WHAT MODERN LIBERTY MEANS
From our recent experience it is
clear that the traditional liberties
of speech and opinion rest on no solid
foundation. At a time when the world
needs above all other things the activity
of generous imaginations and the creative
leadership of planning and inventive
minds, our thinking is shriveled with
panic. Time and energy that should go
to building and restoring are instead consumed
in warding off the pin-pricks of
prejudice and fighting a guerilla war
against misunderstanding and intolerance.
For suppression is felt, not simply
by the scattered individuals who are actually
suppressed. It reaches back into
the steadiest minds, creating tension
everywhere; and the tension of fear produces
sterility. Men cease to say what
they think; and when they cease to say
it, they soon cease to think it. They
think in reference to their critics and not
in reference to the facts. For when
thought becomes socially hazardous, men
spend more time wondering about the
hazard than they do in cultivating their
thought. Yet nothing is more certain
than that mere bold resistance will not
permanently liberate men’s minds. The
problem is not only greater than that, but
different, and the time is ripe for reconsideration.
We have learned that many
of the hard-won rights of man are utterly
insecure. It may be that we cannot
make them secure simply by imitating
the earlier champions of liberty.
Something important about the human
character was exposed by Plato when,
with the spectacle of Socrates’s death before
him, he founded Utopia on a censorship
stricter than any which exists on
this heavily censored planet. His intolerance
seems strange. But it is really the
logical expression of an impulse that
most of us have not the candor to recognize.
It was the service of Plato to
formulate the dispositions of men in the
shape of ideals, and the surest things we
can learn from him are not what we
ought to do, but what we are inclined
to do. We are peculiarly inclined to
suppress whatever impugns the security
of that to which we have given our allegiance.
If our loyalty is turned to what
exists, intolerance begins at its frontiers;
if it is turned, as Plato’s was, to Utopia,
we shall find Utopia defended with intolerance.
There are, so far as I can discover, no
absolutists of liberty; I can recall no
doctrine of liberty, which, under the acid
test, does not become contingent upon
some other ideal. The goal is never liberty,
but liberty for something or other.
For liberty is a condition under which
activity takes place, and men’s interests
attach themselves primarily to their activities
and what is necessary to fulfill
them, not to the abstract requirements
of any activity that might be conceived.
And yet controversialists rarely take
this into account. The battle is fought
with banners on which are inscribed absolute
and universal ideals. They are
not absolute and universal in fact. No
man has ever thought out an absolute or
a universal ideal in politics, for the simple
reason that nobody knows enough,
or can know enough, to do it. But we
all use absolutes, because an ideal which
seems to exist apart from time, space,
and circumstance has a prestige that no
candid avowal of special purpose can
ever have. Looked at from one point of
view universals are part of the fighting
apparatus in men. What they desire
enormously they easily come to call
God’s will, or their nation’s purpose.
Looked at genetically, these idealizations
are probably born in that spiritual reverie
where all men live most of the time.
In reverie there is neither time, space,
nor particular reference, and hope is omnipotent.
This omnipotence, which is
denied to them in action, nevertheless illuminates
activity with a sense of utter
and irresistible value.
The classic doctrine of liberty consists
of absolutes. It consists of them except
at the critical points where the author
has come into contact with objective difficulties.
Then he introduces into the argument,
somewhat furtively, a reservation
which liquidates its universal meaning
and reduces the exalted plea for
liberty in general to a special argument
for the success of a special purpose.
There are at the present time, for instance,
no more fervent champions of
liberty than the western sympathizers
with the Russian Soviet government.
Why is it that they are indignant when
Mr. Burleson suppresses a newspaper and
complacent when Lenin does? And,
vice versa, why is it that the anti-Bolshevist
forces in the world are in favor
of restricting constitutional liberty as a
preliminary to establishing genuine liberty
in Russia? Clearly the argument
about liberty has little actual relation to
the existence of it. It is the purpose of
the social conflict, not the freedom of
opinion, that lies close to the heart of the
partisans. The word liberty is a weapon
and an advertisement, but certainly not
an ideal which transcends all special
aims.
If there were any man who believed
in liberty apart from particular purposes,
that man would be a hermit contemplating
all existence with a hopeful
and neutral eye. For him, in the last
analysis, there could be nothing worth
resisting, nothing particularly worth attaining,
nothing particularly worth defending,
not even the right of hermits
to contemplate existence with a cold and
neutral eye. He would be loyal simply
to the possibilities of the human spirit,
even to those possibilities which most
seriously impair its variety and its health.
No such man has yet counted much in
the history of politics. For what every
theorist of liberty has meant is that certain
types of behavior and classes of
opinion hitherto regulated should be
somewhat differently regulated in the
future. What each seems to say is that
opinion and action should be free; that
liberty is the highest and most sacred
interest of life. But somewhere each of
them inserts a weasel clause to the effect
that “of course” the freedom granted
shall not be employed too destructively.
It is this clause which checks exuberance
and reminds us that, in spite of appearances,
we are listening to finite men
pleading a special cause.
Among the English classics none are
more representative than Milton’s Areopagitica
and the essay On Liberty by
John Stuart Mill. Of living men Mr.
Bertrand Russell is perhaps the most
outstanding advocate of liberty. The
three together are a formidable set of witnesses.
Yet nothing is easier than to
draw texts from each which can be cited
either as an argument for absolute liberty
or as an excuse for as much repression
as seems desirable at the moment.
Says Milton:
Yet if all cannot be of one mind, as who
looks they should be? this doubtles is more
wholsome, more prudent, and more Christian
that many be tolerated, rather than all
compell’d.
So much for the generalization. Now
for the qualification which follows immediately
upon it.
I mean not tolerated Popery, and open
superstition, which as it extirpats all religions
and civill supremacies, so itself should
be extirpat, provided first that all charitable
and compassionat means be used to win and
regain the weak and misled: that also which
is impious or evil absolutely either against
faith or maners no law can possibly permit,
that intends not to unlaw it self: but those
neighboring differences, or rather indifferences,
are what I speak of, whether in some
point of doctrine or of discipline, which
though they may be many, yet need not interrupt
the unity of spirit, if we could but
find among us the bond of peace.
With this as a text one could set up
an inquisition. Yet it occurs in the noblest
plea for liberty that exists in the
English language. The critical point in
Milton’s thought is revealed by the word
“indifferences.” The area of opinion
which he wished to free comprised the
“neighboring differences” of certain
Protestant sects, and only these where
they were truly ineffective in manners
and morals. Milton, in short, had come
to the conclusion that certain conflicts
of doctrine were sufficiently insignificant
to be tolerated. The conclusion depended
far less upon his notion of the
value of liberty than upon his conception
of God and human nature and the England
of his time. He urged indifference
to things that were becoming indifferent.
If we substitute the word indifference
for the word liberty, we shall come much
closer to the real intention that lies behind
the classic argument. Liberty is to
be permitted where differences are of no
great moment. It is this definition which
has generally guided practice. In times
when men feel themselves secure, heresy
is cultivated as the spice of life. During
a war liberty disappears as the community
feels itself menaced. When revolution
seems to be contagious, heresy-hunting
is a respectable occupation. In other
words, when men are not afraid, they
are not afraid of ideas; when they are
much afraid, they are afraid of anything
that seems, or can even be made to appear,
seditious. That is why nine-tenths
of the effort to live and let live consists
in proving that the thing we wish to have
tolerated is really a matter of indifference.
