We must now turn from Turkey’s internal affairs to her
foreign relations. Turkish political history during the sixteenth
century was so interwoven with that of the European
states, the influence of Ottoman interference upon the wars
and negotiations of Christian princes was so marked, that
a study of Suleiman’s foreign relations becomes almost a
study of contemporary Europe.87 The two sultans who succeeded
Mohammed the Conqueror had not extended Turkish
power in Europe, Bayazid having failed in his attempts at
conquest, and Selim having turned his attention from Europe
to the East. This caused a period of transition and preparation
for the great events of Suleiman’s reign.
When Suleiman came to the throne, he found certain relations
established with Ragusa and Venice, the two commercial
cities of the Adriatic, whose large carrying trade
made an entente cordiale with the Porte very desirable.88
Ragusa was the first foreign state to reach the new sultan
with her congratulations on his accession,89 and the sultan
renewed with the Ragusan republic the commercial privileges
it had enjoyed in Egypt.
After Venice had been defeated by Turkey in the battle
of Sapienza in 1499 and had been obliged to sue for peace,
she had received the following answer from the then grand
vizir: “You can tell the doge that he has done wedding
the sea, it is our turn now.”90 This boast became steadily
more completely realized as Turkish conquest in the Mediterranean
continued, and Venice soon saw that her chance
of freedom on the seas lay in keeping on good terms
with the Turk, whom she could not conquer. In vain
she sought for help against the Moslems; in vain she carried
on a single‐handed struggle against their encroachments,
earning the title of “Bulwark of Christianity”.
Had she not “learned to kiss the hand that she could not
cut off,”91 she could not have continued to exist as even
the second‐rate power in the Levant to which she had been reduced.
Frequent missions were
sent from Venice to the Porte, and a Venetian baillie was
kept at the Porte. These baillies were very good statesmen,
and they not only kept Venice on good terms with Turkey
for thirty‐three years, but they made an invaluable contribution
to recorded history by sending frequent and detailed
reports to the signories.
Russia also sent an embassy to the Porte, after the conquests
of Belgrad and Rhodes had demonstrated the power
of Turkey; and the Tsar, recognizing the value of an alliance
with the Porte, made two attempts to form one, but
without success. Suleiman saw no advantage in such an
alliance, but he never assumed an unfriendly attitude towards
Russia, at that time still an unimportant power. In
a letter written later in his reign he recalls the amicable relations
that had existed between the Porte and Russia, and
recommends his Ottoman merchants to buy furs and merchandise
in Moscow.92
As Suleiman’s conquests naturally threw him into antagonism
with the House of Hapsburg, it is desirable to review
briefly the political conditions in the Holy Roman
Empire at this time.
The accession of Charles of Spain to the Imperial throne
took place in October of the same year as Suleiman’s accession,
1520. Handicapped in every possible way by the
German princes, for whose safety and prosperity the emperor
assumed the entire responsibility without receiving in
return any equivalent whatever,93 Charles V presented a
great contrast to Suleiman, whose slightest word was law
throughout his extensive dominions. With the empire,
Charles acquired the enmity of Francis I of France, his unsuccessful
rival, and hereafter his constant foe. Another
rival not outwardly so dangerous, but destined to be a great
source of anxiety and weakness to the empire was Ferdinand,
the emperor’s brother. Concerning him, Charles’
counsellor, de Chièvres, is reported to have said to Charles,94
“Do not fear the king of France nor any other prince except
your brother”. Ferdinand’s ambition had been early
recognized. His grandfather, Ferdinand of Aragon, had
attempted to construct an Italian kingdom for him, but
failed. Charles, after his election to the Empire, tried to
satisfy Ferdinand’s craving for power by conferring on
him the old Austrian provinces, and further by marrying
him to Anna, heiress of the kingdom of Hungary and
Bohemia, whose child‐king, Lewis, was weak physically and
not destined for a long reign. This opened to Ferdinand a
large sphere of activity in the southeast, and brought him
into direct contact with the steadily encroaching Suleiman;
a sphere that effectually absorbed his energies and made
him but a source of weakness to the Empire.
Thus Charles V, in name the imperial ruler of Central
Europe, was confronted with four rivals who desired to
divide with him the supremacy; Francis I, a relentless foe;
his brother Ferdinand, an ambitious claimant: the conquering
Suleiman; and the Protestant Revolt. The weakness
and disunion of Christendom was the strength of Suleiman,
and he was far too shrewd not to trade on it.
It had in fact been long since Europe had been sufficiently
united to oppose with any vigor the oncoming Turks. The
Popes of Rome had been the most persistent foes of Turkish
advance in Europe; notably Calixtus III, who in 1453 tried
in vain to save Europe from Mohammed’s conquering
armies; Pius II, who having for his master—thought the
freeing of Europe from Islam, preached a general crusade,
and even attempted to convert Mohammed by letter;
Paul II, who gave lavish aid to Scanderbeg and the armies
in Hungary and Albania in their struggle against Turkish
invasion; Alexander VI, who held Prince Jem, the mutinous
brother of Sultan Bayazid, as hostage for the friendliness
of the sultan whom he attacked after Jem’s death; and
Julius II, who planned a crusade early in the sixteenth century,
but failed to execute it.95 All this time Turkish conquest
continued practically unhindered. By the close of the
fifteenth century the Turks were accepted as a permanent
political factor in Europe. Nevertheless, when
Charles became a candidate for election to the headship of
the Holy Roman Empire, he emphasized his fitness for the
high office by alleging that his vast possessions, united to
the Imperial dignity, would enable him to oppose the Turks
successfully.96 But the sudden rise of revolt
within the Church tended to force the dread of Islam into
the background, even in the face of the loss of Belgrad and
Rhodes. At least such was the case with Charles V and the
German princes; it was of necessity otherwise with little
King Lewis, who saw with terror the preparations of the
Turkish conquerors for war to the death with Hungary.
As Suleiman’s conquests naturally threw him into antagonism
with Austria, equally naturally he had common interests
with Francis I. Friendly relations between the Porte
and France were not unprecedented, although strongly disapproved
by the more religious among the French. Commercial
agreements had existed for some time between the
two states.97 The accession of Francis I, January 1, 1515,
marked an epoch in the Eastern Question. Francis’ Oriental
policy began on the conventional lines; he made an
agreement with Leo X to drive the Turks from Europe but
refused to subsidize Hungary in the interests of this purpose.
