In the last few years the
study of Radioactivity has
brought about amazing advances
in our knowledge of
the properties and nature of
the Atom; and into this fascinating
wonderland of the
infinitely small yet infinitely
complex and infinitely full of
energy, Mr. Russell introduces
us.
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY 681 Fifth Avenue, New York
ICARUS OR
The Future of Science
BY BERTRAND RUSSELL
New York E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY 681 Fifth Avenue
Copyright, 1924
By E. P. Dutton & Company
All Rights Reserved
First printing, April, 1924
Second printing, June, 1924
Third printing, October, 1924
Fourth printing, December, 1924
Fifth Printing, December, 1924
Sixth Printing, June, 1925
Seventh Printing, June, 1925
Mr. Haldane’s Daedalus has set forth
an attractive picture of the future as it
may become through the use of
scientific discoveries to promote human
happiness. Much as I should like to
agree with his forecast, a long experience
of statesmen and governments has
made me somewhat sceptical. I am
compelled to fear that science will be
used to promote the power of dominant
groups, rather than to make men happy.
Icarus, having been taught to fly by his
father Daedalus, was destroyed by his
rashness. I fear that the same fate
may overtake the populations whom
modern men of science have taught to
fly. Some of the dangers inherent in the
progress of science while we retain our
present political and economic institutions
are set forth in the following
pages.
This subject is so vast that it is impossible,
within a limited space, to do
more than outline some of its aspects.
The world in which we live differs
profoundly from that of Queen Anne’s
time, and this difference is mainly
attributable to science. That is to say,
the difference would be very much less
than it is but for various scientific
discoveries, but resulted from those
discoveries by the operation of ordinary
human nature. The changes that have
been brought about have been partly
good, partly bad; whether, in the end,
science will prove to have been a
blessing or a curse to mankind, is to
my mind, still a doubtful question.
A science may affect human life in
two different ways. On the one hand,
without altering men’s passions or their
general outlook, it may increase their
power of gratifying their desires. On
the other hand, it may operate through
an effect upon the imaginative conception
of the world, the theology or
philosophy which is accepted in practice
by energetic men. The latter is a
fascinating study, but I shall almost
wholly ignore it, in order to bring my
subject within a manageable compass.
I shall confine myself almost wholly to
the effect of science in enabling us to
gratify our passions more freely, which
has hitherto been far the more important
of the two.
From our point of view, we may
divide the sciences into three groups:
physical, biological, and anthropological.
In the physical group I include
chemistry, and broadly speaking
any science concerned with the properties
of matter apart from life. In
the anthropological group I include
all studies specially concerned with
man: human physiology and psychology
(between which no sharp line can be
drawn), anthropology, history, sociology,
and economics. All these studies
can be illuminated by considerations
drawn from biology; for instance,
Rivers threw a new light on parts of
economics by adducing facts about
landed property among birds during
the breeding season. But in spite of
their connection with biology—a connection
which is likely to grow closer
as time goes on—they are broadly
distinguished from biology by their
methods and data, and deserve to be
grouped apart, at any rate in a sociological
inquiry.
The effect of the biological sciences,
so far, has been very small. No doubt
Darwinism and the idea of evolution
affected men’s imaginative outlook;
arguments were derived in favour of
free competition, and also of nationalism.
But these effects were of the sort that
I propose not to consider. It is probable
that great effects will come from these
sciences sooner or later. Mendelism
might have revolutionized agriculture,
and no doubt some similar theory will
do so sooner or later. Bacteriology may
enable us to exterminate our enemies
by disease. The study of heredity may
in time make eugenics an exact science,
and perhaps we shall in a later age be
able to determine at will the sex of our
children. This would probably lead to
an excess of males, involving a complete
change in family institutions. But
these speculations belong to the future.
I do not propose to deal with the
possible future effects of biology, both
because my knowledge of biology is very
limited, and because the subject has
been admirably treated by Mr. Haldane.1
The anthropological sciences are those
from which, a priori, we might have
expected the greatest social effects, but
hitherto this has not proved to be the
case, partly because these sciences are
mostly still at an early stage of development.
Even economics has not so far
had much effect. Where it has seemed
to have, this is because it advocated
what was independently desired.