In Mill this truth reveals itself still
more clearly. Though his argument is
surer and completer than Milton’s, the
qualification is also surer and completer.
Such being the reasons which make it imperative
that human beings should be free to
form opinions, and to express their opinions
without reserve; and such the baneful consequences
to the intellectual and through that
to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty
is either conceded or asserted in spite
of prohibition, let us next examine whether
the same reasons do not require that men
should be free to act upon their opinions, to
carry these out in their lives, without hindrance,
either moral or physical, from their
fellow men, so long as it is at their own risk
and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable.
No one pretends that actions
should be as free as opinions. On the contrary,
even opinions lose their immunity when
the circumstances in which they are expressed
are such as to constitute their expression a
positive instigation to some mischievous act.
“At their own risk and peril.” In
other words, at the risk of eternal damnation.
The premise from which Mill
argued was that many opinions then under
the ban of society were of no interest
to society, and ought therefore not to be
interfered with. The orthodoxy with
which he was at war was chiefly theocratic.
It assumed that a man’s opinions
on cosmic affairs might endanger his
personal salvation and make him a dangerous
member of society. Mill did not
believe in the theological view, did not
fear damnation, and was convinced that
morality did not depend upon the religious
sanction. In fact, he was convinced
that a more reasoned morality
could be formed by laying aside theological
assumptions. “But no one pretends
that actions should be as free as opinions.”
The plain truth is that Mill did
not believe that much action would result
from the toleration of those opinions
in which he was most interested.
Political heresy occupied the fringe of
his attention, and he uttered only the
most casual comments. So incidental
are they, so little do they impinge on his
mind, that the arguments of this staunch
apostle of liberty can be used honestly,
and in fact are used, to justify the bulk
of the suppressions which have recently
occurred. “Even opinions lose their immunity,
when the circumstances in which
they are expressed are such as to constitute
their expression a positive instigation
to some mischievious act.” Clearly
there is no escape here for Debs or Haywood
or obstructors of Liberty Loans.
The argument used is exactly the one
employed in sustaining the conviction of
Debs.
In corroboration Mill’s single concrete
instance may be cited: “An opinion that
corn dealers are starvers of the poor, or
that private property is robbery, ought
to be unmolested when simply circulated
through the press, but may justly incur
punishment when delivered orally to an
excited mob assembled before the house
of a corn dealer, or when handed about
among the same mob in the form of a
placard.”
Clearly Mill’s theory of liberty wore
a different complexion when he considered
opinions which might directly affect
social order. Where the stimulus of
opinion upon action was effective he
could say with entire complacency, “The
liberty of the individual must be thus far
limited; he must not make himself a
nuisance to other people.” Because Mill
believed this, it is entirely just to infer
that the distinction drawn between a
speech or placard and publication in the
press would soon have broken down for
Mill had he lived at a time when the
press really circulated and the art of
type-display had made a newspaper
strangely like a placard.
On first acquaintance no man would
seem to go further than Mr. Bertrand
Russell in loyalty to what he calls “the
unfettered development of all the instincts
that build up life and fill it with
mental delights.” He calls these instincts
“creative”; and against them he
sets off the “possessive impulses.” These,
he says, should be restricted by “a public
authority, a repository of practically
irresistible force whose function should
be primarily to repress the private use
of force.” Where Milton said no “tolerated
Popery,” Mr. Russell says, no tolerated
“possessive impulses.” Surely he
is open to the criticism that, like every
authoritarian who has preceded him, he
is interested in the unfettered development
of only that which seems good to
him. Those who think that “enlightened
selfishness” produces social harmony will
tolerate more of the possessive impulses,
and will be inclined to put certain of
Mr. Russell’s creative impulses under
lock and key.
The moral is, not that Milton, Mill,
and Bertrand Russell are inconsistent, or
that liberty is to be obtained by arguing
for it without qualifications. The impulse
to what we call liberty is as strong
in these three men as it is ever likely to
be in our society. The moral is of another
kind. It is that the traditional
core of liberty, namely, the notion of indifference,
is too feeble and unreal a doctrine
to protect the purpose of liberty,
which is the furnishing of a healthy environment
in which human judgment
and inquiry can most successfully organize
human life. Too feeble, because in
time of stress nothing is easier than to
insist, and by insistence to convince, that
tolerated indifference is no longer tolerable
because it has ceased to be indifferent.
It is clear that in a society where public
opinion has become decisive, nothing
that counts in the formation of it
can really be a matter of indifference.
When I say “can be,” I am speaking
literally. What men believed about the
constitution of heaven became a matter
of indifference when heaven disappeared
in metaphysics; but what they believe
about property, government, conscription,
taxation, the origins of the late war,
or the origins of the Franco-Prussian
War, or the distribution of Latin culture
in the vicinity of copper mines, constitutes
the difference between life and
death, prosperity and misfortune, and it
will never on this earth be tolerated as
indifferent, or not interfered with, no
matter how many noble arguments are
made for liberty, or how many martyrs
give their lives for it. If widespread
tolerance of opposing views is to be
achieved in modern society, it will not
be simply by fighting the Debs’ cases
through the courts, and certainly not by
threatening to upset those courts if they
do not yield to the agitation. The task
is fundamentally of another order, requiring
other methods and other theories.
The world about which each man is
supposed to have opinions has become
so complicated as to defy his powers of
understanding. What he knows of events
that matter enormously to him, the purposes
of governments, the aspirations of
peoples, the struggle of classes, he knows
at second, third, or fourth hand. He
cannot go and see for himself. Even the
things that are near to him have become
too involved for his judgment. I know
of no man, even among those who devote
all of their time to watching public affairs,
who can even pretend to keep
track, at the same time, of his city government,
his state government, Congress,
the departments, the industrial situation,
and the rest of the world. What men
who make the study of politics a vocation
cannot do, the man who has an hour
a day for newspapers and talk cannot
possibly hope to do. He must seize
catchwords and headlines or nothing.
This vast elaboration of the subject-matter
of politics is the root of the whole
problem. News comes from a distance;
it comes helter-skelter, in inconceivable
confusion; it deals with matters that are
not easily understood; it arrives and is
assimilated by busy and tired people who
must take what is given to them. Any
lawyer with a sense of evidence knows
how unreliable such information must
necessarily be.
The taking of testimony in a trial is
hedged about with a thousand precautions
derived from long experience of
the fallibility of the witness and the
prejudices of the jury. We call this, and
rightly, a fundamental phase of human
liberty. But in public affairs the stake
is infinitely greater. It involves the lives
of millions, and the fortune of everybody.
