The Plays and Poems of Shakespeare supply ample evidence that
their author not only had a very extensive and accurate knowledge
of law, but that he was well acquainted with the manners and
customs of members of the Inns of Court and with legal life
generally.
“While novelists and dramatists are constantly making
mistakes as to the laws of marriage, of wills, and inheritance,
to Shakespeare’s law, lavishly as he expounds it, there can
neither be demurrer, nor bill of exceptions, nor writ of
error.” Such was the testimony borne by one of the
most distinguished lawyers of the nineteenth century who was
raised to the high office of Lord Chief Justice in 1850, and
subsequently became Lord Chancellor. Its weight will,
doubtless, be more appreciated by lawyers than by laymen, for
only lawyers know how impossible it is for those who have not
served an apprenticeship to the law to avoid displaying their
ignorance if they venture to employ legal terms and to discuss
legal doctrines. “There is nothing so
dangerous,” wrote Lord Campbell, “as for one not of
the craft to tamper with our freemasonry.” A layman
is certain to betray himself by using some expression which a
lawyer would never employ. Mr. Sidney Lee himself supplies
us with an example of this. He writes (p. 164): “On
February 15, 1609, Shakespeare . . . obtained judgment from a
jury against Addenbroke for the payment of No. 6, and No. 1.
5s. 0d. costs.” Now a lawyer would
never have spoken of obtaining “judgment from a
jury,” for it is the function of a jury not to deliver
judgment (which is the prerogative of the court), but to find a
verdict on the facts. The error is, indeed, a venial one,
but it is just one of those little things which at once enable a
lawyer to know if the writer is a layman or “one of the
craft.”
But when a layman ventures to plunge deeply into legal
subjects, he is naturally apt to make an exhibition of his
incompetence. “Let a non-professional man, however
acute,” writes Lord Campbell again, “presume to talk
law, or to draw illustrations from legal science in discussing
other subjects, and he will speedily fall into laughable
absurdity.”
And what does the same high authority say about
Shakespeare? He had “a deep technical knowledge of
the law,” and an easy familiarity with “some of the
most abstruse proceedings in English jurisprudence.”
And again: “Whenever he indulges this propensity he
uniformly lays down good law.” Of Henry IV.,
Part 2, he says: “If Lord Eldon could be supposed to have
written the play, I do not see how he could be chargeable with
having forgotten any of his law while writing it.”
Charles and Mary Cowden Clarke speak of “the marvelous
intimacy which he displays with legal terms, his frequent
adoption of them in illustration, and his curiously technical
knowledge of their form and force.” Malone, himself a
lawyer, wrote: “His knowledge of legal terms is not merely
such as might be acquired by the casual observation of even his
all-comprehending mind; it has the appearance of technical
skill.” Another lawyer and well-known Shakespearean,
Richard Grant White, says: “No dramatist of the time, not
even Beaumont, who was the younger son of a judge of the Common
Pleas, and who after studying in the Inns of Court abandoned law
for the drama, used legal phrases with Shakespeare’s
readiness and exactness. And the significance of this fact
is heightened by another, that it is only to the language of the
law that he exhibits this inclination. The phrases peculiar
to other occupations serve him on rare occasions by way of
description, comparison or illustration, generally when something
in the scene suggests them, but legal phrases flow from his pen
as part of his vocabulary, and parcel of his thought. Take
the word ‘purchase’ for instance, which, in ordinary
use, means to acquire by giving value, but applies in law to all
legal modes of obtaining property except by inheritance or
descent, and in this peculiar sense the word occurs five times in
Shakespeare’s thirty-four plays, and only in one single
instance in the fifty-four plays of Beaumont and Fletcher.
It has been suggested that it was in attendance upon the courts
in London that he picked up his legal vocabulary. But this
supposition not only fails to account for Shakespeare’s
peculiar freedom and exactness in the use of that phraseology, it
does not even place him in the way of learning those terms his
use of which is most remarkable, which are not such as he would
have heard at ordinary proceedings at nisi prius, but such
as refer to the tenure or transfer of real property, ‘fine
and recovery,’ ‘statutes merchant,’
‘purchase,’ ‘indenture,’
‘tenure,’ ‘double voucher,’ ‘fee
simple,’ ‘fee farm,’ ‘remainder,’
‘reversion,’ ‘forfeiture,’ etc.