Hitherto, the most effective of the
anthropological sciences has been medicine,
through its influence on sanitation
and public health, and through the fact
that it has discovered how to deal with
malaria and yellow fever. Birth-control
is also a very important social fact
which comes into this category. But
although the future effect of the anthropological
sciences (to which I shall
return presently) is illimitable, the
effect up to the present has been confined
within fairly narrow limits.
One general observation to begin
with. Science has increased man’s
control over nature, and might therefore
be supposed likely to increase his
happiness and well-being. This would
be the case if men were rational, but in
fact they are bundles of passions and
instincts. An animal species in a stable
environment, if it does not die out,
acquires an equilibrium between its
passions and the conditions of its life.
If the conditions are suddenly altered,
the equilibrium is upset. Wolves in a
state of nature have difficulty in getting
food, and therefore need the stimulus
of a very insistent hunger. The result
is that their descendants, domestic dogs,
over-eat if they are allowed to do so.
When a certain amount of something is
useful, and the difficulty of obtaining it
is diminished, instinct will usually lead
an animal to excess in the new circumstances.
The sudden change produced
by science has upset the balance between
our instincts and our circumstances,
but in directions not sufficiently
noticed. Over-eating is not a serious
danger, but over-fighting is. The
human instincts of power and rivalry,
like the dog’s wolfish appetite will need
to be artificially curbed, if industrialism
is to succeed.
II. EFFECTS OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
Much the greatest part of the changes
which science has made in social life is
due to the physical sciences, as is
evident when we consider that they
brought about the industrial revolution.
This is a trite topic, about which I shall
say as little as my subject permits.
There are, however, some points which
must be made.
First, industrialism, still has great
parts of the earth’s surface to conquer.
Russia and India are very imperfectly
industrialized; China hardly at all.
In South America there is room for
immense development. One of the
effects of industrialism is to make the
world an economic unit: its ultimate
consequences will be very largely due
to this fact. But before the world
can be effectively organized as a unit,
it will probably be necessary to develop
industrially all the regions capable of
development that are at present backward.
The effects of industrialism
change as it becomes more wide-spread;
this must be remembered in any attempt
to argue from its past to its future.
The second point about industrialism
is that it increases the productivity of
labour, and thus makes more luxuries
possible. At first, in England, the chief
luxury achieved was a larger population
with an actual lowering of the standard
of life. Then came a golden age when
wages increased, hours of labour
diminished, and simultaneously the
middle-class grew more prosperous.
That was while Great Britain was still
supreme. With the growth of foreign
industrialism, a new epoch began.
Industrial organizations have seldom
succeeded in becoming world-wide, and
have consequently become national.
Competition, formerly between individual
firms, is now mainly between
nations, and is therefore conducted by
methods quite different from those
contemplated by the classical
economists.
Modern industrialism is a struggle
between nations for two things, markets
and raw materials, as well as for the
sheer pleasure of dominion. The labour
which is set free from providing the
necessaries of life tends to be more and
more absorbed by national rivalry.
There are first the armed forces of the
State; then those who provide
munitions of war, from the raw minerals
up to the finished product; then the
diplomatic and consular services; then
the teachers of patriotism in schools;
then the Press. All of these perform
other functions as well, but the chief
purpose is to minister to international
competition. As another class whose
labours are devoted to the same end,
we must add a considerable proportion
of the men of science. These men
invent continually more elaborate
methods of attack and defence. The
net result of their labours is to diminish
the proportion of the population that
can be put into the fighting line, since
more are required for munitions. This
might seem a boon, but in fact war is
now-a-days primarily against the
civilian population, and in a defeated
country they are liable to suffer just
as much as the soldiers.
It is science above all that has
determined the importance of raw
materials in international competition.
Coal and iron and oil, especially, are
the bases of power, and thence of
wealth. The nation which possesses
them, and has the industrial skill required
to utilize them in war, can
acquire markets by armed force, and
levy tribute upon less fortunate nations.
Economists have underestimated the
part played by military prowess in the
acquisition of wealth. The landed
aristocracies of Europe were, in origin,
warlike invaders. Their defeat by the
bourgeoisie in the French Revolution,
and the fear which this generated in
the Duke of Wellington, facilitated the
rise of the middle class. The wars of
the eighteenth century decided that
England was to be richer than France.