The jury is the whole community,
not even the qualified voters alone. The
jury is everybody who creates public
sentiment—chattering gossips, unscrupulous
liars, congenital liars, feeble-minded
people, prostitute minds, corrupting
agents. To this jury any testimony is
submitted, is submitted in any form, by
any anonymous person, with no test of
reliability, no test of credibility, and no
penalty for perjury. If I lie in a lawsuit
involving the fate of my neighbor’s cow,
I can go to jail. But if I lie to a million
readers in a matter involving war and
peace, I can lie my head off, and, if I
choose the right series of lies, be entirely
irresponsible. Nobody will punish me if
I lie about Japan, for example. I can
announce that every Japanese valet is a
reservist, and every Japanese art store a
mobilization center. I am immune.
And if there should be hostilities with
Japan, the more I lied the more popular
I should be. If I asserted that the Japanese
secretly drank the blood of children,
that Japanese women were unchaste,
that the Japanese were really not
a branch of the human race after all, I
guarantee that most of the newspapers
would print it eagerly, and that I could
get a hearing in churches all over the
country. And all this for the simple
reason that the public, when it is dependent
on testimony and protected by
no rules of evidence, can act only on the
excitement of its pugnacities and its
hopes.
The mechanism of the news-supply
has developed without plan, and there is
no one point in it at which one can fix
the responsibility for truth. The fact is
that the subdivision of labor is now accompanied
by the subdivision of the
news-organization. At one end of it is
the eye-witness, at the other, the reader.
Between the two is a vast, expensive
transmitting and editing apparatus. This
machine works marvelously well at times,
particularly in the rapidity with which
it can report the score of a game or a
transatlantic flight, or the death of a
monarch, or the result of an election.
But where the issue is complex, as for
example in the matter of the success of
a policy, or the social conditions among
a foreign people,—that is to say, where
the real answer is neither yes or no, but
subtle, and a matter of balanced evidence,—the
subdivision of the labor involved
in the report causes no end of
derangement, misunderstanding, and
even misrepresentation.
Thus the number of eye-witnesses capable
of honest statement is inadequate
and accidental. Yet the reporter making
up his news is dependent upon the
eye-witnesses. They may be actors in the
event. Then they can hardly be expected
to have perspective. Who, for example,
if he put aside his own likes and dislikes
would trust a Bolshevik’s account of
what exists in Soviet Russia or an exiled
Russian prince’s story of what exists in
Siberia? Sitting just across the frontier,
say in Stockholm, how is a reporter to
write dependable news when his witnesses
consist of emigrés or Bolshevist
agents?
At the Peace Conference, news was
given out by the agents of the conferees
and the rest leaked through those who
were clamoring at the doors of the Conference.
Now the reporter, if he is to
earn his living, must nurse his personal
contacts with the eye-witnesses and privileged
informants. If he is openly hostile
to those in authority, he will cease
to be a reporter unless there is an opposition
party in the inner circle who can
feed him news. Failing that, he will
know precious little of what is going on.
Most people seem to believe that, when
they meet a war correspondent or a special
writer from the Peace Conference,
they have seen a man who has seen the
things he wrote about. Far from it.
Nobody, for example, saw this war.
Neither the men in the trenches nor the
commanding general. The men saw
their trenches, their billets, sometimes
they saw an enemy trench, but nobody,
unless it be the aviators, saw a battle.
What the correspondents saw, occasionally,
was the terrain over which a battle
had been fought; but what they reported
day by day was what they were told at
press headquarters, and of that only what
they were allowed to tell.
At the Peace Conference the reporters
were allowed to meet periodically the
four least important members of the
Commission, men who themselves had
considerable difficulty in keeping track
of things, as any reporter who was present
will testify. This was supplemented
by spasmodic personal interviews with
the commissioners, their secretaries, their
secretaries’ secretaries, other newspaper
men, and confidential representatives of
the President, who stood between him
and the impertinences of curiosity. This
and the French press, than which there
is nothing more censored and inspired, a
local English trade-journal of the expatriates,
the gossip of the Crillon lobby,
the Majestic, and the other official hotels,
constituted the source of the news
upon which American editors and the
American people have had to base one
of the most difficult judgments of their
history. I should perhaps add that there
were a few correspondents occupying
privileged positions with foreign governments.
They wore ribbons in their button-holes
to prove it. They were in
many ways the most useful correspondents
because they always revealed to the
trained reader just what it was that their
governments wished America to believe.
The news accumulated by the reporter
from his witnesses has to be selected, if
for no other reason than that the cable
facilities are limited. At the cable office
several varieties of censorship intervene.
The legal censorship in Europe is political
as well as military, and both
words are elastic. It has been applied,
not only to the substance of the news, but
to the mode of presentation, and even to
the character of the type and the position
on the page. But the real censorship
on the wires is the cost of transmission.
This in itself is enough to limit any expensive
competition or any significant independence.
The big Continental news
agencies are subsidized. Censorship
operates also through congestion and the
resultant need of a system of priority.
Congestion makes possible good and bad
service, and undesirable messages are not
infrequently served badly.
When the report does reach the editor,
another series of interventions occurs.
The editor is a man who may
know all about something, but he can
hardly be expected to know all about
everything. Yet he has to decide the
question which is of more importance
than any other in the formation of opinions,
the question where attention is to
be directed. In a newspaper the heads
are the foci of attention, the odd corners
the fringe; and whether one aspect
of the news or another appears in the
center or at the periphery makes all the
difference in the world. The news of
the day as it reaches the newspaper office
is an incredible medley of fact, propaganda,
rumor, suspicion, clues, hopes,
and fears, and the task of selecting and
ordering that news is one of the truly
sacred and priestly offices in a democracy.
For the newspaper is in all literalness
the bible of democracy, the book
out of which a people determines its conduct.
It is the only serious book most
people read. It is the only book they
read every day. Now the power to determine
each day what shall seem important
and what shall be neglected is a
power unlike any that has been exercised
since the Pope lost his hold on the secular
mind.
The ordering is not done by one man,
but by a host of men, who are on the
whole curiously unanimous in their selection
and in their emphasis. Once you
know the party and social affiliations of
a newspaper, you can predict with considerable
certainty the perspective in
which the news will be displayed. This
perspective is by no means altogether
deliberate. Though the editor is ever so
much more sophisticated than all but a
minority of his readers, his own sense of
relative importance is determined by
rather standardized constellations of
ideas. He very soon comes to believe
that his habitual emphasis is the only
possible one.
Why the editor is possessed by a particular
set of ideas is a difficult question
in social psychology, of which no adequate
analysis has been made. But we
shall not be far wrong if we say that he
deals with the news in reference to the
prevailing mores of his social group.
These mores are of course in a large
measure the product of what previous
newspapers have said; and experience
shows that, in order to break out of this
circle, it has been necessary at various
times to create new forms of journalism,
such as the national monthly, the critical
weekly, the circular, the paid advertisements
of ideas, in order to change the
emphasis which had become obsolete and
habit-ridden.
Into this extremely refractory, and I
think increasingly disserviceable mechanism,
there has been thrown, especially
since the outbreak of war, another monkey-wrench—propaganda.