This conveyancer’s jargon could not have been picked up by
hanging round the courts of law in London two hundred and fifty
years ago, when suits as to the title of real property were
comparatively rare. And beside, Shakespeare uses his law
just as freely in his first plays, written in his first London
years, as in those produced at a later period. Just as
exactly, too; for the correctness and propriety with which these
terms are introduced have compelled the admiration of a Chief
Justice and a Lord Chancellor.”
Senator Davis wrote: “We seem to have something more
than a sciolist’s temerity of indulgence in the terms of an
unfamiliar art. No legal solecisms will be found. The
abstrusest elements of the common law are impressed into a
disciplined service. Over and over again, where such
knowledge is unexampled in writers unlearned in the law,
Shakespeare appears in perfect possession of it. In the law
of real property, its rules of tenure and descents, its entails,
its fines and recoveries, their vouchers and double vouchers, in
the procedure of the Courts, the method of bringing writs and
arrests, the nature of actions, the rules of pleading, the law of
escapes and of contempt of court, in the principles of evidence,
both technical and philosophical, in the distinction between the
temporal and spiritual tribunals, in the law of attainder and
forfeiture, in the requisites of a valid marriage, in the
presumption of legitimacy, in the learning of the law of
prerogative, in the inalienable character of the Crown, this
mastership appears with surprising authority.”
To all this testimony (and there is much more which I have not
cited) may now be added that of a great lawyer of our own times,
viz.: Sir James Plaisted Wilde, Q.C. created a Baron of
the Exchequer in 1860, promoted to the post of Judge-Ordinary and
Judge of the Courts of Probate and Divorce in 1863, and better
known to the world as Lord Penzance, to which dignity he was
raised in 1869. Lord Penzance, as all lawyers know, and as
the late Mr. Inderwick, K.C., has testified, was one of the first
legal authorities of his day, famous for his “remarkable
grasp of legal principles,” and “endowed by nature
with a remarkable facility for marshalling facts, and for a clear
expression of his views.”
Lord Penzance speaks of Shakespeare’s “perfect
familiarity with not only the principles, axioms, and maxims, but
the technicalities of English law, a knowledge so perfect and
intimate that he was never incorrect and never at fault . . . The
mode in which this knowledge was pressed into service on all
occasions to express his meaning and illustrate his thoughts, was
quite unexampled. He seems to have had a special pleasure
in his complete and ready mastership of it in all its
branches. As manifested in the plays, this legal knowledge
and learning had therefore a special character which places it on
a wholly different footing from the rest of the multifarious
knowledge which is exhibited in page after page of the
plays. At every turn and point at which the author required
a metaphor, simile, or illustration, his mind ever turned
first to the law. He seems almost to have
thought in legal phrases, the commonest of legal
expressions were ever at the end of his pen in description or
illustration. That he should have descanted in lawyer
language when he had a forensic subject in hand, such as
Shylock’s bond, was to be expected, but the knowledge of
law in ‘Shakespeare’ was exhibited in a far different
manner: it protruded itself on all occasions, appropriate or
inappropriate, and mingled itself with strains of thought widely
divergent from forensic subjects.” Again: “To
acquire a perfect familiarity with legal principles, and an
accurate and ready use of the technical terms and phrases not
only of the conveyancer’s office but of the pleader’s
chambers and the Courts at Westminster, nothing short of
employment in some career involving constant contact with legal
questions and general legal work would be requisite. But a
continuous employment involves the element of time, and time was
just what the manager of two theatres had not at his
disposal. In what portion of Shakespeare’s
(i.e. Shakspere’s) career would it be possible to
point out that time could be found for the interposition of a
legal employment in the chambers or offices of practising
lawyers?”