The traditional economist’s rules for
the distribution of wealth hold only
when men’s actions are governed by
law, i.e. when most people think the
issue unimportant. The issues that
people have considered vital have been
decided by civil wars or wars between
nations. And for the present, owing to
science, the art of war consists in
possessing coal, iron, oil, and the
industrial skill to work them. For the
sake of simplicity, I omit other raw
materials, since they do not affect the
essence of our problem.
We may say, therefore, speaking very
generally, that men have used the increased
productivity which they owe
to science for three chief purposes in
succession: first, to increase the
population; then, to raise the standard
of comfort; and, finally, to provide
more energy to war. This last result
has been chiefly brought about by
competition for markets, which led to
competition for raw materials, especially
the raw materials of munitions.
III. THE INCREASE OF ORGANIZATION
The stimulation of nationalism which
has taken place in modern times is,
however, due very largely to another
factor, namely the increase of organization,
which is of the very essence of
industrialism. Wherever expensive
fixed capital is required, organization
on a large scale is of course necessary.
In view of the economies of large scale
production, organization in marketing
also becomes of great importance.
For some purposes, if not for all, many
industries come to be organized nationally,
so as to be in effect one business
in each nation.
Science has not only brought about
the need of large organizations, but also
the technical possibility of their existence.
Without railways, telegraphs,
and telephones, control from a centre
is very difficult. In ancient empires,
and in China down to modern times,
provinces were governed by practically
independent satraps or proconsuls, who
were appointed by the central government,
but decided almost all questions
on their own initiative. If they displeased
the sovereign, they could only
be controlled by civil war, of which the
issue was doubtful. Until the invention
of the telegraph, ambassadors had a
great measure of independence, since
it was often necessary to act without
waiting for orders from home. What
applied in politics applied also in business:
an organization controlled from
the centre had to be very loosely knit,
and to allow much autonomy to
subordinates. Opinion as well as action
was difficult to mould from a centre,
and local variations marred the
uniformity of party creeds.
Now-a-days all this is changed.
Telegraph, telephone, and wireless make
it easy to transmit orders from a centre:
railways and steamers make it easy to
transport troops in case the orders are
disobeyed. Modern methods of printing
and advertising make it enormously
cheaper to produce and distribute one
newspaper with a large circulation than
many with small circulations; consequently,
in so far as the Press controls
opinion, there is uniformity, and, in
particular, there is uniformity of news.
Elementary education, except in so far
as religious denominations introduce
variety, is conducted on a uniform
pattern decided by the State, by means
of teachers whom the State has trained,
as far as possible, to imitate the regularity
and mutual similarity of machines
produced to standard. Thus the
material and psychological conditions
for a great intensity of organization
have increased pari passu, but the basis
of the whole development is scientific
invention in the purely physical realm.
Increased productivity has played its
part, by making it possible to set apart
more labour for propaganda, under
which head are to be included advertisement,
the cinema, the Press, education,
politics, and religion. Broadcasting is
a new method likely to acquire great
potency as soon as people are satisfied
that it is not a method of propaganda.
Political controversies, as Mr. Graham
Wallas has pointed out, ought to be
conducted in quantitative terms. If
sociology were one of the sciences that
had affected social institutions (which
it is not), this would be the case. The
dispute between anarchism and bureaucracy
at present tends to take the form
of one side maintaining that we want no
organization, while the other maintains
that we want as much as possible. A
person imbued with the scientific spirit
would hardly even examine these extreme
positions. Some people think
that we keep our rooms too hot for
health, others that we keep them too
cold. If this were a political question,
one party would maintain that the best
temperature is the absolute zero, the
other that it is the melting point of
iron. Those who maintained any intermediate
position would be abused as
timorous time-servers, concealed agents
of the other side, men who ruined the
enthusiasm of a sacred cause by tepid
appeals to mere reason. Any man who
had the courage to say that our rooms
ought to be neither very hot nor very
cold would be abused by both parties,
and probably shot in No Man’s Land.
Possibly some day politics may become
more rational, but so far there is not the
faintest indication of a change in this
direction.
