GREEK AGE OF INQUIRY.
RISE AND DECLINE OF PHYSICAL SPECULATION.
Ionian Philosophy, commencing from Egyptian Ideas, identifies in
Water, or Air, or Fire, the First Principle.—Emerging from the Stage
of Sorcery, it founds Psychology, Biology, Cosmogony, Astronomy, and
ends in doubting whether there is any Criterion of Truth.
Italian Philosophy depends on Numbers and Harmonies.—It
reproduces the Egyptian and Hindu Doctrine of Transmigration.
Eleatic Philosophy presents a great Advance, indicating a rapid
Approach to Oriental Ideas.—It assumes a Pantheistic Aspect.
Rise of Philosophy in European Greece.—Relations and Influence of
the Mediterranean Commercial and Colonial System.—Athens attains
to commercial Supremacy.—Her vast Progress in Intelligence and Art.—Her
Demoralization.—She becomes the Intellectual Centre of the
Mediterranean.
Commencement of the Athenian higher Analysis.—It is conducted by The
Sophists, who reject Philosophy, Religion, and even Morality, and end
in Atheism.
Political Dangers of the higher Analysis.—Illustration from the Middle
Ages.
Origin of
Greek philosophy.
In Chapter II. I have described the origin and decline of
Greek Mythology; in this, I am to relate the
first European attempt at philosophizing. The
Ionian systems spring directly out of the contemporary
religious opinions, and appear as a phase in
Greek comparative theology.
Contrasted with the psychical condition of India, we
cannot but be struck with the feebleness of these first
European efforts. They correspond to that period in
which the mind has shaken off its ideas of sorcery, but
has not advanced beyond geocentral and anthropocentral
conceptions. As is uniformly observed, as soon as man has
Its imperfections.
collected what he considers to be trustworthy data, he forthwith
applies them to a cosmogony, and develops
pseudo-scientific systems. It is not until a later
period that he awakens to the suspicion that we have no
absolute knowledge of truth.
The reader, who might, perhaps, be repelled by the
apparent worthlessness of the succession of Greek opinions
now to be described, will find them assume an interest, if
considered in the aggregate, or viewed as a series of steps
or stages of European approach to conclusions long before
arrived at in Egypt and India. Far in advance of anything
that Greece can offer, the intellectual history of
India furnishes systems at once consistent and imposing—systems
not remaining useless speculations, but becoming
inwoven in social life.
Commences
in Asia Minor.
Greek philosophy is considered as having originated
with Thales, who, though of Phœnician descent,
was born at Miletus, a Greek colony in Asia
Minor, about B.C. 640. At that time, as related in the last
chapter, the Egyptian ports had been opened to foreigners
by Psammetichus. In the civil war which that monarch
had been waging with his colleagues, he owed his success
to Ionian and other Greek mercenaries whom he had
employed; but, though proving victor in the contest, his
political position was such as to compel him to depart
from the maxims followed in his country for so many
thousand years, and to permit foreigners to have access to
it. Hitherto the Europeans had been only known to the
Egyptians as pirates and cannibals.
Doctrine of
Thales
is derived
from Egypt.
From the doctrine of Thales, it may be inferred that,
though he had visited Egypt, he had never been
in communication with its sources of learning,
but had merely mingled among the vulgar, from whom he
had gathered the popular notion that the first principle is
water. The state of things in Egypt suggests
that this primitive dogma of European philosophy
was a popular notion in that country. With but
little care on the part of men the fertilizing Nile-water
yielded those abundant crops which made Egypt the
granary of the Old World. It might therefore be said,
both philosophically and facetiously, that the first principle
Importance of water in Egypt.
of all things is water. The harvests depended on it, and,
through them, animals and man. The government
of the country was supported by it, for
the financial system was founded on a tax paid by the
proprietors of the land for the use of the public sluices
and aqueducts. There was not a peasant to whom it was
not apparent that water is the first principle of all things,
even of taxation; and, since it was not only necessary to
survey lands to ascertain the surface that had been
irrigated, but to redetermine their boundaries after the
subsidence of the flood, even the scribes and surveyors
might concede that geometry itself was indebted for its
origin to water.
Thales asserts
that water is
the first
principle.
If, therefore, in any part of the Old World, this doctrine
had both a vulgar and a philosophical significance, that
country was Egypt. We may picture to ourselves the
inquisitive but ill-instructed Thales carried in some pirate-ship
or trading-bark to the mysterious Nile, respecting
which Ionia was full of legends and myths. He saw the
aqueducts, canals, flood-gates, the great Lake Mœris, dug
by the hand of man as many ages before his day as have
elapsed from his day to ours; he saw on all sides the
adoration paid to the river, for it had actually become
deified; he learned from the vulgar, with whom
alone he came in contact, their universal belief
that all things arise from water—from the vulgar
alone, for, had he ever been taught by the
priests, we should have found traces in his system of the
doctrines of emanation, transmigration, and absorption,
which were imported into Greece in later times. We may
interpret the story of Thales on the principles which
would apply in the case of some intelligent Indian who
should find his way to the outposts of a civilized country.
Imperfectly acquainted with the language, and coming in
contact with the lower class alone, he might learn their
vulgar philosophy, and carry back the fancied treasure to
his home.
As to the profound meaning which some have been
disposed to extract from the dogma of Thales, we shall,
perhaps, be warranted in rejecting it altogether. It
has been affirmed that he attempted to concentrate all
supernatural powers in one; to reduce all possible agents
to unity; in short, out of polytheism to bring forth monotheism;
to determine the invariable in the variable; and
to ascertain the beginning of things: that he observed
how infinite is the sea; how necessary moisture is to
growth; nay, even how essential it was to the well-being
of himself; "that without moisture his own body would
not have been what it was, but a dry husk falling to
pieces." Nor can we adopt the opinion that the intention
of Thales was to establish a coincidence between philosophy
and the popular theology as delivered by Hesiod, who
affirms that Oceanus is one of the parent-gods of Nature.
The imputation of irreligion made against him shows at
what an early period the antagonism of polytheism and
scientific inquiry was recognized. But it is possible to
believe that all things are formed out of one primordial
substance, without denying the existence of a creative
power. Or, to use the Indian illustration, the clay may
not be the potter.
Other doctrines
of Thales.
Thales is said to have predicted the solar eclipse which
terminated a battle between the Medes and Lydians, but
it has been suggestively remarked that it is not stated that
he predicted the day on which it should occur.
He had an idea that warmth originates from or
is nourished by humidity, and that even the sun and stars
derived their aliment out of the sea at the time of their
rising and setting. Indeed, he regarded them as living
beings; obtaining an argument from the phenomena of
amber and the magnet, supposed by him to possess a living
soul, because they have a moving force. Moreover, he
taught that the whole world is an insouled thing, and that
it is full of dæmons. Thales had, therefore, not completely
passed out of the stage of sorcery.
His system obtained importance not only from its own
plausibility, but because it was introduced under favourable
auspices and at a favourable time. It came into Asia
Minor as a portion of the wisdom of Egypt, and therefore
with a prestige sufficient to assure for it an attentive reception.
But this would have been of little avail had not
the mental culture of Ionia been advanced to a degree
suitable for offering to it conditions of development.
Under such circumstances the Egyptian dogma formed the
starting-point for a special method of philosophizing.
They constitute
the starting-point
of
Ionian philosophy.
The manner in which that development took place
illustrates the vigour of the Grecian mind. In Egypt a
doctrine might exist for thousands of years, protected
by its mere antiquity from controversy
or even examination, and hence sink with the
lapse of time into an ineffectual and lifeless
state; but the same doctrine brought into a young
community full of activity would quickly be made productive
and yield new results. As seeds taken from the coffins of
mummies, wherein they have been shut up for thousands
of years, when placed under circumstances favourable for
development in a rich soil, and supplied with moisture,
have forthwith, even in our own times, germinated, borne
flowers, and matured new seeds, so the rude philosophy of
Thales passed through a like development. Its tendency is
shown in the attempt it at once made to describe the universe,
even before the parts thereof had been determined.
Anaximenes
asserts that
air is the first
principle.
But it is not alone the water or ocean that seems to be
infinite, and capable of furnishing a supply for the origin
of all other things. The air, also, appears to reach as far
as the stars. On it, as Anaximenes of Miletus remarks,
"the very earth itself floats like a broad leaf." Accordingly,
this Ionian, stimulated doubtless by
the hope of sharing in or succeeding to the
celebrity that Thales had enjoyed for a century,
proposed to substitute for water, as the primitive
source of things, atmospheric air. And, in truth, there
seem to be reasons for bestowing upon it such a pre-eminence.
To those who have not looked closely into the
matter, it would appear that water itself is generated from
it, as when clouds are formed, and from them rain-drops,
and springs, and fountains, and rivers, and even the sea.
He also attributes infinity to it, a dogma scarcely requiring
any exercise of the imagination, but being rather the
expression of an ostensible fact; for who, when he looks
upward, can discern the boundary of the atmosphere.
It is also the soul.
Anaximenes also held that even the human soul
itself is nothing but air, since life consists in
inhaling and exhaling it, and ceases as soon as that
process stops. He taught also that warmth and cold arise
from mere rarefaction and condensation, and gave as a
proof the fact that when we breathe with the lips drawn
together the air is cold, but it becomes warm when we
breathe through the widely-opened mouth. Hence he
concluded that, with a sufficient rarefaction, air might
turn into fire, and that this probably was the origin of the
sun and stars, blazing comets, and other meteors; but if by
chance it should undergo condensation, it would turn into
wind and clouds, or, if that operation should be still more
increased, into water, snow, hail, and, at last, even into
earth itself. And since it is seen from the results of
The air is God.
breathing that the air is a life-giving principle to man,
nay, even is actually his soul, it would appear to
be a just inference that the infinite air is God
and that the gods and goddesses have sprung from it.
Such was the philosophy of Anaximenes. It was the
beginning of that stimulation of activity by rival schools
which played so distinguished a part in the Greek intellectual
movement. Its superiority over the doctrine of
Thales evidently consists in this, that it not only assigns
a primitive substance, but even undertakes to show by
observation and experiment how others arise from it, and
transformations occur. As to the discovery of the obliquity
of the ecliptic by the aid of a gnomon attributed to Anaximenes,
it was merely a boast of his vainglorious countrymen,
and altogether beyond the scientific grasp of one
who had no more exact idea of the nature of the earth
than that it was "like a broad leaf floating in the air."
Diogenes
asserts that
air is the soul
of the world.
The doctrines of Anaximenes received a very important
development in the hands of Diogenes of Apollonia, who
asserted that all things originate from one essence, which,
undergoing continual changes, becoming different at different
times, turns back again to the same state. He
regarded the entire world as a living being, spontaneously
evolving and transforming itself, and
agreed with Anaximenes that the soul of man
is nothing but air, as is also the soul of the
world. From this it follows that the air must be eternal,
imperishable, and endowed with consciousness. "It knows
much; for without reason it would be impossible for all to
be arranged so duly and proportionately as that all should
maintain its fitting measure, winter and summer, night
and day, the rain, the wind, and fair weather; and whatever
object we consider will be found to have been ordered
in the best and most beautiful manner possible." "But
that which has knowledge is that which men call air; it
is it that regulates and governs all, and hence it is the use
of air to pervade all, and to dispose all, and to be in all,
for there is nothing that has not part in it."