The word, of
course, covers a multitude of sins and a
few virtues. The virtues can be easily
separated out, and given another name,
either advertisement or advocacy. Thus,
if the National Council of Belgravia
wishes to publish a magazine out of its
own funds, under its own imprint, advocating
the annexation of Thrums, no one
will object. But if, in support of that
advocacy, it gives to the press stories that
are lies about the atrocities committed
in Thrums; or, worse still, if those stories
seem to come from Geneva, or Amsterdam,
not from the press-service of the
National Council of Belgravia, then Belgravia
is conducting propaganda. If,
after arousing a certain amount of interest
in itself, Belgravia then invites a
carefully selected correspondent, or perhaps
a labor leader, to its capital, puts
him up at the best hotel, rides him
around in limousines, fawns on him at
banquets, lunches with him very confidentially,
and then puts him through a
conducted tour so that he shall see just
what will create the desired impression,
then again Belgravia is conducting propaganda.
Or if Belgravia happens to
possess the greatest trombone-player in
the world, and if she sends him over to
charm the wives of influential husbands,
Belgravia is, in a less objectionable way,
perhaps, committing propaganda, and
making fools of the husbands.
Now, the plain fact is that out of the
troubled areas of the world the public
receives practically nothing that is not
propaganda. Lenin and his enemies control
all the news there is of Russia, and
no court of law would accept any of the
testimony as valid in a suit to determine
the possession of a donkey. I am writing
many months after the Armistice.
The Senate is at this moment engaged
in debating the question whether it will
guarantee the frontiers of Poland; but
what we learn of Poland we learn from
the Polish Government and the Jewish
Committee. Judgment on the vexed issues
of Europe is simply out of the question
for the average American; and the
more cocksure he is, the more certainly
is he the victim of some propaganda.
These instances are drawn from foreign
affairs, but the difficulty at home,
although less flagrant, is nevertheless
real. Theodore Roosevelt, and Leonard
Wood after him, have told us to think
nationally. It is not easy. It is easy
to parrot what those people say who live
in a few big cities and who have constituted
themselves the only true and authentic
voice of America. But beyond
that it is difficult. I live in New York
and I have not the vaguest idea what
Brooklyn is interested in. It is possible,
with effort, much more effort than most
people can afford to give, for me to know
what a few organized bodies like the
Non-Partisan League, the National Security
League, the American Federation
of Labor, and the Republican National
Committee are up to; but what the unorganized
workers, and the unorganized
farmers, the shopkeepers, the local bankers
and boards of trade are thinking and
feeling, no one has any means of knowing,
except perhaps in a vague way
at election time. To think nationally
means, at least, to take into account the
major interests and needs and desires of
this continental population; and for that
each man would need a staff of secretaries,
traveling agents, and a very expensive
press-clipping bureau.
We do not think nationally because
the facts that count are not systematically
reported and presented in a form
we can digest. Our most abysmal ignorance
occurs where we deal with the immigrant.
If we read his press at all, it
is to discover “Bolshevism” in it and to
blacken all immigrants with suspicion.
For his culture and his aspirations, for
his high gifts of hope and variety, we
have neither eyes nor ears. The immigrant
colonies are like holes in the road
which we never notice until we trip over
them. Then, because we have no current
information and no background of
facts, we are, of course, the undiscriminating
objects of any agitator who
chooses to rant against “foreigners.”
Now, men who have lost their grip
upon the relevant facts of their environment
are the inevitable victims of
agitation and propaganda. The quack,
the charlatan, the jingo, and the terrorist,
can flourish only where the audience is
deprived of independent access to information.
But where all news comes at
second-hand, where all the testimony is
uncertain, men cease to respond to truths,
and respond simply to opinions. The
environment in which they act is not the
realities themselves, but the pseudo-environment
of reports, rumors, and
guesses. The whole reference of thought
comes to be what somebody asserts, not
what actually is. Men ask, not whether
such and such a thing occurred in Russia,
but whether Mr. Raymond Robins
is at heart more friendly to the Bolsheviki
than Mr. Jerome Landfield. And
so, since they are deprived of any trustworthy
means of knowing what is really
going on, since everything is on the plane
of assertion and propaganda, they believe
whatever fits most comfortably with
their prepossessions.
That this breakdown of the means of
public knowledge should occur at a time
of immense change is a compounding of
the difficulty. From bewilderment to
panic is a short step, as everyone knows
who has watched a crowd when danger
threatens. At the present time a nation
easily acts like a crowd. Under the influence
of headlines and panicky print,
the contagion of unreason can easily
spread through a settled community. For
when the comparatively recent and unstable
nervous organization which makes
us capable of responding to reality as it
is, and not as we should wish it, is baffled
over a continuing period of time, the
more primitive but much stronger instincts
are let loose.
War and Revolution, both of them
founded on censorship and propaganda,
are the supreme destroyers of realistic
thinking, because the excess of danger
and the fearful overstimulation of passion
unsettle disciplined behavior. Both
breed fanatics of all kinds, men who, in
the words of Mr. Santayana, have redoubled
their effort when they have forgotten
their aim. The effort itself has
become the aim. Men live in their effort,
and for a time find great exaltation.
They seek stimulation of their effort
rather than direction of it. That is why
both in war and revolution there seems
to operate a kind of Gresham’s Law of
the emotions, in which leadership passes
by a swift degradation from a Mirabeau
to a Robespierre; and in war, from a
high-minded statesmanship to the depths
of virulent, hating jingoism.
The cardinal fact always is the loss of
contact with objective information. Public
as well as private reason depends
upon it. Not what somebody says, not
what somebody wishes were true, but
what is so beyond all our opining, constitutes
the touchstone of our sanity. And
a society which lives at second-hand will
commit incredible follies and countenance
inconceivable brutalities if that
contact is intermittent and untrustworthy.
Demagoguery is a parasite that
flourishes where discrimination fails,
and only those who are at grips with
things themselves are impervious to it.
For, in the last analysis, the demagogue,
whether of the Right or the Left, is, consciously
or unconsciously an undetected
liar.
Many students of politics have concluded
that, because public opinion was
unstable, the remedy lay in making government
as independent of it as possible.
The theorists of representative government
have argued persistently from this
premise against the believers in direct
legislation. But it appears now that,
while they have been making their case
against direct legislation, rather successfully
it seems to me, they have failed
sufficiently to notice the increasing malady
of representative government.
Parliamentary action is becoming notoriously
ineffective. In America certainly
the concentration of power in the
Executive is out of all proportion either
to the intentions of the Fathers or to the
orthodox theory of representative government.
The cause is fairly clear. Congress
is an assemblage of men selected
for local reasons from districts. It brings
to Washington a more or less accurate
sense of the superficial desires of its constituency.
In Washington it is supposed
to think nationally and internationally.
But for that task its equipment and its
sources of information are hardly better
than that of any other reader of the newspaper.
Except for its spasmodic investigating
committees, Congress has no particular
way of informing itself. But the
Executive has. The Executive is an elaborate
hierarchy reaching to every part of
the nation and to all parts of the world.
It has an independent machinery, fallible
and not too truthworthy, of course, but
nevertheless a machinery of intelligence.
It can be informed and it can act, whereas
Congress is not informed and cannot
act.
Now the popular theory of representative
government is that the representatives
have the information and therefore
create the policy which the executive administers.