The pope called for a truce in Europe and a crusade
against the common enemy, but the death of Maximilian
and the outbreak of the Protestant Revolt put a complete stop to
this plan. The only result was the extension of the circle
of European politics to include Eastern affairs and the
Ottoman Empire, and to bring the Eastern Question home
to all the European powers. Those who had been furthest
away were now drawn in; France, Spain, and even England
began to step within the circle of Eastern influence.
The battle of Pavia marked a crisis in European affairs.
The captivity of the French king, his falling into the hands
of his bitterest foe, Charles of Hapsburg, destroyed any
scruples that the French court had felt against seeking
Turkish aid. The first French mission to Suleiman I did
not reach the Porte, the ambassador being assassinated en
route.98 This first attempt was quickly followed by another.
The Croat Frangipani brought two letters to the Sultan, one
written by Francis from his Madrid prison, the other from
his distracted mother, the queen‐regent. Francis also sent
a letter to Ibrahim Pasha, who later gave an account of
this embassy to Cornelius Scepper and Hieronymus von
Zara, envoys of Ferdinand.99
“Post hec tempora, inquit Ibrahim, accedit quod rex
Francie captus fuit. Tunc mater ipsius regis ad ipsum
Caesarem Thurcarum scripsit hoc modo. ‘Filius meus Rex
Francie captus est à Carolo, Rege Hispanie. Speravi quod
ipse liberaliter ipsum demitteret. Id quo non fecit, sed
iniuste cum eo agit. Confugimus ad te magnum Caesarem
ut tu liberalitatem tuam ostendas et filium meum redimas’.”100
Frangipani demanded that Suleiman should undertake an
expedition by land and sea to deliver the king of France, who
otherwise would make terms which would leave Charles
master of the world. This exactly fitted into the plans of
Suleiman, whose European expeditions were naturally directed
against the possessions of the house of Hapsburg; so
he graciously acceded to all the demands of the French
mission. Ibrahim later stated101 that this embassy decided
the Sultan to prepare his army immediately for an expedition
into Hungary. The knowledge of this successful embassy
was one of the reasons that led Charles to sign the
Treaty of Madrid in January, 1526. By the time of this
treaty Francis promised to send five thousand cavalry and
fifteen thousand infantry against his recent allies, the
Turks,—but of course he had no intention of keeping his
word.
Since the capture of Belgrad by the Turks in 1521, hostilities
on the Hungarian frontier had never ceased, and the
Turkish danger had been constantly before the Reichstag
and in the mind of the Pope. In April, 1526, Suleiman started
with a large army for his first regular Hungarian campaign.
The Hungarian nobles, continually at feud with one another,
were utterly unprepared to resist him, and the treasury
was exhausted. The first city to be taken was Peterwardein,
which was stormed by Ibrahim Pasha. Then fell
Illok and Esek. But the decisive victory of the campaign
was the battle of Mohacz, August 29, 1526. In this brief
but bloody conflict little King Lewis fell, and the country
was laid open to the sultan. The keys of Buda, the capital of
Hungary, were handed over to him and he entered the city
on September 1st. In spite of the express prohibition of the
sultan, his soldiers accustomed to regard war as an opportunity
for rapine, burned two quarters of the city, including
the great church, while the akinji (scouts) burned
neighboring villages and slaughtered the peasants. Other
victories followed until at last the sultan, promising the
Hungarians that John Zapolya should be their king, withdrew
his army to Constantinople, carrying with him an
immense amount of booty.
The death at Mohacz of King Lewis without direct heirs
left the thrones of Hungary and Bohemia vacant. The
Archduke Ferdinand, as the husband of Lewis’ sister,
and recognized as Lewis’ successor by official acts of his
brother, the Emperor Charles, passed at the Diets of Worms
and Brussels on April 28, 1521, and March 18, 1522, was
the legal heir to the throne. But the sovereignty was
claimed also by John Zapolya, voivode of Transylvania, a
vigorous fighter and an unscrupulous politician. Both of
these claimants had themselves been recognized in Hungary
and crowned with the Iron Crown,102 and both of them
turned for substantial aid in support of their claims to
Suleiman, regardless of possible loss of independence.
Suleiman, as conqueror of the strongholds of Hungary, and
as a court of appeal for the rivals, considered himself to
have in his hand the disposition of the crown. He did
not want it himself. He had expressly declared that he invaded
Hungary to avenge insults, not to take the kingdom
from Lewis; but the death of the latter forced him to choose
between the two rival claimants. His word had been pledged
for the support of Zapolya, and his dislike of the Hapsburgs
and his friendship for the French king inclined him to
keep it.
Ferdinand and Zapolya both hastened to send embassies
to the Turks, Ferdinand taking the first step. He sent envoys
to Upper Bosnia and to Belgrad to ask the governors
to refuse aid to Zapolya, offering three to six thousand
ducats for their alliance.103 One of the governors died before
the embassy reached him, and from neither of them were
there any results from this mission.104 At the same time Ferdinand
attacked Zapolya, driving him from Ofen and back
towards Transylvania. Zapolya in distress despatched his
first mission to the Porte. His envoy, Hieronymus Laszky,
was empowered to effect a defensive and offensive alliance
with the sultan. The mission was successful, Suleiman accepting
Zapolya’s offer of devotion, and promising him
the crown of Hungary and the protection of the Porte
against his enemies.
Although the mission from Zapolya was kept as secret
as possible, it soon became known to Ferdinand, who dispatched
the embassy he had long planned, in the hope
of counteracting Zapolya’s move. One embassy failed to
reach Constantinople,105 and the first ambassadors from
the archduke of Austria to reach the Porte were John
Hobordonacz and Sigmund Weixelberger, in May, 1528.
They demanded the Kingship of Hungary for their master
Ferdinand, and the restoration to Hungary of all the places
taken by Suleiman. The sultan refused both of these demands
and in his turn offered to make peace on the payment
of tribute. The embassy accomplished nothing, its sequel
being the campaign in Hungary in 1529. Three days before
the final answer to Ferdinand, Suleiman had in full
divan delivered to Ibrahim a commission making him
serasker or general‐in‐chief of the expedition against the
Hapsburgs. The Peace of Cambrai in 1529 left the Austrians
free to fight the Turks.