To a rational mind, the question is
not: Do we want organization or do we
not? The question is: How much
organization do we want, and where and
when and of what kind? In spite of a
temperamental leaning to anarchism,
I am persuaded that an industrial
world cannot maintain itself against
internal disruptive forces without a
great deal more organization than we
have at present. It is not the amount
of organization, but its kind and its
purposes, that cause our troubles. But
before tackling this question, let us
pause for a moment to ask ourselves
what is the measure of the intensity of
organization in a given community.
A man’s acts are partly determined
by spontaneous impulse, partly by the
conscious or unconscious effects of the
various groups to which he belongs.
A man who works (say) on a railway or
in a mine is, in his working-hours
almost entirely determined in his actions
by those who direct the collective
labour of which he forms part. If he
decides to strike, his action is again not
individual, but determined by his
Union. When he votes for Parliament,
party caucuses have limited his choice
to one of two or three men, and party
propaganda has induced him to accept
in toto one of the two or three blocks of
opinions which form the rival party
programmes. His choice between the
parties may be individual, but it may
also be determined by the action of
some group, such as a trade union, which
collectively supports one party. His
newspaper-reading exposes him to
great organized forces; so does the
cinema, if he goes to it. His choice of a
wife is probably spontaneous, except
that he must choose a woman of his own
class. But in the education of his
children he is almost entirely powerless:
they must have the education which is
provided. Organization thus determines
many vital things in his life.
Compare him with a handicraftsman or
peasant-proprietor who cannot read
and does not have his children educated,
and it becomes clear what is meant by
saying that industrialism has increased
the intensity of organization. To
define this term, we must, I think,
exclude the unconscious effects of
groups, except as causes facilitating
the conscious effects. We may define
the intensity of organization to which
a given individual is subject as the
proportion of his acts which is determined
by the orders or advice of some
group, expressed through democratic
decisions or executive officers. The
intensity of organization in a community
may then be defined as the
average intensity for its several
members.
The intensity of organization is
increased not only when a man belongs
to more organizations, but also when
the organizations to which he already
belongs play a larger part in his life,
as, for example, the State plays a
larger part in war than in peace.
Another matter which needs to be
treated quantitatively is the degree of
democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy in
an organization. No organization
belongs completely to any one of the
three types. There must be executive
officers, who will often in practice be
able to decide policy, even if in theory
they cannot do so. And even if their
power depends upon persuasion, they
may so completely control the relevant
publicity that they can always rely
upon a majority. The directors of a
railway company, for instance, are to
all intents and purposes uncontrolled
by the shareholders, who have no
adequate means of organizing an
opposition if they should wish to do so.
In America, a railroad president is
almost a monarch. In party politics,
the power of leaders, although it
depends upon persuasion, continually
increases as printed propaganda becomes
more important. For these
reasons, even where formal democracy
increases, the real degree of democratic
control tends to diminish, except on a
few questions which rouse strong popular
passions.
The result of these causes is that, in
consequence of scientific inventions
which facilitate centralization and propaganda,
groups become more organized,
more disciplined, more group-conscious,
and more docile to leaders. The effect
of leaders on followers is increased, and
the control of events by a few prominent
personalities becomes more marked.
In all this there would be nothing
very tragic, but for the fact, with which
science has nothing to do, that organization
is almost wholly national. If men
were actuated by the love of gain, as
the older economists supposed, this
would not be the case; the same causes
which have led to national trusts would
have led to international trusts. This
has happened in a few instances, but
not on a sufficiently wide scale to
affect politics or economics very vitally.
Rivalry is, with most well-to-do
energetic people, a stronger motive
than love of money. Successful rivalry
requires organization of rival forces;
the tendency is for a business such as
oil, for example, to organize itself into
two rival groups, between them covering
the world. They might, of course,
combine, and they would no doubt
increase their wealth if they did so.
But combination would take the zest
out of life. The object of a football
team, one might say, is to kick goals.
