Our Geographical Knowledge of
the Isthmus—The Value of Early Narratives and Histories—Projects
for Uniting the two Oceans by Canals and Railroads—Criteria
for Assisting the Judgment—Tunnels, Harbors, Locks, Dimensions
of Canal—Tehuantepec—The Garay Grant—Moro’s Survey—Barnard’s
Survey—Honduras—A Better Route Practicable—Nicaragua—Louis Napoleon’s
Scheme—Col. Childs’ Report—Variations of Route—Advantages of
this Line—Chiriqui—St. Clair Morton—No Information Extant—Costa
Rica—Railroad Practicable—Great Altitude of Ridge—Panama—Information
Abundant—Garella’s Route—Hughes’s Route—Advantages—Cost of Canal
on this Route—Mexican Desagues—Panama and Aspinwall—Harbors Easily
Improved—Panama Railroad Company—San Blas and Bayano River—F.
W. Kelly—McDougal’s Survey—Fine Harbors—Tunnel Seven Miles
Long—Darien—Between Caledonia Bay and the Gulf of San Miguel—Baron
Humboldt—Vasco Nunez—Paterson’s Colony—Causes of Its Failure—Dr.
Cullen and Savana River—Reports the Ridge 150 Feet—English
Company—Concessions of the Granadian Government—Mr. Gisborne Sent
to Darien—His Speculations—Delayed at Carthagena—Stopped by the
Indians—Supposed Success—Misunderstanding with Dr. Cullen—Returns
to England—Provisional Directory Organized—Controversy Between
Sir Charles Fox and the London Times—Combined Expedition of Four
Governments—Lieut. Strain’s Misfortunes—Fails to Find a Pass—Dr.
Cullen and Mr. Gisborne’s Failure—Captain Prevost Fails to Cross—Dr.
Cullen Changes His Opinion—French Expedition under Bourdiol—Fails
to Cross—Granadian Expedition Fails—Condensed Statement of the
Results of all the Expeditions—Captains Prevost and Parsons see
Evidences of a Pass—Darien Not Yet Explored—San Miguel to the Gulf
of Urabá—The Atrato Route—Successful Survey—Representations of
Unprofessional Persons—Gorgoza and De La Charme—Their Route—Trautwine
—Mr. Porter and Kennish’s Routes—Lieut. Michler’s Route —Extracts
from Michler’s Report—Tunnel Two and One-Half Miles—Cost too
Small—Barometric—Levels—Humboldt’s Opinion.
Having hastily sketched the
relation of the proposed canal to the commerce of the world, its importance
is sufficiently apparent to justify a careful consideration of the
condition of our knowledge of the geography of the Isthmus. The facts
and reasoning of previous chapters will furnish a standard, in the
absence of a better, for trying the merits of the routes about to
be described, and will indicate the nature of the deficiency to be
supplied by future explorations.
The American Isthmus extends in length about twelve hundred miles, from
the Coazacoalcos River, in Mexico, to the valley of the Atrato, in
Columbia. It includes the Mexican States of Tehuantepec, the Republics
of Yucatan, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, San Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, the Mosquito Kingdom, and the State of Panama, one of the States
of Columbia. Embracing a varied and salubrious climate; a rich soil,
clothed with the luxuriance of tropical vegetation; ruins of an ancient
people, consisting of vast and silent cities, whose impressive but
grotesque architecture, embodying a civilization unique and insular, is
overgrown with forest of flor de robles, mahogany, and palm; divided
throughout its entire length by a volcanic dyke, rising to altitudes
of five to six thousand feet, and sinking into depressions two hundred
and eighty feet above the level of the sea; concealing in its strata
the matrices of gold and precious stones; expanding in Yucatan to a
width of six hundred and fifty miles, and contracting at San Blas and
Darien to thirty or forty miles—this connecting link, the result of
a submarine endogenous movement subsequent to the elevation of the
continents which it unites, opposes a solitary but not insurmountable
barrier to the commercial union of the two oceans.
The narratives of Dampier, Wafer, the adventures of the Spanish
Buccaneers who infested the South Sea, and the descriptions of Las
Casas, Fonseca, Don Andres de Ariza, however interesting historically,
add but little to the physico-geographical knowledge of the country.
These histories contain accounts of earthquakes as terrific as that
which has recently visited the coast; of sieges notable for bold
assault and gallant defense; of gold mines opened and abandoned; of
strange fauna, birds of splendid plumage, and a tropical flora of
gorgeous colors; but the reader will seek in vain for information of
practical value in determining the question of a practicable route for
an interoceanic ship canal.
Recent explorers have supplied much accurate information of special
routes. The following table exhibits the different projects for uniting
the Atlantic and Pacific:
- 1. Tehuantepec, by the Coazacoalcos and Chicapa.
- 2. Honduras.
- 3. Nicaragua, from San Juan de Nicaragua and Lake Nicaragua,
- five variations, viz.:
- R. San Carlos, G. de Nicoya,
- R. Nino, Tempisque, G. de Nicoya,
- R. Sapoa, B. Salinas,
- San Juan del Sud,
- and Brito.
- From San Juan de Nicaragua, by way of Lake Nicaragua and Managua,
- three variations, viz.:
- R. Tamarinda.
- B. Realejo.
- B. Fonseca.
- 4. Panama, four distinct routes, viz.:
- Gorgona, Panama.
- Trinidad, Caymito.
- Navy Bay, R. Chagres, R. Bonito, R. Bernardo.
- San Blas, R. Chepo.
- 5. Darien, including the old province of Chócó; the different
- routes and the variations are five in number, viz.:
- B. Caledonia, G. San Miguel.
- Rs. Arguia, Paya, Tuyra, G. San Miguel.
- B. Napipi, Cupica.
- R. Truando, Kelley’s Island.
- R. Tuyra, G. Urabá or R. Atrato.
The above lists include canal projects; the following list enumerates
the projected railroads:
| I. |
Coazacoalcos, Tehuantepec. |
| II. |
B. Honduras to G. of Fonseca. |
| III. |
R. San Juan, Nicaragua, Managua. |
| IV. |
Port Limon to Caldera, Costa Rica. |
| V. |
Chiriqui inlet to Golfo Dulce. |
| VI. |
Aspinwall, Panama, (railroad finished.) |
| VII. |
Gorgon B., Realijo |
 |
Nicaragua |
| VIII. |
Gorgon B., San Juan del Sur. |
Before describing the routes above enumerated, some criteria for
assisting the judgment may be brought together, as follows:
1. The Isthmean Canal may be a thorough-cut, with guard-locks.
2. It should be without a tunnel.
3. It may have a summit-level and moderate lockage, to avoid
excessive tunneling and cutting.
4. Great advantages in other respects—viz.: shortness of line and
fine harbors—may compensate for a short tunnel.
5. The route
should possess good harbors, or such as can be easily improved.
6. Dimension of the canal and size of the locks. The canal should
be sufficiently wide to permit ships to pass easily, or it should have
convenient turn-outs.
The width of the intermarine canal proposed by Mr. Kennish, to unite
the Atrato and the Pacific, is estimated to have 200 feet. General
Michler assumes a width of 100 feet, and states that vessels can
pass alternately from one end to the other, employing tug-boats and
telegraphic signals to avoid confusion.
The canal now in process of construction, under the direction of
General Wilson, around the Des Moines rapids on the Mississippi, has a
width of 250 feet in embankment.
The Engineer in charge of the canal around the falls of the Ohio at
Louisville, proposes a width of 120 feet, which is the same as that of
the Caledonia Canal.
The Suez Canal has a minimum width at water
surface of 190 feet. This last dimension, with a sufficient number
of turn-outs, would be suitable for the canal across the American Isthmus.
The locks of the Des Moines Canal are 380 feet between gates, by 80
feet wide. General Weitzel proposes, for the Louisville Canal, locks
400 feet between gates, and 100 feet wide. The Isthmean locks may be
400 feet between gates, and 90 feet wide.
Locks of these dimensions, if all unnecessary dressing of the stone is
dispensed with, may probably be erected for one million of dollars.
It is unnecessary to mention other ship canals and locks, built for the
accommodation of ships of less tonnage than those which would make the
intermarine transit.