Difficulty of
rising above
fetichism.
The early cultivator of philosophy emerges with difficulty
from fetichism. The harmony observed
among the parts of the world is easily explained
on the hypothesis of a spiritual principle residing
in things, and arranging them by its intelligent volition.
It is not at once that he rises to the conception that all
this beauty and harmony are due to the operation of law.
We are so prone to judge of the process of external things
from the modes of our own personal experience, our acts
being determined by the exercise of our wills, that it is
with difficulty we disentangle ourselves from such notions
in the explanation of natural phenomena. Fetichism may
be observed in the infancy of many of the natural sciences.
Thus the electrical power of amber was imputed to a soul
residing in that substance, a similar explanation being also
given of the control of the magnet over iron. The movements
of the planetary bodies, Mercury, Venus, Mars, were
attributed to an intelligent principle residing in each,
Astronomy and chemistry have passed
beyond the fetich stage.
guiding and controlling the motions, and ordering all
things for the best. It was an epoch in the history of the
human mind when astronomy set an example to all other
sciences of shaking off its fetichism, and showing that
the intricate movements of the heavenly bodies
are all capable not only of being explained,
but even foretold, if once was admitted the
existence of a simple, yet universal, invariable,
and eternal law.
Not without difficulty do men perceive that there is nothing
inconsistent between invariable law and endlessly
varying phenomena, and that it is a more noble view
of the government of this world to impute its order to
a penetrating primitive wisdom, which could foresee
consequences throughout a future eternity, and provide for
them in the original plan at the outset, than to invoke the
perpetual intervention of an ever-acting spiritual agency
for the purpose of warding off misfortunes that might
happen, and setting things to rights. Chemistry furnishes
us with a striking example—an example very opportune
in the case we are considering—of the doctrine of Diogenes
of Apollonia, that the air is actually a spiritual being; for,
on the discovery of several of the gases by the earlier experimenters,
they were not only regarded as of a spiritual
nature, but actually received the name under which they
pass to this day, gheist or gas, from a belief that they were
ghosts. If a labourer descended into a well and was suffocated,
as if struck dead by some invisible hand; if a lamp
lowered down burnt for a few moments with a lurid flame,
and was then extinguished; if, in a coal mine, when the
unwary workman exposed a light, on a sudden the place
was filled with flashing flames and thundering explosions,
tearing down the rocks and destroying every living thing
in the way, often, too, without leaving on the dead any
marks of violence; what better explanation could be given
of such catastrophes than to impute them to some supernatural
agent? Nor was there any want, in those times,
of well-authenticated stories of unearthly faces and forms
seen in such solitudes.
Origin of
psychology.
The modification made by Diogenes in the theory of
Anaximenes, by converting it from a physical
into a psychological system, is important, as
marking the beginning of the special philosophy of
Greece. The investigation of the intellectual development
of the universe led the Greeks to the study of the
intellect itself. In his special doctrine, Diogenes imputed
the changeability of the air to its mobility; a property in
which he thought it excelled all other substances, because
it is among the rarest or thinnest of the elements. It is,
however, said by some, who are disposed to transcendentalize
his doctrine, that he did not mean the common
atmospheric air, but something more attenuated and warm;
and since, in its purest state, it constitutes the most perfect
intellect, inferior degrees of reason must be owing to
an increase of its density and moisture. Upon such a
principle, the whole earth is animated by the breath of life;
the souls of brutes, which differ from one another so
much in intelligence, are only air in its various conditions
of moisture and warmth. He explained the production of
the world through condensation of the earth from air by
cold, the warmth rising upward and forming the sun; in
the stars he thought he recognized the respiratory organs
of the world. From the preponderance of moist air in the
constitution of brutes, he inferred that they are like the
insane, incapable of thought, for thickness of the air
impedes respiration, and therefore quick apprehension.
From the fact that plants have no cavities wherein to
receive the air, and are altogether unintelligent, he was
led to the principle that the thinking power of man arises
from the flowing of that substance throughout the body in
the blood. He also explained the superior intelligence of
men from their breathing a purer air than the beasts,
which carry their nostrils near the ground. In these
crude and puerile speculations we have the beginning of
mental philosophy.
Modern discoveries
as to
the relations
of the air.
I cannot dismiss the system of the Apollonian without
setting in contrast with it the discoveries of
modern science respecting the relations of the
air. Toward the world of life it stands in a position
of wonderful interest. Decomposed into its
constituents by the skill of chemistry, it is no longer
looked upon as a homogeneous body; its ingredients have
not only been separated, but the functions they discharge
have been ascertained. From one of these, carbonic acid,
all the various forms of plants arise; that substance being
decomposed by the rays of the sun, and furnishing to
vegetables carbon, their chief solid ingredient. All those
beautifully diversified organic productions, from the
mosses of the icy regions to the palms characteristic of
the landscapes of the tropics—all those we cast away as
worthless weeds, and those for the obtaining of which we
Inter-dependence of animals
and plants.
expend the sweat of our brow—all, without any exception,
are obtained from the atmosphere by the influence
of the sun. And since without plants
the life of animals could not be maintained, they
constitute the means by which the aërial material, vivified,
as it may be said, by the rays of the sun, is conveyed even
into the composition of man himself. As food, they serve
to repair the waste of the body necessarily occasioned in
the acts of moving and thinking. For a time, therefore,
these ingredients, once a part of the structure of plants,
enter as essential constituents in the structure of animals.
Yet it is only in a momentary way, for the essential condition
of animal activity is that there shall be unceasing
interstitial death; not a finger can be lifted without the
waste of muscular material; not a thought arise without
the destruction of cerebral substance. From the animal
system the products of decay are forthwith removed, often
by mechanisms of the most exquisite construction; but
their uses are not ended, for sooner or later they find their
way back again into the air, and again serve for the origination
of plants. It is needless to trace these changes in
all their details; the same order or cycle of progress holds
good for the water, the ammonia; they pass from the
inorganic to the living state, and back to the inorganic
again; now the same particle is found in the air next
aiding in the composition of a plant, then in the body of an
animal, and back in the air once more. In this perpetual
Agency of the sun.
revolution material particles run, the dominating influence
determining and controlling their movement being in
that great centre of our system, the sun. From
him, in the summer days, plants receive, and, as
it were, store up that warmth which, at a subsequent time,
is to reappear in the glow of health of man, or to be rekindled
in the blush of shame, or to consume in the burning
fever. Nor is there any limit of time. The heat we
derive from the combustion of stubble came from the sun
as it were only yesterday; but that with which we
moderate the rigour of winter when we burn anthracite or
bituminous coal was also derived from the same source in
the ultra-tropical climate of the secondary times, perhaps a
thousand centuries ago.
In such perpetually recurring cycles are the movements
of material things accomplished, and all takes place under
the dominion of invariable law. The air is the source
whence all organisms have come; it is the receptacle to
which they all return. Its parts are awakened into life,
not by the influence of any terrestrial agency or principle
concealed in itself, as Diogenes supposed, but by a star
which is ninety millions of miles distant, the source,
direct or indirect, of every terrestrial movement, and the
dispenser of light and life.
Heraclitus asserts
that fire
is the first
principle.
To Thales and Diogenes, whose primordial elements
were water and air respectively, we must add Heraclitus
of Ephesus, who maintained that the first
principle is fire. He illustrated the tendency
which Greek philosophy had already assumed
of opposition to Polytheism and the idolatrous
practices of the age. It is said that in his work, ethical,
political, physical, and theological subjects were so confused,
and so great was the difficulty of understanding his
meaning, that he obtained the surname of "the Obscure."
In this respect he has had among modern metaphysicians
many successors. He founds his system, however, upon
the simple axiom that "all is convertible into fire, and
fire into all." Perhaps by the term fire he understood
what is at present meant by heat, for he expressly says that
The fictitious permanence
of successive forms.
he does not mean flame, but something merely dry and
warm. He considered that this principle is in a state of
perpetual activity, forming and absorbing every
individual thing. He says, "All is, and is not;
for though it does in truth come into being, yet
it forthwith ceases to be." "No one has ever been
twice on the same stream, for different waters are constantly
flowing down. It dissipates its waters and gathers them
again; it approaches and recedes, overflows and fails." And
to teach us that we ourselves are changing and have
changed, he says, "On the same stream we embark and
embark not, we are and we are not." By such illustrations
he implies that life is only an unceasing motion, and we
cannot fail to remark that the Greek turn of thought is fast
following that of the Hindu.
But Heraclitus totally fails to free himself from local
conceptions. He speaks of the motion of the primordial
principle in the upward and downward directions, in the
higher and lower regions. He says that the chief accumulation
thereof is above, and the chief deficiency below:
and hence he regards the soul of a man as a portion of
fire migrated from heaven. He carries his ideas of the
transitory nature of all phenomena to their last consequences,
and illustrates the noble doctrine that all which
appears to us to be permanent is only a regulated and
self-renewing concurrence of similar and opposite motions
by such extravagances as that the sun is daily destroyed
and renewed.
Physical and
physiological
doctrines of
Heraclitus.
In the midst of many wild physical statements many
true axioms are delivered. "All is ordered by reason and
intelligence, though all is subject to Fate."
Already he perceived what the metaphysicians
of our own times are illustrating, that "man's
mind can produce no certain knowledge from its
own interior resources alone." He regarded the organs of
sense as being the channels through which the outer life
of the world, and therewith truth, enters into the mind,
and that in sleep, when the organs of sense are closed, we
are shut out from all communion with the surrounding
universal spirit. In his view every thing is animated and
insouled, but to different degrees, organic objects being
most completely or perfectly so. His astronomy may be
anticipated from what has been said respecting the sun,
which he moreover regarded as being scarcely more than a
foot in diameter, and, like all other celestial objects, a
mere meteor. His moral system was altogether based upon
the physical, the fundamental dogma being the excellence
of fire. Thus he accounted for the imbecility of the
drunkard by his having a moist soul, and drew the
inference that a warm or dry soul is the wisest and best;
with justifiable patriotism asserting that the noblest souls
must belong to a climate that is dry, intending thereby to
indicate that Greece is man's fittest and truest country.
There can be no doubt that in Heraclitus there is a strong
tendency to the doctrine of a soul of the world. If the
divinity is undistinguishable from heat, whither can we go
to escape its influences? And in the restless activity and
incessant changes it produces in every thing within our
reach, do we not recognize the tokens of the illimitable
and unshackled?
The puerility
of Ionian
philosophy.
I have lingered on the chief features of the early Greek
philosophy as exhibited in the physical school of Ionia.
They serve to impress upon us its intrinsic imperfection.