If two rival teams combined, and
kicked the ball alternately over the two
goals, many more goals would be
scored. Nevertheless no one suggests
that this should be done, the object of
a football team being not to kick goals
but to win. So the object of a big
business is not to make money, but to
win in the contest with some other
business. If there were no other
business to be defeated, the whole thing
would become uninteresting. This
rivalry has attached itself to nationalism,
and enlisted the support of the
ordinary citizens of the countries concerned;
they seldom know what it is
that they are supporting, but, like the
spectators at a football-match, they
grow enthusiastic for their own side.
The harm that is being done by science
and industrialism is almost wholly due
to the fact that, while they have proved
strong enough to produce a national
organization of economic forces, they
have not proved strong enough to
produce an international organization.
It is clear that political internationalism
such as the League of Nations was
supposed to inaugurate, will never be
successful until we have economic
internationalism, which would require,
as a minimum, an agreement between
various national organizations dividing
among them the raw materials and
markets of the world. This, however,
can hardly be brought about while big
business is controlled by men who are
so rich as to have grown indifferent to
money, and to be willing to risk enormous
losses for the pleasure of rivalry.
The increase of organization in the
modern world has made the ideals of
liberalism wholly inapplicable. Liberalism,
from Montesquieu to President
Wilson, was based upon the assumption
of a number of more or less equal
individuals or groups, with no differences
so vital that they were willing to
die sooner than compromise. It was
supposed that there was to be free
competition between individuals and
between ideas. Experience has shown,
however, that the existing economic
system is incompatible with all forms
of free competition except between
States by means of armaments. I
should wish, for my part, to preserve
free competition between ideas, though
not between individuals and groups,
but this is only possible by means of
what an old-fashioned liberal would
regard as interferences with personal
liberty. So long as the sources of
economic power remain in private
hands, there will be no liberty except
for the few who control those sources.
Such liberal ideals as free trade, free
press, unbiased education, either already
belong to the past or soon will do so.
One of the triumphs of early liberalism
in England was the establishment of
parliamentary control over the army;
this was the casus belli in the Civil War,
and was decided by the Revolution of
1688. It was effective so long as
Parliament represented the same class
from which army officers were drawn.
This was still the case with the late
Parliament, but may cease to be the
case with the advent of a Labour
Government. Russia, Hungary, Italy,
Spain, and Bavaria have shown in
recent years how frail democracy has
become; east of the Rhine it lingers
only in outlying regions. Constitutional
control over armaments must, therefore,
be regarded as another liberal principal
which is rapidly becoming obsolete.
It would seem probable that, in the
next fifty years or so, we shall see a
still further increase in the power of
governments, and a tendency for
governments to be such as are desired
by the men who control armaments
and raw materials. The forms of
democracy may survive in western
countries, since those who possess
military and economic power can control
education and the press, and therefore
can usually secure a subservient
democracy. Rival economic groups
will presumably remain associated with
rival nations, and will foster nationalism
in order to recruit their football teams.
There is, however, a hopeful element
in the problem. The planet is of
finite size, but the most efficient size
for an organization is continually increased
by new scientific inventions.
The world becomes more and more of
an economic unity. Before very long
the technical conditions will exist for
organizing the whole world as one
producing and consuming unit. If,
when that time comes, two rival groups
contend for mastery, the victor may be
able to introduce that single world-wide
organization that is needed to prevent
the mutual extermination of civilized
nations. The world which would result
would be, at first, very different from
the dreams of either liberals or socialists;
but it might grow less different with the
lapse of time. There would be at first
economic and political tyranny of the
victors, a dread of renewed upheavals,
and therefore a drastic suppression of
liberty. But if the first half-dozen
revolts were successfully repressed, the
vanquished would give up hope, and
accept the subordinate place assigned
to them by the victors in the great
world-trust. As soon as the holders of
power felt secure, they would grow less
tyrannical and less energetic. The
motive of rivalry being removed, they
would not work so hard as they do now,
and would soon cease to exact such
hard work from their subordinates.
Life at first might be unpleasant, but
it would at least be possible, which
would be enough to recommend the
system after a long period of warfare.
Given a stable world-organization, economic
and political, even if, at first, it
rested upon nothing but armed force,
the evils which now threaten civilization
would gradually diminish, and a more
thorough democracy than that which
now exists might become possible.