In the meanwhile French diplomacy continued actively.
Francis I was disturbed by the result of the invasion of
Hungary which he had himself urged, for the kingdoms of
Hungary and Bohemia seemed now to be falling into the
hands of his enemies of Austria. More than ever he had
need of the Ottoman alliance, and he determined on an
alliance with Zapolya. He sent Rincon to the latter to form
an offensive and defensive alliance, claiming as his reward
the reversion of the kingdom of Hungary for his second
son, Henry, should Zapolya die without heirs.106 On the 20th
of September, 1528, Sultan Suleiman renewed a former act
called by old French historians “la trêve marchande,”107 giving
commercial privileges to the Catalonian and French
merchants in the Mediterranean, and placing all French factories,
consuls, and pilgrims, under the protection of the
Sublime Porte. The French were thus able to reappear
with confidence in the Levant, and were welcomed by the
Christians in the East. The pilgrimages to Jerusalem recommenced.
Even Francis expressed a desire to go to the
Holy Land and to visit en route “his dear patron and friend,
Suleiman.”108 A question concerning the Holy Places in
Palestine was also brought up by Francis at this time, which
is of very great significance, as it marks the beginning of
the train of developments that resulted in the conception of
the protection of Turkey’s Christian subjects by the European
Powers. Francis and Venice united in asking that a
certain church in Jerusalem, long before converted into a
mosque, be restored to the Christians.109 Ibrahim replied
that had the King of France demanded a province, the
Turks would not have refused him, but in a matter of religion
they could not gratify his desire. Nevertheless the
Sultan made the following general promise which was later
used as a basis for further demand by the Catholics. He
wrote to Francis:110 “The Christians shall live peaceably
under the wing of our protection; they shall be allowed to
repair their doors and windows; they shall preserve in all
safety their oratories and establishments which they actually
occupy, without any one being allowed to oppose or torment
them.”111
On the 10th day of May, 1529, Suleiman set out to settle
matters by force with Charles V. Before the end of August
the Turks were again encamped with a vast army on the
fatal plain of Mohacz. Here John Zapolya met his overlord
and did him homage. Three days later the Turks advanced
to Buda, and took it from Ferdinand, crowning
Zapolya a second time within the walls of the capital. By
September 27, Suleiman was encamped before Vienna.
On the 19th day of October, 1529, Ferdinand, in great
distress, wrote to his brother the Emperor; after referring
to the horrors that followed the siege of Vienna, he says:
“I do not know what he (Suleiman) intends to do,
whether to betake himself to his own country or to stay
in Hungary and fortify it and the fortresses, with the intention
of returning next spring to invade Christendom,
which I firmly believe he will do. I therefore beg you
Sire, to consider my great need and poverty, and that it
may please you not to abandon me but to assist me with
money.”112
The invasion of Austria had convinced Charles that he
must support Ferdinand against Turkey, and the royal
brothers agreed on their Oriental policy, namely, peace at
almost any price. To this end another embassy was fitted
out and despatched to treat with Suleiman. On the 17th
day of October, 1530, Nicholas Juritschitz and Joseph von
Lamberg arrived in Constantinople. Their instructions
were practically the same as those given Juritschitz the previous
year.113 The mission was hopeless from the start, for
the ambassadors could accept peace only on the condition of
the evacuation of Hungary by the Turks, and to this the
Sultan would not listen.
Ferdinand however, who had just failed in a military attack
on Zapolya and had accepted a truce, saw no hope but
in another embassy to the Porte. Therefore he sent Graf
Leonhard von Nogarola and Joseph von Lamberg, who were
to attempt to buy peace by the payment of annual pensions
to Suleiman and Ibrahim. The sultan, who had already left
Constantinople at the head of a great army for his fifth
Hungarian campaign, was intercepted at his camp near Belgrad
by the Austrian envoys. The only result of this embassy
was a letter to Ferdinand from Suleiman saying that
the latter was starting for Ofen, where he would treat with
Ferdinand in person, a threat which he followed up immediately.
By April, 1531, Suleiman was ready to avenge his failure
before Vienna. At Belgrad he was met by the French
ambassador Rincon. France was now anxious to prevent
the Sultan’s expedition against Austria, not in the interests
of the Hapsburgs but against them, for he was afraid that
the Turkish danger would unite Catholic and Protestant Germany
against the common foe of Christianity. Suleiman
received Rincon hospitably but assured him he had come too
late, for while on account of his friendship with the King of
France he would like to oblige the latter, he could not give
up the expedition without giving the world occasion to think
that he was afraid of the “King of Spain”, as he always
called Charles V.114
The Ottoman army entered Hungary. Fourteen fortresses
sent the Sultan their keys as he approached.115 But
the forces did not advance to Vienna as their enemies expected,
but turned into Styria and besieged the little town
of Güns. For three weeks seven hundred brave defenders
held the little fort against the might of Turkish arms, and
finally made a highly honorable capitulation. After a
general devastation of the country and much looting, the
great army of Suleiman returned to Constantinople. Suleiman
was incited to this course by the active preparations
which were being made by Charles and Ferdinand to receive
him at Vienna, and by the naval successes in the Mediterranean
of Andrea Doria, admiral of the Italian fleet.
Thus what promised to be a great duel between the two
“Masters of the World” was allowed by both of them to
degenerate into a plundering expedition.
Affairs in Persia were in great need of Suleiman’s presence,
and the capture of Koron and Patras by Doria made
the Sultan more ready to listen to overtures of peace.
Charles and Ferdinand took advantage of this fact to send
Hieronymus von Zara and Cornelius Duplicius Schepper to
the Porte in 1533. The ambassadors, after weeks of patience
and adroitness succeeded in winning from the Sultan
a treaty of peace, to last as long as Ferdinand should remain
peaceful. Ferdinand was to retain the forts he had
taken in Hungary and Zapolya to keep the others; the
Emperor Charles might make peace by sending his own
embassy to the Porte. As soon as Ferdinand received the
news of this humiliating success, he sent word all over the
kingdom, to Carniola, Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia that
any violation of the truce would be severely punished; “denn
daran ... mug der Turghisch Kaeser erkhennen dass wir den
Frieden angenommen derselben zu halten gaentzlich entschlossen
und so dawider gehandelt wurf, dass mit ernst zu
shafen willen haben.”116 Such were the humiliating terms
of the first peace concluded by the House of Austria with
the Porte (1533).