The more subtle theory is that
the executive initiates the policy which
the legislature corrects in accordance
with popular wisdom. But when the legislature
is haphazardly informed, this
amounts to very little, and the people
themselves prefer to trust the executive
which knows, rather than the Congress
which is vainly trying to know. The result
has been the development of a kind
of government which has been harshly
described as plebiscite autocracy, or government
by newspapers. Decisions in
the modern state tend to be made by the
interaction, not of Congress and the executive,
but of public opinion and the
executive.
Public opinion for this purpose finds
itself collected about special groups
which act as extra-legal organs of government.
There is a labor nucleus, a
farmers’ nucleus, a prohibition nucleus,
a National Security League nucleus, and
so on. These groups conduct a continual
electioneering campaign upon the unformed,
exploitable mass of public opinion.
Being special groups, they have
special sources of information, and what
they lack in the way of information is
often manufactured. These conflicting
pressures beat upon the executive departments
and upon Congress, and formulate
the conduct of the government. The
government itself acts in reference to
these groups far more than in reference
to the district congressmen. So politics
as it is now played consists in coercing
and seducing the representative by the
threat and the appeal of these unofficial
groups. Sometimes they are the allies,
sometimes the enemies, of the party in
power, but more and more they are the
energy of public affairs. Government
tends to operate by the impact of controlled
opinion upon administration.
This shift in the locus of sovereignty has
placed a premium upon the manufacture
of what is usually called consent. No
wonder that the most powerful newspaper
proprietor in the English-speaking
world declined a mere government
post.
No wonder, too, that the protection of
the sources of its opinion is the basic
problem of democracy. Everything else
depends upon it. Without protection
against propaganda, without standards
of evidence, without criteria of emphasis,
the living substance of all popular decision
is exposed to every prejudice and
to infinite exploitation. That is why I
have argued that the older doctrine of
liberty was misleading. It did not assume
a public opinion that governs. Essentially
it demanded toleration of opinions
that were, as Milton said, indifferent.
It can guide us little in a world
where opinion is sensitive and decisive.
The axis of the controversy needs to
be shifted. The attempt to draw fine
distinctions between “liberty” and “license”
is no doubt part of the day’s work,
but it is fundamentally a negative part.
It consists in trying to make opinion responsible
to prevailing social standards,
whereas the really important thing is to
try and make opinion increasingly responsible
to the facts. There can be no
liberty for a community which lacks the
information by which to detect lies.
Trite as the conclusion may at first seem,
it has, I believe, immense practical consequences,
and may perhaps offer an escape
from the logomachy into which the
contests of liberty so easily degenerate.
It may be bad to suppress a particular
opinion, but the really deadly thing
is to suppress the news. In time of great
insecurity, certain opinions acting on unstable
minds may cause infinite disaster.
Knowing that such opinions necessarily
originate in slender evidence, that they
are propelled more by prejudice from
the rear than by reference to realities,
it seems to me that to build the case for
liberty upon the dogma of their unlimited
prerogatives is to build it upon the
poorest foundation. For, even though
we grant that the world is best served by
the liberty of all opinion, the plain fact
is that men are too busy and too much
concerned to fight more than spasmodically
for such liberty. When freedom of
opinion is revealed as freedom of error,
illusion, and misinterpretation, it is virtually
impossible to stir up much interest
in its behalf. It is the thinnest of all
abstractions and an over-refinement of
mere intellectualism. But people, wide
circles of people, are aroused when their
curiosity is baulked. The desire to know,
the dislike of being deceived and made
game of, is a really powerful motive,
and it is that motive that can best be enlisted
in the cause of freedom.
What, for example, was the one most
general criticism of the work of the
Peace Conference? It was that the covenants
were not openly arrived at. This
fact stirred Republican Senators, British
Labor, the whole gamut of parties from
the Right to the Left. And in the last
analysis lack of information about the
Conference was the origin of its difficulties.
Because of the secrecy endless
suspicion was aroused; because of it the
world seemed to be presented with a
series of accomplished facts which it
could not reject and did not wish altogether
to accept. It was lack of information
which kept public opinion from
affecting the negotiations at the time
when intervention would have counted
most and cost least. Publicity occurred
when the covenants were arrived at, with
all the emphasis on the at. This is what
the Senate objected to, and this is what
alienated much more liberal opinion
than the Senate represents.
In a passage quoted previously in this
essay, Milton said that differences of
opinion, “which though they may be
many, yet need not interrupt the unity
of spirit, if we could but find among us
the bond of peace.” There is but one
kind of unity possible in a world as diverse
as ours. It is unity of method,
rather than of aim; the unity of the disciplined
experiment. There is but one
bond of peace that is both permanent
and enriching: the increasing knowledge
of the world in which experiment occurs.
With a common intellectual method
and a common area of valid fact,
differences may become a form of coöperation
and cease to be an irreconcilable
antagonism.
That, I think, constitutes the meaning
of freedom for us. We cannot successfully
define liberty, or accomplish it, by
a series of permissions and prohibitions.
For that is to ignore the content of opinion
in favor of its form. Above all, it
is an attempt to define liberty of opinion
in terms of opinion. It is a circular and
sterile logic. A useful definition of liberty
is obtainable only by seeking the
principle of liberty in the main business
of human life, that is to say, in the process
by which men educate their response
and learn to control their environment.
In this view liberty is the name we give
to measures by which we protect and increase
the veracity of the information
upon which we act.
LIBERTY AND THE NEWS
The debates about liberty have
hitherto all been attempts to determine
just when in the series from
Right to Left the censorship should intervene.
In the preceding paper I ventured
to ask whether these attempts do
not turn on a misconception of the problem.
The conclusion reached was that,
in dealing with liberty of opinion, we
were dealing with a subsidiary phase of
the whole matter; that, so long as we
were content to argue about the privileges
and immunities of opinion, we were
missing the point and trying to make
bricks without straw. We should never
succeed even in fixing a standard of tolerance
for opinions, if we concentrated
all our attention on the opinions. For
they are derived, not necessarily by reason,
to be sure, but somehow, from the
stream of news that reaches the public,
and the protection of that stream is the
critical interest in a modern state. In
going behind opinion to the information
which it exploits, and in making the validity
of the news our ideal, we shall be
fighting the battle where it is really being
fought. We shall be protecting for
the public interest that which all the
special interests in the world are most
anxious to corrupt.
As the sources of the news are protected,
as the information they furnish
becomes accessible and usable, as our
capacity to read that information is educated,
the old problem of tolerance will
wear a new aspect. Many questions
which seem hopelessly insoluble now will
cease to seem important enough to be
worth solving. Thus the advocates of a
larger freedom always argue that true
opinions will prevail over error; their
opponents always claim that you can fool
most of the people most of the time.
Both statements are true, but both are
half-truths. True opinions can prevail
only if the facts to which they refer are
known; if they are not known, false ideas
are just as effective as true ones, if not
a little more effective.
The sensible procedure in matters affecting
the liberty of opinion would be
to ensure as impartial an investigation
of the facts as is humanly possible. But
it is just this investigation that is denied
us. It is denied us, because we are dependent
upon the testimony of anonymous
and untrained and prejudiced witnesses;
because the complexity of the
relevant facts is beyond the scope of our
hurried understanding; and finally, because
the process we call education fails
so lamentably to educate the sense of evidence
or the power of penetrating to the
controlling center of a situation. The
task of liberty, therefore, falls roughly
under three heads, protection of the
sources of the news, organization of the
news so as to make it comprehensible,
and education of human response.