The following description, commencing at Tehuantepec, will treat of
each route in succession:
In March, 1842, Santa Anna, “for the purpose of aggrandizing the nation
and rendering the people happy,” granted certain privileges to Don
Jose de Garay, to enable him to open a line of communication between
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, through the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.
The route was to be neutral to all nations at peace with the Mexican
Republic. The “negotiation” was permitted to hold for public use all
unoccupied land, not more than one-fourth of a league on either side
of the line, which was conceded to them in fee simple. The right
of collecting dues was conceded for fifty years, and the exclusive
privilege of freight, by steam vessel or railroad, for sixty years.
The survey was intrusted to Sr. Moro, an Italian engineer of
distinction. The distance from sea to sea was ascertained to be 135
miles in a straight line. Wide plains and table land adjacent each
ocean were found to be broken by the Andes, rising to the height of 650
feet above the level of the sea.
Thirty miles of the Coazacoalcos River, after passing the bar, is
navigable for ships of the largest class, and fifteen miles for vessels
of light draught, leaving 115 miles of railroad to be made.
Sr. Moro, taking the dimensions and cost of the Caledonia Canal as
a standard, estimates the cost of a similar ship canal across the
Isthmus[7]
at $17,000,000. He includes in his estimate the cost of one
hundred and sixty-one (161) locks, which may be reduced to one hundred
and twenty. These results were not deemed satisfactory.
The privileges granted to Mr. Garay were secured by P. A. Hargous and
Major (now Brevet Major-General) Barnard, Corps of Engineers. W. H.
Sidell and others were employed to survey the route of a railroad. Of
this survey we have the very interesting report of J. J. Williams,
containing information of the statistics, geology, and topography of
the country. The summit is 855 feet above tide; the entire length of
the line is 190 miles. A summit-level and tunnel would be necessary
to carry a canal across the ridge. Com’d Perry and Lieut. Temple, U.
S. N., found about twelve feet water on the Coazacoalcos bar. The bar
is supposed to be composed of hard clay, admitting of a permanent
improvement. Capt. Basil Hall, R. N., and Com. Shubrick, U. S. N.,
speak of the Pacific terminus at Ventosa Bay as exceeding boisterous
and unfavorable for anchorage.
The merits of this route have been minutely described by Col. J. J.
Abert, Chief Corps Topographical Engineers, and Col. G. W. Hughes,
of the same corps; and by common consent the route is regarded as
possessing “little merit as a practicable line for the construction of
a ship canal.”
A barometric survey was made of this route. With excellent harbors, it
is obstructed by an elevated dividing ridge. The topographical features
of the country indicate the probable existence of a more favorable
pass. A better route may be found by starting from the Gulf of Dulce,
and proceeding toward the town of Guatemala; or by starting from the
same point, a more southerly direction appears to possess advantages.
Inference from maps of this region must be received with caution. The
route is condemned by Admiral Davis.
With the exception of the Panama route, no Isthmean project has
received so careful an examination as the lines passing through
Lake Nicaragua. This part of the Isthmus widens into continental
proportions of great fertility. The productive and industrial
development of this country, by means of railroad or canal, would
supply a material addition to the commerce of the world. With the
growth of Central America, our gulf ports—Galveston, New Orleans,
Mobile, Appalachicola, Pensacola, Tampa Bay, and Key West—would
increase in military and commercial importance.
This line possesses additional interest for the political reasons
adduced by the Emperor Napoleon III, in a memoir prepared by him when
a prisoner at Ham. Arranged with method and prepared with care, this
pamphlet bears the impress of a sagacious judgment. “In order,” says
the writer, “that the canal should become the principal element of
the advancement of Central America, it must be cut, not through the
narrowest part of the tongue of land, but through the country which is
most populous, the most healthy, and the most fertile, and which is
crossed by the greatest number of rivers, in order that its activity
may be communicated to the remotest part of the interior. England will
see with pleasure Central America become a flourishing and powerful
State, which will establish a balance of power by creating in Spanish
America a new center of active enterprise, powerful enough to give rise
to a feeling of nationality, and to prevent, by backing up Mexico, any
further encroachment from the North.”
The line selected by Louis Napoleon (although he errs in his statement
of distance), has not been improved by the changes in location proposed
by subsequent engineers. All these routes commence at San Juan de
Nicaragua, and follow the San Juan river to the Lake Nicaragua. From
this lake three other routes pass through Lake Managua to Realijo, and
to the Gulf of Fonseca. Lake Managua is about twenty feet above the
level of Lake Nicaragua. The dry season suspends the flow of water
between the lakes, and the question arises whether, even by the aid of
a dam, sufficient water can be stored in the smaller lake to feed the
summit level on each side of it during the dry season.
Col. Childs’ route terminates at Brito; a fifth at San Juan del Sud,
and three other variations of route near the same point of the Pacific
coast. Col. Childs’ report, which is very complete, was submitted to
a Board of English Engineers, and to Colonels Abert and Turnbull, of
the Corps of Topographical Engineers, U. S. A. Although the survey was
thoroughly and scientifically executed, the route was condemned by
these officers, because of the insufficiency of the harbors of Brito,
and the small dimensions of the canal proposed by Colonel Childs.
The length of the canal was divided into sections, for the convenience
of description and estimation of the cost:
| |
MILES. |
FEET. |
| Western division, from Brito to the Lake |
18 |
588 |
| From Lake Nicaragua to head of San Juan |
56 |
500 |
| Slack water of seven dams on the San Juan |
90 |
800 |
| Canal to San Juan del Norte |
28 |
505 |
| Total distance |
194 |
393 |
The maximum width of the canal was designed to be 118 feet, and the
depth 17 feet. The descent from the lake to Brito was accomplished by
fourteen locks.
The following table exhibits the distances from
sea to sea of the proposed lines originating at San Juan del Norte:
| |
ROUTES FROM THE
PORT OF SAN JUAN
TO THE PACIFIC. |
LENGTH OF
THE RIO
SAN JUAN. |
DISTANCE
ON LAKE
NICARAGUA. |
FROM LAKE
NICARAGUA
TO THE
PACIFIC. |
FROM LAKE
NICARAGUA
TO LAKE
MANAGUA. |
DISTANCE
INLAKE
MANAGUA. |
DIST. BETWEEN
LAKE MANAGUA
AND THE
PACIFIC. |
LENGTH OF
ACTUAL
CANAL. |
TOTAL
LENGTH. |
| |
MILES. |
MILES. |
MILES. |
MILES. |
MILES. |
MILES. |
MILES. |
MILES. |
| To Brito |
119 |
57 |
18 |
|
|
|
137 |
194 |
| Fonseca, Tamarinda |
119 |
120 |
|
4 |
50 |
16 |
139 |
309 |
| Realijo |
119 |
120 |
|
4 |
50 |
45 |
168 |
338 |
| Fonseca, Estero Real |
119 |
120 |
|
4 |
50 |
20 |
143 |
313 |
| |
The ports on the Bay of Fonseca, and at
Realijo, are good, but the other ports designated as terminal points
upon the Pacific are not so favorable for shipping. San Juan del Norte,
the initial point upon the Atlantic of all these routes, will not admit
ships of large draught, and the harbor is rapidly deteriorating. All
harbors of Central and South America receiving rivers, and opening
to the northward, are decreasing in depth. The incessant wave-beat,
caused by the trade-winds and northers, acts like a ponderous hammer,
wielded by an irresistible force, whose unceasing efforts, for six
months of the year, are exerted to force the sand into the entrance of
the harbors, and to arrest the sediment brought down by the rivers. The
result is a tortuous and variable channel, and a shifting and shoaling bar.
The deterioration of the harbor of San Juan de Nicaragua, or Greytown,
has been minutely discussed by a board of scientific officers of the
United States Corps of Engineers, and of the Coast Survey Department.
Their conclusions were unfavorable to the improvement of the harbor.
Where the Cyane lay during the bombardment of Greytown a luxuriant
grass marsh is now growing. It has not been many years since this
harbor afforded refuge for shipping of ordinary draught, but it is not
unusual, at the present time, to find the harbor so completely closed
during a storm that a pedestrian may walk dry-footed across the former
entrance. Upon such occasion the harbor of Greytown is converted into
a lagoon until after the storm, when the accumulating water of the San
Juan erodes for itself a new outlet to the ocean.