Shortly after the embassy of von Zara and Schepper,
Suleiman left Europe to wage war against the Persians. As
usual when planning a campaign in one direction, he made
careful arrangements to keep matters quiet on other frontiers.
He treated in secret with Francis I, agreeing to
despatch Barbarosa with a fleet to ravage the coasts of the
Empire; this was a great success for French diplomacy, for
the advantage was all in favor of France. Then, fearing lest
the rivals for the Hungarian throne should come to an
agreement in his absence, and thus menace his suzerainty,
Suleiman delegated Luigi Gritti to determine the frontiers
between the possessions of the two kings. This was a clever
move, for it prolonged the intrigues between the royal competitors
until the return of the sultan. The successes of Barbarosa,
the victories and defeats of Charles V on the Mediterranean,
and the continuation of French diplomacy are
outside the limits of our subject, which ends with the death
of Ibrahim Pasha in 1535. Gévay preserves several letters
written by Ferdinand to Ibrahim in 1535–6, in the interest of
peace in Hungary, the last being dated March 14, 1536, a
year after Ibrahim’s death. The last international act in
which Ibrahim Pasha had a part was the celebrated treaty
of commerce made with France in February, 1535.
Francis I had received a Turkish mission, not from the
haughty Sultan, but from his admiral Barbarosa,117 and in
return the king sent a clever diplomat named La Forest, to
thank Barbarosa for his kind offers of aid, and then to
seek the sultan in Persia and conclude a definite treaty with
him.118 Suleiman received La Forest in his military camp,
keeping him till his own return to Turkey in 1535.
The treaty is dated February, 1535; it formed the basis of
the economic, religious, and political protectorate of France
in the Levant. The French might carry on commerce
in the Levant by paying the same dues as did the subjects
of the Sultan, and the Turks could do the same in France.
The French were to be judged by their consul at Alexandria
or by their ambassador at Constantinople. This treaty
ended the commercial predominance of Venice in the Mediterranean.
After this, all Christians except the Venetians
were forced to put themselves under the protection of the
French flag, which alone guaranteed inviolability.119 This
commercial freedom and political influence gained by
France involved a sort of economic protection and was
supplemented by a religious protectorate over the Catholics
in the Levant and the Holy Places.
After this sketch of the beginnings of diplomatic relations
between the Porte and the two rival powers of Europe,
the House of Hapsburg and the House of Valois, we are
ready to consider the significance of these relations and to
take up some of the details that will serve to bring out the
share of Ibrahim Pasha in Turkish diplomacy, and his
characteristics as a diplomat.
Diplomatic relations between the Porte and Europe, relations
other than those of conqueror and conquered, relations
reciprocal and more or less friendly, began in the reign of
Suleiman I, and the first French embassy to the Porte in
1526 already described was the beginning of a complete
change in the European attitude towards Turkey. Before
this time, the religious differences between Moslem and
Christian had effectually absorbed attention, but now political
interests began to push aside religious concern. The
masses of the people in Europe still feared a Moslem invasion
of the North, but this was no longer a real danger.
A general rising of Christians, such as a crusade, was no
longer necessary to hold back the Turk; the regular means
and the ordinary efforts of a few states combined sufficed, as
was proved by the successful resistance of Güns and Vienna.
It was decreed that the Turk was not to pass Vienna.
Francis might therefore seek the friendship of the Ottoman
without betraying the cause of Christianity. There
were, it is true, plenty of Christians who cried out against
the impious alliance of the Crescent and the Lily,120 but the
outcry was largely political and as we have seen soon even
the Austrians were seeking terms of peace with the Turks.
When Suleiman came to the throne, he attended closely
to the business of government, but by 1526 he was leaving
practically the whole responsibility on the shoulders of his
grand vizir Ibrahim. Ambassadors to the Porte had their
first audience always with Ibrahim, after which they sometimes
had audiences with the other vizirs. Generally a very
formal ceremony of hand‐kissing was permitted by the
Sultan, after which Ibrahim concluded the business. At
some audiences with the grand vizir, Suleiman would be
present, concealed behind a little window,121 but oftener he
was not present at all.
In his early diplomatic work, Ibrahim, feeling himself
unprepared, turned to Luigi Gritti, natural son by a Greek
mother of Andreas Gritti, who had been ambassador and
at one time doge of Venice. Ibrahim was very well
served by Luigi Gritti, who was intelligent as well as experienced,
especially in Christian dealings, clever, able, and
tactful.122 Zapolya’s ambassador Laszky, knowing this, persuaded
Gritti to take up his affairs, hoping through him to
win Ibrahim, and through Ibrahim, Suleiman. The event
justified him.123 Ibrahim frankly acknowledged Gritti’s influence,
saying to Laszky: “Without the Doge Gritti and
his son we should have destroyed the power of Ferdinand
and of thy master (Zapolya), for the conflict of two enemies
who ruin each other is always favorable to the third who
survives.”
We may get an idea of the manner of conducting embassies
at the Porte, as well as the functions and characteristics
of Ibrahim as diplomat as such by following the report
of Hobordanacz to Ferdinand. Hobordanacz sent an
official and detailed report of the embassy to his master,
written in Latin, which is preserved in Gévay’s Urkunden
und Actenstuecke.124
The two ambassadors Hobordanacz and Weixelberger
were received with splendor on their entrance into Constantinople
by a guard of four hundred knights, and were immediately
conducted to the grand vizir. This ceremonious
reception greatly encouraged the hopes of Hobordanacz.125
After greetings to Ibrahim, “Supremum Nomine”, the
Hungarians offered him presents and then retired to quarters
assigned them. On the third day forty horsemen escorted
the royal nuncios to the Imperial palace. Hobordanacz
was greatly impressed with the splendid array of janissaries
and guards in gorgeous costumes. They were received by
the three vizirs, Ibrahim, Cassim, and Ayas Pasha, while
from his little window his Majesty watched the audience,
himself unseen.