It is a mixture of the physical, metaphysical, and mystical
which, upon the whole, has no other value than
this, that it shows how feeble were the beginnings
of our knowledge—that we commenced with
the importation of a few vulgar errors from Egypt. In
presence of the utilitarian philosophy of that country and
the theology of India, how vain and even childish are
these germs of science in Greece! Yet this very imperfection
is not without its use, since it warns us of the inferior
position in which we stand as respects the time of our
civilization when compared with those ancient states, and
teaches us to reject the assertion which so many European
scholars have wearied themselves in establishing, that
Greece led the way to all human knowledge of any value.
Above all, it impresses upon us more appropriate, because
more humble views of our present attainments and position,
and gives us to understand that other races of men not
only preceded us in intellectual culture, but have equalled,
and perhaps surpassed every thing that we have yet done
in mental philosophy.
Anaximander's
doctrine of the
Infinite.
Of the other founders of Ionic sects it may be observed
that, though they gave to their doctrines different forms,
the method of reasoning was essentially the same in them
all. Of this a better illustration could not be given than
in the philosophy of Anaximander of Miletus, who was
contemporary with Thales. He started with the
postulate that things arose by separation from
a universal mixture of all: his primordial principle
was therefore chaos, though he veiled it in the metaphysically
obscure designation "The Infinite." The want
of precision in this respect gave rise to much difference of
opinion as to his tenets. To his chaos he imputed an
internal energy, by which its parts spontaneously separated
from each other; to those parts he imputed absolute
unchangeability. He taught that the earth is of a cylindrical
form, its base being one-third of its altitude; it
is retained in the centre of the world by the air in an
equality of distance from all the boundaries of the universe;
that the fixed stars and planets revolved round it, each
being fastened to a crystalline ring; and beyond them, in
like manner, the moon, and, still farther off, the sun. He
Origin of cosmogony.
conceived of an opposition between the central
and circumferential regions, the former being
naturally cold, and the latter hot; indeed, in his opinion,
the settling of the cold parts to the centre, and the
ascending of the hot, gave origin, respectively, to the
formation of the earth and shining celestial bodies, the
latter first existing as a complete shell or sphere, which,
undergoing destruction, broke up into stars. Already we
perceive the tendency of Greek philosophy to shape itself
into systems of cosmogony, founded upon the disturbance
Origin of biology.
of the chaotic matter by heat and cold. Nay, more,
Anaximander explained the origin of living
creatures on like principles, for the sun's heat,
acting upon the primal miry earth, produced filmy
bladders or bubbles, and these, becoming surrounded with
a prickly rind, at length burst open, and, as from an egg,
animals came forth. At first they were ill-formed and
imperfect, but subsequently elaborated and developed. As
to man, so far from being produced in his perfect shape,
he was ejected as a fish, and under that form continued in
the muddy water until he was capable of supporting
himself on dry land. Besides "the Infinite" being thus
the cause of generation, it was also the cause of destruction:
"things must all return whence they came, according to
destiny, for they must all, in order of time, undergo due
penalties and expiations of wrong-doing." This expression
obviously contains a moral consideration, and is an exemplification
of the commencing feeble interconnection between
physical and moral philosophy.
As to the more solid discoveries attributed to this philosopher,
we may dispose of them in the same manner that
we have dealt with the like facts in the biographies of his
predecessors—they are idle inventions of his vainglorious
countrymen. That he was the first to make maps is
scarcely consistent with the well-known fact that the
Egyptians had cultivated geometry for that express
purpose thirty centuries before he was born. As to his
inventing sun-dials, the shadow had gone back on that of
Ahaz a long time before. In reality, the sun-dial was a
very ancient Oriental invention. And as to his being the
first to make an exact calculation of the size and distance of
the heavenly bodies, it need only be remarked that those
who have so greatly extolled his labours must have overlooked
how incompatible such discoveries are with a
system which assumes that the earth is cylindrical in
shape, and kept in the midst of the heavens by the atmosphere;
that the sun is farther off than the fixed stars;
and that each of the heavenly bodies is made to revolve
by means of a crystalline wheel.
The philosopher whose views we have next to consider
is Anaxagoras of Clazomene, the friend and master of
Pericles, Euripides, and Socrates. Like several of his
predecessors, he had visited Egypt. Among his disciples
were numbered some of the most eminent men of those
times.
Anaxagoras
teaches the
unchangeability
of the
universe.
The fundamental principle of his philosophy was the
recognition of the unchangeability of the universe as a
whole, the variety of forms that we see being
produced by new arrangements of its constituent
parts. Such a doctrine includes, of course, the
idea of the eternity of matter. Anaxagoras says,
"Wrongly do the Greeks suppose that aught begins or
ceases to be, for nothing comes into being or is destroyed,
but all is an aggregation or secretion of pre-existent things,
so that all becoming might more correctly be called becoming-mixed,
and all corruption becoming-separate." In
such a statement we cannot fail to remark that the Greek
is fast passing into the track of the Egyptian and the
Hindu. In some respects his views recall those of the
chaos of Anaximander, as when he says, "Together were
The primal intellect.
all things infinite in number and smallness; nothing was
distinguishable. Before they were sorted, while all was
together, there was no quality noticeable." To
the first moving force which arranged the parts
of things out of the chaos, he gave the designation of "the
Intellect," rejecting Fate as an empty name, and imputing
all things to Reason. He made no distinction between
the Soul and Intellect. His tenets evidently include a
dualism indicated by the moving force and the moved
mass, an opposition between the corporeal and mental.
This indicated that for philosophy there are two separate
routes, the physical and intellectual. While Reason is thus
the prime mover in his philosophy, he likewise employed
many subordinate agents in the government of things—for
instance, air, water, and fire, being evidently unable to
explain the state of nature in a satisfactory way by the
Cosmogony of Anaxagoras.
operation of the Intellect alone. We recognize
in the details of his system ideas derived from
former ones, such as the settling of the cold and dense
below, and the rising of the warm and light above. In
the beginning the action of Intellect was only partial;
that which was primarily moved was only imperfectly
sorted, and contained in itself the capability of many
separations. From this point his system became a cosmogony,
showing how the elements and fogs, stones,
stars, and the sea, were produced. These explanations, as
mighty be anticipated, have no exactness. Among his
primary elements are many incongruous things, such as
cold, colour, fire, gold, lead, corn, marrow, blood, &c. This
doctrine implied that in compound things there was not a
formation, but an arrangement. It required, therefore,
many elements instead of a single one. Flesh is made of
fleshy particles, bones of bony, gold of golden, lead of
leaden, wood of wooden, &c. These analogous constituents
are homœomeriæ. Of an infinite number of kinds, they
composed the infinite all, which is a mixture of them.
From such conditions Anaxagoras proves that all the parts
of an animal body pre-exist in the food, and are merely collected
therefrom. As to the phenomena of life, he explains
it on his doctrine of dualism between mind and matter;
he teaches that sleep is produced by the reaction of the
latter on the former. Even plants he regards as only
rooted animals, motionless, but having sensations and
desires; he imputes the superiority of man to the mere
fact of his having hands. He explains our mental perceptions
upon the hypothesis that we have naturally within
us the contraries of all the qualities of external things;
and that, when we consider an object, we become aware
of the preponderance of those qualities in our mind which
are deficient in it. Hence all sensation is attended with
pain. His doctrine of the production of animals was
founded on the action of the sunlight on the miry earth.
The earth he places in the centre of the world, whither it
was carried by a whirlwind, the pole being originally in
the zenith; but, when animals issued from the mud, its
position was changed by the Intellect, so that there might
be suitable climates. In some particulars his crude guesses
present amusing anticipations of subsequent discoveries.
Thus he maintained that the moon has mountains, and
valleys like the earth; that there have been grand epochs
in the history of our globe, in which it has been successively
modified by fire and water; that the hills of
Lampsacus would one day be under the sea, if time did
not too soon fail.
Doubts
whether we
have any criterion
of
truth.
As to the nature of human knowledge, Anaxagoras, asserted
that by the Intellect alone do we become
acquainted with the truth, the senses being altogether
untrustworthy. He illustrated this by
putting a drop of coloured liquid into a quantity
of clear water, the eye being unable to recognize any change.
Upon such principles also he asserted that snow is not
white, but black, since it is composed of water, of which
the colour is black; and hence he drew such conclusions
as that "things are to each man according as they seem to
him." It was doubtless the recognition of the unreliability
of the senses that extorted from him the well-known complaint:
"Nothing can be known; nothing can be learned;
nothing can be certain; sense is limited; intellect is weak;
life is short."
Anaxagoras is
persecuted.
The biography of Anaxagoras is not without interest.
Born in affluence, he devoted all his means to philosophy,
and in his old age encountered poverty and want. He
was accused by the superstitious Athenian populace of
Atheism and impiety to the gods, since he asserted that
the sun and moon consist of earth and stone, and that the
so-called divine miracles of the times were nothing more
than common natural effects. For these reasons, and also
because of the Magianism of his doctrine—for he taught
the antagonism of mind and matter, a dogma of the
detested Persians—he was thrown into prison,
condemned to death, and barely escaped through
the influence of Pericles. He fled to Lampsacus, where he
ended his days in exile. His vainglorious countrymen,
however, conferred honour upon his memory in their
customary exaggerated way, boasting that he was the first
to explain the phases of the moon, the nature of solar and
lunar eclipses, that he had the power of foretelling future
events, and had even predicted the fall of a meteoric
stone.
From the biography of Anaxagoras, as well as of several
of his contemporaries and successors, we may learn that a
popular opposition was springing up against philosophy,
not limited to a mere social protest, but carried out into
political injustice. The antagonism between learning and
Polytheism was becoming every day more distinct. Of
the philosophers, some were obliged to flee into exile, some
suffered death. The natural result of such a state of
things was to force them to practise concealment and
mystification, as is strikingly shown in the history of the
Pythagoreans.
Pythagoras,
biography of.
Of Pythagoras, the founder of this sect, but little is
known with certainty; even the date of his
birth is contested, probably he was born at
Samos about B.C. 540. If we were not expressly told so,
we should recognize from his doctrines that he had been in
Egypt and India. Some eminent scholars, who desire on
all occasions to magnify the learning of ancient Europe,
depreciate as far as they can the universal testimony of
antiquity that such was the origin of the knowledge of
Pythagoras, asserting that the constitution of the Egyptian
priesthood rendered it impossible for a foreigner to become
initiated. They forget that the ancient system of that
country had been totally destroyed in the great revolution
which took place more than a century before those times.
If it were not explicitly stated by the ancients that
Pythagoras lived for twenty-two years in Egypt, there is
sufficient internal evidence in his story to prove that he
had been there a long time. As a connoisseur can detect the
hand of a master by the style of a picture, so one who has
devoted attention to the old systems of thought sees, at a
glance, the Egyptian in the philosophy of Pythagoras.