It is apparent some other initial point must be found before this route
can be seriously considered as a suitable terminus for interoceanic
communication. Monkey Point is said to supply a good anchorage, and has
been suggested for this purpose. Monkey Point affords anchorage for
ships drawing rather more than three fathoms. By joining the island
with a breakwater of pierre perdu, of the length of about twelve
hundred feet, a good harbor, affording five fathoms water, can be
obtained.
The writer is not aware that any surveys have ever been made for
connecting this point with the San Juan river, or with the lakes. It
is therefore unnecessary to mention other reports upon the same route,
or to do more than to refer to the plans, profiles, and details of the
“Interoceanic Canal of Nicaragua,” submitted at the Paris exhibition by
L. J. Thome de Gamond. The report of M. de Gamond is not at hand.
A healthy and productive country; two lakes affording an inexhaustible
supply for a summit level; a divide easily overcome at an altitude
represented as 174 feet, and the convenient channel of the San Juan,
through which the waters of Lakes Managua and Nicaragua find their way
from an amphitheater of hills to the Atlantic ocean, are advantages
which engineers and capitalists are loath to abandon, and which
the reader relinquishes with regret. We may expect, therefore, to
find the question continually revived. But its advantages have been
overestimated.
The San Juan river has cut an outlet for the canal through the ridge,
separating Lake Nicaragua from the Atlantic; but to pierce the divide
on the opposite side, which separates the lake from the Pacific, a
tunnel of about six miles in length will be requisite. The altitude
of the divide is six hundred feet above the level of the lake. The
singular omission in Colonel Childs’ report may have led Admiral
Davis to overlook so important an objection, or perhaps he may have
thought it unnecessary to multiply objections to a route which appeared
impracticable upon other grounds.
The so-called Isthmus of Chiriqui, lying between Panama and Nicaragua,
was explored by the late Lieut. St. Clair Morton, who was killed in
the siege of Petersburg. Lieut. Morton crossed the Isthmus twice,
and pronounced the route practicable for a railroad. As no notes of
this survey are extant, curiosity in regard to this route must remain
unsatisfied. Lieut. Jeffers, U. S. N., speaks favorably of the harbors.
Mr. Evans, the geologist, discovered an inferior kind of coal. Another
reconnoissance may develop some important information.
A railroad has been projected from Port Limon, near the tenth parallel
of latitude on the Atlantic, to Caldera, in the Gulf of Nicoya. Rising
to an altitude of 5,100 feet the route passes through a salubrious
climate, and over a productive soil. A macadamized road, 134 miles
long, with five stone bridges, has been completed along this line. As a
route for a ship canal the altitude of the summit appears to exclude it
from further consideration.
As the passenger route and highway of the trade between the Atlantic
and Pacific States of America, the mention of this line arrests
attention. Information in regard to it is full and accurate. Here,
alone, in all Central America, a railroad unites the two oceans.
Confining his remarks to the project of M. Garella, Admiral Davis
pronounces his condemnation of the route.
M. Garella’s route, starting from the Bay of Limon, on the Atlantic,
following the valley of the Chagres, ascending with 17 locks to the
summit, which it passes with a tunnel 17,500 feet in length, at an
altitude of 135 feet above high water in the Pacific, and descending
with 18 locks, terminates at the Bay of Vaca del Monte, on the
Atlantic. The altitude of the ridge to be pierced is 459 feet. The
commission of the “Ponts et chaussés” appointed to report upon
Garella’s project, object to the expense of tunneling, and to the
absence of evidence of the sufficiency of the mountain streams to feed
the summit level.
But a tunnel is not a necessary plan of piercing the Isthmus at this
point, nor is a summit level 135 feet above high water an unavoidable
necessity. The Panama railroad passes the divide without a tunnel, at
an altitude of 280 feet above tide. The fact that a route possessing
such advantages should be found so near the line of M. Garella,
encourages the belief that a more critical examination of other
prescribed routes may be rewarded with the same good fortune.
The merits above mentioned justify a more attentive consideration. The
advantages of the route may be enumerated as follows:
1. A divide 280 feet above tide.
2. Distance between oceans 48 miles.
3. The Chagres river, emptying into the Atlantic, and the Rio
Grande, flowing into the Pacific, together with the smaller rivers,
Maraboso, Obispo, Dominica, Mandingo, which can be made tributary to
the summit level of the canal. The rainfall in this region varies from
90 to 100 inches, being three times the amount which ordinarily falls
in the United States.
4. The harbors at the termini, Panama and Aspinwall, have
accommodated the trade of California and the Atlantic States,
and are far superior to those of Port Said and Suez.
5. Tunnel unnecessary.
Possessing such advantages, the objections which have led to the
ignoring of this route should be noticed.
The objection of the Commission of French Engineers to M. Garella’s
project has been mentioned. “The river Chagres,” it was observed, “was
gauged at Cruces and Gorgona, but the river is to be tapped above these
points.”
The summit upon Garella’s line is 459 feet above tide, while upon
the line of the Panama railroad it is but 280 feet. Garella proposes
to pierce the ridge, at 135 feet above tide, with a tunnel three and
four-tenths miles in length. No tunnel is required upon the other line.
| Estimating the tunnel of M. Garella at the present contract price
in the United States, this part of the work alone will cost |
$57,623,380. |
| Add 47 miles of open canal |
84,232,491. |
| Total cost of canal |
$141,855,871. |
A canal by the aid of locks can be constructed between the two seas,
upon the line proposed by Col. Hughes, at a much less cost.
Assuming the same dimensions of canal—100 feet wide by 30 feet
deep—and the same prices as above, taken from General Michler’s report
upon the survey of the canal for joining the Atrato and the Pacific,
and we obtain the probable cost of constructing a canal upon this line,
as follows:
| For 50 miles of open canal |
$ 89,610,150 |
| 12 locks raise the summit level 75 feet |
12,000,000 |
| Breakwater, ship basin, and contingencies |
8,000,000 |
| Total cost of canal |
$ 109,610,150 |
This diminution of cost of $32,245,721, due to the absence of a tunnel,
upon this route, allows of a margin more than can be required for
increasing the number of the locks, or for building, graving docks, and
other auxiliary conveniences in the harbors.
The execution of this work would require a cut of less dimensions than
the famous Mexican Desague of Huehuetoca, referred to by Humboldt, and
described by Admiral Fitzroy as “200 feet deep and 300 feet wide for
nearly a thousand yards, and above 100 feet deep through an extent of
nearly a thousand yards, (making altogether two miles of distance in
which the vast excavation would be capable of concealing the mast-head
of a first-rate man-of-war, executed in the last three centuries in
Central America,) should induce us to listen respectfully to the plans
of modern engineers, however startling they may appear at first.”
Another objection remains to be considered: “Navy Bay is an insecure
anchorage, and the harbor upon the Pacific is altogether insufficient
for vessels of even moderate draught.” “M. Garella is obliged to
include in his estimate the sum of a million and a quarter dollars for
the improvement of this harbor.”
On account of the rise of the tide, which varies as much as 22 feet,
vessels are compelled to anchor two and one-half miles from Panama, and
the passengers and freight are transported in light-draught steamers.
These difficulties may be converted, by the use of docks, as in English
harbors, into an advantage. The withdrawal of 20 to 23 feet of water at
extreme tides affords extraordinary facilities for constructing ship
basins and docks upon the natural pavement of rock which covers the
bottom of the bay in front of the City of Panama.
On the other side, Limon Bay possesses sufficient depth of water,
but is open to “northers.” The entrance of these dangerous winds may
be prevented by a stone breakwater, or one composed of screw piles,
driven sufficiently near to support iron or flanged plates, sliding
vertically into position, one above another, until the requisite height
is attained, and braced strongly at the back.
Notwithstanding northers, steamships arrive and depart regularly. The
Royal Mail Steamship Company are building wharves of stone and iron,
and the railroad company has projected a breakwater for the protection
of shipping.