Amidst profound silence, Ibrahim Pasha addressed the
first nuncio, asking him politely whether they were treated
well in their quarters, to which Hobordanacz answered that
they had everything in abundance, as was fitting in the
palace of so great an emperor. Ibrahim then began to interrogate
them concerning the journey and their king, explaining
that he was not asking about the king of Hungary,
for Lewis of Hungary had been killed in battle, but was
inquiring about the king of Bohemia and Germany. The
Hungarian nuncios took the opportunity to boast of the
greatness of Ferdinand, provoking a smile from Ibrahim.
Hobordanacz said they had come to admire and to congratulate
the emperor of the Turks that God had made him
a nearer neighbor to Ferdinand than previously. He said
that the Emperor Maximilian had given Hungary to Ferdinand,
whereupon Ibrahim broke in: “By what right, when
Sultan Suleiman has subjugated Hungary?” He asked
them if they did not know that the Sultan had been to Buda.
The Hungarians responded rudely that there were signs
enough by which they could know of Suleiman’s visit, as the
country lay waste. Ibrahim went on: “The fortress of
Buda, how does it stand?” “Whole and undamaged,” they
replied. When he asked why, they suggested that it was
because it was the king’s castle. Ibrahim denied this and
said it was because the sultan had saved the citadel for himself,
and intended to keep it with divine aid. Ibrahim here
explained that Suleiman and he had not wished so much
harm done in Hungary, and had ordered the soldiers not
to burn Buda and Pesth, but could not hold them back from
devastating. This was naturally a sore subject with the
Hungarians who after expressions of admiration for the
great obedience they saw in Turkey, even when the sultan
was not present, asked pertinently why then he could not
have saved Buda and Pesth. This seems to have been too
much for Ibrahim who remarked “Let us omit these things.”
Turning therefore to a more congenial subject, he uttered
a Turkish dictum, “Wherever the hoof of the sultan’s horse
has trod, there the land belongs to him.” Hobordanacz
replied somewhat sarcastically that they knew such was the
sultan’s idea, but that even Alexander the Great had not
been able to carry out all his ideas. Cutting through all
these generalities, Ibrahim said sharply, “Then you say that
Buda does not belong to Suleiman!” Hobordanacz replied
stoutly, “I can say no more than that my king holds Buda.”
Said Ibrahim, “Why has he then sent you to ask for peace
and friendship if he holds Buda, which the sultan has conquered?”
The nuncio told a long story of Zapolyta’s usurpation
of the throne, and of Ferdinand’s merits to which
Ibrahim sarcastically remarked, “You have talked of the
many virtues of your lord! Very noble if they be true!”
He then asked Hobordanacz if he were a relative of Ferdinand’s
and how long he had served the Archduke. The
nuncio replied that he had served him since the latter became
king of Hungary. “Then,” said the pasha triumphantly,
“if you have served him so short a time, how do you
know he is so wise and virtuous and powerful?” A curious
contest of wits followed with no practical object.
Ibrahim: “Tell us what wisdom you see in Ferdinand
and how you know that he is wise.”
Hobor.: “Because when he has won great victories, he
ascribes the glory to God.”
I.: “What does wisdom seem to you to be like?”
H.: “In our books and in yours, the beginning of wisdom
is said to be the fear of God.”
I.: “True, but what other wisdom do you find in Ferdinand?”
H.: “He works deliberately and with foresight and
taking of counsel; also he undertakes no affairs
that he cannot finish.”
I.: “If he does this, he is praiseworthy. Now what
boldness and courage do you find in him?”
Ibrahim’s next question as to the victories of Ferdinand
received a long and clever answer. Ibrahim further inquired
as to Ferdinand’s wealth. Hobordanacz claimed
endless treasure for his master. Ibrahim then asked, “What
have you to say about the power of your master?” Hobordanacz
claimed many powerful friends and neighbors, the
greatest being his brother Charles. Ibrahim inflicted one
of his battle‐axe strokes; “We know that these so‐called
friends and neighbors are his enemies.” The Hungarian
replied sententiously, “Unhappy is the king without rivals,
whom all favor.” Ibrahim at length stopped the discussion
of Ferdinand’s merits by saying, “If this be so, it is well.”
Then he asked whether they came in peace or in war, to
which Hobordanacz replied that Ferdinand wished friendship
from all his neighbors and enmity from none.
After this sprightly introduction, Ibrahim led the nuncios
in a brilliant procession to the presence of the sultan. Here
the janissaries received gifts for the sultan from the servants
of the ambassadors, and showed them to all in turn;
in the next room seven eunuchs took the gifts and spread
them out on tables. The three pashas first went to salute
Suleiman, leaving the nuncios before the door. Ibrahim
Pasha and Cassim Pasha then, holding them by their two
arms, led each of the nuncios in turn to salute the sultan,
who sat with his hands on his knees and looked them over.
When they had saluted him, they returned to their place
by the door where stood the interpreter. Hobordanacz
was greatly annoyed because the interpreter, familiar with
the flowery and courtly Oriental speech, embellished the
somewhat curt address of the Hungarian, but Ibrahim told
the interpreter to repeat exactly what the envoy said. After
this he asked Hobordanacz to state his business. After this
statement of Ferdinand’s wishes, Suleiman called Ibrahim
to him and whispered in his ear. Ibrahim then resumed
negotiations while Suleiman looked on.
Taking up his grievance against Ferdinand once again,
Ibrahim inquired how the latter, in addressing the Sultan,
dared declare himself so powerful when other princes were
content to commend themselves to Suleiman’s protection
and to offer him their services. To Hobordanacz’ question
who these princes were, Ibrahim named the rulers of
France, Poland, and Transylvania, the Pope and the Doge
of Venice, and added that these princes (except the voivode
of Transylvania) were the greatest in Europe. The Austrian
nuncios seemed to be impressed and indeed the statement
was a sufficiently startling one and was moreover borne out
by the facts. After that Hobordanacz spoke with greater
meekness, expressing his master’s desire for the friendship
of the sultan, if the latter were willing to grant it. “If
he is not willing,” said Ibrahim sharply, “what then?”