He passed into Italy during the reign of Tarquin the
Proud, and settled at Crotona, a Greek colonial city on the
Bay of Tarentum. At first he established a school, but,
favoured by local dissensions, he gradually organized from
the youths who availed themselves of his instructions a
secret political society. Already it had passed into a
maxim among the learned Greeks that it is not advantageous
to communicate knowledge too freely to the people—a
bitter experience in persecutions seemed to demonstrate
that the maxim was founded on truth. The step from a
secret philosophical society to a political conspiracy is but
short. Pythagoras appears to have taken it. The disciples
who were admitted to his scientific secrets after a
period of probation and process of examination constituted
a ready instrument of intrigue against the state, the issue
of which, after a time, appeared in the supplanting of the
ancient senate and the exaltation of Pythagoras and his
club to the administration of government. The actions of
men in all times are determined by similar principles; and
as it would be now with such a conspiracy, so it was then;
for, though the Pythagorean influence spread from Crotona
to other Italian towns, an overwhelming reaction soon set
in, the innovators were driven into exile, their institutions
destroyed, and their founder fell a victim to his enemies.
The organization attempted by the Pythagoreans is an
exception to the general policy of the Greeks. The philosophical
schools had been merely points of reunion for
those entertaining similar opinions; but in the state they
can hardly be regarded as having had any political
existence.
His miracles.
It is difficult, when the political or religious feelings of
men have been engaged, to ascertain the truth of events in
which they have been concerned; deception, and falsehood,
seem to be licensed. In the midst of the troubles befalling
Italy as the consequence of these Pythagorean machinations,
it is impossible to ascertain facts with certainty.
One party exalts Pythagoras to a superhuman state; it
pictures him majestic and impassive, clothed in robes of
white, with a golden coronet around his brows, listening
to the music of the spheres, or seeking relaxation in the
more humble hymns of Homer, Hesiod, and Thales; lost
in the contemplation of Nature, or rapt in ecstasy in his
meditations on God; manifesting his descent from Apollo
or Hermes by the working of miracles, predicting future
events, conversing with genii in the solitude of a dark
cavern, and even surpassing the wonder of speaking
simultaneously in different tongues, since it
was established, by the most indisputable testimony, that he
had accomplished the prodigy of being present with and
addressing the people in several different places at the
same time. It seems not to have occurred to his disciples
that such preposterous assertions cannot be sustained by
any evidence whatsoever; and that the stronger and clearer
such evidence is, instead of supporting the fact for which
it is brought forward, it the more serves to shake our confidence
in the truth of man, or impresses on us the conclusion
that he is easily lead to the adoption of falsehood, and
is readily deceived by imposture.
His character.
By his opponents he was denounced as a quack, or, at
the best, a visionary mystic, who had deluded
the young with the mummeries of a free-masonry;
had turned the weak-minded into shallow enthusiasts
and grim ascetics; and as having conspired
against a state which had given him an honourable refuge,
and brought disorder and bloodshed upon it. Between
such contradictory statements, it is difficult to determine
how much we should impute to the philosopher and how
much to the trickster. In this uncertainty, the Pythagoreans
reap the fruit of one of their favourite maxims, "Not
unto all should all be made known." Perhaps at the
bottom of these political movements lay the hope of establishing
a central point of union for the numerous Greek
colonies of Italy, which, though they were rich and highly
civilized, were, by reason of their isolation and antagonism,
essentially weak. Could they have been united
in a powerful federation by the aid of some political or
religious bond, they might have exerted a singular influence
on the rising fortunes of Rome, and thereby on
humanity.
Pythagoras
asserts that
number is the
first principle.
The fundamental dogma of the Pythagoreans was that
"number is the essence or first principle of
things." This led them at once to the study
of the mysteries of figures and of arithmetical
relations, and plunged them into the wildest fantasies when
it took the absurd form that numbers are actually things.
The approval of the doctrines of Pythagoras so generally
expressed was doubtless very much due to the fact that
they supplied an intellectual void. Those who had been
in the foremost ranks of philosophy had come to the
conclusion that, as regard external things, and even ourselves,
we have no criterion of truth; but in the properties
of numbers and their relations, such a criterion does
exist.
Pythagorean
philosophy.
It would scarcely repay the reader to pursue this system
in its details; a very superficial representation of it is
all that is necessary for our purpose. It recognizes two
species of numbers, the odd and even; and since one, or
unity, must be at once both odd and even, it must be the
very essence of number, and the ground of all other
numbers; hence the meaning of the Pythagorean expression,
"All comes from one;" which also took form in the
mystical allusion, "God embraces all and actuates all, and
is but one." To the number ten extraordinary importance
was imputed, since it contains in itself, or arises from the
addition of, 1, 2, 3, 4—that is, of even and odd numbers
together; hence it received the name of the grand tetractys,
because it so contains the first four numbers. Some, however,
assert that that designation was imposed on the
number thirty-six. To the triad the Pythagoreans
likewise attached much significance, since it has
a beginning, a middle, and an end. To unity, or one, they
gave the designation of the even-odd, asserting that it
contained the property both of the even and odd, as is
plain from the fact that if one be added to an even number
it becomes odd, but if to an odd number it becomes even.
They arranged the primary elements of nature in a table
of ten contraries, of which the odd and even are one, and
light and darkness another. They said that "the nature
and energy of number may be traced not only in divine
and dæmonish things, but in human works and words
everywhere, and in all works of art and in music." They
even linked their arithmetical views to morality, through
the observation that numbers never lie; that they are
hostile to falsehood; and that, therefore, truth belongs to
their family: their fanciful speculations led them to infer
that in the limitless or infinite, falsehood and envy must
reign. From similar reasoning, they concluded that the
number one contained not only the perfect, but also the
imperfect; hence it follows that the most good, most
beautiful, and most true are not at the beginning, but that
they are in the process of time evolved. They held that
whatever we know must have had a beginning, a middle,
and an end, of which the beginning and end are the
boundaries or limits; but the middle is unlimited, and, as
a consequence, may be subdivided ad infinitum. They
therefore resolved corporeal existence into points, as is set
forth in their maxim that "all is composed of points or
spacial units, which, taken together, constitute a number."
Such being their ideas of the limiting which constitutes
the extreme, they understood by the unlimited the intermediate
space or interval. By the aid of these intervals
they obtained a conception of space; for, since the units,
or monads, as they were also called, are merely geometrical
points, no number of them could produce a line, but
by the union of monads and intervals conjointly a line
can arise, and also a surface, and also a solid. As to the
interval thus existing between monads, some considered it
as being mere aërial breath, but the orthodox regarded it
as a vacuum; hence we perceive the meaning of their
absurd affirmation that all things are produced by a
vacuum. As it is not to be overlooked that the monads
are merely mathematical points, and have no dimensions
or size, substances actually contain no matter, and are
nothing more than forms.
Pythagorean
cosmogony.
The Pythagoreans applied these principles to account
for the origin of the world, saying that, since its very
existence is an illusion, it could not have any
origin in time, but only seemingly so to human
thought. As to time itself, they regarded it as "existing
only by the distinction of a series of different moments,
which, however, are again restored to unity by the limiting
moments." The diversity of relations we find in the
world they supposed to be occasioned by the bond of harmony.
"Since the principles of things are neither similar
nor congenerous, it is impossible for them to be brought
into order except by the intervention of harmony, whatever
may have been the manner in which it took place. Like
and homogeneous things, indeed, would not have required
harmony; but, as to the dissimilar and unsymmetrical,
such must necessarily be held together by harmony if they
are to be contained in a world of order." In this manner
they confused together the ideas of number and harmony,
regarding the world not only as a combination of contraries,
but as an orderly and harmonical combination thereof.
To particular numbers they therefore imputed great significance,
asserting that "there are seven chords or harmonies,
seven pleiads, seven vowels, and that certain parts
of the bodies of animals change in the course of seven
years." They carried to an extreme the numerical
doctrine, assigning certain numbers as the representatives
of a bird, a horse, a man. This doctrine may be illustrated
Modern Pythagorisms in chemistry.
by facts familiar to chemists, who, in like manner, attach
significant numbers to the names of things. Taking
hydrogen as unity, 6 belongs to carbon, 8 to
oxygen, 16 to sulphur. Carrying those principles
out, there is no substance, elementary or compound,
inorganic or organic, to which an expressive number
does not belong. Nay, even an archetypal form, as of man
or any other such composite structure, may thus possess a
typical number, the sum of the numbers of its constituent
parts. It signifies nothing what interpretation we give
to these numbers, whether we regarded them as atomic
weights, or, declining the idea of atoms, consider them as
the representatives of force. As in the ancient philosophical
doctrine, so in modern science, the number is invariably
connected with the name of a thing, of whatever
description the thing may be.
The grand standard of harmonical relation among the
Pythagoreans was the musical octave. Physical qualities,
such as colour and tone, were supposed to appertain to the
surface of bodies. Of the elements they enumerated five—earth,
air, fire, water, and ether, connecting therewith the
fact that man has five organs of sense. Of the planets
they numbered five, which, together with the sun, moon,
and earth, are placed apart at distances determined by a
musical law, and in their movements through space give
rise to a sound, the harmony of the spheres, unnoticed by
us because we habitually hear it. They place the sun
Pythagorean
physics and psychology.
in the centre of the system, round which, with the other
planets, the earth revolves. At this point the
geocentric doctrine is being abandoned and the
heliocentric takes its place. As the circle is the
most perfect of forms, the movements of the planets are
circular. They maintained that the moon is inhabited, and
like the earth, but the people there are taller than men, in
the proportion as the moon's periodic rotation is greater
than that of the earth. They explained the Milky Way as
having been occasioned by the fall of a star, or as having
been formerly the path of the sun. They asserted that the
world is eternal, but the earth is transitory and liable to
change, the universe being in the shape of a sphere. They
held that the soul of man is merely an efflux of the
universal soul, and that it comes into the body from without.
From dreams and the events of sickness they inferred
the existence of good and evil dæmons. They supposed
that souls can exist without the body, leading a kind of
dream-life, and identified the motes in the sunbeam with
them. Their heroes and dæmons were souls not yet become
embodied, or who had ceased to be so. The doctrine of
transmigration which they had adopted was in harmony
with such views, and, if it does not imply the absolute
immortality of the soul, at least asserts its existence after
the death of the body, for the disembodied spirit becomes
incarnate again as soon as it finds a tenement which fits
it. To their life after death the Pythagoreans added a
doctrine of retributive rewards and punishments, and, in
this respect, what has been said of animals forming a
penitential mechanism in the theology of India and Egypt,
holds good for the Pythagoreans too.
Of their system of politics nothing can now with certainty
be affirmed beyond the fact that its prime element
was an aristocracy; of their rule of private life, but little
beyond its including a recommendation of moderation in
all things, the cultivation of friendship, the observance of
faith, and the practice of self-denial, promoted by ascetic
exercises. It was a maxim with them that a right education
is not only of importance to the individual, but also
to the interests of the state. Pythagoras himself, as is
well known, paid much attention to the determination of
extension and gravity, the ratios of musical tones, astronomy,
and medicine. He directed his disciples, in their
orgies or secret worship, to practise gymnastics, dancing,
music. In correspondence with his principle of imparting
to men only such knowledge as they were fitted to receive,
he communicated to those who were less perfectly prepared
exoteric doctrines, reserving the esoteric for the privileged
few who had passed five years in silence, had endured
humiliation, and been purged by self-denial and sacrifice.
The Eleatic
philosophy.
We have now reached the consideration of the Eleatic
philosophy. It differs from the preceding in its neglect of
material things, and its devotion to the supra-sensible.