Colonel G. W. Hughes, in a letter to the Hon. J. M. Clayton, at that
time Secretary of State, makes the following observations in regard to
this route: “The line I have traced for a railroad is, I think, more
favorable for a ship canal than that suggested by M. Garella. If
we adopt the same depth of cutting he suggests for an open cut, it
will leave the bottom of the canal 44 feet above the level of the
Pacific at high tide. This would be about ten feet lower than the
bed of the river at Gorgona. An open cut two hundred feet deep would
obviate all difficulty in crossing the Chagres at Gorgona, while the
Rio Grande, the Obispo, and the Mandingo might be converted into an
immense reservoir for supplying the summit-level with water, and the
Rio Chagres above Cruces, and the Pedro, Miguel, Camero, etc., would
furnish the lower level. A spacious tide basin might be constructed at
the mouth of the Rio Grande, a few miles west of Panama.”
For this project, so favorably recommended, it is necessary to obtain
the consent of the Panama Railroad Company to the use of land belonging
to their reservation.
This route is one of several surveyed under the generous patronage
of F. W. Kelly and others. The map of Mr. McDougal, the surveyor and
engineer, and the report of Admiral Davis, furnish some interesting
facts. The narrowest part of the Isthmus is found here, being thirty
miles from ocean to ocean, and here the tide of the Pacific is said to
approach within fifteen miles of the Atlantic coast.
Mr. McDougal proposes to pierce the ridge, which has an altitude of
1500 feet, at a height of 93½ feet above mean tide, by a tunnel seven
miles long. The harbor of San Blas is deep and spacious. The channel
leading into the Bay of Panama has not less than eighteen feet of
water at mean low tide, while the rise of the water is sixteen feet.
This result, Admiral Davis observes, does not agree with the admiralty
charts.
The map indicates the probable existence of a better route to the
north-west, and the surveyors were satisfied they saw evidences of a
depression in that direction.
Admiral Davis quotes the well-merited compliment of Sir R. Murchison,
to the zeal and energy with which Mr. Kelly has pursued “this great
and philanthropic object,” in which “all civilized nations are deeply
interested.”
Between Caledonia Bay and the Gulf of San Miguel every effort to
make a thorough exploration has resulted in failure. Disappointed
expectations, arduous but fruitless labors, conflicting reports,
failure, starvation, and death have stamped with ill omen every attempt
to cross this part of the Isthmus. Baron Humboldt has directed public
attention to Darien, and Admiral Davis expresses his deliberate
conviction that to this part of the Isthmus we must look for a solution
of the question of interoceanic ship communication.
The history of so many attempts, proving so unexpectedly disastrous,
supplies much curious and valuable information. From the Paterson
colonization scheme to the unfortunate expedition of Lieut. Strain, one
word will characterize every attempt. The first settlement of Vasco
Nunez, in 1510, after eight years of calamitous trial, was abandoned.
Paterson’s colony was remarkable in the causes which led to its
inception; in the ability and statesman-like views of him who conceived
a design so vast and benevolent; in the governments enlisted in its
favor; in the sufferings of the colonists, and in its final abandonment.
William Paterson, a Scottish clergyman, of fertile resources, and great
political sagacity, the original designer of the Bank of England,
conceived the magnificent design of establishing a colony upon the
shores of Darien, based on principles of religious toleration and free
trade, which, occupying the highway of commerce, “grasping the riches
of both the Indies, and wresting the keys of commerce from Spain,”
should build up, on the shores of two oceans, cities surpassing his
own Edinburgh, and rivaling ancient Alexandria. With experience drawn
from long study and patient observation, he organized his scheme upon
liberal commercial principles, and an enlightened political policy.
Scotland, Hamburg, and Holland, contributed the sum of $4,500,000.
This large amount surprised London merchants, and spread panic in the
board of the East India Company. The unfriendly feeling of this great
corporation proved, in the end, fatal to the scheme. Aided by Spanish
intrigue, and Dutch rivalry, and bringing their vast machinery to bear
against the colonists, by argument and misrepresentation, they induced
William III. to issue an edict, forbidding all English colonies in
the West Indies from sending provisions, arms, or ammunition to the
Scottish colony of Darien.
Of 1,200 colonists, three hundred of whom represented the best blood of
Scotland, thirty only returned to tell the story of their sufferings.
Dissension, disease, and starvation, had accomplished the usual
results. Thus, this design for the union of two great oceans failed;
this effort to form a nucleus of a new system of beneficent wealth, and
commerce, came to an untimely end.
The Caledonia Bay was no longer frequented by the ships of England,
Holland and Scotland, The gold mines of Cana, worked by one thousand
men, under the Spanish domination, were destined to remain to the
present day, unmolested. The north-western slopes, and the head waters
of the Chuquanaqua, reverted to the undisputed possession of the
Indians, while, between the lower part of this river and along the
Savana, and the Bay of San Miguel, a mongrel population of 1,200 souls
cultivate bananas, and impose upon strangers.
Dr. Cullen justly claims to have recalled public attention to the
merits of this route. The fine harbors of San Miguel on the Pacific,
and of Caledonia Bay and Port Escocés on the Atlantic, taken in
connection with the narrowness of the Isthmus, would attract a casual
observer. The favorable opinion of Humboldt has led many to look
hopefully to this region. The advantageous situation of the Savana
River was pointed out by Dr. Cullen, who claims to have “crossed, and
recrossed, between Caledonia Bay, and Port Escocés alone, during the
rainy season, cutting and marking his way with a machete. From the
head of the Savana,” he continues, “a ravine, three leagues in length,
extends to Caledonia Bay, and there a canal might be cut with less
difficulty than elsewhere, if it were not for the opposition of the
natives. From the sea shore (at Caledonia) a plain extends to the base
of a ridge, which runs parallel to the coast, and whose summit is 350
feet. This ridge is not quite continuous and unbroken, but is divided
by transverse valleys, through which the Aglasenique and Aglatomente,
and other rivers have their course, and whose highest elevations do not
exceed 150 feet.”
Impressed by these favorable representations, and believing Dr.
Cullen’s statement of the existence of large gold deposits near
Esperitu Santu, and in the diggings of Veraguas, the distinguished
capitalists, Sir Charles Fox, John Henderson, and Thomas Brassy,
uniting with Dr. Cullen, obtained, by a decree of the Granadian
Congress, dated Bogotá, June 1st, 1852, the concession of the exclusive
privilege of cutting a ship canal across the Isthmus of Darien, between
the Gulf of San Miguel on the Pacific, and the Bay of Caledonia on the
Atlantic, with the liberty of selecting any other point on the Atlantic
coast between Puerto de Mosquitoes, and the west mouth of the Atrato,
for the entrance of the canal; and were granted, besides the lands
necessary for the canal and its works, 2,000,000 acres of land, to be
selected in any part of the Republic. All the ports of Darien were
declared free and neutral.
Notwithstanding these favorable conditions, it was deemed prudent, by
the distinguished capitalists above mentioned, to send out a competent
engineer to verify the statements of Dr. Cullen. Mr. Lionel Gisborne
was selected for the purpose, and was accompanied by Dr. Cullen, to
point out the way.
Before arriving in South America Mr. Gisborne, assuming the data
supplied by Dr. Cullen to be correct, enters into some interesting
speculations. “Let us suppose,” he observes, “the summit level to be
150 feet above the level of the sea. The Atlantic rise of tide is only
3 feet (1′ 5″); that of the Pacific is 25 feet (22 to 23), therefore,
the difference in the level, at high and low tide is 11 feet (this,
although suppositious, will, I anticipate, not be far from the truth).
In such a case I would propose to cut a canal through from ocean to
ocean without any locks,” etc.
Proceeding on the supposition of certain “circumstances likely to
coexist in a country whose chief geological formation is igneous,” he
proposed a second plan. “By embankments placed in the most advantageous
position” two lakes are to be formed upon each side of the ridge,
which, being cut through, ships can pass from lake to lake, and
lock down to either ocean from the opposite extremities. “The only
objection” to this plan, is, he thinks, “the loss of land inundated.”
“I hope,” he adds, “a tract of country will be found where one or the
other of these cases is applicable.” It is very remarkable that Mr.
Gisborne found a country adapted to this plan.
This expedition was long delayed in Cartejena, awaiting Dr. Cullen,
who was occupied with business connected with the survey before the
Congress of Bogotá. “I determined to wait for the English mails,”
writes Mr. Gisborne, “due here the 25th, otherwise I should certainly
not spend three weeks waiting for Dr. Cullen.” On another day, “an
instrumental survey,” he prognosticates, “seems to be out of the
question, so that our levels, theodolites, sextants, and chains, will
probably remain in the same box Troughton and Simms consigned them to
on our departure from England.”