Hobordanacz, recovering his boldness, said haughtily, “Our
master forces no man’s friendship.” Ibrahim then dismissed
them with the parting fling that the sultan was occupied
with much more important business. They never
saw the sultan again. Ibrahim informed them that his
master was concerned with personal affairs, and that he
himself would conduct the whole business. This illustrates
the respective shares of Suleiman and Ibrahim in
the business of the state. Doubtless the sultan had a definite
policy of friendship to Zapolya and antagonism to
Ferdinand, but it appears certain that he allowed Ibrahim
Pasha to control entirely the details of diplomacy.
In later audiences with the grand vizir, Hobordanacz expressed
the hope that Ferdinand and Charles V and Sultan
Suleiman might become good friends and neighbors. Ibrahim
inquired scornfully how such a friendship could come
about! Hobordanacz declared that it was his mission to
offer friendship, and it seemed to him that Ibrahim’s influence
should be able to bring about advantages for both
sides. Ibrahim again urged him to indicate the method of
procedure, saying, “Your king has seized upon our kingdom,
and yet he asks for friendship; how can that be?”
The nuncio said he knew all things at the Porte were done
by Ibrahim’s will and authority; he believed that he could
serve their cause. Ibrahim then proposed peace on condition
that Ferdinand should abandon Hungary. Hobordanacz
on the other hand asked for a definite truce for a term
of years and requested the restitution to Ferdinand of those
portions of Hungary taken by Suleiman, giving a list of
twenty‐seven fortresses. This aroused Ibrahim’s bitter
wrath. “It is strange” said he “that your master does
not ask for Constantinople.” He tried to make the ambassadors
acknowledge that Ferdinand would attempt to take
these forts by force if they were not conceded to him.
“With what hope does he ask for these forts,” he further
inquired, “when he knows that the sultan took them with
great labor and much bloodshed?”
The question of compensation for these forts being opened,
Ibrahim exclaimed indignantly that the sultan was not so
poor that he would sell what his arms had won. Dramatically
opening a window he said “Do you see those Seven
Towers! they are filled with gold and treasure.”126 He
then turned to the question of skill in war, and after praising
the prowess of the Germans, he said, “You know the
arms of the Turks, how sharp they are, and how far they
have penetrated, for you have fled before them many times.”
Hobordanacz gave a qualified assent, but praised his master’s
warlike skill. Ibrahim finally broke in, “Then your master
wishes to keep those forts?” Hobordanacz suggested a
middle course, but the grand vizir said decisively: “There
is no other way but for your king to abandon Buda and
Hungary and then we will treat with him about Germany.”
Upon Hobordanacz’ refusal to consider such terms Ibrahim
stated, “I conquered Lewis and Hungary, and now I will
build the bridges of the Sultan, and prepare a way for his
Majesty into Germany.” He closed the interview by accusing
Ferdinand and Charles of not keeping faith and said
he would give the nuncios a final reply in three or four days.
The third audience was held in the palace, with Ibrahim
presiding, and Suleiman at his window, and was conducted
on similar lines to the other audiences. Ibrahim informed
the Hungarians that their master had just been defeated by
Zapolya with an army of thirty‐six thousand men, which
statement Hobordanacz took the liberty of doubting, saying
that if Zapolya added all the cocks and hens in Transylvania
to his army, he could not make up the number to thirty‐six
thousand. The nuncios and the grand vizir could not
agree on terms of alliance; to the Austrian demands, Ibrahim
impatiently exclaimed: “The Emperor Charles and
your master, what do they want more? to rule the whole
earth? Do they count themselves no less than the gods?”
Naturally nothing was accomplished by such recrimination,
and finally Suleiman ended the audience, dismissing the ambassadors
with the threat: “Your master has not yet felt our
friendship and neighborliness, but he shall soon feel it.
You can tell your master frankly that I myself with all
my forces will come to him to give Hungary in our person
the fortresses he demands. Inform him that he must
be ready to treat me well.”
So ended the mission of Ferdinand for peace. There had
been no possibility of success from the beginning. Suleiman
and Ibrahim were not to be won to friendship for
Ferdinand, and had they been, the rude, independent Hobordanacz
was not the man to gain Oriental favor. One feels
that Ibrahim enjoyed the opportunity to sharpen his claws
on an enemy, and to show Europeans his own power and
that of his master. The envoys must have been very uncomfortable,
and their discomforts were not yet at an end,
for a Venetian enemy of Ferdinand’s told Ibrahim that they
were not ambassadors but spies, and urged their detention
at the Porte. For five months they were kept in close confinement,
after which a long journey lay between them and
the anxious Archduke who had hoped so much from the
embassy.
This treatment of royal ambassadors as though they were
spies was not uncommon at the Porte. The King of Poland
had been forced to complain of the rough handling of his
envoys by Sultan Bayazid (Suleiman’s grandfather), saying
they were not only detained for months before they were
given audience, but were thrown into prison, and instead of
being lodged like the envoys of a king, who would naturally
feel that it accorded with his honor to send only the sons of
the noblest families to represent him, were treated as criminals,
and that promises made to such envoys were often
broken.127 Busbequius, himself an ambassador, who was detained
for months and sharply watched, recounted another
instance, that of Malvezzi, whom the Sultan held responsible
for the broken faith of his master Ferdinand, and threw
into prison when Ferdinand took Transylvania in 1551.128 It
was a Turkish maxim that ambassadors were responsible for
the word given by their masters, and that in their capacity
as hostages they must expiate its violation; moreover power
was often conceived to reside in an ambassador, who
therefore was kept in durance in the hope that he could be
brought to terms. Such treatment, however naïve and
unjust, is nevertheless an improvement on the reception by
Hungary of the ambassador sent to announce the accession
of Suleiman, whose nose and ears were slit. Further illustrations
of the way ambassadors were liable to be treated
in Europe were the assassination of Rincon, envoy of
France, connived at by Charles V, and the murder of Martinez,
a Spanish ambassador to the Porte, instigated by
Ferdinand.