It derives its name from Elea, a Greek
colonial city of Italy, its chief authors being Xenophanes,
Parmenides, and Zeno.
Xenophanes
represents a
great philosophical
advance.
Xenophanes was a native of Ionia, from which having
been exiled, he appears to have settled at last in Elea, after
leading for many years the life of a wandering rhapsodist.
He gave his doctrines a poetical form for the
purpose of more easily diffusing them. To the
multitude he became conspicuous from his opposition
to Homer, Hesiod, and other popular poets,
whom he denounced for promoting the base polytheism of
the times, and degrading the idea of the divine by the
immoralities they attributed to the gods. He proclaimed
God as an all-powerful Being, existing from eternity, and
without any likeness to man. A strict monotheist, he
denounced the plurality of gods as an inconceivable error,
asserting that of the all-powerful and all-perfect there
could not, in the nature of things, be more than one; for,
if there were only so many as two, those attributes could
not apply to one of them, much less, then, if there were
many. This one principle or power was to him the same as
the universe, the substance of which, having existed from
all eternity, must necessarily be identical with God; for,
since it is impossible that there should be two Omnipresents,
so also it is impossible that there should be two
Eternals. It therefore may be said that there is a tincture
of Orientalism in his ideas, since it would scarcely be
possible to offer a more succinct and luminous exposition of
the pantheism of India.
He approaches
the Indian
ideas.
The reader who has been wearied with the frivolities of
the Ionian philosophy, and lost in the mysticisms
of Pythagoras, cannot fail to recognize that here
we have something of a very different kind. To
an Oriental dignity of conception is added an extraordinary
clearness and precision of reasoning.
Theology of
Xenophanes.
To Xenophanes all revelation is a pure fiction; the
discovery of the invisible is to be made by the intellect
of man alone. The vulgar belief which imputes to the
Deity the sentiments, passions, and crimes of
man, is blasphemous and accursed. He exposes
the impiety of those who would figure the Great Supreme
under the form of a man, telling them that if the ox or
the lion could rise to a conception of the Deity, they
might as well embody him under their own shape; that
the negro represents him with a flat nose and black face;
the Thracian with blue eyes and a ruddy complexion.
"There is but one God; he has no resemblance to the
bodily form of man, nor are his thoughts like ours." He
taught that God is without parts, and throughout alike;
for, if he had parts, some would be ruled by others, and
others would rule, which is impossible, for the very notion
of God implies his perfect and thorough sovereignty.
Throughout he must be Reason, and Intelligence, and
Omnipotence, "ruling the universe without trouble by
Reason and Insight." He conceived that the Supreme
understands by a sensual perception, and not only thinks,
but sees and hears throughout. In a symbolical manner
he represented God as a sphere, like the heavens, which
encompass man and all earthly things.
His physical
views.
In his natural philosophy it is said that he adopted the
four elements, Earth, Air, Fire, Water; though by some
it is asserted that, from observing fossil fish, on the tops of
mountains, he was led to the belief that the
earth itself arose from water; and generally,
that the phenomena of nature originate in combinations
of the primary elements. From such views he inferred
that all things are necessarily transitory, and that men,
and even the earth itself, must pass away. As to the
latter, he regarded it as a flat surface, the inferior region
of which extends indefinitely downward, and so gives a
solid foundation. His physical views he, however, held
with a doubt almost bordering on scepticism: "No mortal
man ever did, or ever shall know God and the universe
thoroughly; for, since error is so spread over all things, it
is impossible for us to be certain even when we utter the
true and the perfect." It seemed to him hopeless that
man could ever ascertain the truth, since he has no other
aid than truthless appearances.
I cannot dismiss this imperfect account of Xenophanes,
who was, undoubtedly, one of the greatest of the Greek
philosophers, without an allusion to his denunciation of
Homer, and other poets of his country, because they had
aided in degrading the idea of the Divinity; and also to
his faith in human nature, his rejection of the principle of
concealing truth from the multitude, and his self-devotion
in diffusing it among all at a risk of liberty and life.
He wandered from country to country, withstanding
polytheism to its face, and imparting wisdom in rhapsodies
and hymns, the form, above all others, calculated most
quickly in those times to spread knowledge abroad. To
those who are disposed to depreciate his philosophical conclusions,
it may be remarked that in some of their most
striking features they have been reproduced in modern
times, and I would offer to them a quotation from the
Some of his thoughts
reappear in Newton.
General Scholium at the end of the third book of the
Principia of Newton: "The Supreme God exists
necessarily, and by the same necessity he exists
always and everywhere. Whence, also, he is all
similar, all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all
power to perceive, to understand, and to act, but in a
manner not at all human, not at all corporeal; in a manner
utterly unknown to us. As a blind man has no idea of
colours, so have we no idea of the manner by which the all-wise
God perceives and understands all things. He is utterly
void of all body and bodily figure, and can therefore neither
be seen, nor heard, nor touched, nor ought to be worshipped
under the representation of any corporeal thing. We have
ideas of his attributes, but what the real substance of
anything is we know not."
To the Eleatic system thus originating with Xenophanes
is to be attributed the dialectic phase henceforward so
prominently exhibited by Greek philosophy. It abandoned,
for the most part, the pursuits which had occupied
the Ionians—the investigation of visible nature,
the phenomena of material things, and the laws presiding
over them; conceiving such to be merely deceptive, and
attaching itself to what seemed to be the only true knowledge—an
investigation of Being and of God. By the
Eleats, since all change appeared to be an impossibility,
the phenomena of succession presented by the world were
Parmenides on reason and opinion.
regarded as a pure illusion, and they asserted that Time,
and Motion, and Space are phantasms of the imagination,
or vain deceptions of the senses. They therefore separated
reason from opinion, attributing to the former
conceptions of absolute truth, and to the latter
imperfections arising from the fictions of sense.
It was on this principle that Parmenides divided his
work on "Nature" into two books, the first on Reason, the
second on Opinion. Starting from the nature of Being, the
uncreated and unchangeable, he denied altogether the idea
of succession in time, and also the relations of space, and
pronounced change and motion, of whatever kind they
Philosophy becoming Pantheism.
may be, mere illusions of opinion. His pantheism appears
in the declaration that the All is thought and
intelligence; and this, indeed, constitutes the
essential feature of his doctrine, for, by thus
placing thought and being in parallelism with each other,
and interconnecting them by the conception that it is for
the sake of being that thought exists, he showed that they
must necessarily be conceived of as one.
Such profound doctrines occupied the first book of the
poem of Parmenides; in the second he treated of opinion,
which, as we have said, is altogether dependent on the
senses, and therefore untrustworthy, not, however, that it
must necessarily be absolutely false. It is scarcely possible
for us to reconstruct from the remains of his works the
details of his theory, or to show his approach to the Ionian
doctrines by the assumption of the existence in nature of
two opposite species—ethereal fire and heavy night; of
an equal proportion of which all things consist, fire being
the true, and night the phenomenal. From such an unsubstantial
and delusive basis it would not repay us, even if
we had the means of accomplishing it, to give an exposition
of his physical system. In many respects it degenerated
into a wild vagary; as, for example, when he placed an
overruling dæmon in the centre of the phenomenal world.
Nor need we be detained by his extravagant reproduction of
the old doctrine of the generation of animals from miry clay,
nor follow his explanation of the nature of man, who, since
he is composed of light and darkness, participates in both,
and can never ascertain absolute truth. By other routes,
and upon far less fanciful principles, modern philosophy
has at last come to the same melancholy conclusion.
Doctrines of
Parmenides
carried out
by Zeno;
The doctrines of Parmenides were carried out by Zeno
the Eleatic, who is said to have been his adopted
son. He brought into use the method of refuting
error by the reductio ad absurdum. His compositions
were in prose, and not in poetry, as
were those of his predecessors. As it had been the
object of Parmenides to establish the existence of
"the One," it was the object of Zeno to establish the
non-existence of "the Many." Agreeably to such principles,
he started from the position that only one thing
really exists, and that all others are mere modifications or
appearances of it. He denied motion, but admitted the
appearance of it; regarding it as a name given to a series
of conditions, each of which is necessarily rest. This
dogma against the possibility of motion he maintained by
four arguments; the second of them is the celebrated
Achilles puzzle. It is thus stated: "Suppose Achilles to
run ten times as fast as a tortoise, yet, if the tortoise has
the start, Achilles can never overtake him; for, if they
are separated at first by an interval of a thousand feet,
when Achilles has run these thousand feet the tortoise will
have run a hundred, and when Achilles has run these
hundred the tortoise will have got on ten, and so on for
ever; therefore Achilles may run for ever without overtaking
the tortoise." Such were his arguments against the existence
of motion; his proof of the existence of One, the
indivisible and infinite, may thus be stated: "To suppose
that the one is divisible is to suppose it finite. If divisible,
it must be infinitely divisible. But suppose two things
to exist, then there must necessarily be an interval between
those two—something separating and limiting them.
What is that something? It is some other thing. But
then if not the same thing, it also must be separated and
limited, and so on ad infinitum. Thus only one thing can
exist as the substratum for all manifold appearances."
Zeno furnishes us with an illustration of the fallibility
of the indications of sense in his argument against
Protagoras. It may be here introduced as a specimen of
his method: "He asked if a grain of corn, or the ten
thousandth part of a grain, would, when it fell to the
ground, make a noise. Being answered in the negative,
he further asked whether, then, would a measure of corn.
This being necessarily affirmed, he then demanded whether
the measure was not in some determinate ratio to the
single grain; as this could not be denied, he was able to
conclude, either, then, the bushel of corn makes no noise on
falling, or else the very smallest portion of a grain does
the same."
and by Melissus
of Samos.
To the names already given as belonging to the Eleatic
school may be added that of Melissus of Samos,
who also founded his argument on the nature of
Being, deducing its unity, unchangeability, and indivisibility.
He denied, like the rest of his school, all change
and motion, regarding them as mere illusions of the senses.
From the indivisibility of being he inferred its incorporeality,
and therefore denied all bodily existence.
Biography of
Empedocles.
The list of Eleatic philosophers is doubtfully closed by
the name of Empedocles of Agrigentum, who
in legend almost rivals Pythagoras. In the East
he learned medicine and magic, the art of working
miracles, of producing rain and wind. He decked himself
in priestly garments, a golden girdle, and a crown, proclaiming
himself to be a god. It is said by some that he
never died, but ascended to the skies in the midst of a
supernatural glory. By some it is related that he leaped
into the crater of Etna, that, the manner of his death being
unknown, he might still continue to pass for a god—an
expectation disappointed by an eruption which cast out one
of his brazen sandals.