We need, first, to know what can be
done with the existing news-structure, in
order to correct its grosser evils. How
far is it useful to go in fixing personal
responsibility for the truthfulness of
news? Much further, I am inclined to
think, than we have ever gone. We
ought to know the names of the whole
staff of every periodical. While it is not
necessary, or even desirable, that each
article should be signed, each article
should be documented, and false documentation
should be illegal. An item of
news should always state whether it is
received from one of the great news-agencies,
or from a reporter, or from a
press bureau. Particular emphasis
should be put on marking news supplied
by press bureaus, whether they are labeled
“Geneva,” or “Stockholm,” or “El
Paso.”
One wonders next whether anything
can be devised to meet that great evil of
the press, the lie which, once under way,
can never be tracked down. The more
scrupulous papers will, of course, print
a retraction when they have unintentionally
injured someone; but the retraction
rarely compensates the victim. The law
of libel is a clumsy and expensive instrument,
and rather useless to private individuals
or weak organizations because
of the gentlemen’s agreement which obtains
in the newspaper world. After all,
the remedy for libel is not money damages,
but an undoing of the injury.
Would it be possible then to establish
courts of honor in which publishers
should be compelled to meet their accusers
and, if found guilty of misrepresentation,
ordered to publish the correction
in the particular form and with
the prominence specified by the finding
of the court? I do not know. Such
courts might prove to be a great nuisance,
consuming time and energy and attention,
and offering too free a field for
individuals with a persecution mania.
Perhaps a procedure could be devised
which would eliminate most of these inconveniences.
Certainly it would be a
great gain if the accountability of publishers
could be increased. They exercise
more power over the individual than
is healthy, as everybody knows who has
watched the yellow press snooping at
keyholes and invading the privacy of
helpless men and women. Even more
important than this, is the utterly reckless
power of the press in dealing with
news vitally affecting the friendship of
peoples. In a Court of Honor, possible
perhaps only in Utopia, voluntary associations
working for decent relations
with other peoples might hale the jingo
and the subtle propagandist before a tribunal,
to prove the reasonable truth of
his assertion or endure the humiliation
of publishing prominently a finding
against his character.
This whole subject is immensely difficult,
and full of traps. It would be well
worth an intensive investigation by a
group of publishers, lawyers, and students
of public affairs. Because in some
form or other the next generation will
attempt to bring the publishing business
under greater social control. There is
everywhere an increasingly angry disillusionment
about the press, a growing
sense of being baffled and misled; and
wise publishers will not pooh-pooh these
omens. They might well note the history
of prohibition, where a failure to
work out a programme of temperance
brought about an undiscriminating taboo.
The regulation of the publishing business
is a subtle and elusive matter, and
only by an early and sympathetic effort
to deal with great evils can the more sensible
minds retain their control. If publishers
and authors themselves do not
face the facts and attempt to deal with
them, some day Congress, in a fit of temper,
egged on by an outraged public
opinion, will operate on the press with
an ax. For somehow the community
must find a way of making the men who
publish news accept responsibility for an
honest effort not to misrepresent the
facts.
But the phrase “honest effort” does not
take us very far. The problem here is
not different from that which we begin
dimly to apprehend in the field of government
and business administration.
The untrained amateur may mean well,
but he knows not how to do well. Why
should he? What are the qualifications
for being a surgeon? A certain minimum
of special training. What are the
qualifications for operating daily on the
brain and heart of a nation? None. Go
some time and listen to the average run
of questions asked in interviews with
Cabinet officers—or anywhere else.
I remember one reporter who was detailed
to the Peace Conference by a leading
news-agency. He came around every
day for “news.” It was a time when
Central Europe seemed to be disintegrating,
and great doubt existed as to
whether governments would be found
with which to sign a peace. But all that
this “reporter” wanted to know was
whether the German fleet, then safely interned
at Scapa Flow, was going to be
sunk in the North Sea. He insisted
every day on knowing that. For him it
was the German fleet or nothing. Finally,
he could endure it no longer. So
he anticipated Admiral Reuther and announced,
in a dispatch to his home papers,
that the fleet would be sunk. And
when I say that a million American
adults learned all that they ever learned
about the Peace Conference through this
reporter, I am stating a very moderate
figure.
He suggests the delicate question
raised by the schools of journalism: how
far can we go in turning newspaper enterprise
from a haphazard trade into a
disciplined profession? Quite far, I
imagine, for it is altogether unthinkable
that a society like ours should remain
forever dependent upon untrained accidental
witnesses. It is no answer to say
that there have been in the past, and that
there are now, first-rate correspondents.
Of course there are. Men like Brailsford,
Oulahan, Gibbs, Lawrence, Swope,
Strunsky, Draper, Hard, Dillon, Lowry,
Levine, Ackerman, Ray Stannard Baker,
Frank Cobb, and William Allen White,
know their way about in this world. But
they are eminences on a rather flat plateau.
The run of the news is handled
by men of much smaller caliber. It is
handled by such men because reporting
is not a dignified profession for which
men will invest the time and cost of an
education, but an underpaid, insecure,
anonymous form of drudgery, conducted
on catch-as-catch-can principles. Merely
to talk about the reporter in terms of his
real importance to civilization will make
newspaper men laugh. Yet reporting is
a post of peculiar honor. Observation
must precede every other activity, and
the public observer (that is, the reporter)
is a man of critical value. No amount
of money or effort spent in fitting the
right men for this work could possibly
be wasted, for the health of society depends
upon the quality of the information
it receives.
Do our schools of journalism, the few
we have, make this kind of training their
object, or are they trade-schools designed
to fit men for higher salaries in the existing
structure? I do not presume to
answer the question, nor is the answer of
great moment when we remember how
small a part these schools now play in
actual journalism. But it is important
to know whether it would be worth while
to endow large numbers of schools on
the model of those now existing, and
make their diplomas a necessary condition
for the practice of reporting. It is
worth considering. Against the idea lies
the fact that it is difficult to decide just
what reporting is—where in the whole
mass of printed matter it begins and ends.
No one would wish to set up a closed
guild of reporters and thus exclude invaluable
casual reporting and writing.
If there is anything in the idea at all,
it would apply only to the routine service
of the news through large organizations.
Personally I should distrust too much
ingenuity of this kind, on the ground
that, while it might correct certain evils,
the general tendency would be to turn
the control of the news over to unenterprising
stereotyped minds soaked in the
traditions of a journalism always ten
years out of date. The better course is
to avoid the deceptive short cuts, and
make up our minds to send out into reporting
a generation of men who will by
sheer superiority, drive the incompetents
out of business. That means two things.
It means a public recognition of the dignity
of such a career, so that it will cease
to be the refuge of the vaguely talented.