Stratfordians, as is well known, casting about for some
possible explanation of Shakespeare’s extraordinary
knowledge of law, have made the suggestion that Shakespeare
might, conceivably, have been a clerk in an attorney’s
office before he came to London. Mr. Collier wrote to Lord
Campbell to ask his opinion as to the probability of this being
true. His answer was as follows: “You require us to
believe implicitly a fact, of which, if true, positive and
irrefragable evidence in his own handwriting might have been
forthcoming to establish it. Not having been actually
enrolled as an attorney, neither the records of the local court
at Stratford nor of the superior Courts at Westminster would
present his name as being concerned in any suit as an attorney,
but it might reasonably have been expected that there would be
deeds or wills witnessed by him still extant, and after a very
diligent search none such can be discovered.”
Upon this Lord Penzance comments: “It cannot be doubted
that Lord Campbell was right in this. No young man could
have been at work in an attorney’s office without being
called upon continually to act as a witness, and in many other
ways leaving traces of his work and name.” There is
not a single fact or incident in all that is known of
Shakespeare, even by rumor or tradition, which supports this
notion of a clerkship. And after much argument and surmise
which has been indulged in on this subject, we may, I think,
safely put the notion on one side, for no less an authority than
Mr. Grant White says finally that the idea of his having been
clerk to an attorney has been “blown to pieces.”
It is altogether characteristic of Mr. Churton Collins that
he, nevertheless, adopts this exploded myth. “That
Shakespeare was in early life employed as a clerk in an
attorney’s office, may be correct. At Stratford there
was by royal charter a Court of Record sitting every fortnight,
with six attorneys, beside the town clerk, belonging to it, and
it is certainly not straining probability to suppose that the
young Shakespeare may have had employment in one of them.
There is, it is true, no tradition to this effect, but such
traditions as we have about Shakespeare’s occupation
between the time of leaving school and going to London are so
loose and baseless that no confidence can be placed in
them. It is, to say the least, more probable that he was in
an attorney’s office than that he was a butcher killing
calves ‘in a high style,’ and making speeches over
them.”
This is a charming specimen of Stratfordian argument.
There is, as we have seen, a very old tradition that Shakespeare
was a butcher’s apprentice. John Dowdall, who made a
tour in Warwickshire in 1693, testifies to it as coming from the
old clerk who showed him over the church, and it is
unhesitatingly accepted as true by Mr. Halliwell-Phillipps.
(Vol I, p. 11, and see Vol. II, p. 71, 72.) Mr. Sidney Lee
sees nothing improbable in it, and it is supported by Aubrey, who
must have written his account some time before 1680, when his
manuscript was completed. Of the attorney’s clerk
hypothesis, on the other hand, there is not the faintest vestige
of a tradition. It has been evolved out of the fertile
imaginations of embarrassed Stratfordians, seeking for some
explanation of the Stratford rustic’s marvellous
acquaintance with law and legal terms and legal life. But
Mr. Churton Collins has not the least hesitation in throwing over
the tradition which has the warrant of antiquity and setting up
in its stead this ridiculous invention, for which not only is
there no shred of positive evidence, but which, as Lord Campbell
and Lord Penzance point out, is really put out of court by the
negative evidence, since “no young man could have been at
work in an attorney’s office without being called upon
continually to act as a witness, and in many other ways leaving
traces of his work and name.” And as Mr. Edwards
further points out, since the day when Lord Campbell’s book
was published (between forty and fifty years ago), “every
old deed or will, to say nothing of other legal papers, dated
during the period of William Shakespeare’s youth, has been
scrutinized over half a dozen shires, and not one signature of
the young man has been found.”
Moreover, if Shakespeare had served as clerk in an
attorney’s office it is clear that he must have so served
for a considerable period in order to have gained (if indeed it
is credible that he could have so gained) his remarkable
knowledge of law. Can we then for a moment believe that, if
this had been so, tradition would have been absolutely silent on
the matter? That Dowdall’s old clerk, over eighty
years of age, should have never heard of it (though he was sure
enough about the butcher’s apprentice), and that all the
other ancient witnesses should be in similar ignorance!
But such are the methods of Stratfordian controversy.