Agreeably to the school to which he belonged, he relied
on Reason and distrusted the Senses. From his fragments
it has been inferred that he was sceptical of the guidance
of the former as well as of the latter, founding his distrust
on the imperfection the soul has contracted, and for
which it has been condemned to existence in this world, and
even to transmigration from body to body. Adopting the
Eleatic doctrine that like can be only known by like, fire
He mingles
mysticism with philosophy.
by fire, love by love, the recognition of the divine by man
is sufficient proof that the Divine exists. His primary
elements were four—Earth, Air, Fire, and Water; to these
he added two principles, Love and Hate. The
four elements he regarded as four gods, or divine
eternal forces, since out of them all things are
made. Love he regards as the creative power, the
destroyer or modifier being Hate. It is obvious, therefore,
that in him the strictly philosophical system of Xenophanes
had degenerated into a mixed and mystical view, in which
the physical, the metaphysical, and the moral were confounded
together; and that, as the necessary consequence
of such a state, the principles of knowledge were becoming
unsettled, a suspicion arising that all philosophical systems
were untrustworthy, and a general scepticism was already
setting in.
To this result also, in no small degree, the labours of
Democritus of Abdera tended. He had had the advantages
derived from wealth in the procurement of knowledge, for
it is said that his father was rich enough to be able to
entertain the Persian King Xerxes, who was so gratified
thereby that he left several Magi and Chaldæans to complete
the education of the youth. On his father's death,
Democritus, dividing with his brothers the estate, took as
his portion the share consisting of money, leaving to them
the lands, that he might be better able to devote himself to
travelling. He passed into Egypt, Ethiopia, Persia, and
India, gathering knowledge from all those sources.
Democritus
asserts the untrustworthiness
of knowledge.
According to Democritus, "Nothing is true, or, if so, is
not certain to us." Nevertheless, as, in his system sensation
constitutes thought, and, at the same time,
is but a change in the sentient being, "sensations
are of necessity true;" from which somewhat
obscure passage we may infer that, in the view
of Democritus, though sensation is true subjectively, it is
not true objectively. The sweet, the bitter, the hot, the
cold, are simply creations of the mind; but in the outer
object to which we append them, atoms and space alone
exist, and our opinion of the properties of such objects is
founded upon images emitted by them falling upon the
senses. Confounding in this manner sensation with
thought, and making them identical, he, moreover, included
Reflexion as necessary for true knowledge, Sensation by
itself being untrustworthy. Thus, though Sensation may
indicate to us that sweet, bitter, hot, cold, occur in bodies,
Reflexion teaches us that this is altogether an illusion, and
that, in reality, atoms and space alone exist.
Devoting his attention, then, to the problem of perception—how
the mind becomes aware of the existence of
external things—he resorted to the hypothesis that they
constantly throw off images of themselves, which are
assimilated by the air through which they have to pass,
and enter the soul by pores in its sensitive organs. Hence
such images, being merely of the superficial form, are
necessarily imperfect and untrue, and so, therefore, must
be the knowledge yielded by them. Democritus rejected
the one element of the Eleatics, affirming that there must
He introduces
the atomic theory.
be many; but he did not receive the four of Empedocles,
nor his principles of Love and Hate, nor the homœomeriæ
of Anaxagoras. He also denied that the primary
elements had any sensible qualities whatever.
He conceived of all things as being composed of
invisible, intangible, and indivisible particles or atoms,
which, by reason of variation in their configuration, combination,
or position, give rise to the varieties of forms: to
the atom he imputed self-existence and eternal duration.
His doctrine, therefore, explains how it is that the many
can arise from the one, and in this particular he reconciled
Destiny, Fate
and resistless law.
the apparent contradictions of the Ionians and Eleatics.
The theory of chemistry, as it now exists,
essentially includes his views. The general
formative principle of Nature he regarded as
being Destiny or Fate; but there are indications that by
this he meant nothing more than irreversible law.
A system thus based upon severe mathematical considerations,
and taking as its starting-point a vacuum and
atoms—the former actionless and passionless; which
considers the production of new things as only new
aggregations, and the decay of the old as separations;
which recognizes in compound bodies specific arrangements
of atoms to one another; which can rise to the
conception that even a single atom may constitute a
world—such a system may commend itself to our attention
for its results, but surely not to our approval, when
we find it carrying us to the conclusions that even
Is led to atheism.
mathematical cognition is a mere semblance; that the
soul is only a finely-constituted form fitted into the
grosser bodily frame; that even for reason itself
there is an absolute impossibility of all certainty;
that scepticism is to be indulged in to that degree
that we may doubt whether, when a cone has been cut
asunder, its two surfaces are alike; that the final result
of human inquiry is the absolute demonstration that man
is incapable of knowledge; that, even if the truth be in
his possession, he can never be certain of it; that the
world is an illusive phantasm, and that there is no God.
Legends of
Democritus.
I need scarcely refer to the legendary stories related of
Democritus, as that he put out his eyes with a
burning-glass that he might no longer be
deluded with their false indications, and more tranquilly
exercise his reason—a fiction bearing upon its face the
contemptuous accusation of his antagonists, but, by the
stolidity of subsequent ages, received as an actual fact
instead of a sarcasm. As to his habit of so constantly
deriding the knowledge and follies of men that he universally
acquired the epithet of the laughing philosopher, we
may receive the opinion of the great physician Hippocrates,
who being requested by the people of Abdera to
cure him of his madness, after long discoursing with him,
expressed himself penetrated with admiration, and even
with the most profound veneration for him, and rebuked
those who had sent him with the remark that they themselves
were the more distempered of the two.
Thus far European Greece had done but little in the
cause of philosophy. The chief schools were in Asia
Minor, or among the Greek colonies of Italy. But the
time had now arrived when the mother country was to
Rise of philosophy
in European Greece.
enter upon a distinguished career, though, it must be
confessed, from a most unfavourable beginning.
This was by no means the only occasion on
which the intellectual activity of the Greek colonies
made itself felt in the destinies of Europe.
The mercantile character in a community has ever been
found conducive to mental activity and physical adventure;
it holds in light esteem prescriptive opinion,
and puts things at the actual value they at the time
possess. If the Greek colonies thus discharged the
important function of introducing and disseminating
speculative philosophy, we shall find them again, five
hundred years later, occupied with a similar task on the
advent of that period in which philosophical speculation
was about to be supplanted by religious faith. For there
Commercial communities
favourable to new ideas.
can be no doubt that, humanly speaking, the cause of
the rapid propagation of Christianity, in its
first ages, lay in the extraordinary facilities
existing among the commercial communities
scattered all around the shores of the Mediterranean
Sea, from the ports of the Levant to those of
France and Spain. An incessant intercourse was kept up
among them during the five centuries before Christ; it
became, under Roman influence, more and more active,
and of increasing political importance. Such a state of
things is in the highest degree conducive to the propagation
of thought, and, indeed, to its origination, through
the constant excitement it furnishes to intellectual
activity. Commercial communities, in this respect, present
a striking contrast to agricultural. By their aid
speculative philosophy was rapidly disseminated everywhere,
as was subsequently Christianity. But the agriculturists
steadfastly adhered with marvellous stolidity to
their ancestral traditions and polytheistic absurdities,
until the very designation—paganism—under which their
system passes was given as a nickname derived from
themselves.
Philosophical
influence of
the Greek
colonies.
The intellectual condition of the Greek colonies of Italy
and Sicily has not attracted the attention of critics in the
manner it deserves. For, though its political result may
appear to those whose attention is fixed by mere material
aggrandizement to have been totally eclipsed by the subsequent
power of the Roman republic, to one
who looks at things in a mere general way
it may be a probable inquiry whether the philosophy
cultivated in those towns has not,
in the course of ages, produced as solid and lasting results
as the military achievements of the Eternal City. The
relations of the Italian peninsula to the career of European
civilization are to be classified under three epochs, the
first corresponding to the philosophy generated in the
southern Greek towns: this would have attained the
elevation long before reached in the advanced systems of
India had it not been prevented by the rapid development
of Roman power; the second presents the military
influence of republican and imperial Rome; to the third
belongs the agency of ecclesiastical Rome—for the production
of the last we shall find hereafter that the
preceding two conspire. The Italian effect upon the
whole has therefore been philosophical, material, and
mixed. We are greatly in want of a history of the first,
for which doubtless many facts still remain to a painstaking
and enlightened inquirer.
Origin of the
Greek colonial
system.
It was on account of her small territory and her
numerous population that Greece was obliged to colonize.
To these motives must be added internal dissensions, and
particularly the consequences of unequal marriages. So
numerous did these colonies and their offshoots become, that
a great Greek influence pervaded all the Mediterranean
shores and many of the most important
islands, attention more particularly being paid
to the latter, from their supposed strategical value; thus,
in the opinion of Alexander the Great, the command of
the Mediterranean lay in the possession of Cyprus. The
Greek colonists were filibusters; they seized by force the
women wherever they settled, but their children were
taught to speak the paternal language, as has been the
case in more recent times with the descendants of the
Spaniards in America. The wealth of some of these
Greek colonial towns is said to have been incredible.
Crotona was more than twelve miles in circumference;
and Sybaris, another of the Italiot cities, was so luxurious
and dissipated as even to give rise to a proverb. The
prosperity of these places was due to two causes: they
were not only the centres of great agricultural districts,
but carried on also an active commerce in all directions, the
dense population of the mother country offering them a
steady and profitable market; they also maintained an
active traffic with all the Mediterranean cities; thus, if
they furnished Athens with corn, they also furnished
Carthage with oil. In the Greek cities connected with
this colonial system, especially in Athens, the business of
ship-building and navigation was so extensively prosecuted
as to give a special character to public life. In
other parts of Greece, as in Sparta, it was altogether
different. In that state the laws of Lycurgus had abolished
private property; all things were held in common;
savage life was reduced to a system, and therefore there
was no object in commerce. But in Athens, commerce was
regarded as being so far from dishonourable that some of
the most illustrious men, whose names have descended to
us as philosophers, were occupied with mercantile pursuits.
Aristotle kept a druggist's shop in Athens, and Plato sold
oil in Egypt.
It was the intention of Athens, had she succeeded in the
conquest of Sicily, to make an attempt upon Carthage,
foreseeing therein the dominion of the Mediterranean, as
was actually realized subsequently by Rome. The destruction
of that city constituted the point of ascendancy
in the history of the Great Republic. Carthage stood
upon a peninsula forty-five miles round, with a neck only
three miles across. Her territory has been estimated as
having a sea-line of not less than 1400 miles, and containing
300 towns; she had also possessions in Spain, in
Sicily, and other Mediterranean islands, acquired, not by
conquest, but by colonization. In the silver mines of
Spain she employed not less than forty thousand men. In
these respects she was guided by the maxims of her
Phœnician ancestry, for the Tyrians had colonized for
depôts, and had forty stations of that kind in the Mediterranean.
Indeed, Carthage herself originated in that
way, owing her development to the position she held at
the junction of the east and west basins. The Carthaginian
merchants did not carry for hire, but dealt in their
Carthaginian
supremacy in the Mediterranean.
commodities. This implied an extensive system
of depôts and bonding. They had anticipated
many of the devices of modern commerce. They
effected insurances, made loans on bottomry, and
it has been supposed that their leathern money may have
been of the nature of our bank notes.
Attempts of
the Persians
at dominion
in the Mediterranean.