I believe that, owing to men’s folly, a
world-government will only be established
by force, and will therefore be
at first cruel and despotic. But I believe
that it is necessary for the preservation
of a scientific civilization, and that, if
once realized, it will gradually give rise
to the other conditions of a tolerable
existence.
IV. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL SCIENCES
It remains to say something about
the future effects of the anthropological
sciences. This is of course extremely
conjectural, because we do not know
what discoveries will be made. The
effect is likely to be far greater than we
can now imagine, because these sciences
are still in their infancy. I will, however,
take a few points on which to hang
conjectures. I do not wish to be
supposed to be making prophecies:
I am only suggesting possibilities which
it may be instructive to consider.
Birth-control is a matter of great
importance, particularly in relation to
the possibility of a world-government,
which could hardly be stable if some
nations increased their population much
more rapidly than others. At present,
birth-control is increasing in all civilized
countries, though in most it is opposed
by governments. This opposition is
due partly to mere superstition and
desire to conciliate the Catholic vote,
partly to the desire for large armies
and severe competition between wage-earners,
so as to keep down wages.
In spite of the opposition of governments,
it seems probable that birth-control
will lead to a stationary population
in most white nations within the
next fifty years. There can be no
security that it will stop with a stationary
population; it may go on to the point
where the population diminishes.
The increase in the practice of birth-control
is an example of a process
contrary to that seen in industrialism:
it represents a victory of individual
over collective passions. Collectively,
Frenchmen desire that France should
be populous, in order to be able to
defeat her enemies in war. Individually,
they desire that their own families
should be small, in order to increase
the inheritance of their children and to
diminish the expense of education. The
individual desire has triumphed over
the collective desire, and even, in many
cases, over religious scruples. In this
case, as in most others, the individual
desire is less harmful to the world than
the collective desire: the man who acts
from pure selfishness does less damage
than the man who is actuated by
“public spirit.” For, since medicine
and sanitation have diminished the
infant death-rate, the only checks to
over-population that remain (apart
from birth-control) are war and famine.
So long as this continues to be the case,
the world must either have a nearly
stationary population, or employ war
to produce famine. The latter method,
which is that favoured by opponents
of birth-control, has been adopted on a
large scale since 1914; it is however
somewhat wasteful. We require a
certain number of cattle and sheep,
and we take steps to secure the right
number. If we were as indifferent
about them as we are about human
beings, we should produce far too many,
and cause the surplus to die by the slow
misery of under-feeding. Farmers
would consider this plan extravagant,
and humanitarians would consider it
cruel. But where human beings are
concerned, it is considered the only
proper course, and works advocating
any other are confiscated by the police
if they are intelligible to those whom
they concern.
It must be admitted, however, that
there are certain dangers. Before long
the population may actually diminish.
This is already happening in the most
intelligent sections of the most intelligent
nations; government opposition
to birth-control propaganda gives a
biological advantage to stupidity, since
it is chiefly stupid people whom governments
succeed in keeping in ignorance.
Before long, birth-control may become
nearly universal among the white
races; it will then not deteriorate
their quality, but only diminish their
numbers, at a time when uncivilized
races are still prolific and are preserved
from a high death-rate by white science.
This situation will lead to a tendency—already
shown by the French—to
employ more prolific races as mercenaries.
Governments will oppose the
teaching of birth-control among Africans,
for fear of losing recruits. The
result will be an immense numerical
inferiority of the white races, leading
probably to their extermination in a
mutiny of mercenaries. If, however, a
world-government is established, it may
see the desirability of making subject
races also less prolific, and may permit
mankind to solve the population
question. This is another reason for
desiring a world-government.
Passing from quantity to quality of
population, we come to the question of
eugenics. We may perhaps assume
that, if people grow less superstitious,
governments will acquire the right to
sterilize those who are not considered
desirable as parents. This power will
be used, at first, to diminish imbecility,
a most desirable object. But probably,
in time, opposition to the government
will be taken to prove imbecility, so
that rebels of all kinds will be sterilized.
Epileptics, consumptives, dipsomaniacs
and so on will gradually be included;
in the end, there will be a tendency to
include all who fail to pass the usual
school examinations. The result will
be to increase the average intelligence;
in the long run, it may be greatly increased.
