men to flinch when your
general leads you on!” In his eagerness, he threw himself far
in the advance, with his pioneers and a few officers, and made a
dash at the first barrier. The Canadians stationed there, taken
by surprise, made a few random shots, then threw down their
muskets and fled. Montgomery sprang forward, aided with his
own hand to pluck down the pickets, which the pioneers were
sawing, and having made a breach sufficiently wide to admit three
or four men abreast, entered sword in hand, followed by his staff,
Captain Cheeseman, and some of his men. The Canadians had
fled from the picket to the battery or block house, but seemed to
have carried the panic with them, for the battery remained silent.
Montgomery felt for a moment as if the surprise had been complete.
He paused in the breach to rally on the troops, who were
stumbling along the difficult pass. “Push on, my brave boys,”
cried he, “Quebec is ours!”
He again dashed forward, but, when within forty paces of the
battery, a discharge of grape-shot from a single cannon, made
deadly havoc. Montgomery, and McPherson, one of his aides,
were killed on the spot. Captain Cheeseman, who was leading
on his New Yorkers, received a canister shot through the body;
made an effort to rise and push forward, but fell back a corpse;
with him fell his orderly sergeant and several of his men. This
148fearful slaughter, and the death of their general, threw every
thing in confusion. The officer next in lineal rank to the general,
was far in the rear; in this emergency, Colonel Campbell,
quarter-master-general, took the command, but, instead of rallying
the men, and endeavoring to effect the junction with Arnold,
ordered a retreat, and abandoned the half-won field, leaving behind
him the bodies of the slain.
While all this was occurring on the side of Cape Diamond,
Arnold led his division against the opposite side of the lower
town along the suburb and street of St. Roque. Like Montgomery,
he took the advance at the head of a forlorn hope of twenty-five
men, accompanied by his secretary Oswald, formerly one of
his captains at Ticonderoga. Captain Lamb and his artillery
company came next, with a field-piece mounted on a sledge.
Then came a company with ladders and scaling implements, followed
by Morgan and his riflemen. In the rear of all these
came the main body. A battery on a wharf commanded the narrow
pass by which they had to advance. This was to be attacked
with the field-piece, and then scaled with ladders by the
forlorn hope; while Captain Morgan with his riflemen, was to
pass round the wharf on the ice.
The false attack which was to have been made by Livingston
on the gate of St. Johns, by way of diversion, had not taken
place; there was nothing, therefore, to call off the attention of
the enemy in this quarter from the detachment. The troops, as
they strangled along in lengthened file through the drifting snow,
were sadly galled by a flanking fire on the right, from walls and
pickets. The field-piece at length became so deeply embedded in
a snow-drift, that it could not be moved. Lamb sent word to
Arnold of the impediment; in the mean time, he and his artillery
149company were brought to a halt. The company with the scaling
ladders would have halted also, having been told to keep in the
rear of the artillery; but they were urged on by Morgan with a
thundering oath, who pushed on after them with his riflemen, the
artillery company opening to the right and left to let them pass.
They arrived in the advance, just as Arnold was leading on
his forlorn hope to attack the barrier. Before he reached it, a
severe wound in the right leg with a musket ball completely disabled
him, and he had to be borne from the field. Morgan instantly
took the command. Just then Lamb came up with his
company, armed with muskets and bayonets, having received orders
to abandon the field-piece, and support the advance. Oswald
joined him with the forlorn hope. The battery which commanded
the defile mounted two pieces of cannon. There was a
discharge of grape-shot when the assailants were close under the
muzzles of the guns, yet but one man was killed. Before there
could be a second discharge, the battery was carried by assault,
some firing into the embrasures; others scaling the walls. The
captain and thirty of his men were taken prisoners.
The day was just dawning as Morgan led on to attack the
second barrier, and his men had to advance under a fire from the
town walls on their right, which incessantly thinned their ranks.
The second barrier was reached; they applied their scaling ladders
to storm it. The defence was brave and obstinate, but the
defenders were at length driven from their guns, and the battery
was gained. At the last moment one of the gunners ran back,
linstock in hand, to give one more shot. Captain Lamb snapped
a fusee at him. It missed fire. The cannon was discharged, and
a grape-shot wounded Lamb in the head, carrying away part of
150the cheek-bone. He was borne off senseless, to a neighboring
shed.
The two barriers being now taken, the way on this side
into the lower town seemed open. Morgan prepared to enter it
with the victorious vanguard; first stationing Captain Dearborn
and some provincials at Palace Gate, which opened down into the
defile from the upper town. By this time, however, the death of
Montgomery and retreat of Campbell, had enabled the enemy to
turn all their attention in this direction. A large detachment
sent by General Carleton, sallied out of Palace Gate after Morgan
had passed it, surprised and captured Dearborn and the
guard, and completely cut off the advanced party. The main
body, informed of the death of Montgomery, and giving up the
game as lost, retreated to the camp, leaving behind the field-piece
which Lamb’s company had abandoned, and the mortars in the
battery of St. Roque.
Morgan and his men were now hemmed in on all sides, and
obliged to take refuge in a stone house, from the inveterate fire
which assailed them. From the windows of this house they kept
up a desperate defence, until cannon were brought to bear upon
it. Then, hearing of the death of Montgomery, and seeing that
there was no prospect of relief, Morgan and his gallant handful of
followers were compelled to surrender themselves prisoners of
war.
Thus foiled at every point, the wrecks of the little army
abandoned their camp, and retreated about three miles from the
town; where they hastily fortified themselves, apprehending a
pursuit by the garrison. General Carleton, however, contented
himself with having secured the safety of the place, and remained
cautiously passive until he should be properly reinforced; distrusting
151the good faith of the motley inhabitants. He is said to
have treated the prisoners with a humanity the more honorable,
considering the “habitual military severity of his temper;” their
heroic daring, displayed in the assault upon the lower town, having
excited his admiration.
The remains of the gallant Montgomery received a soldier’s
grave, within the fortifications of Quebec, by the care of
Cramahé, the lieutenant-governor, who had formerly known him.
Arnold, wounded and disabled, had been assisted back to the
camp, dragging one foot after the other for nearly a mile in great
agony, and exposed continually to the musketry from the walls at
fifty yards’ distance, which shot down several at his side.
He took temporary command of the shattered army, until
General Wooster should arrive from Montreal, to whom he sent
an express, urging him to bring on succor. “On this occasion,”
says a contemporary writer, “he discovered the utmost vigor of a
determined mind, and a genius full of resources. Defeated and
wounded, as he was, he put his troops into such a situation as to
keep them still formidable.”[45]
With a mere handful of men, at one time not exceeding five
hundred, he maintained a blockade of the strong fortress from
which he had just been repulsed. “I have no thoughts,” writes
he, “of leaving this proud town until I enter it in triumph. I
am in the way of my duty, and I know no fear!”[46]
Happy for him had he fallen at this moment.—Happy for him
had he found a soldier’s and a patriot’s grave, beneath the
rock-built walls of Quebec. Those walls would have remained
152enduring monuments of his renown. His name, like that of
Montgomery, would have been treasured up among the dearest
though most mournful recollections of his country, and that
country would have been spared the single traitorous blot that
dims the bright page of its revolutionary history.
CHAPTER XVI. CORRESPONDENCE OF WASHINGTON AND SCHUYLER ON THE DISASTERS IN CANADA—REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED FROM NEW ENGLAND—DANGERS IN THE INTERIOR OF NEW YORK—JOHNSON HALL BELEAGUERED—SIR JOHN CAPITULATES—GENEROUS CONDUCT OF SCHUYLER—GOVERNOR TRYON AND THE TORIES—TORY MACHINATIONS—LEE AT NEW YORK—SIR HENRY CLINTON IN THE HARBOR—MENACES OF LEE—THE CITY AND RIVER FORTIFIED—LEE’S TREATMENT OF THE TORIES—HIS PLANS OF FORTIFICATION—ORDERED TO THE COMMAND IN CANADA—HIS SPECULATIONS ON TITLES OF DIGNITY.
153
Schuyler’s letter to Washington, announcing the recent events,
was written with manly feeling. “I wish,” said he, “I had no
occasion to send my dear general this melancholy account. My
amiable friend, the gallant Montgomery, is no more; the brave
Arnold is wounded; and we have met with a severe check in an
unsuccessful attempt on Quebec. May Heaven be graciously
pleased that the misfortune may terminate here! I tremble for
our people in Canada.”
Alluding to his recent request to retire from the army, he
writes: “Our affairs are much worse than when I made the
request. This is motive sufficient for me to continue to serve my
country in any way I can be thought most serviceable; but my
utmost can be but little, weak and indisposed as I am.”
154Washington was deeply moved by the disastrous intelligence.
“I most sincerely condole with you,” writes he, in reply to
Schuyler, “upon the fall of the brave and worthy Montgomery.
In the death of this gentleman, America has sustained a
heavy loss. I am much concerned for the intrepid and enterprising
Arnold, and greatly fear that consequences of the most
alarming nature will result from this well-intended, but unfortunate
attempt.”
General Schuyler, who was now in Albany, urged the necessity
of an immediate reinforcement of three thousand men for the
army in Canada. Washington had not a man to spare from the
army before Boston. He applied, therefore, on his own responsibility,
to Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Connecticut, for
three regiments, which were granted. His prompt measure received
the approbation of Congress, and further reinforcements
were ordered from the same quarters.
Solicitude was awakened about the interior of the province
of New York. Arms and ammunition were said to be concealed
in Tryon County, and numbers of the tories in that neighborhood
preparing for hostilities. Sir John Johnson had fortified Johnson
Hall, gathered about him his Scotch Highland tenants and Indian
allies, and it was rumored he intended to carry fire and sword
along the valley of the Mohawk.
Schuyler, in consequence, received orders from Congress to
take measures for securing the military stores, disarming the disaffected,
and apprehending their chiefs. He forthwith hastened
from Albany, at the head of a body of soldiers; was joined by
Colonel Herkimer, with the militia of Tryon County marshalled
forth on the frozen bosom of the Mohawk River, and appeared
155before Sir John’s stronghold, near Johnstown, on the 19th of
January.
Thus beleaguered, Sir John, after much negotiation, capitulated.
He was to surrender all weapons of war and military
stores in his possession, and to give his parole not to take arms
against America. On these conditions he was to be at liberty
to go as far westward in Tryon County as the German Flats and
Kingsland districts, and to every part of the colony to the southward
and eastward of these districts; provided he did not go
into any seaport town.
Sir John intimated a trust, that he, and the gentlemen with
him, would be permitted to retain such arms as were their own
property. The reply was characteristic: “General Schuyler’s
feelings as a gentleman, induce him to consent that Sir John
Johnson may retain the few favorite family arms, he making a
list of them. General Schuyler never refused a gentleman his
side-arms.”
The capitulation being adjusted, Schuyler ordered his troops
to be drawn up in line at noon (Jan. 20th), between his quarters
and the Court House, to receive the surrender of the Highlanders,
enjoining profound silence on his officers and men, when the
surrender should be made. Every thing was conducted with
great regard to the feelings of Sir John’s Scottish adherents;
they marched to the front, grounded their arms, and were dismissed
with exhortations to good behavior.
The conduct of Schuyler, throughout this affair, drew forth a
resolution of Congress, applauding him for his fidelity, prudence
and expedition, and the proper temper he had maintained toward
the “deluded people” in question. Washington, too, congratulated
him on his success. “I hope,” writes he, “General Lee
156will execute a work of the same kind on Long Island. It is high
time to begin with our internal foes, when we are threatened with
such severity of chastisement from our kind parent without.”
The recent reverses in Canada had, in fact, heightened the
solicitude of Washington about the province of New York.
That province was the central and all-important link in the confederacy;
but he feared it might prove a brittle one. We have
already mentioned the adverse influences in operation there. A
large number of friends to the crown, among the official and commercial
classes; rank tories, (as they were called,) in the city and
about the neighboring country; particularly on Long and Staten
Islands; king’s ships at anchor in the bay and harbor, keeping up
a suspicious intercourse with the citizens; while Governor Tryon,
castled, as it were, on board one of these ships, carried on intrigues
with those disaffected to the popular cause, in all parts of
the neighborhood. County committees had been empowered by
the New York Congress and convention, to apprehend all persons
notoriously disaffected, to examine into their conduct, and ascertain
whether they were guilty of any hostile act or machination.
Imprisonment or banishment was the penalty. The committees
could call upon the militia to aid in the discharge of their functions.
Still, disaffection to the cause was said to be rife in the
province, and Washington looked to General Lee for effective
measures to suppress it.
Lee arrived at New York on the 4th of February, his caustic
humors sharpened by a severe attack of the gout, which had rendered
it necessary, while on the march, to carry him for a considerable
part of the way in a litter. His correspondence is a complete
mental barometer. “I consider it as a piece of the greatest
good fortune,” writes he to Washington (Feb. 5th), “that the
157Congress have detached a committee to this place, otherwise I
should have made a most ridiculous figure, besides bringing upon
myself the enmity of the whole province. My hands were effectually
tied up from taking any step necessary for the public service
by the late resolve of Congress, putting every detachment
of the continental forces under the command of the Provincial
Congress where such detachment is.”
By a singular coincidence, on the very day of his arrival Sir
Henry Clinton, with the squadron which had sailed so mysteriously
from Boston, looked into the harbor. “Though it was Sabbath,”
says a letter-writer of the day, “it threw the whole city into such
a convulsion as it never knew before. Many of the inhabitants
hastened to move their effects into the country, expecting an
immediate conflict. All that day and all night, were there carts
going and boats loading, and women and children crying, and
distressed voices heard in the roads in the dead of the night.”[47]
Clinton sent for the mayor, and expressed much surprise and
concern at the distress caused by his arrival; which was merely,
he said, on a short visit to his friend Tryon, and to see how
matters stood. He professed a juvenile love for the place, and
desired that the inhabitants might be informed of the purport of
his visit, and that he would go away as soon as possible.
“He brought no troops with him,” writes Lee, “and pledges
his honor that none are coming. He says it is merely a visit to
his friend Tryon. If it is really so, it is the most whimsical
piece of civility I ever heard of.”
A gentleman in New York, writing to a friend in Philadelphia,
reports one of the general’s characteristic menaces, which
kept the town in a fever.
158“Lee says, he will send word on board of the men-of-war,
that, if they set a house on fire, he will chain a hundred of their
friends by the neck, and make the house their funeral pile.”[48]
For this time, the inhabitants of New York were let off for
their fears. Clinton, after a brief visit, continued his mysterious
cruise, openly avowing his destination to be North Carolina—which
nobody believed, simply because he avowed it.
The Duke of Manchester, speaking in the House of Lords of
the conduct of Clinton, contrasts it with that of Lord Dunmore,
who wrapped Norfolk in flames. “I will pass no censure on
that noble lord,” said he, “but I could wish that he had acted
with that generous spirit that forbade Clinton uselessly to destroy
the town of New York. My lords, Clinton visited New York;
the inhabitants expected its destruction. Lee appeared before it
with an army too powerful to be attacked, and Clinton passed
by without doing any wanton damage.”
The necessity of conferring with committees at every step,
was a hard restraint upon a man of Lee’s ardent and impatient
temper, who had a soldierlike contempt for the men of peace
around him; yet at the outset he bore it better than might have
been expected.
“The Congress committees, a certain number of the committees
of safety, and your humble servant,” writes he to Washington,
“have had two conferences. The result is such as will
agreeably surprise you. It is in the first place agreed, and justly,
that to fortify the town against shipping is impracticable; but we
are to fortify lodgments on some commanding part of the city
for two thousand men. We are to erect enclosed batteries on
159both sides of the water, near Hell Gate, which will answer the
double purpose of securing the town against piracies through the
Sound, and secure our communication with Long Island, now become
a more important point than ever; as it is determined to
form a strong fortified camp of three thousand men, on the
Island, immediately opposite to New York. The pass in the
Highlands is to be made as respectable as possible, and guarded
by a battalion. In short, I think the plan judicious and complete.”
The pass in the Highlands above alluded to, is that grand
defile of the Hudson, where, for upwards of fifteen miles, it
wends its deep channel between stern, forest-clad mountains and
rocky promontories. Two forts, about six miles distant from
each other, and commanding narrow parts of the river at its
bends through these Highlands, had been commenced in the preceding
autumn, by order of the Continental Congress; but they
were said to be insufficient for the security of that important
pass, and were to be extended and strengthened.
Washington had charged Lee, in his instructions, to keep a
stern eye upon the tories, who were active in New York. “You
can seize upon the persons of the principals,” said he; “they
must be so notoriously known, that there will be little danger of
committing mistakes.” Lee acted up to the letter of these instructions,
and weeded out with a vigorous hand, some of the
rankest of the growth. This gave great offence to the peace-loving
citizens, who insisted that he was arrogating a power vested
solely in the civil authority. One of them, well-affected to the
cause, writes: “To see the vast number of houses shut up, one
would think the city almost evacuated. Women and children are
scarcely to be seen in the streets. Troops are daily coming in;
160they break open and quarter themselves in any house they find
shut.”[49]
The enemy, too, regarded his measures with apprehension.
“That arch rebel Lee,” writes a British officer, “has driven all
the well-affected people from the town of New York. If something
is not speedily done, his Britannic majesty’s American dominions
will be confined within a very narrow compass.”[50]
In the exercise of his military functions, Lee set Governor
Tryon and the captain of the Asia at defiance. “They had
threatened perdition to the town,” writes he to Washington, “if
the cannon were removed from the batteries and wharves, but I
ever considered their threats as a brutum fulmen, and even persuaded
the town to be of the same way of thinking. We accordingly
conveyed them to a place of safety in the middle of the
day, and no cannonade ensued. Captain Parker publishes a pleasant
reason for his passive conduct. He says that it was manifestly
my intention, and that of the New England men under my
command, to bring destruction on this town, so hated for their
loyal principles, but that he was determined not to indulge us;
so remained quiet out of spite. The people here laugh at his
nonsense, and begin to despise the menaces which formerly used
to throw them into convulsions.”
Washington appears to have shared the merriment. In his
reply to Lee, he writes, “I could not avoid laughing at Captain
Parker’s reasons for not putting his repeated threats into execution,”—a
proof, by the way, under his own hand, that he could
laugh occasionally; and even when surrounded by perplexities.
According to Lee’s account, the New Yorkers showed a wonderful
161alacrity in removing the cannon. “Men and boys of all
ages,” writes he, “worked with the greatest zeal and pleasure.
I really believe the generality are as well-affected as any on the
continent.” Some of the well-affected, however, thought he was
rather too self-willed and high-handed. “Though General Lee
has many things to recommend him as a general,” writes one of
them, “yet I think he was out of luck when he ordered the removal
of the guns from the battery; as it was without the approbation
or knowledge of our Congress.”[51]—Lee seldom waited for
the approbation of Congress in moments of exigency.
He now proceeded with his plan of defences. A strong redoubt,
capable of holding three hundred men, was commenced at
Horen’s Hook, commanding the pass at Hell Gate, so as to block
up from the enemy’s ships, the passage between the mainland and
Long Island. A regiment was stationed on the island, making
fascines, and preparing other materials for constructing the works
for an intrenched camp, which Lee hoped would render it impossible
for the enemy to get a footing there. “What to do with
this city,” writes he, “I own, puzzles me. It is so encircled with
deep navigable water, that whoever commands the sea must command
the town. To-morrow I shall begin to dismantle that part
of the fort next to the town, to prevent its being converted into
a citadel. I shall barrier the principal streets, and, at least, if I
cannot make it a continental garrison, it shall be a disputable
field of battle.” Batteries were to be erected on an eminence
behind Trinity Church, to keep the enemy’s ships at so great a
distance as not to injure the town.
King’s Bridge, at the upper end of Manhattan or New York
162Island, linking it with the mainland, was pronounced by Lee “a
most important pass, without which the city could have no communication
with Connecticut.” It was, therefore, to be made as
strong as possible.
Heavy cannon were to be sent up to the forts in the Highlands;
which were to be enlarged and strengthened.
In the midst of his schemes, Lee received orders from Congress
to the command in Canada, vacant by the death of Montgomery.
He bewailed the defenceless condition of the city; the
Continental Congress, as he said, not having, as yet, taken the
least step for its security. “The instant I leave it,” said he, “I
conclude the Provincial Congress, and inhabitants in general, will
relapse into their former hysterics. The men-of-war and Mr.
Tryon will return to their old station at the wharves, and the
first regiments who arrive from England, will take quiet possession
of the town and Long Island.”
It must be observed that, in consequence of his military demonstrations
in the city, the enemy’s ships had drawn off and
dropped down the bay; and he had taken vigorous measures,
without consulting the committees, to put an end to the practice
of supplying them with provisions.
“Governor Tryon and the Asia,” writes he to Washington,
“continue between Nutten and Bedlow’s Islands. It has pleased
his excellency, in violation of the compact he has made, to seize
several vessels from Jersey laden with flour. It has, in return,
pleased my excellency to stop all provisions from the city, and
cut off all intercourse with him,—a measure which has thrown
the mayor, council, and tories into agonies. The propensity, or
rather rage, for paying court to this great man, is inconceivable.
They cannot be weaned from him. We must put wormwood on
163his paps, or they will cry to suck, as they are in their second
childhood.”
We would observe in explanation of a sarcasm in the above
quoted letter, that Lee professed a great contempt for the titles
of respect which it was the custom to prefix to the names of men
in office or command. He scoffed at them, as unworthy of “a
great, free, manly, equal commonwealth.” “For my own part,”
said he, “I would as lief they would put ratsbane in my mouth,
as the excellency with which I am daily crammed. How much
more true dignity was there in the simplicity of address among
the Romans! Marcus Tullius Cicero, Decius Bruto Imperatori,
or Caio Marcello Consuli; than to ’His Excellency Major-general
Noodle,’ or to the ’Honorable John Doodle.’”
CHAPTER XVII. MONOTONOUS STATE OF AFFAIRS BEFORE BOSTON—WASHINGTON ANXIOUS FOR ACTION—EXPLOIT OF PUTNAM—ITS DRAMATIC CONSEQUENCES—THE FARCE OF THE BLOCKADE OF BOSTON—AN ALARMING INTERRUPTION—DISTRESSES OF THE BESIEGED—WASHINGTON’S IRKSOME PREDICAMENT—HIS BOLD PROPOSITION—DEMUR OF THE COUNCIL OF WAR—ARRIVAL OF KNOX WITH ARTILLERY—DORCHESTER HEIGHTS TO BE SEIZED AND FORTIFIED—PREPARATIONS FOR THE ATTEMPT.
164
The siege of Boston continued through the winter, without any
striking incident to enliven its monotony. The British remained
within their works, leaving the beleaguering army slowly to augment
its forces. The country was dissatisfied with the inaction
of the latter. Even Congress was anxious for some successful
blow that might revive popular enthusiasm. Washington shared
this anxiety, and had repeatedly, in councils of war, suggested an
attack upon the town, but had found a majority of his general
officers opposed to it. He had hoped some favorable opportunity
would present, when, the harbor being frozen, the troops might
approach the town upon the ice. The winter, however, though
severe at first, proved a mild one, and the bay continued open.
General Putnam, in the mean time, having completed the new
works at Lechmere Point, and being desirous of keeping up the
spirit of his men, resolved to treat them to an exploit. Accordingly,
165from his “impregnable fortress” of Cobble Hill, he detached
a party of about two hundred, under his favorite officer,
Major Knowlton, to surprise and capture a British guard stationed
at Charlestown. It was a daring enterprise, and executed
with spirit. As Charlestown Neck was completely protected,
Knowlton led his men across the mill-dam, round the base of the
hill, and immediately below the fort; set fire to the guard-house
and some buildings in its vicinity; made several prisoners, and
retired without loss; although thundered upon by the cannon of
the fort. The exploit was attended by a dramatic effect on
which Putnam had not calculated. The British officers, early in
the winter, had fitted up a theatre, which was well attended by
the troops and tories. On the evening in question, an afterpiece
was to be performed, entitled “The Blockade of Boston,” intended
as a burlesque on the patriot army which was beleaguering it.
Washington is said to have been represented in it as an awkward
lout, equipped with a huge wig, and a long rusty sword, attended
by a country booby as orderly sergeant, in rustic garb, with an
old firelock seven or eight feet long.
The theatre was crowded, especially by the military. The
first piece was over, and the curtain was rising for the farce,
when a sergeant made his appearance, and announced that “the
alarm guns were firing at Charlestown, and the Yankees attacking
Bunker’s Hill.” At first this was supposed to be a part of the
entertainment, until General Howe gave the word, “Officers, to
your alarm posts.”
Great confusion ensued; every one scrambled out of the
theatre as fast as possible. There was, as usual, some shrieking
and fainting of ladies; and the farce of “The Blockade of
Boston” had a more serious than comic termination.
166The London Chronicle, in a sneering comment on Boston
affairs, gave Burgoyne as the author of this burlesque afterpiece,
though perhaps unjustly. “General Burgoyne has opened a
theatrical campaign, of which himself is sole manager, being
determined to act with the Provincials on the defensive only.
Tom Thumb has been already represented; while, on the other
hand, the Provincials are preparing to exhibit, early in the spring,
’Measure for Measure.’”
The British officers, like all soldiers by profession, endeavored
to while away the time by every amusement within their reach;
but, in truth, the condition of the besieged town was daily becoming
more and more distressing. The inhabitants were without
flour, pulse, or vegetables; the troops were nearly as destitute.
There was a lack of fuel, too, as well as food. The smallpox
broke out, and it was necessary to inoculate the army. Men,
women and children either left the city voluntarily, or were sent
out of it; yet the distress increased. Several houses were broken
open and plundered; others were demolished by the soldiery for
fuel. General Howe resorted to the sternest measures to put a stop
to these excesses. The provost was ordered to go the rounds
with the hangman, and hang up the first man he should detect in
the fact, without waiting for further proof for trial. Offenders
were punished with four hundred, six hundred, and even one
thousand lashes. The wife of a private soldier, convicted of receiving
stolen goods, was sentenced to one hundred lashes on her
bare back, at the cart’s tail, in different parts of the town, and an
imprisonment of three months.
Meanwhile, Washington was incessantly goaded by the impatient
murmurs of the public, as we may judge by his letters to
Mr. Reed. “I know the integrity of my own heart,” writes he,
167on the 10th of February; “but to declare it, unless to a friend,
may be an argument of vanity. I know the unhappy predicament
I stand in; I know that much is expected of me; I know
that, without men, without arms, without ammunition, without
any thing fit for the accommodation of a soldier, little is to be
done; and, what is mortifying, I know that I cannot stand justified
to the world without exposing my own weakness, and injuring
the cause, by declaring my wants; which I am determined
not to do, further than unavoidable necessity brings every man
acquainted with them.
“My own situation is so irksome to me at times, that, if I
did not consult the public good more than my own tranquillity, I
should long ere this have put every thing on the cast of a die.
So far from my having an army of twenty thousand men, well
armed, I have been here with less than one half of that number,
including sick, furloughed, and on command; and those neither
armed nor clothed as they should be. In short, my situation has
been such, that I have been obliged to use art, to conceal it from
my own officers.”
How precious are those letters! And how fortunate that the
absence of Mr. Reed from camp, should have procured for us
such confidential outpourings of Washington’s heart at this time
of its great trial.
He still adhered to his opinion in favor of an attempt upon
the town. He was aware that it would be attended with considerable loss,
but believed it would be successful if the men should
behave well. Within a few days after the date of this letter,
the bay became sufficiently frozen for the transportation of
troops. “This,” writes he to Reed, “I thought, knowing the ice
would not last, a favorable opportunity to make an assault upon
168the troops in town. I proposed it in council; but behold, though
we had been waiting all the year for this favorable event, the
enterprise was thought too dangerous. Perhaps it was; perhaps
the irksomeness of my situation led me to undertake more than
could be warranted by prudence. I did not think so, and I am
sure yet that the enterprise, if it had been undertaken with resolution,
must have succeeded; without it, any would fail.”
His proposition was too bold for the field-officers assembled
in council (Feb. 16th), who objected that there was not force, nor
arms and ammunition sufficient in camp for such an attempt.
Washington acquiesced in the decision, it being almost unanimous;
yet he felt the irksomeness of his situation. “To have the
eyes of the whole continent,” said he, “fixed with anxious expectation
of hearing of some great event, and to be restrained in
every military operation for want of the necessary means of
carrying it on, is not very pleasing, especially as the means used
to conceal my weakness from the enemy, conceal it also from our
friends, and add to their wonder.”
In the council of war above mentioned, a cannonade and bombardment
were considered advisable, as soon as there should be
a sufficiency of powder; in the mean time, preparations might be
made for taking possession of Dorchester Heights, and Noddle’s
Island.
At length the camp was rejoiced by the arrival of Colonel
Knox, with his long train of sledges drawn by oxen, bringing
more than fifty cannon, mortars, and howitzers, beside supplies of
lead and flints. The zeal and perseverance which he had displayed
in his wintry expedition across frozen lakes and snowy
wastes, and the intelligence with which he had fulfilled his instructions,
won him the entire confidence of Washington. His conduct
169in this enterprise was but an earnest of that energy and
ability which he displayed throughout the war.
Further ammunition being received from the royal arsenal at
New York, and other quarters, and a reinforcement of ten regiments
of militia, Washington no longer met with opposition to
his warlike measures. Lechmere Point, which Putnam had fortified,
was immediately to be supplied with mortars and heavy
cannon, so as to command Boston on the north; and Dorchester
Heights, on the south of the town, were forthwith to be taken
possession of. “If any thing,” said Washington, “will induce
the enemy to hazard an engagement, it will be our attempting to
fortify those heights, as, in that event taking place, we shall be
able to command a great part of the town, and almost the whole
harbor.” Their possession, moreover, would enable him to push
his works to Nook’s Hill, and other points opposite Boston,
whence a cannonade and bombardment must drive the enemy
from the city.
The council of Massachusetts, at his request, ordered the
militia of the towns contiguous to Dorchester and Roxbury, to
hold themselves in readiness to repair to the lines at those places
with arms, ammunition and accoutrements, on receiving a preconcerted
signal.
Washington felt painfully aware how much depended upon
the success of this attempt. There was a cloud of gloom and
distrust lowering upon the public mind. Danger threatened on
the north and on the south. Montgomery had fallen before the
walls of Quebec. The army in Canada was shattered. Tryon
and the tories were plotting mischief in New York. Dunmore
was harassing the lower part of Virginia, and Clinton and his
170fleet were prowling along the coast, on a secret errand of
mischief.
Washington’s general orders evince the solemn and anxious
state of his feelings. In those of the 26th of February, he forbade
all playing at cards and other games of chance. “At this
time of public distress,” writes he, “men may find enough to do
in the service of God and their country, without abandoning
themselves to vice and immorality. * * * * It is a noble
cause we are engaged in; it is the cause of virtue and mankind;
every advantage and comfort to us and our posterity depend upon
the vigor of our exertions; in short, freedom or slavery must be
the result of our conduct; there can, therefore, be no greater inducement
to men to behave well. But it may not be amiss to
the troops to know, that, if any man in action shall presume to
skulk, hide himself, or retreat from the enemy without the orders
of his commanding officer, he will be instantly shot down as an
example of cowardice; cowards having too frequently disconcerted
the best formed troops by their dastardly behavior.”
In the general plan it was concerted, that, should the enemy
detach a large force to dislodge our men from Dorchester
Heights, as had been done in the affair of Bunker’s Hill, an
attack upon the opposite side of the town should forthwith be
made by General Putnam. For this purpose he was to have
four thousand picked men in readiness, in two divisions, under
Generals Sullivan and Greene. At a concerted signal from Roxbury,
they were to embark in boats near the mouth of Charles
River, cross under cover of the fire of three floating batteries,
land in two places in Boston, secure its strong posts, force the
gates and works at the Neck, and let in the Roxbury troops.
CHAPTER XVIII. THE AFFAIR OF DORCHESTER HEIGHTS—AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LETTERS RESPECTING IT—A LABORIOUS NIGHT—REVELATIONS AT DAYBREAK—HOWE IN A PERPLEXITY—A NIGHT ATTACK MEDITATED—STORMY WEATHER—THE TOWN TO BE EVACUATED—NEGOTIATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS—PREPARATIONS TO EMBARK—EXCESSES OF THE TROOPS—BOSTON EVACUATED—SPEECH OF THE DUKE OF MANCHESTER ON THE SUBJECT—A MEDAL VOTED BY CONGRESS.
171
The evening of Monday, the 4th of March, was fixed upon for
the occupation of Dorchester Heights. The ground was frozen
too hard to be easily intrenched; fascines, therefore, and gabions,
and bundles of screwed hay, were collected during the two preceding
nights, with which to form breastworks and redoubts.
During these two busy nights the enemy’s batteries were cannonaded
and bombarded from opposite points, to occupy their
attention, and prevent their noticing these preparations. They
replied with spirit, and the incessant roar of artillery thus kept
up, covered completely the rumbling of waggons and ordnance.
How little the enemy were aware of what was impending, we
may gather from the following extract of a letter from an officer
of distinction in the British army in Boston to his friend in London,
dated on the 3d of March:
“For these last six weeks or near two months, we have been
172better amused than could possibly be expected in our situation.
We had a theatre, we had balls, and there is actually a subscription
on foot for a masquerade. England seems to have forgot
us, and we have endeavored to forget ourselves. But we were
roused to a sense of our situation last night, in a manner unpleasant
enough. The rebels have been for some time past erecting
a bomb battery, and last night began to play upon us. Two
shells fell not far from me. One fell upon Colonel Monckton’s
house, but luckily did not burst until it had crossed the street.
Many houses were damaged, but no lives lost. The rebel army,”
adds he, “is not brave, I believe, but it is agreed on all hands
that their artillery officers are at least equal to ours.”[52]
The wife of John Adams, who resided in the vicinity of the
American camp, and knew that a general action was meditated,
expresses in a letter to her husband the feelings of a patriot
woman during the suspense of these nights.
“I have been in a constant state of anxiety, since you left
me,” writes she on Saturday. “It has been said to-morrow, and
to-morrow for this month, and when the dreadful to-morrow will
be, I know not. But hark! The house this instant shakes with
the roar of cannon. I have been to the door, and find it is a
cannonade from our army. Orders, I find, are come, for all the
remaining militia to repair to the lines Monday night, by twelve
o’clock. No sleep for me to-night.”
On Sunday the letter is resumed. “I went to bed after
twelve, but got no rest; the cannon continued firing, and my
heart kept pace with them all night. We have had a pretty
quiet day, but what to-morrow will bring forth, God only
knows.”
173On Monday, the appointed evening, she continues: ’I have
just returned from Penn’s Hill, where I have been sitting to hear
the amazing roar of cannon, and from whence I could see every
shell which was thrown. The sound, I think, is one of the grandest
in nature, and is of the true species of the sublime. ’Tis now
an incessant roar; but oh, the fatal ideas which are connected
with the sound! How many of our dear countrymen must
fall!
“I went to bed about twelve, and rose again a little after
one. I could no more sleep than if I had been in the engagement;
the rattling of the windows, the jar of the house, the
continual roar of twenty-four pounders, and the bursting of shells,
give us such ideas, and realize a scene to us of which we could
scarcely form any conception. I hope to give you joy of Boston,
even if it is in ruins, before I send this away.”
On the Monday evening thus graphically described, as soon
as the firing commenced, the detachment under General Thomas
set out on its cautious and secret march from the lines of Roxbury
and Dorchester. Every thing was conducted as regularly
and quietly as possible. A covering party of eight hundred men
preceded the carts with the intrenching tools; then came General
Thomas with the working party, twelve hundred strong, followed
by a train of three hundred waggons, laden with fascines, gabions,
and hay screwed into bundles of seven or eight hundred weight.
A great number of such bundles were ranged in a line along
Dorchester Neck on the side next the enemy, to protect the
troops, while passing, from being raked by the fire of the enemy.
Fortunately, although the moon, as Washington writes, was shining
in its full lustre, the flash and roar of cannonry from opposite
points, and the bursting of bombshells high in the air, so engaged
174and diverted the attention of the enemy, that the detachment
reached the heights about eight o’clock, without being heard or
perceived. The covering party then divided; one half proceeded
to the point nearest Boston, the other to the one nearest to Castle
Williams. The working party commenced to fortify, under the
directions of Gridley, the veteran engineer, who had planned the
works on Bunker’s Hill. It was severe labor, for the earth was
frozen eighteen inches deep; but the men worked with more than
their usual spirit; for the eye of the commander-in-chief was
upon them. Though not called there by his duties, Washington
could not be absent from this eventful operation. An eloquent
orator has imagined his situation—“All around him intense
movement; while nothing was to be heard excepting the tread of
busy feet, and the dull sound of the mattock upon the frozen soil.
Beneath him the slumbering batteries of the castle; the roadsteads
and harbor filled with the vessels of the royal fleet, motionless,
except as they swung round at their moorings at the turn of the
midnight tide; the beleaguered city occupied with a powerful
army, and a considerable non-combatant population, startled into
unnatural vigilance by the incessant and destructive cannonade,
yet unobservant of the great operations in progress so near them;
the surrounding country, dotted with a hundred rural settlements,
roused from the deep sleep of a New England village, by
the unwonted glare and tumult.”[53]
The same plastic fancy suggests the crowd of visions, phantoms
of the past, which may have passed through Washington’s
mind, on this night of feverish excitement. “His early training
in the wilderness; his escape from drowning, and the deadly rifle
175of the savage in the perilous mission to Venango; the shower of
iron hail through which he rode unharmed on Braddock’s field;
the early stages of the great conflict now brought to its crisis,
and still more solemnly, the possibilities of the future for himself
and for America—the ruin of the patriot cause if he failed at
the outset; the triumphant consolidation of the Revolution if he
prevailed.”
The labors of the night were carried on by the Americans
with their usual activity and address. When a relief party arrived
at four o’clock in the morning, two forts were in sufficient
forwardness to furnish protection against small arms and grape-shot;
and such use was made of the fascines and bundles of
screwed hay, that, at dawn, a formidable-looking fortress frowned
along the height. We have the testimony of a British officer
already quoted, for the fact. “This morning at daybreak we discovered
two redoubts on Dorchester Point, and two smaller ones
on their flanks. They were all raised during the last night, with
an expedition equal to that of the genii belonging to Aladdin’s
wonderful lamp. From these hills they command the whole
town, so that we must drive them from their post, or desert the
place.”
Howe gazed at the mushroom fortress with astonishment, as
it loomed indistinctly, but grandly, through a morning fog.
“The rebels,” exclaimed he, “have done more work in one night,
than my whole army would have done in one month.”
Washington had watched, with intense anxiety, the effect of
the revelation at daybreak. “When the enemy first discovered
our works in the morning,” writes he, “they seemed to be in
great confusion, and from their movements, to intend an attack.”
An American, who was on Dorchester Heights, gives a picture
176of the scene. A tremendous cannonade was commenced
from the forts in Boston, and the shipping in the harbor. “Cannon
shot,” writes he, “are continually rolling and rebounding
over the hill, and it is astonishing to observe how little our
soldiers are terrified by them. The royal troops are perceived
to be in motion, as if embarking to pass the harbor and land on
Dorchester shore, to attack our works. The hills and elevations
in this vicinity are covered with spectators, to witness deeds of
horror in the expected conflict. His excellency, General Washington,
is present, animating and encouraging the soldiers, and
they in return manifest their joy; and express a warm desire
for the approach of the enemy; each man knows his own place.
Our breastworks are strengthened, and among the means of defence
are a great number of barrels, filled with stones and sand,
and arranged in front of our works, which are to be put in motion,
and made to roll down the hill, to break the legs of the assailants
as they advance.”
General Thomas was reinforced with two thousand men. Old
Putnam stood ready to make a descent upon the north side of the
town, with his four thousand picked men, as soon as the heights on
the south should be assailed: “All the forenoon,” says the American
above cited, “we were in momentary expectation of witnessing
an awful scene; nothing less than the carnage of Breed’s
Hill battle was expected.”
As Washington rode about the heights, he reminded the troops
that it was the 5th of March, the anniversary of the Boston
massacre, and called on them to revenge the slaughter of their
brethren. They answered him with shouts. “Our officers and
men,” writes he, “appeared impatient for the appeal. The event
177I think, must have been fortunate; nothing less than success and
victory on our side.”
Howe, in the mean time, was perplexed between his pride and
the hazards of his position. In his letters to the ministry, he had
scouted the idea of “being in danger from the rebels.” He had
“hoped they would attack him.” Apparently, they were about
to fulfil his hopes, and with formidable advantages of position.
He must dislodge them from Dorchester Heights, or evacuate
Boston. The latter was an alternative too mortifying to be
readily adopted. He resolved on an attack, but it was to be a
night one.
“A body of light infantry, under the command of Major
Mulgrave, and a body of grenadiers, are to embark to-night at
seven,” writes the gay British officer already quoted. “I think
it likely to be a general affair. Adieu balls, masquerades, &c.,
for this may be looked upon as the opening of the campaign.”
In the evening the British began to move. Lord Percy was
to lead the attack. Twenty-five hundred men were embarked in
transports, which were to convey them to the rendezvous at
Castle William. A violent storm set in from the east. The
transports could not reach their place of destination. The men-of-war
could not cover and support them. A furious surf beat
on the shore where the boats would have to land. The attack
was consequently postponed until the following day.
That day was equally unpropitious. The storm continued,
with torrents of rain. The attack was again postponed. In the
mean time, the Americans went on strengthening their works; by
the time the storm subsided, General Howe deemed them too
strong to be easily carried; the attempt, therefore, was relinquished
altogether.
178What was to be done? The shells thrown from the heights
into the town, proved that it was no longer tenable. The fleet
was equally exposed. Admiral Shuldham, the successor to Graves,
assured Howe that if the Americans maintained possession of
the heights, his ships could not remain in the harbor. It was
determined, therefore, in a council of war, to evacuate the place as
soon as possible. But now came on a humiliating perplexity.
The troops, in embarking, would be exposed to a destructive fire.
How was this to be prevented? General Howe’s pride would not
suffer him to make capitulations; he endeavored to work on the
fears of the Bostonians, by hinting that if his troops were molested
while embarking, he might be obliged to cover their retreat,
by setting fire to the town.
The hint had its effect. Several of the principal inhabitants
communicated with him through the medium of General Robertson.
The result of the negotiation was, that a paper was concocted
and signed by several of the “select men” of Boston, stating
the fears they had entertained of the destruction of the place,
but that those fears had been quieted by General Howe’s declaration
that it should remain uninjured, provided his troops were
unmolested while embarking; the select men, therefore, begged
“some assurance that so dreadful a calamity might not be brought
on, by any measures from without.”
This paper was sent out from Boston, on the evening of the
8th, with a flag of truce, which bore it to the American lines at
Roxbury. There it was received by Colonel Learned, and carried
by him to head-quarters. Washington consulted with such of
the general officers as he could immediately assemble. The paper
was not addressed to him, nor to any one else. It was not authenticated
by the signature of General Howe; nor was there any
179other act obliging that commander to fulfil the promise, asserted
to have been made by him. It was deemed proper, therefore,
that Washington should give no answer to the paper; but that
Colonel Learned should signify in a letter, his having laid it
before the commander-in-chief, and the reasons assigned for not
answering it.
With this uncompromising letter, the flag returned to Boston.
The Americans suspended their fire, but continued to fortify their
positions. On the night of the 9th, a detachment was sent to
plant a battery on Nook’s Hill, an eminence at Dorchester, which
lies nearest to Boston Neck. A fire kindled behind the hill, revealed
the project. It provoked a cannonade from the British,
which was returned with interest from Cobble Hill, Lechmere
Point, Cambridge, and Roxbury. The roar of cannonry and
bursting of bombshells prevailed from half after eight at night,
until six in the morning. It was another night of terror to the
people of Boston; but the Americans had to desist, for the
present, from the attempt to fortify Nook’s Hill. Among the
accidents of the bombardment, was the bursting of Putnam’s
vaunted mortar, “the Congress.”
Daily preparations were now made by the enemy for departure.
By proclamation, the inhabitants were ordered to deliver up all
linen and woollen goods, and all other goods, that, in possession
of the rebels, would aid them in carrying on the war. Crean
Bush, a New York tory, was authorized to take possession of
such goods, and put them on board of two of the transports.
Under cover of his commission, he and his myrmidons broke open
stores, and stripped them of their contents. Marauding gangs
from the fleet and army followed their example, and extended
their depredations to private houses. On the 14th, Howe, in a
180general order, declared that the first soldier caught plundering
should be hanged on the spot. Still on the 16th houses were
broken open, goods destroyed, and furniture defaced by the troops.
Some of the furniture, it is true, belonged to the officers, and was
destroyed because they could neither sell it nor carry it away.
The letter of a British officer gives a lively picture of the
hurried preparations for retreat. “Our not being burdened with
provisions, permitted us to save some stores and ammunition, the
light field-pieces, and such things as were most convenient of carriage.
The rest, I am sorry to say, we were obliged to leave
behind; such of the guns as by dismounting we could throw into
the sea was so done. The carriages were disabled, and every
precaution taken that our circumstances would permit; for our
retreat was by agreement. The people of the town who were
friends to government, took care of nothing but their merchandise,
and found means to employ the men belonging to the transports
in embarking their goods, so that several of the vessels were
entirely filled with private property, instead of the king’s stores.
By some unavoidable accident, the medicines, surgeons’ chests,
instruments, and necessaries, were left in the hospital. The confusion
unavoidable to such a disaster, will make you conceive how
much must be forgot, where every man had a private concern.
The necessary care and distress of the women, children, sick, and
wounded, required every assistance that could be given. It was
not like breaking up a camp, where every man knows his duty;
it was like departing your country with your wives, your servants,
your household furniture, and all your incumbrances. The
officers, who felt the disgrace of their retreat, did their utmost
to keep up appearances. The men, who thought they were
181changing for the better, strove to take advantage of the present
times, and were kept from plunder and drink with difficulty.”[54]
For some days the embarkation of the troops was delayed by
adverse winds. Washington, who was imperfectly informed of
affairs in Boston, feared that the movements there might be a
feint. Determined to bring things to a crisis, he detached a
force to Nook’s Hill on Saturday, the 16th, which threw up a
breastwork in the night regardless of the cannonading of the
enemy. This commanded Boston Neck, and the south part of
the town, and a deserter brought a false report to the British
that a general assault was intended.
The embarkation, so long delayed, began with hurry and confusion
at four o’clock in the morning. The harbor of Boston
soon presented a striking and tumultuous scene. There were
seventy-eight ships and transports casting loose for sea, and
eleven or twelve thousand men, soldiers, sailors, and refugees,
hurrying to embark; many, especially of the latter, with their
families and personal effects. The refugees, in fact, labored
under greater disadvantages than the king’s troops, being obliged
to man their own vessels, as sufficient seamen could not be spared
from the king’s transports. Speaking of those “who had taken
upon themselves the style and title of government men” in
Boston, and acted an unfriendly part in this great contest, Washington
observes: “By all accounts there never existed a more
miserable set of beings than these wretched creatures now are.
Taught to believe that the power of Great Britain was superior
to all opposition, and that foreign aid, if not, was at hand, they
were even higher and more insulting in their opposition than the
182Regulars. When the order issued, therefore, for embarking the
troops in Boston, no electric shock—no sudden clap of thunder,—in
a word, the last trump could not have struck them with
greater consternation. They were at their wits’ end, and conscious
of their black ingratitude, chose to commit themselves,
in the manner I have above described, to the mercy of the waves
at a tempestuous season, rather than meet their offended countrymen.”[55]
While this tumultuous embarkation was going on, the Americans
looked on in silence from their batteries on Dorchester
Heights, without firing a shot. “It was lucky for the inhabitants
now left in Boston, that they did not,” writes a British officer;
“for I am informed every thing was prepared to set the
town in a blaze, had they fired one cannon.”[56]
At an early hour of the morning, the troops stationed at
Cambridge and Roxbury had paraded, and several regiments
under Putnam had embarked in boats, and dropped down Charles
River, to Sewall’s Point, to watch the movements of the enemy
by land and water. About nine o’clock a large body of troops
was seen marching down Bunker’s Hill, while boats full of soldiers
were putting off for the shipping. Two scouts were sent from
the camp to reconnoitre. The works appeared still to be occupied,
for sentries were posted about them with shouldered muskets.
Observing them to be motionless, the scouts made nearer
scrutiny, and discovered them to be mere effigies, set up to delay
the advance of the Americans. Pushing on, they found the
works deserted, and gave signal of the fact; whereupon, a detachment
was sent from the camp to take possession.
183Part of Putnam’s troops were now sent back to Cambridge;
a part were ordered forward to occupy Boston. General Ward,
too, with five hundred men, made his way from Roxbury, across
the neck, about which the enemy had scattered caltrops or crow’s
feet,[57] to impede invasion. The gates were unbarred and thrown
open, and the Americans entered in triumph, with drums beating
and colors flying.
By ten o’clock the enemy were all embarked and under way:
Putnam had taken command of the city, and occupied the important
points, and the flag of thirteen stripes, the standard of
the Union, floated above all the forts.
On the following day, Washington himself entered the town,
where he was joyfully welcomed. He beheld around him sad
traces of the devastation caused by the bombardment, though
not to the extent that he had apprehended. There were evidences,
also, of the haste with which the British had retreated—five
pieces of ordnance with their trunnions knocked off; others
hastily spiked; others thrown off the wharf. “General Howe’s
retreat,” writes Washington, “was precipitate beyond anything
I could have conceived. The destruction of the stores at Dunbar’s
camp, after Braddock’s defeat, was but a faint image of
what may be seen at Boston; artillery carts cut to pieces in one
place, gun carriages in another; shells broke here, shots buried
there, and every thing carrying with it the face of disorder and
confusion, as also of distress.”[58]
To add to the mortification of General Howe, he received, we
are told, while sailing out of the harbor, despatches from the
ministry, approving the resolution he had so strenuously expressed,
184of maintaining his post until he should receive reinforcements.
As the smallpox prevailed in some parts of the town, precautions
were taken by Washington for its purification; and the
main body of the army did not march in until the 20th. “The
joy manifested in the countenances of the inhabitants,” says an
observer, “was overcast by the melancholy gloom caused by ten
tedious months of siege;” but when, on the 22d, the people from
the country crowded into the town, “it was truly interesting,”
writes the same observer, “to witness the tender interviews and
fond embraces of those who had been long separated under circumstances
so peculiarly distressing.”[59]
Notwithstanding the haste with which the British army was
embarked, the fleet lingered for some days in Nantucket Road.
Apprehensive that the enemy, now that their forces were collected
in one body, might attempt by some blow to retrieve their
late disgrace, Washington hastily threw up works on Fort Hill,
which commanded the harbor, and demolished those which protected
the town from the neighboring country. The fleet at
length disappeared entirely from the coast, and the deliverance
of Boston was assured.
The eminent services of Washington throughout this arduous
siege, his admirable management, by which, “in the course of a
few months, an undisciplined band of husbandmen became soldiers,
and were enabled to invest, for nearly a year, and finally to
expel a brave army of veterans, commanded by the most experienced
generals,” drew forth the enthusiastic applause of the
nation. No higher illustration of this great achievement need be
185given, than the summary of it contained in the speech of a
British statesman, the Duke of Manchester, in the House of
Lords. “The army of Britain,” said he, “equipped with every
possible essential of war; a chosen army, with chosen officers,
backed by the power of a mighty fleet, sent to correct revolted
subjects; sent to chastise a resisting city; sent to assert Britain’s
authority;—has, for many tedious months, been imprisoned within
that town by the Provincial army; who, their watchful guards,
permitted them no inlet to the country; who braved all their
efforts, and defied all their skill and ability in war could ever attempt.
One way, indeed, of escape was left; the fleet is yet respected;
to the fleet the army has recourse; and British generals,
whose name never met with a blot of dishonor, are forced to quit
that town which was the first object of the war, the immediate
cause of hostilities, the place of arms, which has cost this nation
more than a million to defend.”
We close this eventful chapter of Washington’s history, with
the honor decreed to him by the highest authority of his country.
On motion of John Adams, who had first moved his nomination
as commander-in-chief, a unanimous vote of thanks to him was
passed in Congress; and it was ordered that a gold medal be
struck, commemorating the evacuation of Boston, bearing the
effigy of Washington as its deliverer.
CHAPTER XIX. DESTINATION OF THE FLEET—COMMISSION OF THE TWO HOWES—CHARACTER OF LORD HOWE—THE COLONIES DIVIDED INTO DEPARTMENTS—LEE ASSIGNED TO THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT—GENERAL THOMAS TO CANADA—CHARACTER OF LEE, BY WASHINGTON—LETTERS OF LEE FROM THE SOUTH—A DOG IN A DANCING SCHOOL—COMMITTEE OF SAFETY IN VIRGINIA—LEE’S GRENADIERS—PUTNAM IN COMMAND AT NEW YORK—STATE OF AFFAIRS THERE—ARRIVAL OF WASHINGTON—NEW ARRANGEMENTS—PERPLEXITIES WITH RESPECT TO CANADA—ENGLAND SUBSIDIZES HESSIAN TROOPS.
186
The British fleet bearing the army from Boston, had disappeared
from the coast. “Whither they are bound, and where they next
will pitch their tents,” writes Washington, “I know not.” He
conjectured their destination to be New York, and made his
arrangements accordingly; but he was mistaken. General Howe
had steered for Halifax, there to await the arrival of strong reinforcements
from England, and the fleet of his brother, Admiral
Lord Howe; who was to be commander-in-chief of the naval
forces on the North American station.
It was thought these brothers would co-operate admirably
in the exercise of their relative functions on land and water.
Yet they were widely different in their habits and dispositions.
Sir William, easy, indolent, and self-indulgent, “hated business,”
we are told, “and never did any. Lord Howe loved it,
187dwelt upon it, never could leave it.” Beside his nautical commands,
he had been treasurer of the navy, member of the board
of admiralty, and had held a seat in Parliament; where, according
to Walpole, he was “silent as a rock,” excepting when naval
affairs were under discussion; when he spoke briefly and to the
point. “My Lord Howe,” said George II., “your life has been
a continued series of services to your country.” He was now
about fifty-one years of age, tall, and well proportioned like his
brother; but wanting his ease of deportment. His complexion
was dark, his countenance grave and strongly marked, and he had
a shy reserve, occasionally mistaken for haughtiness. As a naval
officer, he was esteemed resolute and enterprising, yet cool and
firm. In his younger days he had contracted a friendship for
Wolfe; “it was like the union of cannon and gunpowder,” said
Walpole. Howe, strong in mind, solid in judgment, firm of
purpose, was said to be the cannon; Wolfe, quick in conception,
prompt in execution, impetuous in action—the gunpowder.[60]
The bravest man, we are told, could not wish for a more able,
or more gallant commander than Howe, and the sailors used to
say of him, “Give us Black Dick, and we fear nothing.”
Such is his lordship’s portrait as sketched by English pencils;
we shall see hereafter how far his conduct conforms to it. At
present we must consider the state of the American army, in
the appointments and commands of which various changes had
recently taken place.
It was presumed the enemy, in the ensuing campaign, would
direct their operations against the Middle and Southern colonies.
Congress divided those colonies into two departments; one, comprehending
188New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and
Maryland, was to be under the command of a major-general, and
two brigadier-generals; the other, comprising Virginia, the Carolinas
and Georgia, to be under the command of a major-general,
and four brigadiers.
In this new arrangement, the orders destining General Lee to
Canada, were superseded, and he was appointed to the command
of the Southern department, where he was to keep watch upon the
movements of Sir Henry Clinton. He was somewhat dissatisfied
with the change in his destination. “As I am the only general
officer on the continent,” writes he to Washington, “who can
speak or think in French, I confess I think it would have been
more prudent to have sent me to Canada; but I shall obey with
alacrity, and I hope with success.”
In reply, Washington observes, “I was just about to congratulate
you on your appointment to the command in Canada, when
I received the account that your destination was altered. As a
Virginian, I must rejoice at the change, but as an American, I
think you would have done more essential service to the common
cause in Canada. For, besides the advantage of speaking and
thinking in French, an officer who is acquainted with their
manners and customs, and has travelled in their country, must
certainly take the strongest hold of their affection and confidence.”
The command in Canada was given to General Thomas, who
had distinguished himself at Roxbury, and was promoted to the
rank of major-general. It would have been given to Schuyler,
out for the infirm state of his health; still Congress expressed a
reliance on his efforts to complete the work “so conspicuously
begun and well conducted” under his orders, in the last campaign;
189and, as not merely the success but the very existence of
the army in Canada would depend on supplies sent from these
colonies across the lakes, he was required, until further orders, to
fix his head-quarters at Albany, where, without being exposed to
the fatigue of the camp until his health was perfectly restored,
he would be in a situation to forward supplies; to superintend
the operations necessary for the defence of New York and the
Hudson River, and the affairs of the whole middle department.