In the preceding chapter we have spoken of the attempts
of the Asiatics on Egypt and the south shore of
the Mediterranean; we have now to turn to
their operations on the north shore, the consequences
of which are of the utmost interest in
the history of philosophy. It appears that the cities of
Asia Minor, after their contest with the Lydian kings,
had fallen an easy prey to the Persian power. It remained,
therefore, only for that power to pass to the
European continent. A pretext is easily found where the
policy is so clear. So far as the internal condition of
Greece was concerned, nothing could be more tempting to
an invader. There seemed to be no bond of union between
the different towns, and, indeed, the more prominent ones
Contest between
them and the Greeks.
might be regarded as in a state of chronic revolution. In
Athens, since B.C. 622, the laws of Draco had been supplanted
by those of Solon; and again and again the
government had been seized by violence or gained through
intrigue by one adventurer after another. Under these
circumstances the Persian king passed an army
into Europe. The military events of both this
and the succeeding invasion under Xerxes have
been more than sufficiently illustrated by the brilliant
imagination of the lively Greeks. It was needless, however,
to devise such fictions as the million of men who
crossed into Europe, or the two hundred thousand who lay
dead upon the field after the battle of Platæa. If there
The fifty years' war,
and eventual supremacy of Athens.
were not such stubborn facts as the capture and burning
of Athens, the circumstance that these wars
lasted for fifty years would be sufficient to inform
us that all the advantages were not on one
side. Wars do not last so long without bringing
upon both parties disasters as well as conferring
glories; and had these been as exterminating and over
whelming
as classical authors have supposed, our surprise
may well be excited that the Persian annals have preserved
so little memory of them. Greece did not perceive that,
if posterity must take her accounts as true, it must give
the palm of glory to Persia, who could, with unfaltering
perseverance, persist in attacks illustrated by such unparalleled
catastrophes. She did not perceive that the
annals of a nation may be more splendid from their exhibiting
a courage which could bear up for half a century
against continual disasters, and extract victory at last from
defeat.
In pursuance of their policy, the Persians extended their
dominion to Cyrene and Barca on the south, as well as to
Thrace and Macedonia on the north. The Persian wars
gave rise to that wonderful development in Greek art
which has so worthily excited the admiration of subsequent
ages. The assertion is quite true that after those wars the
Greeks could form in sculpture living men. On the part
of the Persians, these military undertakings were not of
the base kind so common in antiquity; they were the
carrying out of a policy conceived with great ability, their
object being to obtain countries for tribute and not for
devastation. The great critic Niebuhr, by whose opinions
I am guided in the views I express of these events, admits
that the Greek accounts, when examined, present little
that was possible. The Persian empire does not seem to
have suffered at all; and Plato, whose opinion must be
considered as of very great authority, says that, on the
whole, the Persian wars reflect extremely little honour on
the Greeks. It was asserted that only thirty-one towns,
and most of them small ones, were faithful to Greece.
Treason to her seems for years in succession to have infected
all her ablest men. It was not Pausanias alone who
wanted to be king under the supremacy of Persia. Such a
satrap would have borne about the same relation to the
great king as the modern pacha does to the grand seignior.
However, we must do justice to those able men. A king
was what Greece in reality required; had she secured one
at this time strong enough to hold her conflicting interests
in check, she would have become the mistress of the world.
Her leading men saw this.
The consequence
is her
vast intellectual
progress.
The elevating effect of the Persian wars was chiefly felt
in Athens. It was there that the grand development of
pure art, literature, and science took place. As
to Sparta, she remained barbarous as she had
ever been; the Spartans continuing robbers and
impostors, in their national life exhibiting not a
single feature that can be commended. Mechanical art
reached its perfection at Corinth; real art at Athens, finding
a multitude not only of true, but also of new expressions.
Before Pericles the only style of architecture
was the Doric; his became at once the age of perfect
Her progress in art.
beauty. It also became the age of freedom in thinking
and departure from the national faith. In this
respect the history of Pericles and of Aspasia is
very significant. His, also, was the great age of oratory,
but of oratory leading to delusion, the democratical forms
of Athens being altogether deceptive, power ever remaining
in the hands of a few leading men, who did everything.
The true popular sentiment, as was almost always
the case under those ancient republican institutions, could
find for itself no means of expression. The great men
were only too prone to regard their fellow-citizens as a
rabble, mere things to be played off against one another,
and to consider that the objects of life are dominion and
lust, that love, self-sacrifice, and devotion are fictions; that
oaths are only good for deception.
The treaty
with Persia.
Though the standard of statesmanship, at the period of
the Persian wars, was very low, there can be no doubt that
among the Greek leaders were those who clearly understood
the causes of the Asiatic attack; and hence, with an instinct
of self-preservation, defensive alliances were continually
maintained with Egypt. When their valour and
endurance had given to the Greeks a glorious
issue to the war, the articles contained in the final treaty
manifest clearly the motives and understandings of both
parties. No Persian vessel was to appear between the
Cyanean Rocks and Chelidonian Islands; no Persian army
to approach within three days' journey of the Mediterranean
Sea, B.C. 449.
To Athens herself the war had given political supremacy.
We need only look at her condition fifty years after the
battle of Platæa. She was mistress of more than a thousand
miles of the coast of Asia Minor; she held as dependencies
more than forty islands; she controlled the straits between
Europe and Asia; her fleets ranged the Mediterranean and
the Black Seas; she had monopolized the trade of all the
adjoining countries; her magazines were full of the most
valuable objects of commerce. From the ashes of the
Persian fire she had risen up so supremely beautiful that
her temples, her statues, her works of art, in
She becomes the centre
of policy and philosophy.
their exquisite perfection, have since had no
parallel in the world. Her intellectual supremacy
equalled her political. To her, as to a focal
point, the rays of light from every direction converged.
The philosophers of Italy and Asia Minor directed their
steps to her as to the acknowledged centre of mental
activity. As to Egypt, an utter ruin had befallen her
since she was desolated by the Persian arms. Yet we
must not therefore infer that though, as conquerors, the
Persians had trodden out the most aged civilization on the
globe, as sovereigns they were haters of knowledge, or
merciless as kings. We must not forget that the Greeks
of Asia Minor were satisfied with their rule, or, at all
events, preferred rather to remain their subjects than to
contract any permanent political connexions with the
conquering Greeks of Europe.
In this condition of political glory, Athens became not
only the birthplace of new and beautiful productions of
art, founded on a more just appreciation of the true than
had yet been attained to in any previous age of the world
(which, it may be added, have never been surpassed, if,
indeed, they have been equalled since), she also became the
receptacle for every philosophical opinion, new and old.
Ionian, Italian, Egyptian, Persian, all were brought to
her, and contrasted and compared together. Indeed, the
philosophical celebrity of Greece is altogether due to
Athens. The rest of the country participated but little
in the cultivation of learning. It is a popular error that
Greece, in the aggregate, was a learned country.
State of philosophy
at
this juncture.
We have already seen how the researches of individual
inquirers, passing from point to point, had conducted them,
in many instances, to a suspicion of the futility of human
knowledge; and looking at the results reached by the
successive philosophical schools, we cannot fail
to remark that there was a general tendency to
scepticism. We have seen how, from the material
and tangible beginnings of the Ionians, the Eleatics land
us not only in a blank atheism, but in a disbelief of the
existence of the world. And though it may be said that
these were only the isolated results of special schools, it is
not to be forgotten that they were of schools the most
advanced. The time had now arrived when the name of
a master was no more to usurp the place of reason, as had
been hitherto the case; when these last results of the
different methods of philosophizing were to be brought
together, a criticism of a higher order established, and
conclusions of a higher order deduced.
Commencement
of the
higher analysis.
Thus it will ever be with all human investigation. The
primitive philosophical elements from which we
start are examined, first by one and then by
another, each drawing his own special conclusions
and deductions, and each firmly believing
in the truth of his inferences. Each analyst has
seen the whole subject from a particular point of view,
without concerning himself with the discordances, contradictions,
and incompatibilities obvious enough when his
conclusions come to be compared with those of other analysts
as skilful as himself. In process of time, it needs must be
that a new school of examiners will arise, who, taking the
results at which their predecessors have arrived from an
examination of the primary elements, will institute a
secondary comparison; a comparison of results with results;
a comparison of a higher order, and more likely to lead to
absolute truth.
Illustration
from subsequent
Roman
history.
Perhaps I cannot better convey what I here mean by
this secondary and higher analysis of philosophical questions
than by introducing, as an illustration, what
took place subsequently in Rome, through her
policy of universal religious toleration. The
priests and followers of every god and of every
faith were permitted to pursue without molestation their
special forms of worship. Of these, it may be supposed
that nearly all were perfectly sincere in their adherence to
their special divinity, and, if the occasion had arisen, could
have furnished unanswerable arguments in behalf of his
supremacy and of the truth of his doctrines. Yet it is
very clear that, by thus bringing these several primary
systems into contact, a comparison of a secondary and of
a higher order, and therefore far more likely to approach to
absolute truth, must needs be established among them. It
is very well known that the popular result of this secondary
examination was the philosophical rejection of polytheism.
The Sophists.
So, in Athens the result of the secondary examination of
philosophical systems and deductions was scepticism as
regards them all, and the rise of a new order of
men—the Sophists—who not only rejected the
validity of all former philosophical methods, but carried
their infidelity to a degree plainly not warranted by the
facts of the case, in this, that they not only denied that
human reason had thus far succeeded in ascertaining anything,
but even affirmed that it is incapable, from its very
nature, as dependent on human organization, or the condition
under which it acts, of determining the truth at all;
nay, that even if the truth is actually in its possession,
since it has no criterion by which to recognize it, it cannot
so much as be certain that it is in such possession of it.
From these principles it follows that, since we have no
standard of the true, neither can we have any standard of
the good, and that our ideas of what is good and what is
evil are altogether produced by education or by convention.
Or, to use the phrase adopted by the Sophists, "it is might
that makes right." Right and wrong are hence seen to be
mere fictions created by society, having no eternal or
absolute existence in nature. The will of a monarch, or of
a majority in a community, declares what the law shall be;
the law defines what is right and what is wrong; and
these, therefore, instead of having an actual existence, are
mere illusions, owing their birth to the exercise of force.
It is might that has determined and defined what is right.
They reject philosophy,
and even morality.
And hence it follows that it is needless for a
man to trouble himself with the monitions of
conscience, or to be troubled thereby, for conscience,
instead of being anything real, is an
imaginary fiction, or, at the best, owes its origin to
education, and is the creation of our social state. Hence
the wise will give himself no concern as to a meritorious
act or a crime, seeing that the one is intrinsically neither
better nor worse than the other; but he will give himself
sedulous concern as respects his outer or external relations—his
position in society; conforming his acts to that
standard which it in its wisdom or folly, but in the
exercise of its might, has declared shall be regarded as
right. Or, if his occasions be such as to make it for his
interest to depart from the social rule, let him do it in
secrecy; or, what is far better, let him cultivate rhetoric,
that noble art by which the wrong may be made to
appear the right; by which he who has committed a crime
may so mystify society as to delude it into the belief that he
is worthy of praise; and by which he may prove that his
enemy, who has really performed some meritorious deed,
has been guilty of a crime. Animated by such considerations,
the Sophists passed from place to place, offering to
sell for a sum of money a knowledge of the rhetorical
art, and disposed of their services in the instruction of
the youth of wealthy and noble families.