Tradition is to be scouted when it is found inconvenient, but
cited as irrefragable truth when it suits the case.
Shakespeare of Stratford was the author of the Plays and
Poems, but the author of the Plays and Poems
could not have been a butcher’s apprentice. Away,
therefore, with tradition. But the author of the
Plays and Poems must have had a very large and a
very accurate knowledge of the law. Therefore, Shakespeare
of Stratford must have been an attorney’s clerk! The
method is simplicity itself. By similar reasoning
Shakespeare has been made a country schoolmaster, a soldier, a
physician, a printer, and a good many other things beside,
according to the inclination and the exigencies of the
commentator. It would not be in the least surprising to
find that he was studying Latin as a schoolmaster and law in an
attorney’s office at the same time.
However, we must do Mr. Collins the justice of saying that he
has fully recognized, what is indeed tolerably obvious, that
Shakespeare must have had a sound legal training. “It
may, of course, be urged,” he writes, “that
Shakespeare’s knowledge of medicine, and particularly that
branch of it which related to morbid psychology, is equally
remarkable, and that no one has ever contended that he was a
physician. (Here Mr. Collins is wrong; that contention also
has been put forward.) It may be urged that his acquaintance with
the technicalities of other crafts and callings, notably of
marine and military affairs, was also extraordinary, and yet no
one has suspected him of being a sailor or a soldier.
(Wrong again. Why even Messrs. Garnett and Gosse
‘suspect’ that he was a soldier!) This may be
conceded, but the concession hardly furnishes an analogy.
To these and all other subjects he recurs occasionally, and in
season, but with reminiscences of the law his memory, as is
abundantly clear, was simply saturated. In season and out
of season now in manifest, now in recondite application, he
presses it into the service of expression and illustration.
At least a third of his myriad metaphors are derived from
it. It would indeed be difficult to find a single act in
any of his dramas, nay, in some of them, a single scene, the
diction and imagery of which is not colored by it. Much of
his law may have been acquired from three books easily accessible
to him, namely Tottell’s Precedents (1572),
Pulton’s Statutes (1578), and Fraunce’s
Lawier’s Logike (1588), works with which he
certainly seems to have been familiar; but much of it could only
have come from one who had an intimate acquaintance with legal
proceedings. We quite agree with Mr. Castle that
Shakespeare’s legal knowledge is not what could have been
picked up in an attorney’s office, but could only have been
learned by an actual attendance at the Courts, at a
Pleader’s Chambers, and on circuit, or by associating
intimately with members of the Bench and Bar.”
This is excellent. But what is Mr. Collins’
explanation. “Perhaps the simplest solution of the
problem is to accept the hypothesis that in early life he was in
an attorney’s office (!), that he there contracted a love
for the law which never left him, that as a young man in London,
he continued to study or dabble in it for his amusement, to
stroll in leisure hours into the Courts, and to frequent the
society of lawyers. On no other supposition is it possible
to explain the attraction which the law evidently had for him,
and his minute and undeviating accuracy in a subject where no
layman who has indulged in such copious and ostentatious display
of legal technicalities has ever yet succeeded in keeping himself
from tripping.”
A lame conclusion. “No other supposition”
indeed! Yes, there is another, and a very obvious
supposition, namely, that Shakespeare was himself a lawyer, well
versed in his trade, versed in all the ways of the courts, and
living in close intimacy with judges and members of the Inns of
Court.
One is, of course, thankful that Mr. Collins has appreciated
the fact that Shakespeare must have had a sound legal training,
but I may be forgiven if I do not attach quite so much importance
to his pronouncements on this branch of the subject as to those
of Malone, Lord Campbell, Judge Holmes, Mr. Castle, K.C., Lord
Penzance, Mr. Grant White, and other lawyers, who have expressed
their opinion on the matter of Shakespeare’s legal
acquirements.