But probably the effect upon
really exceptional intelligence will be
bad. Mr. Micawber, who was Dickens’s
father, would hardly have been regarded
as a desirable parent. How
many imbeciles ought to outweigh one
Dickens I do not profess to know.
Eugenics has, of course, more ambitious
possibilities in a more distant
future. It may aim not only at
eliminating undesired types, but at
increasing desired types. Moral standards
may alter so as to make it
possible for one man to be the sire of a
vast progeny by many different mothers.
When men of science envisage a
possibility of this kind, they are prone
to a type of fallacy which is common
also in other directions. They imagine
that a reform inaugurated by men of
science would be administered as men
of science would wish, by men similar
in outlook to those who have advocated
it. In like manner women who advocated
votes for women used to imagine
that the woman voter of the
future would resemble the ardent
feminist who won her the vote; and
socialist leaders imagine that a socialist
State would be administered by idealistic
reformers like themselves. These
are, of course, delusions; a reform,
once achieved, is handed over to the
average citizen. So, if eugenics reached
the point where it could increase
desired types, it would not be the types
desired by present-day eugenists that
would be increased, but rather the
types desired by the average official.
Prime Ministers, Bishops, and others
whom the State considers desirable
might become the fathers of half the
next generation. Whether this would
be an improvement it is not for me to
say, as I have no hope of ever becoming
either a Bishop or a Prime Minister.
If we knew enough about heredity
to determine, within limits, what sort
of population we would have, the
matter would of course be in the hands
of State officials, presumably elderly
medical men. Whether they would
really be preferable to Nature I do not
feel sure. I suspect that they would
breed a subservient population, convenient
to rulers but incapable of
initiative. However, it may be that I am
too sceptical of the wisdom of officials.
The effects of psychology on practical
life may in time become very great.
Already advertisers in America employ
eminent psychologists to instruct them
in the technique of producing irrational
belief; such men may, when they have
grown more proficient, be very useful
in persuading the democracy that
governments are wise and good. Then,
again, there are the psychological tests
of intelligence, as applied to recruits for
the American army during the war.
I am very sceptical of the possibility of
testing anything except average intelligence
by such methods, and I think
that, if they were widely adopted, they
would probably lead to many persons
of great artistic capacity being classified
as morons. The same thing would have
happened to some first-rate mathematicians.
Specialized ability not infrequently
goes with general disability,
but this would not be shown by the
kind of tests which psychologists recommended
to the American government.
More sensational than tests of intelligence
is the possibility of controlling
the emotional life through the secretions
of the ductless glands. It will be possible
to make people choleric or timid, strongly
or weakly sexed, and so on, as may be
desired. Differences of emotional disposition
seem to be chiefly due to secretions
of the ductless glands, and therefore
controllable by injections or by
increasing or diminishing the secretions.
Assuming an oligarchic organization of
society, the State could give to the
children of holders of power the disposition
required for command, and to
the children of the proletariat the
disposition required for obedience.
Against the injections of the State
physicians the most eloquent Socialist
oratory would be powerless. The only
difficulty would be to combine this
submissiveness with the necessary ferocity
against external enemies; but
I do not doubt that official science
would be equal to the task.
It is not necessary, when we are
considering political consequences, to
pin our faith to the particular theories
of the ductless glands, which may blow
over, like other theories. All that is
essential in our hypothesis is the belief
that physiology will in time find ways
of controlling emotion, which it is
scarcely possible to doubt. When that
day comes, we shall have the emotions
desired by our rulers, and the chief
business of elementary education will
be to produce the desired disposition,
no longer by punishment or moral
precept, but by the far surer method
of injection or diet. The men who will
administer this system will have a
power beyond the dreams of the
Jesuits, but there is no reason to suppose
that they will have more sense than the
men who control education to-day.
Technical scientific knowledge does not
make men sensible in their aims, and
administrators in the future, will be
presumably no less stupid and no less
prejudiced than they are at present.
CONCLUSION
It may seem as though I had been at
once gloomy and frivolous in some of
my prognostications. I will end, however,
with the serious lesson which seems
to me to result. Men sometimes speak
as though the progress of science must
necessarily be a boon to mankind, but
that, I fear, is one of the comfortable
nineteenth-century delusions which our
more disillusioned age must discard.