Lee set out for the South on the 7th of March, carrying
with him his bold spirit, his shrewd sagacity, and his whimsical
and splenetic humors. The following admirably impartial sketch
is given of him by Washington, in a letter to his brother Augustine:
“He is the first in military knowledge and experience we
have in the whole army. He is zealously attached to the cause;
honest and well meaning, but rather fickle and violent, I fear, in
his temper. However, as he possesses an uncommon share of
good sense and spirit, I congratulate my countrymen on his
appointment to that department.”[61]
We give by anticipation a few passages from Lee’s letters,
illustrative of his character and career. The news of the evacuation
of Boston reached him in Virginia. In a letter to Washington,
dated Williamsburg, April 5, he expresses himself on the
subject with generous warmth. “My dear general,” writes he,
“I most sincerely congratulate you; I congratulate the public, on
the great and glorious event, your possession of Boston. It will
be a most bright page in the annals of America, and a most
abominable black one in those of the beldam Britain. Go on, my
dear general; crown yourself with glory, and establish the liberties
190and lustre of your country on a foundation more permanent
than the Capitol rock.”
Then reverting to himself, his subacid humors work up, and
he shows that he had been as much annoyed in Williamsburg, by
the interference of committees, as he had been in New York.
“My situation,” writes he, “is just as I expected. I am afraid I
shall make a shabby figure, without any real demerits of my own.
I am like a dog in a dancing-school; I know not where to turn
myself, where to fix myself. The circumstances of the country,
intersected with navigable rivers; the uncertainty of the enemy’s
designs and motions, who can fly in an instant to any spot they
choose, with their canvas wings, throw me, or would throw Julius
Cæsar into this inevitable dilemma; I may possibly be in the
North, when, as Richard says, I should serve my sovereign in the
West. I can only act from surmise, and have a very good chance
of surmising wrong. I am sorry to grate your ears with a truth,
but must, at all events, assure you, that the Provincial Congress
of New York are angels of decision, when compared with your
countrymen, the committee of safety assembled at Williamsburg.
Page, Lee, Mercer and Payne, are, indeed, exceptions; but from
Pendleton, Bland, the Treasurer and Co.—Libera nos domine!”
Lee’s letters from Virginia, written at a later date, were in a
better humor. “There is a noble spirit in this province pervading
all orders of men; if the same becomes universal, we shall be
saved. I am, fortunately for my own happiness, and, I think, for
the well-being of the community, on the best terms with the
senatorial part, as well as the people at large. I shall endeavor
to preserve their confidence and good opinion.”[62]
191And in a letter to Washington:
“I have formed two companies of grenadiers to each regiment,
and with spears thirteen feet long. Their rifles (for they
are all riflemen) sling over their shoulders, their appearance is
formidable, and the men are conciliated to the weapon. * * *
I am likewise furnishing myself with four-ounced rifled amusettes,
which will carry an infernal distance; the two-ounced hit
a half sheet of paper, at five hundred yards distance.”
On Lee’s departure for the South, Brigadier-general Lord
Stirling had remained in temporary command at New York.
Washington, however, presuming that the British fleet had
steered for that port, with the force which had evacuated Boston,
hastened detachments thither under Generals Heath and Sullivan,
and wrote for three thousand additional men to be furnished by
Connecticut. The command of the whole he gave to General
Putnam, who was ordered to fortify the city and the passes of
the Hudson, according to the plans of General Lee. In the
mean time, Washington delayed to come on himself, until he
should have pushed forward the main body of his army by
divisions.
Lee’s anticipations that laxity and confusion would prevail
after his departure, were not realized. The veteran Putnam, on
taking command, put the city under rigorous military rule. Tho
soldiers were to retire to their barracks and quarters at the beating
of the tattoo, and remain there until the reveille in the morning.
The inhabitants were subjected to the same rule. None
would be permitted to pass a sentry, without the countersign,
which would be furnished to them on applying to any of the
brigade majors. All communication between the “ministerial
fleet” and shore was stopped; the ships were no longer to be furnished
192with provisions. Any person taken in the act of holding
communication with them would be considered an enemy, and
treated accordingly.
We have a lively picture of the state of the city, in letters
written at the time, and already cited. “When you are informed
that New York is deserted by its old inhabitants, and filled with
soldiers from New England, Philadelphia, Jersey, &c., you will
naturally conclude the environs of it are not very safe from so
undisciplined a multitude as our Provincials are represented to
be; but I do believe there are very few instances of so great a
number of men together, with so little mischief done by them.
They have all the simplicity of ploughmen in their manners, and
seem quite strangers to the vices of older soldiers: they have
been employed in creating fortifications in every part of the town. * * * Governor Tryon loses his credit with the people here
prodigiously; he has lately issued a proclamation, desiring the
deluded people of this colony to return to their obedience,
promising a speedy support to the friends of government, declaring
a door of mercy open to the penitent, and a rod for the disobedient,
&c. The friends of government were provoked at
being so distinguished, and the friends to liberty hung him in
effigy, and printed a dying speech for him. A letter, too, was intercepted
from him, hastening Lord Howe to New York, as the
rebels were fortifying. These have entirely lost him the good
will of the people. * * * You cannot think how sorry I am
the governor has so lost himself, a man once so much beloved.
O Lucifer, once the son of morn, how fallen! General Washington
is expected hourly; General Putnam is here, with several
other generals, and some of their ladies. * * * The variety of
reports keeps one’s mind always in agitation. Clinton and Howe
193have set the continent a racing from Boston to Carolina. Clinton
came into our harbor: away flew the women, children, goods and
chattels, and in came the soldiers flocking from every part. No
sooner was it known that he was not going to land here, than expresses
were sent to Virginia and Carolina, to put them on their
guard; his next expedition was to Virginia; there they were
ready to receive him; from thence without attempting to land, he
sailed to Carolina. Now General Howe is leading us another
dance.”[63]
Washington came on by the way of Providence, Norwich and
New London, expediting the embarkation of troops from these
posts, and arrived at New York on the 13th of April. Many of
the works which Lee had commenced were by this time finished;
others were in progress. It was apprehended the principal
operations of the enemy would be on Long Island, the high
grounds of which, in the neighborhood of Brooklyn, commanded
the city. Washington saw that an able and efficient officer was
needed at that place. Greene was accordingly stationed there,
with a division of the army. He immediately proceeded to complete
the fortifications of that important post, and to make himself
acquainted with the topography, and the defensive points of
the surrounding country.
The aggregate force distributed at several extensive posts in
New York and its environs, and on Long Island, Staten Island
and elsewhere, amounted to little more than ten thousand men;
some of those were on the sick list, others absent on command, or
on furlough; there were but about eight thousand available and
fit for duty. These, too, were without pay; those recently enlisted,
194without arms, and no one could say where arms were to be
procured.
Washington saw the inadequacy of the force to the purposes
required, and was full of solicitude about the security of a place,
the central point of the Confederacy, and the grand deposit of
ordnance and military stores. He was aware too, of the disaffection
to the cause among many of the inhabitants; and apprehensive
of treachery. The process of fortifying the place had induced
the ships of war to fall down into the outer bay, within the
Hook, upwards of twenty miles from the city; but Governor
Tryon was still on board of one of them, keeping up an active
correspondence with the tories on Staten and Long Islands, and
in other parts of the neighborhood.
Washington took an early occasion to address an urgent letter
to the committee of safety, pointing out the dangerous, and even
treasonable nature of this correspondence. He had more weight
and influence with that body than had been possessed by General
Lee, and procured the passage of a resolution prohibiting, under
severe penalties, all intercourse with the king’s ships.
Head-quarters, at this time, was a scene of incessant toil on
the part of the commander-in-chief, his secretaries and aides-de-camp.
“I give in to no kind of amusements myself,” writes he,
“and consequently those about me can have none, but are confined
from morning until evening, hearing and answering applications
and letters.” The presence of Mrs. Washington was a
solace in the midst of these stern military cares, and diffused a
feminine grace and decorum, and a cheerful spirit over the
domestic arrangements of head-quarters, where every thing was
conducted with simplicity and dignity. The wives of some of
the other generals and officers rallied around Mrs. Washington,
195but social intercourse was generally at an end. “We all live
here,” writes a lady of New York, “like nuns shut up in a
nunnery. No society with the town, for there are none there to
visit; neither can we go in or out after a certain hour without
the countersign.”
In addition to his cares about the security of New York,
Washington had to provide for the perilous exigencies of the army
in Canada. Since his arrival in the city, four regiments of
troops, a company of riflemen and another of artificers had been
detached under the command of Brigadier-general Thompson, and
a further corps of six regiments under Brigadier-general Sullivan,
with orders to join General Thomas as soon as possible.
Still Congress inquired of him, whether further reinforcements
to the army in Canada would not be necessary, and
whether they could be spared from the army in New York. His
reply shows the peculiar perplexities of his situation, and the tormenting
uncertainty in which he was kept, as to where the next
storm of war would break. “With respect to sending more
troops to that country, I am really at a loss what to advise, as it
is impossible, at present, to know the designs of the enemy.
Should they send the whole force under General Howe up the
river St. Lawrence, to relieve Quebec and recover Canada, the
troops gone and now going, will be insufficient to stop their progress;
and, should they think proper to send that, or an equal
force, this way from Great Britain, for the purpose of possessing
this city and securing the navigation of Hudson’s River, the
troops left here will not be sufficient to oppose them; and yet, for
any thing we know, I think it not improbable they may attempt
both; both being of the greatest importance to them, if they
have men. I could wish, indeed, that the army in Canada should
196be more powerfully reinforced; at the same time, I am conscious
that the trusting of this important post, which is now become the
grand magazine of America, to the handful of men remaining
here, is running too great a risk. The securing of this post and
Hudson’s River is to us also of so great importance, that I cannot,
at present, advise the sending any more troops from hence; on
the contrary, the general officers now here, whom I thought it my
duty to consult, think it absolutely necessary to increase the
army at this place with at least ten thousand men; especially
when it is considered, that from this place only the army in
Canada must draw its supplies of ammunition, provisions, and
most probably of men.”
Washington at that time was not aware of the extraordinary
expedients England had recently resorted to, against the next
campaign. The Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse
Cassel, and the Hereditary Prince of Cassel, Count of Hanau,
had been subsidized to furnish troops to assist in the subjugation
of her colonies. Four thousand three hundred Brunswick troops,
and nearly thirteen thousand Hessians, had entered the British
service. Beside the subsidy exacted by the German princes, they
were to be paid seven pounds four shillings and four pence sterling
for every soldier furnished by them, and as much more for
every one slain.
Of this notable arrangement, Washington, as we observed, was
not yet aware. “The designs of the enemy,” writes he, “are too
much behind the curtain for me to form any accurate opinion of
their plan of operations for the summer’s campaign. We are left
to wander, therefore, in the field of conjecture.”[64]
197Within a few days afterwards, he had vague accounts of
“Hessians and Hanoverian troops coming over;” but it was not
until the 17th of May, when he received letters from General
Schuyler, inclosing others from the commanders in Canada, that
he knew in what direction some of these bolts of war were
launched; and this calls for some further particulars of the campaign
on the banks of the St. Lawrence; which we shall give to
the reader in the ensuing chapter.
CHAPTER XX. ARNOLD BLOCKADES QUEBEC—HIS DIFFICULTIES—ARRIVAL OF GENERAL WOOSTER—OF GENERAL THOMAS—ABORTIVE ATTEMPT ON QUEBEC—PREPARATIONS FOR RETREAT—SORTIE OF CARLETON—RETREAT OF THE AMERICANS—HALT AT POINT DESCHAMBAULT—ALARM IN THE COLONIES AT THE RETREAT OF THE ARMY—POPULAR CLAMOR AGAINST SCHUYLER—SLANDERS REFUTED.
198
In a former chapter, we left Arnold before the walls of Quebec,
wounded, crippled, almost disabled, yet not disheartened; blockading
that “proud town” with a force inferior, by half, in number
to that of the garrison. For his gallant services, Congress promoted
him in January to the rank of brigadier-general.
Throughout the winter he kept up the blockade with his shattered
army; though had Carleton ventured upon a sortie, he
might have been forced to decamp. That cautious general, however,
remained within his walls. He was sure of reinforcements
from England in the spring, and, in the mean time, trusted to the
elements of dissolution at work in the besieging army.
Arnold, in truth, had difficulties of all kinds to contend with.
His military chest was exhausted; his troops were in want of
necessaries; to procure supplies, he was compelled to resort to
the paper money issued by Congress, which was uncurrent among
199the Canadians; he issued a proclamation making the refusal to
take it in payment a penal offence. This only produced irritation
and disgust. As the terms of their enlistment expired, his men
claimed their discharge and returned home. Sickness also thinned
his ranks; so that, at one time, his force was reduced to five
hundred men, and for two months, with all his recruitments of
raw militia, did not exceed seven hundred.
The failure of the attack on Quebec had weakened the cause
among the Canadians; the peasantry had been displeased by the
conduct of the American troops; they had once welcomed them
as deliverers; they now began to regard them as intruders. The
seigneurs, or noblesse, also, feared to give further countenance
to an invasion, which, if defeated, might involve them in ruin.
Notwithstanding all these discouragements, Arnold still kept
up a bold face; cut off supplies occasionally, and harassed the
place with alarms. Having repaired his batteries, he opened a
fire upon the town, but with little effect; the best part of the
artillerists, with Lamb, their capable commander, were prisoners
within the walls.
On the 1st day of April, General Wooster arrived from Montreal,
with reinforcements, and took the command. The day
after his arrival, Arnold, by the falling of his horse, again
received an injury on the leg recently wounded, and was disabled
for upwards of a week. Considering himself slighted by General
Wooster, who did not consult him in military affairs, he obtained
leave of absence until he should be recovered from his lameness,
and repaired to Montreal, where he took command.
General Thomas arrived at the camp in the course of April,
and found the army in a forlorn condition, scattered at different
posts, and on the island of Orleans. It was numerically increased
200to upwards of two thousand men, but several hundred
were unfit for service. The smallpox had made great ravages.
They had inoculated each other. In their sick and debilitated
state, they were without barracks, and almost without medicine.
A portion, whose term of enlistment had expired, refused to do
duty, and clamored for their discharge.
The winter was over, the river was breaking up, reinforcements
to the garrison might immediately be expected, and then the case
would be desperate. Observing that the river about Quebec was
clear of ice, General Thomas determined on a bold effort. It
was, to send up a fire-ship with the flood, and, while the ships in
the harbor were in flames, and the town in confusion, to scale the
walls.
Accordingly, on the third of May, the troops turned out with
scaling ladders; the fire-ship came up the river under easy sail,
and arrived near the shipping before it was discovered. It was
fired into. The crew applied a slow match to the train and
pulled off. The ship was soon in a blaze, but the flames caught
and consumed the sails; her way was checked, and she drifted off
harmlessly with the ebbing tide. The rest of the plan was, of
course, abandoned.
Nothing now remained but to retreat before the enemy
should be reinforced. Preparations were made in all haste, to
embark the sick and the military stores. While this was taking
place, five ships made their way into the harbor, on the 6th of
May, and began to land troops. Thus reinforced, General Carleton
sallied forth, with eight hundred or a thousand men. We
quote his own letter for an account of his sortie. “As soon as
part of the 29th regiment with the marines, in all about two
hundred, were landed, they, with the greatest part of the garrison,
201by this time much improved, and in high spirits, marched out
of the ports of St. Louis and St. Johns, to see what these mighty
boasters were about. They were found very busy in their preparations
for a retreat. A few shots being exchanged, the line
marched forward, and the place was soon cleared of these plunderers.”
By his own account, however, these “mighty boasters” had
held him and his garrison closely invested for five months; had
burnt the suburbs; battered the walls; thrown red-hot shot
among the shipping; made repeated and daring attempts to carry
the place by assault and stratagem, and rendered it necessary for
soldiers, sailors, marines, and even judges and other civil officers
to mount guard.[65] One officer declares, in a letter, that for
eighty successive nights he slept in his clothes, to be ready in case
of alarm.
All this, too, was effected by a handful of men, exposed in
open encampments to the rigors of a Canadian winter. If in
truth they were boasters, it must be allowed their deeds were
equal to their words.
The Americans were in no condition to withstand Carleton’s
unlooked-for attack. They had no intrenchments, and could not
muster three hundred men at any point. A precipitate retreat
was the consequence, in which baggage, artillery, every thing was
abandoned. Even the sick were left behind; many of whom
crawled away from the camp hospitals, and took refuge in the
woods, or among the Canadian peasantry.
General Carleton did not think it prudent to engage in a pursuit
with his newly-landed troops. He treated the prisoners with
202great humanity, and caused the sick to be sought out in their
hiding-places, and brought to the general hospitals; with assurances,
that, when healed, they should have liberty to return to
their homes.
General Thomas came to a halt at Point Deschambault, about
sixty miles above Quebec, and called a council of war to consider
what was to be done. The enemy’s ships were hastening up the
St. Lawrence; some were already but two or three leagues distant.
The camp was without cannon; powder, forwarded by General
Schuyler, had fallen into the enemy’s hands; there were not provisions
enough to subsist the army for more than two or three
days; the men-of-war, too, might run up the river, intercept all
their resources, and reduce them to the same extremity they had
experienced before Quebec. It was resolved, therefore, to ascend
the river still further.
General Thomas, however, determined to send forward the
invalids, but to remain at Point Deschambault with about five
hundred men, until he should receive orders from Montreal, and
learn whether such supplies could be forwarded immediately as
would enable him to defend his position.[66]
The despatches of General Thomas, setting forth the disastrous
state of affairs, had a disheartening effect on Schuyler, who
feared the army would be obliged to abandon Canada. Washington,
on the contrary, spoke cheeringly on the subject. “We
must not despair. A manly and spirited opposition only can
insure success, and prevent the enemy from improving the advantage
they have obtained.”[67]
He regretted that the troops had not been able to make a stand
203at Point Deschambault, but hoped they would maintain a post as
far down the river as possible. The lower it was, the more important
would be the advantages resulting from it, as all the
country above would be favorable, and furnish assistance and
support; while all below would necessarily be in the power of
the enemy.
The tidings of the reverses in Canada and the retreat of the
American army, had spread consternation throughout the New
Hampshire Grants, and the New England frontiers, which would
now be laid open to invasion. Committees of towns and districts
assembled in various places, to consult on the alarming state of
affairs. In a time of adversity, it relieves the public mind to
have some individual on whom to charge its disasters. General
Schuyler, at present, was to be the victim. We have already
noticed the prejudice and ill will, on the part of the New England
people, which had harassed him throughout the campaign, and
nearly driven him from the service. His enemies now stigmatized
him as the cause of the late reverses. He had neglected,
they said, to forward reinforcements and supplies to the army in
Canada. His magnanimity in suffering Sir John Johnson to go
at large, while in his power, was again misconstrued into a crime:
he had thus enabled that dangerous man to renew his hostilities.
Finally, it was insinuated that he was untrue to his country, if
not positively leagued with her enemies.
These imputations were not generally advanced; and when
advanced, were not generally countenanced; but a committee of
King’s County appears to have given them credence, addressing a
letter to the commander-in-chief on the subject, accompanied by
documents.
Washington, to whom Schuyler’s heart had been laid open
204throughout all its trials, and who knew its rectitude, received the
letter and documents with indignation and disgust, and sent copies
of them to the general. “From these,” said he, “you will
readily discover the diabolical and insidious arts and schemes
carrying on by the tories and friends of government to raise distrust,
dissensions, and divisions among us. Having the utmost
confidence in your integrity, and the most incontestable proof of
your great attachment to our common country and its interest, I
could not but look upon the charge against you with an eye of
disbelief, and sentiments of detestation and abhorrence; nor
should I have troubled you with the matter, had I not been informed
that copies were sent to different committees, and to
Governor Trumbull, which I conceived would get abroad, and
that you, should you find I had been furnished with them, would
consider my suppressing them as an evidence of my belief, or at
best of my doubts, of the charges.”[68]
We will go forward, and give the sequel of this matter.
While the imputations in question had merely floated in public
rumor, Schuyler had taken no notice of them; “but it is now,”
writes he in reply to Washington, “a duty which I owe myself
and my country, to detect the scoundrels, and the only means of
doing this is by requesting that an immediate inquiry be made
into the matter; when I trust it will appear that it was more a
scheme calculated to ruin me, than to disunite and create jealousies
in the friends of America. Your Excellency will, therefore,
please to order a court of inquiry the soonest possible; for
I cannot sit easy under such an infamous imputation; since on
this extensive continent, numbers of the most respectable characters
205may not know what your Excellency and Congress do of my
principles and exertions in the common cause.”
He further adds: “I am informed by persons of good credit,
that about one hundred persons, living on what are commonly
called the New Hampshire Grants, have had a design to seize me
as a tory, and perhaps still have. There never was a man so infamously
scandalized and ill-treated as I am.”
We need only add, that the Berkshire committees which, in a
time of agitation and alarm, had hastily given countenance to
these imputations, investigated them deliberately in their cooler
moments, and acknowledged, in a letter to Washington, that they
were satisfied their suspicions respecting General Schuyler were
wholly groundless. “We sincerely hope,” added they, “his
name may be handed down, with immortal honor, to the latest
posterity, as one of the great pillars of the American cause.”
CHAPTER XXI. GATES SENT TO PHILADELPHIA WITH THE CANADA DESPATCHES—PROMOTED TO THE RANK OF MAJOR-GENERAL—WASHINGTON SUMMONED TO PHILADELPHIA—PUTNAM LEFT IN COMMAND—CONFERENCE WITH CONGRESS—ARMY ARRANGEMENTS—A BOARD OF WAR INSTITUTED—THE CLINTONS OF NEW YORK—MRS. WASHINGTON INOCULATED—REED MADE ADJUTANT-GENERAL.
206
As the reverses in Canada would affect the fortunes of the Revolution
elsewhere, Washington sent General Gates to lay the despatches
concerning them, before Congress. “His military experience,”
said he, “and intimate acquaintance with the situation
of our affairs, will enable him to give Congress the fullest satisfaction
about the measures necessary to be adopted at this alarming
crisis; and, with his zeal and attachment to the cause of
America, he will have a claim to their notice and favors.”
Scarce had Gates departed on his mission (May 19th), when
Washington himself received a summons to Philadelphia, to advise
with Congress concerning the opening campaign. He was informed
also that Gates, on the 16th of May, had been promoted
to the rank of major-general, and Mifflin to that of brigadier-general,
and a wish was intimated that they might take the command
of Boston.
Washington prepared to proceed to Philadelphia. His general
207orders issued on the 19th of May, show the anxious situation
of affairs at New York. In case of an alarm the respective regiments
were to draw up opposite to their encampments or quarters,
until ordered to repair to the alarm posts. The alarm
signals for regulars, militia, and the inhabitants of the city,
were, in the daytime—two cannon fired from the rampart at
Fort George, and a flag hoisted on the top of Washington’s head-quarters.
In the night—two cannon fired as above, and two
lighted lanterns hoisted on the top of head-quarters.[69]
In his parting instructions to Putnam, who, as the oldest
major-general in the city, would have the command during his
absence, Washington informed him of the intention of the Provincial
Congress of New York to seize the principal tories, and
disaffected persons in the city, and the surrounding country, especially
on Long Island, and authorized him to afford military aid,
if required, to carry the same into execution. He was also to
send Lord Stirling, Colonel Putnam the engineer, and Colonel
Knox, if he could be spared, up to the Highlands, to examine the
state of the forts and garrisons, and report what was necessary to
put them in a posture of defence. Their garrisons were chiefly
208composed of parts of a regiment of New York troops, commanded
by Colonel James Clinton, of Ulster County, and were said to be
sufficient.
The general, accompanied by Mrs. Washington, departed from
New York on the 21st of May, and they were invited by Mr.
Hancock, the President of Congress, to be his guests during their
sojourn at Philadelphia.
Lee, when he heard of Washington’s visit there, augured good
effects from it. “I am extremely glad, dear general,” writes he,
“that you are in Philadelphia, for their councils sometimes lack a
little of military electricity.”
Washington, in his conferences with Congress, appears to have
furnished this electricity. He roundly expressed his conviction,
that no accommodation could be effected with Great Britain, on
acceptable terms. Ministerialists had declared in Parliament,
that, the sword being drawn, the most coercive measures would be
persevered in, until there was complete submission. The recent
subsidizing of foreign troops was a part of this policy, and indicated
unsparing hostility. A protracted war, therefore, was inevitable;
but it would be impossible to carry it on successfully,
with the scanty force actually embodied, and with transient
enlistments of militia.
In consequence of his representations, resolutions were passed
in Congress that soldiers should be enlisted for three years, with
a bounty of ten dollars for each recruit; that the army at New
York should be reinforced until the 1st of December, with thirteen
thousand eight hundred militia; that gondolas and fire rafts
should be built, to prevent the men-of-war and enemy’s ships
from coming into New York Bay, or the Narrows; and that a
flying camp of ten thousand militia, furnished by Pennsylvania,
209Delaware and Maryland, and likewise engaged until the 1st December,
should be stationed in the Jerseys for the defence of the
Middle colonies. Washington was, moreover, empowered, in case
of emergency, to call on the neighboring colonies for temporary
aid with their militia.
Another important result of his conferences with Congress
was the establishment of a war office. Military affairs had hitherto
been referred in Congress to committees casually appointed,
and had consequently been subject to great irregularity and neglect.
Henceforth a permanent committee, entitled the Board of
War and Ordnance, was to take cognizance of them. The first
board was composed of five members; John Adams, Colonel
Benjamin Harrison, Roger Sherman, James Wilson, and Edward
Rutledge; with Richard Peters as secretary. It went into operation
on the 12th of June.
While at Philadelphia, Washington had frequent consultations
with George Clinton, one of the delegates from New York, concerning
the interior defences of that province, especially those
connected with the security of the Highlands of the Hudson,
where part of the regiment of Colonel James Clinton, the brother
of the delegate, was stationed. The important part which these
brothers were soon to act in the military affairs of that province,
and ultimately in its political history, entitles them to a special
notice.
They were of the old Clinton stock of England; being descended
from General James Clinton, an adherent of royalty in the time
of the civil wars, but who passed over to Ireland, after the death
of Charles I. Their father, Charles Clinton, grandson of the
general, emigrated to America in 1729, and settled in Ulster,
now Orange County, just above the Highlands of the Hudson.
210Though not more than fifty miles from the city of New York, it
was at that time on the borders of a wilderness, where every
house had at times to be a fortress. Charles Clinton, like most
men on our savage frontier in those days, was a warrior by necessity,
if not by choice. He took an active part in Indian and
French wars, commanded a provincial regiment stationed at Fort
Herkimer, joined in the expedition under General Bradstreet,
when it passed up the valley of the Mohawk, and was present at
the capture of Fort Frontenac. His sons, James and George,
one twenty, the other seventeen years of age, served in the same
campaign, the one as captain, the other as lieutenant; thus taking
an early lesson in that school of American soldiers, the
French war.
James, whose propensities were always military, continued
in the provincial army until the close of that war; and afterwards,
when settled on an estate in Ulster County, was able and
active in organizing its militia. George applied himself to the
law, and became successful at the bar, in the same county.
Their father, having laid aside the sword, occupied for many
years, with discernment and integrity, the honorable station of
Judge of the Court of Common Pleas. He died in Ulster County,
in 1773, in the eighty-third year of his age, “in full view of
that revolution in which his sons were to act distinguished
parts.” With his latest breath he charged them “to stand by the
liberties of their country.”
They needed no such admonition. From the very first, they
had been heart and hand in the cause. George had championed it
for years in the New York legislature, signalizing himself by his
zeal as one of an intrepid minority in opposing ministerial oppression.
211He had but recently taken his seat as delegate to
the Continental Congress.
James Clinton, appointed colonel on the 30th of June, 1775,
had served with his regiment of New York troops under Montgomery
at the siege of St. Johns, and the capture of Montreal,
after which he had returned home. He had subsequently been
appointed to the command of a regiment in one of the four battalions
raised for the defence of New York. We shall soon have
occasion to speak further of these patriot brothers.
The prevalence of the smallpox had frequently rendered
Washington uneasy on Mrs. Washington’s account during her
visits to the army; he was relieved, therefore, by her submitting
to inoculation during their sojourn in Philadelphia, and having a
very favorable time.
He was gratified, also, by procuring the appointment of his
late secretary, Joseph Reed, to the post of adjutant-general,
vacated by the promotion of General Gates, thus placing him
once more by his side.
CHAPTER XXII. AFFAIRS IN CANADA—DISASTER AT THE CEDARS—HOSTILE DESIGNS OF THE JOHNSONS—A BLOODY SUMMER EXPECTED—FORTS IN THE HIGHLANDS—COLONEL JAMES CLINTON IN COMMAND—FORTIFICATIONS AT KING’S BRIDGE AND ON LONG ISLAND.
212
Despatches from Canada continued to be disastrous. General
Arnold, who was in command at Montreal, had established a post
on the St. Lawrence, about forty miles above that place, on a
point of land called the Cedars; where he had stationed Colonel
Bedel, with about four hundred men, to prevent goods being
sent to the enemy, in the upper country, and to guard against
surprise from them, or their Indians.
In the latter part of May, Colonel Bedel received intelligence
that a large body of British, Canadians, and Indians,
under the command of Captain Forster, were coming down from
Oswegatchie, to attack him. Leaving Major Butterfield in command
of the post, he hastened down to Montreal to obtain reinforcements.
Arnold immediately detached one hundred men,
under Major Shelburne, and prepared to follow in person, with
a much greater force. In the mean time, the post at the Cedars
had been besieged, and Major Butterfield intimidated into a surrender,
by a threat from Captain Forster, that resistance would
213provoke a massacre of his whole garrison by the Indians. The
reinforcements under Major Shelburne were assailed within four
miles of the Cedars, by a large party of savages, and captured
after a sharp skirmish, in which several were killed on both sides.
Arnold received word of these disasters while on the march.
He instantly sent forward some Caughnawaga Indians, to overtake
the savages, and demand a surrender of the prisoners; with
a threat that, in case of a refusal, and that any of them were murdered,
he would sacrifice every Indian who fell into his hands, and
would follow the offenders to their towns, and destroy them by
fire and sword. He now embarked four hundred of his men in
bateaux, and pushed on with the remainder by land. Arriving
at St. Ann’s, above the rapids of the St. Lawrence, he discovered
several of the enemy’s bateaux, taking the prisoners off
from an island, a league distant. It was a tormenting sight, as
it was not in his power to relieve them. His bateaux were a
league behind, coming up the rapids very slowly. He sent several
expresses to hurry them. It was sunset before they arrived
and he could embark all his people; in the mean time, his Caughnawaga
messengers returned with an answer from the savages.
They had five hundred prisoners collected together, they said, at
Quinze Chiens, where they were posted; should he offer to land
and attack them, they would kill every prisoner, and give no
quarter to any who should fall into their hands thereafter.
“Words cannot express my feelings,” writes Arnold, “at the
delivery of this message. Torn by the conflicting passions of
revenge and humanity; a sufficient force to take ample revenge,
raging for action, urged me on one hand; and humanity for five
hundred unhappy wretches, who were on the point of being
sacrificed, if our vengeance was not delayed, pleaded equally
214strong on the other.” In this situation, he ordered the boats
to row immediately for the island, whither he had seen the enemy
taking their prisoners. Before he reached it, the savages had
conveyed them all away, excepting five, whom he found naked,
and almost starved, and one or two, whom, being unwell,
they had butchered. Arnold now pushed for Quinze Chiens,
about four miles distant, on the mainland. Here was the whole
force of the enemy, civilized and savage, intrenched and fortified.
As Arnold approached, they opened a fire upon his boats, with
small arms, and two brass six-pounders. He rowed near the
land, without returning a shot. By this time it was too dark to
distinguish any thing on shore, and being unacquainted with the
ground, he judged it prudent to return to St. Johns.
Here he called a council of war, and it was determined to
attack the enemy early in the morning. In the course of the
night, a flag was sent by Captain Forster, with articles for an
exchange of prisoners, which had been entered into by him and
Major Sherburne. As the terms were not equal, they were objected
to by Arnold, and a day passed before they were adjusted.
A cartel was then signed, by which the prisoners, consisting of
two majors, nine captains, twenty subalterns, and four hundred
and forty-three privates, were to be exchanged for an equal number
of British prisoners of the same rank, and were to be sent
to the south shore of the St. Lawrence, near Caughnawaga,
whence to return to their homes. Nine days were allowed for
the delivery of the prisoners, during which time hostilities should
be suspended.
Arnold, in a letter to the commissioners of Congress then at
Montreal, giving an account of this arrangement, expressed his
indignation at the conduct of the king’s officers, in employing
215savages to screen their butcheries, and suffering their prisoners to
be killed in cold blood. “I intend being with you this evening,”
added he, “to consult on some effectual measures to take with
these savages, and still more savage British troops, who are still
at Quinze Chiens. As soon as our prisoners are released, I hope
it will be in our power to take ample vengeance, or nobly fall in
the attempt.”[70]
The accounts which reached Washington of these affairs were
vague and imperfect, and kept him for some days in painful suspense.
The disasters at the Cedars were attributed entirely to
the base and cowardly conduct of Bedel and Butterworth, and
he wrote to Schuyler to have good courts appointed, and bring
them, and every other officer guilty of misconduct, to trial.
“The situation of our affairs in Canada,” observes he, “is
truly alarming. I sincerely wish the next letters from the northward
may not contain the melancholy advices of General Arnold’s
defeat, and the loss of Montreal. The most vigorous exertions
will be necessary to retrieve our circumstances there, and I hope
you will strain every nerve for that purpose. Unless it can be
done now, Canada will be lost to us for ever.”
While his mind was agitated by these concerns, letters from
Schuyler showed that mischief was brewing in another quarter.
Colonel Guy Johnson, accompanied by the Sachem Brant and
the Butlers, had been holding councils with the Indians, and designed,
it was said, to come back to the Mohawk country, at the
head of a British and savage force. A correspondence was
carried on between him and his cousin, Sir John Johnson, who
216was said to be preparing to co-operate with his Scotch dependants
and Indian allies.
Considering this a breach of Sir John’s parole, Schuyler had
sent Colonel Elias Dayton with a force to apprehend him. Sir
John, with a number of his armed tenants, retreated for refuge
among the Indians, on the borders of the lakes. Dayton took
temporary possession of Johnson Hall, placed guards about it,
seized upon Sir John’s papers, and read them in presence of
Lady Johnson, and subsequently conveyed her ladyship as a kind
of hostage to Albany.
Shortly afterwards came further intelligence of the designs
of the Johnsons. Sir John, with his Scotch warriors and Indian
allies, was said to be actually coming down the valley of the
Mohawk, bent on revenge, and prepared to lay every thing waste;
and Schuyler collecting a force at Albany to oppose him. Washington
instantly wrote to Schuyler, to detach Colonel Dayton with
his regiment on that service, with instructions to secure a post
where Fort Stanwix formerly stood, in the time of the French
war. As to Schuyler himself, Washington, on his own responsibility,
directed him to hold a conference with the Six Nations, and
with any others whom he and his brother commissioners on Indian
affairs might think necessary, and secure their active services,
without waiting further directions from Congress; that body
having recently resolved to employ Indian allies in the war, the
enemy having set the example.
“We expect a bloody summer in New York and Canada,”
writes Washington to his brother Augustine, “and I am sorry to
say that we are not, either in men or arms, prepared for it.
However, it is to be hoped, that, if our cause is just, as I most
217religiously believe it, the same Providence which has in many
instances appeared for us, will still go on to afford its aid.”
Lord Stirling, who, by Washington’s orders, had visited and
inspected the defences in the Highlands, rendered a report of
their condition, of which we give the purport. Fort Montgomery,
at the lower part of the Highlands, was on the west bank of
the river, north of Dunderberg (or Thunder Hill). It was situated
on a bank one hundred feet high. The river at that place was
about half a mile wide. Opposite the fort was the promontory
of Anthony’s Nose, many hundred feet high, accessible only to
goats, or men expert in climbing. A body of riflemen stationed
here, might command the decks of vessels. Fort Montgomery
appeared to Lord Stirling the proper place for a guard post.
Fort Constitution was about six miles higher up the river, on
a rocky island of the same name, at a narrow strait where the
Hudson, shouldered by precipices, makes a sudden bend round
West Point. A redoubt, in the opinion of Lord Stirling, would
be needed on the point, not only for the preservation of Fort
Constitution, but for its own importance.
The garrison of that fort consisted of two companies of
Colonel James Clinton’s regiment, and Captain Wisner’s company
of minute men, in all one hundred and sixty rank and file. Fort
Montgomery was garrisoned by three companies of the same regiment,
about two hundred rank and file. Both garrisons were
miserably armed. The direction of the works of both forts was
in the hands of commissioners appointed by the Provincial Congress
of New York. The general command of the posts required
to be adjusted. Several persons accused of being “notorious
tories,” had recently been sent into Fort Montgomery by the
218district committees of the counties of Albany, Dutchess and
Westchester, with directions to the commanding officers, to keep
them at hard labor until their further order. They were employed
upon the fortifications.
In view of all these circumstances, Washington, on the 14th
of June, ordered Colonel James Clinton to take command of both
posts, and of all the troops stationed at them. He seemed a fit
custodian for them, having been a soldier from his youth; brought
up on a frontier subject to Indian alarms and incursions, and
acquainted with the strong points and fastnesses of the Highlands.
King’s Bridge, and the heights adjacent, considered by General
Lee of the utmost importance to the communication between New
York and the mainland, and to the security of the Hudson, were
reconnoitred by Washington on horseback, about the middle of
the month; ordering where works should be laid out. Breastworks
were to be thrown up for the defence of the bridge, and an
advanced work (subsequently called Fort Independence) was to
be built beyond it, on a hill commanding Spyt den Duivel Creek,
as that inlet of the Hudson is called, which links it with the
Harlaem River.
A strong work, intended as a kind of citadel, was to crown a
rocky height between two and three miles south of the bridge,
commanding the channel of the Hudson; and below it were to
be redoubts on the banks of the river at Jeffrey’s Point. In
honor of the general, the citadel received the name of Fort Washington.
Colonel Rufus Putnam was the principal engineer, who had
the direction of the works. General Mifflin encamped in their
vicinity, with part of the two battalions from Pennsylvania, to be
employed in their construction, aided by the militia.
219While these preparations were made for the protection of the
Hudson, the works about Brooklyn on Long Island were carried
on with great activity, under the superintendence of General
Greene. In a word, the utmost exertions were made at every
point, to put the city, its environs, and the Hudson River, in a
state of defence, before the arrival of another hostile armament.
CHAPTER XXIII. RETREAT OF GENERAL THOMAS—HIS DEATH—GENERAL SULLIVAN IN COMMAND—SCENE ON THE SOREL—SANGUINE EXPECTATIONS OF SULLIVAN—WASHINGTON’S OPINION OF SULLIVAN’S CHARACTER—GATES APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN CANADA—REINFORCEMENTS OF THE ENEMY—REVERSES—THOMPSON CAPTURED—RETREAT OF SULLIVAN—CLOSE OF THE INVASION OF CANADA.
220
Operations in Canada were drawing to a disastrous close. General
Thomas, finding it impossible to make a stand at Point
Deschambault, had continued his retreat to the mouth of the
Sorel, where he found General Thompson with part of the troops
detached by Washington, from New York, who were making some
preparations for defence. Shortly after his arrival, he was taken
ill with the smallpox, and removed to Chamblee. He had
prohibited inoculation among his troops, because it put too many
of their scanty number on the sick list; he probably fell a victim
to his own prohibition, as he died of that malady on the 2d of
June.
On his death, General Sullivan, who had recently arrived with
the main detachment of troops from New York, succeeded to the
command; General Wooster having been recalled. He advanced
immediately with his brigade to the mouth of the Sorel, where he
found General Thompson with but very few troops to defend that
221post, having detached Colonel St. Clair, with six or seven hundred
men, to Three Rivers, about fifty miles down the St. Lawrence,
to give check to an advanced corps of the enemy of about eight
hundred regulars and Canadians, under the veteran Scot, Colonel
Maclean. In the mean time General Thompson, who was left
with but two hundred men to defend his post, was sending off his
sick and his heavy baggage, to be prepared for a retreat, if necessary.
“It really was affecting,” writes Sullivan to Washington,
“to see the banks of the Sorel lined with men, women and children,
leaping and clapping their hands for joy, to see me arrive;
it gave no less joy to General Thompson, who seemed to be wholly
forsaken, and left to fight against an unequal force or retreat
before them.”
Sullivan proceeded forthwith to complete the works on the
Sorel; in the mean time he detached General Thompson with
additional troops to overtake St. Clair, and assume command of
the whole party, which would then amount to two thousand men.
He was by no means to attack the encampment at Three Rivers,
unless there was great prospect of success, as his defeat might
prove the total loss of Canada. “I have the highest opinion of
the bravery and resolution of the troops you command,” says
Sullivan in his instructions, “and doubt not but, under the direction
of a kind Providence, you will open the way for our recovering
that ground which former troops have so shamefully lost.”
Sullivan’s letter to Washington, written at the same time, is
full of sanguine anticipation. It was his fixed determination to
gain post at Deschambault, and fortify it so as to make it inaccessible.
“The enemy’s ships are now above that place,” writes
he; “but if General Thompson succeeds at Three Rivers, I will
222soon remove the ships below Richelieu Falls, and after that,
approach Quebec as fast as possible.”
“Our affairs here,” adds he, “have taken a strange turn since
our arrival. The Canadians are flocking by hundreds to take a
part with us. The only reason of their disaffection was, because
our exertions were so feeble that they doubted much of our
success, and even of our ability to protect them.
“I venture to assure you, and the Congress, that I can in a
few days reduce the army to order, and with the assistance of a
kind Providence, put a new face to our affairs here, which a few
days since seemed almost impossible.”
The letter of Sullivan gave Washington an unexpected
gleam of sunshine. “Before it came to hand,” writes he in
reply, “I almost dreaded to hear from Canada, as my advices
seemed to promise nothing favorable, but rather further misfortunes.
But I now hope that our affairs, from the confused,
distracted, and almost forlorn state in which you found them, will
change, and assume an aspect of order and success.” Still his
sagacious mind perceived a motive for this favorable coloring of
affairs. Sullivan was aiming at the command in Canada; and
Washington soberly weighed his merits for the appointment, in a
letter to the President of Congress. “He is active, spirited, and
zealously attached to the cause. He has his wants, and he has
his foibles. The latter are manifested in his little tincture of
vanity, and in an over-desire of being popular, which now and
then lead him into embarrassments. His wants are common to
us all. He wants experience to move upon a grand scale; for
the limited and contracted knowledge, which any of us have in
military matters, stands in very little stead.” This want was
overbalanced, on the part of General Sullivan, by sound judgment,
223some acquaintance with men and books, and an enterprising
genius.
“As the security of Canada is of the last importance to the
well-being of these colonies,” adds Washington, “I should like
to know the sentiments of Congress, respecting the nomination
of any officer to that command. The character I have drawn
of General Sullivan is just, according to my ideas of him. Congress
will therefore determine upon the propriety of continuing
him in Canada, or sending another, as they shall see fit.”[71]
Scarce had Washington despatched this letter, when he
received one from the President of Congress, dated the 18th of
June, informing him that Major-general Gates had been appointed
to command the forces in Canada, and requesting him to
expedite his departure as soon as possible. The appointment
of Gates has been attributed to the influence of the Eastern delegates,
with whom he was a favorite; indeed, during his station
at Boston, he had been highly successful in cultivating the good
graces of the New England people. He departed for his command
on the 26th of June, vested with extraordinary powers
for the regulation of affairs in that “distant, dangerous, and
shifting scene.” “I would fain hope,” writes Washington, “his
arrival there will give our affairs a complexion different from
what they have worn for a long time past, and that many essential
benefits will result from it.”
Despatches just received from General Sullivan, had given
a different picture of affairs in Canada from that contained in
his previous letter. In fact, when he wrote that letter, he was
ignorant of the actual force of the enemy in Canada, which had
224recently been augmented to about 13,000 men; several regiments
having arrived from Ireland, one from England, another from
General Howe, and a body of Brunswick troops under the Baron
Reidesel. Of these, the greater part were on the way up from
Quebec in divisions, by land and water, with Generals Carleton,
Burgoyne, Philips and Reidesel; while a considerable number
under General Frazer had arrived at Three Rivers, and others,
under General Nesbit, lay near them on board of transports.
Sullivan’s despatch, dated on the 8th of June, at the mouth
of the Sorel, began in his former sanguine vein, anticipating
the success of General Thompson’s expedition to Three Rivers.
“He has proceeded in the manner proposed, and made his attack
at daylight, for at that time a very heavy cannonading began,
which lasted with some intervals to twelve o’clock. It is now
near one P. M.; the firing has ceased, except some irregular firing
with cannon, at a considerable distance of time one from the
other. At eight o’clock a very heavy firing of small arms was
heard even here, at the distance of forty-five miles. I am
almost certain that victory has declared in our favor, as the
irregular firing of the cannon for such a length of time after the
small arms ceased, shows that our men are in possession of the
ground.”
The letter was kept open to give the particulars of this supposed
victory; it closed with a dismal reverse. General Thompson
had coasted in bateaux along the right bank of the river at that
expanse called Lake St. Pierre, and arrived at Nicolete, where
he found St. Clair and his detachment. He crossed the river
in the night, and landed a few miles above Three Rivers, intending
to surprise the enemy before daylight; he was not aware
225at the time that additional troops had arrived under General
Burgoyne.
After landing, he marched with rapidity toward Three Rivers,
but was led by treacherous guides into a morass, and obliged to
return back nearly two miles. Day broke, and he was discovered
from the ships. A cannonade was opened upon his men as they
made their way slowly for an hour and a half through a swamp.
At length they arrived in sight of Three Rivers, but it was to find
a large force drawn up in battle array, under General Frazer,
by whom they were warmly attacked, and after a brief stand
thrown in confusion. Thompson attempted to rally his troops,
and partly succeeded, until a fire was opened upon them in rear
by Nesbit, who had landed from his ships. Their rout now was
complete. General Thompson, Colonel Irvine, and about two
hundred men were captured, twenty-five were slain, and the rest
pursued for several miles through a deep swamp. After great
fatigues and sufferings, they were able to get on board of their
boats, which had been kept from falling into the hands of the
enemy. In these they made their way back to the Sorel, bringing
General Sullivan a sad explanation of all the firing he had
heard, and the alarming intelligence of the overpowering force
that was coming up the river.
“This, my dear general,” writes Sullivan, in the conclusion
of his letter, “is the state of this unfortunate enterprise. What
you will next hear I cannot say. I am every moment informed
of the vast number of the enemy which have arrived. I have
only two thousand five hundred and thirty-three rank and file.
Most of the officers seem discouraged, and, of course, their men.
I am employed day and night in fortifying and securing my
226camp, and am determined to hold it as long as a person will
stick by me.”
He had, indeed, made the desperate resolve to defend the
mouth of the Sorel, but was induced to abandon it by the
unanimous opinion of his officers, and the evident unwillingness
of his troops. Dismantling his batteries, therefore, he
retreated with his artillery and stores, just before the arrival
of the enemy, and was followed, step by step along the Sorel,
by a strong column under General Burgoyne.
On the 18th of June, he was joined by General Arnold with
three hundred men, the garrison of Montreal, who had crossed
at Longueil just in time to escape a large detachment of the
enemy. Thus reinforced, and the evacuation of Canada being
determined on in a council of war, Sullivan succeeded in destroying
every thing at Chamblee and St. Johns that he could not
carry away, breaking down bridges, and leaving forts and vessels
in flames, and continued his retreat to the Isle aux Noix, where
he made a halt for some days, until he should receive positive
orders from Washington or General Schuyler. In a letter to
Washington, he observes, “I am extremely sorry it was not in
my power to fulfil your Excellency’s wishes, by leading on our
troops to victory.” After stating the reason of his failure, he
adds, “I think we shall secure all the public stores and baggage
of the army, and secure our retreat with very little loss.
Whether we shall have well men enough to carry them on, I
much doubt, if we don’t remove quickly; unless Heaven is
pleased to restore health to this wretched army, now, perhaps,
the most pitiful one that ever was formed.”
The low, unhealthy situation of the Isle aux Noix, obliged
him soon to remove his camp to the Isle la Motte, whence, on
227receiving orders to that effect from General Schuyler, he ultimately
embarked with his forces, sick and well, for Crown Point.
Thus ended this famous invasion; an enterprise bold in its
conceptions, daring and hardy in its execution; full of ingenious
expedients, and hazardous exploits; and which, had not unforeseen
circumstances counteracted its well-devised plans, might
have added all Canada to the American confederacy.
CHAPTER XXIV. DESIGNS OF THE ENEMY AGAINST NEW YORK AND THE HUDSON—PLOT OF TRYON AND THE TORIES—ARRIVAL OF A FLEET—ALARM POSTS—TREACHERY UP THE HUDSON—FRESH ARRIVALS—GENERAL HOWE AT STATEN ISLAND—WASHINGTON’S PREPARATIONS.
228
The great aim of the British, at present, was to get possession of
New York and the Hudson, and make them the basis of military
operations. This they hoped to effect on the arrival of a powerful
armament, hourly expected, and designed for operations on
the seaboard.
At this critical juncture there was an alarm of a conspiracy
among the tories in the city and on Long Island, suddenly to
take up arms and co-operate with the British troops on their
arrival. The wildest reports were in circulation concerning it.
Some of the tories were to break down King’s Bridge, others
were to blow up the magazines, spike the guns, and massacre all
the field-officers. Washington was to be killed or delivered up to
the enemy. Some of his own body-guard were said to be in the
plot.
Several publicans of the city were pointed out, as having aided
or abetted the plot. One was landlord of the Highlander, at the
corner of Beaver Street and Broadway. Another dispensed
229liquor under the sign of Robin Hood. Another named Lowry,
described as a “fat man in a blue coat,” kept tavern in a low
house opposite the Oswego market. Another, James Houlding,
kept a beer house in Tryon Row, opposite the gates of the upper
barracks. It would seem as if a network of corruption and
treachery had been woven throughout the city by means of these
liquor dealers. One of the most noted, however, was Corbie,
whose tavern was said to be “to the south-east of General Washington’s
house, to the westward of Bayard’s Woods, and north
of Lispenard’s Meadows,” from which it would appear that, at
that time, the general was quartered at what was formerly called
Richmond Hill; a mansion surrounded by trees, at a short distance
from the city, in rather an isolated situation.
A committee of the New York Congress, of which John Jay
was chairman, traced the plot up to Governor Tryon, who, from
his safe retreat on shipboard, acted through agents on shore.
The most important of these was David Matthews, the tory
mayor of the city. He was accused of disbursing money to
enlist men, purchase arms, and corrupt the soldiery.
Washington was authorized and requested by the committee,
to cause the mayor to be apprehended, and all his papers secured.
Matthews was at that time residing at Flatbush on Long Island,
at no great distance from General Greene’s encampment. Washington
transmitted the warrant of the committee to the general
on the 21st, with directions that it should “be executed with precision,
and exactly by one o’clock of the ensuing morning, by a
careful officer.”
Precisely at the hour of one, a detachment from Greene’s brigade
surrounded the house of the mayor, and secured his person;
but no papers were found, though diligent search was made.
230Numerous other arrests took place, and among the number,
some of Washington’s body-guard. A great dismay fell upon
the tories. Some of those on Long Island who had proceeded to
arm themselves, finding the plot discovered, sought refuge in
woods and morasses. Washington directed that those arrested,
who belonged to the army, should be tried by a court-martial, and
the rest handed over to the secular power.
According to statements made before the committee, five
guineas bounty was offered by Governor Tryon to each man who
should enter the king’s service; with a promise of two hundred
acres of land for himself, one hundred for his wife, and fifty for
each child. The men thus recruited were to act on shore, in co-operation
with the king’s troops when they came.
Corbie’s tavern, near Washington’s quarters, was a kind of
rendezvous of the conspirators. There one Gilbert Forbes, a
gunsmith, “a short, thick man, with a white coat,” enlisted men,
gave them money, and “swore them on the book to secrecy.”
From this house a correspondence was kept up with Governor
Tryon on shipboard, through a “mulatto-colored negro, dressed
in blue clothes.” At this tavern it was supposed Washington’s
body-guards were tampered with. Thomas Hickey, one of the
guards, a dark-complexioned man, five feet six inches high, and
well set, was said not only to be enlisted, but to have aided in
corrupting his comrades; among others, Greene the drummer, and
Johnson the fifer.
It was further testified before the committee, that one Sergeant
Graham, an old soldier, formerly of the royal artillery, had
been employed by Governor Tryon to prowl round and survey
the grounds and works about the city, and on Long Island, and
that, on information thus procured, a plan of operations had been
231concerted. On the arrival of the fleet, a man-of-war should cannonade
the battery at Red Hook; while that was doing, a detachment
of the army should land below with cannon, and by a circuitous
march surprise and storm the works on Long Island. The
shipping then, with the remainder of the army, were to divide,
one part to run up the Hudson, the other up the East River;
troops were to land above New York, secure the pass at King’s
Bridge, and cut off all communication between the city and
country.[72]
Much of the evidence given was of a dubious kind. It was
certain that persons had secretly been enlisted, and sworn to
hostile operations, but Washington did not think that any regular
plan had been digested by the conspirators. “The matter,”
writes he, “I am in hopes, by a timely discovery, will be suppressed.”[73]
According to the mayor’s own admission before the committee,
he had been cognizant of attempts to enlist tories and corrupt
Washington’s guards, though he declared that he had discountenanced
them. He had on one occasion, also, at the request of
Governor Tryon, paid money for him to Gilbert Forbes, the gunsmith,
for rifles and round-bored guns which he had already furnished,
and for others which he was to make. He had done so,
however (according to his account), with great reluctance, and
after much hesitation and delay, warning the gunsmith that he
would be hanged if found out. The mayor, with a number of
others, were detained in prison to await a trial.
Thomas Hickey, the individual of Washington’s guard, was
tried before a court-martial. He was an Irishman, and had been
232a deserter from the British army. The court-martial found him
guilty of mutiny and sedition, and treacherous correspondence
with the enemy, and sentenced him to be hanged.
The sentence was approved by Washington, and was carried
promptly into effect, in the most solemn and impressive manner,
to serve as a warning and example in this time of treachery and
danger. On the morning of the 28th, all the officers and men
off duty, belonging to the brigades of Heath, Spencer, Stirling
and Scott, assembled under arms at their respective parades at
10 o’clock, and marched thence to the ground. Twenty men
from each brigade, with bayonets fixed, guarded the prisoner to
the place of execution, which was a field near the Bowery Lane.
There he was hanged in the presence, we are told, of near twenty
thousand persons.
While the city was still brooding over this doleful spectacle,
four ships of war, portentous visitants, appeared off the Hook,
stood quietly in at the Narrows, and dropped anchor in the bay.
In his orderly book, Washington expressed a hope that the
unhappy fate of Thomas Hickey, executed that day for mutiny,
sedition, and treachery, would be a warning to every soldier in
the line, to avoid the crimes for which he suffered.[74]
233On the 29th of June, an express from the look-out on Staten
Island, announced that forty sail were in sight. They were, in
fact, ships from Halifax, bringing between nine and ten thousand
of the troops recently expelled from Boston; together with six
transports filled with Highland troops, which had joined the fleet
at sea. At sight of this formidable armament standing into the
harbor, Washington instantly sent notice of its arrival to Colonel
James Clinton, who had command of the posts in the Highlands,
and urged all possible preparations to give the enemy a warm
reception should they push their frigates up the river.
According to general orders issued from head-quarters on the
following day (June 30), the officers and men, not on duty, were
to march from their respective regimental parades to their alarm
posts, at least once every day, that they might become well
acquainted with them. They were to go by routes least exposed
to a fire from the shipping, and all the officers, from the highest
to the lowest, were to make themselves well acquainted with the
grounds. Upon a signal of the enemy’s approach, or upon any
234alarm, all fatigue parties were immediately to repair to their
respective corps with their arms, ammunition and accoutrements,
ready for instant action.
It was ascertained that the ramifications of the conspiracy
lately detected, extended up the Hudson. Many of the disaffected
in the upper counties were enlisted in it. The committee
of safety at Cornwall, in Orange County, sent word to
Colonel James Clinton, Fort Constitution, of the mischief that
was brewing. James Haff, a tory, had confessed before them,
that he was one of a number who were to join the British troops
as soon as they should arrive. It was expected the latter would
push up the river and land at Verplanck’s Point; whereupon the
guns at the forts in the Highlands were to be spiked by soldiers
of their own garrisons; and the tories throughout the country
were to be up in arms.[75]
Clinton received letters, also, from a meeting of committees
in the precincts of Newburgh, apprising him that persons dangerous
to the cause were lurking in that neighborhood, and requesting
him to detach twenty-five men under a certain lieutenant acquainted
with the woods, “to aid in getting some of these rascals
apprehended and secured.”
While city and country were thus agitated by apprehensions
of danger, internal and external, other arrivals swelled the number
of ships in the bay of New York to one hundred and thirty,
men-of-war and transports. They made no movement to ascend
the Hudson, but anchored off Staten Island, where they landed
their troops, and the hill sides were soon whitened with their
tents.