Ibrahim’s usual way of opening an audience was to brow‐beat
the ambassador, and he indulged in frequent sarcasm
and scornful laughter. To the envoys of Ferdinand in
1532 he railed at Ferdinand and “his tricks” and gibed at
his faithlessness. “How is a man a king” he said “unless
he keeps his word?”129 To Lamberg and Juritschitz (1530)130
he spoke of the quarrels among Christian rulers, twitting
his auditors with Charles’s treatment of the Pope and of
Francis I, declaring that the Turks would never do “so inhuman
a thing,” and following this by a long talk “full of
scorn and irony.”131
Ibrahim was enormously inquisitive, seeming to look upon
a foreign embassy as an opportunity for gaining all sorts of
general information. Sometimes he asked about such practical
matters as the fortification of certain forts; at other
times he asked such trivial questions as how old the
rulers were, and how they pronounced their names. He
once remarked that a man who did not try to learn all
things is an incompetent man. Several times he boasted
that in Turkey they knew all that was taking place in
Europe.
His manner, as we have seen, was usually sharp and rude,
but he could be elaborately courteous when he wished to
please, as when he received an embassy from “our good
friend” Francis I, and the Hungarian embassy of 1534.
He was invariably boastful; during the earlier years he
bragged of the sultan, his power and treasure; in the later
embassies he boasted of himself.
One of the most important documents about Ibrahim that
we possess is the account of the peace embassy sent by Ferdinand
in 1533, the report being written by Hieronymus
von Zara in Latin in September, 1533. This shows Ibrahim
in a sharper light than we have had elsewhere, and brings
out some traits in his character that have been growing
steadily since his rise to such great power: his ambition
and his towering pride.132
Ibrahim, splendidly clad, received the ambassadors for
their first audience, without rising. He accepted the rich
jewels they offered him, and appointed a later day for the
business of the treaty. On the appointed day the envoys
were permitted to kiss the garments of the grand vizir, and
they saluted him as brother of their sovereigns, Ferdinand
and Queen Marie of Hungary. Ibrahim had never acknowledged
the sovereignty of Ferdinand, and had always spoken
of him without any kingly title, to the amaze of the ambassadors.133
In this interview and throughout the whole
conference Ibrahim spoke of Ferdinand as his brother, and
as son to Suleiman. This was not mere personal vanity;
under the pretext of the community of good which should
exist between father and son he cloaked the Sultan’s usurpation
of Hungary, and the fraternity of Ferdinand and
Ibrahim served to disguise the humiliation of the former,
who was placed in the same rank as a vizir.134 But in the
long speech that Ibrahim Pasha made to the ambassadors,
he revealed his personal pride. We quote from the speech:
“It is I who govern this vast empire. What I do is done;
I have all the power, all offices, all the rule. What I wish
to give is given and cannot be taken away; what I do not
give is not confirmed by any one. If ever the great Sultan
wishes to give, or has given anything, if I do not please it
is not carried out. All is in my hands, peace, war, treasure.
I do not say these things for no reason, but to give you
courage to speak freely.”135
When the letters of Emperor Charles were shown him,
he examined the seals, remarking as he did so: “My master
has two seals, of which one remains in his hands and the
other is confided to me, for he wishes no difference between
him and me; and if he has garments made for himself, he
orders the same for me; he refuses to let me expend anything
in building; this hall was built by him.”
Ibrahim seems to have lost his head during this, his last
embassy, and to have uttered things that were not safe
for any subject of an Oriental despot, however doting, to
utter. Whether he spoke out of the sheer madness that the
gods send upon those whom they would destroy, or whether
he seriously aspired to assume literally and explicitly the
power he held actually is impossible to say. Even as grand
vizir of Turkey he seems never to have forgotten that he was
a Greek. For years he ignored it, and behaved like a Turk
and a loyal Moslem, but as he came to feel more secure in
his high position, he became more careless, and spoke to
these Christian ambassadors of the pride and generosity
with which the Greeks are filled. It is a question whether
any Greek, from the fall of Byzantium to our time, has not
in his inmost heart felt his race superior to his Moslem
conquerors, and the fitting ruler of the Eastern Empire. To
that feeling are due some of the knottiest complexities in the
Young Turk situation of 1911. Naturally this attitude has
always been profoundly resented by the Turks; therefore
Ibrahim was seriously jeopardizing his standing with the
Ottoman Sultan when he remembered that he was both
Greek and Christian by birth.
There were plenty at the court to take immediate advantage
of any such slip. The courtiers had already been scandalized
at the freedom the Pasha took with the Sultan, and
thought that he had bewitched Suleiman.136 In the same
interview he further expresses his relations to his imperial
master in a parable:
The fiercest of animals, the lion, must be conquered not by
force, but by cleverness; by the food which his master gives it
and by the influence of habit. Its guardian should carry a
stick to intimidate it, and should be the only one to feed it. The
lion is the prince. The Emperor Charles is a lion. I, Ibrahim
Pasha, control my master, the Sultan of the Turks, with
the stick of truth and justice. Charles’ ambassador should
also control him in the same way.
From this he went on to expatiate on his own power:
The mighty Sultan of the Turks has given to me, Ibrahim,
all power and authority. It is I alone who do everything.
I am above all the pashas. I can elevate a groom to
a pasha. I give kingdoms and provinces to whom I will, without
inquiry even from my master. If he orders a thing and
I disapprove, it is not executed; but if I order a thing and he
disapproves, it is done nevertheless. To make war or conclude
peace is in my hands, and I can distribute all treasure.
My master’s kingdoms, lands, treasure, are confided to me.
He also boasted of his past accomplishments, speaking
of himself as having conquered Hungary, received ambassadors,
and made peace. If Suleiman knew of these vauntings,
he made no sign of resentment, but continued to repose
the same confidence in Ibrahim as hitherto, but the
courtiers held them in their hearts to use when the time
should come.
Ibrahim’s importance and influence are taken for granted
by foreign rulers and envoys. In all his instructions to his
ambassadors Ferdinand tells them to see Ibrahim first, and
the queen regent of France wrote to him, when she wrote to
the sultan. The collections of Gévay and Charrière contain
a number of letters from Ferdinand and Francis to Ibrahim.