Science enables the holders of power to
realize their purposes more fully than
they could otherwise do. If their
purposes are good, this is a gain; if
they are evil, it is a loss. In the present
age, it seems that the purposes of the
holders of power are in the main evil,
in the sense that they involve a diminution,
in the world at large, of the things
men are agreed in thinking good.
Therefore, at present, science does
harm by increasing the power of rulers.
Science is no substitute for virtue; the
heart is as necessary for a good life as
the head.
If men were rational in their conduct,
that is to say, if they acted in the way
most likely to bring about the ends that
they deliberately desire, intelligence
would be enough to make the world
almost a paradise. In the main, what
is in the long run advantageous to one
man is also advantageous to another.
But men are actuated by passions which
distort their view; feeling an impulse
to injure others, they persuade themselves
that it is to their interest to do so.
They will not, therefore, act in the way
which is in fact to their own interest
unless they are actuated by generous
impulses which make them indifferent
to their own interest. This is why the
heart is as important as the head. By
the “heart” I mean, for the moment,
the sum-total of kindly impulses. Where
they exist, science helps them to be
effective; where they are absent,
science only makes men more cleverly
diabolic.
It may be laid down as a general
principle to which there are few exceptions
that, when people are mistaken
as to what is to their own interest, the
course they believe to be wise is more
harmful to others than the course that
really is wise. There are innumerable
examples of men making fortunes
because, on moral grounds, they did
something which they believed to be
contrary to their own interests. For
instance, among early Quakers there
were a number of shopkeepers, who
adopted the practice of asking no more
for their goods than they were willing
to accept, instead of bargaining with
each customer, as everybody else did.
They adopted this practice because
they held it to be a lie to ask more than
they would take. But the convenience
to customers was so great that everybody
came to their shops and they grew
rich. (I forget where I read this, but
if my memory serves me it was in some
reliable source). The same policy might
have been adopted from shrewdness,
but in fact no one was sufficiently
shrewd. Our unconscious is more
malevolent than it pays us to be;
therefore the people who do most
completely what is in fact to their
interest are those who, on moral
grounds, do what they believe to be
against their interest.
For this reason, it is of the greatest
importance to inquire whether any
method of strengthening kindly impulses
exists. I have no doubt that
their strength or weakness depends
upon discoverable physiological causes;
let us assume that it depends upon the
glands. If so, an international secret
society of physiologists could bring
about the millennium by kidnapping,
on a given day, all the rulers of the
world, and injecting into their blood
some substance which would fill them
with benevolence towards their fellow-creatures.
Suddenly M. Poincare would
wish well to Ruhr miners, Lord Curzon
to Indian nationalists, Mr. Smuts to
the natives of what was German South
West Africa, the American Government
to its political prisoners and its victims
in Ellis Island. But alas, the physiologists
would first have to administer the
love-philtre to themselves before they
would undertake such a task. Otherwise,
they would prefer to win titles
and fortunes by injecting military
ferocity into recruits. And so we come
back to the old dilemma: only kindliness
can save the world, and even if we
knew how to produce kindliness we
should not do so unless we were already
kindly. Failing that, it seems that the
solution which the Houynhnms adopted
towards the Yahoos, namely extermination,
is the only one; apparently the
Yahoos are bent on applying it to each
other.
We may sum up this discussion in a
few words. Science has not given men
more self-control, more kindliness, or
more power of discounting their passions
in deciding upon a course of action.
It has given communities more power
to indulge their collective passions,
but, by making society more organic,
it has diminished the part played by
private passions. Men’s collective
passions are mainly evil; far the
strongest of them are hatred and
rivalry directed towards other groups.
Therefore at present all that gives men
power to indulge their collective
passions is bad. That is why science
threatens to cause the destruction of
our civilization. The only solid hope
seems to lie in the possibility of world-wide
domination by one group, say the
United States, leading to the gradual
formation of an orderly economic and
political world-government. But
perhaps, in view of the sterility of the
Roman Empire, the collapse of our
civilization would in the end be
preferable to this alternative.
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made
consistent when a predominant preference was found
in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced
quotation marks were remedied when the change was
obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.