Here it may, perhaps, be worth while to quote again from Lord
Penzance’s book as to the suggestion that Shakespeare had
somehow or other managed “to acquire a perfect familiarity
with legal principles, and an accurate and ready use of the
technical terms and phrases, not only of the conveyancer’s
office, but of the pleader’s chambers and the courts at
Westminster.” This, as Lord Penzance points out,
“would require nothing short of employment in some career
involving constant contact with legal questions and
general legal work.” But “in what portion of
Shakespeare’s career would it be possible to point out that
time could be found for the interposition of a legal employment
in the chambers or offices of practising lawyers? . . . It is
beyond doubt that at an early period he was called upon to
abandon his attendance at school and assist his father, and was
soon after, at the age of sixteen, bound apprentice to a
trade. While under the obligation of this bond he could not
have pursued any other employment. Then he leaves Stratford
and comes to London. He has to provide himself with the
means of a livelihood, and this he did in some capacity at the
theatre. No one doubts that. The holding of horses is
scouted by many, and perhaps with justice, as being unlikely and
certainly unproved; but whatever the nature of his employment was
at the theatre, there is hardly room for the belief that it could
have been other than continuous, for his progress there was so
rapid. Ere long he had been taken into the company as an
actor, and was soon spoken of as a ‘Johannes
Factotum.’ His rapid accumulation of wealth speaks
volumes for the constancy and activity of his services. One
fails to see when there could be a break in the current of his
life at this period of it, giving room or opportunity for legal
or indeed any other employment. ‘In 1589,’ says
Knight, ‘we have undeniable evidence that he had not only a
casual engagement, was not only a salaried servant, as many
players were, but was a shareholder in the company of the
Queen’s players with other shareholders below him on the
list.’ This (1589) would be within two years after
his arrival in London, which is placed by White and
Halliwell-Phillipps about the year 1587. The difficulty in
supposing that, starting with a state of ignorance in 1587, when
he is supposed to have come to London, he was induced to enter
upon a course of most extended study and mental culture, is
almost insuperable. Still it was physically possible,
provided always that he could have had access to the needful
books. But this legal training seems to me to stand on a
different footing. It is not only unaccountable and
incredible, but it is actually negatived by the known facts of
his career.” Lord Penzance then refers to the fact
that “by 1592 (according to the best authority, Mr. Grant
White) several of the plays had been written. The Comedy
of Errors in 1589, Love’s Labour’s Lost in
1589, Two Gentlemen of Verona in 1589 or 1590, and so
forth,” and then asks, “with this catalogue of
dramatic work on hand . . . was it possible that he could have
taken a leading part in the management and conduct of two
theatres, and if Mr. Phillipps is to be relied upon, taken his
share in the performances of the provincial tours of his
company—and at the same time devoted himself to the study
of the law in all its branches so efficiently as to make himself
complete master of its principles and practice, and saturate his
mind with all its most technical terms?”
I have cited this passage from Lord Penzance’s book,
because it lay before me, and I had already quoted from it on the
matter of Shakespeare’s legal knowledge; but other writers
have still better set forth the insuperable difficulties, as they
seem to me, which beset the idea that Shakespeare might have
found time in some unknown period of early life, amid
multifarious other occupations, for the study of classics,
literature and law, to say nothing of languages and a few other
matters. Lord Penzance further asks his readers: “Did
you ever meet with or hear of an instance in which a young man in
this country gave himself up to legal studies and engaged in
legal employments, which is the only way of becoming familiar
with the technicalities of practice, unless with the view of
practicing in that profession? I do not believe that it
would be easy, or indeed possible, to produce an instance in
which the law has been seriously studied in all its branches,
except as a qualification for practice in the legal
profession.”
* * * * *
This testimony is so strong, so direct, so authoritative; and
so uncheapened, unwatered by guesses, and surmises, and
maybe-so’s, and might-have-beens, and could-have-beens, and
must-have-beens, and the rest of that ton of plaster of paris out
of which the biographers have built the colossal brontosaur which
goes by the Stratford actor’s name, that it quite convinces
me that the man who wrote Shakespeare’s Works knew all
about law and lawyers. Also, that that man could not have
been the Stratford Shakespeare—and wasn’t.
Who did write these Works, then?
I wish I knew.