235In the frigate Greyhound, one of the four ships which first
arrived, came General Howe. He had preceded the fleet, in
order to confer with Governor Tryon, and inform himself of the
state of affairs. In a letter to his government he writes: “I met
with Governor Tryon on board of a ship at the Hook, and
many gentlemen, fast friends of government, attending him,
from whom I have the fullest information of the state of the
rebels. * * * * * We passed the Narrows with three
ships of war, and the first division of transports, landed the
grenadiers and light infantry, as the ships came up, on this
island, to the great joy of a most loyal people, long suffering on
that account under the oppression of the rebels stationed among
them; who precipitately fled on the approach of the shipping. * * * * * There is great reason to expect a numerous
body of the inhabitants to join the army from the province of
York, the Jerseys and Connecticut, who, in this time of universal
oppression, only wait for opportunities to give proofs of their
loyalty and zeal.”[76]
Washington beheld the gathering storm with an anxious eye,
aware that General Howe only awaited the arrival of his brother,
the admiral, to commence hostile operations. He wrote to the
President of Congress, urging a call on the Massachusetts government
236for its quota of continental troops; and the formation of a
flying camp of ten thousand men, to be stationed in the Jerseys
as a central force, ready to act in any direction as circumstances
might require.
On the 2d of July, he issued a general order, calling upon
the troops to prepare for a momentous conflict which was to
decide their liberties and fortunes. Those who should signalize
themselves by acts of bravery, would be noticed and rewarded;
those who proved craven would be exposed and punished. No
favor would be shown to such as refused or neglected to do their
duty at so important a crisis.
CHAPTER XXV. FIRST APPEARANCE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON—HIS EARLY DAYS—GENERAL HUGH MERCER IN COMMAND OF THE FLYING CAMP—DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE—ANNOUNCED TO THE ARMY—DOWNFALL OF THE KING’S STATUE.
237
About this time, we have the first appearance in the military
ranks of the Revolution, of one destined to take an active and
distinguished part in public affairs; and to leave the impress of
his genius on the institutions of the country.
As General Greene one day, on his way to Washington’s
head-quarters, was passing through a field,—then on the outskirts
of the city, now in the heart of its busiest quarter, and known as
“the Park,”—he paused to notice a provincial company of artillery,
and was struck with its able performances, and with the tact
and talent of its commander. He was a mere youth, apparently
about twenty years of age; small in person and stature, but
remarkable for his alert and manly bearing. It was Alexander
Hamilton.
Greene was an able tactician, and quick to appreciate any display
of military science; a little conversation sufficed to convince
him that the youth before him had a mind of no ordinary grasp
and quickness. He invited him to his quarters, and from that
time, cultivated his friendship.
238Hamilton was a native of the island of Nevis, in the West
Indies, and at a very early age had been put in a counting-house
at Santa Cruz. His nature, however, was aspiring. “I contemn
the grovelling condition of a clerk to which my fortune condemns
me,” writes he to a youthful friend, “and would willingly risk
my life, though not my character, to exalt my station. * * *
I mean to prepare the way for futurity. I am no philosopher,
and may be justly said to build castles in the air; yet we have
seen such schemes succeed, when the projector is constant. I
shall conclude by saying, I wish there was a war.”
Still he applied himself with zeal and fidelity to the duties of
his station, and such were the precocity of his judgment, and his
aptness at accounts, that, before he was fourteen years of age, he
was left for a brief interval, during the absence of the principal,
at the head of the establishment. While his situation in the
house gave him a practical knowledge of business, and experience
in finance, his leisure hours were devoted to self-cultivation. He
made himself acquainted with mathematics and chemistry, and
indulged a strong propensity to literature. Some early achievements
of his pen attracted attention, and showed such proof of
talent, that it was determined to give him the advantage of a
regular education. He was accordingly sent to Elizabethtown, in
the Jerseys, in the autumn of 1772, to prepare, by a course of
studies, for admission into King’s (now Columbia) College, at
New York. He entered the college as a private student, in the
latter part of 1773, and endeavored, by diligent application, to fit
himself for the medical profession.
The contentions of the colonies with the mother country gave
a different direction and impulse to his ardent and aspiring mind.
He soon signalized himself by the exercise of his pen, sometimes
239in a grave, sometimes in a satirical manner. On the 6th of
July, 1774, there was a general meeting of the citizens in the
“Fields,” to express their abhorrence of the Boston Port Bill.
Hamilton was present, and, prompted by his excited feelings and
the instigation of youthful companions, ventured to address the
multitude. The vigor and maturity of his intellect, contrasted
with his youthful appearance, won the admiration of his auditors;
even his diminutive size gave additional effect to his eloquence.
The war, for which in his boyish days he had sighed, was
approaching. He now devoted himself to military studies, especially
pyrotechnics and gunnery, and formed an amateur corps
out of a number of his fellow students, and the young gentlemen
of the city. In the month of March, 1776, he became captain
of artillery, in a provincial corps, newly raised, and soon, by able
drilling, rendered it conspicuous for discipline.
It was while exercising his artillery company that he attracted,
as we have mentioned, the attention of General Greene. Further
acquaintance heightened the general’s opinion of his extraordinary
merits, and he took an early occasion to introduce him to
the commander-in-chief, by whom we shall soon find him properly
appreciated.
A valuable accession to the army, at this anxious time, was
Washington’s neighbor, and former companion in arms, Hugh
Mercer, the veteran of Culloden and Fort Duquesne. His military
spirit was alert as ever; the talent he had shown in organizing
the Virginia militia, and his zeal and efficiency as a member
of the committee of safety, had been properly appreciated by
Congress, and on the 5th of June he had received the commission
of brigadier-general. He was greeted by Washington with
the right hand of fellowship. The flying camp was about forming.
240The committee of safety of Pennsylvania were forwarding
some of the militia of that province to the Jerseys, to perform
the service of the camp until the militia levies, specified by Congress,
should arrive. Washington had the nomination of some
continental officer to the command. He gave it to Mercer, of
whose merits he felt sure, and sent him over to Paulus Hook, in
the Jerseys, to make arrangements for the Pennsylvania militia
as they should come in; recommending him to Brigadier-general
William Livingston, as an officer on whose experience and judgment
great confidence might be reposed.
Livingston was a man inexperienced in arms, but of education,
talent, sagacity and ready wit. He was of the New York
family of the same name, but had resided for some time in the
Jerseys, having a spacious mansion in Elizabethtown, which he
had named Liberty Hall. Mercer and he were to consult
together, and concert plans to repel invasions; the New Jersey
militia, however, were distinct from the flying camp, and only
called out for local defence. New Jersey’s greatest danger of
invasion was from Staten Island, where the British were throwing
up works, and whence they might attempt to cross to Amboy.
The flying camp was therefore to be stationed in the neighborhood
of that place.
“The known disaffection of the people of Amboy,” writes
Washington, “and the treachery of those on Staten Island, who,
after the fairest professions, have shown themselves our most inveterate
enemies, have induced me to give directions that all persons
of known enmity and doubtful character, should be removed
from those places.”
According to General Livingston’s humorous account, his own
village of Elizabethtown was not much more reliable, being peopled
241in those agitated times by “unknown, unrecommended
strangers, guilty-looking tories, and very knavish whigs.”
While danger was gathering round New York, and its inhabitants
were in mute suspense and fearful anticipations, the General
Congress at Philadelphia was discussing, with closed doors,
what John Adams pronounced—“The greatest question ever
debated in America, and as great as ever was or will be debated
among men.” The result was, a resolution passed unanimously,
on the 2d of July, “that these United Colonies are, and
of right ought to be, free and independent States.”
“The 2d of July,” adds the same patriotic statesman, “will
be the most memorable epoch in the history of America. I am
apt to believe that it will be celebrated by succeeding generations,
as the great anniversary festival. It ought to be commemorated
as the day of deliverance, by solemn acts of devotion to
Almighty God. It ought to be solemnized with pomp and
parade, with shows, games, sports, guns, bells, bonfires and illuminations,
from one end of this continent to the other, from this
time forth for evermore.”
The glorious event has, indeed, given rise to an annual jubilee,
but not on the day designated by Adams. The fourth of July
is the day of national rejoicing, for on that day, the “Declaration
of Independence,” that solemn and sublime document, was
adopted. Tradition gives a dramatic effect to its announcement.
It was known to be under discussion, but the closed doors of
Congress excluded the populace. They awaited, in throngs, an
appointed signal. In the steeple of the state-house was a bell,
imported twenty-three years previously from London by the Provincial
Assembly of Pennsylvania. It bore the portentous text
from scripture: “Proclaim liberty throughout all the land, unto
242all the inhabitants thereof.” A joyous peal from that bell gave
notice that the bill had been passed. It was the knell of British
domination.
No one felt the importance of the event more deeply than
John Adams, for no one had been more active in producing it.
We quote his words written at the moment. “When I look back
to the year 1761, and recollect the argument concerning writs of
assistance in the superior court, which I have hitherto considered
as the commencement of the controversy between Great Britain
and America, and run through the whole period from that time
to this, and recollect the series of political events, the chain of
causes and effects; I am surprised at the suddenness, as well as
the greatness of this Revolution; Great Britain has been filled
with folly, America with wisdom.”
His only regret was, that the declaration of independence had
not been made sooner. “Had it been made seven months ago,”
said he, “we should have mastered Quebec, and been in possession
of Canada, and might before this hour have formed alliances
with foreign states. Many gentlemen in high stations, and of
great influence, have been duped by the ministerial bubble of
commissioners to treat, and have been slow and languid in promoting
measures for the reduction of that province.”
Washington hailed the declaration with joy. It is true, it
was but a formal recognition of a state of things which had long
existed, but it put an end to all those temporizing hopes of reconciliation
which had clogged the military action of the country.
On the 9th of July, he caused it to be read at six o’clock in
the evening, at the head of each brigade of the army. “The
general hopes,” said he in his orders, “that this important event
will serve as a fresh incentive to every officer and soldier, to act
243with fidelity and courage, as knowing that now the peace and
safety of his country depend, under God, solely on the success of
our arms; and that he is now in the service of a state, possessed
of sufficient power to reward his merit, and advance him to the
highest honors of a free country.”
The excitable populace of New York were not content with the
ringing of bells to proclaim their joy. There was a leaden statue
of George III. in the Bowling Green, in front of the fort.
Since kingly rule is at an end, why retain its effigy? On the
same evening, therefore, the statue was pulled down amid the
shouts of the multitude, and broken up to be run into bullets
“to be used in the cause of independence.”
Some of the soldiery having been implicated in this popular
effervescence, Washington censured it in general orders, as having
much the appearance of a riot and a want of discipline, and the
army was forbidden to indulge in any irregularities of the kind.
It was his constant effort to inspire his countrymen in arms with
his own elevated idea of the cause in which they were engaged,
and to make them feel that it was no ordinary warfare, admitting
of vulgar passions and perturbations. “The general hopes and
trusts,” said he, “that every officer and man will endeavor so to
live and act as becomes a Christian soldier, defending the dearest
rights and liberties of his country.”[77]
CHAPTER XXVI. ARRIVAL OF MORE SHIPS—MOVEMENTS OF THE PHŒNIX AND THE ROSE—PANIC IN THE CITY—HOSTILE SHIPS UP THE HUDSON—STIR OF WAR ALONG THE RIVER—GENERAL GEORGE CLINTON, AND THE MILITIA OF ULSTER COUNTY—FRESH AGITATION OF NEW YORK—ARRIVAL OF LORD HOWE.
244
The exultation of the patriots of New York, caused by the
Declaration of Independence, was soon overclouded. On the
12th of July, several ships stood in from sea, and joined the
naval force below. Every nautical movement was now a matter
of speculation and alarm, and all the spy-glasses in the city were
incessantly reconnoitering the bay.
“The enemy are now in the harbor,” writes an American
officer, “although they have not yet ventured themselves within
gunshot of the city, but we hourly expect to be called into
action. The whole army is out between two and three every
morning, at their respective alarm posts, and remain there until
sunrise. I am morally certain that it will not be long before we
have an engagement.”
Scarce had this letter been penned, when two ships of war
were observed getting under way, and standing toward the city.
One was the Phœnix, of forty guns; the other the Rose, of
twenty guns, commanded by Captain Wallace, of unenviable
245renown, who had marauded the New England coast, and domineered
over Rhode Island. The troops were immediately at their
alarm posts. It was about half past three o’clock in the afternoon,
as the ships and three tenders came sweeping up the bay
with the advantage of wind and tide, and shaped their course up the
Hudson. The batteries of the city and of Paulus Hook on the
opposite Jersey shore, opened a fire upon them. They answered
it with broadsides. There was a panic throughout the city.
Women and children ran hither and thither about the streets,
mingling their shrieks and cries with the thundering of the
cannon. “The attack has begun! The city is to be destroyed!
What will become of us?”
The Phœnix and the Rose continued their course up the
Hudson. They had merely fired upon the batteries as they
passed; and on their own part had sustained but little damage,
their decks having ramparts of sand-bags. The ships below
remained in sullen quiet at their anchors, and showed no intention
of following them. The firing ceased. The fear of a general
attack upon the city died away, and the agitated citizens breathed
more freely.
Washington, however, apprehended this movement of the ships
might be with a different object. They might be sent to land
troops and seize upon the passes of the Highlands. Forts Montgomery
and Constitution were far from complete, and were scantily
manned. A small force might be sufficient to surprise them.
The ships might intend, also, to distribute arms among the tories
in the river counties, and prepare them to co-operate in the
apprehended attack upon New York.
Thus thinking, the moment Washington saw these ships
standing up the river, he sent off an express to put General
246Mifflin on the alert, who was stationed with his Philadelphia
troops at Fort Washington and King’s Bridge. The same
express carried a letter from him to the New York Convention,
at that time holding its sessions at White Plains in Westchester
County, apprising it of the impending danger. His immediate
solicitude was for the safety of Forts Constitution and Montgomery.
Fortunately George Clinton, the patriotic legislator, had recently
been appointed brigadier-general of the militia of Ulster
and Orange counties. Called to his native State by his military
duties in this time of danger, he had only remained in
Congress to vote for the declaration of independence, and then
hastened home. He was now at New Windsor, in Ulster County,
just above the Highlands. Washington wrote to him on the
afternoon of the 12th, urging him to collect as great a force as
possible of the New York militia, for the protection of the
Highlands against this hostile irruption, and to solicit aid, if
requisite, from the western parts of Connecticut. “I have the
strongest reason to believe,” added he, “it will be absolutely
necessary, if it were only to prevent an insurrection of your own
tories.”
Long before the receipt of Washington’s letter, Clinton had
been put on the alert. About nine o’clock in the morning of the
13th, an alarm gun from his brother at Fort Constitution,
thundered through the echoing defiles of the mountains. Shortly
afterwards, two river sloops came to anchor above the Highlands
before the general’s residence. Their captains informed him that
New York had been attacked on the preceding afternoon. They
had seen the cannonade from a distance, and judged from the
247subsequent firing, that the enemy’s ships were up the river as far
as King’s Bridge.
Clinton was as prompt a soldier as he had been an intrepid
legislator. The neighboring militia were forthwith put
in motion. Three regiments were ordered out; one was to
repair to Fort Montgomery; another to Fort Constitution; the
third to rendezvous at Newburgh, just above the Highlands,
ready to hasten to the assistance of Fort Constitution, should
another signal be given. All the other regiments under his command
were to be prepared for service at a moment’s notice. In
ordering these hasty levies, however, he was as considerate as he
was energetic. The colonels were directed to leave the frontier
companies at home, to protect the country against the Indians,
and some men out of each company to guard against internal
enemies.
Another of his sagacious measures was to send expresses to
all the owners of sloops and boats twenty miles up the west side
of the river, to haul them off so as to prevent their grounding.
Part of them were to be ready to carry over the militia to the
forts; the rest were ordered down to Fort Constitution, where a
chain of them might be drawn across the narrowest part of the
river, to be set on fire, should the enemy’s ships attempt to pass.
Having made these prompt arrangements, he proceeded early
in the afternoon of the same day, with about forty of his
neighbors, to Fort Constitution; whence, leaving some with his
brother, he pushed down on the same evening to Fort Montgomery,
where he fixed his head-quarters, as being nearer the enemy and
better situated to discover their motions.
Here, on the following day (July 14th), he received Washington’s
letter, written two days previously; but by this time he
248had anticipated its orders, and stirred up the whole country.
On that same evening, two or three hundred of the hardy Ulster
yeomanry, roughly equipped, part of one of the regiments he had
ordered out, marched into Fort Montgomery, headed by their
colonel (Woodhull). Early the next morning five hundred of
another regiment arrived, and he was told that parts of two
other regiments were on the way.
“The men,” writes he to Washington, “turn out of their
harvest fields to defend their country with surprising alacrity.
The absence of so many of them, however, at this time, when
their harvests are perishing for want of the sickle, will greatly
distress the country. I could wish, therefore, that a less number
might answer the purpose.”
On no one could this prompt and brave gathering of the
yeomanry produce a more gratifying effect, than upon the commander-in-chief;
and no one could be more feelingly alive, in
the midst of stern military duties, to the appeal in behalf of the
peaceful interests of the husbandman.
While the vigilant Clinton was preparing to defend the passes
of the Highlands, danger was growing more imminent at the
mouth of the Hudson.
New York has always been a city prone to agitations. That
into which it was thrown on the afternoon of the 12th of July,
by the broadsides of the Phœnix and the Rose, was almost
immediately followed by another. On the same evening there
was a great booming of cannon, with clouds of smoke, from the
shipping at anchor at Staten Island. Every spy-glass was again
in requisition. The British fleet were saluting a ship of the
line, just arrived from sea. She advanced grandly, every manof-war
249thundering a salute as she passed. At her foretop masthead
she bore St. George’s flag. “It is the admiral’s ship!”
cried the nautical men on the look-out at the Battery. “It is
the admiral’s ship!” was echoed from mouth to mouth, and the
word soon flew throughout the city, “Lord Howe is come!”
CHAPTER XXVII. PRECAUTIONS AGAINST TORIES—SECRET COMMITTEES—DECLARATION OF LORD HOWE—HIS LETTER TO THE COLONIAL GOVERNORS—HIS LETTER TO WASHINGTON REJECTED—INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE BRITISH ADJUTANT-GENERAL AND COLONEL REED—RECEPTION OF THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL BY WASHINGTON—THE PHŒNIX AND ROSE IN THE TAPPAN SEA AND HAVERSTRAW BAY—ARMING OF THE RIVER YEOMANRY—GEORGE CLINTON AT THE GATES OF THE HIGHLANDS.
250
Lord Howe was indeed come, and affairs now appeared to be
approaching a crisis. In consequence of the recent conspiracy,
the Convention of New York, seated at White Plains in Westchester
County, had a secret committee stationed in New York
for the purpose of taking cognizance of traitorous machinations.
To this committee Washington addressed a letter the day after
his lordship’s arrival, suggesting the policy of removing from
the city and its environs, “all persons of known disaffection and
enmity to the cause of America;” especially those confined in
jail for treasonable offences; who might become extremely dangerous
in case of an attack and alarm. He took this step with
great reluctance; but felt compelled to it by circumstances.
The late conspiracy had shown him that treason might be lurking
in his camp. And he was well aware that the city and
the neighboring country, especially Westchester County, and
251Queens and Suffolk counties on Long Island, abounded with
“tories,” ready to rally under the royal standard whenever
backed by a commanding force.
In consequence of his suggestion, thirteen persons in confinement
for traitorous offences, were removed to the jail of Litchfield
in Connecticut. Among the number was the late mayor;
but as his offence was not of so deep a dye as those whereof the
rest stood charged, it was recommended by the president of the
Convention that he should be treated with indulgence.
The proceedings of Lord Howe soon showed the policy of
these precautions. His lordship had prepared a declaration,
addressed to the people at large, informing them of the powers
vested in his brother and himself as commissioners for restoring
peace; and inviting communities as well as individuals,
who, in the tumult and disasters of the times, had deviated
from their allegiance to the crown, to merit and receive pardon
by a prompt return to their duty. It was added, that proper
consideration would be had of the services of all who should
contribute to the restoration of public tranquillity.
His lordship really desired peace. According to a contemporary,
he came to America “as a mediator, not as a destroyer,”[78]
and had founded great hopes in the efficacy of this
document in rallying back the people to their allegiance; it was
a sore matter of regret to him, therefore, to find that, in consequence
of his tardy arrival, his invitation to loyalty had been
forestalled by the Declaration of Independence.
Still it might have an effect in bringing adherents to the
royal standard; he sent a flag on shore, therefore, bearing a circular
252letter, written in his civil and military capacity, to the
colonial governor, requesting him to publish his address to the
people as widely as possible.
We have heretofore shown the tenacity with which Washington,
in his correspondence with Generals Gage and Howe,
exacted the consideration and deference due to him as commander-in-chief
of the American armies; he did this not from
official pride and punctilio, but as the guardian of American
rights and dignities. A further step of the kind was yet to be
taken. The British officers, considering the Americans in arms
rebels without valid commissions, were in the habit of denying
them all military title. Washington’s general officers had urged
him not to submit to this tacit indignity, but to reject all letters
directed to him without a specification of his official rank.
An occasion now presented itself for the adjustment of this matter.
Within a day or two an officer of the British navy, Lieutenant
Brown, came with a flag from Lord Howe, seeking a conference
with Washington. Colonel Reed, the adjutant-general, embarked
in a barge, and met him half way between Governor’s and
Staten Islands. The lieutenant informed him that he was the
bearer of a letter from Lord Howe to Mr. Washington. Colonel
Reed replied, that he knew no such person in the American
army. The lieutenant produced and offered the letter. It was
addressed to George Washington, Esquire. He was informed
that it could not be received with such a direction. The lieutenant
expressed much concern. The letter, he said, was of a civil,
rather than a military nature—Lord Howe regretted he had not
arrived sooner—he had great powers—it was much to be wished
the letter could be received.
While the lieutenant was embarrassed and agitated, Reed
253maintained his coolness, politely declining to receive the letter,
as inconsistent with his duty. They parted; but after the lieutenant
had been rowed some little distance, his barge was put about,
and Reed waited to hear what further he had to say. It was
to ask by what title General—but, catching himself, Mr. Washington
chose to be addressed.
Reed replied that the general’s station in the army was well
known; and they could not be at a loss as to the proper mode
of addressing him, especially as this matter had been discussed
in the preceding summer, of which, he presumed, the admiral
could not be ignorant. The lieutenant again expressed his disappointment
and regret, and their interview closed.
On the 19th, an aide-de-camp of General Howe came with
a flag, and requested to know, as there appeared to be an obstacle
to a correspondence between the two generals, whether
Colonel Patterson, the British adjutant-general, could be admitted
to an interview with General Washington. Colonel Reed,
who met the flag, consented in the name of the general, and
pledged his honor for the safety of the adjutant-general during
the interview, which was fixed for the following morning.
At the appointed time, Col. Reed and Colonel Webb, one of
Washington’s aides, met the flag in the harbor, took Colonel Patterson
into their barge, and escorted him to town, passing in front
of the grand battery. The customary precaution of blindfolding
was dispensed with; and there was a lively and sociable conversation
the whole way. Washington received the adjutant-general
at head-quarters with much form and ceremony, in full military
array, with his officers and guards about him.
Colonel Patterson, addressing him by the title of your excellency,
endeavored to explain the address of the letter as consistent
254with propriety, and founded on a similar address in the previous
summer, to General Howe. That General Howe did not
mean to derogate from the respect or rank of General Washington,
but conceived such an address consistent with what had been
used by ambassadors or plenipotentiaries where difficulties of
rank had arisen. He then produced, but did not offer, a letter
addressed to George Washington, Esquire, &c. &c., hoping that
the et ceteras, which implied every thing, would remove all
impediments.
Washington replied, that it was true, the et ceteras implied
every thing, but they also implied any thing. His letter alluded
to, of the previous summer, was in reply to one addressed in like
manner. A letter, he added, addressed to a person acting in a
public character, should have some inscriptions to designate it
from a mere private letter; and he should absolutely decline any
letter addressed to himself as a private person, when it related to
his public station.
Colonel Patterson, finding the letter would not be received,
endeavored, as far as he could recollect, to communicate the scope
of it in the course of a somewhat desultory conversation. What
he chiefly dwelt upon was, that Lord Howe and his brother had
been specially nominated commissioners for the promotion of
peace, which was esteemed a mark of favor and regard to
America; that they had great powers, and would derive the
highest pleasure from effecting an accommodation; and he concluded
by adding, that he wished his visit to be considered as
making the first advance toward that desirable object.
Washington replied that, by what had appeared (alluding, no
doubt, to Lord Howe’s circular), their powers, it would seem,
were only to grant pardons. Now those who had committed no
255fault needed no pardon; and such was the case with the Americans,
who were only defending what they considered their indisputable
rights.
Colonel Patterson avoided a discussion of this matter, which,
he observed, would open a very wide field; so here the conference,
which had been conducted on both sides with great courtesy,
terminated. The colonel took his leave, excusing himself
from partaking of a collation, having made a late breakfast, and
was again conducted to his boat. He expressed himself highly
sensible of the courtesy of his treatment, in having the usual
ceremony of blindfolding dispensed with.
Washington received the applause of Congress and of the
public for sustaining the dignity of his station. His conduct in
this particular was recommended as a model to all American
officers in corresponding with the enemy; and Lord Howe
informed his government that, thenceforward, it would be politic
to change the superscription of his letters.
In the mean time the irruption of the Phœnix and the Rose
into the waters of the Hudson had roused a belligerent spirit
along its borders. The lower part of that noble river is commanded
on the eastern side by the bold woody heights of Manhattan
Island and Westchester County, and on the western side
by the rocky cliffs of the Palisades. Beyond those cliffs, the
river expands into a succession of what may almost be termed
lakes; first the Tappan Sea, then Haverstraw Bay, then the Bay
of Peekskill; separated from each other by long stretching
points, or high beetling promontories, but affording ample sea
room and safe anchorage. Then come the redoubtable Highlands,
that strait, fifteen miles in length, where the river bends its
course, narrow and deep, between rocky, forest-clad mountains.
256“He who has command of that grand defile,” said an old navigator,
“may at any time throttle the Hudson.”
The New York Convention, aware of the impending danger,
despatched military envoys to stir up the yeomanry along the
river, and order out militia. Powder and ball were sent to
Tarrytown, before which the hostile ships were anchored, and
yeoman troops were stationed there and along the neighboring
shores of the Tappan Sea. In a little while the militia of
Dutchess County and Cortlandt’s Manor were hastening, rudely
armed, to protect the public stores at Peekskill, and mount guard
at the entrance of the Highlands.
No one showed more zeal in this time of alarm, than Colonel
Pierre Van Cortlandt, of an old colonial family, which held its
manorial residence at the mouth of the Croton. With his regiment
he kept a dragon watch along the eastern shore of the
Tappan Sea and Haverstraw Bay; while equal vigilance was
maintained night and day along the western shore, from Nyack
quite up to the Donderberg, by Colonel Hay and his regiment
of Haverstraw. Sheep and cattle were driven inland, out of
the reach of maraud. Sentinels were posted to keep a look-out
from heights and headlands and give the alarm should any boats
approach the shore, and rustic marksmen were ready to assemble
in a moment, and give them a warm reception.
The ships of war which caused this alarm and turmoil, lay
quietly anchored in the broad expanses of the Tappan Sea and
Haverstraw Bay; shifting their ground occasionally, and keeping
out of musket shot of the shore, apparently sleeping in the
summer sunshine, with awnings stretched above their decks;
while their boats were out taking soundings quite up to the
Highlands, evidently preparing for further operations. At night,
257too, their barges were heard rowing up and down the river on
mysterious errands; perriaugers, also, paid them furtive visits
occasionally; it was surmised, with communications and supplies
from tories on shore.
While the ships were anchored in Haverstraw Bay, one of the
tenders stood into the Bay of Peekskill, and beat up within long
shot of Fort Montgomery, where General George Clinton was
ensconced with six hundred of the militia of Orange and Ulster
counties. As the tender approached, a thirty-two pounder was
brought to range upon her. The ball passed through her quarter;
whereupon she put about, and ran round the point of the
Donderberg, where the boat landed, plundered a solitary house at
the foot of the mountain, and left it in flames. The marauders,
on their way back to the ships, were severely galled by rustic
marksmen, from a neighboring promontory.
The ships, now acquainted with the channel, moved up within
six miles of Fort Montgomery. General Clinton apprehended
they might mean to take advantage of a dark night, and slip by
him in the deep shadows of the mountains. The shores were
high and bold, the river was deep, the navigation of course safe
and easy. Once above the Highlands, they might ravage the
country beyond, and destroy certain vessels of war which were
being constructed at Poughkeepsie.
To prevent this, he stationed a guard at night on the furthest
point in view, about two miles and a half below the fort, prepared
to kindle a blazing fire should the ships appear in sight. Large
piles of dry brushwood mixed with combustibles, were prepared
at various places up and down the shore opposite to the fort, and
men stationed to set fire to them as soon as a signal should be
given from the lower point. The fort, therefore, while it remained
258in darkness, would have a fair chance with its batteries as
the ships passed between it and these conflagrations.
A private committee sent up by the New York Convention,
had a conference with the general, to devise further means of obstructing
the passage of ships up the river. Fire rafts were to
be brought from Poughkeepsie and kept at hand ready for action.
These were to be lashed two together, with chains, between old
sloops filled with combustibles, and sent down with a strong wind
and tide, to drive upon the ships. An iron chain, also, was to be
stretched obliquely across the river from Fort Montgomery to the
foot of Anthony’s Nose, thus, as it were, chaining up the gate of
the Highlands.
For a protection below the Highlands, it was proposed to
station whale-boats about the coves and promontories of Tappan
Sea and Haverstraw Bay; to reconnoitre the enemy, cruise
about at night, carry intelligence from post to post, seize any
river craft that might bring the ships supplies, and cut off their
boats when attempting to land. Galleys, also, were prepared,
with nine-pounders mounted at the bows.
Colonel Hay of Haverstraw, in a letter to Washington,
rejoices that the national Congress are preparing to protect this
great highway of the country, and anticipates that the banks of
the Hudson were about to become the chief theatre of the war.
NOTE.
The Van Cortlandt Family.—Two members of this old and honorable
family were conspicuous patriots throughout the Revolution. Pierre Van
Cortlandt, the father, at this time about 56 years of age, a stanch friend and
ally of George Clinton, was member of the first Provincial Congress, and
president of the Committee of Public Safety. Governor Tryon had visited
him in his old manor house at the mouth of the Croton, in 1774, and made him
259offers of royal favors, honors, grants of land, &c., if he would abandon the
popular cause. His offers were nobly rejected. The Cortlandt family suffered
in consequence, being at one time obliged to abandon their manorial
residence: but the head remained true to the cause, and subsequently filled
the office of Lieutenant-governor with great dignity.
His son Pierre, mentioned in the above chapter, and then about 27 years
of age, had likewise resisted the overtures of Tryon, destroying a major’s commission
in the Cortlandt militia, which he sent him. Congress, in 1775, made
him lieutenant-colonel in the Continental service, in which capacity we now
find him, acquitting himself with zeal and ability
CHAPTER XXVIII. QUESTION OF COMMAND BETWEEN GATES AND SCHUYLER—CONDITION OF THE ARMY AT CROWN POINT—DISCONTENT AND DEPARTURE OF SULLIVAN—FORTIFICATIONS AT TICONDEROGA—THE QUESTION OF COMMAND ADJUSTED—SECRET DISCONTENTS—SECTIONAL JEALOUSIES IN THE ARMY—SOUTHERN TROOPS—SMALLWOOD’S MACARONI BATTALION—CONNECTICUT LIGHT-HORSE.
260
While the security of the Hudson from invading ships was
claiming the attention of Washington, he was equally anxious
to prevent an irruption of the enemy from Canada. He was
grieved, therefore, to find there was a clashing of authorities
between the generals who had charge of the Northern frontier.
Gates, on his way to take command of the army in Canada, had
heard with surprise in Albany, of its retreat across the New
York frontier. He still considered it under his orders, and was
proceeding to act accordingly; when General Schuyler observed,
that the resolution of Congress, and the instructions of Washington,
applied to the army only while in Canada; the moment it
retreated within the limits of New York, it came within his
(Schuyler’s) command. A letter from Schuyler to Washington,
written at the time, says: “If Congress intended that General
Gates should command the Northern army, wherever it may be,
as he assures me they did, it ought to have been signified to me,
261and I should then have immediately resigned the command to
him; but until such intention is properly conveyed to me, I
never can. I must, therefore, entreat your Excellency to lay
this letter before Congress, that they may clearly and explicitly
signify their intentions, to avert the dangers and evils that may
arise from a disputed command.”
That there might be no delay in the service at this critical
juncture, the two generals agreed to refer the question of command
to Congress, and in the mean time to act in concert. They
accordingly departed together for Lake Champlain, to prepare
against an anticipated invasion by Sir Guy Carleton. They
arrived at Crown Point on the 6th of July, and found there the
wrecks of the army recently driven out of Canada. They had
been harassed in their retreat by land; their transportation on
the lake had been in leaky boats, without awnings, where the
sick, suffering from smallpox, lay on straw, exposed to a burning
July sun; no food but salt pork, often rancid, hard biscuit or
unbaked flour, and scarcely any medicine. Not more than six
thousand men had reached Crown Point, and half of those were
on the sick list; the shattered remains of twelve or fifteen very
fine battalions. Some few were sheltered in tents, some under
sheds, and others in huts hastily formed of bushes; scarce one
of which but contained a dead or dying man. Two thousand
eight hundred were to be sent to a hospital recently established
at the south end of Lake George, a distance of fifty miles; when
they were gone, with those who were to row them in boats, there
would remain but the shadow of an army.[79]
In a council of war, it was determined that, under present
262circumstances, the post of Crown Point was not tenable; neither
was it capable of being made so this summer, without a force
greatly superior to any they might reasonably expect; and that,
therefore, it was expedient to fall back, and take a strong position
at Ticonderoga.
General Sullivan had been deeply hurt that Gates, his former
inferior in rank, should have been appointed over him to
the command of the army in Canada; considering it a tacit
intimation that Congress did not esteem him competent to the
trust which had devolved upon him. He now, therefore, requested
leave of absence, in order to wait on the commander-in-chief.
It was granted with reluctance. Before departing, he
communicated to the army, through General Schuyler, his high
and grateful sense of their exertions in securing a retreat from
Canada, and the cheerfulness with which his commands had been
received and obeyed.
On the 9th of July, Schuyler and Gates returned to Ticonderoga,
accompanied by Arnold. Instant arrangements were made
to encamp the troops, and land the artillery and stores as fast as
they should arrive. Great exertions, also, were made to strengthen
the defences of the place. Colonel John Trumbull, who was
to have accompanied Gates to Canada, as adjutant-general, had
been reconnoitring the neighborhood of Ticonderoga, and had
pitched upon a place for a fortification on the eastern side of the
lake, directly opposite the east point of Ticonderoga, where Fort
Independence was subsequently built. He also advised the erection
of a work on a lofty eminence, the termination of a mountain
ridge, which separates Lake George from Lake Champlain.
His advice was unfortunately disregarded. The eminence, subsequently
called Mount Defiance, looked down upon and commanded
263the narrow parts of both lakes. We shall hear more of it
hereafter.
Preparations were made, also, to augment the naval force on
the lakes. Ship carpenters from the Eastern States were employed
at Skenesborough, to build the hulls of galleys and boats,
which, when launched, were to be sent down to Ticonderoga for
equipment and armament, under the superintendence of General
Arnold.
Schuyler soon returned to Albany, to superintend the general
concerns of the Northern department. He was indefatigable in
procuring and forwarding the necessary materials and artillery for
the fortification of Ticonderoga.
The question of command between him and Gates, was apparently
at rest. A letter from the President of Congress, dated
July 8th, informed General Gates, that according to the resolution
of that body under which he had been appointed, his command
was totally independent of General Schuyler, while the
army was in Canada, but no longer. Congress had no design
to divest General Schuyler of the command while the troops were
on this side of Canada.
To Schuyler, under the same date, the president writes:
“The Congress highly approve of your patriotism and magnanimity
in not suffering any difference of opinion to hurt the public
service.
“A mutual confidence and good understanding are at this
time essentially necessary, so that I am persuaded they will take
place on all occasions between yourself and General Gates.”
Gates professed himself entirely satisfied with the explanation
he had received, and perfectly disposed to obey the commands
of Schuyler. “I am confident,” added he, “we shall, as
264the Congress wish, go hand in hand to promote the public welfare.”
Schuyler, too, assured both Congress and Washington, “that
the difference in opinion between Gates and himself had not
caused the least ill will, nor interrupted that harmony necessary
to subsist between their officers.”
Samuel Adams, however, who was at that time in Congress,
had strong doubts in the matter.
“Schuyler and Gates are to command the troops,” writes he,
“the former while they are without, the latter while they are
within, the bounds of Canada. Admitting these generals to have
the accomplishments of a Marlborough, or a Eugene, I cannot
conceive that such a disposition of them will be attended with
any good effects, unless harmony subsists between them. Alas,
I fear this is not the case. Already disputes have arisen, which
they have referred to Congress; and, although they affect to treat
each other with a politeness becoming their rank, in my mind, altercations
between commanders who have pretensions nearly
equal (I mean in point of command), forebode a repetition of misfortune.
I sincerely wish my apprehensions may prove groundless.”[80]
We have a letter before us, also, written to Gates, by his
friend Joseph Trumbull, commissary-general, on whose appointment
of a deputy, the question of command had arisen. Trumbull’s
letter was well calculated to inflame the jealousy of Gates.
“I find you are in a cursed situation,” writes he; “your authority
at an end; and commanded by a person who will be willing
265to have you knocked in the head, as General Montgomery was, if
he can have the money chest in his power.”
Governor Trumbull, too, the father of the commissary-general,
observes subsequently: “It is justly to be expected that
General Gates is discontented with his situation, finding himself
limited and removed from the command, to be a wretched spectator
of the ruin of the army, without power, of attempting to
save them.”[81] We shall have frequent occasion hereafter to
notice the discord in the service caused by this rankling discontent.
As to General Sullivan, who repaired to Philadelphia and
tendered his resignation, the question of rank which had
aggrieved him was explained in a manner that induced him to
continue in service. It was universally allowed that his retreat
had been ably conducted through all kinds of difficulties and disasters.
A greater source of solicitude to Washington than this jealousy
between commanders, was the sectional jealousy springing
up among the troops. In a letter to Schuyler (July 17th), he
says, “I must entreat your attention to do away the unhappy and
pernicious distinctions and jealousies between the troops of different
governments. Enjoin this upon the officers, and let them
inculcate and press home to the soldiery, the necessity of order
and harmony among those who are embarked in one common
cause, and mutually contending for all that freemen hold dear.”
Nowhere were these sectional jealousies more prevalent than
in the motley army assembled from distant quarters under Washington’s
own command. Reed, the adjutant-general, speaking on
266this subject, observes: “The Southern troops, comprising the
regiments south of the Delaware, looked with very unkind feelings
on those of New England; especially those from Connecticut,
whose peculiarities of deportment made them the objects
of ill-disguised derision among their fellow-soldiers.”[82]
Among the troops thus designated as Southern, were some
from Virginia under a Major Leitch; others from Maryland,
under Colonel Smallwood; others from Delaware led by Colonel
Haslet. There were four Continental battalions from Pennsylvania,
commanded by Colonels Shee, St. Clair, Wayne, and
Magaw; and provincial battalions, two of which were severally
commanded by Colonels Miles and Atlee. The Continental battalion
under Colonel Shee, was chiefly from the city of Philadelphia,
especially the officers; among whom were Lambert Cadwalader
and William Allen, members of two of the principal,
and most aristocratic families, and Alexander Graydon, to whose
memoirs we are indebted for some graphic pictures of the times.
These Pennsylvania troops were under the command of Brigadier-general
Mifflin, who, in the preceding year, had acted as
Washington’s aide-de-camp, and afterwards as quartermaster-general.
His townsman and intimate, Graydon, characterizes him
as a man of education and cultivated manners, with a great
talent at haranguing; highly animated in his appearance, full of
activity and apparently of fire; but rather too much of a bustler,
harassing his men unnecessarily. “He assumed,” adds Graydon,
“a little of the veteran, from having been before Boston.”
His troops were chiefly encamped near King’s Bridge, and employed
in constructing works at Fort Washington.
267Smallwood’s Maryland battalion was one of the brightest in
point of equipment. The scarlet and buff uniforms of those
Southerners contrasted vividly with the rustic attire of the yeoman
battalions from the East. Their officers, too, looked down
upon their Connecticut compeers, who could only be distinguished
from their men by wearing a cockade. “There were none,” says
Graydon, “by whom an unofficer-like appearance and deportment
could be tolerated less than by a city-bred Marylander; who, at
this time, was distinguished by the most fashionable cut coat, the
most macaroni cocked-hat, and hottest blood in the Union.”
Alas, for the homespun-clad officers from Connecticut River!
The Pennsylvania regiment under Shee, according to Graydon,
promoted balls and other entertainments, in contradistinction
to the fast-days and sermons borrowed from New England.
There was nothing of the puritanical spirit among the Pennsylvanian
soldiery.
In the same sectional spirit, he speaks of the Connecticut
light-horse: “Old-fashioned men, truly irregulars; whether their
clothing, equipments, or caparisons were regarded, it would have
been difficult to have discovered any circumstance of uniformity.
Instead of carbines and sabres, they generally carried fowling-pieces,
some of them very long, such as in Pennsylvania are
used for shooting ducks. Here and there one appeared in a
dingy regimental of scarlet, with a triangular, tarnished, laced
hat. These singular dragoons were volunteers, who came to
make a tender of their services to the commander-in-chief. But
they staid not long in New York. As such a body of cavalry
had not been counted upon, there was in all probability a want
of forage for their jades, which, in the spirit of ancient knighthood,
they absolutely refused to descend from; and as the general
268had no use for cavaliers in his insular operations, they were
forthwith dismissed, with suitable acknowledgments for their
truly chivalrous ardor.”[83]
The troops thus satirized, were a body of between four and
five hundred Connecticut light-horse, under Colonel Thomas Seymour.
On an appeal for aid to the governor of their State, they
had voluntarily hastened on in advance of the militia, to render
the most speedy succor. Supposing, from the suddenness and
urgency of the call upon their services, that they were immediately
to be called into action and promptly to return home, they
had come off in such haste, that many were unprovided even with
a blanket or a change of clothing.
Washington speaks of them as being for the most part, if
not all, men of reputation and property. They were, in fact,
mostly farmers. As to their sorry jades, they were rough country
horses, such as farmers keep, not for show, but service. As
to their dingy regimentals, we quote a word in their favor from a
writer of that day. “Some of these worthy soldiers assisted in
their present uniforms at the reduction of Louisburg, and their
’lank checks and war-worn coats,’ are viewed with more veneration
by their honest countrymen, than if they were glittering
nabobs from India, or bashaws with nine tails.”[84]
On arriving, their horses, from scarcity of forage, had to be
pastured about King’s Bridge. In fact, Washington informed
them that, under present circumstances, they could not be of use
as horsemen; on which they concluded to stay, and do duty on
foot till the arrival of the new levies.[85] In a letter to Governor
Trumbull (July 11), Washington observes: “The officers and
269men of that corps have manifested so firm an attachment to the
cause we are engaged in, that they have consented to remain
here, till such a body of troops are marched from your colony as
will be a sufficient reinforcement, so as to admit of their leaving
this city with safety. * * * * They have the additional
merit of determining to stay, even if they are obliged to maintain
their horses at their own expense.”[86]
In a very few days, however, the troopers, on being requested
to mount guard like other soldiers, grew restless and uneasy.
Colonel Seymour and his brother field-officers, therefore, addressed
a note to Washington, stating that, by the positive laws
of Connecticut, the light-horse were expressly exempted from
staying in garrison, or doing duty on foot, apart from their
horses; and that they found it impossible to detain their men
any longer under that idea, they having come “without the least
expectation or preparation for such services.” They respectfully,
therefore, asked a dismission in form. Washington’s brief reply,
shows that he was nettled by their conduct.
“Gentlemen: In answer to yours of this date, I can only repeat
to you what I said last night, and that is, that if your men
think themselves exempt from the common duty of a soldier—will
not mount guard, do garrison duty, or service separate from
their horses—they can no longer be of any use here, where horses
cannot be brought to action, and I do not care how soon they are
dismissed.”
In fact, the assistance of these troops was much needed;
yet he apprehended the exemption from fatigue and garrison
duty which they demanded as a right, would, if granted, set a
270dangerous example to others, and be productive of many evil
consequences.
In the hurry of various concerns he directed his aide-de-camp,
Colonel Webb, to write in his name to Governor Trumbull
on the subject.
Colonel Seymour, on his return home, addressed a long letter
to the governor explanatory of his conduct. “I can’t help remarking
to your honor,” adds he, “that it may with truth be
said, General Washington is a gentleman of extreme care and
caution: that his requisitions for men are fully equal to the
necessities of the case. * * * I should have stopped here,
but am this moment informed that Mr. Webb, General Washington’s
aide-de-camp, has written to your honor something dishonorable
to the light-horse. Whatever it may be I know not, but
this I do know, that it is a general observation both in camp and
country, if the butterflies and coxcombs were away from the
army, we should not be put to so much difficulty in obtaining
men of common sense to engage in the defence of their
country.”[87]
As to the Connecticut infantry which had been furnished by
Governor Trumbull in the present emergency, they likewise were
substantial farmers, whose business, he observed, would require
their return, when the necessity of their further stay in the army
should be over. They were all men of simple rural manners,
from an agricultural State, where great equality of condition prevailed;
the officers were elected by the men out of their own
ranks, they were their own neighbors, and every way their
equals. All this, as yet, was but little understood or appreciated
271by the troops from the South, among whom military rank
was more defined and tenaciously observed, and where the officers
were men of the cities, and of more aristocratic habits.
We have drawn out from contemporary sources these few
particulars concerning the sectional jealousies thus early springing
up among the troops from the different States, to show the
difficulties with which Washington had to contend at the outset,
and which formed a growing object of solicitude throughout the
rest of his career.
John Adams, speaking of the violent passions, and discordant
interests at work throughout the country, from Florida to Canada,
observes: “It requires more serenity of temper, a deeper
understanding, and more courage than fell to the lot of Marlborough,
to ride in this whirlwind.”[88]
CHAPTER XXIX. SOUTHERN CRUISE OF SIR HENRY CLINTON—FORTIFICATIONS AT CHARLESTON—ARRIVAL THERE OF GENERAL LEE—BATTLE AT SULLIVAN’S ISLAND—WASHINGTON ANNOUNCES THE RESULT TO THE ARMY.
272
Letters from General Lee gave Washington intelligence of the
fate of Sir Henry Clinton’s expedition to the South; that expedition
which had been the subject of so much surmise and perplexity.
Sir Henry in his cruise along the coast had been repeatedly
foiled by Lee. First, as we have shown, when he looked
in at New York; next, when he paused at Norfolk in Virginia;
and lastly, when he made a bold attempt at Charleston in South
Carolina; for scarce did his ships appear off the bar of the harbor,
than the omnipresent Lee was marching his troops into the city.
Within a year past, Charleston had been fortified at various
points. Fort Johnson, on James Island, three miles from the
city, and commanding the breadth of the channel, was garrisoned
by a regiment of South Carolina regulars under Colonel Gadsden.
A strong fort had recently been constructed nearly opposite, on
the south-west point of Sullivan’s Island, about six miles below
the city. It was mounted with twenty-six guns, and garrisoned
by three hundred and seventy-five regulars and a few militia, and
commanded by Colonel William Moultrie, of South Carolina,
273who had constructed it. This fort, in connection with that on
James Island, was considered the key of the harbor.
Cannon had also been mounted on Haddrell’s Point on the
mainland, to the north-west of Sullivan’s Island, and along the
bay in front of the town.
The arrival of General Lee gave great joy to the people of
Charleston, from his high reputation for military skill and experience.
According to his own account in a letter to Washington,
the town on his arrival was “utterly defenceless.” He was rejoiced
therefore, when the enemy, instead of immediately attacking
it, directed his whole force against the fort on Sullivan’s
Island. “He has lost an opportunity,” said Lee, “such as I
hope will never occur again, of taking the town.”
The British ships, in fact, having passed the bar with some
difficulty, landed their troops on Long Island, situated to the
east of Sullivan’s Island, and separated from it by a small creek
called the Breach. Sir Henry Clinton meditated a combined
attack with his land and naval forces on the fort commanded by
Moultrie; the capture of which, he thought, would insure the
reduction of Charleston.
The Americans immediately threw up works on the north-eastern
extremity of Sullivan’s Island, to prevent the passage of
the enemy over the Breach, stationing a force of regulars and
militia there, under Colonel Thompson. General Lee encamped
on Haddrell’s Point, on the mainland, to the north of the island,
whence he intended to keep up a communication by a bridge of
boats, so as to be ready at any moment to aid either Moultrie or
Thompson.
Sir Henry Clinton, on the other hand, had to construct batteries
on Long Island, to oppose those of Thompson, and cover
274the passage of his troops by boats or by the ford. Thus time
was consumed, and the enemy were, from the 1st to the 28th of
June, preparing for the attack; their troops suffering from the
intense heat of the sun on the burning sands of Long Island, and
both fleet and army complaining of brackish water and scanty
and bad provisions.
At length on the 28th of June, the Thunder Bomb commenced
the attack, throwing shells at the fort as the fleet, under
Sir Peter Parker, advanced. About eleven o’clock the ships
dropped their anchors directly before the front battery. “I was
at this time in a boat,” writes Lee, “endeavoring to make the
island; but the wind and tide being violently against us, drove
us on the main. They immediately commenced the most furious
fire I ever heard or saw. I confess I was in pain, from the little
confidence I reposed in our troops; the officers being all boys, and
the men raw recruits. What augmented my anxiety was, that
we had no bridge finished for retreat or communication; and the
creek or cove which separates it from the continent is near a mile
wide. I had received, likewise, intelligence that their land
troops intended at the same time to land and assault. I never in
my life felt myself so uneasy; and what added to my uneasiness
was, that I knew our stock of ammunition was miserably low. I
had once thought of ordering the commanding officer to spike his
guns, and, when his ammunition was spent, to retreat with as little
loss as possible. However, I thought proper previously to send
to town for a fresh supply, if it could possibly be procured, and
ordered my aide-de-camp, Mr. Byrd (who is a lad of magnanimous
courage), to pass over in a small canoe, and report the state
of the spirit of the garrison. If it had been low, I should have
abandoned all thoughts of defence. His report was flattering.
275I then determined to maintain the post at all risks, and passed
the creek or cove in a small boat, in order to animate the garrison
in propria personâ; but I found they had no occasion for
such an encouragement.
“They were pleased with my visit, and assured me they never
would abandon the post but with their lives. The cool courage
they displayed astonished and enraptured me, for I do assure
you, my dear general, I never experienced a better fire. Twelve
full hours it was continued without intermission. The noble
fellows who were mortally wounded, conjured their brethren
never to abandon the standard of liberty. Those who lost their
limbs deserted not their posts. Upon the whole, they acted like
Romans in the third century.”
Much of the foregoing is corroborated by the statement of
a British historian. “While the continued fire of our ships,”
writes he, “seemed sufficient to shake the fierceness of the
bravest enemy, and daunt the courage of the most veteran soldier,
the return made by the fort could not fail calling for the
respect, as well as of highly incommoding the brave seamen of
Britain. In the midst of that dreadful roar of artillery, they
stuck with the greatest constancy and firmness to their guns;
fired deliberately and slowly, and took a cool and effective aim.
The ships suffered accordingly, they were torn almost to pieces,
and the slaughter was dreadful. Never did British valor shine
more conspicuous, and never did our marine in an engagement
of the same nature with any foreign enemy experience so rude
an encounter.”[89]
The fire from the ships did not produce the expected effect.
276The fortifications were low, composed of earth and palmetto
wood, which is soft, and makes no splinters, and the merlons were
extremely thick. At one time there was a considerable pause in
the American fire, and the enemy thought the fort was abandoned.
It was only because the powder was exhausted. As soon as a
supply could be forwarded from the mainland by General Lee,
the fort resumed its fire with still more deadly effect. Through
unskilful pilotage, several of the ships ran aground, where one,
the frigate Actæon, remained; the rest were extricated with
difficulty. Those which bore the brunt of the action were
much cut up. One hundred and seventy-five men were killed,
and nearly as many wounded. Captain Scott, commanding the
Experiment, of fifty guns, lost an arm, and was otherwise wounded.
Captain Morris, commanding the Actæon, was slain. So
also was Lord Campbell, late governor of the province, who
served as a volunteer on board of the squadron.
Sir Henry Clinton, with two thousand troops and five or six
hundred seamen, attempted repeatedly to cross from Long Island,
and co-operate in the attack upon the fort, but was as often foiled
by Colonel Thompson, with his battery of two cannons, and a
body of South Carolina rangers and North Carolina regulars.
“Upon the whole,” says Lee, “the South and North Carolina
troops and Virginia rifle battalion we have here, are admirable
soldiers.”
The combat slackened before sunset, and ceased before ten
o’clock. Sir Peter Parker, who had received a severe contusion
in the engagement, then slipped his cables, and drew off his
shattered ships to Five Fathom Hole. The Actæon remained
aground.
On the following morning Sir Henry Clinton made another
277attempt to cross from Long Island to Sullivan’s Island; but was
again repulsed, and obliged to take shelter behind his breastworks.
Sir Peter Parker, too, giving up all hope of reducing the
fort in the shattered condition of his ships, ordered that the
Actæon should be set on fire and abandoned. The crew left her
in flames, with the guns loaded, and the colors flying. The
Americans boarded her in time to haul down her colors, and
secure them as a trophy, discharge her guns at one of the enemy’s
ships, and load three boats with stores. They then abandoned her
to her fate, and in half an hour she blew up.
Within a few days the troops were reembarked from Long
Island; the attempt upon Charleston was for the present abandoned,
and the fleet once more put to sea.
In this action, one of the severest in the whole course of the
war, the loss of the Americans in killed and wounded, was but
thirty-five men. Colonel Moultrie derived the greatest glory
from the defence of Sullivan’s Island; though the thanks of
Congress were voted as well to General Lee, Colonel Thompson,
and those under their command.
“For God’s sake, my dear general,” writes Lee to Washington,
“urge the Congress to furnish me with a thousand cavalry.
With a thousand cavalry I could insure the safety of these
Southern provinces; and without cavalry, I can answer for
nothing. From want of this species of troops we had infallibly
lost this capital, but the dilatoriness and stupidity of the
enemy saved us.”
The tidings of this signal repulse of the enemy came most
opportunely to Washington, when he was apprehending an attack
upon New York. He writes in a familiar vein to Schuyler on
the subject. “Sir Peter Parker and his fleet got a severe drubbing
278in an attack upon our works on Sullivan’s Island, just by
Charleston in South Carolina; a part of their troops, at the
same time, in attempting to land, were repulsed.” He assumed a
different tone in announcing it to the army in a general order of
the 21st July. “This generous example of our troops under the
like circumstances with us, the general hopes, will animate every
officer and soldier to imitate, and even outdo them, when the
enemy shall make the same attempt on us. With such a bright
example before us of what can be done by brave men fighting in
defence of their country, we shall be loaded with a double share
of shame and infamy if we do not acquit ourselves with courage,
and manifest a determined resolution to conquer or die.”
CHAPTER XXX. PUTNAM’S MILITARY PROJECTS—CHEVAUX-DE-FRISE AT FORT WASHINGTON—MEDITATED ATTACK ON STATEN ISLAND—ARRIVAL OF SHIPS—HESSIAN REINFORCEMENTS—SCOTCH HIGHLANDERS—SIR HENRY CLINTON AND LORD CORNWALLIS—PUTNAM’S OBSTRUCTIONS OF THE HUDSON—THE PHŒNIX AND ROSE ATTACKED BY ROW GALLIES AT TARRYTOWN—GENERAL ORDER OF WASHINGTON ON THE SUBJECT OF SECTIONAL JEALOUSIES—PROFANE SWEARING PROHIBITED IN THE CAMP—PREPARATIONS AGAINST ATTACK—LEVIES OF YEOMANRY—GEORGE CLINTON IN COMMAND OF THE LEVIES ALONG THE HUDSON—ALARMS OF THE PEOPLE OF NEW YORK—BENEVOLENT SYMPATHY OF WASHINGTON—THE PHŒNIX GRAPPLED BY A FIRE-SHIP—THE SHIPS EVACUATE THE HUDSON.
279
General Putnam, beside his bravery in the field, was somewhat
of a mechanical projector. The batteries at Fort Washington
had proved ineffectual in opposing the passage of hostile ships up
the Hudson. He was now engaged on a plan for obstructing the
channel opposite the fort, so as to prevent the passing of any
more ships. A letter from him to General Gates (July 26th) explains
his project. “We are preparing chevaux-de-frise, at which
we make great despatch by the help of ships, which are to be
sunk—a scheme of mine which you may be assured is very simple;
a plan of which I send you. The two ships’ sterns lie towards
each other, about seventy feet apart. Three large logs,
which reach from ship to ship, are fastened to them. The two
280ships and logs stop the river two hundred and eighty feet. The
ships are to be sunk, and when hauled down on one side, the
pricks will be raised to a proper height, and they must inevitably
stop the river, if the enemy will let us sink them.”
It so happened that one Ephraim Anderson, adjutant to the
second Jersey battalion, had recently submitted a project to Congress
for destroying the enemy’s fleet in the harbor of New York.
He had attempted an enterprise of the kind against the British
ships in the harbor of Quebec during the siege, and, according to
his own account, would have succeeded, had not the enemy discovered
his intentions, and stretched a cable across the mouth of
the harbor, and had he not accidentally been much burnt.