With this increase of prestige must go a
professional training in journalism in
which the ideal of objective testimony
is cardinal. The cynicism of the trade
needs to be abandoned, for the true patterns
of the journalistic apprentice are
not the slick persons who scoop the news,
but the patient and fearless men of science
who have labored to see what the
world really is. It does not matter that
the news is not susceptible of mathematical
statement. In fact, just because news
is complex and slippery, good reporting
requires the exercise of the highest of the
scientific virtues. They are the habits of
ascribing no more credibility to a statement
than it warrants, a nice sense of the
probabilities, and a keen understanding
of the quantitative importance of particular
facts. You can judge the general
reliability of any observer most easily by
the estimate he puts upon the reliability
of his own report. If you have no facts
of your own with which to check him,
the best rough measurement is to wait
and see whether he is aware of any limitations
in himself; whether he knows that
he saw only part of the event he describes;
and whether he has any background
of knowledge against which he
can set what he thinks he has seen.
This kind of sophistication is, of
course, necessary for the merest pretense
to any education. But for different professions
it needs to be specialized in particular
ways. A sound legal training is
pervaded by it, but the skepticism is
pointed to the type of case with which
the lawyer deals. The reporter’s work
is not carried on under the same conditions,
and therefore requires a different
specialization. How he is to acquire it
is, of course, a pedagogical problem requiring
an inductive study of the types
of witness and the sources of information
with whom the reporter is in contact.
Some time in the future, when men
have thoroughly grasped the rôle of public
opinion in society, scholars will not
hesitate to write treatises on evidence for
the use of news-gathering services. No
such treatise exists to-day, because political
science has suffered from that
curious prejudice of the scholar which
consists in regarding an irrational phenomenon
as not quite worthy of serious
study.
Closely akin to an education in the
tests of credibility is rigorous discipline
in the use of words. It is almost impossible
to overestimate the confusion in
daily life caused by sheer inability to
use language with intention. We talk
scornfully of “mere words.” Yet through
words the whole vast process of human
communication takes place. The sights
and sounds and meanings of nearly all
that we deal with as “politics,” we learn,
not by our own experience, but through
the words of others. If those words are
meaningless lumps charged with emotion,
instead of the messengers of fact, all
sense of evidence breaks down. Just so
long as big words like Bolshevism,
Americanism, patriotism, pro-Germanism,
are used by reporters to cover anything
and anybody that the biggest fool
at large wishes to include, just so long
shall we be seeking our course through a
fog so dense that we cannot tell whether
we fly upside-down or right-side-up. It
is a measure of our education as a people
that so many of us are perfectly content
to live our political lives in this
fraudulent environment of unanalyzed
words. For the reporter, abracadabra is
fatal. So long as he deals in it, he is
gullibility itself, seeing nothing of the
world, and living, as it were, in a hall
of crazy mirrors.
Only the discipline of a modernized
logic can open the door to reality. An
overwhelming part of the dispute about
“freedom of opinion” turns on words
which mean different things to the censor
and the agitator. So long as the
meanings of the words are not dissociated,
the dispute will remain a circular
wrangle. Education that shall make
men masters of their vocabulary is one
of the central interests of liberty. For
such an education alone can transform the
dispute into debate from similar premises.
A sense of evidence and a power to
define words must for the modern reporter
be accompanied by a working
knowledge of the main stratifications and
currents of interest. Unless he knows
that “news” of society almost always
starts from a special group, he is doomed
to report the surface of events. He will
report the ripples of a passing steamer,
and forget the tides and the currents and
the ground-swell. He will report what
Kolchak or Lenin says, and see what
they do only when it confirms what he
thinks they said. He will deal with the
flicker of events and not with their motive.
There are ways of reading that
flicker so as to discern the motive, but
they have not been formulated in the
light of recent knowledge. Here is big
work for the student of politics. The
good reporter reads events with an intuition
trained by wide personal experience.
The poor reporter cannot read
them, because he is not even aware that
there is anything in particular to read.
And then the reporter needs a general
sense of what the world is doing. Emphatically
he ought not to be serving a
cause, no matter how good. In his professional
activity it is no business of his
to care whose ox is gored. To be sure,
when so much reporting is ex parte, and
hostile to insurgent forces, the insurgents
in self-defense send out ex parte reporters
of their own. But a community cannot
rest content to learn the truth about
the Democrats by reading the Republican
papers, and the truth about the Republicans
by reading the Democratic papers.
There is room, and there is need,
for disinterested reporting; and if this
sounds like a counsel of perfection now,
it is only because the science of public
opinion is still at the point where astronomy
was when theological interests
proclaimed the conclusions that all research
must vindicate.
While the reporter will serve no cause,
he will possess a steady sense that the
chief purpose of “news” is to enable
mankind to live successfully toward the
future. He will know that the world
is a process, not by any means always
onward and upward, but never quite the
same. As the observer of the signs of
change, his value to society depends upon
the prophetic discrimination with which
he selects those signs.
But the news from which he must pick
and choose has long since become too
complicated even for the most highly
trained reporter. The work, say, of the
government is really a small part of the
day’s news, yet even the wealthiest and
most resourceful newspapers fail in their
efforts to report “Washington.” The
high lights and the disputes and sensational
incidents are noted, but no one can
keep himself informed about his Congressman
or about the individual departments,
by reading the daily press. This
failure in no way reflects on the newspapers.
It results from the intricacy and
unwieldiness of the subject-matter.
Thus, it is easier to report Congress than
it is to report the departments, because
the work of Congress crystallizes crudely
every so often in a roll-call. But administration,
although it has become
more important than legislation, is hard
to follow, because its results are spread
over a longer period of time, and its effects
are felt in ways that no reporter
can really measure.
Theoretically Congress is competent
to act as the critical eye on administration.
Actually, the investigations Of
Congress are almost always planless
raids, conducted by men too busy and
too little informed to do more than catch
the grosser evils, or intrude upon good
work that is not understood. It was a
recognition of these difficulties that was
the cause of two very interesting experiments
in late years. One was the establishment
of more or less semi-official institutes
of government research; the
other, the growth of specialized private
agencies which attempt to give technical
summaries of the work of various
branches of the government. Neither
experiment has created much commotion:
yet together they illustrate an idea
which, properly developed, will be increasingly
valuable to an enlightened
public opinion.
Their principle is simple. They are
expert organized reporters. Having no
horror of dullness, no interest in being
dramatic, they can study statistics and
orders and reports which are beyond the
digestive powers of a newspaper man or
of his readers. The lines of their growth
would seem to be threefold: to make a
current record, to make a running analysis
of it, and on the basis of both, to suggest
plans.
Record and analysis require an experimental
formulation of standards by
which the work of government can be
tested. Such standards are not to be
evolved off-hand out of anyone’s consciousness.
Some have already been
worked out experimentally, others still
need to be discovered; all need to be refined
and brought into perspective by
the wisdom of experience. Carried out
competently, the public would gradually
learn to substitute objective criteria for
gossip and intuitions. One can imagine
a public-health service subjected to such
expert criticism. The institute of research
publishes the death-rate as a
whole for a period of years. It seems
that for a particular season the rate is
bad in certain maladies, that in others
the rate of improvement is not sufficiently
rapid. These facts are compared
with the expenditures of the service,
and with the main lines of its activity.