What shall we say of such a system and of such a state
of things? Simply this: that it indicated a complete
mental and social demoralization—mental demoralization,
for the principles of knowledge were sapped, and man
persuaded that his reason was no guide; social demoralization,
for he was taught that right and wrong, virtue and
vice, conscience, and law, and God, are imaginary fictions;
that there is no harm in the commission of sin, though
there may be harm, as assuredly there is folly, in being
detected therein; that it is excellent for a man to sell his
country to the Persian king, provided that the sum of
money he receives is large enough, and that the transaction
is so darkly conducted that the public, and particularly
his enemies, can never find it out. Let him never forget
that patriotism is the first delusion of a simpleton, and the
last refuge of a knave.
Such were the results of the first attempt to correct the
partial philosophies, by submitting them to the measure
of a more universal one; such the manner in which, instead
of only losing their exclusiveness and imperfections by
their contact with one another, they were wrested from
their proper object, and made subservient to the purpose
of deception. Nor was it science alone that was affected;
already might be discerned the foreshadowings of that
They reject the national religion.
conviction which many centuries later occasioned the final
destruction of polytheism in Rome. Already, in Athens,
the voice of philosophers was heard, that among so many
gods and so many different worships it was impossible
for a man to ascertain what is true. Already,
many even of the educated were overwhelmed
with the ominous suggestion that, if ever it had
been the will of heaven to reveal any form of faith to the
world, such a revelation, considering its origin, must
necessarily have come with sufficient power to override all
opposition; that if there existed only as many as two
forms of faith synchronous and successful in the world,
that fact would of itself demonstrate that neither of them
is true, and that there never had been any revelation from
an all-wise and omnipotent God. Nor was it merely
among the speculative men that these infidelities were
cherished; the leading politicians and statesmen had become
deeply infected with them. It was not Anaxagoras
alone who was convicted of atheism; the same charge was
made against Pericles, the head of the republic—he who
Spread of their opinions among the
highest classes.
had done so much for the glory of Athens—the
man who, in practical life, was, beyond all
question, the first of his age. With difficulty
he succeeded, by the use of what influence remained
to him, in saving the life of the guilty philosopher
his friend, but in the public estimation he was universally
viewed as a participator in his crime. If the foundations
of philosophy and those of religion were thus sapped, the
foundations of law experienced no better fate. The Sophists,
who were wandering all over the world, saw that each
nation had its own ideas of merit and demerit, and therefore
its own system of law; that even in different towns
there were contrary conceptions of right and wrong, and
therefore opposing codes. It is evident that in such examinations
they applied the same principles which had guided
them in their analysis of philosophy and religion, and that
the result could be no other than it was, to bring them to
the conclusion that there is nothing absolute in justice or
in law. To what an appalling condition society has arrived,
when it reaches the positive conclusion that there is no
truth, no religion, no justice, no virtue in the world; that
the only object of human exertion is unrestrained physical
enjoyment; the only standard of a man's position, wealth;
that, since there is no possibility of truth, whose eternal
principles might serve for an uncontrovertible and common
guide, we should resort to deception and the arts of persuasion,
that we may dupe others for our purposes; that
there is no sin in undermining the social contract; no
crime in blasphemy, or rather there is no blasphemy at
all, since there are no gods; that "man is the measure of
all things," as Protagoras teaches, and that "he is the
criterion of existence;" that "thought is only the relation
of the thinking subject to the object thought of, and that
They end
in blank atheism.
the thinking subject, the soul, is nothing more than the
sum of the different moments of thinking." It is no wonder
that that Sophist who was the author of such doctrines
should be condemned to death to satisfy the clamours
of a populace who had not advanced sufficiently
into the depths of this secondary, this higher
philosophy, and that it was only by flight that
he could save himself from the punishment awaiting the
opening sentiment of his book: "Of the gods I cannot tell
whether they are or not, for much hinders us from knowing
this—both the obscurity of the subject and the shortness
of life." It is no wonder that the social demoralization
spread apace, when men like Gorgias, the disciple of
Empedocles, were to be found, who laughed at virtue,
made an open derision of morality, and proved, by metaphysical
demonstration, that nothing at all exists.
From these statements respecting the crisis at which
ancient philosophy had arrived, we might be disposed to
believe that the result was unmitigated evil, for it scarcely
deserves mention that the quibbles and disputes of the
Sophists occasioned an extraordinary improvement of the
Greek language, introducing precision into its terms, and
a wonderful dialectical skill into its use. For us there may
be extracted from these melancholy conclusions at least
one instructive lesson—that it is not during the process of
decomposition of philosophies, and especially of religions,
Political dangers of
the higher analysis.
that social changes occur, for such breakings-up
commonly go on in an isolated, and therefore
innocuous way; but if by chance the fragments
and decomposed portions are brought together,
and attempts are made by fusion to incorporate them anew,
or to extract from them, by a secondary analysis, what
truth they contain, a crisis is at once brought on, and—such
is the course of events—in the catastrophe that ensues
Illustrations
from the Middle Ages.
they are commonly all absolutely destroyed. It was doubtless
their foresight of such consequences that inspired the
Italian statesmen of the Middle Ages with a
resolute purpose of crushing in the bud every
encroachment on ecclesiastical authority, and
every attempt at individual interpretation of religious
doctrines. For it is not to be supposed that men of clear
intellect should be insensible to the obvious unreasonableness
of many of the dogmas that had been consecrated by
authority. But if once permission were accorded to human
criticism and human interpretation, what other issue could
there be than that doctrine upon doctrine, and sect upon
sect should arise; that theological principles should undergo
a total decomposition, until two men could scarcely be
found whose views coincided; nay, even more than that,
that the same man should change his opinion with the
changing incidents of the different periods of his life. No
matter what might be the plausible guise of the beginning,
and the ostensibly cogent arguments for its necessity, once
let the decomposition commence, and no human power
could arrest it until it had become thorough and complete.
Considering the prestige, the authority, and the mass of
fact to be dealt with, it might take many centuries for
this process to be finished, but that that result would at
length be accomplished no enlightened man could doubt.
The experience of the ancient European world had shown
that in the act of such decompositions there is but little
danger, since, for the time being, each sect, and, indeed,
each individual, has a guiding rule of life. But as soon
as the period of secondary analysis is reached a crisis must
inevitably ensue, in all probability involving not only
religion, but also the social contract. And though, by the
exercise of force on the part of the interests that are disturbed,
Danger of
intellect outgrowing formulas
of faith.
aided by that popular sentiment which is abhorrent
of anarchy, the crisis might, for a time, be put
off, it could not be otherwise than that Europe
should be left in that deplorable state which
must result when the intellect of a people has
outgrown its formulas of faith. A fearful condition to
contemplate, for such a dislocation must also affect political
relations, and necessarily implies revolt against existing
law. Nations plunged in the abyss of irreligion must
necessarily be nations in anarchy. For a time their
tendency to explosion may be kept down by the firm application
of the hand of power; but this is simply an antagonism,
it is no cure. The social putrefaction proceeds,
working its way downward into classes that are lower and
lower, until at length it involves the institutions that are
relied on for its arrest. Armies, the machinery of compression,
once infected, the end is at hand, but no human
Absolute necessity of preparing
communities for these changes.
foresight can predict what the event shall be, especially if
the contemporaneous ruling powers have either
ignorantly or wilfully neglected to prepare
society for the inevitable trial it is about to
undergo. It is the most solemn of all the duties
of governments, when once they have become aware of
such a momentous condition, to prepare the nations for
its fearful consequences. For this it may, perhaps, be
lawful for them to dissemble in a temporary manner, as it
is sometimes proper for a physician to dissemble with his
patient; it may be lawful for them even to resort to the
use of force, but never should such measures of doubtful
correctness be adopted without others directed to a preparation
of the mass of society for the trials through which
it is about to pass. Such, doubtless, were the profound
views of the great Italian statesmen of the Middle Ages;
such, doubtless, were the arguments by which they justified
to themselves resistance against the beginning of the
evil—a course for which Europe has too often and unfairly
condemned them.
Summary of
the preceding
theories.
It remains for us now to review the details presented in
the foregoing pages for the purpose of determining the
successive phases of development through which the Greek
mind passed. It is not with the truth or fallacy of these
details that we have to do, but with their order
of occurrence. They are points enabling us
to describe graphically the curve of Grecian
intellectual advance.
The starting point of Greek philosophy is physical and
geocentral. The earth is the grand object of the universe,
and, as the necessary result, erroneous ideas are entertained
as to the relations and dimensions of the sea and air.
This philosophy was hardly a century old before it began
to cosmogonize, using the principles it considered itself
sure of. Long before it was able to get rid of local ideas,
such as upward and downward in space, it undertook to
explain the origin of the world.
But, as advances were made, it was recognized that
creation, in its various parts, displays intention and
design, the adaptation of means to secure proposed ends.
This suggested a reasoning and voluntary agency, like
that of man, in the government of the world; and from a
continual reference to human habits and acts, Greek philosophy
passed through its stage of anthropoid conceptions.
A little farther progress awakened suspicions that the
mind of man can obtain no certain knowledge; and the
opinion at last prevailed that we have no trustworthy
criterion of truth. In the scepticism thus setting in, the
approach to Oriental ideas is each successive instant more
and more distinct.
Approach to
Oriental ideas.
This period of doubt was the immediate forerunner of
more correct cosmical opinions. The heliocentric mechanism
of the planetary system was introduced, the earth
deposed to a subordinate position. The doctrines, both
physical and intellectual, founded on geocentric ideas,
were necessarily endangered, and, since these had connected
themselves with the prevailing religious views, and were
represented by important material interests, the public
began to practise persecution and the philosophers hypocrisy.
Pantheistic notions of the nature of the world
became more distinct, and, as their necessary
consequence, the doctrines of Emanation, Transmigration,
and Absorption were entertained. From this
it is but a step to the suspicion that matter, motion, and
time are phantasms of the imagination—opinions embodied
in the atomic theory, which asserts that atoms and space
alone exist; and which became more refined when it
recognized that atoms are only mathematical points; and
still more so when it considered them as mere centres of
force. The brink of Buddhism was here approached.
As must necessarily ever be the case where men are
coexisting in different psychical stages of advance, some
having made a less, some a greater intellectual progress,
all these views which we have described successively, were
at last contemporaneously entertained. At this point commenced
the action of the Sophists, who, by setting the
doctrines of one school in opposition to those of another,
and representing them all as of equal value, occasioned
the destruction of them all, and the philosophy founded
on physical speculation came to an end.
Uniformity
in the manner
of intellectual
progress.
Of this phase of Greek intellectual life, if we compare
the beginning with the close, we cannot fail to observe
how great is the improvement. The thoughts
dealt with at the later period are intrinsically
of a higher order than those at the outset. From
the puerilities and errors with which we have
thus been occupied, we learn that there is a definite mode
of progress for the mind of man; from the history of later
times we shall find that it is ever in the same direction.