His scheme was favorably entertained by Congress, and
Washington, by a letter dated July 10th, was instructed to aid
him in carrying it into effect. Anderson, accordingly, was soon
at work at New York constructing fire-ships, with which the fleet
was to be attacked. Simultaneous with the attack, a descent was
to be made on the British camp on Staten Island, from the nearest
point of the Jersey shore, by troops from Mercer’s flying
camp, and by others stationed at Bergen under Major Knowlton,
Putnam’s favorite officer for daring enterprises.
Putman entered into the scheme as zealously as if it had been
his own. Indeed, by the tenor of his letter to Gates, already
quoted, he seemed almost to consider it so. “The enemy’s fleet,”
writes he, “now lies in the bay, close under Staten Island.
Their troops possess no land here but the island. Is it not
strange that those invincible troops, who were to lay waste all
this country with their fleets and army, are so fond of islands
and peninsulas, and dare not put their feet on the main? But
I hope, by the blessing of God, and good friends, we shall pay
281them a visit on their island. For that end we are preparing
fourteen fire-ships to go into their fleet, some of which are ready
charged and fitted to sail, and I hope soon to have them all fixed.”
Anderson, also, on the 31st July, writes from New York to
the President of Congress: “I have been for some time past
very assiduous in the preparation of fire-ships. Two are already
complete, and hauled off into the stream; two more will be off to-morrow,
and the residue in a very short time. In my next,
I hope to give you a particular account of a general conflagration,
as every thing in my power shall be exerted for the demolition
of the enemy’s fleet. I expect to take an active part, and be an
instrument for that purpose. I am determined (God willing) to
make a conspicuous figure among them, by being a ’burning and
shining light,’ and thereby serve my country, and have the honor
of meeting the approbation of Congress.”[90]
Projectors are subject to disappointments. It was impossible
to construct a sufficient number of fire-ships and galleys in time.
The flying camp, too, recruited but slowly, and scarcely exceeded
three thousand men; the combined attack by fire and sword had
therefore to be given up, and the “burning and shining light”
again failed of conflagration.
Still, a partial night attack on the Staten Island encampment
was concerted by Mercer and Knowlton, and twice attempted.
On one occasion, they were prevented from crossing the strait by
tempestuous weather, on another by deficiency of boats.
In the course of a few days arrived a hundred sail, with large
reinforcements, among which were one thousand Hessians, and as
many more were reported to be on the way. The troops were
282disembarked on Staten Island, and fortifications thrown up on
some of the most commanding hills.
All projects of attack upon the enemy were now out of the
question. Indeed, some of Washington’s ablest advisers questioned
the policy of remaining in New York, where they might
be entrapped as the British had been in Boston. Reed, the adjutant-general,
observed that, as the communication by the Hudson
was interrupted, there was nothing now to keep them at New
York but a mere point of honor; in the mean time, they endangered
the loss of the army and its military stores. Why
should they risk so much in defending a city, while the greater
part of its inhabitants were plotting their destruction? His advice
was, that, when they could defend the city no longer, they
should evacuate, and burn it, and retire from Manhattan Island;
should avoid any general action, or indeed any action, unless in
view of great advantages; and should make it a war of posts.
During the latter part of July, and the early part of August,
ships of war with their tenders continued to arrive, and Scotch
Highlanders, Hessians, and other troops to be landed on Staten
Island. At the beginning of August, the squadron with Sir
Henry Clinton, recently repulsed at Charleston, anchored in the
bay. “His coming,” writes Colonel Reed, “was as unexpected
as if he had dropped from the clouds.” He was accompanied by
Lord Cornwallis, and brought three thousand troops.
In the mean time, Putnam’s contrivances for obstructing the
channel had reached their destined place. A letter dated Fort
Washington, August 3d, says: “Four ships chained and boomed,
with a number of amazing large chevaux-de-frise, were sunk close
by the fort under command of General Mifflin, which fort mounts
thirty-two pieces of heavy cannon. We are thoroughly sanguine
283that they [the ships up the river] never will be able to join the
British fleet, nor assistance from the fleet be afforded to them; so
that we may set them down as our own.”
Another letter, written at the same date from Tarrytown, on
the borders of the Tappan Sea, gives an account of an attack
made by six row galleys upon the Phœnix and the Rose. They
fought bravely for two hours, hulling the ships repeatedly, but
sustaining great damage in return; until their commodore, Colonel
Tupper, gave the signal to draw off. “Never,” says the
writer, “did men behave with more firm, determined spirit, than
our little crews. One of our tars being mortally wounded, cried
to his companions: ’I am a dying man; revenge my blood, my
boys, and carry me alongside my gun, that I may die there.’
We were so preserved by a gracious Providence, that in all our
galleys we had but two men killed and fourteen wounded, two of
which are thought dangerous. We hope to have another touch
at those pirates before they leave our river; which God prosper!”
Such was the belligerent spirit prevailing up the Hudson.
The force of the enemy collected in the neighborhood of New
York was about thirty thousand men; that of the Americans a
little more than seventeen thousand, but was subsequently increased
to twenty thousand, for the most part, raw and undisciplined.
One fourth were on the sick list with bilious and putrid
fevers and dysentery; others were absent on furlough or command;
the rest had to be distributed over posts and stations
fifteen miles apart.
The sectional jealousies prevalent among them, were more
and more a subject of uneasiness to Washington. In one of his
general orders he observes: “It is with great concern that
the general understands that jealousies have arisen among the
284troops from the different provinces, and reflections are frequently
thrown out which can only tend to irritate each other, and injure
the noble cause in which we are engaged, and which we ought to
support with one hand and one heart. The general most
earnestly entreats the officers and soldiers to consider the consequences;
that they can no way assist our enemies more effectually
than by making divisions among ourselves; that the honor
and success of the army, and the safety of our bleeding country,
depend upon harmony and good agreement with each other; that
the provinces are all united to oppose the common enemy, and all
distinctions sunk in the name of an American. To make this
name honorable, and to preserve the liberty of our country,
ought to be our only emulation; and he will be the best soldier
and the best patriot, who contributes most to this glorious work,
whatever be his station, or from whatever part of the continent
he may come. Let all distinction of nations, countries and provinces,
therefore, be lost in the generous contest, who shall behave
with the most courage against the enemy, and the most kindness
and good humor to each other. If there be any officers or
soldiers so lost to virtue and a love of their country, as to continue
in such practices after this order, the general assures them,
and is authorized by Congress to declare to the whole army, that
such persons shall be severely punished, and dismissed from the
service with disgrace.”
The urgency of such a general order is apparent in that early
period of our confederation, when its various parts had not as yet
been sufficiently welded together to acquire a thorough feeling of
nationality; yet what an enduring lesson does it furnish for every
stage of our Union!
285We subjoin another of the general orders issued in this time
of gloom and anxiety:
“That the troops may have an opportunity of attending
public worship, as well as to take some rest after the great fatigue
they have gone through, the general, in future, excuses them
from fatigue duty on Sundays, except at the ship yards, or on
special occasions, until further orders. The general is sorry to
be informed, that the foolish and wicked practice of profane
cursing and swearing, a vice heretofore little known in an American
army, is growing into fashion. He hopes the officers will, by
example as well as influence, endeavor to check it, and that both
they and the men will reflect, that we can have little hope of the
blessing of Heaven on our arms, if we insult it by our impiety
and folly. Added to this, it is a vice so mean and low, without
any temptation, that every man of sense and character detests
and despises it.”[91]
While Washington thus endeavored to elevate the minds of
his soldiery to the sanctity of the cause in which they were engaged,
he kept the most watchful eye upon the movements of the
enemy. Beside their great superiority in point of numbers as well
as discipline, to his own crude and scanty legions, they possessed
a vast advantage in their fleet. “They would not be half the
enemy they are,” observed Colonel Reed, “if they were once
separated from their ships.” Every arrival and departure of
these, therefore, was a subject of speculation and conjecture.
Aaron Burr, at that time in New York, aide-de-camp to General
Putnam, speaks in a letter to an uncle, of thirty transports,
286which, under convoy of three frigates, had put to sea on the 7th
of August, with the intention of sailing round Long Island and
coming through the Sound, and thus investing the city by the
North and East Rivers. “They are then to land on both sides
of the island,” writes he, “join their forces, and draw a line
across, which will hem us in, and totally cut off all communication;
after which, they will have their own fun.” He adds:
“They hold us in the utmost contempt. Talk of forcing all our
lines without firing a gun. The bayonet is their pride. They
have forgot Bunker’s Hill.”[92]
In this emergency, Washington wrote to General Mercer for
2,000 men from the flying camp. Colonel Smallwood’s battalion
was immediately furnished, as a part of them. The Convention
of the State ordered out hasty levies of country militia, to form
temporary camps on the shore of the Sound, and on that of the
Hudson above King’s Bridge, to annoy the enemy, should they
attempt to land from their ships on either of these waters.
Others were sent to reinforce the posts on Long Island. As
Kings County on Long Island was noted for being a stronghold
of the disaffected, the Convention ordered that, should any
of the militia of that county refuse to serve, they should be
disarmed and secured, and their possessions laid waste.
Many of the yeomen of the country, thus hastily summoned
from the plough, were destitute of arms, in lieu of which they
were ordered to bring with them a shovel, spade, or pickaxe, or a
scythe straightened and fastened to a pole. This rustic array
may have provoked the thoughtless sneers of city scoffers, such
as those cited by Graydon; but it was in truth one of the glorious
287features of the Revolution, to be thus aided in its emergencies
by “hasty levies of husbandmen.”[93]
By the authority of the New York Convention, Washington
had appointed General George Clinton to the command of the
levies on both sides of the Hudson. He now ordered him to
hasten down with them to the fort just erected on the north side
of King’s Bridge; leaving two hundred men under the command
of a brave and alert officer to throw up works at the pass of
Anthony’s Nose, where the main road to Albany crosses that
mountain. Troops of horse also were to be posted by him along
the river to watch the motions of the enemy.
Washington now made the last solemn preparations for the
impending conflict. All suspected persons, whose presence might
promote the plans of the enemy, were removed to a distance.
All papers respecting affairs of State were put up in a large case,
to be delivered to Congress. As to his domestic arrangements,
288Mrs. Washington had some time previously gone to Philadelphia,
with the intention of returning to Virginia, as there was no prospect
of her being with him any part of the summer, which threatened
to be one of turmoil and danger. The other ladies, wives
of general officers, who used to grace and enliven head-quarters,
had all been sent out of the way of the storm which was lowering
over this devoted city.
Accounts of deserters, and other intelligence, informed Washington,
on the 17th, that a great many of the enemy’s troops had
gone on board of the transports; that three days’ provisions had
been cooked, and other steps taken indicating an intention of
leaving Staten Island. Putnam, also, came up from below with
word that at least one fourth of the fleet had sailed. There were
many conjectures at head-quarters as to whither they were bound,
or whether they had not merely shifted their station. Every
thing indicated, however, that affairs were tending to a crisis.
The “hysterical alarms” of the peaceful inhabitants of New
York, which had provoked the soldierlike impatience and satirical
sneers of Lee, inspired different sentiments in the benevolent
heart of Washington, and produced the following letter to the
New York Convention:
“When I consider that the city of New York will, in all
human probability, very soon be the scene of a bloody conflict, I
cannot but view the great numbers of women, children, and
infirm persons remaining in it, with the most melancholy concern.
When the men-of-war (the Phœnix and Rose) passed up
the river, the shrieks and cries of these poor creatures, running
every way with their children, were truly distressing, and I fear
they will have an unhappy effect upon the ears and minds of our
289young and inexperienced soldiery. Can no method be devised
for their removal?”
How vividly does this call to mind the compassionate sensibility
of his younger days, when commanding at Winchester, in
Virginia, in time of public peril; and melted to “deadly sorrow”
by the “supplicating tears of the women, and moving petitions
of the men.” As then, he listened to the prompt suggestions of
his own heart; and, without awaiting the action of the Convention,
issued a proclamation, advising the inhabitants to remove,
and requiring the officers and soldiery to aid the helpless and the
indigent. The Convention soon responded to his appeal, and
appointed a committee to effect these purposes in the most
humane and expeditious manner.
A gallant little exploit at this juncture, gave a fillip to the
spirits of the community. Two of the fire-ships recently constructed,
went up the Hudson to attempt the destruction of the
ships which had so long been domineering over its waters. One
succeeded in grappling the Phœnix, and would soon have set her
in flames, but in the darkness got to leeward, and was cast loose
without effecting any damage. The other, in making for the
Rose, fell foul of one of the tenders, grappled and burnt her.
The enterprise was conducted with spirit, and though it failed of
its main object, had an important effect. The commanders of
the ships determined to abandon those waters, where their boats
were fired upon by the very yeomanry whenever they attempted
to land; and where their ships were in danger from midnight incendiaries,
while riding at anchor. Taking advantage of a brisk
wind, and favoring tide, they made all sail early on the morning
of the 18th of August, and stood down the river, keeping close
under the eastern shore, where they supposed the guns from
290Mount Washington could not be brought to bear upon them.
Notwithstanding this precaution, the Phœnix was thrice hulled
by shots from the fort, and one of the tenders once. The Rose,
also, was hulled once by a shot from Burdett’s Ferry. The men
on board were kept close, to avoid being picked off by a party of
riflemen posted on the river bank. The ships fired grape-shot as
they passed, but without effecting any injury. Unfortunately, a
passage had been left open in the obstructions on which General
Putnam had calculated so sanguinely; it was to have been closed
in the course of a day or two. Through this they made their
way, guided by a deserter; which alone, in Putnam’s opinion,
saved them from being checked in their career, and utterly
destroyed by the batteries.
CHAPTER XXXI. THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.
291
The movements of the British fleet, and of the camp on Staten
Island, gave signs of a meditated attack; but, as the nature of
that attack was uncertain, Washington was obliged to retain the
greater part of his troops in the city for its defence, holding them
ready, however, to be transferred to any point in the vicinity.
General Mifflin, with about five hundred of the Pennsylvania
troops, of Colonels Shee and Magaw’s regiments, were at King’s
Bridge, ready to aid at a moment’s notice. “They are the best
disciplined of any troops that I have yet seen in the army,” said
General Heath, who had just reviewed them. General George
Clinton was at that post, with about fourteen hundred of his
yeomanry of the Hudson. As the Phœnix and Rose had explored
the shores, and taken the soundings as far as they had
gone up the river, General Heath thought Howe might attempt
an attack somewhere above King’s Bridge, rather than in the
face of the many and strong works erected in and around the
city. “Should his inclination lead him this way,” adds be,
“nature has done much for us, and we shall, as fast as possible,
and the strength of art. We are pushing our works with great
diligence.”[94]
292Reports from different quarters, gave Washington reason to
apprehend that the design of the enemy might be to land part of
their force on Long Island, and endeavor to get possession of the
heights of Brooklyn, which overlooked New York; while another
part should land above the city, as General Heath suggested.
Thus, various disconnected points, distant from each other, and a
great extent of intervening country, had to be defended by raw
troops, against a superior force, well disciplined, and possessed of
every facility for operating by land and water.
General Greene, with a considerable force, was stationed at
Brooklyn. He had acquainted himself with all the localities of
the island, from Hell Gate to the Narrows, and made his plan of
defence accordingly. His troops were diligently occupied in
works which he laid out, about a mile beyond the village of
Brooklyn, and facing the interior of the island, whence a land
attack might be attempted.
Brooklyn was immediately opposite to New York. The
Sound, commonly called the East River, in that place about three
quarters of a mile in width, swept its rapid tides between them.
The village stood on a kind of peninsula, formed by the deep
inlets of Wallabout Bay on the north, and Gowanus Cove on the
south. A line of intrenchments and strong redoubts extended
across the neck of the peninsula, from the bay to a swamp and
creek emptying into the cove. To protect the rear of the works
from the enemy’s ships, a battery was erected at Red Hook, the
south-west corner of the peninsula, and a fort on Governor’s
Island, nearly opposite.
About two miles and a half in front of the line of intrenchments
and redoubts, a range of hills, densely wooded, extended
from south-west to north-east, forming a natural barrier across the
293island. It was traversed by three roads. One, on the left of
the works, stretched eastwardly to Bedford, and then by a pass
through the Bedford Hills to the village of Jamaica; another,
central and direct, led through the woody heights to Flatbush; a
third, on the right of the lines, passed by Gowanus Cove to the
Narrows and Gravesend Bay.
The occupation of this range of hills, and the protection of
its passes, had been designed by General Greene; but unfortunately,
in the midst of his arduous toils, he was taken down by a
raging fever, which confined him to his bed; and General Sullivan,
just returned from Lake Champlain, had the temporary
command.
Washington saw that to prevent the enemy from landing on
Long Island would be impossible, its great extent affording so
many places favorable for that purpose, and the American works
being at the part opposite to New York. “However,” writes he
to the President of Congress, “we shall attempt to harass them
as much as possible, which is all that we can do.”
On the 21st came a letter, written in all haste by Brigadier-general
William Livingston, of New Jersey. Movements of the
enemy on Staten Island had been seen from his camp. He had
sent over a spy at midnight, who brought back the following
intelligence. Twenty thousand men had embarked to make an
attack on Long Island, and up the Hudson. Fifteen thousand
remained on Staten Island, to attack Bergen Point, Elizabethtown
Point, and Amboy. The spy declared that he had heard
orders read, and the conversation of the generals. “They appear
very determined,” added he, “and will put all to the sword!”
Washington sent a copy of the letter to the New York Convention. On
the following morning (August 22d) the enemy
294appeared to be carrying their plans into execution. The reports
of cannon and musketry were heard from Long Island, and columns
of smoke were descried rising above the groves and
orchards at a distance. The city, as usual, was alarmed, and had
reason to be so; for word soon came that several thousand men,
with artillery and light-horse, were landed at Gravesend; and
that Colonel Hand, stationed there with the Pennsylvania rifle
regiment, had retreated to the lines, setting fire to stacks of
wheat, and other articles, to keep them from falling into the
enemy’s hands.
Washington apprehended an attempt of the foe by a forced
march, to surprise the lines at Brooklyn. He immediately sent
over a reinforcement of six battalions. It was all that he could
spare, as with the next tide the ships might bring up the residue
of the army, and attack the city. Five battalions more, however,
were ordered to be ready as a reinforcement, if required. “Be
cool, but determined,” was the exhortation given to the departing
troops. “Do not fire at a distance, but wait the commands of
your officers. It is the general’s express orders, that if any man
attempt to skulk, lie down, or retreat without orders, he be instantly
shot down for an example.”
In justice to the poor fellows, most of whom were going for
the first time on a service of life and death, Washington observes,
that “they went off in high spirits,” and that the whole capable
of duty evinced the same cheerfulness.[95]
Nine thousand of the enemy had landed, with forty pieces of
cannon. Sir Henry Clinton had the chief command, and led
the first division. His associate officers were the Earls of
295Cornwallis and Percy, General Grant, and General Sir William
Erskine. As their boats approached the shore, Colonel Hand,
stationed, as has been said, in the neighborhood with his rifle
regiment, retreated to the chain of wooded hills, and took post
on a height commanding the central road leading from Flatbush.
The enemy having landed without opposition, Lord Cornwallis
was detached with the reserve to Flatbush, while the rest of the
army extended itself from the ferry at the Narrows through
Utrecht and Gravesend, to the village of Flatland.
Lord Cornwallis, with two battalions of light infantry, Colonel
Donop’s corps of Hessians, and six field-pieces, advanced
rapidly to seize upon the central pass through the hills. He
found Hand and his riflemen ready to make a vigorous defence.
This brought him to a halt, having been ordered not to risk an
attack should the pass be occupied. He took post for the night,
therefore, in the village of Flatbush.
It was evidently the aim of the enemy to force the lines at
Brooklyn, and get possession of the heights. Should they succeed,
New York would be at their mercy. The panic and distress
of the inhabitants went on increasing. Most of those who
could afford it, had already removed to the country. There was
now a new cause of terror. It was rumored that, should the
American army retreat from the city, leave would be given for
any one to set it on fire. The New York Convention apprised
Washington of this rumor. “I can assure you, gentlemen,”
writes he in reply, “that this report is not founded on the least
authority from me. On the contrary, I am so sensible of the
value of such a city, and the consequences of its destruction to
many worthy citizens and their families, that nothing but the
296last necessity, and that such as would justify me to the whole
world, would induce me to give orders to that purpose.”
In this time of general alarm, head-quarters were besieged
by applicants for safeguard from the impending danger; and
Washington was even beset in his walks by supplicating women
with their children. The patriot’s heart throbbed feelingly under
the soldier’s belt. Nothing could surpass the patience and benignant
sympathy with which he listened to them, and endeavored
to allay their fears. Again he urged the Convention to carry out
their measures for the removal of these defenceless beings.
“There are many,” writes he, “who anxiously wish to remove,
but have not the means.”
On the 24th he crossed over to Brooklyn, to inspect the lines
and reconnoitre the neighborhood. In this visit he felt sensibly
the want of General Greene’s presence, to explain his plans and
point out the localities.
The American advanced posts were in the wooded hills.
Colonel Hann, with his riflemen, kept watch over the central
road, and a strong redoubt had been thrown up in front of the
pass, to check any advance of the enemy from Flatbush. Another
road leading from Flatbush to Bedford, by which the
enemy might get round to the left of the works at Brooklyn, was
guarded by two regiments, one under Colonel Williams, posted
on the north side of the ridge, the other by a Pennsylvanian rifle
regiment, under Colonel Miles, posted on the south side. The
enemy were stretched along the country beyond the chain of
hills.
As yet, nothing had taken place but skirmishing and irregular
firing between the outposts. It was with deep concern
Washington noticed a prevalent disorder and confusion in the
297camp. There was a want of system among the officers, and co-operation
among the troops, each corps seeming to act independently
of the rest. Few of the men had any military experience,
except, perchance, in bush-fighting with the Indians. Unaccustomed
to discipline and the restraint of camps, they sallied forth
whenever they pleased, singly or in squads, prowling about and
firing upon the enemy, like hunters after game.
Much of this was no doubt owing to the protracted illness of
General Greene.
On returning to the city, therefore, Washington gave the
command on Long Island to General Putnam, warning him,
however, in his letter of instructions, to summon the officers together
and enjoin them to put a stop to the irregularities which
he had observed among the troops. Lines of defence were to be
formed round the encampment, and works on the most advantageous
ground. Guards were to be stationed on the lines, with a
brigadier of the day constantly at hand to see that orders were
executed. Field-officers were to go the rounds and report the
situation of the guards, and no one was to pass beyond the lines
without a special permit in writing. At the same time, partisan
and scouting parties, under proper officers, and with regular
license, might sally forth to harass the enemy, and prevent their
carrying off the horses and cattle of the country people.
Especial attention was called to the wooded hills between the
works and the enemy’s camp. The passes through them were
to be secured by abatis, and defended by the best troops, who
should, at all hazards, prevent the approach of the enemy. The
militia being the least tutored and experienced, might man the
interior works.
Putnam crossed with alacrity to his post. “He was made
298happy,” writes Colonel Reed, “by obtaining leave to go over.
The brave old man was quite miserable at being kept here.”
In the mean time, the enemy were augmenting their forces on
the island. Two brigades of Hessians, under Lieutenant-general
De Heister, were transferred from the camp on Staten Island on
the 25th. This movement did not escape the vigilant eye of
Washington. By the aid of his telescope, he had noticed that
from time to time tents were struck on Staten Island, and portions
of the encampment broken up; while ship after ship
weighed anchor, and dropped down to the Narrows.
He now concluded that the enemy were about to make a push
with their main force for the possession of Brooklyn Heights.
He accordingly sent over additional reinforcements, and among
them Colonel John Haslet’s well equipped and well disciplined
Delaware regiment; which was joined to Lord Stirling’s brigade,
chiefly composed of Southern troops, and stationed outside of the
lines. These were troops which Washington regarded with
peculiar satisfaction, on account of their soldierlike appearance
and discipline.
On the 26th, he crossed over to Brooklyn, accompanied by
Reed, the adjutant-general. There was much movement among
the enemy’s troops, and their number was evidently augmented.
In fact, General De Heister had reached Flatbush with his Hessians,
and taken command of the centre; whereupon Sir Henry
Clinton, with the right wing, drew off to Flatlands, in a diagonal
line to the right of De Heister, while the left wing, commanded
by General Grant, extended to the place of landing on Gravesend
Bay.
Washington remained all day, aiding General Putnam with
his counsels, who, new to the command, had not been able to
299make himself well acquainted with the fortified posts beyond the
lines. In the evening, Washington returned to the city, full of
anxious thought. A general attack was evidently at hand.
Where would it be made? How would his inexperienced troops
stand the encounter? What would be the defence of the city if
assailed by the ships? It was a night of intense solicitude, and
well might it be; for during that night a plan was carried into
effect, fraught with disaster to the Americans.
The plan to which we allude was concerted by General Howe,
the commander-in-chief. Sir Henry Clinton, with the vanguard,
composed of the choicest troops, was, by a circuitous march in
the night, to throw himself into the road leading from Jamaica
to Bedford, seize upon a pass through the Bedford Hills, within
three miles of that village, and thus turn the left of the American
advanced posts. It was preparatory to this nocturnal march,
that Sir Henry during the day had fallen back with his troops
from Flatbush to Flatlands, and caused that stir and movement
which had attracted the notice of Washington.
To divert the attention of the Americans from this stealthy
march on their left, General Grant was to menace their right
flank toward Gravesend before daybreak, and General De Heister
to cannonade their centre, where Colonel Hand was stationed.
Neither, however, was to press an attack until the guns of Sir
Henry Clinton should give notice that he had effected his purpose,
and turned the left flank of the Americans; then the latter
were to be assailed at all points with the utmost vigor.
About nine o’clock in the evening, of the 26th, Sir Henry
Clinton began his march from Flatlands with the vanguard, composed
of light infantry. Lord Percy followed with the grenadiers,
artillery, and light dragoons, forming the centre. Lord
300Cornwallis brought up the rear-guard with the heavy ordnance.
General Howe accompanied this division.
It was a silent march, without beat of drum or sound of
trumpet, under guidance of a Long Island tory, along by-roads
traversing a swamp by a narrow causeway, and so across the country
to the Jamaica road. About two hours before daybreak,
they arrived within half a mile of the pass through the Bedford
Hills, and halted to prepare for an attack. At this juncture
they captured an American patrol, and learnt, to their surprise,
that the Bedford pass was unoccupied. In fact, the whole road
beyond Bedford, leading to Jamaica, had been left unguarded, excepting
by some light volunteer troops. Colonels Williams and
Miles, who were stationed to the left of Colonel Hand, among
the wooded hills, had been instructed to send out parties occasionally
to patrol the road, but no troops had been stationed at
the Bedford pass. The road and pass may not have been included
in General Greene’s plan of defence, or may have been
thought too far out of the way to need special precaution. The
neglect of them, however, proved fatal.
Sir Henry Clinton immediately detached a battalion of light
infantry to secure the pass; and, advancing with his corps at the
first break of day, possessed himself of the heights. He was
now within three miles of Bedford, and his march had been undiscovered.
Having passed the heights, therefore, he halted his
division for the soldiers to take some refreshment, preparatory to
the morning’s hostilities.
There we will leave them, while we note how the other divisions
performed their part of the plan.
About midnight General Grant moved from Gravesend Bay,
with the left wing, composed of two brigades and a regiment of
301regulars, a battalion of New York loyalists, and ten field-pieces.
He proceeded along the road leading past the Narrows and Gowanus
Cove, toward the right of the American works. A picket
guard of Pennsylvanian and New York militia, under Colonel
Atlee, retired before him fighting to a position on the skirts of
the wooded hills.
In the mean time, scouts had brought in word to the American
lines that the enemy were approaching in force upon the
right. General Putnam instantly ordered Lord Stirling to
hasten with the two regiments nearest at hand, and hold them in
check. These were Haslet’s Delaware, and Smallwood’s Maryland
regiments; the latter the macaronis, in scarlet and buff,
who had outshone, in camp, their yeoman fellow-soldiers in homespun.
They turned out with great alacrity, and Stirling pushed
forward with them on the road toward the Narrows. By the
time he had passed Gowanus Cove, daylight began to appear.
Here, on a rising ground, he met Colonel Atlee with his Pennsylvania
Provincials, and learned that the enemy were near.
Indeed, their front began to appear in the uncertain twilight.
Stirling ordered Atlee to place himself in ambush in an orchard
on the left of the road, and await their coming up, while he
formed the Delaware and Maryland regiments along a ridge
from the road, up to a piece of woods on the top of the hill.
Atlee gave the enemy two or three volleys as they approached,
and then retreated and formed in the wood on Lord
Stirling’s left. By this time his lordship was reinforced by
Kichline’s riflemen, part of whom he placed along a hedge at the
foot of the hill, and part in front of the wood. General Grant
threw his light troops in the advance, and posted them in an orchard
302and behind hedges, extending in front of the Americans,
and about one hundred and fifty yards distant.
It was now broad daylight. A rattling fire commenced
between the British light troops and the American riflemen,
which continued for about two hours, when the former retired to
their main body. In the mean time, Stirling’s position had been
strengthened by the arrival of Captain Carpenter with two field-pieces.
These were placed on the side of the hill, so as to command
the road and the approach for some hundred yards. General
Grant, likewise, brought up his artillery within three hundred
yards, and formed his brigades on opposite hills, about six
hundred yards distant. There was occasional cannonading on
both sides, but neither party sought a general action.
Lord Stirling’s object was merely to hold the enemy in check;
and the instructions of General Grant, as we have shown, were
not to press an attack until aware that Sir Henry Clinton was on
the left flank of the Americans.
During this time, De Heister had commenced his part of the
plan by opening a cannonade from his camp at Flatbush, upon the
redoubt, at the pass of the wooded hills, where Hand and his
riflemen were stationed. On hearing this, General Sullivan, who
was within the lines, rode forth to Colonel Hand’s post to reconnoitre.
De Heister, however, according to the plan of operations,
did not advance from Flatbush, but kept up a brisk fire
from his artillery on the redoubt in front of the pass, which replied
as briskly. At the same time, a cannonade from a British
ship upon the battery at Red Hook, contributed to distract the
attention of the Americans.
In the mean time terror reigned in New York. The volleying
of musketry and the booming of cannon at early dawn, had
303told of the fighting that had commenced. As the morning advanced,
and platoon firing and the occasional discharge of a field-piece
were heard in different directions, the terror increased.
Washington was still in doubt whether this was but a part of a
general attack, in which the city was to be included. Five ships
of the line were endeavoring to beat up the bay. Were they to
cannonade the city, or to land troops above it? Fortunately, a
strong head-wind baffled their efforts; but one vessel of inferior
force got up far enough to open the fire already mentioned upon
the fort at Red Hook.
Seeing no likelihood of an immediate attack upon the city,
Washington hastened over to Brooklyn in his barge, and galloped
up to the works. He arrived there in time to witness the catastrophe
for which all the movements of the enemy had been
concerted.
The thundering of artillery in the direction of Bedford, had
given notice that Sir Henry had turned the left of the Americans.
De Heister immediately ordered Colonel Count Donop to advance
with his Hessian regiment, and storm the redoubt, while he followed
with his whole division. Sullivan did not remain to defend
the redoubt. Sir Henry’s cannon had apprised him of the fatal
truth, that his flank was turned, and he in danger of being surrounded.
He ordered a retreat to the lines, but it was already
too late. Scarce had he descended from the height, and emerged
into the plain, when he was met by the British light infantry, and
dragoons, and driven back into the woods. By this time De
Heister and his Hessians had come up, and now commenced a
scene of confusion, consternation, and slaughter, in which the
troops under Williams and Miles were involved. Hemmed in and
entrapped between the British and Hessians, and driven from
304one to the other, the Americans fought for a time bravely, or
rather desperately. Some were cut down and trampled by the
cavalry, others bayoneted without mercy by the Hessians. Some
rallied in groups, and made a brief stand with their rifles from
rocks or behind trees. The whole pass was a scene of carnage,
resounding with the clash of arms, the tramp of horses, the volleying
of fire-arms and the cries of the combatants, with now and
then the dreary braying of the trumpet. We give the words of
one who mingled in the fight, and whom we have heard speak
with horror of the sanguinary fury with which the Hessians plied
the bayonet. At length some of the Americans, by a desperate
effort, cut their way through the host of foes, and effected a retreat
to the lines, fighting as they went. Others took refuge among
the woods and fastnesses of the hills, but a great part were either
killed or taken prisoners. Among the latter was General
Sullivan.
Washington, as we have observed, arrived in time to witness
this catastrophe, but was unable to prevent it. He had heard
the din of the battle in the woods, and seen the smoke rising from
among the trees; but a deep column of the enemy was descending
from the hills on the left; his choicest troops were all in action,
and he had none but militia to man the works. His solicitude
was now awakened for the safety of Lord Stirling and his corps,
who had been all the morning exchanging cannonades with General
Grant. The forbearance of the latter in not advancing,
though so superior in force, had been misinterpreted by the
Americans. According to Colonel Haslet’s statement, the Delawares
and Marylanders, drawn up on the side of the hill, “stood
upwards of four hours, with a firm and determined countenance,
in close array, their colors flying, the enemy’s artillery playing
305on them all the while, not daring to advance and attack them,
though six times their number, and nearly surrounding them.”[96]
Washington saw the danger to which these brave fellows were
exposed, though they could not. Stationed on a hill within the
lines, he commanded, with his telescope, a view of the whole
field, and saw the enemy’s reserve, under Cornwallis, marching
down by a cross-road to get in their rear, and thus place them
between two fires. With breathless anxiety he watched the result.
The sound of Sir Henry Clinton’s cannon apprised Stirling
that the enemy was between him and the lines. General Grant,
too, aware that the time had come for earnest action, was closing
up, and had already taken Colonel Atlee prisoner. His lordship
now thought to effect a circuitous retreat to the lines, by crossing
the creek which empties into Gowanus Cove, near what was called
the Yellow Mills. There was a bridge and mill-dam, and the
creek might be forded at low water, but no time was to be lost,
for the tide was rising.
Leaving part of his men to keep face toward General Grant,
Stirling advanced with the rest to pass the creek, but was suddenly
checked by the appearance of Cornwallis and his grenadiers.
Washington, and some of his officers on the hill, who watched
every movement, had supposed that Stirling and his troops, finding
the case desperate, would surrender in a body, without firing.
On the contrary, his lordship boldly attacked Cornwallis with
half of Smallwood’s battalion, while the rest of his troops retreated
across the creek. Washington wrung his hands in agony
306at the sight. “Good God!” cried he, “what brave fellows I
must this day lose!”[97]
It was, indeed, a desperate fight; and now Smallwood’s macaronis
showed their game spirit. They were repeatedly broken,
but as often rallied, and renewed the fight. “We were on the
point of driving Lord Cornwallis from his station,” writes Lord
Stirling, “but large reinforcements arriving, rendered it impossible
to do more than provide for safety.”
“Being thus surrounded, and no probability of a reinforcement,”
writes a Maryland officer, “his lordship ordered me to retreat
with the remaining part of our men, and force our way to
our camp. We soon fell in with a party of the enemy, who
clubbed their firelocks, and waved their hats to us as if they
meant to surrender as prisoners; but on our advancing within
sixty yards, they presented their pieces and fired, which we returned
with so much warmth that they soon quitted their post,
and retired to a large body that was lying in ambuscade.”[98]
The enemy rallied, and returned to the combat with additional
force. Only five companies of Smallwood’s battalion were
now in action. There was a warm and close engagement for
nearly ten minutes. The struggle became desperate on the part
of the Americans. Broken and disordered, they rallied in a
piece of woods, and made a second attack. They were again
overpowered with numbers. Some were surrounded and bayoneted
in a field of Indian corn; others joined their comrades who
were retreating across the marsh. Lord Stirling had encouraged
and animated his young soldiers by his voice and example, but
307when all was lost, he sought out General De Heister, and surrendered
himself as his prisoner.
More than two hundred and fifty brave fellows, most of them
of Smallwood’s regiment, perished in this deadly struggle, within
sight of the lines of Brooklyn. That part of the Delaware troops
who had first crossed the creek and swamp, made good their retreat
to the lines with a trifling loss, and entered the camp covered
with mud and drenched with water, but bringing with them
twenty-three prisoners, and their standard tattered by grape-shot.
The enemy now concentrated their forces within a few hundred
yards of the redoubts. The grenadiers were within musket
shot. Washington expected they would storm the works, and prepared
for a desperate defence. The discharge of a cannon and
volleys of musketry from the part of the lines nearest to them,
seemed to bring them to a pause.
It was, in truth, the forbearance of the British commander
that prevented a bloody conflict. His troops, heated with action
and flushed with success, were eager to storm the works; but he
was unwilling to risk the loss of life that must attend an assault,
when the object might be attained at a cheaper rate, by regular
approaches. Checking the ardor of his men, therefore, though
with some difficulty, he drew them off to a hollow way, in front
of the lines, but out of reach of the musketry, and encamped
there for the night.[99]
The loss of the Americans in this disastrous battle has been
variously stated, but is thought in killed, wounded and prisoners,
to have been nearly two thousand; a large number, considering
308that not above five thousand were engaged. The enemy acknowledged
a loss of 380 killed and wounded.[100]
The success of the enemy was attributed, in some measure, to
the doubt in which Washington was kept as to the nature of the
intended attack, and at what point it would chiefly be made.
This obliged him to keep a great part of his forces in New York,
and to distribute those at Brooklyn over a wide extent of country,
and at widely distant places. In fact, he knew not the superior
number of the enemy encamped on Long Island, a majority
of them having been furtively landed in the night, some days
after the debarkation of the first division.
Much of the day’s disaster has been attributed, also, to a confusion
in the command, caused by the illness of General Greene.
Putnam, who had supplied his place in the emergency after the
enemy had landed, had not time to make himself acquainted with
the post, and the surrounding country. Sullivan, though in his
letters he professes to have considered himself subordinate to
General Putnam within the lines, seems still to have exercised
somewhat of an independent command, and to have acted at his
own discretion: while Lord Stirling was said to have command
of all the troops outside of the works.
The fatal error, however, and one probably arising from all
these causes, consisted in leaving the passes through the wooded
hills too weakly fortified and guarded; and especially in neglecting
the eastern road, by which Sir Henry Clinton got in the rear
of the advanced troops, cut them off from the lines, and subjected
them to a cross fire of his own men and De Heister’s Hessians.
309This able and fatal scheme of the enemy might have been
thwarted, had the army been provided with a few troops of light-horse,
to serve as videttes. With these to scour the roads and
bring intelligence, the night march of Sir Henry Clinton, so decisive
of the fortunes of the day, could hardly have failed to be
discovered and reported. The Connecticut horsemen, therefore,
ridiculed by the Southerners for their homely equipments, sneered
at as useless, and dismissed for standing on their dignity and privileges
as troopers, might, if retained, have saved the army from
being surprised and severed, its advanced guards routed, and
those very Southern troops cut up, captured, and almost annihilated.
CHAPTER XXXII. THE RETREAT FROM LONG ISLAND
310
The night after the battle was a weary, yet almost sleepless one
to the Americans. Fatigued, dispirited, many of them sick and
wounded, yet they were, for the most part, without tent or other
shelter. To Washington it was a night of anxious vigil. Every
thing boded a close and deadly conflict. The enemy had pitched
a number of tents about a mile distant. Their sentries were but
a quarter of a mile off, and close to the American sentries. At
four o’clock in the morning, Washington went the round of the
works, to see that all was right, and to speak words of encouragement.
The morning broke lowering and dreary. Large encampments
were gradually descried; to appearance, the enemy were
twenty thousand strong. As the day advanced, their ordnance
began to play upon the works. They were proceeding to intrench
themselves, but were driven into their tents by a drenching rain.
Early in the morning General Mifflin arrived in camp, with
part of the troops which had been stationed at Fort Washington
and King’s Bridge. He brought with him Shee’s prime Philadelphia
regiment, and Magaw’s Pennsylvania regiment, both well
disciplined and officered, and accustomed to act together. They
were so much reduced in number, however, by sickness, that they
311did not amount in the whole, to more than eight hundred men.
With Mifflin came also Colonel Glover’s Massachusetts regiment,
composed chiefly of Marblehead fishermen and sailors, hardy,
adroit, and weather-proof; trimly clad in blue jackets and trowsers.
The detachment numbered, in the whole, about thirteen
hundred men, all fresh and full of spirits. Every eye brightened
as they marched briskly along the line with alert step and cheery
aspect. They were posted at the left extremity of the intrenchments
towards the Wallabout.
There were skirmishes throughout the day, between the riflemen
on the advanced posts and the British “irregulars,” which
at times were quite severe; but no decided attack was attempted.
The main body of the enemy kept within their tents until the
latter part of the day; when they began to break ground at
about five hundred yards distance from the works, as if preparing
to carry them by regular approaches.
On the 29th, there was a dense fog over the island, that
wrapped every thing in mystery. In the course of the morning,
General Mifflin, with Adjutant-general Reed, and Colonel Grayson
of Virginia, one of Washington’s aides-de-camp, rode to the
western outposts, in the neighborhood of Red Hook. While they
were there, a light breeze lifted the fog from a part of the New
York Bay, and revealed the British ships at their anchorage opposite
Staten Island. There appeared to be an unusual bustle
among them. Boats were passing to and from the admiral’s ship,
as if seeking or carrying orders. Some movement was apparently
in agitation. The idea occurred to the reconnoitring
party that the fleet was preparing, should the wind hold and the
fog clear away, to come up the bay at the turn of the tide, silence
the feeble batteries at Red Hook and the city, and anchor in the
312East River. In that case the army on Long Island would be
completely surrounded and entrapped.
Alarmed at this perilous probability, they spurred back to
head-quarters, to urge the immediate withdrawal of the army.
As this might not be acceptable advice, Reed, emboldened by his
intimacy with the commander-in-chief, undertook to give it.
Washington instantly summoned a council of war. The difficulty
was already apparent, of guarding such extensive works with
troops fatigued and dispirited, and exposed to the inclemencies
of the weather. Other dangers now presented themselves.
Their communication with New York might be cut off by the
fleet from below. Other ships had passed round Long Island,
and were at Flushing Bay on the Sound. These might land
troops on the east side of Harlem River, and make themselves
masters of King’s Bridge; that key of Manhattan Island.
Taking all these things into consideration, it was resolved to
cross with the troops to the city that very night.
Never did retreat require greater secrecy and circumspection.
Nine thousand men, with all the munitions of war, were to be
withdrawn from before a victorious army, encamped so near, that
every stroke of spade and pickaxe from their trenches could be
heard. The retreating troops, moreover, were to be embarked
and conveyed across a strait three quarters of a mile wide, swept
by rapid tides. The least alarm of their movement would bring
the enemy upon them, and produce a terrible scene of confusion
and carnage at the place of embarkation.
Washington made the preparatory arrangements with great
alertness, yet profound secrecy. Verbal orders were sent to
Colonel Hughes, who acted as quartermaster-general, to impress
all water craft, large and small, from Spyt den Duivel on the
313Hudson round to Hell Gate on the Sound, and have them on the
east side of the city by evening. The order was issued at noon,
and so promptly executed, that, although some of the vessels had
to be brought a distance of fifteen miles, they were all at Brooklyn
at eight o’clock in the evening, and put under the management
of Colonel Glover’s amphibious Marblehead regiment.
To prepare the army for a general movement without betraying
the object, orders were issued for the troops to hold themselves
in readiness for a night attack upon the enemy. The
orders caused surprise, for the poor fellows were exhausted, and
their arms rendered nearly useless by the rain; all, however, prepared
to obey; but several made nuncupative wills; as is customary
among soldiers on the eve of sudden and deadly peril.
According to Washington’s plan of retreat, to keep the
enemy from discovering the withdrawal of the Americans until
their main body should have embarked in the boats and pushed
off from the shore, General Mifflin was to remain at the lines with
his Pennsylvania troops, and the gallant remains of Haslet,
Smallwood and Hand’s regiments, with guards posted and sentinels
alert, as if nothing extraordinary was taking place; when
the main embarkation was effected, they were themselves to move
off quietly, march briskly to the ferry, and embark. In case of
any alarm that might disconcert the arrangements, Brooklyn
church was to be the rallying place, whither all should repair,
so as unitedly to resist any attack.
It was late in the evening when the troops began to retire
from the breastworks. As one regiment quietly withdrew from
their station on guard, the troops on the right and left moved up
and filled the vacancy. There was a stifled murmur in the camp,
unavoidable in a movement of the kind; but it gradually died
314away in the direction of the river, as the main body moved on
in silence and order. The youthful Hamilton, whose military
merits had won the favor of General Greene, and who had lost
his baggage and a field-piece in the battle, brought up the rear
of the retreating party. In the dead of the night, and in the
midst of this hushed and anxious movement, a cannon went off
with a tremendous roar. “The effect,” says an American who
was present, “was at once alarming and sublime. If the explosion
was within our lines, the gun was probably discharged in the
act of spiking it, and could have been no less a matter of speculation
to the enemy than to ourselves.”[101]
“What with the greatness of the stake, the darkness of the
night, the uncertainty of the design, and the extreme hazard of
the issue,” adds the same writer, “it would be difficult to conceive
a more deeply solemn and interesting scene.”
The meaning of this midnight gun was never ascertained;
fortunately, though it startled the Americans, it failed to rouse
the British camp.
In the mean time the embarkation went on with all possible
despatch, under the vigilant eye of Washington, who stationed
himself at the ferry, superintending every movement. In his
anxiety for despatch, he sent back Colonel Scammel, one of his
aides-de-camp, to hasten forward all the troops that were on the
march. Scammel blundered in executing his errand, and gave
the order to Mifflin likewise. The general instantly called in his
pickets and sentinels, and set off for the ferry.
By this time the tide had turned; there was a strong wind
from the north-east; the boats with oars were insufficient to convey
315the troops; those with sails could not make headway against
wind and tide. There was some confusion at the ferry, and in
the midst of it, General Mifflin came down with the whole covering
party; adding to the embarrassment and uproar.
“Good God! General Mifflin!” cried Washington, “I am
afraid you have ruined us by so unseasonably withdrawing the
troops from the lines.”
“I did so by your order,” replied Mifflin with some warmth.
“It cannot be!” exclaimed Washington. “By G—, I did!”
was the blunt rejoinder. “Did Scammel act as aide-de-camp for
the day, or did he not?” “He did.” “Then,” said Mifflin, “I
had orders through him.” “It is a dreadful mistake,” rejoined
Washington, “and unless the troops can regain the lines before
their absence is discovered by the enemy, the most disastrous
consequences are to be apprehended.”
Mifflin led back his men to the lines, which had been completely
deserted for three quarters of an hour. Fortunately, the
dense fog had prevented the enemy from discovering that they
were unoccupied. The men resumed their former posts, and
remained at them until called off to cross the ferry. “Whoever
has seen troops in a similar situation,” writes General Heath, “or
duly contemplates the human heart in such trials, will know how
to appreciate the conduct of these brave men on this occasion.”
The fog which prevailed all this time, seemed almost providential.
While it hung over Long Island, and concealed the
movements of the Americans, the atmosphere was clear on the
New York side of the river. The adverse wind, too, died away,
the river became so smooth that the row-boats could be laden
almost to the gunwale; and a favoring breeze sprang up for the
sail-boats. The whole embarkation of troops, artillery, ammunition,
316provisions, cattle, horses and carts, was happily effected, and
by daybreak the greater part had safely reached the city, thanks
to the aid of Glover’s Marblehead men. Scarce any thing was
abandoned to the enemy, excepting a few heavy pieces of artillery.
At a proper time, Mifflin with his covering party left the
lines, and effected a silent retreat to the ferry. Washington,
though repeatedly entreated, refused to enter a boat until all the
troops were embarked; and crossed the river with the last.
A Long Island tradition tells how the British camp became
aware of the march which had been stolen upon it.[102] Near the
ferry, resided a Mrs. Rapelye, whose husband, suspected of favoring
the enemy, had been removed to the interior of New Jersey.
On seeing the embarkation of the first detachment, she, out of loyalty
or revenge, sent off a black servant to inform the first British
officer he could find, of what was going on. The negro succeeded
in passing the American sentinels, but arrived at a Hessian outpost,
where he could not make himself understood, and was put
under guard as a suspicious person. There he was kept until
daybreak, when an officer visiting the post, examined him, and was
astounded by his story. An alarm was given, the troops were
called to arms; Captain Montresor, aide-de-camp of General
Howe, followed by a handful of men, climbed cautiously over the
crest of the works and found them deserted. Advanced parties
were hurried down to the ferry. The fog had cleared away, sufficiently
for them to see the rear boats of the retreating army half
way across the river. One boat, still within musket shot, was
compelled to return; it was manned by three vagabonds, who had
lingered behind to plunder.
317This extraordinary retreat, which, in its silence and celerity,
equalled the midnight fortifying of Bunker’s Hill, was one of the
most signal achievements of the war, and redounded greatly to the
reputation of Washington, who, we are told, for forty-eight hours
preceding the safe extricating of his army from their perilous
situation, scarce closed his eyes, and was the greater part of the
time on horseback. Many, however, who considered the variety
of risks and dangers which surrounded the camp, and the apparently
fortuitous circumstances which averted them all, were disposed
to attribute the safe retreat of the patriot army to a peculiar
Providence.
CHAPTER XXXIII. LONG ISLAND IN POSSESSION OF THE ENEMY—DISTRESSED SITUATION OF THE AMERICAN ARMY AT NEW YORK—QUESTION OF ABANDONING THE CITY—LETTERS FROM EITHER CAMP—ENEMY’S SHIPS IN THE SOUND—REMOVAL OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM THE CITY—YEARNING FOR HOME AMONG THE MILITIA—TOLERANT IDEAS OF WASHINGTON AND GREENE—FORT CONSTITUTION—CONFERENCE OF LORD HOWE WITH A COMMITTEE FROM CONGRESS.
318
The enemy had now possession of Long Island. British and
Hessian troops garrisoned the works at Brooklyn, or were distributed
at Bushwick, Newtown, Hell Gate and Flushing. Admiral
Howe came up with the main body of the fleet, and anchored
close to Governor’s Island, within cannon shot of the city.
“Our situation is truly distressing,” writes Washington to the
President of Congress, on the 2d of September. “The check
our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo, has dispirited too
great a proportion of our troops, and filled their minds with
apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth
their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition in order to
repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to
return. Great numbers of them have gone off; in some instances
almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies, at a
time. * * * * With the deepest concern, I am obliged to
319confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops. * * * Our number of men at present fit for duty is under
twenty thousand. I have ordered General Mercer to send the
men intended for the flying camp to this place, about a thousand
in number, and to try with the militia, if practicable, to make a
diversion upon Staten Island. Till of late, I had no doubt in my
own mind of defending this place; nor should I have yet, if the
men would do their duty, but this I despair of.
“If we should be obliged to abandon the town, ought it to
stand as winter quarters for the enemy? They would derive
great conveniences from it, on the one hand, and much property
would be destroyed on the other. It is an important question,
but will admit of but little time for deliberation. At present, I
dare say the enemy mean to preserve it if they can. If Congress,
therefore, should resolve upon the destruction of it, the
resolution should be a profound secret, as the knowledge will
make a capital change in their plans.”
Colonel Reed, writing on the same day to his wife, says, “I
have only time to say I am alive and well; as to spirits, but
middling. * * * * My country will, I trust, yet be free,
whatever may be our fate who are cooped up, or are in danger
of so being, on this tongue of land, where we ought never to have
been.”[103]
We turn to cite letters of the very same date from British
officers on Long Island, full of rumors and surmises. “I have
just heard,” writes an English field-officer, “there has been a
most dreadful fray in the town of New York. The New Englanders
insisted on setting the town on fire and retreating. This
320was opposed by the New Yorkers, who were joined by the Pennsylvanians,
and a battle has been the consequence, in which many
have lost their lives. By the steps our general is taking, I
imagine he will effectually cut off their retreat at King’s Bridge,
by which the island of New York is joined to the continent.”
An English officer of the guards, writing from camp on the
same day, varies the rumor. The Pennsylvanians, according to
his version, joined with the New Englanders in the project to set
fire to the town; both had a battle with the New Yorkers on the
subject, and then withdrew themselves from the city—which,
“with other favorable circumstances,” gave the latter writer a
lively “hope that this distressful business would soon be brought
to a happy issue.”
Another letter gives a different version. “In the night of
the 2d instant, three persons escaped from the city in a canoe
and informed our general that Mr. Washington had ordered three
battalions of New York Provincials to leave New York, and that
they should be replaced by an equal number of Connecticut troops;
but the former, assured that the Connecticutians would burn
and destroy all the houses, peremptorily refused to give up their
city, declaring that no cause of exigency whatever should induce
them to intrust the defence of it to any other than her own inhabitants.
This spirited and stubborn resolution prevailed over the
order of their commander, and the New Yorkers continue snugly
in possession of the place.”[104]
“Matters go on swimmingly,” writes another officer. “I don’t
doubt the next news we send you, is, that New York is ours,
though in ashes, for the rebel troops have vowed to put it in flames
if the tory troops get over.”
321An American officer writes to an absent New Yorker, in a different
tone. “I fear we shall evacuate your poor city. The
very thought gives me the horrors!” Still he indulges a vague
hope of succor from General Lee, who was returning, all glorious,
from his successes at the South. “General Lee,” writes he, “is
hourly expected, as if from heaven,—with a legion of flaming
swordsmen.” It was, however, what Lee himself would have
termed a mere brutum fulmen.
These letters show the state of feeling in the opposite camps,
at this watchful moment, when matters seemed hurrying to a
crisis.
On the night of Monday (Sept. 2d), a forty gun ship, taking
advantage of a favorable wind and tide, passed between Governor’s
Island and Long Island, swept unharmed by the batteries which
opened upon her, and anchored in Turtle Bay, above the city. In
the morning, Washington dispatched Major Crane of the artillery,
with two twelve-pounders and a howitzer to annoy her from
the New York shore. They hulled her several times, and
obliged her to take shelter behind Blackwell’s Island. Several
other ships of war, with transports and store-ships, had made
their appearance in the upper part of the Sound, having gone
round Long Island.
As the city might speedily be attacked, Washington caused
all the sick and wounded to be conveyed to Orangetown, in the
Jerseys, and such military stores and baggage as were not immediately
needed, to be removed, as fast as conveyances could be procured,
to a post partially fortified at Dobbs’ Ferry, on the eastern
bank of the Hudson, about twenty-two miles above the city.
Reed, in his letters to his wife, talks of the dark and mysterious
motions of the enemy, and the equally dark and intricate
322councils of Congress, by which the army were disheartened and
perplexed. “We are still here,” writes he on the 6th, “in a
posture somewhat awkward; we think (at least I do) that we
cannot stay, and yet we do not know how to go, so that we may
be properly said to be between hawk and buzzard.”
The “shameful and scandalous desertions,” as Washington
termed them, continued. In a few days the Connecticut militia
dwindled down from six to less than two thousand. “The
impulse for going home was so irresistible,” writes he, “that it
answered no purpose to oppose it. Though I would not discharge
them, I have been obliged to acquiesce.”
Still his considerate mind was tolerant of their defection.
“Men,” said he, “accustomed to unbounded freedom, cannot
brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good
order and government of an army.” And again, “Men just
dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to
the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military
skill (which is followed by a want of confidence in themselves,
when opposed to troops regularly trained, superior in
knowledge, and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from
their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner
of living, brings on an unconquerable desire to return to their
homes.”
Greene, also, who coincided so much with Washington in
opinions and sentiments, observes: “People coming from home
with all the tender feelings of domestic life, are not sufficiently
fortified with natural courage to stand the shocking scenes of
war. To march over dead men, to hear without concern the
groans of the wounded—I say few men can stand such scenes
unless steeled by habit or fortified by military pride.”
323Nor was this ill-timed yearning for home confined to the
yeomanry of Connecticut, who might well look back to their
humble farms, where they had left the plough standing in the
furrow, and where every thing might go to ruin, and their family
to want, in their absence. Some of the gentlemen volunteers
from beyond the Delaware, who had made themselves merry at
the expense of the rustic soldiery of New England, were likewise
among the first to feel the homeward impulse. “When I
look around,” said Reed, the adjutant-general, “and see how few
of the numbers who talked so loudly of death and honor are
around me, I am lost in wonder and surprise. Some of our
Philadelphia gentlemen who came over on visits, upon the first
cannon, went off in a most violent hurry. Your noisy sons of liberty,
are, I find, the quietest on the field.”[105]
Present experience induced Washington to reiterate the opinion
he had repeatedly expressed to Congress, that little reliance
was to be placed on militia enlisted for short periods. The only
means of protecting the national liberties from great hazard, if
not utter loss, was, he said, an army enlisted for the war.
The thousand men ordered from the flying camp were furnished
by General Mercer. They were Maryland troops under
Colonels Griffith and Richardson, and were a seasonable addition
to his effective forces; but the ammunition carried off by the
disbanding militia, was a serious loss at this critical juncture.