Again, “I have read and listened about Darien Indians, their cruelty
and jealousy, until I am callous and unbelieving; but it frets me
to remain in doubt, ebbing out an existence in Cartejena. I have
determined,” he says, “to wait ten days longer—then D. V. Cullen,
or no Cullen, I shall try what can be done with these ungovernable
Indians.”
Waiting impatiently, he speculates upon the Aurora Borealis, geology,
magnetic observations; ingeniously proposing, by the automatic action
of appropriate machinery, to make all meteorological phenomena register
its name and mission in a room selected for that purpose. This he
calls a “meteorological loom in which the web of time is spun with the
present for a pattern.”
“May 29th—The Bogotá mail has come, but no letter from Dr. Cullen.
Every thing here is mañana (to-morrow).”
He again takes to speculating on fortifications, and the beauty of
the senoritas. A reasonable man would have been contented. But he
leaves this primrose path to write, “Dr. Cullen has neither written,
nor appeared in person, and I am beginning to have my doubts whether
he will do so.” In the meantime Cullen was hammering at the “mañana”
Congress at Bogotá.
After waiting six weeks he left Cartejena in disgust, and landed,
without the indefatigable Doctor, in Caledonia Bay. Here he spent two
days wandering among the hills with his barometer, his spirits going
down as the mercury went up.
He was arrested by three half-naked Indians, who, in an unintelligible
language, but plainly to be understood gestures, commanded him to
follow. This he prudently acquiesced in, but not until he had, as he
thought, ascertained the dividing ridge between the Atlantic and the
Pacific to be 272 feet above tide. Falling asleep, with a contented
mind, he thought he heard the roar of the surf of the Pacific, but his
companion, Ford, very shrewdly suggested that they were still within
hearing of the Atlantic. With a gentle admonition that they must never
be caught there again they were permitted to return to their boat.
Naturally, he could not forbear another fling at the helpless Dr.
Cullen. “I had not much faith in Dr. Cullen’s map, as his descriptions
of land south-west of Port Escocés were directly contrary to the fact.”
The comment, on his failure may puzzle the reader. “I am far more
satisfied at having failed in crossing from Port Escocés than to have
crossed and returned (supposing that was possible with safety), and
reported a summit 275 feet, when, within a few miles, one of 40 is to
be got further inland.”
“It is dangerous to argue by induction,” observes Mr. Gisborne, and he
gives 238 pages in illustration of this truth.
Nothing daunted by his failure to effect a transit from the Atlantic
side of the Isthmus, he determines to proceed to Panama, and to make
another attempt from San Miguel on the Pacific. Proceeding up the
Savana river he disembarked with his Asst. Ford, who had charge of
the mountain barometer, and penetrating two days’ journey into the
interior, he is warned by a log over a stream that he had reached
the country of his enemies, the Caledonia Indians. Remembering their
parting injunction he returned.
“A dreamy hope of success,” he writes, “is strengthened by inductive
argument, the cause of former failures leads to generalizations of
geological theories, and topographical analogy, and it was this
conviction that cheered me under all difficulties, making suffering an
indispensable appendage of success.”
Consoling himself with such reflections he met Dr. Cullen at Panama,
in high dudgeon. The Doctor reproached him with having broken his
instructions, and required that he should return to San Miguel.
Gisborne was recalcitrant. “Feeling satisfied that a ship canal could
be made across Darien, he urged Dr. Cullen to come to England, and, as
he said he was without money, I offered to advance the passage money.”
This generous offer was accepted. Having found, as he believed,
a summit of 150 feet above tide, corresponding with Dr. Cullen’s
statement, he submits two plans to his employers. One for a
thorough-cut without locks; the other by the junction of two lakes,
for which he had found a suitable physical conformity, in remarkable
harmony with his prophetic speculations before reaching Cartejena.
The first plan was estimated to cost £12,500,000, or about $62,500,000.
The friends of the measure in London were elated by the representations
of the expeditionists.
The Atlantic and Pacific Junction Company was incorporated by royal
charter, or act of Parliament. The capital, limited to £15,000,000,
was disposed of in shares of £100 each. A deposit of ten shillings on
each share was to be made without further liability, forming a sum of
£75,000 for preliminary expenses.
A provisional directory was organized, with Lord Wharncliffe as
chairman. Upon the publication of their prospectus, a lively
correspondence sprang up between the London Times and Sir Charles
Fox. The writer of the Times is charged with want of appreciation
of the merits of the Darien route, and retorts, that if no one is to
question Sir Charles Fox’s views, or even speak of their inaccuracies,
there must be an end of discussion.
While this controversy was raging, another expedition was being
organized, in numbers and appliances far exceeding any previous
attempt, with the same object. England, France, and the United States
coöperated with New Granada. Not since the landing of Paterson had so
formidable an expedition appeared in that region.
When the Virago entered the Bay of San Miguel, the Scorpion and
l’Espeigle, with Mr. Gisborne and Dr. Cullen on board, anchored in
Caledonia Bay. The French ship, La Chimere, and the American corvette,
Cyane, Lieut. Strain, at the same time joined the expedition, raising
the united crews to the number of 700 men.
The Granadian Government, in furtherance of the object of the
expedition, had established a depot near the junction of the rivers
Savana and Lara. It was confidently believed that the practicability of
the Darien route was about to be set at rest forever.
Relying on Mr. Gisborne’s and Dr. Cullen’s reports, Lieut. Strain, with
a party of twenty-seven men, two Granadian Commissioners, and ten days’
provisions, pushed forward up the bed of the Caledonia River. Here,
taking advantage of an opening among the trees, he examined, with a
spy-glass, the range of Cordillera, to find a semi-circular chain 1500
to 2000 feet in height. He concluded that this route could not be that
alluded to by Mr. Gisborne and Dr. Cullen. He still pushed forward up
arduous ascents. A seaman of the Cyane climbed a tree to reconnoiter
the country, and reported nothing but hills and mountains in every
direction. For a pathetic account of this unfortunate expedition, the
reader is referred to Harper’s Monthly, Vol. X.
After forty days of wandering, subsisting for the time chiefly on sour
palmetto berries, emaciated with hunger, lacerated with thorns, sick,
and half naked, Strain, having hastened ahead of his party, sought
succor in Yvisa. Proceeding to the Savana, he presented himself to
the English agent, who, receiving him with every kindness, shed tears
at the sight. Securing assistance, which was reluctantly granted, at
Yvisa, he hastily returned to find the remnant of his party, feebly
struggling back toward Caledonia Bay, having lost five of their number,
among whom were the two Granadian Commissioners.
Strain, mistaking the Chuquanaqua for the Savana, reached the Pacific
by the longest route. He claims that his expedition “has disproved a
magnificent preconceived theory,” and that instead of a summit-level of
150 feet, it is at least 1000 feet.
Three days after the departure of Strain, “another party, composed of
English and French together, under the guidance of Dr. Cullen and Mr.
Gisborne, set out from the same point, and endeavored to follow in his
track.” “Gisborne and Cullen could not follow their own maps,” and
after having “penetrated not more than six miles in all, returned.” Mr.
Gisborne, observes the narrator in the Nouvelles Annales des Voyages,
“dementait complétement” his former statements. They failed to confirm
the first statements, and the London company, organized with such high
hopes, was dissolved.
On the heels of Gisborne and Cullen, the Granadian expedition, under
the command of Codazzi, made a cotemporaneous essay. “How far,” says
Strain, “it penetrated is not known; but, struggling over the space of
a mile, it was broken up, and returned after having lost several men.”
While failure and misfortune was befalling the exploring parties
starting from the Atlantic coast, another attempt was made at the same
time to effect a transit from the now notable Savana. Capt. Prevost, of
the Virago, after advancing twenty-six miles, at the rate of one and
one-half miles per day, returned again to the Savana, followed, says
Mr. Gisborne, by two hundred hostile Indians. Four sailors, left to
guard a depot of provisions, were found murdered.
Capt. Prevost failed to find a practicable pass. Crossing valleys which
probably led to the Pacific, the altitude of which is not given, he
terminated his survey at a summit of 1080 feet above the level of the
ocean. “L’execution de canal interoceaneque était devenue á peu pris
impracticable,” remarks the reviewer.