The Venetian baillies transacted all their business with
Ibrahim and sent many reports to the Signoria of his power
in the state and his influence over the sultan. The envoys
brought him valuable presents which he did not hesitate to
accept.137 He loved to receive jewels and there was a famous
ruby once on the finger of Francis I which was sent
by the first French envoy to the Porte, (the envoy who was
killed in Bosnia) and which somehow came into Ibrahim’s
possession when the Pasha of Bosnia was called to Constantinople
to account for the murder.138
But although Ibrahim took presents, and even resented it
if they were not offered him, he refused bribes again and
again. Ferdinand empowered his envoys in three missions
to offer an annual pension to Suleiman (a tribute under a
name less offensive to Ferdinand) and at the same time an
annual pension to the grand vizir. When Juritschitz and
Lamberg offered Ibrahim five to six thousand Hungarian
ducats139 annually for his aid in bringing about peace, he rejected
it so indignantly that they apologized and withdrew
their offer. He said that the previous ambassadors Hobordanacz
and Weixelberger had offered him one hundred
thousand florins to buy his protection, but that he said then
and would now repeat that no sort of present could make
him desert the interests of his master, and that he would
prefer to aid in the conquest of the whole world than advise
the Sultan to restore conquered territory.140
The passage just quoted would seem sufficient to disprove
the assertion made by contemporary European historians
that Ibrahim Pasha had lifted the siege of Vienna
because he had been bought by the gold of the ambassadors.
Suleiman gave him everything that he could have asked and
much more than lay in the power of any European monarch
to bestow. Ibrahim acquired vast wealth, but there is no
evidence that his loyalty to Suleiman could be purchased,
and while the Turkish historians speak often of the avarice
of his successor Rustem Pasha, they never ascribe that
quality to Ibrahim. If he had a price, it was too high for
Ferdinand to pay.
It is apparent from what has been said that Ibrahim’s
diplomatic methods were not subtle; they had no need to
be. As the diplomacy of the Porte was usually either the
introduction to, or the conclusion of a military campaign,
small wonder that it usually attained its object. As the
favor of the Porte was eagerly sought by France, Venice,
Poland, Russia, Hungary and Austria, it required no
finesse of diplomatic handling to deal with their ambassadors.
Ibrahim, holding all the trumps, needed no great
skill to play his cards well. He might be as rude and boastful
as he would, and still the ambassadors would beg for
his influence in making peace. Both Suleiman and Ibrahim
treated Charles V and Ferdinand with great haughtiness,
nevertheless pursuing an entirely successful policy; France,
on the other hand, playing a subtle game, won considerable
from the Porte. It would seem that the test of Turkish
diplomacy was not its method but its general plan and
large lines. The question then before us is, what were the
objects and accomplishments of Turkish diplomacy between
1525 and 1540.
Suleiman had two objects, first to extend his conquering
power further into Europe, and second to assist Francis I
against the House of Hapsburg. In these two objects he
was successful. His empire was greatly extended during his
reign, both in territory and in influence, while the power of
the rival House of Hapsburg was steadily diminished and
limited. But that which makes of this period an epoch in
European political history is not the territorial aggrandizement
of Turkey, nor the recognition of its power by
Europe, but the first entrance of Turkey into the European
concert, if we may anticipate a later term, and the change
from the consideration of the Turks as merely unbelievers
and foes of Christianity to regarding them as political
allies or foes, and as possible factors in the European question.
At the close of the reign of Selim the Grim, Turkey,
although it was a conquering nation, was still an excrescence
in Europe. But the time had come when it must enter
into the affairs of the Northern nations, and for that time
Suleiman, unusually tolerant towards the West, with a great
idea of the destiny of Turkey, and aided by his Christian
grand vizir, was ready, and by the end of his reign he had
made himself felt in every court on the continent, and had
to be reckoned with in every European cabinet. But as a
natural corollary to this fact, Turkey was never, after this
time, wholly free from European influence. The fine wedge
of French intervention was introduced by La Forest in the
treaty of 1535, and conservative Turks of today look on
Suleiman’s “capitulations” as the beginning of endless
troubles for Turkey, while the French still rejoice over the
triumphs of astute and far‐sighted Francis I. “Suleiman en
sortant de son farouche isolement,” says Zeller, “François
Ier en bravant les préventions de ses contemporains, accomplirent
une véritable revolution dans la politique de
l’Europe.”141 For four centuries France remained the most
weighty foreign influence at the Porte. A fuller significance
lay in what Lord Stratford de Redcliffe called the
“extra‐koranic” character of the concessions made in this
reign, the introduction of extra‐koranic legislation in both
foreign and internal affairs, by the side of the maxims and
rules of the Sheri or Holy Law. Turkey began to discover
the inadequacy of Koran legislation for a modern state.142
How much did Ibrahim Pasha influence Suleiman in this
policy? He undoubtedly had the details in his own hands,
but did he inspire the plan? Probably not. Suleiman knew
pretty clearly what he wanted, and he pursued the same
policy with the same success after the death of Ibrahim.
His contemporaries ascribed to Ibrahim the brain and the
force of Turkish diplomacy, and later historians have given
to him the exclusive credit of this political evolution. But
Zeller’s view143 that too much importance may be given to
the rôle of Ibrahim Pasha seems better substantiated.
Zeller, nevertheless, in his introduction to La Diplomatie
Française, accords to Ibrahim just that credit that peculiarly
belongs to him, if we have rightly understood the work of
the grand vizir, when he says: “Suleiman was not less enlightened
than Francis; he had, as well as the latter, the
knowledge of his own interests, and like him he was partially
enfranchised from the prejudices of his nation....
At the same time we cannot doubt but that the grand vizir,
whose ability and enlightenment are attested by all the
ambassadors, contributed to open the mind of his master
to the ideas outside his realm, to initiate him into a European
Policy, to make him see the menace of the increasing power
of Charles V, and the interest which he had to support
France”. In the unusual liberality of thought and freedom
from prejudice that Suleiman showed in his relation to
Europe, we may see the influence of his intelligent favorite.
Thus the two together, Suleiman and Ibrahim, or Ibrahim
and Suleiman, as Ferdinand often spoke of them, started
the Ottoman Empire from the lonely path of independence
and semibarbarism to the labyrinthine and noisy streets of
European politics.