A work had been commenced on the Jersey shore, opposite
Fort Washington, to aid in protecting Putnam’s chevaux-de-frise
which had been sunk between them. This work had received
the name of Fort Constitution (a name already borne by one of
324the forts in the Highlands.) Troops were drawn from the flying
camp to make a strong encampment in the vicinity of the fort,
with an able officer to command it and a skilful engineer to
strengthen the works. It was hoped, by the co-operation of these
opposite forts and the chevaux-de-frise, to command the Hudson,
and prevent the passing and repassing of hostile ships.
The British, in the mean time, forbore to press further hostilities.
Lord Howe was really desirous of a peaceful adjustment
of the strife between the colonies and the mother country,
and supposed this a propitious moment for a new attempt at pacification.
He accordingly sent off General Sullivan on parole,
charged with an overture to Congress. In this he declared himself
empowered and disposed to compromise the dispute between
Great Britain and America, on the most favorable terms, and
though he could not treat with Congress as a legally organized
body, he was desirous of a conference with some of its members.
These, for the time, he should consider only as private gentlemen,
but if in the conference any probable scheme of accommodation
should be agreed upon, the authority of Congress would after
wards be acknowledged, to render the compact complete.[106]
The message caused some embarrassment in Congress. To
accede to the interview might seem to waive the question of independence;
to decline it was to shut the door on all hope of
conciliation, and might alienate the co-operation of some worthy
whigs who still clung to that hope. After much debate, Congress,
on the 5th September, replied, that, being the representatives
of the free and independent States of America, they could
not send any members to confer with his lordship in their private
325characters, but that, ever desirous of establishing peace on reasonable
terms, they would send a committee of their body to ascertain
what authority he had to treat with persons authorized by
Congress, and what propositions he had to offer.
A committee was chosen on the 6th of September, composed
of John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and Doctor Franklin. The
latter, in the preceding year, during his residence in England,
had become acquainted with Lord Howe, at the house of his
lordship’s sister, the Honorable Mrs. Howe, and they had held
frequent conversations on the subject of American affairs, in the
course of which, his lordship had intimated the possibility of his
being sent commissioner to settle the differences in America.
Franklin had recently adverted to this in a letter to Lord
Howe. “Your lordship may possibly remember the tears of joy
that wet my cheek, when, at your good sister’s in London, you
gave me expectations that a reconciliation might soon take place.
I had the misfortune to find those expectations disappointed.
“The well-founded esteem, and, permit me to say, affection,
which I shall always have for your lordship, makes it painful for
me to see you engaged in conducting a war, the great ground of
which, as expressed in your letter, is ’the necessity of preventing
the American trade from passing into foreign channels.’ * * * I know your great motive in coming hither, was the hope
of being instrumental in a reconciliation; and I believe that
when you find that impossible on any terms given to you to propose,
you will relinquish so odious a command, and return to a
more honorable private station.”
“I can have no difficulty to acknowledge,” replied Lord
Howe, “that the powers I am invested with were never calculated
326to negotiate a reunion with America, under any other description
than as subject to the crown of Great Britain. But I do esteem
these powers competent, not only to confer and negotiate with
any gentlemen of influence in the colonies upon the terms, but
also to effect a lasting peace and reunion between the two countries,
were the tempers of the colonies such as professed in the
last petition of Congress to the king.”[107]
A hope of the kind lingered in the breast of his lordship
when he sought the proposed conference. It was to take place
on the 11th, at a house on Staten Island, opposite to Amboy;
at which latter place the veteran Mercer was stationed with his
flying camp. At Amboy, the committee found Lord Howe’s
barge waiting to receive them; with a British officer of rank,
who was to remain within the American lines during their absence,
as a hostage. This guarantee of safety was promptly declined,
and the parties crossed together to Staten Island. The admiral
met them on their landing, and conducted them through his
guards to his house.
On opening the conference, his lordship again intimated that
he could not treat with them as a committee of Congress, but
only confer with them as private gentlemen of influence in the
colonies, on the means of restoring peace between the two countries.
The commissioners replied that, as their business was to hear,
he might consider them in what light he pleased; but that they
should consider themselves in no other character than that in
which they were placed by order of Congress.
Lord Howe then entered into a discourse of considerable
327length, but made no explicit proposition of peace, nor promise of
redress of grievances, excepting on condition that the colonies
should return to their allegiance.
This, the commissioners replied, was not now to be expected.
Their repeated humble petitions to the king and parliament
having been treated with contempt, and answered by additional
injuries, and war having been declared against them, the colonies
had declared their independence, and it was not in the power of
Congress to agree for them that they should return to their
former dependent state.[108]
His lordship expressed his sorrow that no accommodation was
likely to take place; and, on breaking up the conference, assured
his old friend, Dr. Franklin, that he should suffer great pain in
being obliged to distress those for whom he had so much regard.
“I feel thankful to your lordship for your regard,” replied
Franklin good-humoredly; “the Americans, on their part, will
endeavor to lessen the pain you may feel, by taking good care of
themselves.”
The result of this conference had a beneficial effect. It
showed that his lordship had no power but what was given by the
act of Parliament; and put an end to the popular notion that he
was vested with secret powers to negotiate an adjustment of
grievances.
CHAPTER XXXIV. MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY—COUNCILS OF WAR—QUESTION OF THE ABANDONMENT OF THE CITY—DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY—SHIPS IN THE EAST RIVER—THE ENEMY AT HELL GATE—SKIRMISH AT TURTLE BAY—PANIC OF THE CONNECTICUT MILITIA—RAGE AND PERSONAL PERIL OF WASHINGTON—PUTNAM’S PERILOUS RETREAT FROM THE CITY—BRITISH REGALE AT MURRAY HILL.
328
Since the retreat from Brooklyn, Washington had narrowly
watched the movements of the enemy to discover their further
plans. Their whole force, excepting about four thousand men,
had been transferred from Staten to Long Island. A great part
was encamped on the peninsula between Newtown Inlet and
Flushing Bay. A battery had been thrown up near the extremity
of the peninsula, to check an American battery at Horen’s
Hook opposite, and to command the mouth of Harlem River.
Troops were subsequently stationed on the islands about Hell
Gate. “It is evident,” writes Washington, “the enemy mean to
enclose us on the island of New York, by taking post in our rear,
while the shipping secures the front, and thus, by cutting off our
communication with the country, oblige us to fight them on their
own terms, or surrender at discretion; or by a brilliant stroke
endeavor to cut this army in pieces, and secure the collection of
329arms and stores, which, they well know, we shall not be able soon
to replace.”[109]
The question was, how could their plans be most successfully
opposed? On every side, he saw a choice of difficulties; every
measure was to be formed with some apprehension that all the
troops would not do their duty. History, experience, the opinions
of able friends in Europe, the fears of the enemy, even the
declarations of Congress, all concurred in demonstrating that the
war on the American side should be defensive; a war of posts;
that, on all occasions, a general action should be avoided, and
nothing put at risk unnecessarily. “With these views,” said
Washington, “and being fully persuaded that it would be presumption
to draw out our young troops into open ground against
their superiors, both in number and discipline, I have never
spared the spade and pickaxe.”
In a council of war, held on the 7th of September, the question
was discussed, whether the city should be defended or evacuated.
All admitted that it would not be tenable, should it be
cannonaded and bombarded. Several of the council, among
whom was General Putnam, were for a total and immediate removal
from the city; urging that one part of the army might be
cut off before the other could support it; the extremities being
at least sixteen miles apart, and the whole, when collected, being
inferior to the enemy. By removing, they would deprive the
enemy of the advantage of their ships; they would keep them at
bay; put nothing at hazard; keep the army together to be recruited
another year, and preserve the unspent stores and the
heavy artillery. Washington himself inclined to this opinion.
Others, however, were unwilling to abandon a place which had
330been fortified with great cost and labor, and seemed defensible,
and which, by some, had been considered the key to the northern
country; it might dispirit the troops, and enfeeble the cause.
General Mercer, who was prevented by illness from attending the
council, communicated his opinion by letter. “We should keep
New York if possible,” said he, “as the acquiring of it will give
eclat to the arms of Great Britain, afford the soldiers good quarters,
and furnish a safe harbor for the fleet.”
General Greene, also, being still unwell, conveyed his opinion
in a letter to Washington, dated Sept. 5th. He advised that the
army should abandon both city and island, and post itself at
King’s Bridge and along the Westchester shore. That there
was no object to be obtained by holding any position below
King’s Bridge. The enemy might throw troops on Manhattan
Island, from their camps on Long Island, and their ships on the
Hudson, and form an intrenched line across it, between the city
and the middle division of the army, and support the two flanks
of the line by their shipping. In such case, it would be necessary
to fight them on disadvantageous terms or submit.
The city and island, he observed, were objects not to be put
in competition with the general interests of America. Two
thirds of the city and suburbs belonged to tories, there was no
great reason, therefore, to run any considerable risk in its defence.
The honor and interest of America required a general
and speedy retreat. But as the enemy, once in possession, could
never be dislodged without a superior naval force; as the place
would furnish them with excellent winter quarters and barrack
room, and an abundant market, he advised to burn both city and
suburbs before retreating.[110]
331Well might the poor, harassed citizens feel hysterical, threatened
as they were by sea and land, and their very defenders debating
the policy of burning their houses over their heads. Fortunately
for them, Congress had expressly forbidden that any
harm should be done to New York, trusting, that though the
enemy might occupy it for a time, it would ultimately be regained.
After much discussion a middle course was adopted. Putnam,
with five thousand men, was to be stationed in the city.
Heath, with nine thousand, was to keep guard on the upper part
of the island, and oppose any attempt of the enemy to land.
His troops, among whom were Magaw’s, Shee’s, Hand’s, and
Miles’s Pennsylvanian battalions, and Haslet’s Delaware regiment,
were posted about King’s Bridge and its vicinity.
The third division, composed principally of militia, was under
the command of Generals Greene and Spencer, the former of
whom, however, was still unwell. It was stationed about the centre
of the island, chiefly along Turtle Bay and Kip’s Bay, where
strong works had been thrown up, to guard against any landing
of troops from the ships or from the encampments on Long Island.
It was also to hold itself ready to support either of the other divisions.
Washington himself had his head-quarters at a short distance
from the city. A resolution of Congress, passed the 10th
of September, left the occupation or abandonment of the city entirely
at Washington’s discretion. Nearly the whole of his officers,
too, in a second council of war, retracted their former opinion,
and determined that the removal of his army was not only
prudent, but absolutely necessary. Three members of the council,
however, Generals Spencer, Heath, and George Clinton, tenaciously
held to the former decision.
332Convinced of the propriety of evacuation, Washington prepared
for it by ordering the removal of all stores, excepting such
as were indispensable for the subsistence of the troops while they
remained. A letter from a Rhode Island officer, on a visit
to New York, gives an idea of its agitations. “On the 13th
of September, just after dinner, three frigates and a forty gun
ship sailed up the East River with a gentle breeze, toward Hell
Gate, and kept up an incessant fire, assisted by the cannon at
Governor’s Island. The batteries of the city returned the ships
the like salutation. Three men agape, idle spectators, had the
misfortune of being killed by one cannon ball. One shot struck
within six feet of General Washington, as he was on horseback,
riding into the fort.”[111]
On the 14th, Washington’s baggage was removed to King’s
Bridge, whither head-quarters were to be transferred the same
evening; it being clear that the enemy were preparing to encompass
him on the island. “It is now a trial of skill whether they
will or not,” writes Colonel Reed, “and every night we lie down
with the most anxious fears for the fate of to-morrow.”[112]
About sunset of the same day, six more ships, two of them
men-of-war, passed up the Sound and joined those above. Within
half an hour came expresses spurring to head-quarters, one from
Mifflin at King’s Bridge, the other from Colonel Sargent at
Horen’s Hook. Three or four thousand of the enemy were crossing
at Hell Gate to the islands at the mouth of Harlem River,
where numbers were already encamped. An immediate landing
at Harlem, or Morrisania, was apprehended. Washington was
instantly in the saddle, spurring to Harlem Heights. The night,
333however, passed away quietly. In the morning the enemy commenced
operations. Three ships of war stood up the Hudson,
“causing a most tremendous firing, assisted by the cannons of
Governor’s Island, which firing was returned from the city as
well as the scarcity of heavy cannon would allow.”[113] The ships
anchored opposite Bloomingdale, a few miles above the city, and
put a stop to the removal by water of stores and provisions to
Dobbs’ Ferry. About eleven o’clock, the ships in the East River
commenced a heavy cannonade upon the breastworks between
Turtle Bay and the city. At the same time two divisions of the
troops encamped on Long Island, one British, under Sir Henry
Clinton, the other Hessian, under Colonel Donop, emerged in
boats from the deep, woody recesses of Newtown Inlet, and under
cover of the fire from the ships, began to land at two points between
Turtle and Kip’s Bays. The breastworks were manned by
militia who had recently served at Brooklyn. Disheartened by
their late defeat, they fled at the first advance of the enemy.
Two brigades of Putnam’s Connecticut troops (Parsons’ and
Fellows’) which had been sent that morning to support them,
caught the panic, and regardless of the commands and entreaties
of their officers, joined in the general scamper.
At this moment Washington, who had mounted his horse at
the first sound of the cannonade, came galloping to the scene of
confusion; riding in among the fugitives, he endeavored to rally
and restore them to order. All in vain. At the first appearance
of sixty or seventy red coats, they broke again without firing a
shot, and fled in headlong terror. Losing all self-command at
the sight of such dastardly conduct, he dashed his hat upon the
334ground in a transport of rage. “Are these the men,” exclaimed
he, “with whom I am to defend America!” In a paroxysm of
passion and despair he snapped his pistols at some of them,
threatened others with his sword, and was so heedless of his own
danger, that he might have fallen into the hands of the enemy,
who were not eighty yards distant, had not an aide-de-camp
seized the bridle of his horse, and absolutely hurried him away.[114]
It was one of the rare moments of his life, when the vehement
element of his nature was stirred up from its deep recesses.
He soon recovered his self-possession, and took measures against
the general peril. The enemy might land another force about
Hell Gate, seize upon Harlem Heights, the strong central portion
of the island, cut off all retreat of the lower divisions, and effectually
sever his army. In all haste, therefore, he sent off an express
to the forces encamped above, directing them to secure that
position immediately; while another express to Putnam, ordered
an immediate retreat from the city to those heights.
It was indeed a perilous moment. Had the enemy followed
up their advantage, and seized upon the heights, before thus occupied;
or had they extended themselves across the island, from
the place where they had effected a landing, the result might
have been most disastrous to the Americans. Fortunately, they
contented themselves for the present with sending a strong detachment
down the road along the East River, leading to the city,
while the main body, British and Hessians, rested on their arms.
335In the mean time, Putnam, on receiving Washington’s express,
called in his pickets and guards, and abandoned the city in
all haste, leaving behind him a large quantity of provisions and
military stores, and most of the heavy cannon. To avoid the
enemy he took the Bloomingdale road, though this exposed him
to be raked by the enemy’s ships anchored in the Hudson. It
was a forced march, on a sultry day, under a burning sun and
amid clouds of dust. His army was encumbered with women and
children and all kinds of baggage. Many were overcome by fatigue
and thirst, some perished by hastily drinking cold water;
but Putnam rode backward and forward, hurrying every one on.
Colonel Humphreys, at that time a volunteer in his division,
writes: “I had frequent opportunities that day of beholding
him, for the purpose of issuing orders and encouraging the
troops, flying on his horse covered with foam, wherever his presence
was most necessary. Without his extraordinary exertions,
the guards must have been inevitably lost, and it is probable the
entire corps would have been cut in pieces.
“When we were not far from Bloomingdale, an aide-de-camp
came to him at full speed, to inform him that a column of British
infantry was descending upon our right. Our rear was soon fired
upon, and the colonel of our regiment, whose order was just communicated
for the front to file off to the left, was killed upon the
spot. With no other loss, we joined the army after dark upon
the heights of Harlem.”[115]
Tradition gives a circumstance which favored Putnam’s retreat.
The British generals, in passing by Murray Hill, the
country residence of a patriot of that name who was of the Society
336of Friends, made a halt to seek some refreshment. The
proprietor of the house was absent; but his wife set cake and
wine before them in abundance. So grateful were these refreshments
in the heat of the day, that they lingered over their wine,
quaffing and laughing, and bantering their patriotic hostess about
the ludicrous panic and discomfiture of her countrymen. In the
mean time, before they were roused from their regale, Putnam
and his forces had nearly passed by, within a mile of them. All
the loss sustained by him in his perilous retreat, was fifteen
killed, and about three hundred taken prisoners. It became,
adds the tradition, a common saying among the American officers,
that Mrs. Murray saved Putnam’s division of the army.[116]
CHAPTER XXXV. FORTIFIED CAMP AT KING’S BRIDGE—AMERICAN AND BRITISH LINES—THE MORRIS HOUSE—ALEXANDER HAMILTON—THE ENEMY ADVANCE—SUCCESSFUL SKIRMISH—DEATH OF KNOWLTON—GREAT FIRE IN NEW YORK—REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY—EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS—DANIEL MORGAN REGAINED—DE LANCEY’S TORY BRIGADE—ROBERT ROGERS, THE PARTISAN—HIS RANGERS—THE ROEBUCK, PHŒNIX, AND TARTAR IN THE HUDSON—MILITARY MOVEMENTS BY LAND AND WATER—LETTER OF JOHN JAY.
337
The fortified camp, where the main body of the army was now
assembled, was upon that neck of land several miles long, and for
the most part not above a mile wide, which forms the upper part
of Manhattan or New York Island. It forms a chain of rocky
heights, and is separated from the mainland by Harlem River, a
narrow strait, extending from Hell Gate on the Sound, to Spyt
den Duivel, a creek or inlet of the Hudson. Fort Washington
occupied the crest of one of the rocky heights above mentioned,
overlooking the Hudson, and about two miles north of it was
King’s Bridge, crossing Spyt den Duivel Creek, and forming at
that time the only pass from Manhattan Island to the mainland.
About a mile and a half south of the fort, a double row of
lines extended across the neck from Harlem River to the Hudson.
They faced south towards New York, were about a quarter
of a mile apart, and were defended by batteries.
338There were strong advanced posts, about two miles south of
the outer line; one on the left of Harlem, commanded by General
Spencer, the other on the right, at what was called McGowan’s
Pass, commanded by General Putnam. About a mile
and a half beyond these posts the British lines extended across
the island from Horen’s Hook to the Hudson, being a continuous
encampment, two miles in length, with both flanks covered by
shipping. An open plain intervened between the hostile camps.
Washington had established his head-quarters about a quarter
of a mile within the inner line; at a country-seat, the owners of
which were absent. It belonged in fact to Colonel Roger Morris,
his early companion in arms in Braddock’s campaign, and his
successful competitor for the hand of Miss Mary Philipse. Morris
had remained in America, enjoying the wealth he had acquired
by his marriage; but had adhered to the royal party, and was a
member of the council of the colony. It is said that at this time
he was residing in the Highlands at Beverley, the seat of his
brother-in-law, Washington’s old friend, Beverley Robinson.[117]
While thus posted, Washington was incessantly occupied in
fortifying the approaches to his camp by redoubts, abatis, and
deep intrenchments. “Here,” said he, “I should hope the
enemy, in case of attack, would meet a defeat, if the generality
of our troops would behave with tolerable bravery; but experience,
to my extreme affliction, has convinced me that it is rather
to be wished than expected. However, I trust there are many
who will act like men worthy of the blessings of freedom.” The
late disgraceful scene at Kip’s Bay was evidently rankling in his
mind.
339In the course of his rounds of inspection, he was struck with
the skill and science displayed in the construction of some of the
works, which were thrown up under the direction of a youthful
captain of artillery. It proved to be the same young officer,
Alexander Hamilton, whom Greene had recommended to his notice.
After some conversation with him, Washington invited
him to his marquee, and thus commenced that intercourse which
has indissolubly linked their memories together.
On the morning of the 16th, word was brought to head-quarters
that the enemy were advancing in three large columns.
There had been so many false reports, that Reed, the adjutant-general,
obtained leave to sally out and ascertain the truth.
Washington himself soon mounted his horse and rode towards
the advanced posts. On arriving there he heard a brisk firing.
It was kept up for a time with great spirit. There was evidently
a sharp conflict. At length Reed came galloping back with information.
A strong detachment of the enemy had attacked the
most advanced post, which was situated on a hill skirted by a
wood. It had been bravely defended by Lieutenant-colonel
Knowlton, Putnam’s favorite officer, who had distinguished himself
at Bunker’s Hill; he had under him a party of Connecticut
rangers, volunteers from different regiments. After skirmishing
for a time, the party had been overpowered by numbers and
driven in, and the outpost was taken possession of by the enemy.
Reed supposed the latter to be about three hundred strong, but
they were much stronger, the main part having been concealed
behind a rising ground in the wood. They were composed of a
battalion of light infantry, another of Royal Highlanders, and
three companies of Hessian riflemen; all under the command of
General Leslie.
340Reed urged that troops should be sent to support the brave
fellows who had behaved so well. While he was talking with
Washington, “the enemy,” he says, “appeared in open view, and
sounded their bugles in the most insulting manner, as usual after
a fox-chase. I never,” adds he, “felt such a sensation before;
it seemed to crown our disgrace.”
Washington, too, was stung by the taunting note of derision;
it recalled the easy triumph of the enemy at Kip’s Bay. Resolved
that something should be done to wipe out that disgrace,
and rouse the spirits of the army, he ordered out three companies
from Colonel Weedon’s regiment just arrived from Virginia, and
sent them under Major Leitch, to join Knowlton’s rangers. The
troops thus united were to get in the rear of the enemy, while a
feigned attack was made upon them in front.
The plan was partially successful. As the force advanced to
make the false attack, the enemy ran down the hill, and took
what they considered an advantageous position behind some
fences and bushes which skirted it. A firing commenced between
them and the advancing party, but at too great distance to do
much harm on either side. In the mean time, Knowlton and
Leitch, ignorant of this change in the enemy’s position, having
made a circuit, came upon them in flank instead of in rear.
They were sharply received. A vivid contest took place, in
which Connecticut vied with Virginia in bravery. In a little
while Major Leitch received three bullets in his side, and was
borne off the field. Shortly afterward, a wound in the head from
a musket ball, brought Knowlton to the ground. Colonel Reed
placed him on his horse, and conveyed him to a distant redoubt.
The men, undismayed by the fall of their leaders, fought with
unflinching resolution under the command of their captains.
341The enemy were reinforced by a battalion of Hessians and a
company of chasseurs. Washington likewise sent reinforcements
of New England and Maryland troops. The action waxed hotter
and hotter; the enemy were driven from the wood into the plain
and pushed for some distance; the Americans were pursuing
them with ardor, when Washington, having effected the object of
this casual encounter, and being unwilling to risk a general action,
ordered a retreat to be sounded.
It was with difficulty, however, his men could be called off, so
excited were they by the novelty of pursuing an enemy. They
retired in good order; and, as it subsequently appeared, in good
season, for the main body of the enemy were advancing at a
rapid rate, and might have effectually reversed the scene.
Colonel Knowlton did not long survive the action. “When
gasping in the agonies of death,” says Colonel Reed, “all his inquiry
was whether he had driven in the enemy.” He was anxious
for the tarnished honor of Connecticut. He had the dying
satisfaction of knowing that his men had behaved bravely, and
driven the enemy in an open field-fight. So closed his gallant
career.
The encounter thus detailed was a small affair in itself, but
important in its effects. It was the first gleam of success in the
campaign, and revived the spirits of the army. Washington
sought to turn it to the greatest advantage. In his general
orders, he skilfully distributed praise and censure. The troops
under Leitch were thanked for being the first to advance upon
the enemy; and the New England troops for gallantly supporting
them, and their conduct was honorably contrasted with that
of the recreant troops at Kip’s Bay. Of Knowlton, who had
342fallen while gloriously fighting, he spoke as “one who would
have done honor to any country.”
The name of Leitch was given by him for the next day’s
parole. That brave officer died of his wounds on the 1st of October,
soothed in his last moments by that recompense so dear to
a soldier’s heart, the encomium of a beloved commander.
In the dead of the night, on the 20th September, a great
light was beheld by the picket guards, looming up from behind
the hills in the direction of the city. It continued throughout
the night, and was at times so strong that the heavens in that
direction appeared to them, they said, as if in flames. At daybreak
huge columns of smoke were still rising. It was evident
there had been a great conflagration in New York.
In the course of the morning Captain Montresor, aide-de-camp
to General Howe, came out with a flag, bearing a letter to
Washington on the subject of an exchange of prisoners. According
to Montresor’s account a great part of the city had been
burnt down, and as the night was extremely windy, the whole
might have been so, but for the exertions of the officers and men
of the British army. He implied it to be the act of American
incendiaries, several of whom, he informed Colonel Reed, had
been caught in the fact and instantly shot. General Howe, in his
private correspondence, makes the same assertion, and says they
were detected, and killed on the spot by the enraged troops in
garrison.
Enraged troops, with weapons in their hands, are not apt, in
a time of confusion and alarm, to be correct judges of fact, or
dispensers of justice. The act was always disclaimed by the
Americans, and it is certain their commanders knew nothing
bout it. We have shown that the destruction of the city was at
343one time discussed in a council of war as a measure of policy,
but never adopted, and was expressly forbidden by Congress.
The enemy were now bringing up their heavy cannon, preparatory
to an attack upon the American camp by the troops and by
the ships. What was the state of Washington’s army? The
terms of engagement of many of his men would soon be at an
end, most of them would terminate with the year, nor did Congress
hold out offers to encourage re-enlistments. “We are now,
as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution of the army,”
writes he, “and unless some speedy and effectual measures are
adopted by Congress, our cause will be lost.” Under these
gloomy apprehensions, he borrowed, as he said, “a few moments
from the hours allotted to sleep,” and on the night of the 24th
of September, penned an admirable letter to the President of
Congress, setting forth the total inefficiency of the existing military
system, the total insubordination, waste, confusion, and discontent
produced by it among the men, and the harassing cares
and vexations to which it subjected the commanders. Nor did
he content himself with complaining, but, in his full, clear, and
sagacious manner, pointed out the remedies. To the achievements
of his indefatigable pen, we may trace the most fortunate
turns in the current of our revolutionary affairs. In the present
instance his representations, illustrated by sad experience, produced
at length a reorganization of the army, and the establishment
of it on a permanent footing. It was decreed that eighty-eight
battalions should be furnished in quotas, by the different
States, according to their abilities. The pay of the officers was
raised. The troops which engaged to serve throughout the war
were to receive a bounty of twenty dollars and one hundred acres
of land, besides a yearly suit of clothes while in service. Those
344who enlisted for but three years, received no bounty in land.
The bounty to officers was on a higher ratio. The States were to
send commissioners to the army, to arrange with the commander-in-chief
as to the appointment of officers in their quotas; but, as
they might occasionally be slow in complying with this regulation,
Washington was empowered to fill up all vacancies.
All this was a great relief to his mind. He was gratified,
also, by effecting, after a long correspondence with the British
commander, an exchange of prisoners, in which those captured in
Canada were included. Among those restored to the service
were Lord Stirling and Captain Daniel Morgan. The latter, in
reward of his good conduct in the expedition with Arnold, and
of “his intrepid behavior in the assault upon Quebec where the
brave Montgomery fell,” was recommended to Congress by Washington
for the command of a rifle regiment about to be raised. We shall see
how eminently he proved himself worthy of this recommendation.
About this time information was received that the enemy
were enlisting great numbers of the loyalists of Long Island, and
collecting large quantities of stock for their support. Oliver De
Lancey, a leading loyalist of New York, member of a wealthy
family of honorable Huguenot descent, was a prime agent in the
matter. He had recently been appointed brigadier-general in the
royal service, and authorized by General Howe to raise a brigade
of provincials; and was actually at Jamaica, on Long Island,
offering commissions of captain, lieutenant and ensign, to any
respectable person who should raise a company of seventy men;
the latter to receive British pay.
A descent upon Long Island, to counteract these projects,
was concerted by General George Clinton of New York, an
345General Lincoln of Massachusetts, but men and water craft were
wanting to carry it into effect, and the “tory enlistments continued.”
They were not confined to Long Island, but prevailed
more or less on Staten Island, in the Jerseys, up the Hudson as
far as Dutchess County, and in Westchester County more especially.
Many of the loyalists, it must be acknowledged, were
honorable men, conscientiously engaged in the service of their
sovereign, and anxious to put down what they sincerely regarded
as an unjustifiable rebellion; and among these may be clearly
classed the De Lanceys. There were others, however, of a different
stamp, the most notorious of whom, at this juncture, was one
Robert Rogers of New Hampshire. He had been a worthy comrade
of Putnam and Stark, in some of their early enterprises
during the French war, and had made himself famous as major
of a partisan corps called Rogers’ Rangers. Governor Trumbull
described him as a “famous scouter and wood-hunter, skilled in
waylaying, ambuscade, and sudden attack.” His feats of arms
had evidently somewhat of the Indian character. He had since
been Governor of Michilimackinac (1766), and accused of a plot
to plunder his own fort and join the French. At the outbreak
of the Revolution he played a skulking, equivocal part, and appeared
ready to join either party. In 1775, Washington had received
notice that he was in Canada, in the service of Carleton,
and had been as a spy, disguised as an Indian, through the American
camp at St. Johns.
Recently, on learning that he was prowling about the country
under suspicious circumstances, Washington had caused him to be
arrested. On examination, he declared that he was on his way
to offer his secret services to Congress. He was accordingly sent
on to that body, in custody of an officer. Congress liberated
346him on his pledging himself in writing, “on the honor of a gentleman,”
not to bear arms against the American United Colonies
in any manner whatever, during the contest with Great Britain.
Scarcely was he liberated when he forfeited his parole, offered
his services to the enemy, received a colonel’s commission, and
was now actually raising a tory corps to be called the Queen’s
Rangers. All such as should bring recruits to his standard were
promised commissions, portions of rebel lands, and privileges
equal to any of his majesty’s troops.
Of all Americans of note enlisted under the royal standard,
this man had rendered himself the most odious. He was stigmatized
as an arrant renegade, a perfect Judas Iscariot; and his
daring, adventurous spirit and habits of Indian warfare rendered
him a formidable enemy.
Nothing perplexed Washington at this juncture more than
the conduct of the enemy. He beheld before him a hostile army,
armed and equipped at all points, superior in numbers, thoroughly
disciplined, flushed with success, and abounding in the means
of pushing a vigorous campaign, yet suffering day after day to
elapse unimproved. What could be the reason of this supineness
on the part of Sir William Howe? He must know the depressed
and disorganized state of the American camp; the absolute
chaos that reigned there. Did he meditate an irruption into the
Jerseys? A movement towards Philadelphia? Did he intend
to detach a part of his forces for a winter’s campaign against the
South?
In this uncertainty, Washington wrote to General Mercer, of the
flying camp, to keep a vigilant watch from the Jersey shore on the
movements of the enemy, by sea and land, and to station videttes
on the Neversink Heights, to give immediate intelligence should
347any of the British fleet put to sea. At the same time he himself
practised unceasing vigilance, visiting the different parts of
his camp on horseback. Occasionally he crossed over to Fort
Constitution, on the Jersey shore, of which General Greene had
charge, and, accompanied by him, extended his reconnoitrings
down to Paulus Hook, to observe what was going on in the city
and among the enemy’s ships. Greene had recently been promoted
to the rank of major-general, and now had command of all
the troops in the Jerseys. He had liberty to shift his quarters
to Baskingridge or Bergen, as circumstances might require; but
was enjoined to keep up a communication with the main army,
east of the Hudson, so as to secure a retreat in case of necessity.
The security of the Hudson was at this time an object of
great solicitude with Congress, and much reliance was placed on
Putnam’s obstructions at Fort Washington. Four galleys,
mounted with heavy guns and swivels, were stationed at the
chevaux-de-frise, and two new ships were at hand, which, filled
with stones, were to be sunk where they would block up the
channel. A sloop was also at anchor, having on board a machine,
invented by a Mr. Bushnell, for submarine explosion, with
which to blow up the men-of-war; a favorite scheme with General
Putnam. The obstructions were so commanded by batteries
on each shore, that it was thought no hostile ship would be able
to pass.
On the 9th of October, however, the Roebuck and Phœnix,
each of forty-four guns, and the Tartar of twenty guns, which
had been lying for some time opposite Bloomingdale, got under
way with their three tenders, at eight o’clock in the morning, and
came standing up the river with an easy southern breeze. At
348their approach, the galleys and the two ships intended to be sunk,
got under way with all haste, as did a schooner laden with rum,
sugar, and other supplies for the American army, and the sloop
with Bushnell’s submarine machine.
The Roebuck, Phœnix and Tartar, broke through the vaunted
barriers as through a cobweb. Seven batteries kept up a constant
fire upon them, yet a gentleman was observed walking the
deck of the second ship as coolly as if nothing were the matter.[118]
Washington, indeed, in a letter to Schuyler, says “they passed
without any kind of damage or interruption;” but Lord Howe
reports to the admiralty that they suffered much in their masts
and rigging, and that a lieutenant, two midshipmen, and six men
were killed, and eighteen wounded.
The hostile ships kept on their course, the American vessels
scudding before them. The schooner was overhauled and captured;
a well-aimed shot sent the sloop and Bushnell’s submarine
engine to the bottom of the river. The two new ships would
have taken refuge in Spyt den Duivel Creek, but fearing there
might not be water enough, they kept on and drove ashore at
Philips’ Mills at Yonkers. Two of the galleys got into a place
of safety, where they were protected from the shore; the other
two trusted to outsail their pursuers. The breeze freshened, and
the frigates gained on them fast; at 11 o’clock began to fire on
them with their bow-chasers, and at 12 o’clock overreached them,
which caused them to bear in shore; at half past one the galleys
ran aground just above Dobbs’ Ferry, and lay exposed to a
shower of grape-shot. The crews, without stopping to burn or
bilge them, swam on shore, and the enemy took possession of the
349two galleys, which were likely to be formidable means of annoyance
in their hands.
One express after another brought Washington word of these
occurrences. First, he sent off a party of rifle and artillery men,
with two twelve-pounders, to secure the new ships which had run
aground at Yonkers. Next, he ordered Colonel Sargent to march
up along the eastern shore with five hundred infantry, a troop of
light-horse, and a detachment of artillery, to prevent the landing
of the enemy. Before the troops arrived at Dobbs’ Ferry the
ships’ boats had plundered a store there, and set it on fire.
To prevent, if possible, the men-of-war already up the river
from coming down, or others from below joining them, Washington
gave orders to complete the obstructions. Two hulks which
lay in Spyt den Duivel Creek, were hastily ballasted by men from
General Heath’s division, and men were sent up to get off the
ships which had run aground at Philips’ Mills, that they might
be brought down and sunk immediately.
It is difficult to give an idea of the excitement caused by this
new irruption of hostile ships into the waters of the Hudson, or
of the various conjectures as to their object. They might intend
merely to interrupt navigation, and prevent supplies from coming
down to the American army. They might be carrying arms and
ammunition for domestic enemies skulking about the river, and
only waiting an opportunity to strike a blow. They might have
troops concealed on board with intent to surprise the posts in the
Highlands, and cut off the intercourse between the American
armies. To such a degree had the spirit of disaffection been increased
in the counties adjacent to the river, since the descent of
the Rose and Phœnix, by the retreats and evacuation which had
taken place; and so great had been the drain on the militia of
350those counties for the army of Washington, that, in case of insurrection,
those who remained at home and were well-affected,
would be outnumbered, and might easily be overpowered, especially
with the aid of troops landed from ships.
While this agitation prevailed below, fugitive river crafts carried
the news up to the Highlands that the frigates were already
before Tarrytown in the Tappan Sea. Word was instantly despatched
to Peter R. Livingston, president of the Provincial
Congress, and startled that deliberative body, which was then
seated at Fishkill just above the Highlands. The committee of
safety wrote, on the spur of the moment, to Washington.
“Nothing,” say they, “can be more alarming than the present
situation of our State. We are daily getting the most authentic
intelligence of bodies of men enlisted and armed in order to
assist the enemy. We much fear that they, co-operating with the
enemy, may seize such passes as will cut off the communication
between the army and us, and prevent your supplies. * * * *
We beg leave to suggest to your Excellency the propriety of
sending a body of men to the Highlands or Peekskill, to secure
the passes, prevent insurrection, and overawe the disaffected.”
Washington transmitted the letter to the President of Congress
on the 12th. “I have ordered up,” writes he, “part of the
militia from Massachusetts, under General Lincoln, to prevent,
if possible, the consequences which they suggest may happen, and
which there is reason to believe the conspirators have in contemplation.
I am persuaded that they are on the eve of breaking
out, and that they will leave nothing unessayed that will distress
us, and favor the designs of the enemy, as soon as their schemes
are ripe for it.” In fact, it was said that the tories were arming
and collecting in the Highlands under the direction of disguised
351officers, to aid the conspiracies formed by Governor Tryon and
his adherents.
As a further precaution, an express was sent off by Washington
to Colonel Tash, who, with a regiment of New Hampshire
militia, was on his way from Hartford to the camp, ordering him
to repair with all possible dispatch to Fishkill, and there hold
himself at the disposition of the committee of safety.
James Clinton, also, who had charge of the posts in the Highlands,
was put on the alert. That trusty officer was now a brigadier-general,
having been promoted by Congress, on the 8th of
August. He was charged to have all boats passing up and down
the river rigidly searched, and the passengers examined. Beside
the usual sentries, a barge, well manned, was to patrol the river
opposite to each fort every night; all barges, row-boats, and other
small craft, between the forts in the Highlands and the army,
were to be secured in a place of safety, to prevent their falling
into the enemy’s hands and giving intelligence. Moreover, a
French engineer was sent up to aid in strengthening and securing
the passes. The commanding officers of the counties of Litchfield
and Fairfield in Connecticut, had, likewise, orders to hold
their militia in readiness to render assistance in case of insurrections
in the State of New York.
So perilous appeared the condition of affairs to residents up
the river, that John Jay, a member of the New York Convention,
and one of the secret committee for the defence of the
Hudson, applied for leave of absence, that he might remove his
aged parents to a place of safety. A letter from him to Edward
Rutledge, of the Board of War, contains this remarkable sentence:
“I wish our army well stationed in the Highlands, and
352all the lower country desolated; we might then bid defiance to
all the further efforts of the enemy in that quarter.”
Nor was this a random or despairing wish. It shows a brave
spirit of a leading civilian of the day, and the sacrifices that true
patriots were disposed to make in the cause of independence.
But a few days previously he had held the following language
to Gouverneur Morris, chairman of a special committee: “Had
I been vested with absolute power in this State, I have often said,
and still think, that I would last spring have desolated all Long
Island, Staten Island, the city and county of New York, and all
that part of the county of Westchester which lies below the
mountains. I would then have stationed the main body of the
army in the mountains on the east, and eight or ten thousand men
in the Highlands on the west side of the river. I would have
directed the river at Fort Montgomery, which is nearly at the
southern extremity of the mountains, to be so shallowed as to
afford only depth sufficient for an Albany sloop, and all the
southern passes and defiles in the mountains to be strongly fortified.
Nor do I think the shallowing of the river a romantic
scheme. Rocky mountains rise immediately from the shores.
The breadth is not very great, though the depth is. But what
cannot eight or ten thousand men, well worked, effect? According
to this plan of defence the State would be absolutely impregnable
against all the world, on the seaside, and would have
nothing to fear except from the way of the lake. Should the
enemy gain the river, even below the mountains, I think I foresee
that a retreat would become necessary, and I can’t forbear
wishing that a desire of saving a few acres may not lead us into
difficulties.”[119]
353Three days after this remarkable letter was written, the
enemy’s ships did gain the river; and two days afterwards,
October 11th, Reed, the adjutant-general, the confidant of Washington’s
councils, writes to his wife from Harlem Heights: “My
most sanguine views do not extend further than keeping our
ground here till this campaign closes. If the enemy incline to
press us, it is resolved to risk an engagement, for, if we cannot
fight them on this ground, we can on none in America. The
ships are the only circumstances unfavorable to us here.”
On the same day that this letter was written, a small vessel,
sloop-rigged, with a topsail, was descried from Mount Washington,
coming down the river with a fresh breeze. It was suspected
by those on the look-out to be one of the British tenders,
and they gave it a shot from a twelve-pounder. Their aim was
unfortunately too true. Three of the crew were killed and the
captain wounded. It proved to be Washington’s yacht, which
had run up the river previously to the enemy’s ships, and was
now on its return.[120]
CHAPTER XXXVI. LEE EXPECTED IN CAMP—HIS LETTER OF ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS—THE ENEMY AT THROG’S NECK—WASHINGTON’S ARRANGEMENTS—RIDES TO THROG’S NECK—THE ENEMY BROUGHT TO A STAND—MILITARY MOVEMENTS—ARRIVAL OF LEE—A COMMAND ASSIGNED TO HIM—CRITICISES THE CONDUCT OF CONGRESS AND THE ARMY—COUNCIL OF WAR—THE ARMY TO MOVE TO THE MAINLAND—FORT WASHINGTON TO BE KEPT UP.
354
“If General Lee should be in Philadelphia,” writes John Jay to
Rutledge, “pray hasten his departure—he is much wanted at
New York.” The successes of Lee at the South were contrasted
by many with the defeat on Long Island, and evacuation of
New York, and they began to consider him the main hope of the
army. Hazard, the postmaster, writing from Harlem Heights to
General Gates on the 11th, laments it as a misfortune that Lee
should have been to the southward for several months past, but
adds cheeringly, “he is expected here to-day.”
Joseph Trumbull, the commissary-general, also writes to
Gates under the same date: “General Lee is to be here this
evening. He left Philadelphia on the 8th.”
Lee, the object of so many hopes, was actually in the Jerseys,
on his way to the camp. He writes from Amboy on the
12th, to the President of Congress, informing him, that the Hessians,
355encamped opposite on Staten Island, had disappeared on the
preceding night, quitting the island entirely, and some great
measure was believed to be in agitation. “I am confident,”
writes he, “they will not attack General Washington’s lines; such
a measure is too absurd for a man of Mr. Howe’s genius; and unless
they have received flattering accounts from Burgoyne, that he
will be able to effectuate a junction (which I conceive they have
not), they will no longer remain kicking their heels at New York.
They will put the place in a respectable state of defence, which,
with their command of the waters, may be easily done, leave four
or five thousand men, and direct their operations to a more decisive
object. They will infallibly proceed either immediately up
the river Delaware with their whole troops, or, what is more probable,
land somewhere about South Amboy or Shrewsbury, and
march straight to Trenton or Burlington. On the supposition
that this will be the case, what are we to do? What force have
we? What means have we to prevent their possessing themselves
of Philadelphia? General Washington’s army cannot possibly
keep pace with them. The length of his route is not only
infinitely greater, but his obstructions almost insuperable. In
short, before he could cross Hudson River, they might be lodged
and strongly fortified on both banks of the Delaware, * *
For Heaven’s sake, arouse yourselves! For Heaven’s sake let
ten thousand men be immediately assembled, and stationed somewhere
about Trenton. In my opinion, your whole depends upon
it. I set out immediately for head-quarters, where I shall communicate
my apprehension that such will be the next operation
of the enemy, and urge the expediency of sparing a part of his
army (if he has any to spare) for this object.”[121]
356On the very morning that Lee was writing this letter at Amboy,
Washington received intelligence by express from General
Heath, stationed above King’s Bridge, that the enemy were landing
with artillery on Throg’s Neck[122] in the Sound, about nine
miles from the camp. Washington surmised that Howe was pursuing
his original plan of getting into the rear of the American
army, cutting off its supplies, which were chiefly derived from
the East, and interrupting its communication with the main
country. Officers were ordered to their alarm posts, and the
troops to be ready, under arms, to act as occasion might require.
Word, at the same time, was sent to General Heath to dispose of
the troops on his side of King’s Bridge, and of two militia regiments
posted on the banks of Harlem River opposite the camp,
in such manner as he should think necessary.
Having made all his arrangements as promptly as possible,
Washington mounted his horse, and rode over towards Throg’s
Neck to reconnoitre.
Throg’s Neck is a peninsula in Westchester County, stretching
upwards of two miles into the Sound. It was separated from
the mainland by a narrow creek and a marsh, and was surrounded
by water every high tide. A bridge across a creek connecting
with a ruined causeway across the marsh, led to the mainland, and
the upper end of the creek was fordable at low water. Early in
the morning, eighty or ninety boats full of men had stood up the
Sound from Montresor’s Island, and Long Island, and had landed
troops to the number of four thousand on Throg’s Point, the extremity
of the neck. Thence their advance pushed forward
toward the causeway and bridge, to secure that pass to the mainland.
357General Heath had been too rapid for them. Colonel
Hand and his Philadelphia riflemen, the same who had checked
the British advance on Long Island, had taken up the planks of
the bridge, and posted themselves opposite the end of the causeway,
whence they commenced firing with their rifles. They were soon
reinforced by Colonel Prescott, of Bunker’s Hill renown, with his
regiment, and Lieutenant Bryant of the artillery, with a three-pounder.
Checked at this pass, the British moved toward the
head of the creek; here they found the Americans in possession
of the ford, where they were reinforced by Colonel Graham, of
the New York line, with his regiment, and Lieutenant Jackson
of the artillery, with a six-pounder. These skilful dispositions
of his troops by General Heath had brought the enemy to a
stand. By the time Washington arrived in the vicinity, the
British had encamped on the neck; the riflemen and yagers keeping
up a scattering fire at each other across the marsh; and Captain
Bryant now and then saluting the enemy with his field-piece.
Having surveyed the ground, Washington ordered works to
be thrown up at the passes from the neck to the mainland. The
British also threw up a work at the end of the causeway. In the
afternoon nine ships, with a great number of schooners, sloops,
and flat-bottomed boats full of men, passed through Hell Gate,
towards Throg’s Point; and information received from two deserters,
gave Washington reason to believe that the greater part
of the enemy’s forces were gathering in that quarter. General
McDougall’s brigade, in which were Colonel Smallwood and the
independent companies, was sent in the evening to strengthen
Heath’s division at King’s Bridge, and to throw up works opposite
the ford of Harlem River.
Greene, who had heard of the landing of the enemy at
358Throg’s Neck, wrote over to Washington, from Fort Constitution,
informing him that he had three brigades ready to join him if
required. “If the troops are wanted over your side,” said he,
“or likely to be so, they should be got over in the latter part of
the night, as the shipping may move up from below, and impede,
if not totally stop the troops from passing. The tents upon
Staten Island,” he added, “had all been struck, as far as could
be ascertained.” It was plain the whole scene of action was
changing.
On the 14th, General Lee arrived in camp, where he was
welcomed as the harbinger of good luck. Washington was absent,
visiting the posts beyond King’s Bridge, and the passes
leading from Throg’s Neck; Lee immediately rode forth to join
him. No one gave him a sincerer greeting than the commander-in-chief;
who, diffident of his own military knowledge, had a
high opinion of that of Lee. He immediately gave him command
of the troops above King’s Bridge, now the greatest part
of the army, but desired that he would not exercise it for a day
or two, until he had time to acquaint himself with the localities
and arrangements of the post; Heath, in the interim, held the
command.
Lee was evidently elevated by his successes at the South, and
disposed to criticise disparagingly the military operations of
other commanders. In a letter, written on the day of his arrival
to his old associate in arms, General Gates, he condemns the position
of the army, and censures Washington for submitting to
the dictation of Congress, whose meddlesome instructions had
produced it. “Inter nos,” writes he, “the Congress seem to
stumble every step. I do not mean one or two of the cattle, but
the whole stable. I have been very free in delivering my opinion
359to them. In my opinion General Washington is much to blame
in not menacing ’em with resignation, unless they refrain from
unhinging the army by their absurd interference.
“Keep us Ticonderoga; much depends upon it. We ought
to have an army in the Delaware. I have roared it in the ears of
Congress, but carent auribus. Adieu, my dear friend; if we do
meet again—why, we shall smile.”[123]
In the mean time, Congress, on the 11th of October, having
heard of the ingress of the Phœnix, Roebuck and Tartar, passed
a resolution that General Washington be desired, if it be practicable,
by every art, and at whatever expense, to obstruct effectually
the navigation of the North River between Fort Washington
and Mount Constitution, as well to prevent the regress of the
enemy’s vessels lately gone up as to hinder them from receiving
succors.
Under so many conflicting circumstances, Washington held
a council of war on the 16th, at Lee’s head-quarters, at which
all the major-generals were present excepting Greene, and all
the brigadiers, as well as Colonel Knox, who commanded the
artillery. Letters from the Convention and from individual
members of it were read, concerning the turbulence of the
disaffected in the upper parts of the State; intelligence gained
from deserters was likewise stated, showing the intention of
the enemy to surround the camp. The policy was then discussed
of remaining in their present position on Manhattan Island,
and awaiting there the menaced attack: the strength of the position
was urged; its being well fortified, and extremely difficult of
access. Lee, in reply, scoffed at the idea of a position being good
360merely because its approaches were difficult. How could they
think of holding a position where the enemy were so strong in
front and rear; where ships had the command of the water on
each side, and where King’s Bridge was their only pass by which
to escape from being wholly enclosed? Had not their recent experience
on Long Island and at New York taught them the danger
of such positions? “For my part,” said he, “I would have
nothing to do with the islands to which you have been clinging
so pertinaciously—I would give Mr. Howe a fee-simple of
them.”
“After much consideration and debate,” says the record of the
council, “the following question was stated: Whether (it having
appeared that the obstructions in the North River have proved insufficient,
and that the enemy’s whole force is now in our rear on
Frog Point) it is now deemed possible, in our situation, to
prevent the enemy from cutting off the communication with the
country, and compelling us to fight them at all disadvantages
or surrender prisoners at discretion?”
All agreed, with but one dissenting voice, that it was not possible
to prevent the communication from being cut off, and that
one of the consequences mentioned in the question must follow.
The dissenting voice was that of General George Clinton, a
brave downright man, but little versed in the science of warfare.
He could not comprehend the policy of abandoning so strong a
position; they were equal in number to the enemy, and, as they
must fight them somewhere, could do it to more advantage
there than any where else. Clinton felt as a guardian of the
Hudson and the upper country, and wished to meet the enemy, as
it were, at the very threshold.
As the resolve of Congress seemed imperative with regard to
361Fort Washington, that post, it was agreed, should be “retained
as long as possible.”
A strong garrison was accordingly placed in it, composed
chiefly of troops from Magaw’s and Shee’s Pennsylvania regiments,
the latter under Lieutenant-colonel Lambert Cadwalader,
of Philadelphia. Shee having obtained leave of absence, Colonel
Magaw was put in command of the post, and solemnly charged
by Washington to defend it to the last extremity. The name of
the opposite post on the Jersey shore, where Greene was stationed,
was changed from Fort Constitution to Fort Lee, in honor of the
general. Lee, in fact, was the military idol of the day. Even
the family of the commander in-chief joined in paying him homage.
Colonel Tench Tilghman, Washington’s aide-de-camp, in a letter
to a friend, writes: “You ask if General Lee is in health, and
our people bold. I answer both in the affirmative. His appearance
amongst us has contributed not a little to the latter.”
CHAPTER XXXVII. ARMY ARRANGEMENTS—WASHINGTON AT WHITE PLAINS—THE ENEMY AT THROG’S POINT—SKIRMISH OF COLONEL GLOVER—ATTEMPT TO SURPRISE ROGERS, THE RENEGADE—TROOPERS IN A ROUGH COUNTRY—ALARMS AT WHITE PLAINS—CANNONADING OF SHIPS AT FORT WASHINGTON—MARCH OF LEE—FORTIFIED CAMP AT WHITE PLAINS—RECONNOITRING—THE AFFAIR AT CHATTERTON HILL—RELATIVE SITUATION OF THE ARMIES—CHANGE OF POSITION—CONTRAST OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE TROOPS—GEORGE CLINTON’S IDEA OF STRATEGY—MOVEMENT OF THE BRITISH ARMY—INCENDIARIES AT WHITE PLAINS.
362
Previous to decamping from Manhattan Island, Washington
formed four divisions of the army, which were respectively assigned
to Generals Lee, Heath, Sullivan (recently obtained in
exchange for General Prescott), and Lincoln. Lee was stationed
on Valentine’s Hill on the mainland, immediately opposite King’s
Bridge, to cover the transportation across it of the military stores
and heavy baggage. The other divisions were to form a chain of
fortified posts, extending about thirteen miles along a ridge of
hills on the west side of the Bronx, from Lee’s camp up to the
village of White Plains.
Washington’s head-quarters continued to be on Harlem
Heights for several days, during which time he was continually in
the saddle, riding about a broken, woody, and half wild country,
363forming posts, and choosing sites for breastworks and redoubts.
By his skilful disposition of the army, it was protected in its
whole length by the Bronx, a narrow but deep stream, fringed
with trees, which ran along the foot of the ridge; at the same
time his troops faced and outflanked the enemy, and covered the
roads along which the stores and baggage had to be transported.
On the 21st, he shifted his head-quarters to Valentine’s Hill, and
on the 23d to White Plains, where he stationed himself in a
fortified camp.
While he was thus incessantly in action, General, now Sir
William Howe (having recently, in reward for his services, been
made a knight companion of the Bath), remained for six days
passive in his camp on Throg’s Point, awaiting the arrival of
supplies and reinforcements, instead of pushing across to the
Hudson, and throwing himself between Washington’s army and
the upper country. His inaction lost him a golden opportunity.
By the time his supplies arrived, the Americans had broken up
the causeway leading to the mainland, and taken positions too
strong to be easily forced.
Finding himself headed in this direction, Sir William reembarked
part of his troops in flat-boats on the 18th, crossed
Eastchester Bay, and landed on Pell’s Point, at the mouth of
Hutchinson’s River. Here he was joined in a few hours by the
main body, with the baggage and artillery, and proceeded
through the manor of Pelham towards New Rochelle; still with
a view to get above Washington’s army.
In their march, the British were waylaid and harassed by
Colonel Glover of Massachusetts, with his own, Reed’s, and
Shepard’s regiments of infantry. Twice the British advance
guard were thrown into confusion and driven back with severe
364loss, by a sharp fire from behind stone fences. A third time they
advanced in solid columns. The Americans gave them repeated
volleys, and then retreated with the loss of eight killed and
thirteen wounded, among whom was Colonel Shepard. Colonel
Glover, and the officers and soldiers who were with him in this
skirmish, received the public thanks of Washington for their merit
and good behavior.
On the 21st, General Howe was encamped about two miles
north of New Rochelle, with his outposts extending to Mamaroneck
on the Sound. At the latter place was posted Colonel Rogers,
the renegade, as he was called, with the Queen’s Rangers, his
newly-raised corps of loyalists.
Hearing of this, Lord Stirling resolved, if possible, to cut off
this outpost and entrap the old hunter. Colonel Haslet, of his
brigade, always prompt on such occasions, undertook the exploit
at the head of seven hundred and fifty of the Delaware troops,
who had fought so bravely on Long Island. With these he
crossed the line of the British march; came undiscovered upon
the post; drove in the guard; killed a lieutenant and several
men, and brought away thirty-six prisoners, with a pair of colors,
sixty stands of arms, and other spoils. He missed the main
prize, however,—Rogers skulked off in the dark at the first fire.
He was too old a partisan to be easily entrapped.
For this exploit, Colonel Haslet and his men were publicly
thanked by Lord Stirling, on parade.
These, and other spirited and successful skirmishes, while
they retarded the advance of the enemy, had the far more
important effect of exercising and animating the American troops,
and accustoming them to danger.
While in this neighborhood, Howe was reinforced by a second
365division of Hessians under General Knyphausen, and a regiment
of Waldeckers, both of which had recently arrived in New York.
He was joined, also, by the whole of the seventeenth light dragoons,
and a part of the sixteenth, which had arrived on the 3d
instant from Ireland, with Lieutenant-colonel (afterwards Earl)
Harcourt. Some of their horses had been brought with them
across the sea, others had been procured since their arrival.
The Americans at first regarded these troopers with great
dread. Washington, therefore, took pains to convince them, that
in a rough, broken country, like the present, full of stone fences,
no troops were so inefficient as cavalry. They could be waylaid
and picked off by sharp shooters from behind walls and thickets,
while they could not leave the road to pursue their covert foe.
Further to inspirit them against this new enemy, he proclaimed,
in general orders, a reward of one hundred dollars for every
trooper brought in with his horse and accoutrements, and so on,
in proportion to the completeness of the capture.
On the 25th, about two o’clock in the afternoon, intelligence
was brought to head-quarters that three or four detachments of
the enemy were on the march, within four miles of the camp, and
the main army following in columns. The drums beat to arms;
the men were ordered to their posts; an attack was expected.
The day passed away, however, without any demonstration of the
enemy. Howe detached none of his force on lateral expeditions,
evidently meditating a general engagement. To prepare for it,
Washington drew all his troops from the posts along the Bronx
into the fortified camp at White Plains. Here every thing
remained quiet but expectant, throughout the 26th. In the
morning of the 27th, which was Sunday, the heavy booming of
cannon was heard from a distance, seemingly in the direction of
366Fort Washington. Scouts galloped off to gain intelligence.
We will anticipate their report.
Two of the British frigates, at seven o’clock in the morning,
had moved up the Hudson, and come to anchor near Bourdett’s
Ferry, below the Morris House, Washington’s old head-quarters,
apparently with the intention of stopping the ferry, and cutting
off the communication between Fort Lee and Fort Washington.