After an examination of the maps of Gisborne, Prevost, Strain, and
Codazzi, there seems to be a general agreement in placing the summit
of the ridge at not less than one thousand feet above the level of the
tide. The united maps of Prevost and Gisborne exhibit their routes,
proceeding from opposite points and intersecting, and the continuous
profile between the two oceans fails to solve the question of a
practicable route. As one of these parties had the advantage of Dr.
Cullen’s personal guidance, it is but fair to allow him to supplement
his first statement by an explanation of the causes which led to a
failure so complete and unexpected.
Speaking of the party from the Virago, he observes that Capt. Prevost
“directed his explorations too far to the north-west.” That when it
stopped he was but thirty miles from the point where the line should pass.
Strain, on the other hand, erred by going “too far to the south-west.”
In a word, the true line is to be found in the golden mean in which
Aristotle places all virtue.
But he has so far modified his first statement that he now thinks a
line, “with tunneling,” may be found between Sucubti and Port Escocés.
Under nine heads, he enumerates the advantages of this route.
The reader has, perhaps, concluded that, like Pantagruel’s army, this
subject is pretty well covered with tongue, and he may even adopt the
conclusion of a distinguished attorney-general upon the fallibility of
this unruly member. But one or two of the nine may be quoted. Under No.
7 Dr. Cullen states the land rises to nine hundred and thirty feet, and
that here a tunnel will be required. No. 8 states that between this
point and the Pacific no obstacle is to be found. The divide of one
hundred and fifty feet, first discovered by Dr. Cullen, expanded to ten
times that altitude.
If men of intelligence and education can so err, all statements of
persons whose previous habits and studies have not fitted them for
passing judgment upon the relative merits of different canal routes
should be received with caution.
The failure of this formidable effort of four Governments to discover a
practicable route for a ship canal between Caledonia Bay and the Gulf
of San Miguel, while it disappointed reasonable expectation, stimulated
public curiosity. The French, in nowise discouraged, determined to make
another effort. The Granadian Minister, Francisco Martin, and Senator
F. Barrow, signed, at Paris, a treaty embodying certain concession.
According to agreement, the survey was to be conducted from the head of
the Chuquanaqua toward the village of Monti, where Codazzi represented
a summit of 460 feet.
M. Bourdiol, Civil Engineer, with a party of fifteen persons—afterward
increased to twenty by the addition of some natives—proceeded
carefully, cutting their way, and chaining and leveling at the rate
of about a mile a day. Reaching the Chuquanaqua below the junction of
the Sucubti, he was compelled to desist, by the approach of the rainy
season. He returned to Panama after an absence of sixty days.
The nearest approach to a determination of a pass by M. Bourdiol
appears in the rather equivocal statement, that the origin of the
valley of Monti is one hundred and eighty-two metres (about 597 feet).
If all of these explorers had left some permanent mark at the
termination of their surveys, succeeding parties could have taken
up the line where the former left off, and the determination of a
practicable route could have been made in one-half the time now required.
M. Bourdiol affirms that he verified the height of the Sucubti, as
given by Codazzi and Gisborne, but it is not apparent how he found the
same points determined by these engineers.
Where so many failed, with every accessory and advantage likely to
assure success, the pertinent inquiry suggests itself, Is there any one
fact in common which may serve to explain failures so universal? All
find difficulties in cutting the way, requiring natives accustomed to
the use of the machete; all are misled by imperfect maps, which fail
to give the altitude of the passes and the true course of the rivers.
While one party is turned back by the rainy season, another is stopped
by the Indians, another by want of time. But one party succeeded in
crossing from sea to sea, but under such circumstances that each day
was a struggle for existence, to the exclusion of the scientific
objects of the expedition.
The hostility of the Indians, although not always stated, appears to
have been the chief obstacle to a careful exploration; and internal
dissension concurred to bring failure upon the best appointed of these
expeditions.
The following table presents, at one view, all that is known of the
Darien routes:
| |
| NAMES. |
LOCALITY. |
SUMMIT
REPORTED |
REMARKS. |
| |
|
FEET. |
|
| Cullen |
Savana, Port Escocés |
150? |
“Crossed and recrossed?” |
| Gisborne |
““ |
150? |
Saw across to former position? |
| Cullen |
 |
Started at |
980! |
|
Second attempt and |
| Gisborne |
Caledonia Bay. |
failed to cross over. |
| Strain |
Caledonia Bay. |
1000+ |
Lost his way on the Chuquanaqua. |
| Prevost |
Savana River. |
1080 |
Did not see the Pacific. |
| Bourdiol |
““ |
597? |
Turned back by rain. |
It would appear, at the first glance, that the question of a
practicable route across the Isthmus of Darien was settled by these
explorers.[8]
Dr. Cullen, notwithstanding the unfortunate result of his early
prognostications, still remains sanguine, and opines that the valleys
of the Aglatomente and Aglasenaca afford levels favorable to a canal;
but Gisborne’s map represents the water-shed of the Aglasenaca at 1,020
feet above the level of the sea, and supplies no indications of a lower
summit. But Capt. Prevost gives some important testimony. In a letter
to Admiral Moresby, written after the return of his expedition, he
speaks of valleys at a lower level than any yet discovered, leading to
the Pacific. His map confirms this statement. Capt. Parsons, R. N., of
the Scorpion, testifies to the same effect. From the deck of his vessel
he could discern a very decided break in the ridge, which appeared
continuous when viewed from other points.
These estimates we have learned to receive with caution. “A dreamy
hope of success is strengthened by inductive argument,” observes Mr.
Gisborne, “the cause of former failures leads to generalizations,”
etc., and such faint lights have so far proved veritable
will-o’-the-wisps. In the present instance, concurrent opinion is highly
favorable. The appearance of isolated summits, and disjointed and
dislocated character of schistose and trychitic rock; the testimony
of Prevost and Parsons, to the appearance of a break in the ridge;
the fact that Col. Hughes found at Panama a summit of two hundred and
eighty feet above the sea, at two miles north of the line, upon which
Garella could not find less than four hundred and fifty-nine feet
above the same level; all these facts, if not “confirmations strong
as proofs of Holy Writ,” are more than “trifles light as air,” and go
far to confirm the opinion that the Isthmus of Darien has not been
sufficiently explored.
Sr. Gorgoza, a Granadian, represents that he has passed over this
line, and found an altitude of one hundred and ninety feet. How this
elevation was determined without a barometer or spirit-level is not
clear. This part of the Isthmus is referred to in general terms by
Humboldt, Fitzroy, and Trautwine, but as these authorities echo each
other, the inference derives little additional strength from their
concurrence.
Taking leave of the Darien surveys, the explorations in the province of
Chócó come next in order. Under this head are included the surveys made
in the valley of the Atrato. Success appears to have accompanied these
operations, as disaster followed the Darien expeditions. The hopes
centering in any one Isthmean route have been in the inverse ratio of
the information concerning them.
The indispensable desiderata of a summit of moderate elevation, and
deep harbors, have not yet been found existing conjointly together. The
volcanic agency which hollowed out deep basins where ships may securely
anchor, has, at the same time, given unusual altitude to the dividing
ridge. Shallow harbors and low divides, and deep harbors and great
altitudes, accompany each other with the persistence of a law.
As the explorations dissipated the hope of one route, another was
taken up. Vague rumors continually reach us similar to those we have
already encountered. One of the latest of these is this: A Mr. or Sr.
Gorgoza, a resident of New Granada, has found a short and easy transit
across the Cordillera, between the Gulf of San Miguel and Urabà (or
Darien), by ascending the Tuyra, and crossing the valley of the Atrato.
According to his statement, the depression in the divide is not more
than 190 feet above the mean tide, and the distance between head
waters, navigable by canoes, is not more than three miles.
The March number of Putnam’s Monthly contains a description of a
route surveyed by M. De La Charme, which occupies a position between
the Darien routes, and the line between Humboldt Bay and the Atrato,
surveyed by Lieut. Michler.
The article referred to gives an account of what appears to be the
latest reconnoissance made in that region, and claims for its author,
M. De La Charme, “the right of discovery.” Of this survey Sr. De
Gorgoza is the patron and prime mover.