Are the bad results due to the causes
beyond the control of the service? do
they indicate a lack of foresight in asking
appropriations for special work? or
in the absence of novel phenomena, do
they point to a decline of the personnel,
or in its morale? If the latter, further
analysis may reveal that salaries are too
low to attract men of ability, or that
the head of the service by bad management
has weakened the interest of his
staff.
When the work of government is analyzed
in some such way as this, the reporter
deals with a body of knowledge
that has been organized for his apprehension.
In other words, he is able to
report the “news,” because between him
and the raw material of government
there has been interposed a more or
less expert political intelligence. He
ceases to be the ant, described by William
James, whose view of a building
was obtained by crawling over the cracks
in the walls.
These political observatories will, I
think, be found useful in all branches
of government, national, state, municipal,
industrial, and even in foreign affairs.
They should be clearly out of
reach either of the wrath or of the favor
of the office-holders. They must, of
course, be endowed, but the endowment
should be beyond the immediate control
of the legislature and of the rich patron.
Their independence can be partially
protected by the terms of the trust; the
rest must be defended by the ability of
the institute to make itself so much the
master of the facts as to be impregnably
based on popular confidence.
One would like to think that the universities
could be brought into such a
scheme. Were they in close contact with
the current record and analysis, there
might well be a genuine “field work” in
political science for the students; and
there could be no better directing idea
for their more advanced researches than
the formulation of the intellectual
methods by which the experience of
government could be brought to usable
control. After all, the purpose of studying
“political science” is to be able to act
more effectively in politics, the word
effectively being understood in the largest
and, therefore, the ideal sense. In the
universities men should be able to think
patiently and generously for the good of
society. If they do not, surely one of
the reasons is that thought terminates in
doctor’s theses and brown quarterlies,
and not in the critical issues of politics.
On first thought, all this may seem
rather a curious direction for an inquiry
into the substance of liberty. Yet we
have always known, as a matter of common
sense, that there was an intimate
connection between “liberty” and the use
of liberty. Every one who has examined
the subject at all has had to conclude
that tolerance per se is an arbitrary line,
and that, in practice, the determining
factor is the significance of the opinion to
be tolerated. This study is based on an
avowal of that fact. Once it is avowed,
there seems to be no way of evading the
conclusion that liberty is not so much
permission as it is the construction of a
system of information increasingly independent
of opinion. In the long run it
looks as if opinion could be made at
once free and enlightening only by transferring
our interest from “opinion” to the
objective realities from which it springs.
This thought has led us to speculations
on ways of protecting and organizing
the stream of news as the source of all
opinion that matters. Obviously these
speculations do not pretend to offer a
fully considered or a completed scheme.
Their nature forbids it, and I should be
guilty of the very opinionativeness I
have condemned, did these essays claim
to be anything more than tentative indications
of the more important phases
of the problem.
Yet I can well imagine their causing
a considerable restlessness in the minds
of some readers. Standards, institutes,
university research, schools of journalism,
they will argue, may be all right,
but they are a gray business in a vivid
world. They blunt the edge of life; they
leave out of account the finely irresponsible
opinion thrown out by the creative
mind; they do not protect the indispensable
novelty from philistinism and oppression.
These proposals of yours, they
will say, ignore the fact that such an apparatus
of knowledge will in the main
be controlled by the complacent and the
traditional, and the execution will inevitably
be illiberal.
There is force in the indictment.
And yet I am convinced that we shall
accomplish more by fighting for truth
than by fighting for our theories. It is a
better loyalty. It is a humbler one, but
it is also more irresistible. Above all it
is educative. For the real enemy is ignorance,
from which all of us, conservative,
liberal, and revolutionary, suffer.
If our effort is concentrated on our desires,—be
it our desire to have and to
hold what is good, our desire to remake
peacefully, or our desire to transform
suddenly,—we shall divide hopelessly
and irretrievably. We must go back of
our opinions to the neutral facts for unity
and refreshment of spirit. To deny this,
it seems to me, is to claim that the mass
of men is impervious to education, and
to deny that, is to deny the postulate of
democracy, and to seek salvation in a
dictatorship. There is, I am convinced,
nothing but misery and confusion that
way. But I am equally convinced that
democracy will degenerate into this dictatorship
either of the Right or of the
Left, if it does not become genuinely
self-governing. That means, in terms of
public opinion, a resumption of that contact
between beliefs and realities which
we have been losing steadily since the
small-town democracy was absorbed into
the Great Society.
The administration of public information
toward greater accuracy and more
successful analysis is the highway of
liberty. It is, I believe, a matter of first-rate
importance that we should fix this
in our minds. Having done so, we may
be able to deal more effectively with the
traps and the lies and the special interests
which obstruct the road and drive us
astray. Without a clear conception of
what the means of liberty are, the
struggle for free speech and free opinion
easily degenerates into a mere contest of
opinion.
But realization is not the last step,
though it is the first. We need be under
no illusion that the stream of news can
be purified simply by pointing out the
value of purity. The existing news-structure
may be made serviceable to democracy
along the general lines suggested,
by the training of the journalist, and by
the development of expert record and
analysis. But while it may be, it will not
be, simply by saying that it ought to be.
Those who are now in control have too
much at stake, and they control the source
of reform itself.
Change will come only by the drastic
competition of those whose interests are
not represented in the existing news-organization.
It will come only if organized
labor and militant liberalism set
a pace which cannot be ignored. Our
sanity and, therefore, our safety depend
upon this competition, upon fearless and
relentless exposure conducted by self-conscious
groups that are now in a minority.
It is for these groups to understand
that the satisfaction of advertising
a pet theory is as nothing compared to
the publication of the news. And having
realized it, it is for them to combine
their resources and their talent for the
development of an authentic news-service
which is invincible because it supplies
what the community is begging for and
cannot get.
All the gallant little sheets expressing
particular programmes are at bottom
vanity, and in the end, futility, so long
as the reporting of daily news is left in
untrained and biased hands. If we are
to move ahead, we must see a great independent
journalism, setting standards
for commercial journalism, like those
which the splendid English coöperative
societies are setting for commercial business.
An enormous amount of money is
dribbled away in one fashion or another
on little papers, mass-meetings, and what
not. If only some considerable portion
of it could be set aside to establish a
central international news-agency, we
should make progress. We cannot fight
the untruth which envelops us by parading
our opinions. We can do it only by
reporting the facts, and we do not deserve
to win if the facts are against us.
The country is spotted with benevolent
foundations of one kind or another,
many of them doing nothing but pay
the upkeep of fine buildings and sinecures.
Organized labor spends large
sums of money on politics and strikes
which fail because it is impossible to secure
a genuine hearing in public opinion.
Could there be a pooling of money for
a news-agency? Not, I imagine, if its
object were to further a cause. But suppose
the plan were for a news-service in
which editorial matter was rigorously
excluded, and the work was done by men
who had already won the confidence of
the public by their independence? Then,
perhaps.
At any rate, our salvation lies in two
things: ultimately, in the infusion of the
news-structure by men with a new
training and outlook; immediately, in
the concentration of the independent
forces against the complacency and bad
service of the routineers. We shall advance
when we have learned humility;
when we have learned to seek the truth,
to reveal it and publish it; when we
care more for that than for the privilege
of arguing about ideas in a fog of
uncertainty.