At the same time, troops made their appearance on Harlem
Plains, where Lord Percy held command. Colonel Morgan
immediately manned the lines with troops from the garrison of
Fort Washington. The ships opened a fire to enfilade and dislodge
them. A barbette battery on the cliffs of the Jersey
shore, left of the ferry, fired down upon the frigate, but with little
effect. Colonel Magaw got down an eighteen-pounder to the
lines near the Morris House, and fired fifty or sixty rounds, two
balls at a time. Two eighteen-pounders were likewise brought
down from Fort Lee, and planted opposite the ships. By the fire
from both shores they were hulled repeatedly.
It was the thundering of these cannonades which had reached
Washington’s camp at White Plains, and even startled the Highlands
of the Hudson. The ships soon hoisted all sail. The
foremost slipped her cable, and appeared to be in the greatest
confusion. She could make no way, though towed by two boats.
The other ship seeing her distress, sent two barges to her assistance,
and by the four boats she was dragged out of reach of the
American fire, her pumps going all the time. “Had the tide been
flood one half hour longer,” writes General Greene, “we should
have sunk her.”
At the time that the fire from the ships began, Lord Percy
brought up his field-pieces and mortars, and made an attack upon
367the lines. He was resolutely answered by the troops sent down
from Fort Washington, and several Hessians were killed. An
occasional firing was kept up until evening, when the ships fell
down the river, and the troops which had advanced on Harlem
Plains drew within their lines again.
“We take this day’s movement to be only a feint,” writes one
of the garrison at Fort Lee; “at any rate, it is little honorable
to the red coats.” Its chief effect was to startle the distant camp,
and astound a quiet country with the thundering din of war.
The celebrated Thomas Paine, author of “The Rights of
Man,” and other political works, was a spectator of the affair
from the rocky summit of the Palisades, on the Jersey shore.
While these things were passing at Fort Washington, Lee had
struck his tents, and with the rear division, eight thousand
strong, the baggage and artillery, and a train of waggons four
miles long, laden with stores and ammunition, was lumbering
along the rough country roads to join the main army. It was
not until Monday morning, after being on the road all night,
that he arrived at White Plains.
Washington’s camp was situated on high ground, facing the
east. The right wing stretched towards the south along a rocky
hill, at the foot of which the Bronx, making an elbow, protected
it in flank and rear. The left wing rested on a small, deep lake
among the hills. The camp was strongly intrenched in front.
About a quarter of a mile to the right of the camp, and separated
from the height on which it stood by the Bronx and a
marshy interval, was a corresponding height called Chatterton’s
Hill. As this partly commanded the right flank, and as the
intervening bend of the Bronx was easily passable, Washington
had stationed on its summit a militia regiment.
368The whole encampment was a temporary one, to be changed
as soon as the military stores collected there could be removed;
and now that General Lee was arrived, Washington rode out with
him, and other general officers who were off duty, to reconnoitre
a height which appeared more eligible. When arrived at it, Lee
pointed to another on the north, still more commanding. “Yonder,”
said he, “is the ground we ought to occupy.” “Let us
go, then, and view it,” replied Washington. They were gently
riding in that direction, when a trooper came spurring up his
panting horse. “The British are in the camp, sir!” cried he.
“Then, gentlemen,” said Washington, “we have other business
to attend to than reconnoitring.” Putting spurs to his horse, he
set off for the camp at full gallop, the others spurring after him.
Arrived at head-quarters, he was informed by Adjutant-general
Reed, that the picket guards had all been driven in, and the
enemy were advancing: but that the whole American army was
posted in order of battle. “Gentlemen,” said Washington, turning
calmly to his companions, “you will return to your respective
posts, and do the best you can.”
Apprehensive that the enemy might attempt to get possession
of Chatterton’s Hill, he detached Colonel Haslet with his Delaware
regiment, to reinforce the militia posted there. To these he
soon added General McDougall’s brigade, composed of Smallwood’s
Marylanders, Ritzema’s New Yorkers, and two other regiments.
These were much reduced by sickness and absence.
General McDougall had command of the whole force upon the
hill, which did not exceed 1,600 men.
These dispositions were scarcely made, when the enemy appeared
glistening on the high grounds beyond the village of White
Plains. They advanced in two columns, the right commanded by
369Sir Henry Clinton, the left by the Hessian general, De Heister.
There was also a troop of horse; so formidable in the inexperienced
eyes of the Americans. “It was a brilliant but formidable
sight,” writes Heath in his memoirs. “The sun shone bright,
their arms glittered; and perhaps troops never were shown to
more advantage.”
For a time they halted in a wheat field, behind a rising
ground, and the general officers rode up in the centre to hold a
consultation. Washington supposed they were preparing to
attack him in front, and such indeed was their intention; but the
commanding height of Chatterton’s Hill had caught Sir William’s
eye, and he determined first to get possession of it.
Colonel Rahl was accordingly detached with a brigade of
Hessians, to make a circuit southwardly round a piece of wood,
cross the Bronx about a quarter of a mile below, and ascend
the south side of the hill; while General Leslie, with a large
force, British and Hessian, should advance directly in front,
throw a bridge across the stream, and charge up the hill.
A furious cannonade was now opened by the British from
fifteen or twenty pieces of artillery, placed on high ground opposite
the hill; under cover of which, the troops of General Leslie
hastened to construct the bridge. In so doing, they were severely
galled by two field-pieces, planted on a ledge of rock on Chatterton’s
Hill, and in charge of Alexander Hamilton, the youthful
captain of artillery. Smallwood’s Maryland battalion, also, kept
up a sharp fire of small arms.
As soon as the bridge was finished, the British and Hessians
under Leslie rushed over it, formed, and charged up the hill to
take Hamilton’s two field-pieces. Three times the two field-pieces
were discharged, ploughing the ascending columns from
370hill-top to river, while Smallwood’s “blue and buff” Marylanders
kept up their volleys of musketry.
In the mean time, Rahl and his Hessian brigade forded the
Bronx lower down, pushed up the south side of the hill, and
endeavored to turn McDougall’s right flank. The militia gave
the general but little support. They had been dismayed at the
opening of the engagement by a shot from a British cannon,
which wounded one of them in the thigh, and nearly put the
whole to flight. It was with the utmost difficulty McDougall had
rallied them, and posted them behind a stone wall. Here they
did some service, until a troop of British cavalry, having gained
the crest of the hill, came on, brandishing their sabres. At their
first charge the militia gave a random, scattering fire, then broke,
and fled in complete confusion.
A brave stand was made on the summit of the hill by Haslet,
Ritzema, and Smallwood, with their troops. Twice they repulsed
horse and foot, British and Hessians, until, cramped for
room and greatly outnumbered, they slowly and sullenly retreated
down the north side of the hill, where there was a bridge
across the Bronx. Smallwood remained upon the ground for
some time after the retreat had begun, and received two flesh
wounds, one in the hip, the other through the arm. At the
bridge over the Bronx, the retreating troops were met by General
Putnam, who was coming to their assistance with Beall’s
brigade. In the rear of this they marched back into the camp.
The loss on both sides, in this short but severe action, was
nearly equal. That of the Americans was between three and
four hundred men, killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. At
first it was thought to be much more, many of the militia and
a few of the regulars being counted as lost, who had scattered
371themselves among the hills, but afterwards returned to head-quarters.
The British army now rested with their left wing on the hill
they had just taken, and which they were busy intrenching.
They were extending their right wing to the left of the American
lines, so that their two wings and centre formed nearly a
semicircle. It was evidently their design to outflank the American
camp, and get in the rear of it. The day, however, being
far advanced, was suffered to pass without any further attack;
but the morrow was looked forward to for a deadly conflict.
Washington availed himself of this interval to have the sick and
wounded, and as much of the stores as possible, removed from the
camp. “The two armies,” says General Heath in his Memoirs,
“lay looking at each other, within long cannon shot. In the
night time the British lighted up a vast number of fires, the
weather growing pretty cold. These fires, some on the level
ground, some at the foot of the hills, and at all distances to their
brows, some of which were lofty, seemed to the eye to mix with
the stars. The American side doubtless exhibited to them a
similar appearance.”
During this anxious night, Washington was assiduously
occupied throwing back his right wing to stronger ground;
doubling his intrenchments and constructing three redoubts,
with a line in front, on the summit of his post. These works
were principally intended for defence against small arms, and
were thrown up with a rapidity that to the enemy must have
savored of magic. They were, in fact, made of the stalks of
Indian corn or maize taken from a neighboring corn-field, and
pulled up with the earth clinging in masses to the large roots.
“The roots of the stalks,” says Heath, “and earth on them placed
372in the face of the works, answered the purpose of sods and
fascines. The tops being placed inwards, as the loose earth was
thrown upon them, became as so many trees to the work, which
was carried up with a despatch scarcely conceivable.”
In the morning of the 29th, when Howe beheld how greatly
Washington had improved his position and strengthened it, by
what appeared to be solidly constructed works, he postponed his
meditated assault, ordered up Lord Percy from Harlem with the
fourth brigade and two battalions of the sixth, and proceeded to
throw up lines and redoubts in front of the American camp, as
if preparing to cannonade it. As the enemy were endeavoring
to outflank him, especially on his right wing, Washington apprehended
one of their objects might be to advance a part of their
force, and seize on Pine’s Bridge over Croton River, which would
cut off his communication with the upper country. General
Beall, with three Maryland regiments, was sent off with all
expedition to secure that pass. It was Washington’s idea that,
having possession of Croton River and the passes in the Highlands,
his army would be safe from further pursuit, and have
time to repose after its late excessive fatigue, and would be fresh,
and ready to harass the enemy should they think fit to winter
up the country.
At present nothing could exceed the war-worn condition of
the troops, unseasoned as they were to this kind of service. A
scornful letter, written at this time by a British officer, to his
friend in London, gives a picture of the ragged plight to which
they were reduced, in this rainy and inclement season. “The
rebel army are in so wretched a condition as to clothing and
accoutrements, that I believe no nation ever saw such a set of
tatterdemalions. There are few coats among them but what are
373out at elbows, and in a whole regiment there is scarce a pair of
breeches. Judge, then, how they must be pinched by a winter’s
campaign. We, who are warmly clothed and well equipped,
already feel it severely; for it is even now much colder than I
ever felt it in England.”
Alas for the poor half-naked, weather-beaten patriots, who
had to cope with these well-fed, well-clad, well-appointed mercenaries!
A letter written at the very same date (October 31), by
General George Clinton, shows what, in their forlorn plight, they
had to grapple with.
“We had reason,” writes he, “to apprehend an attack last
night, or by daylight this morning. Our lines were manned all
night in consequence; and a most horrid night it was to lay in
cold trenches. Uncovered as we are, daily on fatigue, making
redoubts, fleches, abattis, and retreating from them and the little
temporary huts made for our comfort before they are well finished,
I fear will ultimately destroy our army without fighting.”[124]
“However,” adds he, honestly, “I would not be understood to
condemn measures. They may be right for aught I know. I
do not understand much of the refined art of war; it is said to
consist in stratagem and deception.” In a previous letter to the
same friend, in a moment of hurry and alarm, he writes, “Pray
let Mrs. Clinton know that I am well, and that she need not be
uneasy about me. It would be too much honor to die in so good
a cause.”
Clinton, as we have before intimated, was an honest and ardent
patriot, of resolute spirit, and plain, direct good sense;
but an inexperienced soldier. His main idea of warfare was
374straightforward fighting; and he was greatly perplexed by the
continual strategy which Washington’s situation required. One
of the aides-de-camp of the latter had a truer notion on the subject.
“The campaign hitherto,” said he, “has been a fair trial
of generalship, in which I flatter myself we have had the advantage.
If we, with our motley army, can keep Mr. Howe and his
grand appointment at bay, I think we shall make no contemptible
military figure.”[125]
On the night of the 31st, Washington made another of those
moves which perplexed the worthy Clinton. In the course of
the night he shifted his whole position, set fire to the barns and
out-houses containing forage and stores, which there was no time
to remove, and, leaving a strong rear-guard on the heights, and
in the neighboring woods, retired with his main army a distance
of five miles, among the high, rocky hills about Northcastle.
Here he immediately set to work to intrench and fortify himself;
his policy at this time being, as he used to say, “to fight with
the spade and mattock.”
General Howe did not attempt to dislodge him from this fastness.
He at one time ordered an attack on the rear-guard, but a
violent rain prevented it, and for two or three days he remained
seemingly inactive. “All matters are as quiet as if the enemy
were one hundred miles distant from us,” writes one of Washington’s
aides on the 2d of November. During the night of the
4th, this quiet was interrupted. A mysterious sound was heard
in the direction of the British camp; like the rumbling of waggons
and artillery. At daybreak the meaning of it was discovered.
The enemy were decamping. Long trains were observed,
375defiling across the hilly country, along the roads leading to
Dobbs’ Ferry on the Hudson. The movement continued for
three successive days, until their whole force, British and Hessians,
disappeared from White Plains.
The night after their departure a party of Americans, heated
with liquor, set fire to the court-house and other edifices in the
village, as if they had belonged to the enemy; an outrage which
called forth a general order from Washington, expressive of his
indignation, and threatening the perpetrators with signal punishment
when detected. We notice this matter, because in British
accounts, the burning of those buildings had been charged upon
Washington himself; being, no doubt, confounded with the burning
of the barns and out-houses ordered by him on shifting his
encampment.
CHAPTER XXXVIII. CONJECTURES AS TO THE INTENTIONS OF THE ENEMY—CONSEQUENT PRECAUTIONS—CORRESPONDENCE WITH GREENE RESPECTING FORT WASHINGTON—DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY—LEE LEFT IN COMMAND AT NORTHCASTLE—INSTRUCTIONS TO HIM—WASHINGTON AT PEEKSKILL—VISITS TO THE POSTS IN THE HIGHLANDS.
376
Various were the speculations at head-quarters on the sudden
movement of the enemy. Washington writes to General William
Livingston (now governor of the Jerseys): “They have gone
towards the North River and King’s Bridge. Some suppose
they are going into winter quarters, and will sit down in New
York without doing more than investing Fort Washington. I
cannot subscribe wholly to this opinion myself. That they will
invest Fort Washington, is a matter of which there can be no
doubt; and I think there is a strong probability that General
Howe will detach a part of his force to make an incursion into
the Jerseys, provided he is going to New York. He must attempt
something on account of his reputation, for what has he
done as yet, with his great army?”
In the same letter he expressed his determination, as soon as
it should appear that the present manœuvre was a real retreat,
and not a feint, to throw over a body of troops into the Jerseys
377to assist in checking Howe’s progress. He, moreover, recommended
to the governor to have the militia of that State put on
the best possible footing, and a part of them held in readiness
to take the place of the State levies, whose term of service would
soon expire. He advised, also, that the inhabitants contiguous
to the water, should be prepared to remove their stock, grain,
effects, and carriages, on the earliest notice.
In a letter of the same date, he charged General Greene,
should Howe invest Fort Washington with part of his force, to
give the garrison all possible assistance.
On the following day (Nov. 8), his aide-de-camp, Colonel
Tilghman, writes to General Greene from head-quarters: “The
enemy are at Dobbs’ Ferry with a great number of boats, ready
to go into Jersey, or proceed up the river.”
Greene doubted any intention of the enemy to cross the
river; it might only be a feint to mislead; still, as a precaution,
he had ordered troops up from the flying camp, and was posting
them opposite Dobbs’ Ferry, and at other passes where a landing
might be attempted; the whole being under the command of
General Mercer.
Affairs at Fort Washington soon settled the question of the
enemy’s intentions with regard to it. Lord Percy took his station
with a body of troops before the lines to the south. Knyphausen
advanced on the north. The Americans had previously
abandoned Fort Independence, burnt its barracks, and removed
the stores and cannon. Crossing King’s Bridge, Knyphausen
took a position between it and Fort Washington. The approach
to the fort, on this side, was exceedingly steep and rocky; as,
indeed, were all its approaches excepting that on the south,
where the country was more open, and the ascent gradual. The
378fort could not hold within its walls above one thousand men; the
rest of the troops were distributed about the lines and outworks.
While the fort was thus menaced, the chevaux-de-frise had again
proved inefficient. On the night of the 5th, a frigate and two
transports, bound up to Dobbs’ Ferry, with supplies for Howe’s
army, had broken through; though, according to Greene’s account,
not without being considerably shattered by the batteries.
Informed of these facts, Washington wrote to Greene on the
8th: “If we cannot prevent vessels from passing up the river,
and the enemy are possessed of all the surrounding country,
what valuable purpose can it answer to hold a post from which
the expected benefit cannot be had? I am, therefore, inclined to
think, that it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at
Mount Washington; but, as you are on the spot, I leave it to
you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington as
you may judge best, and so far revoking the orders given to
Colonel Magaw, to defend it to the last.”
Accounts had been received at head-quarters of a considerable
movement on the preceding evening (Nov. 7th), among the
enemy’s boats at Dobbs’ Ferry, with the intention, it was said, of
penetrating the Jerseys, and falling down upon Fort Lee.
Washington, therefore, in the same letter directed Greene to
have all the stores not necessary to the defence removed immediately,
and to destroy all the stock, the hay and grain, in the
neighborhood, which the owners refused to remove. “Experience
has shown,” adds he, “that a contrary conduct is not of
the least advantage to the poor inhabitants, from whom all their
effects of every kind are taken without distinction and without
the least satisfaction.”
Greene, in reply (Nov. 9th), adhered with tenacity to the
379policy of maintaining Fort Washington. “The enemy,” said he,
“must invest it with double the number of men required for its
defence. They must keep troops at King’s Bridge, to cut off all
communication with the country, and in considerable force, for
fear of an attack.” He did not consider the fort in immediate
danger. Colonel Magaw thought it would take the enemy until
the end of December to carry it. In the mean time, the garrison
could at any time be brought off, and even the stores removed,
should matters grow desperate. If the enemy should not find it
an object of importance, they would not trouble themselves about
it; if they should, it would be a proof that they felt an injury
from its being maintained. The giving it up would open for
them a free communication with the country by the way of
King’s Bridge.[126]
It is doubtful when or where Washington received this letter,
as he left the camp at Northcastle at eleven o’clock of the following
morning. There being still considerable uncertainty as to
the intentions of the enemy, all his arrangements were made
accordingly. All the troops belonging to the States west of the
Hudson, were to be stationed in the Jerseys, under command of
General Putnam. Lord Stirling had already been sent forward
with the Maryland and Virginia troops to Peekskill, to cross the
river at King’s Ferry. Another division composed of Connecticut
and Massachusetts troops, under General Heath, was to
co-operate with the brigade of New York militia under General
George Clinton, in securing the Highland posts on both sides of
the river.
The troops which would remain at Northcastle after the
380departure of Heath and his division, were to be commanded by
Lee. Washington’s letter of instructions to that general is characterized
by his own modesty, and his deference for Lee’s superior
military experience. He suggests, rather than orders, yet his
letter is sufficiently explicit. “A little time now,” writes he,
“must manifest the enemy’s designs, and point out to you the
measures proper to be pursued by that part of the army under
your command. I shall give no directions, therefore, on this head,
having the most entire confidence in your judgment and military
exertions. One thing, however, I will suggest, namely, that the
appearance of embarking troops for the Jerseys may be intended
as a feint to weaken us, and render the post we now hold more
vulnerable, or the enemy may find that troops are assembled with
more expedition, and in greater numbers, than they expected, on
the Jersey shore, to oppose them; and, as it is possible, from
one or other of these motives, that they may yet pay the party
under your command a visit, it will be unnecessary, I am persuaded,
to recommend to you the propriety of putting this post,
if you stay at it, into a proper posture of defence, and guarding
against surprises. But I would recommend it to your consideration,
whether, under the suggestion above, your retiring to Croton
Bridge, and some strong post still more easterly (covering the
passes through the Highlands), may not be more advisable than
to run the hazard of an attack with unequal numbers. At any
rate, I think all your baggage and stores, except such as are
necessary for immediate use, ought to be to the northward of
Croton River. * * * * You will consider the post at Croton’s
(or Pine’s) Bridge as under your immediate care. * * * * If the enemy should remove the whole, or the greater
part of their force to the west side of Hudson’s River, I have
381no doubt of your following with all possible dispatch, leaving the
militia and invalids to cover the frontiers of Connecticut in case
of need.”
We have been minute in stating these matters, from their
bearing on subsequent operations.
On the 10th of November, Washington left the camp at Northcastle,
at 11 o’clock, and arrived at Peekskill at sunset; whither
General Heath, with his division, had preceded him by a few
hours. Lord Stirling was there, likewise, having effected the
transportation of the Maryland and Virginia troops across the
river, and landed them at the ferry south of Stony Point; though
a better landing was subsequently found north of the point. His
lordship had thrown out a scouting party in the advance, and a
hundred men to take possession of a gap in the mountain, through
which a road passed toward the Jerseys.
Washington was now at the entrance of the Highlands, that
grand defile of the Hudson, the object of so much precaution
and solicitude. On the following morning, accompanied by Generals
Heath, Stirling, James and George Clinton, Mifflin, and
others, he made a military visit in boats to the Highland posts.
Fort Montgomery was in a considerable state of forwardness,
and a work in the vicinity was projected to co-operate with it.
Fort Constitution commanded a sudden bend of the river, but
Lord Stirling, in his report of inspection, had intimated that the
fort itself was commanded by West Point opposite. A glance
of the eye, without going on shore, was sufficient to convince
Washington of the fact. A fortress subsequently erected on that
point, has been considered the Key of the Highlands.
On the morning of the 12th, at an early hour, Washington
rode out with General Heath to reconnoitre the east side of
382the Hudson, at the gorge of the Highlands. Henry Wisner, in a
report to the New York Convention, had mentioned a hill to the
north of Peekskill, so situated, with the road winding along the
side of it, that ten men on the top, by rolling down stones,
might prevent ten thousand from passing. “I’ll believe,” said he,
“nothing more need be done than to keep great quantities of
stones at the different places where the troops must pass, if they
attempt penetrating the mountains.”
Near Robinson’s Bridge, in this vicinity, about two miles
from Peekskill, Washington chose a place where troops should
be stationed to cover the south entrance into the mountains; and
here, afterwards, was established an important military depot
called Continental Village.
On the same day (12th), he wrote to General Lee, inclosing a
copy of resolutions just received from Congress, respecting levies
for the new army, showing the importance of immediately beginning
the recruiting service. If no commissioners arrived from
Rhode Island, he was to appoint the officers recommended to that
State by General Greene. “I cannot conclude,” adds he, “without
reminding you of the military and other stores about your
encampment, and at Northcastle, and to press the removal of
them above Croton Bridge, or such other places of security as
you may think proper. General Howe, having sent no part of
his force to Jersey yet, makes the measure more necessary, as he
may turn his views another way, and attempt their destruction.”
It was evidently Washington’s desire that Lee should post
himself, as soon as possible, beyond the Croton, where he would
be safe from surprise, and at hand to throw his troops promptly
across the Hudson, should the Jerseys be invaded.
Having made all these surveys and arrangements, Washington
383placed Heath in the general command of the Highlands, with
written instructions to fortify the passes with all possible despatch,
and directions how the troops were to be distributed on both
sides of the river; and here we take occasion to give some
personal notice of this trusty officer.
Heath was now in the fortieth year of his age. Like many
of the noted officers of the Revolution, he had been brought up
in rural life, on an hereditary farm near Boston; yet, according
to his own account, though passionately fond of agricultural
pursuits, he had also, almost from childhood, a great relish for
military affairs, and had studied every treatise on the subject
in the English language, so that he considered himself “fully
acquainted with the theory of war, in all its branches and duties,
from the private soldier to the commander-in-chief.”
He describes himself to be of a middling stature, light
complexion, very corpulent and bald-headed, so that the French
officers who served in America, compared him, in person, to the
Marquis of Granby.[127]
Such was the officer intrusted with the command of the Highland
passes, and encamped at Peekskill, their portal. We shall
find him faithful to his trust; scrupulous in obeying the letter of
his instructions; but sturdy and punctilious in resisting any
undue assumption of authority.
CHAPTER XXXIX. AFFAIRS ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN—GATES AT TICONDEROGA—ARNOLD’S FLOTILLA—MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF SIR GUY CARLETON AT ST. JOHNS—NAUTICAL ENCOUNTERS—GALLANT CONDUCT OF ARNOLD AND WATERBURY—CARLETON IN POSSESSION OF CROWN POINT—HIS RETURN TO CANADA AND WINTER QUARTERS.
384
During his brief and busy sojourn at Peekskill, Washington
received important intelligence from the Northern army; especially
that part of it on Lake Champlain, under the command
of General Gates. A slight retrospect of affairs in that quarter
is proper, before we proceed to narrate the eventful campaign in
the Jerseys.
The preparations for the defence of Ticonderoga, and the
nautical service on the lake, had met with difficulties at every
step. At length, by the middle of August, a small flotilla was
completed, composed of a sloop and schooner each of twelve guns
(six and four pounders), two schooners mounting eight guns each,
and five gondolas, each of three guns. The flotilla was subsequently
augmented, and the command given by Gates to Arnold,
in compliance with the advice of Washington; who had a high
opinion of that officer’s energy, intrepidity, and fertility in expedients.
385Sir Guy Carleton, in the mean time, was straining every nerve
for the approaching conflict. The successes of the British forces
on the seaboard, had excited the zealous rivalry of the forces in
Canada. The commanders, newly arrived, were fearful the war
might be brought to a close, before they could have an opportunity
to share in the glory. Hence the ardor with which they
encountered and vanquished obstacles which might otherwise
have appeared insuperable. Vessels were brought from England
in pieces and put together at St. Johns, boats of various kinds
and sizes were transported over land, or dragged up the rapids of
the Sorel. The soldiers shared with the seamen in the toil.
The Canadian farmers, also, were taken from their agricultural
pursuits, and compelled to aid in these, to them, unprofitable
labors. Sir Guy was full of hope and ardor. Should he get the
command of Lakes Champlain and George, the northern part of
New York would be at his mercy; before winter set in he might
gain possession of Albany. He would then be able to co-operate
with General Howe in severing and subduing the northern and
southern provinces, and bringing the war to a speedy and triumphant
close.
In despite of every exertion, three months elapsed before
his armament was completed. Winter was fast approaching.
Before it arrived, the success of his brilliant plan required that he
should fight his way across Lake Champlain; carry the strong
posts of Crown Point and Ticonderoga; traverse Lake George,
and pursue a long and dangerous march through a wild and rugged
country, beset with forests and morasses, to Albany. That
was the first post to the southward where he expected to find rest
and winter quarters for his troops.[128]
386By the month of October, between twenty and thirty sail
were afloat, and ready for action. The flag-ship (the Inflexible)
mounted eighteen twelve-pounders; the rest were gunboats, a
gondola and a flat-bottomed vessel called a radeau, and named
the Thunderer; carrying a battery of six twenty-four and twelve
six-pounders, besides howitzers. The gunboats mounted brass
field-pieces and howitzers. Seven hundred seamen navigated the
fleet; two hundred of them were volunteers from the transports.
The guns were worked by detachments from the corps of artillery.
In a word, according to British accounts, “no equipment
of the kind was ever better appointed or more amply furnished
with every kind of provision necessary for the intended service.”[129]
Captain Pringle conducted the armament, but Sir Guy Carleton
was too full of zeal, and too anxious for the event, not to head
the enterprise; he accordingly took his station on the deck of the
flag-ship. They made sail early in October, in quest of the
American squadron, which was said to be abroad upon the lake.
Arnold, however, being ignorant of the strength of the enemy,
and unwilling to encounter a superior force in the open lake, had
taken his post under cover of Valcour Island, in the upper part
of a deep channel, or strait between that island and the mainland.
His force consisted of three schooners, two sloops, three
galleys and eight gondolas; carrying in all seventy guns, many
of them eighteen-pounders.
The British ships, sweeping past Cumberland Head with a
fair wind and flowing sail on the morning of the 11th, had left
the southern end of Valcour Island astern, when they discovered
Arnold’s flotilla anchored behind it, in a line extending
387across the strait so as not to be outflanked. They immediately
hauled close to the wind, and tried to beat up into
the channel. The wind, however, did not permit the largest
of them to enter. Arnold took advantage of the circumstance.
He was on board of the galley Congress, and, leaving
the line, advanced with two other galleys and the schooner
Royal Savage, to attack the smaller vessels as they entered
before the large ones could come up. About twelve o’clock
the enemy’s schooner Carleton opened a brisk fire upon the
Royal Savage and the galleys. It was as briskly returned.
Seeing the enemy’s gunboats approaching, the Americans endeavored
to return to the line. In so doing, the Royal Savage
ran aground. Her crew set her on fire and abandoned
her. In about an hour the British brought all their gunboats
in a range across the lower part of the channel, within
musket shot of the Americans, the schooner Carleton in the
advance. They landed, also, a large number of Indians on
the island, to keep up a galling fire from the shore upon the
Americans with their rifles. The action now became general,
and was severe and sanguinary. The Americans, finding themselves
thus hemmed in by a superior force, fought with desperation.
Arnold pressed with his galley into the hottest of
the fight. The Congress was hulled several times, received
seven shots between wind and water, was shattered in mast
and rigging, and many of the crew were killed or wounded.
The ardor of Arnold increased with his danger. He cheered
on his men by voice and example, often pointing the guns
with his own hands. He was ably seconded by Brigadier-general
Waterbury, in the Washington galley, which, like his
own vessel, was terribly cut up. The contest lasted throughout
388the day. Carried on as it was within a narrow compass,
and on a tranquil lake, almost every shot took effect. The
fire of the Indians from the shore was less deadly than had
been expected; but their whoops and yells, mingling with the
rattling of the musketry, and the thundering of the cannon,
increased the horrors of the scene. Volumes of smoke rose
above the woody shores, which echoed with the unusual din
of war, and for a time this lovely recess of a beautiful and
peaceful lake was rendered a perfect pandemonium.
The evening drew nigh, yet the contest was undecided.
Captain Pringle, after a consultation with Sir Guy Carleton,
called off the smaller vessels which had been engaged, and
anchored his whole squadron in a line as near as possible to
the Americans, so as to prevent their escape; trusting to
capture the whole of them when the wind should prove
favorable, so that he could bring his large vessels into action.
Arnold, however, sensible that with his inferior and crippled
force all resistance would be unavailing, took advantage
of a dark cloudy night, and a strong north wind; his vessels
slipped silently through the enemy’s line without being discovered,
one following a light on the stern of the other; and
by daylight they were out of sight. They had to anchor,
however, at Schuyler’s Island, about ten miles up the lake,
to stop leaks and make repairs. Two of the gondolas were
here sunk, being past remedy. About noon the retreat was
resumed, but the wind had become adverse; and they made
little progress. Arnold’s galley, the Congress, the Washington
galley and four gondolas, all which had suffered severely in
the late fight, fell astern of the rest of the squadron in
the course of the night. In the morning, when the sun lifted
389a fog which had covered the lake, they beheld the enemy
within a few miles of them in full chase, while their own
comrades were nearly out of sight, making the best of their
way for Crown Point.
It was now an anxious trial of speed and seamanship. Arnold,
with the crippled relics of his squadron, managed by noon
to get within a few leagues of Crown Point, when they were overtaken
by the Inflexible, the Carleton, and the schooner Maria of
14 guns. As soon as they came up, they poured in a tremendous
fire. The Washington galley, already shattered, and having lost
most of her officers, was compelled to strike, and General Waterbury
and the crew were taken prisoners. Arnold had now to
bear the brunt of the action. For a long time he was engaged
within musket shot with the Inflexible, and the two schooners,
until his galley was reduced to a wreck and one third of the crew
were killed. The gondolas were nearly in the same desperate
condition: yet the men stood stoutly to their guns. Seeing resistance
vain, Arnold determined that neither vessels nor crew should
fall into the hands of the enemy. He ordered the gondolas to
run on shore, in a small creek in the neighborhood, the men to set
fire to them as soon as they grounded, to wade on shore with their
muskets, and keep off the enemy until they were consumed. He
did the same with his own galley; remaining on board of her until
she was in flames, lest the enemy should get possession and strike
his flag, which was kept flying to the last.
He now set off with his gallant crew, many of whom were wounded,
by a road through the woods to Crown Point, where he arrived
at night, narrowly escaping an Indian ambush. Two schooners,
two galleys, one sloop and one gondola, the remnant which had
escaped of this squadron, were at anchor at the Point, and General
390Waterbury and most of his men arrived there the next day on
parole. Seeing that the place must soon fall into the hands of the
enemy, they set fire to the houses, destroyed every thing they
could not carry away, and embarking in the vessels made sail for
Ticonderoga.
The loss of the Americans in these two actions is said to have
been between eighty and ninety men; that of the British about
forty. It is worthy of mention, that among the young officers
in Sir Guy Carleton’s squadron, was Edward Pellew, who afterwards
rose to renown as Admiral Viscount Exmouth; celebrated,
among other things for his victory at Algiers.
The conduct of Arnold in these naval affairs gained him new
laurels. He was extolled for the judgment with which he chose
his position, and brought his vessels into action; for his masterly
retreat, and for the self-sacrificing devotion with which he exposed
himself to the overwhelming force of the enemy in covering the
retreat of part of his flotilla.
Sir Guy Carleton took possession of the ruined works at Crown
Point, where he was soon joined by the army. He made several
movements by land and water, as if meditating an attack upon
Ticonderoga; pushing strong detachments on both sides of the
lake, which approached within a small distance of the fort, while
one vessel appeared within cannon shot of a lower battery, sounding
the depth of the channel, until a few shot obliged her to retire.
General Gates, in the mean time, strengthened his works with
incessant assiduity, and made every preparation for an obstinate
defence. A strong easterly wind prevented the enemy’s ships
from advancing to attack the lines, and gave time for the arrival
of reinforcements of militia to the garrison. It also afforded time
for Sir Guy Carleton to cool in ardor, and calculate the chances
391and the value of success. The post, from its strength, and the
apparent number and resolution of the garrison, could not be
taken without great loss of life. If taken, the season was now
too far advanced to think of passing Lake George, and exposing
the army to the perils of a winter campaign in the inhospitable
and impracticable wilds to the southward. Ticonderoga, too,
could not be kept during the winter, so that the only result of
the capture would be the reduction of the works and the taking
of some cannon; all which damage the Americans could remedy
before the opening of the summer campaign. If, however, the
defence should be obstinate, the British army, even if successful,
might sustain a loss sufficient to cripple its operations in the
coming year.[130]
These, and other prudential reasons, induced Carleton to
give up all attempt upon the fortress at present; wherefore,
re-embarking his troops, he returned to St. Johns, and cantoned
them in Canada for the winter. It was not until about the 1st
of November, that a reconnoitring party, sent out from Ticonderoga
by General Gates, brought him back intelligence that
Crown Point was abandoned by the enemy, and not a hostile
sail in sight. All apprehensions of an attack upon Ticonderoga
during the present year were at an end, and many of the troops
stationed there were already on their march toward Albany.
Such was the purport of the news from the north, received
by Washington at Peekskill. It relieved him for the present
from all anxiety respecting affairs on Lake Champlain, and gave
him the prospect of reinforcements from that quarter.
CHAPTER XL. WASHINGTON CROSSES THE HUDSON—ARRIVES AT FORT LEE—AFFAIRS AT FORT WASHINGTON—QUESTION ABOUT ITS ABANDONMENT—MOVEMENTS OF HOWE—THE FORT SUMMONED TO SURRENDER—REFUSAL OF COLONEL MAGAW—THE FORT ATTACKED—CAPTURE OF THE FORT AND GARRISON—COMMENTS OF WASHINGTON ON THE STATE OF AFFAIRS.
392
On the morning of the 12th of November, Washington crossed
the Hudson, to the ferry below Stony Point, with the residue
of the troops destined for the Jerseys. Far below were to be
descried the Phœnix, the Roebuck, and the Tartar, at anchor
in the broad waters of Haverstraw Bay and the Tappan Sea,
guarding the lower ferries. The army, thus shut out from the
nearer passes, was slowly winding its way by a circuitous route
through the gap in the mountains, which Lord Stirling had
secured. Leaving the troops which had just landed, to pursue
the same route to the Hackensack, Washington, accompanied by
Colonel Reed, struck a direct course for Fort Lee, being anxious
about affairs at Fort Washington. He arrived there on the following
day, and found, to his disappointment, that General Greene
had taken no measures for the evacuation of that fortress; but
on the contrary, had reinforced it with a part of Colonel Durkee’s
regiment, and the regiment of Colonel Rawlings, so that its
393garrison now numbered upwards of two thousand men; a great part,
however, were militia. Washington’s orders for its evacuation
had, in fact, been discretionary, leaving the execution of them
to Greene’s judgment, “as being on the spot.” The latter had
differed in opinion as to the policy of such a measure; and
Colonel Magaw, who had charge of the fortress, was likewise
confident it might be maintained.
Colonel Reed was of opposite counsels; but then he was
personally interested in the safety of the garrison. It was composed
almost entirely of Pennsylvania troops under Magaw and
Lambert Cadwalader; excepting a small detachment of Maryland
riflemen commanded by Otho H. Williams. They were his
friends and neighbors, the remnant of the brave men who had
suffered so severely under Atlee and Smallwood.[131] The fort was
now invested on all sides but one; and the troops under Howe
which had been encamped at Dobbs’ Ferry, were said to be
moving down toward it. Reed’s solicitude was not shared by
the garrison itself. Colonel Magaw, its brave commander, still
thought it was in no immediate danger.
Washington was much perplexed. The main object of Howe
was still a matter of doubt with him. He could not think that Sir
William was moving his whole force upon that fortress, to invest
which, a part would be sufficient. He suspected an ulterior
object, probably a Southern expedition, as he was told a large
number of ships were taking in wood and water at New York.
He resolved, therefore, to continue a few days in this neighborhood,
during which he trusted the designs of the enemy
would be more apparent; in the mean time he would distribute
394troops at Brunswick, Amboy, Elizabethtown and Fort Lee, so as
to be ready at these various points, to check any incursions into
the Jerseys.
In a letter to the President of Congress he urged for an increase
of ordnance and field-artillery. The rough, hilly country
east of the Hudson, and the strongholds and fastnesses of which
the Americans had possessed themselves, had prevented the enemy
from profiting by the superiority of their artillery; but this
would not be the case, should the scene of action change to an
open champaign country, like the Jerseys.
Washington was mistaken in his conjecture as to Sir William
Howe’s design. The capture of Fort Washington was, at present,
his main object; and he was encamped on Fordham Heights, not
far from King’s Bridge, until preliminary steps should be taken.
In the night of the 14th, thirty flat-bottomed boats stole quietly
up the Hudson, passed the American forts undiscovered, and
made their way through Spyt den Duivel Creek into Harlem
River. The means were thus provided for crossing that river and
landing before unprotected parts of the American works.
On the 15th, General Howe sent in a summons to surrender,
with a threat of extremities should he have to carry the place by
assault. Magaw, in his reply, intimated a doubt that General
Howe would execute a threat “so unworthy of himself and the
British nation; but give me leave,” added he, “to assure his
Excellency, that, actuated by the most glorious cause that mankind
ever fought in, I am determined to defend this post to the
very last extremity.”
Apprised by the Colonel of his peril, General Greene sent
over reinforcements, with an exhortation to him to persist in his
defence; and despatched an express to Washington, who was at
395Hackensack, where the troops which had crossed from Peekskill
were encamped. It was nightfall when Washington arrived at
Fort Lee. Greene and Putnam were over at the besieged fortress.
He threw himself into a boat, and had partly crossed the
river, when he met those generals returning. They informed
him of the garrison’s having been reinforced, and assured him
that it was in high spirits, and capable of making a good defence.
It was with difficulty, however, they could prevail on him
to return with them to the Jersey shore, for he was excessively
excited.
Early the next morning (16th), Magaw made his dispositions
for the expected attack. His forces, with the recent addition,
amounted to nearly three thousand men. As the fort could not
contain above a third of that number, most of them were stationed
about the outworks.
Colonel Lambert Cadwalader, with eight hundred Pennsylvanians,
was posted in the outer lines, about two miles and a half
south of the fort, the side menaced by Lord Percy with sixteen
hundred men. Colonel Rawlings, of Maryland, with a body of
troops, many of them riflemen, was stationed by a three-gun battery,
on a rocky, precipitous hill, north of the fort, and between
it and Spyt den Duivel Creek. Colonel Baxter, of Bucks County,
Pennsylvania, with his regiment of militia, was posted east
of the fort, on rough, woody heights, bordering the Harlem River,
to watch the motions of the enemy, who had thrown up redoubts
on high and commanding ground, on the opposite side of the
river, apparently to cover the crossing and landing of troops.
Sir William Howe had planned four simultaneous attacks;
one on the north by Knyphausen, who was encamped on the
York side of King’s Bridge, within cannon shot of Fort Washington,
396but separated from it by high and rough hills, covered
with almost impenetrable woods. He was to advance in two
columns, formed by detachments made from the Hessians of his
corps, the brigade of Rahl, and the regiment of Waldeckers.
The second attack was to be by two battalions of light infantry,
and two battalions of guards, under Brigadier-general Mathew,
who was to cross Harlem River in flat-boats, under cover of the
redoubts above mentioned, and to land on the right of the fort.
This attack was to be supported by the first and second grenadiers,
and a regiment of light infantry under command of Lord
Cornwallis. The third attack, intended as a feint to distract
the attention of the Americans, was to be by Colonel Sterling,
with the forty-second regiment, who was to drop down the Harlem
River in bateaux, to the left of the American lines, facing
New York. The fourth attack was to be on the south, by Lord
Percy, with the English and Hessian troops under his command,
on the right flank of the American intrenchments.[132]
About noon, a heavy cannonade thundering along the rocky
hills, and sharp volleys of musketry, proclaimed that the action
was commenced. Knyphausen’s division was pushing on from
the north in two columns, as had been arranged. The right was
led by Colonel Rahl, the left by himself. Rahl essayed to mount
a steep, broken height called Cock Hill, which rises from Spyt
den Duivel Creek, and was covered with woods. Knyphausen undertook
a hill rising from the King’s Bridge road, but soon found
himself entangled in a woody defile, difficult to penetrate, and
where his Hessians were exposed to the fire of the three-gun battery,
and Rawlings’ riflemen.
397While this was going on at the north of the fort, General
Mathew, with his light infantry and guards, crossed the Harlem
River in the flat-boats, under cover of a heavy fire from the redoubts.
He made good his landing, after being severely handled by
Baxter and his men, from behind rocks and trees, and the breastworks
thrown up on the steep river bank. A short contest ensued.
Baxter, while bravely encouraging his men, was killed by a British
officer. His troops, overpowered by numbers, retreated to the
fort. General Mathew now pushed on with his guards and light
infantry to cut off Cadwalader. That officer had gallantly defended
the lines against the attack of Lord Percy, until informed
that Colonel Sterling was dropping down Harlem River in bateaux
to flank the lines, and take him in the rear. He sent off a detachment
to oppose his landing. They did it manfully. About
ninety of Sterling’s men were killed or wounded in their boats,
but he persevered, landed, and forced his way up a steep height,
which was well defended, gained the summit, forced a redoubt,
and took nearly two hundred prisoners. Thus doubly assailed,
Cadwalader was obliged to retreat to the fort. He was closely
pursued by Percy with his English troops and Hessians, but
turned repeatedly on his pursuers. Thus he fought his way to
the fort, with the loss of several killed and more taken prisoners;
but marking his track by the number of Hessians slain.
The defence on the north side of the fort was equally obstinate
and unsuccessful. Rawlings with his Maryland riflemen
and the aid of the three-gun battery, had for some time kept the
left column of Hessians and Waldeckers under Knyphausen at bay.
At length Colonel Rahl, with the right column of the division,
having forced his way directly up the north side of the steep hill
398at Spyt den Duivel Creek, came upon Rawlings’ men, whose
rifles, from frequent discharges, had become foul and almost useless,
drove them from their strong post, and followed them until
within a hundred yards of the fort, where he was joined by
Knyphausen, who had slowly made his way through dense forest
and over felled trees. Here they took post behind a large
stone house, and sent in a flag, with a second summons to surrender.
Washington, surrounded by several of his officers, had been
an anxious spectator of the battle from the opposite side of the
Hudson. Much of it was hidden from him by intervening hills and
forest; but the roar of cannonry from the valley of Harlem River,
the sharp and incessant reports of rifles, and the smoke rising
above the tree tops, told him of the spirit with which the assault
was received at various points, and gave him for a time a hope
that the defence might be successful. The action about the lines
to the south lay open to him, and could be distinctly seen through
a telescope; and nothing encouraged him more than the gallant
style in which Cadwalader with an inferior force maintained his
position. When he saw him, however, assailed in flank, the line
broken, and his troops, overpowered by numbers, retreating to
the fort, he gave up the game as lost. The worst sight of all,
was to behold his men cut down and bayoneted by the Hessians
while begging quarter. It is said so completely to have overcome
him, that he wept “with the tenderness of a child.”
Seeing the flag go into the fort from Knyphausen’s division,
and surmising it to be a summons to surrender, he wrote a note
to Magaw, telling him that if he could hold out until evening,
and the place could not be maintained, he would endeavor to
bring off the garrison in the night. Captain Gooch, of Boston, a
399brave and daring man, offered to be the bearer of the note. “He
ran down to the river, jumped into a small boat, pushed over the
river, landed under the bank, ran up to the fort and delivered
the message:—came out, ran and jumped over the broken
ground, dodging the Hessians, some of whom struck at him with
their pieces and others attempted to thrust him with their bayonets;
escaping through them, he got to his boat and returned to
Fort Lee.”[133]
Washington’s message arrived too late. “The fort was so
crowded by the garrison, and the troops which had retreated into
it, that it was difficult to move about. The enemy, too, were in
possession of the little redoubts around, and could have poured
in showers of shells and ricochet balls that would have made
dreadful slaughter.” It was no longer possible for Magaw to get
his troops to man the lines; he was compelled, therefore, to yield
himself and his garrison prisoners of war. The only terms granted
them were, that the men should retain their baggage and the
officers their swords.
The sight of the American flag hauled down, and the British
flag waving in its place, told Washington of the surrender. His
instant care was for the safety of the upper country, now that the
lower defences of the Hudson were at an end. Before he knew
any thing about the terms of capitulation, he wrote to General
Lee, informing him of the surrender, and calling his attention to
the passes of the Highlands and those which lay east of the
river; begging him to have such measures adopted for their defence
as his judgment should suggest to be necessary. “I do
not mean,” added he, “to advise abandoning your present post,
400contrary to your own opinion; but only to mention my own ideas
of the importance of those passes, and that you cannot give too
much attention to their security, by having works erected on the
most advantageous places for that purpose.”
Lee, in reply, objected to removing from his actual encampment
at Northcastle. “It would give us,” said he, “the air of
being frightened; it would expose a fine, fertile country to their
ravages; and I must add, that we are as secure as we could be in
any position whatever.” After stating that he should deposit his
stores, &c., in a place fully as safe, and more central than Peekskill,
he adds: “As to ourselves, light as we are, several retreats
present themselves. In short, if we keep a good look-out, we are
in no danger; but I must entreat your Excellency to enjoin the
officers posted at Fort Lee, to give us the quickest intelligence, if
they observe any embarkation on the North River.” As to the
affair of Fort Washington, all that Lee observed on the subject
was: “Oh, general, why would you be over-persuaded by men
of inferior judgment to your own? It was a cursed affair.”
Lee’s allusion to men of inferior judgment, was principally
aimed at Greene, whose influence with the commander-in-chief
seems to have excited the jealousy of other officers of rank. So
Colonel Tilghman, Washington’s aide-de-camp, writes on the 17th,
to Robert R. Livingston of New York, “We were in a fair way
of finishing the campaign with credit to ourselves, and, I think,
to the disgrace of Mr. Howe; and, had the general followed his
own opinion, the garrison would have been withdrawn immediately
upon the enemy’s falling down from Dobbs’ Ferry. But General
Greene was positive that our forces might at any time be
drawn off under the guns of Fort Lee. Fatal experience has
evinced the contrary.”[134]
401Washington’s own comments on the reduction of the fort,
made in a letter to his brother Augustine, are worthy of special
note. “This is a most unfortunate affair, and has given me great
mortification; as we have lost, not only two thousand men,[135] that
were there, but a good deal of artillery, and some of the best
arms we had. And what adds to my mortification is, that this
post, after the last ships went past it, was held contrary to my
wishes and opinion, as I conceived it to be a hazardous one: but
it having been determined on by a full council of general officers,
and a resolution of Congress having been received, strongly expressive
of their desire that the channel of the river which we
had been laboring to stop for a long time at that place, might be
obstructed, if possible; and knowing that this could not be done,
unless there were batteries to protect the obstructions, I did not
care to give an absolute order for withdrawing the garrison, till I
could get round and see the situation of things; and then it became
too late, as the place was invested. Upon the passing of
the last ships, I had given it as my opinion to General Greene,
under whose care it was, that it would be best to evacuate the
place; but, as the order was discretionary, and his opinion differed
from mine, it was unhappily delayed too long; to my great
grief.”
The correspondence of Washington with his brother, is full
of gloomy anticipations. “In ten days from this date, there will
not be above two thousand men, if that number, of the fixed
established regiments on this side of Hudson River, to oppose
Howe’s whole army; and very little more on the other, to secure
402the eastern colonies, and the important passes leading through the
Highlands to Albany, and the country about the lakes. In short
it is impossible for me, in the compass of a letter, to give you any
idea of our situation, of my difficulties, and of the constant perplexities
I meet with, derived from the unhappy policy of short
enlistments, and delaying them too long. Last fall, or winter
before the army, which was then to be raised, was set about, I
represented in clear and explicit terms the evils which would
arise from short enlistments, the expense which must attend the
raising an army every year, and the futility of such an army
when raised; and if I had spoken with a prophetic spirit, I could
not have foretold the evils with more accuracy than I did. All
the year since, I have been pressing Congress to delay no time in
engaging men upon such terms as would insure success, telling
them that the longer it was delayed, the more difficult it would
prove. But the measure was not commenced until it was too
late to be effected. * * * I am wearied almost to death
with the retrograde motion of things; and I solemnly protest,
that a pecuniary reward of twenty thousand pounds a year would
not induce me to undergo what I do, and, after all, perhaps to
lose my character; as it is impossible, under such a variety of
distressing circumstances, to conduct matters agreeably to public
expectation.”
CHAPTER XLI. THE ENEMY CROSS THE HUDSON—RETREAT OF THE GARRISON FROM FORT LEE—THE CROSSING OF THE HACKENSACK—LEE ORDERED TO MOVE TO THE WEST SIDE OF THE RIVER—REED’S LETTER TO HIM—SECOND MOVE OF THE ARMY BEYOND THE PASSAIC—ASSISTANCE SOUGHT FROM VARIOUS QUARTERS—CORRESPONDENCES AND SCHEMES OF LEE—HEATH STANCH TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS—ANXIETY OF GEORGE CLINTON FOR THE SAFETY OF THE HUDSON—CRITICAL SITUATION OF THE ARMY—DISPARAGING CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LEE AND REED—WASHINGTON RETREATS ACROSS THE RARITAN—ARRIVES AT TRENTON—REMOVES HIS BAGGAGE ACROSS THE DELAWARE—DISMAY AND DESPONDENCY OF THE COUNTRY—PROCLAMATION OF LORD HOWE—EXULTATION OF THE ENEMY—WASHINGTON’S RESOLVE IN CASE OF EXTREMITY.
403
With the capture of Fort Washington, the project of obstructing
the navigation of the Hudson, at that point, was at an end.
Fort Lee, consequently, became useless, and Washington ordered
all the ammunition and stores to be removed, preparatory to its
abandonment. This was effected with the whole of the ammunition,
and a part of the stores, and every exertion was making to
hurry off the remainder, when, early in the morning of the 20th,
intelligence was brought that the enemy, with two hundred boats,
had crossed the river and landed a few miles above. General
Greene immediately ordered the garrison under arms, sent out
troops to hold the enemy in check, and sent off an express to
Washington, at Hackensack.
404The enemy had crossed the Hudson, on a very rainy night, in
two divisions, one diagonally upward from King’s Bridge, landing
on the west side, about eight o’clock; the other marched up
the east bank, three or four miles, and then crossed to the opposite
shore. The whole corps, six thousand strong, and under the
command of Lord Cornwallis, were landed, with their cannon, by
ten o’clock, at a place called Closter Dock, five or six miles above
Fort Lee, and under that line of lofty and perpendicular cliffs
known as the Palisades. “The seamen,” says Sir William
Howe, “distinguished themselves remarkably on this occasion,
by their readiness to drag the cannon up a very narrow road,
for nearly half a mile to the top of a precipice, which bounds the
shore for some miles on the west side.”[136]
Washington arrived at the fort in three quarters of an hour.
Being told that the enemy were extending themselves across the
country, he at once saw that they intended to form a line from
the Hudson to the Hackensack, and hem the whole garrison in
between the two rivers. Nothing would save it but a prompt
retreat to secure the bridge over the Hackensack. No time was
to be lost. The troops sent out to check the enemy were recalled.
The retreat commenced in all haste. There was a want
of horses and waggons; a great quantity of baggage, stores and
provisions, therefore, was abandoned. So was all the artillery
excepting two twelve-pounders. Even the tents were left standing,
and camp-kettles on the fire. With all their speed they did
not reach the Hackensack River before the vanguard of the enemy
405was close upon them. Expecting a brush, the greater part
hurried over the bridge, others crossed at the ferry, and some
higher up. The enemy, however, did not dispute the passage of
the river; but Cornwallis stated in his despatches, that, had not
the Americans been apprised of his approach, he would have surrounded
them at the fort. Some of his troops that night occupied
the tents they had abandoned.
From Hackensack, Colonel Grayson, one of Washington’s aides-de-camp,
wrote instantly, by his orders, to General Lee; informing
him that the enemy had crossed into the Jerseys, and, as was
reported, in great numbers. “His Excellency,” adds Grayson,
“thinks it would be advisable in you to remove the troops under
your command on this side of the North River, and there wait
for further commands.”
Washington himself wrote to Lee on the following day (Nov.
21st). “I am of opinion,” said he, “and the gentlemen about
me concur in it, that the public interest requires your coming
over to this side of the Hudson with the Continental troops. * * * * The enemy is evidently changing the seat of war to
this side of the North River, and the inhabitants of this country
will expect the Continental army to give them what support they
can; and failing in that, they will cease to depend upon, or support
a force from which no protection is to be derived. It is,
therefore, of the utmost importance, that at least an appearance
of force should be made, to keep this province in connection with
the others.”
In this moment of hurry and agitation, Colonel Reed, also,
Washington’s fidus Achates, wrote to Lee, but in a tone and
spirit that may surprise the reader, knowing the devotion he had
hitherto manifested for the commander-in-chief. After expressing
406the common wish that Lee should be at the principal scene
of action, he adds: “I do not mean to flatter or praise you, at
the expense of any other; but I do think it is entirely owing to
you, that this army, and the liberties of America, so far as they
are dependent on it, are not entirely cut off. You have decision,
a quality often wanting in minds otherwise valuable, and I ascribe
to this our escape from York Island, King’s Bridge, and the
Plains; and I have no doubt, had you been here, the garrison
of Mount Washington would now have composed a part of this
army; and from all these circumstances, I confess, I do ardently
wish to see you removed from a place where there will be so
little call for your judgment and experience, to the place where
they are likely to be so necessary. Nor am I singular in my
opinion; every gentleman of the family, the officers and soldiers
generally, have a confidence in you. The enemy constantly inquire
where you are, and seem to be less confident when you are
present.”
Then alluding to the late affair at Fort Washington, he continues:
“General Washington’s own judgment, seconded by representations
from us, would, I believe, have saved the men, and
their arms; but, unluckily, General Greene’s judgment was contrary.
This kept the general’s mind in a state of suspense, till
the stroke was struck. Oh, general! An indecisive mind is one
of the greatest misfortunes that can befall an army; how often
have I lamented it this campaign. All circumstances considered,
we are in a very awful and alarming situation; one that requires
the utmost wisdom, and firmness of mind. As soon as the season
will admit, I think yourself and some others, should go to
Congress, and form the plan of the new army. * * * * I
407must conclude, with my clear and explicit opinion, that your
presence is of the last importance.”[137]
Well might Washington apprehend that his character and
conduct, in the perplexities in which he was placed, would be
liable to be misunderstood by the public, when the friend of his
bosom could so misjudge him.
Reed had evidently been dazzled by the daring spirit and unscrupulous
policy of Lee, who, in carrying out his measures,
heeded but little the counsels of others, or even the orders of
government; Washington’s respect for both, and the caution
with which he hesitated in adopting measures in opposition to
them, was stamped by the bold soldier and his admirers as indecision.
At Hackensack the army did not exceed three thousand men,
and they were dispirited by ill success, and the loss of tents and
baggage. They were without intrenching tools, in a flat country,
where there were no natural fastnesses. Washington resolved,
therefore, to avoid any attack from the enemy, though, by so doing,
he must leave a fine and fertile region open to their ravages;
or a plentiful storehouse, from which they would draw voluntary
supplies. A second move was necessary, again to avoid the danger
of being enclosed between two rivers. Leaving three regiments,
therefore, to guard the passes of the Hackensack, and
serve as covering parties, he again decamped, and threw himself
on the west bank of the Passaic, in the neighborhood of Newark.