The attention of Sr. De Gorgoza was called to this route by certain
“documents” containing “hints about passages used by the Indians in
crossing the Cordilleras.” These documents consisted of “reports
by the civil and ecclesiastical authorities about the province of
Balboa, which was, at that time, of great importance, from its rich
gold mines,” and are probably as reliable as any other civil and
ecclesiastical reports of the pious marauders of that period. These
reports were accompanied by “a map,” which seems, from a reference
upon page 133, to have been that remarkable specimen of puzzling
topography, known as Arisa’s map, a copy of which may be found appended
to the report of Admiral Davis. The usual reference is made to those
unconscious pioneers of interoceanic canal routes, the filibusters,
“who carried off quantities of gold, to the great detriment of the
Spanish treasury,” etc., etc.
This reliable evidence is further corroborated by the flight of
birds. Some Pissisi ducks providentially appear to lead our explorer
upon the right path, and M. De La Charme is so convinced that the route
will be found in the direction taken by these web-footed engineers,
that he confidently affirms “there remained to me no doubt but at this
place I should find the desired passage. So persuaded,” he “prosecuted
his work with confidence.”
Many immaterial facts are circumstantially related, but we are not
told by what method the survey was conducted, nor whether M. De La
Charme was assisted in his work by professional engineers. Without such
assistance, his duties must have been complicated and laborious. As
mention is made of bogas and laborers only, we must conclude that this
arduous duty was performed without any intelligent assistance.
He states that strict attention was given to barometric measurements.
The notes should have been supplied in proof of the accuracy of his
conclusions.
The irregularities of the barometer along the dividing ridge of the
Isthmus and in South America have been noticed by Moro, Hughes,
Herndon, Maury, Michler, and other observers. Used with extreme care,
and according to the method recommended by Lieut. Col. Williamson,
U. S. A., the results obtained with this instrument are affected by
discrepancies and anomalies, which, along the Andes, vitiate the most
careful observations, and elude the grasp of the best formulæ.
A favorable reconnoissance with the barometer, in this region, should
receive a careful verification with more accurate instruments, but it
can not be regarded as establishing the feasibility of a route.
The map of M. De La Charme, like that of Dr. Cullen, is made up from
old maps. The additional topographical information is not laid down.
Two parties were sent to the Isthmus to verify this route. One,
composed of French engineers, was under the charge of M. Flacat; the
other, composed of American engineers, was under the direction of Mr.
Spooner. With both the principals Sr. De Gorgoza quarreled, and the
parties returned without accomplishing the work for which they had made
so long a journey.
The following paragraphs contain all that M. De La Charme claims to
have established. If correct, he is justly entitled to the right of
discovery, in the furtherance of which claim “he considers it his duty
to publish the present memorandum.”
“This canal should go in a straight course E. 20° S. from Real Viejo to
the village of Paya, thence south-east through the passage between the
Cordilleras and the Andes, and, finally, easterly or north-easterly,
as should prove best for the navigation from the Atlantic by the
Atrato. It would not be more than fifty miles long, and would traverse
a country whose formation presents no difficulties to the opening of
the same, either in the excavation or in the removal of the materials
excavated, an important point in works of this kind.
“The highest point or summit-level of the route thus explored was near
the village of Paya. It was, by barometrical measurement, one hundred
and seventy-eight feet (about 55 metres) above the level of the sea,
and this must necessarily be very nearly the true altitude. And, it may
be added, the field notes of the expedition contain satisfactory data
respecting the questions of practical engineering involved, such as
feeders, locks,” etc.
So little accurate information exists in regard to the topography of
the Isthmus, there is always a probability in favor of the discovery of
new routes. But the uncertainty which must attach to the sanguine
representations based upon interested but unprofessional examinations,
has been made sufficiently apparent. Such statements can not be
accepted without verification. This is doubtless all that Sr. Gorgoza
desires.
In July, 1857, the results of a survey from the Atrato to the Pacific,
made by Mr. Kennish, under the direction of F. W. Kelley, were laid
before the Secretaries of War and Navy. Mr. Trautwine had previously
surveyed the Atrato from its mouth to its head, crossing the ridge in
three places, obtaining much valuable information. Mr. Porter made a
survey in 1853. The survey of Mr. Kennish, before alluded to, was made
in 1855.
Commencing at the mouth of the Atrato River, the work to be done is
described as follows: The mouth of the Atrato being obstructed by bars,
the caño coquito, by which the river is to be united with the Gulf of
Urabà, having at the present time a depth of four feet water, is to be
excavated to a depth of thirty feet. From thence sixty-five miles to
the mouth of the Truando, the depth is not less than forty-seven feet.
The bar at the mouth of the Truando is eighteen feet. For six miles
the river has an average depth of fourteen feet. From thence to the
Pacific, twenty-six miles, much of the distance is through solid rock.
At 505 feet above the ocean level, Mr. Kennish proposes to pierce the
divide by a tunnel three and one-half miles in length, sufficiently
large to admit two ships abreast.
The harbor at the Pacific terminus requires improvement; guard locks
not considered necessary. Total length of the line, one hundred and
twenty-six miles. The results of this survey were regarded as highly
favorable by the friends of the measure.
Mr. Kelley regarded his labors and expenditures as well rewarded.
“Franklin,” he observes, “was not more delighted when he drew lightning
from the clouds, nor Columbus when he discovered America, than I was
when it was demonstrated, by instrumental measurement, that the two
oceans could be united, that all the science, industry, enlightened
enterprise, and generous expenditure had not been exhausted in vain.”
To verify this survey, Congress authorized the Secretaries of War and
Navy to organize a joint expedition. In accordance with this authority,
the Secretary of the Navy designated Com. Craven. This gallant officer
was afterward sunk off Mobile, and lost with all the crew of his ship.
To Lieut. N. Michler, Corps of Topographical Engineers, (now Brevet
Brigadier-General,) the execution of the topographical survey was
assigned. The operations of this officer were published in the form of
a diary, with special scientific reports and observations, accompanied
by maps and profiles. The special reports embrace observations upon
geology, botany, hipsometrical and astronomical determinations,
climatology, and field notes.
The itinerary is full and interesting, supplying information valuable
to future explorers. The reader is never asked to accept a statement
upon the ipse dixit of the writer. The observation of a corps of
intelligent surveyors is laid before the reader.
The line adopted by General Michler may be described as follows: To
avoid the bar at the mouth of the Atrato, a canal, about two and
one-half miles, is to be cut through the channel of the caño coquito.
The mouth of this caño is protected by nature from the prevailing
winds. The Atrato affords navigation for the largest ships. The
remaining part of the line is described in General Michler’s words:
“Let the first section follow the projected line referred to above,
across the Lagunas to its intersection with the Truando; the second
section connects this last point by a straight line with the head
of the Palizadas; the third extends in a direct line to the foot of
the Saltos; the fourth in a curved line to the head of the Saltos,
including a tunnel of 800 feet through the Sierra de los Saltos; the
fifth leads directly to the mouth of the river Grundó, a tributary of
the Nercua; the sixth leaves the valley of the Nercua at the point by
a straight line, perpendicular to the axis of the Cordilleras de los
Andes, and, after piercing the mountains with a tunnel 12,500 feet
in length, continues on to the mouth of the Chuparador; the seventh
follows for some distance down the valley of the river Paracuchichí;
and, lastly, the eighth strikes in a direct line for the Bahia
Ensenadá, or Estero de Paracuchichí.
“The line proposed by Mr. Kennish differs very materially from the one
just described. It leaves the Atrato at the mouth of the Truando, and
follows the meanderings of the stream to its junction with the Nercua;
it then ascends the valleys of the latter and of the Hingador, and
strikes across the mountains to the Pacific. The length of the cut by
his plan is stated in his report to be 56.08 miles.
“In order to complete the line of canal communication between the
Atrato and the Pacific, it is necessary to connect the Estero de
Paracuchichí with Humboldt’s Bay. It is proposed to do this by a cut
from the former across the peninsula, and then by building out in its
prolongation, from the shores of the latter, jetties to form a passage
through the surf into deep water of the ocean. The depth of the cut
between them will have to be sufficient to allow for the swells of the
latter, at least from thirty-five to forty feet below low tide.”