His army, small as it was, would soon be less. The term of
enlistment of those under General Mercer, from the flying camp,
was nearly expired; and it was not probable that, disheartened
408as they were by defeats and losses, exposed to inclement weather,
and unaccustomed to military hardships, they would longer forego
the comforts of their homes, to drag out the residue of a ruinous
campaign.
In addition, too, to the superiority of the force that was following
him, the rivers gave the enemy facilities, by means of their
shipping, to throw troops in his rear. In this extremity he cast
about in every direction for assistance. Colonel Reed, on whom
he relied as on a second self, was despatched to Burlington, with
a letter to Governor William Livingston, describing his hazardous
situation, and entreating him to call out a portion of the
New Jersey militia; and General Mifflin was sent to Philadelphia
to implore immediate aid from Congress, and the local
authorities.
His main reliance for prompt assistance, however, was upon
Lee. On the 24th came a letter from that general, addressed to
Colonel Reed. Washington opened it, as he was accustomed to
do, in the absence of that officer, with letters addressed to him
on the business of the army. Lee was at his old encampment at
Northcastle. He had no means, he said, of crossing at Dobbs’
Ferry, and the round by King’s Ferry would be so great, that he
could not get there in time to answer any purpose. “I have
therefore,” added he, “ordered General Heath, who is close to
the only ferry which can be passed, to detach two thousand men
to apprise his Excellency, and await his further orders; a mode
which I flatter myself will answer better what I conceive to be
the spirit of the orders, than should I move the corps from hence.
Withdrawing our troops from hence would be attended with some
very serious consequences, which at present would be tedious to
enumerate; as to myself,” adds he, “I hope to set out to-morrow.”
409A letter of the same date (Nov. 23d), from Lee to James
Bowdoin, president of the Massachusetts council, may throw some
light on his motives for delaying to obey the orders of the commander-in-chief.
“Before the unfortunate affair of Fort Washington,”
writes he, “it was my opinion that the two armies—that
on the east, and that on the west side of the North River—must
rest each on its own bottom; that the idea of detaching and reinforcing
from one side to the other, on every motion of the
enemy, was chimerical; but to harbor such a thought in our
present circumstances, is absolute insanity. In this invasion,
should the enemy alter the present direction of their operations,
and attempt to open the passage of the Highlands, or enter New
England, I should never entertain the thought of being succored
by the western army. I know it is impossible. We must, therefore,
depend upon ourselves. To Connecticut and Massachusetts,
I shall look for assistance. * * * * * I hope the cursed
job of Fort Washington will occasion no dejection: the place
itself was of no value. For my own part, I am persuaded that
if we only act with common sense, spirit, and decision, the day
must be our own.”
In another letter to Bowdoin, dated on the following day, and
enclosing an extract from Washington’s letter of Nov. 21st, he
writes: “Indecision bids fair for tumbling down the goodly fabric
of American freedom, and, with it, the rights of mankind.
’Twas indecision of Congress prevented our having a noble army,
and on an excellent footing. ’Twas indecision in our military
councils which cost us the garrison of Fort Washington, the consequence
of which must be fatal, unless remedied in time by a contrary
spirit. Enclosed I send you an extract of a letter from the
general, on which you will make your comments; and I have no
410doubt you will concur with me in the necessity of raising immediately
an army to save us from perdition. Affairs appear in so important
a crisis, that I think the resolves of the Congress must no
longer too nicely weigh with us. We must save the community, in
spite of the ordinances of the legislature. There are times when
we must commit treason against the laws of the State, for the salvation
of the State. The present crisis demands this brave, virtuous
kind of treason.” He urges President Bowdoin, therefore,
to waive all formalities, and not only complete the regiments prescribed
to the province, but to add four companies to each regiment.
“We must not only have a force sufficient to cover your
province, and all these fertile districts, from the insults and irruptions
of the tyrant’s troops, but sufficient to drive ’em out of all
their quarters in the Jerseys, or all is lost. * * * In the mean
time, send up a formidable body of militia, to supply the place of
the Continental troops, which I am ordered to convey over the
river. Let your people be well supplied with blankets, and warm
clothes, as I am determined, by the help of God, to unnest ’em,
even in the dead of winter.”[138]
It is evident Lee considered Washington’s star to be on the
decline, and his own in the ascendant. The “affair of Fort
Washington,” and the “indecision of the commander-in-chief,”
were apparently his watchwords.
On the following day (24th), he writes to Washington from
Northcastle, on the subject of removing troops across the Hudson.
“I have received your orders, and shall endeavor to put
them in execution, but question whether I shall be able to carry
with me any considerable number; not so much from a want of
411zeal in the men, as from their wretched condition with respect to
shoes, stockings, and blankets, which the present bad weather
renders more intolerable. I sent Heath orders to transport two
thousand men across the river, apprise the general, and wait for
further orders; but that great man (as I might have expected)
intrenched himself within the letter of his instructions, and refused
to part with a single file, though I undertook to replace
them with a part of my own.” He concludes by showing that,
so far from hurrying to the support of his commander-in-chief,
he was meditating a side blow of his own devising. “I should
march this day with Glover’s brigade; but have just received intelligence
that Rogers’ corps, a part of the light-horse, and
another brigade lie in so exposed a situation, as to present us the
fairest opportunity of carrying them off. If we succeed, it will
have a great effect, and amply compensate for two days’ delay.”
Scarce had Lee sent this letter, when he received one from
Washington, informing him that he had mistaken his views in regard
to the troops required to cross the Hudson; it was his
(Lee’s) division that he wanted to have over. The force under
Heath must remain to guard the posts and passes through the
Highlands, the importance of which was so infinitely great, that
there should not be the least possible risk of losing them. In
the same letter Washington, who presumed Lee was by this time
at Peekskill, advised him to take every precaution to come by a
safe route, and by all means to keep between the enemy and the
mountains, as he understood they were taking measures to intercept
his march.
Lee’s reply was still from Northcastle. He explained that
his idea of detaching troops from Heath’s division was merely
for expedition’s sake, intending to replace them from his own.
412The want of carriages and other causes had delayed him. From
the force of the enemy remaining in Westchester County, he did
not conceive the number of them in the Jerseys to be near so
great as Washington was taught to believe. He had been making
a sweep of the country to clear it of the tories. Part of his
army had now moved on, and he would set out on the following
day. He concluded with the assurance, “I shall take care to
obey your Excellency’s orders, in regard to my march, as exactly
as possible.”
On the same day, he vents his spleen in a tart letter to
Heath. “I perceive,” writes he, “that you have formed an idea,
that should General Washington remove to the Straits of Magellan,
the instructions he left with you, upon a particular occasion,
have, to all intents and purposes, invested you with a command
separate from, and independent of any other superiors. * * * * That General Heath is by no means to consider himself
obliged to obey the second in command.” He concluded by informing
him that, as the commander-in-chief was now separated
from them, he (Lee) commanded, of course, on this side of the
water, and for the future would, and must be obeyed.
Before receiving this letter, Heath, doubtful whether Washington
might not be pressed, and desirous of having his troops
across the Hudson, had sent off an express to him for explicit
instructions on that point, and, in the mean time, had kept them
ready for a move.
General George Clinton, who was with him, and had the safety
of the Hudson at heart, was in an agony of solicitude. “We
have been under marching orders these three days past,” writes
he, “and only wait the directions of General Washington. Should
they be to move, all’s over with the river this season, and, I fear,
413for ever. General Lee, four or five days ago, had orders to move
with his division across the river. Instead of so doing, he ordered
General Heath to march his men through, and he would replace
them with so many of his. General Heath could not do this
consistent with his instructions, but put his men under marching
orders to wait his Excellency’s orders.” Honest George Clinton
was still perplexed and annoyed by these marchings and countermarchings;
and especially with these incessant retreats. “A
strange way of cooking business!” writes he. “We have no particular
accounts yet from head-quarters, but I am apt to believe
retreating is yet fashionable.”
The return of the express sent to Washington, relieved Clinton’s
anxiety about the Highlands; reiterating the original order,
that the division under Heath should remain for the protection
of the passes.
Washington was still at Newark when, on the 27th, he received
Lee’s letter of the 24th, speaking of his scheme of capturing
Rogers the partisan. Under other circumstances it might
have been a sufficient excuse for his delay, but higher interests
were at stake; he immediately wrote to Lee as follows: “My former
letters were so full and explicit, as to the necessity of your
marching as early as possible, that it is unnecessary to add more on
that head. I confess I expected you would have been sooner in
motion. The force here, when joined by yours, will not be adequate
to any great opposition; at present it is weak, and it has
been more owing to the badness of the weather that the enemy’s
progress has been checked, than any resistance we could make.
They are now pushing this way,—part of ’em have passed the
Passaic. Their plan is not entirely unfolded, but I shall not be
414surprised if Philadelphia should turn out the object of their
movement.”
The situation of the little army was daily becoming more perilous.
In a council of war, several of the members urged a move
to Morristown, to form a junction with the troops expected from
the Northern army. Washington, however, still cherished the
idea of making a stand at Brunswick on the Raritan, or, at all
events, of disputing the passage of the Delaware; and in this intrepid
resolution he was warmly seconded by Greene.
Breaking up his camp once more, therefore, he continued his
retreat towards New Brunswick; but so close was Cornwallis
upon him, that his advance entered one end of Newark, just as
the American rear-guard had left the other.
From Brunswick, Washington wrote on the 29th to William
Livingston, governor of the Jerseys, requesting him to have all
boats and river craft, for seventy miles along the Delaware,
removed to the western bank out of the reach of the enemy, and
put under guard. He was disappointed in his hope of making
a stand on the banks of the Raritan. All the force he could
muster at Brunswick, including the New Jersey militia, did not
exceed four thousand men. Colonel Reed had failed in procuring
aid from the New Jersey legislature. That body, shifting from
place to place, was on the eve of dissolution. The term of the
Maryland and New Jersey troops in the flying camp had expired.
General Mercer endeavored to detain them, representing
the disgrace of turning their back upon the cause when the enemy
was at hand: his remonstrances were fruitless. As to the Pennsylvania
levies, they deserted in such numbers, that guards were
stationed on the roads and ferries to intercept them.
At this moment of care and perplexity, a letter, forwarded
415by express, arrived at head-quarters. It was from General Lee,
dated from his camp at Northcastle, to Colonel Reed, and was
in reply to the letter written by that officer from Hackensack
on the 21st, which we have already laid before the reader. Supposing
that it related to official business, Washington opened it,
and read as follows:
“My dear Reed:—I received your most obliging, flattering
letter; lament with you that fatal indecision of mind, which in war
is a much greater disqualification than stupidity, or even want
of personal courage. Accident may put a decisive blunderer in
the right; but eternal defeat and miscarriage must attend the
man of the best parts, if cursed with indecision. The General
recommends in so pressing a manner as almost to amount to an
order, to bring over the continental troops under my command,
which recommendation, or order, throws me into the greatest
dilemma from several considerations.” After stating these
considerations, he adds: “My reason for not having marched
already is, that we have just received intelligence that Rogers’
corps, the light-horse, part of the Highlanders, and another
brigade, lie in so exposed a situation as to give the fairest opportunity
of being carried. I should have attempted it last night,
but the rain was too violent, and when our pieces are wet, you
know our troops are hors du combat. This night I hope will
be better. * * * * * * I only wait myself for this business
of Rogers and company being over. I shall then fly to you;
for, to confess a truth, I really think our chief will do better
with me than without me.”
A glance over this letter sufficed to show Washington that,
at this dark moment, when he most needed support and sympathy,
his character and military conduct were the subject of
416disparaging comments, between the friend in whom he had so
implicitly confided, and a sarcastic and apparently self-constituted
rival. Whatever may have been his feelings of wounded pride
and outraged friendship, he restrained them, and enclosed the
letter to Reed, with the following chilling note:
“Dear Sir:—The enclosed was put into my hands by an
express from White Plains. Having no idea of its being a private
letter, much less suspecting the tendency of the correspondence,
I opened it; as I have done all other letters to
you from the same place, and Peekskill, upon the business of
your office, as I conceived, and found them to be. This, as it is
the truth, must be my excuse for seeing the contents of a letter,
which neither inclination nor intention would have prompted me
to,” &c.
The very calmness and coldness of this note must have had
a greater effect upon Reed, than could have been produced by
the most vehement reproaches. In subsequent communications,
he endeavored to explain away the offensive paragraphs in Lee’s
letter, declaring there was nothing in his own inconsistent with
the respect and affection he had ever borne for Washington’s
person and character.
Fortunately for Reed, Washington never saw that letter.
There were passages in it beyond the reach of softening explanation.
As it was, the purport of it, as reflected in Lee’s reply, had
given him a sufficient shock. His magnanimous nature, however,
was incapable of harboring long resentments; especially in matters
relating solely to himself. His personal respect for Colonel
Reed continued; he invariably manifested a high sense of his
merits, and consulted him, as before, on military affairs; but his
hitherto affectionate confidence in him, as a sympathizing friend,
417had received an incurable wound. His letters, before so frequent,
and such perfect outpourings of heart and mind, became few and
far between, and confined to matters of business.
It must have been consoling to Washington at this moment
of bitterness, to receive the following letter (dated Nov. 27th)
from William Livingston, the intelligent and patriotic governor
of New Jersey. It showed that while many misjudged him, and
friends seemed falling from his side, others appreciated him
truly, and the ordeal he was undergoing.
“I can easily form some idea of the difficulties under which
you labor,” writes Livingston, “particularly of one for which the
public can make no allowance, because your prudence, and fidelity
to the cause, will not suffer you to reveal it to the public; an
instance of magnanimity, superior, perhaps, to any that can be
shown in battle. But depend upon it, my dear sir, the impartial
world will do you ample justice before long. May God support
you under the fatigue, both of body and mind, to which you must
be constantly exposed.”[139]
Washington lingered at Brunswick until the 1st of December,
in the vain hope of being reinforced. The enemy, in the
mean time, advanced through the country, impressing waggons
and horses, and collecting cattle and sheep, as if for a distant
march. At length their vanguard appeared on the opposite side.
418of the Raritan. Washington immediately broke down the end
of the bridge next the village, and after nightfall resumed his
retreat. In the mean time, as the river was fordable, Captain
Alexander Hamilton planted his field-pieces on high, commanding
ground, and opened a spirited fire, to check any attempt of the
enemy to cross.
At Princeton, Washington left twelve hundred men in two
brigades, under Lord Stirling and General Adam Stephen, to
cover the country, and watch the motions of the enemy. Stephen
was the same officer that had served as a colonel under Washington
in the French war, as second in command of the
Virginia troops, and had charge of Fort Cumberland. In
consideration of his courage and military capacity, he had, in
1764, been intrusted with the protection of the frontier. He
had recently brought a detachment of Virginia troops to the
army, and received from Congress, in September, the commission
of brigadier-general.
The harassed army reached Trenton on the 2d of December.
Washington immediately proceeded to remove his baggage and
stores across the Delaware. In his letters from this place to the
President of Congress, he gives his reasons for his continued
retreat. “Nothing but necessity obliged me to retire before the
enemy, and leave so much of the Jerseys unprotected. Sorry am
I to observe that the frequent calls upon the militia of this State,
the want of exertion in the principal gentlemen of the country,
and a fatal supineness and insensibility of danger, till it is too
late to prevent an evil that was not only foreseen, but foretold,
have been the causes of our late disgraces.
“If the militia of this State had stepped forth in season (and
timely notice they had), we might have prevented the enemy’s
419crossing the Hackensack. We might, with equal possibility of
success, have made a stand at Brunswick on the Raritan. But as
both these rivers were fordable in a variety of places, being knee
deep only, it required many men to guard the passes, and these
we had not.”
In excuse for the people of New Jersey, it may be observed,
that they inhabited an open, agricultural country, where the
sound of war had never been heard. Many of them looked upon
the Revolution as rebellion; others thought it a ruined enterprise;
the armies engaged in it had been defeated and broken up. They
beheld the commander-in-chief retreating through their country
with a handful of men, weary, wayworn, dispirited; without
tents, without clothing, many of them barefooted, exposed to
wintry weather, and driven from post to post, by a well-clad,
well-fed, triumphant force, tricked out in all the glittering bravery
of war. Could it be wondered at, that peaceful husbandmen, seeing
their quiet fields thus suddenly overrun by adverse hosts, and
their very hearthstones threatened with outrage, should, instead of
flying to arms, seek for the safety of their wives and little ones,
and the protection of their humble means, from the desolation
which too often marks the course even of friendly armies?
Lord Howe and his brother sought to profit by this dismay
and despondency. A proclamation, dated 30th of November, commanded
all persons in arms against his majesty’s government, to
disband and return home, and all Congresses to desist from
treasonable acts: offering a free pardon to all who should comply
within fifty days.
Many who had been prominent in the cause, hastened to take
advantage of this proclamation. Those who had most property
420to lose, were the first to submit. The middle ranks remained
generally steadfast in this time of trial.[140]
The following extract of a letter from a field-officer in New
York, dated Dec. 2d, to his friend in London, gives the British
view of affairs. “The rebels continue flying before our army
Lord Cornwallis took the fort opposite Brunswick, plunged into
Raritan River, and seized the town. Mr. Washington had
orders from the Congress to rally and defend that post, but he
sent them word he could not. He was seen retreating with two
brigades to Trenton, where they talk of resisting; but such a
panic has seized the rebels, that no part of the Jerseys will hold
them, and I doubt whether Philadelphia itself will stop their
career. The Congress have lost their authority. * * * *
They are in such consternation that they know not what to do.
The two Adamses are in New England; Franklin gone to France;
Lynch has lost his senses; Rutledge has gone home disgusted;
Dana is persecuting at Albany, and Jay’s in the country playing
as bad a part; so that the fools have lost the assistance of the
knaves. However, should they embrace the enclosed proclamation,
they may yet escape the halter. * * * Honest David
Mathew, the mayor, has made his escape from them, and arrived
here this day.”[141]
In this dark day of peril to the cause, and to himself, Washington
remained firm and undaunted. In casting about for some
stronghold where he might make a desperate stand for the liberties
of his country, his thoughts reverted to the mountain regions
of his early campaigns. General Mercer was at hand, who had
shared his perils among these mountains, and his presence may
421have contributed to bring them to his mind. “What think you,”
said Washington; “if we should retreat to the back parts of
Pennsylvania, would the Pennsylvanians support us?”
“If the lower counties give up, the back counties will do the
same,” was the discouraging reply.
“We must then retire to Augusta County in Virginia,” said
Washington. “Numbers will repair to us for safety, and we will
try a predatory war. If overpowered, we must cross the Alleganies.”
Such was the indomitable spirit, rising under difficulties, and
buoyant in the darkest moment, that kept our tempest-tost cause
from foundering.
CHAPTER XLII. LEE AT PEEKSKILL—STANCH ADHERENCE OF HEATH TO ORDERS—LEE CROSSES THE HUDSON—WASHINGTON AT TRENTON—LEE AT THE HEELS OF THE ENEMY—HIS SPECULATIONS ON MILITARY GREATNESS—FORCED MARCH OF CORNWALLIS—WASHINGTON CROSSES THE DELAWARE—PUTNAM IN COMMAND AT PHILADELPHIA—BAFFLING LETTERS OF LEE—HOPES TO RECONQUER THE JERSEYS—GATES ON THE MARCH—LEE QUARTERED AT BASKINGRIDGE—SURPRISED AND CAPTURED—SPECULATIONS ON HIS CONDUCT.
422
Notwithstanding the repeated and pressing orders and entreaties
of the commander-in-chief, Lee did not reach Peekskill until
the 30th of November. In a letter of that date to Washington,
who had complained of his delay, he simply alleged difficulties,
which he would explain when both had leisure. His scheme to
entrap Rogers, the renegade, had failed; the old Indian hunter
had been too much on the alert; he boasted, however, to have
rendered more service by his delay, than he would have done had
he moved sooner. His forces were thereby augmented, so that
he expected to enter the Jerseys with four thousand firm and
willing men, who would make a very important diversion.
“The day after to-morrow,” added he, “we shall pass the
river, when I should be glad to receive your instructions; but I
could wish you would bind me as little as possible; not from any
opinion, I do assure you, of my own parts, but from a persuasion
423that detached generals cannot have too great latitude, unless they
are very incompetent indeed.”
Lee had calculated upon meeting no further difficulty in obtaining
men from Heath. He rode to that general’s quarters in
the evening, and was invited by him to alight and take tea. On
entering the house, Lee took Heath aside, and alluding to his
former refusal to supply troops as being inconsistent with the
orders of the commander-in-chief, “in point of law,” said he,
“you are right, but in point of policy I think you are wrong. I
am going into the Jerseys for the salvation of America; I wish
to take with me a larger force than I now have, and request you
to order two thousand of your men to march with me.”
Heath answered that he could not spare that number. He
was then asked to order one thousand; to which he replied, that
the business might be as well brought to a point at once—that
not a single man should march from the post by his order.
“Then,” exclaimed Lee, “I will order them myself.” “That
makes a wide difference,” rejoined Heath. “You are my senior,
but I have received positive written instructions from him who is
superior to us both, and I will not myself break those orders.”
In proof of his words, Heath produced the recent letter received
from Washington, repeating his former orders that no troops
should be removed from that post. Lee glanced over the letter.
“The commander-in-chief is now at a distance, and does not
know what is necessary here so well as I do.” He asked a sight
of the return book of the division. It was brought by Major
Huntington, the deputy adjutant-general. Lee ran his eye over
it, and chose two regiments. “You will order them to march
early to-morrow morning to join me,” said he to the major.
Heath, ruffling with the pride of military law, turned to the
424major with an air of authority. “Issue such orders at your
peril!” exclaimed he: then addressing Lee, “Sir,” said he, “if
you come to this post, and mean to issue orders here which will
break the positive ones I have received, I pray you do it completely
yourself, and through your own deputy adjutant-general
who is present, and not draw me or any of my family in as partners
in the guilt.”
“It is right,” said Lee; “Colonel Scammel, do you issue the
order.” It was done accordingly; but Heath’s punctilious scruples
were not yet satisfied. “I have one more request to make,
sir,” said he to Lee, “and that is, that you will be pleased to
give me a certificate that you exercise command at this post, and
order from it these regiments.”
Lee hesitated to comply, but George Clinton, who was present,
told him he could not refuse a request so reasonable. He
accordingly wrote, “For the satisfaction of General Heath, and
at his request, I do certify that I am commanding officer, at this
present writing, in this post, and that I have, in that capacity,
ordered Prescott’s and Wyllis’s regiments to march.”
Heath’s military punctilio was satisfied, and he smoothed his
ruffled plumes. Early the next morning the regiments moved
from their cantonments ready to embark, when Lee again rode
up to his door. “Upon further consideration,” said he, “I have
concluded not to take the two regiments with me—you may order
them to return to their former post.”
“This conduct of General Lee,” adds Heath in his memoirs,
“appeared not a little extraordinary, and one is almost at a loss
to account for it. He had been a soldier from his youth, had a
perfect knowledge of service in all its branches, but was rather
425obstinate in his temper, and could scarcely brook being crossed
in any thing in the line of his profession.”[142]
It was not until the 4th of December, that Lee crossed the
Hudson and began a laggard march, though aware of the imminent
peril of Washington and his army—how different from the
celerity of his movements in his expedition to the South!
In the meantime, Washington, who was at Trenton, had profited
by a delay of the enemy at Brunswick, and removed most
of the stores and baggage of the army across the Delaware; and,
being reinforced by fifteen hundred of the Pennsylvania militia,
procured by Mifflin, prepared to face about, and march back to
Princeton with such of his troops as were fit for service, there to be
governed by circumstances, and the movements of General Lee.
Accordingly, on the 5th of December he sent about twelve hundred
men in the advance, to reinforce Lord Stirling, and the next
day set off himself with the residue.
“The general has gone forward to Princeton,” writes Colonel
Reed, “where there are about three thousand men, with which, I
fear, he will not be able to make any stand.”[143]
While on the march, Washington received a letter from
Greene, who was at Princeton, informing him of a report that
Lee was “at the heels of the enemy.” “I should think,” adds
Greene, “he had better keep on the flanks than the rear, unless
it were possible to concert an attack at the same instant of time
in front and rear. * * * I think General Lee must be confined
within the lines of some general plan, or else his operations
will be independent of yours. His own troops, General St.
Clair’s, and the militia, must form a respectable army.”
426Lee had no idea of conforming to a general plan; he had an
independent plan of his own, and was at that moment at Pompton,
indulging speculations on military greatness, and the lamentable
want of it in his American contemporaries. In a letter
from that place to Governor Cooke of Rhode Island, he imparts
his notions on the subject. “Theory joined to practice, or a
heaven-born genius, can alone constitute a general. As to the
latter, God Almighty indulges the modern world very rarely
with the spectacle; and I do not know, from what I have seen,
that he has been more profuse of this ethereal spirit to the
Americans, than to other nations.”
While Lee was thus loitering and speculating, Cornwallis,
knowing how far he was in the rear, and how weak was the situation
of Washington’s army, and being himself strongly reinforced,
made a forced march from Brunswick, and was within two miles
of Princeton. Stirling, to avoid being surrounded, immediately
set out with two brigades for Trenton. Washington, too, receiving
intelligence by express of these movements, hastened back to
that place, and caused boats to be collected from all quarters,
and the stores and troops transported across the Delaware. He
himself crossed with the rear-guard on Sunday morning, and took
up his quarters about a mile from the river; causing the boats to
be destroyed, and troops to be posted opposite the fords. He
was conscious, however, as he said, that with his small force he
could make no great opposition, should the enemy bring boats
with them. Fortunately they did not come thus provided.
The rear-guard, says an American account, had barely crossed
the river, when Lord Cornwallis “came marching down with all
the pomp of war, in great expectation of getting boats, and immediately
pursuing.” Not one was to be had there or elsewhere;
427for Washington had caused the boats, for an extent of seventy
miles up and down the river, to be secured on the right bank.
His lordship was effectually brought to a stand. He made some
moves with two columns, as if he would cross the Delaware
above and below, either to push on to Philadelphia, or to entrap
Washington in the acute angle made by the bend of the river
opposite Bordentown. An able disposition of American troops
along the upper part of the river, and of a number of galleys below,
discouraged any attempt of the kind. Cornwallis, therefore, gave
up the pursuit, distributed the German troops in cantonments
along the left bank of the river, and stationed his main force at
Brunswick, trusting to be able before long to cross the Delaware
on the ice.
On the 8th, Washington wrote to the President of Congress:
“There is not a moment’s time to be lost in assembling such a
force as can be collected, as the object of the enemy cannot now
be doubted in the smallest degree. Indeed, I shall be out in my
conjecture, for it is only conjecture, if the late embarkation at
New York is not for Delaware River, to co-operate with the army
under General Howe, who, I am informed from good authority,
is with the British troops, and his whole force upon this route. I
have no certain intelligence of General Lee, although I have sent
expresses to him, and lately a Colonel Humpton, to bring me
some accurate accounts of his situation. I last night despatched
another gentleman to him (Major Hoops), desiring he would
hasten his march to the Delaware, on which I would provide
boats near a place called Alexandria, for the transportation of
his troops. I cannot account for the slowness of his march.”
In further letters to Lee, Washington urged the peril of
Philadelphia. “Do come on,” writes he; “your arrival may be
428fortunate, and, if it can be effected without delay, it may be the
means of preserving a city, whose loss must prove of the most
fatal consequence to the cause of America.”
Putnam was now detached to take command of Philadelphia,
and put it in a state of defence, and General Mifflin to have
charge of the munitions of war deposited there. By their advice
Congress hastily adjourned on the 12th of December, to meet
again on the 20th, at Baltimore.
Washington’s whole force at this time, was about five thousand
five hundred men; one thousand of them Jersey militia,
fifteen hundred militia from Philadelphia, and a battalion of five
hundred of the German yeomanry of Pennsylvania. Gates, however,
he was informed, was coming on with seven regiments detached
by Schuyler from the Northern department; reinforced
by these, and the troops under Lee, he hoped to be able to attempt
a stroke upon the enemy’s forces, which lay a good deal
scattered, and to all appearances, in a state of security. “A
lucky blow in this quarter,” writes he, “would be fatal to them,
and would most certainly raise the spirits of the people, which
are quite sunk by our late misfortunes.”[144]
While cheering himself with these hopes, and trusting to
speedy aid from Lee, that wayward commander, though nearly
three weeks had elapsed since he had received Washington’s orders
and entreaties to join him with all possible despatch, was no
farther on his march than Morristown, in the Jerseys; where,
with militia recruits, his force was about four thousand men. In
a letter written by him on the 8th of December to a committee
of Congress, he says: “If I was not taught to think the army with
429General Washington had been considerably reinforced, I should
immediately join him; but as I am assured he is very strong,
I should imagine we can make a better impression by beating up
and harassing their detached parties in their rear, for which purpose,
a good post at Chatham seems the best calculated. It is a
happy distance from Newark, Elizabethtown, Woodbridge and
Boundbrook. We shall, I expect, annoy, distract, and consequently
weaken them in a desultory war.”[145]
On the same day he writes from Chatham, in reply to Washington’s
letter by Major Hoops, just received: “I am extremely
shocked to hear that your force is so inadequate to the necessity
of your situation, as I had been taught to think you had been
considerably reinforced. Your last letters proposing a plan of
surprises and forced marches, convinced me that there was no
danger of your being obliged to pass the Delaware; in consequence
of which proposals, I have put myself in a position the
most convenient to co-operate with you by attacking their rear.
I cannot persuade myself that Philadelphia is their object at
present. * * * It will be difficult, I am afraid, to join you;
but cannot I do you more service by attacking their rear?”
This letter, sent by a light-horseman, received an instant reply
from Washington. “Philadelphia, beyond all question, is the object
of the enemy’s movements, and nothing less than our utmost
exertions will prevent General Howe from possessing it.
The force I have is weak, and utterly incompetent to that end.
I must, therefore, entreat you to push on with every possible
succor you can bring.”[146]
On the 9th, Lee, who was at Chatham, receives information
430from Heath, that three of the regiments detached under Gates
from the Northern army, had arrived from Albany at Peekskill.
He instantly writes to him to forward them, without loss of time,
to Morristown: “I am in hopes,” adds he, “to reconquer (if I
may so express myself) the Jerseys. It was really in the hands
of the enemy before my arrival.”
On the 11th, Lee writes to Washington from Morristown,
where he says his troops had been obliged to halt two days for
want of shoes. He now talked of crossing the great Brunswick
post-road, and, by a forced night’s march, making his way to the
ferry above Burlington, where boats should be sent up from
Philadelphia to receive him.
“I am much surprised,” writes Washington in reply, “that
you should be in any doubt respecting the route you should take,
after the information you have received upon that head. A
large number of boats was procured, and is still retained at Tinicum,
under a strong guard, to facilitate your passage across the
Delaware. I have so frequently mentioned our situation, and the
necessity of your aid, that it is painful for me to add a word on
the subject. * * * Congress have directed Philadelphia to
be defended to the last extremity. The fatal consequences that
must attend its loss, are but too obvious to every one; your
arrival may be the means of saving it.”
In detailing the close of General Lee’s march, so extraordinary
for its tardiness, we shall avail ourselves of the memoir
already cited of General Wilkinson, who was at that time a brigade
major, about twenty-two years of age, and was accompanying
General Gates, who had been detached by Schuyler with seven
regiments to reinforce Washington. Three of these regiments,
as we have shown, had descended the Hudson to Peekskill, and
431were ordered by Lee to Morristown. Gates had embarked with
the remaining four, and landed with them at Esopus, whence he
took a back route by the Delaware and the Minisink.
On the 11th of December, he was detained by a heavy snow
storm, in a sequestered valley near the Wallpeck in New Jersey.
Being cut off from all information respecting the adverse armies,
he detached Major Wilkinson to seek Washington’s camp,
with a letter, stating the force under his command, and inquiring
what route he should take. Wilkinson crossed the hills on
horseback to Sussex court-house, took a guide, and proceeded
down the country. Washington, he soon learnt, had passed the
Delaware several days before; the boats, he was told, had been
removed from the ferries, so that he would find some difficulty in
getting over, but Major-general Lee was at Morristown. Finding
such obstacles in his way to the commander-in-chief, he determined
to seek the second in command, and ask orders from
him for General Gates. Lee had decamped from Morristown on
the 12th of December, but had marched no further than Vealtown,
barely eight miles distant. There he left General Sullivan
with the troops, while he took up his quarters three miles off, at
a tavern, at Baskingridge. As there was not a British cantonment
within twenty miles, he took but a small guard for his
protection, thinking himself perfectly secure.
About four o’clock in the morning, Wilkinson arrived at his
quarters. He was presented to the general as he lay in bed, and
delivered into his hands the letter of General Gates. Lee, observing
it was addressed to Washington, declined opening it, until
apprised by Wilkinson of its contents, and the motives of his
visit. He then broke the seal, and recommended Wilkinson to
take repose. The latter lay down on his blanket, before a comfortable
432fire, among the officers of his suite; “for we were not
encumbered in those days,” says he, “with beds or baggage.”
Lee, naturally indolent, lingered in bed until eight o’clock.
He then came down in his usual slovenly style, half-dressed, in slippers
and blanket coat, his collar open, and his linen apparently of
some days’ wear. After some inquiries about the campaign in
the North, he gave Wilkinson a brief account of the operations
of the main army, which he condemned in strong terms, and in
his usual sarcastic way. He wasted the morning in altercation
with some of the militia, particularly the Connecticut light-horse;
“several of whom,” says Wilkinson, “appeared in large,
full-buttoned perukes, and were treated very irreverently. One
wanted forage, another his horse shod, another his pay, a fourth
provisions, &c.; to which the general replied, ’Your wants are
numerous; but you have not mentioned the last,—you want to
go home, and shall be indulged; for d— you, you do no good
here.’”
Colonel Scammel, the adjutant-general, called from General
Sullivan for orders concerning the morning’s march. After musing
a moment or two, Lee asked him if he had a manuscript map
of the country. It was produced, and spread upon a table.
Wilkinson observed Lee trace with his finger the route from
Vealtown to Pluckamin, thence to Somerset court-house, and on,
by Rocky Hill, to Princeton; he then returned to Pluckamin,
and traced the route in the same manner by Boundbrook to
Brunswick, and after a close inspection carelessly said to Scammel,
“Tell General Sullivan to move down towards Pluckamin;
that I will soon be with him.” This, observes Wilkinson, was
off his route to Alexandria on the Delaware, where he had been
ordered to cross, and directly on that towards Brunswick and
433Princeton. He was convinced, therefore, that Lee meditated an
attack on the British post at the latter place.
From these various delays they did not sit down to breakfast
before ten o’clock. After breakfast Lee sat writing a reply
to General Gates, in which, as usual, he indulged in sarcastic
comments on the commander-in-chief. “The ingenious manœuvre
of Fort Washington,” writes he, “has completely unhinged the
goodly fabric we had been building. There never was so d—d a
stroke; entre nous, a certain great man is most damnably deficient.
He has thrown me into a situation where I have my
choice of difficulties: if I stay in this province I risk myself and
army; and if I do not stay, the province is lost for ever. * * *
* * As to what relates to yourself, if you think you can be in
time to aid the general, I would have you by all means go; you
will at least save your army,” &c.[147]
While Lee was writing, Wilkinson was looking out of a window
down a lane, about a hundred yards in length, leading from
the house to the main road. Suddenly a party of British dragoons
turned a corner of the avenue at a full charge. “Here,
sir, are the British cavalry!” exclaimed Wilkinson. “Where?”
replied Lee, who had just signed his letter. “Around the
house!”—for they had opened file and surrounded it. “Where
is the guard? d— the guard, why don’t they fire?” Then after
a momentary pause—“Do, sir, see what has become of the
guard.”
The guards, alas, unwary as their general, and chilled by the
air of a frosty morning, had stacked their arms, and repaired to
the south side of a house on the opposite side of the road to sun
434themselves, and were now chased by the dragoons in different
directions. In fact, a tory, who had visited the general the evening
before, to complain of the loss of a horse taken by the army,
having found where Lee was to lodge and breakfast, had ridden
eighteen miles in the night to Brunswick and given the information,
and had piloted back Colonel Harcourt with his dragoons.[148]
The women of the house would fain have concealed Lee in a
bed, but he rejected the proposition with disdain. Wilkinson,
according to his own account, posted himself in a place where
only one person could approach at a time, and there took his
stand, a pistol in each hand, resolved to shoot the first and second
assailant, and then appeal to his sword. While in this “unpleasant
situation,” as he terms it, he heard a voice declare, “If the
general does not surrender in five minutes, I will set fire to the
house!” After a short pause the threat was repeated, with a
solemn oath. Within two minutes he heard it proclaimed,
“Here is the general, he has surrendered.”
There was a shout of triumph, but a great hurry to make
sure of the prize before the army should arrive to the rescue. A
trumpet sounded the recall to the dragoons, who were chasing the
scattered guards. The general, bareheaded, and in his slippers
and blanket coat, was mounted on Wilkinson’s horse, which stood
at the door, and the troop clattered off with their prisoner to
Brunswick. In three hours the booming of cannon in that direction
told the exultation of the enemy.[149] They boasted of having
taken the American Palladium; for they considered Lee the
most scientific and experienced of the rebel generals.
On the departure of the troops, Wilkinson, finding the coast
435clear, ventured from his stronghold, repaired to the stable,
mounted the first horse he could find, and rode full speed in
quest of General Sullivan, whom he found under march toward
Pluckamin. He handed him the letter to Gates, written by Lee
the moment before his capture, and still open. Sullivan having
read it, returned it to Wilkinson, and advised him to rejoin General
Gates without delay: for his own part, being now in command,
he changed his route, and pressed forward to join the commander-in-chief.
The loss of Lee was a severe shock to the Americans; many of
whom, as we have shown, looked to him as the man who was to
rescue them from their critical, and well-nigh desperate situation.
With their regrets, however, were mingled painful doubts,
caused by his delay in obeying the repeated summons of his
commander-in-chief, when the latter was in peril; and by his
exposing himself so unguardedly in the very neighborhood of the
enemy. Some at first suspected that he had done so designedly,
and with collusion; but this was soon disproved by the indignities
attending his capture, and his rigorous treatment subsequently by
the British; who affected to consider him a deserter, from his
having formerly served in their army.
Wilkinson, who was at that time conversant with the cabals
of the camp, and apparently in the confidence of some of the
leaders, points out what he considers the true secret of Lee’s
conduct. His military reputation, originally very high, had been
enhanced of late, by its being generally known that he had been
opposed to the occupation of Fort Washington; while the fall of
that fortress and other misfortunes of the campaign, though
beyond the control of the commander-in-chief, had quickened the
discontent which, according to Wilkinson, had been generated
436against him at Cambridge, and raised a party against him in
Congress. “It was confidently asserted at the time,” adds he,
“but is not worthy of credit, that a motion had been made in
that body tending to supersede him in the command of the
army. In this temper of the times, if General Lee had anticipated
General Washington in cutting the cordon of the enemy
between New York and the Delaware, the commander-in-chief
would probably have been superseded. In this case, Lee would
have succeeded him.”
What an unfortunate change would it have been for the
country! Lee was undoubtedly a man of brilliant talents, shrewd
sagacity, and much knowledge and experience in the art of war;
but he was wilful and uncertain in his temper, self-indulgent in
his habits, and an egoist in warfare; boldly dashing for a soldier’s
glory rather than warily acting for a country’s good. He wanted
those great moral qualities which, in addition to military capacity,
inspired such universal confidence in the wisdom, rectitude and
patriotism of Washington, enabling him to direct and control
legislative bodies as well as armies; to harmonize the jarring
passions and jealousies of a wide and imperfect confederacy, and
to cope with the varied exigencies of the Revolution.
The very retreat which Washington had just effected through
the Jerseys bore evidence to his generalship. Thomas Paine,
who had accompanied the army “from Fort Lee to the edge of
Pennsylvania,” thus speaks in one of his writings published at
the time: “With a handful of men we sustained an orderly retreat
for near an hundred miles, brought off our ammunition, all our
field-pieces, the greatest part of our stores, and had four rivers
to pass. None can say that our retreat was precipitate, for we
were three weeks in performing it, that the country might have
437time to come in. Twice we marched back to meet the enemy,
and remained out until dark. The sign of fear was not seen in
our camp; and had not some of the cowardly and disaffected
inhabitants spread false alarms through the country, the Jerseys
had never been ravaged.”
And this is his testimony to the moral qualities of the
commander-in-chief, as evinced in this time of perils and hardships.
“Voltaire has remarked, that King William never appeared
to full advantage but in difficulties and in action. The
same remark may be made of General Washington, for the character
fits him. There is a natural firmness in some minds, which
cannot be unlocked by trifles; but which, when unlocked, discovers
a cabinet of fortitude; and I reckon it among those kinds of
public blessings which we do not immediately see, that God hath
blessed him with uninterrupted health, and given him a mind that
can even flourish upon care.”[150]
CHAPTER XLIII. WASHINGTON CLOTHED WITH ADDITIONAL POWERS—RECRUITMENT OF THE ARMY—INCREASED PAY—COLONEL JOHN CADWALADER—ARRIVAL OF SULLIVAN—GATES—WILKINSON—A COUP DE MAIN MEDITATED—POSTURE OF AFFAIRS AT TRENTON—GATES DECLINES TO TAKE A PART—HIS COMMENTS ON WASHINGTON’S PLANS—PREPARATIONS FOR THE COUP DE MAIN—CROSSING OF THE DELAWARE—ATTACK ON THE ENEMY’S FORCES AT TRENTON—DEATH OF RAHL—HIS CHARACTER.
438
“Before you receive this letter,” writes Washington to his
brother Augustine, “you will undoubtedly have heard of the captivity
of General Lee. This is an additional misfortune; and the
more vexatious, as it was by his own folly and imprudence, and
without a view to effect any good that he was taken. As he went
to lodge three miles out of his own camp, and within twenty miles
of the enemy, a rascally tory rode in the night to give notice of
it to the enemy, who sent a party of light-horse that seized him,
and carried him off with every mark of triumph and indignity.”
This is the severest comment that the magnanimous spirit of
Washington permitted him to make on the conduct and fortunes
of the man who would have supplanted him; and this is made in
his private correspondence with his brother. No harsh strictures
on them appear in his official letters to Congress or the Board of
War; nothing but regret for his capture, as a loss to the service.
439In the same letter he speaks of the critical state of affairs:
“If every nerve is not strained to recruit the army with all possible
expedition, I think the game is pretty nearly up. * * *
You can form no idea of the perplexity of my situation. No
man I believe ever had a greater choice of evils and less means
to extricate himself from them. However, under a full persuasion
of the justice of our cause, I cannot entertain an idea that it
will finally sink, though it may remain for some time under a
cloud.”
Fortunately, Congress, prior to their adjournment, had resolved
that “until they should otherwise order, General Washington
should be possessed of all power to order and direct all things
relative to the department and to the operations of war.” Thus
empowered, he proceeded immediately to recruit three battalions
of artillery. To those whoso terms were expiring, he promised an
augmentation of twenty-five per cent. upon their pay, and a bounty
of ten dollars to the men for six weeks’ service. “It was no time,”
he said, “to stand upon expense; nor in matters of self-evident
exigency, to refer to Congress at the distance of a hundred and
thirty or forty miles.” “If any good officers will offer to raise
men upon continental pay and establishment in this quarter, I
shall encourage them to do so, and regiment them when they
have done it. It may be thought that I am going a good deal
out of the line of my duty, to adopt these measures, or to advise
thus freely. A character to lose, an estate to forfeit, the inestimable
blessings of liberty at stake, and a life devoted, must be
my excuse.”[151]
The promise of increased pay and bounties, had kept together
440for a time the dissolving army. The local militia began to turn
out freely. Colonel John Cadwalader, a gentleman of gallant
spirit, and cultivated mind and manners, brought a large volunteer
detachment, well equipped, and composed principally of
Philadelphia troops. Washington, who held Cadwalader in high
esteem, assigned him an important station at Bristol, with Colonel
Reed, who was his intimate friend, as an associate. They had it
in charge to keep a watchful eye upon Count Donop’s Hessians,
who were cantoned along the opposite shore from Bordentown to
the Black Horse.
On the 20th of December arrived General Sullivan in camp,
with the troops recently commanded by the unlucky Lee. They
were in a miserable plight; destitute of almost every thing; many
of them fit only for the hospital, and those whose terms were
nearly out, thinking of nothing but their discharge. About four
hundred of them, who were Rhode Islanders, were sent down
under Colonel Hitchcock to reinforce Cadwalader; who was now
styled brigadier-general by courtesy, lest the Continental troops
might object to act under his command.
On the same day arrived General Gates, with the remnants
of four regiments from the Northern army. With him came Wilkinson,
who now resumed his station as brigade major in St.
Clair’s brigade, to which he belonged. To his Memoirs we are
indebted for notices of the commander-in-chief. “When the
divisions of Sullivan and Gates joined General Washington,”
writes Wilkinson, “he found his numbers increased, yet his difficulties
were not sensibly diminished; ten days would disband his
corps and leave him 1,400 men, miserably provided in all things
I saw him in that gloomy period; dined with him, and attentively
441marked his aspect; always grave and thoughtful, he appeared at
that time pensive and solemn in the extreme.”
There were vivid schemes forming under that solemn aspect.
The time seemed now propitious for the coup de main which
Washington had of late been meditating. Every thing showed
careless confidence on the part of the enemy. Howe was in winter
quarters at New York. His troops were loosely cantoned
about the Jerseys, from the Delaware to Brunswick, so that they
could not readily be brought to act in concert on a sudden alarm.
The Hessians were in the advance, stationed along the Delaware,
facing the American lines, which were along the west bank.
Cornwallis, thinking his work accomplished, had obtained leave of
absence, and was likewise at New York, preparing to embark for
England. Washington had now between five and six thousand
men fit for service; with these he meditated to cross the river at
night, at different points, and make simultaneous attacks upon the
Hessian advance posts.
He calculated upon the eager support of his troops, who were
burning to revenge the outrages on their homes and families, committed
by these foreign mercenaries. They considered the Hessians
mere hirelings; slaves to a petty despot, fighting for sordid
pay, and actuated by no sentiment of patriotism or honor. They
had rendered themselves the horror of the Jerseys, by rapine,
brutality, and heartlessness. At first, their military discipline had
inspired awe, but of late they had become careless and unguarded,
knowing the broken and dispirited state of the Americans, and
considering them incapable of any offensive enterprise.
A brigade of three Hessian regiments, those of Rahl,[152] Lossberg,
442and Knyphausen, was stationed at Trenton. Colonel Rahl
had the command of the post at his own solicitation, and in consequence
of the laurels he had gained at White Plains and Fort
Washington. We have before us journals of two Hessian lieutenants
and a corporal, which give graphic particulars of the colonel
and his post. According to their representations, he, with all his
bravery, was little fitted for such an important command. He
lacked the necessary vigilance and forecast.
One of the lieutenants speaks of him in a sarcastic vein, and
evidently with some degree of prejudice. According to his
account, there was more bustle than business at the post. The
men were harassed with watches, detachments, and pickets, without
purpose and without end. The cannon must be drawn forth
every day from their proper places, and paraded about the town,
seemingly only to make a stir and uproar.
The lieutenant was especially annoyed by the colonel’s passion
for music. Whether his men when off duty were well or ill clad,
whether they kept their muskets clean and bright, and their ammunition
in good order, was of little moment to the colonel, he
never inquired about it;—but the music! that was the thing! the
hautboys—he never could have enough of them. The main guard
was at no great distance from his quarters, and the music could
not linger there long enough. There was a church close by, surrounded
by palings; the officer on guard must march round and
round it, with his men and musicians, looking, says the lieutenant,
like a Catholic procession, wanting only the cross and the banner,
and chanting choristers.
According to the same authority, Rahl was a boon companion;
made merry until a late hour in the night, and then lay in
bed until nine o’clock in the morning. When the officers came
443to parade between ten end eleven o’clock, and presented themselves
at head-quarters, he was often in his bath, and the guard
must be kept waiting half an hour longer. On parade, too, when
any other commander would take occasion to talk with his staff
officers and others upon duty about the concerns of the garrison,
the colonel attended to nothing but the music—he was wrapped
up in it to the great disgust of the testy lieutenant.
And then, according to the latter, he took no precautions
against the possibility of being attacked. A veteran officer,
Major Von Dechow, proposed that some works should be thrown
up, where the cannon might be placed, ready against any assault.
“Works!—pooh—pooh:”—the colonel made merry with the
very idea—using an unseemly jest, which we forbear to quote.
“An assault by the rebels! Let them come! We’ll at them with
the bayonet.”
The veteran Dechow gravely persisted in his counsel. “Herr
Colonel,” said he, respectfully, “it costs almost nothing; if it
does not help, it does not harm.” The pragmatical lieutenant,
too, joined in the advice, and offered to undertake the work.
The jovial colonel only repeated his joke, went away laughing at
them both, and no works were thrown up.
The lieutenant, sorely nettled, observes sneeringly: “He
believed the name of Rahl more fearful and redoubtable than
all the works of Vauban and Cohorn, and that no rebel would
dare to encounter it. A fit man truly to command a corps! and
still more to defend a place lying so near an enemy having a hundred
times his advantages. Every thing with him was done
heedlessly and without forecast.”[153]
444Such is the account given of this brave, but inconsiderate and
light-hearted commander; given, however, by an officer not of
his regiment. The honest corporal already mentioned, who was
one of Rahl’s own men, does him more justice. According to
his journal, rumors that the Americans meditated an attack had
aroused the vigilance of the colonel, and on the 21st of December
he had reconnoitred the banks of the Delaware, with a strong
detachment, quite to Frankfort, to see if there were any movements
of the Americans indicative of an intention to cross the
river. He had returned without seeing any; but had since
caused pickets and alarm posts to be stationed every night outside
the town.[154]
Such was the posture of affairs at Trenton at the time the
coup de main was meditated.
Whatever was to be done, however, must be done quickly,
before the river was frozen. An intercepted letter had convinced
Washington of what he had before suspected, that Howe
was only waiting for that event to resume active operations, cross
the river on the ice, and push on triumphantly to Philadelphia.
He communicated his project to Gates, and wished him
to go to Bristol, take command there, and co-operate from that
quarter. Gates, however, pleaded ill health, and requested leave
to proceed to Philadelphia.
The request may have surprised Washington, considering the
spirited enterprise that was on foot; but Gates, as has before
been observed, had a disinclination to serve immediately under
the commander-in-chief; like Lee, he had a disparaging opinion
of him, or rather an impatience of his supremacy. He had,
445moreover, an ulterior object in view. Having been disappointed
and chagrined, in finding himself subordinate to General Schuyler
in the Northern campaign, he was now intent on making
interest among the members of Congress for an independent
command. Washington urged that, on his way to Philadelphia,
he would at least stop for a day or two at Bristol, to concert a
plan of operations with Reed and Cadwalader, and adjust any
little questions of etiquette and command that might arise between
the continental colonels who had gone thither with Lee’s
troops and the volunteer officers stationed there.[155]
He does not appear to have complied even with this request.
According to Wilkinson’s account, he took quarters at Newtown,
and set out thence for Baltimore on the 24th of December, the
very day before that of the intended coup de main. He prevailed
on Wilkinson to accompany him as far as Philadelphia.
On the road he appeared to be much depressed in spirits; but he
relieved himself, like Lee, by criticising the plans of the commander-in-chief.
“He frequently,” writes Wilkinson, “expressed
the opinion that, while Washington was watching the enemy
above Trenton, they would construct bateaux, pass the Delaware
in his rear, and take possession of Philadelphia before he
was aware; and that, instead of vainly attempting to stop Sir
William Howe at the Delaware, General Washington ought to
retire to the south of the Susquehanna, and there form an army.
He said it was his intention to propose this measure to Congress
at Baltimore, and urged me to accompany him to that
place; but my duty forbade the thought.”
Here we have somewhat of a counterpart to Lee’s project of
446eclipsing the commander-in-chief. Evidently the two military
veterans who had once been in conclave with him at Mount
Vernon, considered the truncheon of command falling from his
grasp.
The projected attack upon the Hessian posts was to be threefold.
1st. Washington was to cross the Delaware with a considerable
force, at McKonkey’s Ferry (now Taylorsville), about nine miles
above Trenton, and march down upon that place, where Rahl’s
cantonment comprised a brigade of fifteen hundred Hessians, a
troop of British light-horse, and a number of chasseurs.
2d. General Ewing, with a body of Pennsylvania militia,
was to cross at a ferry about a mile below Trenton; secure the
bridge over the Assunpink creek, a stream flowing along the
south side of the town, and cut off any retreat of the enemy in
that direction.
3d. General Putnam, with the troops occupied in fortifying
Philadelphia, and those under General Cadwalader, was to cross
below Burlington, and attack the lower posts under Count Donop.
The several divisions were to cross the Delaware at night,
so as to be ready for simultaneous action, by five o’clock in the
morning.
Seldom is a combined plan carried into full operation.
Symptoms of an insurrection in Philadelphia, obliged Putnam
to remain with some force in that city; but he detached five or
six hundred of the Pennsylvania militia under Colonel Griffin,
his adjutant-general, who threw himself into the Jerseys, to be at
hand to co-operate with Cadwalader.
A letter from Washington to Colonel Reed, who was stationed
with Cadwalader, shows the anxiety of his mind, and his
consciousness of the peril of the enterprise.
447“Christmas day at night, one hour before day, is the time
fixed upon for our attempt upon Trenton. For Heaven’s sake
keep this to yourself, as the discovery of it may prove fatal to
us; our numbers, I am sorry to say, being less than I had any
conception of; yet nothing but necessity, dire necessity, will, nay
must, justify an attack. Prepare, and in concert with Griffin,
attack as many of their posts as you possibly can, with a prospect
of success; the more we can attack at the same instant, the
more confusion we shall spread, and the greater good will result
from it. * * I have ordered our men to be provided with
three days’ provision ready cooked, with which, and their blankets,
they are to march; for if we are successful, which Heaven
grant, and the circumstances favor, we may push on. I shall
direct every ferry and ford to be well guarded, and not a soul
suffered to pass without an officer’s going down with the permit.
Do the same with you.”
It has been said that Christmas night was fixed upon for the
enterprise, because the Germans are prone to revel and carouse
on that festival, and it was supposed a great part of the troops
would be intoxicated, and in a state of disorder and confusion;
but in truth Washington would have chosen an earlier day, had
it been in his power. “We could not ripen matters for the
attack before the time mentioned,” said he in his letter to Reed,
“so much out of sorts, and so much in want of every thing are
the troops under Sullivan.”
Early on the eventful evening (Dec. 25th), the troops destined
for Washington’s part of the attack, about two thousand four
hundred strong, with a train of twenty small pieces, were paraded
near McKonkey’s Ferry, ready to pass as soon as it grew
dark, in the hope of being all on the other side by twelve o’clock.
448Washington repaired to the ground accompanied by Generals
Greene, Sullivan, Mercer, Stephen, and Lord Stirling. Greene
was full of ardor for the enterprise; eager, no doubt, to wipe
out the recollection of Fort Washington. It was, indeed, an
anxious moment for all.
We have here some circumstances furnished to us by the
Memoirs of Wilkinson. That officer had returned from Philadelphia,
and brought a letter from Gates to Washington. There
was some snow on the ground, and he had traced the march of
the troops for the last few miles by the blood from the feet of
those whose shoes were broken. Being directed to Washington’s
quarters, he found him, he says, alone, with his whip in his hand,
prepared to mount his horse. “When I presented the letter of
General Gates to him, before receiving it, he exclaimed with
solemnity,—’What a time is this to hand me letters!’ I answered
that I had been charged with it by General Gates. ’By
General Gates! Where is he?’ ’I left him this morning in Philadelphia.’
’What was he doing there?’ ’I understood him
that he was on his way to Congress.’ He earnestly repeated,
’On his way to Congress!’ then broke the seal, and I made my
bow, and joined General St. Clair on the bank of the river.”
Did Washington surmise the incipient intrigues and cabals,
that were already aiming to undermine him? Had Gates’s eagerness
to push on to Congress, instead of remaining with the army
in a moment of daring enterprise, suggested any doubts as to his
object? Perhaps not. Washington’s nature was too noble to be
suspicious; and yet he had received sufficient cause to be distrustful.
Boats being in readiness, the troops began to cross about
sunset. The weather was intensely cold; the wind was high, the
449current strong, and the river full of floating ice. Colonel Glover,
with his amphibious regiment of Marblehead fishermen, was
in advance; the same who had navigated the army across the
Sound, in its retreat from Brooklyn on Long Island, to New
York. They were men accustomed to battle with the elements,
yet with all their skill and experience, the crossing was difficult
and perilous. Washington, who had crossed with the troops,
stood anxiously, yet patiently, on the eastern bank, while one
precious hour after another elapsed, until the transportation of
the artillery should be effected. The night was dark and tempestuous,
the drifting ice drove the boats out of their course, and
threatened them with destruction. Colonel Knox, who attended
to the crossing of the artillery, assisted with his labors, but still
more with his “stentorian lungs,” giving orders and directions.
It was three o’clock before the artillery was landed, and
nearly four before the troops took up their line of march.
Trenton was nine miles distant; and not to be reached before
daylight. To surprise it, therefore, was out of the question.
There was no making a retreat without being discovered, and
harassed in repassing the river. Beside, the troops from the
other points might have crossed, and co-operation was essential to
their safety. Washington resolved to push forward, and trust to
Providence.
He formed the troops into two columns. The first he led
himself, accompanied by Greene, Stirling, Mercer, and Stephen;
it was to make a circuit by the upper or Pennington road, to the
north of Trenton. The other led by Sullivan, and including the
brigade of St. Clair, was to take the lower river road, leading to
the west end of the town. Sullivan’s column was to halt a few
moments at a cross-road leading to Howland’s Ferry, to give
450Washington’s column time to effect its circuit, so that the attack
might be simultaneous. On arriving at Trenton, they were to
force the outer guards, and push directly into the town before
the enemy had time to form.
The Hessian journals before us enable us to give the reader
a glance into the opposite camp on this eventful night. The
situation of Washington was more critical than he was aware.
Notwithstanding the secrecy with which his plans had been
conducted, Colonel Rahl had received a warning from General
Grant, at Princeton, of the intended attack, and of the very
time it was to be made, but stating that it was to be by a detachment
under Lord Stirling. Rahl was accordingly on the
alert.
It so happened that about dusk of this very evening, when
Washington must have been preparing to cross the Delaware,
there were alarm guns and firing at the Trenton outpost.
The whole garrison was instantly drawn out under arms, and
Colonel Rahl hastened to the outpost. It was found in confusion,
and six men wounded. A body of men had emerged from the
woods, fired upon the picket, and immediately retired.[156] Colonel
Rahl, with two companies and a field-piece, marched through the
woods, and made the rounds of the outposts, but seeing and hearing
nothing, and finding all quiet, returned. Supposing this to
be the attack against which he had been warned, and that it
451was “a mere flash in the pan,” he relapsed into his feeling of
security; and, as the night was cold and stormy, permitted the
troops to return to their quarters and lay aside their arms. Thus
the garrison and its unwary commander slept in fancied security,
at the very time that Washington and his troops were making
their toilsome way across the Delaware. How perilous would
have been their situation had their enemy been more vigilant!
It began to hail and snow as the troops commenced their
march, and increased in violence as they advanced, the storm
driving the sleet in their faces. So bitter was the cold that
two of the men were frozen to death that night. The day dawned
by the time Sullivan halted at the cross-road. It was discovered
that the storm had rendered many of the muskets wet and useless.
“What is to be done?” inquired Sullivan of St. Clair. “You
have nothing for it but to push on, and use the bayonet,” was the
reply. While some of the soldiers were endeavoring to clear
their muskets, and squibbing off priming, Sullivan despatched an
officer to apprise the commander-in-chief of the condition of
their arms. He came back half-dismayed by an indignant burst
of Washington, who ordered him to return instantly and tell
General Sullivan to “advance and charge.”
It was about eight o’clock when Washington’s column arrived
in the vicinity of the village. The storm, which had rendered
the march intolerable, had kept every one within doors, and the
snow had deadened the tread of the troops and the rumbling of
the artillery. As they approached the village, Washington, who
was in front, came to a man that was chopping wood by the roadside,
and inquired, “Which way is the Hessian picket?” “I don’t
know,” was the surly reply. “You may tell,” said Captain Forest
of the artillery, “for that is General Washington.” The aspect
452of the man changed in an instant. Raising his hands to heaven,
“God bless and prosper you!” cried he. “The picket is in that
house, and the sentry stands near that tree.”[157]
The advance guard was led by a brave young officer, Captain
William A. Washington, seconded by Lieutenant James Monroe
(in after years President of the United States). They received
orders to dislodge the picket. Here happened to be stationed the
very lieutenant whose censures of the negligence of Colonel
Rahl we have just quoted. By his own account, he was very
near being entrapped in the guard-house. His sentries, he says,
were not alert enough; and had he not stepped out of the picket
house himself and discovered the enemy, they would have been
upon him before his men could scramble to their arms. “Der
feind! der feind! heraus! heraus!” (the enemy! the enemy!
turn out! turn out!) was now the cry. He at first, he says,
made a stand, thinking he had a mere marauding party to
deal with; but seeing heavy battalions at hand, gave way, and
fell back upon a company stationed to support the picket; but
which appears to have been no better prepared against surprise.
By this time the American artillery was unlimbered; Washington
kept beside it, and the column proceeded. The report
of fire-arms told that Sullivan was at the lower end of the
town. Colonel Stark led his advance guard, and did it in
gallant style. The attacks, as concerted, were simultaneous.
The outposts were driven in; they retreated, firing from behind
houses. The Hessian drums beat to arms; the trumpets
of the light-horse sounded the alarm: the whole place was in
an uproar. Some of the enemy made a wild and undirected
453fire from the windows of their quarters; others rushed forth in
disorder, and attempted to form in the main street, while dragoons
hastily mounted, and galloping about, added to the confusion.
Washington advanced with his column to the head of
King Street; riding beside Captain Forest of the artillery.
When Forest’s battery of six guns was opened the general
kept on the left and advanced with it, giving directions to the
fire. His position was an exposed one, and he was repeatedly
entreated to fall back; but all such entreaties were useless, when
once he became heated in action.
The enemy were training a couple of cannon in the main
street to form a battery, which might have given the Americans
a serious check; but Captain Washington and Lieutenant Monroe,
with a part of the advance guard rushed forward, drove
the artillerists from their guns, and took the two pieces when
on the point of being fired. Both of these officers were wounded;
the captain in the wrist, the lieutenant in the shoulder.
While Washington advanced on the north of the town,
Sullivan approached on the west, and detached Stark to press
on the lower or south end of the town. The British light-horse,
and about five hundred Hessians and Chasseurs, had
been quartered in the lower part of the town. Seeing Washington’s
column pressing in front, and hearing Stark thundering in
their rear, they took headlong flight by the bridge across the
Assunpink, and so along the banks of the Delaware toward Count
Dunop’s encampment at Bordentown. Had Washington’s plan
been carried into full effect, their retreat would have been cut
off by General Ewing; but that officer had been prevented from
crossing the river by the ice.
Colonel Rahl, according to the account of the lieutenant who
454had commanded the picket, completely lost his head in the confusion
of the surprise. The latter, when driven in by the American
advance, found the colonel on horseback, endeavoring to rally
his panic-stricken and disordered men, but himself sorely bewildered.
He asked the lieutenant what was the force of the assailants.
The latter answered that he had seen four or five battalions
in the woods; three of them had fired upon him before he
had retreated—“but,” added he, “there are other troops to the
right and left, and the town will soon be surrounded.” The colonel
rode in front of his troops:—“Forward! march! advance!
advance!” cried he. With some difficulty he succeeded in extricating
his troops from the town, and leading them into an adjacent
orchard. Now was the time, writes the lieutenant, for him to
have pushed for another place, there to make a stand. At this
critical moment he might have done so with credit, and without
loss. The colonel seems to have had such an intention. A rapid
retreat by the Princeton road was apparently in his thoughts;
but he lacked decision. The idea of flying before the rebels was
intolerable. Some one, too, exclaimed at the ruinous loss of leaving
all their baggage to be plundered by the enemy. Changing
his mind, he made a rash resolve. “All who are my grenadiers,
forward!” cried he, and went back, writes his corporal, like a
storm upon the town. “What madness was this!” writes the
critical lieutenant. “A town that was of no use to us; that but
ten or fifteen minutes before he had gladly left; that was now
filled with three or four thousand enemies, stationed in houses or
behind walls and hedges, and a battery of six cannon planted on
the main street. And he to think of retaking it with his six or
seven hundred men and their bayonets!”
Still he led his grenadiers bravely but rashly on, when, in the
455midst of his career, he received a fatal wound from a musket ball,
and fell from his horse. His men, left without their chief, were
struck with dismay; heedless of the orders of the second in command,
they retreated by the right up the banks of the Assunpink,
intending to escape to Princeton. Washington saw their design,
and threw Colonel Hand’s corps of Pennsylvania riflemen in their
way; while a body of Virginia troops gained their left. Brought
to a stand, and perfectly bewildered, Washington thought they
were forming in order of battle, and ordered a discharge of canister
shot. “Sir, they have struck,” exclaimed Forest. “Struck!”
echoed the general. “Yes, sir, their colors are down.” “So they
are!” replied Washington, and spurred in that direction, followed
by Forest and his whole command. The men grounded their
arms and surrendered at discretion; “but had not Colonel Rahl
been severely wounded,” remarks his loyal corporal, “we would
never have been taken alive!”
The skirmishing had now ceased in every direction. Major
Wilkinson, who was with the lower column, was sent to the commander-in-chief
for orders. He rode up, he says, at the moment
that Colonel Rahl, supported by a file of sergeants, was presenting
his sword. “On my approach,” continues he, “the commander-in-chief
took me by the hand, and observed, ’Major Wilkinson,
this is a glorious day for our country!’ his countenance beaming
with complacency; whilst the unfortunate Rahl, who the day before
would not have changed fortunes with him, now pale, bleeding,
and covered with blood, in broken accents seemed to implore
those attentions which the victor was well disposed to bestow on
him.”
He was, in fact, conveyed with great care to his quarters,
which were in the house of a kind and respectable Quaker family.
456The number of prisoners taken in this affair was nearly one
thousand, of which thirty-two were officers. The veteran Major
Von Dechow, who had urged in vain the throwing up of breastworks,
received a mortal wound, of which he died in Trenton.
Washington’s triumph, however, was impaired by the failure of
the two simultaneous attacks. General Ewing, who was to have
crossed before day at Trenton Ferry, and taken possession of the
bridge leading out of the town, over which the light-horse and
Hessians retreated, was prevented by the quantity of ice in the
river. Cadwalader was hindered by the same obstacle. He got
part of his troops over, but found it impossible to embark his cannon,
and was obliged, therefore, to return to the Pennsylvania
side of the river. Had he and Ewing crossed, Donop’s quarters
would have been beaten up, and the fugitives from Trenton intercepted.
By the failure of this part of his plan, Washington had been
exposed to the most imminent hazard. The force with which he
had crossed, twenty-four hundred men, raw troops, was not
enough to cope with the veteran garrison, had it been properly on
its guard; and then there were the troops under Donop at hand
to co-operate with it. Nothing saved him but the utter panic of
the enemy; their want of proper alarm places, and their exaggerated
idea of his forces: for one of the journals before us (the corporal’s)
states that he had with him 15,000 men, and another
6,000.[158] Even now that the place was in his possession he dared
not linger in it. There was a superior force under Donop below
457him, and a strong battalion of infantry at Princeton. His own
troops were exhausted by the operations of the night and morning
in cold, rain, snow and storm. They had to guard about a
thousand prisoners, taken in action or found concealed in houses;
there was little prospect of succor, owing to the season and the
state of the river. Washington gave up, therefore, all idea of immediately
pursuing the enemy or keeping possession of Trenton,
and determined to recross the Delaware with his prisoners and
captured artillery. Understanding that the brave but unfortunate
Rahl was in a dying state, he paid him a visit before leaving
Trenton, accompanied by General Greene. They found him at
his quarters in the house of a Quaker family. Their visit and
the respectful consideration and unaffected sympathy manifested
by them, evidently soothed the feelings of the unfortunate soldier;
now stripped of his late won laurels, and resigned to die rather
than outlive his honor.[159]
We have given a somewhat sarcastic portrait of the colonel
drawn by one of his lieutenants; another, Lieutenant Piel, paints
with a soberer and more reliable pencil.
“For our whole ill luck,” writes he, “we have to thank Colonel
Rahl. It never occurred to him that the rebels might attack
us; and, therefore, he had taken scarce any precautions against
such an event. In truth I must confess we have universally
thought too little of the rebels, who, until now, have never on any
occasion been able to withstand us. Our brigadier (Rahl) was too
proud to retire a step before such an enemy; although nothing remained
for us but to retreat.
“General Howe had judged this man from a wrong point of
458view, or he would hardly have intrusted such an important post
as Trenton to him. He was formed for a soldier, but not for
a general. At the capture of Fort Washington he had gained
much honor while under the command of a great general, but
he lost all his renown at Trenton where he himself was general.
He had courage to dare the hardiest enterprise; but he alone
wanted the cool presence of mind necessary in a surprise like
that at Trenton. His vivacity was too great; one thought crowded
on another so that he could come to no decision. Considered as
a private man, he was deserving of high regard. He was generous,
open-handed, hospitable; never cringing to his superiors, nor
arrogant to his inferiors; but courteous to all. Even his domestics
were treated more like friends than servants.”
The loyal corporal, too, contributes his mite of praise to his
dying commander. “In his last agony,” writes the grateful
soldier, “he yet thought of his grenadiers, and entreated General
Washington that nothing might be taken from them but their
arms. A promise was given,” adds the corporal, “and was kept.”
Even the satirical lieutenant half mourns over his memory.
“He died,” says he, “on the following evening, and lies buried in
this place which he has rendered so famous, in the graveyard of
the Presbyterian church. Sleep well! dear Commander! (theurer
Feldherr.) The Americans will hereafter set up a stone
above thy grave with this inscription:
“Hier liegt der Oberst Rahl,
Mit ihm ist alles all!
(Here lies the Colonel Rahl,
With him all is over.)”
CHAPTER XLIV. TREATMENT OF THE HESSIAN PRISONERS—THEIR INTERVIEWS WITH WASHINGTON—THEIR RECEPTION BY THE PEOPLE.
459
The Hessian prisoners were conveyed across the Delaware by
Johnson’s Ferry, into Pennsylvania; the private soldiers were
marched off immediately to Newtown; the officers, twenty-three
in number, remained in a small chamber in the Ferry House,
where, according to their own account, they passed a dismal
night; sore at heart that their recent triumphs at White Plains
and Fort Washington should be so suddenly eclipsed.
On the following morning they were conducted to Newtown
under the escort of Colonel Weedon. His exterior, writes Lieutenant
Piel, spoke but little in his favor, yet he won all our hearts
by his kind and friendly conduct.
At Newtown the officers were quartered in inns and private
houses, the soldiers in the church and jail. The officers paid a
visit to Lord Stirling, whom some of them had known from his
being captured at Long Island. He received them with great
kindness. “Your general, Van Heister,” said he, “treated me
like a brother when I was a prisoner, and so, gentlemen, will you
be treated by me.”
460“We had scarce seated ourselves,” continues Lieutenant Piel,
“when a long, meagre, dark-looking man, whom we took for the
parson of the place, stepped forth and held a discourse in German,
in which he endeavored to set forth the justice of the
American side in this war. He told us he was a Hanoverian
born; called the king of England nothing but the Elector of
Hanover, and spoke of him so contemptuously that his garrulity
became intolerable. We answered that we had not come to
America to inquire which party was in the right; but to fight
for the king.
“Lord Stirling, seeing how little we were edified by the
preacher, relieved us from him by proposing to take us with
him to visit General Washington. The latter received us very
courteously, though we understood very little of what he said, as
he spoke nothing but English, a language in which none of us
at that time were strong. In his aspect shines forth nothing
of the great man that he is universally considered. His eyes
have scarce any fire. There is, however, a smiling expression
on his countenance when he speaks, that wins affection and
respect. He invited four of our officers to dine with him; the
rest dined with Lord Stirling.” One of those officers who
dined with the commander-in-chief, was the satirical lieutenant
whom we have so often quoted, and who was stationed at the
picket on the morning of the attack. However disparagingly he
may have thought of his unfortunate commander, he evidently
had a very good opinion of himself.
“General Washington,” writes he in his journal, “did me
the honor to converse a good deal with me concerning the unfortunate
affair. I told him freely my opinion that our dispositions
had been bad, otherwise we should not have fallen
461into his hands. He asked me if I could have made better
dispositions, and in what manner? I told him yes; stated all
the faults of our arrangements, and showed him how I would
have done; and would have managed to come out of the affair
with honor.”
We have no doubt, from the specimens furnished in the
lieutenant’s journal, that he went largely into his own merits
and achievements, and the demerits and shortcomings of his
luckless commander. Washington, he added, not only applauded
his exposition of what he would have done, but made
him a eulogy thereupon, and upon his watchfulness and the defence
he had made with his handful of men when his picket
was attacked. Yet according to his own account, in his journal,
with all his watchfulness, he came near being caught napping.
“General Washington,” continues he, “is a courteous and
polite man, but very cautious and reserved; talks little; and
has a crafty (listige) physiognomy.” We surmise the lieutenant
had the most of the talk on that occasion, and that the
crafty or sly expression in Washington’s physiognomy, may have
been a lurking but suppressed smile, provoked by the lieutenant’s
self-laudation and wordiness.
The Hessian prisoners were subsequently transferred from
place to place, until they reached Winchester in the interior
of Virginia. Wherever they arrived, people thronged from far
and near to see these terrible beings of whom they had received
such formidable accounts; and were surprised and disappointed
to find them looking like other men. At first they
had to endure the hootings and revilings of the multitude, for
having hired themselves out to the trade of blood; and they
especially speak of the scoldings they received from old women
462in the villages, who upbraided them for coming to rob them of
their liberty. “At length,” writes the corporal in his journal,
“General Washington had written notices put up in town and
country, that we were innocent of this war and had joined in
it not of our free will, but through compulsion. We should,
therefore, be treated not as enemies, but friends. From this
time,” adds he, “things went better with us. Every day came
many out of the towns, old and young, rich and poor, and
brought us provisions, and treated us with kindness and humanity.”[160]
CHAPTER XLV. EPISODE—COLONEL GRIFFIN IN THE JERSEYS—DONOP DECOYED—INROAD OF CADWALADER AND REED—RETREAT AND CONFUSION OF THE ENEMY’S OUTPOSTS—WASHINGTON RECROSSES THE DELAWARE WITH HIS TROOPS—THE GAME REVERSED—THE HESSIANS HUNTED BACK THROUGH THE COUNTRY—WASHINGTON MADE MILITARY DICTATOR.
463
There was a kind of episode in the affair at Trenton. Colonel
Griffin, who had thrown himself previously into the Jerseys with
his detachment of Pennsylvania militia, found himself, through
indisposition and the scanty number of his troops, unable to render
efficient service in the proposed attack. He sent word to
Cadwalader, therefore, that he should probably render him more
real aid by making a demonstration in front of Donop, and drawing
him off so far into the interior as to be out of the way of
rendering support to Colonel Rahl.
He accordingly presented himself in sight of Donop’s cantonment
on the 25th of December, and succeeded in drawing him
out with nearly his whole force of two thousand men. He then
retired slowly before him, skirmishing, but avoiding any thing
like an action, until he had lured him as far as Mount Holly;
when he left him to find his way back to his post at his leisure.
The cannonade of Washington’s attack in Trenton on the
464morning of the 26th, was distinctly heard at Cadwalader’s camp
at Bristol. Imperfect tidings of the result reached there about
eleven o’clock, and produced the highest exultation and excitement.
Cadwalader made another attempt to cross the river and
join Washington, whom he supposed to be still in the Jerseys,
following up the blow he had struck. He could not effect the
passage of the river with the most of the troops, until mid-day
of the 27th, when he received from Washington a detailed account
of his success, and of his having recrossed into Pennsylvania.
Cadwalader was now in a dilemma. Donop, he presumed,
was still at Mount Holly, whither Griffin had decoyed him; but
he might soon march back. His forces were equal, if not superior
in number to his own, and veterans instead of raw militia.
But then there was the glory of rivalling the exploit at Trenton,
and the importance of following out the effort for the relief of
the Jerseys, and the salvation of Philadelphia. Beside, Washington,
in all probability, after disposing of his prisoners, had
again crossed into the Jerseys and might be acting offensively.
Reed relieved Cadwalader from his dilemma, by proposing
that they should push on to Burlington, and there determine,
according to intelligence, whether to proceed to Bordentown or
Mount Holly. The plan was adopted. There was an alarm
that the Hessian yagers lurked in a neighboring wood. Reed,
accompanied by two officers, rode in advance to reconnoitre. He
sent word to Cadwalader that it was a false alarm, and the latter
took up his line of march.
Reed and his companions spurred on to reconnoitre the enemy’s
outposts, about four miles from Burlington, but pulled up
at the place where the picket was usually stationed. There was
465no smoke, nor any sign of a human being. They rode up and
found the place deserted. From the country people in the neighborhood
they received an explanation. Count Donop had returned
to his post from the pursuit of Griffin, only in time to
hear of the disaster at Trenton. He immediately began a retreat
in the utmost panic and confusion, calling in his guards and parties
as he hurried forward. The troops in the neighborhood of
Burlington had decamped precipitately the preceding evening.
Colonel Reed sent back intelligence of this to Cadwalader,
and still pushed on with his companions. As they rode along,
they observed the inhabitants pulling down red rags which had
been nailed to their doors; tory signs to insure good will from
the British. Arrived at Bordentown not an enemy was to be
seen; the fugitives from Trenton had spread a panic on the 26th,
and the Hessians and their refugee adherents had fled in confusion,
leaving their sick behind them. The broken and haggard
looks of the inhabitants showed what they had suffered during
the Hessian occupation. One of Reed’s companions returned to
Cadwalader, who had halted at Burlington, and advised him to
proceed.
Cadwalader wrote in the night to Washington, informing him
of his whereabouts, and that he should march for Bordentown in
the morning. “If you should think proper to cross over,” added
he, “it may easily be effected at the place where we passed; a
pursuit would keep up the panic. They went off with great precipitation,
and pressed all the waggons in their reach; I am told
many of them are gone to South Amboy. If we can drive them
from West Jersey, the success will raise an army next spring,
and establish the credit of the Continental money to support
it.”
466There was another letter from Cadwalader, dated on the following
day, from Bordentown. He had eighteen hundred men
with him. Five hundred more were on the way to join him.
General Mifflin, too, had sent over five hundred from Philadelphia,
and three hundred from Burlington, and was to follow with
seven or eight hundred more.
Colonel Reed, too, wrote from Trenton on the 28th. He had
found that place without a single soldier of either army, and in a
still more wretched condition than Bordentown. He urged
Washington to recross the river, and pursue the advantages already
gained. Donop might be overtaken before he could reach
Princeton or Brunswick, where the enemy were yet in force.[161]
Washington needed no prompting of the kind. Bent upon
following up his blow, he had barely allowed his troops a day or
two to recover from recent exposure and fatigue, that they might
have strength and spirit to pursue the retreating enemy, beat up
other of their quarters, and entirely reverse affairs in the Jerseys.
In this spirit he had written to Generals McDougall and
Maxwell at Morristown, to collect as large a body of militia as
possible, and harass the enemy in flank and rear. Heath, also,
had been ordered to abandon the Highlands, which there was no
need of guarding at this season of the year, and hasten down
with the eastern militia, as rapidly as possible, by the way of
Hackensack, continuing on until he should send him further orders.
“A fair opportunity is offered,” said he, “of driving the
enemy entirely from the Jerseys, or at least to the extremity of
the province.”
Men of influence also were despatched by him into different
467parts of the Jerseys, to spirit up the militia to revenge the oppression,
the ravage, and insults they had experienced from the
enemy, especially from the Hessians. “If what they have suffered,”
said he, “does not rouse their resentment, they must not
possess the feelings of humanity.”
On the 29th, his troops began to cross the river. It would
be a slow and difficult operation, owing to the ice; two parties
of light troops therefore were detached in advance, whom Colonel
Reed was to send in pursuit of the enemy. They marched
into Trenton about two o’clock, and were immediately put on
the traces of Donop, to hang on his rear and harass him until
other troops should come up. Cadwalader also detached a party
of riflemen from Bordentown with like orders. Donop, in retreating,
had divided his force, sending one part by a cross-road to
Princeton, and hurrying on with the remainder to Brunswick.
Notwithstanding the severity of the weather, and the wretchedness
of the road, it was a service of animation and delight to the
American troops to hunt back these Hessians through the country
they had recently outraged, and over ground which they
themselves had trodden so painfully and despondingly, in their
retreat. In one instance the riflemen surprised and captured a
party of refugees who lingered in the rear-guard, among whom
were several newly-made officers. Never was there a more sudden
reversal in the game of war than this retreat of the heavy
German veterans, harassed by light parties of a raw militia,
which they so lately had driven like chaff before them.
While this was going on, Washington was effecting the passage
of his main force to Trenton. He himself had crossed on the
29th of December, but it took two days more to get the troops
and artillery over the icy river, and that with great labor and
468difficulty. And now came a perplexity. With the year expired
the term of several regiments, which had seen most service, and
become inured to danger. Knowing how indispensable were
such troops to lead on those which were raw and undisciplined,
Washington had them paraded and invited to re-enlist. It was a
difficult task to persuade them. They were haggard with fatigue,
and hardship and privation of every kind; and their hearts
yearned for home. By the persuasions of their officers, however,
and a bounty of ten dollars, the greater proportion of those from
the eastward were induced to remain six weeks longer.
Hard money was necessary in this emergency. How was it to
be furnished? The military chest was incompetent. On the 30th,
Washington wrote by express to Robert Morris, the patriot financier
at Philadelphia, whom he knew to be eager that the blow
should be followed up. “If you could possibly collect a sum, if
it were but one hundred, or one hundred and fifty pounds, it
would be of service.”
Morris received the letter in the evening. He was at his
wits’ end to raise the sum, for hard money was scarce. Fortunately
a wealthy Quaker, in this moment of exigency supplied the
“sinews of war,” and early the next morning the money was forwarded
by the express.
At this critical moment, too, Washington received a letter
from a committee of Congress, transmitting him resolves of that
body dated the 27th of December, investing him with military
powers quite dictatorial. “Happy is it for this country,” write
the committee, “that the general of their forces can safely be intrusted
with the most unlimited power, and neither personal
security, liberty or property, be in the least degree endangered
thereby.”[162]
469Washington’s acknowledgment of this great mark of confidence
was noble and characteristic. “I find Congress have done
me the honor to intrust me with powers, in my military capacity,
of the highest nature and almost unlimited extent. Instead of
thinking myself freed from all civil obligations by this mark of
their confidence, I shall constantly bear in mind that, as the sword
was the last resort for the preservation of our liberties, so it
ought to be the first thing laid aside when those liberties are
firmly established.”
CHAPTER XLVI HOWE HEARS OF THE AFFAIR AT TRENTON—CORNWALLIS SENT BACK TO THE JERSEYS—RECONNOITERING EXPEDITION OF REED—HIS EXPLOITS—WASHINGTON IN PERIL AT TRENTON—REINFORCED BY TROOPS UNDER CADWALADER AND MIFFLIN—POSITION OF HIS MEN—CORNWALLIS AT TRENTON—REPULSED AT THE ASSUNPINK—THE AMERICAN CAMP MENACED—NIGHT MARCH OF WASHINGTON—AFFAIR AT PRINCETON—DEATH OF MERCER—ROUT OF BRITISH TROOPS—PURSUED BY WASHINGTON—CORNWALLIS AT PRINCETON—BAFFLED AND PERPLEXED—WASHINGTON AT MORRISTOWN—HIS SYSTEM OF ANNOYANCE—THE TABLES TURNED UPON THE ENEMY.
470
General Howe was taking his ease in winter quarters at New
York, waiting for the freezing of the Delaware to pursue his triumphant
march to Philadelphia, when tidings were brought him
of the surprise and capture of the Hessians at Trenton. “That
three old established regiments of a people who made war their
profession, should lay down their arms to a ragged and undisciplined
militia, and that with scarcely any loss on either side,” was
a matter of amazement. He instantly stopped Lord Cornwallis,
who was on the point of embarking for England, and sent him
back in all haste to resume the command in the Jerseys.
The ice in the Delaware impeded the crossing of the American
troops, and gave the British time to draw in their scattered
cantonments and assemble their whole force at Princeton. While
471his troops were yet crossing, Washington sent out Colonel Reed
to reconnoitre the position and movements of the enemy and obtain
information. Six of the Philadelphia light-horse, spirited
young fellows, but who had never seen service, volunteered to
accompany Reed. They patrolled the country to the very vicinity
of Princeton, but could collect no information from the inhabitants;
who were harassed, terrified, and bewildered by the
ravaging marches to and fro of friend and enemy.
Emerging from a wood almost within view of Princeton, they
caught sight, from a rising ground, of two or three red coats
passing from time to time from a barn to a dwelling house.
Here must be an outpost. Keeping the barn in a line with
the house so as to cover their approach, they dashed up to the
latter without being discovered, and surrounded it. Twelve British
dragoons were within, who, though well armed, were so
panic-stricken that they surrendered without making defence.
A commissary, also, was taken; the sergeant of the dragoons
alone escaped. Colonel Reed and his six cavaliers returned in
triumph to head-quarters. Important information was obtained
from their prisoners. Lord Cornwallis had joined General Grant
the day before at Princeton, with a reinforcement of chosen
troops. They had now seven or eight thousand men, and were
pressing waggons for a march upon Trenton.[163]
Cadwalader, stationed at Crosswicks, about seven miles distant,
between Bordentown and Trenton, sent intelligence to the
same purport, received by him from a young gentleman who had
escaped from Princeton.
Word, too, was brought from other quarters, that General
472Howe was on the march with a thousand light troops, with which
he had landed at Amboy.
The situation of Washington was growing critical. The enemy
were beginning to advance their large pickets towards Trenton.
Every thing indicated an approaching attack. The force with
him was small; to retreat across the river, would destroy the
dawn of hope awakened in the bosoms of the Jersey militia by
the late exploit; but to make a stand without reinforcements was
impossible. In this emergency, he called to his aid General
Cadwalader from Crosswicks, and General Mifflin from Bordentown,
with their collective forces, amounting to about three thousand
six hundred men. He did it with reluctance, for it seemed
like involving them in the common danger, but the exigency of
the case admitted of no alternative. They promptly answered to
his call, and marching in the night, joined him on the 1st of
January.
Washington chose a position for his main body on the east
side of the Assunpink. There was a narrow stone bridge across
it, where the water was very deep; the same bridge over which
part of Rahl’s brigade had escaped in the recent affair. He
planted his artillery so as to command the bridge and the fords.
His advance guard was stationed about three miles off in a wood,
having in front a stream called Shabbakong Creek.
Early on the morning of the 2d, came certain word that Cornwallis
was approaching with all his force. Strong parties were
sent out under General Greene, who skirmished with the enemy
and harassed them in their advance. By twelve o’clock they
reached the Shabbakong, and halted for a time on its northern
bank. Then crossing it, and moving forward with rapidity, they
drove the advance guard out of the woods, and pushed on until
473they reached a high ground near the town. Here Hand’s corps
of several battalions was drawn up, and held them for a time
in check. All the parties in advance ultimately retreated to the
main body, on the east side of the Assunpink, and found some
difficulty in crowding across the narrow bridge.
From all these checks and delays, it was nearly sunset before
Cornwallis with the head of his army entered Trenton. His
rear-guard under General Leslie rested at Maiden Head, about
six miles distant, and nearly half way between Trenton and
Princeton. Forming his troops into columns, he now made
repeated attempts to cross the Assunpink at the bridge and the
fords, but was as often repulsed by the artillery. For a part of
the time Washington, mounted on a white horse, stationed himself
at the south end of the bridge, issuing his orders. Each
time the enemy was repulsed there was a shout along the American
lines. At length they drew off, came to a halt, and lighted
their camp fires. The Americans did the same, using the neighboring
fences for the purpose. Sir William Erskine, who was
with Cornwallis, urged him, it is said, to attack Washington that
evening in his camp; but his lordship declined; he felt sure
of the game which had so often escaped him; he had at length,
he thought, got Washington into a situation from which he could
not escape, but where he might make a desperate stand, and he
was willing to give his wearied troops a night’s repose to prepare
them for the closing struggle. He would be sure, he said, to
“bag the fox in the morning.”
A cannonade was kept up on both sides until dark; but with
little damage to the Americans. When night closed in, the two
camps lay, in sight of each other’s fires, ruminating the bloody
action of the following day. It was the most gloomy and anxious
474night that had yet closed in on the American army, throughout
its series of perils and disasters; for there was no concealing the
impending danger. But what must have been the feelings of the
commander-in-chief, as he anxiously patrolled his camp, and considered
his desperate position? A small stream, fordable in several
places, was all that separated his raw, inexperienced army,
from an enemy vastly superior in numbers and discipline, and
stung to action by the mortification of a late defeat. A general
action with them must be ruinous; but how was he to retreat?
Behind him was the Delaware, impassable from floating ice.
Granting even (a thing not to be hoped) that a retreat across it
could be effected, the consequences would be equally fatal. The
Jerseys would be left in possession of the enemy, endangering
the immediate capture of Philadelphia, and sinking the public
mind into despondency.
In this darkest of moments a gleam of hope flashed upon his
mind: a bold expedient suggested itself. Almost the whole of the
enemy’s force must by this time be drawn out of Princeton, and
advancing by detachments toward Trenton, while their baggage
and principal stores must remain weakly guarded at Brunswick.
Was it not possible by a rapid night march along the Quaker
road, a different road from that on which General Leslie with
the rear-guard was resting, to get past that force undiscovered,
come by surprise upon those left at Princeton, capture or destroy
what stores were left there, and then push on to Brunswick? This
would save the army from being cut off; would avoid the appearance
of a defeat; and might draw the enemy away from Trenton,
while some fortunate stroke might give additional reputation to
the American arms. Even should the enemy march on to Philadelphia,
475it could not in any case be prevented; while a counterblow
in the Jerseys would be of great consolation.
Such was the plan which Washington revolved in his mind
on the gloomy banks of the Assunpink, and which he laid before
his officers in a council of war, held after nightfall, at the quarters
of General Mercer. It met with instant concurrence, being
of that hardy, adventurous kind, which seems congenial with the
American character. One formidable difficulty presented itself.
The weather was unusually mild; there was a thaw, by which
the roads might be rendered deep and miry, and almost impassable.
Fortunately, or rather providentially, as Washington was
prone to consider it, the wind veered to the north in the course
of the evening; the weather became intensely cold, and in two
hours the roads were once more hard and frost-bound. In the
mean time, the baggage of the army was silently removed to
Burlington, and every other preparation was made for a rapid
march. To deceive the enemy, men were employed to dig
trenches near the bridge within hearing of the British sentries,
with orders to continue noisily at work until daybreak; others
were to go the rounds; relieve guards at the bridge and fords;
keep up the camp fires, and maintain all the appearance of a regular
encampment. At daybreak they were to hasten after the
army.
In the dead of the night, the army drew quietly out of the
encampment and began its march. General Mercer, mounted on
a favorite gray horse, was in the advance with the remnant of his
flying camp, now but about three hundred and fifty men, principally
relics of the brave Delaware and Maryland regiments, with
some of the Pennsylvania militia. Among the latter were youths
476belonging to the best families in Philadelphia. The main body
followed, under Washington’s immediate command.
The Quaker road was a complete roundabout, joining the
main road about two miles from Princeton, where Washington
expected to arrive before daybreak. The road, however, was
new and rugged; cut through woods, where the stumps of trees
broke the wheels of some of the baggage trains, and retarded the
march of the troops; so that it was near sunrise of a bright,
frosty morning, when Washington reached the bridge over Stony
Brook, about three miles from Princeton. After crossing the
bridge, he led his troops along the bank of the brook to the edge
of a wood, where a by-road led off on the right through low
grounds, and was said by the guides to be a short cut to Princeton,
and less exposed to view. By this road Washington defiled
with the main body, ordering Mercer to continue along the brook
with his brigade, until he should arrive at the main road, where
he was to secure, and, if possible, destroy a bridge over which it
passes; so as to intercept any fugitives from Princeton, and
check any retrograde movements of the British troops which
might have advanced towards Trenton.
Hitherto the movements of the Americans had been undiscovered
by the enemy. Three regiments of the latter, the 17th,
40th, and 55th, with three troops of dragoons, had been quartered
all night in Princeton, under marching orders to join Lord
Cornwallis in the morning. The 17th regiment, under Colonel
Mawhood, was already on the march; the 55th regiment was
preparing to follow. Mawhood had crossed the bridge by which
the old or main road to Trenton passes over Stony Brook, and
was proceeding through a wood beyond, when, as he attained the
summit of a hill about sunrise, the glittering of arms betrayed
477to him the movement of Mercer’s troops to the left, who were
filing along the Quaker road to secure the bridge, as they had
been ordered.
The woods prevented him from seeing their number. He supposed
them to be some broken portion of the American army
flying before Lord Cornwallis. With this idea, he faced about
and made a retrograde movement, to intercept them or hold them
in check; while messengers spurred off at all speed, to hasten forward
the regiments still lingering at Princeton, so as completely
to surround them.
The woods concealed him until he had recrossed the bridge
of Stony Brook, when he came in full sight of the van of Mercer’s
brigade. Both parties pushed to get possession of a rising
ground on the right near the house of a Mr. Clark, of the peaceful
Society of Friends. The Americans being nearest, reached it
first, and formed behind a hedge fence which extended along a
slope in front of the house; whence, being chiefly armed with
rifles, they opened a destructive fire. It was returned with great
spirit by the enemy. At the first discharge Mercer was dismounted,
“his gallant gray” being crippled by a musket ball in the leg.
One of his colonels, also, was mortally wounded and carried to
the rear. Availing themselves of the confusion thus occasioned,
the British charged with the bayonet; the American riflemen
having no weapon of the kind, were thrown into disorder and
retreated. Mercer, who was on foot, endeavored to rally them,
when a blow from the butt end of a musket felled him to the
ground. He rose and defended himself with his sword, but was
surrounded, bayoneted repeatedly, and left for dead.
Mawhood pursued the broken and retreating troops to the
brow of the rising ground, on which Clark’s house was situated,
478when he beheld a large force emerging from a wood and advancing
to the rescue. It was a body of Pennsylvania militia, which
Washington, on hearing the firing, had detached to the support of
Mercer. Mawhood instantly ceased pursuit, drew up his artillery,
and by a heavy discharge brought the militia to a stand.
At this moment Washington himself arrived at the scene of
action, having galloped from the by-road in advance of his troops.
From a rising ground he beheld Mercer’s troops retreating in confusion,
and the detachment of militia checked by Mawhood’s artillery.
Every thing was at peril. Putting spurs to his horse he
dashed past the hesitating militia, waving his hat and cheering
them on. His commanding figure and white horse, made him
a conspicuous object for the enemy’s marksmen; but he heeded
it not. Galloping forward under the fire of Mawhood’s battery,
he called upon Mercer’s broken brigade. The Pennsylvanians
rallied at the sound of his voice, and caught fire from his example.
At the same time the 7th Virginia regiment emerged
from the wood, and moved forward with loud cheers, while a fire
of grape-shot was opened by Captain Moulder of the American
artillery, from the brow of a ridge to the south.
Colonel Mawhood, who a moment before had thought his triumph
secure, found himself assailed on every side, and separated
from the other British regiments. He fought, however, with
great bravery, and for a short time the action was desperate.
Washington was in the midst of it; equally endangered by the
random fire of his own men, and the artillery and musketry of
the enemy. His aide-de-camp, Colonel Fitzgerald, a young and
ardent Irishman, losing sight of him in the heat of the fight
when enveloped in dust and smoke, dropped the bridle on the neck
of his horse and drew his hat over his eyes; giving him up for
479lost. When he saw him, however, emerge from the cloud, waving
his hat, and beheld the enemy giving way, he spurred up to
his side. “Thank God,” cried he, “your excellency is safe!”
“Away, my dear colonel, and bring up the troops,” was the reply,
“the day is our own!” It was one of those occasions in which
the latent fire of Washington’s character blazed forth.
Mawhood, by this time, had forced his way, at the point of
the bayonet, through gathering foes, though with heavy loss,
back to the main road, and was in full retreat towards Trenton
to join Cornwallis. Washington detached Major Kelly with a
party of Pennsylvania troops, to destroy the bridge at Stony
Brook, over which Mawhood had retreated, so as to impede the
advance of General Leslie from Maiden Head.
In the mean time the 55th regiment, which had been on the
left and nearer Princeton, had been encountered by the American
advance guard under General St. Clair, and after some sharp
fighting in a ravine had given way, and was retreating across
fields and along a by-road to Brunswick. The remaining regiment,
the 40th, had not been able to come up in time for the action;
a part of it fled toward Brunswick; the residue took refuge
in the college at Princeton, recently occupied by them as barracks.
Artillery was now brought to bear on the college, and a few shot
compelled those within to surrender.
In this brief but brilliant action, about one hundred of the
British were left dead on the field, and nearly three hundred
taken prisoners, fourteen of whom were officers. Among the
slain was Captain Leslie, son of the Earl of Leven. His death
was greatly lamented by his captured companions.
The loss of the Americans was about twenty-five or thirty
men and several officers. Among the latter was Colonel Haslet,
480who had distinguished himself throughout the campaign, by being
among the foremost in services of danger. He was indeed a gallant
officer, and gallantly seconded by his Delaware troops.
A greater loss was that of General Mercer. He was said to
be either dead or dying, in the house of Mr. Clark, whither he
had been conveyed by his aide-de-camp, Major Armstrong, who
found him, after the retreat of Mawhood’s troops, lying on the
field gashed with several wounds, and insensible from cold and
loss of blood. Washington would have ridden back from Princeton
to visit him, and have him conveyed to a place of greater security;
but was assured, that, if alive, he was too desperately
wounded to bear removal; in the mean time he was in good hands,
being faithfully attended to by his aide-de-camp, Major Armstrong,
and treated with the utmost care and kindness by Mr.
Clark’s family.[164]
Under these circumstances Washington felt compelled to leave
his old companion in arms to his fate. Indeed, he was called
away by the exigencies of his command, having to pursue the routed
regiments which were making a headlong retreat to Brunswick.
In this pursuit he took the lead at the head of a detachment
of cavalry. At Kingston, however, three miles to the north-east
of Princeton, he pulled up, restrained his ardor, and held a council
of war on horseback. Should he keep on to Brunswick or
not? The capture of the British stores and baggage would make
his triumph complete; but, on the other hand, his troops were
excessively fatigued by their rapid march all night and hard
fight in the morning. All of them had been one night without
sleep, and some of them two, and many were half-starved. They
were without blankets, thinly clad, some of them barefooted, and
481this in freezing weather. Cornwallis would be upon them before
they could reach Brunswick. His rear-guard, under General
Leslie, had been quartered but six miles from Princeton, and
the retreating troops must have roused them. Under these considerations,
it was determined to discontinue the pursuit and push
for Morristown. There they would be in a mountainous country,
heavily wooded, in an abundant neighborhood, and on the flank
of the enemy, with various defiles by which they might change
their position according to his movements.
Filing off to the left, therefore, from Kingston, and breaking
down the bridges behind him, Washington took the narrow road
by Rocky Hill to Pluckamin. His troops were so exhausted,
that many in the course of the march would lie down in the
woods on the frozen ground and fall asleep, and were with difficulty
roused and cheered forward. At Pluckamin he halted for
a time, to allow them a little repose and refreshment. While
they are taking breath we will cast our eyes back to the camp of
Cornwallis, to see what was the effect upon him of this masterly
movement of Washington.
His lordship had retired to rest at Trenton with the sportsman’s
vaunt that he would “bag the fox in the morning.”
Nothing could surpass his surprise and chagrin, when at daybreak
the expiring watchfires and deserted camp of the Americans
told him that the prize had once more evaded his grasp;
that the general whose military skill he had decried had out-generalled
him.
For a time he could not learn whither the army, which had
stolen away so silently, had directed its stealthy march. By sunrise,
however, there was the booming of cannon, like the rumbling
of distant thunder, in the direction of Princeton. The idea
482flashed upon him that Washington had not merely escaped, but
was about to make a dash at the British magazines at Brunswick.
Alarmed for the safety of his military stores, his lordship forthwith
broke up his camp, and made a rapid march towards Princeton.
As he arrived in sight of the bridge over Stony Brook, he
beheld Major Kelly and his party busy in its destruction. A
distant discharge of round shot from his field-pieces drove them
away, but the bridge was already broken. It would take time to
repair it for the passage of the artillery; so Cornwallis in his
impatience urged his troops breast-high through the turbulent
and icy stream, and again pushed forward. He was brought to a
stand by the discharge of a thirty-two pounder from a distant
breastwork. Supposing the Americans to be there in force, and
prepared to make resistance, he sent out some horsemen to reconnoitre,
and advanced to storm the battery. There was no one
there. The thirty-two pounder had been left behind by the
Americans, as too unwieldy, and a match had been applied to it
by some lingerer of Washington’s rear-guard.
Without further delay Cornwallis hurried forward, eager to
save his magazines. Crossing the bridge at Kingston, he kept
on along the Brunswick road, supposing Washington still before
him. The latter had got far in the advance, during the delays
caused by the broken bridge at Stony Brook, and the discharge
of the thirty-two pounder; and the alteration of his course at
Kingston had carried him completely out of the way of Cornwallis.
His lordship reached Brunswick towards evening, and
endeavored to console himself, by the safety of the military
stores, for being so completely foiled and out-manœuvred.
Washington, in the mean time, was all on the alert; the lion
part of his nature was aroused; and while his weary troops were
483in a manner panting upon the ground around him, he was despatching
missives and calling out aid to enable him to follow up
his successes. In a letter to Putnam, written from Pluckamin
during the halt, he says: “The enemy appear to be panic-struck.
I am in hopes of driving them out of the Jerseys. March the
troops under your command to Crosswicks, and keep a strict
watch upon the enemy in this quarter. Keep as many spies out
as you think proper. A number of horsemen in the dress of
the country must be kept constantly going backwards and forwards
for this purpose. If you discover any motion of the enemy
of consequence, let me be informed thereof as soon as possible,
by express.”
To General Heath, also, who was stationed in the Highlands
of the Hudson, he wrote at the same hurried moment. “The
enemy are in great consternation; and as the panic affords us a favorable
opportunity to drive them out of the Jerseys, it has been
determined in council that you should move down towards New
York with a considerable force, as if you had a design upon the
city. That being an object of great importance, the enemy will
be reduced to the necessity of withdrawing a considerable part of
their force from the Jerseys, if not the whole, to secure the city.”
These letters despatched, he continued forward to Morristown,
where at length he came to a halt from his incessant and
harassing marchings. There he learnt that General Mercer was
still alive. He immediately sent his own nephew, Major George
Lewis, under the protection of a flag, to attend upon him. Mercer
had indeed been kindly nursed by a daughter of Mr. Clark
and a negro woman, who had not been frightened from their
home by the storm of battle which raged around it. At the
time that the troops of Cornwallis approached, Major Armstrong
484was binding up Mercer’s wounds. The latter insisted on his
leaving him in the kind hands of Mr. Clark’s household, and
rejoining the army. Lewis found him languishing in great pain;
he had been treated with respect by the enemy, and great tenderness
by the benevolent family who had sheltered him. He expired
in the arms of Major Lewis on the 12th of January, in the
fifty-sixth year of his age. Dr. Benjamin Rush, afterwards celebrated
as a physician, was with him when he died.
He was upright, intelligent and brave; esteemed as a soldier
and beloved as a man, and by none more so than by Washington.
His career as a general had been brief; but long enough to
secure him a lasting renown. His name remains one of the consecrated
names of the Revolution.
From Morristown, Washington again wrote to General Heath,
repeating his former orders. To Major-general Lincoln, also,
who was just arrived at Peekskill, and had command of the
Massachusetts militia, he writes on the 7th, “General Heath will
communicate mine of this date to you, by which you will find
that the greater part of your troops are to move down towards
New York, to draw the attention of the enemy to that quarter;
and if they do not throw a considerable body back again, you
may, in all probability, carry the city, or at least blockade them
in it. * * * * Be as expeditious as possible in moving
forward, for the sooner a panic-struck enemy is followed the better.
If we can oblige them to evacuate the Jerseys, we must
drive them to the utmost distress; for they have depended upon
the supplies from that State for their winter’s support.”
Colonel Reed was ordered to send out rangers and bodies of
militia to scour the country, waylay foraging parties, cut off supplies,
and keep the cantonments of the enemy in a state of siege.
485“I would not suffer a man to stir beyond their lines,” writes
Washington, “nor suffer them to have the least communication
with the country.”
The expedition under General Heath toward New York, from
which much had been anticipated by Washington, proved a failure.
It moved in three divisions, by different routes, but all
arriving nearly at the same time at the enemy’s outposts at King’s
Bridge. There was some skirmishing, but the great feature of
the expedition was a pompous and peremptory summons of Fort Independence
to surrender. “Twenty minutes only can be allowed,”
said Heath, “for the garrison to give their answer, and, should it
be in the negative, they must abide the consequences.” The
garrison made no answer but an occasional cannonade. Heath
failed to follow up his summons by corresponding deeds. He
hovered and skirmished for some days about the outposts and
Spyt den Duivel Creek, and then retired before a threatened
snow storm, and the report of an enemy’s fleet from Rhode
Island, with troops under Lord Percy, who might land in Westchester,
and take the besieging force in rear.
Washington, while he spoke of Heath’s failure with indulgence
in his despatches to government, could not but give him
a rebuke in a private letter. “Your summons,” writes he, “as you
did not attempt to fulfil your threats, was not only idle, but
farcical; and will not fail of turning the laugh exceedingly upon
us. These things I mention to you as a friend, for you will
perceive they have composed no part of my public letter.”
But though disappointed in this part of his plan, Washington,
having received reinforcements of militia, continued, with his scanty
army, to carry on his system of annoyance. The situation of Cornwallis,
who, but a short time before, traversed the Jerseys so
486triumphantly, became daily more and more irksome. Spies were
in his camp, to give notice of every movement, and foes without
to take advantage of it; so that not a foraging party could sally
forth without being waylaid. By degrees he drew in his troops
which were posted about the country, and collected them at New
Brunswick and Amboy, so as to have a communication by water
with New York, whence he was now compelled to draw nearly
all his supplies; “presenting,” to use the words of Hamilton, “the
extraordinary spectacle of a powerful army, straitened within
narrow limits by the phantom of a military force, and never permitted
to transgress those limits with impunity.”
In fact, the recent operations in the Jerseys had suddenly
changed the whole aspect of the war, and given a triumphant
close to what had been a disastrous campaign.
The troops, which for months had been driven from post to
post, apparently an undisciplined rabble, had all at once turned
upon their pursuers, and astounded them by brilliant stratagems
and daring exploits. The commander, whose cautious policy had
been sneered at by enemies, and regarded with impatience by
misjudging friends, had all at once shown that he possessed enterprise,
as well as circumspection, energy as well as endurance, and
that beneath his wary coldness lurked a fire to break forth at the
proper moment. This year’s campaign, the most critical one of
the war, and especially the part of it which occurred in the
Jerseys, was the ordeal that made his great qualities fully appreciated
by his countrymen, and gained for him from the statesmen
and generals of Europe the appellation of the American Fabius.
30. See Letter of Gen. Greene to Samuel Ward. Am. Arch. 4th Series, vol. iv.
31. Sparks. Washington’s Writings, vol. iii. p. 194.
32. Thomas Walker, a merchant of Montreal, who, accused of traitorous
dealings with the Americans, had been thrown into prison during Prescott’s
sway, and his country-house burnt down, undertook a journey to Philadelphia
in the depth of winter, when he understood the general was a captive there,
trusting to obtain satisfaction for his ill-treatment. To his great surprise, he
found Mr. Prescott lodged in the best tavern of the place, walking or riding at
large through Philadelphia and Bucks counties, feasting with gentlemen of the
first rank in the province, and keeping a levée for the reception of the grandees.
In consequence of which unaccountable phenomena, and the little prospect
of his obtaining any adequate redress in the present unsettled state of
public affairs, Mr. Walker has returned to Montreal.—Am. Archives, 4th Series
vol. iv. 1178.
35. Adams’s Letters, vol. ii. p. 80. Adams adds, that they made him “low
bows and scrapes”—a kind of homage never paid by an Indian warrior.
36. From memoranda written at an advanced age, by the late Hon. Israel
Trask; who, when but ten years old, was in the camp at Cambridge with his
father, who was a lieutenant.
37. Lee to Rich. Henry Lee. Am. Archives, 4th Series, iv. 248.
73. Washington to the President of Congress, June 28.
74. As a specimen of the reports which circulated throughout the country,
concerning this conspiracy, we give an extract from a letter, written from
Wethersfield, in Connecticut, 9th of July, 1776, by the Reverend John
Marsh.
“You have heard of the infernal plot that has been discovered. About
ten days before any of the conspirators were taken up, a woman went to the
general and desired a private audience. He granted it to her, and she let him
know that his life was in danger, and gave him such an account of the conspiracy
as gained his confidence. He opened the matter to a few friends, on
whom he could depend. A strict watch was kept night and day, until a favorable
opportunity occurred; when the general went to bed as usual, arose
about two o’clock, told his lady he was a going, with some of the Provincial
Congress, to order some tories seized—desired she would make herself easy,
and go to sleep. He went off without any of his aides-de-camp, except the
captain of his life-guard, was joined by a number of chosen men, with lanterns,
and proper instruments to break open houses, and before six o’clock
next morning, had forty men under guard at the City Hall, among whom was
the mayor of the city, several merchants, and five or six of his own life-guard.
Upon examination, one Forbes confessed that the plan was to assassinate
the general, and as many of the superior officers as they could, and to
blow up the magazine upon the appearance of the enemy’s fleet, and to go off
in boats prepared for that purpose to join the enemy. Thos. Hickey, who
has been executed, went from this place. He came from Ireland a few years
ago. What will be done with the mayor is uncertain. He can’t be tried by
court-martial, and, it is said, there is no law of that colony by which he can
be condemned. May he have his deserts.”
75. Extracts from minutes of the committee, Am. Archives, 4th S. vi. 1112.
76. Governor Tryon, in a letter dated about this time from on board of
the Duchess of Gordon, off Staten Island, writes: “The testimony given
by the inhabitants of the island, of loyalty to his majesty, and attachment to
his government, I flatter myself will be general throughout the province, as
soon as the army gets the main body of the rebels between them and the sea;
which will leave all the back country open to the command of the king’s
friends, and yield a plentiful resource of provisions for the army, and place
them in a better situation to cut off the rebels’ retreat when forced from their
strong hold.”—Am. Arch. 5th S. i. 122.
93. General orders, Aug. 8th, show the feverish state of affairs in the city.
“As the movements of the enemy, and intelligence by deserters, give the
utmost reason to believe that the great struggle in which we are contending
for every thing dear to us and our posterity is near at hand, the general most
earnestly recommends the closest attention to the state of the men’s arms,
ammunition, and flints; that if we should be suddenly called to action, nothing
of this kind may be to provide. And he does most anxiously exhort both
officers and soldiers not to be out of their quarters or encampments, especially
in the morning, or upon the tide of flood.
“A flag in the daytime, or a light at night, in the fort on Bayard’s Hill,
with three guns from the same place fired quick but distinct, is to be considered
as a signal for the troops to repair to their alarm posts, and prepare
for action. And that the alarm may be more effectually given, the drums
are immediately to beat to arms upon the signal being given from Bayard’s
Hill. This order is not to be considered as countermanding the firing two
guns at Fort George, as formerly ordered. That is also to be done on an
alarm, but the flag will not be hoisted at the old head-quarters in Broadway.”—Am.
Archives, 5th Series, i. 912.
114. Graydon’s Memoirs, Littell’s ed., p. 174. General Greene, in a letter to a
friend, writes: “We made a miserable, disorderly retreat from New York, owing
to the conduct of the militia, who ran at the appearance of the enemy’s advanced
guard. Fellows’ and Parsons’ brigades ran away from about fifty men, and
left his excellency on the ground, within eighty yards of the enemy, so vexed
at the infamous conduct of his troops, that he sought death rather than life.”
115. Peabody, Life of Putnam. Sparks’ Am. Biog., vii. 189.
117. The portrait of Miss Mary Philipse is still to be seen in the possession
of Frederick Phillips, Esquire, at the Grange, on the Highlands opposite West
Point.
135. The number of prisoners, as returned by Sir William Howe, was 2,813
of whom 2,607 were privates. They were marched off to New York at midnight.
136. Some writers have stated that Cornwallis crossed on the 18th. They
have been misled by a letter of Sir William Howe, which gives that date.
Lord Howe, in a letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, gives the date we
have stated (the 20th), which is the true one.
139. We cannot dismiss this painful incident in Washington’s life, without a
prospective note on the subject. Reed was really of too generous and intelligent
a nature not to be aware of the immense value of the friendship he had
put at hazard. He grieved over his mistake, especially as after events showed
more and more the majestic greatness of Washington’s character. A letter in
the following year, in which he sought to convince Washington of his sincere
and devoted attachment, is really touching in its appeals. We are happy to
add, that it appears to have been successful, and to have restored, in a great
measure, their relations of friendly confidence.
152. Seldom has a name of so few letters been spelled so many ways as that
of this commander. We find it written Rall in the military journals before us;
yet we adhere to the one hitherto adopted by us, apparently on good authority.
156. Who it was that made this attack upon the outpost is not clearly ascertained.
The Hessian lieutenant who commanded at the picket, says it was a
patrol sent out by Washington, under command of a captain, to reconnoitre,
with strict orders not to engage, but if discovered, to retire instantly as silently
as possible. Colonel Reed, in a memorandum, says, it was an advance party
returning from the Jerseys to Pennsylvania.—See Life and Corresp. vol. i. p. 277.
158. The lieutenant gives the latter number on the authority of Lord Stirling;
but his lordship meant the whole number of men intended for the three several
attacks. The force that actually crossed with Washington was what we have
stated.
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