To connect the Atrato with the Pacific by a canal without locks, there
would be 95 miles of river navigation, and 52⅔ miles of canal, making
an aggregate length of 147⅔ miles.
The following table gives the different items and the total cost
of the work:
Interoceanic Ship Canal.
Summary of the estimated cost of the canal and appurtenances.
| |
| OBJECT OF EXPENDITURE. |
ESTIMATE BY
GEN. MICHLER
FOR EXCAVATION
AND TUNNELING. |
| Works at the mouth of the Atrato |
$500,000 |
| Excavation of earth |
24,835,173 |
| Rock cuttings |
64,774,950 |
| Tunneling |
13,995,000 |
| Pacific harbor improvements |
1,150,000 |
| Light-house |
35,000 |
| Piers |
25,000 |
| Depots on Pacific |
50,000 |
| Depots on line, and hospital |
35,000 |
| Depot at junction |
15,000 |
| Executive department |
120,000 |
| Engineer department |
375,000 |
| Medical department |
80,000 |
| Pay department |
90,000 |
| Commissary department |
120,000 |
| Quartermaster’s department |
135,000 |
| Dredging machinery |
350,000 |
| Hoisting and pumping engines’ machinery |
875,000 |
| |
$ 107,560,123 |
| Add 25 per cent. for contingencies |
26,890,031 |
| |
$ 134,450,154 |
| |
This estimate supposes the dimensions of the
canal to be 100 feet wide and 30 feet deep. This rate ($2.50) per cubic
yard is evidently too small. Estimating this tunnel at the contract
price being employed ($5.40), the cost will be $30,229,200; and should
the price reach the not improbable limit of $10 per cubic yard, the
cost will be increased to $55,970,000. Substituting these sums in place
of the cost of tunneling as given in the above estimate, and the total
cost of the canal along this route will, in the first case, be
$150,684,354, and, in the second case, $176,625,154, which is not
excessive, if the tunnel is to be lined throughout.
The Penaebach tunnel is the only one in England that is
self-supporting. It is driven through solid basalt. The Penmaenwhr
tunnel, pierced through hard green-stone, had to be lined throughout;
and the Bangor tunnel, supposed to be sufficiently firm, was afterward
cased with brick. It has been found necessary to line some of the
tunnels of the Washington aqueduct, which are driven through very hard
gneiss.
Before taking leave of this instructive report, we have selected some
interesting portions of the narrative and scientific statements for
quotation:
“The great falls of the Hingador are grand and exceedingly romantic,
and equal in height and beauty to many of those in other countries
which elicit so much admiration from all lovers of magnificent scenery.
The valley itself is pleasant to gaze upon; many bright streams gush
into it, and impart additional charms to the already picturesque
landscape of falls and rapids, and rich tropical vegetation. Several
thermal springs were discovered at the foot of the great falls.
“As the party had to wade through the water, over smooth and slippery
rocks, and clamber up steep precipices, it took four days to accomplish
this section of the survey. Several fragments of rocks were broken
off at the head of the falls for subsequent analysis. According to
the report of the geologist, of which the following is an extract,
‘the rocky falls were found to be overcoated with a light, shaly
conglomerate of a cemented texture, and containing, imbedded in a
calcareous matrix, coarse sand and gravel. Higher up, in one of the
western head branches of this stream, a more consolidated semi-rock was
noticed, containing copiously interspersed fragments of little shells.
This rock seems also to be impregnated with carbonate of lime.’”
The character of the natives may be gathered from the extract: “January
30th, 1858—Whilst seated on the rocks overlooking the falls, and
listening to the music of the roaring waters, as they rushed fiercely
past, with an occasional anxious glance at the curve of the river
above, in expectancy of the momentary appearance of the long-expected
canoe, the attention was suddenly drawn toward a long line of Indians,
men, women, and children, emerging from the trail over the Sierra. As
they filed by, several familiar faces were seen, and a kindly nod of
recognition given and returned. Each bore a pack, from the largest to
the smallest; these rested upon the back, and were supported by bands,
composed of the bark of trees, which passed in front of the forehead.
Most of their effects were packed away in baskets, made of bark of
certain trees, and very neatly manufactured. They proved to be old
friends from Tocame, and were en route to make a visit to one of
their Tambos, on the Nercua. All fear as to moving ahead was dispelled
at sight of them. After depositing their loads on the rocks, near the
small haven, just above the falls, they all left again as quietly as
they had come, in order to bring up their canoes over the Saltos.
“Whilst the members of the engineer corps were extremely anxious to
discharge their duties accurately and faithfully, and to prosecute, in
the most thorough manner, every conceivable examination which could,
in the remotest degree, furnish additional information in reference
to the great work upon which they were engaged; still, circumstances
over which they had no control, such as their want of provisions, and
the scarcity of money wherewith to purchase and renew even necessary
supplies, compelled them to turn back from the Pacific, and leave
unaccomplished the reconnoissance of both the Paracuchichí and Jurador
rivers. To have rendered their labors complete these examinations
should have been made in connection with their other most interesting
duties. The future survey of these streams, and more especially of the
former, together with that of the country, between its head-waters and
those of the Pavarador, a tributary of the Nercua, and also between
some of the tributaries of the Truando and the coast, at some more
southern point of Humboldt Bay, may throw a flood of light upon the
feasibility of the work in contemplation.”
He again expresses his regret that he was unable to extend his
examination:
“It is to be greatly regretted that circumstances prevented the party
from gaining more minute information concerning the valley of the
Paracuchichí, and of the transversal passes leading from it through
the mountains into the valley of a large tributary of the Truando,
which flows in only a few miles above its mouth. As this river has more
than twice the quantity of water possessed by the Nercua, it is highly
probable that a still more favorable route can be found leading out
from its valley above the junction.”
The following table of comparison between altitudes, determined
by the level and by barometric observations, shows how much has been gained in
accuracy, since the time of Humboldt, in the use of the barometer:
Table of data used in computing the various heights, with the
results as compared with the heights obtained by the level.
| |
| STATIONS. |
MEAN
READING OF
BAROMETER. |
MEAN
TEMP. |
BAROMETRIC
HEIGHT. |
HEIGHT
BY
LEVEL. |
DIFFERENCE. |
| |
INCHES. |
DEG. |
FEET. |
FEET. |
FEET. |
| Sea coast |
29.874 |
80. |
... |
... |
... |
| First camp on Truando |
29.817 |
75.4 |
58.39 |
44.57 |
+ 13.82 |
| Tocame |
29.805 |
76.8 |
69.6 |
57.39 |
12.21 |
| Foot of Saltos |
29.759 |
76.1 |
122.65 |
97.5 |
25.15 |
| Observatory Hill |
29.663 |
76.6 |
207.45 |
204.95 |
2.5 |
| Head Salto Grande |
29.741 |
75.9 |
132.3 |
138.79 |
- 6.49 |
| Head of Saltos |
29.737 |
75.9 |
138.1 |
183.47 |
45.37 |
| Junction of Rivers Nercua and Truando |
29.674 |
77. |
192.5 |
192.6 |
+ 0.44 |
| Tambo |
29.607 |
77. |
260.92 |
264.4 |
- 3.48 |
| First Ridge west of Rio Nercua |
28.815 |
75.2 |
1,046.45 |
... |
... |
| [9]
Log Crossing on |
 |
No. 1362 |
29.053 |
75.2 |
809.42 |
791.23 |
+ 18.19 |
| Rio Hingador |
|
... |
... |
Mean 879.9 |
... |
... |
| |
No. 1363 |
28.912 |
75.2 |
949.94 |
... |
... |
| Camp on Hingador |
29.074 |
75.2 |
788.6 |
814.32 |
- 25.72 |
| Dividing Ridge |
28.913 |
75.2 |
948.5 |
947.44 |
+ 1.06 |
| Rio Chupepe |
29.631 |
75.2 |
240.24 |
241.35 |
- 1.11 |
| Rio Totumia, below Dos Bocas |
29.837 |
75.2 |
40.6 |
45.3 |
5.24 |
These hypsometric determinations differ from the true levels at the
points of observation from two to forty-five feet. These figures fall
considerably within the limit of error considered as probable by Baron
Humboldt. This distinguished observer states that the barometer may be
trusted to determine heights to within from seventy-five or ninety feet
of the truth.
